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                          [Cover Illustration]




                            NAZI  CONSPIRACY
                            AND  AGGRESSION

                              _VOLUME  I_


                       _Office of United States_
                   _Chief of Counsel For Prosecution_
                         _of Axis Criminality_

                             [Illustration]

                UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
                          WASHINGTON  •  1946




                            For Sale by the
                      Superintendent of Documents
                    U. S. Government Printing Office
                          Washington 25, D. C.






A Collection of Documentary Evidence and Guide Materials Prepared by the
American and British Prosecuting Staffs for presentation before the
International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany, in the case of

    THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED
    KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF
    SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

                               —against—

    HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP,
    ROBERT LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED
    ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER
    FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH, KARL
    DOENITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR von SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL,
    ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ von PAPEN, ARTUR
    SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN von NEURATH, and HANS
    FRITZSCHE, Individually and as Members of Any of the Following
    Groups or Organizations to which They Respectively Belonged,
    Namely: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER
    POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN
    ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE
    SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN
    ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the “SS”) and including DIE
    SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME
    STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known as the
    “GESTAPO”); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known
    as the “SA”) and the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND of the
    GERMAN ARMED FORCES all as defined in Appendix B of the
    Indictment,

                                                        Defendants.




                            C O N T E N T S


                                                                    Page
 Preface                                                               v
 Chapter
    I. Agreement by the United States, France, Great Britain, and
       the Soviet Union for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
       Major War Criminals of the European Axis                        1

   II. Charter of the International Military Tribunal and Protocol
       of 6 October 1945                                               4

  III. International Military Tribunal, Indictment No. 1 and
       Statement of Reservation Filed by U. S. Chief of Counsel       13

   IV. Motions, Rulings, and Explanatory Material Relating to
       Certain of the Defendants                                      83
        1. Robert Ley                                                 83
        2. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach                        84
        3. Martin Bormann                                             94
        4. Ernst Kaltenbrunner                                        95
        5. Julius Streicher                                           96
        6. Rudolf Hess                                                97

    V. Opening Address for the United States                         114

   VI. Organization of the Nazi Party and State                      175

  VII. Means used by the Nazi Conspirators in Gaining Control of
       the German State                                              184
        1. Common Objectives, Methods, and Doctrines of the
           Conspiracy                                                184
        2. Acquisition of Totalitarian Political Control             199
        3. Consolidation of Totalitarian Political Control           218
        4. Purge of Political Opponents and Terrorization            239
        5. Destruction of the Free Trade Unions and Acquisition of
           Control over the Productive Labor Capacity                252
        6. Suppression of the Christian Churches                     263
        7. Adoption and Publication of the Program for Persecution
           of Jews                                                   296
        8. Reshaping of Education and Training of Youth              312
        9. Propaganda, Censorship, and Supervision of Cultural
           Activities                                                328
       10. Militarization of Nazi Organizations                      341

 VIII. Economic Aspects of the Conspiracy                            349

   IX. Launching of Wars of Aggression                               370
        1. The Plotting of Aggressive War                            370
        2. Preparation for Aggression: 1933-1936                     410
        3. Aggression Against Austria                                450
        4. The Execution of the Plan to Invade Czechoslovakia        515
        5. Opening Address for the United Kingdom                    593
        6. Aggression as a Basic Nazi Idea: Mein Kampf               644
        7. Treaty Violations                                         651
        8. Aggression against Poland, Danzig, England and France     673
        9. Aggression against Norway and Denmark                     733
       10. Aggression against Belgium, the Netherlands, and
           Luxembourg                                                760
       11. Aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia                  775
       12. Aggression against the USSR                               794
       13. Collaboration with Italy and Japan and Aggressive War
           against the United States: November 1936 to December
           1941                                                      840

    X. The Slave Labor Program, the Illegal Use of Prisoners of
       War, and the Special Responsibility of Sauckel and Speer
       Therefor                                                      875

   XI. Concentration Camps                                           949

  XII. The Persecution of the Jews                                   978

 XIII. Germanization and Spoliation                                 1023

  XIV. The Plunder of Art Treasures                                 1097




                                PREFACE


                                   I

On the 2d day of May 1945, President Truman signed Executive Order 9547
appointing Justice Robert H. Jackson as Representative of the United
States and as its Chief of Counsel in the preparation and prosecution of
the case against the major Axis war criminals. Since that date and up to
the present, the staff of the Office of Chief of Counsel, or OCC, has
been engaged continuously in the discovery, collection, examination,
translation, and marshalling of documentary evidence demonstrating the
criminality of the former leaders of the German Reich. Since the 20th
day of November 1945, a considerable part of this documentary arsenal
has been directed against the 22 major Nazi war criminals who are on
trial before the International Military Tribunal in Nurnberg. As of this
writing the American and British cases-in-chief, on Counts I and II of
the Indictment charging, respectively, conspiracy and the waging of wars
of aggression, have been completed.

There is perhaps no need to recall in these pages that the Nurnberg
trial represents the first time in history that legal proceedings have
been instituted against leaders of an enemy nation. It is perhaps equal
supererogation to state here that there are no exact precedents for the
charges made by the American, British, French, and Russian prosecutors
that to plot or wage a war of aggression is a crime for which
individuals may be punished. Yet it was because of these very facts that
in its indictment the prosecution presented a challenge to itself quite
as great as to the defense. A heavy burden was laid on the accusing
nations to make sure that their proof measured up to the magnitude of
their accusations, and that the daring of their grand conception was
matched by the industry of their research, lest the hard-bought
opportunity to make International Law a guardian of peace should fail by
default.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the American collecting and
processing of documentary evidence, under the general direction of Col.
Robert G. Storey, gradually developed into an operation of formidable
scope. Although some pieces of evidence were secured in Washington and
London, by far the greater part was obtained in the land of the enemy.
As the American Armies had swept into Germany, military investigating
teams had filled document centers with an increasing wealth of materials
which were freely made available by the Army to OCC field investigators.
Special assistance was given by the Document Section, G-2 Division,
SHAEF, and by the Document Sections of the Army Groups and Armies
operating in the European Theater. OCC investigators also made valuable
discoveries while prospecting on their own. They soon found themselves
embarrassed with riches. Perhaps foremost among the prize acquisitions
was the neatly crated collection of all the personal and official
correspondence of Alfred Rosenberg, together with a great quantity of
Nazi Party correspondence. This cache was discovered behind a false wall
in an old castle in Eastern Bavaria, where it had been sent for
safekeeping. Another outstanding collection consisted of thirty-nine
leather-bound volumes containing detailed inventories of the art
treasures of Europe which had been looted by the _Einsatzstab
Rosenberg_. These catalogues, together with much of the priceless
plunder itself, were found hidden deep in an Austrian salt mine. An
innocent-appearing castle near Marburg was found to contain some 485
tons of crated papers, which inspection revealed to be the records of
the German Foreign Office from 1837 to 1944. Among other outstanding
bulk acquisitions were more than 300 crates of German High Command
files, 85 notebooks containing minutes of Hitler’s conferences, and the
complete files of the German Navy.

The task was to screen thoroughly this abundance of material so as to
overlook no relevant item, and yet at the same time to obtain the proof
and to translate it in season, so as not to delay preparation of the
Indictment or commencement of the trial. The procedures followed in this
process are described in the affidavit of Maj. William H. Coogan
(_001-A-PS_), which is listed numerically among the documents. As a
result of those procedures, more than 100,000 documents were
individually examined in order to segregate those of importance. Of
these 100,000 documents, approximately 4,000 were found to be of clear
or potential value. This group of 4,000 was further reduced through
exacting standards of elimination to a total of some 2,000 documents
which it was proposed to offer in evidence, and which make up the bulk
of this publication. Thus, the documents presented in these volumes are
the fittest survivors of a rigorous sifting. Each of them has met
requirements designed to ensure the selection of only the most
significant in bearing on the American case. Documents primarily
concerned with the report of individual barbarities or perversions were
excluded, in conformity with the emphasis placed upon those tending to
prove elements in the Nazi Master Plan.

These documents consist, in the main, of official papers found in
archives of the German Government and Nazi Party, diaries and letters of
prominent Germans, and captured reports and orders. There are included,
in addition, excerpts from governmental and Party decrees, from official
newspapers and from authoritative German publications. The authenticity
of all these materials is established by Maj. Coogan’s affidavit
(_001-A-PS_). Considered together, they reveal a fairly comprehensive
view of the inner workings and outward deeds of the German government
and of the Nazi Party, which were always concealed from the world, and
for which, the world will always hold the Hitler regime in horror and
contempt.

                                   II

It is important that it be clearly understood what this collection of
documents is not. In the first place, it is neither an official record,
nor an unofficial transcript of the trial proceedings. It is not
designed to reproduce what has taken place in court. It is merely the
documentary evidence prepared by the American and British prosecuting
staffs, and is in no wise under the sponsorship of the Tribunal. It is
presented in the belief that this collection containing the full text of
the documents, classified under appropriate subjects, may be more useful
to students of the Nurnberg trial than the official record, when
prepared, may be.

The reason for this goes back to the first few days of the trial, when
the Tribunal ruled that it would treat no written matter as in evidence
unless it was read in full, word by word, in court. The purpose of the
ruling was to enable the documentary material which the American and
British staffs had translated from German into English to be further
translated into Russian and French through the simultaneous interpreting
system in the courtroom. The consequence, however, was to enforce upon
the American and British prosecution the task of trimming their evidence
drastically unless the trial was to be protracted to an unconscionable
length. Counsel therefore had to content themselves in most instances
with introducing, by reading _verbatim_, only the most vital parts of
the documents relied upon. Only these evidentiary minima appear in the
daily transcript, and presumably, since no more is officially in
evidence under the Tribunal’s ruling, no more can properly be included
in the official record. It has frequently been the case, furthermore,
that different parts of certain documents were read in proof of
different allegations, and hence are scattered throughout the
transcript. American counsel, in several instances, read only sketchy
portions of some documents, leaving other portions, at the request of
the French and Soviet delegations, to be read later as a part of their
case. Still other portions of the same document will undoubtedly be read
later on by the defense. It is an unavoidable consequence that the
transcript itself will be a thing of shreds and patches, and that any
comprehensive and orderly notion of the documentary evidence must be
obtained elsewhere. The documentary excerpts, when accompanied by the
explanation of trial counsel, are of course sufficient for the trial and
for the judgment of the Tribunal. But the purposes of historians and
scholars will very likely lead them to wish to examine the documents in
their entirety. It is to those long-range interests that these volumes
are in the main addressed.

Secondly, this collection of documents is not the American case. It is
at once more and less than that. It is less, because it of course cannot
include the captured motion picture and still photographic evidence
relied upon, and because it contains only a few of the organizational
charts and visual presentation exhibits utilized at the trial. It is
more, because although it does contain all the evidence introduced
either in part or in whole by the American staff in proof of Count I, it
also includes many documents not introduced into evidence at all. There
were various reasons for not offering this material to the Tribunal: the
documents were cumulative in nature, better documents were available on
the same point, or the contents did not justify the time required for
reading. (The document index at the end of Volume VIII is marked to
indicate which documents were introduced, either in whole or in part, in
evidence.) Of more than 800 American documents so far introduced in
evidence, a small number were received through judicial notice or oral
summarization, while some 500 were read, in part or in whole, in court.
Approximately 200 more went into evidence in the first few days of the
trial, under an earlier ruling of the Tribunal which admitted documents
without reading, and merely on filing with the court after proof of
authenticity. Of the documents not now in evidence and thus not before
the Tribunal for consideration in reaching its decision, many have been
turned over to the French and Soviet prosecuting staffs and, by the time
these volumes are published, will have been introduced in the course of
their cases. Others will have been put before the Tribunal by the
American case in rebuttal or utilized in cross-examining witnesses
called by the defense.

This publication includes a series of affidavits prepared under the
direction of Col. John Harlan Amen, chief of the OCC Interrogation
Division. Those which were introduced into evidence are listed among the
documents in the _PS_ series. A number of affidavits which were not
offered to the Tribunal are printed in a separate section at the end of
the document series. Affidavits of the latter type were prepared in an
attempt to eliminate surprise by delineating clearly the testimony which
the affiant might be expected to give in court, should it be decided to
call him as a witness. In the case of the affiants who testified in
court, their affidavits represent a substantially accurate outline of
their testimony on direct examination. Others of the affiants may, by
the time of publication, have been called as rebuttal witnesses for the
prosecution. In addition, there are included selected statements of
certain defendants and prisoners written to the prosecutors from prison.
It should be mentioned in this connection that as a result of many
months of exhaustive questioning of the defendants, prisoners of war,
and other potential witnesses, the Interrogation Division has harvested
approximately 15,000 typewritten pages of valuable and previously
unavailable information on a variety of subjects. These extensive
transcripts represent approximately 950 individual interrogations and
are presently being edited and catalogued in Nurnberg so that the
significant materials may be published in a useful form and within a
manageable scope, as a supplement to these present volumes.

This collection also includes approximately 200 documents obtained and
processed by the British prosecuting staff, known as the British War
Crimes Executive, and presented in substantiation of Count II of the
Indictment, which the British delegation assumed the responsibility of
proving. It seems altogether fitting that these documents should be
included in these volumes since, in proving illegal acts of aggression,
they naturally supplement the American documents proving the illegal
conspiracy to commit aggression. The American prosecuting staff is
grateful to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, the British Deputy Chief Prosecutor,
from whom and from the goodly company of whose associates there has ever
been the most generous cooperation, for consent to the publication of
the British documents by the United States Government.

Under the division of the case agreed on by the Chief Prosecutors of the
four Allied nations, the French and Soviet delegates are responsible for
the presentation of evidence bearing on the proof of Count III (War
Crimes) and Count IV (Crimes against Humanity) of the Indictment. The
French case will concern itself with these crimes when committed in the
West, while the Russian evidence will concern the commission of these
crimes in the East. None of the documents obtained by these two
prosecuting nations are included in these volumes. The reason is that,
at this writing, the French case has just commenced and the Soviet case
will not be reached for several weeks. Since one of the objects of this
undertaking is to acquaint the American public at the earliest
opportunity with the character of the evidence produced by its
representatives, there seems no justification in delaying publication
until the close of the French and Russian cases, when all the
prosecution documents will be available. As is indicated by the title of
these present volumes, _Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression_, this collection
relates only to Counts I and II of the Indictment, or one-half of the
prosecution case. It is to be hoped, however, that supplementary volumes
containing the French and Soviet documents may be published at a later
time.

Finally, this collection, by its nature limited to a part of the
prosecution case, does not of course purport to present the whole story
of the evidence adduced at Nurnberg. The evidence and arguments of
defense counsel will not be presented for some time, and the text of
these matters will, if possible, be included in any additional volumes,
which it may become possible to publish.

                                  III

On the other hand, it may be useful to indicate what this collection is.
The publication is offered in accordance with the conviction which has
constantly animated the American prosecution, that only a part of its
duty would have been done if it succeeded in persuading the judges of
the International Military Tribunal. Its full task will be accomplished
only if the world is also convinced of the justness of the cause. There
were always some people who, perhaps under the spell of the exposure of
the “atrocity propaganda” used in the First World War, felt that the
deceptions and the outrages laid to the Nazis were quite possibly untrue
and in any event exaggerated. The mission of convincing these skeptics
is one that has not been and cannot be discharged by newspaper reports
of the Nurnberg proceedings, which by their nature are incomplete and
evanescent. But an inspection of the Nazis’ own official records should
suffice to banish all honest doubts, and to make it undeniably clear
that those things really happened because the Nazis planned it that way.
It is the hope of the American prosecution that these volumes may in
some measure expose, for the warning of future generations as well as a
reminder to the present, the anatomy of National Socialism in all its
ugly nakedness. Many of these documents disclose the repressive
governmental machinery and intricate Party bureaucracy by which the
Nazis stifled initiative and opposition. They reveal also the image of
horror which a gang of brigands created in the name of the German state,
in order to seize and maintain power for themselves at the expense of
the liberties of their own people and the lives of their neighbors.
Legal proof has perhaps seldom been so overwhelming, certainly never so
self-admitted, as is this proof of the deeds with which the Nazi
leadership befouled the earth.

Yet, although these documents naturally are concerned primarily with the
guilt of the leaders of the German Reich, they also contain a wealth of
information, much of it hitherto unavailable elsewhere, on many other
matters of importance. Their pages illuminate many dark corners of
recent history. Hence, this collection has an additional purpose. It is
offered as a source book, of interest to historians, political
scientists, students, universities, libraries, government agencies,
private research groups, newspaper editors, and others, so that they may
see, from the official papers of the Nazi government and from the words
of its own leaders, the things that went on in Germany in the days of
that blasphemous regime. These papers, although they include a few legal
matters, are not addressed nor are they expected to appeal primarily to
lawyers. The satisfaction of these professional interests must perforce
be postponed until publication of the official record of the trial.

                                   IV

It is apparent that such a vast collection of documents on a variety of
subjects would be useless to any one not thoroughly conversant with the
field, without some sort of guide through the maze. That is the reason
for the first two volumes, which consist of various explanatory
materials included in order to facilitate understanding. The average
reader who tries to cope with some of the more pompous of the Nazi
titles—such as _Beauftragter des Fuehrers fuer die ueberwachung des
Gesamten Geistigen und Weltausschaulichers Schulung und Erziehung der
NSDAP_, or Delegate of the Fuehrer for the Total Supervision of
Intellectual and Ideological Training and Education of the Party
(Rosenberg)—is plainly in need of assistance. A Glossary of common
German and Nazi titles, designations, and terms has therefore been
compiled. For those who are unfamiliar with the difference between a
_Hauptmann_ and a _Hauptsturmfuehrer_, a table of military ranks, with
their American equivalents, has been prepared. A brief biographical
gazeteer of the more prominent Nazis, together with a listing of the
major officials of the Government, Party, and Armed Forces, has also
been included for reference purposes. In addition, an index of the
Code-Words used by the Nazis to preserve the secrecy of the invasions
they plotted has been compiled. Moreover, in order to make clear
developments in the proceedings affecting the status of several of the
defendants, certain motions of counsel and rulings of the Tribunal,
together with factual accounts, are also presented. And finally the
international treaties relating to land warfare and prisoners of war are
printed in full (_3737-PS_; _3738-PS_).

The principal content of Volumes I and II is composed of what might be
called essays, summarizing and connecting up most of the documents
relating to particular subjects in the order of their mention in Counts
I and II of the Indictment. As an additional aid, at the end of each
essay there appears a descriptive list of all documents referred to in
the essay, so that the reader may quickly discover which of the
published documents bear upon the subject in which he is interested. In
many cases these lists include documents not discussed in the essays for
the reason that they are cumulative in nature or were discovered
subsequent to the preparation of the essays.

Some of these essays are adaptations of factual “trial briefs” prepared
by the staff of OCC. Some of these “trial briefs” were handed to the
Tribunal for its assistance, while others were used only for the
guidance of trial counsel. Others of the essays have been adapted from
the oral presentation and summary of counsel in court. Their difference
in origin explains their difference in form. It must be borne in mind
that each of these essays, which were originally prepared for the
purpose of convincing the Tribunal of the legal guilt of the defendants,
has been submitted to a process of editing and revision in order to
serve a quite different purpose—to give the general reader a general
and coherent conception of the subject matter.

These essays bear the marks of haste and are not offered as in any sense
definitive or exhaustive. The task of translation from German into
English was a formidable one, and in many instances translations of
documents could be made available to the brief-writers only a few days
before the briefs were scheduled to be presented in court. In other
instances it was utterly impossible, with the constantly overburdened
translating staff available, to translate in full all the material known
to be of value if the prosecution was to be ready on the date set for
trial. The diary of Hans Frank, for example (_2233-PS_) consisted of 42
volumes, of which only a few outstanding excerpts, chosen by
German-reading analysts, were translated. Similarly, large portions of
the 250 volumes of the Rosenberg correspondence remain still
untranslated and unused. Books, decrees, and lengthy reports were not
translated, in full, and only salient excerpts were utilized.
Approximately 1,500 documents in the possession of OCC have not yet been
translated and more are being received daily. It is expected that they
will be used for purposes of cross-examination and rebuttal, and may
later be published.

It must also be remembered that these documents are, in the main,
translations from the original German. The magnitude of the task,
coupled with a sense of the hastening on of time, naturally resulted in
imperfections. However, an attempt has been made to preserve the format
of the original documents in the printed translations. Italics represent
underlining in the original documents and editorial additions have been
enclosed in brackets. The reader may notice occasional variations
between the English wording of documents quoted in the essays, and the
full text of the document itself. This divergence is explained by the
fact that translations of the same documents were sometimes made by two
different persons. Variations in the exact means of expression were of
course to be expected in such an event, yet both translations are of
equal authenticity. Certain passages of some documents may strike the
reader as confused or incomplete, and occasionally this is the result of
hasty work. More frequently, however the jumble of language accurately
reflects the chaos of the original German, for the language of National
Socialists was often merely a turgid and mystical aggregation of words
signifying nothing, to which the German language easily lends itself.
The accuracy of the translations is attested to in Maj. Coogan’s
affidavit (_001-A-PS_).

If the case had not been set down for trial until 1948, a complete and
satisfactory preparation would have been possible. A perfect case could
not have been made in less time. But the Allied governments and public
opinion were understandably impatient of delay for whatever reason, and
they had to be respected. The nature of the difficulties caused by the
pressure for speed were stated in Justice Jackson’s address opening the
American case:

    “In justice to the nations and the men associated in this
    prosecution, I must remind you of certain difficulties which may
    leave their mark on this case. Never before in legal history has
    an effort been made to bring within the scope of a single
    litigation the developments of a decade, covering a whole
    Continent, and involving a score of nations, countless
    individuals, and innumerable events. Despite the magnitude of
    the task, the world has demanded immediate action. This demand
    has had to be met, though perhaps at the cost of finished
    craftsmanship. In my country, established courts, following
    familiar procedures, applying well thumbed precedents, and
    dealing with the legal consequences of local and limited events,
    seldom commence a trial within a year of the event in
    litigation. Yet less than eight months ago today the courtroom
    in which you sit was an enemy fortress in the hands of German SS
    troops. Less than eight months ago nearly all our witnesses and
    documents were in enemy hands. The law had not been codified, no
    procedures had been established, no Tribunal was in existence,
    no usable courthouse stood here, none of the hundreds of tons of
    official German documents had been examined, no prosecuting
    staff had been assembled, nearly all the present defendants were
    at large, and the four prosecuting powers had not yet joined in
    common cause to try them. I should be the last to deny that the
    case may well suffer from incomplete researches and quite likely
    will not be the example of professional work which any of the
    prosecuting nations would normally wish to sponsor. It is,
    however, a completely adequate case to the judgment we shall ask
    you to render, and its full development we shall be obliged to
    leave to historians.”

                                   V

No work in a specialized field would be complete without its own occult
paraphernalia, and the curious reader may desire an explanation of the
strange wizardry behind the document classification symbols. The
documents in the American series are classified under the cryptic
categories of “_L_,” “_R_,” “_PS_,” “_EC_,” “_ECH_,” “_ECR_,” and “_C_.”
The letter “_L_” was used as an abbreviation for “London,” and
designates those documents either obtained from American and British
sources in London or processed in the London Office of the OCC, under
the direction of Col. Murray C. Bernays and Col. Leonard Wheeler, Jr.
The letter “_R_” stands for “Rothschild,” and indicates the documents
obtained through the screening activities of Lt. Walter Rothschild of
the London branch of OSS. The origins of the “_PS_” symbol are more
mysterious, but the letters are an abbreviation of the amalgam,
“Paris-Storey.” The “_PS_” symbol, accordingly, denotes those documents
which, although obtained in Germany, were processed by Col. Storey’s
division of the OCC in Paris, as well as those documents later processed
by the same division after headquarters were established in Nurnberg.
The “_EC_” symbol stands for “Economic Case” and designates those
documents which were obtained and processed by the Economic Section of
OCC under Mr. Francis M. Shea, with field headquarters at Frankfurt. The
“_ECH_” variant denotes those which were screened at Heidelberg. The
letter “_C_,” which is an abbreviation for “Crimes,” indicates a
collection of German Navy documents which were jointly processed by
British and American teams, with Lt. Comdr. John Bracken representing
the OCC.

The British documents hence include some in the joint Anglo-American
“_C_” series. The remainder of the British documents are marked with the
symbols “_TC_,” “_UK_,” “_D_,” and “_M_.” The symbol “_TC_” is an
abbreviation of “Treaty Committee” and signifies the documents selected
by a Foreign Office Committee which assisted the British prosecution.
“_UK_” is the abbreviation for “United Kingdom” and indicates documents
collected from another source. No especial significance lurks in the
letters “_D_” and “_M_,” which were apparently the result of accident,
possibly caprice, rather than design. As a matter of record, however,
“_M_” stands for the first name of the British assistant prosecutor.
Finally, “_D_” is merely an humble filing reference, which may have had
some obscure connection with the word “document.”

The reader will note that there are numerous and often lengthy gaps in
the numbering of documents within a given series, and the documents are
not numbered in any apparent order. This anomaly is accounted for by
several different factors. As the documents avalanched into the OCC
offices they were catalogued and numbered in the order received without
examination. Upon subsequent analysis it was frequently found that an
earlier document was superseded in quality by a later acquisition, and
the earlier one was accordingly omitted. Others were withdrawn because
of lack of proof of their authenticity. Occasionally it was discovered
that two copies of the same document had been received from different
sources, and one of them was accordingly stricken from the list. In
other cases blocks of numbers were assigned to field collecting teams,
which failed to exhaust all the numbers allotted. In all these cases no
change was made in the original numbers because of the delay and
confusion which would accompany renumbering. Nor has renumbering been
attempted in this publication, and the original gaps remain. This is
because the documents introduced into evidence carried their originally
assigned numbers, and students of the trial who use these volumes in
conjunction with the official record will therefore be able to refer
rapidly from citations in the record of the proceedings to the text of
the documents cited.

                                   VI

It only remains to acknowledge the toil and devotion of the members of
the OCC staff who were responsible for the original preparation of the
materials contained in these volumes. Mention must first be made of Mr.
Gordon Dean, who was responsible in large part for the conception of
this undertaking, and of Lt. Comdr. Charles A. Horsky, USCGR (T) who set
in motion the governmental machinery necessary to publication.

The material in Chapter VI on the Organization of the Nazi Party and
State was originally prepared by Mr. Ralph G. Albrecht.

The essays in Chapter VII on the Means Used by the Nazi Conspirators in
Gaining Control of the German State were originally prepared by Col.
Leonard Wheeler, Jr., Lt. Col. Benjamin Kaplan, Maj. Frank B. Wallis,
Dr. Edmund A. Walsh, Maj. Seymour M. Peyser, Maj. J. Hartley Murray, Lt.
Paul Johnston, USNR, Lt. Comdr. Morton E. Rome, USNR, Capt. D. A.
Sprecher, Lt. Samuel E. Sharp, Lt. (jg) A. R. Martin, USNR, Lt. Henry V.
Atherton, and Lt. William E. Miller.

The materials on the Economic Aspects of the Conspiracy, contained in
Chapter VIII, on Slave Labor, contained in Chapter X, and on
Germanization and Spoliation, contained in Chapter XIII, were prepared
by Mr. Francis M. Shea, Mr. Benedict Deinard, Lt. Col. Murray I.
Gurfein, Lt. Comdr. W. S. Emmet, USNR, Lt. Thomas L. Karsten, USNR,
Capt. Sam Harris, Capt. James H. Mathias, Capt. Melvin Siegel, Capt.
Edward H. Kenyon, Lt. (jg) Bernard Meltzer, USNR, Lt. (jg) Brady O.
Bryson, USNR, Lt. Raymond Ickes, USMCR, Mr. Jan Charmatz, Mr. Walter
Derenberg, Mr. Sidney Jacoby, Mr. Werner Peiser, Mr. Edgar Bodenheimer,
and Mr. Leon Frechtel.

The materials contained in Chapter IX on Aggressive War, (except those
relating to Aggression as a Basic Nazi Idea, the Violation of Treaties,
and Aggression against Poland, Danzig, England and France, Norway and
Denmark, the Low Countries, and the Balkans) were prepared by Mr. Sidney
S. Alderman, Comdr. Sidney J. Kaplan, USCGR, Lt. Col. Herbert Krucker,
Maj. Lacey Hinely, Maj. Joseph Dainow, Lt. Comdr. Harold Leventhal,
USCGR, Lt. John M. Woolsey, Jr., USNR, Lt. James A. Gorrell, and Lt. Roy
H. Steyer, USNR.

The materials contained in Chapter XII, on Persecution of the Jews, in
Chapter XI on Concentration Camps, and in Chapter XIV on Plunder of Art
Treasures, were prepared by Col. Hardy Hollers, Maj. William F. Walsh,
Mr. Thomas J. Dodd, Capt. Seymour Krieger, Lt. Frederick Felton, USNR,
Lt. (jg) Brady O. Bryson, USNR, Mr. Hans Nathan, Mr. Isaac Stone, Lt.
Daniel F. Margolies, Capt. Edgar Boedeker, Lt. (jg) Bernard Meltzer,
USNR, Lt. Nicholas Doman, and Mr. Walter W. Brudno.

The materials contained in Chapter XVI on the responsibility of the
Individual Defendants were prepared by Col. Howard Brundage, Mr. Ralph
G. Albrecht, Dr. Robert M. W. Kempner, Lt. Col. William H. Baldwin, Maj.
Seymour M. Peyser, Maj. Joseph D. Bryan, Capt. D. A. Sprecher, Capt.
Norman Stoll, Capt. Robert Clagett, Capt. John Auchincloss, Capt.
Seymour Krieger, Lt. Whitney R. Harris, USNR, Lt. Frederick Felton,
USNR, Lt. Henry V. Atherton, Lt. Richard Heller, USNR, Mr. Henry
Kellerman, Mr. Frank Patton, Mr. Karl Lachmann, Mr. Bert Heilpern, Mr.
Walter Menke, Mr. Joseph Michel, Mr. Walter W. Brudno, Mrs. Katherine
Walch, Miss Harriet Zetterberg, Lt. (jg) Brady O. Bryson, USNR, and
Capt. Sam Harris.

The materials contained in the first six sections of Chapter XV on the
Criminal Organizations were prepared by Lt. Col. George E. Seay, Maj.
Warren F. Farr, Lt. Comdr. Wm. S. Kaplan, USNR, Lt. Whitney R. Harris,
USNR, Miss Katherine Fite, Maj. Robert G. Stephens, Lt. Thomas F.
Lambert, Jr., USNR, and Mr. Charles S. Burdell.

The materials contained in Section 7 of Chapter XV on the General Staff
and High Command were prepared on behalf of the American delegation by
Col. Telford Taylor, Maj. Loftus Becker, Maj. Paul Neuland, Capt. Walter
Rapp, Capt. Seymour Krieger, and Mr. Charles Kruszeawski; with the
assistance of a British staff made jointly available to both the
American and British delegations, consisting of W/Cdr. Peter
Calvocoressi, RAFVR, Maj. Oliver Berthoud, IC, Lt. Michael Reade, RNVR,
F/Lt. George Sayers, RAFVR, S/O Barbara Pinion, WAAF, W/O Mary Carter,
WAAF, and Miss Elizabeth Stewart.

The charts reproduced are among those introduced by the prosecution, and
were designed and executed by presentation specialists assigned to OCC
by the Office of Strategic Services, and headed by David Zablodousky
under the direction of Comdr. James B. Donovan, USNR.

Acknowledgment must also be made of the very effective labors of the
British delegation in preparing those materials in Chapter IX on
Aggressive War relating to Aggression as a Basic Nazi Idea, the
Violation of Treaties, and the Aggressions against Poland, Danzig,
England and France, Norway and Denmark, the Low Countries, and the
Balkans, as well as the materials in sections on Individual Defendants
relating to Streicher, Raeder, Doenitz, Neurath, and Ribbentrop. This
share of the common task was borne by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, K.C.,
M.P., Mr. Geoffrey D. Roberts, K.C., Lt. Col. J. M. G. Griffith-Jones,
M.C., Col. Harry J. Phillimore, O.B.E., and Maj. Elwyn Jones, M.P. The
British opening address was delivered by the Attorney General and chief
of the British delegation, Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., M.P.

Recognition is also due to Maj. F. Jay Nimitz, Miss Alma Soller, and
Miss Mary Burns, for their loyal and capable assistance in all the
harassing details of compiling, editing and indexing these numerous
papers.

One final word should be said in recognition of the financial burden
assumed by the State and War Departments, which have generously joined
in allocating from their budgets the very considerable funds required to
make this publication possible.

                                        Roger W. Barrett, Captain, JAGD
                              William E. Jackson, Lieutenant (jg), USNR
                                                               _Editors_

Approved:

  Robert H. Jackson
  _Chief of Counsel_
Nurnberg, 20 January 1946.




                               Chapter I


 AGREEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THE
 PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
 UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT
 OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS FOR THE PROSECUTION AND
 PUNISHMENT OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS OF THE EUROPEAN AXIS.

WHEREAS the United Nations have from time to time made declarations of
their intention that War Criminals shall be brought to justice;

AND WHEREAS the Moscow Declaration of the 30th October 1943 on German
atrocities in Occupied Europe stated that those German Officers and men
and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have
taken a consenting part in atrocities and crimes will be sent back to
the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that
they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated
countries and of the free Governments that will be created therein;

AND WHEREAS this Declaration was stated to be without prejudice to the
case of major criminals whose offenses have no particular geographic
location and who will be punished by the joint decision of the
Governments of the Allies;

NOW THEREFORE the Government of the United States of America, the
Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter called “the
Signatories”) acting in the interests of all the United Nations and by
their representatives duly authorized thereto have concluded this
Agreement.

_Article 1._ There shall be established after consultation with the
Control Council for Germany an International Military Tribunal for the
trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical
location whether they be accused individually or in their capacity as
members of organizations or groups or in both capacities.

_Article 2._ The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the
International Military Tribunal shall be those set out in the Charter
annexed to this Agreement, which Charter shall form an integral part of
this Agreement.

_Article 3._ Each of the Signatories shall take the necessary steps to
make available for the investigation of the charges and trial the major
war criminals detained by them who are to be tried by the International
Military Tribunal. The Signatories shall also use their best endeavors
to make available for investigation of the charges against and the trial
before the International Military Tribunal such of the major war
criminals as are not in the territories of any of the Signatories.

_Article 4._ Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the provisions
established by the Moscow Declaration concerning the return of war
criminals to the countries where they committed their crimes.

_Article 5._ Any Government of the United Nations may adhere to this
Agreement by notice given through the diplomatic channel to the
Government of the United Kingdom, who shall inform the other signatory
and adhering Governments of each such adherence.

_Article 6._ Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the jurisdiction
or the powers of any national or occupation court established or to be
established in any allied territory or in Germany for the trial of war
criminals.

_Article 7._ This Agreement shall come into force on the day of
signature and shall remain in force for the period of one year and shall
continue thereafter, subject to the right of any Signatory to give,
through the diplomatic channel, one month’s notice of intention to
terminate it. Such termination shall not prejudice any proceedings
already taken or any findings already made in pursuance of this
Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in quadruplicate in London this 8th day of August 1945 each in
English, French and Russian, and each text to have equal authenticity.

                    For the Government of the United States of America
                                             [signed]  ROBERT H. JACKSON
                 For the Provisional Government of the French Republic
                                                  [signed]  ROBERT FALCO
             For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
                                                 and Northern Ireland
                                                     [signed]  JOWITT C.
                             For the Government of the Union of Soviet
                                                  Socialist Republics
                                             [signed]  I. T. NIKITCHENKO
                                                 [signed]  A. N. TRAININ




                               Chapter II
             CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL


         I. CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

_Article 1._ In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th day of
August 1945 by the Government of the United States of America, the
Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there shall be established
an International Military Tribunal (hereinafter called “the Tribunal”)
for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals
of the European Axis.

_Article 2._ The Tribunal shall consist of four members, each with an
alternate. One member and one alternate shall be appointed by each of
the Signatories. The alternates shall, so far as they are able, be
present at all sessions of the Tribunal. In case of illness of any
member of the Tribunal or his incapacity for some other reason to
fulfill his functions, his alternate shall take his place.

_Article 3._ Neither the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates can
be challenged by the prosecution, or by the Defendants or their Counsel.
Each Signatory may replace its member of the Tribunal or his alternate
for reasons of health or for other good reasons, except that no
replacement may take place during a Trial, other than by an alternate.

_Article 4._

  (_a_) The presence of all four members of the Tribunal or the
alternate for any absent member shall be necessary to constitute the
quorum.

  (_b_) The members of the Tribunal shall, before any trial begins,
agree among themselves upon the selection from their number of a
President, and the President shall hold office during that trial, or as
may otherwise be agreed by a vote of not less than three members. The
principle of rotation of presidency for successive trials is agreed. If,
however, a session of the Tribunal takes place on the territory of one
of the four Signatories, the representative of that Signatory on the
Tribunal shall preside.

  (_c_) Save as aforesaid the Tribunal shall take decisions by a
majority vote and in case the votes are evenly divided, the vote of the
President shall be decisive: provided always that convictions and
sentences shall only be imposed by affirmative votes of at least three
members of the Tribunal.

_Article 5._ In case of need and depending on the number of the matters
to be tried, other Tribunals may be set up; and the establishment,
functions, and procedure of each Tribunal shall be identical, and shall
be governed by this Charter.

                II. JURISDICTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES

_Article 6._ The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in
Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals
of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish
persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries,
whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of
the following crimes.

The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility:

  (_a_) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation,
or waging of war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;

  (_b_) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war.
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder,
ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment
of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder
of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;

  (_c_) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population, before or during the war; or persecution on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not
in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of
the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any
persons in execution of such plan.

_Article 7._ The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of
State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be
considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.

_Article 8._ The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but
may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determine
that justice so requires.

_Article 9._ At the trial of any individual member of any group or
organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of
which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of
which the individual was a member was a criminal organization.

After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such notice as
it thinks fit that the prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to make
such declaration and any member of the organization will be entitled to
apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon the
question of the criminal character of the organization. The Tribunal
shall have power to allow or reject the application. If the application
is allowed, the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall
be represented and heard.

_Article 10._ In cases where a group or organization is declared
criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any
Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for
membership therein before national, military or occupation courts. In
any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is
considered proved and shall not be questioned.

_Article 11._ Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged before
a national, military or occupation court, referred to in Article 10 of
this Charter, with a crime other than of membership in a criminal group
or organization and such court may, after convicting him, impose upon
him punishment independent of and additional to the punishment imposed
by the Tribunal for participation in the criminal activities of such
group or organization.

_Article 12._ The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings
against a person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this
Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for
any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct
the hearing in his absence.

_Article 13._ The Tribunal shall draw up rules for its procedure. These
rules shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter.

               III. COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND,
                   PROSECUTION OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

_Article 14._ Each Signatory shall appoint a Chief Prosecutor for the
investigation of the charges against and the prosecution of major war
criminals.

The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for the following
purposes:

  (_a_) to agree upon a plan of the individual work of each of the Chief
Prosecutors and his staff,

  (_b_) to settle the final designation of major war criminals to be
tried by the Tribunal,

  (_c_) to approve the Indictment and the documents to be submitted
therewith,

  (_d_) to lodge the Indictment and the accompanying documents with the
Tribunal,

  (_e_) to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for its approval draft
rules of procedure, contemplated by Article 13 of this Charter. The
Tribunal shall have power to accept, with or without amendments, or to
reject, the rules so recommended.

The Committee shall act in all the above matters by a majority vote and
shall appoint a Chairman as may be convenient and in accordance with the
principle of rotation: provided that if there is an equal division of
vote concerning the designation of a Defendant to be tried by the
Tribunal, or the crimes with which he shall be charged, that proposal
will be adopted which was made by the party which proposed that the
particular Defendant be tried, or the particular charges be preferred
against him.

_Article 15._ The Chief Prosecutors shall individually, and acting in
collaboration with one another, also undertake the following duties:

  (_a_) investigation, collection and production before or at the Trial
of all necessary evidence,

  (_b_) the preparation of the Indictment for approval by the Committee
in accordance with paragraph (_c_) of Article 14 hereof,

  (_c_) the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses and of
the Defendants,

  (_d_) to act as prosecutor at the Trial,

  (_e_) to appoint representatives to carry out such duties as may be
assigned to them,

  (_f_) to undertake such other matters as may appear necessary to them
for the purposes of the preparation for and conduct of the Trial.

It is understood that no witness or Defendant detained by any Signatory
shall be taken out of the possession of that Signatory without its
assent.

                     IV. FAIR TRIAL FOR DEFENDANTS

_Article 16._ In order to ensure fair trial for the Defendants, the
following procedure shall be followed:

  (_a_) The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying in
detail the charges against the Defendants. A copy of the Indictment and
of all the documents lodged with the Indictment, translated into a
language which he understands, shall be furnished to the Defendant at a
reasonable time before the Trial.

  (_b_) During any preliminary examination or trial of a Defendant he
shall have the right to give any explanation relevant to the charges
made against him.

  (_c_) A preliminary examination of a Defendant and his Trial shall be
conducted in or translated into, a language which the Defendant
understands.

  (_d_) A defendant shall have the right to conduct his own defense
before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of Counsel.

  (_e_) A defendant shall have the right through himself or through his
Counsel to present evidence at the Trial in support of his defense, and
to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution.

                     V. POWERS OF THE TRIBUNAL AND
                          CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL

_Article 17._ The Tribunal shall have the power

  (_a_) to summon witnesses to the Trial and to require their attendance
and testimony and to put questions to them,

  (_b_) to interrogate any Defendant,

  (_c_) to require the production of documents and other evidentiary
material,

  (_d_) to administer oaths to witnesses,

(_e_) to appoint officers for the carrying out of any task designated by
the Tribunal including the power to have evidence taken on commission.

_Article 18._ The Tribunal shall

  (_a_) confine the Trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the
issues raised by the charges,

  (_b_) take strict measures to prevent any action which will cause
unreasonable delay, and rule out irrelevant issues and statements of any
kind whatsoever,

  (_c_) deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate
punishment, including exclusion of any Defendant or his Counsel from
some or all further proceedings, but without prejudice to the
determination of the charges.

_Article 19._ The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of
evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent
expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence
which it deems to have probative value.

_Article 20._ The Tribunal may require to be informed of the nature of
any evidence before it is offered so that it may rule upon the relevance
thereof.

_Article 21._ The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common
knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also take
judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports of the
United Nations, including the acts and documents of the committees set
up in the various allied countries for the investigation of war crimes,
and the records and findings of military or other Tribunals of any of
the United Nations.

_Article 22._ The permanent seat of the Tribunal shall be in Berlin. The
first meetings of the members of the Tribunal and of the Chief
Prosecutors shall be held at Berlin in a place to be designated by the
Control Council for Germany. The first trial shall be held at Nurnberg,
and any subsequent trials shall be held at such places as the Tribunal
may decide.

_Article 23._ One or more of the Chief Prosecutors may take part in the
prosecution at each Trial. The function of any Chief Prosecutor may be
discharged by him personally, or by any person or persons authorized by
him.

The function of Counsel for a Defendant may be discharged at the
Defendant’s request by any Counsel professionally qualified to conduct
cases before the Courts of his own country, or by any other person who
may be specially authorized thereto by the Tribunal.

_Article 24._ The proceedings at the Trial shall take the following
course:

  (_a_) The Indictment shall be read in court.

  (_b_) The Tribunal shall ask each Defendant whether he pleads “guilty”
or “not guilty”.

  (_c_) The prosecution shall make an opening statement.

  (_d_) The Tribunal shall ask the prosecution and the defense what
evidence (if any) they wish to submit to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal
shall rule upon the admissibility of any such evidence.

  (_e_) The witnesses for the Prosecution shall be examined and after
that the witnesses for the Defense. Thereafter such rebutting evidence
as may be held by the Tribunal to be admissible shall be called by
either the Prosecution or the Defense.

  (_f_) The Tribunal may put any question to any witness and to any
Defendant, at any time.

  (_g_) The Prosecution and the Defense shall interrogate and may
cross-examine any witnesses and any Defendant who gives testimony.

  (_h_) The Defense shall address the court.

  (_i_) The Prosecution shall address the court.

  (_j_) Each Defendant may make a statement to the Tribunal.

  (_k_) The Tribunal shall deliver judgment and pronounce sentence.

_Article 25._ All official documents shall be produced, and all court
proceedings conducted, in English, French, and Russian, and in the
language of the Defendant. So much of the record and of the proceedings
may also be translated into the language of any country in which the
Tribunal is sitting, as the Tribunal considers desirable in the
interests of justice and public opinion.

                       VI. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

_Article 26._ The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the
innocence of any Defendant shall give the reasons on which it is based,
and shall be final and not subject to review.

_Article 27._ The Tribunal shall have the right to impose upon a
Defendant on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be
determined by it to be just.

_Article 28._ In addition to any punishment imposed by it, the Tribunal
shall have the right to deprive the convicted person of any stolen
property and order its delivery to the Control Council for Germany.

_Article 29._ In case of guilt, sentences shall be carried out in
accordance with the orders of the Control Council for Germany, which may
at any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentences, but may not
increase the severity thereof. If the Control Council for Germany, after
any Defendant has been convicted and sentenced, discovers fresh evidence
which, in its opinion, would found a fresh charge against him, the
Council shall report accordingly to the Committee established under
Article 14 hereof, for such action as they may consider proper, having
regard to the interests of justice.

                             VII. EXPENSES

_Article 30._ The expenses of the Tribunal and of the Trials, shall be
charged by the Signatories against the funds allotted for maintenance of
the Control Council for Germany.

                 *        *        *        *        *

                                PROTOCOL

Whereas an Agreement and Charter regarding the Prosecution of War
Criminals was signed in London on the 8th August 1945, in the English,
French and Russian languages.

And whereas a discrepancy has been found to exist between the originals
of Article 6, paragraph (_c_), of the Charter in the Russian language,
on the one hand, and the originals in the English and French languages,
on the other, to wit, the semi-colon in Article 6, paragraph (_c_), of
the Charter between the words “war” and “or”, as carried in the English
and French texts, is a comma in the Russian text.

And whereas it is desired to rectify this discrepancy:

NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned, signatories of the said Agreement on
behalf of their respective Governments, duly authorized thereto, have
agreed that Article 6, paragraph (_c_), of the Charter in the Russian
text is correct, and that the meaning and intention of the Agreement and
Charter require that the said semi-colon in the English, text should be
changed to a comma, and that the French text should be amended to read
as follows:

  (_c_) LES CRIMES CONTRE L’HUMANITE: c’est à dire l’assassinat,
l’extermination, la reduction en esclavage, la deportation, et tout
autre acte inhumain commis contre toutes populations civiles, avant ou
pendant la guerre, ou bien les persecutions pour des motifs politiques,
raciaux, ou religieux, lorsque ces actes ou persecutions, qu’ils aient
constitue ou non une violation du droit interne du pays ou ils ont ete
perpetres, ont ete commis a la suite de tout crime rentrant dans la
competence du Tribunal, ou en liaison avec ce crime.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned have signed the present Protocol.

DONE in quadruplicate in Berlin this 6th day of October, 1945, each in
English, French, and Russian, and each text to have equal authenticity.

                    For the Government of the United States of America
                                                  /s/  ROBERT H. JACKSON
                 For the Provisional Government of the French Republic
                                                /s/  FRANCOIS de MENTHON
                              For the Government of the United Kingdom
                                of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
                                                  /s/  HARTLEY SHAWCROSS
                                       For the Government of the Union
                                        of Soviet Socialist Republics
                                                         /s/  R. RUDENKO




                              Chapter III
                    INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL,
                          INDICTMENT NUMBER I.


THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
 GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
                               REPUBLICS

                               —AGAINST—

HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, ROBERT
LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK,
WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV
KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH, KARL DOENITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR VON
SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ VON PAPEN,
ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH, AND HANS
FRITZSCHE, =Individually and as Members of Any of the Following
Groups or Organisations to Which They Respectively Belonged,
Namely=: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER
POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI
(LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (=commonly known
as the= “SS”) AND INCLUDING DIE SICHERHEITSDIENST (COMMONLY KNOWN
AS THE “SD”); DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE,
=commonly known as the= “GESTAPO”); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER
N.S.D.A.P. (COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE “SA”) AND THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH
COMMAND OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES ALL AS DEFINED IN APPENDIX B.

                                                              Defendants


                               INDICTMENT

                                   I.

The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics by the undersigned, Robert H. Jackson, Francois de Menthon,
Hartley Shawcross and R. A. Rudenko, duly appointed to represent their
respective Governments in the investigation of the charges against and
the prosecution of the major war criminals, pursuant to the Agreement of
London dated 8th August, 1945, and the Charter of this Tribunal annexed
thereto, hereby accuse as guilty, in the respects hereinafter set forth,
of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, and of
a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those Crimes, all as defined in
the Charter of the Tribunal, and accordingly name as defendants in this
cause and as indicted on the counts hereinafter set out: HERMANN WILHELM
GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, ROBERT LEY, WILHELM
KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK, WILHELM
FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP VON
BOHLEN UND HALBACH, KARL DOENITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR VON SCHIRACH,
FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ VON PAPEN, ARTUR
SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH AND HANS FRITZSCHE,
individually and as members of any of the Groups or Organizations next
hereinafter named.

                                  II.

The following are named as Groups or Organizations (since dissolved)
which should be declared criminal by reason of their aims and the means
used for the accomplishment thereof and in connection with the
conviction of such of the named defendants as were members thereof: DIE
REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF
THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN
DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the “SS”) and including DIE
SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME
STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known as the “GESTAPO”);
DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known as the “SA”); and
the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES. The
identity and membership of the Groups or Organizations referred to in
the foregoing titles are hereinafter in Appendix B more particularly
defined.


                COUNT ONE—THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY

                (Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (_a_))
                     III. Statement of the Offense

All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period of years
preceding 8th May, 1945, participated as leaders, organizers,
instigators or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common
plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of,
Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, as
defined in the Charter of this Tribunal, and, in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter, are individually responsible for their own
acts and for all acts committed by any persons in the execution of such
plan or conspiracy. The common plan or conspiracy embraced the
commission of Crimes against Peace, in that the defendants planned,
prepared, initiated and waged wars of aggression, which were also wars
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances. In the
development and course of the common plan or conspiracy it came to
embrace the commission of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the
defendants determined upon and carried out, ruthless wars against
countries and populations, in violation of the rules and customs of war,
including as typical and systematic means by which the wars were
prosecuted, murder, ill-treatment, deportation for slave labor and for
other purposes of civilian populations of occupied territories, murder
and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of persons on the high seas,
the taking and killing of hostages, the plunder of public and-private
property, the wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, and
devastation not justified by military necessity. The common plan or
conspiracy contemplated and came to embrace as typical and systematic
means, and the defendants determined upon and committed, Crimes against
Humanity, both within Germany and within occupied territories, including
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against civilian populations before and during the war, and
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, in execution of
the plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal wars, many
of such acts and persecutions being violations of the domestic laws of
the countries where perpetrated.

  IV. Particulars of the nature and development of the common plan or
                               conspiracy

 (_A_) NAZI PARTY AS THE CENTRAL CORE OF THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY

In 1921 Adolf Hitler became the supreme leader or Fuehrer of the
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist
German Workers Party), also known as the Nazi Party, which had been
founded in Germany in 1920. He continued as such throughout the period
covered by this Indictment. The Nazi Party, together with certain of its
subsidiary organizations, became the instrument of cohesion among the
defendants and their co-conspirators and an instrument for the carrying
out of the aims and purposes of their conspiracy. Each defendant became
a member of the Nazi Party and of the conspiracy, with knowledge of
their aims and purposes, or, with such knowledge, became an accessory to
their aims and purposes at some stage of the development of the
conspiracy.

           (_B_) COMMON OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF CONSPIRACY

The aims and purposes of the Nazi Party and of the defendants and divers
other persons from time to time associated as leaders, members,
supporters or adherents of the Nazi Party (hereinafter called
collectively the “Nazi conspirators”) were, or came to be, to accomplish
the following by any means deemed opportune, including unlawful means,
and contemplating ultimate resort to threat of force, force and
aggressive war: (i) to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles
and its restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany;
(ii) to acquire the territories lost by Germany as the result of the
World War of 1914-1918 and other territories in Europe asserted by the
Nazi conspirators to be occupied principally by so-called “racial
Germans”; (iii) to acquire still further territories in continental
Europe and elsewhere claimed by the Nazi conspirators to be required by
the “racial Germans” as “Lebensraum,” or living space, all at the
expense of neighboring and other countries. The aims and purposes of the
Nazi conspirators were not fixed or static but evolved and expanded as
they acquired progressively greater power and became able to make more
effective application of threats of force and threats of aggressive war.
When their expanding aims and purposes became finally so great as to
provoke such strength of resistance as could be overthrown only by armed
force and aggressive war, and not simply by the opportunistic methods
theretofore used, such as fraud, deceit, threats, intimidation, fifth
column activities and propaganda, the Nazi conspirators deliberately
planned, determined upon and launched their aggressive wars and wars in
violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances by the
phases and steps hereinafter more particularly described.

      (_C_) DOCTRINAL TECHNIQUES OF THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY

To incite others to join in the common plan or conspiracy, and as a
means of securing for the Nazi conspirators the highest degree of
control over the German community, they put forth, disseminated, and
exploited certain doctrines, among others, as follows:

1. That persons of so-called “German blood” (as specified by the Nazi
conspirators) were a “master race” and were accordingly entitled to
subjugate, dominate or exterminate other “races” and peoples;

2. That the German people should be ruled under the Fuehrerprinzip
(leadership principle) according to which power was to reside in a
Fuehrer from whom sub-leaders were to derive authority in a hierarchical
order, each sub-leader to owe unconditional obedience to his immediate
superior but to be absolute in his own sphere of jurisdiction; and the
power of the leadership was to be unlimited, extending to all phases of
public and private life;

3. That war was a noble and necessary activity of Germans;

4. That the leadership of the Nazi Party, as the sole bearer of the
foregoing and other doctrines of the Nazi Party, was entitled to shape
the structure, policies and practices of the German State and all
related institutions, to direct and supervise the activities of all
individuals within the State, and to destroy all opponents.

   (_D_) THE ACQUIRING OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL OF GERMANY: POLITICAL

1. _First steps in acquisition of control of State machinery_

In order to accomplish their aims and purposes, the Nazi conspirators
prepared to seize totalitarian control over Germany to assure that no
effective resistance against them could arise within Germany itself.
After the failure of the Munich Putsch of 1923 aimed at the overthrow of
the Weimar Republic by direct action, the Nazi conspirators set out
through the Nazi Party to undermine and capture the German Government by
“legal” forms supported by terrorism. They created and utilized, as a
Party formation, Die Sturmabteilungen (SA), a semi-military, voluntary
organization of young men trained for and committed to the use of
violence, whose mission was to make the Party the master of the streets.

2. _Control acquired_

On 30th January, 1933, Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic.
After the Reichstag fire of 28th February, 1933, clauses of the Weimar
constitution guaranteeing personal liberty, freedom of speech, of the
press, of association and assembly were suspended. The Nazi conspirators
secured the passage by the Reichstag of a “Law for the Protection of the
People and the Reich” giving Hitler and the members of his then cabinet
plenary powers of legislation. The Nazi conspirators retained such
powers after having changed the members of the cabinet. The conspirators
caused all political parties except the Nazi Party to be prohibited.
They caused the Nazi Party to be established as a para-governmental
organization with extensive and extraordinary privileges.

3. _Consolidation of control_

Thus possessed of the machinery of the German State, the Nazi
conspirators set about the consolidation of their position of power
within Germany, the extermination of potential internal resistance and
the placing of the German nation on a military footing.

    (_a_) The Nazi conspirators reduced the Reichstag to a body of their
own nominees and curtailed the freedom of popular elections throughout
the country. They transformed the several states, provinces and
municipalities, which had formerly exercised semi-autonomous powers,
into hardly more than administrative organs of the central government.
They united the offices of the President and the Chancellor in the
person of Hitler; instituted a widespread purge of civil servants; and
severely restricted the independence of the judiciary and rendered it
subservient to Nazi ends. The conspirators greatly enlarged existing
State and Party organizations; established a network of new State and
Party organizations; and “co-ordinated” State agencies with the Nazi
Party and its branches and affiliates, with the result that German life
was dominated by Nazi doctrine and practice and progressively mobilized
for the accomplishment of their aims.

    (_b_) In order to make their rule secure from attack and to instil
fear in the hearts of the German people, the Nazi conspirators
established and extended a system of terror against opponents and
supposed or suspected opponents of the regime. They imprisoned such
persons without judicial process, holding them in “protective custody”
and concentration camps, and subjected them to persecution, degradation,
despoilment enslavement, torture and murder. These concentration camps
were established early in 1933 under the direction of the defendant
GOERING and expanded as a fixed part of the terroristic policy and
method of the conspirators and used by them for the commission of the
Crimes against Humanity hereinafter alleged. Among the principal
agencies utilized in the perpetration of these crimes were the SS and
the GESTAPO, which, together with other favored branches or agencies of
the State and Party, were permitted to operate without restraint of law.

    (_c_) The Nazi conspirators conceived that, in addition to the
suppression of distinctively political opposition, it was necessary to
suppress or exterminate certain other movements or groups which they
regarded as obstacles to their retention of total control in Germany and
to the aggressive aims of the conspiracy abroad. Accordingly:

    (1) The Nazi conspirators destroyed the free trade unions in
    Germany by confiscating their funds and properties, persecuting
    their leaders, prohibiting their activities, and supplanting
    them by an affiliated Party organization. The leadership
    principle was introduced into industrial relations, the
    entrepreneur becoming the leader and the workers becoming his
    followers. Thus any potential resistance of the workers was
    frustrated and the productive labor capacity of the German
    nation was brought under the effective control of the
    conspirators.

    (2) The Nazi conspirators, by promoting beliefs and practices
    incompatible with Christian teaching, sought to subvert the
    influence of the Churches over the people and in particular over
    the youth of Germany. They avowed their aim to eliminate the
    Christian Churches in Germany and sought to substitute therefor
    Nazi institutions and Nazi beliefs and pursued a programme of
    persecution of priests, clergy and members of monastic orders
    whom they deemed opposed to their purposes and confiscated
    church property.

    (3) The persecution by the Nazi conspirators of pacifist groups,
    including religious movements dedicated to pacifism, was
    particularly relentless and cruel.

    (_d_) Implementing their “master race” policy, the conspirators
joined in a program of relentless persecution of the Jews, designed to
exterminate them. Annihilation of the Jews became an official State
policy, carried out both by official action and by incitements to mob
and individual violence. The conspirators openly avowed their purpose.
For example, the defendant ROSENBERG stated: “Anti-Semitism is the
unifying element of the reconstruction of Germany.” On another occasion
he also stated: “Germany will regard, the Jewish question as solved only
after the very last Jew has left the greater German living space . . .
Europe will have its Jewish question solved only after the very last Jew
has left the Continent.” The defendant LEY declared: “We swear we are
not going to abandon the struggle until the last Jew in Europe has been
exterminated and is actually dead. It is not enough to isolate the
Jewish enemy of mankind—the Jew has got to be exterminated.” On another
occasion he also declared: “The second German secret weapon is
anti-Semitism because if it is consistently pursued by Germany, it will
become a universal problem which all nations will be forced to
consider.” The defendant STREICHER declared: “The sun will not shine on
the nations of the earth until the last Jew is dead.” These avowals and
incitements were typical of the declarations of the Nazi conspirators
throughout the course of their conspiracy. The program of action against
the Jews included disfranchisement, stigmatization, denial of civil
rights, subjecting their persons and property to violence, deportation,
enslavement, enforced labor, starvation, murder and mass extermination.
The extent to which the conspirators succeeded in their purpose can only
be estimated, but the annihilation was substantially complete in many
localities of Europe. Of the 9,600,000 Jews who lived in the parts of
Europe under Nazi domination, it is conservatively estimated that
5,700,000 have disappeared, most of them deliberately put to death by
the Nazi conspirators. Only remnants of the Jewish population of Europe
remain.

    (_e_) In order to make the German people amenable to their will, and
to prepare them psychologically for war, the Nazi conspirators reshaped
the educational system and particularly the education and training of
the German youth. The leadership principle was introduced into the
schools and the Party and affiliated organizations were given wide
supervisory powers over education. The Nazi conspirators imposed a
supervision of all cultural activities, controlled the dissemination of
information and the expression of opinion within Germany as well as the
movement of intelligence of all kinds from and into Germany, and created
vast propaganda machines.

    (_f_) The Nazi conspirators placed a considerable number of their
dominated organizations on a progressively militarized footing with a
view to the rapid transformation and use of such organizations whenever
necessary as instruments of war.

 (_E_) THE ACQUIRING OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL IN GERMANY: ECONOMIC; AND
       THE ECONOMIC PLANNING AND MOBILIZATION FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR

Having gained political power the conspirators organized Germany’s
economy to give effect to their political aims.

1. In order to eliminate the possibility of resistance in the economic
sphere, they deprived labour of its rights of free industrial and
political association as particularized in paragraph (_D_) 3 (_c_) (1)
herein.

2. They used organizations of German business as instruments of economic
mobilization for war.

3. They directed Germany’s economy towards preparation and equipment of
the military machine. To this end they directed finance, capital
investment, and foreign trade.

4. The Nazi conspirators, and in particular the industrialists among
them, embarked upon a huge rearmament programme and set out to produce
and develop huge quantities of materials of war and to create a powerful
military potential.

5. With the object of carrying through the preparation for war the Nazi
conspirators, set up a series of administrative agencies and
authorities. For example, in 1936 they established for this purpose the
office of the Four Year Plan with the defendant GOERING as
Plenipotentiary, vesting it with overriding control over Germany’s
economy. Furthermore, on 28th August, 1939, immediately before launching
their aggression against Poland, they appointed the defendant FUNK
Plenipotentiary for Economics; and on 30th August, 1939, they set up the
Ministerial Council for the Defence of the Reich to act as a War
Cabinet.

        (_F_) UTILIZATION OF NAZI CONTROL FOR FOREIGN AGGRESSION

1. _Status of the conspiracy by the middle of 1933 and projected plans._

By the middle of the year 1933 the Nazi conspirators, having acquired
governmental control over Germany, were in a position to enter upon
further and more detailed planning with particular relationship to
foreign policy. Their plan was to rearm and to re-occupy and fortify the
Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties,
in order to acquire military strength and political bargaining power to
be used against other nations.

2. The Nazi conspirators decided that for their purpose the Treaty of
Versailles must definitely be abrogated and specific plans were made by
them and put into operation by 7th March, 1936, all of which opened the
way for the major aggressive steps to follow, as hereinafter set forth.
In the execution of this phase of the conspiracy the Nazi conspirators
did the following acts:

    (_a_) They led Germany to enter upon a course of secret rearmament
from 1933 to March, 1935, including the training of military personnel
and the production of munitions of war, and the building of an air
force.

    (_b_) On 14th October, 1933, they led Germany to leave the
International Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.

    (_c_) On 10th March, 1935, the defendant GOERING announced that
Germany was building a military air force.

    (_d_) On 16th March, 1935, the Nazi conspirators promulgated a law
for universal military service, in which they stated the peace-time
strength of the German Army would be fixed at 500,000 men.

    (_e_) On 21st May, 1935, they falsely announced to the world, with
intent to deceive and allay fears of aggressive intentions, that they
would respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles Treaty and
comply with the Locarno Pacts.

    (_f_) On 7th March, 1936, they reoccupied and fortified the
Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact
of Locarno of 16th October, 1925, and falsely announced to the world
that “we have no territorial demands to make in Europe.”

3. _Aggressive action against Austria and Czechoslovakia_

    (_a_) _The 1936-1938 phase of the plan: planning for the assault on
Austria and Czechoslovakia_

    The Nazi conspirators next entered upon the specific planning
    for the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, realizing it
    would be necessary, for military reasons, first to seize Austria
    before assaulting Czechoslovakia. On 21st May, 1935, in a speech
    to the Reichstag, Hitler stated that: “Germany neither intends
    nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to
    annex Austria or to conclude an Anschluss.” On 1st May, 1936,
    within two months after the reoccupation of the Rhineland,
    Hitler stated: “The lie goes forth again that Germany tomorrow
    or the day after will fall upon Austria or Czechoslovakia.”
    Thereafter, the Nazi conspirators caused a treaty to be entered
    into between Austria and Germany on 11th July, 1936, Article 1
    of which stated that “The German Government recognizes the full
    sovereignty of the Federated State of Austria in the spirit of
    the pronouncements of the German Fuehrer and Chancellor of 21st
    May, 1935.” Meanwhile, plans for aggression in violation of that
    treaty were being made. By the autumn of 1937, all noteworthy
    opposition within the Reich had been crushed. Military
    preparation for the Austrian action was virtually concluded. An
    influential group of the Nazi conspirators met with Hitler on
    5th November, 1937, to review the situation. It was reaffirmed
    that Nazi Germany must have “Lebensraum” in central Europe. It
    was recognized that such conquest would probably meet resistance
    which would have to be crushed by force and that their decision
    might lead to a general war, but this prospect was discounted as
    a risk worth taking. There emerged from this meeting three
    possible plans for the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia.
    Which of the three was to be used was to depend upon the
    developments in the political and military situation in Europe.
    It was contemplated that the conquest of Austria and
    Czechoslovakia would, through compulsory emigration of 2,000,000
    persons from Czechoslovakia and 1,000,000 persons from Austria,
    provide additional food to the Reich for 5,000,000 to 6,000,000
    people, strengthen it militarily by providing shorter and better
    frontiers, and make possible the constituting of new armies up
    to about twelve divisions. Thus, the aim of the plan against
    Austria and Czechoslovakia was conceived of not as an end to
    itself but as a preparatory measure toward the next aggressive
    steps in the Nazi conspiracy.

    (_b_) _The execution of the plan to invade Austria: November, 1937,
to March, 1938_

    Hitler on 8th February, 1938, called Chancellor Schuschnigg to a
    conference at Berchtesgaden. At the meeting of 12th February,
    1938, under threat of invasion, Schuschnigg yielded a promise of
    amnesty to imprisoned Nazis and appointment of Nazis to
    ministerial posts. He agreed to remain silent until Hitler’s
    20th February speech in which Austria’s independence was to be
    reaffirmed, but Hitler in his speech, instead of affirming
    Austrian independence, declared himself protector of all
    Germans. Meanwhile, subversive activities of Nazis in Austria
    increased. Schuschnigg on 9th March, 1938, announced a
    plebiscite for the following Sunday on the question of Austrian
    independence. On 11th March Hitler sent an ultimatum, demanding
    that the plebiscite be called off or that Germany would invade
    Austria. Later the same day a second ultimatum threatened
    invasion unless Schuschnigg should resign in three hours.
    Schuschnigg resigned. The defendant SEYSS-INQUART, who was
    appointed Chancellor, immediately invited Hitler to send German
    troops into Austria to “preserve order.” The invasion began on
    12th March, 1938. On 13th March, Hitler by proclamation assumed
    office as Chief of State of Austria and took command of its
    armed forces. By a law of the same date Austria was annexed to
    Germany.

    (_c_) _The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia: April,
1938, to March, 1939_

    1. Simultaneously with their annexation of Austria the Nazi
    conspirators gave false assurances to the Czechoslovak
    Government that they would not attack that country. But within a
    month they met to plan specific ways and means of attacking
    Czechoslovakia, and to revise, in the light of the acquisition
    of Austria, the previous plans for aggression against
    Czechoslovakia.

    2. On 21st April, 1938, the Nazi conspirators met and prepared
    to launch an attack on Czechoslovakia not later than 1st
    October, 1938. They planned specifically to create an “incident”
    to “justify” the attack. They decided to launch a military
    attack only after a period of diplomatic squabbling which,
    growing more serious, would lead to the excuse for war, or, in
    the alternative, to unleash a lightning attack as a result of an
    “incident” of their own creation. Consideration was given to
    assassinating the German Ambassador at Prague to create the
    requisite incident. From and after 21st April, 1938, the Nazi
    conspirators caused to be prepared detailed and precise military
    plans designed to carry out such an attack at any opportune
    moment and calculated to overcome all Czechoslovak, resistance
    within four days, thus presenting the world with a fait
    accompli, and so forestalling outside resistance. Throughout the
    months of May, June, July, August and September, these plans
    were made more specific and detailed, and by 3rd September,
    1938, it was decided that all troops were to be ready for action
    on 28th September, 1938.

    3. Throughout this same period, the Nazi conspirators were
    agitating the minorities question in Czechoslovakia, and
    particularly in the Sudetenland, leading to a diplomatic crisis
    in August and September, 1938. After the Nazi conspirators
    threatened war, the United Kingdom and France concluded a pact
    with Germany and Italy at Munich on 29th September, 1938,
    involving the cession of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to
    Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. On 1st
    October, 1938, German troops occupied the Sudetenland.

    4. On 15th March, 1939, contrary to the provisions of the Munich
    Pact itself, the Nazi conspirators caused the completion of
    their plan by seizing and occupying the major part of
    Czechoslovakia not ceded to Germany by the Munich Pact.

4. _Formulation of the plan to attack Poland_: _preparation and
initiation of aggressive war_: _March, 1939, to September, 1939_

    (_a_) With these aggressions successfully consummated, the
conspirators had obtained much desired resources and bases and were
ready to undertake further aggressions by means of war. Following
assurances to the world of peaceful intentions, an influential group of
the conspirators met on 23rd May, 1939, to consider the further
implementation of their plan. The situation was reviewed and it was
observed that “the past six years have been put to good use and all
measures have been taken in correct sequence and in accordance with our
aims”; that the national-political unity of the Germans had been
substantially achieved; and that further successes could not be achieved
without war and bloodshed. It was decided nevertheless next to attack
Poland at the first suitable opportunity. It was admitted that the
questions concerning Danzig which they had agitated with Poland were not
true questions, but rather that the question was one of aggressive
expansion for food and “Lebensraum.” It was recognized that Poland would
fight if attacked and that a repetition of the Nazi success against
Czechoslovakia without war could not be expected. Accordingly, it was
determined that the problem was to isolate Poland and, if possible,
prevent a simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers. Nevertheless,
it was agreed that England was an enemy to their aspirations, and that
war with England and her ally France must eventually result, and
therefore that in that war every attempt must be made to overwhelm
England with a “Blitzkrieg.” It was thereupon determined immediately to
prepare detailed plans for an attack on Poland at the first suitable
opportunity and thereafter for an attack on England and France, together
with plans for the simultaneous occupation by armed force of air bases
in the Netherlands and Belgium.

    (_b_) Accordingly, after having denounced the German-Polish Pact of
1934 on false grounds, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to stir up the
Danzig issue to prepare frontier “incidents” to “justify” the attack,
and to make demands for the cession of Polish territory. Upon refusal by
Poland to yield, they caused German armed forces to invade Poland on 1st
September, 1939, thus precipitating war also with the United Kingdom and
France.

5. _Expansion of the war into a general war of aggression: planning and
execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium, The Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece: 1939 to April, 1941_

Thus the aggressive war prepared for by the Nazi conspirators through
their attacks on Austria and Czechoslovakia was actively launched by
their attack on Poland, in violation of the terms of the Briand-Kellogg
Pact, 1928. After the total defeat of Poland, in order to facilitate the
carrying out of their military operations against France and the United
Kingdom, the Nazi conspirators made active preparations for an extension
of the war in Europe. In accordance with those plans, they caused the
German armed forces to invade Denmark and Norway on 9th April, 1940;
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on 10th May, 1940; Yugoslavia
and Greece on 6th April, 1941. All these invasions had been specifically
planned in advance.

6. _German invasion on June 22nd, 1941, of the U.S.S.R. territory in
violation of Non-Aggression Pact of 23rd August, 1939_

On June 22nd, 1941, the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the
Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and without any
declaration of war invaded Soviet territory thereby beginning a War of
Aggression against the U.S.S.R.

From the first day of launching their attack on Soviet territory the
Nazi conspirators, in accordance with their detailed plans, began to
carry out the destruction of cities, towns and villages, the demolition
of factories, collective farms, electric stations and railroads, the
robbery and barbaric devastation of the natural cultural institutions of
the peoples of the U.S.S.R., the devastation of museums, churches,
historic monuments. The mass deportation of the Soviet citizens for
slave labor to Germany, as well as the annihilation of old people, women
and children, especially Belo-Russians and Ukrainians. The extermination
of Jews committed throughout the territory of the Soviet Union.

The above-mentioned criminal offenses were perpetrated by the German
troops in accordance with the orders of the Nazi Government and the
General Staff and High Command of the German armed forces.

7. _Collaboration with Italy and Japan and aggressive war against the
United States: November, 1936, to December, 1941_

After the initiation of the Nazi wars of aggression the Nazi
conspirators brought about a German-Italian-Japanese ten-year
military-economic alliance signed at Berlin on 27th September, 1940.
This agreement, representing a strengthening of the bonds among those
three nations established by the earlier but more limited pact of 25th
November, 1936, stated: “The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan,
considering it as a condition precedent of any lasting peace that all
nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to
stand by and co-operate with one another in regard of their efforts in
Greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their
prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated
to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.”
The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would weaken
and handicap those nations with whom they were at war, and those with
whom they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators exhorted
Japan to seek “a new order of things.” Taking advantage of the wars of
aggression then being waged by the Nazi conspirators, Japan commenced an
attack on 7th December, 1941, against the United States of America at
Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, and against the British Commonwealth
of Nations, French Indo-China and the Netherlands in the southwest
Pacific. Germany declared war against the United States on 11th
December, 1941.

(_G_) WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF
  EXECUTING THE CONSPIRACY FOR WHICH THE CONSPIRATORS ARE RESPONSIBLE

1. Beginning with the initiation of the aggressive war on 1st September,
1939, and throughout its extension into wars involving almost the entire
world, the Nazi conspirators carried out their common plan or conspiracy
to wage war in ruthless and complete disregard and violation of the laws
and customs of war. In the course of executing the common plan or
conspiracy there were committed the War Crimes detailed hereinafter in
Count Three of this Indictment.

2. Beginning with the initiation of their plan to seize and retain total
control of the German State, and thereafter throughout their utilization
of that control for foreign aggression, the Nazi conspirators carried
out their common plan or conspiracy in ruthless and complete disregard
and violation of the laws of humanity. In the course of executing the
common plan or conspiracy there were committed the Crimes against
Humanity detailed hereinafter in Count Four of this Indictment.

3. By reason of all the foregoing, the defendants with divers other
persons are guilty of a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of Crimes against Peace; of a conspiracy to commit Crimes against
Humanity in the course of preparation for war and in the course of
prosecution of war; and of a conspiracy to commit War Crimes not only
against the armed forces of their enemies but also against
non-belligerent civilian populations.

(_H_) INDIVIDUAL, GROUP AND ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OFFENSE
                          STATED IN COUNT ONE

Reference is hereby, made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a
statement of the responsibility, of the individual defendants for the
offense set forth in this Count One of the Indictment. Reference is
hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the
responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal
groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count One of
the Indictment.


                     COUNT TWO—CRIMES AGAINST PEACE

                       (Charter, Article 6 (_a_))
                      V. Statement of the Offense

All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period of years
preceding 8th May, 1945, participated in the planning, preparation,
initiation and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in
violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances.

   VI. Particulars of the wars planned, prepared, initiated and waged

(_A_) The wars referred to in the Statement of Offense in this Count Two
of the Indictment and the dates of their initiation were the following:
against Poland, 1st September, 1939; against the United Kingdom and
France, 3rd September, 1939; against Denmark and Norway, 9th April,
1940; against Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, 10th May, 1940;
against Yugoslavia and Greece, 6th April, 1941; against the U.S.S.R.,
22nd June, 1941; and against the United States of America, 11th
December, 1941.

(_B_) Reference is hereby made to Count One of the Indictment for the
allegations charging that these wars were wars of aggression on the part
of the defendants.

(_C_) Reference is hereby made to Appendix C annexed to this Indictment
for a statement of particulars of the charges of violations of
international treaties, agreements and assurances caused by the
defendants in the course of planning, preparing and initiating these
wars.

 VII. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense
                          stated in Count Two

Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a
statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the
offense set forth in this Count Two of the Indictment. Reference is
hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the
responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal
groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Two of
the Indictment.


                         COUNT THREE—WAR CRIMES

               (Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (_b_)).
                     VIII. Statement of the Offense

All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1st September, 1939, and
8th May, 1945, in Germany and in all those countries and territories
occupied by the German armed forces since 1st September, 1939, and in
Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on the High Seas.

All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and
executed a common plan or conspiracy to commit War Crimes as defined in
Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter. This plan involved, among other things,
the practice of “total war” including methods of combat and of military
occupation in direct conflict with the laws and customs of war, and the
commission of crimes perpetrated on the field of battle during
encounters with enemy armies, and against prisoners of war, and in
occupied territories against the civilian population of such
territories.

The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and by other
persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under Article 6
of the Charter) as such other persons when committing the said War
Crimes performed their acts in execution of a common plan and conspiracy
to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which
plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated as leaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices.

These methods and crimes constituted violations of international
conventions, of internal penal laws and of the general principles of
criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations,
and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct.

(_A_) MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS OF OR IN OCCUPIED
                     TERRITORY AND ON THE HIGH SEAS

Throughout the period of their occupation of territories overrun by
their armed forces the defendants, for the purpose of systematically
terrorizing the inhabitants, murdered and tortured civilians, and
ill-treated them, and imprisoned them without legal process.

The murders and ill-treatment were carried out by divers means,
including shooting, hanging, gassing, starvation, gross overcrowding,
systematic under-nutrition, systematic imposition of labor tasks beyond
the strength of those ordered to carry them out, inadequate provision of
surgical and medical services, kickings, beatings, brutality and torture
of all kinds, including the use of hot irons and pulling out of
fingernails and the performance of experiments by means of operations
and otherwise on living human subjects. In some occupied territories the
defendants interfered with religious services, persecuted members of the
clergy and monastic orders, and expropriated church property. They
conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of
racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain
occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of
people and national, racial or religious groups, particularly Jews,
Poles and Gypsies and others.

Civilians were systematically subjected to tortures of all kinds, with
the object of obtaining information.

Civilians of occupied countries were subjected systematically to
“protective arrests” whereby they were arrested and imprisoned without
any trial and any of the ordinary protections of the law, and they were
imprisoned under the most unhealthy and inhumane conditions.

In the concentration camps were many prisoners who were classified
“Nacht und Nebel”. These were entirely cut off from the world and were
allowed neither to receive nor to send letters. They disappeared without
trace and no announcement of their fate was ever made by the German
authorities.

Such murders and ill-treatment were contrary to International
Conventions, in particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907,
the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as
derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal
penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to
Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter.

The following particulars and all the particulars appearing later in
this count are set out herein by way of example only, are not exclusive
of other particular cases, and are stated without prejudice to the right
of the Prosecution to adduce evidence of other cases of murder and
ill-treatment of civilians.

1. _In France, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Luxembourg, Italy and
the Channel Islands (hereinafter called the “Western Countries”) and in
that part of Germany which lies west of a line drawn due North and South
through the centre of Berlin (hereinafter called “Western Germany”)._

Such murder and ill-treatment took place in concentration camps and
similar establishments set up by the defendants and particularly in the
concentration camps set up at Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Breendonck,
Grini, Natzweiler, Ravensbruck, Vught and Amersfoort, and in numerous
cities, towns and villages, including Oradour sur Glane, Trondheim and
Oslo.

Crimes committed in France or against French citizens took the following
forms:—

Arbitrary arrests were carried out under political or racial pretexts;
they were both individual and collective; notably in Paris (round-up of
the 18th Arrondissement by the Field Gendarmerie, round-up of the Jewish
population of the 11th Arrondissement in August, 1941, round-up of
Jewish intellectuals in December, 1941, round-up in July, 1942); at
Clermont-Ferrand, (round-up of professors and students of the University
of Strasbourg, who were taken to Clermon-Ferrand[Clermont-Ferrand?] on
25th November, 1943); at Lyons; at Marseilles (round-up of 40,000
persons in January, 1943); at Grenoble (round-up on 24th December,
1943); at Cluny (round-up on 24th December, 1944); at Figeac (round-up
in May, 1944); at Saint Pol de Leon (round-up in July, 1944); at Locminé
(round-up on 3rd July, 1944); at Eyzieux (round-up in May, 1944) and at
Moussey (round-up in September, 1944). These arrests were followed by
brutal treatment and tortures carried out by the most diverse methods,
such as immersion in icy water, asphyxiation, torture of the limbs, and
the use of instruments of torture, such as the iron helmet and electric
current, and practised in all the prisons of France, notably in Paris,
Lyons, Marseilles, Rennes, Metz, Clermont-Ferrand, Toulouse, Nice,
Grenoble, Annecy, Arras, Bethune, Lille, Loos, Valenciennes, Nancy,
Troyes and Caen, and in the torture chambers fitted up at the Gestapo
centres.

In the concentration camps, the health regime, and the labour regime,
were such that the rate of mortality (alleged to be from natural causes)
attained enormous proportions, for instance:—

      1. Out of a convoy of 230 French women deported from Compiegne to
Auschwitz in January, 1943, 180 died of exhaustion by the end of four
months.

      2. 143 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 23rd March and 6th
May, 1943, in Block 8 at Dachau.

      3. 1,797 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 21st November, 1943,
and 15th March, 1945, in the Block at Dora.

      4. 465 Frenchmen died of general debility in November, 1944, at
Dora.

      5. 22,761 deportees died of exhaustion at Buchenwald between 1st
January, 1943, and 15th April, 1945.

      6. 11,560 detainees died of exhaustion at Dachau Camp (most of
them in Block 30 reserved for the sick and infirm) between 1st January
and 15th April, 1945.

      7. 780 priests died of exhaustion at Mauthausen.

      8. Out of 2,200 Frenchmen registered at Flossenburg Camp, 1,600
died from supposedly natural causes.

Methods used for the work of extermination in concentration camps
were:—bad treatment, pseudo-scientific experiments (sterilization of
women at Auschwitz and at Ravensbruck, study of the evolution of cancer
of the womb at Auschwitz, of typhus at Buchenwald, anatomical research
at Natzweiller, heart injections at Buchenwald, bone grafting and
muscular excisions at Ravensbruck, etc.), gas-chambers, gas-wagons and
crematory ovens. Of 228,000 French political and racial deportees in
concentration camps, only 28,000 survived.

In France also systematic extermination was practised, notably at Asq on
1st April, 1944, at Colpo on 22nd July, 1944, at Buzet sur Tarn on 6th
July, 1944 and on 17th August, 1944, at Pluvignier on 8th July, 1944, at
Rennes on 8th June, 1944, at Grenoble on 8th July, 1944, at Saint Flour
on 10th June, 1944, at Ruisnes on 10th July, 1944, at Nimes, at Tulle,
and at Nice, where, in July, 1944, the victims of torture were exposed
to the population, and at Oradour sur Glane where the entire village
population was shot or burned alive in the church.

The many charnel pits give proof of anonymous massacres. Most notable of
these are the charnel pits of Paris (Cascade du Bois de Boulogne),
Lyons, Saint Genies Laval, Besancon, Petit Saint Bernard, Aulnat, Caen,
Port Louis, Charleval, Fontainebleau, Bouconne, Gabaudet, L’hermitage,
Lorges, Morlaas, Bordelongue, Signe.

In the course of a premeditated campaign of terrorism, initiated in
Denmark by the Germans in the latter part of 1943, 600 Danish subjects
were murdered and, in addition, throughout the German occupation of
Denmark, large numbers of Danish subjects were subjected to torture and
ill-treatment of all sorts. In addition, approximately 500 Danish
subjects were murdered, by torture and otherwise, in German prisons and
concentration camps.

In Belgium between 1940 and 1944 tortures by various means, but
identical in each place, were carried out at Brussels, Liege, Mons,
Ghent, Namur, Antwerp, Tournai, Arlon, Charleroi and Dinant.

At Vught, in Holland, when the camp was evacuated about 400 persons were
murdered by shooting.

In Luxembourg, during the German occupation, 500 persons were murdered
and, in addition, another 521 were illegally executed, by order of such
special tribunals as the so-called “Sondergericht”. Many more persons in
Luxembourg were subjected to torture and mistreatment by the Gestapo.
Not less than 4,000 Luxembourg nationals were imprisoned during the
period of German occupation, and of these at least 400 were murdered.

Between March, 1944, and April, 1945, in Italy, at least 7,500 men,
women and children, ranging in years from infancy to extreme old age
were murdered by the German soldiery at Civitella, in the Ardeatine
Caves in Rome, and at other places.

2. _In the U.S.S.R., i.e., in the Bielorussian, Ukrainian, Esthonian,
Latvian, Lithuanian, Karelo-Finnish, and Moldavian Soviet Socialist
Republics, in 19 regions of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic, and in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the
Balkans (hereinafter called “the Eastern Countries”) and in that part of
Germany which lies East of a line drawn North and South through the
centre of Berlin (hereinafter called “Eastern Germany”)._

From the 1st September, 1939, when the German armed forces invaded
Poland, and from the 22nd June, 1941, when they invaded the U.S.S.R.,
the German Government and the German High Command adopted a systematic
policy of murder and ill-treatment of the civilian populations of and in
the Eastern Countries as they were successively occupied by the German
armed forces. These murders and ill-treatments were carried on
continuously until the German Armed Forces were driven out of the said
countries.

Such murders and ill-treatments included:—

(_a_) Murders and ill-treatments at concentration camps and similar
establishments set up by the Germans in the Eastern Countries and in
Eastern Germany including those set up at Maidanek and Auschwitz.

The said murders and ill-treatments were carried out by divers means
including all those set out above, as follows:

About 1,500,000 persons were exterminated in Maidanek and about
4,000,000 persons were exterminated in Auschwitz, among whom were
citizens of Poland, the U.S.S.R., the United States of America, Great
Britain, Czechoslovakia, France and other countries.

In the Lwow region and in the city of Lwow the Germans exterminated
about 700,000 Soviet people, including 70 persons in the field of the
arts, science and technology, and also citizens of the U. S. A., Great
Britain, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Holland, brought to this region
from other concentration camps.

In the Jewish ghetto from 7th September, 1941, to 6th July, 1943, over
133,000 persons were tortured and shot.

Mass shooting of the population occurred in the suburbs of the city and
in the Livenitz forest.

In the Ganov camp 200,000 peaceful citizens were exterminated. The most
refined methods of cruelty were employed in this extermination, such as
disembowelling and the freezing of human beings in tubs of water. Mass
shootings took place to the accompaniment of the music of an orchestra
recruited from the persons interned.

Beginning with June, 1943, the Germans carried out measures to hide the
evidence of their crimes. They exhumed and burned corpses, and they
crushed the bones with machines and used them for fertilizer.

At the beginning of 1944 in the Ozarichi region of the Bielorussian
S.S.R., before liberation by the Red Army, the Germans established three
concentration camps without shelters, to which they committed tens of
thousands of persons from the neighbouring territories. They brought
many people to these camps from typhus hospitals intentionally, for the
purpose of infecting the other persons interned and for spreading the
disease in territories from which the Germans were being driven by the
Red Army. In these camps there were many murders and crimes.

In the Esthonian S.S.R. they shot tens of thousands of persons and in
one day alone, 19th September, 1944, in Camp Kloga, the Germans shot
2,000 peaceful citizens. They burned the bodies on bonfires.

In the Lithuanian S.S.R. there were mass killings of Soviet citizens,
namely: in Panerai at least 100,000; in Kaunas more than 70,000; in
Alitus about 60,000; at Prenai more than 3,000; in Villiampol about
8,000; in Mariampol about 7,000; in Trakai and neighbouring towns
37,640.

In the Latvian S.S.R. 577,000 persons were murdered.

As a result of the whole system of internal order maintained in all
camps, the interned persons were doomed to die.

In a secret instruction entitled “the internal regime in concentration
camps”, signed personally by Himmler in 1941 severe measures of
punishment were set forth for the internees. Masses of prisoners of war
were shot, or died from the cold and torture.

(_b_) Murders and ill-treatments at places in the Eastern Countries and
in the Soviet Union, other than in the camps referred to in (_a_) above,
included, on various dates during the occupation by the German Armed
Forces:

The destruction in the Smolenck region of over 135,000 Soviet citizens.

Among these, near the village of Kholmetz of the Sychev region, when the
military authorities were required to remove the mines from an area, on
the order of the Commander of the 101st German Infantry Division,
Major-General Fisler, the German soldiers gathered the inhabitants of
the village of Kholmetz and forced them to remove mines from the road.
All of these people lost their lives as a result of exploding mines.

In the Leningrad region there were shot and tortured over 172,000
persons, including over 20,000 persons who were killed in the city of
Leningrad by the barbarous artillery barrage and the bombings.

In the Stavropol region in an anti-tank trench close to the station of
Mineralny Vody, and in other cities, tens of thousands of persons were
exterminated.

In Pyatigorsk many were subjected to torture and criminal treatment,
including suspension from the ceiling and other methods. Many of the
victims of these tortures were then shot.

In Krasnodar some 6,700 civilians were murdered by poison gas in gas
vans, or were shot and tortured.

In the Stalingrad region more than 40,000 persons were killed and
tortured. After the Germans were expelled from Stalingrad, more than a
thousand mutilated bodies of local inhabitants were found with marks of
torture. One hundred and thirty-nine women had their arms painfully bent
backward and held by wires. From some their breasts had been cut off and
their ears, fingers and toes had been amputated. The bodies bore the
marks of burns. On the bodies of the men the five pointed star was
burned with an iron or cut with a knife. Some were disembowelled.

In Orel over 5,000 persons were murdered.

In Novgorod and in the Novgorod region many thousands of Soviet citizens
were killed by shooting, starvation and torture. In Minsk tens of
thousands of citizens were similarly killed.

In the Crimea peaceful citizens were gathered on barges, taken out to
sea and drowned, over 144,000 persons being exterminated in this manner.

In the Soviet Ukraine there were monstrous criminal acts of the Nazi
conspirators. In Babi Yar, near Kiev, they shot over 100,000 men, women,
children and old people. In this city in January, 1941, after the
explosion in German Headquarters on Dzerzhinsky Street the Germans
arrested as hostages 1,250 persons—old men, minors, women with nursing
infants. In Kiev they killed over 195,000 persons.

In Rovno and the Rovno region they killed and tortured over 100,000
peaceful citizens.

In Dnepropetrovsk, near the Transport Institute, they shot or threw
alive into a great ravine 11,000 women, old men and children.

In Kamenetz-Podolsk Region 31,000 Jews were shot and exterminated,
including 13,000 persons brought there from Hungary.

In the Odessa Region at least 200,000 Soviet citizens were killed.

In Kharkov about 195,000 persons were either tortured to death, shot or
gassed in gas vans.

In Gomel the Germans rounded up the population in prison, and tortured
and tormented them, and then took them to the centre of the city and
shot them in public.

In the city of Lyda in the Grodenen region on 8th May, 1942, 5,670
persons were completely undressed, driven into pens in groups of 100 and
then shot by machine guns. Many were thrown in the graves while they
were still alive.

Along with adults the Nazi conspirators mercilessly destroyed even
children. They killed them with their parents, in groups and alone. They
killed them in children’s homes and hospitals, burying the living in the
graves, throwing them into flames, stabbing them with bayonets,
poisoning them, conducting experiments upon them, extracting their blood
for the use of the German Army, throwing them into prison and Gestapo
torture chambers and concentration camps, where the children died from
hunger, torture and epidemic diseases.

From 6th September to 24th November, 1942, in the region of Brest,
Pinsk, Kobren, Dyvina, Malority and Berezy-Kartuzsky about 400 children
were shot by German punitive units.

In the Yanov camp in the city of Lwow the Germans killed 8,000 children
in two months.

In the resort of Tiberda the Germans annihilated 500 children suffering
from tuberculosis of the bone, who were in the sanatorium for the cure.

On the territory of the Latvian S.S.R. the German usurpers killed
thousands of children, which they had brought there with their parents
from the Bielorussian S.S.R., and from the Kalinin, Kaluga and other
regions of the R.S.F.S.R.

In Czechoslovakia as a result of torture, beating, hanging, and
shootings, there were annihilated in Gestapo prisons in Brno, Seim and
other places over 20,000 persons. Moreover many thousands of internees
were subjected to criminal treatment, beatings and torture.

Both before the war, as well as during the war, thousands of Czech
patriots, in particular catholics and protestants, lawyers, doctors,
teachers, etc., were arrested as hostages and imprisoned. A large number
of these hostages were killed by the Germans.

In Greece in October, 1941, the male populations between 16 and 60 years
of age of the Greek villages Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia Mesovunos,
Selli, Ano-Kerzilion and Kato-Kerzilion were shot—in all 416 persons.

In Yugoslavia many thousands of civilians were murdered. Other examples
are given under paragraph (_D_), “Killing of Hostages”, below.

    (_B_) DEPORTATION FOR SLAVE LABOUR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES OF THE
          CIVILIAN POPULATIONS OF AND IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

During the whole period of the occupation by Germany of both the Western
and the Eastern Countries it was the policy of the German Government and
of the German High Command to deport able bodied citizens from such
occupied countries to Germany and to other occupied countries for the
purpose of slave labour upon defence works, in factories and in other
tasks connected with the German War effort.

In pursuance of such policy there were mass deportations from all the
Western and Eastern countries for such purposes during the whole period
of the occupation.

Such deportations were contrary to international Conventions, in
particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and
customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from
the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of
the countries in which such crimes were committed and to Article 6 (_b_)
of the Charter.

Particulars of deportations, by way of example only and without
prejudice to the production of evidence of other cases are as follows:

1. From the Western Countries:

From France the following deportations of persons for political and
racial reasons took place—each of which consisted of from 1,500-2,500
deportees:

                1940                         3 Transports
                1941                        14 Transports
                1942                       104 Transports
                1943                       257 Transports
                1944                       326 Transports

Such deportees were subjected to the most barbarous conditions of
overcrowding; they were provided with wholly insufficient clothing and
were given little or no food for several days.

The conditions of transport were such that many deportees died in the
course of the voyage, for example:

In one of the wagons of the train which left Compiegne for Buchenwald,
on the 17th September, 1943, 80 men died out of 130;

On 4th June, 1944, 484 bodies were taken out of the train at Sarrebourg;

In a train which left Compiegne on the 2nd July, 1944, for Dachau, more
than 600 dead were found on arrival, i.e., one-third of the total
number;

In a train which left Compiegne on the 16th January, 1944, for
Buchenwald more than 100 men were confined in each wagon, the dead and
the wounded being heaped in the last wagon during the voyage;

In April, 1945, of 12,000 internees evacuated from Buchenwald, 4,000
only were still alive when the marching column arrived near Regensburg.

During the German occupation of Denmark, 5,200 Danish subjects were
deported to Germany and there imprisoned in concentration camps and
other places.

In 1942 and thereafter 6,000 nationals of Luxembourg were departed from
their country under deplorable conditions as a result of which many of
them perished.

From Belgium between 1940 and 1941 at least 190,000 civilians were
deported to Germany and used as slave labour. Such deportees were
subjected to ill-treatment and many of them were compelled to work in
armament factories.

From Holland, between 1940 and 1944 nearly half a million civilians were
deported to Germany and to other occupied countries.

2. From the Eastern Countries:

The German occupying authorities deported from the Soviet Union to
slavery about 4,978,000 Soviet citizens.

750,000 Czechoslovakian citizens were taken away for forced labor
outside the Czechoslovak frontiers in the interior of the German war
machine.

On June 4, 1941, in the city of Zagreb (Yugoslavia) a meeting of German
representatives was called with the Councillor Von Troll presiding. The
purpose was to set up the means of deporting the Yugoslav population
from Slovenia. Tens of thousands of persons were deported in carrying
out this plan.

(_C_) MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND OF OTHER MEMBERS
 OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES WITH WHOM GERMANY WAS AT WAR, AND
                      OF PERSONS ON THE HIGH SEAS

The Defendants murdered and ill-treated prisoners of war by denying them
adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care and attention; by
forcing them to labor in inhumane conditions; by torturing them and
subjecting them to inhuman indignities and by killing them. The German
Government and the German High Command imprisoned prisoners of war in
various concentration camps, where they were killed and subjected to
inhuman treatment by the various methods set forth in paragraph VIII
(_A_). Members of the armed forces of the countries with whom Germany
was at war were frequently murdered while in the act of surrendering.
These murders and ill-treatment were contrary to International
Conventions, particularly Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907, and to Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the Prisoners of War
Convention (Geneva 1929) the laws and customs of war, the general
principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all
civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which
such crimes were committed and to Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter.

Particulars by way of examples and without prejudice to the production
of evidence of other cases, are as follows:

1. In the Western Countries:

French officers who escaped from Oflag X C were handed over to the
Gestapo and disappeared; others were murdered by their guards; others
sent to concentration camps and exterminated. Among others, the men of
Stalag VI C were sent to Buchenwald.

Frequently prisoners captured on the Western Front were obliged to march
to the camps until they completely collapsed. Some of them walked more
than 600 kilometers with hardly any food; they marched on for 48 hours
running, without being fed; among them a certain number died of
exhaustion or of hunger; stragglers were systematically murdered.

The same crimes have been committed in 1943, 1944 and 1945 when the
occupants of the camps were withdrawn before the Allied advance;
particularly during the withdrawal of the prisoners of Sagan on February
8th, 1945.

Bodily punishments were inflicted upon non-commissioned officers and
cadets who refused to work. On December 24th, 1943, three French N.C.O’s
were murdered for that motive in Stalag IV A. Many ill-treatments were
inflicted without motive on other ranks: stabbing with bayonets,
striking with rifle-butts and whipping; in Stalag XX B the sick
themselves were beaten many times by sentries; in Stalag III B and
Stalag III C, worn-out prisoners were murdered or grievously wounded. In
military gaols in Graudenz for instance, in reprisal camps as in
Rava-Ruska, the food was so insufficient that the men lost more than 15
kilograms in a few weeks. In May, 1942, 1 loaf of bread only was
distributed in Rava-Ruska to each group of 35 men.

Orders were given to transfer French officers in chains to the camp of
Mauthausen after they had tried to escape. At their arrival in camp they
were murdered, either by shooting, or by gas and their bodies destroyed
in the crematorium.

American prisoners, officers and men, were murdered in Normandy during
the summer of 1944 and in the Ardennes in December, 1944. American
prisoners were starved, beaten and otherwise mistreated in numerous
Stalag in Germany and in the occupied countries, particularly in 1943,
1944 and 1945.

2. In the Eastern Countries:

At Orel prisoners of war were exterminated by starvation, shooting,
exposure, and poisoning.

Soviet prisoners of war were murdered en masse on orders from the High
Command and the Headquarters of the SIPO and SD. Tens of thousands of
Soviet prisoners of war were tortured and murdered at the “Gross
Lazaret” at Slavuta.

In addition, many thousands of the persons referred to in paragraph VIII
(A) 2, above, were Soviet prisoners of war.

Prisoners of war who escaped and were recaptured were handed over to
SIPO and SD for shooting.

Frenchmen fighting with the Soviet Army who were captured were handed
over to the Vichy Government for “proceedings”.

In March, 1944, 50 R.A.F. officers who escaped from Stalag Luft III at
Sagan, when recaptured, were murdered.

In September, 1941, 11,000 Polish officers, who were prisoners of war
were killed in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk.

In Yugoslavia the German Command and the occupying authorities in the
person of the chief officials of the Police, the SS troops (Police
Lieutenant General Rosener) and the Divisional Group Command (General
Kuebler and others) in the period 1941-43 ordered the shooting of
prisoners of war.

                       (_D_) KILLING OF HOSTAGES

Throughout the territories occupied by the German armed forces in the
course of waging aggressive wars, the defendants adopted and put into
effect on a wide scale the practice of taking, and of killing, hostages
from the civilian population. These acts were contrary to International
Conventions, particularly Article 50 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the
laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as
derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal
penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed and to
Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter.

Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the production of
evidence of other cases, are as follows:

1. In the Western Countries:

In France hostages were executed either individually or collectively;
these executions took place in all the big cities of France, among
others in Paris, Bordeaux and Nantes, as well as at Chateabriant.

In Holland many hundreds of hostages were shot at the following among
other places—Rotterdam, Apeldoorn, Amsterdam, Benschop and Haarlem.

In Belgium many hundreds of hostages were shot during the period 1940 to
1944.

2. In the Eastern Countries:

At Kragnevatz in Yugoslavia 2,300 hostages were shot in October, 1941.

At Kralevo in Yugoslavia 5,000 hostages were shot.

              (_E_) PLUNDER OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

The defendants ruthlessly exploited the people and the material
resources of the countries they occupied, in order to strengthen the
Nazi war machine, to depopulate and impoverish the rest of Europe, to
enrich themselves and their adherents, and to promote German economic
supremacy over Europe.

The Defendants engaged in the following acts and practices, among
others:

1. They degraded the standard of life of the people of occupied
countries and caused starvation, by stripping occupied countries of
foodstuffs for removal to Germany.

2. They seized raw materials and industrial machinery in all of the
occupied countries, removed them to Germany and used them in the
interest of the German war effort and the German economy.

3. In all the occupied countries, in varying degrees, they confiscated
businesses, plants and other property.

4. In an attempt to give color of legality to illegal acquisitions of
property, they forced owners of property to go through the forms of
“voluntary” and “legal” transfers.

5. They established comprehensive controls over the economies of all of
the occupied countries and directed their resources, their production
and their labor in the interests of the German war economy, depriving
the local populations of the products of essential industries.

6. By a variety of financial mechanisms, they despoiled all of the
occupied countries of essential commodities and accumulated wealth,
debased the local currency systems and disrupted the local economies.
They financed extensive purchases in occupied countries through clearing
arrangements by which they exacted loans from the occupied countries.
They imposed occupation levies, exacted financial contributions, and
issued occupation currency, far in excess of occupation costs. They used
these excess funds to finance the purchase of business properties and
supplies in the occupied countries.

7. They abrogated the rights of the local populations in the occupied
portions of the USSR and in Poland and in other countries to develop or
manage agricultural and industrial properties, and reserved this area
for exclusive settlement, development, and ownership by Germans and
their so-called racial brethren.

8. In further development of their plan of criminal exploitation, they
destroyed industrial cities, cultural monuments, scientific
institutions, and property of all types in the occupied territories to
eliminate the possibility of competition with Germany.

9. From their program of terror, slavery, spoliation and organized
outrage, the Nazi conspirators created an instrument for the personal
profit and aggrandizement of themselves and their adherents. They
secured for themselves and their adherents

      (_a_) Positions in administration of business involving power,
influence and lucrative perquisites.

      (_b_) The use of cheap forced labor.

      (_c_) The acquisition on advantageous terms of foreign properties,
business interests, and raw materials.

      (_d_) The basis for the industrial supremacy of Germany.

These acts were contrary to International Conventions, particularly
Articles 46 to 56 inclusive of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and
customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from
the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of
the countries in which such crimes were committed and to Article 6 (_b_)
of the Charter.

Particulars (by way of example and without prejudice to the production
of evidence of other cases) are as follows:

1. Western Countries:

There was plundered from the Western Countries from 1940 to 1944, works
of art, artistic objects, pictures, plastics, furniture, textiles,
antique pieces and similar articles of enormous value to the number of
21,903.

In France statistics show the following:

                        _Removal of Raw Materials_
             Coal                             63,000,000 tons
             Electric energy                      20,976 Mkwh
             Petrol and fuel                   1,943,750 tons
             Iron ore                         74,848,000 tons
             Siderurgical products             3,822,000 tons
             Bauxite                           1,211,800 tons
             Cement                            5,984,000 tons
             Lime                              1,888,000 tons
             Quarry products                  25,872,000 tons

and various other products to a total value of 79,961,423,000 francs.

                   _Removal of Industrial Equipment_

Total: 9,759,861,000 Francs, of which 2,626,479,000 Francs of Machine
Tools.

                   _Removal of Agricultural Produce_

Total: 126,655,852,000 francs, i.e., for the principal

            Products:
               Wheat                   2,947,337 tons
               Oats                    2,354,080 tons
               Milk                      790,000 hectolitres
               Milk (concentrated        460,000 hectolitres
                 and in powder)
               Butter                     76,000 tons
               Cheese                     49,000 tons
               Potatoes                  725,975 tons
               Various vegetables        575,000 tons
               Wine                    7,647,000 hectolitres
               Champagne              87,000,000 bottles
               Beer                    3,821,520 hectolitres
               Various kinds of        1,830,000 hectolitres
                 alcohol

                   _Removal of Manufactured Products_

to a total of 184,640,000 francs.

                              _Plundering_

Francs: 257,020,024,000 from private enterprise.

Francs: 55,000,100,000 from the State.

                        _Financial Exploitation_

From June 1940 to September 1944 the French Treasury was compelled to
pay to Germany 631,866,000,000 francs.

               _Looting and Destruction of Works of Art_

The museums of Nantes, Nancy, Old-Marseilles were looted.

Private collections of great value were stolen. In this way Raphaels,
Vermeers, Van Dycks and works of Rubens, Holbein, Rembrandt, Watteau,
Boucher disappeared. Germany compelled France to deliver up “The Mystic
Lamb” by Van Eyck, which Belgium had entrusted to her.

In Norway and other occupied countries decrees were made by which the
property of many civilians, societies, etc., was confiscated. An immense
amount of property of every kind was plundered from France, Belgium,
Norway, Holland and Luxembourg.

As a result of the economic plundering of Belgium between 1940 and 1944
the damage suffered amounted to 175 billions of Belgian francs.

2. Eastern Countries:

During the occupation of the Eastern Countries the German Government and
the German High Command carried out, as a systematic policy, a
continuous course of plunder and destruction including:—

On the territory of the Soviet Union the Nazi conspirators destroyed or
severely damaged 1,710 cities and more than 70,000 villages and hamlets,
more than 6,000,000 buildings and made homeless about 25,000,000
persons.

Among the cities which suffered most destruction are Stalingrad,
Sevastopol, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Novgorod, Pskov, Orel,
Kharkov, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don, Stalino and Leningrad.

As is evident from an official memorandum of the German command, the
Nazi conspirators planned the complete annihilation of entire Soviet
cities. In completely secret order of the Chief of the Naval Staff
(Staff Ia No. 1601/41, dated 29, IX, 1941), addressed only to Staff
officers, it was said:

“The Fuehrer has decided to erase from the face of the earth St.
Petersburgh. The existence of this large city will have no further
interest after Soviet Russia is destroyed. Finland has also said that
the existence of this city on her new border is not desirable from her
point of view. The original request of the Navy that docks, harbor, etc.
necessary for the fleet be preserved—is known to the Supreme Commander
of the Military Forces, but the basic principles of carrying out
operations against St. Petersburgh do not make it possible to satisfy
this request.

It is proposed to approach near to the city and to destroy it with the
aid of an artillery barrage from weapons of different calibres and with
long air attacks.

The problem of the life of the population and the provisioning of them
is a problem which cannot and must not be decided by us.

In this war * * * we are not interested in preserving even a part of the
population of this large city.”

The Germans destroyed 427 museums, among them the wealthy museums of
Leningrad, Smolensk, Stalingrad, Novgorod, Poltava and others.

In Pyatigorsk the art objects brought there from the Rostov museum were
seized.

The losses suffered by the coal mining industry alone in the Stalin
Region amount to 2,000,000,000 rubles. There was colossal destruction of
industrial establishments in Makerevka, Carlovka, Yenakievo,
Konstantinovka, Mariupol, from which most of the machinery and factories
were removed.

Stealing of huge dimensions and the destruction of industrial, cultural
and other property was typified in Kiev. More than 4,000,000 books,
magazines and manuscripts (many of which were very valuable and even
unique) and a large number of artistic productions and valuables of
different kinds were stolen and carried away.

Many valuable art productions were taken away from Riga.

The extent of the plunder of cultural valuables is evidenced by the fact
that 100,000 valuable volumes and 70 cases of ancient periodicals and
precious monographs were carried away by Rosenberg’s staff alone.

Among further examples of these crimes are:

Wanton devastation of the city of Novgorod and of many historical and
artistic monuments there. Wanton devastation and plunder of the city of
Rovno and of its province. The destruction of the industrial, cultural
and other property in Odessa. The destruction of cities and villages in
Soviet Karelia. The destruction in Estonia of cultural, industrial and
other buildings.

The destruction of medical and prophylactic institutes, the destruction
of agriculture and industry in Lithuania, the destruction of cities in
Latvia.

The Germans approached monuments of culture, dear to the Soviet people,
with special hatred. They broke up the estate of the poet Pushkin in
Mikhailovskoye, desecrating his grave, and destroying the neighboring
villages and the Svyatogor monastery.

They destroyed the estate and museum of Lev Tolstoy, “Yasnaya Polyana”
and desecrated the grave of the great writer. They destroyed in Klin the
museum of Tsaikovsky and in Penaty, the museum of the painter Repin and
many others.

The Nazi conspirators destroyed 1,670 Greek Orthodox Churches, 237 Roman
Catholic Churches, 67 Chapels, 532 Synagogues, etc.

They broke up, desecrated and senselessly destroyed also the most
valuable monuments of the Christian Church, such as Kievo-Pecherskaya
Lavra, Novy Jerusalem in the Istrin region, and the most ancient
monasteries and churches.

Destruction in Esthonia of cultural industrial and other premises:
burning down of many thousands of residential buildings: removal of
10,000 works of art: destruction of medical and prophylactic
institutions. Plunder and removal to Germany of immense quantities of
agricultural stock including horses, cows, pigs, poultry, beehives and
agricultural machines of all kinds.

Destruction of agriculture, enslavement of peasants and looting of stock
and produce in Lithuania.

In the Latvian Republic destruction of the agriculture by the looting of
all stock, machinery and produce.

The result of this policy of plunder and destruction was to lay waste
the land and cause utter desolation.

The overall value of the material loss which the U.S.S.R. has borne, is
computed to be 679,000,000,000 rubles, in state prices of 1941.

Following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 the
defendants seized and stole large stocks of raw materials, copper, tin,
iron, cotton, and food; caused to be taken to Germany large amounts of
railway rolling stock, and many engines, carriages, steam vessels and
trolley buses; plundered libraries, laboratories, and art museums of
books, pictures, objects of art, scientific apparatus and furniture;
stole all gold reserves and foreign exchange of Czechoslovakia,
including 23,000 kilograms of gold of a nominal value of £5,265,000;
fraudulently acquired control and thereafter looted the Czech banks and
many Czech industrial enterprises; and otherwise stole, looted and
misappropriated Czechoslovak public and private property. The total sum
of defendants’ economic spoliation of Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1945
is estimated at 200,000,000,000 Czechoslovak crowns.

               (_F_) THE EXACTION OF COLLECTIVE PENALTIES

The Germans pursued a systematic policy of inflicting, in all the
occupied countries, collective penalties, pecuniary and otherwise, upon
the population for acts of individuals for which it could not be
regarded as collectively responsible; this was done at many places,
including Oslo, Stavanger, Trondheim and Rogaland.

Similar instances occurred in France, among others in Dijon, Nantes and
as regards the Jewish population in the occupied territories. The total
amount of fines imposed on French communities add up to 1,157,179,484
francs made up as follows—

           A fine on the Jewish population       1,000,000,000
           Various fines                           157,179,484

These acts violated Article 50, Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and
customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from
the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of
the countries in which such crimes were committed and Article 6 (_b_) of
the Charter.

 (_G_) WANTON DESTRUCTION OF CITIES, TOWNS AND VILLAGES AND DEVASTATION
                  NOT JUSTIFIED BY MILITARY NECESSITY

The Defendants wantonly destroyed cities, towns and villages and
committed other acts of devastation without military justification or
necessity. These acts violated Articles 46 and 50 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles
of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized
nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes
were committed and Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter.

Particulars by way of example only and without prejudice to the
production of evidence of other cases are as follows:

1. Western Countries:

In March, 1941, part of Lofoten in Norway was destroyed.

In April, 1942, the town of Telerag in Norway was destroyed.

Entire villages were destroyed in France, among others
Oradour-sur-Glane, Saint-Nizier and, in the Vercors, La Mure, Vassieux,
La Chapelle en Vercors. The town of Saint Dié was burnt down and
destroyed. The Old Port District of Marseilles was dynamited in the
beginning of 1943 and resorts along the Atlantic and the Mediterranean
coasts, particularly the town of Sanary, were demolished.

In Holland there was most widespread and extensive destruction, not
justified by military necessity, including the destruction of harbours,
locks, dykes and bridges: immense devastation was also caused by
inundations which equally were not justified by military necessity.

2. Eastern Countries:

In the Eastern Countries the Defendants pursued a policy of wanton
destruction and devastation: some particulars of this (without prejudice
to the production of evidence of other cases) are set out above under
the heading—“Plunder of Public and Private Property”.

In Greece in 1941, the villages of Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia,
Messovunos, Selli, Ano-Kerzilion and Kato-Kerzilion were utterly
destroyed.

In Yugoslavia on 15 August, 1941, the German military command officially
announced that the village of Skela was burned to the ground and the
inhabitants killed on the order of the command.

On the order of the Field Commander Hoersterberg a punitive expedition
from the SS troops and the field police destroyed the villages of
Machkovats, and Kriva Reka in Serbia and all the inhabitants were
killed.

General Fritz Neidhold (369 Infantry Division) on 11 September, 1944,
gave an order to destroy the villages of Zagniezde and Udora, hanging
all the men and driving away all the women and children.

In Czechoslovakia the Nazi conspirators also practised the senseless
destruction of populated places. Lezaky and Lidice were burned to the
ground and the inhabitants killed.

                 (_H_) CONSCRIPTION OF CIVILIAN LABOUR

Throughout the occupied territories the defendants conscripted and
forced the inhabitants to labour and requisitioned their services for
purposes other than meeting the needs of the armies of occupation and to
an extent far out of proportion to the resources of the countries
involved. All the civilians so conscripted were forced to work for the
German war effort. Civilians were required to register and many of those
who registered were forced to join the Todt Organization and the Speer
Legion, both of which were semi-military organizations involving some
military training. These acts violated Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles
of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized
nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes
were committed and Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter.

Particulars, by way of example only and without prejudice to the
production of evidence of other cases, are as follows:

1. Western Countries:

In France, from 1942 to 1944, 963,813 persons were compelled to work in
Germany and 737,000 to work in France for the German Army.

In Luxembourg in 1944 alone, 2,500 men and 500 girls were conscripted
for forced labor.

2. Eastern Countries:

Of the large number of citizens of the Soviet Union and of
Czechoslovakia referred to under Count Three VIII (_B_) 2 above many
were so conscripted for forced labor.

(_I_) FORCING CIVILIANS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO SWEAR ALLEGIANCE TO A
                             HOSTILE POWER

Civilians who joined the Speer Legion, as set forth in paragraph (_H_)
above, were required under threat of depriving them of food, money and
identity papers, to swear a solemn oath acknowledging unconditional
obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer of Germany, which was to them a
hostile power.

In Lorraine, Civil Servants were obliged, in order to retain their
positions, to sign a declaration by which they acknowledged the “return
of their Country to the Reich”, pledged themselves to obey without
reservation the orders of their Chiefs and put themselves “at the active
service of the Fuehrer and the Great National Socialist Germany”.

A similar pledge was imposed on Alsatian Civil Servants by threat of
deportation or internment.

These acts violated Article 45 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws
and customs of war, the general principles of international law and
Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter.

              (_J_) GERMANIZATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

In certain occupied territories purportedly annexed to Germany the
defendants methodically and pursuant to plan endeavoured to assimilate
those territories politically, culturally, socially and economically
into the German Reich. The defendants endeavoured to obliterate the
former national character of these territories. In pursuance of these
plans and endeavours, the defendants forcibly deported inhabitants who
were predominantly non-German and introduced thousands of German
colonists.

This plan included economic domination, physical conquest, installation
of puppet Governments, purported de jure annexation and enforced
conscription into the German Armed Forces.

This was carried out in most of the Occupied Countries including:
Norway, France (particularly in the departments of Upper Rhine, Lower
Rhine, Moselle, Ardennes, Aisne, Nord, Meurthe and Moselle), Luxembourg,
the Soviet Union, Denmark, Belgium, Holland.

In France in the Departments of the Aisne, the Nord, the Meurthe and
Moselle, and especially in that of the Ardennes, rural properties were
seized by a German state organization which tried to have them exploited
under German direction; the landowners of these exploitations were
dispossessed and turned into agricultural labourers.

In the Department of the Upper Rhine, the Lower Rhine and the Moselle,
the methods of Germanization were those of annexation followed by
conscription.

1. From the month of August, 1940, officials who refused to take the
oath of allegiance to the Reich were expelled. On September 21st
expulsions and deportation of populations began and on November 22nd,
1940, more than 70,000 Lorrainers or Alsacians were driven into the
South zone of France. From July 31, 1941, onwards, more than 100,000
persons were deported into the Eastern regions of the Reich or to
Poland. All the property of the deportees or expelled persons was
confiscated. At the same time, 80,000 Germans coming from the Saar or
from Westphalia, were installed in Lorraine and 2,000 farms belonging to
French people were transferred to Germans.

2. From 2nd January, 1942, all the young people of the Departments of
the Upper Rhine and the Lower Rhine, aged from 10 to 18 years, were
incorporated in the Hitler Youth. The same thing was done in the Moselle
from 4th August, 1942. From 1940 all the French schools were closed,
their staffs expelled, and the German school system was introduced in
the three departments.

3. On the 28th September, 1940, an order applicable to the Department of
the Moselle ordained the Germanization of all the surnames and christian
names which were French in form. The same thing was done from the 15th
January, 1943, in the Departments of the Upper Rhine and the Lower
Rhine.

4. Two orders from the 23rd to 24th August, 1942, imposed by force
German nationality on French citizens.

5. On the 8th May, 1941, for the Upper Rhine and the Lower Rhine, the
23rd April, 1941, for the Moselle, orders were promulgated enforcing
compulsory labour service on all French citizens of either sex aged from
17 to 25 years. From the 1st January, 1942, for young men and from the
26th January, 1942, for young girls, national labour service was
effectively organized in the Moselle. It was from the 27th August, 1942,
in the Upper-Rhine and in the Lower Rhine for young men only. The
classes 1940, 1941, 1942 were called up.

6. These classes were retained in the Wehrmacht on the expiration of
their time and labour service. On the 19th August, 1942, an order
instituted compulsory military service in the Moselle. On the 25th
August, 1942, the classes 1940-44 were called up in three Departments.
Conscription was enforced by the German authorities in conformity with
the provisions of German legislation. The first revision boards took
place from the 3rd September, 1942. Later in the Upper Rhine and the
Lower Rhine new levies were effected everywhere on classes 1928 to 1939
inclusive. The French people who refused to obey these laws were
considered as deserters and their families were deported, while their
property was confiscated.

These acts violated Articles 43, 46, 55 and 56 of the Hague Regulations,
1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal
law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the
internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed
and Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter.

 IX. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense
                         stated in Count Three

Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a
statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the
offense set forth in this Count Three of the Indictment. Reference is
hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the
responsibility of the groups, and organizations named herein as criminal
groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Three
of the Indictment.


                   COUNT FOUR—CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

               (Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (_c_).)
                      X. Statement of the Offense

All the defendants committed Crimes against Humanity during a period of
years preceding 8th May, 1945 in Germany and in all those countries and
territories occupied by the German armed forces since 1st September,
1939 and in Austria and Czechoslovakia and in Italy and on the High
Seas.

All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and
executed a common plan or conspiracy to commit Crimes against Humanity
as defined in Article 6(_c_) of the Charter. This plan involved, among
other things, the murder and persecution of all who were or who were
suspected of being hostile to the Nazi Party and all who were or who
were suspected of being opposed to the common plan alleged in Count One.

The said Crimes against Humanity were committed by the defendants and by
other persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under
Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons, when committing the
said War Crimes, performed their acts in execution of a common plan and
conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and
execution of which plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated
as leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices.

These methods and crimes constituted violations of international
conventions, of internal penal laws, of the general principles of
criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations
and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct. The
said acts were contrary to Article 6 of the Charter.

The prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count Three as
also constituting Crimes against Humanity.

(_A_) MURDER, EXTERMINATION, ENSLAVEMENT, DEPORTATION AND OTHER INHUMANE
 ACTS COMMITTED AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATIONS BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR

For the purposes set out above, the defendants adopted a policy of
persecution, repression, and extermination of all civilians in Germany
who were, or who were believed to, or who were believed likely to
become, hostile to the Nazi Government and the common plan or conspiracy
described in Count One. They imprisoned such persons without judicial
process, holding them in “protective custody” and concentration camps,
and subjected them to persecution, degradation, despoilment,
enslavement, torture and murder.

Special courts were established to carry out the will of the
conspirators; favoured branches or agencies of the State and Party were
permitted to operate outside the range even of nazified law and to crush
all tendencies and elements which were considered “undesirable”. The
various concentration camps included Buchenwald, which was established
in 1933 and Dachau, which was established in 1934. At these and other
camps the civilians were put to slave labour, and murdered and
ill-treated by divers means, including those set out in Count Three
above, and these acts and policies were continued and extended to the
occupied countries after the 1st September, 1939, and until 8th May,
1945.

    (_B_) PERSECUTION ON POLITICAL, RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUNDS IN
 EXECUTION OF AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMMON PLAN MENTIONED IN COUNT
                                  ONE

As above stated, in execution of and in connection with the common plan
mentioned in Count One, opponents of the German Government were
exterminated and persecuted. These persecutions were directed against
Jews. They were also directed against persons whose political belief or
spiritual aspirations were deemed to be in conflict with the aims of the
Nazis.

Jews were systematically persecuted since 1933; they were deprived of
their liberty, thrown into concentration camps where they were murdered
and ill-treated. Their property was confiscated. Hundreds of thousands
of Jews were so treated before the 1st September, 1939.

Since the 1st September, 1939, the persecution of the Jews was
redoubled: millions of Jews from Germany and from the occupied Western
Countries were sent to the Eastern Countries for extermination.

Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the production of
evidence of other cases are as follows:

The Nazis murdered amongst others Chancellor Dollfuss, the Social
Democrat Breitscheid and the Communist Thaelmann. They imprisoned in
concentration camps numerous political and religious personages, for
example Chancellor Schuschnigg and Pastor Niemoeller.

In November, 1938 by orders of the Chief of the Gestapo, anti-Jewish
demonstrations all over Germany took place. Jewish property was
destroyed, 30,000 Jews were arrested and sent to concentration camps and
their property confiscated.

Under paragraph VIII (_A_), above, millions of the persons there
mentioned as having been murdered and ill-treated were Jews.

Among other mass murders of Jews were the following:

At Kislovdosk all Jews were made to give up their property: 2,000 were
shot in an anti-tank ditch at Mineraliye Vodi: 4,300 other Jews were
shot in the same ditch.

              60,000 Jews were shot on an island on the Dvina
                       near Riga.
              20,000 Jews were shot at Lutsk.
              32,000 Jews were shot at Sarny.
              60,000 Jews were shot at Kiev and
                       Dniepropetrovsk.

Thousands of Jews were gassed weekly by means of gas-wagons which broke
down from overwork.

As the Germans retreated before the Soviet Army they exterminated Jews
rather than allow them to be liberated. Many concentration camps and
ghettos were set up in which Jews were incarcerated and tortured,
starved, subjected to merciless atrocities and finally exterminated.

About 70,000 Jews were exterminated in Yugoslavia.

 XI. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense
                          stated in Count Four

Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a
statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the
offense set forth in this Count Four of the Indictment. Reference is
hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the
responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal
groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Four of
the Indictment.

Wherefore, this Indictment is lodged with the Tribunal in English,
French and Russian, each text having equal authenticity, and the charges
herein made against the above-named defendants are hereby presented to
the Tribunal.

                                 ROBERT H. JACKSON.
                     _Acting on Behalf of the United States of America._
                              FRANCOIS DE MENTHON.
                         _Acting on Behalf of the French Republic._
                                HARTLEY SHAWCROSS.
                     _Acting on Behalf of the United Kingdom of Great_
                             _Britain and Northern Ireland._
                                     R. RUDENKO.
                     _Acting on Behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist_
                                      _Republics._

_Berlin, 6th October, 1945._

                 *        *        *        *        *

                               APPENDIX A

Statement of Individual Responsibility for Crimes Set Out in Counts One,
                          Two, Three and Four

The statements hereinafter set forth following the name of each
individual defendant constitute matters upon which the prosecution will
rely _inter alia_ as establishing the individual responsibility of the
defendant:

GOERING:

The defendant GOERING between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party,
Supreme Leader of the SA, General in the SS, a member and President of
the Reichstag, Minister of the Interior of Prussia, Chief of the
Prussian Police and Prussian Secret State Police, Chief of the Prussian
State Council, Trustee of the Four Year Plan, Reich Minister for Air,
Commander in Chief of the Air Force, President of the Council of
Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet
Council, head of the Hermann Goering Industrial Combine, and Successor
Designate to Hitler. The defendant GOERING used the foregoing positions,
his personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in
such a manner that: he promoted the accession to power of the Nazi
conspirators and the consolidation of their control over Germany set
forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the military and
economic preparation for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment;
he participated in the planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators
for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties,
Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the
Indictment; and he authorized, directed and participated in the War
Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and the Crimes
against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including a
wide variety of crimes against persons and property.

RIBBENTROP:

The defendant RIBBENTROP between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi
Party, a member of the Nazi Reichstag, Advisor to the Fuehrer on matters
of foreign policy, representative of the Nazi Party for matters of
foreign policy, special German delegate for disarmament questions,
Ambassador extraordinary, Ambassador in London, organizer and director
of Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, member
of the Secret Cabinet Council, member of the Fuehrer’s political staff
at general headquarters, and General in the SS. The defendant RIBBENTROP
used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate
connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the
accession to power of the Nazi conspirators as set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in
Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances as set
forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; in accordance with the
Fuehrer Principle he executed and assumed responsibility for the
execution of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi conspirators set forth
in Count One of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and
participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of
the Indictment, including more particularly the crimes against persons
and property in occupied territories.

HESS:

The defendant HESS between 1921 and 1941 was a member of the Nazi Party,
Deputy to the Fuehrer, Reich Minister without Portfolio, member of the
Reichstag, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defence of the
Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet Council, Successor Designate to the
Fuehrer after the defendant Goering, a General in the SS and a General
in the SA. The defendant Hess used the foregoing positions, his personal
influence and his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner
that: he promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and
the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One
of the Indictment; he promoted the military, economic and psychological
preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
participated in the political planning and preparation for Wars of
Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agreements
and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment: he
participated in the preparation and planning of foreign policy plans of
the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
authorized, directed and participated in the War Crimes set forth in
Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes
against persons and property.

KALTENBRUNNER:

The defendant KALTENBRUNNER between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi
Party, a General in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, a General of the
Police, State Secretary for Security in Austria in charge of the
Austrian Police, Police Leader of Vienna, Lower and Upper Austria, Head
of the Reich Main Security Office and Chief of the Security Police and
Security Service. The defendant KALTENBRUNNER used the foregoing
positions and his personal influence in such a manner that: he promoted
the consolidation of control over Austria seized by the Nazi
conspirators as set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed and participated in the War Crimes set forth in
Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment, including particularly the Crimes
against Humanity involved in the system of concentration camps.

ROSENBERG:

The defendant ROSENBERG between 1920 and 1945 was: a member of the Nazi
Party, Nazi member of the Reichstag, Reichsleiter in the Nazi Party for
Ideology and Foreign Policy, the Editor of the Nazi newspaper
“Voelkischer Beobachter”, and of the “NS Monatshefte”, head of the
Foreign Political Office of the Nazi Party, Special Delegate for the
entire Spiritual and Ideological Training of the Nazi Party, Reich
Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories, organizer of the
“Einsatzstab Rosenberg”, a General in the SS and a General in the SA.
The defendant ROSENBERG used the foregoing positions, his personal
influence and his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner
that: he developed, disseminated and exploited the doctrinal techniques
of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the psychological preparations for war set
forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the political
planning and preparation for Wars of Aggression and Wars, in Violation
of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and
participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of
the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and
property.

FRANK:

The defendant FRANK between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party, a
General in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister without
Portfolio, Reich Commissar for the Coordination of Justice, President of
the International Chamber of Law and Academy of German Law, Chief of the
Civil Administration of Lodz, Supreme Administrative Chief of the
military district of West Prussia, Poznan, Odz and Krakow and Governor
General of the Occupied Polish territories. The defendant FRANK used the
foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connection
with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the accession to
power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their control
over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he authorized,
directed and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of
the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four
of the Indictment, including particularly the War Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity involved in the administration of occupied territories.

BORMANN:

The defendant BORMANN between 1925 and 1945 was: a member of the Nazi
Party, member of the Reichstag, a member of the Staff of the Supreme
Command of the SA, founder and head of “Hilfskasse der NSDAP”,
Reichsleiter, Chief of Staff Office of the Fuehrer’s Deputy, head of the
Party Chancery, Secretary of the Fuehrer, member of the Council of
Ministers for the Defence of the Reich, organizer and head of the
Volkssturm, a General in the SS and a General in the SA. The defendant
BORMANN used the foregoing position, his personal influence and his
intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted
the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of
their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the
Indictment; and he authorized, directed and participated in the War
Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against
Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including a wide
variety of crimes against persons and property.

FRICK:

The defendant FRICK between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party,
Reichsleiter, General in the SS, member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister
of the Interior, Prussian Minister of the Interior, Reich Director of
Elections, General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich,
head of the Central Office for the Reunification of Austria and the
German Reich, Director of the Central Office for the Incorporation of
Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig, the eastern incorporated territories, Eupen,
Malmedy, and Moresnot, Director of the Central Office for the
Protectorate of Bohemia, Moravia, the Government General, Lower Styria,
Upper Carinthia, Norway, Alsace, Lorraine and all other occupied
territories and Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. The defendant
FRICK used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his
intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted
the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of
their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
participated in the planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators
for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties,
Agreements and Assurances set forth in Count One and Two of the
Indictment; and he authorized, directed and participated in the War
Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against
Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including more
particularly the crimes against persons and property in occupied
territories.

LEY:

The defendant LEY between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party,
Reichsleiter, Nazi Party Organization Manager, member of the Reichstag,
leader of the German Labor Front, a General in the SA, and Joint
Organizer of the Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers. The
defendant LEY used the foregoing positions, his personal influence and
his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he
promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany as set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the preparation for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; he authorized, directed and participated in the
War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and in the Crimes
against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including
particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity relating to the
abuse of human beings for labor in the conduct of the aggressive wars.

SAUCKEL:

The defendant SAUCKEL between 1921 and 1945 was: a member of the Nazi
Party, Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Thuringia, a member of the
Reichstag, General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labour under
the Four Year Plan, Joint Organizer with the defendant Ley of the
Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers, a General in the SS
and a General in the SA. The defendant SAUCKEL used the foregoing
positions and his personal influence in such a manner that: he promoted
the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One
of the indictment; he participated in the economic preparations for Wars
of Aggression and Wars in Violation of Treaties, Agreements and
Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he
authorized, directed and participated in the War Crimes set forth, in
Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment, including particularly the War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity involved in forcing the inhabitants of
occupied countries to work, as slave laborers in occupied countries and
in Germany.

SPEER:

The defendant SPEER between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party,
Reichsleiter, member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister for Armament and
Munitions, Chief of the Organization Todt, General Plenipotentiary for
Armaments in the Office of the Four Year Plan, and Chairman of the
Armaments Council. The defendant SPEER used the foregoing positions and
his personal influence in such a manner that: he participated in the
military and economic planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators
for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties,
Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the
Indictment; and he authorized, directed and participated in the War
Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against
Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including more
particularly the abuse and exploitation of human beings for forced labor
in the conduct of aggressive war.

FUNK:

The defendant FUNK between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party,
Economic Adviser of Hitler, National Socialist Deputy to the Reichstag,
Press Chief of the Reich Government, State Secretary of the Reich
Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Reich Minister of
Economics, Prussian Minister of Economics, President of the German
Reichsbank, Plenipotentiary for Economy and member of the Ministerial
Council for the Defense of the Reich. The defendant FUNK used the
foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his close connection
with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the accession to
power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their control
over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the
preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
participated in the military and economic planning and preparation of
the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of
International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and
participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of
the Indictment, including more particularly crimes against persons and
property in connection with the economic exploitation of occupied
territories.

SCHACHT:

The defendant SCHACHT between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party,
a member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister of Economics, Reich Minister
without Portfolio and President of the German Reichsbank. The defendant
SCHACHT used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his
connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the
accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of
their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the
Indictment; and he participated in the military and economic plans and
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression, and Wars in
Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth
in Counts One and Two of the Indictment.

PAPEN:

The defendant PAPEN between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party, a
member of the Reichstag, Reich Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor under Hitler,
special Plenipotentiary for the Saar, negotiator of the Concordat with
the Vatican, Ambassador in Vienna and Ambassador in Turkey. The
defendant PAPEN used the foregoing positions, his personal influence and
his close connection with the Fuehrer in such manner that: he promoted
the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and participated in the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; and he participated in the political planning and
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in
Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth
in Counts One and Two of the Indictment.

KRUPP:

The defendant KRUPP was between 1932-1945: head of Friedrich KRUPP A.G.,
a member of the General Economic Council, President of the Reich Union
of German Industry, and head of the Group for Mining and Production of
Iron and Metals under the Reich Ministry of Economics. The defendant
KRUPP used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his
connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the
accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of
their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
promoted the preparation for war set forth in Count One of the
Indictment; he participated in the military and economic planning and
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in
Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth
in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and
participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of
the Indictment, including more particularly the exploitation and abuse
of human beings for labor in the conduct of aggressive wars.

NEURATH:

The defendant NEURATH between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party,
a General in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister, Reich
Minister of Foreign Affairs, President of the Secret Cabinet Council,
and Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. The defendant NEURATH used
the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his close
connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the
accession to power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in
Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth
in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; in accordance with the Fuehrer
Principle he executed, and assumed responsibility for the execution of
the foreign policy plans of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One
of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and participated in the
War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes
against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including
particularly the crimes against persons and property in the occupied
territories.

SCHIRACH:

The defendant SCHIRACH between 1924 and 1945 was: a member of the Nazi
Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Youth Leader on the Staff of the
SA Supreme Command, Reichsleiter in the Nazi Party for Youth Education,
Leader of Youth of the German Reich, head of the Hitler Jugend, Reich
Defence Commissioner and Reichstatthalter and Gauleiter of Vienna. The
defendant SCHIRACH used the foregoing positions, his personal influence
and his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he
promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the psychological and educational
preparations for war and the militarization of Nazi-dominated
organizations set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed and participated in the Crimes against Humanity set
forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including, particularly,
anti-Jewish measures.

SEYSS-INQUART:

The defendant SEYSS-INQUART between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi
Party, a General in the SS, State Councillor of Austria, Minister of the
Interior and Security of Austria, Chancellor of Austria, a member of the
Reichstag, a member of the Reich Cabinet, Reich Minister without
Portfolio, Chief of the Civil Administration in South Poland, Deputy
Governor-General of the Polish Occupied Territory, and Reich Commissar
for the Occupied Netherlands. The defendant SEYSS-INQUART used the
foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a manner that: he
prompted the seizure and the consolidation of control over Austria by
the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
participated in the political planning and preparation of the Nazi
conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of
International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and
participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of
the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and
property.

STREICHER:

The defendant STREICHER between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi
Party, a member of the Reichstag, a General in the SA, Gauleiter of
Franconia, Editor in Chief of the anti-Semitic newspaper “Der Stuermer”.
The defendant STREICHER used the foregoing positions, his personal
influence, and his close connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner
that: he promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and
the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One
of the Indictment: he authorized, directed and participated in the
Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment,
including particularly the incitement of the persecution of the Jews set
forth in Count One and Count Four of the Indictment.

KEITEL:

The defendant KEITEL between 1938 and 1945 was: Chief of the High
Command of the German Armed Forces, member of the Secret Cabinet
Council, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defence of the
Reich, and Field Marshal. The defendant KEITEL used the foregoing
positions, his personal influence and his intimate connection with the
Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the military preparations for
war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the
political planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of
Aggression and Wars in Violations of International Treaties, Agreements
and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he
executed and assumed responsibility for the execution of the plans of
the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of
International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment; he authorized, directed and participated
in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the
Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment,
including particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
involved in the ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of the civilian
population of occupied territories.

JODL:

The defendant JODL between 1932 and 1945 was: Lt. Colonel, Army
Operations Department of the Wehrmacht, Colonel, Chief of OKW Operations
Department, Major-General and Chief of Staff OKW and Colonel-General.
The defendant JODL used the foregoing positions, his personal influence,
and his close connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he
promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; he participated in the military planning and
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in
Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth
in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and
participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of
the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and
property:

RAEDER:

The defendant RAEDER between 1928 and 1945 was: Commander-in-Chief of
the German Navy, Generaladmiral, Grossadmiral, Admiralinspekteur of the
German Navy, and a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. The defendant
RAEDER used the foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a
manner that: he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One
of the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in
Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth
in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he executed, and assumed
responsibility for the execution of the plans of the Nazi conspirators
for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties,
Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the
Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and participated in the war
crimes, set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, including
particularly war crimes arising out of sea warfare.

DOENITZ:

The defendant DOENITZ between 1932 and 1945 was: Commanding Officer of
the Weddigen U-boat flotilla, Commander-in-Chief of the U-boat arm,
Vice-Admiral, Admiral, Grossadmiral and Commander-in-Chief of the German
Navy, Advisor to Hitler, and Successor to Hitler as head of the German
Government. The defendant DOENITZ used the foregoing positions, his
personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such
a manner that: he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; he participated in the military planning and
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in
Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth
in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and
participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment, including particularly the crimes against persons and
property on the high seas.

FRITZSCHE:

The defendant FRITZSCHE between 1933 and 1945 was: a member of the Nazi
Party, Editor-in-Chief of the official German news agency, “Deutsche
Nachrichten Bureo”, Head of the Wireless News Service and of the Home
Press Division of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, Ministerialdirektor
of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, head of the Radio Division of the
Propaganda Department of the Nazi Party, and Plenipotentiary for the
Political Organization of the Greater German Radio. The defendant
FRITZSCHE used the foregoing positions and his personal influence to
disseminate and exploit the principal doctrines of the Nazi conspirators
set forth in Count One of the Indictment, and to advocate, encourage and
incite the commission of the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of
the Indictment including, particularly, anti-Jewish measures and the
ruthless exploitation of occupied territories.

                 *        *        *        *        *

                               APPENDIX B

          Statement of Criminality of Groups and Organizations

The statements hereinafter set forth, following the name of each Group
or Organization named in the Indictment as one which should be declared
criminal, constitute matters upon which the prosecution will rely inter
alia as establishing the criminality of the Group or Organization:

                  DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET)

“Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet)” referred to in the Indictment
consists of persons who were:

    (i) Members of the ordinary cabinet after 30 January 1933, the date
on which Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic. The term
“ordinary cabinet” as used herein means the Reich Ministers, i.e., heads
of departments of the central government; Reich Ministers without
portfolio; State ministers acting as Reich Ministers; and other
officials entitled to take part in meetings of this cabinet.

    (ii) Members of der Ministerrat fuer die Reichsverteidigung (Council
of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich).

    (iii) Members of der Geheimer Kabinettsrat (Secret Cabinet Council).

Under the Fuehrer, these persons functioning in the foregoing capacities
and in association as a group, possessed and exercised legislative,
executive, administrative and political powers and functions of a very
high order in the system of German government. Accordingly, they are
charged with responsibility for the policies adopted and put into effect
by the government including those which comprehended and involved the
commission of the crimes referred to in Counts, One, Two, Three and Four
of the Indictment.

 DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN
          ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY)

“Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen
Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party)” referred to in the
Indictment consists of persons who were at any time, according to common
Nazi terminology, “Politischer Leiter” (Political Leaders) of any grade
or rank.

The Politischen Leiter comprised the leaders of the various functional
offices of the Party (for example, the Reichsleitung, or Party Reich
Directorate, and the Gauleitung, or Party Gau Directorate), as well as
the territorial leaders of the Party (for example, the Gauleiter).

The Politischen Leiter were a distinctive and elite group within the
Nazi Party proper and as such were vested with special prerogatives.
They were organized according to the leadership principle and were
charged with planning, developing and imposing upon their followers the
policies of the Nazi Party. Thus the territorial leaders among them were
called Hoheitstraeger, or bearers of sovereignty, and were entitled to
call upon and utilize the various Party formations when necessary for
the execution of Party policies.

Reference is hereby made to the allegations in Count One of the
Indictment showing that the Nazi Party was the central core of the
common plan or conspiracy therein set forth. The Politischen Leiter, as
a major power within the Nazi Party proper, and functioning in the
capacities above-described and in association as a group, joined in the
common plan or conspiracy, and accordingly share responsibility for the
crimes set forth in Counts One, Two, Three and Four of the Indictment.

The prosecution expressly reserves the right to request, at any time
before sentence is pronounced, that Politischer Leiter of subordinate
grades or ranks or of other types or classes, to be specified by the
prosecution, be excepted from further proceedings in this Case No. 1,
but without prejudice to other proceedings or actions against them.

DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI
  (COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE SS) INCLUDING DIE SICHERHEITSDIENST (COMMONLY
                            KNOWN AS THE SD)

“Die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei
(commonly known as the SS) including Die Sicherheitsdienst (commonly
known as the SD)” referred to in the Indictment consists of the entire
corps of the SS and all offices, departments, services, agencies,
branches, formations, organizations and groups of which it was at any
time comprised or which were at any time integrated in it, including but
not limited to, the Allgemeine SS, the Waffen SS, the SS Totenkopf
Verbaende, SS Polizei Regimente and the Sicherheitsdienst des
Reichsfuehrers-SS (commonly known as the SD).

The SS, originally established by Hitler in 1925 as an élite section of
the SA to furnish a protective guard for the Fuehrer and Nazi Party
leaders, became an independent formation of the Nazi Party in 1934 under
the leadership of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, Heinrich Himmler. It was
composed of voluntary members, selected in accordance with Nazi
biological, racial and political theories, completely indoctrinated in
Nazi ideology and pledged to uncompromising obedience to the Fuehrer.
After the accession of the Nazi conspirators to power, it developed many
departments, agencies, formations and branches and extended its
influence and control over numerous fields of governmental and Party
activity. Through Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the
German Police, agencies and units of the SS and of the Reich were joined
in operation to form a unified repressive police force. The
Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfuehrers-SS (commonly known as the SD), a
department of the SS, was developed into a vast espionage and
counter-intelligence system which operated in conjunction with the
Gestapo and criminal police in detecting, suppressing and eliminating
tendencies, groups and individuals deemed hostile or potentially hostile
to the Nazi Party, its leaders, principles and objectives, and
eventually was combined with the Gestapo and criminal police in a single
security police department, the Reich Main Security Office.

Other branches of the SS developed into an armed force and served in the
wars of aggression referred to in Counts One and Two of the Indictment.
Through other departments and branches the SS controlled the
administration of concentration camps and the execution of Nazi racial,
biological and resettlement policies. Through its numerous functions and
activities it served as the instrument for insuring the domination of
Nazi ideology and protecting and extending the Nazi regime over Germany
and occupied territories. It thus participated in and is responsible for
the crimes referred to in Counts One, Two, Three and Four of the
Indictment.

 DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE
                                GESTAPO)

“Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, commonly known as the
Gestapo)” referred to in the Indictment consists of the headquarters,
departments, offices, branches and all the forces and personnel of the
Geheime Staatspolizei organized or existing at any time after 30 January
1933, including the Geheime Staatspolizei of Prussia and equivalent
secret or political police forces of the Reich and the components
thereof.

The Gestapo was created by the Nazi conspirators immediately after their
accession to power, first in Prussia by the defendant GOERING and
shortly thereafter in all other states in the Reich. These separate
secret and political police forces were developed into a centralized,
uniform organization operating through a central headquarters and
through a network of regional offices in Germany and in occupied
territories. Its officials and operatives were selected on the basis of
unconditional acceptance of Nazi ideology, were largely drawn from
members of the SS, and were trained in SS and SD schools. It acted to
suppress and eliminate tendencies, groups and individuals deemed hostile
or potentially hostile to the Nazi Party, its leaders, principles and
objectives, and to repress resistance and potential resistance to German
control in occupied territories. In performing these functions it
operated free from legal control, taking any measures it deemed
necessary for the accomplishment of its missions.

Through its purposes, activities and the means it used, it participated
in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes set forth in
Counts One, Two, Three and Four of the Indictment.

       DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN
               ARBEITERPARTEI (COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE SA)

“Die Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen
Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the SA)” referred to in the Indictment
was a formation of the Nazi Party under the immediate jurisdiction of
the Fuehrer, organized on military lines, whose membership was composed
of volunteers serving as political soldiers of the Party. It was one of
the earliest formations of the Nazi Party and the original guardian of
the National Socialist movement. Founded in 1921 as a voluntary militant
formation, it was developed by the Nazi conspirators before their
accession to power into a vast private army and utilized for the purpose
of creating disorder, and terrorizing and eliminating political
opponents. It continued to serve as an instrument for the physical,
ideological and military training of Party members and as a reserve for
the German armed forces. After the launching of the wars of aggression,
referred to in Counts One and Two of the Indictment, the SA not only
operated as an organization for military training but provided auxiliary
police and security forces in occupied territories, guarded
prisoner-of-war camps and concentration camps and supervised and
controlled persons forced to labour in Germany and occupied territories.

Through its purposes and activities and the means it used, it
participated in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes set
forth in Counts One, Two, Three and Four of the Indictment.

       GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

The “General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces” referred
to in the Indictment consist of those individuals who between February
1938 and May 1945 were the highest commanders of the Wehrmacht, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces. The individuals comprising this
group are the persons who held the following appointments:

    Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander in Chief of the
    Navy)

    Chef (and, formerly, Chef des Stabes) der Seekriegsleitung
    (Chief of Naval War Staff)

    Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres (Commander in Chief of the Army)

    Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres (Chief of the General Staff of
    the Army)

    Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Commander in Chief of the Air
    Force)

    Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe (Chief of the General Staff
    of the Air Force)

    Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High Command
    of the Armed Forces)

    Chef des Fuehrungstabes des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief
    of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces)

    Stellvertretender Chef des Fuehrungstabes des Oberkommandos der
    Wehrmacht (Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of the High
    Command of the Armed Forces)

    Commanders-in-Chief in the field, with the status of
    Oberbefehlshaber, of the Wehrmacht, Navy, Army, Air Force.

Functioning in such capacities and in association as a group at the
highest level in the German Armed Forces Organization, these persons had
a major responsibility for the planning, preparation, initiation and
waging of illegal wars as set forth in Counts One and Two of the
Indictment and for the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved
in the execution of the common plan or conspiracy set forth in Counts
Three and Four of the Indictment.

                 *        *        *        *        *

                               APPENDIX C

    Charges and Particulars of Violations of International Treaties,
  Agreements and Assurances Caused by the Defendants in the Course of
              Planning, Preparing and Initiating the Wars

                                   I

CHARGE: _Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes signed at The Hague, 29 July, 1899._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, by force and arms, on the dates
specified in Column 1, invade the territory of the sovereigns specified
in Column 2, respectively, without first having attempted to settle its
disputes with said sovereigns by pacific means.

                _Column 1_                   _Column 2_
              6 April 1941            Kingdom of Greece
              6 April 1941            Kingdom of Yugoslavia

                                   II

CHARGE: _Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in
Column 1, by force of arms invade the territory of the sovereigns
specified in Column 2, respectively, without having first attempted to
settle its dispute with said sovereigns by pacific means.

            _Column 1_                    _Column 2_
          1 September 1939    Republic of Poland
          9 April 1940        Kingdom of Norway
          9 April 1940        Kingdom of Denmark
         10 May 1940          Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg
         10 May 1940          Kingdom of Belgium
         10 May 1940          Kingdom of the Netherlands
         22 June 1941         Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

                                  III

CHARGE: _Violation of Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of
Hostilities, signed 18 October 1907._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in
Column 1, commence hostilities against the countries specified in Column
2, respectively, without previous warning in the form of a reasoned
declaration of war or an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.

            _Column 1_                    _Column 2_
          1 September 1939    Republic of Poland
          9 April 1940        Kingdom of Norway
          9 April 1940        Kingdom of Denmark
         10 May 1940          Kingdom of Belgium
         10 May 1940          Kingdom of the Netherlands
         10 May 1940          Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg
         22 June 1941         Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

                                   IV

CHARGE: _Violation of Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, signed 18
October 1907._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in
Column 1, by force and arms of its military forces, cross into, invade,
and occupy the territories of the sovereigns specified in, Column 2,
respectively, then and thereby violating the neutrality of said
sovereigns.

            _Column 1_                    _Column 2_
          9 April 1940        Kingdom of Norway
          9 April 1940        Kingdom of Denmark
         10 May 1940          Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg
         10 May 1940          Kingdom of Belgium
         10 May 1940          Kingdom of the Netherlands
         22 June 1941         Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

                                   V

CHARGE: _Violation of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and
Associated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles, 28 June 1919, known
as the Versailles Treaty._

PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany did, on and after 7 March 1936,
maintain and assemble armed forces and maintain and construct military
fortifications in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland in violation
of the provisions of Articles 42 to 44 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(2) In that Germany did, on or about 13 March 1938, annex Austria into
the German Reich in violation of the provisions of Article 80 of the
Treaty of Versailles.

(3) In that Germany did, on or about 22 March 1939, incorporate the
district of Memel into the German Reich in violation of the provisions
of Article 99 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(4) In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939, incorporate the
Free City of Danzig into the German Reich in violation of the provisions
of Article 100 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(5) In that Germany did, on or about 16 March 1939, incorporate the
provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, formerly part of Czechoslovakia, into
the German Reich in violation of the provisions of Article 81 of the
Treaty of Versailles.

(6) In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and thereafter,
repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval and Air Clauses of
the Treaty of Versailles, by creating an air force, by use of compulsory
military service, by increasing the size of the army beyond treaty
limits, and by increasing the size of the navy beyond treaty limits,

                                   VI

CHARGE: _Violation of the Treaty between the United States and Germany
Restoring Friendly Relations, signed at Berlin, 25 August 1921._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and
thereafter, repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval and Air
Clauses of the Treaty Between the United States and Germany Restoring
Friendly Relations by creating an air force, by use of compulsory
military service, by increasing the size of the army beyond treaty
limits, and by increasing the size of the navy beyond treaty limits.

                                  VII

CHARGE: _Violation of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany,
Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy, done at Locarno, 16 October
1925._

PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936,
unlawfully send armed forces into the Rhineland demilitarized zone of
Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

(2) In that Germany did, on or about March 1936, and thereafter,
unlawfully maintain armed forces in the Rhineland demilitarized zone of
Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

(3) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936, and thereafter,
unlawfully construct and maintain fortifications in the Rhineland
demilitarized zone of Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty
of Mutual Guarantee.

(4) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully attack and
invade Belgium, in violation of Article 2 of the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee.

(5) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully attack and
invade Belgium, without first having attempted to settle its dispute
with Belgium by peaceful means, in violation of Article 3 of the Treaty
of Mutual Guarantee.

                                  VIII

CHARGE: _Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and
Czechoslovakia, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 15 March 1939, unlawfully
by duress and threats of military might force Czechoslovakia to deliver
the destiny of Czechoslovakia and its inhabitants into the hands of the
Fuehrer and Reichschancellor of Germany without having attempted to
settle its dispute with Czechoslovakia by peaceful means.

                                   IX

CHARGE: _Violation of the Arbitration Convention between Germany and
Belgium, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully
attack and invade Belgium without first having attempted to settle its
dispute with Belgium by peaceful means.

                                   X

CHARGE: _Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland,
done at Locarno, 16 October 1925._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939,
unlawfully attack and invade Poland without first having attempted to
settle its dispute with Poland by peaceful means.

                                   XI

CHARGE: _Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation entered
into between Germany and the Netherlands on 20 May 1926._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning and notwithstanding its
solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature
whatever which might arise between it and the Netherlands which were not
capable of settlement by diplomacy and which had not been referred by
mutual agreement to the Permanent Court of International Justice, did,
on or about 10 May 1940, with a Military force, attack, invade, and
occupy the Netherlands, thereby violating its neutrality and territorial
integrity and destroying its sovereign independence.

                                  XII

CHARGE: _Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation entered
into between Germany and Denmark on 2 June 1926._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its
solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature
whatever which might arise between it and Denmark which were not capable
of settlement by diplomacy and which had not been referred by mutual
agreement to the Permanent Court of International Justice, did, on or
about 9 April, 1940, with a Military Force, attack, invade, and occupy
Denmark, thereby violating its neutrality and territorial integrity and
destroying its sovereign independence.

                                  XIII

CHARGE: _Violation of Treaty between Germany and other Powers providing
for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, signed at
Paris 27 August 1928, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in
Column 1, with a military force, attack the sovereigns specified in
Column 2, respectively, and resort to war against such sovereigns, in
violation of its solemn declaration condemning recourse to war for the
solution of international controversies, its solemn renunciation of war
as an instrument of national policy in its relations with such
sovereigns, and its solemn covenant that settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or origin arising between it
and such sovereigns should never be sought except by pacific means.

               _Column 1_                 _Column 2_
          1 September 1939    Republic of Poland
          9 April 1940        Kingdom of Norway
          9 April 1940        Kingdom of Denmark
         10 May 1940          Kingdom of Belgium
         10 May 1940          Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg
         10 May 1940          Kingdom of the Netherlands
          6 April 1941        Kingdom of Greece
          6 April 1941        Kingdom of Yugoslavia
         22 June 1941         Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
         11 December 1941     United States of America

                                  XIV

CHARGE: _Violation of Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation entered
into between Germany and Luxembourg on 11 September 1929._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its
solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes which might
arise between it and Luxembourg which were not capable of settlement by
diplomacy, did, on or about 10 May 1940, with a military force, attack,
invade, and occupy Luxembourg, thereby violating its neutrality and
territorial integrity and destroying its sovereign independence.

                                   XV

CHARGE: _Violation of the Declaration of Non-Aggression entered into
between Germany and Poland on 26 January 1934._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany proceeding to the application of force for
the purpose of reaching a decision did, on or about 1 September 1939, at
various places along the German-Polish frontier employ military forces
to attack, invade and commit other acts of aggression against Poland.

                                  XVI

CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurance given on 21 May 1935 that the
Inviolability and Integrity of the Federal State of Austria would be
Recognized._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 12 March 1938, at various
points and places along the German-Austrian frontier, with a military
force and in violation of its solemn declaration and assurance, invade
and annex to Germany the territory of the Federal State of Austria.

                                  XVII

CHARGE: _Violation of Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany during the period from 12 February 1938 to
13 March 1938 did by duress and various aggressive acts, including the
use of military force, cause the Federal State of Austria to yield up
its sovereignty to the German State in violation of Germany’s agreement
to recognize the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria.

                                 XVIII

CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurances given on 30 January 1937, 28
April 1939, 26 August 1939 and 6 October 1939 to Respect the Neutrality
and Territorial Inviolability of the Netherlands._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and without recourse to
peaceful means of settling any considered differences did, on or about
10 May 1940, with a military force and in violation of its solemn
assurances, invade, occupy, and attempt to subjugate the sovereign
territory of the Netherlands.

                                  XIX

CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurances given on 30 January 1937, 13
October 1937, 28 April 1939, 26 August 1939 and 6 October 1939 to
Respect the Neutrality and Territorial Integrity and Inviolability of
Belgium._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, did on or about 10 May
1940, with a military force and in violation of its solemn assurances
and declarations, attack, invade, and occupy the sovereign territory of
Belgium.

                                   XX

CHARGE: _Violation of Assurances given on 11 March 1938 and 26 September
1938 to Czechoslovakia._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany, on or about 15 March 1939 did, by
establishing a Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, under duress and by
the threat of force, violate the assurance given on 11 March 1938 to
respect the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic and the
assurance given on 26 September 1938 that, if the so-called Sudeten
territories were ceded to Germany, no further German territorial claims
on Czechoslovakia would be made.

                                  XXI

CHARGE: _Violation of the Munich Agreement and Annexes of 29 September
1938._

PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany on or about 15 March 1939, did by
duress and the threat of military intervention force the Republic of
Czechoslovakia to deliver the destiny of the Czech people and country
into the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich.

(2) In that Germany refused and failed to join in an international
guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovakia state as provided
for in Annex No. 1 to the Munich Agreement.

                                  XXII

CHARGE: _Violation of the Solemn Assurance of Germany given on 3
September 1939, 28 April 1939 and 6 October 1939 that they would not
violate the Independence or Sovereignty of the Kingdom of Norway._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning did, on or about 9 April
1940, with its military and naval forces attack, invade and commit other
acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Norway.

                                 XXIII

CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurances given on 28 April 1939 and 26
August 1939 to Respect the Neutrality and Territorial Inviolability of
Luxembourg._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and without recourse to
peaceful means of settling any considered differences, did, on or about
10 May 1940, with a military force and in violation of the solemn
assurances, invade, occupy, and absorb into Germany the sovereign
territory of Luxembourg.

                                  XXIV

CHARGE: _Violation of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and
Denmark signed at Berlin 31 May 1939._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without prior warning did, on or about 9
April 1940, with its military forces attack, invade and commit other
acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Denmark.

                                  XXV

CHARGE: _Violation of Treaty of Non-Aggression entered into between
Germany and U.S.S.R. on 23 August 1939._

PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany did, on or about 22 June 1941, employ
military forces to attack and commit acts of aggression against the
U.S.S.R.

(2) In that Germany without warning or recourse to a friendly exchange
of views or arbitration did, on or about 22 June 1941, employ military
forces to attack and commit acts of aggression against the U.S.S.R.

                                  XXVI

CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurance given on 6 October 1939 to
Respect the Neutrality and Territorial Integrity of Yugoslavia._

PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without prior warning did, on or about 6
April 1941, with its military forces attack, invade and commit other
acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

                 *        *        *        *        *

               STATEMENT OF RESERVATION TO THE INDICTMENT

Upon the signing of the Indictment in Berlin on 6 October 1945, Justice
Jackson, on behalf of the United States, filed the following statement
of reservation with the Tribunal and with the Chief Prosecutors of
France, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia:

                                                              Berlin
                                                          6 October 1945

M. Francois de Menthon,
Sir Hartley Shawcross,
General R. A. Rudenko.

Dear Sirs:

In the Indictment of German War Criminals signed today, reference is
made to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and certain other territories as
being within the area of the USSR. This language is proposed by Russia
and is accepted to avoid the delay which would be occasioned by
insistence on an alteration in the text. The Indictment is signed
subject to this reservation and understanding.

I have no authority either to admit or to challenge, on behalf of the
United States of America, Soviet claims to sovereignty over such
territories. Nothing, therefore, in this Indictment is to be construed
as a recognition by the United States of such sovereignty or as
indicating any attitude, either on the part of the United States or on
the part of the undersigned, toward any claim to recognition of such
sovereignty.

                                              Respectfully submitted,
                                            [signed]  Robert H. Jackson
                                                      ROBERT H. JACKSON
                                  Chief of Counsel for the United States

                 *        *        *        *        *

To the Clerk or Recording Officer,
  International Military Tribunal:

The representative of the United States has found it necessary to make
certain reservations as to the possible bearing of certain language in
the Indictment upon political questions which are considered to be
irrelevant to the proceedings before this Tribunal. However, it is
considered appropriate to disclose such reservations that they may not
be unknown to the Tribunal in the event they should at any time be
considered relevant. For that purpose, the foregoing copy is filed.




                               Chapter IV
               MOTIONS, RULINGS, AND EXPLANATORY MATERIAL
                  RELATING TO CERTAIN OF THE DEFENDANTS


Although 24 individuals were named as defendants in the Indictment
signed in Berlin on 6 October 1945, only 22 remained as defendants when
the trial commenced on 20 November. The number had been reduced by the
suicide of Robert Ley and by the Tribunal’s severance of Gustav Krupp
von Bohlen und Halbach from the proceedings. Of the 22 surviving
defendants only 20 appeared in the prisoners’ dock at the opening of
court. Martin Bormann, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary,
was presumed to be alive and at large. Ernst Kaltenbrunner had been
hospitalized by a cranial hemorrhage, and as a consequence was unable to
be present at the trial save for one period of a few days.

Defense counsel for two of the twenty men in the prisoners’ dock, Hess
and Streicher, sought to have the proceedings against their clients
dismissed on the grounds of their mental incapacity to stand trial.
Expert medical examiners concluded that both defendants were fit to
defend themselves, and the proceedings against them were resumed. One of
them, Hess, who had claimed to be a victim of amnesia, created something
of a sensation by confessing in open court that he had only been
pretending to suffer from amnesia and that his memory was actually in
good repair.

Fuller explanatory notes concerning the positions taken by the
prosecution and the defense and the actions of the Tribunal in the cases
of each of these six defendants, together with significant papers
bearing on these matters, are printed hereinafter.


                             1. ROBERT LEY

Pending the opening of the trial on 20 November 1945 the defendants were
held in the prison at the Palace of Justice in Nurnberg, under the
custody of the United States Army. In the evening of October 25 the
guard on watch before the cell of Robert Ley noticed that the prisoner
had maintained the same position for some time without moving. The guard
entered the cell to find that although the prison officials had taken
every known precaution, Ley had succeeded in committing suicide. Ley had
ripped the hemmed edge from a towel, twisted it, soaked it in water, and
fashioned it into a crude noose which he fastened to an overhead toilet
flush pipe. He had then stuffed his mouth with rags, apparently torn
from his own underwear. When he seated himself, strangulation was
produced, and Robert Ley had succeeded in accomplishing his exit from
the court of judgment, and from the world of living men. A farewell
message written by Ley, together with other statements made by him
during imprisonment, may be found at the end of the last volume
(_Statements_ XI-XIII).


                 2. GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH

The name of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach stood thirteenth on the
list of twenty-four defendants accused in the Indictment signed in
Berlin on 6 October 1945. On 4 November counsel for Krupp filed a motion
requesting that the Tribunal defer proceedings against the defendant
until his health permitted him to stand trial, and that he should not be
tried in his absence. The Tribunal on 5 November appointed a medical
commission consisting of representatives of the Soviet Union, France,
Great Britain, and the United States, to examine Krupp and determine
whether he was fit to stand trial. On 12 November the Chief of Counsel
for the United States filed an answer opposing the motion of defense
counsel and proposing that Gustav Krupp should not be dismissed from the
proceedings unless Alfried Krupp, the son and sole owner of the Krupp
Works, were substituted as a defendant. On 14 November, before the
opening of the trial itself, the Tribunal heard oral argument by the
prosecution and defense, in which substantially the same views were
presented as had been previously expressed in the written motions.

The Tribunal on 15 November announced its ruling postponing the
proceedings against Gustav Krupp, but retaining the Indictment charges
against him on the docket for later trial if his physical and mental
condition should permit. The ruling stated that the question of adding
another name to the Indictment would be considered later. Thereupon, on
16 November, the American Chief of Counsel filed a memorandum with the
Tribunal stating as a matter of record that the United States was not
committed to participate in any subsequent four-power trial. On the same
day the Soviet and French Chief Prosecutors joined the United States
Chief of Counsel in a motion formally designating Alfried Krupp a
defendant. On the following day the Tribunal announced its ruling
rejecting the motion to add the name of Alfried Krupp as a defendant.

The significant papers pertaining to these questions are set forth
below.

 A. _MOTION BY DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
                  GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH_

                                              Nurnberg, 4 November 1945

THEODOR KLEFISCH
LAWYER
COLOGNE, 43, BLUMENTHALSTRASSE

To: The International Military Tribunal Nurnberg.

As defending counsel to the accused Dr. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und
Halbach I beg to state that the proceedings against this accused be
deferred until he is again fit for trial.

At any rate I request that the accused be not tried in his absence.

                               _Reasons_

By Article 12 of the Statute of the International Military Tribunal this
court has the right to try an accused in his absence if he cannot be
found, or if the court deem this necessary for other reasons in the
interest of justice.

The 75 year old accused Krupp von Bohlen has for a long time been
incapable of trial or examination owing to his severe physical and
mental infirmities. He is not in a position to be in contact with the
outside world nor to make or receive statements. The indictment was
served on him on the 19th October 1945 by a representative of the
International Military Tribunal by placing the document on his bed. The
accused had no knowledge of this event. Consequently he is not aware of
the existence of an indictment. Naturally therefore he is not capable of
communicating either with his defense counsel nor with other persons on
the subject of his defense.

To prove the above, 2 medical certificates are enclosed viz. that of the
court medical expert Doctor Karl Gersdorf of Werfen Salzburg of 9th
September 1945 and that of the Professor Doctor Otto Gerke of Bedgnstein
of 13th September.

Latterly Herr Krupp von Bohlen has been examined several times by
American military doctors. As far as it is possible I should like to
request for another complete medical examination. If the accused is
unable to appear before the court, then according to article 12 of the
statute he could only be tried if the court deemed it necessary in the
interests of justice.

Whatever may be understood by the phrase “in the interests of justice”
it would hardly be objective justice to try a defendant accused of such
serious crimes, if he were not informed of the contents of the
accusations or if he were not given the chance to conduct his own
defense or instruct a defense counsel. Particularly is he in no
condition to comprehend the following rights of an accused set out in
the statute:

1. By article 16 Section (a) of the statute a copy of the indictment in
a language which he understands will be served on the accused at a
suitably appointed time. In the first place this concerns the statement
which the accused has to render on inquiry as to whether he admits his
guilt or not, a statement which is of particular importance for the
course of the trial and for the decision of the tribunal. This is all
the more important as this statement regarding guilt or innocence can
only be made exclusively by the accused himself according to his own
judgment and after examining his conscience. So far as the procedure is
admissible at all, the defense counsel could not at the request of the
court express himself on the question of guilt as such a declaration
presupposes the possibility of communication and understanding with the
accused.

Also the defendant could not exercise the right to the last word to
which he is entitled according to Article 24 Section f.

The legislators who set up these guarantees for the defense, cannot wish
to deny them undeservedly to an accused who cannot make use of them
owing to illness. If by Article 12 of the statute the trial of an absent
defendant is allowed then this exception to the rule can only be applied
to a defendant who is unwilling to appear though able to do so. As is
the case with the criminal procedure rules of nearly all countries, it
is on this principle that the rules and regulations concerning the trial
of absent defendants are based.

                                                   [signed]  Klefisch
                                                                 Lawyer
B. _ANSWER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO THE MOTION FILED IN BEHALF OF KRUPP
                              VON BOHLEN_

To the International Military Tribunal:

The United States respectfully opposes the application on behalf of
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach that his trial be “deferred until he
is again fit for trial.”

If the Tribunal should grant this application, the practical effect
would be to quash all proceedings, for all time, against Krupp von
Bohlen.

It appears that Krupp should not be arrested and brought to the court
room for trial. But the plea is that the Tribunal also excuse him from
being tried _in absentia_. This form of trial admittedly is authorized
by Article 12 of the Charter of the Tribunal. Of course, trial _in
absentia_ in the circumstances of the case is an unsatisfactory
proceeding either for prosecution or for defense. But the request that
Krupp von Bohlen be neither brought to court nor tried in his absence is
based on the contention that “the interest of justice” requires that he
be thus excused from any form of trial. Public interests, which
transcend all private considerations, require that Krupp von Bohlen
shall not be dismissed unless some other representative of the Krupp
armament and munitions interests be substituted. These public interests
are as follows:

Four generations of the Krupp family have owned and operated the great
armament and munitions plants which have been the chief source of
Germany’s war supplies. For over 130 years this family has been the
focus, the symbol, and the beneficiary of the most sinister forces
engaged in menacing the peace of Europe. During the period between the
two World Wars the management of these enterprises was chiefly in
defendant Krupp von Bohlen. It was at all times, however, a Krupp family
enterprise. Krupp von Bohlen was only a nominal owner himself; his wife,
Bertha Krupp, owned the bulk of the stock. About 1937 their son, Alfried
Krupp, became plant manager and was actively associated in policy-making
and executive management thereafter. In 1940, Krupp von Bohlen, getting
on in years, became Chairman of the Board of the concerns, thus making
way for Alfried, who became President. In 1943, Alfried became sole
owner of the Krupp enterprises by agreement between the family and the
Nazi government, for the purpose of perpetuating this business in Krupp
family control. It is evident that the future menace of this concern
lies in continuance of the tradition under Alfried, now reported to be
an internee of the British Army of the Rhine.

To drop Krupp von Bohlen from this case without substitution of Alfried,
drops from the case the entire Krupp family, and defeats any effective
judgment against the German armament makers. Whether this would be “in
the interests of justice” will appear from the following recital of only
the most significant items of evidence now in possession of the United
States as to the activities of Krupp von Bohlen, in which his son
Alfried at all times aided, as did other associates in the vast armament
enterprises, all plotting to bring about the second World War, and to
aid in its ruthless and illegal conduct.

After the first World War, the Krupp family and their associates failed
to comply with Germany’s disarmament agreements, but all secretly and
knowingly conspired to evade them.

In the March 1, 1940 issue of the Krupp Magazine, the defendant Krupp
stated:

    “I wanted and had to maintain Krupp in spite of all opposition,
    as an armament plant for the later future, even if in
    camouflaged form. I could only speak in the smallest, most
    intimate circles, about the real reasons which made me undertake
    the changeover of the plants for certain lines of production. *
    * * Even the Allied snoop commissioners were duped. * * * After
    the accession to power of Adolf Hitler, I had the satisfaction
    of reporting to the Fuehrer that Krupp stood ready, after a
    short warming-up period, to begin rearmament of the German
    people without any gaps of experience * * *”

Krupp von Bohlen (and Alfried Krupp as well) lent his name, prestige,
and financial support to bring the Nazi Party, with an avowed program of
renewing the war, into power over the German State. On April 25, 1931
von Bohlen acted as chairman of the Association of German Industry to
bring it into line with Nazi policies. On May 30, 1933 he wrote to
Schacht that “it is proposed to initiate a collection in the most
far-reaching circles of German industry, including agriculture and the
banking world, which is to be put at the disposal of the Fuehrer of the
NSDAP in the name of ‘The Hitler Fund’ * * * I have accepted the
chairmanship of the management council.” Krupp contributed from the
treasury of the main Krupp company 4,738,446 Marks to the Nazi Party
fund. In June, 1935 he contributed 100,000 Marks to the Nazi Party out
of his personal account.

The Nazi Party did not succeed in obtaining control of Germany until it
obtained support of the industrial interests, largely through the
influence of Krupp. Alfried first became a Nazi Party member and later
von Bohlen did also. The Krupp influence was powerful in promoting the
Nazi plan to incite aggressive warfare in Europe.

Krupp von Bohlen strongly advocated and supported Germany’s withdrawal
from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. He
personally made repeated public speeches approving and inciting Hitler’s
program of aggression; on April 6th and 7th, 1938 two speeches approved
annexation of Austria; on October 13, 1938 he publicly approved Nazi
occupation of the Sudetenland; on September 4, 1939 he approved the
invasion of Poland; on May 6, 1941 he spoke commemorating the success of
Nazi arms in the West. Alfried Krupp also made speeches to the same
general effect. The Krupps were thus one of the most persistent and
influential forces that made this war.

The Krupps also were the chief factor in getting ready for the war. In
January, 1944 in a speech at the University of Berlin, von Bohlen
boasted, “Through years of secret work, scientific and basic groundwork
was laid in order to be ready again to work for the German Armed Forces
at the appointed hour without loss of time or experience.” In 1937,
before Germany went to war, the Krupps booked orders to equip satellite
governments on approval of the German High Command. Krupp contributed
20,000 Marks to the defendant Rosenberg for the purpose of spreading
Nazi propaganda abroad. In a memorandum of October 12, 1939, a Krupp
official wrote offering to mail propaganda pamphlets abroad at Krupp
expense.

Once the war was on, Krupps, both von Bohlen and Alfried being directly
responsible therefor, led German industry in violating treaties and
International Law by employing enslaved laborers, impressed and imported
from nearly every country occupied by Germany, and by compelling
prisoners of war to make arms and munitions for use against their own
countries. There is ample evidence that in Krupp’s custody and service
they were underfed and overworked, misused and inhumanly treated.
Captured records show that in September, 1944, Krupp concerns were
working 54,990 foreign workers and 18,902 prisoners of war.

Moreover, the Krupp companies profited greatly from destroying the peace
of the world through support of the Nazi program. The rearmament of
Germany gave Krupp huge orders and corresponding profits. Before this
Nazi menace to the peace began, the Krupps were operating at a
substantial loss. But the net profits after taxes, gifts and reserves
steadily rose with rise of Nazi rearmament, being as follows:

                                                      _Marks_
         For year ending Sept. 30, 1935                57,216,392
         For year ending Sept. 30, 1938                97,071,632
         For year ending Sept. 30, 1941               111,555,216

The book value of the Krupp concerns mounted from 75,962,000 Marks on
October 1, 1933 to 237,316,093 Marks on October 1, 1943. Even this
included many going concerns in occupied countries carried at a book
value of only 1 Mark each. These figures are subject to the adjustments
and controversies usual with financial statements of each vast
enterprise but approximately reflect the facts about property and
operations.

The services of Alfried Krupp and of von Bohlen and their family to the
war aims of the Nazi Party were so outstanding that the Krupp
enterprises were made a special exception to the policy of
nationalization of industries. Hitler said that he would be “prepared to
arrange for any possible safeguarding for the continued existence of the
works as a family enterprise; it would be simplest to issue ‘lex Krupp’
to start with.” After short negotiations, this was done. A decree of
November 12, 1943 preserves the Krupp works as a family enterprise in
Alfried Krupp’s control and recites that it is done in recognition of
the fact that “for 132 years the firm of Fried. Krupp, as a family
enterprise has achieved outstanding and unique merits for the armed
strength of the German people.”

It has at all times been the position of the United States that the
great industrialists of Germany were guilty of the crimes charged in
this Indictment quite as much as its politicians, diplomats, and
soldiers. Its Chief of Counsel on June 7, 1945, in a report to President
Truman, released by him and with his approval, stated that the
accusations of crimes include individuals in authority in the financial,
industrial, and economic life of Germany, as well as others.

Pursuant thereto, the United States, with approval of the Secretary of
State, proposed to indict Alfried Krupp, son of Krupp von Bohlen, and
President and owner of the Krupp concern. The Prosecutors representing
the Soviet Union, the French Republic, and the United Kingdom
unanimously opposed inclusion of Alfried Krupp. This is not said in
criticism of them or their judgment. The necessity of limiting the
number of defendants was considered by representatives of the other
three nations to preclude the addition of Alfried Krupp. Learning the
serious condition of Krupp von Bohlen, immediately upon service of the
Indictment, the United States again called a meeting of Prosecutors and
proposed an amendment to include Alfried Krupp. Again the proposal of
the United States was defeated by a vote of three-to-one. If now the
Tribunal shall exercise its discretion to excuse from trial the one
indicted member of the Krupp family, one of the chief purposes of the
United States will be defeated, and it is submitted that such a result
is not “in the interests of justice.”

The United States respectfully submits that no greater disservice to the
future peace of the world could be done than to excuse the entire Krupp
family and the armament enterprise from this trial in which aggressive
war-making is sought to be condemned. The “interests of justice” cannot
be determined without taking into account justice to the men of four
generations whose lives have been taken or menaced by Krupp munitions
and Krupp armament, and those of the future who can feel no safety if
such persons as this escape all condemnation in proceedings such as
this.

While of course the United States can not, without the concurrence of
one other power, indict a new defendant, it can under the Charter alone
oppose this Motion. The United States respectfully urges that if the
favor now sought by Krupp von Bohlen is to be granted, it be upon the
condition that Alfried Krupp be substituted or added as a defendant so
that there may be a representative of the Krupp interests before the
Tribunal.

It may be suggested that bringing in a new defendant would result in
delay. Admitting, however, that a delay which cannot exceed a few days
may be occasioned, it is respectfully suggested that the precise day
that this trial will start is a less important consideration than
whether it is to fail of one of its principal purposes. The American
Prosecution Staff has been by long odds the longest and farthest away
from home in this endeavor. On personal, as well as public interest
considerations, it deplores delay. But we think the future, as well as
the contemporary world, cannot fail to be shocked if, in a trial in
which it is sought to condemn aggressive war-making, the Krupp
industrial empire is completely saved from condemnation.

The complete trial brief of the United States on Krupp von Bohlen, with
copies of the documents on which his culpability is asserted, will be
made available to the Tribunal if it is desired as evidence concerning
him and Alfried Krupp and the Krupp concerns.

Respectfully submitted:

                                           [signed]  Robert H. Jackson
                                                    ROBERT H. JACKSON,
                     Chief of Counsel for the United States of America.
 12 November 1945.
            C. _RULING OF THE TRIBUNAL ON 15 NOVEMBER 1945_

  IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF COUNSEL FOR KRUPP VON BOHLEN FOR
         POSTPONEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THIS DEFENDANT

Council for Gustav Krupp von Bohlen has applied to the Tribunal for
postponement of the proceedings against this defendant on the ground
that his physical and mental condition are such that he is incapable of
understanding the proceedings against him and of presenting any defence
that he may have.

On November 5, the Tribunal appointed a medical commission composed of
the following physicians: R. E. Tunbridge, Brigadier, O.B.E., M.D.,
M.Sc., F.R.C.P., Consulting Physician, British Army of the Rhine; Rene
Piedelievre, M.D., professor a la Faculte de Medicine de Paris; Expert
pres les Tribuneaux; Nicolas Kurshakov, M.D., Professor of Medicine,
Medical Institute of Moscow; Chief Internist, Commissariat of Public
Health, U.S.S.R.; Eugene Sepp, M.D., Emeritus Professor of Neurology,
Medical Institute of Moscow; Member, Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R.;
Eugene Krasnushkin, M.D.; Professor of Psychiatry, Medical Institute of
Moscow; Bertram Schaffner, Major, Medical Corps, Neuropsychiatrist, Army
of the United States.

The Commission has reported to the Tribunal that it is unanimously of
the opinion that Krupp von Bohlen suffers from senile softening of the
brain; that his mental condition is such that he is incapable of
understanding court procedure and of understanding or cooperating in
interrogations; that his physical state is such that he cannot be moved
without endangering his life; and that his condition is unlikely to
improve but rather will deteriorate further.

The Tribunal accepts the findings of the medical commission to which
exception is taken neither by the Prosecution nor by the Defense.

Article 12 of the Charter authorizes the trial of a defendant _in
absentia_ if found by the Tribunal to be “necessary in the interests of
justice”. It is contended on behalf of the Chief Prosecutors that in the
interests of justice Krupp von Bohlen should be tried _in absentia_,
despite his physical and mental condition.

It is the decision of the Tribunal that upon the facts presented the
interests of justice do not require that Krupp von Bohlen be tried _in
absentia_. The Charter of the Tribunal envisages a fair trial in which
the Chief Prosecutors may present the evidence in support of an
indictment and the defendants may present such defence as they may
believe themselves to have. Where nature rather than flight or contumacy
has rendered such a trial impossible, it is not in accordance with
justice that the case should proceed in the absence of a defendant.

For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal _Orders that_:

1. The application for postponement of the proceeding against Gustav
Krupp von Bohlen is granted.

2. The charges in the indictment against Gustav Krupp von Bohlen shall
be retained upon the docket of the Tribunal for trial hereafter, if the
physical and mental condition of the Defendant should permit.

Further questions raised by the Chief Prosecutors, including the
question of adding another name to the Indictment, will be considered
later.

      D. _MEMORANDUM FILED BY THE UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL_

TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

The United States, by its Chief of Counsel, respectfully shows:

The order of the Tribunal, that “The charges in the indictment against
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen shall be retained upon the docket of the
Tribunal for trial hereafter, if the physical and mental condition of
the Defendant should permit,” requires the United States to make clear
its attitude toward subsequent trials, which may have been
misapprehended by the Tribunal, in order that no inference be drawn from
its silence.

The United States never has committed itself to participate in any Four
Power trial except the one now pending. The purpose of accusing
organizations and groups as criminal was to reach, through subsequent
and more expeditious trials before Military Government or military
courts, a large number of persons. According to estimates of the United
States Army, a finding that the organizations presently accused are
criminal organizations would result in the trial of approximately
130,000 persons now held in the custody of the United States Army; and I
am uninformed as to those held by others. It has been the great purpose
of the United States from the beginning to bring into this one trial all
that is necessary by way of defendants and evidence to reach the large
number of persons responsible for the crimes charged without going over
the entire evidence again. We, therefore, desire that it be a matter of
record that the United States has not been, and is not by this order,
committed to participate in any subsequent Four Power trial. It reserves
freedom to determine that question after the capacity to handle one
trial under difficult conditions has been tested.

Respectfully submitted:

                                          [signed]  Robert H. Jackson
                                                   ROBERT H. JACKSON,
                                 Chief of Counsel for the United States
 16 November 1945
  E. _MOTION BY THE SOVIET, FRENCH, AND AMERICAN CHIEF PROSECUTORS TO
                DESIGNATE ALFRIED KRUPP AS A DEFENDANT_

TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL:

Upon the Indictment, the motion of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach
and the answers thereto, and all proceedings had thereunder, the
Committee of Prosecutors created under the Charter hereby designates
Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach as a defendant and respectfully
moves that the Indictment be amended by adding the name of Alfried Krupp
von Bohlen und Halbach as a defendant, and by the addition of
appropriate allegations in reference to him in the Appendix A thereof.
It also moves that the time of Alfried Krupp be shortened from thirty
days to December 2, 1945. For this purpose, the Committee of Prosecutors
adopts and ratifies the Answer filed on behalf of the United States on
November 12, 1945 in response to the Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach
motion, and the motion made by Robert H. Jackson in open Court on behalf
of the United States of America, The Soviet Union, and The Provisional
Government of France. This motion is authorized by a resolution adopted
at a meeting of the Committee of Prosecutors held on November 16, 1945.

                                                  [signed]  Pokrovsky
                            For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
                                        [signed]  Francois de Menthon
                               For the Provisional Government of France
                                          [signed]  Robert H. Jackson
                                      For the United States of America.
 16 November 1945.
 F. _RULING OF THE TRIBUNAL REJECTING THE PROSECUTION’S MOTION TO NAME
                     ALFRIED KRUPP AS A DEFENDANT_

                    INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
           Sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 17 November 1945,
                         In session 1500 hours

THE PRESIDENT: The motion to amend the indictment by adding the name of
Alfried Krupp has been considered by the Tribunal in all its aspects and
the application is rejected.

The Tribunal will now adjourn.

(Whereupon at 1505 the Tribunal adjourned.)


                           3. MARTIN BORMANN

As the day of the trial approached, Martin Bormann, although named as a
defendant in the Indictment, had not yet been apprehended despite the
efforts of numerous special investigators. On 17 November 1945 the
Tribunal requested the views of the prosecution on the question of trial
_in absentia_. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Deputy Chief Prosecutor of Great
Britain, reviewed the information available and, on behalf of the United
States and France as well as Great Britain, stated that: “The
prosecution cannot say that the matter is beyond a probability that
Bormann is dead. There is still the clear possibility that he is alive.”
Notice had been publicly given, in the manner prescribed by the
Tribunal, that Bormann had been named a defendant, and it was therefore
suggested that the case fell within Article 12 of the Charter
authorizing trial _in absentia_. The Soviet representative expressed
concurrence; whereupon Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding, orally
announced the Tribunal’s ruling, on the same date:

    “The Tribunal has decided that, in pursuance of Article 12 of
    the Charter, it will try the Defendant Bormann in his absence,
    and it announces that counsel for the Defendant Bormann will be
    appointed to defend him.”

Thereafter, the counsel named to defend Bormann moved for postponement
of the proceedings against the defendant. The Tribunal announced on 22
November through Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding, that:

    “* * * in view of the fact that the provisions of the Charter
    and the Tribunal’s rule of procedure have been strictly carried
    out in the notices which have been given, and the fact that
    counsel for Bormann will have ample time before they are called
    upon to present defense on his behalf, the motion is denied.”


                         4. ERNST KALTENBRUNNER

On 18 November 1945, two days before the opening of the trial,
Kaltenbrunner suffered a spontaneous subarachanoid hemorrhage and was
taken to the hospital for treatment. He remained there until 6 December,
when he was returned to the jail. He attended the 10 December session of
the Tribunal and was in court for several days thereafter, but his
condition deteriorated so that it was necessary to return him to the
hospital for further treatment. Medical opinion expects at this writing
(23 January), that he will be required to remain under hospital care for
a considerable period.

On 2 January Kaltenbrunner’s counsel, Dr. Kauffmann, requested the
Tribunal to postpone the case against his client because of his illness.
The Tribunal ruled (1) that the prosecution should proceed with any
evidence which it proposed to direct against the criminality of
organizations with which Kaltenbrunner was connected, (2) that any
prosecution evidence directed against Kaltenbrunner as an individual
should be withheld until the prosecution reached that part of its case
in which it had planned to trace the responsibility of individual
defendants, and (3) that Kaltenbrunner’s case should properly be left
until the end of this section of the evidence. If at that time the
defendant should be still unable to be present in court, the Tribunal
ruled that “the evidence will have to be given in his absence.”

A closed session followed at which the Tribunal heard both the
prosecution and defense counsel, as a result of which the Tribunal
modified its ruling. Since the prosecution’s evidence was so
inextricably mingled that it was impossible to divide it between that
which bore against Kaltenbrunner as an individual and that which bore
against the organizations which he headed, the Tribunal ruled that it
would hear the prosecution’s evidence in its entirety. Counsel for
Kaltenbrunner, however, was given the privilege of cross-examining at a
later date any witnesses which the prosecution might call against
Kaltenbrunner. The Tribunal pointed out that defense counsel would also,
of course, have an opportunity to deal with any documentary evidence
against Kaltenbrunner when the time came for the presentation of the
defense case.


                          5. JULIUS STREICHER

Counsel for Streicher orally requested the Tribunal, on 15 November
1945, to appoint a commission to make a psychiatric examination of the
defendant. This was requested for the Defense Counsel’s “own
protection”, although the defendant thought himself normal and did not
wish an examination. The Tribunal directed the Defense Counsel to make
his motion in writing. The Soviet prosecutor suggested to the Tribunal
the desirability of having such an examination, if it were necessary at
all, while medical experts from the Soviet Union remained in Nurnberg.
Subsequently a panel of three medical experts examined Streicher and
reported that he was fit to stand trial. The Tribunal thereupon ruled,
Lord Justice Lawrence making the announcement orally in court on 22
November, that

    “* * * the Tribunal wishes me to announce the decision on the
    application made on behalf of the Defendant Julius Streicher by
    his counsel that his condition should be examined. It has been
    examined by three medical experts on behalf of the Tribunal and
    their report has been submitted to and considered by the
    Tribunal; and it is as follows:

    “‘1. The Defendant Julius Streicher is sane.

    “‘2. The Defendant Julius Streicher is fit to appear before the
    Tribunal, and to present his defense.

    “‘3. It being the unanimous conclusion of the examiners that
    Julius Streicher is sane, he is for that reason capable of
    understanding the nature and policy of his acts during the
    period of time covered by the indictment.’

    “The Tribunal accepts the report of the medical experts and the
    trial against Julius Streicher will, therefore, proceed.”


                             6. RUDOLF HESS

Through his pre-trial confinement in the Nurnberg prison, Hess had
consistently maintained that he was suffering from amnesia and therefore
could not remember facts concerning his previous activities. In order to
determine Hess’ mental state the Tribunal appointed a commission of
psychiatric experts from the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and
France, to examine the defendant and furnish a report. After receiving
the medical report the Tribunal directed that oral argument by the
prosecution and defense counsel should be heard on 30 November 1945
concerning the issues raised by the medical report. Prior to the oral
argument, both the prosecution and defense filed written motions which
outlined substantially the positions later taken in court.

At the conclusion of the oral arguments, the Tribunal called upon Hess
for a statement. Hess thereupon announced that he had simulated loss of
memory for tactical reasons and that his memory was “again in order.” On
the following day the Tribunal ruled that Hess was capable of standing
trial and that his case would proceed.

The papers pertaining to these matters are set out below.

A. _RULING OF THE TRIBUNAL ORDERING ARGUMENT ON THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY
                          THE MEDICAL REPORTS_

1. Counsel for the defendant Hess has made application to the Tribunal
to appoint an expert designated by the medical faculty of the University
of Zurich or of Lausanne to examine the defendant Hess with reference to
his mental competence and capacity to stand trial. This application is
denied.

2. The Tribunal has designated a commission composed of the following
members:

    Eugene Krasnuchkin, M.D., Professor Psychiatry,
      Medical Institute of Moscow, assisted by
    Eugene Sepp, M.D., Professor Neurology,
      Medical Institute of Moscow
      Member, Academy of Medical Sciences, USSR; and,
    Nicolas Kuraskov, M.D., Professor of Medicine
      Medical Institute of Moscow,
      Chief Internist, Commissariat of Public Health, USSR.
    Lord Moran, M.D., F.R.C.P.
      President of the Royal College of Physicians, assisted by
    Dr. T. Reece, M.D., F.R.C.P.
      Chief Consultant Psychiatrist to the War Office, and
    Dr. George Ruddock, M.D., F.R.C.P.
      Director of Neurology to the London Hospital and
      Chief Consultant Neurologist to the War Office
    Dr. Nolan D. C. Lewis, assisted by
    Dr. D. Ewen Cameron and
    Col. Paul Schroeder, M.D.
    Professor Jean Delay.

The Tribunal has requested the commission to examine the defendant Hess
and furnish a report on the mental state of the defendant with
particular reference to the question whether he is able to take his part
in the trial, specifically: (1) Is the defendant able to plead to the
indictment? (2) Is the defendant sane or not, and on this last issue the
Tribunal wishes to be advised whether the defendant is of sufficient
intellect to comprehend the course of the proceedings of the trial so as
to make a proper defense, to challenge a witness to whom he might wish
to object and to understand the details of the evidence.

3. The examiners have presented their reports to the Tribunal in the
form which commends itself to them. It is directed that copies of the
reports be furnished to each of the Chief Prosecutors and to defense
counsel. The Tribunal will hear argument by the Prosecution and by
defense counsel on the issues presented by the reports on Friday,
November 30 at 4 P. M.

                    INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
                                          [signed]  Geoffrey Lawrence
                                                    Geoffrey Lawrence
                                                              President
 Dated Nurnberg, Germany this 24th day of November, 1945
 Copies of four (4) Medical Reports attached:
                      _(1) British Medical Report_

REPORT on Rudolf Hess, telephoned from London.

“The undersigned, having seen and examined Rudolf Hess, have come to the
following conclusion:

1. There are no relevant physical abnormalities.

2. His mental state is of a mixed type. He is an unstable man, and what
is technically called a psychopathic personality. The evidence of his
illness in the past four years, as presented by one of us who has had
him under his care in England, indicates that he has had a delusion of
poisoning, and other similar paranoid ideas.

Partly as a reaction to the failure of his mission, these abnormalities
got worse, and led to suicidal attempts.

In addition, he has a marked hysterical tendency, which has led to the
development of various symptoms, notably a loss of memory, which lasted
from November 1943 to June 1944, and which resisted all efforts at
treatment. A second loss of memory began in February 1945 and lasted
till the present. This amnesic symptom will eventually clear, when
circumstances change.

3. At the moment he is not insane in the strict sense. His loss of
memory will not entirely interfere with his comprehension of the
proceedings, but it will interfere with his ability to make his defense,
and to understand details of the past, which arise in evidence.

4. We recommend that further evidence should be obtained by
narco-analysis and that if the Court decides to proceed with the Trial,
the question should afterwards be reviewed on psychiatric grounds.”

                                                        [signed]  Moran
                                                      J. Rees, MD, FRCP
                                                         George Riddoch
 Dated 19th November, 1945
             _(2) Joint American and French Medical Report_
                                                       20 November 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Brigadier General Wm. L. Mitchell, General Secretary for
the International Military Tribunal.

In response to request of the Tribunal that the defendant Rudolf Hess be
examined, the undersigned psychiatrists examined Rudolf Hess on November
15th and 19th, 1945, in his cell in the Military Prison in Nurnberg.

The following examinations were made: physical, neurological and
psychological.

In addition, documents were studied bearing information concerning his
personal development and career. Reports concerning the period of his
stay in England were scrutinized. The results of all psychological,
special psychometric examinations and observations carried out by the
prison psychiatrist and his staff were studied. Information was also
derived from the official interrogation of the defendant on November
14th and November 16th, 1945.

(1) We find, as a result of our examinations and investigations, that
Rudolf Hess is suffering from hysteria characterized in part by loss of
memory. The nature of this loss of memory is such that it will not
interfere with his comprehension of the proceedings, but it will
interfere with his response to questions relating to his past and will
interfere with his undertaking his defense.

In addition there is a conscious exaggeration of his loss of memory and
a tendency to exploit it to protect himself against examination.

(2) We consider that the existing hysterical behaviour which the
defendant reveals was initiated as a defense against the circumstances
in which he found himself while in England; that it has now become in
part habitual and that it will continue as long as he remains under the
threat of imminent punishment, even though it may interfere with his
undertaking a more normal form of defense.

(3) It is the unanimous conclusion of the undersigned that Rudolf Hess
is not insane at the present time in the strict sense of the word.

                                                 (s)  D. Ewen Cameron
                                                  DR. D. EWEN CAMERON
                            Professor of Psychiatrie, McGill University
                                               (s)  Paul L. Schroeder
                                               COL. PAUL L. SCHROEDER
                                     A.U.S. Neuropsychiatric Consultant
                                                      (s)  Jean Delay
                                                       DR. JEAN DELAY
           Professor of Psychiatrie at the Faculty of Medicine in Paris
                                               (s)  Nolan D. C. Lewis
                                                DR. NOLAN D. C. LEWIS
                              Professor Psychiatry, Columbia University
                      _(3) Soviet Medical Report_

TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

In pursuance of the assignment by the Tribunal, we, the medical experts
of the Soviet Delegation, together with the physicians of the English
Delegation and in the presence of one representative of the American
Medical Delegation, have examined Rudolf Hess and made a report on our
examination of Mr. Hess together with our conclusions and interpretation
of the behavior of Mr. Hess.

The statement of the general conclusions has been signed only by the
physicians of the Soviet Delegation and by Professor Delay, the medical
expert of the French Delegation.

Appendix: 1 Conclusions and 2 the Report on the examination of Mr. Hess.

                                     (signed)  Professor Krasnushkin,
                                                     Doctor of Medicine
                                            (signed)  Professor Sepp,
                              Honorary Scientist, Regular Member of the
                                                    Academy of Medicine
                                        (signed)  Professor Kushakov,
                          Doctor of Medicine, Chief Therapeutist of the
                                 Commissariat of Health of the U.S.S.R.
 November 17, 1945
                           (_a_) Conclusions

After observation and an examination of Rudolf Hess the undersigned have
reached the following conclusions:

1. No essential physical deviations from normality were observed.

2. His mental conditions are of a mixed type. He is an unstable person,
which in technical terms is called a psychopathic personality. The data
concerning his illness during the period of the last four years
submitted by one of us who had him under observation in England, show
that he had a delusion of being poisoned and other similar paranoic
notions.

Partly as a reaction to the failure of his mission there, the abnormal
manifestations increased and led to attempts at suicide. In addition to
the above-mentioned he has noticeable hysterical tendencies which caused
a development of various symptoms, primarily, of amnesia that lasted
from November 1943 to June of 1944 and resisted all attempts to be
cured.

The amnesia symptom may disappear with changing circumstances.

The second period of amnesia started in February of 1945 and has lasted
up through the present.

3. At present he is not insane in the strict sense of the word. His
amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding what is going
on around him but it will interfere with his ability to conduct his
defense and to understand details of the past which would appear as
factual data.

4. To clarify the situation we recommend that a narco-analysis be
performed on him and, if the Court decides to submit him to trial, the
problem should be subsequently reexamined again from a psychiatric point
of view.

The conclusion reached on November 14 by the physicians of the British
Delegation, Lord Moran, Dr. T. Rees and Dr. G. Riddoch, and the
physicians of the Soviet Delegation, Professors Krasnushkin, Sepp, and
Kurshakov, was also arrived at on November 15 by the representative of
the French Delegation, Professor Jean Delay.

After an examination of Mr. Hess which took place on November 15, 1945,
the undersigned Professors and experts of the Soviet Delegation,
Krasnushkin, Sepp and Kurshakov, and Professor Jean Delay, the expert
from the French Delegation, have agreed on the following statement:

Mr. Hess categorically refused to be submitted to narco-analysis and
resisted all other procedures intended to effect a cure of his amnesia,
and stated that he would agree to undergo treatment only after the
trial. The behavior of Mr. Hess makes it impossible to apply the methods
suggested in Paragraph 4 of the report of November 14 and to follow the
suggestion of that Paragraph in present form.

                                     (signed)  Professor Krasnushkin,
                                                     Doctor of Medicine
                                            (signed)  Professor Sepp,
                              Honorary Scientist, Regular Member of the
                                                    Academy of Medicine
                                       (signed)  Professor Kurshakov,
                           Doctor of Medicine, Chief Theraputist of the
                                 Commissariat of Health of the U.S.S.R.
                                       (signed)  Professor Jean Delay
                                     of the School of Medicine in Paris
 November 16, 1945
               (_b_) Record of Examination of Rudolf Hess

According to the information obtained on Nov. 16, 1945, during the
interrogation of Rosenberg who had seen Hess immediately before the
latter’s flight to England, Hess gave no evidence of any abnormality
either in appearance or conversation. He was, as usual, quiet and
composed. Nor was it apparent that he might have been nervous. Prior to
this, he was a calm person, habitually suffering pains in the region of
the stomach.

As can be judged on the basis of the report of the English psychiatrist,
Doctor Rees, who had Hess under observation from the first days of his
flight to England, Hess, after the airplane crash, disclosed no evidence
of a brain injury, but, upon arrest and incarceration, he began to give
expression to ideas of persecution. He feared that he would be poisoned,
or killed and his death represented as a suicide, and that all this
would be done by the English under the hypnotic influence of the Jews.
Furthermore, these delusions of persecution were maintained up to the
news of the catastrophe suffered by the German Army at Stalingrad when
the manifestations were replaced by amnesia. According to Doctor Rees,
the delusions of persecution and the amnesia were observed not to take
place simultaneously. Furthermore, there were two attempts at suicide. A
knife wound, inflicted during the second attempt, in the skin near the
heart gave evidence of a clearly hysterico-demonstrative character.
After this there was again observed a change from amnesia to delusions
of persecution, and during this period he wrote that he was simulating
his amnesia, and, finally, again entered into a state of amnesia which
has been prolonged up to the present.

According to the examination of Rudolf Hess on Nov. 14, 1945, the
following was disclosed.

Hess complains of frequent cramping pains in the region of the stomach
which appear independent of the taking of food, and headaches in the
frontal lobes during mental strain, and, finally, of loss of memory.

In general his condition is marked by a pallor of the skin and a
noticeable reduction in food intake.

Regarding the internal organs of Hess, the pulse is 92, and a shakening
of the heart tone is noticeable. There has been no change in the
condition of the other internal organs.

Concerning the neurological aspect, there are no symptoms of organic
impairment of the nervous system.

Psychologically, Hess is in a state of clear consciousness; knows that
he is in prison at Nurnberg under indictment as a war criminal; has
read, and, according to his own words, is acquainted with the charges
against him. He answers questions rapidly and to the point. His speech
is coherent, his thoughts formed with precision and correctness and they
are accompanied by sufficient emotionally expressive movements. Also,
there is no kind of evidence of paralogism. It should also be noted
here, that the present psychological examination, which was conducted by
Lieut. Gilbert, M.D., bears out the testimony that the intelligence of
Hess is normal and in some instances above the average. His movements
are natural and not forced.

He has expressed no delirious fancies nor does he give any delirious
explanation for the painful sensation in his stomach or the loss of
memory, as was previously attested to by Doctor Rees, namely, when Hess
ascribed them to poisoning. At the present time, to the question about
the reason for his painful sensations and the loss of memory, Hess
answers that this is for the doctors to know. According to his own
assertions, he can remember almost nothing of his former life. The gaps
in Hess’ memory are ascertained only on the basis of the subjective
changing of his testimony about his inability to remember this or that
person or event given at different times. What he knows at the present
time is, in his own words, what he allegedly learned only recently from
the information of those around him and the films which have been shown
him.

On Nov. 14 Hess refused the injection of narcotics which were offered
for the purpose of making an analysis of his psychological condition. On
Nov. 15, in answer to Prof. Delay’s offer, he definitely and firmly
refused narcosis and explained to him that, in general, he would take
all measures to cure his amnesia only upon completion of the trial.

All that has been exposed above, we are convinced, permits, of the
interpretation that the deviation from the norm in the behavior of Hess
takes the following forms:

I. In the psychological personality of Hess there are no changes typical
of the progressive schizophrenic disease, and therefore the delusions,
from which he suffered periodically while in England, cannot be
considered as manifestations of a schizophrenic paranoia, and must be
recognized as the expression of a psychogenic paranoic reaction, that
is, the psychologically comprehensible reaction of an unstable
(psychologically) personality to the situation (the failure of his
mission, arrest and incarceration). Such an interpretation of the
delirious statements of Hess in England is bespoken by their
disappearance, appearance and repeated disappearance depending on
external circumstances which affected the mental state of Hess.

II. The loss of memory of Hess is not the result of some kind of mental
disease but represents hysterical amnesia, the basis of which is a
subconscious inclination toward self-defense as well as a deliberate and
conscious tendency toward it. Such behavior often terminates when the
hysterical person is faced with an unavoidable necessity of conducting
himself correctly. Therefore, the amnesia of Hess may end upon his being
brought to trial.

III. Rudolf Hess, prior to his flight to England, did not suffer from
any kind of insanity, nor is he now suffering from it. At the present
time he exhibits hysterical behavior with signs of a
conscious-intentional (simulated) character, which does not exonerate
him from his responsibility under the indictment.

                                     (signed)  Professor Krasnushkin,
                                                     Doctor of Medicine
                                            (signed)  Professor Sepp,
                              Honorary Scientist, Regular Member of the
                                                    Academy of Medicine
                                       (signed)  Professor Kurshakov,
                           Doctor of Medicine, Chief Theraputist of the
                                 Commissariat of Health of the U.S.S.R.
 17 November 1945
 B. _MOTION BY DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
                                 HESS_

Attorney-at-law von Rohrscheidt
Defense Counsel for Rudolf Hess

                                             Nurnberg, 29 November 1945

To the General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal,
Nurnberg:

_Reference: Rudolf Hess—Session of 30 November 1945._

I. Reply to the request of the Tribunal of 28 November 1945.

II. Preparatory statement for the trial.

                                   I

I, as Counsel for the Defendant Hess, answer the request of the Tribunal
of 28 November 1945 as follows:

1. No formal objection is being raised by Defense against presentation
and use of the expert opinions obtained by the Tribunal.

2. The Defense does not think the defendant Hess to be
“verhandlungsfaehig” (in a state of health to be tried).

3. Material objections are being raised by the Defense, inasmuch as the
expert opinion denies the competence of the defendant as a consequence
of a mental disorder.

                                   II

For the proceedings, I, as Counsel for the Defendant Hess, wish to make
the following statement:

1. _I move_:

_a._ That a decision be made to adjourn the proceedings against the
defendant temporarily.

_b._ That in case incapacity to be tried is asserted, proceedings in
absentia against the defendant should not be carried on.

_c._ That in case my motion _ad a_ is rejected, a super expert opinion
be obtained from additional eminent psychiatrists.

2. I _argue_ these motions as follows:

_ad 1-a_:  The adjournment of the proceedings is necessary because of the
           unfitness of the defendant to follow them.

In this respect the (medical) opinions state unanimously upon the
questions asked by the Tribunal, that “the ability of the Defendant Hess
is impaired to the extent that he cannot defend himself, nor oppose a
witness, nor understand the details of evidence.” Even if the amnesia
does not keep him from understanding what happens about him or to
understand the course of the trial, this amnesia nevertheless has a
disturbing effect on his defense.

The impairment of the defendant in his defense, through his amnesia,
recognized by all opinions as a mental defect, has to be acknowledged as
such, in view of the statements in the opinions of the Soviet, English
and American Delegations of 14 November 1945, which designate the mental
condition as one of a mixed kind, but more as one of a sort of mental
abnormality. This will not make a pertinent defense possible for him
(Hess).

In this respect, it does not have to be considered that the defendant is
not mentally ill “in the literal meaning of the word” and that he can
follow the proceedings. The question whether the defendant is at present
incapable, as a result of the diminution of his “mental powers,” to
understand all occurrences and to defend himself properly, has nothing
to do with his mental derangement when committing the crime.

In the opinion of counsel, the defendant is in no case in a position to
make himself understood or to understand argument, because he is
impaired in his mental clarity through the loss of his memory and
because he has completely lost the knowledge of previous events and of
people of former acquaintance.

Since the expert establishment of his mental disorder which impairs the
defendant in the full execution of his defense, makes proceedings
against him inadmissible, the statement of the defendant that he thinks
himself capable of being tried has no significance.

According to expert opinion, the impairment of the defendant cannot be
removed within a measurable space of time. It is not sure whether
treatment through Narco-Analysis, as proposed by the medical experts,
will have the desired result. The defendant has refused to submit to
this treatment only because he thinks of himself as capable of being
tried and consequently not in need of such treatment. Furthermore,
because he is opposed to any forcible influence upon the body, and
finally, he is afraid of physical disturbances which would prevent him
from participating in the trial if such method of treatment is used at
this time. The proceedings would have to be dropped in case of an
illness of long duration which excludes his fitness to be tried.

_ad 1-b_:  According to Article 12 of the Statutes, the Tribunal has the
           right to proceed against a defendant in absentia if

he, the defendant, cannot be located or if the Tribunal thinks it
necessary, for other reasons, in the interests of justice. If the
Tribunal, on the basis of convincing expert opinions, establishes that
the defendant is not in a position to put up a pertinent defense and
consequently decides not to proceed against him, proceedings in
absentia, according to Article 12, could then only be carried on if this
is in the interest of justice. It would not be compatible with objective
justice, in case that actual proof of this fact is available, if the
defendant is impeded by an impairment based upon health reasons, in
personally standing up for his rights and in being present at the trial.

In proceedings which accuse the defendant of such serious crimes and
possibly carry the death penalty, it would not be compatible with
objective justice if he were personally denied the opportunity to look
after his rights as stated in Article 16 of the Statutes. These rights
provide for his self-defense. The possibility to “personally present
evidence for one’s defense and to cross-examine each witness of the
prosecution” is of such importance that any exclusion of such rights has
to be considered an injustice toward the defendant. Proceedings in
absentia can, under no circumstances, be accepted as a “fair trial.”

The same is true for the exclusion of the defendant from the rights
which are granted him during the proceedings according to Article 24.

If the defendant is impaired in his ability to defend himself for the
reasons of the expert opinions, and to the extent explained therein,
then he is just as little in a position to give his Counsel the
necessary information and to enable him to take care of the defense in
his absence.

Since the Statutes establish the rights for the defense in this precise
manner, it does not seem fair to withhold these from a defendant in a
case when he is prevented from personally taking care of his defense
during the proceedings. The rules in Article 12, regarding the
proceedings against an absent defendant, have to be considered as an
exception which should only be used against a defendant who tries to
dodge in spite of his being in a position to be tried. The Defendant
Hess has always been prepared to be tried in order to avoid proceedings
in absentia, which he considers an injustice of the highest measure.

_ad 1-c_:  In case the Court should not agree with the explanations and
           should not consider the statements of the expert

opinion in the sense of the defense, and therefore come to a denial of
the Application ad a, it seems necessary to obtain the super opinion
because the opinions testify to the fact that the defendant is a
psychopathic personality who suffers from hallucinations and still today
shows, in the loss of memory, clear signs of a serious hysteria. If the
Tribunal does not consider these sentiments alone as sufficient for the
establishment of incapability to be tried, a more intensive examination
would have to follow which would not be confined to an examination of
only one or two hours on several days, but require a clinical
observation.

The opinions, themselves, provide for another examination of the mental
condition of the defendant, which seems to prove that the experts
possibly have a “disturbance of the mental capacity” in mind if the
condition of the defendant lasts and the Tribunal, against expectations,
declares the defendant unfit to be tried and therewith incompetent under
all circumstances.

                                            /Signed/  von Rohrscheidt
                                                        Attorney-at-Law
 Translator: Dr. H. v. V. Veith
               C. _ANSWER BY THE FOUR CHIEF PROSECUTORS_

TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL:
MATTER OF RUDOLF HESS

The undersigned representatives of their respective nations answer the
request of the Tribunal of 28 November, 1945 respectfully as follows:

1. We do not challenge or question the report of the Committee.

2. It is our position that the defendant Rudolf Hess is fit to stand
trial.

3. Observations may be filed by any of the undersigned based on their
respective relationships to the subject matter.

                                                 [signed]  R. RUDENKO
                            For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
                                                  [signed]  C. DUBOST
                               For the Provisional Government of France
                                         [signed]  DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE
           For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
                                          [signed]  ROBERT H. JACKSON
                                       For the United States of America
 29 November 1945
           _(1) Answer by the United States Chief of Counsel_

TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL:

The United States respectfully files the following observations on the
application of RUDOLF HESS:

Hess’ condition was known to the undersigned representative of the
United States immediately after his delivery to the Nurnberg prison and
was the subject of a report by Major Douglas McG. Kelley of the Medical
Corps of the United States Army, which report is attached hereto.

The report of Major Kelley and his recommendation for treatment were
submitted to me and on October 20, 1945, I advised that “any treatment
of this case involving the use of drugs which might cause injury to the
subject is disapproved.” This was not because I disapproved of the
treatment. I approve of the treatment and would insist on its being
employed if the victim were a member of my own family. But I was of the
opinion that the private administration of any kind of drug to Hess
would be dangerous because if he should thereafter die, even of natural
causes, it would become the subject of public controversy. This
completely agreed with the opinion of the Security Officer, Colonel B.
C. Andrus, whose report is attached.

In view of the statements contained in the medical report of the
Commission and in view of the facts which I have recited, the United
States must regard Hess as a victim, at most, of a voluntary amnesia and
presenting no case for excuse from trial.

Respectfully submitted

                                          [signed]  Robert H. Jackson
                                Chief of Counsel for the United States.
 29 November 1945.

                 *        *        *        *        *

 [Enclosure]

                              HEADQUARTERS
                      INTERNAL SECURITY DETACHMENT
                       OFFICE US CHIEF OF COUNSEL
                            APO 403, US ARMY

                                                        16 October 1945

SUBJECT: Psychiatric Status of Internee.
TO: Commanding Officer, Internal Security Detachment.

1. Internee Rudolf HESS has been carefully studied since his admission
to Nurnberg Prison.

2. On entry HESS manifested a spotty amnesia. The British psychiatrist
accompanying him stated that from 4 October 43 to 4 February 45 HESS
presented symptoms of total amnesia. From 4 February 45 to 12 July 45 he
recovered, and is said to have made a statement that his previous
amnesia was simulated. On 12 July 45 he again developed amnesia which
has lasted to the present. Also while in England HESS claimed he was
being poisoned and sealed up numerous samples of food, chocolate,
medicine, etc. as “evidence” to be analyzed prior to his trials. Such
behavior could be either simulated or a true paranoid reaction.

3. Present examination reveals a normal mental status with the exception
of the amnesia. Attitude and general behavior are normal, mood and
affect, while slightly depressed, are intact and normal. Sensorium is
intact and insight is good. Content reveals vague paranoid trends, but
there is no evidence of any actual psychosis. His reactions to his
suspicions are not fixed—and delusioned trends—are distinctly spotty
and disconnected. His reactions are those of an individual who has given
up a simulated behavior pattern rather than those of the psychotic.
Oddly enough his memory for this phase of behavior is excellent.

4. Special examinations with Rorschach cards indicate some neurotic
patterns. They point to a highly schizoid personality with hysterical
and obsessive components. Such findings are confirmed in the patient’s
present reactions. He complains bitterly of “stomach cramps” which are
obviously neurotic manifestations. He is over-dramatic in his actions
presenting typical hysterical gestures, complaints and symptoms. His
amnesia is at present limited to personal events concerning his history
after joining the party. The amnesia however shifts in a highly
suspicious fashion. Such amnesias may be hysterical in nature but in
such cases do not change in depth from day to day and facts recently
learned are not lost as with Hess.

5. In HESS’ case there is also the factor of his long amnesia in
England. It is quite possible that he has suggested an amnesia to
himself for so long that he partially believes in it. In a person of
hysterical make-up such auto suggestion could readily produce an amnesic
state. Also the “gain” or protection found in amnesia, fancied or real,
would be a bar to its easy clearance. Finally a large conscious element
may well be present.

6. In this case I believe all those factors are present. Treatment will
have to be formulated along lines attacking the suggestive factors and
overcoming conscious restraints. Hypnosis would be a value but probably
chemical hypnosis will be required. Such narco-hypnosis and analysis
require the use of intra venous drugs of the barbitol series, either
sodium amytol or sodium pentothal. Such treatment is in general
innocuous if proper precautions are taken. It must be borne in mind,
however, that occasional accidents happen in any intravenous technique.
With the drugs mentioned above rare fatalities have been reported
although in more than 1000 such cases personally treated, I have never
seen one.

7. Essentially the present situation is as follows:

_a._ Internee HESS is sane and responsible.

_b._ Internee HESS is a profound neurotic of the hysterical type.

_c._ His amnesia is of mixed etiology, stemming from auto suggestions
and conscious malingering in a hysterical personality.

_d._ Treatment will be required if it is felt desirable to remove this
amnesia.

_e._ Such treatment, though it cannot eliminate the conscious element is
of great value in estimating its importance. With such techniques
accurate estimates of malingering can be made. If this is a true
amnesia, total recovery can be predicted.

_f._ Such treatment is essentially harmless except in extremely rare
instances. In ordinary practice the value of the treatment far outweighs
any of its hazards.

8. Clarification as to the desired degree of treatment in this case is
requested.

                                        [signed]  DOUGLAS McG. KELLEY
                                                              Major, MC

                 *        *        *        *        *

                                1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, INTERNAL SECURITY DETACHMENT, OFFICE US CHIEF OF
COUNSEL—APO 403, U. S. ARMY—17 OCTOBER 1945

TO: Mr. Justice Jackson’s Office US Chief of Counsel
    APO 403, U. S. Army
    (Attention: Colonel Gill)

HESS believes or has pretended that the British attempted to poison him.
Treatment with drugs might call forth the same suspicion or allegation
against us by him. Undue alarm might be injurious to the patient.

                                               /s/  B. C. Andrus
                                             /t/  B. C. ANDRUS
                                                         Colonel Cav
                                                              Commandant

                 *        *        *        *        *

                                2nd Ind

OFFICE US CHIEF OF COUNSEL, EXECUTIVE OFFICE, APO, 403, U. S. ARMY

                                                        20 October 1945

TO: Headquarters, Internal Security Detachment.
    Office US Chief of Counsel

Any treatment of this case involving the use of drugs which might cause
injury to the subject is disapproved.

                                                ROBT. J. GILL
                                                      Colonel, CMP
                                                               Executive

      D. _STATEMENT BY HESS TO THE TRIBUNAL CONCERNING HIS MEMORY_

                                                       30 November 1945
                                                      Afternoon Session

“Mr. President: At the beginning of this afternoon’s proceedings, I
handed my defense counsel a note stating that I am of the opinion that
these proceedings could be shortened if I could speak briefly. What I
have to say is as follows: In order to prevent any possibility of my
being declared incapable of pleading—although I am willing to take part
in the rest of the proceedings with the rest of them, I would like to
make the following declaration to the Tribunal although I originally
intended not to make this declaration until a later time. My memory is
again in order. The reason why I simulated loss of memory was tactical.
In fact, it is only that my power for concentration is slightly reduced
but in conflict to that my capacity to follow the trial, my capacity to
defend myself, to put questions to witnesses or even to answer
questions—in these, my capacities are not influenced. I emphasize the
fact that I bear full responsibility for everything that I have done,
signed or have signed as co-signatory. My fundamental attitude that the
Tribunal is not legally competent, is not affected by the statement I
have just made. Hitherto, in my conversations with my official defense
counsel, I have maintained my loss of memory. He was, therefore, acting
in good faith when he asserted I had lost my memory.”

                      E. _RULING OF THE TRIBUNAL_

The ruling of the International Military Tribunal was announced orally
by Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding, on 1 December 1945:

“The Tribunal has given careful consideration to the motion of Counsel
for the Defendant Hess, and it has had the advantage of hearing full
argument upon it both from the Defense and from the Prosecution. The
Tribunal has also considered the very full medical reports, which have
been made on the condition of the Defendant Hess, and has come to the
conclusion that no grounds whatever exist for a further examination to
be ordered.

“After hearing the statement of the Defendant Hess in court yesterday,
and in view of all the evidence, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the
Defendant Hess is capable of standing his trial at the present time, and
the motion of Counsel for the Defense is, therefore, denied, and the
trial will proceed.”




                               Chapter V
                  OPENING ADDRESS FOR THE UNITED STATES


_The following address, opening the American case under Count I of the
Indictment, was delivered by Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel
for the United States, before the Tribunal on 21 November 1945:_

May it please Your Honors,

The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against
the peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs which
we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant and
so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored
because it cannot survive their being repeated. That four great nations,
flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance
and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law
is one of the most significant tributes that Power ever has paid to
Reason.

This tribunal, while it is novel and experimental, is not the product of
abstract speculations nor is it created to vindicate legalistic
theories. This inquest represents the practical effort of four of the
most mighty of nations, with the support of seventeen more, to utilize
International Law to meet the greatest menace of our times—aggressive
war. The common sense of mankind demands that law shall not stop with
the punishment of petty crimes by little people. It must also reach men
who possess themselves of great power and make deliberate and concerted
use of it to set in motion evils which leave no home in the world
untouched. It is a cause of this magnitude that the United Nations will
lay before Your Honors.

In the prisoners’ dock sit twenty-odd broken men. Reproached by the
humiliation of those they have led almost as bitterly as by the
desolation of those they have attacked, their personal capacity for evil
is forever past. It is hard now to perceive in these miserable men as
captives the power by which as Nazi leaders they once dominated much of
the world and terrified most of it. Merely as individuals, their fate is
of little consequence to the world.

What makes this inquest significant is that those prisoners represent
sinister influence that will lurk in the world long after their bodies
have returned to dust. They are living symbols of racial hatreds, of
terrorism and violence, and of the arrogance and cruelty of power. They
are symbols of fierce nationalisms and militarism, of intrigue and
war-making which have embroiled Europe generation after generation,
crushing its manhood, destroying its homes, and impoverishing its life.
They have so identified themselves with the philosophies they conceived
and with the forces they directed that any tenderness to them is a
victory and an encouragement to all the evils which are attached to
their names. Civilization can afford no compromise with the social
forces which would gain renewed strength if we deal ambiguously or
indecisively with the men in whom those forces now precariously survive.

What these men stand for we will patiently and temperately disclose. We
will give you undeniable proofs of incredible events. The catalogue of
crimes will omit nothing that could be conceived by a pathological
pride, cruelty, and lust for power. These men created in Germany, under
the _Fuehrerprinzip_, a National Socialist despotism equalled only by
the dynasties of the ancient East. They took from the German people all
those dignities and freedoms that we hold natural and inalienable rights
in every human being. The people were compensated by inflaming and
gratifying hatreds toward those who were marked as “scape-goats.”
Against their opponents, including Jews, Catholics, and free labor the
Nazis directed such a campaign of arrogance, brutality, and annihilation
as the world has not witnessed since the pre-Christian ages. They
excited the German ambition to be a “master race,” which of course
implies serfdom for others. They led their people on a mad gamble for
domination. They diverted social energies and resources to the creation
of what they thought to be an invincible war machine. They overran their
neighbors. To sustain the “master race” in its war-making, they enslaved
millions of human beings and brought them into Germany, where these
hapless creatures now wander as “displaced persons”. At length
bestiality and bad faith reached such excess that they aroused the
sleeping strength of imperiled civilization. Its united efforts have
ground the German war machine to fragments. But the struggle has left
Europe a liberated yet prostrate land where a demoralized society
struggles to survive. These are the fruits of the sinister forces that
sit with these defendants in the prisoners’ dock.

In justice to the nations and the men associated in this prosecution, I
must remind you of certain difficulties which may leave their mark on
this case. Never before in legal history has an effort been made to
bring within the scope of a single litigation the developments of a
decade, covering a whole Continent, and involving a score of nations,
countless individuals, and innumerable events. Despite the magnitude of
the task, the world has demanded immediate action. This demand has had
to be met, though perhaps at the cost of finished craftsmanship. In my
country, established courts, following familiar procedures, applying
well thumbed precedents, and dealing with the legal consequences of
local and limited events seldom commence a trial within a year of the
event in litigation. Yet less than eight months ago today the courtroom
in which you sit was an enemy fortress in the hands of German SS troops.
Less than eight months ago nearly all our witnesses and documents were
in enemy hands. The law had not been codified, no procedure had been
established, no Tribunal was in existence, no usable courthouse stood
here, none of the hundreds of tons of official German documents had been
examined, no prosecuting staff had been assembled, nearly all the
present defendants were at large, and the four prosecuting powers had
not yet joined in common cause to try them. I should be the last to deny
that the case may well suffer from incomplete researches and quite
likely will not be the example of professional work which any of the
prosecuting nations would normally wish to sponsor. It is, however, a
completely adequate case to the judgment we shall ask you to render, and
its full development we shall be obliged to leave to historians.

Before I discuss particulars of evidence, some general considerations
which may affect the credit of this trial in the eyes of the world
should be candidly faced. There is a dramatic disparity between the
circumstances of the accusers and of the accused that might discredit
our work if we should falter, in even minor matters, in being fair and
temperate.

Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both prosecution
and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished foes. The
worldwide scope of the aggressions carried out by these men has left but
few real neutrals. Either the victors must judge the vanquished or we
must leave the defeated to judge themselves. After the First World War,
we learned the futility of the latter course. The former high station of
these defendants, the notoriety of their acts, and the adaptability of
their conduct to provoke retaliation make it hard to distinguish between
the demand for a just and measured retribution, and the unthinking cry
for vengeance which arises from the anguish of war. It is our task, so
far as humanly possible, to draw the line between the two. We must never
forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the
record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants
a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon
such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this trial
will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity’s aspirations to
do justice.

At the very outset, let us dispose of the contention that to put these
men to trial is to do them an injustice entitling them to some special
consideration. These defendants may be hard pressed but they are not ill
used. Let us see what alternative they would have to being tried.

More than a majority of these prisoners surrendered to or were tracked
down by forces of the United States. Could they expect us to make
American custody a shelter for our enemies against the just wrath of our
Allies? Did we spend American lives to capture them only to save them
from punishment? Under the principles of the Moscow Declaration, those
suspected war criminals who are not to be tried internationally must be
turned over to individual governments for trial at the scene of their
outrages. Many less responsible and less culpable American-held
prisoners have been and will be turned over to other United Nations for
local trial. If these defendants should succeed, for any reason, in
escaping the condemnation of this Tribunal, or if they obstruct or abort
this trial, those who are American-held prisoners will be delivered up
to our continental Allies. For these defendants, however, we have set up
an International Tribunal and have undertaken the burden of
participating in a complicated effort to give them fair and
dispassionate hearings. That is the best known protection to any man
with a defense worthy of being heard.

If these men are the first war leaders of a defeated nation to be
prosecuted in the name of the law, they are also the first to be given a
chance to plead for their lives in the name of the law. Realistically,
the Charter of this Tribunal, which gives them a hearing, is also the
source of their only hope. It may be that these men of troubled
conscience, whose only wish is that the world forget them, do not regard
a trial as a favor. But they do have a fair opportunity to defend
themselves—a favor which these men, when in power, rarely extended to
their fellow countrymen. Despite the fact that public opinion already
condemns their acts, we agree that here they must be given a presumption
of innocence, and we accept the burden of proving criminal acts and the
responsibility of these defendants for their commission.

When I say that we do not ask for convictions unless we prove crime, I
do not mean mere technical or incidental transgression of international
conventions. We charge guilt on planned and intended conduct that
involves moral as well as legal wrong. And we do not mean conduct that
is a natural and human, even if illegal, cutting of corners, such as
many of us might well have committed had we been in the defendants’
positions. It is not because they yielded to the normal frailties of
human beings that we accuse them. It is their abnormal and inhuman
conduct which brings them to this bar.

We will not ask you to convict these men on the testimony of their foes.
There is no count of the Indictment that cannot be proved by books and
records. The Germans were always meticulous record keepers, and these
defendants had their share of the Teutonic passion for thoroughness in
putting things on paper. Nor were they without vanity. They arranged
frequently to be photographed in action. We will show you their own
films. You will see their own conduct and hear their own voices as these
defendants reenact for you, from the screen, some of the events in the
course of the conspiracy.

We would also make clear that we have no purpose to incriminate the
whole German people. We know that the Nazi Party was not put in power by
a majority of the German vote. We know it came to power by an evil
alliance between the most extreme of the Nazi revolutionists, the most
unrestrained of the German reactionaries, and the most aggressive of the
German militarists. If the German populace had willingly accepted the
Nazi program, no Stormtroopers would have been needed in the early days
of the Party and there would have been no need for concentration camps
or the Gestapo, both of which institutions were inaugurated as soon as
the Nazis gained control of the German state. Only after these lawless
innovations proved successful at home were they taken abroad.

The German people should know by now that the people of the United
States hold them in no fear, and in no hate. It is true that the Germans
have taught us the horrors of modern warfare, but the ruin that lies
from the Rhine to the Danube shows that we, like our Allies, have not
been dull pupils. If we are not awed by German fortitude and proficiency
in war, and if we are not persuaded of their political maturity, we do
respect their skill in the arts of peace, their technical competence,
and the sober, industrious and self-disciplined character of the masses
of the German people. In 1933, we saw the German people recovering
prestige in the commercial, industrial and artistic world after the
set-back of the last war. We beheld their progress neither with envy nor
malice. The Nazi regime interrupted this advance. The recoil of the Nazi
aggression has left Germany in ruins. The Nazi readiness to pledge the
German word without hesitation and to break it without shame has
fastened upon German diplomacy a reputation for duplicity that will
handicap it for years. Nazi arrogance has made the boast of the “master
race” a taunt that will be thrown at Germans the world over for
generations. The Nazi nightmare has given the German name a new and
sinister significance throughout the world which will retard Germany a
century. The German, no less than the non-German world, has accounts to
settle with these defendants.

The fact of the war and the course of the war, which is the central
theme of our case, is history. From September 1st, 1939, when the German
armies crossed the Polish frontiers, until September, 1942, when they
met epic resistance at Stalingrad, German arms seemed invincible.
Denmark and Norway, The Netherlands and France, Belgium and Luxembourg,
the Balkans and Africa, Poland and the Baltic States, and parts of
Russia, all had been overrun and conquered by swift, powerful,
well-aimed blows. That attack upon the peace of the world is the crime
against international society which brings into international cognizance
crimes in its aid and preparation which otherwise might be only internal
concerns. It was aggressive war, which the nations of the world had
renounced. It was war in violation of treaties, by which the peace of
the world was sought to be safeguarded.

This war did not just happen—it was planned and prepared for over a
long period of time and with no small skill and cunning. The world has
perhaps never seen such a concentration and stimulation of the energies
of any people as that which enabled Germany twenty years after it was
defeated, disarmed, and dismembered to come so near carrying out its
plan to dominate Europe. Whatever else we may say of those who were the
authors of this war, they did achieve a stupendous work in organization,
and our first task is to examine the means by which these defendants and
their fellow conspirators prepared and incited Germany to go to war.

In general, our case will disclose these defendants all uniting at some
time with the Nazi Party in a plan which they well knew could be
accomplished only by an outbreak of war in Europe. Their seizure of the
German state, their subjugation of the German people, their terrorism
and extermination of dissident elements, their planning and waging of
war, their calculated and planned ruthlessness in the conduct of
warfare, their deliberate and planned criminality toward conquered
peoples, all these are ends for which they acted in concert; and all
these are phases of the conspiracy, a conspiracy which reached one goal
only to set out for another and more ambitious one. We shall also trace
for you the intricate web of organizations which these men formed and
utilized to accomplish these ends. We will show how the entire structure
of offices and officials was dedicated to the criminal purposes and
committed to use of the criminal methods planned by these defendants and
their co-conspirators, many of whom war and suicide have put beyond
reach.

It is my purpose to open the case, particularly under Count One of the
Indictment, and to deal with the common plan or conspiracy to achieve
ends possible only by resort to crimes against peace, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. My emphasis will not be on individual
barbarities and perversions which may have occurred independently of any
central plan. One of the dangers ever-present is that this trial may be
protracted by details of particular wrongs and that we will become lost
in a “wilderness of single instances.” Nor will I now dwell on the
activity of individual defendants except as it may contribute to
exposition of the common plan.

The case as presented by the United States will be concerned with the
brains and authority back of all the crimes. These defendants were men
of a station and rank which does not soil its own hands with blood. They
were men who knew how to use lesser folk as tools. We want to reach the
planners and designers, the inciters and leaders without whose evil
architecture the world would not have been for so long scourged with the
violence and lawlessness, and wracked with the agonies and convulsions,
of this terrible war.

                       THE LAWLESS ROAD TO POWER

The chief instrumentality of cohesion in plan and action was the
National Socialist German Workers Party, known as the Nazi Party. Some
of the defendants were with it from the beginning. Others joined only
after success seemed to have validated its lawlessness or power had
invested it with immunity from the processes of the law. Adolf Hitler
became its supreme leader or _fuehrer_ in 1921.

On the 24th of February, 1920, at Munich, it publicly had proclaimed its
program (_1708-PS_). Some of its purposes would commend themselves to
many good citizens, such as the demands for “profit-sharing in the great
industries,” “generous development of provision for old age,” “creation
and maintenance of a healthy middle class,” “a land reform suitable to
our national requirements,” and “raising the standard of health.” It
also made a strong appeal to that sort of nationalism which in ourselves
we call patriotism and in our rivals chauvinism. It demanded “equality
of rights for the German people in its dealing with other nations and
the evolution of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germaine.” It
demanded the “union of all Germans on the basis of the right of
self-determination of peoples to form a Great Germany.” It demanded
“land and territory (colonies) for the enrichment of our people and the
settlement of our surplus population.” All these, of course, were
legitimate objectives if they were to be attained without resort to
aggressive warfare.

The Nazi Party from its inception, however, contemplated war. It
demanded “the abolition of mercenary troops and the formation of a
national army.” It proclaimed that “In view of the enormous sacrifice of
life and property demanded of a nation by every war, personal enrichment
through war must be regarded as a crime against the nation. We demand,
therefore, the ruthless confiscation of all war profits.” I do not
criticise this policy. Indeed, I wish it were universal. I merely point
out that in a time of peace, war was a preoccupation of the Party, and
it started the work of making war less offensive to the masses of the
people. With this it combined a program of physical training and sports
for youth that became, as we shall see, the cloak for a secret program
of military training.

The Nazi Party declaration also committed its members to an anti-Semitic
program. It declared that no Jew or any person of non-German blood could
be a member of the nation. Such persons were to be disfranchised,
disqualified for office, subject to the alien laws, and entitled to
nourishment only after the German population had first been provided
for. All who had entered Germany after August 2, 1914 were to be
required forthwith to depart, and all non-German immigration was to be
prohibited.

The Party also avowed, even in those early days, an authoritarian and
totalitarian program for Germany. It demanded creation of a strong
central power with unconditional authority, nationalization of all
businesses which had been “amalgamated,” and a “reconstruction” of the
national system of education which “must aim at teaching the pupil to
understand the idea of the State (state sociology).” Its hostility to
civil liberties and freedom of the press was distinctly announced in
these words: “It must be forbidden to publish newspapers which do not
conduce to the national welfare. We demand the legal prosecution of all
tendencies in art or literature of a kind likely to disintegrate our
life as a nation and the suppression of institutions which might
militate against the above requirements.”

The forecast of religious persecution was clothed in the language of
religious liberty, for the Nazi program stated, “We demand liberty for
all religious denominations in the State.” But, it continues with the
limitation, “so far as they are not a danger to it and do not militate
against the morality and moral sense of the German race.”

The Party program foreshadowed the campaign of terrorism. It announced,
“We demand ruthless war upon those whose activities are injurious to the
common interests”, and it demanded that such offenses be punished with
death.

It is significant that the leaders of this Party interpreted this
program as a belligerent one certain to precipitate conflict. The Party
platform concluded, “The leaders of the Party swear to proceed
regardless of consequences—if necessary, at the sacrifice of their
lives—toward the fulfillment of the foregoing points.” It is this
Leadership Corps of the Party, not its entire membership, that stands
accused as a criminal organization.

Let us now see how the leaders of the Party fulfilled their pledge to
proceed regardless of consequences. Obviously, their foreign objectives,
which were nothing less than to undo international treaties and to wrest
territory from foreign control, as well as most of their internal
program, could be accomplished only by possession of the machinery of
the German State. The first effort, accordingly, was to subvert the
Weimar Republic by violent revolution. An abortive putsch at Munich in
1923 landed many of them in jail. The period of meditation which
followed produced _Mein Kampf_, henceforth the source of law for the
Party workers and a source of considerable revenue to its supreme
leader. The Nazi plans for the violent overthrow of the feeble Republic
then turned to plans for its capture.

No greater mistake could be made than to think of the Nazi Party in
terms of the loose organizations which we of the western world call
“political parties.” In discipline, structure, and method the Nazi Party
was not adapted to the democratic process of persuasion. It was an
instrument of conspiracy and of coercion. The Party was not organized to
take over power in the German State by winning support of a majority of
the German people. It was organized to seize power in defiance of the
will of the people.

The Nazi Party, under the _Fuehrerprinzip_, was bound by an iron
discipline into a pyramid, with the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, at the top
and broadening into a numerous Leadership Corps, composed of overlords
of a very extensive Party membership at the base. By no means all of
those who may have supported the movement in one way or another were
actual Party members. The membership took the Party oath which in
effect, amounted to an abdication of personal intelligence and moral
responsibility. This was the oath: “I vow inviolable fidelity to Adolf
Hitler; I vow absolute obedience to him and to the leaders he designates
for me.” The membership in daily practice followed its leaders with an
idolatry and self-surrender more Oriental than Western.

We will not be obliged to guess as to the motives or goal of the Nazi
Party. The immediate aim was to undermine the Weimar Republic. The order
to all Party members to work to that end was given in a letter from
Hitler of August 24, 1931 to Rosenberg, of which we will produce the
original. Hitler wrote,

    “I am just reading in the VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, edition
    235/236, page 1, an article entitled “Does Wirth intend to come
    over?” The tendency of the article is to prevent on our part a
    crumbling away from the present form of government. I myself am
    travelling all over Germany to achieve exactly the opposite. May
    I therefore ask that my own paper will not stab me in the back
    with tactically unwise articles * * *” (_047-PS_).

Captured film enables us to present the defendant, Alfred Rosenberg, who
from the screen will himself tell you the story. The SA practiced
violent interference with elections. We have the reports of the SD
describing in detail how its members later violated the secrecy of
elections in order to identify those who opposed them. One of the
reports makes this explanation:

    “The control was effected in the following way: some members of
    the election-committee marked all the ballot papers with
    numbers. During the ballot itself, a voters’ list was made up.
    The ballot-papers were handed out in numerical order, therefore
    it was possible afterwards with the aid of this list to find out
    the persons who cast no-votes or invalid votes. One sample of
    these marked ballot-papers is enclosed. The marking was done on
    the back of the ballot-papers with skimmed milk * * *”
    (_R-142_).

The Party activity, in addition to all the familiar forms of political
contest, took on the aspect of a rehearsal for warfare. It utilized a
Party formation, _DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN_, commonly known as the SA. This
was a voluntary organization of youthful and fanatical Nazis trained for
the use of violence under semi-military discipline. Its members began by
acting as bodyguards for the Nazi leaders and rapidly expanded from
defensive to offensive tactics. They became disciplined ruffians for the
breaking up of opposition meetings and the terrorization of adversaries.
They boasted that their task was to make the Nazi Party “master of the
streets.” The SA was the parent organization of a number of others. Its
offspring include _DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN_, commonly known as the SS, formed
in 1925 and distinguished for the fanaticism and cruelty of its members;
_DER SICHERHEITSDIENST_, known as the SD; and _DIE GEHEIME
STAATSPOLIZEI_, the Secret State Police, the infamous Gestapo formed in
1934 after Nazi accession to power.

A glance at a chart of the Party organization (_Chart No. 1_) is enough
to show how completely it differed from the political parties we know.
It had its own source of law in the fuehrer and sub-fuehrers. It had its
own courts and its own police. The conspirators set up a government
within the Party to exercise outside the law every sanction that any
legitimate state could exercise and many that it could not. Its chain of
command was military, and its formations were martial in name as well as
in function. They were composed of battalions set up to bear arms under
military discipline, motorized corps, flying corps, and the infamous
“Death Head Corps”, which was not misnamed. The Party had its own secret
police, its security units, its intelligence and espionage division, its
raiding forces, and its youth forces. It established elaborate
administrative mechanisms to identify and liquidate spies and informers,
to manage concentration camps, to operate death vans, and to finance the
whole movement. Through concentric circles of authority, the Nazi Party,
as its leadership later boasted, eventually organized and dominated
every phase of German life—but not until they had waged a bitter
internal struggle characterized by brutal criminality. In preparation
for this phase of their struggle, they created a party police system.
This became the pattern and the instrument of the police state, which
was the first goal in their plan.

The Party formations, including the Leadership Corps of the Party, the
SD, the SS, the SA and the infamous Secret State Police, or Gestapo—all
these stand accused before you as criminal organizations; organizations
which, as we will prove from their own documents, were recruited only
from recklessly devoted Nazis, ready in conviction and temperament to do
the most violent of deeds to advance the common program. They terrorized
and silenced democratic opposition and were able at length to combine
with political opportunists, militarists, industrialists, monarchists,
and political reactionaries.

On January 30, 1933 Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the German
Republic. An evil combination, represented in the prisoners’ dock, by
its most eminent survivors, had succeeded in possessing itself of the
machinery of the German Government, a facade behind which they
thenceforth would operate to make a reality of the war of conquest they
so long had plotted. The conspiracy had passed into its second phase.

                    THE CONSOLIDATION OF NAZI POWER

We shall now consider the steps, which embraced the most hideous of
crimes against humanity, to which the conspirators resorted in
perfecting control of the German State and in preparing Germany for the
aggressive war indispensable to their ends.

The Germans of the 1920’s were a frustrated and baffled people as a
result of defeat and the disintegration of their traditional government.
The democratic elements, which were trying to govern Germany through the
new and feeble machinery of the Weimar Republic, got inadequate support
from the democratic forces of the rest of the world. It is not to be
denied that Germany, when worldwide depression was added to her other
problems, was faced with urgent and intricate pressure in her economic
and political life which necessitated bold measures.

The internal measures by which a nation attempts to solve its problems
are ordinarily of no concern to other nations. But the Nazi program from
the first was recognized as a desperate program for a people still
suffering the effects of an unsuccessful war. The Nazi policy embraced
ends always recognized as attainable only by a renewal and a more
successful outcome of war. The conspirators’ answer to Germany’s
problems was nothing less than to plot the regaining of territories lost
in the First World War and the acquisition of other fertile lands of
Central Europe by dispossessing or exterminating those who inhabited
them. They also contemplated destroying or permanently weakening all
other neighboring peoples so as to win virtual domination of Europe and
probably of the world. The precise limits of their ambition we need not
define for it was and is as illegal to wage aggressive war for small
stakes as for large ones.

We find at this period two governments in Germany—the real and the
ostensible. The forms of the German Republic were maintained for a time,
and it was the outward and visible government. But the real authority in
the State was outside of and above the law and rested in the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party.

On February 27, 1933, less than a month after Hitler became Chancellor,
the Reichstag building was set on fire. The burning of this symbol of
free parliamentary government was so providential for the Nazis that it
was believed they staged the fire themselves. Certainly when we
contemplate their known crimes, we cannot believe they would shrink from
mere arson. It is not necessary, however, to resolve the controversy as
to who set the fire. The significant point is in the use that was made
of the fire and of the state of public mind it produced. The Nazis
immediately accused the Communist Party of instigating and committing
the crime, and turned every effort to portray this single act of arson
as the beginning of a Communist revolution. Then, taking advantage of
the hysteria, the Nazi met this phantom revolution with a real one. In
the following December, the German Supreme Court with commendable
courage and independence acquitted the accused Communists, but it was
too late to influence the tragic course of events which the Nazi
conspirators had set rushing forward.

Hitler, on the morning after the fire, obtained from the aged and ailing
President von Hindenburg a Presidential decree suspending the extensive
guarantees of individual liberty contained in the Constitution of the
Weimar Republic. The decree provided that:

    “Sections 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the
    Constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further
    notice. Thus, restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of
    free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, on
    the right of assembly and the right of association, and
    violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic
    communications, and warrants for house-searches, orders for
    confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also
    permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.”
    (_1390-PS_).

The extent of the restriction on personal liberty under the decree of
February 28, 1933 may be understood by reference to the rights under the
Weimar Constitution which were suspended:

    “_Article 114._ The freedom of the person is inviolable.
    Curtailment or deprivation of personal freedom by a public
    authority is only permissible on a legal basis.

    “Persons who have been deprived of their freedom must be
    informed at the latest on the following day by whose authority
    and for what reasons the deprivation of freedom was ordered;
    opportunity shall be afforded them without delay of submitting
    objections to their deprivation of freedom.

    “_Article 115._ Every German’s home is his sanctuary and
    inviolable. Exceptions may only be made as provided by law.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_Article 117._ The secrecy of letters and all postal,
    telegraphic and telephone communications is inviolable.
    Exceptions are inadmissible except by Reich law.

    “_Article 118._ Every German has the right, within the limits of
    the general laws, to express his opinions freely in speech, in
    writing, in print, in picture form or in any other way. No
    conditions of work or employment may detract from this right and
    no disadvantage may accrue to him from any person for making use
    of this right. * * *

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_Article 123._ All Germans have the right to assemble
    peacefully and unarmed without giving notice and without special
    permission.

    “A Reich law may make previous notification obligatory for
    assemblies in the open air, and may prohibit them in the case of
    immediate danger to the public safety.

    “_Article 124._ All the Germans have the right to form
    associations or societies for purposes not contrary to criminal
    law. This right may not be curtailed by preventive measures. The
    same provisions apply to religious associations and societies.

    “Every association may become incorporated (Erwerb der
    Rechtsfaehigkeit) according to the provisions of the civil law.
    The right may not be refused to any association on the grounds
    that its aims are political, social-political or religious.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_Article 153._ Property is guaranteed by the Constitution. Its
    content and limits are defined by the laws.

    “Expropriation can only take place for the public benefit and on
    a legal basis. Adequate compensation shall be granted, unless a
    Reich law orders otherwise. In the case of dispute concerning
    the amount of compensation, it shall be possible to submit the
    matter to the ordinary civil courts, unless Reich laws determine
    otherwise. Compensation must be paid if the Reich expropriates
    property belonging to the Lands, Communes, or public utility
    associations.

    “Property carries obligations. Its use shall also serve the
    common good.” (_2050-PS_).

It must be said in fairness to von Hindenburg that the Constitution
itself authorized him temporarily to suspend these fundamental rights
“if the public safety and order in the German Reich are considerably
disturbed or endangered.” It must also be acknowledged that President
Ebert previously had invoked this power.

But the National Socialist coup was made possible because the terms of
the Hitler-Hindenburg decree departed from all previous ones in which
the power of suspension had been invoked. Whenever Ebert had suspended
constitutional guarantees of individual rights, his decree had expressly
revived the Protective Custody Act adopted by the Reichstag in 1916
during the previous war. This Act guaranteed a judicial hearing within
24 hours of arrest, gave a right to have counsel and to inspect all
relevant records, provided for appeal, and authorized compensation from
Treasury funds for erroneous arrests.

The Hitler-Hindenburg decree of February 28, 1933 contained no such
safeguards. The omission may not have been noted by von Hindenburg.
Certainly he did not appreciate its effect. It left the Nazi police and
party formations, already existing and functioning under Hitler,
completely unrestrained and irresponsible. Secret arrest and indefinite
detention, without charges, without evidence, without hearing, without
counsel, became the method of inflicting inhuman punishment on any whom
the Nazi police suspected or disliked. No court could issue an
injunction, or writ of _habeas corpus_, or _certiorari_. The German
people were in the hands of the police, the police were in the hands of
the Nazi Party, and the Party was in the hands of a ring of evil men, of
whom the defendants here before you are surviving and representative
leaders.

The Nazi conspiracy, as we shall show, always contemplated not merely
overcoming current opposition but exterminating elements which could not
be reconciled with its philosophy of the state. It not only sought to
establish the Nazi “new order” but to secure its sway, as Hitler
predicted, “for a thousand years.” Nazis were never in doubt or
disagreement as to what these dissident elements were. They were
concisely described by one of them, Col. General von Fritsch, on
December 11, 1938, in these words:

    “Shortly after the first war I came to the conclusion that we
    should have to be victorious in three battles if Germany were to
    become powerful again: 1. The battle against the working
    class—Hitler has won this. 2. Against the Catholic Church,
    perhaps better expressed against Ultramontanism. 3. Against the
    Jews.” (_1947-PS_).

The warfare against these elements was continuous. The battle in Germany
was but a practice skirmish for the worldwide drive against them. We
have in point of geography and of time two groups of crimes against
humanity—one within Germany before and during the war, the other in
occupied territory during the war. But the two are not separated in Nazi
planning. They are a continuous unfolding of the Nazi plan to
exterminate peoples and institutions which might serve as a focus or
instrument for overturning their “new world order” at any time. We
consider these Crimes against Humanity in this address as manifestations
of the one Nazi plan and discuss them according to General von Fritsch’s
classification.

                1. The Battle Against the Working Class

When Hitler came to power, there were in Germany three groups of trade
unions. The General German Trade Union Confederation (ADGB) with
twenty-eight affiliated unions, and the General Independent Employees
Confederation (AFA) with thirteen federated unions together numbered
more than 4,500,000 members. The Christian Trade Union had over
1,250,000 members.

The working people of Germany, like the working people of other nations,
had little to gain personally by war. While labor is usually brought
around to the support of the nation at war, labor by and large is a
pacific, though by no means a pacifist force in the world. The working
people of Germany had not forgotten in 1933 how heavy the yoke of the
war lord can be. It was the workingmen who had joined the sailors and
soldiers in the revolt of 1918 to end the First World War. The Nazis had
neither forgiven nor forgotten. The Nazi program required that this part
of the German population not only be stripped of power to resist
diversion of its scanty comforts to armament, but also be wheedled or
whipped into new and unheard of sacrifices as part of the Nazi war
preparation. Labor must be cowed, and that meant its organizations and
means of cohesion and defense must be destroyed.

The purpose to regiment labor for the Nazi Party was avowed by Ley in a
speech to workers on May 2, 1933, as follows:

    “You may say what else do you want, you have the absolute power.
    True we have the power, but we do not have the whole people, we
    do not have you workers 100%, and it is you whom we want; we
    will not let you be until you stand with us in complete, genuine
    acknowledgment.” (_614-PS_).

The first Nazi attack was upon the two larger unions. On April 21, 1933
an order not even in the name of the Government, but of the Nazi Party
was issued by the conspirator Robert Ley as “Chief of Staff of the
political organization of the NSDAP,” applicable to the Trade Union
Confederation and the Independent Employees Confederation. It directed
seizure of their properties and arrest of their principal leaders. The
party order directed party organs which we here denounce as criminal
associations, the SA and SS “to be employed for the occupation of the
trade union properties, and for the taking into custody of personalities
who come into question.” And it directed the taking into “protective
custody” of all chairmen and district secretaries of such unions and
branch directors of the labor bank (_392-PS_).

These orders were carried out on May 2, 1933. All funds of the labor
unions, including pension and benefit funds, were seized. Union leaders
were sent to concentration camps. A few days later, on May 10, 1933,
Hitler appointed Ley leader of the German Labor Front (_DEUTSCHE
ARBEITSFRONT_), which succeeded to the confiscated union funds. The
German Labor Front, a Nazi controlled labor bureau, was set up under Ley
to teach the Nazi philosophy to German workers and to weed out from
industrial employment all who were backward in their lessons
(_1940-PS_). “Factory Troops” were organized as an “ideological shock
squad within the factory” (_1817-PS_). The Party order provided that
“outside of the German Labor Front, no other organization (whether of
workers or of employees) is to exist.” On June 24, 1933 the remaining
Christian Trade Unions were seized pursuant to an order of the Nazi
Party signed by Ley.

On May 19, 1933, this time by government decree, it was provided that
“trustees” of labor, appointed by Hitler, should regulate the conditions
of all labor contracts, replacing the former process of collective
bargaining (_405-PS_). On January 20, 1934 a decree “regulating national
labor” introduced the fuehrer-principle into industrial relations. It
provided that the owners of enterprises should be the “fuehrers” and the
workers should be the followers. The enterpriser-fuehrers should “make
decisions for employees and laborers in all matters concerning the
enterprise” (_1861-PS_). It was by such bait that the great German
industrialists were induced to support the Nazi cause, to their own
ultimate ruin.

Not only did the Nazis dominate and regiment German labor, but they
forced the youth into the ranks of the laboring people they had thus led
into chains. Under a compulsory labor service decree on 26 June, 1935,
young men and women between the ages of 18 and 25 were conscripted for
labor (see _1654-PS_). Thus was the purpose to subjugate German labor
accomplished. In the words of Ley, this accomplishment consisted “in
eliminating the association character of the trade union and employees’
associations, and in its place we have substituted the conception
‘soldiers of work’.” The productive manpower of the German nation was in
Nazi control. By these steps the defendants won the battle to liquidate
labor unions as potential opposition and were enabled to impose upon the
working class the burdens of preparing for aggressive warfare.

Robert Ley, the field marshal of the battle against labor, answered our
indictment with suicide. Apparently he knew no better answer.

                   2. The Battle Against the Churches

The Nazi Party always was predominantly anti-Christian in its ideology.
But we who believe in freedom of conscience and of religion base no
charge of criminality on anybody’s ideology. It is not because the Nazi
themselves were irreligious or pagan, but because they persecuted others
of the Christian faith that they become guilty of crime, and it is
because the persecution was a step in the preparation for aggressive
warfare that the offense becomes one of international consequence. To
remove every moderating influence among the German people and to put its
population on a total war footing, the conspirators devised and carried
out a systematic and relentless repression of all Christian sects and
churches.

We will ask you to convict the Nazis on their own evidence. Martin
Bormann in June, 1941, issued a secret decree on the relation of
Christianity and National Socialism. The decree provided:

    “For the first time in German history the Fuehrer consciously
    and completely has the leadership of the people in his own hand.
    With the party, its components and attached units the Fuehrer
    has created for himself and thereby the German Reich leadership
    an instrument which makes him independent of the church. All
    influences which might impair or damage the leadership of the
    people exercised by the Fuehrer with help of the NSDAP, must be
    eliminated. More and more the people must be separated from the
    churches and their organs, the pastors. Of course, the churches
    must and will, seen from their viewpoint, defend themselves
    against this loss of power. But never again must an influence on
    leadership of the people be yielded to the churches. This
    (influence) must be broken completely and finally.

    “Only the Reich government and by its direction the party, its
    components and attached units have a right to leadership of the
    people. Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers, seers
    and other fakers are eliminated and suppressed by the state, so
    must the possibility of church influence also be totally
    removed. Not until this has happened, does the state leadership
    have influence on the individual citizens. Not until then are
    people and Reich secure in their existence for all the future”
    (_D-75_).

And how the party had been securing the Reich from Christian influence,
will be proved by such items as this teletype from the Gestapo, Berlin,
to the Gestapo, Nurnberg, on July 24, 1938. Let us hear their own
account of events in Rottenburg.

    “The Party on 23 July 1939 from 2100 on carried out the third
    demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants about
    2500-3000 were brought in from outside by bus, etc. The
    Rottenburg populace again did not participate in the
    demonstration. This town took rather a hostile attitude to the
    demonstrations. The action got completely out of hand of the
    Party Member responsible for it. The demonstrators stormed the
    palace, beat in the gates and doors. About 150 to 200 people
    forced their way into the palace, searched the rooms, threw
    files out of the windows and rummaged through the beds in the
    rooms of the palace. One bed was ignited. Before the fire got to
    the other objects of equipment in the rooms and the palace, the
    flaming bed could be thrown from the window and the fire
    extinguished. The Bishop was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg
    and the ladies and gentlemen of his menage in the chapel at
    prayer. About 25 to 30 people pressed into this chapel and
    molested those present. Bishop Groeber was taken for Bishop
    Sproll. He was grabbed by the robe and dragged back and forth.
    Finally the intruders realized that Bishop Groeber is not the
    one they are seeking. They could then be persuaded to leave the
    building. After the evacuation of the palace by the
    demonstrators I had an interview with Archbishop Groeber, who
    left Rottenburg in the night. Groeber wants to turn to the
    Fuehrer and Reich Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick, anew. On
    the course of the action, the damage done as well as the homage
    of the Rottenburg populace beginning today for the Bishop I
    shall immediately hand in a full report, after I am in the act
    of suppressing counter mass meetings. * * *

    “In case the Fuehrer has instructions to give in this matter, I
    request that these be transmitted most quickly * * *”
    (_848-PS_).

Later, defendant Rosenberg wrote to Bormann reviewing the proposal of
Kerrl as Church Minister to place the Protestant Church under State
tutelage and proclaim Hitler its Supreme head. Rosenberg was opposed,
hinting that Naziism was to suppress the Christian Church completely
after the war (see _098-PS_).

The persecution of all pacifist and dissenting sects, such as Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Pentecostal Association, was peculiarly relentless and
cruel. The policy toward the Evangelical Churches, however, was to use
their influence for the Nazis’ own purposes. In September, 1933, Mueller
was appointed the Fuehrer’s representative with power to deal with the
“affairs of the Evangelical Church” in its relations to the State.
Eventually, steps were taken to create a Reich Bishop vested with power
to control this Church. A long conflict followed, Pastor Niemoeller was
sent to concentration camp, and extended interference with the internal
discipline and administration of the Churches occurred.

A most intense drive was directed against the Roman Catholic Church.
After a strategic concordat with the Holy See, signed in July, 1933 in
Rome, which never was observed by the Nazi Party, a long and persistent
persecution of the Catholic Church, its priesthood and its members, was
carried out. Church Schools and educational institutions were suppressed
or subjected to requirements of Nazi teaching inconsistent with the
Christian faith. The property of the Church was confiscated and inspired
vandalism directed against Church property was left unpunished.
Religious instruction was impeded and the exercise of religion made
difficult. Priests and bishops were laid upon, riots were stimulated to
harass them, and many were sent to concentration camps.

After occupation of foreign soil, these persecutions went on with
greater vigor than ever. We will present to you from the files of the
Vatican the earnest protests made by the Vatican to Ribbentrop
summarizing the persecutions to which the priesthood and the Church had
been subjected in this Twentieth Century under the Nazi regime.
Ribbentrop never answered them. He could not deny. He dared not justify.

                       3. Crimes Against the Jews

The most savage and numerous crimes planned and committed by the Nazis
were those against the Jews. These in Germany, in 1933, numbered about
500,000. In the aggregate, they had made for themselves positions which
excited envy, and had accumulated properties which excited the avarice
of the Nazis. They were few enough to be helpless and numerous enough to
be held up as a menace.

Let there be no misunderstanding about the charge of persecuting Jews.
What we charge against these defendants is not those arrogances and
pretensions which frequently accompany the intermingling of different
peoples and which are likely despite the honest efforts of government,
to produce regrettable crimes and convulsions. It is my purpose to show
a plan and design, to which all Nazis were fanatically committed, to
annihilate all Jewish people. These crimes were organized and promoted
by the Party Leadership, executed and protected by the Nazi officials,
as we shall convince you by written orders of the Secret State Police
itself.

The persecution of the Jews was a continuous and deliberate policy. It
was a policy directed against other nations as well as against the Jews
themselves. Anti-Semitism was promoted to divide and embitter the
democratic peoples and to soften their resistance to the Nazi
aggression. As Robert Ley declared in _Der Angriff_ on 14 May 1944, “The
second German secret weapon is Anti-Semitism because if it is constantly
pursued by Germany, it will become a universal problem which all nations
will be forced to consider.”

Anti-Semitism also has been aptly credited with being a “spearhead of
terror.” The ghetto was the laboratory for testing repressive measures.
Jewish property was the first to be expropriated, but the custom grew
and included similar measures against Anti-Nazi Germans, Poles, Czechs,
Frenchmen, and Belgians. Extermination of the Jews enabled the Nazis to
bring a practiced hand to similar measures against Poles, Serbs, and
Greeks. The plight of the Jew was a constant threat to opposition or
discontent among other elements of Europe’s population—pacifists,
conservatives, communists, Catholics, Protestants, socialist. It was, in
fact, a threat to every dissenting opinion and to every non-Nazi’s life.

The persecution policy against the Jews commenced with non-violent
measures, such as disfranchisement and discriminations against their
religion, and the placing of impediments in the way of success in
economic life. It moved rapidly to organized mass violence against them,
physical isolation in ghettos, deportation, forced labor, mass
starvation, and extermination. The Government, the Party formation
indicated before you as criminal organizations, the Secret State Police,
the Army, private and semi-public associations, and “spontaneous” mobs
that were carefully inspired from official sources, were all agencies
concerned in this persecution. Nor was it directed against individual
Jews for personal bad citizenship or unpopularity. The avowed purpose
was the destruction of the Jewish people as a whole, as an end in
itself, as a measure of preparation for war, and as a discipline of
conquered peoples.

The conspiracy or common plan to exterminate the Jew was so methodically
and thoroughly pursued that despite the German defeat and Nazi
prostration, this Nazi aim largely has succeeded. Only remnants of the
European Jewish population remain in Germany, in the countries which
Germany occupied, and in those which were her satellites or
collaborators. Of the 9,600,000 Jews who lived in Nazi-dominated Europe,
60 percent are authoritatively estimated to have perished. 5,700,000
Jews are missing from the countries in which they formerly lived, and
over 4,500,000 cannot be accounted for by the normal death rate nor by
immigration; nor are they included among displaced persons. History does
not record a crime ever perpetrated against so many victims or one ever
carried out with such calculated cruelty.

You will have difficulty, as I have, to look into the faces of these
defendants and believe that in this Twentieth Century human beings could
inflict such sufferings as will be proved here on their own countrymen
as well as upon their so-called “inferior” enemies. Particular crimes,
and the responsibility of defendants for them, are to be dealt with by
the Soviet Government’s Counsel, when committed in the East, and by
Counsel for the Republic of France when committed in the West. I advert
to them only to show their magnitude as evidence of a purpose and a
knowledge common to all defendants, of an official plan rather than of a
capricious policy of some individual commander, and to show such a
continuity of Jewish persecution from the rise of the Nazi conspiracy to
its collapse as forbids us to believe that any person could be
identified with any part of Nazi action without approving this most
conspicuous item of its program.

The Indictment itself recites many evidences of the anti-Semitic
persecutions. The defendant Streicher led the Nazis in anti-Semitic
bitterness and extremism. In an article appearing in _Der Stuermer_ on
19 March, 1942 he complained that Christian teachings have stood in the
way of “radical solution of the Jewish question in Europe,” and quoted
enthusiastically as the Twentieth Century solution the Fuehrer’s
proclamation of February 24, 1942 that “the Jew will be exterminated.”
And on November 4, 1943, Streicher declared in _Der Stuermer_ that the
Jews “have disappeared from Europe and that the Jewish ‘Reservoir of the
East’ from which the Jewish plague has for centuries beset the people of
Europe, has ceased to exist.” Streicher now has the effrontery to tell
us he is “only a Zionist”—he says he wants only to return the Jews to
Palestine. But on May 7, 1942 his newspaper, _Der Stuermer_, had this to
say:

    “It is also not only an European problem! _The Jewish question
    is a world question!_ Not only is Germany not safe in the face
    of the Jews as long as one Jew lives in Europe, but also the
    Jewish question is hardly solved in Europe so long as Jews live
    in the rest of the world.”

And the defendant Hans Frank, a lawyer by profession I say with shame,
summarized in his Diary in 1944 the Nazi policy thus: “The Jews are a
race which has to be eliminated; whenever we catch one, it is his end.”
(Frank Diary, 4 March 1944, p. 26). And earlier, speaking of his
function as Governor-General of Poland, he confided to his diary this
sentiment: “Of course I cannot eliminate all lice and Jews in only a
year’s time.” (_2233-C-PS_) I could multiply endlessly this kind of Nazi
ranting but I will leave it to the evidence and turn to the fruit of
this perverted thinking.

The most serious of the actions against Jews were outside of any law,
but the law itself was employed to some extent. There were the infamous
Nurnberg decrees of September 15, 1935 (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1935, Part
I, p. 1146). The Jews were segregated into ghettos and put into forced
labor; they were expelled from their professions; their property was
expropriated; all cultural life, the press, the theatre, and schools
were prohibited them; and the SD was made responsible for them
(_212-PS_; _069-PS_). This was an ominous guardianship, as the following
order for “The Handling of the Jewish Question” shows:

    “The competency of the Chief of the Security Police and Security
    Service, who is charged with the mission of solving the European
    Jewish question, extends even to the occupied eastern provinces.
    * * *

    “An eventual act by the civilian population against the Jews is
    not to be prevented as long as this is compatible with the
    maintenance of order and security in the rear of the fighting
    troops * * *

    “The first main goal of the German measures must be strict
    segregation of Jewry from the rest of the population. In the
    execution of this, first of all is the seizing of the Jewish
    populace by the introduction of a registration order and similar
    appropriate measures * * *

    “Then immediately, the wearing of the recognition sign
    consisting of a yellow Jewish star is to be brought about and
    all rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. They are to
    be placed in Ghettos and at the same time are to be separated
    according to sexes. The presence of many more or less closed
    Jewish settlements in White Ruthenia and in the Ukraine makes
    this mission easier. Moreover, places are to be chosen which
    make possible the full use of the Jewish manpower in case labor
    needs are present * * *

    “The entire Jewish property is to be seized and confiscated with
    exception of that which is necessary for a bare existence. As
    far as the economical situation permits, the power of disposal
    of their property is to be taken from the Jews as soon as
    possible through orders and other measures given by the
    commissariate, so that the moving of property will quickly
    cease.

    “Any cultural activity will be completely forbidden, to the Jew.
    This includes the outlawing of the Jewish press, the Jewish
    theatres and schools.

    “The slaughtering of animals according to Jewish rites is also
    to be prohibited * * *” (_212-PS_).

The anti-Jewish campaign became furious in Germany following the
assassination in Paris of the German Legation Councillor von Rath.
Heydrich, Gestapo head, sent a teletype to all Gestapo and SD offices
with directions for handling “spontaneous” uprising anticipated for the
nights of November 9 and 10, 1938, so as to aid in destruction of
Jewish-owned property and protect only that of Germans (_374-PS_;
_765-PS_). No more cynical document ever came into evidence. Then there
is a report by an SS Brigade Leader, Dr. Stahlecher, to Himmler, which
recites that:

    “Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start
    pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture,
    though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following
    our orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the
    Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But
    it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an
    immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the
    extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German
    circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native
    population itself took the first action by way of natural
    reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades
    and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the
    preceding period.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In view of the extension of the area of operations and the
    great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security
    Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the
    cooperation of the reliable population for the fight against
    vermin—that is mainly the Jews and Communists. Beyond our
    directing of the first spontaneous actions of self-cleansing,
    which will be reported elsewhere, care had to be taken that
    reliable people should be put to the cleansing job and that they
    were appointed auxiliary members of the Security Police.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Kowno * * * To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in
    motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. KLIMATIS, the leader of
    the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this
    purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis
    of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in
    Kowno, and in such a way that no German order or German
    instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first
    pogrom in the night from 25. to 26.6 the Lithuanian partisans
    did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several
    synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a
    Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During
    the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a
    similar way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions
    followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to
    the Communists who had been left behind.

    “These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army
    authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this
    procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first
    days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for
    carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the
    self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.

    “It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar
    cleansing actions in Latvia.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish
    problem in the East could not be solved by pogroms alone. In
    accordance with the basic orders received, however, the
    cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim at a
    complete annihilation of the Jews * * *

    “The sum total of the Jews liquidated in Lithuania amounts to
    71,105.” (_L-180_).

Of course, it is self-evident that these “uprisings” were managed by the
government and the Nazi Party. If we were in doubt, we could resort to
Streicher’s memorandum of April 14, 1939, which says, “The anti-Jewish
action of November, 1938 did not arise spontaneously from the people. *
* * Part of the party formation have been charged with the execution of
the anti-Jewish action.” (_406-PS_). Jews as a whole were fined a
billion Reichsmarks. They were excluded from all businesses, and claims
against insurance companies for their burned properties were
confiscated, all by decree of the defendant Goering
(_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, Part I, Pp. 1579-1582).

Synagogues were the objects of a special vengeance. On November 10,
1938, the following order was given: “By order of the Group Commander,
all Jewish Synagogues in the area of Brigade 50 have to be blown up or
set afire. * * * The operation will be carried out in civilian clothing.
* * * Execution of the order will be reported * * *.” (_1721-PS_). Some
40 teletype messages from various police headquarters will tell the fury
with which all Jews were pursued in Germany on those awful November
nights. The SS troops were turned loose and the Gestapo supervised.
Jewish-owned property was authorized to be destroyed. The Gestapo
ordered twenty to thirty thousand “well-to-do Jews” to be arrested.
Concentration camps were to receive them. Healthy Jews, fit for labor,
were to be taken (_3051-PS_).

As the German frontiers were expanded by war, so the campaign against
the Jews expanded. The Nazi plan never was limited to extermination in
Germany; always it contemplated extinguishing the Jew in Europe and
often in the world. In the west, the Jews were killed and their property
taken over. But the campaign achieved its zenith of savagery in the
East. The Eastern Jew has suffered as no people ever suffered. Their
sufferings were carefully reported to the Nazi authorities to show
faithful adherence to the Nazi design. I shall refer only to enough of
the evidence of these to show the extent of the Nazi design for killing
Jews.

If I should recite these horrors in words of my own, you would think me
intemperate and unreliable. Fortunately, we need not take the word of
any witness but the Germans themselves. I invite you now to look at a
few of the vast number of captured German orders and reports that will
be offered in evidence, to see what a Nazi invasion meant. We will
present such evidence as the report of _Einsatzgruppe_ (Action Group) A
of October 15, 1941, which boasts that in overrunning the Baltic States,
“Native Anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against the
Jews during the first hours after occupation * * *.” The report
continues:

    “From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish
    problem in the East could not be solved by pogroms alone. In
    accordance with the basic orders received, however, the
    cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim at a
    complete annihilation of the Jews. Special detachments
    reinforced by selected units—in Lithuania partisan detachments,
    in Latvia units of the Latvian auxiliary police—therefore
    performed extensive executions both in the towns and in rural
    areas. The actions of the execution detachments were performed
    smoothly.

    “The sum total of the Jews liquidated in Lithuania amounts to
    71,105. During the pogroms in Kowno 3,800 Jews were eliminated,
    in the smaller towns about 1,200 Jews.

    “In Latvia, up to now a total of 30,000 Jews were executed. 500
    were eliminated by pogroms in Riga.” (_L-180_).

This is a captured report from the Commissioner of Sluzk on October 30,
1941, which describes the scene in more detail. It says:

    “The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion had
    received the assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews
    here in the town of Sluzk, within two days. Then I requested him
    to postpone the action one day. However, he rejected this with
    the remark that he had to carry out this action everywhere and
    in all towns and that only two days were allotted for Sluzk.
    Within these two days, the town of Sluzk had to be cleared of
    Jews by all means. * * * All Jews without exception were taken
    out of the factories and shops and deported in spite of our
    agreement. It is true that part of the Jews was moved by way of
    the ghetto where many of them were processed and still
    segregated by me, but a large part was loaded directly on trucks
    and liquidated without further delay outside of the town. * * *
    For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must
    point out to my deepest regret that the latter bordered already
    on sadism. The town itself offered a picture of horror during
    the action. With indescribable brutality on the part of both the
    German police officers and particularly the Lithuanian
    partisans, the Jewish people, but also among them White
    Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded
    together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in
    different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The
    White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves
    from the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish
    people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a
    terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian
    people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also worked over
    with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an
    action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like a
    revolution. * * *” (_1104-PS_).

There are reports which merely tabulate the numbers slaughtered. An
example is an account of the work of _Einsatzgruppen_ of Sipo and SD in
the East, which relates that—

    In Estonia, all Jews were arrested immediately upon the arrival
    of the Wehrmacht. Jewish men and women above the age of 16 and
    capable of work were drafted for forced labor. Jews were
    subjected to all sorts of restrictions and all Jewish property
    was confiscated.

    All Jewish males above the age of 16 were executed, with the
    exception of doctors and elders. Only 500 of an original 4,500
    Jews remained.

    37,180 persons have been liquidated by the Sipo and SD in White
    Ruthenia during October.

    In one town, 337 Jewish women were executed for demonstrating a
    “provocative attitude.” In another, 380 Jews were shot for
    spreading vicious propaganda.

And so the report continues, listing town after town, where hundreds
upon hundreds of Jews were murdered.

    In Witebsk 3,000 Jews were liquidated because of the danger of
    epidemics.

    In Kiew, 33,771 Jews were executed on September 29 and 30 in
    retaliation for some fires which were set off there.

    In Shitomir, 3,145 Jews “had to be shot” because, judging from
    experience they had to be considered as the carriers of
    Bolshevik propaganda.

    In Cherson, 410 Jews were executed in reprisal against acts of
    sabotage.

    In the territory east of the Djnepr, the Jewish problem was
    “solved” by the liquidation of 4,891 Jews and by putting the
    remainder into labor battalions of up to 1,000 persons
    (_R-102_).

Other accounts tell not of the slaughter so much as of the depths of
degradation to which the tormentors stooped. For example, we will show
the reports made to defendant Rosenberg about the army and the SS in the
area under Rosenberg’s jurisdiction, which recited the following:

    “Details: In presence of SS man, a Jewish dentist has to break
    all gold teeth and fillings out of mouth of German and Russian
    Jews _before_ they are executed.”

    Men, women and children are locked into barns and burned alive.

    Peasants, women and children are shot on pretext that they are
    suspected of belonging to bands (_R-135_).

We of the Western World heard of Gas Wagons in which Jews and political
opponents were asphyxiated. We could not believe it. But here we have
the report of May 16, 1942 from the German SS officer, Becker, to his
supervisor in Berlin which tells this story:

    Gas vans in C. group can be driven to execution spot, which is
    generally stationed 10 to 15 kms. from main road only in dry
    weather. Since those to be executed become frantic if conducted
    to this place, such vans become immobilized in wet weather.

    Gas vans in D. group camouflaged as cabin trailers, but vehicles
    well known to authorities and civilian population which calls
    them “Death Vans”.

    Writer of letter (Becker) ordered all men to keep as far away as
    possible during gassing. Unloading van has “atrocious spiritual
    and physical effect” on men and they should be ordered not to
    participate in such work (_501-PS_).

I shall not dwell on this subject longer than to quote one more
sickening document which evidences the planned and systematic character
of the Jewish persecutions. I hold a report written with Teutonic
devotion to detail, illustrated with photographs to authenticate its
almost incredible text, and beautifully bound in leather with the loving
care bestowed on a proud work. It is the original report of the SS
Brigadier General Stroop in charge of the destruction of the Warsaw
Ghetto, and its title page carries the inscription, “The Jewish Ghetto
in Warsaw no longer exists.” It is characteristic that one of the
captions explains that the photograph concerned shows the driving out of
Jewish “bandits”; those whom the photograph shows being driven out are
almost entirely women and little children. It contains a day-by-day
account of the killings mainly carried out by the SS organization, too
long to relate, but let me quote General Stroop’s summary:

    “The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could only be
    suppressed by energetic actions of our troops day and night.
    _The Reichsfuehrer SS ordered, therefore on 23 April 1943 the
    cleaning out of the ghetto with utter ruthlessness and merciless
    tenacity._ I, therefore, decided to destroy and burn down the
    entire ghetto without regard to the armament factories. These
    factories were systematically dismantled and then burned. Jews
    usually left their hideouts, but frequently remained in the
    burning buildings and jumped out of the windows only when the
    heat became unbearable. They then tried to crawl with broken
    bones across the street into buildings which were not afire.
    Sometimes they changed their hideouts during the night into the
    ruins of burned buildings. Life in the sewers was not pleasant
    after the first week. Many times we could hear loud voices in
    the sewers. SS men or policemen climbed bravely through the
    manholes to capture these Jews. Sometimes they stumbled over
    Jewish corpses; sometimes they were shot at. Tear gas bombs were
    thrown into the manholes and the Jews driven out of the sewers
    and captured. Countless numbers of Jews were liquidated in
    sewers and bunkers through blasting. The longer the resistance
    continued the tougher became the members of the Waffen SS police
    and Wehrmacht who always discharged their duties in an exemplary
    manner. Frequently Jews who tried to replenish their food
    supplies during the night or to communicate with neighboring
    groups were exterminated.” (_1061-PS_).

This action eliminated, says the SS commander, “a proved total of
56,065. To that we have to add the number of those killed through
blasting, fire, etc., which cannot be counted.”

We charge that all atrocities against Jews were the manifestation and
culmination of the Nazi plan to which every defendant here was a party.
I know very well that some of these men did take steps to spare some
particular Jew for some personal reason from the horrors that awaited
the unrescued Jew. Some protested that particular atrocities were
excessive, and discredited the general policy. While a few defendants
may show efforts to make specific exceptions to the policy of Jewish
extermination, I have found no instance in which any defendant opposed
the policy itself or sought to revoke or even modify it.

Determination to destroy the Jews was a binding force which at all times
cemented the elements of this conspiracy. On many internal policies
there were differences among the defendants. But there is not one of
them who has not echoed the rallying cry of Naziism—_DEUTSCHLAND
ERWACHE JUDA VERRECKE!_ (GERMANY AWAKE, JEWRY PERISH!)

                   TERRORISM AND PREPARATION FOR WAR

How a Government treats its own inhabitants generally is thought to be
no concern of other Governments or of international society. Certainly
few oppressions or cruelties would warrant the intervention of foreign
powers. But the German mistreatment of Germans is now known to pass in
magnitude and savagery any limits of what is tolerable by modern
civilization. Other nations, by silence, would take a consenting part in
such crimes. These Nazi persecutions, moreover, take character as
international crimes because of the purpose for which they were
undertaken.

The purpose, as we have seen, of getting rid of the influence of free
labor, the churches, and the Jews was to clear their obstruction to the
precipitation of aggressive war. If aggressive warfare in violation of
treaty obligation is a matter of international cognizance, the
preparations for it must also be of concern to the international
community. Terrorism was the chief instrument for securing the cohesion
of the German people in war purposes. Moreover, these cruelties in
Germany served as atrocity practice to discipline the membership of the
criminal organization to follow the pattern later in occupied countries.

Through the police formations that before you are accused as criminal
organizations, the Nazi Party leaders, aided at some point in their
basic and notorious purpose by each of the individual defendants
instituted a reign of terror. These espionage and police organizations
were utilized to hunt down every form of opposition and to penalize
every nonconformity. These organizations early founded and administered
concentration camps—Buchenwald in 1933, Dachau in 1934. But these
notorious names were not alone. Concentration camps came to dot the
German map and to number scores. At first they met with resistance from
some Germans. We have a captured letter from Minister of Justice
Guertner to Hitler which is revealing. A Gestapo official had been
prosecuted for crimes committed in the camp at Hohnstein, and the Nazi
Governor of Saxony had promptly asked that the proceeding be quashed.
The Minister of Justice in June of 1935 protested because, as he said:

    “In this camp unusually grave mistreatments of prisoners have
    occurred at least since Summer 1933. The prisoners not only were
    beaten with whips without cause, similarly as in the
    Concentration Camp Bredow near Stettin till they lost
    consciousness, but they were also tortured in other manners,
    e.g. with the help of a dripping apparatus constructed
    exclusively for this purpose, under which prisoners had to stand
    until they were suffering from serious purulent wounds of the
    scalp * * *” (_787-PS_).

I shall not take time to detail the ghastly proceedings in these
concentration camps. Beatings, starvings, tortures, and killings were
routine—so routine that the tormenters became blase and careless. We
have a report of discovery that in Ploetzens one night, 186 persons were
executed while there were orders for only 180. Another report describes
how the family of one victim received two urns of ashes by mistake.
Inmates were compelled to execute each other. In 1942, they were paid
five Reichsmarks per execution, but on June 27, 1942, SS General Gluecks
ordered commandants of all concentration camps to reduce this honorarium
to three cigarettes. In 1943, the Reichsleader of the SS and Chief of
German Police ordered the corporal punishments on Russian women to be
applied by Polish women and vice versa, but the price was not frozen.
“As reward, a few cigarettes” was authorized. Under the Nazis, human
life had been progressively devalued until it finally became worth less
than a handful of tobacco—ersatz tobacco. There were, however, some
traces of the milk of human kindness. On August 11, 1942, an order went
from Himmler to the commanders of fourteen concentration camps that
“only German prisoners are allowed to beat other German prisoners.”
(_2189-PS_).

Mystery and suspense was added to cruelty in order to spread torture
from the inmate to his family and friends. Men and women disappeared
from their homes or business or from the streets, and no word came of
them. The omission of notice was not due to overworked staff; it was due
to policy. The Chief of the SD and Sipo reported that in accordance with
orders from the Fuehrer anxiety should be created in the minds of the
family of the arrested person (_668-PS_). Deportations and secret
arrests were labeled, with a Nazi wit which seems a little ghoulish,
_Nacht und Nebel_ (Night and Fog) (_L-90, 833-PS_). One of the many
orders for these actions gave this explanation:

    “The decree carries a basic innovation. The Fuehrer and
    Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces commands that crimes of
    the specified sort committed by civilians of the occupied
    territories are to be punished by the pertinent courts-martial
    in the occupied territories _only_ when

    _a._ the sentence calls for the death penalty, and

    _b._ the sentence is pronounced within 8 days after the arrest.

    “Only when both conditions are met does the Fuehrer and
    Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces hope for the desired
    deterrent effect from the conduct of punitive proceedings in the
    occupied territories.

    “In other cases in the future the accused are to be secretly
    brought to Germany and the further conduct of the trial carried
    on here. The deterrent effect of those measures lies

    _a._ in allowing the disappearance of the accused without a
    trace,

    _b._ therein, that no information whatsoever may be given about
    their whereabouts and their fate.” (_833-PS_).

To clumsy cruelty, scientific skill was added. “Undesirables” were
exterminated by injection of drugs into the bloodstream, by asphyxiation
in gas chambers. They were shot with poison bullets, to study the
effects (_L-103_).

Then, to cruel experiments the Nazi added obscene ones. These were not
the work of underling degenerates but of master minds high in the Nazi
conspiracy. In May 20, 1942, General Field Marshal Milch authorized SS
General Wolff to go ahead at Dachau Camp with so-called “cold
experiments”; and four female gypsies were supplied for the purpose.
Himmler gave permission to carry on these “experiments” also in other
camps (_1617-PS_). At Dachau, the reports of the “doctor” in charge show
that victims were immersed in cold water until their body temperature
was reduced to 28 degrees centigrade (82.4 degrees Fahrenheit), when
they all died immediately (_1618-PS_). This was in August 1942. But the
“doctor’s” technique improved. By February, 1943, he was able to report
that thirty persons were chilled to 27 to 29 degrees, their hands and
feet frozen white, and their bodies “rewarmed” by a hot bath. But the
Nazi scientific triumph was “rewarming with animal heat.” The victim,
all but frozen to death, was surrounded with bodies of living women
until he revived and responded to his environment by having sexual
intercourse (_1616-PS_). Here Nazi degeneracy reached its nadir.

I dislike to encumber the record with such morbid tales, but we are in
the grim business of trying men as criminals, and these are the things
their own agents say happened. We will show you these concentration
camps in motion pictures, just as the Allied armies found them when they
arrived, and the measures General Eisenhower had to take to clean them
up. Our proof will be disgusting and you will say I have robbed you of
your sleep. But these are the things which have turned the stomach of
the world and set every civilized hand against Nazi Germany.

Germany became one vast torture chamber. Cries of its victims were heard
round the world and brought shudders to civilized people everywhere. I
am one who received during this war most atrocity tales with suspicion
and skepticism. But the proof here will be so overwhelming that I
venture to predict not one word I have spoken will be denied. These
defendants will only deny personal responsibility or knowledge.

Under the clutch of the most intricate web of espionage and intrigue
that any modern state has endured, and persecution and torture of a kind
that has not been visited upon the world in many centuries, the elements
of the German population which were both decent and courageous were
annihilated. Those which were decent but weak were intimidated. Open
resistance, which had never been more than feeble and irresolute,
disappeared. But resistance, I am happy to say, always remained,
although it was manifest in only such events as the abortive effort to
assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944. With resistance driven underground,
the Nazi had the German State in his own hands.

But the Nazis not only silenced discordant voices. They created positive
controls as effective as their negative ones. Propaganda organs, on a
scale never before known, stimulated the party and party formations with
a permanent enthusiasm and abandon such as we democratic people can work
up only for a few days before a general election. They inculcated and
practiced the _fuehrerprinzip_, which centralized control of the Party
and of the Party-controlled state over the lives and thought of the
German people, who are accustomed to look upon the German State by
whomever controlled with a mysticism that is incomprehensible to my
people.

All these controls from their inception were exerted with unparalleled
energy and singlemindedness to put Germany on a war footing. We will
show from the Nazis’ own documents their secret training of military
personnel, their secret creation of a military air force. Finally, a
conscript army was brought into being. Financiers, economists,
industrialists, joined in the plan and promoted elaborate alterations in
industry and finance to support an unprecedented concentration of
resources and energies upon preparations for war. Germany’s rearmament
so outstripped the strength of her neighbors that in about a year she
was able to crush the whole military force of Continental Europe,
exclusive of that of Soviet Russia, and then to push the Russian armies
back to the Volga. These preparations were of a magnitude which
surpassed all need of defense and every defendant, and every intelligent
German, well understood them to be for aggressive purposes.

                       EXPERIMENTS IN AGGRESSION

Before resorting to open aggressive warfare, the Nazis undertook some
rather cautious experiments to test the spirit and resistance of those
who lay across their path. They advanced, but only as others yielded,
and kept in a position to draw back if they found a temper that made
persistence dangerous.

On 7 March 1936, the Nazis reoccupied the Rhineland and then proceeded
to fortify it in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Pact of
Locarno. They encountered no substantial resistance and were emboldened
to take the next step, which was the acquisition of Austria. Despite
repeated assurances that Germany had no designs on Austria, invasion was
perfected. Threat of attack forced Schuschnigg to resign as Chancellor
of Austria and put the Nazi defendant Seyss-Inquart in his place. The
latter immediately opened the frontier and invited Hitler to invade
Austria “to preserve order.” On March 12th the invasion began. The next
day, Hitler proclaimed himself Chief of the Austrian State, took command
of its armed forces, and a law was enacted annexing Austria to Germany.

Threats of aggression had succeeded without arousing resistance. Fears
nevertheless had been stirred. They were lulled by an assurance to the
Czechoslovak Government that there would be no attack on that country.
We will show that the Nazi Government already had detailed plans for the
attack. We will lay before you the documents in which these conspirators
planned to create an incident to justify their attack. They even gave
consideration to assassinating their own Ambassador at Prague in order
to create a sufficiently dramatic incident. They did precipitate a
diplomatic crisis which endured through the summer. Hitler set September
30th as the day when troops should be ready for action. Under the threat
of immediate war, the United Kingdom and France concluded a pact with
Germany and Italy at Munich on September 29, 1938 which required
Czechoslovakia to acquiesce in the cession of the Sudetenland to
Germany. It was consummated by German occupation on October 1, 1938.

The Munich Pact pledged no further aggression against Czechoslovakia,
but the Nazi pledge was lightly given and quickly broken. On the 15th of
March, 1939, in defiance of the treaty of Munich itself, the Nazis
seized and occupied Bohemia and Moravia, which constituted the major
part of Czechoslovakia not already ceded to Germany. Once again the West
stood aghast, but it dreaded war, it saw no remedy except war, and it
hoped against hope that the Nazi fever for expansion had run its course.
But the Nazi world was intoxicated by these unresisted successes in open
alliance with Mussolini and covert alliance with Franco. Then, having
made a deceitful, delaying peace with Russia, the conspirators entered
upon the final phase of the plan to renew war.

                           WAR OF AGGRESSION

I will not prolong this address by detailing the steps leading to the
war of aggression which began with the invasion of Poland on September,
1, 1939. The further story will be unfolded to you from documents
including those of the German High Command itself. The plans had been
laid long in advance. As early as 1935 Hitler appointed the defendant
Schacht to the position of “General Deputy for the War Economy.”
(_2261-PS_). We have the diary of General Jodl (_1780-PS_); the “Plan
Otto,” Hitler’s own order for attack on Austria in case trickery failed
(_C-102_); the “Plan Green” which was the blueprint for attack on
Czechoslovakia (_388-PS_); plans for the War in the West (_376-PS_,
_375-PS_); Funk’s letter to Hitler dated August 25, 1939, detailing the
long course of economic preparation (_699-PS_); Keitel’s top secret
mobilization order for 1939-40 prescribing secret steps to be taken
during a “period of tension” during which no “‘state of war’ will be
publicly declared even if open war measures against the foreign enemy
will be taken.” This latter order (_1639-A-PS_) is in our possession
despite a secret order issued on March 16, 1945, when Allied troops were
advancing into the heart of Germany, to burn these plans. We have also
Hitler’s directive, dated December 18, 1940, for the “Barbarossa
Contingency” outlining the strategy of the attack upon Russia
(_446-PS_). That plan in the original bears the initials of the
defendants Keitel and Jodl. They were planning the attack and planning
it long in advance of the declaration of war. We have detailed
information concerning “Case White,” the plan for attack on Poland
(_C-120_). That attack began the war. The plan was issued by Keitel on
April 3rd, 1939. The attack did not come until September. Steps in
preparation for the attack were taken by subordinate commanders, one of
whom issued an order on June 14, providing that:

    “The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has ordered the working out
    of a _plan of deployment against Poland_ which takes in account
    the demands of the political leadership _for the opening of war
    by surprise and for quick success_ * * *

    “I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the
    divisional commanders and the commandants to limit as much as
    possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to
    limit the extent of the information, and ask that all suitable
    measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting
    information.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish
    mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with
    forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed
    on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial
    superiority over the Polish frontier-guards and surprise that
    can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly
    bringing up other parts of the army as well to counteract the
    marching up of the Polish Army.

    “If the development of the Political situation should show that
    a surprise at the beginning of the war is out of question,
    because of well advanced defense preparations on the part of the
    Polish Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army will order the
    opening of the hostilities only after the assembling of
    sufficient additional forces. The basis of all preparations will
    be to surprise the enemy.” (_2327-PS_).

We have also the order for the invasion of England, signed by Hitler and
initialed by Keitel and Jodl. It is interesting that it commences with a
recognition that although the British military position is “hopeless,”
they show not the slightest sign of giving in (_442-PS_).

Not the least incriminating are the minutes of Hitler’s meeting with his
high advisers. As early as November 5, 1937, Hitler told defendants
Goering, Raeder, and Neurath, among others, that German rearmament was
practically accomplished and that he had decided to secure by force,
starting with a lightning attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria, greater
living space for Germans in Europe no later than 1943-45 and perhaps as
early as 1938 (_386-PS_). On the 23rd of May, 1939, the Fuehrer advised
his staff that—

    “It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and
    of securing our food supplies * * * over and above the natural
    fertility, thorough-going German exploitation will enormously
    increase the surplus.”

    “There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are
    left with the decision: _To attack Poland at the first suitable
    opportunity_. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair.
    There will be war.” (_L-79_).

On August 22nd, 1939 Hitler again addressed members of the High Command,
telling them when the start of military operations would be ordered. He
disclosed that for propaganda purposes, he would provocate a good
reason. “It will make no difference,” he announced, “whether this reason
will sound convincing or not. After all, the victor will not be asked
whether he talked the truth or not. We have to proceed brutally. The
stronger is always right.” (_1014-PS_). On 23 November 1939 after the
Germans had invaded Poland, Hitler made this explanation:

    “For the first time in history we have to fight on only one
    front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know
    how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time
    whether I should strike in the east and then in the west.
    Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to
    strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or
    later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was
    decided that the east was to be attacked first * * *”
    (_789-PS_).

We know the bloody sequel. Frontier incidents were staged. Demands were
made for cession of territory. When Poland refused, the German forces
invaded on September 1st, 1939. Warsaw was destroyed; Poland fell. The
Nazis, in accordance with plan, moved swiftly to extend their aggression
throughout Europe and to gain the advantage of surprise over their
unprepared neighbors. Despite repeated and solemn assurances of peaceful
intentions, they invaded Denmark and Norway on 9th April, 1940; Belgium,
The Netherlands and Luxembourg on 10th May, 1940; Yugoslavia and Greece
on 6th April, 1941.

As part of the Nazi preparation for aggression against Poland and her
allies, Germany, on 23rd August, 1939 had entered into a nonaggression
pact with Soviet-Russia. It was only a delaying treaty intended to be
kept no longer than necessary to prepare for its violation. On June 22,
1941, pursuant to long matured plans, the Nazis hurled troops into
Soviet territory without any declaration of war. The entire European
world was aflame.

                         CONSPIRACY WITH JAPAN

The Nazi plans of aggression called for use of Asiatic allies and they
found among the Japanese men of kindred mind and purpose. They were
brothers, under the skin.

Himmler records a conversation he had on January 31, 1939 with General
Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. He wrote:

    “Furthermore, he (Oshima) had succeeded up to now to send 10
    Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These
    Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional
    Russians, whom he had also sent across, had been shot at the
    frontier.” (_2195-PS_).

On September 27th, 1940, the Nazis concluded a German-Italian-Japanese
ten-year military and economic alliance by which those powers agreed “to
stand by and cooperate with one another in regard to their efforts in
Greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their
prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things * * *.”

On March 5, 1941, a top secret directive was issued by defendant Keitel.
It stated that “The Fuehrer has ordered instigation of Japan’s active
participation in the war” and directed that “Japan’s military power has
to be strengthened by the disclosure of German war experiences and
support of a military, economic and technical nature has to be given.”
The aim was stated to be to crush England quickly, “thereby keeping the
United States out of the war.” (_C-75_).

On March 29, 1941, Ribbentrop told Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign
Minister, that the German Army was ready to strike against Russia.
Matsuoka reassured Ribbentrop about the Far East. Japan, he reported,
was acting at the moment as though she had no interest whatever in
Singapore, but “intends to strike when the right moment comes.”
(_1877-PS_). On April 5, 1941, Ribbentrop urged Matsuoka that entry of
Japan into the war would “hasten the victory” and would be more in the
interest of Japan that of Germany since it would give Japan a unique
chance to fulfill her national aims and to play a leading part in
Eastern Asia (_1882-PS_).

The proofs in this case will also show that the leaders of Germany were
planning war against the United States from its Atlantic as well as
instigating it from its Pacific approaches. A captured memorandum from
the Fuehrer’s headquarters, dated October 29, 1940, asks certain
information as to air bases and supply and reports further that

    “The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the
    occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the
    prosecution of war against America at a later date.
    Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here.”
    (_376-PS_).

On December 7, 1941, a day which the late President Roosevelt declared
“will live in infamy,” victory for German aggression seemed certain. The
Wehrmacht was at the gates of Moscow. Taking advantage of the situation,
and while her plenipotentiaries were creating a diplomatic diversion in
Washington, Japan without declaration of war treacherously attacked the
United States at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. Attacks followed
swiftly on the British Commonwealth and The Netherlands in the Southwest
Pacific. These aggressions were met in the only way they could be met,
with instant declarations of war and with armed resistance which mounted
slowly through many long months of reverse until finally the Axis was
crushed to earth and deliverance for its victims was won.

                      CRIMES IN THE CONDUCT OF WAR

Even the most warlike of peoples have recognized in the name of humanity
some limitations on the savagery of warfare. Rules to that end have been
embodied in international conventions to which Germany became a party.
This code had prescribed certain restraints as to the treatment of
belligerents. The enemy was entitled to surrender and to receive quarter
and good treatment as a prisoner of war. We will show by German
documents that these rights were denied, that prisoners of war were
given brutal treatment and often murdered. This was particularly true in
the case of captured airmen, often my countrymen.

It was ordered that captured English and American airmen should no
longer be granted the status of prisoners of war. They were to be
treated as criminals and the Army was ordered to refrain from protecting
them against lynching by the populace (_R-118_). The Nazi Government,
through its police and propaganda agencies, took pains to incite the
civilian population to attack and kill airmen who crash-landed. The
order, given by the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, on 10 August 1943,
directed that,

    “It is not the task of the police to interfere in clashes
    between German and English and American fliers who have bailed
    out.”

This order was transmitted on the same day by SS Obersturmbannfuhrer
Brand of Himmler’s Personal Staff to all Senior Executive SS and Police
officers, with these directions:

    “I am sending you the inclosed order with the request that the
    Chief of the Regular Police and of the Security Police be
    informed. They are to make this instruction known to their
    subordinate officers verbally.” (_R-110_).

Similarly, we will show Hitler’s top secret order, dated 18 October
1942, that commandos, regardless of condition, were “to be slaughtered
to the last man” after capture (_498-PS_). We will show the circulation
of secret orders, one of which was signed by Hess, to be passed orally
to civilians, that enemy fliers or parachutists were to be arrested or
liquidated (_062-PS_). By such means were murders incited and directed.

This Nazi campaign of ruthless treatment of enemy forces assumed its
greatest proportions in the fight against Russia. Eventually all
prisoners of war were taken out of control of the Army and put in the
hands of Himmler and the SS (_058-PS_). In the East, the German fury
spent itself. Russian prisoners were ordered to be branded. They were
starved. I shall quote passages from a letter written February 28, 1942
by defendant Rosenberg to defendant Keitel:

    “The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on the
    contrary a tragedy of the greatest extent. Of 3.6 millions of
    prisoners of war, only several hundred thousand are still able
    to work fully. A large part of them has starved, or died,
    because of the hazards of the weather. Thousands also died from
    spotted fever.

    “The camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population to
    put food at the disposal of the prisoners, and they have rather
    let them starve to death.

    “In many cases, when prisoners of war could no longer keep up on
    the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they were shot
    before the eyes of the horrified civilian population, and the
    corpses were left.

    “In numerous camps, no shelter for the prisoners of war was
    provided at all. They lay under the open sky during rain or
    snow. Even tools were not made available to dig holes or caves.

    “Finally, the shooting of prisoners of war must be mentioned.
    For instance, in various camps, all the ‘Asiatics’ were shot.”
    (_081-PS_).

Civilized usage and conventions to which Germany was a party had
prescribed certain immunities for civilian populations unfortunate
enough to dwell in lands overrun by hostile armies. The German
occupation forces, controlled or commanded by men on trial before you,
committed a long series of outrages against the inhabitants of occupied
territory that would be incredible except for captured orders and the
captured reports showing the fidelity with which these orders were
executed.

We deal here with a phase of common criminality designed by the
conspirators as part of the common plan. We can appreciate why these
crimes against their European enemies were not of a casual character but
were planned and disciplined crimes when we get at the reason for them.
Hitler told his officers on August 22, 1939 that “The main objective in
Poland is the destruction of the enemy and not the reaching of a certain
geographical line.” (_1014-PS_). The project of deporting promising
youth from occupied territories was approved by Rosenberg on the theory
that “a desired weakening of the biological force of the conquered
people is being achieved.” (_031-PS_). To Germanize or to destroy was
the program. Himmler announced, “Either we win over any good blood that
we can use for ourselves and give it a place in our people or,
gentlemen—you may call this cruel, but nature is cruel—we destroy this
blood.” As to “racially good types” Himmler further advised, “Therefore,
I think that it is our duty to take their children with us to remove
them from their environment if necessary by robbing or stealing them.”
(_L-70_). He urged deportation of Slavic children to deprive potential
enemies of future soldiers.

The Nazi purpose was to leave Germany’s neighbors so weakened that even
if she should eventually lose the war, she would still be the most
powerful nation in Europe. Against this background, we must view the
plan for ruthless warfare, which means a plan for the commission of war
crimes and crimes against humanity.

Hostages in large numbers were demanded and killed. Mass punishments
were inflicted, so savage that whole communities were extinguished.
Rosenberg was advised of the annihilation of three unidentified villages
in Slovakia. In May of 1943, another village of about 40 farms and 220
inhabitants was ordered wiped out. The entire population was ordered
shot, the cattle and property impounded, and the order required that
“the village will be destroyed totally by fire.” A secret report from
Rosenberg’s Reich Ministry of Eastern territory reveals that:

    “Food rations allowed the Russian population are so low that
    they fail to secure their existence and provide only for minimum
    subsistence of limited duration. The population, does not know
    if they will still live tomorrow. They are faced with death by
    starvation.

    “The roads are clogged by hundreds of thousands of people,
    sometime as many as one million according to the estimate of
    experts, who wander around in search of nourishment.

    “Sauckel’s action has caused great unrest among the civilians.
    Russian girls were deloused by men, nude photos in forced
    positions were taken, women doctors were locked into freight
    cars for the pleasure of the transport commanders, women in
    night shirts were fettered and forced through the Russian towns
    to the railroad station, etc. All this material has been sent to
    the OKH.”

Perhaps the deportation to slave labor was the most horrible and
extensive slaving operation in history. On few other subjects is our
evidence so abundant or so damaging. In a speech made on January 25,
1944, the defendant Frank, Governor-General of Poland, boasted, “I have
sent 1,300,000 Polish workers into the Reich.” The defendant Sauckel
reported that “out of the five million foreign workers who arrived in
Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily.” This fact was reported to
the Fuehrer and defendants Speer, Goering, and Keitel (_R-124_).
Children of 10 to 14 years were impressed into service by telegraphic
order of Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories:

    “The Command is further charged with the transferring of
    worthwhile Russian youth between 10-14 years of age, to the
    Reich. The authority is not affected by the changes connected
    with the evacuation and transportation to the reception camps of
    Pialystok, Krajewo, and Olitei. The Fuehrer wishes that this
    activity be increased even more.” (_200-PS_).

When enough labor was not forthcoming, prisoners of war were forced in
war work in flagrant violation of international conventions (_016-PS_).
Slave labor came from France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and the East.
Methods of recruitment were violent (_R-124, 018-PS, 204-PS_). The
treatment of these slave laborers was stated in general terms, not
difficult to translate into concrete deprivations, in a letter to the
defendant Rosenberg from the defendant Sauckel, which stated:

    “All _prisoners of war_, from the _territories_ of the West as
    well of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely
    incorporated into the German armament and munition industries.
    Their production must be brought to the highest possible level.

    “The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the
    use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men
    and women, has become an undisputable necessity for the solution
    of the mobilization of labor program in this war.

    “All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as
    to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest
    conceivable degrees of expenditure.” (_016-PS_).

In pursuance of the Nazi plan permanently to reduce the living standards
of their neighbors and to weaken them physically and economically, a
long series of crimes were committed. There was extensive destruction,
serving no military purpose, of the property of civilians. Dikes were
thrown open in Holland almost at the close of the war not to achieve
military ends but to destroy the resources and retard the economy of the
thrifty Netherlanders.

There was carefully planned economic syphoning off of the assets of
occupied countries. An example of the planning is shown by a report on
France dated December 7, 1942 made by the Economic Research Department
of the Reichsbank. The question arose whether French occupation costs
should be increased from 15 million Reichsmarks per day to 25 million
Reichsmarks per day. The Reichsbank analyzed French economy to determine
whether it could bear the burden. It pointed out that the armistice had
burdened France to that date to the extent of 18½ billion Reichsmarks,
equalling 370 billion Francs. It pointed out that the burden of these
payments within two and a half years equalled the aggregate French
national income in the year 1940, and that the amount of payments handed
over to Germany in the first six months of 1942 corresponded to the
estimate for the total French revenue for that whole year. The report
concluded, “In any case, the conclusion is inescapable that relatively
heavier tributes have been imposed on France since the armistice in
June, 1940 than upon Germany after the World War. In this connection, it
must be noted that the economic powers of France never equalled those of
the German Reich and that vanquished France could not draw on foreign
economic and financial resources in the same degree as Germany after the
last World War.”

The defendant Funk was the Reichs Minister of Economics and President of
the Reichsbank; the defendant Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister; the
defendant Goering was Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, and all of
them participated in the exchange of views of which this captured
document is a part (_2149-PS_). Notwithstanding this analysis by the
Reichsbank, they proceeded to increase the imposition on France from 15
million Reichsmarks daily to 25 million daily.

It is small wonder that the bottom has been knocked out of French
economy. The plan and purpose of the thing appears in a letter from
General Stulpnagle, head of the German Armistice Commission, to the
defendant Jodl as early as 14th September, 1940 when he wrote, “The
slogan ‘Systematic weakening of France’ has already been surpassed by
far in reality.”

Not only was there a purpose to debilitate and demoralize the economy of
Germany’s neighbors for the purpose of destroying their competitive
position, but there was looting and pilfering on an unprecedented scale.
We need not be hypocritical about this business of looting. I recognize
that no army moves through occupied territory without some pilfering as
it goes. Usually the amount of pilfering increases as discipline wanes.
If the evidence in this case showed no looting except of that sort, I
certainly would ask no conviction of these defendants for it.

But we will show you that looting was not due to the lack of discipline
or to the ordinary weaknesses of human nature. The German organized
plundering, planned it, disciplined it, and made it official just as he
organized everything else, and then he compiled the most meticulous
records to show that he had done the best job of looting that was
possible under the circumstances. And we have those records.

The defendant Rosenberg was put in charge of a systematic plundering of
the art objects of Europe by direct order of Hitler dated 29 January
1940 (_136-PS_). On the 16th of April, 1943 Rosenberg reported that up
to the 7th of April, 92 railway cars with 2,775 cases containing art
objects had been sent to Germany; and that 53 pieces of art had been
shipped to Hitler direct, and 594 to the defendant Goering. The report
mentioned something like 20,000 pieces of seized art and the main
locations where they were stored (_015-PS_).

Moreover, this looting was glorified by Rosenberg. Here we have 39
leather-bound tabulated volumes of his inventory, which in due time we
will offer in evidence. One cannot but admire the artistry of this
Rosenberg report. The Nazi taste was cosmopolitan. Of the 9,455 articles
inventoried, there were included 5,255 paintings, 297 sculptures, 1,372
pieces of antique furniture, 307 textiles, and 2,224 small objects of
art. Rosenberg observed that there were approximately 10,000 more
objects still to be inventoried (_015-PS_). Rosenberg himself estimated
that the values involved would come close to a billion dollars
(_090-PS_).

I shall not go into further details of the war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed by the Nazi gangster ring whose leaders are before
you. It is not the purpose in my part of this case to deal with the
individual crimes. I am dealing with the common plan or design for crime
and will not dwell upon individual offenses. My task is only to show the
scale on which these crimes occurred, and to show that these are the men
who were in the responsible positions and who conceived the plan and
design which renders them answerable, regardless of the fact that the
plan was actually executed by others.

At length, this reckless and lawless course outraged the world. It
recovered from the demoralization of surprise attack, assembled its
forces, and stopped these men in their tracks. Once success deserted
their banners, one by one the Nazi satellites fell away. Sawdust Caesar
collapsed. Resistance forces in every occupied country arose to harry
the invader. Even at home, Germans saw that Germany was being led to
ruin by these mad men, and the attempt on July 20, 1944 to assassinate
Hitler, an attempt fostered by men of highest station, was a desperate
effort by internal forces to stop short of ruin. Quarrels broke out
among the failing conspirators, and the decline of the Nazi power was
more swift than its ascendancy. German armed forces surrendered, its
government disintegrated, its leaders committed suicide by the dozen,
and by the fortunes of war these defendants fell into our hands.
Although they are not by any means all the guilty ones, they are
survivors among the most responsible. Their names appear over and over
in the documents and their faces grace the photographic evidence. We
have here the surviving top politicians, militarists, financiers,
diplomats, administrators, and propagandists of the Nazi movement. Who
was responsible for these crimes if they were not?

                          THE LAW OF THE CASE

The end of the war and capture of these prisoners presented the
victorious Allies with the question whether there is any legal
responsibility on high-ranking men for acts which I have described. Must
such wrongs either be ignored or redressed in hot blood? Is there no
standard in the law for a deliberate and reasoned judgment on such
conduct?

The Charter of this Tribunal evidences a faith that the law is not only
to govern the conduct of little men, but that even rulers are, as Lord
Chief Justice Coke put it to King James, “under God and the law.” The
United States believed that the law long has afforded standards by which
a juridical hearing could be conducted to make sure that we punish only
the right men and for the right reasons. Following the instructions of
the late President Roosevelt and the decision of the Yalta conference,
President Truman directed representatives of the United States to
formulate a proposed International Agreement, which was submitted during
the San Francisco Conference to Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom,
the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of France. With many
modifications, that proposal has become the Charter of this Tribunal.

But the Agreement which sets up the standards by which these prisoners
are to be judged does not express the views of the signatory nations
alone. Other nations with diverse but highly respected systems of
jurisprudence also have signified adherence to it. These are Belgium,
The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Poland,
Greece, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Australia, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, New
Zealand, Venezuela, and India. You judge, therefore, under an organic
act which represents the wisdom, the sense of justice, and the will of
twenty-one governments, representing an overwhelming majority of all
civilized people.

The Charter by which this Tribunal has its being embodies certain legal
concepts which are inseparable from its jurisdiction and which must
govern its decision. These, as I have said, also are conditions attached
to the grant of any hearing to defendants. The validity of the
provisions of the Charter is conclusive upon us all whether we have
accepted the duty of judging or of prosecuting under it, as well as upon
the defendants, who can point to no other law which gives them a right
to be heard at all. My able and experienced colleagues believe, as do I,
that it will contribute to the expedition and clarity of this trial if I
expound briefly the application of the legal philosophy of the Charter
to the facts I have recited.

While this declaration of the law by the Charter is final, it may be
contended that the prisoners on trial are entitled to have it applied to
their conduct only most charitably if at all. It may be said that this
is new law, not authoritatively declared at the time they did the acts
it condemns, and that this declaration of the law has taken them by
surprise.

I cannot, of course, deny that these men are surprised that this is the
law; they really are surprised that there is any such thing as law.
These defendants did not rely on any law at all. Their program ignored
and defied all law. That this is so will appear from many acts and
statements, of which I cite but a few. In the Fuehrer’s speech to all
military commanders on November 23, 1939, he reminded them that at the
moment Germany had a pact with Russia, but declared, “Agreements are to
be kept only as long as they serve a certain purpose.” Later on in the
same speech he announced, “A violation of the neutrality of Holland and
Belgium will be of no importance.” (_789-PS_). A Top Secret document,
entitled “Warfare as a Problem of Organization,” dispatched by the Chief
of the High Command to all Commanders on April 19, 1938, declared that
“the normal rules of war toward neutrals may be considered to apply on
the basis whether operation of rules will create greater advantages or
disadvantages for belligerents.” (_L-211_). And from the files of the
German Navy Staff, we have a “Memorandum on Intensified Naval War,”
dated October 15, 1939, which begins by stating a desire to comply with
International Law. “However,” it continues, “if decisive successes are
expected from any measure considered as a war necessity, it must be
carried through even if it is not in agreement with international law.”
(_UK-65_). International Law, natural law, German law, any law at all
was to these men simply a propaganda device to be invoked when it helped
and to be ignored when it would condemn what they wanted to do. That men
may be protected in relying upon the law at the time they act is the
reason we find laws of retrospective operation unjust. But these men
cannot bring themselves within the reason of the rule which in some
systems of jurisprudence prohibits _ex post facto_ laws. They cannot
show that they ever relied upon International Law in any state or paid
it the slightest regard.

The Third Count of the Indictment is based on the definition of war
crimes contained in the Charter. I have outlined to you the systematic
course of conduct toward civilian populations and combat forces which
violates international conventions to which Germany was a party. Of the
criminal nature of these acts at least, the defendants had, as we shall
show, clear knowledge. Accordingly, they took pains to conceal their
violations. It will appear that the defendants Keitel and Jodl were
informed by official legal advisors that the orders to brand Russian
prisoners of war, to shackle British prisoners of war, and to execute
commando prisoners were clear violations of International Law.
Nevertheless, these orders were put into effect. The same is true of
orders issued for the assassination of General Giraud and General
Weygand, which failed to be executed only because of a ruse on the part
of Admiral Canaris, who was himself later executed for his part in the
plot to take Hitler’s life on July 20, 1944 (_Affidavit A_).

The Fourth Count of the Indictment is based on crimes against humanity.
Chief among these are mass killings of countless human beings in cold
blood. Does it take these men by surprise that murder is treated as a
crime?

The First and Second Counts of the Indictment add to these crimes the
crime of plotting and waging wars of aggression and wars in violation of
nine treaties to which Germany was a party. There was a time, in fact I
think the time of the first World War, when it could not have been said
that war-inciting or war-making was a crime in law, however
reprehensible in morals.

Of course, it was under the law of all civilized peoples a crime for one
man with his bare knuckles to assault another. How did it come that
multiplying this crime by a million, and adding fire arms to bare
knuckles, made a legally innocent act? The doctrine was that one could
not be regarded as criminal for committing the usual violent acts in the
conduct of legitimate warfare. The age of imperialistic expansion during
the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries added the foul doctrine,
contrary to the teachings of early Christian and International Law
scholars such as Grotius, that all wars are to be regarded as legitimate
wars. The sum of these two doctrines was to give war-making a complete
immunity from accountability to law.

This was intolerable for an age that called itself civilized. Plain
people, with their earthly common sense, revolted at such fictions and
legalisms so contrary to ethical principles and demanded checks on war
immunity. Statesmen and international lawyers at first cautiously
responded by adopting rules of warfare designed to make the conduct of
war more civilized. The effort was to set legal limits to the violence
that could be done to civilian populations and to combatants as well.

The common sense of men after the First World War demanded, however,
that the law’s condemnation of war reach deeper, and that the law
condemn not merely uncivilized ways of waging war, but also the waging
in any way of uncivilized wars—wars of aggression. The world’s
statesmen again went only as far as they were forced to go. Their
efforts were timid and cautious and often less explicit than we might
have hoped. But the 1920’s did outlaw aggressive war.

The reestablishment of the principle that there are unjust wars and that
unjust wars are illegal is traceable in many steps. One of the most
significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, by which Germany, Italy,
and Japan, in common with practically all the nations of the world,
renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to
seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies. This
pact altered the legal status of a war of aggression. As Mr. Stimson,
the United States Secretary of State put it in 1932, such a war “is no
longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the
principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of
nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. * * * By that very act, we have
made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal profession
the task of reexamining many of its codes and treaties.”

The Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-eight governments,
declared that “a war of aggression constitutes * * * an international
crime.” The Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on
unanimous resolution of the representatives of forty-eight member
nations, including Germany, declared that a war of aggression
constitutes an international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference
of 1928, the twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a
resolution stating that “war of aggression constitutes an international
crime against the human species.”

A failure of these Nazis to heed, or to understand the force and meaning
of this evolution in the legal thought of the world is not a defense or
a mitigation. If anything, it aggravates their offense and makes it the
more mandatory that the law they have flouted be vindicated by juridical
application to their lawless conduct. Indeed, by their own law—had they
heeded any law—these principles were binding on these defendants.
Article 4 of the Weimar Constitution provided that “The generally
accepted rules of international law are to be considered as binding
integral parts of the law of the German Reich.” (_2050-PS_). Can there
be any doubt that the outlawry of aggressive war was one of the
“generally accepted rules of international law” in 1939?

Any resort to war—to any kind of a war—is a resort to means that are
inherently criminal. War inevitably is a course of killings, assaults,
deprivations of liberty, and destruction of property. An honestly
defensive war is, of course, legal and saves those lawfully conducting
it from criminality. But inherently criminal acts cannot be defended by
showing that those who committed them were engaged in a war, when war
itself is illegal. The very minimum legal consequence of the treaties
making aggressive wars illegal is to strip those who incite or wage them
of every defense the law ever gave, and to leave warmakers subject to
judgment by the usually accepted principles of the law of crimes.

But if it be thought that the Charter, whose declarations concededly
bind us all, does contain new law I still do not shrink from demanding
its strict application by this Tribunal. The rule of law in the world,
flouted by the lawlessness incited by these defendants, had to be
restored at the cost to my country of over a million casualties, not to
mention those of other nations. I cannot subscribe to the perverted
reasoning that society may advance and strengthen the rule of law by the
expenditure of morally innocent lives but that progress in the law may
never be made at the price of morally guilty lives.

It is true, of course, that we have no judicial precedent for the
Charter. But International Law is more than a scholarly collection of
abstract and immutable principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties and
agreements between nations and of accepted customs. Yet every custom has
its origin in some single act, and every agreement has to be initiated
by the action of some state. Unless we are prepared to abandon every
principle of growth for International Law, we cannot deny that our own
day has the right to institute customs and to conclude agreements that
will themselves become sources of a newer and strengthened International
Law. International Law is not capable of development by the normal
processes of legislation for there is no continuing international
legislative authority. Innovations and revisions in International Law
are brought about by the action of governments designed to meet a change
in circumstances. It grows, as did the Common Law, through decisions
reached from time to time in adapting settled principles to new
situations. The fact is that when the law evolves by the case method, as
did the Common Law and as International Law must do if it is to advance
at all, it advances at the expense of those who wrongly guessed the law
and learned too late their error. The law, so far as International Law
can be decreed, had been clearly pronounced when these acts took place.
Hence, I am not disturbed by the lack of judicial precedent for the
inquiry we propose to conduct.

The events I have earlier recited clearly fall within the standards of
crimes, set out in the Charter, whose perpetrators this Tribunal is
convened to judge and punish fittingly. The standards for war crimes and
crimes against humanity are too familiar to need comment. There are,
however, certain novel problems in applying other precepts of the
Charter which I should call to your attention.

                        THE CRIME AGAINST PEACE

A basic provision of the Charter is that to plan, prepare, initiate, or
wage a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements, and assurances, or to conspire or participate in a
common plan to do so is a crime.

It is perhaps a weakness in this Charter that it fails itself to define
a war of aggression. Abstractly, the subject is full of difficulty and
all kinds of troublesome hypothetical cases can be conjured up. It is a
subject which, if the defense should be permitted to go afield beyond
the very narrow charge in the Indictment, would prolong the trial and
involve the Tribunal in insoluble political issues. But so far as the
question can properly be involved in this case, the issue is one of no
novelty and is one on which legal opinion has well crystalized.

One of the most authoritative sources of International Law on this
subject is the Convention for the Definition of Aggression signed at
London on July 3, 1933 by Rumania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Turkey, The
Soviet Union, Persia, and Afghanistan. The subject has also been
considered by international committees and by commentators whose views
are entitled to the greatest respect. It had been little discussed prior
to the First World War but has received much attention as International
Law has evolved its outlawry of aggressive war. In the light of these
materials of International Law, and so far as relevant to the evidence
in this case, I suggest that an “aggressor” is generally held to be that
state which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

    (1) Declaration of war upon another State;

    (2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration
    war, of the territory of another State;

    (3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a
    declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of
    another State;

    (4) Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory
    of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the
    invaded State, to take in its own territory, all the measures in
    its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or
    protection.

And I further suggest that it is the general view that no political,
military, economic or other considerations shall serve as an excuse or
justification for such actions; but exercise of the right of legitimate
self-defense, that is to say, resistance to an act of aggression, or
action to assist a State which has been subjected to aggression, shall
not constitute a war of aggression.

It is upon such an understanding of the law that our evidence of a
conspiracy to provoke and wage an aggressive war is prepared and
presented. By this test each of the series of wars begun by these Nazi
leaders was unambiguously aggressive.

It is important to the duration and scope of this trial that we bear in
mind the difference between our charge that this war was one of
aggression and a position that Germany had no grievances. We are not
inquiring into the conditions which contributed to causing this war.
They are for history to unravel. It is no part of our task to vindicate
the European _status quo_ as of 1933, or as of any other date. The
United States does not desire to enter into discussion of the
complicated pre-war currents of European politics, and it hopes this
trial will not be protracted by their consideration. The remote
causations avowed are too insincere and inconsistent, too complicated
and doctrinaire to be the subject of profitable inquiry in this trial. A
familiar example is to be found in the _Lebensraum_ slogan, which
summarized the contention that Germany needed more living space as a
justification for expansion. At the same time that the Nazis were
demanding more space for the German people, they were demanding more
German people to occupy space. Every known means to increase the birth
rate, legitimate and illegitimate, was utilized. _Lebensraum_
represented a vicious circle of demand—from neighbors more space, and
from Germans more progeny. We do not need to investigate the verity of
doctrines which led to constantly expanding circles of aggression. It is
the plot and the act of aggression which we charge to be crimes.

Our position is that whatever grievances a nation may have, however
objectionable it finds the _status quo_, aggressive warfare is an
illegal means for settling those grievances or for altering those
conditions. It may be that the Germany of the 1920’s and 1930’s faced
desperate problems, problems that would have warranted the boldest
measures short of war. All other methods—persuasion, propaganda,
economic competition, diplomacy—were open to an aggrieved country, but
aggressive warfare was outlawed. These defendants did make aggressive
war, a war in violation of treaties. They did attack and invade their
neighbors in order to effectuate a foreign policy which they knew could
not be accomplished by measures short of war. And that is as far as we
accuse or propose to inquire.

                  THE LAW OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

The Charter also recognizes individual responsibility on the part of
those who commit acts defined as crimes, or who incite others to do so,
or who join a common plan with other persons, groups or organizations to
bring about their commission. The principle of individual responsibility
for piracy and brigandage, which have long been recognized as crimes
punishable under International Law, is old and well established. That is
what illegal warfare is. This principle of personal liability is a
necessary as well as logical one if International Law is to render real
help to the maintenance of peace. An International Law which operates
only on states can be enforced only by war because the most practicable
method of coercing a state is warfare. Those familiar with American
history know that one of the compelling reasons for adoption of our
Constitution was that the laws of the Confederation, which operated only
on constituent states, were found ineffective to maintain order among
them. The only answer to recalcitrance was impotence or war. Only
sanctions which reach individuals can peacefully and effectively be
enforced. Hence, the principle of the criminality of aggressive war is
implemented by the Charter with the principle of personal
responsibility.

Of course, the idea that a state, any more than a corporation, commits
crimes is a fiction. Crimes always are committed only by persons. While
it is quite proper to employ the fiction of responsibility of a state or
corporation for the purpose of imposing a collective liability, it is
quite intolerable to let such a legalism become the basis of personal
immunity.

The Charter recognizes that one who has committed criminal acts may not
take refuge in superior orders nor in the doctrine that his crimes were
acts of states. These twin principles working together have heretofore
resulted in immunity for practically everyone concerned in the really
great crimes against peace and mankind. Those in lower ranks were
protected against liability by the orders of their superiors. The
superiors were protected because their orders were called acts of state.
Under the Charter, no defense based on either of these doctrines can be
entertained. Modern civilization puts unlimited weapons of destruction
in the hands of men. It cannot tolerate so vast an area of legal
irresponsibility.

Even the German Military Code provides that:

    “If the execution of a military order in the course of duty
    violates the criminal law, then the superior officer giving the
    order will bear the sole responsibility therefor. However, the
    obeying subordinate will share the punishment of the
    participant: (1) if he has exceeded the order given to him, or
    (2) if it was within his knowledge that the order of his
    superior officer concerned an act by which it was intended to
    commit a civil or military crime or transgression.”
    (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1926, No. 37, p. 278, Art. 47).

Of course, we do not argue that the circumstances under which one
commits an act should be disregarded in judging its legal effect. A
conscripted private on a firing squad cannot expect to hold an inquest
on the validity of the execution. The Charter implies common sense
limits to liability just as it places common sense limits upon immunity.
But none of these men before you acted in minor parts. Each of them was
entrusted with broad discretion and exercised great power. Their
responsibility is correspondingly great and may not be shifted to that
fictional being, “the State”, which can not be produced for trial, can
not testify, and can not be sentenced.

The Charter also recognized a vicarious liability, which responsibility
is recognized by most modern systems of law, for acts committed by
others in carrying out a common plan or conspiracy to which a defendant
has become a party. I need not discuss the familiar principles of such
liability. Every day in the courts of countries associated in this,
prosecution, men are convicted for acts that they did not personally
commit but for which they were held responsible because of membership in
illegal combinations or plans or conspiracies.

           THE POLITICAL, POLICE, AND MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

Accused before this Tribunal as criminal organizations are certain
political and police organizations which the evidence will show to have
been instruments of cohesion in planning and executing the crimes I have
detailed. Perhaps the worst of the movement were the Leadership Corps of
the NSDAP, the Schutzstaffeln or “SS”, and the Sturmabteilungen or “SA”,
and the subsidiary formations which these include. These were the Nazi
Party leadership, espionage, and policing groups. They were the real
government, above and outside of any law. Also accused as organizations
are the Reich Cabinet and the Secret State Police or Gestapo, which were
fixtures of the Government but animated solely by the Nazi Party.

Except for a late period when some compulsory recruiting was done in the
SS, membership in all these militarized formations was voluntary. The
police organizations were recruited from ardent partisans who enlisted
blindly to do the dirty work the leaders planned. The Reich Cabinet was
the governmental facade for Nazi Party Government and in its members
legal as well as actual responsibility was vested for the entire
program. Collectively they were responsible for the program in general,
individually they were especially responsible for segments of it. The
finding which we ask you to make, that these are criminal organizations,
will subject members to punishment to be hereafter determined by
appropriate tribunals, unless some personal defense—such as becoming a
member under threat to person, to family, or inducement by false
representation, or the like—be established. Every member will have a
chance to be heard in the subsequent forum on his personal relation to
the organization, but your finding in this trial will conclusively
establish the criminal character of the organization as a whole.

We have also accused as criminal organizations the High Command and the
General Staff of the German Armed Forces. We recognize that to plan
warfare is the business of professional soldiers in every country. But
it is one thing to plan strategic moves in the event war comes, and it
is another thing to plot and intrigue to bring on that war. We will
prove the leaders of the German General Staff and of the High Command to
have been guilty of just that. Military men are not before you because
they served their country. They are here because they mastered it, along
with these others, and drove it to war. They are not here because they
lost the war but because they started it. Politicians may have thought
of them as soldiers, but soldiers know they were politicians. We ask
that the General Staff and the High Command, as defined in the
Indictment, be condemned as a criminal group whose existence and
tradition constitute a standing menace to the peace of the world.

These individual defendants did not stand alone in crime and will not
stand alone in punishment. Your verdict of “guilty” against these
organizations will render _prima facie_ guilty, as nearly as we can
learn, thousands upon thousands of members now in custody of United
States forces and of other Armies.

                  THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS TRIBUNAL

To apply the sanctions of the law to those whose conduct is found
criminal by the standards I have outlined, is the responsibility
committed to this Tribunal. It is the first court ever to undertake the
difficult task of overcoming the confusion of many tongues and the
conflicting concepts of just procedure among divers systems of law, so
as to reach a common judgment. The tasks of all of us are such as to
make heavy demands on patience and good will. Although the need for
prompt action has admittedly resulted in imperfect work on the part of
the prosecution, four great nations bring you their hurriedly assembled
contributions of evidence. What remains undiscovered we can only guess.
We could, with witnesses’ testimony, prolong the recitals of crime for
years—but to what avail? We shall rest the case when we have offered
what seems convincing and adequate proof of the crimes charged without
unnecessary cumulation of evidence. We doubt very much whether it will
be seriously denied that the crimes I have outlined took place. The
effort will undoubtedly be to mitigate or escape personal
responsibility.

Among the nations which unite in accusing these defendants the United
States is perhaps in a position to be the most dispassionate, for,
having sustained the least injury, it is perhaps the least animated by
vengeance. Our American cities have not been bombed by day and night, by
humans and by robots. It is not our temples that have been laid in
ruins. Our countrymen have not had their homes destroyed over their
heads. The menace of Nazi aggression, except to those in actual service,
has seemed less personal and immediate to us than to European peoples.
But while the United States is not first in rancor, it is not second in
determination that the forces of law and order be made equal to the task
of dealing with such international lawlessness as I have recited here.

Twice in my lifetime, the United States has sent its young manhood
across the Atlantic, drained its resources, and burdened itself with
debt to help defeat Germany. But the real hope and faith that has
sustained the American people in these great efforts was that victory
for ourselves and our Allies would lay the basis for an ordered
international relationship in Europe and would end the centuries of
strife on this embattled continent.

Twice we have held back in the early stages of European conflict in the
belief that it might be confined to a purely European affair. In the
United States, we have tried to build an economy without armament, a
system of government without militarism, and a society where men are not
regimented for war. This purpose, we know now, can never be realized if
the world periodically is to be embroiled in war. The United States
cannot, generation after generation, throw its youth or its resources
onto the battlefields of Europe to redress the lack of balance between
Germany’s strength and that of her enemies, and to keep the battles from
our shores.

The American dream of a peace and plenty economy, as well as the hopes
of other nations, can never be fulfilled if those nations are involved
in a war every generation so vast and devastating as to crush the
generation that fights and burden the generation that follows. But
experience has shown that wars are no longer local. All modern wars
become world wars eventually. And none of the big nations at least can
stay out. If we cannot stay out of wars, our only hope is to prevent
wars.

I am too well aware of the weaknesses of juridical action alone to
contend that in itself your decision under this Charter can prevent
future wars. Judicial action always comes after the event. Wars are
started only on the theory and in the confidence that they can be won.
Personal punishment, to be suffered only in the event the war is lost,
will probably not be a sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where the
warmakers feel the chances of defeat to be negligible.

But the ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable in
a system of international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible
to law. And let me make clear that while this law is first applied
against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a
useful purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations,
including those which sit here now in judgment. We are able to do away
with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression by those in power
against the rights of their own people only when we make all men
answerable to the law. This trial represents mankind’s desperate effort
to apply the discipline of the law to statesmen who have used their
powers of state to attack the foundations of the world’s peace and to
commit aggressions against the rights of their neighbors.

The usefulness of this effort to do justice is not to be measured by
considering the law or your judgment in isolation. This trial is part of
the great effort to make the peace more secure. One step in this
direction is the United Nations organization, which may take joint
political action to prevent war if possible, and joint military action
to insure that any nation which starts a war will lose it. This Charter
and this trial, implementing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, constitute another
step in the same direction—juridical action of a kind to ensure that
those who start a war will pay for it personally.

While the defendants and the prosecutors stand before you as
individuals, it is not the triumph of either group alone that is
committed to your judgment. Above all personalities there are anonymous
and impersonal forces whose conflict makes up much of human history. It
is yours to throw the strength of the law back of either the one or the
other of these forces for at least another generation. What are the real
forces that are contending before you?

No charity can disguise the fact that the forces, which these defendants
represent, the forces that would advantage and delight in their
acquittal, are the darkest and most sinister forces in
society—dictatorship and oppression, malevolence and passion,
militarism and lawlessness. By their fruits we best know them. Their
acts have bathed the world in blood and set civilization back a century.
They have subjected their European neighbors to every outrage and
torture, every spoliation and deprivation that insolence, cruelty, and
greed could inflict. They have brought the German people to the lowest
pitch of wretchedness, from which they can entertain no hope of early
deliverance. They have stirred hatreds and incited domestic violence on
every continent. These are the things that stand in the dock shoulder to
shoulder with these prisoners.

The real complaining party at your bar is Civilization. In all our
countries it is still a struggling and imperfect thing. It does not
plead that the United States, or any other country, has been blameless
of the conditions which made the German people easy victims to the
blandishments and intimidations of the Nazi conspirators.

But it points to the dreadful sequence of aggressions and crimes I have
recited, it points to the weariness of flesh, the exhaustion of
resources, and the destruction of all that was beautiful or useful in so
much of the world, and to greater potentialities for destruction in the
days to come. It is not necessary among the ruins of this ancient and
beautiful city, with untold members of its civilian inhabitants still
buried in its rubble, to argue the proposition that to start or wage an
aggressive war has the moral qualities of the worst of crimes. The
refuge of the defendants can be only their hope that International Law
will lag so far behind the moral sense of mankind that conduct which is
crime in the moral sense must be regarded as innocent in law.

Civilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to
deal with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this order of
importance. It does not expect that you can make war impossible. It does
expect that your juridical action will put the forces of International
Law, its precepts, its prohibitions and, most of all, its sanctions, on
the side of peace, so that men and women of good will in all countries
may have “leave to live by no man’s leave, underneath the law.”

                 *        *        *        *        *

    [In most instances, documents referred to or quoted from have
    been cited by number, even though some of them have not been
    introduced in evidence as part of the American case. Where they
    were not offered as evidence it was chiefly for the reason that
    documents subsequently discovered covered the point more
    adequately, and because the pressure of time required the
    avoidance of cumulative evidence.

    In some instances, no citations are given of documents quoted
    from or referred to. These are documents which for a variety of
    reasons were not introduced in evidence during the American
    case. The length of some of them was disproportionate to the
    value of their contents, and hence instead of full translations
    only summaries were prepared in English. In some cases a
    translation of the document referred to was made only for use in
    the address and was not included in the evidence which it was
    proposed to offer in court. In other cases the document,
    although translated, was turned over to the French or Russian
    delegations for use in the proof of Counts III and IV, and hence
    forms no part of the American case.]




                               Chapter VI
                ORGANIZATION OF THE NAZI PARTY AND STATE


                           I. THE NAZI PARTY

In the opinion of the prosecution, some preliminary references must be
made to the National Socialist German Labor Party, the NSDAP
(_Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei_) which is not itself
one of the defendant organizations in this proceeding, but which is
represented among the defendant organizations by its most important
formations, viz., the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party (_Das Korps der
Politischen Leiter der NSDAP_), the SS (_Die Schutzstaffeln der NSDAP_),
and the SA (_Die Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP_).

The prosecution has prepared a chart (_Chart No. 1_) showing the
structure and organization of the NSDAP substantially as it existed at
the peak of its development in March 1945. This chart has been prepared
on the basis of information contained in important publications of the
National Socialist Party, with which the defendants must be presumed to
have been well acquainted. Particular reference is made to the
Organization Book of the Party (_Das Organisationsbuch der NSDAP_) and
to the National Socialist Year Book (_Nationalsozialistisches
Jahrbuch_), of both of which Robert Ley was publisher. Both books were
printed in many editions and appeared in hundreds of thousands of
copies, throughout the period when the National Socialist party was in
control of the German Reich and of the German people. This chart has
been certified on its face as correct by a high official of the Nazi
party, viz. Franz Xaver Schwarz, its Treasurer (_Reichsschatzmeister der
NSDAP_), and its official in charge of party administration, whose
affidavit is submitted with the chart.

Certain explanatory remarks concerning the organization of the National
Socialist party may be useful.

The _Leadership Corps of the NSDAP_, named as a defendant organization,
comprised the sum of the officials of the Nazi party. It was divided
into seven categories:

                      1. The Fuehrer
                      2. Reichsleiter
                    { 3. Gauleiter
                    { 4. Kreisleiter
   _Hoheitstraeger_ { 5. Ortsgruppenleiter
                    { 6. Zellenleiter
                    { 7. Blockleiter

The _Fuehrer_ was the supreme and only leader who stood at the top of
the party hierarchy. His successor designate was first, Hermann Goering,
and second, Rudolf Hess.

The _Reichsleiter_, of whom 16 are shown on the chart, made up the Party
Directorate (_Reichsleitung_). Through them, coordination of party and
state machinery was assured. A number of these _Reichsleiter_, each of
whom, at some time, was in charge of at least one office within the
Party Directorate, were also the heads of party formations and of
affiliated or supervised organizations of the party, or of agencies of
the state, or even held ministerial positions. The _Reichsleitung_ may
be said to have represented the horizontal organization of the party
according to functions, within which all threads controlling the varied
life of the German people met. Each office within the _Reichsleitung_ of
the NSDAP executed definite tasks assigned to it by the Fuehrer, or by
the leader of the Party Chancellory (_Chef der Parteikanzlei_), who in
1945 was Martin Bormann and before him, Rudolph Hess.

It was the duty of the _Reichsleitung_ to make certain these tasks were
carried out so that the will of the Fuehrer was quickly communicated to
the lowliest _Zelle_ or _Block_. The individual offices of the
_Reichsleitung_ had the mission to remain in constant and closest
contact with the life of the people through the subdivisions of the
party organization, in the _Gaue_, _Kreisen_, and _Ortsgruppen_. These
leaders had been taught that the right to organize human beings accrued
through appreciation of the fact that a people must be educated
ideologically (_weltanschaulich_), that is to say, according to the
philosophy of National Socialism. Among the former _Reichsleiter_ on
trial in this cause are the following defendants:

    _Alfred Rosenberg_—The delegate to the Fuehrer for Ideological
    Training and Education of the Party. (_Der Beauftragte des
    Fuehrer’s fuer die Ueberwachung der gesammten geistigen und
    weltanschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP_).

    _Hans Frank_—At one time head of the Legal Office of the party
    (_Reichsleiter des Reichsrechtsamtes_).

    _Baldur von Schirach_—Leader of Youth Education (_Leiter fuer
    die Jugenderziehung_).

and the late

    _Robert Ley_—Leader of the Party Organization
    (_Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP_) and Leader of the German
    Labor Front (_Leiter der Deutschen Arbeitsfront_).

The next categories to be considered are the _Hoheitstraeger_, the
“bearers of sovereignty.” To them was assigned political sovereignty
over specially designated subdivisions of the state of which they were
the appointed leaders. The _Hoheitstraeger_ may be said to represent the
vertical organization of the party. These leaders included all:

    _a. Gauleiter_, of which there were 42 within the Reich in 1945.
    A _Gauleiter_ was the political leader of the largest
    subdivision of the State. He was charged by the Fuehrer with
    political, cultural, and economic control over the life of the
    people, which he was to coordinate with the National Socialist
    ideology. A number of the defendants before the bar of the
    Tribunal were former _Gauleiter_ of the NSDAP. Among them are
    Julius Streicher (Franconia) whose seat was in Nurnberg, Baldur
    von Schirach (Vienna), and Fritz Sauckel (Thuringia).

    _b. Kreisleiter_, the political leaders of the largest
    subdivision of a _Gau_.

    _c. Ortsgruppenleiter_, the political leaders of the largest
    subdivision of a _Kreis_ consisting of several towns or
    villages, or of a part of a larger city, and including from 1500
    to 3000 households.

    _d. Zellenleiter_, the political leaders of a group of from 4 to
    8 city blocks or of a corresponding grouping of households in
    the country.

    _e. Blockleiter_, the political leaders of from 40 to 60
    households.

Each of these _Hoheitstraeger_, or “bearers of sovereignty,” was
directly responsible to the next highest leader in the Nazi hierarchy.
The _Gauleiter_ was directly subordinate to the _Fuehrer_ himself, the
_Kreisleiter_ was directly subordinate to the _Gauleiter_, the
_Ortsgruppenleiter_ to the _Kreisleiter_, and so on. The _Fuehrer_
himself appointed all _Gauleiter_ and _Kreisleiter_, all _Reichsleiter_,
and all other political leaders within the Party Directorate
(_Reichsleitung_) down to the grade of _Gauamtsleiter_, the head of a
subdivision of the party organization within a _Gau_.

The _Hoheitstraeger_ and _Reichsleitung_ together constituted the
all-powerful group of leaders by means of which the Nazi party reached
into the lives of the people, consolidated its control over them, and
compelled them to conform to the National Socialist pattern. For this
purpose, broad powers were given them, including the right to call upon
all party machinery to effectuate their plans. They could requisition
the services of the SA and of the SS, as well as of the HJ and the NSKK.

The controlled party organizations (_Gliederungen der NSDAP_) actually
constituted the party itself, and substantially the entire party
membership was contained within these organizations, viz.:

    SA—NS Storm Troops (_Sturmabteilungen_).

    SS—NS Elite Corps (_Schutzstaffeln_).

    NSKK—NS Motor Corps (_Kraftfahrkorps_).

    HJ—Hitler Youth (_Hitlerjugend_).

    NS Women’s Organization (_Frauenschaft_).

    NS German Students’ Bund (_Deutscher Studentenbund_).

    NS University Teachers’ Bund (_Deutscher Dozentenbund_).

There were additional affiliated organizations (_Angeschlossene
Verbaende der NSDAP_). Among these were included the following:

    DAF—German Labor Front (_Deutsche Arbeitsfront_).

    NS Public Welfare Organization (_Volkswohlfahrt_).

    NS War Victims’ Organization (_Kriegsopferversorgung_).

    NS Bund for German Technology (_Bund Deutscher Technik_).

    German Civil Service (_Reichsbund der Deutschen Beamten_).

    NS Physicians’ Bund (_Deutscher Aerztebund_).

    NS Teachers’ Bund (_Lehrerbund_).

    NS League of Legal Officials (_Rechtswahrerbund_).

A third group of organizations was officially known as supervised
organizations (_Betreute Organisationen der NSDAP_). These included the
following:

    German Women’s Work (_Deutsches Frauenwerk_).

    German Students’ Society (_Deutsche Studentenschaft_).

    NS Bund of Former German Students (_Altherrenbund der Deutschen
    Studenten_).

    Reich League “German Family” (_Reichsbund Deutsche Familie_).

    German Communal Congress (_Deutscher Gemeindetag_).

    NS Bund for Physical Exercise (_Reichsbund fuer
    Leibesuebungen_).

According to the official party designations, there was a fourth
classification known as _Weitere Nationalsozialistische Organisationen_,
and in this category the following organizations appeared:

    RAD—Reich Labor Service (_Reichsarbeitsdienst_), at one time
    subordinate to the Reich Labor leader (_Reichsarbeitsfuehrer_).

    NSFK—NS Flying Corps (_NS-Fliegerkorps_), which was subordinate
    to the Reich Minister for Aviation.

                  2. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE THIRD REICH

The prosecution has prepared another chart (_Chart No. 18_) delineating
substantially the organizational structure of the government of the
Third Reich, as it existed in March 1945, and “the chief leadership
personnel of the Reich Government and the Reich Administration during
said years.” This chart has been prepared on the basis of information
contained in two well known official publications: The _Taschenbuch fuer
Verwaltungsbeamte_, and the _Nationalsozialistischer Jahrbuch_,
above-mentioned, of which Robert Ley was publisher. The chart has been
examined, corrected, and certified by Wilhelm Frick, whose affidavit is
submitted with it. It seems plain that Frick, a former Minister of
Interior of the Reich from January 1933 to August 1943, was well
qualified, by reason of his position and long service in public office
during the National Socialist regime, to certify to the substantial
accuracy of the facts disclosed in this chart.

It may be useful to commence with consideration of the
_Reichsregierung_, a word which may not be translated literally as
“government of the Reich.” The word _Reichsregierung_ was a word of art
applied collectively to the ministers who composed the German cabinet.
The _Reichsregierung_, which has been named as a defendant group in this
proceeding, includes the following:

    _a._ Members of the ordinary cabinet after 30 January 1933, i.e.
    Reich ministers with and without portfolio and all other
    officials entitled to participate in the meetings of this
    cabinet.

    _b._ Members of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the
    Reich (_Ministerrat fuer die Reichsverteidigung_).

    _c._ Members of the Secret Cabinet Council (_Geheimer
    Kabinettsrat_).

Unlike the cabinets and ministerial councils in countries not within the
orbit of the former Axis, the _Reichsregierung_, after 30 January 1933
when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic, did not
remain merely the executive branch of the government. In short order it
also came to possess, and it exercised, legislative and other functions
in the governmental system developed under the domination of the
National Socialist party.

It is proper to observe here that, unlike such NS party organizations as
the SS and the SA, the _Reichsregierung_ before 1933 was not a body
created exclusively or predominantly for the purpose of committing
illegal acts. The _Reichsregierung_ was an instrument of government
provided for by the Weimar Constitution. Under the Nazi regime, however,
the _Reichsregierung_ gradually became a primary agent of the party with
functions formulated in accordance with the objectives and methods of
the party. The party was intended to be a _Fuehrerorden_, an order of
_Fuehrers_, a pool of political leaders; and whole the party was—in the
words of a German law—“the bearer of the concept of the German State,”
it was not identical with the State. Hence, in order to realize its
ideological and political objectives and to reach the German people, the
party had to avail itself of official state channels. The
_Reichsregierung_, and the agencies and offices established by it, were
the chosen instruments by means of which party policies were converted
into legislative and administrative acts binding upon the German people
as a whole.

In order to accomplish this result, the _Reichsregierung_ was thoroughly
remodelled so as to coordinate party and state machinery, in order to
impose the will of the _Fuehrer_ on the German people. On 30 January
1933 the _Reichsregierung_ contained but few National Socialists. But as
the power of the party in the Reich grew, the composition of the cabinet
came to include an ever-increasing number of Nazis until, by January
1937, no non-party member remained in the _Reichsregierung_. New cabinet
posts were created and Nazis appointed to fill them. Many of these
cabinet members were also in the _Reichsleitung_ of the party.

To give a few examples: Rosenberg, the Delegate of the _Fuehrer_ for
Ideological Training and Education of the Party, was a member of the
_Reichsregierung_ as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
(_Reichsminister f. d. b. Ostgebiete_). Frick, the leader of the
National Socialist faction in the Reichstag, was also Minister of the
Interior (_Reichsinnenminister_). Goebbels, the _Reichsleiter_ for
Propaganda, also sat in the cabinet as Minister for Public Enlightenment
and Propaganda (_Reichsminister fuer Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda_).

After 25 July 1934, party participation in the work of the cabinet was
at all times attained through Rudolf Hess, the Deputy of the _Feuhrer_.
By a decree of the _Fuehrer_, Hess was invested with power to take part
in the editing of bills dealing with all departments of the Reich. Later
this power of the Fuehrer’s Deputy was expanded to include all executive
decisions and orders published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. After Hess’
flight to England in 1941, Martin Bormann took over, as his successor,
the same function and, in addition, was given the authority of a Reich
minister and made a member of the cabinet.

On 30 January 1937 Hitler accepted into the party those last few members
of the cabinet who were not then party members. Only one cabinet member
had the strength of character to reject membership in the party; he was
the Minister of Ports and of Transportation, von Eltz-Ruebenach, who
stated at the time that he was unable to reconcile membership in the
NSDAP with his beliefs in Christianity. But such was not the case with
Constantin von Neurath. He did not reject party membership. Nor did
Erich Raeder reject party membership. And if Hjalmar Schacht was not
already a party member at that time, then he too did not reject
membership on 30 January 1937.

The chart shows many other instances where party members on the highest
as well as on subordinate levels occupied corresponding or other
positions in the organization of the state.

_a._ Hitler himself, the _Fuehrer_ of the NSDAP, was also the Chancellor
of the Reich, with which office the office of President of the German
Republic was united after the death of President von Hindenburg in 1934.

_b._ Goering, the successor designate of Hitler as Fuehrer of the NSDAP,
was a member of the cabinet as Minister for Air (_Luftfahrtminister_),
and he also held many other important positions, including that of
Commander in Chief of the _Luftwaffe_, the German air force, and
Delegate for the Four Year Plan (_Beauftragter f. d. Vierjahresplan_).

_c._ Heinrich Himmler, the notorious head of the SS (_Reichsfuehrer
SS_), was also Chief of the German Police, reporting to Frick. He
himself later became Minister of the Interior after the attempted
assassination of Hitler on 20 June 1944, which event also catapulted him
into the position of Commander in Chief of the German Reserve Army.

The _Reichstag_, which was the German parliament, presents an anomaly in
this picture. Under the Republic it had been the supreme law-making body
of the Reich, subject only to a limited check by the _Reichsrat_
(Council of the Reich), the President, and the German people themselves,
by way of initiative and referendum. Putting their opposition to all
forms of parliamentarism at once into effect, the Nazis proceeded to
curtail these legislative powers of the _Reichstag_, the _Reichsrat_,
and the _Reichspraesident_.

By the Act of 24 March 1933 the cabinet was given unlimited legislative
powers, including the right to deviate from the constitution.
Subsequently the _Reichsrat_ was abolished; and later, upon the death of
President von Hindenburg in 1934, the posts of Chancellor and President
were merged.

The development of the _Reichstag_ into an emasculated legislative body
was an intermediate step on the road to rule by Fuehrer decree, the
ultimate goal of the National Socialist party—and one which it
achieved.

The Nazis then proceeded to delegate some of the functions of the
_Reichsregierung_ to various newly-created agencies. Cabinet functions
were delegated:

1. To the _Reichsverteidigungsrat_, the Reich Defense Council, possibly
as early as 4 April 1933 but certainly not later than May 1935. This was
a large war-planning group of which Hitler was chairman and Goering
alternate. The group included many cabinet members, and a working
committee, presided over by Fieldmarshal Wilhelm Keitel, was also
composed of cabinet members and Reich defense officials, the majority of
whom were appointed by cabinet members and subordinate to them.

2. To the Plenipotentiary for War Economy (_Generalbevollmaechtigter f.
d. Kriegswirtschaft_), Hjalmar Schacht (and later Walter Funk), who by
the Secret Reich Defense Law of May 1935 was authorized to “begin his
work already in peacetime.”

3. To the Plenipotentiary for Administration (_Generalbevollmaechtigter
f. d. Reichsverwaltung_), Wilhelm Frick, whose deputy, Himmler, later
succeeded him, and who was appointed by a Secret Reich Defense Law.
Subordinate to Frick as Plenipotentiary were the ministries of the
Interior, Justice, Education, Church Affairs and _Raumordnung_ (Spatial
Planning).

4. To the Delegate for the Four Year Plan (_Beauftragter f. d.
Vierjahresplan_), Goering.

5. To the _Dreierkollegium_, the College of Three, consisting of the two
Plenipotentiaries for War Economy and Administration, and Fieldmarshal
Keitel as chief of the OKW. The duties of this _Dreierkollegium_ appear
to have included the drafting of decrees in preparation of and for use
during the war.

6. To the _Geheime Kabinettsrat_, the Secret Cabinet Council, created by
Fuehrer decree in February 1938, of which von Neurath was president; and

7. To the _Ministerrat f. d. Reichsverteidigung_, the Council of
Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, established by _Fuehrer_ decree
on 30 August 1939 and responsible to him alone. Its membership was taken
from the Reich Defense Council. It had broad powers to issue decrees
with force of law insofar as the _Reichsregierung_ itself had not
legislated on the subject.

It should be stressed that this delegation of cabinet functions and
authority to various secret and semi-secret groups composed largely of
its own members, helped to conceal some of the most important policies
of the _Reichsregierung_, particularly those relating to preparation for
war.

Thus, step by step, the National Socialist party succeeded in putting
its policies into effect through the machinery of the state, the
_Reichsregierung_, in its revised form.




                              Chapter VII
             MEANS USED BY THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS IN GAINING
                       CONTROL OF THE GERMAN STATE


            I. COMMON OBJECTIVES, METHODS, AND DOCTRINES OF
                             THE CONSPIRACY

In 1921 Adolf Hitler became the supreme leader or _Fuehrer_ of the
_Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei_ (National Socialist
German Workers Party), also known as the Nazi Party, which had been
founded in Germany in 1920. He continued as such throughout the period
covered by the Indictment. As will be shown, the Nazi Party, together
with certain of its subsidiary organizations, became the instrument of
cohesion among the defendants and their co-conspirators and an
instrument for the carrying out of the aims and purposes of the
conspiracy. And as will also be shown, each defendant became a member of
the Nazi Party and of the conspiracy, with knowledge of their aims, and
purposes, or, with such knowledge, became an accessory to their aims and
purposes at some stage of the development of the conspiracy.

A. _Aims, and Purposes._ The aims and purposes of the Nazi conspirators
were:

(1) _To abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its
restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany._ The
first major public meeting of the NSDAP took place in Munich on 24
February 1920. At that meeting Hitler publicly announced the Program of
the Party. That program, consisting of 25 points (annually reprinted in
the National Socialist Yearbook), was referred to as “The political
foundation of the NSDAP and therewith the fundamental political law of
the state,” and “has remained unaltered” since the date of its
promulgation. Section 2 of the Program provided as follows:

    “We demand equality of rights for the German people with respect
    to other nations, and abolition of the Peace Treaties of
    Versailles and St. Germain.” (_1708-PS_)

In a speech at Munich on 13 April 1923, Hitler said:

    “It was no Peace Treaty which they have signed, but a betrayal
    of Peace. So long as this Treaty stands there can be no
    resurrection of the German people: no social reform of any kind
    is possible. The Treaty was made in order to bring 20 million
    Germans to their deaths and to ruin the German nation. But those
    who made the Treaty cannot set it aside. At its foundation our
    movement formulated three demands:

        1. Setting aside of the Peace Treaty

        2. Unification of all Germans

        3. Land and soil (_Grund und Boden_) to feed our
        nation.” (_2405-PS_)

On August 1, 1923 Hitler declared:

    “The day must come when a German government shall summon up the
    courage to declare to the foreign powers: ‘The Treaty of
    Versailles is founded on a monstrous lie.’ We fulfill nothing
    more. Do what you will! If you want battle, look for it! Then we
    shall see whether you can turn 70 million Germans into serfs and
    slaves!” (_2405-PS_; see also additional statements of Hitler
    contained in _2405-PS_ castigating those Germans who shared
    responsibility for the Treaty of Versailles, viz; the “November
    criminals.”)

In his speech of 30 January 1941 Hitler alluded to the consistency of
his record concerning the aims of National Socialist foreign policy:

    “My foreign policy had identical aims. My program was to abolish
    the Treaty of Versailles. It is futile nonsense for the rest of
    the world to pretend today that I did not reveal this program
    until 1933 or 1935 or 1937. Instead of listening to the foolish
    chatter of emigrés, these gentlemen would have been wiser to
    read what I have written thousands of times.

    “No human being has declared or recorded what he wanted more
    than I. Again and again I wrote these words: ‘The abolition of
    the Treaty of Versailles’. * * *” (_2541-PS_)

Similar views were expressed by other Nazi conspirators. Rosenberg
stated that the lie of Germany’s war guilt was the basis of the Treaties
of Versailles and St. Germain. He rejected the idea of a “revision” of
those Treaties and demanded outright cancellation. (_2433-PS_)

Hess, in advocating rearmament in violation of treaty restrictions,
stated in 1986 that “guns instead of butter” were necessary lest “one
day our last butter be taken from us.” (_2426-PS_)

(2) _To acquire the territories lost by Germany as the result of the
World War of 1914-1918, and other territories in Europe asserted to be
occupied by so-called “racial Germans.”_ Section I of the Nazi Party
Platform gave advance notice of the intentions of the Nazi conspirators
to claim territories occupied by so-called racial Germans. It provided:

    “We demand the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany
    on the basis of the right of self-determination of people.”
    (_1708-PS_)

While Rosenberg pointed out in 1922 that it was not possible at that
time to designate “such European and non European territories which
would be taken into consideration for colonization” he nevertheless
stated that the following could be laid down as a basic objective,
namely that

    “* * * German Foreign Policy must make its most important
    primary goal the consolidation of all Germans living closely
    together in Europe in one state and to secure the territory of
    what today is the Polish-Czech East.” (_2433-PS_)

In his Reichstag speech of 20 February 1928 Hitler said:

    “The claim, therefore, for German colonial possession will be
    voiced from year to year with increasing vigor, possessions
    which Germany did not take away from other countries, and which
    today are virtually of no value to these powers, but appear
    indispensable for our own people.” (_2772-PS_)

Again, in his Reichstag speech of 30 January 1939 Hitler declared:

    “The theft of the German colonies was morally unjustified.
    Economically, it was utter insanity. The political motives
    advanced were so mean that one is tempted to call them silly. In
    1918, after the end of the war, the victorious Powers really
    would have had the authority to bring about a reasonable
    settlement of international problems. * * *

    “The great German colonial possessions, which the Reich once
    acquired peacefully by treaties and by paying for them, have
    been stolen—contrary indeed to the solemn assurance given by
    President Wilson, which was the basic condition on which Germany
    laid down her arms. The objection that these colonial
    possessions are of no importance in any case should only lead to
    their being returned to us with an easy mind.” (_2773-PS_)

(3) _To acquire further territories in colonial Europe and elsewhere
claimed to be required by “racial Germans” as “Lebensraum” or living
space, at the expense of neighboring and other countries._ Hitler made
it clear that the two objectives of the Nazi conspirators set forth
above were only preliminary steps in a more ambitious plan of
territorial aggrandizement. Thus he stated:

    “One must take the point of view, coolly and soberly, that it
    certainly cannot be the intention of Heaven to give one people
    fifty times as much space (_Grund und Boden_) on this earth as
    to another. One should not permit himself to be diverted in this
    case by political boundaries from the boundaries of eternal
    justice.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The boundaries of 1914 do not mean anything for the future of
    the German nation. They did not represent either a defense of
    the past nor would they represent a power in the future. The
    German people will not obtain either its inner compactness by
    them, nor will its nutrition be secured by them, nor do these
    boundaries appear from a military standpoint as appropriate or
    even satisfactory. * * *” (_2760-A-PS_)

While the precise limits of German expansion were only vaguely defined
by the Nazi conspirators, they clearly indicated that the _lebensraum_
to which they felt they were entitled would be acquired primarily in the
East. Rosenberg was particularly insistent in his declarations that
Russia would have to “move over” to make way for German living space. He
underlined this demand as follows:

    “The understanding that the German nation, if it is not to
    perish in the truest sense of the word, needs ground and soil
    for itself and its future generations, and the second sober
    perception that this soil can no more be conquered in Africa,
    but in Europe and first of all in the East—these organically
    determine the German foreign policy for centuries. (_2777-PS_)

    “The Russians * * * will have to confine themselves so as to
    remove their center of gravity to Asia.” (_2426-PS_)

A similar view was expressed by Hitler in _Mein Kampf_:

    “If one wanted territory in Europe, this could be done on the
    whole at the expense of Russia, and the new Reich would have to
    set out to march over the road of the former Knights, in order
    to give soil to the German plow by means of the German sword,
    and to give daily bread to the nation.” (_2760-A-PS_)

In _Mein Kampf_ Hitler threatened war as a means of attaining additional
space:

    “If this earth really has space (_Raum_) for all to live in,
    then we should be given the territory necessary. Of course, one
    will not do that gladly. Then, however, the right of
    self-preservation comes into force; that which is denied to
    kindness, the fist will have to take. If our forefathers had
    made their decisions dependent on the same pacifistic nonsense
    as the present, then we would possess only a third of our
    present territory.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In contrast, we, National Socialists, have to hold on steadily
    to our foreign political goals, namely, _to secure on this earth
    the territory due to the German people_. And this action is the
    only one which will make bloody sacrifice before God and our
    German posterity appear justified.” (_2760-A-PS_)

B. _Methods. The Nazi conspirators advocated the accomplishment of the
foregoing aims and purposes by any means deemed opportune, including
illegal means and resort to threat of force, force, and aggressive war._
The use of force was distinctly sanctioned, in fact guaranteed, by
official statements and directives of the conspirators which made
activism and aggressiveness a political quality obligatory for Party
members.

Hitler stated in _Mein Kampf_:

    “* * * The lack of a great creative idea means at all times an
    impairment of the fighting spirit. The conviction that it is
    right to use even the most brutal weapons is always connected
    with the existence of a fanatical belief that it is necessary
    that a revolutionary new order of this earth should become
    victorious. A movement which does not fight for these highest
    aims and ideals will therefore never resort to the ultimate
    weapon.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * It is not possible to undertake a task half-heartedly or
    hesitatingly if its execution seems to be feasible only by
    expending the very last ounce of energy . . . One had to become
    clear in one’s mind that this goal [i.e. acquisition of new
    territory in Europe] could be achieved by fight alone and then
    had to face this armed conflict with calmness and composure.”
    (_2760-A-PS_)

In 1934 Hitler set out the duties of Party members in the following
terms:

    “Only a part of the people will be really active fighters. But
    they were the fighters of the National Socialist struggle. They
    were the fighters for the National Socialist revolution, and
    they are the millions of the rest of the population. For them it
    is not sufficient to confess: ‘I believe,’ but to swear: ‘_I
    fight_’.” (_2775-PS_)

This same theme is expressed in the Party Organization Book:

    “The Party includes _only fighters_ who are ready to accept and
    sacrifice everything in order to carry through the National
    Socialist ideology.” (_2774-PS_)

At the trial of _Reichswehr_ officers at Leipzig in September 1930
Hitler testified:

    “Germany is being strangled by Peace Treaties. * * * The
    National Socialists do not regard the Treaty as a law, but as
    something forced upon us. We do not want future generations, who
    are completely innocent, to be burdened by this. When we fight
    this with all means at our disposal, then we are on the way to a
    revolution.”

President of the Court: ‘Even by illegal means?’

    Hitler: “I will declare here and now, that when we have become
    powerful (_gesiegt haben_), then we shall fight against the
    Treaty with all the means at our disposal, even from the point
    of view of the world, with illegal means.” (_2512-PS_)

Moreover, Hitler stated the true reason for rearmament as follows:

    “It is impossible to build up an army and give it a sense of
    worth if the object of its existence is not the preparation for
    war. Armies for the preservation of peace do not exist; they
    exist only for the triumphant exertion of war.” (_2541-PS_)

C. _Doctrines. The Nazi conspirators adopted and published the following
doctrines:_

(1) _That persons of so-called “German blood” were a master race and
were accordingly entitled to subjugate, dominate, or exterminate other
“races” and “peoples.”_ The Nazi doctrine of racial supremacy was
incorporated as Point 4 in the Party Program of 24 February 1920, which
provided as follows:

    “Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the
    race can only be one who is of German blood, without
    consideration of creed. Consequently no Jew can be a member of
    the race.” (_1708-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators’ dogma of the racial supremacy of the Germanic
peoples was fully elucidated in the writings of Rosenberg:

    “The meaning of world history has radiated out from the north
    over the whole world, borne by a blue-eyed blond race which in
    several great waves determined the spiritual face of the world *
    * *

    “We stand today before a definitive decision. Either through a
    new experience and cultivation of the old blood, coupled with an
    enhanced fighting will, we will rise to a purificatory action,
    or the last Germanic-western values of morality and
    state-culture shall sink away in the filthy human masses of the
    big cities, become stunted on the sterile burning asphalt of a
    bestialized inhumanity, or trickle away as a morbific agent in
    the form of emigrants bastardizing themselves in South America,
    China, Dutch East India, Africa.

    “A new faith is arising today: the myth of the blood, the faith,
    to defend with the blood the divine essence of man. The faith,
    embodied in clearest knowledge that the Nordic blood represents
    that mysterium which has replaced and overcome the old
    sacraments.” (_2771-PS_)

Thus, the Nazi conspirators acclaimed the “master race” doctrine as a
new religion—the faith of the blood—superseding in individual
allegiance all other religions and institutions. According to Rosenberg:

    “The new thought puts folk and race higher than the state and
    its forms. It declares protection of the folk more important
    than protection of a religious denomination, a class, the
    monarchy, or the republic; it sees in treason against the folk a
    greater crime than treason against the state.” (_2771-PS_; see
    also further excerpts from Rosenberg’s writings contained in
    _2405-PS_.)

Illustrative of the Nazi conspirators’ continued espousal and
exploitation of racial dogmas following their accession to power was the
discriminatory legislation which they caused to be enacted. These laws,
with particular reference to Jews, are set forth in Section 7 of this
Chapter on the Program for Persecution of Jews.

The logical consequence of the “master race” dogma, in its bearing on
the right of Germany to dominate other “inferior” peoples and to acquire
such of their territory as was considered necessary for German living
space, was disclosed by the Nazi conspirators. In a speech concluding
the _Reichsparteitag_ at Nurnberg on 3 September 1933 Hitler said:

    “But long ago man has proceeded in the same way with his
    fellowman. The higher race—at first ‘higher’ in the sense of
    possessing a greater gift for organization—subjects to itself a
    lower race and thus constitutes a relationship which now
    embraces races of unequal value. Thus there results the
    subjection of a number of people under the will often of only a
    few persons, a subjection based simply on the right of the
    stronger, a right which, as we see it in Nature, can be regarded
    as the sole conceivable right because founded on reason. The
    wild mustang does not take upon itself the yoke imposed by man
    either voluntarily or joyfully; neither does one people welcome
    the violence of another.” (_2584-PS_)

(2) _The Fuehrerprinzip (Fuehrer Principle)._

(_a_) _Essential elements._

    _1. Complete and total authority is vested in the Fuehrer._

        “The Fuehrer Principle requires a pyramidal organization
        structure in its details as well as in its entirety.

        “The Fuehrer is at the top.

        “He nominates the necessary leaders for the various
        spheres of work of the Reich’s direction, the Party
        apparatus and the State administration.” (_1814-PS_)

        “He shapes the collective will of the people within
        himself and he enjoys the political unity and entirety
        of the people in opposition to individual interests.

        “The Fuehrer unites in himself all the sovereign
        authority of the Reich; all public authority in the
        state as well as in the movement is derived from the
        authority of the Fuehrer. We must speak not of the
        state’s authority but of the Fuehrer’s authority if we
        wish to designate the character of the political
        authority within the Reich correctly. The state does not
        hold political authority as an impersonal unit but
        receives it from the Fuehrer as the executor of the
        national will. The authority of the Fuehrer is complete
        and all-embracing; it unites in itself all the means of
        political direction; it extends into all fields of
        national life; it embraces the entire people, which is
        bound to the Fuehrer in loyalty and obedience. The
        authority of the Fuehrer is not limited by checks and
        controls, by special autonomous bodies or individual
        rights, but it is free and independent, all-inclusive
        and unlimited.

        “The Fuehrer-Reich of the (German) people is founded on
        the recognition that the true will of the people cannot
        be disclosed through parliamentary votes and plebiscites
        but that the will of the people in its pure and
        uncorrupted form can only be expressed through the
        Fuehrer.” (_2771-PS_)

        “Thus at the head of the Reich, stands a single Fuehrer,
        who in his personality embodies the idea which sustains
        all and whose spirit and will therefore animate the
        entire community.” (_2780-PS_)

As stated in the Organization Book of the Nazi Party:

        “The will of the Fuehrer is the Party’s law.”
        (_1814-PS_)

    The first commandment for the Party members declares:

        “The Fuehrer is always right.” (_1814-PS_)

        “He (the Fuehrer) is responsible only to his conscience
        and the German people.” (_1814-PS_)

    Hess, in a speech broadcast at Cologne on 25 June 1934,
    characterized the position of the Fuehrer as follows:

        “It is with pride that we see that one man is kept above
        all criticism—that is the Fuehrer.

        “The reason is that everyone feels and knows: he was
        always right and will always be right. The National
        Socialism of us all is anchored in the uncritical
        loyalty, in the devotion to the Fuehrer that does not
        ask for the wherefore in the individual case, in the
        tacit performance of his commands. We believe that the
        Fuehrer is fulfilling a divine mission to German
        destiny! This belief is beyond challenge.” (_2426-PS_;
        see also additional statements of the Nazi conspirators
        designed to condition the German people to blind
        acceptance of the decisions of the Fuehrer and his
        co-conspirators, as translated in _2373-PS_.)

    _2. The Fuehrer’s power descends to sub-leaders in a hierarchial
    order._ In the words of the Organization Book of the NSDAP:

        “The Party is the order of fuehrers.

        “All political directors (_Politische Leiter_) stand as
        appointed by the Fuehrer and are responsible to him.
        They possess full authority towards the lower echelons.
        (_1893-PS_)

        “He (The Fuehrer) nominates the necessary leaders for
        the various spheres of work of the Reichs’ direction,
        the Party apparatus, and the State administration.”
        (_1814-PS_)

    The effect of this was aptly expressed by Hitler in 1933:

        “When our opponents said, ‘It is easy for you: you are a
        dictator’—We answer them, ‘No, gentlemen, you are
        wrong; there is no single dictator, but ten thousand,
        each in his own place.’ And even the highest authority
        in the hierarchy has itself only one wish, never to
        transgress against the supreme authority to which it,
        too, is responsible.” (_2771-PS_)

    _3. Each subleader is bound to unconditional obedience to his
    immediate superior and to the Fuehrer._ As Hitler said,

        “We have in our movement developed this loyalty in
        following the leader, this blind obedience of which all
        the others know nothing and which gave to us the power
        to surmount everything.” (_2771-PS_)

    The duty of obedience is so fundamental that it is incorporated
    as the second of the NSDAP commandments for party members:

        “Never go against discipline!” (_2771-PS_)

    As Ley said:

        “Our conscience is clearly and exactly defined. Only
        what Adolf Hitler, our Fuehrer, commands, allows, or
        does not allow is our conscience.” (_2771-PS_)

    The obedience required was not the loyalty of a soldier to the
    Fatherland, as was the case prior to the Nazi regime. On the
    contrary, the obedience exacted was unconditional and absolute,
    regardless of the legality or illegality of the order. The oath
    taken by political leaders (_Politische Leiter_) yearly was as
    follows:

        “I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge
        unconditional obedience to him and the Fuehrers
        appointed by him.” (_1893-PS_)

    _4. Each subleader is absolute in his own sphere of
    jurisdiction._ The Nazi Party Organization Book lays down the
    same principle with respect to the successive tiers of its
    leaders:

        “The Fuehrer Principle represented by the Party imposes
        complete responsibility on all party leaders for their
        respective spheres of activity * * * The responsibility
        for all tasks within a major sphere of jurisdiction
        rests with the respective leader of the NSDAP: i.e.,
        with the Fuehrer for the territory of the Reich, the
        Gauleiter for the territory of the Gau, the district
        leader for the territory of the district, the local
        leader for the territory of the local group, etc.

        “The Party leader has responsibility for the entire
        territory under his jurisdiction on the one hand, and on
        the other hand, his own political fields of activity
        appertaining thereto.

        “This responsibility for the complete or partial
        performance of task entails a relationship of
        subordination of the leaders among themselves,
        corresponding to the fuehrer principle.” (_2771-PS_)

(3) _Glorification of War as a noble and necessary activity of Germans._
The Nazi conspirators disseminated dogmas designed to engender in the
masses a deep reverence for the vocation of the warrior and to induce
acceptance of the postulate that the waging of war was good and
desirable _per se_. The motive underlying the concerted program of the
Nazis to glorify war was disclosed by Hitler in _Mein Kampf_:

    “Thus the question of how to regain German power is not: How
    shall we manufacture arms?, but: How do we create the spirit
    which enables a nation to bear arms? If this spirit governs a
    people, the will finds thousands of ways, each of which ends
    with a weapon!”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * Oppressed countries are led back into the lap of a common
    Reich by a mighty sword and not by flaming protests. It is the
    task of the inner political leaders of a people to forge this
    sword; to safeguard the work of the smith and to seek comrades
    in arms in the task of the foreign policy.” (_2760-A-PS_)

Hitler’s writings and public utterances are full of declarations
rationalizing the use of force and glorifying war. The following are
typical:

    “Always before God and the world, the stronger has the right to
    carry through his will. History proves it: He who has no might,
    has no use for might. (_2405-PS_)

    “The political testament of the German People for its foreign
    policy should and must always follow this line of thought: Never
    tolerate the rise of two continental powers in Europe. See in
    every attempt to organize a second military power, * * * an
    attack against Germany and take therefrom not only the right but
    the duty to prevent by all means, including the use of arms, the
    rise of such a state, respectively to destroy such a state if it
    has already arisen. Take care that the strength of our people
    should have its foundation not in colonies but in the soil of
    the home country in Europe. Never consider the Reich as secured
    as long as it cannot give to every descendant of our people his
    own bit of soil for centuries to come; never forget that the
    most sacred right on this earth is the right to own the soil
    which one wants to cultivate and the most sacred sacrifice, the
    blood which is shed for this soil.” (_2760-A-PS_)

(4) _The leadership of the Nazi Party._

(_a_) _The Nazi Party leadership was the sole bearer of the doctrines of
the Nazi Party._ The Party Organization Book declares:

    “The Party as an instrument of ideological education, must grow
    to be the Leader Corps (_Fuehrer Korps_) of the German Nation.

    “This Leader Corps is responsible for the complete penetration
    of the German Nation with the National Socialist spirit * * *”
    (_1893-PS_)

    “The Party is the order of fuehrers. It is furthermore
    responsible for the spiritual ideological National Socialist
    direction of the German people.” (_1814-PS_)

Referring to the mission of the _Ortsgruppenleiter_ (local chapter
leader) of the NSDAP, the Party Organization Book states:

    “As Hoeheitstraeger (bearer of sovereignty) all expressions of
    the party will emanate from him; he is responsible for the
    political and ideological leadership and organization within his
    zone of sovereignty.” (_1893-PS_)

Similar statements are made with regard to the _Kreisleiter_ (county
leader) and the _Gauleiter_ (Gau leader) and the Reich Directorate
(1893-PS).

(_b_) _The Nazi Party leadership was entitled to control and dominate
the German state and all related institutions and all individuals
therein._ Hitler said at the 1935 Nurnberg Party Congress:

    “It is not the State which gives orders to us, it is we who give
    orders to the State.” (_2775-PS_)

Frick declared in a similar vein:

    “In National Socialist Germany, leadership is in the hands of an
    organized community, the National Socialist Party; and as the
    latter represents the will of the nation, the policy adopted by
    it in harmony with the vital interests of the nation is at the
    same time the policy adopted by the country. * * *” (_2771-PS_)

Goebbels declared:

    “The Party must always continue to represent the hierarchy of
    National Socialist leadership. This minority must always insist
    upon its prerogative to control the state. * * * It is
    responsible for the leadership of the state and it solemnly
    relieves the people of this responsibility.” (_2771-PS_)

Hess remarked that the Party was a “necessity” in the German state and
constituted the cohesive mechanism with which to “organize and direct
offensively and defensively the spiritual and political strength of the
people.” (_2426-PS_)

Nazi interpreters of constitutional law expressed the same idea:

    “The NSDAP is not a structure which stands under direct state
    control, to which single tasks of public administration are
    entrusted by the state, but it holds and maintains its claim to
    totality as the ‘bearer of the German state-idea’ in all fields
    relating to the community—regardless of how various single
    functions are divided between the organization of the Party and
    the organization of the State.” (_2771-PS_)

This doctrine was incorporated into laws which established the NSDAP as
“the only political party in Germany” and declared the NSDAP “The bearer
of the German state-idea” and “indissolubly linked to the state.”
(_1388-A-PS_; _1395-PS_)

(_c_) _The Nazi Party leadership was entitled to destroy all opponents._
Reference is made generally to Sections2 and 3 on the Acquisition and
Consolidation of Political Control of Germany for proof of this
allegation.

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO COMMON OBJECTIVES,
                METHODS, AND DOCTRINES OF THE CONSPIRACY

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│  I   │       5
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (B,  │      │
                │  C).                                   │  I   │  16, 17
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 1388-A-PS      │Law against the establishment of        │      │
                │  Parties, 14 July 1933. 1933           │      │
                │  Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479.    │ III  │     962
                │                                        │      │
*1395-PS        │Law to insure the unity of Party and    │      │
                │  State, 1 December 1933. 1933          │      │
                │  Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016.   │      │
                │  (GB 252)                              │ III  │     978
                │                                        │      │
*1708-PS        │The Program of the NSDAP. National      │      │
                │  Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153.   │      │
                │  (USA 255; USA 324).                   │  IV  │     208
                │                                        │      │
*1814-PS        │The Organization of the NSDAP and its   │      │
                │  affiliated associations, from         │      │
                │  Organization book of the NSDAP,       │      │
                │  editions of 1936, 1938, 1940 and 1943,│      │
                │  pp. 86-88. (USA 328)                  │  IV  │     411
                │                                        │      │
*1893-PS        │Extracts from Organization Book of the  │      │
                │  NSDAP, 1943 edition. (USA 323)        │  IV  │     529
                │                                        │      │
 2373-PS        │Extracts from German Publications.      │  IV  │    1106
                │                                        │      │
 2405-PS        │Extracts from German Publications.      │  V   │      79
                │                                        │      │
*2426-PS        │Extracts from Speeches, by Hess. (GB    │      │
                │  253)                                  │  V   │      90
                │                                        │      │
*2433-PS        │Extracts from “Nature, Foundation and   │      │
                │  Aims of NSDAP” by Rosenberg, 1934.    │      │
                │  (USA 596)                             │  V   │      93
                │                                        │      │
 2512-PS        │Hitler’s Testimony Before the Court for │      │
                │  High Treason, published in Frankfurter│      │
                │  Zeitung, 26 September 1931.           │  V   │     246
                │                                        │      │
 2541-PS        │Extracts from German Publications.      │  V   │     285
                │                                        │      │
 2584-PS        │Hitler’s speech concluding the          │      │
                │  Reichsparteitag, 3 September 1933. The│      │
                │  First Reichstag of the United German  │      │
                │  Nation, 1933.                         │  V   │     311
                │                                        │      │
 2760-A-PS      │Extract from Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler,│      │
                │  41st edition, 1933.                   │  V   │     407
                │                                        │      │
 2771-PS        │U. S. State Department, National        │      │
                │  Socialism, published by U. S.         │      │
                │  Government Printing Office, 1943.     │  V   │     417
                │                                        │      │
 2772-PS        │Speech of Hitler, published in Documents│      │
                │  of German Politics, Vol. IV, Part I,  │      │
                │  p. 37.                                │  V   │     417
                │                                        │      │
 2773-PS        │Speech of Hitler, published in Documents│      │
                │  of German Politics, Vol. VII, 1939,   │      │
                │  pp. 466-7.                            │  V   │     417
                │                                        │      │
 2774-PS        │Extract from Organization Book of the   │      │
                │  NSDAP, 1937, 4th Edition, p. 86.      │  V   │     418
                │                                        │      │
*2775-PS        │Hitler’s speech, published in Nurnberg  │      │
                │  Party Congress, 1934. (USA 330)       │  V   │     418
                │                                        │      │
*2777-PS        │Article: Space Policy by Rosenberg,     │      │
                │  published in National Socialist       │      │
                │  Monthly, May 1932, p. 199. (USA 594). │  V   │     418
                │                                        │      │
 2780-PS        │Extract from Constitution and           │      │
                │  Administration in the Third Reich, by │      │
                │  Paul Schmidt, Berlin, 1937.           │  V   │     419
                │                                        │      │
*3863-PS        │Extracts from Operations in the Third   │      │
                │  Reich by Lammers. (GB 320)            │  VI  │     786


            2. ACQUISITION OF TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL CONTROL

A. _First Steps in Acquiring Control of State Machinery._

(1) _The Nazi conspirators first sought control of State machinery by
force. The Munich Putsch of 1923, aimed at the overthrow of the Weimar
Republic by direct action, failed._ On 8 November 1923 the so-called
Munich Putsch occurred. During the evening, von Kahr, State Commissioner
General of Bavaria, was speaking at the _Buergerbraeukeller_ in Munich.
Hitler and other Nazi leaders appeared, supported by the
_Sturmabteilungen_ (Storm Troops) and other fighting groups. Hitler
fired a shot and announced that a Nationalist Revolution setting up a
dictatorship had taken place. There followed a conference after which
von Kahr, von Lossow, and Colonel of Police von Seisser, announced they
would cooperate with Hitler and that a “Provisional National Government”
was established, as follows:

           Reich Chancellor                       Adolf Hitler
           Leader of the National Army     Gen. von Ludendorff
           Reich Minister of War                    von Lossow
           Reich Minister of Police                von Seisser
           Reich Finance Minister                        Feder

It was also announced that Kahr would be State Administrator for
Bavaria, Poehner would be Bavarian Prime Minister, and Frick would be
Munich Police President. Kahr, Lossow and Seisser then departed. During
the night the latter group alerted the police, brought troops to Munich,
and announced that their consent to the Putsch had been obtained by
force. On the afternoon of the next day, Hitler, Ludendorff, and their
supporters attempted to march into the center of Munich. At the
_Feldherrnhalle_ the procession met a patrol of police, shots were
exchanged, and men on both sides were killed. Hermann Goering was
wounded, the Putsch was broken up, the Party and its organization were
declared illegal, and its leaders, including Hitler, Frick, and
Streicher were arrested. Rosenberg, together with Amann and Drexler,
tried to keep the Party together after it had been forbidden. Hitler and
others later were tried for high treason. At the trial Hitler admitted
his participation in the foregoing attempt to seize control of the State
by force. He was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. (_2532-PS_;
_2404-PS_)

(2) _The Nazi Conspirators then set out through the Nazi Party to
undermine and capture the German Government by “legal” forms supported
by terrorism._

(_a_) _In 1925, the conspirators reorganized the Nazi Party and began a
campaign to secure support from Germany voters throughout the nation._
On 26 February 1925, the _Voelkischer Beobachter_, the official
newspaper of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP)
appeared for the first time after the Munich Putsch, and on the
following day Hitler made his first speech after his release from
prison. He then began to rebuild the Party organization. The
conspirators, through the Nazi Party, participated in election campaigns
and other political activity throughout Germany and secured the election
of members of the Reichstag. (_2532-PS_)

As a reflection of this activity the Nazi Party in May 1928, received
2.6% of the total vote and obtained 12 out of 491 seats in the
Reichstag. In September 1930, the Nazi Party polled 18.3% of the total
vote and won 107 out of 577 seats in the Reichstag. In July 1932, it
received 37.3% of the total vote east and won 230 out of 608 seats. In
November 1932, it polled 33.1% of the vote and won 196 out of 584 seats
in the Reichstag. (_2514-PS_)

(_b_) _The Nazi conspirators asserted they sought power only by legal
forms._ In November 1934, Hitler, speaking of the Munich Putsch of 1923
said:

    “It gave me the opportunity to lay down the new tactics of the
    Party and to pledge it to legality”. (_2741-PS_)

In September 1931, three officers of the _Reichswehr_ were tried at
Leipzig for high treason. At the request of Hans Frank, Hitler was
invited to testify at this trial that the NSDAP was striving to attain
its goal by purely legal means. He was asked: “How do you imagine the
setting up of a Third Reich?” His reply was, “This term only describes
the basis of the struggle but not the objective. We will enter the legal
organizations and will make our Party a decisive factor in this way. But
when we do possess constitutional rights then we will form the State in
the manner which we consider to be the right one.” The President then
asked: “This too by constitutional means?” Hitler replied: “Yes.”
(_2512-PS_)

(_c_) _The purpose of the Nazi conspirators in participating in
elections and in the Reichstag was to undermine the parliamentary system
of the Republic and to replace it with a dictatorship of their own._
This the Nazi conspirators themselves made clear. Frick wrote in 1927:

    “There is no National Socialist and no racialist who expects any
    kind of manly German deed from that gossip club on the
    Koenigsplatz and who is not convinced of the necessity for
    direct action by the unbroken will of the German people to bring
    about their spiritual and physical liberation. But there is a
    long road ahead. After the failure of November, 1923, there was
    no choice but to begin all over again and to strive to bring
    about a change in the spirit and determination of the most
    valuable of our racial comrades, as the indispensable
    prerequisite for the success of the coming fight for freedom.
    Our activities in parliament must be evaluated as merely part of
    this propaganda work.

    “Our participation in the parliament does not indicate a
    support, but rather an undermining of the parliamentarian
    system. It does not indicate that we renounce our
    anti-parliamentarian attitude, but that we are fighting the
    enemy with his own weapons and that we are fighting for our
    National Socialist goal from the parliamentary platform.”
    (_2742-PS_)

On 30 April 1928, Goebbels wrote in his paper “_Der Angriff_”;

    “We enter parliament in order to supply ourselves, in the
    arsenal of democracy, with its own weapons. We become members of
    the Reichstag in order to paralyze the Weimar sentiment with its
    own assistance. If democracy is so stupid as to give us free
    tickets and _per diem_ for the this “blockade” (_Barendienst_),
    that is its own affair.”

Later in the same article he continued:

    “We do not come as friends, nor even as neutrals. We come as
    enemies: As the wolf bursts into the flock, so we come.”
    (_2500-PS_)

In a pamphlet published in 1935, Goebbels said:

    “When democracy granted democratic methods for us in the times
    of opposition, this was bound to happen in a democratic system.
    However, we National Socialists never asserted that we
    represented a democratic point of view, but we have declared
    openly that we used democratic methods only in order to gain the
    power and that, after assuming the power, we would deny to our
    adversaries without any consideration the means which were
    granted to us in the times of opposition. (_2412-PS_)

A leading Nazi writer on Constitutional Law, Ernst Rudolf Huber, later
wrote of this period:

    “The parliamentary battle of the NSDAP had the single purpose of
    destroying the parliamentary system from within through its own
    methods. It was necessary above all to make formal use of the
    possibilities of the party-state system but to refuse real
    cooperation and thereby to render the parliamentary system,
    which is by nature dependent upon the responsible cooperation of
    the opposition, incapable of action.” (_2633-PS_)

The Nazi members of the Reichstag conducted themselves as a storm troop
unit. Whenever representatives of the government or the democratic
parties spoke, the Nazi members marched out in a body in studied
contempt of the speaker, or entered in a body to interrupt the speaker,
thus making it physically impossible for the Reichstag President to
maintain order. In the case of speakers of opposition parties, the Nazi
members constantly interrupted, often resorting to lengthy and spurious
parliamentary maneuvers, with the result that the schedule of the
session was thrown out of order. The tactics finally culminated in
physical attacks by the Nazis upon members of the house as well as upon
visitors. (_L-83_)

In a letter of 24 August 1931 to Rosenberg, Hitler deplored an article
in “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” the effect of which was to prevent
undermining of support for the then existing form of government, and
said: “I myself am travelling all over Germany to achieve exactly the
opposite. (_047-PS_)

(_d_) _The Nazi conspirators supported their “legal” activities by
terrorism._

    _1. The Nazi conspirators created and utilized as a Party
    formation the Sturmabteilungen (SA) a semi-military voluntary
    organization of young men trained for and committed to the use
    of violence, whose mission was to make the Party the master of
    the streets._ The SA was organized in 1921. As indicated by its
    name, it was a voluntary organization of young men trained for
    and committed to the use of violence. To quote from a pamphlet
    compiled on order of the Supreme SA Headquarters:

        “The SA was not founded as one forms just any sort of
        club. It was born in midst of strife and received from
        the Fuehrer himself the name “Storm Troops” after that
        memorable hall battle in Hofbraeuhaus at Munich on the
        4th of November 1921. * * * Blood and sacrifice were the
        most faithful companions of the young SA on its hard
        path to power. The Storm Troops were and still are today
        the fist and propaganda arm of the movement”.
        (_2168-PS_)

    It was organized along semi-military lines from the beginning.
    To quote again from the same official pamphlet:

        “It is one of the greatest historical services of the SA
        that at the time when the German People’s Army had to
        undergo a dissolution, it held high those virtues which
        marked the German soldier: personal courage, idealism,
        willingness to sacrifice, consciousness of
        responsibility, power to decide, and leadership. Thus,
        the SA became among the people the messenger and bearer
        of German armed strength and German armed spirit.

        “The 4th of November 1921 was not only the birth hour of
        the SA by itself, but was the day from which the young
        fighting troop of the Movement took its stand at the
        focal point of political events. With the clear
        recognition that now the unity (_Geschlossenheit_) of a
        troop led to victory, the SA was systematically
        reorganized and so-called “Centuries”
        (_Hundertschaften_) were established * * *” (_2168-PS_)

    In March 1928, Goering took command of the entire SA. In
    November 1923, SA units were used in the Munich Putsch. When the
    Party was reorganized in 1925, the SA continued to be the
    fighting organization of the Party. Again to quote the official
    pamphlet on the SA:

        “And now a fight for Germany began of such a sort as was
        never before fought. What are names, what are words or
        figures which are not indeed able to express the
        magnitude of belief and of idealism on one side and the
        magnitude of hate on the other side. 1925: the Party
        lives again, and its iron spearhead is the SA. With it
        the power and meaning of the National Socialist movement
        grows. Around the central events of the whole Movement,
        the Reich Party Days, dates, decisions, fights and
        victory roll themselves into a long list of German men
        of undenying willingness to sacrifice.” (_2168-PS_)

    Mastery of the streets was at all times the mission of the SA.
    While discussing his ideas as to the part which this
    organization should play in the political activity of his Party,
    Hitler stated:

        “What we needed and still need were and are not a
        hundred or two hundred reckless conspirators, but a
        hundred thousand and a second hundred thousand fighters
        for our philosophy of life. We should not work in secret
        conventicles, but in mighty mass demonstrations, and it
        is not by dagger and poison or pistol that the road can
        be cleared for the movement but by the conquest of the
        streets. We must teach the Marxists that the future
        master of the streets is National Socialism, just as it
        will some day be the master of the state.” (_404-PS_)

    To quote again from the official SA pamphlet:

        “Possession of the streets is the key to power in the
        state—for this reason the SA marched and fought. The
        public would have never received knowledge from the
        agitative speeches of the little Reichstag faction and
        its propaganda or from the desires and aims of the
        Party, if the martial tread and battle song of the SA
        companies had not beat the measure for the truth of a
        relentless criticism of the state of affairs in the
        governmental system. * * *

        “The SA conquered for itself a place in public opinion
        and the leadership of the National Socialist Movement
        dictated to its opponents the law for quarrels. The SA
        was already a state within a state; a part of the future
        in a sad present.” (_2168-PS_; for further material
        concerning the SA, see Section 4 of Chapter XV.)

    _2. The Nazi conspirators constantly used physical violence and
    terror to break up meetings of political opponents, and to
    suppress opposition in their own meetings._ The following facts
    are indicative of the methods constantly used by the Nazi
    conspirators during this period: On numerous occasions meetings
    of the _Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft_ (Peace Society) were
    broken up and terrorized by shock troops and SA units. Groups of
    National Socialists invaded meetings of the society, interrupted
    the speaker, attempted to attack him, and endeavored to make
    sufficient disturbance so that the meetings would have to be
    cancelled. (_L-83_)

    To quote once again from the official SA pamphlet:

        “* * * As an example of a seemingly impossible deed, the
        11th of February 1927 should be firmly preserved. It is
        the day on which the SA broke the Red Terror, with heavy
        sacrifice, in the hall battle at the Pharoah’s Hall
        (_Pharussaelen_) in Berlin, the stronghold of the
        Communists, and thereby established itself decisively in
        the capitol city of the Reich. In considering the badly
        wounded SA men, Dr. Goebbels coined the phrase “unknown
        SA Man”, who silently fights and bleeds, obeying only
        his duty.” (_2168-PS_)

    In Berlin, under the leadership of Goebbels, so-called
    _Rollkommandos_, were organized for the purpose of disrupting
    political meetings of all non-Nazi groups. These _Rollkommandos_
    were charged with interrupting, making noise, and unnerving the
    speaker. Finally the Nazis broke up meetings by _Rollkommando_
    raids. In many cases, fights resulted, during which furniture
    was destroyed and a number of persons hurt. The Nazis armed
    themselves with blackjacks, brass knuckles, rubber truncheons,
    walking sticks, and beer bottles. After the Reichstag election
    of 1930, Nazi terrorism became more overt, and from then on
    scarcely a day went by when the Chief of the Security Police in
    Berlin did not receive a minimum of five to ten reports, and
    often more, of riots instigated by Nazis. (_2955-PS_)

    During the campaign for the Reichstag election of 14 September
    1930, Nazi conspirators made it a practice to send speakers
    accompanied by many Storm Troopers to meetings of other
    political parties, often physically taking over the meetings. On
    one such occasion a large detachment of Storm Troopers, some of
    whom were armed with pistols and clubs, attended a meeting
    called by the Social Democratic Party, succeeded in forcibly
    excluding everybody not in sympathy with their views, and
    concluded the meeting as their own. Such violent tactics,
    repeated many times, were an integral part of the political
    creed of the Nazi. (_L-83_)

    Ultimately, in Berlin, just before the Nazis seized power, it
    was necessary to devote the entire Police Force to the job of
    fighting the Nazis, thus leaving little time for other Police
    duties. (_2955-PS_)

    _3. The Nazi conspirators constantly threatened their opponents
    with organized reprisals and terror._ During the course of the
    trial of three officers of the _Reichswehr_ for high treason in
    Leipzig in September 1931, Hitler said:

        “But I may assure you that if the Nazi movement’s
        struggle is successful, then there will be a Nazi Court
        of Law too, the November 1918 revolution will be atoned,
        and there’ll be some heads chopped off.” (_2512-PS_)

    Frick wrote in the National Socialist Yearbook for 1930:

        “No wonder that as the situation of the entire German
        people, as well as that of the individual racial
        comrade, grows rapidly worse, increased numbers are
        realizing the incompetence of the parliamentarian
        system, and no wonder that even some who are responsible
        for the present system desperately cry for a
        dictatorship. This however, will not save them from
        their fate of one day being called to account before a
        German State Tribunal.” (_2743-PS_)

    On 7 October 1929, the National Socialist District leader
    Terboven said in a meeting in Essen:

        “This weakness is especially known to Severing, who
        symbolizes the present State, and he intends to render a
        service to the State, which is breathing its last; but
        this too will no longer save the present corrupt
        parliamentarian system. * * * But I give such a
        dictatorship only four weeks. Then the people will
        awaken, then the National Socialists will come to power,
        and then there will not be enough lamp posts in Germany.

        “The National Socialists will march into the new
        Reichstag with thirty members; then there will be black
        eyes every day in this Reichstag; thus this corrupt
        parliamentarian system will be further discredited;
        disorder and chaos will set in, and then the National
        Socialists will judge the moment to have arrived in
        which they are to seize the political power.”
        (_2513-PS_)

    On 18 October 1929, Frick, while discussing the Young Plan in a
    meeting in Pyritz said:

        “This fateful struggle will first be taken up with the
        ballot, but this cannot continue indefinitely, for
        history has taught us that in a battle, blood must be
        shed, and iron broken. The ballot is the beginning of
        this fateful struggle. We are determined to promulgate
        by force that which we preach. Just as Mussolini
        exterminated the Marxists in Italy, so must we also
        succeed in accomplishing the same through dictatorship
        and terror.” (_2513-PS_)

    In December 1932, Frick, at that time Chairman of the Foreign
    Affairs Committee of the Reichstag, stated to a fellow member of
    that committee:

        “Don’t worry, when we are in power we shall put all of
        you guys into concentration camps.” (_L-83_)

    _4. The Nazi conspirators openly approved acts of terrorist
    committed by their subordinates._ On 22 August 1932, five
    National Socialists were condemned to death for a murder in the
    town of Potempa. Hitler wired to the condemned men:

        “My Comrades! Faced with this terrible blood sentence, I
        feel myself bound to you in unlimited faithfulness. Your
        liberty is from this moment a question of our honor. To
        fight against a Government under which such a thing
        could happen is our duty.” (_2532-PS_; _2511-PS_)

    Goering, two days later sent the following telegram to the
    condemned men:

        “In nameless embitterment and rage against the terror
        sentence which has struck you, I promise you, My
        Comrades, that our whole fight from now on will be for
        your freedom. You are no murderers. You have defended
        the life and the honor of your Comrades. I send to your
        families today 1,000 Marks which I have received from
        your friends. Be courageous. More than 14,000,000 of the
        best Germans have made your interest their own.”
        (_2634-PS_)

    On 2 September 1932, the death sentences were commuted to
    imprisonment for life. In 1933, after the Nazis came into power,
    the five were set free. (_2532-PS_)

    Soon after coming to power the Nazi conspirators took steps to
    grant a general amnesty for all unlawful acts, including acts of
    violence, committed by their adherents in the course of their
    struggle for power. On 21 March 1933 a decree was promulgated,
    signed by von Hindenburg, Hitler, Frick, and von Papen granting
    amnesty “For penal acts committed in the national revolution of
    the German People, in its preparation or in the fight for the
    German soil”. (_2059-PS_)

B. _Control Acquired_

(1) _On 30 January 1933, Hitler became Chancellor of the German
Republic._

(2) _After the Reichstag fire of 28 February 1933, clauses of the Weimar
Constitution guaranteeing personal liberty and freedom of speech, of the
press, of association and assembly, were suspended._ The Weimar
Constitution contained certain guarantees as to personal freedom
(Article 114), as to inviolability of the home (Article 115), and as to
the secrecy of letters and other communications (Article 117). It also
had provisions safeguarding freedom of speech and of the press (Article
118), and of assembly (Article 123), and of association (Article 124).
The Reich President was authorized, “if public safety and order in the
German Reich are considerably disturbed or endangered,” to take steps to
suspend “the Fundamental Rights” established in Articles 114, 115, 117,
118, 123, 124, and 153. (Article 48 (2)). (_2050-PS_)

On 28 February 1933, the Nazi conspirators, taking as their excuse a
fire which had just destroyed the Reichstag building, caused to be
promulgated a Decree of the Reich President suspending the
constitutional guarantees of freedom. This decree, which purported to be
an exercise of the powers of the Reich President under Article 48 (2) of
the Constitution, and which was signed by the Reich President,
Hindenburg, the Reich Chancellor, Hitler, the Reich Minister of the
Interior, Frick, and the Reich Minister of Justice, Guertner, provided
in part:

    “Sections 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the
    Constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further
    notice. Thus, restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of
    free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, on
    the right of assembly and the right of association, and
    violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic
    communications, and warrants for house-searchers, orders for
    confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also
    permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.”
    (_1390-PS_)

(3) _The Nazi conspirators secured the passage by the Reichstag of a
“Law for the Protection of the People and the Reich”, giving Hitler and
the members of his then Cabinet plenary powers of legislation._ At the
first meeting of Hitler’s Cabinet on 30 January 1933, passage of an
Enabling Law (_Ermaechtigungsgesetz_) was discussed, and suppression of
the Communist Party was considered as a means for securing the majority
requisite for this and other purposes. (_351-PS_) Since such a law
involved a change in the Constitution it was governed by Article 76 of
the Weimar Constitution which provided: “The Constitution may be amended
by law. The acts of the Reichstag amending the Constitution can only
take effect if two-thirds of the regular number of members are present
and at least two-thirds of those present consent.” (_2050-PS_) At the
first meeting of the Hitler Cabinet on 30 January 1933, both Hitler and
Goering favored early dissolution of the Reichstag and new elections in
an effort to achieve a majority for the new Cabinet. (_351-PS_) This
course was followed and new elections for the Reichstag were held on 5
March 1933, at which 288 Nazi were elected out of 647 members
(_2514-PS_).

Taking advantage of the Presidential decree of 28 February 1933
suspending constitutional guarantees of freedom, Goering and other Nazi
conspirators immediately caused a large number of Communists, including
party officials and Reichstag deputies, and a smaller number of Social
Democratic officials and deputies to be placed in “protective custody”.
(_2324-PS_; _2573-PS_; _L-83_) Thus all Communist deputies and a number
of Social Democratic deputies were prevented from attending the new
session of the Reichstag. On 9 March 1933, Frick announced that the
Communists would be prevented from participating in the first session of
the Reichstag on March 21st, because of their being more usefully
occupied. (_2403-PS_) As Frick cynically stated:

    “When the Reichstag meets the 21st of March, the Communists will
    be prevented by urgent labor elsewhere from participating in the
    session. In concentration camps they will be re-educated for
    productive work. We will know how to render harmless permanently
    sub-humans who do not want to be re-educated.” (_2651-PS_)

At a meeting of the Reich Cabinet on 15 March 1933, the problem of
securing the necessary two-thirds majority in favor of an Enabling Act
was again considered. Frick stated his belief that the Act would have to
be broadly-conceived, in a manner to allow for any deviation from the
clauses of the Constitution of the Reich. Goering thought the two-thirds
majority would be forthcoming and that if necessary some of the Social
Democrats could be excluded from the room during the voting. (_2962-PS_)

At a meeting of the Cabinet on 20 March 1933, there was further
discussion of means for securing the majority and quorum necessary to
secure passage of the Act (_2963-PS_). On 23 March, Hitler spoke in
favor of an Enabling Law proposed by the Nazi conspirators and in the
course of the debate said:

    “The Government insists on the passage of this law. It expects a
    clear decision in any case. It offers to all the Parties in the
    Reichstag the possibility of a peaceful development and a
    possible conciliation in the future. But it is also determined
    to consider a disapproval of this law as a declaration of
    resistance. It is up to you, gentlemen, to make the decision
    now. It will be either peace or war.” (_2652-PS_)

Thus subject to the full weight of Nazi pressure and terror, the
Reichstag passed the proposed law, 441 deputies voting in its favor, and
94 Social Democrats being opposed (_2579-PS_). The following day, the
law was promulgated. It provided:

    “The Reichstag has resolved the following law, which is, with
    the approval of the Reichsrat, herewith promulgated, after it
    has been established that the requirements have been satisfied
    for legislation altering the Constitution.

    “SECTION 1. Reich laws can be enacted by the Reich Cabinet as
    well as in accordance with the Procedure established in the
    Constitution. This applies also to the laws referred to in
    article 85, paragraph 2, and in article 87 of the Constitution.

    “SECTION 2. The national laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet may
    deviate from the Constitution so far as they do not affect the
    position of the Reichstag and the Reichsrat. The powers of the
    President remain undisturbed.

    “SECTION 3. The national laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet are
    prepared by the Chancellor and published in the
    Reichsgesetzblatt. They come into effect, unless otherwise
    specified, upon the day following their publication. Articles 68
    to 77 of the Constitution do not apply to the laws enacted by
    the Reich Cabinet.

    “SECTION 4. Treaties of the Reich with foreign states which
    concern matters of national legislation do not require the
    consent of the bodies participating in legislation. The Reich
    Cabinet is empowered to issue the necessary provisions for the
    execution of these treaties.

    “SECTION 5. This law becomes effective on the day of its
    publication. It becomes invalid on April 1, 1937; it further
    becomes invalid when the present Reich Cabinet is replaced by
    another.” (_2001-PS_)

The time limit stated in the law was twice extended by action of the
Reichstag and once by decree of Hitler. (_2047-PS_; _2048-PS_;
_2103-PS_)

On 29 June 1933, Dr. Hugenberg resigned as Reich Minister of Economy and
as Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture (_351-PS_). Thereafter, other
members of the Cabinet resigned from time to time, and new members were
added. The Reich Cabinet continued to exercise, on numerous occasions
the plenary powers conferred on it by the law of 24 March 1933. (See
Section 3 of Chapter XV for further material on the Reich Cabinet.)

(4) _The Nazi conspirators caused all political parties, except the Nazi
Party, to be prohibited._ After the Reichstag fire of 27 February 1933,
the organization of the Communist Party was destroyed. On 9 March 1933,
the Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick, announced that the Communists
would be prevented from taking part in the opening of the Reichstag on
21 March 1933, because of their seditious activity. On 26 May 1933, a
law was promulgated, signed by Hitler and Frick, providing for the
confiscation of Communist property. (_2403-PS_; _1396-PS_)

After suspension of the Constitutional guarantees of freedom on 28
February 1933, numerous restraints were imposed on the Social Democratic
Party, including the arrest of a number of its leaders and Reichstag
deputies. The backbone of this Party was broken by the occupation of the
trade union buildings and the smashing of free trade unions in May 1933.
On 22 June 1933, the Social Democratic Party was suppressed in Prussia
(_2403-PS_). On 7 July 1933 a Reich decree eliminated Social Democrats
from the Reichstag and from the governing bodies of Provinces and
Municipalities. (_2058-PS_)

On 14 July 1933, provisions of the Law of 26 May 1933 confiscating
Communist property were made applicable to assets and interests of the
Social Democratic Party and its affiliated organizations, “and also to
assets and interests which are used or destined to promote Marxist or
other activities found by the Reich Minister of the Interior to be
subversive to people and state.” (_1388-PS_) Faced with similar
pressure, the other German Parties either dissolved or combined with the
Nazis (_2403-PS_).

The Nazi conspirators then promulgated a law declaring the Nazi Party to
be the only political party in Germany and making it criminal to
maintain any other political party or to form a new political party.
This law, which was signed by Hitler, Frick, and Guertner, provided in
part:

    “Art. 1

    The National Socialist German Worker’s Party
    (_National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei_) constitutes
    the only political party in Germany.

    “Art. 2

    Whoever undertakes to maintain the organizational structure of
    another political party or to form a new political party will be
    punished with penal servitude up to three years or with
    imprisonment of from six months to three years, if the deed is
    not subject to a greater penalty according to other
    regulations.” (_1388-PS_)

In a speech on 6 July 1933 Hitler stated:

    “The political parties have finally been abolished. This is a
    historical occurrence, the meaning and implication of which one
    cannot yet be fully conscious of. Now, we must set aside the
    last vestige of democracy, particularly the methods of voting
    and making majority decisions which today are used in local
    governments, in economic organizations and in labor boards; in
    its place we must validate the responsibility of the individual.
    The achievement of external power must be followed by the
    inner-education of the people * * *”

Later in the same speech, Hitler said:

    “The Party has become the State. All power lies with the Reich
    Authorities.” (_2632-PS_)

(5) _The Nazi conspirators caused the Nazi Party to be established as a
para-governmental organization with extensive and extraordinary
privileges._ On 1 December 1933 the Reich Cabinet promulgated a law
designed for “Securing the Unity of Party and State”. It was signed by
Hitler and Frick, and provided:

    “Art. 1

    1. After the victory of the National Socialistic Revolution, the
    National Socialistic German Labor Party is the bearer of the
    concept of the German State and is inseparably the state.

    2. It will be a part of the public law. Its organization will be
    determined by the Fuehrer.

    “Art. 2

    The deputy of the Fuehrer and the Chief of Staff of the SA will
    become members of the Reichs government in order to insure close
    cooperation of the offices of the party and SA with the public
    authorities.

    “Art. 3

    1. The members of the National Socialistic German Labor Party
    and the SA (including their subordinate organizations) as the
    leading and driving force of the National Socialist State will
    bear greater responsibility toward Fuehrer, people and state.

    2. In case they violate these duties, they will be subject to
    special jurisdiction by party and state.

    3. The Fuehrer may extend these regulations in order to include
    members of other organizations.

    “Art. 4

    Every action or neglect on the part of members of the SA
    (including their subordinate organizations) attacking or
    endangering the existence, organization, activity or reputation
    of the National Socialistic German Labor Party, in particular
    any infraction against discipline and order, will be regarded as
    a violation of duty.

    “Art. 5

    Custody and arrest may be inflicted in addition to the usual
    penalties.

    “Art. 6

    The public authorities have to grant legal and administrative
    assistance to the offices of the Party and the SA which are
    entrusted with the execution of the jurisdiction of the Party
    and SA.

    “Art. 7

    The law regarding the authority to inflict penalties on members
    of the SA and SS, of the 28 April 1933 (RGBl, p. 230), will be
    invalidated.

    “Art. 8

    The Reichs Chancellor, as Fuehrer of the National Socialistic
    German Labor Party and as the supreme commander of SA will issue
    the regulation necessary for the execution and augmentation of
    this law, particularly with respect to the organization and
    procedure of the Jurisdiction of the Party and SA. He will
    determine the time at which the regulations concerning this
    jurisdiction will be effective.” (_1395-PS_)

Thus the Nazi Party became a para-governmental organization in Germany.

The Nazi conspirators granted the Nazi Party and its components
extensive and extraordinary privileges. On 19 May 1933, they passed a
law to protect and insure respect for Party symbols (_2759-PS_). On 20
December 1934 the Nazi conspirators caused a law to be promulgated,
signed by Hitler, Guertner, Hess, and Frick, making it a crime to make
false or grievous statements to injure the prestige of the Government of
the Reich, the NSDAP, or its agencies. This law also declared it to be a
crime to wear the uniform or the insignia of the NSDAP without authority
to do so, and controlled the manufacture and sale of Party uniforms,
flags, and insignia (_1393-PS_). A decree of 29 March 1935, defining the
legal status of the NSDAP and of its components and affiliated
organizations, is a further indication of the extraordinary privileges
enjoyed by the Nazi Party. (_1725-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

   LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ACQUISITION OF
                     TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL CONTROL

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (D)  │      │
                │  1, 2.                                 │  I   │  17, 18
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *047-PS        │Letter to Rosenberg signed by Hitler, 24│      │
                │  August 1931. (USA 725)                │ III  │      82
                │                                        │      │
 *351-PS        │Minutes of First Meeting of Cabinet of  │      │
                │  Hitler, 30 January 1933. (USA 389)    │ III  │     270
                │                                        │      │
 *404-PS        │Excerpts from Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp.   │      │
                │  456, 475. (USA 256)                   │ III  │     385
                │                                        │      │
 1388-PS        │Law concerning confiscation of Property │      │
                │  subversive to People and State, 14    │      │
                │  July 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,    │      │
                │  Part I, p. 479.                       │ III  │     962
                │                                        │      │
 1388-A-PS      │Law against the establishment of        │      │
                │  Parties, 14 July 1933. 1933           │      │
                │  Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479.    │ III  │     962
                │                                        │      │
 1390-PS        │Decree of the Reich President for the   │      │
                │  Protection of the People and State, 28│      │
                │  February 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,│      │
                │  Part I, p. 83.                        │ III  │     968
                │                                        │      │
 1393-PS        │Law on treacherous attacks against State│      │
                │  and Party, and for the Protection of  │      │
                │  Party Uniforms, 20 December 1934. 1934│      │
                │  Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1269.   │ III  │     973
                │                                        │      │
*1395-PS        │Law to insure the unity of Party and    │      │
                │  State, 1 December 1933. 1933          │      │
                │  Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016.   │      │
                │  (GB 252)                              │ III  │     978
                │                                        │      │
 1396-PS        │Law concerning the confiscation of      │      │
                │  Communist property, 26 May 1933. 1933 │      │
                │  Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 293.    │ III  │     979
                │                                        │      │
 1725-PS        │Decree enforcing law for securing the   │      │
                │  unity of Party and State, 29 March    │      │
                │  1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                │  p. 502.                               │  IV  │     224
                │                                        │      │
 2001-PS        │Law to Remove the Distress of People and│      │
                │  State, 24 March 1933. 1933            │      │
                │  Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141.    │  IV  │     638
                │                                        │      │
 2047-PS        │Law for the extension of the law        │      │
                │  concerning the removal of the distress│      │
                │  of People and Reich, 30 January 1937. │      │
                │  1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.    │      │
                │  105.                                  │  IV  │     660
                │                                        │      │
 2048-PS        │Law for the extension of the law        │      │
                │  concerning the removal of the distress│      │
                │  of the People and Reich, 30 January   │      │
                │  1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                │  p. 95.                                │  IV  │     660
                │                                        │      │
 2050-PS        │The Constitution of the German Reich, 11│      │
                │  August 1919. 1919 Reichsgesetzblatt,  │      │
                │  Part I, p. 1383.                      │  IV  │     662
                │                                        │      │
 2058-PS        │Decree for the securing of the State    │      │
                │  Leadership, 7 July 1933. 1933         │      │
                │  Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 462.    │  IV  │     699
                │                                        │      │
 2059-PS        │Decree of the Reich President relating  │      │
                │  to the granting of Amnesty, 21 March  │      │
                │  1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                │  p. 134.                               │  IV  │     701
                │                                        │      │
 2103-PS        │Decree of Fuehrer on Cabinet            │      │
                │  Legislation, 10 May 1943. 1943        │      │
                │  Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 295.    │  IV  │     729
                │                                        │      │
*2168-PS        │Book by SA Sturmfuehrer Dr. Ernst Bayer,│      │
                │  entitled “The SA”, depicting the      │      │
                │  history, work, aim and organization of│      │
                │  the SA. (USA 411)                     │  IV  │     772
                │                                        │      │
*2324-PS        │Extracts from Reconstruction of a       │      │
                │  Nation, by Hermann Goering, 1934. (USA│      │
                │  233)                                  │  IV  │    1033
                │                                        │      │
 2403-PS        │The End of the Party State, from        │      │
                │  Documents of German Politics, Vol. I, │      │
                │  pp. 55-56.                            │  V   │      71
                │                                        │      │
 2404-PS        │Report of Hitler’s speech in his own    │      │
                │  defense, published in The Hitler Trial│      │
                │  (1934).                               │  V   │      73
                │                                        │      │
 2405-PS        │Extracts from German Publications.      │  V   │      79
                │                                        │      │
 2412-PS        │Extracts from Nature and Form of        │      │
                │  National Socialism pamphlet by Dr.    │      │
                │  Joseph Goebbels, Berlin, 1935.        │  V   │      88
                │                                        │      │
 2500-PS        │“What do we want in the Reichstag?” one │      │
                │  of Goebbels newspaper articles.       │  V   │     237
                │                                        │      │
 2511-PS        │Statement by Hitler from Voelkischer    │      │
                │  Beobachter, 24 August 1932.           │  V   │     246
                │                                        │      │
 2512-PS        │Hitler’s Testimony Before the Court for │      │
                │  High Treason, published in Frankfurter│      │
                │  Zeitung, 26 September 1931.           │  V   │     246
                │                                        │      │
*2513-PS        │Extract from The National Socialist     │      │
                │  Workers’ Party as an Association      │      │
                │  Hostile to State and to Republican    │      │
                │  Form of Government and Guilty of      │      │
                │  Treasonable Activity. (USA 235)       │  V   │     252
                │                                        │      │
 2514-PS        │Extract from Statistical Yearbook of the│      │
                │  German Reich 1933, concerning         │      │
                │  elections in the Reichstag.           │  V   │     253
                │                                        │      │
 2532-PS        │Extract from The Third Reich, by Gerd   │      │
                │  Ruehle.                               │  V   │     268
                │                                        │      │
 2573-PS        │Announcement of Official Prussian Press │      │
                │  Office, in Frankfurter Zeitung, 1     │      │
                │  March 1933.                           │  V   │     303
                │                                        │      │
 2579-PS        │Extracts from the Frankfurter Zeitung,  │      │
                │  24 March 1933, concerning happenings  │      │
                │  23 March.                             │  V   │     303
                │                                        │      │
 2632-PS        │Extracts from The National Socialist    │      │
                │  Revolution 1933, published in Berlin  │      │
                │  1935.                                 │  V   │     343
                │                                        │      │
 2633-PS        │Extracts from Constitutional Law of the │      │
                │  Greater German Reich, 1939.           │  V   │     344
                │                                        │      │
 2634-PS        │Goering to the Condemned, published in  │      │
                │  Voelkischer Beobachter, 26 August     │      │
                │  1932.                                 │  V   │     344
                │                                        │      │
 2651-PS        │Statement by Frick from Voelkischer     │      │
                │  Beobachter, 14 March 1933.            │  V   │     359
                │                                        │      │
 2652-PS        │Speech of Hitler to Reichstag, 23 March │      │
                │  1933, from Voelkischer Beobachter, 24 │      │
                │  March 1933.                           │  V   │     359
                │                                        │      │
 2741-PS        │Speech by Hitler on 9 November 1934,    │      │
                │  published in Voelkischer Beobachter,  │      │
                │  10 November 1934.                     │  V   │     382
                │                                        │      │
 2742-PS        │Passage written by Frick in National    │      │
                │  Socialist Yearbook, 1927, p. 124.     │  V   │     383
                │                                        │      │
 2743-PS        │Passage written by Frick in National    │      │
                │  Socialist Yearbook, 1930, p. 178.     │  V   │     383
                │                                        │      │
 2759-PS        │Law for the protection of Nationalist   │      │
                │  Symbols, 19 May 1933. 1933            │      │
                │  Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 285.    │  V   │     394
                │                                        │      │
*2955-PS        │Affidavit of Magnus Heimannsberg, 14    │      │
                │  November 1945, referring to SA and    │      │
                │  other Nazi groups posted at polling   │      │
                │  places. (USA 755)                     │  V   │     659
                │                                        │      │
*2962-PS        │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, 15 │      │
                │  March 1933. (USA 578)                 │  V   │     669
                │                                        │      │
*2963-PS        │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, 20 │      │
                │  March 1933. (USA 656)                 │  V   │     670
                │                                        │      │
*3054-PS        │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                │  picture composed of captured German   │      │
                │  film. (USA 167)                       │  V   │     801
                │                                        │      │
*3740-PS        │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 6 March 1946.│      │
                │  (USA 779)                             │  VI  │     635
                │                                        │      │
*L-83           │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July  │      │
                │  1945. (USA 234).                      │ VII  │     859


           3. CONSOLIDATION OF TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL CONTROL

_Between the Accession to Power (early 1933) and the Outbreak of the War
(late 1939) the Nazi Conspirators Consolidated Their Control of Germany
by Utilizing and Molding Its Political Machinery to Their Own Ends._

A. _The Nazi conspirators reduced the Reichstag to an impotent body of
their own appointees._ Under the Weimar Constitution of the German
Reich, adopted by the German people on 11 August 1919, the Reichstag was
a representative parliamentary body with broad legislative powers.
Article 20 provided that the Reichstag should be “composed of the
delegates of the German people.” Article 68 of the Chapter on
Legislation provided that:

    “Bills are introduced by the government of the Reich or by
    members of the Reichstag. Reich laws shall be enacted by the
    Reichstag.” (_2050-PS_)

In _Mein Kampf_ Hitler stated the conspirators’ purpose to undermine the
Reichstag:

    “Our young movement in essence and structure is
    anti-parliamentarian, i.e., it rejects majority voting as a
    matter of principle as well as in its own organization * * * Its
    participation in the activities of a parliament has only the
    purpose to contribute to its destruction, to the elimination of
    an institution which we consider as one of the gravest symptoms
    of decay of mankind * * *” (_2883-PS_).

With the passage of the Law for the Protection of the People and the
Reich (also known as the Enabling Act) the Nazi succeeded, in effect, in
depriving the Reichstag of its legislative functions. The legislative as
well as the executive powers of the government were concentrated in
Hitler and the Cabinet (_2001-PS_; the legislative activities of the
Cabinet (_Reichsregierung_) and its power to contravene constitutional
limitations are treated in Section 3 of Chapter XV).

During the period from March 1933 until the beginning of 1937, the
Reichstag enacted only four laws: The Reconstruction Law of 30 January
1934 and the three Nurnberg laws of 15 September 1935. The Reichstag was
retained chiefly as a sounding board for Hitler’s speeches. All other
legislation was enacted by the Cabinet, by the Cabinet ministers, or by
decree of the Fuehrer (_2481-PS_). Hess has admitted the lack of
importance of the Reichstag in the legislative process after 1933.
(_2426-PS_)

Hitler indicated in a 1939 decree that the Reichstag would be permitted
to enact only such laws as he, in his own judgment, might deem
appropriate for Reichstag legislation. (_2018-PS_)

Immediately after the Nazis acquired the control of the central
government they proceeded systematically to eliminate their opponents.
First they forced all other political parties to dissolve, and on 14
July 1933 issued a decree making illegal the existence of any political
party except the Nazi Party. (_1388-PS_)

In early 1935 there were 661 delegates in the Reichstag. Of this number
641 were officially registered as Nazi party members and the remaining
20 were classified as “guests” (_Gaeste_). (_2384-PS_; _2380-PS_)

B. _The Nazi conspirators curtailed the freedom of popular elections
throughout Germany._ Under the Weimar Republic there existed
constitutional and legislative guarantees of free popular elections. The
Weimar Constitution guaranteed the universal, equal and secret ballot
and proportional representation. (_2050-PS_) These general principles
were implemented by the provisions of the Reich Election Law of 1924,
particularly with respect to the multiple party system and the
functioning of proportional representation. (_2382-PS_)

In _Mein Kampf_ Hitler stated the conspirators’ purpose to subvert the
system of popular election:

    “Majority can never replace men. * * * The political
    understanding of the masses is not sufficiently developed to
    produce independently specific political convictions and to
    select persons to represent them.” (_2883-PS_)

The occasional national elections after 1933 were formalities devoid of
freedom of choice. Bona fide elections could not take place under the
Nazi system. The basic ideological doctrine of the _Fuehrerprinzip_
(Leadership Principle) dictated that all subordinates must be appointed
by their superiors in the governmental hierarchy. In order to insure the
practical application of this principle the Nazis immediately liquidated
all other political parties and provided criminal sanctions against the
formation of new parties. (For further discussion see Section 2 on the
Acquisition of Totalitarian Political Control.)

Although the Reichstag, unlike all other elective assemblies in Germany,
was allowed to continue in existence, elections no longer involved a
free choice between lists or candidates. At these elections there were
usually large bands of uniformed Nazis surrounding the polls and
intimidating the voters. (_2955-PS_)

The surreptitious marking of ballots (e.g. with skimmed milk) was also
customary, to ascertain the identity of the persons who cast “No” or
invalid votes. (_R-142_)

Although it had already become practically impossible to have more than
one list of candidates, it was specifically provided by law in 1938 that
only one list was to be submitted to the electorate. (_2355-PS_)

By the end of this period, little of substance remained in the election
law. In an official volume published during the war there are reprinted
the still effective provisions of the law of 1924. The majority of the
substantive provisions have been marked “obsolete” (_gegenstandslos_)
(_2381-PS_).

The comprehensive Nazi program for the centralization of German
government included in its scope the whole system of regional and local
elections, which soon ceased to exist. Article 17 of the Weimar
Constitution had required a representative form of government and
universal, secret elections in all Laender and municipalities
(_2050-PS_). Yet in early 1934, the sovereign powers (_Hoheitsrechte_)
of the Laender were transferred by law to the Reich and the Land
governments were placed under the Reich control:

    “The popular assemblies (_Volksvertretungen_) of the Laender
    shall be abolished.” (_2006-PS_)

Pursuant to the German Communal Ordinance of 30 January 1935, the mayors
and executive officers of all municipalities received their appointments
“through the confidence of Party and State” (Article 6 (2)).
Appointments were made by Reich authorities from lists prepared by the
Party delegates (Article 41). City councillors were selected by the
Party delegates in agreement with the mayors (Article 51 (1)).
(_2008-PS_)

C. _The Nazi conspirators transformed the states, provinces, and
municipalities into what were, in effect, mere administrative organs of
the central government._ Under the Weimar Constitution of the pre-Nazi
regime, the states, provinces, and municipalities enjoyed considerable
autonomy in the exercise of governmental functions—legislative,
executive and judicial. (_2050-PS_)

Hitler, in _Mein Kampf_, stated the conspirators’ purpose to establish
totalitarian control of local government:

    “National Socialism, as a matter of principle, must claim the
    right to enforce its doctrines, without regard to present
    federal boundaries, upon the entire German nation and to educate
    it in its ideas and its thinking. * * * The National Socialist
    doctrine is not the servant of political interests of individual
    federal states but shall become the ruler of the German nation.”
    (_2883-PS_)

These views were echoed by Rosenberg:

    “In the midst of the great power constellations of the globe
    there must be, for foreign as well as for internal political
    reasons, only one strong central national authority, if one
    wants Germany to regain a position which makes it fit for
    alliance with other countries.” (_2882-PS_)

By a series of laws and decrees, the Nazi conspirators reduced the
powers of the regional and local governments and substantially
transformed them into territorial subdivisions of the Reich government.
The program of centralization began almost immediately after the Nazis
acquired the chief executive posts of the government. On 31 March 1933,
they promulgated the Provisional Law integrating the Laender with the
Reich (_2004-PS_). This law called for the dissolution of all state and
local self governing bodies and for their reconstitution according to
the number of votes cast for each party in the Reichstag election of 5
March 1933. The Communists and their affiliates were expressly denied
representation.

A week later there followed the Second Law Integrating the Laender with
the Reich (_2005-PS_). This Act established the position of Reich
Governor. He was to be appointed by the President upon the proposal of
the Chancellor, and was given power to appoint the members of the Land
governments and the higher Land officials and judges, the authority to
reconstruct the Land legislature according to the law of 31 March 1933
(_2004-PS_, _supra_), and the power of pardon.

On 31 January 1934, most of the remaining vestiges of Land independence
were destroyed by the Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich:

    “The popular referendum and the Reichstag election of November
    12, 1933, have proved that the German people have attained an
    indestructible internal unity (_unloesliche innere Einheit_)
    superior to all internal subdivisions of political character.
    Consequently, the Reichstag has enacted the following law which
    is hereby promulgated with the unanimous vote of the Reichstag
    after ascertaining that the requirements of the Reich
    Constitution have been met:

    Article I. Popular assemblies of the Laender shall be abolished.

    Article II. (1) The sovereign powers (_Hoheitsrechte_) of the
    Laender are transferred to the Reich.

    (2) The Laender governments are placed under the Reich
    government.

    Article III. The Reich governors are placed under the
    administrative supervision of the Reich Minister of Interior.

    Article IV. The Reich Government may issue new constitutional
    laws.”

This law was implemented by a regulation, issued by Frick, providing
that all Land laws must have the assent of the competent Minister of the
Reich, that the highest echelons of the Land Government were to obey the
orders of the competent Reich Minister, and that the employees of the
Laender might be transferred into the Reich Civil Service. (_1653-PS_)

The _Reichsrat_ (Reich Council) was abolished by law on 14 February
1934, and all official representation on the part of the Laender in the
administration of the central government was at an end (_2647-PS_). The
legislative pattern was complete with the enactment of the Reich
Governor Law on 30 January 1935, which solidified the system of
centralized control. The Reich Governor was declared to be the official
representative of the Reich government, who was to receive orders
directly from Hitler (_Reichstatthaltergesetz_ (Reich Governor Law), 30
January 1935, 1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, p. 65). The same
development was apparent in the provinces, the territorial subdivisions
of Prussia. All local powers were concentrated in the Provincial
Presidents, who acted solely as representatives of the national
administration (_2049-PS_). Similarly, in the case of the municipalities
local self-government was quickly reduced to a minimum and communal
affairs were placed under central Reich control. The Nazi Party Delegate
was given special functions:

    “* * * in order to insure harmony between the communal
    administration and the Party.” (Art. 6 (2)).

The Reich was given supervision over the municipalities:

    “* * * in order to insure that their activities conform with the
    laws and the aims of national leadership.” (_2008-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators frequently boasted of their comprehensive program
of government centralization. Frick, Minister of the Interior throughout
this period, wrote:

    “The reconstruction law abolished the sovereign rights and the
    executive powers of the Laender and made the Reich the sole
    bearer of the rights of sovereignty. The supreme powers of the
    Laender do not exist any longer. The natural result of this was
    the subordination of the Land governments to the Reich
    government and the Land Ministers to the corresponding Reich
    Ministers. On 30 January 1934, the German Reich became one
    state. (_2481-PS_)

In another article Frick indicated even more clearly the purposes which
underlay this program of centralization:

    “In the National Socialist revolution of 1933, it was stipulated
    for the first time in the history of the German nation that the
    erection of a unified state (_Einheitsstaat_) would be
    accomplished. From the early days of his political activity,
    Adolf Hitler never left a doubt in the mind of anyone that he
    considered it the first duty of National Socialism to create a
    German Reich in which the will of the people would be led in a
    single direction and that the whole strength of the nation, _at
    home and abroad_, would be placed on the balance scale.”
    (_2380-PS_; _2378-PS_.)

D. _The Nazi conspirators united the offices of President and Chancellor
in the person of Hitler._ The merger of the two offices was accomplished
by the law of 1 August 1934, signed by the entire cabinet (_2003-PS_).
The official Nazi statement concerning the effect of this statute
contains this observation:

    “Through this law, the conduct of Party and State has been
    combined in one hand. * * * He is responsible only to his own
    conscience and to the German nation.” (_1893-PS_)

One of the significant consequences of this law was to give to Hitler
the supreme command of the German armed forces, always a prerequisite of
the Presidency (_2050-PS_). Accordingly, every soldier was immediately
required to take an oath of loyalty and obedience to Hitler. (_2061-PS_)

E. _The Nazi conspirators removed great numbers of civil servants on
racial and political grounds and replaced them with party members and
supporters._

Hitler publicly announced the conspirators’ purpose:

    “We know that two things alone will save us: the end of internal
    corruption and the cleaning out of all those who owe their
    existence simply to the protection of members of the same
    political parties. Through the most brutal ruthlessness towards
    all officials installed by those political parties we must
    restore our finances. * * * The body of German officials must
    once more become what it was.” (_2881-PS_)

The Nazi legislative machine turned to the task of purging the civil
service soon after the accession to power. On 7 April 1933, the Law for
the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service was promulgated
(_1397-PS_). Article 3 of this law applies the Nazi blood theories:

    “(1) Officials who are not of Aryan descent are to be retired
    (See Section 8); where honorary officials are concerned, they
    are to be discharged from office.

    (2)  (1) Does not apply to officials who have been in service
    since August 1, 1914, or who fought in the World War at the
    front for the German Reich or for its allies or whose fathers or
    sons were killed in the World War. The Reich Minister of the
    Interior after consultation with the competent Minister or with
    the highest state authorities may permit further exceptions in
    the case of officials who are in foreign countries.”

Article 8 provides that retirement does not carry a pension unless the
official has served at least ten years. The political purge provision of
this law is contained in Article 4:

    “Officials who because of their previous political activity do
    not offer security that they will exert themselves for the
    national state without reservations, may be discharged. For
    three months after dismissal, they will be paid their former
    salary. From this time on they receive three-quarters of their
    pensions (see 8) and corresponding annuities for their heirs.”

The provisions of the Act apply to all Reich, Land, and Communal
officials (Art. 1 (2)). Civil Servants may be placed on the retired list
without any reason, “for the purpose of simplifying the administration”
(Art. 6). Discharges and transfers, once decided on by the appropriate
administrative chief, are final and are not subject to appeal (Art. 7
(1)).

This basic enactment was followed by a series of decrees, regulations,
and amendments. For example, on 11 April 1933, the term “non-Aryan” was
defined to include persons with only one non-Aryan grandparent
(_2012-PS_). An amendatory law of 30 June ruled out all civil servants
married to non-Aryans. (_1400-PS_)

The political standards of the “Purge Law” were made more explicit by
the supplementary law of 20 July 1933. Officials who belonged to any
party or organization which, in the opinion of the Nazis, furthered the
aims of Communism, Marxism, or Social Democracy were summarily to be
discharged (_1398-PS_). In the later years, these earlier provisions
were enlarged and codified, no longer solely for the purposes of
affecting the existing civil service, but rather to set out the
qualifications for the appointment of new applicants and for their
promotion. Proof of devotion to National Socialism and documentary proof
of acceptable “blood” were prescribed as conditions to promotion.
(_2326-PS_)

The comprehensive German Civil Service Law of 26 January 1937 included
the discriminatory provisions of the earlier legislation, and prevented
the appointment of any applicants opposed or suspected of being opposed
to the Nazi program and policy (_2340-PS_). The legislation dealing with
the training and education of civil servants provided that no person can
be accepted for an official position unless he is a member of the Nazi
Party or one of its formations (_Gliederungen_). (_2341-PS_)

The total subjugation of the German civil servant was ultimately
accomplished by the following resolution passed by the Reichstag at the
request of the Fuehrer.

    “* * * without being bound by existing legal provisions, the
    Fuehrer must therefore in his capacity as Fuehrer of the nation,
    as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, as Head of the
    Government and as the highest bearer of all power, as highest
    Law Lord and as Fuehrer of the Party, always be in a position to
    require every German—whether a simple soldier or officer,
    subordinate or higher official, or judge, supervisory or
    operating functionary of the Party, laborer or employer—to
    carry out his duties with all the means available to him and to
    discharge these duties according to a conscientious examination
    without reference to so-called vested rights, especially without
    the preambles of pre-existing procedure, by removal of any man
    from his office, rank or position.” (_2755-PS_)

F. _The Nazi conspirators restricted the independence of the judiciary
and rendered it subservient to their ends._

The independence of judges, before the Nazi regime, was guaranteed by
the Weimar Constitution. The fundamental principle was stated briefly in
Article 102:

    “Judges are independent and subject only to the law.”
    (_2050-PS_)

Article 104 contained a safeguard against the arbitrary removal or
suspension of judges, while Article 105 prohibited “exceptional courts”.
The fundamental rights of the individual are set out in Article 109 and
include equality before the law. (_2050-PS_)

Like all other public officials, German judges who failed to meet Nazi
racial and political requirements became the subject of a wide-spread
purge. Non-Aryans, political opponents of the Nazis, and all persons
suspected of antagonism to the aims of the Party were summarily removed
(_2967-PS_). The provisions of the Law for the Restoration of
Professional Civil Service of 7 April 1933 applied to all judges. This
was declared expressly in the third regulation for the administration of
the law. (_2867-PS_)

To make certain that cases with political ramifications would be dealt
with acceptably and in conformity with Party principles, the Nazis
granted designated areas of criminal jurisdiction to the so-called
Special Courts (_Sondergerichte_). These constituted a new system of
special criminal courts, independent of the regular judiciary and
directly subservient to the Party (_2076-PS_). A later decree
considerably broadened the jurisdiction of these courts. (_2056-PS_)

In 1934, the People’s Court was set up as a trial court “in cases of
high treason and treason” (_2014-PS_). This action was a direct, result
of the dissatisfaction of the Nazi rulers with the decision of the
Supreme Court (_Reichsgericht_) in the Reichstag fire trial. Three of
the four defendants were acquitted although the Nazi conspirators had
expected convictions in all cases (_2967-PS_). The law which created
this new tribunal contained a wide definition of treason which would
include most of what were regarded by the Nazis as “political” crimes
(Art. 3 (1)). The express denial of any appeal from the decisions of the
People’s Court (Art. 5 (2)) was a further indication of the intention of
the Nazis to set up a criminal law system totally outside of accepted
judicial pattern. The substantive organization of the People’s Court was
later established by law in 1936. (_2342-PS_)

These new tribunals were staffed almost exclusively with Nazis and were
used to tighten the Party’s grip on Germany. This control became
progressively stronger, due first, to the power of the prosecutor to
pick the appropriate court; second, to the restriction of defense
counsel in these courts to specially admitted attorneys; and finally, to
the absence of appeal from the decisions of these judges. Moreover,
there developed along side of the entire judicial system the
increasingly powerful police administration, under which persons opposed
to the regime were regularly imprisoned in concentration camps without
any type of hearing, even after acquittal by the courts. (_2967-PS_)

Still another group of courts was established within the Party itself.
These Party Courts heard cases involving internal party discipline and
infractions of the rules of conduct prescribed for members of formations
and affiliated organizations. The published rules for the Party judges
emphasized the complete dependence of these judges upon the directions
and supervision of their Party superiors. (_2402-PS_)

The Nazi legal theorists freely admitted that there was no place in
their scheme of things for the truly independent judge. They controlled
all judges through special directives and orders from the central
government. Frank underscored the role of the judge as a political
functionary and as an administrator in the National Socialist state
(_2378-PS_). Two case histories of this period serve to illustrate the
manner in which criminal proceedings were directly suppressed or
otherwise affected by order of the Reich government.

In 1935, the Reich Governor of Saxony, Mutschmann, attempted to quash
criminal proceedings which, in this exceptional instance, had been
brought against officials of the Hohnstein concentration camp for a
series of extremely brutal attacks upon inmates. The trial was held and
the defendants convicted, but during the trial the governor inquired of
the presiding judge whether he did not think the penalty proposed by the
prosecutor too severe and whether an acquittal was not indicated. After
the conviction, two jurymen were ousted from the NSDAP and the
prosecutor was advised by his superior to withdraw from the SA. Although
Guertner, the then Minister of Justice, strongly recommended against
taking any action to alter the decision, Hitler pardoned all the
accused. (_783-PS_; _784-PS_; _785-PS_; _786-PS_)

In another similar case, Guertner wrote directly to Hitler narrating the
horrible details of maltreatment and advising that the case be regularly
prosecuted. Nevertheless, Hitler ordered complete suppression of the
proceedings. (_787-PS_; _788-PS_)

Under the Nazi regime, it was part of the official duty of many Party
functionaries to supervise the administration of justice. The official
papers of Hess contain detailed statements concerning his own functions
and those of the Gauleiter in deciding criminal cases. (_2639-PS_)

Another type of governmental interference in judicial matters is
evidenced by the confidential letter which the Ministry of Justice sent
in early 1938 to the Chief Justices of the Regional Supreme Courts
(_Oberlandesgerichtspraesidenten_). The judges were instructed to submit
lists of lawyers who would be sufficiently able and trustworthy to
represent in court persons who had been taken into “protective custody”.
The main requirement was absolute political reliability. Simple Party
membership was not enough; to be selected, the lawyer had to enjoy the
confidence of the “Gestapo”. (_651-PS_)

After the war began, Thierack, Minister of Justice, revealed the low
state to which the judiciary had fallen under Nazi rule. He argued that
the judge was not the “supervisor” but the “assistant” of the
government. He said that the word “independent”, as applied to the
judge, was to be eliminated from the vocabulary and that although the
judge should retain a certain freedom of decision in particular cases,
the government “can and must” give him the “general line” to follow. For
this purpose, Thierack decided in 1942 to send confidential Judge’s
Letters (_Richterbriefe_) to all German judges and prosecutors, setting
forth the political principles and directives with which all judicial
personnel were obligated to comply (_2482-PS_). The first of these
Judge’s Letters clearly expresses the complete subordination of the
judges to the Fuehrer and his government. (_D-229_)

G. _The Nazi conspirators greatly enlarged existing State and Party
organizations and established an elaborate network of new formations and
agencies._

The totalitarian character of the Nazi regime led to the establishment
of a great number of new official and semi-official agencies and
organizations in the various fields of life which were permeated by Nazi
doctrine and practice, including culture, trade, industry, and
agriculture.

New agencies had to be created to handle the large number of additional
administrative tasks taken over from the Laender and the municipalities.
Moreover, the mobilization of the political, economic, and military
resources of Germany required the formation of such coordinating
“super-agencies” as the Four Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary for
Economics, the Plenipotentiary for Administration, and the Ministerial
Council for the Defense of the Reich. At the time of the launching of
war, the central Reich government was an extremely complicated structure
held together under strict Nazi dictatorship. (See _Chart Number 18_;
also _2261-PS_; _2194-PS_; _2018-PS_.)

Simultaneously, in the Party, the growth of agencies and organizations
proceeded rapidly. The Party spread, octopus-like, throughout all
Germany and into many foreign lands. (See _Chart Number 1_; also
_1725-PS_.)

This process of growth was summed up late in 1937 in an official
statement of the Party Chancellery:

“In order to control the whole German nation in all spheres of life, the
NSDAP, after assuming power, set up under its leadership the new Party
formations and affiliated organizations.” (_2383-PS_)

H. _The Nazi conspirators created a dual system of government controls,
set up Party agencies to correspond with State agencies, and coordinated
their activities, often by uniting corresponding State and Party offices
in a single person._

In _Mein Kampf_, Hitler announced the conspirators’ purpose:

    “Such a revolution can and will only be achieved by a movement
    which itself is already organized in the spirit of such ideas
    and thus in itself already bears the coming state. Therefore,
    the National Socialist movement may today become imbued with
    these ideas and put them into practice in its own organization
    so that it not only may direct the state according to the same
    principles, but also may be in a position to put at the state’s
    disposal the finished organizational structure of its own
    state.” (_2883-PS_)

The Nazis attempted to achieve a certain degree of identity between the
Party and the State and, at the same time, to maintain two separate
organizational structures. After the rise to power, the fundamental
principle of unity was translated into “law”:

    “Article 1. After the victory of the National Socialistic
    Revolution, the National Socialistic German Labor Party is the
    bearer of the concept of the German State and is inseparably the
    state.” (_1395-PS_)

The manner in which the Nazis retained a duality of organization despite
the theory of unity is graphically portrayed in the charts of the Party
and the State (_Charts Number 1 and 18_). These visual exhibits
demonstrate the comprehensive character of the Party organization, which
was established on parallel lines with the corresponding government
structure. The Party structure remained at all times technically
separate and could be used for non-governmental purposes whenever such
use best served the needs of the conspirators. In innumerable instances,
the corresponding Party and State offices were, in fact, held by the
same person. For example, the Gauleiter of the Party in most instances
also held the post of Reich Governor (or, in Prussia, that of Provincial
President). (_2880-PS_)

The coordination of the Party and State functions started at the top.
The Chief of the Party Chancellery was designated a Reich Minister and
endowed with plenary powers in the preparation and approval of
legislation. He acted as liaison officer at the highest level between
Party officials and cabinet ministers. He was given also the duty of
passing on the appointment of all the more important civil servants.
(_2787-PS_)

Many of the same powers were bestowed upon the other _Reichsleiter_
(Leaders composing the Party Directorate). The official Nazi exposition
of their position is as follows:

    “It is in the Reich Directorate where the strings of the
    organization of the German people and the State meet. By
    endowment of the Chief of the Party Chancellery with the powers
    of a Reich Minister, and by special administrative directives,
    the penetration of the State apparatus with the political will
    of the Party is guaranteed. It is the task of the separate
    organs of the Reich Directorate to maintain as close a contact
    as possible with the life of the nation through their
    sub-offices in the Gaus. Observations at the front are to be
    collected and exploited by the offices of the Reich
    Directorate.” (_1893-PS_)

On the regional and local levels, the _Gauleiter_, _Kreisleiter_, etc.,
were also empowered to control the purely governmental authorities on
political matters. Hess issued the following order shortly after the war
began:

    “I, therefore order that the bearer of sovereignty
    (_Hoheitstraeger_) of the NSDAP (_Gauleiter_, _Kreisleiter_,
    _Ortsgruppenleiter_) in the scope of his authority is
    responsible for the political leadership and the frame of mind
    (_Stimmung_) of the population. It is his right and his duty to
    take or to cause to be taken any measures necessary for the
    expeditious fulfillment of his political duties and for the
    elimination of wrong within the Party. He is exclusively
    responsible to his superior bearers of sovereignty
    (_Hoheitstraeger_).” (_2383-PS_)

In the later years, the functional coordination of Party and State
offices became much more common. The appointment of Himmler as
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police is a typical example of
the way in which State and Party functions became inextricably merged so
as to render any clean lines of demarcation impossible. (_2073-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

  LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO CONSOLIDATION OF
                     TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL CONTROL

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │      │
                │  (a).                                  │  I   │      18
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *651-PS        │Confidential circular signed by         │      │
                │Schlegeberger, 31 January 1938,         │      │
                │concerning representation by Counsel of │      │
                │Inmates of concentration camps. (USA    │      │
                │730).                                   │ III  │     466
                │                                        │      │
 *783-PS        │Letter from Guertner to Mutschmann, 18  │      │
                │January 1935, concerning charges against│      │
                │members of camp personnel of protective │      │
                │custody Camp Hohnstein. (USA 731).      │ III  │     558
                │                                        │      │
 *784-PS        │Letters from Minister of Justice to Hess│      │
                │and SA Chief of Staff, 5 June 1935,     │      │
                │concerning penal proceedings against    │      │
                │merchant and SA leader and 22 companions│      │
                │because of inflicting bodily injury on  │ (USA │
                │duty.                                   │ 732) │     III
                │                                        │      │
 *785-PS        │Memorandum of Guertner concerning legal │      │
                │proceedings against the camp personnel  │      │
                │of concentration camp Hohnstein. (USA   │      │
                │733)                                    │ III  │     564
                │                                        │      │
 *786-PS        │Minister of Justice memorandum, 29      │      │
                │November 1935, concerning pardon of     │      │
                │those sentenced in connection with      │      │
                │mistreatment in Hohnstein concentration │      │
                │camp. (USA 734)                         │ III  │     568
                │                                        │      │
 *787-PS        │Memorandum to Hitler from Public        │      │
                │Prosecutor of Dresden, 18 June 1935,    │      │
                │concerning criminal procedure against   │      │
                │Vogel on account of bodily injury while │      │
                │in office. (USA 421)                    │ III  │     568
                │                                        │      │
 *788-PS        │Letters from Secretary of State to the  │      │
                │Minister of Justice, 25 June 1935 and 9 │      │
                │September 1935, concerning criminal     │      │
                │procedure against Vogel. (USA 735)      │ III  │     571
                │                                        │      │
 1388-PS        │Law concerning confiscation of Property │      │
                │subversive to People and State, 14 July │      │
                │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │479.                                    │ III  │     962
                │                                        │      │
*1395-PS        │Law to insure the unity of Party and    │      │
                │State, 1 December 1933. 1933            │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. (GB │      │
                │252)                                    │ III  │     978
                │                                        │      │
 1397-PS        │Law for the reestablishment of the      │      │
                │Professional Civil Service, 7 April     │      │
                │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │175.                                    │ III  │     981
                │                                        │      │
 1398-PS        │Law to supplement the Law for the       │      │
                │restoration of the Professional Civil   │      │
                │Service, 20 July 1933. 1933             │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 518.      │ III  │     986
                │                                        │      │
 1400-PS        │Law changing the regulations in regard  │      │
                │to public officer, 30 June 1933. 1933   │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 433.      │ III  │     987
                │                                        │      │
 1653-PS        │First regulation concerning the         │      │
                │reconstruction of the Reich, 2 February │      │
                │1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │81.                                     │  IV  │     162
                │                                        │      │
 1725-PS        │Decree enforcing law for securing the   │      │
                │unity of Party and State, 29 March 1935.│      │
                │1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 502. │  IV  │     224
                │                                        │      │
*1893-PS        │Extracts from Organization Book of the  │      │
                │NSDAP, 1943 edition. (USA 323)          │  IV  │     529
                │                                        │      │
 2001-PS        │Law to Remove the Distress of People and│      │
                │State, 24 March 1933. 1933              │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141.      │  IV  │     638
                │                                        │      │
 2003-PS        │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of the│      │
                │German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934       │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747.      │  IV  │     639
                │                                        │      │
 2004-PS        │Preliminary law for the coordination of │      │
                │Federal States under the Reich, 31 March│      │
                │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │153.                                    │  IV  │     640
                │                                        │      │
 2005-PS        │Second law integrating the “Laender”    │      │
                │with the Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933      │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 173.      │  IV  │     641
                │                                        │      │
 2006-PS        │Law for the reconstruction of the Reich,│      │
                │30 January 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│      │
                │Part I, p. 75.                          │  IV  │     642
                │                                        │      │
 2008-PS        │German Communal Ordinance, 30 January   │      │
                │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │49.                                     │  IV  │     643
                │                                        │      │
 2012-PS        │First regulation for administration of  │      │
                │the law for the restoration of          │      │
                │professional Civil Service, 11 April    │      │
                │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │195.                                    │  IV  │     647
                │                                        │      │
 2014-PS        │Law amending regulations of criminal law│      │
                │and criminal procedure, 24 April 1934.  │      │
                │1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 341. │  IV  │     648
                │                                        │      │
*2018-PS        │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a         │      │
                │Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,  │      │
                │30 August 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ (GB  │
                │Part I, p. 1539.                        │ 250) │      IV
                │                                        │      │
 2049-PS        │Second Decree concerning the            │      │
                │reconstruction of the Reich, 27 November│      │
                │1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │1189.                                   │  IV  │     661
                │                                        │      │
 2050-PS        │The Constitution of the German Reich, 11│      │
                │August 1919. 1919 Reichsgesetzblatt,    │      │
                │Part I, p. 1383.                        │  IV  │     662
                │                                        │      │
 2056-PS        │Decree concerning the extension of the  │      │
                │Jurisdiction of Special Courts, 20      │      │
                │November 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,  │      │
                │Part I, p. 1632.                        │  IV  │     698
                │                                        │      │
 2061-PS        │Oath of Reich Officials and of German   │      │
                │Soldiers, 20 August 1934. 1934          │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 785.      │  IV  │     702
                │                                        │      │
 2073-PS        │Decree concerning the appointment of a  │      │
                │Chief of German Police in the Ministry  │      │
                │of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936     │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487.      │  IV  │     703
                │                                        │      │
 2076-PS        │Decree of the Government concerning     │      │
                │formation of Special Courts, 21 March   │      │
                │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,   │      │
                │pp. 136-137.                            │  IV  │     705
                │                                        │      │
*2194-PS        │Top secret letter from Ministry for     │      │
                │Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich     │      │
                │Protector in Bohemia and Moravia,       │      │
                │enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense   │      │
                │Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36)       │  IV  │     843
                │                                        │      │
*2261-PS        │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme      │      │
                │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces,│      │
                │24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of    │      │
                │Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and    │      │
                │copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 │      │
                │May 1935 on the Council for defense of  │      │
                │the Reich. (USA 24)                     │  IV  │     934
                │                                        │      │
 2326-PS        │Reich Principles Regarding recruiting   │      │
                │appointment and promotion of Reich and  │      │
                │Provincial Officials, 14 October 1936.  │      │
                │1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 893. │  IV  │    1034
                │                                        │      │
 2340-PS        │German public officials law of 27       │      │
                │January 1937. 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt,   │      │
                │Part I, p. 41.                          │  IV  │    1058
                │                                        │      │
 2341-PS        │Decree on Education and Training of     │      │
                │German officials, 28 February 1939. 1939│      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 371.      │  IV  │    1062
                │                                        │      │
 2342-PS        │Law on People’s Court and on 25th       │      │
                │Amendment, to Salary Law of 18 April    │      │
                │1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │369.                                    │  IV  │    1062
                │                                        │      │
 2355-PS        │Second Law relating to right to vote for│      │
                │Reichstag, 18 March 1938. 1938          │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 258.      │  IV  │    1098
                │                                        │      │
 2378-PS        │Extracts from Documents of German       │      │
                │Politics, Vol. 4, pp. 207, 337.         │  V   │       4
                │                                        │      │
*2380-PS        │Articles from National Socialist        │      │
                │Yearbook, 1935. (USA 396)               │  V   │       6
                │                                        │      │
*2381-PS        │Extracts from The Greater German Diet,  │      │
                │1943. (USA 476)                         │  V   │       7
                │                                        │      │
 2382-PS        │Law relating to the Reich Election, 8   │      │
                │March 1924. 1924 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│      │
                │I, pp. 159-162.                         │  V   │       8
                │                                        │      │
*2383-PS        │Ordinance for execution of decree of    │      │
                │Fuehrer concerning position of the Head │      │
                │of Party Chancellery of 16 January 1942,│      │
                │published in Decrees, Regulations,      │      │
                │Announcements. (USA 410)                │  V   │       9
                │                                        │      │
 2384-PS        │The Delegates of the German People,     │      │
                │published in Movement, State and People │      │
                │in their Organizations, 1935, p. 161.   │  V   │      23
                │                                        │      │
 2402-PS        │Guide for Party Courts, 17 February     │      │
                │1934.                                   │  V   │      70
                │                                        │      │
*2426-PS        │Extracts from Speeches, by Hess. (GB    │      │
                │253)                                    │  V   │      90
                │                                        │      │
 2481-PS        │Extracts from Four Years of the Third   │      │
                │Reich, by Frick, published in Magazine  │      │
                │of the Academy for German Law, 1937.    │  V   │     231
                │                                        │      │
 2482-PS        │Extract from German Justice, a legal    │      │
                │periodical, 10th Year, Edition A, No.   │      │
                │42, 16 October 1942.                    │  V   │     233
                │                                        │      │
 2639-PS        │Ordinances of the Deputy of the Fuehrer,│      │
                │published in Munich 1937.               │  V   │     345
                │                                        │      │
 2647-PS        │Law relating to the abolition of the    │      │
                │Reichsrat, 14 February 1934. 1934       │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 89.       │  V   │     358
                │                                        │      │
 2755-PS        │Resolution of the Greater German        │      │
                │Reichstag, 26 April 1942. 1942          │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 247.      │  V   │     393
                │                                        │      │
 2787-PS        │Excerpt from Order of the Deputy of the │      │
                │Fuehrer.                                │  V   │     420
                │                                        │      │
 2867-PS        │Third Decree relating to Implementation │      │
                │of Law for restoration of Professional  │      │
                │Civil Service, 6 May 1933. 1933         │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 245.      │  V   │     527
                │                                        │      │
 2880-PS        │Extracts from Handbook for              │      │
                │Administrative Officials, 1942.         │  V   │     547
                │                                        │      │
 2881-PS        │Hitler’s speech of 12 April 1922, quoted│      │
                │in Adolf Hitler’s Speeches, published by│      │
                │Dr. Ernst Boepple, Munich, 1934, pp.    │      │
                │20-21, 72.                              │  V   │     548
                │                                        │      │
 2882-PS        │The Party Program of 1922, by Rosenberg,│      │
                │25th edition, 1942, p. 60.              │  V   │     548
                │                                        │      │
 2883-PS        │Extracts from Mein Kampf by Adolf       │      │
                │Hitler, 41st edition, 1933.             │  V   │     549
                │                                        │      │
*2955-PS        │Affidavit of Magnus Heimannsberg, 14    │      │
                │November 1945, referring to SA and other│      │
                │Nazi groups posted at polling places.   │      │
                │(USA 755)                               │  V   │     659
                │                                        │      │
 2957-PS        │Extract from German Civil Servants      │      │
                │Calendar, 1940, p. 111.                 │  V   │     663
                │                                        │      │
*2967-PS        │Affidavit of Dr. Hans Anschuetz, 17     │      │
                │November 1945. (USA 756)                │  V   │     673
                │                                        │      │
*3054-PS        │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801
                │                                        │      │
 D-229          │Extract from pamphlet “Judges Letters”  │      │
                │concerning judgment of Lower Court, 24  │      │
                │April 1942, on concealment of Jewish    │      │
                │identification.                         │  VI  │    1091
                │                                        │      │
*R-142          │Memoranda to Koblenz District           │      │
                │Headquarters, 22 April 1938 and 7 May   │      │
                │1938, relating to the plebiscite of 10  │      │
                │April 1938. (USA 481)                   │ VIII │     243
                │                                        │      │
Statement X     │The Relationship of Party and State, As │      │
                │It Existed in Reality, by Wilhelm       │      │
                │Stuckhart, Nurnberg, 1 December 1945.   │ VIII │     736
                │                                        │      │
*Chart No. 1    │National Socialist German Workers’      │      │
                │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2)                 │ VIII │     770
                │                                        │      │
*Chart No. 18   │Organization of the Reich Government.   │ End of Volume
                │(2905-PS; USA 3)                        │     VIII


           4. PURGE OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS AND TERRORIZATION

A. _The Nazi conspirators ruthlessly purged their political opponents._
Soon after the Nazi conspirators had acquired political control, the
defendant Goering, 3 March 1933, stated:

    “Fellow Germans, my measures will not be crippled by any
    judicial thinking. My measures will not be crippled by any
    bureaucracy. Here, I don’t have to give justice, my mission is
    only to destroy and exterminate, nothing more! This struggle,
    fellow Germans, will be a struggle against chaos and such a
    struggle, I shall not conduct with the power of any police. A
    bourgeoise state might have done that. Certainly, I shall use
    the power of the State and the police to the utmost, my dear
    Communists! So you won’t draw any false conclusions; but the
    struggle to the death, in which my fist will grasp your necks, I
    shall lead with those down there—those are the Brown Shirts.”
    (_1856-PS_)

In 1934 Heinrich Himmler, the Deputy Leader of the Prussian Secret State
Police, stated:

    “We are confronted with a very pressing duty—both the open and
    secret enemies of the Fuehrer and of the National Socialist
    movement and of our National Revolution must be discovered,
    combatted and exterminated. In this duty we are agreed to spare
    neither our own blood nor the blood of anyone else when it is
    required by our country.” (_2543-PS_)

Raymond H. Geist, former American Counsel and First Secretary of the
Embassy in Berlin, Germany 1929-1939, has stated:

    “Immediately in 1933, the concentration camps were established
    and put under charge of the Gestapo. Only ‘political’ prisoners
    were held in concentration camps * * *.

    “The first wave of terroristic acts began in March 6-13, 1933,
    accompanied by unusual mob violence. When the Nazi Party won the
    elections in March 1933—on the morning of the 6th—the
    accumulated passion blew off in wholesale attacks on the
    Communists, Jews, and others suspected of being either. Mobs of
    SA men roamed the streets, beating up, looting, and even killing
    persons * * *.

    “For Germans taken into custody by the Gestapo * * * there was a
    regular pattern of brutality and terror. Victims numbered in the
    hundreds of thousands all over Germany.” (_1759-PS_)

The Sturmabteilung (SA) had plans for the murder of former Prime
Minister Bruening, but his life was spared through the negotiations and
activities of the defendant Hess and Dr. Haushofer, President of the
Geopolitic Institute of Munich, because they feared his death might
result in serious repercussions abroad. (_1669-PS_)

From March until October 1933 the Nazi conspirators arrested, mistreated
and killed numerous politicians, Reichstag members, authors, physicians,
and lawyers. Among the persons killed were the Social Democrat Stolling;
Ernst Heilman, Social Democrat and member of the Prussian Parliament;
Otto Eggerstadt, the former Police President of Altona; and various
other persons. The people killed by the Nazis belonged to various
political parties and religious faiths, such as Democrats, Catholics,
Communists, Jews, and pacifists. The killings were usually camouflaged
by such utterances as “killed in attempting to escape” or “resisting
arrest.” It is estimated that during this first wave of terror conducted
by the Nazi conspirators, between 500 and 700 persons died. (_2544-PS_;
see also _2460-PS_ and _2472-PS_.)

On 30 June, and 1, 2 July 1934, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to
destroy opposition within their own ranks by wholesale murder
(_2545-PS_). In making a formal report of these murders to the Reichstag
on 13 July 1934, Hitler stated:

    “The punishment for these crimes was hard and severe. There were
    shot 19 higher SA leaders, 31 SA leaders and SA members and also
    3 SS leaders as participants in the plot. Also 13 SA leaders and
    civilians who tried to resist arrest and were killed in the
    attempt. 3 others committed suicide. 5 members of the Party who
    were not members of the SA were shot because of their
    participation. Finally, 3 SS members were at the same time
    exterminated because they had maltreated concentration camp
    inmates.” (_2572-PS_)

In this same speech, Hitler proudly boasted that he gave the order to
shoot the principal traitors and that he had prosecuted thousands of his
former enemies on account of their corruption. He justified this action
by saying,

    “In this hour I was responsible for the fate of the German
    people.” (_Voelkischer Beobachter (People’s Observer), Berlin
    ed., issue 195, 14 July 1934, Beiblatt, p. 2._)

The conspirators took advantage of this occasion to eliminate many
opponents indiscriminately.

In discussing the Roehm purge, the defendant Frick stated:

    “On account of this order, many, many people were arrested * * *
    something like a hundred, even more, were even killed who were
    accused of high treason. All of this was done without resort to
    legal proceedings. They were just killed on the spot. Many
    people were killed—I don’t know how many—who actually did not
    have anything to do with the putsch. People who just weren’t
    liked very well, as, for instance, SCHLEICHER, the former Reich
    Chancellor, were killed. SCHLEICHER’s wife was also killed as
    was GREGOR STRASSER, who had been the Reich organization leader
    and second man in the Party after Hitler. STRASSER, at the time
    he was murdered, was not active in political affairs anymore.
    However, he had separated himself from the Fuehrer in November
    or December of 1932.” (_2950-PS_)

Such a large scale of extermination could not be carried out without
errors. Shortly after the event, the Nazi conspirators arranged for a
Government pension to be paid to one of its citizens, because “by
mistake” the political police had murdered her husband, Willi Schmidt,
who had never engaged in any kind of political activity. It was believed
at the time that the man intended was Willi Schmidt, an SA leader in
Munich, who was later shot on the same day. (_L-135_)

The Nazi conspirators formally endorsed their murderous purge within
their own ranks by causing the Reichstag to pass a law declaring that
all measures taken in carrying out the purge on 30 June and 1-2 July
1934 were legal as a measure of State necessity (_2057-PS_). Referring
to this act of approval on the part of the Nazi-controlled Reichstag,
Goering stated:

    “The action of the Government in the days of the Roehm revolt
    was the highest realization of the legal consciousness of the
    people. Later the action which itself was justified, now has
    been made legal by the passage of a law.” (_2496-PS_)

Furthermore, the leader of the Nazi conspiracy on 25 July 1934 issued a
decree which stated that because of the meritorious service of the SS,
especially in connection with the events of 30 June 1934, the
organization was elevated to the standing of an independent organization
within the NSDAP. (_1857-PS_)

B. _The Nazi conspirators used the legislative and judicial powers of
the German Reich to terrorize all political opponents._

(1) _They created a great number of new political crimes._ The decree of
28 February 1933 punished the inciting of disobedience to orders given
out by State or Reich Government authorities or the provocation of acts
“contrary to public welfare.” (_1390-PS_) A month later, in order to
give themselves legal justification for murdering by judicial process
their political enemies, the Nazi conspirators passed a law making the
provisions of the above decree applicable retroactively to acts
committed during the period from 31 January to 28 February 1933.
(_2554-PS_)

Referring to these laws, the defendant Goering stated:

    “Whoever in the future raises a hand against a representative of
    the National Socialist movement or of the State, must know that
    he will lose his life in a very short while. Furthermore, it
    will be entirely sufficient, if he is proven to have intended
    the act, or, if the act results not in a death, but only in an
    injury.” (_2494-PS_)

On 21 March 1933 a decree was issued which provided for penitentiary
imprisonment up to two years for possessing a uniform of an organization
supporting the government of the Nationalist movement without being
entitled thereto, or circulating a statement which was untrue or greatly
exaggerated, or which was apt to seriously harm the welfare of the Reich
or the reputation of the Government, or of the Party or organizations
supporting the Government. (_1652-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators caused a law to be enacted punishing whoever
undertook to maintain or form a political party other than the NSDAP.
(_1388-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators enacted a law which made it a crime deliberately
to make false or grave statements calculated to injure the welfare or
the prestige of the Reich, or to circulate a statement manifesting a
malicious or low-minded attitude toward leading personalities of the
State or the Party. The law also applied to statements of this kind
which were not made in public, provided the offender counted on his
statements being eventually circulated in public. (_1393-PS_)

In commenting on the above law, one of the leading Nazi conspirators,
Martin Bormann, stated:

    “Although it must absolutely be prevented that martyrs are
    created, one must take merciless action against such people, in
    whose attacks a bad character or attitude, decisively inimical
    to the State, can be recognized. For this purpose, I request the
    Gauleiters to report here briefly all crimes, which must
    absolutely be punished, and which have become known to the
    districts, regardless of the report to be made to the district
    attorney’s office * * *.

    “The district and local leaderships are to be notified
    accordingly. However, if it should be decided from wherein this
    or that punishable case, that the miscreant is to be given a
    simple or strong reprimand by the court, I shall give the
    directive for the future, that the Districts are informed of the
    names of the persons.

    “I therefore request, to see to it, that these compatriots be
    especially watched by the Ortsgruppen, and that it be attempted,
    to influence them in the National Socialist sense. Otherwise, it
    will be necessary to place the activities of such persons, who
    do not want to be taught, under exact control. In these cases,
    it will eventually be necessary, to notify the Secret State
    Police.” (_2639-PS_)

On 24 April 1934 the Nazi conspirators passed a law imposing the death
penalty for “any treasonable act.” Included in the law was a declaration
to the effect that the creating or organizing of a political party, or
continuing of an existing one was a treasonable act. (_2548-PS_)

(2) _By their interpretation and changes of the penal law, the Nazi
conspirators enlarged their terroristic methods._ After the enactment of
these new political crimes, the Nazi conspirators introduced into the
penal law the theory of punishment by analogy. This enabled them legally
to punish any act injurious to their political interests even if no
existing statute forbade it. The culpability of the act and the
punishment was determined by the law most closely relating to or
covering the act which was in force at the time. (_1962-PS_)

In interpreting this law, Dr. Guertner, Reich Minister of Justice,
stated:

    “National Socialism substitutes for the idea of formal wrong,
    the idea of factual wrong. * * * Even without the threat of
    punishment, every violation of the goals toward which the
    community is striving is a wrong per se. As a result, the law
    ceases to be an exclusive source for the determination of right
    or wrong.” (_2549-PS_)

Referring to the penal code of Nazi Germany, the defendant Frank stated
in 1935:

    “The National Socialist State is a totalitarian State, it makes
    no concessions to criminals, it does not negotiate with them; it
    stamps them out.” (_2552-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators also revised the criminal law so that the State
could, within one year after a decree in a criminal case had become
final, apply for a new trial, and the application would be decided by
members of a Special Penal Chamber appointed by Hitler personally. Thus,
if a defendant should be acquitted in a lower court, the Nazi
conspirators could rectify the situation by another trial. (_2550-PS_)

In direct contrast to the severity of the criminal law as it affected
the general population of Germany, the Nazi conspirators adopted and
endorsed a large body of unwritten laws exempting the police from
criminal liability for illegal acts done under higher authority. This
principle was described by Dr. Werner Best, outstanding Nazi lawyer, in
the following terms:

    “The police never act in a lawless or illegal manner as long as
    they act according to the rules laid down by their superiors up
    to the highest governing body. According to its nature, the
    police must only deal with what the Government wants to know is
    being dealt with. What the Government wants to know is being
    dealt with by the police is the essence of the police law and is
    that which guides and restricts the actions of the police. As
    long as the police carry out the will of the Government, it is
    acting legally.” (_1852-PS_)

C. _The Nazi conspirators created a vast system of espionage into the
daily lives of all parts of the population._

(1) _They destroyed the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic
communications._ They enacted a law in February of 1933 providing that
violations of privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic
communications were permissible beyond legal limitations. (_1390-PS_)

Dr. Hans Anschuetz, the present District Court Director
(_Landgerichtsdirektor_) at Heidelberg, Germany, recently stated:

    “Subsequently, the system of spying upon and supervising the
    political opinions of each citizen which permeated the entire
    people and private life of Germany, was, of course, also
    extended to judges.” (_2967-PS_)

(2) _They used the Secret State Police (Gestapo) and the Security
Service (SD) for the purpose of maintaining close surveillance over the
daily activities of all people in Germany._ The Gestapo had as its
primary preventive activity the thorough observation of all enemies of
the State, in the territory of the Reich. (_1956-PS_)

The SD was an intelligence organization which operated out of various
regional offices. It consisted of many hundreds of professional SD
members who were assisted by thousands of honorary members and
informers. These people were placed in all fields of business,
education, State and Party administration, and frequently performed
their duties secretly in their own organization. This information
service reported on the activities of the people. (_2614-PS_)

D. _Without judicial process, the Nazi conspirators imprisoned, held in
protective custody and sent to concentration camps opponents and
suspected opponents._

_They authorized the Gestapo to arrest and detain without recourse to
any legal proceeding._ Officially, this power was described as follows:

    “The Secret State Police takes the necessary police preventive
    measures against the enemies of the State on the basis of the
    results of the observation. The most effective preventive
    measure is without doubt the withdrawal of freedom which is
    covered in the form of protective custody. * * * While
    protective arrests of short duration are carried out in police
    and court prisons, the concentration camps under the Secret
    State Police admit those taken into protective custody who have
    to be withdrawn from public life for a longer time.” (_1956-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators issued their own orders for the taking of people
into protective custody and these orders set forth no further details
concerning the reasons therefor, except a statement such as “Suspicion
of activities inimical toward the State.” (_2499-PS_)

The defendant Frank stated:

    “To the world we are blamed again and again because of the
    concentration camps. We are asked, ‘Why do you arrest without a
    warrant of arrest?’ I say, put yourselves into the position of
    our nation. Don’t forget that the very great and still untouched
    world of Bolshevism cannot forget that we have made final
    victory for them impossible in Europe, right here on German
    soil.” (_2533-PS_)

The defendant Goering said in 1934:

    “Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly.
    It cannot be forgotten that at the moment of our rise to power,
    according to the official election figures of March 1933, six
    million people still confess their sympathy for Communism and
    eight million for Marxism. * * * _Therefore, the concentration
    camps have been created, where we have first confined thousands
    of Communists and Social Democrat functionaries._ * * *”
    (_2344-PS_)

U. S. Ambassador George S. Messersmith, former Counsel General in
Berlin, Germany, 1930-34, and Raymond H. Geist, former American Counsel
and First Secretary of the Embassy in Berlin, Germany, 1929-1939, have
recently stated:

    “Independent of individual criminal acts committed by high
    functionaries of the German government or the Nazi Party, such
    as the murders ordered by Hitler, Himmler and Goering, all high
    functionaries of the German government and of the Nazi Party * *
    * are guilty in the highest degree of complicity in and
    furtherance of the cardinal crimes of oppression against the
    German people, persecution and destruction of the Jews and all
    of their political opponents.” (_2386-PS_)

Commenting further on the Nazi conspirators’ use of concentration camps
to destroy political opposition, Raymond H. Geist stated:

    “The German people were well acquainted with the goings on in
    concentration camps and it was well known that the fate of
    anyone too actively opposed to any part of the Nazi program was
    liable to be one of great suffering. Indeed, before the Hitler
    regime was many months old, almost every family in Germany had
    had first-hand accounts of the brutalities inflicted in the
    concentration camps from someone either in the relationship or
    in the circle of friends who had served a sentence there;
    consequently the fear of such camps was a very effective brake
    on any possible opposition.” (_1759-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators confined, under the guise of “protective custody”
Reichstag members, Social Democrats, Communists, and other opponents or
suspected opponents. (_2544-PS_; _L-73_; _L-83_; _1430-PS_.)

E. _The Nazi conspirators created and utilized special agencies for
carrying out their system of terror._

(See Chapter XV, Sections 5 and 6, on the Gestapo, SS, and SD)

F. _The Nazi conspirators permitted organizations and individuals to
carry out this system of terror without restraint of law._

(1) _Acts of the Gestapo were not subject to review by the courts._ In
1935 the Prussian Supreme Court of Administration held that the orders
of the Gestapo were not subject to judicial review; and that the accused
person could appeal only to the next higher authority within the State
Police itself. (_2347-PS_)

In 1936 a law was passed concerning The Gestapo in Prussia which
provided that orders in matters of the Gestapo were not subject to
review of the Administrative Courts. (_2107-PS_)

On the same subject, the following article appeared in the official
German Lawyer’s Journal, 1935.

    “Once again the court had to decide on the question of whether
    political measures could be subjected to the review of the
    ordinary courts. * * * The case in question concerned the
    official performance of his duty by an official of the NSDAP. *
    * * The principle of the importance and the mission of the Party
    and its ‘Sovereign Functionaires’ cannot be overlooked.
    Therefore, the plaintiff should have been denied the right to be
    in court.” (_2491-PS_)

(2) _Where no definite law protected terroristic acts of Nazi
conspirators and their accomplices, proceedings against them were in the
first instance suppressed or thereafter their acts were pardoned._ In
1935, proceedings against an employee of the Gestapo accused of
torturing, beating, and killing of inmates of a concentration camp were
suppressed (_787-PS_; _788-PS_). In June 1935 twenty-three SA members
and policemen convicted of the beating and murder of inmates of the
Hohnstein concentration camp were pardoned (_786-PS_). The prosecutor
was forced to resign from the SA. (_784-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PURGE OF POLITICAL
                      OPPONENTS AND TERRORIZATION

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │      │
                │  (b).                                  │  I   │      19
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document as referred to during the trial│      │
                │but was not formally received in        │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *784-PS        │Letters from Minister of Justice to Hess│      │
                │and SA Chief of Staff, 5 June 1935,     │      │
                │concerning penal proceedings against    │      │
                │merchant and SA leader and 22 companions│      │
                │because of inflicting bodily injury on  │      │
                │duty. (USA 732)                         │ III  │     559
                │                                        │      │
 *786-PS        │Minister of Justice memorandum, 29      │      │
                │November 1935, concerning pardon of     │      │
                │those sentenced in connection with      │      │
                │mistreatment in Hohnstein concentration │      │
                │camp. (USA 734)                         │ III  │     568
                │                                        │      │
 *787-PS        │Memorandum to Hitler from Public        │      │
                │Prosecutor of Dresden, 18 June 1935,    │      │
                │concerning criminal procedure against   │      │
                │Vogel on account of bodily injury while │      │
                │in office. (USA 421)                    │ III  │     568
                │                                        │      │
 *788-PS        │Letters from Secretary of State to the  │      │
                │Minister of Justice, 25 June 1935 and 9 │      │
                │September 1935, concerning criminal     │      │
                │procedure against Vogel. (USA 735)      │ III  │     571
                │                                        │      │
 1388-PS        │Law concerning confiscation of Property │      │
                │subversive to People and State, 14 July │      │
                │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │479.                                    │ III  │     962
                │                                        │      │
 1390-PS        │Decree of the Reich President for the   │      │
                │Protection of the People and State, 28  │      │
                │February 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,  │      │
                │Part I, p. 83.                          │ III  │     968
                │                                        │      │
 1393-PS        │Law on treacherous attacks against State│      │
                │and Party, and for the Protection of    │      │
                │Party Uniforms, 20 December 1934. 1934  │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1269.     │ III  │     973
                │                                        │      │
 1430-PS        │Compilation of Leading Men of the System│      │
                │Era, June 1939.                         │  IV  │      15
                │                                        │      │
 1652-PS        │Decree of the Reich President for       │      │
                │protection against treacherous attacks  │      │
                │on the government of the Nationalist    │      │
                │movement, 21 March 1933. 1933           │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 135.      │  IV  │     160
                │                                        │      │
*1669-PS        │Correspondence between Dr. Haushofer and│      │
                │Hess, 24 and 28 August 1933. (USA 741)  │  IV  │     184
                │                                        │      │
*1759-PS        │Affidavit of Raymond H. Geist. (USA 420)│  IV  │     288
                │                                        │      │
*1852-PS        │“Law” from The German Police, 1941, by  │      │
                │Dr. Werner Best. (USA 449). (See Chart  │      │
                │No. 16)                                 │  IV  │     490
                │                                        │      │
*1856-PS        │Extract from book entitled “Hermann     │      │
                │Goering—Speeches and Essays”, 3rd       │      │
                │edition 1939, p. 27. (USA 437)          │  IV  │     496
                │                                        │      │
*1857-PS        │Announcement of creation of SS as       │      │
                │independent formation of NSDAP.         │      │
                │Voelkischer Beobachter, 26 July 1934, p.│      │
                │1. (USA 412)                            │  IV  │     496
                │                                        │      │
 1956-PS        │Meaning and Tasks of the Secret State   │      │
                │Police, published in The Archives,      │      │
                │January 1936, Vol. 22-24, p. 1342.      │  IV  │     598
                │                                        │      │
 1962-PS        │Law to change the Penal Code of 28 June │      │
                │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │839.                                    │  IV  │     600
                │                                        │      │
 2057-PS        │Law relating to National Emergency      │      │
                │Defense Measures of 3 July 1934. 1934   │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 529.      │  IV  │     699
                │                                        │      │
 2107-PS        │Law on Secret State Police of 10        │      │
                │February 1936. 1936 Preussiche          │      │
                │Gesetzsammlung, pp. 21-22.              │  IV  │     732
                │                                        │      │
 2344-PS        │Reconstruction of a Nation by Goering,  │      │
                │1934, p. 89.                            │  IV  │    1065
                │                                        │      │
 2347-PS        │Court decisions from 1935               │      │
                │Reichsverwaltungsblatt, Vol. 56, pp.    │      │
                │577-578, 20 July 1935.                  │  IV  │    1066
                │                                        │      │
*2386-PS        │Joint affidavit of George S. Messersmith│      │
                │and Raymond H. Geist, 29 August 1945.   │      │
                │(USA 750)                               │  V   │      39
                │                                        │      │
*2460-PS        │Affidavit of Rudolf Diels. (USA 751)    │  V   │     205
                │                                        │      │
*2472-PS        │Affidavit of Rudolf Diels, 31 October   │      │
                │1945. (USA 752)                         │  V   │     224
                │                                        │      │
 2491-PS        │Extract from Legal Review, published    │      │
                │Lawyers’ Journal, 1935.                 │  V   │     235
                │                                        │      │
 2494-PS        │Prime Minister Goering’s Press          │      │
                │Conference, published in Voelkischer    │      │
                │Beobachter, Berlin edition, 23-24 July  │      │
                │1933, p. 1.                             │  V   │     236
                │                                        │      │
 2496-PS        │Extract from Goering’s address to Public│      │
                │Prosecutors of Prussia on 12 July 1934  │      │
                │from the Archive, 1934, Vols. IV-VI, p. │      │
                │495.                                    │  V   │     236
                │                                        │      │
*2499-PS        │Original Protective Custody Order served│      │
                │on Dr. R. Kempner, 15 March 1935. (USA  │      │
                │232)                                    │  V   │     236
                │                                        │      │
 2533-PS        │Extract from article “Legislation and   │      │
                │Judiciary in the Third Reich”, from     │      │
                │Journal of the Academy for German Law,  │      │
                │1936, pp. 141-142.                      │  V   │     277
                │                                        │      │
 2543-PS        │Extract from The Mission of the SS,     │      │
                │published in The National Socialist     │      │
                │Magazine, Issue 46, January 1934.       │  V   │     288
                │                                        │      │
*2544-PS        │Affidavit of Rudolf Diels, former       │      │
                │Superior Government Counsellor of the   │      │
                │Police Division of the Prussian Ministry│      │
                │of the Interior. (USA 753)              │  V   │     288
                │                                        │      │
 2545-PS        │Extract from Hitler’s cleaning up act in│      │
                │Reich, published in Voelkischer         │      │
                │Beobachter, Berlin edition, No. 182-183,│      │
                │1-2 July 1934, p. 1.                    │  V   │     290
                │                                        │      │
 2548-PS        │Law about changing rules of Criminal Law│      │
                │and Criminal Procedure of 24 April 1934.│      │
                │1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 34.  │  V   │     291
                │                                        │      │
 2549-PS        │Extract from “Germany’s Road to Freedom”│      │
                │as published in Documents of German     │      │
                │Politics, Vol. 3.                       │  V   │     292
                │                                        │      │
 2550-PS        │Law on modification of rules of general │      │
                │criminal procedure, 16 September 1939.  │      │
                │1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1841.│  V   │     293
                │                                        │      │
 2552-PS        │Excerpt concerning criminals, published │      │
                │in Journal of the Academy for German    │      │
                │Law. No. 3. March 1935.                 │  V   │     293
                │                                        │      │
 2554-PS        │Law concerning adjudication and         │      │
                │execution of the death penalties of 29  │      │
                │March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│      │
                │I, p. 151.                              │  V   │     294
                │                                        │      │
 2572-PS        │Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on 13  │      │
                │July 1934, printed in The Third Reich,  │      │
                │Vol. II, p. 247.                        │  V   │     302
                │                                        │      │
*2614-PS        │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5      │      │
                │November 1945. (USA 918)                │  V   │     337
                │                                        │      │
 2639-PS        │Ordinances of the Deputy of the Fuehrer,│      │
                │published in Munich 1937.               │  V   │     345
                │                                        │      │
*2950-PS        │Affidavit of Frick, 19 November 1945.   │      │
                │(USA 448)                               │  V   │     654
                │                                        │      │
*2967-PS        │Affidavit of Dr. Hans Anschuetz, 17     │      │
                │November 1945. (USA 756)                │  V   │     673
                │                                        │      │
*L-73           │Affidavit of Bruno Bettelheim, 10 July  │      │
                │1945. (USA 746)                         │ VII  │     818
                │                                        │      │
*L-83           │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July  │      │
                │1945. (USA 234)                         │ VII  │     859
                │                                        │      │
*L-135          │Affidavit of Kate Eva Hoerlin, 9 July   │      │
                │1945. (USA 747)                         │ VII  │     883


              5. DESTRUCTION OF THE FREE TRADE UNIONS AND
                     ACQUISITION OF CONTROL OVER THE
                        PRODUCTIVE LABOR CAPACITY

A. _They destroyed the independent organization of German labor._

(1) _Before the Nazis took control, organized labor held a well
established and influential position in Germany._ Most of the trade
unions of Germany were joined together in two large congresses or
federations, the Free Trade Unions (_Freie Gewerkschaften_) and
Christian Trade Unions (_Christlichen Gewerkschaften_). Unions outside
these two large groupings contained only 15 per cent of the total union
membership. The Free Trade Unions were a congress of two federations of
affiliated unions: (1) the General German Trade Union Federation
(_Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbund_, or the “ADGB”) with 28
affiliated unions of industrial workers; (2) the General Independent
Employees Federation (_Allgemeinen Freien Angestelltenbund_, or the
“AFA”) with 13 affiliated unions of white collar workers. (_392-PS_)

The membership of the Free Trade Unions, the affiliated organizations of
the Christian Trade Unions, and all other unions at the end of 1931 (the
last year for which the official government yearbook gives statistics)
was as follows (_2411-PS_):

               Union Group          │   Number of   │ Percentage of
                                    │    members    │     total
                                    │               │
      Free Trade Unions             │      4,569,876│           65.9
      Christian Trade Unions        │      1,283,272│           18.5
      Others Unions                 │      1,081,371│           15.6
                                    │           ————│             ——
            Total                   │      6,934,519│          100.0

Under the Weimar Constitution, workers were “called upon to take part on
equal terms” with employers in regulating conditions of employment. “It
was provided that organizations on both sides and agreements between
them shall be recognized.” Factory Representative Councils (otherwise
known as Workmens or Factory Works Councils) had the right, in
conjunction with employers’ representatives, to take an official part in
the initiation and administration of social and economic legislation.
(_2050-PS_)

(2) _The Nazi conspirators conceived that the free trade unions were
incompatible with their objectives._

Hitler stated in _Mein Kampf_:

    “It (the trade union) created the economic weapon which the
    international world Jew uses for the ruination of the economic
    basis of free, independent states, for the annihilation of their
    national industry and of their national commerce, and thereby
    for the enslavement of free people in the service of the
    above-the-state-standing, world finance Jewry (_ueberstaatlichen
    Weltfinanz-Judentums_).” (_404-PS_)

In announcing to Germany the seizure of the Free Trade Unions, Dr.
Robert Ley, speaking as chairman of the Nazi Committee for the
Protection of German Labor, stated:

    “You may say, what else do you want, you have the absolute
    power, but we do not have the whole people, we do not have you
    workers 100 percent, and it is you whom we want; we will not let
    you be until you stand with us in complete, genuine
    acknowledgement.” (_614-PS_; see also _2224-PS_ and _2283-PS_.)

(3) _Soon after coming to power the Nazi conspirators took drastic
action to convert the Factory Representative Councils into
Nazi-controlled organizations._ The Nazi conspirators eliminated the
independence of the Factory Representative Councils by giving the
Governors of the Laender authority to cancel the membership of labor
representatives in the councils; by abrogating the right of the councils
to oppose the dismissal of a worker when he was “suspected of an
unfriendly attitude toward the state” (_1770-PS_); and finally by
limiting membership in all Factory Representative Councils to Nazis
(_2336-PS_). (After 7 April 1933, the Governors of the Laender were
appointed by the Reich President “upon the proposal of the Reich
Chancellor,” Hitler, _2005-PS_).

(4) _Soon after coming to power the Nazi conspirators proceeded to
destroy the independent unions._ In mid-April 1933, Hitler directed Dr.
Robert Ley, then staff director of the PO (Political Organization) of
the NSDAP, to take over the trade unions. (_2283-PS_)

Ley issued an NSDAP circular directive on 21 April 1933 detailing a
“coordination action” (_Gleichschaltunsaktion_) to be taken on 2 May
1933 against the General German Trade Union Federation (ADGB) and the
General Independent Employees Federation (AFA), the so-called “Free
Trade Unions” (_392-PS_). This directive created a special “Action
Committee” to direct the entire action and declared that the supporters
of the action were to be drawn from the National Socialist Factory Cells
Organization or NSBO (_Nationalsozialistiche
Betriebszellen-Organisation_), the NSDAP political leaders (_Politische
Leiter_) in the factories; it named NSDAP commissars for the
administration of the larger ADGB unions to be seized in the action; it
made the Gauleaders (_Gauleiter_) of the NSDAP responsible for the
disciplined execution of the action in their respective areas and
authorized them to nominate additional commissars to administer the
unions subjected to the action. The directive ordered that SA and SS
were to be used in occupying union offices and the Bank of Workers,
Employees and Officials, Inc., and for taking into protective custody
the higher union leaders.

The order of seizure was carried out as planned and ordered. On 2 May
the official NSDAP press service reported that the NSBO had “eliminated
the old leadership” of Free Trade Unions and taken over their
leadership. (_2224-PS_)

On 3 May 1933 the NSDAP press service announced that the Central League
of Christian Trade Unions (_Gesamtverband der Christlichen
Gewerkschaften_) and several smaller unions “have unconditionally
subordinated themselves to the leadership of Adolf Hitler” (_2225-PS_).
The next day the NSDAP press stated that the German Nationalist Clerks
League (DHV) had also “recognized the leadership of the NSDAP in German
trade union affairs * * * after a detailed conversation” between Dr. Ley
and the leader of the DHV (_2226-PS_). In late June 1933, as a final
measure against the Christian Trade Unions, Ley directed that all their
offices were to be occupied by National Socialists. (_392-PS_)

The duress practiced by the Nazi conspirators in their assumption of
absolute control over the unions is shown by a proclamation of Muchow,
leader of the organizational office of the German Labor Front, in late
June 1933. By this Party proclamation, all associations of workers not
yet “concentrated” in the German Labor Front had to report within eight
days. Thereafter they were to be notified of the branch of the German
Labor Front which “they will have to join”. (_2228-PS_)

(5) _The Nazi Conspirators eliminated the right of collective bargaining
generally._ During the same months in which the unions were abolished, a
decree eliminated collective bargaining on conditions of employment and
substituted regulation by “trustees of labor” (_Treuhaender der Arbeit_)
appointed by Hitler. (_405-PS_)

(6) _The Nazi conspirators confiscated all union funds and property._
The NSDAP circular ordering the seizure of the Free Trade Unions on 2
May 1933 directed that the SA and SS were to be used to occupy the
branches and paying offices of the Bank for Workers, Employees and
Officials and appointed a Nazi commissar, Mueller, for the bank’s
subsequent direction. The stock of this bank was held entirely by the
General German Trade Union Association and its affiliated member unions.
The NSDAP circular also directed that all union funds were to be blocked
until re-opened under the authority and control of NSDAP-appointed
commissars (_392-PS_; _2895-PS_). The Fuehrer’s basic order on the
German Labor Front of the NSDAP in October 1934 declared that all the
property of the trade unions and their dependent organizations
constituted (_bildet_) property of the German Labor Front (_2271-PS_).
Referring to the seizure of the property of the unions in a speech at
the 1937 Party Congress, Ley mockingly declared that he would have to be
convicted if the former trade union leaders were ever to demand the
return of their property. (_1678-PS_)

(7) _The Nazi conspirators persecuted union leaders._ The NSDAP order on
the seizure of the “Free Trade Unions” directed that the chairmen of the
unions were to be taken into “protective custody”. Lesser leaders could
be arrested with the permission of the appropriate Gau leader of the
NSDAP (_392-PS_). In late June 1933 the German Labor Front published a
“List of Outlaws” who were to be denied employment in the factories. The
List named union leaders who had been active in combatting National
Socialism and who allegedly continued to carry on their resistance
secretly. (_2336-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators subjected union leaders to maltreatment ranging
from assaults to murder. Among the offenses committed against union
leaders are the following: assault and battery; degrading work and work
beyond their physical capacity; incarceration in concentration camps;
solitary confinement; denial of adequate food; surveillance; arrest and
maltreatment of members of their families; murder. (_2330-PS_;
_2331-PS_; _2335-PS_; _2334-PS_; _2928-PS_; _2277-PS_; _2332-PS_; and
_2333-PS_)

B. _The Nazi conspirators introduced the Leadership Principle into
industrial relations._ In January 1934, a decree introduced the
Leadership Principle (_Fuehrerprinzip_) into industrial relations, the
entrepreneur becoming the leader and the workers becoming his followers.
(_1861-PS_)

C. _The Nazi conspirators supplanted independent unions by an affiliated
Party organization, the German Labor Front (DAF)._

(1) _They created the German Labor Front._ On the day the Nazis seized
the Free Trade Unions, 2 May 1933, they publicly announced that a
“united front of German workers” with Hitler as honorary patron would be
formed at a Workers’ Congress on 10 May 1933. (_2224-PS_)

Ley was appointed “leader of the German Labor Front” (_Deutsche
Arbeitsfront_, or “DAF”) on 10 May 1933 (_1940-PS_). The German Labor
Front succeeded to the confiscated property of the suppressed trade
union. It was an affiliated organization of the NSDAP, subject to the
Leadership Principle; Ley was concurrently Reich Organization Leader
(_Reichsorganisationsleiter_) and leader of the German Labor Front
(_1814-PS_). The National Socialist Factory Cells Organization or NSBO
contained the political leaders (_Politische Leiter_) of the NSDAP in
the German Labor Front and those political leaders were given first
preference in the filling of jobs in the DAF (_2271-PS_). The German
Labor Front became the largest of the Party’s organizations. At the
outbreak of the war it had 23 million individual members and about 10
million corporative members who were members of organizations affiliated
with it. (_2275-PS_)

(2) _They utilized the German Labor Front as an instrument to impose
their ideology on the masses, to frustrate potential resistance, and to
insure effective control of the productive labor capacity of Germany._
The DAF was charged with the ideological orientation of the broad masses
of Germans working in the factories. Its leaders were charged with
weeding out potential opponents to National Socialism from the ranks of
the DAF and from employment in industry. In its surveillance functions,
the German Labor Front relied on Gestapo reports and on its own
intelligence service (_2336-PS_). The German Labor Front took over the
leadership of the German Cooperatives with the view to their subsequent
liquidation (_2270-PS_). The Nazi conspirators established Factory
Troops (_Werkscharen_) within the Strength Through Joy branch of the
German Labor Front as an “ideological shock squad (_Weltanschaulicher
Stosstrupp_) within the factory” (_1817-PS_). These shock squads were
formed only of voluntary members ready “to fight” for Nazi conceptions.
Among their objects were the speeding up of labor effort and the forging
of a “single-willed community” (_1818-PS_). The SA was charged with the
promotion and building up of Factory Troops by all means. When a factory
worker joined the Factory Troops, he automatically became an SA
candidate. Factory Troops were given a special uniform and their
physical training took place within SA cadre units. (_2230-PS_)

During the war, the German Labor Front was made responsible for the care
of foreign labor employed within the Reich (_1913-PS_). Barely two years
after the suppression of the independent unions and the creation of the
German Labor Front, the Nazi conspirators decreed compulsory labor
service (_Reichsarbeitsdienst_) under which young men and women between
18 and 25 years of age were conscripted for labor service under the
administration of the Reich Minister of Interior, Frick. (_1389-PS_)

After war had been declared, the Nazi conspirators openly admitted the
objectives of the Nazis’ control over labor. A publication of the
Scientific Institute of the German Labor Front declared that it had been
difficult to make the German people understand continuous renunciations
in social conditions because all the nation’s strength had been
channeled into armaments (_Wehrhaftigkeit_) for “the anticipated clash
with an envious surrounding world” (_2276-PS_). Addressing workers five
days after the launching of war on Poland, Ley admitted that the Nazis
had mobilized all the resources and energies of Germany for seven years
“so as to be equipped for the supreme effort of battle” and that the
First World War had not been lost because of cowardice of German
soldiers, “but because dissension and discord tore the people asunder”
(_1939-PS_). Ley’s confidence in the Nazis’ effective control over the
productive labor capacity of Germany in peace or war was declared as
early as 1936 to the Nurnberg Party Congress:

    “The idea of the Factory Troops is making good progress in the
    plants, and I am able to report to you, my Fuehrer, that
    security and peace in the factories has been guaranteed, not
    only in normal times, but also in times of the most serious
    crisis. Disturbances such as the munitions strikes of the
    traitors Ebert and confederates, are out of the question.
    _National Socialism has conquered the factories. Factory Troops
    are the National Socialist shock troops within the factory, and
    their motto is: THE FUEHRER IS ALWAYS RIGHT._” (_2283-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO DESTRUCTION OF THE
 FREE TRADE UNIONS AND ACQUISITION OF CONTROL OVER THE PRODUCTIVE LABOR
                                CAPACITY

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │      │
                │  (c) (1).                              │  I   │      19
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *392-PS        │Official NSDAP circular entitled “The   │      │
                │Social Life of New Germany with Special │      │
                │Consideration of the German Labor       │      │
                │Front”, by Prof. Willy Mueller (Berlin, │      │
                │1938). (USA 326)                        │ III  │     380
                │                                        │      │
 *404-PS        │Excerpts from Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp.   │      │
                │456, 475. (USA 256)                     │ III  │     385
                │                                        │      │
  405-PS        │Law Concerning Trustees of Labor, 19 May│      │
                │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │285.                                    │ III  │     387
                │                                        │      │
  614-PS        │Proclamation of the Action Committee for│      │
                │the Protection of German Labor, 2 May   │      │
                │1933. Documents of German Politics, Vol.│      │
                │I, p. 151-3.                            │ III  │     447
                │                                        │      │
 1389-PS        │Law creating Reich Labor Service, 26    │      │
                │June 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part │      │
                │I, p. 769.                              │ III  │     963
                │                                        │      │
*1678-PS        │Speech of Dr. Robert Ley. Documents of  │      │
                │German Politics, Vol. V, pp. 373, 376.  │      │
                │(USA 365)                               │  IV  │     190
                │                                        │      │
 1770-PS        │Law concerning factory representative   │      │
                │councils and economic organizations, 4  │      │
                │April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│      │
                │I, p. 161.                              │  IV  │     343
                │                                        │      │
*1814-PS        │The Organization of the NSDAP and its   │      │
                │affiliated associations, from           │      │
                │Organization book of the NSDAP, editions│      │
                │of 1936, 1938, 1940 and 1943, pp. 86-88.│      │
                │(USA 328)                               │  IV  │     411
                │                                        │      │
 1817-PS        │Bureau for factory troops, from         │      │
                │Organization Book of the NSDAP, 1936    │      │
                │edition, p. 211.                        │  IV  │     457
                │                                        │      │
 1818-PS        │Bureau for Factory troops and training, │      │
                │from Organization Book of the NSDAP,    │      │
                │1940 edition, pp. 195-196b.             │  IV  │     457
                │                                        │      │
 1861-PS        │Law on the regulation of National labor,│      │
                │20 January 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│      │
                │Part I, p. 45.                          │  IV  │     497
                │                                        │      │
*1913-PS        │Agreement between Plenipotentiary       │      │
                │General for Arbeitseinsatz and German   │      │
                │Labor Front concerning care of          │      │
                │non-German workers. 1943                │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 588. (USA │      │
                │227)                                    │  IV  │     547
                │                                        │      │
 1939-PS        │Speech by Ley published in Forge of the │      │
                │Sword, with an introduction by Marshal  │      │
                │Goering, pp. 14-17.                     │  IV  │     581
                │                                        │      │
 1940-PS        │Fuehrer edict appointing Ley leader of  │      │
                │German Labor Front. Voelkischer         │      │
                │Beobachter, Munich (Southern German)    │      │
                │edition, p. 1.                          │  IV  │     584
                │                                        │      │
 1947-PS        │Letter from von Fritsch, 11 December    │      │
                │1938, concerning need of Germany to be  │      │
                │victorious over working class, Catholic │      │
                │Church and Jews.                        │  IV  │     585
                │                                        │      │
 2005-PS        │Second law integrating the “Laender”    │      │
                │with the Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933      │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 173.      │  IV  │     641
                │                                        │      │
 2050-PS        │The Constitution of the German Reich, 11│      │
                │August 1919. 1919 Reichsgesetzblatt,    │      │
                │Part I, p. 1383.                        │  IV  │     662
                │                                        │      │
*2224-PS        │The End of the Marxist Class Struggle,  │      │
                │published in National Socialist Party   │      │
                │Press Agency, 2 May 1933, pp. 1-2. (USA │      │
                │364)                                    │  IV  │     864
                │                                        │      │
 2225-PS        │The Front of German Workers has been    │      │
                │Erected, published in National Socialist│      │
                │Party Press Agency, 3 May 1933, p. 1.   │  IV  │     868
                │                                        │      │
 2226-PS        │The Labor Front Stands, published in    │      │
                │National Socialist Party Press Agency, 4│      │
                │May 1933, p. 2.                         │  IV  │     869
                │                                        │      │
 2228-PS        │Order issued by German Labor Front,     │      │
                │published in National Socialist Party   │      │
                │Press Agency, 26 June 1933, p. 5.       │  IV  │     869
                │                                        │      │
 2230-PS        │Agreement between Ley and Lutze, chief  │      │
                │of staff of SA, published in            │      │
                │Organization Book of NSDAP, 1938, pp.   │      │
                │484-485b, 486c.                         │  IV  │     871
                │                                        │      │
 2270-PS        │Coordination of Cooperatives, published │      │
                │in National Socialist Party Press Agency│      │
                │release of 16 May 1933.                 │  IV  │     938
                │                                        │      │
 2271-PS        │The National Socialist Factory Cells    │      │
                │Organization, published in Organization │      │
                │Book of NSDAP, pp. 185-187.             │  IV  │     940
                │                                        │      │
 2275-PS        │The German Labor Front, published in    │      │
                │Nature-Aim-Means. Footnote on p. 11.    │  IV  │     949
                │                                        │      │
 2276-PS        │The German Labor Front, published in    │      │
                │Nature-Aim-Means. p. 55.                │  IV  │     950
                │                                        │      │
*2277-PS        │Affidavit, 17 October 1945, of Gustav   │      │
                │Schiefer, Chairman of General German    │      │
                │Trade Union Association, Local          │      │
                │Committee, Munich, in 1933. (USA 748)   │  IV  │     951
                │                                        │      │
*2283-PS        │The Fifth Day of the Party Congress,    │      │
                │from Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich     │      │
                │(Southern German) Edition, Issue 258, 14│      │
                │September 1936. (USA 337)               │  IV  │     971
                │                                        │      │
*2330-PS        │Order of Protective Custody, Police     │      │
                │Directorate of Nurnberg-Fuerth of Josef │      │
                │Simon, Chairman of German Shoemaker’s   │      │
                │Union, 29 August 1935. (USA 237)        │  IV  │    1038
                │                                        │      │
*2331-PS        │Declaration required of union leader    │      │
                │Josef Simon upon his release from       │      │
                │Protective Custody by Bavarian Political│      │
                │Police, 20 December 1935. (USA 743)     │  IV  │    1039
                │                                        │      │
 2332-PS        │Death certificate, Flossenburg          │      │
                │Concentration Camp, concerning union    │      │
                │leader Staimer and official letter to   │      │
                │his wife, 22 December 1941.             │  IV  │    1040
                │                                        │      │
*2333-PS        │Death certificate, Flossenburg          │      │
                │Concentration Camp, concerning union    │      │
                │leader Herrmann, and official letter to │      │
                │his wife, 29 December 1941. (USA 744)   │  IV  │    1040
                │                                        │      │
*2334-PS        │Affidavits of Lorenz Hagen, Chairman of │      │
                │Local Committee, German Trade Unions,   │      │
                │Nurnberg. (USA 238)                     │  IV  │    1041
                │                                        │      │
*2335-PS        │Affidavits of Josef Simon, Chairman of  │      │
                │German Shoemakers’ Union in 1933. (USA  │      │
                │749)                                    │  IV  │    1046
                │                                        │      │
 2336-PS        │Special Circular on Securing of         │      │
                │association of German Labor Front       │      │
                │against hidden Marxist sabotage, 27 June│      │
                │1933.                                   │  IV  │    1052
                │                                        │      │
 2411-PS        │Chart of unions of workers and          │      │
                │employees, from Statistical Yearbook for│      │
                │German Reich, 1932, p. 555.             │  V   │      87
                │                                        │      │
*2895-PS        │Joint affidavit of union leaders Simon, │      │
                │Hagen, and Lex, 13 November 1945. (USA  │      │
                │754)                                    │  V   │     563
                │                                        │      │
*2928-PS        │Affidavit of Mathias Lex, deputy        │      │
                │president of the German Shoemakers      │      │
                │Union. (USA 239)                        │  V   │     594
                │                                        │      │
Statement XII   │Political Testament of Robert Ley,      │      │
                │written in Nurnberg prison, October     │      │
                │1945.                                   │ VIII │     742
                │                                        │      │
Statement XIII  │Outline of Defense of Dr. Robert Ley,   │      │
                │written in Nurnberg prison, 24 October  │      │
                │1945.                                   │ VIII │     749


                6. SUPPRESSION OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES

A. _The Nazi conspirators sought to subvert the influence of the
churches over the people of Germany._

(1) _They sought to eliminate the Christian Churches in Germany._

(_a_) _Statements of this aim._ Martin Bormann stated in a secret decree
of the Party Chancellery signed by him and distributed to all Gauleiters
7 June 1941:

    “Our National Socialist ideology is far loftier than the
    concepts of Christianity, which in their essential points have
    been taken over from Jewry * * *. A differentiation between the
    various Christian confessions is not to be made here * * * the
    Evangelical Church is just as inimical to us as the Catholic
    Church. * * * All influences which might impair or damage the
    leadership of the people exercised by the Fuehrer with the help
    of the NSDAP must be eliminated. More and more the people must
    be separated from the churches and their organs the pastors. * *
    * Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers, seers and
    other fakers are eliminated and suppressed by the State, so must
    the possibility of church influence also be totally removed. * *
    * Not until this has happened, does the state leadership have
    influence on the individual citizens. Not until then are the
    people and Reich secure in their existence for all time.”
    (_D-75_)

Hans Kerrl, Reich Minister for Church Affairs, in a letter dated 6
September 1939 to a Herr Stapel, which indicated that it would be
brought to the attention of the Confidential Council and of the
defendant Hess, made the following statements:

    “The Fuehrer considers his efforts to bring the Evangelical
    Church to reason, unsuccessful and the Evangelical Church with
    respect to its condition rightfully a useless pile of sects. As
    you emphasize the Party has previously carried on not only a
    fight against the political element of the Christianity of the
    Church, but also a fight against membership of Party Members in
    a Christian confession. * * *

    “The Catholic Church will and must, according to the law under
    which it is set up, remain a thorn in the flesh of a Racial
    State * * *.” (_129-PS_)

Gauleiter Florian, in a letter dated 23 September 1940 to the defendant
Hess, stated:

    “The churches with their Christianity are the danger against
    which to fight is absolutely necessary.” (_064-PS_)

Regierungsrat Roth, in a lecture 22 September 1941, to a group of
Security Police, in the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) concluded his
address on Security Police (_Sipo_) measures for combatting church
politics and sects with the following remarks:

    “The immediate aim: the church must not regain one inch of the
    ground it has lost. The ultimate aim: Destruction of the
    Confessional Churches to be brought about by the collection of
    all material obtained through the intelligence service
    (_Nachrichtendienst_) activities which will at a given time be
    produced as evidence for the charge of treasonable activities
    during the German fight for existence.” (_1815-PS_)

The Party Organization Book states:

    “Bravery is valued by the SS man as the highest virtue of men in
    a struggle for his ideology.

    “He openly and unrelentingly fights the most dangerous enemies
    of the State; Jews, Free Masons, Jesuits, and political
    clergymen.

    “However, he recruits and convinces the weak and inconstant by
    his example, who have not been able to bring themselves to the
    National Socialistic ideology.” (_1855-PS_)

(_b_) _The Nazi conspirators promoted beliefs and practices incompatible
with Christian teachings._ The 24th point of the Program of the NSDAP,
unchanged since its adoption in 1920, is as follows:

    “We demand freedom of religion for all religious denominations
    within the state so long as they do not endanger its existence
    or oppose the moral senses of the germanic race. The Party as
    such advocates the standpoint of a positive Christianity without
    binding itself confessionally to any one denomination. It
    combats the Jewish materialistic spirit within and around us,
    and is convinced that a lasting recovery of our nation can only
    succeed from within on the framework: common utility precedes
    individual utility.” (_1708-PS_)

In official correspondence with the defendant Rosenberg in 1940, Bormann
stated:

    “Christian religion and National Socialist doctrines are not
    compatible. * * * The churches cannot be subjugated through
    compromise, only through a new philosophy as prophesied in
    Rosenberg’s works.”

He then proposed creation of a National Socialist Catechism to provide a
“moral foundation” for a National Socialist religion which is gradually
to supplant the Christian churches. He stated the matter was so
important it should be discussed with members of the Reich Cabinet as
soon as possible and requested Rosenberg’s opinion before the meeting.
(_098-PS_)

In a secret decree of the Party Chancellery, signed by Bormann and
distributed to all _Gauleiters_ on 7 June 1941, the following statements
appeared:

    “When we National Socialists speak of a belief in God, we do not
    understand by God, like naive Christians and their spiritual
    opportunists, a human-type being, who sits around somewhere in
    the sphere * * *. The force of natural law, with which all these
    innumerable planets move in the universe, we call the Almighty,
    or God. The claim that this world force * * * can be influenced
    by so-called prayers or other astonishing things is based upon a
    proper dose of naiveté or on a business shamelessness.

    “As opposed to that we National Socialists impose on ourselves
    the demand to live naturally as much as possible, i.e.,
    biologically. The more accurately we recognize and observe the
    laws of nature and of life, the more we adhere to them, so much
    the more do we conform to the will of the Almighty. The more
    insight we have into the will of the Almighty, the greater will
    be our successes.” (_D-75_)

Rosenberg in his book “The Myth of the 20th Century” advocated a new
National Socialist faith or religion to replace the Christian
confessions in Germany. He stated that the Catholic and Protestant
churches represent “negative Christianity” and do not correspond to the
soul of the “Nordic racially determined peoples”; that a German
religious movement would have to declare that the idea of neighborly
love is unconditionally subordinated to national honor; that national
honor is the highest human value and does not admit of any equal valued
force such as Christian love. He predicted:

    “A German religion will, bit by bit, present in the churches
    transferred to it, in place of the crucifixion the spirit of
    fire—the heroic—in the highest sense.” (_2349-PS_)

The Reich Labor Service (_Reichsarbeitsdienst_), a National Socialist
youth organization, was prohibited from participating in religious
celebrations of any kind, and its members were instructed to attend only
the parts of such ceremonies as weddings and funerals which took place
before or after the church celebration. (_107-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators considered religious literature undesirable for
the Wehrmacht. National Socialist publications were prepared for the
Wehrmacht for the expressed purpose of replacing and counteracting the
influence of religious literature dissimulated to the troops. (_101-PS_;
_100-PS_; _064-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators through Rosenberg’s Office for Supervision of the
Ideological Training and Education of the NSDAP and the Office of the
Deputy of the Fuehrer “induced” the substitution of National Socialist
mottoes and services for religious prayers and services in the schools
of Germany. (_070-PS_)

On 14 July 1939, Bormann, as Deputy of the Fuehrer, issued a Party
regulation excluding clergymen, persons closely connected with the
church, and Theology students from membership in the Party. It was
further decreed that in the future Party Members who entered the clergy
or turned to the study of Theology must leave the Party. (_840-PS_)

(_c_) _The Nazi conspirators persecuted priests, clergy and members of
monastic orders._ The priests and clergy of Germany were subjected by
the police to systematic espionage into their daily lives. The Nazi
conspirators through the Chief of the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA)
maintained a special branch of the Security Police and Security Service
(Sipo/SD) whose duties were to investigate the churches and maintain
constant surveillance upon the public and private lives of the clergy.
(_1815-PS_)

At a conference of these police “church specialists” called by Heydrich,
who was then SS Gruppenfuehrer and Chief of the Reich Main Security
Office (RSHA), in Berlin, 23 September 1941, SS Sturmbannfuehrer Hartl,
acting for Heydrich, stated that the greatest importance was to be
attached to church political activity. The intelligence network in this
field, he continued, was to be fostered with the greatest of care and
enlarged with the recruitment of informants, particular value being
attached to contacts with church circles. He closed his lecture with the
following words:

    “Each of you must go to work with your whole heart and a true
    fanaticism. Should a mistake or two be made in the execution of
    this work, this should in no way discourage you, since mistakes
    are made everywhere. The main thing is that the enemy should be
    constantly tackled with determination, will, and effective
    initiative.” (_1815-PS_)

In a letter of 22 October 1941, Heydrich, as Chief of the Reich Main
Security Office (RSHA) issued detailed instructions to all State Police
Offices outlining the organization of the Catholic Church and directing
close surveillance of the activities, writings, and reports of the
Catholic clergy in Germany. In this connection he directed:

    “Reports are also to be submitted on those Theological students
    destined for Papal Institutes, and Priests returning from such
    institutes to Germany. Should the opportunity arise of placing
    someone for intelligence (_Nachrichtendienst_) purposes in one
    of these Institutes, in the guise of a Theological student, we
    should receive immediate notification.” (_1815-PS_)

Priests and other members of the clergy were arrested, fined,
imprisoned, and otherwise punished by executive measures of the police
without judicial process. In his lecture before a conference at the
Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) in Berlin, for “church specialists,”
of the Security Police, 22 November 1941, _Regierungsrat_ Roth stated
(_1815-PS_):

    “It has been demonstrated that it is impracticable to deal with
    political offenses (malicious) under normal legal procedure.
    Owing to the lack of political perception which still prevails
    among the legal authorities, suspension of this procedure must
    be reckoned with. The so-called “Agitator-Priests” must
    therefore be dealt with in future by Stapo measures, and, if the
    occasion arises, be removed to a Concentration Camp, if agreed
    upon by the RSHA.

    “The necessary executive measures are to be decided upon
    according to local conditions, the status of the person accused,
    and the seriousness of the case—as follows:

        1. Warning

        2. Fine

        3. Forbidden to preach

        4. Forbidden to remain in parish

        5. Forbidden all activity as a priest

        6. Short-term arrest

        7. Protective custody.”

Members of monastic orders were forced by the seizure and confiscation
of their properties to give up their established place of abode and seek
homes elsewhere (_R-101-A_; _R-101-D_). A secret order of the SS
Economic Administration Office to all Concentration Camp Commanders,
dated 21 April 1942, concerning labor mobilization of clergy, reveals
that clergymen were at that time, and had previously been, incarcerated
in Concentration Camps. (_1164-PS_)

On the death of von Hindenburg, the Reich Government ordered the ringing
of all church bells on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th August 1934. In Bavaria,
there were many instances of failure to comply with this order. The
Bavarian police submitted a report outlining the above situation and
stating that in three cases the taking into protective custody of
recalcitrant clergy could not be avoided.

    “The Parish priest, Father Johann Quinger of Altenkunstadt BA
    Lichtenfels. He was taken into protective custody on 3 August on
    the express order of the State Ministry of the Interior, because
    he assaulted SA leaders and SA men who were ringing the bells
    against his wishes. He was released from custody on 10 August
    1934.

    “The Parish priest, Father Ludwig Obholzer of Kiefersfelden, BA
    Rosenheim. For his personal safety he was in police custody from
    2400 hours on the 2 August 1934, till 1000 hours on 3 August
    1934. On 5 August 1934, he said sarcastically in his sermon,
    referring to the SA men who had carried out the ringing of the
    funeral knell on their own account, ‘Lord forgive them, for they
    know not what they do’! “The Parish priest, Father Johann
    Nepomuk Kleber of Wiefelsdorf, BA Burglengenfeld, refused to
    ring the church bells on the 2nd and 3rd. He is badly tainted
    politically and had to be taken into protective custody from the
    5th to the 8th of August 34 in the interests of his own safety.”
    (_1521-PS_)

After Hitler’s rise to power, Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg delivered a
series of sermons regarded by the Nazis as damaging, and on 10 April
1938 he refrained from voting in the plebiscite. For this, the Reich
Governor of Wuertemberg declared he would no longer regard Bishop Sproll
as head of the Diocese of Rottenburg; made an official request that he
leave the Gau; and declared he would see to it that all personal and
official intercourse between the Bishop and the State and Party offices
as well as the Armed Forces would be denied (_849-PS_). For his alleged
failure to vote in the plebiscite, of 10 April 1938, the Party caused
three demonstrations to be staged against the Bishop and his household
in Rottenburg. The third demonstration was described as follows in a
teletype message from Gestapo Office Stuttgart to Gestapo Office Berlin:

    “The Party on 23 July 1938 from 2100 on carried out the third
    demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants about
    2,500-3,000 were brought in from outside by bus, etc. The
    Rottenburg populace again did not participate in the
    demonstration. The town took rather a hostile attitude to the
    demonstrations. The action got completely out of hand of the
    Party Member responsible for it. The demonstrators stormed the
    palace, beat in the gates and doors. About 150 to 200 people
    forced their way into the palace, searched the rooms, threw
    files out of the windows and rummaged through the beds in the
    rooms of the palace. One bed was ignited. Before the fire got to
    the other objects of equipment in the rooms and the palace, the
    flaming bed could be thrown from the window and the fire
    extinguished. The Bishop was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg
    and the ladies and gentlemen of his menage in the chapel at
    prayer. About 25 to 30 people pressed into this chapel and
    molested those present. Bishop Groeber was taken for Bishop
    Sproll. He was grabbed by the robe and dragged back and forth.
    Finally the intruders realized that Bishop Groeber is not the
    one they are seeking. They could then be persuaded to leave the
    building. After the evacuation of the palace by the
    demonstrators I had an interview with Archbishop Groeber, who
    left Rottenburg in the night. Groeber wants to turn to the
    Fuehrer and Reich Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick anew. On
    the course of the action, the damage done as well as the homage
    of the Rottenburg populace beginning today for the Bishop I
    shall immediately hand in a full report, after I am in the act
    of suppressing counter mass meetings.” (_848-PS_)

Reich Minister for Church Affairs Kerrl and other Party officials
alleged that these demonstrations were spontaneously staged by indignant
citizens of Rottenburg and caused representations to be made to the Holy
See in an effort to effect the Bishop’s removal from office. (_849-PS_)

On or about 3 December 1941, a copy of a secret decree of the Party
Chancellery on the subject of Relationship of National Socialism to
Christianity was found by the Security Police in the possession of
Protestant Priest Eichholz at Aix-la-Chapelle. For this he was arrested
and held for questioning for an unknown period of time. (_D-75_)

(_d_) _The Nazi conspirators confiscated church property._ On 20 January
1938, the Gestapo District Office at Munich issued a decree dissolving
the Guild of the Virgin Mary of the Bavarian Diocese, together with its
branches and associations. The decree also stated:

    “The property belonging to the dissolved Guild is to be
    confiscated by the police. Not only is property in cash to be
    confiscated, but also any stock on hand and other objects of
    value. All further activity is forbidden the dissolved Guilds,
    particularly the foundation of any organization intended as a
    successor or as a cover. Incorporation as a body into other
    women’s societies is also to be looked on as a forbidden
    continuation of activity. Infringements against the above
    prohibition will be punished according to par. 4 of the order of
    28.2.1933.”

The reasons for the dissolution and confiscation were that the Guild of
the Virgin Mary had occupied itself for years “to a most far-reaching
degree” with arrangements of a “worldly and popular sporting character”
such as community games and “social evenings”; and further that the
president of the society supplied the members with “seditious materials”
which served for “seditious discussions”; and that the members of the
Guild were trained and mobilized for “political and seditious tasks.”
(_1481-PS_)

In a lecture delivered to a conference of police investigators of Church
Affairs assembled in the lecture hall of the Reich Main Security Office
(RSHA) in Berlin, 22 September 1941, _Regierungsrat_ Roth stated that
about 100 monasteries in the Reich had been dissolved and pointed out
that the proper procedure called for seizure of the churches at the same
time the monasteries were dissolved. (_1815-PS_)

In February 1940, SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich suggested to Himmler the
seizure of monasteries for the accommodation of Racial Germans. He
proposed that the authorities of the monastic orders be instructed to
make the monasteries concerned available and move their own members to
less populous monasteries. He pointed out that the final expropriation
of properties thus placed at their disposal could be carried out step by
step in the course of time. Himmler agreed to this proposal and ordered
the measure to be carried out by the Security Police and Security
Service (_Sipo_ and SD) in collaboration with the Reich Commissioner for
Consolidation of German Folkdom. (_R-101-A_)

These orders for confiscation were carried out, as revealed in a letter
dated 30 March 1942 from the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) Chief of
Staff to Himmler mentioning claims for compensation pending in a number
of confiscation cases. In this letter he stated that all rental payments
to those monasteries and ecclesiastical institutions whose premises had
been put to use as camps for resettlers had been stopped on receipt of
Himmler’s order. Concerning current developments, he stated:

    “After further preparations in which the Party Chancellery
    participated prominently, the Reich Minister of the Interior
    found a way which makes it possible to seize ecclesiastical
    premises practically without compensation and yet avoids the
    impression of being a measure directed against the Church. * *
    *” (_R-101-D_)

In a letter of 19 April 1941, Bormann advised Rosenberg that libraries
and art objects of the monasteries confiscated in the Reich were to
remain for the time being in these monasteries and that the Fuehrer had
repeatedly rejected the suggestion that centralization of all such
libraries be undertaken. (_072-PS_)

(_e_) _The Nazi conspirators suppressed religious publications._ On 6
November 1934, Frick, as Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior,
issued an order forbidding until further notice publication of all
announcements in the daily press, in pamphlets and other publications,
which dealt with the Evangelical Church; with the exception of official
announcements of the Church Government of the Reich. (_1498-PS_)

By order of the State Police for the District of Duesseldorf, the Police
Regulation which is quoted in part below was promulgated 28 May 1934:

    “The distribution and sale of published items of any sort in
    connection with worship or religious instructions in public
    streets or squares near churches is forbidden. In the same sense
    the distribution and sale of published items on the occasions of
    processions, pilgrimages and similar church institutions in the
    streets or squares they pass through or in their vicinity is
    prohibited.” (_R-145_)

In January 1940, Bormann informed Rosenberg that he had sought to
restrict production of religious publications by means of having their
rations of printing paper cut down through the control exercised by
Reichsleiter Amann, but that the result of these efforts remained
unsatisfactory. (_101-PS_)

In March 1940, Bormann instructed Reichsleiter Amann, Director of the
NSDAP Publications Office, that in any future redistribution of paper,
confessional writings should receive still sharper restrictions in favor
of literature politically and ideologically more valuable. He went on to
point out:

    “* * * according to a report I have received, only 10% of the
    over 3000 Protestant periodicals appearing in Germany, such as
    Sunday papers, etc. have ceased publication for reasons of paper
    saving.” (_089-PS_)

In April 1940, Bormann informed the High Command of the Navy that use of
the term “Divine Service” to refer exclusively to the services arranged
by Christian Confessions was no longer to be used, even in National
Socialist daily papers. In the alternative he suggested:

    “In the opinion of the Party the term ‘Church Service’ cannot be
    objected to. I consider it fitting since it properly implies
    meetings arranged and organized by the _Churches_.” (_068-PS_)

(_f_) _The Nazi conspirators suppressed religious organizations._ On 28
May 1934, the State Police Office for the District of Duesseldorf issued
an order concerning denominational youth and professional organizations
which stated in part as follows:

    “Denominational youth and professional organizations as well as
    those created for special occasions only are prohibited from
    every public activity outside the church and religious sphere.

    “Especially forbidden is: Any public appearance in groups, all
    sorts of political activity. Any public sport function including
    public hikes and establishment of holiday or outdoor camps. The
    public display or showing of flags, banners, pennants or the
    open wearing of uniforms or insignia.” (_R-145_)

On 20 July 1935, Frick, as Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior,
issued secret instructions to the provincial governments and to the
Prussian Gestapo that Confessional youth organizations were to be
forbidden to wear uniforms, or uniform-like clothing, to assemble
publicly with pennants and flags, to wear insignia as a substitute for
uniforms, or to engage in any outdoor sport activity. (_1482-PS_)

On 20 January 1938 the Gestapo District Office at Munich, issued a
decree which stated in part as follows:

    “The Guild of the Virgin Mary (_die Marianisch
    Jungfrauenkongregation_) of the Bavarian dioceses, including the
    diocese of Speyere, together with its branches and associations
    and the Societies of Our Lady (_Jungfrauenvereinen_) attached to
    it, is by police order to be dissolved and forbidden with
    immediate effect.”

Among the reasons cited for this action were the following:

    “The whole behavior of the Guild of the Virgin Mary had
    therefore to be objected to from various points of view. It
    could be repeatedly observed that the Guild engaged in purely
    worldly affairs, such as community games, and then in the
    holding of ‘Social Evenings’.

    “This proves incontestably that the Guild of the Virgin Mary was
    active to a very great degree in a manner unecclesiastical and
    therefore worldly. By so doing it has left the sphere of its
    proper religious task and entered a sphere of activity to which
    it has no statutory right. The organization has therefore to be
    dissolved and forbidden.” (_1481-PS_)

According to the report of a Security Police “church specialist”
attached to the State Police Office at Aachen, the following points were
made by a lecturer at a conference of Security Police and Security
Service church intelligence investigators in Berlin, on 22 September
1941:

    “Retreats, recreational organizations, etc., may now be
    forbidden on ground of industrial war-needs, whereas formerly
    only a worldly activity could be given as a basis.

    “Youth camps, recreational camps are to be forbidden on
    principle, church organizations in the evening may be prevented
    on grounds of the blackout regulations.

    “Processions, pilgrimages abroad are to be forbidden by reason
    of the over-burdened transport conditions. For local events too
    technical traffic troubles and the danger of air-attack may
    serve as grounds for their prohibition. (One Referent forbade a
    procession, on the grounds of it wearing out shoe leather).”
    (_1815-PS_)

(_g_) _The Nazi conspirators suppressed religious education._ In a
speech on 7 March 1937, Rosenberg stated:

    “The education of youth can only be carried out by those who
    have rescued Germany from disaster. It is therefore impossible
    to demand one Fuehrer, one Reich and one firmly united people as
    long as education is carried out by forces which are mutually
    exclusive to each other.” (_2351-PS_)

In a speech at Fulda, 27 November 1937 Reich Minister for Church Affairs
Hans Kerrl stated:

    “We cannot recognize that the Church has a right to insure that
    the individual should be educated in all respects in the way in
    which it holds to be right; but we must leave it to the National
    Socialist State to educate the child in the way it regards as
    right.” (_2352-PS_)

In January 1939, Bormann, acting as Deputy of the Fuehrer, informed the
Minister of Education, that the Party was taking the position that
theological inquiry was not as valuable as the general fields of
knowledge in the universities and that suppression of Theological
Faculties in the universities was to be undertaken at once. He pointed
out that the Concordat with the Vatican placed certain limitations on
such a program, but that in the light of the general change of
circumstances, particularly the compulsory military service and the
execution of the four-year plan, the question of manpower made certain
reorganizations, economies and simplification necessary. Therefore,
Theological Faculties were to be restricted insofar as they could not be
wholly suppressed. He instructed that the churches were not to be
informed of this development and no public announcement was to be made.
Any complaints, if they were to be replied to at all, should be answered
with a statement that these measures are being executed in a general
plan of reorganization and that similar things are happening to other
faculties. He concludes with the statement that the professorial chairs
vacated by the above program are to be turned over to the newly-created
fields of inquiry, such as Racial Research. (_116-PS_)

A plan for the reduction of Theological Faculties was submitted by the
Reich Minister for Science, Education and Training in April 1939 to
Bormann, who forwarded it to Rosenberg for consideration and action. The
plan called for shifting, combining and eliminating Theological
Faculties in various schools and universities throughout the Reich, with
the following results:

    “To recapitulate this plan would include the complete closing of
    Theological Faculties at Innsbruck, Salzburg and Munich, the
    transfer of the faculty of Graz to Vienna and the vanishing of
    four Catholic faculties.

    “_a._ Closing of three Catholic Theological Faculties or Higher
    Schools and of four Evangelic Faculties in the winter semester
    1939/40.

    “_b._ Closing of one further Catholic and of three further
    Evangelic Faculties in the near future.” (_122-PS_)

In a secret decree of the Party Chancellery, signed by Bormann, and
distributed to all Gauleiters on 7 June 1941, the following statement
concerning religious education was made:

    “No human being would know anything of Christianity if it had
    not been drilled into him in his childhood by pastors. The
    so-called dear God in no wise gives knowledge of his existence
    to young people in advance, but in an astonishing manner in
    spite of his omnipotence leaves this to the efforts of the
    pastors. If therefore in the future our youth learns nothing
    more of this Christianity, whose doctrines are far below ours,
    Christianity will disappear by itself.” (_D-75_)

(2) _Supplementary evidence of acts of suppression within Germany._ In
laying the groundwork for their attempted subversion of the Church, the
Nazi conspirators resorted to assurances of peaceful intentions. Thus
Hitler, in his address to the Reichstag on 23 March 1933 declared:

    “While the government is determined to carry through the
    political and moral purging of our public life, it is creating
    and insuring prerequisites for a truly religious life. The
    government sees in both Christian confessions the factors most
    important for the maintenance of our Folkdom. It will respect
    agreements concluded between them and the states. However, it
    expects that its work will meet with a similar appreciation. The
    government will treat all other denominations with equal
    objective justice. However, it can never condone that belonging
    to a certain denomination or to a certain race might be regarded
    as a license to commit or tolerate crimes. The Government will
    devote its care to the sincere living together of Church and
    State.” (_3387-PS_)

(_a_) _Against the Evangelical Churches._ The Nazi conspirators, upon
their accession to power, passed a number of laws, under
innocent-sounding titles, designed to reduce the Evangelical Churches to
the status of an obedient instrument of Nazi policy. The following are
illustrative:

  Document │   Date   │Reichsge│    Title and Gist of Law     │Signed by
   Number  │          │setzblat│                              │
           │          │ t—Page │                              │
           │          │        │                              │
 _3433-PS_ │   14.7.33│I.471   │_Gesetz ueber die Verfassung  │Hitler
           │          │        │  der Deutschen Evangelischen │Frick
           │          │        │  Kirche_ (Law concerning the │
           │          │        │  Constitution of the German  │
           │          │        │  Evangelical Church),        │
           │          │        │  establishing among other    │
           │          │        │  things the new post of Reich│
           │          │        │  Bishop.                     │
           │          │        │                              │
 _3434-PS_ │   26.6.35│I.774   │_Gesetz ueber das             │Hitler
           │          │        │  Beschlussverfahren in       │Frick
           │          │        │  Rechtsangelegenheiten der   │
           │          │        │  Evangelisschen Kirche_ (Law │
           │          │        │  concerning procedure for    │
           │          │        │  decisions in legal affairs  │
           │          │        │  of the Evangelical Church), │
           │          │        │  giving the Reich Ministry of│
           │          │        │  the Interior sole authority │
           │          │        │  to determine the validity of│
           │          │        │  measures taken in the       │
           │          │        │  Churches since 1 May 1933,  │
           │          │        │  when raised in a civil      │
           │          │        │  lawsuit.                    │
           │          │        │                              │
 _3435-PS_ │    3.7.35│I.851   │_Erste Verordnung zur         │Frick
           │          │        │  Durchfuehrung des Gesetzes  │
           │          │        │  ueber das Beschlussverfahren│
           │          │        │  in Rechtsangelegenheiten der│
           │          │        │  Evangelischen Kirche_ (First│
           │          │        │  Ordinance for Execution of  │
           │          │        │  the Law concerning procedure│
           │          │        │  for decisions in legal      │
           │          │        │  affairs of the Evangelical  │
           │          │        │  Church), setting up detailed│
           │          │        │  organization and procedures │
           │          │        │  under the law of 26 June    │
           │          │        │  1935.                       │
           │          │        │                              │
 _3466-PS_ │   16.7.35│I.1029  │_Erlass ueber die             │Hitler
           │          │        │  Zusammenfassung der         │Rust
           │          │        │  Zustaendigkeiten des Reichs │Koerner
           │          │        │  und Preussens in            │
           │          │        │  Kirchenangelegenheiten_     │
           │          │        │  (Decree to unite the        │
           │          │        │  competences of Reich and    │
           │          │        │  Prussia in Church affairs)  │
           │          │        │  transferring to Kerrl,      │
           │          │        │  Minister without Portfolio, │
           │          │        │  the church affairs          │
           │          │        │  previously handled by Reich │
           │          │        │  and Prussian Ministers of   │
           │          │        │  the Interior and of Science,│
           │          │        │  Education, and Training.    │
           │          │        │                              │
 _3436-PS_ │   24.9.35│I.1178  │_Gesetz zur Sicherung der     │Hitler
           │          │        │  Deutschen Evangelischen     │Kerrl
           │          │        │  Kirche_ (Law for the        │
           │          │        │  Safe-guarding of the German │
           │          │        │  Evangelical Church)         │
           │          │        │  empowering the Reich        │
           │          │        │  Minister of Church Affairs  │
           │          │        │  (Kerrl) to issue Ordinances │
           │          │        │  with binding legal force.   │
           │          │        │                              │
 _3437-PS_ │   2.12.85│I.1370  │_Fuenfte Verordnung Zur       │Kerrl
           │          │        │  Durchfuehrung des Gesetzes  │
           │          │        │  zur Sicherung der Deutschen │
           │          │        │  Evangelischen Kirche_ (Fifth│
           │          │        │  decree for execution of the │
           │          │        │  law for the Safe-guarding of│
           │          │        │  the German Evangelical      │
           │          │        │  Church) prohibiting the     │
           │          │        │  churches from filling their │
           │          │        │  pastorates, ordaining       │
           │          │        │  ministers, visitation,      │
           │          │        │  publishing of banns, and    │
           │          │        │  collecting dues and         │
           │          │        │  assessments.                │
           │          │        │                              │
 _3439-PS_ │   25.6.37│I.697   │_Fuenfzehnte Verordnung zur   │Kerrl
           │          │        │  Durchfuehrung des Gesetzes  │
           │          │        │  zur Sicherung der Deutschen │
           │          │        │  Evangelischen Kirche_       │
           │          │        │  (Fifteenth decree for the   │
           │          │        │  Execution of the Law for    │
           │          │        │  Security of the German      │
           │          │        │  Evangelical Church)         │
           │          │        │  establishing in the Reich   │
           │          │        │  Ministry for Church Affairs │
           │          │        │  a Finance Department, to    │
           │          │        │  supervise administration of │
           │          │        │  the church property budget, │
           │          │        │  tax assessment, and use of  │
           │          │        │  budget funds.               │

With the help of their Reich Bishop, Bishop Mueller, they manoeuvered
the Evangelical Youth Association into the Hitler Jugend under Von
Schirach in December 1933. (_1458-PS_)

They arrested prominent Protestant leaders such as Pastor Niemoeller. By
1937, the result of all these measures was complete administrative
control by the Nazi conspirators over the Evangelical churches.

(_b_) _Against the Catholic Church._ Just as in their program against
the Evangelical Churches, so in their attack on the Catholic Church, the
Nazi conspirators concealed their real intentions under a cloak of
apparent respect for its rights and protection of its activities. On 20
July 1933, a Concordat was concluded between the Holy See and the German
Reich, signed for the Reich by Von Papen (_3280-A-PS_). It was the Nazi
Government, not the Church, which initiated the negotiations.

    “The German Government asked the Holy See to conclude a
    Concordat with the Reich.” (_3268-PS_)

By Article I of the Concordat,

    “The German Reich guarantees freedom of profession and public
    practice of the Catholic religion.

    “It acknowledges the right of the Catholic Church, within the
    limit of those laws which are applicable to all, to manage and
    regulate her own affairs independently, and, within the
    framework of her own competence, to publish laws and ordinances
    binding on her members.” (_3280-A-PS_)

Other articles formulated agreements on basic principles such as free
communication between Rome and the local ecclesiastical authorities,
freedom of the Catholic press, of Catholic education and of Catholic
action in charitable, professional, and youth organizations. In return,
the Vatican pledged loyalty by the clergy to the Reich Government and
emphasis in religious instruction on the patriotic duties of the
Christian citizen. (_3280-A-PS_)

In reliance upon assurances by the Nazi conspirators, the Catholic
hierarchy had already revoked their previous prohibition against
Catholics becoming members of the Nazi Party (_3389-PS_). The Catholic
Center Party, under a combination of Nazi pressure and assurances,
published on 29 December 1933, an announcement of its dissolution
(_2403-PS_). Thus the Catholics went a long way to disarm themselves and
cooperate with the Nazis. Nevertheless, the Nazi conspirators continued
to develop their policy of slow strangulation of religion, first in
covert, and then in open, violation of their assurances and agreements.

In the Encyclical “_Mit Brennender Sorge_”, on 14 March 1937, Pope Pius
XI described the program:

    “It discloses intrigues which from the beginning had no other
    aim than a war of extermination. In the furrows in which we had
    labored to sow the seeds of true peace, others—like the enemy
    in Holy Scripture (Matt. xiii, 25)—sowed the tares of
    suspicion, discord, hatred, calumny of secret and open
    fundamental hostility to Christ and His Church, fed from a
    thousand different sources and making use of every available
    means. On them and on them alone and on their silent and vocal
    protectors rests the responsibility that now on the horizon of
    Germany there is to be seen not the rainbow of peace but the
    threatening storm clouds of destructive religious wars. * * *
    Anyone who has any sense of truth left in his mind and even a
    shadow of the feeling of justice left in his heart will have to
    admit that, in the difficult and eventful years which followed
    the Concordat, every word and every action of Ours was ruled by
    loyalty to the terms of the agreement; but also he will have to
    recognize with surprise and deep disgust that the unwritten law
    of the other party has been arbitrary misinterpretation of
    agreements, evasion of agreements, evacuation of the meaning of
    agreements, and finally more or less open violation of
    agreements.” (_3280-PS_)

The Nazis suppressed the Catholic Youth League, beginning ten days after
the concordat was signed. (See Section 8, infra.)

On 18 January 1942, in declining to accede to a demand made by the
German Government that no further appointment of Archbishops, Bishops,
and other high administrative dignitaries be made in the new territories
of the Reich, or of certain of them within the old Reich, without
previous consultation with the German Government (_3261-PS_), the
Secretary of State of Pope Pius XII pointed to measures taken by the
German Government,

    “Contrary not only to the existing Concordats and to the
    principles of international law ratified by the Second Hague
    conference, but often—and this is much more grave—to the very
    fundamental principles of divine law, both natural and
    positive.”

The Papal Secretary of State continued:

    “Let it suffice to recall in this connection, among other
    things, the changing of the Catholic State elementary schools
    into undenominational schools; the permanent or temporary
    closing of many minor seminaries, of not a few major seminaries
    and of some theological faculties; the suppression of almost all
    the private schools and of numerous Catholic boarding schools
    and colleges; the repudiation, decided unilaterally, of
    financial obligations which the State, Municipalities, etc. had
    towards the Church; the increasing difficulties put in the way
    of the activity of the religious Orders and Congregations in the
    spiritual, cultural and social field and above all the
    suppression of Abbeys, monasteries, convents and religious
    houses in such great numbers that one is led to infer a
    deliberate intention of rendering impossible the very existence
    of the Orders and Congregations in Germany.

    “Similar and even graver acts must be deplored in the annexed
    and occupied territories, especially in the Polish territories
    and particularly in the _Reichsgau Wartheland_, for which the
    Reich Superintendent has issued, under date of September 13th
    last, a ‘Decree concerning Religious Associations and Religious
    Societies’ (_Verordnung ueber Religioese Vereinigungen und
    Religion-gesellschaften_) in clear opposition to the fundamental
    principles of the divine constitution of the Church.”
    (_3261-PS_)

Illustrative of the numerous other cases and specific incidents which
might be adduced as the program of suppression was carried into action
within Germany proper, are the measures adopted beginning in 1936 to
eliminate the priest Rupert Mayer of Munich. Because of his sermons, he
was confined in various prisons, arrested and rearrested, interned in
Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen concentration camp, and the Ettal Monastery,
from which he was released by Allied troops in May 1945, and later died.
(_3272-PS_)

(_c_) _Against other religious groups._

Members of the sect known as “_Bibelforscher_”—meaning “Members of a
Biblical Society” or “Bible-Researchers”—were as early as 1937 sent as
a routine matter to concentration camps by the Gestapo, even after
serving of a sentence imposed by a court or after the cancellation of an
arrest order (_D-84_). At one camp alone—Dachau—there were over 150
“_Bibelforscher_” in protective custody in 1937. (_2928-PS_)

B. _Acts of suppression of the Christian Churches in Annexed and
Occupied Territories._

(1) _In Austria._ The methods of suppression of churches followed in
Austria by the occupying power began with measures to exclude the Church
from public activities, such as processions, printing of newspapers and
Reviews which could spread Christian doctrines; from forming Youth
organizations, such as Boy Scouts; from directing educational or
charitable activities; and even from extending help in the form of food
to foreigners. Unable in conscience to obey the public prescription,
ministers of religions were arrested and sent to concentration camps,
and some were executed. Churches were closed, convents and monastries
suppressed, and educational property confiscated. The total number of
confiscations, suppressions, or alienations of religious institutions
exceeded 100 cases in one diocese alone. (_3278-PS_)

The Lutheran Church in Austria, though comprising a small minority of
the population, was subjected to organized oppression. Its educational
efforts were obstructed or banned. Believers were encouraged, and
sometimes intimidated, to repudiate their faith. Lutheran pastors were
given to understand that a government position would be awarded to each
one who would renounce his ministry and if possible withdraw from the
Lutheran Church. (_3273-PS_)

In summation of the period of Nazi domination and in review of the
attempted suppression of the Christian Church, the Archbishops and
Bishops of Austria in their first joint Pastoral after liberation
declared:

    “At an end also is an intellectual battle, the goal of which was
    the destruction of Christianity and the Church among our people;
    a campaign of lies and treachery against truth and love, against
    divine and human rights and against international law.”
    (_3274-PS_)

(2) _In Czechoslovakia._ The Czechoslovak Official Report for the
prosecution and trial of the German Major War Criminals by the
International Military Tribunal established according to the Agreement
of the Four Great Powers of 8 August, 1945 describes in summary form the
measures taken by the Nazi conspirators to suppress religious liberties
and persecute the churches. The following excerpts are quoted from this
report (_998-PS_):

    “(_a_) _Catholic Church._

    “* * * At the outbreak of war, 487 Catholic priests were among
    the thousands of Czech patriots arrested and sent to
    concentration camps as hostages. Venerable high ecclesiastical
    dignitaries were dragged to concentration camps in Germany. * *
    * Religious orders were dissolved and liquidated, their
    charitable institutions closed down and their members expelled
    or else forced to compulsory labor in Germany. All religious
    instruction in Czech schools was suppressed. Most of the
    weeklies and monthlies which the Catholics had published in
    Czechoslovakia, had been suppressed from the very beginning of
    the occupation. The Catholic gymnastic organization “Orel” with
    800,000 members was dissolved and its property was confiscated.
    To a great extent Catholic church property was seized for the
    benefit of the Reich.

    “(_b_) _Czechoslovak National Church._

    “* * * The Czechoslovak Church in Slovakia was entirely
    prohibited and its property confiscated under German compulsion
    in 1940. It has been allowed to exist in Bohemia and Moravia but
    in a crippled form under the name of the Czecho-Moravian Church.

    “(_c_) _Protestant Churches._

    “The Protestant Churches were deprived of the freedom to preach
    the gospel. German secret state police watched closely whether
    the clergy observed the restrictions imposed on it. * * * Some
    passages from the Bible were not allowed to be read in public at
    all. * * *

    “* * * Church leaders were especially persecuted, scores of
    ministers were imprisoned in concentration camps, among them the
    General Secretary of the Students’ Christian Movement in
    Czechoslovakia. One of the Vice-Presidents was executed.

    “Protestant Institutions such as the YMCA and YWCA were
    suppressed throughout the country.

    “The leading Theological School for all Evangelical
    denominations, HUS Faculty in Prague and all other Protestant
    training schools for the ministry were closed down in November
    1939, with the other Czech universities and colleges.

    “(_d_) _Czech Orthodox Church._

    “The hardest blow was directed against the Czech Orthodox
    Church. The Orthodox churches in Czechoslovakia were ordered by
    the Berlin Ministry of Church Affairs to leave the Pontificat of
    Belgrade and Constantinople respectively and to become
    subordinate to the Berlin Bishop. The Czech Bishop Gorazd was
    executed together with two other priests of the Orthodox Church.
    By a special order of the Protector Daluege, issued in September
    1942, the Orthodox Church of Serbian Constantinople jurisdiction
    was completely dissolved in the Czech lands, its religious
    activity forbidden and its property confiscated.

    “All Evangelical education was handed over to the civil
    authorities and many Evangelical teachers lost their employment;
    moreover the State grant to salaries of many Evangelical priests
    was taken away.” (_998-PS_)

(3) _In Poland._ The repressive measures levelled against the Christian
Church in Poland where Hans Frank was Governor-General from 1939 to
1945, were even more drastic and sweeping. In protest against the
systematic strangulation of religion, the Vatican, on 8 October 1942,
addressed a memorandum to the German Embassy accredited to the Holy See
in which the Secretariat of State emphasized the fact that despite
previous protests to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich, von
Ribbentrop, the religious condition of the Catholics in the _Warthegau_
“has become even sadder and more tragic.” This memorandum states:

    “For quite a long time the religious situation in the
    _Warthegau_ gives cause for very grave and ever-increasing
    anxiety. There, in fact, the Episcopate has been little by
    little almost completely eliminated; the secular and regular
    clergy have been reduced to proportions that are absolutely
    inadequate, because they have been in large part deported and
    exiled; the education of clerics has been forbidden; the
    Catholic education of youth is meeting with the greatest
    opposition; the nuns have been dispersed; insurmountable
    obstacles have been put in the way of affording people the helps
    of religions; very many churches have been closed; Catholic
    intellectual and charitable institutions have been destroyed;
    ecclesiastical property has been seized.” (_3263-PS_)

On 18 November 1942 the Papal Secretary of State requested the
Archbishop of Breslau, Cardinal Bertram, to use every effort to assist
Polish Catholic workers transferred to Germany, who were being deprived
of the consolations of religion. In addition, he again appealed for help
for the Polish priests detained in various concentration camps, whose
death rate was “still on the increase.” (_3265-PS_). On 7 December 1942
the Cardinal Archbishop of Breslau replied that all possible efforts
were being put forward by the German Bishops without success on behalf
of the victims of concentration camps and labor battalions, and deplored
“the intolerable decrees” against religious ministration to Poles.
(_3266-PS_)

On 2 March 1943, the Cardinal Secretary of State addressed a note to von
Ribbentrop, Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, in which the violations
of religious rights and conscience among the civilian population of
Poland were set out in detail, and the time, locality, and character of
the persecutions were specified. Priests and Ecclesiastics were still
being arrested, thrust into concentration camps, and treated with scorn
and derision, while many had been summarily executed. Religious
instruction was hampered; Catholic schools were closed; the use of the
Polish language in sacred functions and even in the Sacrament of Penance
was forbidden. Even the natural right of marriage was denied to men of
Polish nationality under 28 years of age to women under 25. In the
territory called “General Government” similar conditions existed and
against these the Holy See vigorously protested. To save the harassed
and persecuted leaders of the Catholic Church, the Vatican had
petitioned that they be allowed to emigrate to neutral countries of
Europe or America. The only concession made was that they would all be
collected in one concentration camp—Dachau. (_3264-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators adopted a dilatory and obstructionist policy
toward complaints as to religious affairs in the overrun territories,
and a decision was “taken by those competent to do so. * * * that no
further consideration will be taken of proposals or requests concerning
the territories which do not belong to the Old Reich.” (_3262-PS_)

“Those competent” to make decisions on complaints as to religious
affairs in the overrun territories—especially the Party Chancery,
headed by Bormann—the methods they used, and the reasons for their
attitude are outlined by the Cardinal Archbishop of Breslau, a German
living in Germany, in a letter to the Papal Secretary of State on 7
December 1942 as follows:

    “Your Eminence knows very well the greatest difficulty in the
    way of opening negotiations comes from the overruling authority
    which the “National Socialist Party Chancery” (_Kanzlei der
    National-Sozialistischen Partei_, known as the _Partei-Kanzlei_)
    exercises in relation to the Chancery of the Reich
    (_Reichskanzlei_) and to the single Reich Ministries. This
    ‘_Parteikanzlei_’ directs the course to be followed by the
    State, whereas the Ministries and the Chancery of the Reich are
    obliged and compelled to adjust their decrees to these
    directions. Besides, there is the fact that the “Supreme Office
    for the Security of the Reich” called the
    ‘_Reichssicherheitshauptamt_’ enjoys an authority which
    precludes all legal action and all appeals. Under it are the
    ‘Secret Offices for Public Security’ called ‘_Geheime
    Staatspolizei_’ (a title shortened usually to _Gestapo_) of
    which there is one for each Province. Against the decrees of
    this Central Office (_Reichssicherheitshauptamt_) and of the
    Secret Offices (_Geheime Staatspolizei_) there is no appeal
    through the Courts, and no complaint made to the Ministries has
    any effect. Not infrequently the Councillors of the Ministries
    suggest that they have not been able to do as they would wish
    to, because of the opposition of these Party offices. As far as
    the executive power is concerned, the organization called the
    SS, that is _Schutzstaffeln der Partei_, is in practice supreme.

    “This hastily sketched interrelation of authorities is the
    reason why many of the petitions and protests made by the
    Bishops to the Ministries have been foiled. Even if we present
    our complaints to the so-called Supreme Security Office, there
    is rarely any reply; and when there is, it is negative.

    “On a number of very grave and fundamental issues we have also
    presented our complaints to the Supreme Leader of the Reich
    (_Fuehrer_). Either no answer is given, or it is apparently
    edited by the above-mentioned Party Chancery, which does not
    consider itself bound by the Concordat made with the Holy See.”
    (_3266-PS_)

The interchange of correspondence following the transmission of the
above-described note of 2 March 1943 on the religious situation in the
overrun Polish Provinces illustrates the same evasive tactics.
(_3269-PS_)

In his Allocution to the Sacred College, on 2 June 1945, His Holiness
Pope Pius XII recalled, by way of example, “some details from the
abundant accounts which have reached us from priests and laymen who were
interned in the concentration camp at Dachau”:

    “In the forefront, for the number and harshness of the treatment
    meted out to them, are the Polish priests. From 1940 to 1945,
    2,800 Polish ecclesiastics and religious were imprisoned in that
    camp; among them was the Auxiliary bishop of Wloclawek, who died
    there of typhus. In April last there were left only 816, all the
    others being dead except for two or three transferred to another
    camp. In the summer of 1942, 480 German-speaking ministers of
    religion were known to be gathered there; of these, 45 were
    Protestants, all the others Catholic priests. In spite of the
    continuous inflow of new internees, especially from some
    dioceses of Bavaria, Rhenania and Westphalia, their number, as a
    result of the high rate of mortality, at the beginning of this
    year, did not surpass 350. Nor should we pass over in silence
    those belonging to occupied territories, Holland, Belgium,
    France (among whom the Bishop of Clermont), Luxembourg,
    Slovenia, Italy. Many Of those priests and laymen endured
    indescribable sufferings for their faith and for their vocation.
    In one case the hatred of the impious against Christ reached the
    point of parodying on the person of an interned priest, with
    barbed wire, the scourging and the crowning with thorns of our
    Redeemer.” (_3268-PS_)

Further revealing figures on the persecution of Polish priests are
contained in the following extract from Charge No. 17 against Hans
Frank, Governor-General of Poland, submitted by the Polish Government,
entitled “Maltreatment and Persecution of the Catholic Clergy in the
Western Provinces”:

    “IV. _GENERAL CONDITIONS AND RESULTS OF THE PERSECUTION_

        11. The general situation of the clergy in the
        Archdiocese of Poznan in the beginning of April 1940 is
        summarized in the following words of Cardinal Hlond’s
        second report:

            ‘5 priests shot

            27 priests confined in harsh concentration camps
            at Stutthof and in other camps

            190 priests in prison or in concentration camps
            at Bruczkow, Chludowo, Goruszki, Kazimierz,
            Biskupi, Lad, Lubin and Puszczykowo,

            35 priests expelled into the Government General,

            11 priests seriously ill in consequence of
            ill-treatment,

            122 parishes entirely left without priests.’

        12. In the diocese of Chelmno, where about 650 priests
        were installed before the war only 3% were allowed to
        stay, the 97% of them were imprisoned, executed or put
        into concentration camps.

        13. By January 1941 about 7000 priests were killed, 3000
        were in prison or concentration camps.” (_3279-PS_)

The Allocution of Pope Pius XII on 2 June 1945 described National
Socialism as “the arrogant apostasy from Jesus Christ, the denial of His
doctrine and of His work of redemption, the cult of violence, the
idolatry of race and blood, the overthrow of human liberty and dignity.”
It summarized the attacks of “National Socialism” on the Catholic Church
in these terms:

    “The struggle against the Church did, in fact, become even more
    bitter: there was the dissolution of Catholic organizations; the
    gradual suppression of the flourishing Catholic schools, both
    public and private; the enforced weaning of youth from family
    and Church; the pressure brought to bear on the conscience of
    citizens, and especially of civil servants; the systematic
    defamation, by means of a clever, closely-organized propaganda,
    of the Church, the clergy, the faithful, the Church’s
    institutions, teaching and history; the closing, dissolution,
    confiscation of religious houses and other ecclesiastical
    institutions; the complete suppression of the Catholic press and
    publishing houses.” (_3268-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO SUPPRESSION OF THE
                           CHRISTIAN CHURCHES

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a, │      │
                │  c).                                   │  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (D) 3│      │
                │  (_c_) (2, 3); X (B).                  │  I   │  20, 55
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *064-PS        │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 27       │      │
                │September 1940, enclosing letter from   │      │
                │Gauleiter Florian criticizing Churches  │      │
                │and publications for soldiers. (USA 359)│ III  │     109
                │                                        │      │
 *068-PS        │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 5     │      │
                │April 1940, enclosing copy of Bormann’s │      │
                │letter to the High Command of Navy, and │      │
                │copy of Navy High Command letter to     │      │
                │Bormann of 9 February 1940. (USA 726)   │ III  │     114
                │                                        │      │
 *070-PS        │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg,  │      │
                │25 April 1941, on substitution of       │      │
                │National Socialist mottos for morning   │      │
                │prayers in schools. (USA 349)           │ III  │     118
                │                                        │      │
 *072-PS        │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 19 April   │      │
                │1941, concerning confiscation of        │      │
                │property, especially of art treasures in│      │
                │the East. (USA 357)                     │ III  │     122
                │                                        │      │
 *089-PS        │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8     │      │
                │March 1940, instructing Amann not to    │      │
                │issue further newsprint to confessional │      │
                │newspapers. (USA 360)                   │ III  │     147
                │                                        │      │
 *098-PS        │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22       │      │
                │February 1940, urging creation of       │      │
                │National Socialist Catechism, etc. to   │      │
                │provide moral foundation for NS         │      │
                │religion. (USA 350)                     │ III  │     152
                │                                        │      │
 *100-PS        │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 18       │      │
                │January 1940, urging preparation of     │      │
                │National Socialist reading material to  │      │
                │replace Christian literature for        │      │
                │soldiers. (USA 691)                     │ III  │     160
                │                                        │      │
 *101-PS        │Letter from Hess’ office signed Bormann │      │
                │to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940,          │      │
                │concerning undesirability of religious  │      │
                │literature for members of the Wehrmacht.│      │
                │(USA 361)                               │ III  │     160
 *107-PS        │Circular letter signed Bormann, 17 June │      │
                │1938, enclosing directions prohibiting  │      │
                │participation of Reichsarbeitsdienst in │      │
                │religious celebrations. (USA 351)       │ III  │     162
                │                                        │      │
 *116-PS        │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, enclosing│      │
                │copy of letter, 24 January 1939, to     │      │
                │Minister of Education requesting        │      │
                │restriction or elimination of           │      │
                │theological faculties. (USA 685)        │ III  │     165
                │                                        │      │
 *122-PS        │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 17 April │      │
                │1939, enclosing copy of Minister of     │      │
                │Education letter, 6 April 1939, on      │      │
                │elimination of theological faculties in │      │
                │various universities. (USA 362)         │ III  │     173
                │                                        │      │
 *129-PS        │Letter from Kerrl to Herr Stapol, 6     │      │
                │September 1939, found in Rosenberg      │      │
                │files. (USA 727)                        │ III  │     179
                │                                        │      │
 *840-PS        │Party Directive, 14 July 1939, making   │      │
                │clergy and theology students ineligible │      │
                │for Party membership. (USA 355)         │ III  │     606
                │                                        │      │
 *848-PS        │Gestapo telegram from Berlin to         │      │
                │Nurnberg, 24 July 1938, dealing with    │      │
                │demonstrations against Bishop Sproll in │      │
                │Rottenburg. (USA 353)                   │ III  │     613
                │                                        │      │
 *849-PS        │Letter from Kerrl to Minister of State, │      │
                │23 July 1938, with enclosures dealing   │      │
                │with persecution of Bishop Sproll. (USA │      │
                │354)                                    │ III  │     614
                │                                        │      │
 *998-PS        │“German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia”. │      │
                │Excerpts from Czechoslovak Official     │      │
                │Report for the prosecution and trial of │      │
                │the German Major War Criminals by the   │      │
                │International Military Tribunal         │      │
                │established according to Agreement of   │      │
                │four Great Powers of 8 August 1945. (USA│      │
                │91)                                     │ III  │     656
                │                                        │      │
*1164-PS        │Secret letter, 21 April 1942, from SS to│      │
                │all concentration camp commanders       │      │
                │concerning treatment of priests. (USA   │      │
                │736)                                    │ III  │     820
                │                                        │      │
*1458-PS        │The Hitler Youth by Baldur von Schirach,│      │
                │Leipzig, 1934. (USA 667)                │  IV  │      22
                │                                        │      │
*1481-PS        │Gestapo order, 20 January 1938,         │      │
                │dissolving and confiscating property of │      │
                │Catholic Youth Women’s Organization in  │      │
                │Bavaria. (USA 737)                      │  IV  │      50
                │                                        │      │
*1482-PS        │Secret letter, 20 July 1933 to          │      │
                │provincial governments and the Prussian │      │
                │Gestapo from Frick, concerning          │      │
                │Confessional Youth Organizations. (USA  │      │
                │738)                                    │  IV  │      51
                │                                        │      │
*1498-PS        │Order of Frick, 6 November 1934,        │      │
                │addressed inter alios to Prussian       │      │
                │Gestapo prohibiting publication of      │      │
                │Protestant Church announcements. (USA   │      │
                │739)                                    │  IV  │      52
                │                                        │      │
*1521-PS        │Report from the Bavarian Political      │      │
                │Police to the Gestapo, Berlin, 24 August│      │
                │1934, concerning National mourning on   │      │
                │occasion of death of von Hindenburg.    │      │
                │(USA 740)                               │  IV  │      75
                │                                        │      │
*1708-PS        │The Program of the NSDAP. National      │      │
                │Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. (USA│      │
                │255; USA 324)                           │  IV  │     208
                │                                        │      │
*1815-PS        │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning the│      │
                │study and treatment of church politics. │      │
                │(USA 510)                               │  IV  │     415
                │                                        │      │
 1855-PS        │Extract from Organization Book of the   │      │
                │NSDAP, 1937, p. 418.                    │  IV  │     495
                │                                        │      │
*1997-PS        │Decree of the Fuehrer, 17 July 1941,    │      │
                │concerning administration of Newly      │      │
                │Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA 319) │  IV  │     634
                │                                        │      │
*2349-PS        │Extracts from “The Myth of 20th Century”│      │
                │by Alfred Rosenberg, 1941. (USA 352)    │  IV  │    1069
                │                                        │      │
 2351-PS        │Speech of Rosenberg, 7 March 1937, from │      │
                │The Archive, Vol. 34-36, p. 1716,       │      │
                │published in Berlin, March 1937.        │  IV  │    1070
                │                                        │      │
 2352-PS        │Speech of Kerrl, 27 November 1937, from │      │
                │The Archive, Vol. 43-45, p. 1029,       │      │
                │published in Berlin, November 1937.     │  IV  │    1071
                │                                        │      │
 2403-PS        │The End of the Party State, from        │      │
                │Documents of German Politics, Vol. I,   │      │
                │pp. 55-56.                              │  V   │      71
                │                                        │      │
 2456-PS        │Youth and the Church, from Complete     │      │
                │Handbook of Youth Laws.                 │  V   │     198
                │                                        │      │
*2851-PS        │Statement by Rosenberg of positions     │      │
                │held, 9 November 1945. (USA 6)          │  V   │     512
                │                                        │      │
*2910-PS        │Certificate of defendant Seyss-Inquart, │      │
                │10 November 1945. (USA 17)              │  V   │     579
                │                                        │      │
*2928-PS        │Affidavit of Mathias Lex, deputy        │      │
                │president of the German Shoemakers      │      │
                │Union. (USA 239)                        │  V   │     594
                │                                        │      │
*2972-PS        │List of appointments held by von        │      │
                │Neurath, 17 November 1945. (USA 19)     │  V   │     679
                │                                        │      │
*2973-PS        │Statement by von Schirach concerning    │      │
                │positions held. (USA 14)                │  V   │     679
                │                                        │      │
*2978-PS        │Frick’s statement of offices and        │      │
                │positions, 14 November 1945. (USA 8)    │  V   │     683
                │                                        │      │
*2979-PS        │Affidavit by Hans Frank, 15 November    │      │
                │1945, concerning positions held. (USA 7)│  V   │     684
                │                                        │      │
*3261-PS        │Verbal note of the Secretariate of State│      │
                │of His Holiness, to the German Embassy, │      │
                │18 January 1942. (USA 568)              │  V   │    1009
                │                                        │      │
 3262-PS        │Report of His Excellency, the Most      │      │
                │Reverend Cesare Orsenigo, Papal Nuncio  │      │
                │in Germany to His Eminence the Cardinal │      │
                │Secretary of State to His Holiness, 27  │      │
                │June 1942.                              │  V   │    1015
                │                                        │      │
*3263-PS        │Memorandum of Secretariate of State to  │      │
                │German Embassy regarding the situation  │      │
                │in the Warthegau, 8 October 1942. (USA  │      │
                │571)                                    │  V   │    1017
                │                                        │      │
*3264-PS        │Note of His Eminence the Cardinal       │      │
                │Secretary of State to Foreign Minister  │      │
                │of Reich about religious situation in   │      │
                │Warthegau and in other Polish provinces │      │
                │subject to Germany, 2 March 1943. (USA  │      │
                │572)                                    │  V   │    1018
                │                                        │      │
 3265-PS        │Letter to His Eminence the Cardinal     │      │
                │Secretary of State to the Cardinal      │      │
                │Archbishop of Breslau, 18 November 1942.│  V   │    1029
                │                                        │      │
*3266-PS        │Letter of Cardinal Bertram, Archbishop  │      │
                │of Breslau to the Papal Secretary of    │      │
                │State, 7 December 1942. (USA 573)       │  V   │    1031
                │                                        │      │
 3267-PS        │Verbal note of German Embassy to Holy   │      │
                │See to the Secretariate of State of His │      │
                │Holiness, 29 August 1941.               │  V   │    1037
                │                                        │      │
*3268-PS        │Allocution of His Holiness Pope Pius    │      │
                │XII, to the Sacred College, 2 June 1945.│      │
                │(USA 356)                               │  V   │    1038
                │                                        │      │
 3269-PS        │Correspondence between the Holy See, the│      │
                │Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin, and the     │      │
                │defendant von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister│      │
                │of Foreign Affairs.                     │  V   │    1041
                │                                        │      │
 3272-PS        │Statement of Rupert Mayer, 13 October   │      │
                │1945.                                   │  V   │    1061
                │                                        │      │
 3273-PS        │Statement of Lutheran Pastor, Friedrich │      │
                │Kaufmann, Salzburg, 23 October 1945.    │  V   │    1064
                │                                        │      │
*3274-PS        │Pastoral letter of Austrian Bishops read│      │
                │in all churches, 14 October 1945. (USA  │      │
                │570)                                    │  V   │    1067
                │                                        │      │
*3278-PS        │Report on fighting of National Socialism│      │
                │in Apostolic Administration of          │      │
                │Innsbruck-Feldkirch of Tyrol and        │      │
                │Vorarlberg by Bishop Paulus Rusch, 27   │      │
                │June 1945 and attached list of church   │      │
                │institutions there which were closed,   │      │
                │confiscated or suppressed. (USA 569)    │  V   │    1070
                │                                        │      │
*3279-PS        │Extract from Charge No. 17 against Hans │      │
                │Frank submitted by Polish Government to │      │
                │International Military Tribunal. (USA   │      │
                │574)                                    │  V   │    1078
                │                                        │      │
*3280-PS        │Extract from Papal Encyclical “Mit      │      │
                │Brennender Sorge”, set forth in Appendix│      │
                │II, p. 524, of “The Persecution of the  │      │
                │Catholic Church in the Third Reich”.    │      │
                │(USA 567)                               │  V   │    1079
                │                                        │      │
 3280-A-PS      │Concordat between the Holy See and the  │      │
                │German Reich. Reichsgesetzblatt, Part   │      │
                │II, p. 679.                             │  V   │    1080
                │                                        │      │
*3387-PS        │Hitler Reichstag speech, 23 March 1933, │      │
                │asking for adoption of Enabling Act,    │      │
                │from Voelkischer Beobachter, 24 March   │      │
                │1933, p. 1. (USA 566)                   │  VI  │     104
                │                                        │      │
*3389-PS        │Fulda Declaration of 28 March 1933, from│      │
                │Voelkischer Beobachter, 29 March 1933,  │      │
                │p. 2. (USA 566)                         │  VI  │     105
                │                                        │      │
 3433-PS        │Law concerning the Constitution of the  │      │
                │German Protestant Church, 14 July 1933. │      │
                │1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 471. │  VI  │     136
                │                                        │      │
 3434-PS        │Law concerning procedure for decisions  │      │
                │in legal affairs of the Protestant      │      │
                │Church, 26 June 1935. 1935              │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 774.      │  VI  │     143
                │                                        │      │
 3435-PS        │First Ordinance for Execution of Law    │      │
                │concerning procedure for decisions in   │      │
                │legal affairs of the Protestant Church, │      │
                │3 July 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt,    │      │
                │Part I, p. 851.                         │  VI  │     144
                │                                        │      │
 3436-PS        │Law for Safeguarding of German          │      │
                │Protestant Church, 24 September 1935.   │      │
                │1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1178.│  VI  │     145
                │                                        │      │
 3437-PS        │Fifth Decree for execution of law for   │      │
                │safeguarding of the German Protestant   │      │
                │Church, 2 December 1935. 1935           │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1370.     │  VI  │     146
                │                                        │      │
 3439-PS        │Fifteenth decree for the Execution of   │      │
                │law for Security of German Protestant   │      │
                │Church, 25 June 1937. 1937              │      │
                │Reiehsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 697.      │  VI  │     147
                │                                        │      │
 3466-PS        │Decree to unite the competences of Reich│      │
                │and Prussia in Church Affairs, 16 July  │      │
                │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │1029.                                   │  VI  │     168
                │                                        │      │
 3560-PS        │Decree concerning organization and      │      │
                │administration of Eastern Territories, 8│      │
                │October 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt,   │      │
                │Part I, p. 2042.                        │  VI  │     244
                │                                        │      │
 3561-PS        │Decree concerning the Administration of │      │
                │Occupied Polish Territories, 12 October │      │
                │1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │2077.                                   │  VI  │     246
                │                                        │      │
 3701-PS        │Proposal for Reichsleiter Bormann       │      │
                │concerning speech of Bishop of Muenster │      │
                │on 3 August 1941.                       │  VI  │     405
                │                                        │      │
*3751-PS        │Diary of the German Minister of Justice,│      │
                │1935 concerning prosecution of church   │      │
                │officials and punishment in             │      │
                │concentration camps. (USA 828; USA 858) │  VI  │     636
                │                                        │      │
*D-75           │SD Inspector Bierkamp’s letter, 12      │      │
                │December 1941, to RSHA enclosing copy of│      │
                │secret decree signed by Bormann,        │      │
                │entitled Relationship of National       │      │
                │Socialism and Christianity. (USA 348)   │  VI  │    1035
                │                                        │      │
*D-84           │Gestapo instructions to State Police    │      │
                │Departments, 5 August 1937, regarding   │      │
                │protective custody for Bible students.  │      │
                │(USA 236)                               │  VI  │    1040
                │                                        │      │
*EC-68          │Confidential letter from Minister of    │      │
                │Finance and Economy, Baden, containing  │      │
                │directives on treatment of Polish       │      │
                │Farmworkers, 6 March 1941. (USA 205)    │ VII  │     260
                │                                        │      │
*R-101-A        │Letter from Chief of the Security Police│      │
                │and Security Service to the Reich       │      │
                │Commissioner for the Consolidation of   │      │
                │German Folkdom, 5 April 1940, with      │      │
                │enclosures concerning confiscation of   │      │
                │church property. (USA 358)              │ VIII │      87
                │                                        │      │
 R-101-B        │Letter from Himmler to Dr. Winkler, 31  │      │
                │October 1940, concerning treatment of   │      │
                │church property in incorporated Eastern │      │
                │countries.                              │ VIII │      89
                │                                        │      │
*R-101-C        │Letter to Reich Leader SS, 30 July 1941,│      │
                │concerning treatment of church property │      │
                │in incorporated Eastern areas. (USA 358)│ VIII │      91
                │                                        │      │
*R-101-D        │Letter from Chief of Staff of the Reich │      │
                │Main Security Office (RSHA) to Reich    │      │
                │Leader SS, 30 March 1942, concerning    │      │
                │confiscation of church property. (USA   │      │
                │358)                                    │ VIII │      92
                │                                        │      │
*R-103          │Letter from Polish Main Committee to    │      │
                │General Government of Poland on         │      │
                │situation of Polish workers in the      │      │
                │Reich, 17 May 1944. (USA 204)           │ VIII │     104
                │                                        │      │
*R-145          │State Police Order, 28 May 1934, at     │      │
                │Duesseldorf, signed Schmid, concerning  │      │
                │sanction of denominational youth and    │      │
                │professional associations and           │      │
                │distribution of publications in         │      │
                │churches. (USA 745)                     │ VIII │     248


             7. ADOPTION AND PUBLICATION OF THE PROGRAM FOR
                           PERSECUTION OF JEWS

A. _The official program of the NSDAP, proclaimed 24 February 1920 by
Adolf Hitler at a public gathering in Munich._

    Point 4: “None but members of the nation (_Volksgenosse_) may be
    citizens. None but those of German blood, whatever their creed,
    may be members of the nation. No Jew, therefore, may be a member
    of the nation.”

    Point 5: “Anyone who is not a citizen may live in Germany only
    as a guest and must be regarded as being subject to legislation
    for foreigners.”

    Point 6: “The right to determine matters concerning government
    and legislation is to be enjoyed by the citizen alone. We demand
    therefore that all appointments to public office, of whatever
    kind, whether in the Reich, Land, or municipality, be filled
    only by citizens. * * *”

    Point 7: “We demand that the state make it its first duty to
    promote the industry and livelihood of citizens. If it is not
    possible to nourish the entire population of the State, the
    members of foreign nations (non-citizens) are to be expelled
    from the Reich.”

    Point 8: “Any further immigration of non-Germans is to be
    prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who entered Germany
    subsequent to 2 August 1914, shall be forced immediately to
    leave the Reich.”

    Point 23: “We demand legal warfare against conscious political
    lies and their dissemination through the press. In order to make
    possible the creation of a German press we demand:

    (_a_) that all editors and collaborators of newspapers published
    in the German language be members of the nation.

    (_b_) non-German newspapers be requested to have express
    permission of the State to be published. They may not be printed
    in the German language.

    (_c_) non-Germans be prohibited by law from financial
    participation in or influence on German newspapers, and that as
    penalty for contravention of the law such newspapers be
    suppressed and all non-Germans participating in it expelled from
    the Reich. * * *” (_1708-PS_)

B. _Development of ideological basis for anti-Semitic measures._

Among the innumerable statements made by the leaders of the NSDAP are
the following:

Rosenberg advocated in 1920 the adoption of the following program
concerning the Jews:

    “(1) The Jews are to be recognized as a (separate) nation living
    in Germany, irrespective of the religion they belong to.

    (2) A Jew is he whose parents on either side are nationally
    Jews. Anyone who has a Jewish husband or wife is henceforth a
    Jew.

    (3) Jews have no right to speak and write on or be active in
    German politics.

    (4) Jews have no right to hold public offices, or to serve in
    the Army either as soldiers or as officers. However, their
    contribution of work may be considered.

    (5) Jews have no right to be leaders of cultural institutions of
    the state and community (theaters, galleries, etc.) or to be
    professors and teachers in German schools and universities.

    (6) Jews have no right to be active in state or municipal
    commissions for examinations, control, censorship, etc. Jews
    have no right to represent the German Reich in economic
    treaties; they have no right to be represented in the
    directorate of state banks or communal credit establishments.

    (7) Foreign Jews have no right to settle in Germany permanently.
    Their admission into the German political community is to be
    forbidden under all circumstances.

    (8) Zionism should be energetically supported in order to
    promote the departure of German Jews—in numbers to be
    determined annually—to Palestine or generally across the
    border.” (_2842-PS_)

Rosenberg’s “Zionism” was neither sincere nor consistent, for in 1921 he
advocated breaking up Zionism, “which is involved in English-Jewish
politics.” (_2432-PS_). He advocated in 1921 the adoption by “all
Germans” of the following slogans: “Get the Jews out of all parties.
Institute measures for the repudiation of all citizenship rights of all
Jews and half-Jews: banish all the Eastern Jews; exercise strictest
vigilance over the native ones. * * *” (_2432-PS_)

Frick and other Nazis introduced a motion in the Reichstag on 27 May
1924, “to place all members of the Jewish race under special laws.”
(_2840-PS_). Frick also asked in the Reichstag, on 25 August 1924, for
the realization of the Nazi program by “exclusion of all Jews from
public office.” (_2893-PS_)

C. _Anti-Semitism was seized upon by the Nazi conspirators as a
convenient instrument to unite groups and classes of divergent views and
interests under one banner._

Adolf Hitler described racial anti-Semitism as “a new creed for the
masses” and its spreading among the German people as “the most
formidable task to be accomplished by our movement.” (_2881-PS_).
Rosenberg called for the “_Zusammenraffen aller Deutschen zu einer
stahlharten, voelkischen Einheitsfront_” (gathering of all Germans into
a steel-hard racial united front) on the basis of anti-Semitic slogans
(_2432-PS_). Gotfried Feder, official commentator of the Nazi Party
program, stated: “Anti-Semitism is in a way the emotional foundation of
our movement.” (_2844-PS_)

There are innumerable admissions on the part of the Nazi leaders as to
the part which their anti-Semitic propaganda played in their acquisition
of control. The following statement concerning the purpose of racial
propaganda was made by Dr. Walter Gross, director of the Office of
Racial Policy of the Nazi Party:

    “In the years of fight, the aim was to employ all means of
    propaganda which promised success in order to gather people who
    were ready to overthrow, together with the Party, the harmful
    post-war regime and put the power into the hand of the Fuehrer
    and his collaborators. * * * In these years of fight the aim was
    purely political: I meant the overthrow of the regime and
    acquisition of power. * * * Within this great general task the
    education in racial thinking necessarily played a decisive part,
    because herein lies basically the deepest revolutionary nature
    of the new spirit.” (_2845-PS_)

In another official Nazi publication, recommended for circulation in all
Party units and establishments, it is stated:

    “The whole treatment of the Jewish problem in the years prior to
    our seizure of power is to be regarded essentially from the
    point of view of the political education of the German people.”
    (To disregard this angle of the use made of anti-Semitism means)
    “to disregard the success and aim of the work toward racial
    education.” (_2427-PS_)

D. _After the acquisition of power the Nazi conspirators initiated a
state policy of persecution of the Jews._

(1) _The first organized act was the boycott of Jewish enterprises on 1
April 1933._ The boycott action was approved by all the defendants who
were members of the _Reichsregierung_ (Reich Cabinet), and Streicher was
charged with its execution. Presented as an alleged act of “self
defense”, the boycott action was intended to frighten Jewish public
opinion abroad and force it, by the threat of collective responsibility
to all Jews in Germany, to desist from warning against the Nazi danger.
(_2409-PS_; _2410-PS_)

The boycott was devised as a demonstration of the extent to which the
Nazi Party controlled its members and the German masses; consequently,
spontaneous action and physical violence were discouraged. Goebbels
stated:

    “The national socialist leadership had declared: ‘The boycott is
    legal’, and the government demands that the people permit that
    the boycott be carried out legally. We expect iron discipline.
    This must be for the whole world a wonderful show of unity and
    manly training. To those abroad who believe that we could not
    manage it, we want to show that we have the people in our hand.”
    (_2431-PS_)

(2) _Laws eliminating Jews from various offices and functions._ The Nazi
conspirators legislative program was gradual and, in the beginning,
relatively “moderate.” In the first period, which dates from 7 April
1933 until September 1935, the laws eliminated Jews from public office
and limited their participation in schools, certain professions, and
cultural establishments. The following are the major laws issued in this
period:

  Document │   Date   │Reichsge│    Title and gist of law     │Signed by
    No.    │          │setzblat│                              │
           │          │ t page │                              │
           │          │        │                              │
 _1397-PS_ │    7.4.33│I.175   │_Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung │Hitler
           │          │        │  des Berufsbeamtentums_ (Law │Frick
           │          │        │  for the reestablishment of  │Schwerin
           │          │        │  the professional civil      │V. Krosigk
           │          │        │  service), removing Jews from│
           │          │        │  Civil Service.              │
           │          │        │                              │
           │    7.4.33│I.188   │_Gesetz uber die Zulassung zur│Guertner
           │          │        │  Rechtsanwaltschaft_ (Law    │
           │          │        │  relating to admission to the│
           │          │        │  Bar) removing Jews from the │
           │          │        │  Bar.                        │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2868-PS_ │   22.4.33│I.217   │_Gesetz betreffend die        │Hitler
           │          │        │  Zulassung zur               │Guertner
           │          │        │  Patentanwaltschaft_ (Law    │
           │          │        │  relating to the admission to│
           │          │        │  the profession of patent    │
           │          │        │  agent and lawyer) excluding │
           │          │        │  Jews from acting as patent  │
           │          │        │  attorneys.                  │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2869-PS_ │    6.5.33│I.257   │_Gesetz uber die Zulassung von│Hitler
           │          │        │  Steuerberatern_ (Law        │Schwerin
           │          │        │  relating to the admission of│V. Krosigk
           │          │        │  Tax Advisors) eliminating   │
           │          │        │  “non-Aryans” from the       │
           │          │        │  profession of tax           │
           │          │        │  consultants.                │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2084-PS_ │   22.4.33│I.215   │_Gesetz uber die uberfullung  │Hitler
           │          │        │  deutscher Schullen_ (Law    │Frick
           │          │        │  against the overcrowding of │
           │          │        │  German schools and higher   │
           │          │        │  institutions) limiting      │
           │          │        │  drastically the number of   │
           │          │        │  Jewish students.            │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2870-PS_ │   26.7.33│I.538   │_Verordnung zur Durchfuehrung │Pfundtner
           │          │        │  des Gesetzes uber den       │(Asst. to
           │          │        │  Widerruf von                │Frick)
           │          │        │  Einbuergerungen_ (Executing │
           │          │        │  decree for the law about the│
           │          │        │  Repeal of Naturalizations   │
           │          │        │  and the adjudication of     │
           │          │        │  German citizenship) defining│
           │          │        │  Jews from Eastern Europe as │
           │          │        │  “undesirable” and subject to│
           │          │        │  denationalization.          │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2083-PS_ │   4.10.33│I.713   │_Schriftleitergesetz_         │Hitler
           │          │        │  (Editorial Law) barring     │Goebbels
           │          │        │  “non-Aryans” and persons    │
           │          │        │  married to“"non-Aryans” from│
           │          │        │  the newspaper profession.   │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2984-PS_ │   21.5.35│I.608   │_Wehrgesetz_ (Law concerning  │V.
           │          │        │  Armed Forces) barring       │Blomberg
           │          │        │  “non-Aryans” from military  │
           │          │        │  service.                    │

On 10 September 1935, Minister of Education Rust issued a circular
ordering the complete elimination of Jewish pupils from “Aryan” schools
(_2894-PS_). This legislative activity, in addition to being the first
step towards the elimination of the Jews, served an “educational”
purpose and was a further test of the extent of control exerted by the
Nazi Party and regime over the German masses.

Dr. Achim Gercke, racial expert of the Ministry of the Interior, stated:

    “The laws are mainly educational and give direction. The aspect
    of the laws should not be underestimated. The entire nation is
    enlightened on the Jewish problem; it learns to understand that
    the national community is a blood community; it understands for
    the first time the racial idea, and is diverted from a too
    theoretical treatment of the Jewish problem and faced with the
    actual solution.” (_2904-PS_)

It was clear, however, that the Nazi conspirators had a far more
ambitious program in the Jewish problem and put off its realization for
reasons of expediency. In the words of Dr. Gercke:

    “Nevertheless the laws published thus far cannot bring a final
    solution of the Jewish problem, because the time has not yet
    come for it, although the decrees give the general direction and
    leave open the possibility of further developments.

    “It would be in every respect premature now to work out and
    publicly discuss plans to achieve more than can be achieved for
    the time being. However, one must point out a few basic
    principles so that the ideas which one desires and must have
    ripened will contain no mistakes. * * *

    “All suggestions aiming at a permanent situation, at a
    stabilization of, the status of the Jews in Germany do not solve
    the Jewish problem, because they do not detach the Jews from
    Germany. * * *

    “_Plans and programs must contain an aim pointing to the future
    and not merely consisting of the regulation of a momentarily
    uncomfortable situation._” (_2904-PS_)

(3) _Deprivation of Jews of their rights as citizens._ After a
propaganda barrage, in which the speeches and writings of Streicher were
most prominent, the Nazi conspirators initiated the second period of
anti-Jewish legislation (15 September 1935 to September 1938). In this
period the Jews were deprived of their full rights as citizens (First
Nurnberg Law) and forbidden to marry “Aryans” (Second Nurnberg Law).
Further steps were taken to eliminate Jews from certain professions, and
the groundwork was laid for the subsequent expropriation of Jewish
property. These laws were hailed as the fulfillment of the Nazi Party
program.

The major laws issued in this period are listed below:

  Document │   Date   │Reichsge│    Title and gist of law     │Signed by
    No.    │          │setzblat│                              │
           │          │ t page │                              │
           │          │        │                              │
 _1416-PS_ │   15.9.35│I 1145  │_Reichsbuergergesetz_ (Reich  │Hitler
           │          │        │  Citizenship Law), first     │Frick
           │          │        │  Nurnberg Law, reserving     │
           │          │        │  citizenship for subjects of │
           │          │        │  German blood.               │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2000-PS_ │   15.9.35│I 1146  │_Gesetz zum Schutze des       │Hitler
           │          │        │  deutschen Blutes_, (Law for │Frick
           │          │        │  _protection of German_ blood│Guertner
           │          │        │  and German honor),          │Hess
           │          │        │  forbidding marriages and    │
           │          │        │  extra-marital relations     │
           │          │        │  between Jews and “Aryans”.  │
           │          │        │                              │
 _1417-PS_ │  14.11.35│I 1333  │_Erste Verordnung zum         │Hitler
           │          │        │  Reichsbuergergesetz_ (First │Frick Hess
           │          │        │  regulation to Reich         │
           │          │        │  citizenship law), defining  │
           │          │        │  the terms “Jew” and         │
           │          │        │  “part-Jew”. Jewish officials│
           │          │        │  to be dismissed.            │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2871-PS_ │    7.3.36│I 133   │_Gesetz ueber das             │Hitler
           │          │        │  Reichstagwahlrecht_ (Law    │Frick
           │          │        │  governing elections to the  │
           │          │        │  Reichstag) barring Jews from│
           │          │        │  Reichstag vote.             │
           │          │        │                              │
 _1406-PS_ │   26.4.38│I 414   │_Verordnung ueber die         │Goering
           │          │        │  Ammeldung des Vermogens von │Frick
           │          │        │  Juden_ (Decree for reporting│
           │          │        │  Jewish-owned property),     │
           │          │        │  basis for subsequent        │
           │          │        │  expropriation.              │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2872-PS_ │   25.7.38│I 969   │_Vierte Verordnung zum        │Frick
           │          │        │  Reichsbuergergesetz._ Fourth│
           │          │        │  decree on the Citizenship   │
           │          │        │  Law, revoking licenses of   │
           │          │        │  Jewish physicians.          │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2873-PS_ │   17.8.38│I 1044  │_Zweite Verordnung zur        │Frick
           │          │        │  Durchfuhrung des Gesetzes   │
           │          │        │  ueber die Aenderung von     │
           │          │        │  Familiennamen und Vornamen_ │
           │          │        │  (Second decree on law       │
           │          │        │  concerning change of first  │
           │          │        │  and last names), forcing    │
           │          │        │  Jews to adopt the names     │
           │          │        │  “Israel” and “Sara”.        │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2874-PS_ │   27.9.38│I 1403  │_Fuenfte Verordnung zum       │
           │          │        │  Reichsbuergergesetz._ (Fifth│
           │          │        │  decree to law relating to   │
           │          │        │  the Reich citizenship),     │
           │          │        │  revoking admission of Jewish│
           │          │        │  lawyers.                    │

(4) _Program of 9 November 1938 and elimination of Jews from economic
life._

In the autumn of 1938, within the framework of economic preparation for
aggressive war and as an act of defiance to world opinion, the Nazi
conspirators began to put into effect a program of complete elimination
of the Jews. The measures taken were partly presented as retaliation
against “world Jewry” in connection with the killing of a German embassy
official in Paris. Unlike the boycott action in April, 1933, when care
was taken to avoid violence, an allegedly “spontaneous” pogrom was
staged and carried out all over Germany on orders of Heydrich.

The organized character of the pogrom is also obvious from the admission
of Heydrich and others at a meeting presided over by Goering at the Air
Ministry in Berlin. (_1816-PS_)

The legislative measures which followed were discussed and approved in
their final form at a meeting on 12 November 1938 under the chairmanship
of Goering, with the participation of Frick, Funk and others. The
meeting was called following Hitler’s orders “requesting that the Jewish
questions be now, once and for all, coordinated and solved one way or
another.” The participants agreed on measures to be taken “for the
elimination of the Jew from German economy.” Other possibilities, such
as the establishment of ghettos, stigmatization through special
insignia, and “the main problem, namely to kick the Jew out of Germany”,
were also discussed. All these measures were later enacted as soon as
conditions permitted. (_1816-PS_)

The laws issued in this period were signed mostly by Goering, in his
capacity as Deputy for the Four Year Plan, and were thus connected with
the consolidation of control over German economy in preparation for
aggressive war.

The major laws issued in this period are listed below:

  Document │   Date   │Reichsge│    Title and gist of law     │Signed by
    No.    │          │setzblat│                              │
           │          │ t page │                              │
           │          │        │                              │
 _1412-PS_ │  12.11.38│I 1579  │_Verordnung ueber eine        │Goering
           │          │        │  Suhneleistung der Juden_    │
           │          │        │  (Order concerning expiation │
           │          │        │  contribution of Jews of     │
           │          │        │  German nationality),        │
           │          │        │  obligating all German Jews  │
           │          │        │  to pay a collective fine of │
           │          │        │  1.000.000.000 Reichsmark.   │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2875-PS_ │  12.11.38│I 1580  │_Verordnung zur Ausschaltung  │Goering
           │          │        │  der Juden aus dem deutschen │
           │          │        │  Wirtschaftsleben_ (Decree on│
           │          │        │  elimination of Jews from    │
           │          │        │  German economic life),      │
           │          │        │  barring Jews from trade and │
           │          │        │  crafts.                     │
           │          │        │                              │
 _1415-PS_ │  28.11.38│I 1676  │_Polizeiverordnung ueber das  │Heydrich
           │          │        │  Auftreten der Juden in der  │(assistant
           │          │        │  Queffentlichkeit_ (Police   │to Frick)
           │          │        │  regulation of the appearance│
           │          │        │  of Jews in public), limiting│
           │          │        │  movement of Jews to certain │
           │          │        │  localities and hours.       │
           │          │        │                              │
 _1409-PS_ │   3.12.38│I 1709  │_Verordnung ueber den Einsatz │Funk Frick
           │          │        │  des Juedischen Vermoegens_  │
           │          │        │  (Order concerning the       │
           │          │        │  Utilization of Jewish       │
           │          │        │  property), setting time     │
           │          │        │  limit for the sale or       │
           │          │        │  liquidation of Jewish       │
           │          │        │  enterprises; forcing Jews to│
           │          │        │  deposit shares and          │
           │          │        │  securities held by them;    │
           │          │        │  forbidding sale or          │
           │          │        │  acquisition of gold and     │
           │          │        │  precious stones by Jews.    │
           │          │        │                              │
 _1419-PS_ │   30.4.39│I 864   │_Gesetz ueber                 │Hitler
           │          │        │  Mietverhaeltnisse mit Juden_│Guertner
           │          │        │  (Law concerning Jewish      │Krohn
           │          │        │  tenants) granting to        │Frick Hess
           │          │        │  landlords the right to give │
           │          │        │  notice to Jewish tenants    │
           │          │        │  before legal expiration of  │
           │          │        │  lease.                      │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2876-PS_ │    4.7.39│I 1097  │_Zehnte Verordnung zum        │Frick Rust
           │          │        │  Reichsbuergergesetz_ (Tenth │Kerrl Hess
           │          │        │  decree relating to the Reich│
           │          │        │  Citizenship Law), forcible  │
           │          │        │  congregation of Jews in the │
           │          │        │  “Reichsvereinigung der Juden│
           │          │        │  in Deutschland”.            │
           │          │        │                              │
 _2877-PS_ │    1.9.41│I 547   │_Polizeiverordnung ueber die  │Heydrich
           │          │        │  Konnzeichnung der Juden_    │
           │          │        │  (Police order concerning    │
           │          │        │  identification of Jews)     │
           │          │        │  forcing all Jews over 6     │
           │          │        │  years of age to wear the    │
           │          │        │  Star of David.              │

(5) _Extermination of German Jews._ Early in 1939 Hitler and the other
Nazi conspirators decided to arrive at a “final solution of the Jewish
problem.” In connection with preparations for aggressive war, further
consolidation of controls and removal of elements not belonging to the
_Volksgemeinschaft_ (racial community) were deemed necessary. The
conspirators also anticipated the conquest of territories in Eastern
Europe inhabitated by large numbers of Jews and the impossibility of
forcing large-scale emigration in wartime. Hence, other and more drastic
measures became necessary. The emphasis in this period shifted from
legislative acts to police measures.

On 24 January 1939 Heydrich was charged with the mission of “arriving at
a solution of the Jewish problem.” (_710-PS_)

On 15 January 1939 Rosenberg stated in a speech at Detmold:

    “For Germany the Jewish problem will be solved only when the
    last Jew has left Germany.”

On 7 February 1939, Rosenberg appealed to foreign nations to forget
“ideological differences” and unite against the “real enemy,” the Jew.
He advocated the creation of a “reservation” where the Jews of all
countries should be concentrated (_2843-PS_). In his Reichstag speech on
30 January 1939, Hitler made the following prophecy:

    “The result [of war] will be * * * the annihilation of the
    Jewish race in Europe.” (_2663-PS_)

Thus the direction was given for a policy which was carried out as soon
as the conquest of foreign territories created the material conditions.
(For the carrying out and results of the program of the Nazi
conspirators against Jewry, see Chapter XII.)

In the final period of the anti-Jewish crusade very few legislative
measures were passed. The Jews were delivered to the SS and various
extermination staffs. The last law dealing with the Jews in Germany,
signed by Frick, Bormann, Schwerin V. Krosigk, and Thierach, put them
entirely outside the law and ordered the confiscation by the State of
the property of dead Jews (_1422-PS_). This law was a weak reflection of
a factual situation already in existence. Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart,
assistant to Frick, stated at that time:

    “The aim of the racial legislation may be regarded as already
    achieved and consequently the racial legislation as essentially
    closed. It led to the temporary solution of the Jewish problem
    and at the same time prepared the final solution. Many
    regulations will lose their practical importance as Germany
    approaches the achievement of the final goal in the Jewish
    problem.” (_Stuckart and Schiedermair: Rassen und Erbpflege in
    der Gesetzgebung des Reiches_ (The care for Race and Heredity in
    the Legislation of the Reich), Leipzig, 1943, p. 14.)

                 *        *        *        *        *

    LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ADOPTION AND
           PUBLICATION OF THE PROGRAM FOR PERSECUTION OF JEWS

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │      │
                │  (d).                                  │  I   │      20
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
  *710-PS       │Letter from Goering to Heydrich, 31 July│      │
                │1941, concerning solution of Jewish     │      │
                │question. (USA 509)                     │ III  │     525
                │                                        │      │
  1397-PS       │Law for the reestablishment of the      │      │
                │Professional Civil Service, 7 April     │      │
                │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │175.                                    │ III  │     981
                │                                        │      │
  1401-PS       │Law regarding admission to the Bar, 7   │      │
                │April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│      │
                │I, p. 188.                              │ III  │     989
                │                                        │      │
  1406-PS       │Decree for reporting of Jewish-owned    │      │
                │property, 26 April 1938. 1938           │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 414.      │ III  │    1001
                │                                        │      │
  1409-PS       │Order concerning utilization of Jewish  │      │
                │property, 3 December 1938. 1938         │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1709.     │  IV  │       1
                │                                        │      │
  1412-PS       │Decree relating to payment of fine by   │      │
                │Jews of German nationality, 12 November │      │
                │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │1579.                                   │  IV  │       6
                │                                        │      │
  1415-PS       │Police regulation concerning appearance │      │
                │of Jews in public, 28 November 1938.    │      │
                │1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1676.│  IV  │       6
                │                                        │      │
  1416-PS       │Reich Citizen Law of 15 September 1935. │      │
                │1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1146.│  IV  │       7
                │                                        │      │
 *1417-PS       │First regulation to the Reichs          │      │
                │Citizenship Law, 14 November 1935. 1935 │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1333. (GB │      │
                │258)                                    │  IV  │       8
                │                                        │      │
  1419-PS       │Law concerning Jewish tenants, 30 April │      │
                │1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │864.                                    │  IV  │      10
                │                                        │      │
  1422-PS       │Thirteenth regulation under Reich       │      │
                │Citizenship Law, 1 July 1943. 1943      │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 372.      │  IV  │      14
                │                                        │      │
 *1708-PS       │The Program of the NSDAP. National      │      │
                │Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. (USA│      │
                │255; USA 324)                           │  IV  │     208
                │                                        │      │
 *1816-PS       │Stenographic report of the meeting on   │      │
                │The Jewish Question, under the          │      │
                │Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, 12│      │
                │November 1938. (USA 261)                │  IV  │     425
                │                                        │      │
  2000-PS       │Law for protection of German blood and  │      │
                │German honor, 15 September 1935. 1935   │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 100, p.  │      │
                │1146.                                   │  IV  │     636
                │                                        │      │
  2022-PS       │Law against overcrowding of German      │      │
                │schools and Higher Institutions, 25     │      │
                │April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│      │
                │I, p. 225.                              │  IV  │     651
                │                                        │      │
  2083-PS       │Editorial control law, 4 October 1933.  │      │
                │1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 713. │  IV  │     709
                │                                        │      │
  2084-PS       │Law on formation of the Student         │      │
                │Organization at Scientific Univesities, │      │
                │22 April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,  │      │
                │Part I, p. 215.                         │  IV  │     718
                │                                        │      │
 *2409-PS       │Extracts from The Imperial House to the │      │
                │Reich Chancellery by Dr. Joseph         │      │
                │Goebbels. (USA 262)                     │  V   │      83
                │                                        │      │
  2410-PS       │Article by Julius Streicher on the      │      │
                │“coming popular action” under banner    │      │
                │headline “Beat the World Enemy”, from   │      │
                │Voelkischer Beobachter, South German    │      │
                │Edition, 31 March 1933.                 │  V   │      85
                │                                        │      │
  2427-PS       │The Racial Awakening of German Nation by│      │
                │Dr. Rudolf Frercks, in National         │      │
                │Political Enlightenment Pamphlets.      │  V   │      92
                │                                        │      │
  2431-PS       │The Revolution of the Germans; 14 years │      │
                │of National Socialism, by Dr. Joseph    │      │
                │Goebbels.                               │  V   │      92
                │                                        │      │
  2432-PS       │Extracts from Rosenberg’s, Writings From│      │
                │The Years, 1921-1923.                   │  V   │      93
                │                                        │      │
 *2663-PS       │Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag, 30    │      │
                │January 1939, quoted from Voelkischer   │      │
                │Beobachter, Munich edition, 1 February  │      │
                │1939. (USA 268)                         │  V   │     367
                │                                        │      │
  2840-PS       │Dr. Wilhelm Frick and his Ministry,     │      │
                │1937, p. 180-181.                       │  V   │     503
                │                                        │      │
  2841-PS       │Extract from the Care for Race and      │      │
                │Heredity in the Legislation of the      │      │
                │Reich, Leipzig, 1943, p. 14.            │  V   │     504
                │                                        │      │
  2842-PS       │Extract from Writings of the years,     │      │
                │1917-21, by Alfred Rosenberg, published │      │
                │in Munich 1943, pp. 320-321.            │  V   │     504
                │                                        │      │
  2843-PS       │Race Politics from Documents of German  │      │
                │Politics, Vol. VII, pp. 728-729.        │  V   │     505
                │                                        │      │
  2844-PS       │The Program of the Nazi Party, by       │      │
                │Gottfried Feder, August 1927, Munich, p.│      │
                │17.                                     │  V   │     506
                │                                        │      │
  2845-PS       │One Year of Racial Political Education  │      │
                │by Dr. Gross in National Socialist      │      │
                │Monthly No. 54, September 1934, pp.     │      │
                │833-834.                                │  V   │     506
                │                                        │      │
  2868-PS       │Law relating to admission of profession │      │
                │of Patent-Agent and Lawyer, 22 April    │      │
                │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II,  │      │
                │No. 41, pp. 217-8.                      │  V   │     529
                │                                        │      │
  2869-PS       │Law relating to admission of Tax        │      │
                │Advisors, 6 May 1933. 1933              │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 49, p.   │      │
                │257.                                    │  V   │     530
                │                                        │      │
  2870-PS       │Executory decree for law about repeal of│      │
                │Naturalization and Adjudication of      │      │
                │German Citizenship, 26 July 1933. 1933  │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 538.      │  V   │     530
                │                                        │      │
  2871-PS       │Law governing elections to Reichstag, 7 │      │
                │March 1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, No. │      │
                │19, p. 133.                             │  V   │     532
                │                                        │      │
  2872-PS       │Fourth decree relative to Reich Citizen │      │
                │Law of 25 July 1938. 1938               │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 969.      │  V   │     533
                │                                        │      │
  2873-PS       │Second decree allotting to              │      │
                │Implementation of Law on change of first│      │
                │and family names, 17 August 1938. 1938  │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1044.     │  V   │     534
                │                                        │      │
  2874-PS       │Fifth decree to law relating to Reich   │      │
                │Citizenship, 27 September 1938. 1938    │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 165, p.  │      │
                │1403.                                   │  V   │     535
                │                                        │      │
  2875-PS       │Decree on exclusion of Jews from German │      │
                │economic life, 12 November 1938.        │  V   │     536
                │                                        │      │
  2876-PS       │Tenth decree relating to Reich          │      │
                │Citizenship Law, 4 July 1939. 1939      │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1097.     │  V   │     537
                │                                        │      │
  2877-PS       │Police decree concerning “marking” of   │      │
                │Jews, 1 September 1941. 1941            │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 100, p.  │      │
                │547.                                    │  V   │     539
                │                                        │      │
  2881-PS       │Hitler’s speech of 12 April 1922, quoted│      │
                │in Adolf Hitler’s Speeches, published by│      │
                │Dr. Ernst Boepple, Munich, 1934, pp.    │      │
                │20-21, 72.                              │  V   │     548
                │                                        │      │
  2893-PS       │Article: “Dr. Frick and the Unity of the│      │
                │Reich” by Walter Koerber, published in  │      │
                │Our Reich Cabinet, Berlin, 1936, p. 87. │  V   │     562
                │                                        │      │
  2894-PS       │General Decree of September 10, 1935 on │      │
                │establishment of separate Jewish        │      │
                │schools, published in Documents of      │      │
                │German Politics, 1937, p. 152.          │  V   │     562
                │                                        │      │
  2904-PS       │The Racial Problem and the New Reich,   │      │
                │published in The National Socialist     │      │
                │Monthly, No. 38, May 1933, pp.196-7.    │  V   │     570
                │                                        │      │
  2984-PS       │Law concerning armed forces, 21 May     │      │
                │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I.   │  V   │     686
                │                                        │      │
 *3054-PS       │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801


            8. RESHAPING OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF YOUTH

A. _The Nazi conspirators reshaped the educational system._

(1) _The Nazi conspirators publicly announced the purposes of their
educational and training program._ Hitler stated at Elbing, Germany:

    “When an opponent declares, ‘I will not come over to your side,
    and you will not get me on your side,’ I calmly say, ‘Your child
    belongs to me already. A people lives forever. What are you? You
    will pass on. Your descendants however now stand in the new
    camp. _In a short time they will know nothing else but this new
    community.’_” (_2455-PS_)

Hitler said on 1 May 1937:

    “The youth of today is ever the people of tomorrow. For this
    reason we have set before ourselves the task of inoculating our
    youth with the spirit of this community of the people at a very
    early age, at an age when human beings are still unperverted and
    therefore unspoiled. * * * This Reich stands, and it is building
    itself up for the future, upon its youth. And this new Reich
    will give its youth to no one, _but will itself take youth and
    give to youth its own education and its own upbringing_.”
    (_2454-PS_)

The first sentence in the official instructors manual for high schools
reads:

    “The German school is a part of the National Socialist
    Educational order. It is its obligation to form the national
    socialistic personality in cooperation with the other
    educational powers of the nation, but by its distinctive
    educational means.” (_2453-PS_)

Hitler stated in _Mein Kampf_:

    “On this basis the whole education by the National State must
    aim primarily not at the stuffing with mere knowledge, but at
    the building up of bodies which are physically healthy to the
    core. The development of intellectual faculties comes only after
    this.” (_2392-PS_)

(2) _They transferred responsibility for education from the states to
the Reich._ The Reich Ministry of Education was established, and control
of all schools, public and private, including universities and adult
educational activities, was transferred to this Reichsministry
(_2078-PS_; _2088-PS_). The control of education by the local
authorities was replaced by the absolute authority of the Reich in all
educational matters. (_2393-PS_)

(3) _They changed the curricula and textbooks._

_Kindergarten_: Children from two to six years were trained in more than
15,000 Kindergartens operated by the Party and State. The teachers in
charge were trained in special schools that emphasized the ideological
views of the Nazi Party. The children were given a systematic training
in Nazi ideology. (_2443-PS_; _2441-PS_)

_Elementary schools_: Primary emphasis was placed on physical training.
History, German race culture and mathematics were the other subjects
emphasized. These subjects were taught in such a way as to emphasize the
cultural superiority of the German people, the importance of race, the
Fuehrer principle, glorification of German war heroes, the subversive
elements that caused the defeat of Germany in World War I, the shame of
the Versailles Treaty, and the rebirth of Germany under the Nazis.
(_2392-PS_; _2397-PS_; _2441-PS_; _2394-PS_)

In addition to education in the schools all children from six to ten
years were registered in the _Kindergruppen_ (Children’s Groups)
conducted by the National Socialist _Frauenschaft_ (National Socialist
Women’s Organization). All children were required to obtain an
efficiency record card and uniform and were instructed in Nazi ideology
by the members of the Women’s Organization. (_2441-PS_; _2452-PS_)

_High Schools_ (Hoeheren Schule): The curricula and organization of the
_Hoeheren_ School was modified by a series of decrees of the Minister of
Education in order to make these schools effective instruments for the
teaching of the Nazi doctrines. A new curricula emphasizing physical
training, German war history, and race culture was introduced.
(_2453-PS_)

_Universities_: The schools of politics and physical education became
the largest colleges at the universities. Beginning in 1933 the Nazis
introduced courses in heredity and race culture, ancient and modern
German history, biology and geopolitics. (_2443-PS_; _2441-PS_)

Textbooks in the schools were changed to accord with the expressed
objectives of the Nazi conspirators. (_2446-PS_; _2442-PS_; _2444-PS_;
_2445-PS_)

(4) _The Nazi conspirators acquired domination and control over all
teachers._ The law for the reestablishing of the professional civil
service made it possible for the Nazi conspirators thoroughly to
reexamine all German teachers and to remove all “harmful and
untrustworthy” elements (_1397-PS_; _2392-PS_). Many teachers and
professors (mostly Jewish) were dismissed and were replaced with “State
spirited” teachers (_2392-PS_). All teachers were required to take an
oath of loyalty and obedience to Hitler. (_2061-PS_). All teachers were
required to belong to the National Socialist _Lehrerbund_ (National
Socialist Teachers League), which organization was charged with the
training of all teachers in the theories and doctrines of the NSDAP.
(_2452-PS_)

In 1934 the National Socialist Teachers League was declared to be the
official organ of German education. (_2393-PS_)

The Civil Service Act of 1937 required the teachers to be “the executors
of the will of the party-supported State.” It required them to be ready
at “any time to defend without reservation the National Socialist
State.” The law required the teachers to participate strenuously in
elections, have thorough knowledge of Party principles and literature,
render the Hitler Salute, send their children to the Hitler Youth, and
educate them in the Nazi spirit (_2340-PS_). Before taking their second
examination (required for permanent appointment), teachers in Prussia
were required to show service in the SA and in the _Arbeitsdienst_
(Labor Service) (_2392-PS_). Candidates for teaching and other public
positions were required to have “proved themselves” in the Hitler Jugend
(_2451-PS_; _2900-PS_). Teachers’ academies were judged by the Minister
of Education on their ability to turn out men and women with new ideas
“based on blood and soil”. (_2394-PS_)

The leadership principle replaced the democratic school principle. A
decree of the Reich Minister of Education made the head of any school
fully responsible for the conduct of the institution in line with the
official party ideology. Teachers committees and Student Committees were
abolished (_2393-PS_; _2392-PS_). A “confidential instructor,” the
school youth warden of the Hitler Jugend, appointed by the Hitler Youth
authorities, was assigned to each school (_2396-PS_). The “Parents
Advisory Committees” in the public schools were dissolved, and replaced
by the “School Communities,” (_Schulgemeinde_). The headmaster was the
leader. He appointed, after consultation with the local party leader,
two to five teachers or parents, known as “_Jugendwalter_,” (Youth
Advisors) and one Hitler Youth leader, who was appointed after
consultation with the Hitler Youth officials in the district
(_2399-PS_). The duties of the “School Community” were to bring to the
attention of the public the educational objectives of the Nazi Party,
including race questions, heredity indoctrination, physical training,
and the Youth League activities. The function of advising the school
authorities, formerly performed by the “Parents Advisory Committees,”
was eliminated by the decree. (_2399-PS_)

_Universities_: The Leadership Principle was introduced into the
universities. The _Rektor_ (head of the university) was appointed by the
Reich Minister of Education for an unspecified period of time and was
responsible only to the Reichs Minister. The University was divided into
the _Dozentenschaft_ (Lecturers Corps) and the _Studentenschaft_
(Student Corps). The leaders of these two bodies were also appointed by
the Reichsminister of Education (_2394-PS_). The teaching staff of the
university was subject to the control of the National Socialist
_Dozentenbund_ (NSDoB) (Nazi Association of University Lecturers). The
purposes of the NSDoB were:

(_a_) to take a decisive part in the selection of lecturers and to
produce candidates for the teaching staff who were wholly Nazi in their
outlook.

(_b_) to train all university lecturers in Nazi ideology,

(_c_) to see that the entire university life was run in accordance with
the philosophy of the Party. (_2452-PS_; _318-PS_)

All German students at the universities were required to belong to the
_Studentenschaft_ (Student Corps) (_2084-PS_). The Student Corps was
responsible for making the students conscious of their duties to the
Nazis, and was obliged to promote enrollment in the SA and labor
service. Physical training of students was the responsibility of the SA.
Political education was the responsibility of the
_National-Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund_ (NSDStB), (National
Socialist German Student Bund) (_2458-PS_). The National Socialist
Student Bund (NSDStB) was the Nazi “elite” of the student body and was
responsible for the leadership of the university students, and all
leaders of the Student Corps were appointed from its membership. The
Nazi Student Bund was solely responsible for the entire ideological and
political education of the students. (_2395-PS_; _2399-PS_; _2441-PS_;
_2392-PS_; _2393-PS_)

B. _The Nazi conspirators supplemented the school system by training the
youth through the Hitler Jugend._

(1) _The Nazi conspirators from their early days expressed their belief
in the fundamental importance of controlling the education and training
of youth._ Hitler stated in _Mein Kampf_:

    “It is precisely our German people, that today broken down, lies
    defenseless against the kicks of the rest of the world who need
    that suggestive force that lies in self-confidence. But this
    _self-confidence has to be instilled_ into the young
    fellow-citizen from childhood on. His entire education and
    development has to be directed at giving him _the conviction_
    _of being absolutely superior to others_. With this physical
    force and skill he has again to win the belief in the
    invincibility of his entire nationality. For what once led the
    German army to victory was the sum of the confidence which the
    individual and all in common had in their leaders. The
    confidence in _the possibility of regaining its freedom_ is what
    will restore the German people. But this conviction must be the
    final product of the same feeling of millions of individuals.”
    (_404-PS_; see also _2901-PS_)

Again in _Mein Kampf_ Hitler said:

    “The racial State will have to see to it that there will be a
    generation which by a suitable education will be ready for the
    final and ultimate decision on this globe. The nation which
    enters first on this course will be the victorious one.”
    (_404-PS_)

The law of the Hitler Youth provides in part as follows:

    “The future of the German nation depends on its youth, and the
    German youth shall have to be prepared for its future duties. *
    * *

    “The German youth besides being reared within the family and
    school, shall be educated physically, intellectually and morally
    in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people and
    community, through the Hitler Youth.” (_1392-PS_)

On May 1, 1938 Hitler said in a speech to the youth:

    “Since the victory of the Movement, under whose banner you
    stand, there has been completed within our people the
    unification of heart (innere Einigung) of the Germans. And as
    wages for this work of ours Providence has given us Greater
    Germany (Grossdeutschland). _This unification is no gift of
    chance, it is the result of a systematic education of our people
    by the National Socialist Movement._ . . . . And this education
    begins with the individual at an age when he is not already
    burdened with preconceived ideas. The youth is the stone which
    is to go to the building of our new Reich! You are Greater
    Germany! In you is being formed the community of the German
    people. Before the single leader there stands a Reich, before
    the single Reich stands a people, and before the single people
    stands German youth! When I see you my faith in the future of
    Germany has no bounds, nothing can shake it. For I know that you
    will fulfill all that we hope of you. So I greet you today on
    this 1st of May in our new great Germany: for you are our
    spring. In you will and shall be completed that for which
    generations and centuries have striven, Germany!” (_2454-PS_)

(2) _The Nazi conspirators destroyed or took over all other youth
organizations._ The first Nazi youth League (_Nationalsocialistischen
Jugendbund_) was organized in 1922. In 1925 the Hitler Youth was
officially recognized by the Nazi Party and became a Junior Branch of
the SA. In 1931 Baldur von Schirach was appointed Reichs Youth Leader of
the NSDAP with the rank of SA _Gruppenfuehrer_. (_1458-PS_)

When the Nazi conspirators came to power the Hitler Jugend was a minor
organization among many youth associations in Germany. At the end of
1932 it had only 107,956 members—less than 5 percent of the total youth
population of Germany (_2435-PS_). Schirach was appointed
“_Jugendfuehrer des Deutschen Reichs_” (Youth Leader of the German
Reich), in June 1933. In this position he was directly responsible to
Hitler for the education and training of the German youth outside of the
home and school in accordance with the ideology of the Nazi Party.
(_1458-PS_)

In June of 1933 on orders of Schirach, an armed band of Hitler youths
occupied by force the headquarters of the Reich Committee of The German
Youth Associations and took over all files and personnel records of the
youth leagues represented by the Committee. By the same method the
offices and property (including all youth hostels in Germany) of the
Reich Association for German Youth Hostels was seized, and a Nazi
representative of Schirach put in charge (_1458-PS_). By decree dated 22
June 1933 Schirach dissolved the Grossdeutsches Bund and all of its
affiliated organizations and took over their property; he dissolved The
Reich Committee of The German Youth Associations, and required all other
youth organizations to make a complete report of all organizational
information, including names of all officers and members and inventory
of all funds and property (_2229-PS_). The Youth Associations of all
political parties and of all labor organizations were dissolved by
decree of Schirach. By virtue of these decrees all youth organizations
except those sponsored by the Catholic and Protestant Churches were
abolished or incorporated in the Hitler Jugend (_1458-PS_; _2260-PS_).
The Nazi-appointed Reichsbishop Mueller entered into an agreement with
Schirach which transferred all members of the Evangelical Youth to the
Hitler Jugend and provided that the Hitler Jugend alone would provide
the state political and physical education of the Protestant youth. By
the end of 1933 only the Catholic Youth organization remained untouched.
(_1458-PS_)

The Concordat entered into with the Holy See on July 20, 1933 provided
for the continuance of the Catholic Youth Association (_2655-PS_).
Contrary to the provisions of the Concordat, the Nazi conspirators
immediately set out to smash the Catholic Youth organization and to
force all young people into the Hitler Youth. Ten days after the signing
of the Concordat, Schirach issued an order forbidding simultaneous
membership in the Hitler Jugend and the Catholic Youth League
(_2456-PS_). In 1934 Schirach wrote, “The denominational youth league
(Catholic Youth Association) has no right to exist in our time.”
(_1458-PS_). A year later Catholic youth associations were forbidden to
wear uniforms, to assemble publicly, to wear insignia, or to engage in
outdoor sport activity (_1482-PS_). Additional pressure was exerted on
the Catholic Youth by the requirement of membership in the Hitler Youth
as a prerequisite of public employment (_2451-PS_; _2900-PS_). Finally,
in 1937, Schirach announced:

    “_The struggle for the unification of the German Youth is
    finished._ I considered it as my duty to conduct it in a hard
    and uncompromising manner. Many might not have realized why we
    went through so much trouble for the sake of the youth. And yet
    the National Socialist German Workers Party, whose trustee I
    felt I always was and always will be, this party considered _the
    struggle for the youth as the decisive element_ for the future
    of the German nation.” (_2306-PS_)

(3) _The Nazi conspirators made membership in the Hitler Jugend
compulsory._ The Hitler Youth Law of 1936 provided that “All of the
German Youth in the Reich is organized within the Hitler Youth.”
(_1392-PS_). Executive decrees later implemented this law by the
establishment of severe penalties against anyone who deterred a youth
from service in the Hitler Jugend, and confirmed the policy of excluding
Jews from membership.

The Hitler Jugend had been from its inception a formation of the Nazi
Party. By virtue of the 1936 Youth Law it became an agency of the Reich
Government while still retaining its position as a formation of the Nazi
Party. (_1392-PS_).

The membership statistics of the Hitler Jugend to 1940 were:

                End 1932                          107,956
                End 1933                        2,292,041
                End 1934                        3,577,565
                End 1935                        3,943,303
                End 1936                        5,437,601
                End 1937                        5,879,955
                End 1938                        7,031,226
                End 1939                        7,728,259

And BDM (League of German Girls)—440,789. (_2435-PS_)

(4) _Through the Hitler Jugend the Nazi conspirators imbued the youth
with Nazi ideology and prepared them for membership in the Party and its
formations._ Schirach said:

    “I am responsible to the Reich that the entire youth of Germany
    will be educated physically, morally and spiritually in the
    spirit of the National Socialist Idea of the State.” (_2306-PS_)

_Mein Kampf_ was regarded as the “Bible” of the Hitler Jugend
(_1458-PS_). On entering the _Jungvolk_ at the age of 10, children took
the following oath:

    “In the presence of this blood-banner which represents our
    Fuehrer I swear to devote all my energies, and my strength to
    the Savior of our Country, Adolf Hitler. I am willing and ready
    to give up my life for him, so help me God. One People, one
    Reich, one Fuehrer.” (_2441-PS_)

The Hitler Jugend organization operated solely on the Leadership
Principle. The leader was always appointed from above and the leader’s
will was absolute. (_1458-PS_; _2306-PS_; _2436-PS_; _2438-PS_)

The Master Race doctrine and anti-semitism, including physical attacks
on the Jews, was taught systematically in the Hitler Jugend training
program. (_2436-PS_; _L-360-H_; _2441-PS_)

The Hitler Jugend indoctrinated the youth with the idea that war is a
noble activity. (_1458-PS_; _2436-PS_)

The Hitler Jugend, in accordance with the policy of the Nazi Party,
emphasized the importance and demanded the return of the colonies which
had been taken from Germany by the “Versailles Shame Dictate.”
(_1458-PS_; _2436-PS_; _2440-PS_; _2441-PS_)

The Hitler Jugend taught that the guiding principle of German policy was
the utilization of the space to the East (_1458-PS_; _2439-PS_). All
activities carried on in support of the demands for modification of the
Versailles Treaty, the restoration of colonies, and the acquisition of
additional living space were closely coordinated with the (VDA) _Verein
fuer das Deutschtum in Ausland_ (Office of Germans in foreign
countries). (_L-360-H_)

In order to carry out the program of indoctrination of the youth, more
than 765,000 were actively engaged as Hitler Youth leaders by May 1939.
Youth leaders were thoroughly trained, many of them in special “Youth
Leaders” schools (_2435-PS_). More than 200,000 political indoctrination
meetings (_Heimabend_) were held weekly. Each community was required by
law to provide a suitable meeting house for the Hitler Jugend. Training
and propaganda films were produced on an elaborate scale. In the winter
of 1937-38 more than three million youths attended showings of these
films. The Hitler Jugend press and propaganda office published at least
thirteen magazines and large numbers of other publications and yearbooks
appealing to all age groups and to the various interest groups of the
youth. (_2435-PS_)

One of the most important functions of the Hitler Jugend was to prepare
the youth for membership in the Party and its formations. Hitler said at
the Reichsparteitag, 1935:

    “He alone, who owns the youth, gains the Future! Practical
    consequences of this doctrine: The boy will enter the _Jungvolk_
    (boy 10-14) and the _Pimpf_ (members of the _Jungvolk_) will
    come to the Hitler Youth, and the boy of the Hitler Youth will
    join the SA, the SS and the other formations, and the SA man and
    the SS man will one day join the Labor Service, and from there
    he will go to the Armed Forces, and the soldiers of the people
    will return again to the organization of Movement, the Party,
    the SA, the SS, and never again will our people be so depraved
    as they were at one time.” (_2656-PS_; _2401-PS_)

The _Streifendienst_, a special formation of the Hitler Jugend, was
organized by virtue of an agreement between Himmler and Schirach for the
purpose of securing and training recruits for the SS, with special
emphasis on securing recruits for the Deaths Head Troops of the SS
(concentration camp guards). (_2396-PS_)

The farm service section of the Hitler Jugend also became a cadet corps
of the SS by reason of the agreement entered into between Himmler and
Schirach in 1938. This formation was to train for SS membership youths
especially suited to become _Wehrbauer_ (militant peasants), who were to
be settled in places where the Nazis needed especially trained farmers.
(_2567-PS_)

In 1937 the Adolf Hitler Schools were established in order to
indoctrinate boys selected by the Party to be the future leaders of the
Nazi state. The schools were operated by the Hitler Jugend for the
Party. Boys entered at the age of 12 and remained in the school until 18
years of age. (_2653-PS_)

(5) _The Nazi conspirators used the Hitler Jugend for extensive
pre-military training of youth._ In 1933 the Hitler Youth, in
cooperation with the SA and the Wehrmacht, entered into a secret program
of extensive pre-military training of the youth (_1850-PS_). Extensive
pre-military training was carried on in all age groups of the Hitler
Youth in close cooperation with the Wehrmacht. (_2438-PS_; _2441-PS_;
_1992-PS_)

In addition to general military training, specialized training was given
in special formations. These included:

    Hitler Jugend Flying Units

    Hitler Jugend Naval Units

    Hitler Jugend Motorized Units

    Hitler Jugend Signal Units

    Hitler Jugend Medical Units

    Hitler Jugend Musical Units. (_2654-PS_).

The extent of the military training in 1937 was set out by Hitler in a
speech at Berlin.

    “The Naval Hitler Youth comprises 45,000 boys, the Motor Hitler
    Youth 60,000 boys. As part of the campaign for the encouragement
    of aviation 55,000 members of the Jungvolk were trained in
    gliding for group activities; 74,000 boys of the Hitler Youth
    are organized in its flying units; 15,000 boys passed their
    gliding test in the year 1937 alone.

    “Today 1,200,000 boys of the Hitler Youth receive regular
    instructions in small-bore rifle shooting from 7,000
    instructors.” (_2454-PS_; see also _2441-PS_.)

A formal agreement between the Wehrmacht and the Hitler Jugend was
published 11 August 1939. It recites that whereas 30,000 Hitler Jugend
leaders had been trained annually in shooting and field exercises, the
number would be doubled; that 60,000,000 shots had been fired in Hitler
Youth training courses in 1938 and that a considerable increase in the
figure was expected. The agreement recognized the close cooperation that
existed between the Hitler Jugend and the Wehrmacht in the military
training of youth and provided for a far more extensive program.
(_2398-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

    LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO RESHAPING OF
                    EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF YOUTH

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │      │
                │  (e).                                  │  I   │      21
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
  200-PS        │Confidential telegram from Berger to    │      │
                │Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern     │      │
                │Territories, 8 July 1944 concerning     │      │
                │forced labor of children.               │ III  │     214
                │                                        │      │
 *318-PS        │Agreement between Rosenberg and Leader  │      │
                │of the National Socialist University    │      │
                │Professors League (NSDoB), 2 December   │      │
                │1941. (USA 728)                         │ III  │     255
                │                                        │      │
 *404-PS        │Excerpts from Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp.   │      │
                │456, 475. (USA 256)                     │ III  │     385
                │                                        │      │
 1392-PS        │Law on the Hitler Youth, 1 December     │      │
                │1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │993.                                    │ III  │     972
                │                                        │      │
 1397-PS        │Law for the reestablishment of the      │      │
                │Professional Civil Service, 7 April     │      │
                │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │175.                                    │ III  │     981
                │                                        │      │
*1458-PS        │The Hitler Youth by Baldur von Schirach,│      │
                │Leipzig, 1934. (USA 667)                │  IV  │      22
                │                                        │      │
 1462-PS        │First Execution Order to the Law of the │      │
                │Hitler Youth, 25 March 1939. 1939       │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 709.      │  IV  │      44
                │                                        │      │
*1482-PS        │Secret letter, 20 July 1933 to          │      │
                │provincial governments and the Prussian │      │
                │Gestapo from Frick, concerning          │      │
                │Confessional Youth Organizations. (USA  │      │
                │738)                                    │  IV  │      51
                │                                        │      │
*1850-PS        │Conferences, 1933, calling for financing│      │
                │of military training of SA from Ministry│      │
                │of Interior Funds. (USA 742)            │  IV  │     478
                │                                        │      │
*1992-A-PS      │Organization and Obligations of the SS  │      │
                │and the Police from “National Political │      │
                │Education of the Army, January 1937”.   │      │
                │(USA 439).                              │  IV  │     616
                │                                        │      │
 2061-PS        │Oath of Reich Officials and of German   │      │
                │Soldiers, 20 August 1934. 1934          │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 785.      │  IV  │     702
                │                                        │      │
 2078-PS        │Decree concerning establishment of      │      │
                │Ministry for Science, Education and     │      │
                │Popular Culture, 1 May 1934. 1934       │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 365.      │  IV  │     706
                │                                        │      │
 2084-PS        │Law on formation of the Student         │      │
                │Organization at Scientific Universities,│      │
                │22 April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,  │      │
                │Part I, p. 215.                         │  IV  │     718
                │                                        │      │
 2088-PS        │Decree relating to tasks of Reichs      │      │
                │Ministry for Education, 11 May 1934.    │      │
                │1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 375. │  IV  │     718
                │                                        │      │
 2115-PS        │Second Executive Order to the Law for   │      │
                │the Hitler Youth, 25 March 1939. 1939   │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 710.      │  IV  │     745
                │                                        │      │
*2229-PS        │The Reich Youth Leader at Work,         │      │
                │published in National Socialist Party   │      │
                │Press Service Release, 22 June 1933, pp.│      │
                │2-3. (USA 668)                          │  IV  │     870
                │                                        │      │
 2260-PS        │Settlement of Relationship between NSDAP│      │
                │and Stahlhelm (Steel Helmets) published │      │
                │in National Socialist Party Press       │      │
                │Service release, 21 June 1933.          │  IV  │     933
                │                                        │      │
*2306-PS        │Revolution of Education, by Baldur von  │      │
                │Schirach, 1938, pp. 51-52, 63. (USA 860)│  IV  │     997
                │                                        │      │
 2340-PS        │German public officials law of 27       │      │
                │January 1937. 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt,   │      │
                │Part I, p. 41.                          │  IV  │    1058
                │                                        │      │
 2392-PS        │Extracts from The Third Reich, 1933,    │      │
                │Vol. I, pp. 144-154.                    │  V   │      54
                │                                        │      │
 2393-PS        │Extracts from The Third Reich, 1934,    │      │
                │[Vol. II], pp. 218-224.                 │  V   │      58
                │                                        │      │
 2394-PS        │Extracts from The Third Reich, 1935,    │      │
                │Vol. III, pp. 208-212.                  │  V   │      60
                │                                        │      │
 2395-PS        │Extracts from The Third Reich, 1936,    │      │
                │Vol. IV, pp. 360-362.                   │  V   │      62
                │                                        │      │
*2396-PS        │Handbook of Collected Youth Laws, Vol.  │      │
                │I, Group 1, pp. 19a, 19b, 20. (USA 673) │  V   │      63
                │                                        │      │
 2397-PS        │National Socialist Handbook for Law and │      │
                │Legislation by Dr. Hans Frank, p. 566.  │  V   │      65
                │                                        │      │
*2398-PS        │Cooperation of Hitler Jugend with       │      │
                │Wehrmacht, 11 August 1939, published in │      │
                │The Archive, No. 65, August 1939, pp.   │      │
                │601-602. (USA 677)                      │  V   │      66
                │                                        │      │
 2399-PS        │Articles “School Community to replace   │      │
                │parents’ advisory committee” and “NSDAP │      │
                │takes over education of university      │      │
                │students”, published in The Archive,    │      │
                │1934, pp. 1039, 1147-1148.              │  V   │      67
                │                                        │      │
*2401-PS        │The Hitler Youth as recruits for future │      │
                │leaders, from Organization Book of      │      │
                │NSDAP, 1938, pp. 80-81. (USA 430)       │  V   │      69
                │                                        │      │
 2435-PS        │Extracts from The Coming Germany, The   │      │
                │Education of the Youth in the Reich of  │      │
                │Adolf Hitler, by Kaufmann.              │  V   │     113
                │                                        │      │
*2436-PS        │Extracts from Enjoyment, Discipline,    │      │
                │Belief, Official handbook for cultural  │      │
                │work in camp. (USA 859)                 │  V   │     119
                │                                        │      │
 2438-PS        │Extracts from Boys in Service, handbook │      │
                │for boys 10 to 14 years of age.         │  V   │     132
                │                                        │      │
 2439-PS        │Extracts from Girl in Vacation Camp,    │      │
                │official publication of Reichs Youth    │      │
                │Headquarters.                           │  V   │     136
                │                                        │      │
 2440-PS        │Extracts from Boys, Your World, the     │      │
                │yearbook of the Hitler Youth.           │  V   │     139
                │                                        │      │
*2441-PS        │Affidavit of Gregor Ziemer, 4 October   │      │
                │1945, from his book “Education for      │      │
                │Death”. (USA 679)                       │  V   │     141
                │                                        │      │
 2442-PS        │Guide of racial science and science of  │      │
                │heredity of fostering congenitally sound│      │
                │progeny of family science.              │  V   │     176
                │                                        │      │
 2443-PS        │Extracts from Education in the Greater  │      │
                │German Reich.                           │  V   │     178
                │                                        │      │
 2444-PS        │Extracts from German Reading Book for   │      │
                │Elementary Schools, second volume.      │  V   │     181
                │                                        │      │
 2445-PS        │Extracts from German Reading Book for   │      │
                │Elementary Schools, fourth volume.      │  V   │     183
                │                                        │      │
 2446-PS        │Extracts from History Book for the      │      │
                │German Youth.                           │  V   │     184
                │                                        │      │
 2451-PS        │Decree of Reichsminister of Education   │      │
                │Candidates for Teacher’s Positions to   │      │
                │Prove themselves in Hitler Youth,       │      │
                │published in Voelkischer Beobachter,    │      │
                │Berlin edition, 22 October 1935.        │  V   │     187
                │                                        │      │
 2452-PS        │Extracts from Organization Book of      │      │
                │NSDAP, 1943.                            │  V   │     187
                │                                        │      │
 2453-PS        │Education and Instruction in the        │      │
                │Upper Schools, official publication of  │      │
                │the Reich and Prussian Minister of      │      │
                │Education, 1938.                        │  V   │     189
                │                                        │      │
*2454-PS        │Quotations from speeches of Hitler,     │      │
                │published in Voelkischer Beobachter,    │      │
                │Munich edition. (USA 676)               │  V   │     196
                │                                        │      │
 2455-PS        │Statement by Hitler at Elbing, Germany, │      │
                │quoted in Voelkischer Beobachter, Berlin│      │
                │edition, 6 November 1933.               │  V   │     198
                │                                        │      │
 2456-PS        │Youth and the Church, from Complete     │      │
                │Handbook of Youth Laws.                 │  V   │     198
                │                                        │      │
 2458-PS        │Constitution of the German Student      │      │
                │Corps, 1934 Reichs Ministerialblatt, pp.│      │
                │76-79.                                  │  V   │     199
                │                                        │      │
*2567-PS        │Decree signed by Himmler and von        │      │
                │Schirach, concerning cooperation of HJ  │      │
                │and SS, printed in The Young Germany,   │      │
                │Berlin, February 1939. (USA 674)        │  V   │     301
                │                                        │      │
*2653-PS        │The Way of German Youth, from The Third │      │
                │Reich, 5th Year, 1937, pp. 117-118. (USA│      │
                │669)                                    │  V   │     359
                │                                        │      │
*2654-PS        │Organization and Insignia of the Hitler │      │
                │Youth, edited by Reich Youth            │      │
                │Headquarters of NSDAP. (USA 675)        │  V   │     361
                │                                        │      │
 2655-PS        │Concordat between the Holy See and the  │      │
                │German Reich, Article 31. 1933          │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, p. 679,     │      │
                │687-8.                                  │  V   │     364
                │                                        │      │
 2656-PS        │The Bearer of Sovereignty, from speech  │      │
                │of the Fuehrer at the Reichsparteitag,  │      │
                │1935.                                   │  V   │     365
                │                                        │      │
 2900-PS        │Speech by Frick at Anniversary meeting  │      │
                │of Hitler Youth, published in The       │      │
                │Archive, January 1936, p. 1339.         │  V   │     567
                │                                        │      │
 2901-PS        │Extract from The Book of the NSDAP, p.  │      │
                │95.                                     │  V   │     568
                │                                        │      │
*3054-PS        │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801
                │                                        │      │
*3751-PS        │Diary of the German Minister of Justice,│      │
                │1935 concerning prosecution of church   │      │
                │officials and punishment in             │      │
                │concentration camps. (USA 828; USA 858) │  VI  │     636
                │                                        │      │
*L-360-H        │Agreement between the League for        │      │
                │Germandom in Foreign Countries and the  │      │
                │Hitler Youth, 6 May 1933. (USA 671)     │ VII  │    1108
                │                                        │      │
*Chart No. 2    │Totalitarian Control of Propaganda and  │      │
                │Education. (USA 21)                     │ VIII │     771


               9. PROPAGANDA, CENSORSHIP AND SUPERVISION
                         OF CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

A. _The party organization._

(1) _The Reichspropagandaleitung_ (Party Propaganda Department) (RPL).
This office was founded in 1932, as the central propaganda control
office headed by Goebbels. Its functions were:

(_a_) To direct, supervise and synchronize propaganda within the Nazi
movement.

    “Propaganda of the NSDAP, its formations and affiliated
    associations is the responsibility of the
    _Reichspropagandaleiter_.

    “He determines all manifestations of the Movement, including its
    formations and affiliated associations, with regard to
    propaganda.

    “He issues the directives for the Party, including its
    formations and affiliated associations, for the realization of
    the cultural wishes of the Fuehrer.” (_2319-PS_)

These functions were organized vertically through a close network of
_Gauleiters_, _Kreisleiters_, and _Ortsgruppenleiters_ which reached
even the smallest communities. In addition, synchronization of
propaganda within the Movement was guaranteed through the _Reichsring
fuer National-Sozialistische Propaganda und Volksaufklaerung_, (National
Socialist Organization for Propaganda and People’s Enlightenment), an
office within the _Reichspropagandaleitung_. The _Reichsring_
constituted the center of control responsible for the complete
coordination of Party and Movement in the field of propaganda.

    “The _Reichsring_ * * * had the task to ensure the uniform
    direction of propaganda of all formations and affiliated
    associations through the Party.” (_2319-PS_)

(_b_) To imbue the Nazi Movement and the people with Nazi ideology.

    “(The _Reichspropagandaleiter_) upon his initiative, is
    concerned with the permeation of German people with the National
    Socialist ideology.

    “He enlightens the people about the achievements of Party and
    State.

    “He controls the entire German wireless system with regard to
    its internal organizational, cultural and economic
    possibilities;

    “Press, radio and film are in the service of propaganda.”
    (_2319-PS_)

(c) To coordinate Party propaganda with that of the Reich Government.

    “The liaison officer has the task of centralizing all contacts
    with the Reich Ministries, public authorities, and corporations
    and to establish all such contacts with same * * *”. (_2319-PS_)

(_d_) To investigate the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda. This function
was assigned to the lower grades of the Party leadership, and to
regional and local officials, who assembled and analyzed information on
public reaction to the current content of propaganda.

(_e_) Other activities of the _Reichspropagandaleitung_ were discharged
by numerous functional departments which included, _inter alia_,
“_Hauptstellen_” (Main Bureaus) or offices for the following:

_1._ _Press_—preparation of all propaganda material issued by
       _Reichspropagandaleitung_ for dissemination to newspapers.
_2._ _Exhibits and fairs_—supervision of propaganda aspects of exhibits
       and fairs in which the Party participated.
_3._ _Mass or “Aktive” propaganda_—organization of propaganda campaigns
       within the movement; training and supplying speakers with
       propaganda materials.
_4._ _Films_—Popularization of Nazi-inspired films; photographing official
       rallies.
_5._ _Radio_—radio propaganda.
_6._ _Culture_—making all forms of art conform to Nazi standards.

Other Bureaus included Architecture, Style and Design, Works of Art,
Formulation of Programs, and Training of Speakers. (_2319-PS_)

The _Reichspropagandaleitung_ was regionally organized into _Gau-_,
_Kreis-_, and _Ortsgruppenpropagandaaemter_ (_Gau_, district, and local
propaganda offices). The _Gaupropagandaleiter_ (leader of the _Gau_
propaganda office) was at the same time the _Gau_ representative of the
Chamber of Culture (_Landeskulturwalter_) and in most cases also
represented the regional office of the Propaganda Ministry, so that on
the lower levels, Party and State propaganda were completely unified.
(_2315-PS_)

(2) _The office of Reichspressechef_ (Reich Press Chief).

The office of Reich Press Chief of the NSDAP was created in 1934 by
decree of the Fuehrer (_2319-PS_). The functions of this office were
exclusive:

    “The Reich Press Office of the NSDAP is the central office for
    the entire political publishing activity of the Party. It
    represents the press interests of the Reich leadership of the
    NSDAP _vis a vis_ both the German and the foreign press. It
    alone has the authority to issue directives to the press of
    Reich policies concerning the treatment of Party affairs. It
    alone has the authority to issue press directives to all offices
    of Reich leadership. It is responsible for the political and
    editorial preparations, execution and utilization of all
    important Party activities in the Reich. It supplies the
    domestic and foreign press with information, news and
    commentaries about the Party. It keeps a record of press
    reaction to the Party work in publications of the domestic and
    foreign press.” (_2319-PS_)

The Reich Press Chief exercised control over all press offices,
including the chief editors of the National Socialist newspapers, as
well as the _Gau_ press wardens of the Party. He also served as liaison
officer between the Party press and the “Independent” press, and between
Party and Government. (_2319-PS_)

The executive functions of the Reich Press Chief were carried out by two
offices:

(_a_) _The Pressepolitisches Amt_ (Press Political Office).

(_b_) _The Pressepersonalamt_ (Press Personnel Office), which was in
charge of training journalists and keeping files on German and foreign
journalists.

The vertical organization of press controls, corresponding to that of
the _Reichspropagandaleitung_, included _Gau-_, _Kreis-_ and
_Ortsgruppen_ departments. Each was headed by an _Amtsleiter_, or press
warden, who was responsible for the entire Party press within his sphere
of jurisdiction. He supervised the editorial policy of the Party press,
issued information bulletins about the activities of the Movement, and
served as liaison officer between the Party and non-Party press. He also
transmitted local information to headquarters for distribution and made
recommendations concerning the appointments of local party editors. The
_Gau-_ and _Kreis-_ press wardens, at the same time, served as regional
and local representatives of the Home Press Division of the Propaganda
Ministry and of the Reich Press Chamber. (_2319-PS_; _2315-PS_)

(3) _The Reichsleiter fuer die Presse_ (Reich Press Leader).

The Reich Press Leader, Max Amann, was charged with supervising all
matters concerning the German publishing business. The
_Organisationsbuch der NSDAP_ (1937) described his function as follows:

    “He is charged with the creation of a press for the German
    people, which is responsible and answerable to him, and which
    reflects the life and experiences of the German people’s
    community. In addition, the Reichsleiter for Press has the
    function of issuing regulations necessary to carry out the
    demands concerning publication policies established in Article
    23 of the Party Program and to supervise their execution.”
    (_2319-PS_)

Article 23 of the Party Platform referred to above, provided, _inter
alia_, that (a) all editors and newspaper personnel must be “members of
the nation”; (b) non-Germans are prohibited from financial participation
in, or influence of, newspapers; (c) the publication of papers “which do
not conduce to the national welfare” is prohibited; (d) tendencies in
art or literature “of a kind likely to disintegrate our life as a
nation” will be prosecuted; and (e) “institutions which militate against
the requirements mentioned above” will be suppressed. (_1708-PS_)

Thus the Reich Press Leader was not only empowered to control all
publishing houses of the Party, but was assigned the task of bringing
the entire German press into line with National Socialist ideology. To
this end he was given wide and specific powers.

His sphere of jurisdiction included specifically:

(_a_) The administration, publishing, and financing of the Party press;

(_b_) The establishment of newspapers by Party members or affiliated
associations;

(_c_) The incorporation of newspapers into the Party press combine;

(_d_) The appointment of publishers and of their deputies;

(_e_) The termination or alteration of contracts with newspapers;

(_f_) The appointment of Commissars to supervise publishing houses.
(_2319-PS_)

In addition to controlling the administration and finance of the
National Socialist publishing houses in the _Gau_, the Press Leader
headed the _Zentralverlag_, which was the central publishing house and
holding company of the entire Party publishing machine and all its
official organs, such as _Der Voelkischer Beobachter_, _Der Angriff_,
_Der SA Mann_, _Das Schwarze Korps_, _Die HJ_, etc. (_3016-PS_)

It was one of the Reich Press Leader’s duties to turn all publishing by
Party officials into a lucrative undertaking, and to set up an absolute
monopoly in the publication of all political literature. To effectuate
that objective, a decree was passed which made it mandatory for all
“manuscripts which have National Socialist problems and subject matter
as themes” to be offered first to _Eher Verlag_ publication. (_2383-PS_)

The _Reichsleiter fuer die Press_, who was also president of the Reich
Press Chamber, exercised economic controls over the entire German press.
He made use of his position to expand the Party publishing machine at
the expense of non-party newspapers. As president of the Reich Press
Chamber, he was authorized to issue directives with the force of law. In
that capacity he issued certain regulations which had the effect of
prohibiting the ownership of newspapers by corporations of any kind,
except the NSDAP or such groups as were approved by the Party.
(_2315-PS_)

These decrees enabled Amann to close down one or more papers in a
particular locality “to safeguard reasonable standards of competition.”
They thus provided, along with racial and other discriminatory
legislation, the “legal” basis for the pressure which was brought to
bear on such publishing firms as Ullstein and other opposition
publications, in order to force them to sell out to the Party. These
sales were in no sense voluntary; the alternative in each case was total
suppression. The authorizing decree provided:

    “The President of the Reich Chamber of the Press will therefore
    endeavor at first in every individual case to effect agreements
    which will relieve him of the necessity of issuing orders for
    the closing of establishments.” (_2315-PS_)

Max Amann has admitted in an affidavit that he discharged his duties as
Reich Press Leader consistently with the statement of his functions
contained in the Party Organization Book and with Article 23 of the
Party Program. He has further stated that racial and other
discriminatory legislation made it expedient for firms “owned or
controlled by Jewish interests, or by political or religious interests
hostile to the NSDAP * * * to sell their newspapers or assets to the
Eher concern”; and that there was “no free market for the sale of such
properties and the Franz Eher Verlag was generally the only bidder.” His
affidavit concludes as follows:

    “It is a true statement to say that the basic purpose of the
    Nazi press program was to eliminate all press in opposition to
    the Party.” (_3016-PS_)

(4) _Parteiamliche Prufungskommission zum Schutz des NS-Christums_
(Office of Party Examining Commission for the Protection of National
Socialist Publications) (PPK).

The PPK was charged with the censorship and supervision of all
literature with cultural or political implications. According to the
Party Manual:

    “The functional scope of the official Party Examining Commission
    is not confined to any one group of publications but includes
    the entire publishing field. Thus the work of the Official Party
    Examining Commission is sub-divided into departments for books,
    magazines and newspapers. Out of these main departments a group
    of important special fields have emerged as more or less
    independent fields. They are specifically the editing of
    speeches, scientific books, textbooks, scientific periodicals
    and the calendar as a special type of magazine.” (_2319-PS_)

The Examining Commission’s function was to protect National Socialist
literature from attempts to destroy its propagandistic effect or to
pervert its political and social content. The Party Manual stated:

    “It is the function of the Examining Commission to protect the
    National Socialist literature from abuse, corruption, and
    attempts at dissolution. Thus it forestalls the infiltration of
    elements within the National Socialist literature which are
    irreconcilable with it.” (_2319-PS_)

In addition, the PPK concerned itself with the actual suppression of
literature incompatible with Party tenets, and with the approval of
those works which it deemed beneficial to the extension of the National
Socialist ideology. The Party Manual specified as follows:

    “Particularly it is the function of the official Party Examining
    Commission to determine whether or not a work can be considered
    National Socialist literature.” (_2319-PS_)

This office worked in close collaboration with the Delegate of the
Fuehrer for the Total Supervision of the Intellectual and Ideological
Training and Education of the People (Rosenberg). (_2319-PS_; _2383-PS_)

(5) _The Beauftragte des Fuehrers fuer die Ueberwachung der gesamten
geistigen und weltansschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP_
(Delegate of the Fuehrer for the Total Supervision of the Intellectual
and Ideological Training and Education of the Party) (BdF).

The delegate of the Fuehrer was _Reichsleiter_ Alfred Rosenberg. The
Office of the BdF was placed in charge of the Party’s intellectual and
ideological training and education. Its declared objective was the
uniform ideological orientation of the Party, Party formations, and
affiliated associations. Its main functions, in furtherance of this
objective, were the preparation of suitable training materials and the
issuance of directives thereon; the preparation, editing, and
establishment of curricula; the training of qualified teaching staffs;
the counseling of Party agencies, formations, and affiliates on content
and methods of indoctrination; and the elimination of such reading and
teaching materials as were deemed inappropriate from a National
Socialist point of view. To perform these tasks, Rosenberg had the
assistance of a large organization with numerous functional divisions
(_2319-PS_). The BdF took a major part in the work of Party
organizations, affiliated associations, and schools and training
institutes which were instrumental in the indoctrination of the German
people and youth. (_2383-PS_)

B. _The Reich government organization._

The state organ of control was the _Reichsministerium fuer
Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda_ (Reich Ministry for Popular
Enlightenment and Propaganda). The Minister was Josef Goebbels. The
Ministry was founded by decree dated 13 March 1933, which defined its
duties as the “enlightenment of, and propaganda among, the people on the
subject of the policy of the Reich government and on the national
reconstruction of the homeland.” (_2029-PS_). By decree dated 30 June
1933 the functions of the Minister were extended to include
“jurisdiction over the whole field of spiritual indoctrination of the
nation, of propagandizing the State, of cultural and economic
propaganda, of enlightenment of the public at home and abroad;
furthermore he is in charge of all institutions serving these purposes.”
(_2030-PS_). In the words of Mueller, an authority on the Propaganda
Ministry, these decrees formed the basis for the creation of a central
agency for propaganda “the like of which heretofore existed nowhere in
the world.” (_2434-PS_). The influence which this agency exerted on the
everyday life and activities of the German citizen was illustrated by
the multitude of civic and cultural affairs, including public
entertainment, which fell under the sweep of its direction and control.
(_2434-PS_)

A few of the more important departments of the Propaganda Ministry,
together with a brief description of their respective functions,
follows:

(1) _Personnel._ This department issued directives for unified personnel
policy, and exercised general supervision over the personnel of public
art instituted within the entire Reich.

(2) _Law._ “The nuclear task of the law department is the publication
and execution of national socialist cultural laws. The professions and
institutions of literature and art had to be transformed from carriers
of a liberal individualistic intellectual movement to the carriers of
the tasks of public propaganda and leadership. To reach this goal
required the enactment of governmental decrees for creating new
organizations or the making of new laws.”

(3) _Propaganda._ This department coordinated propaganda policies and
issued over-all directives to the various functional departments (press,
radio, etc.) which then carried out the directives. A special function
was “enlightenment of the people as to Jewish question” and as to
“racial policies.”

(4) _Foreign._ This department was the Ministry’s listening post for
political and economic developments abroad “to counteract the worldwide
publicity activities of the enemy against our philosophy and our
political objectives by exposing and rectifying the lies of the press”
and to exploit the information in German propaganda. It also cooperated
closely with the _Auslandsorganization der NSDAP_.

(5) _Radio._ Hans Fritzsche headed this department. It supervised the
political content of German broadcasting, issued directives as to the
arrangement of programs and treatment of material, and cooperated with
the Party in the technical organization of German radio.

(6) The _Film Department_ was in charge of directing and guiding the
German film industry, censoring of films, and developing the German
weekly newsreel.

(7) _Literature._ This agency, in close collaboration with BdF and PPK,
controlled all German literary activities, censored new books, provided
for the publication of German books abroad, and arranged for the
translation and censorship of foreign books.

(8) _Abteilung Deutsche Presse_ (German or Home Press Department). This
department was headed by Fritzsche until he was relieved in 1942 to take
charge of the Radio Division. It was responsible for political control
over the entire German press; it controlled the editorial policy of the
press and its personnel (through the Reich Press Chamber), and
supervised the dissemination of news through the official German News
Agency (DNB). The Home Press Division outlined the editorial policy of
all newspapers and the comment of editors and journalists in its daily
directives. (_Tendenz berichte_). These dealt with the daily contents of
the paper, the methods of treatment of news material, the writing of
headlines, the preference for or omission of certain items, and the
modification or cessation of current campaigns. The directives were
issued to the representatives of the press in person or sent through the
facilities of the DNB to the local papers. (_2434-PS_; _2529-PS_)

The Home Press Department of the Propaganda Ministry had an important
participation in administering the provisions of the Editorial Control
Law, which made the profession of editor “a public task, which is
regulated as to its professional duties and rights by the state.” That
law also included requirements for admission to the profession and other
elaborate controls. (_2083-PS_)

(9) _Periodical Literature._ This department supervised German
periodical literature in the same manner as the _Abteilung Deutsche
Presse_ controlled the daily press.

Other divisions exercised supervision over the Theatre (selection and
supervision of the entire dramatic production and influencing the
programs of all German Theatres); the Arts; Music (“the entire cultural
and political leadership of German musical life”); Special Cultural
Tasks (“This department serves mainly to eliminate all Jews from German
Cultural life”); and Foreign Tourists. (_2434-PS_)

A large organization of faithful Party followers was recruited to
discharge the manifold functions of the Propaganda Ministry. The staff
numbered 1000 persons in 1939-1940. In the words of Mueller:

    “It is no accident; therefore, that the great majority of the
    official workers and other personnel of the Ministry consist of
    reliable National Socialists of which almost 100 are bearers of
    the Gold Party Pin.” (_2434-PS_)

C. _The semi-autonomous professional organizations Reichskulturkammer_
(Reich Chamber of Culture).

The Reich Chamber of Culture was set up in September 1933 to control
(under the supervision of the Propaganda Ministry and within the
framework of general policy directives issued by that activity)
personnel engaged in all fields of propaganda (_2082-PS_). Its tasks as
described in the First Executive Decree of the above law, dated 1
November 1933, were:

    “To promote German culture as responsible to the people and the
    Reich, to regulate the social and economic relations of the
    different groups in the cultural professions and to coordinate
    their aims.” (_2415-PS_)

The _Reichskulturkammer_ was a so-called “_Nachgeordnete Dienststelle_”
(Subordinate office) of the Propaganda Ministry. Together with its
subordinate Chambers it was charged with supervising all personnel
active in any field under the jurisdiction of the Propaganda Ministry.
All persons employed in the cultural professions were obligated to
register with one of the subordinate Chambers. The Chambers were also
responsible for investigating the activities and political reliability
of their members. Moreover, power was given to Chambers to prosecute
members offending against Nazi standards or persons pursuing their
occupation without being duly registered. The punitive powers included,
expulsion from membership, which was tantamount to the loss of
livelihood. The Chambers were also given power to issue directives,
which had the validity of law, regulating the cultural activities under
their control (_2529-PS_). The President of the Chamber of Culture was
the Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, who nominated the
Vice-Presidents. In 1937, the latter consisted of Walter Funk, Max Amann
(Reich Leader of the Press) and Leopold Gutterer (Secretary of State in
the Propaganda Ministry).

The Chamber of Culture was divided into seven functional chambers:

(1) _Reichspressekammer_ (Reich Press Chamber). Max Amann was president
of this chamber, which was, to a greater extent than the other chambers,
a loose association of technical bodies and organizations, such as the
Reich Association of German Newspaper Publishers. It integrated the
activities of these groups and, through the composition of its governing
body, ensured close coordination with Party and State propaganda
machinery. (_2529-PS_; _3016-PS_)

(2) _Reichskammer der bildenden Kunste_ (Reich Chamber of Fine Arts).
This chamber supervised the activities of all architects, interior
decorators, landscape gardeners, sculptors, painters, draftsmen, art
publishers, etc. By 1937, all other art groups and associations had been
dissolved, and all their members “obligated by profession” to join this
chamber. (_2529-PS_)

(3) _Reichsmusikkammer_ (Reich Music Chamber). This Chamber was
organized to “oversee the practice and activity of musicians in their
cultural, economic, and legal relationships with the world. * * * in
order that music will still remain a prized possession of the German
people.” (_2529-PS_)

(4) _Reichstheaterkammer_ (Reich Theater Chamber). The Theater Chamber
was the professional organization for the entire field of the
professional theater. Its purpose was to supervise and promote the
“cultural, social and economic conditions of the professions which it
includes”. Actual censorship of stage production was the responsibility
of the _Reichsdramaturg_. (_2529-PS_)

(5) _Reichsfilmkammer_ (Reich Film Chamber). The primary function of
this Chamber was to lift the film industry “out of the sphere of liberal
economic thoughts” by giving it a sound economic foundation and thus
enable it to “receive those tasks which it has to fulfill in the
National Socialist State”. (_2529-PS_)

(6) _Reichsschrifttumskammer_ (Reich Chamber of Literature). The Chamber
of Literature had jurisdiction over all persons concerned with the
“basic production” (writing and publishing) of literature. Its task was
to protect writers “from undesirable elements” and to keep out of the
book market everything “unGerman.” It had the further function of
bringing literature to the people and making the writer more “aware of
his duty to the nation.” Primary responsibility for critical evaluation
and censorship of literature however, was left to the Propaganda
Ministry. (_2529-PS_)

(7) _Reichsrundfunkkammer_ (Reich Radio Chamber). The official gazette
of the Reich Culture Chamber stated that the radio was the most
immediate propaganda instrument of the National Socialist leadership;
that the ideal and cultural life of the nation could be shown “totally”
in and through the radio; and that since the radio constituted the most
important technical means of influencing the masses it was necessary to
establish a close tie between the radio and the Party.

Functions of the Radio Chamber included: mobilizing of all technical
possibilities of broadcasting, bringing the people closer to radio,
planning the manufacture of cheap receiving sets, and propaganda in
connection with the drive for new listeners. (_2529-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

     LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PROPAGANDA,
           CENSORSHIP, AND SUPERVISION OF CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │      │
                │  (e).                                  │  I   │      21
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
*1708-PS        │The Program of the NSDAP. National      │      │
                │Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. (USA│      │
                │255; USA 324)                           │  IV  │     208
                │                                        │      │
 2029-PS        │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry  │      │
                │of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, │      │
                │13 March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,  │      │
                │Part I, p. 104.                         │  IV  │     652
                │                                        │      │
 2030-PS        │Decree concerning the Duties of the     │      │
                │Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment │      │
                │and Propaganda, 30 June 1933. 1933      │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 449.      │  IV  │     653
                │                                        │      │
 2082-PS        │Law relating to the Reich Chamber of    │      │
                │Culture of 22 September 1933. 1933      │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 661.      │  IV  │     708
                │                                        │      │
 2083-PS        │Editorial control law, 4 October 1933.  │      │
                │1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 713. │  IV  │     709
                │                                        │      │
 2315-PS        │Order concerning the Supervision of     │      │
                │District Leaders of Work of Reich       │      │
                │Chamber of Culture, published in The Law│      │
                │of the Reich Chamber of Culture, Vol. 2,│      │
                │1 January to 30 June 1935.              │  IV  │    1007
                │                                        │      │
*2319-PS        │Extracts from Organization Book of      │      │
                │NSDAP, 4th edition, 1937. (USA 602)     │  IV  │    1009
                │                                        │      │
*2383-PS        │Ordinance for execution of decree of    │      │
                │Fuehrer concerning position of the Head │      │
                │of Party Chancellery of 16 January 1942,│      │
                │published in Decrees, Regulations,      │      │
                │Announcements. (USA 410)                │  V   │       9
                │                                        │      │
 2415-PS        │First decree for the implementation of  │      │
                │law relating to The Reich Chamber of    │      │
                │Culture, 1 November 1933. 1933          │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I.              │  V   │      89
                │                                        │      │
*2434-PS        │The Reich Ministry for Enlightenment of │      │
                │the People and for Propaganda, Berlin   │      │
                │1940, by Georg Mueller. (USA 722)       │  V   │     102
                │                                        │      │
 2529-PS        │Extracts from Handbook of Reich Chamber │      │
                │of Culture for 1937.                    │  V   │     262
                │                                        │      │
*3016-PS        │Affidavit of Max Amann, 19 November     │      │
                │1945. (USA 757)                         │  V   │     735
                │                                        │      │
*3469-PS        │Affidavit of Hans Fritzsche, 7 January  │      │
                │1946. (USA 721)                         │  VI  │     174
                │                                        │      │
*Chart No. 2    │Totalitarian Control of Propaganda and  │      │
                │Education. (USA 21)                     │ VIII │     771


               10. MILITARIZATION OF NAZI ORGANIZATIONS.

A. _The Nazi conspirators placed many of their organizations on a
progressively militarized footing with a view to the rapid
transformation and use of such organizations as instruments of war._

(1) _The Schutzstaffeln (SS)._ The SS was militarized beginning in March
1933, when special, volunteer, armed units were created consisting of
full-time garrisoned troops. These units, which rapidly grew in
strength, were a part neither of the Wehrmacht, nor of the police, but
were exclusively at the disposal of the Fuehrer. This militarization of
the SS was in accordance with Nazi policy. (For documentation and
further discussion see Chapter XV, Section 5.)

(2) _The Sturmabteilung (SA)._ The SA was founded in 1921 as a
para-military organization to fight political enemies of the Nazis.
After the accession of the Nazis to power, the SA was used to provide
pre-military training at a time when the Reichswehr was legally limited
to a strength of 100,000 men. Thus the SA, from its inception, had a
military purpose, which was carried out and gradually increased in
scope. (For documentation and further discussion see Chapter XV, Section
4.)

(3) _The Hitler Jugend (HJ)._ One of the chief purposes of the Hitler
Jugend was to provide for military training of German youth at a very
early age. As early as 1933, the HJ entered into a secret program of
extensive pre-military training for German youth in conjunction with the
SA and the Wehrmacht. In addition to general military training, members
of the HJ were given specialized training in various types of military
units, such as flying units, naval units, motorized units, signal units,
etc. (For documentation and further discussion, see Section 8, _supra_.)

(4) _The National Socialist Motor Corps (NSKK)._ The original NSKK was
founded under the name of NSAK (National Socialist Automobile Corps) on
1 April 1930 by Hitler, who joined as its first member. By the end of
1931 it had a membership of approximately 10,000, as compared to 300 at
the beginning of that year (_2804-PS_). In 1934 the motorized Hitler
Jugend and the motorized SA were placed under the NSKK. Hitler, on 23
August of that year, decreed that:

    “the NSAK and the motorized SA are from now on welded together
    into a unit called NSKK. The NSKK is directly subordinate to
    me”. (_2804-PS_)

Thus the NSKK was elevated to the position of an independent affiliated
unit of the NSDAP, similar to the SA and the SS. The membership of the
enlarged NSKK grew rapidly.

The military purpose of the NSKK is evident from the following statement
from The _Organizationbuch der NSDAP_ (1940):

    “The young driver who has received his training in the six-week
    courses of the NSKK will be well prepared in body and spirit
    when the time comes for his military service, and will wear with
    pride the dress of the Armed Forces of the Nation.”
    (_2320-B-PS_)

The program of militarization proceeded rapidly:

    “More than one-third of all leaders and men of the NSKK, which
    had in the meantime grown to a membership of 350,000, were
    already active in the fight for power * * * Thus, the NSKK had
    in its ranks, in addition to the proud tradition of the period
    of our fight, also that of the World War. This front spirit and
    experience of a generation matured to manhood in the barrages,
    in the battles of attrition, in the battles of the Freikorps,
    and in the heroic fight of National Socialism for Germany’s
    rebirth, is passed on to our youth as a sacred heritage.”
    (_2804-PS_)

The training given to NSKK members was intended to furnish seasoned
recruits for the Nazi military forces.

    “Military motorized training of our youth is the cardinal task
    of the educational work of the NSKK. Here it collaborates most
    closely with the bearer of the arms of the Reich, the Wehrmacht,
    and it has done so already throughout the years before the
    seizure of power. The demands and needs of the Army, which
    continuously grew in scope after the awakening of our Nation and
    after our regained military freedom also caused the tasks and
    the work of the NSKK in the field of military motorized training
    to grow correspondingly * * * By order of the Fuehrer and
    Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, the NSKK has been given
    charge of the pre-military training of the entire young reserve
    of the motorized troop units of our Army in addition to
    post-military training.” (_2804-PS_)

NSKK-trained men were intended to be assimilated into Reich Panzer
units.

    “Well prepared physically and spiritually, the young German man
    who has now become a motorized soldier, can serve with a
    motorized or partially-motorized unit of the Army. To become a
    tank soldier is his only ambition.” (_2804-PS_)

The NSKK was actually used for military purposes.

    “The men of the NSKK have considerably contributed to the
    liberation of the Sudetenland by the Fuehrer and have thus
    gained undying merit, not only for the Germans in the
    Sudetenland, but for the entire German people as a whole.”
    (_2804-PS_)

Further evidence of actual military use of the NSKK is given in the
following passage from “_Deutschland im Kampf_” written by
_Ministerialdirigent_ A. J. Berndt of the Reich Propaganda Ministry and
Lt. Col. von Wedel of the German Army High Command, in the issue of June
1940:

    “The NSKK is playing a decisive part in the carrying out of
    considerable war-important tasks on the Inner Front, one of
    which is traffic. * * * Among the tasks of the NSKK are
    pre-military training, education, and schooling and motorized
    transport. Thus, for instance, the conducting of the entire
    transport system of the TODT Organization on the West Wall and
    the traffic in the Western War Theater are in the hands of the
    NSKK.” (_2810-PS_)

(5) _The National Socialist Aviation Corps (NSFK)._ The NSFK was another
organization affiliated with the NSDAP used by the Nazi conspirators for
military purposes. It was the great training school for the Luftwaffe.

    “In the endeavor to assure for the German Luftwaffe a
    numerically strong and well prepared reserve, and to strengthen
    in the German people the conviction that Germany must retain its
    head-start in all spheres of aviation, the NSFK was founded by
    the Fuehrer on 17 April 1937 * * *.

    “The NSFK at the time of its creation, was given the following
    tasks by the Reichsmarshal:

    “1. Pre-military aviation training of the new blood for the
    Luftwaffe.

    “2. The keeping in training of the reservists of the aviation
    troops.

    “3. The combining and directing of all German air sports.

    “4. Promotion and extension of the aviation idea among the
    German people.

    “These tasks are so great that the cooperation of tens of
    thousands of active members is necessary to make carrying them
    out possible, so that the Luftwaffe may be able at any time to
    count on their fulfillment according to plan.” (_2811-PS_)

The paramount military purpose of the NSFK is clearly indicated in the
following admission by _Generalleutnant_ Friedrich Christiansen,
_Korpsfuehrer_ of the NSFK:

    “Schooled in character, trained physically as a flier, and as a
    soldier, the member-to-be of the Luftwaffe leaves the NSFK.”
    (_2813-PS_)

(6) _The Reichsarbeitdienst (RAD)_ (The Reich Labor Service). The Reich
Labor Service was also subverted to military purposes by the Nazi
conspirators.

Membership in the RAD was made compulsory for both young men and women
on 26 June 1935.

    “All young Germans of either sex between 18-25 years of age are
    obligated to serve their people in the Reich Labor Service. As
    the schooling of the Nation, it has as its object this education
    of the German Youth to National Socialist Ideology.

    “The Reich Labor Service for men is, thanks to its military
    nature, closely-knit units, and its particular education and
    training an ever-ready, powerful tool of the National Socialist
    Reich.” (_2805-PS_)

The tens of thousands of members of the RAD were militarily trained and
ready for action when Germany launched her campaigns of aggression.
Actual military use of the men of the RAD is clearly shown in the 1 June
1943 edition of “_Fuehren und Erziehen_” (Leadership and Education), the
official magazine of the Reich Labor Service. A photograph depicts a
Labor Service man repairing a bridge at the front, across which four
infantrymen are proceeding, and is titled as follows:

    “The young crews who have gone through the educational
    institutions of the Reich Labor Service today represent the most
    active nucleus of our Army. * * * Our photograph shows labor men
    who in the East are preparing the way for infantry shock troops
    by repairing a bridge. Thus also the men of the Reich Labor
    Service are today one of the examples of eternal German
    soldierdom.” (_2806-PS_)

The military uses of the RAD are further described in the following
letter written by Goering to Reich Labor Service Leader Konstantin
Hierl:

    “After the victorious termination of the campaign in Poland, I
    cannot but convey to you my sincere thanks for and unreserved
    recognition of the help rendered by the Reich Labor Service in
    the carrying out of the operations of the Luftwaffe. In guarding
    Army airfields, in clearing and quickly repairing former enemy
    airports, in road construction and in bringing up supplies,
    everywhere your men have done a real job and have thus
    contributed considerably to the successes of the German
    Luftwaffe.” (_2807-PS_)

(7) _The TODT Organization (OT)._ The TODT Organization, or OT, was
another NSDAP affiliate used to further the militaristic aims of the
Nazi conspirators. The OT, originally an offshoot of the RAD, was
created as a separate entity in June 1938 when Dr. Fritz Todt was
charged with the construction of the Siegfried Line or West Wall. The
military employment of the OT is clearly shown in the following passage
from “_Maenner der OT_”, which was published by the Photographic Office
of the Reich Propaganda Office:

    “No sooner had the greatest and most modern fortifications of
    the world, the West Wall, been completed by the workers of the
    OT, when these very same workers were called upon by the Fuehrer
    to prove their worth also in direct front service * * * and they
    thus helped * * * to achieve the greatest victory in history.
    When the great offensive in the west began, the brown workers’
    columns of the TODT organization followed immediately behind
    them. After the armistice with France had been signed, an
    entirely new situation developed for the TODT organization. Its
    columns had pushed deep into enemy country. Not seldom did they
    have direct contact with the enemy—their losses in dead and
    wounded and the Iron Cross awards are heroic proof of that.
    While, as the foremost construction workers of the German Reich,
    they had already proved their worth when building the West Wall,
    they were now able to perfect what they had learned in the fight
    against the British world enemy. From the Channel coast to the
    Atlantic Ocean, the front technicians and front workers of the
    OT now proceeded to create the prerequisites for a successful
    fight against England.” (_2808-PS_)

Though the OT was in its origin technically a civilian organization, it
subsequently became a para-military body which, before and during the
war, cooperated fully with the German Army. On 2 July 1940, a directive
was issued from the German High Command appointing a liaison officer.

    “* * * to establish the closest liaison and cooperation of the
    respective military offices with the main construction work of
    the TODT Organization.” (_2812-PS_)

This militarization of the OT is further shown in the following passage
from “_Nationalsozialistische Monatschefte_” for 1942:

    “From the Autobahn workers was developed the ‘Organization TODT’
    a body of hundreds of thousands of workers who help the
    Wehrmacht everywhere in eliminating obstacles, building bridges
    and erecting fortifications and shelters. The front soldier and
    the front worker stand side by side. Together they have shed
    their blood in this war and together they have won victories.
    Long-range guns on the Channel coast, U-boat bases on the
    Atlantic, and now the East will render the ‘OT’ immortal for all
    times to come.” (_2809-PS_)

A letter from Fritz Sauckel to Hitler, dated 17 May 1943, states that
the OT had supplied 248,200 workers by March 1943 for the completion of
the Atlantic Wall, and praises the OT for its excellent work in this
regard. (_407-VIII-PS_)

By 1938, all phases of German life _had been_ mobilized for the
accomplishment of militant aims.

Hitler declared to the Reichstag on 20 February 1938:

    “Only now we have succeeded in setting before us the great tasks
    and in possessing the material things which are the
    prerequisites for the realization of great creative plans in all
    fields of our national existence. Thus, National Socialism has
    made up within a few years for what centuries before it had
    omitted. * * *

    “National Socialism has given the German people that leadership
    which as party not only mobilizes the nation but also organizes
    it, so that on the basis of the natural principle of selection,
    the continuance of a stable political leadership is safeguarded
    forever * * * National Socialism * * * possesses Germany
    entirely and completely since the day when, five years ago, I
    left the house in Wilhelmplatz as Reich Chancellor. There is no
    institution in this state which is not National Socialist. Above
    all, however, the National Socialist Party in these five years
    not only has made the nation National Socialist, but also has
    given itself that perfect organizational structure which
    guarantees its permanence for all future. _The greatest
    guarantee of the National Socialist revolution lies in the
    complete domination of the Reich and all its institutions and
    organizations, internally and externally, by the National
    Socialist Party. Its protection against the world abroad,
    however, lies in its new National Socialist armed forces._ * * *

    “In this Reich, anybody who has a responsible position is a
    National Socialist. * * * Every institution of this Reich is
    under the orders of the supreme political leadership. * * * The
    party leads the Reich politically, the armed forces defend it
    militarily. * * * There is nobody in any responsible position in
    this state who doubts that I am the authorized leader of this
    Reich.” (_2715-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

  LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO MILITARIZATION OF
                           NAZI ORGANIZATIONS

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │      │
                │  (f).                                  │  I   │      21
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *407-VIII-PS   │Telegram from Sauckel to Hitler, 17 May │      │
                │1943, concerning foreign labor. (USA    │      │
                │210)                                    │ III  │     394
                │                                        │      │
 2320-B-PS      │Extracts from Organization Book of      │      │
                │NSDAP, 1940, p. 394.                    │  IV  │    1026
                │                                        │      │
*2715-PS        │Speech by Hitler to the Reichstag on 20 │      │
                │February 1938, published in The Archive,│      │
                │February 1938, Vol. 47, pp. 1441-1442.  │      │
                │(USA 331).                              │  V   │     376
                │                                        │      │
 2804-PS        │Extracts from “Das NSKK” by Hans Helmut │      │
                │Krenzlein, NSKK Gruppenfuehrer, with    │      │
                │foreword by Leader of NSKK, Korpsfuehrer│      │
                │A. Huehnlein.                           │  V   │     446
                │                                        │      │
 2805-PS        │Extract from Organization Book of NSDAP,│      │
                │1943, p. 465.                           │  V   │     447
                │                                        │      │
 2806-PS        │Extract from Leadership and Education,  │      │
                │official magazine of Dutch Labor        │      │
                │Service, 1 June 1943, p. 19.            │  V   │     448
                │                                        │      │
 2807-PS        │Letter by Goering to Reich Labor Service│      │
                │Leader Konstantin Hierl, published by   │      │
                │National Socialist Monthly, 1940, Vol.  │      │
                │I, p. 155.                              │  V   │     448
                │                                        │      │
 2808-PS        │Men of the OT, published by Photographic│      │
                │Office of Reich Propaganda Office.      │  V   │     448
                │                                        │      │
 2809-PS        │Extract from National Socialist Monthly,│      │
                │February-March, 1942, p. 167.           │  V   │     449
                │                                        │      │
 2810-PS        │Extract from Germany in Battle, by      │      │
                │Berndt of Reich Propaganda Ministry and │      │
                │von Wedel of German Army High Command,  │      │
                │1940, p. 107.                           │  V   │     449
                │                                        │      │
 2811-PS        │Extracts from Organization Book of the  │      │
                │NSDAP, 1938, pp. 470, 470(c).           │  V   │     450
                │                                        │      │
 2812-PS        │Directive from German Army High Command,│      │
                │published in General Army Bulletin,     │      │
                │1940, Vol. VII, p. 96.                  │  V   │     450
                │                                        │      │
 2813-PS        │Extract from The National Socialist Air │      │
                │Corps, p. 14.                           │  V   │     451
                │                                        │      │
*3054-PS        │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801




                              Chapter VIII
                   ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY


It is well known that the Nazi conspirators rearmed Germany on a vast
scale. The purpose of that rearmament is revealed in the secret records
of the plans and deliberations of the inner councils of the Nazis. These
records show that the reorganization of the German government, the
financial wizardry of Hjalmar Schacht, and the total mobilization of the
German economy largely under Hjalmar Schacht, Hermann Goering, and
Walter Funk, were directed at a single goal: aggressive war.

                    I. ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION FOR WAR

The significance of the economic measures adopted and applied by the
conspirators can be properly appraised only if they are placed in the
larger social and political context of Nazi Germany. These economic
measures were adopted while the conspirators were directing their vast
propaganda apparatus to the glorification of war. They were adopted
while the conspirators were perverting physical training into training
for war. They were adopted while these conspirators were threatening to
use force and were planning to use force to achieve their material and
political objects. In short, these measures constitute in the field of
economics and government administration the same preparation for
aggressive war which dominated every aspect of the Nazi state.

In 1939 and 1940, after the Nazi aggression upon Poland, Holland,
Belgium, and France, it became clear to the world that the Nazi
conspirators had created probably the greatest instrument of aggression
in history. That machine was built up almost in its entirety in a period
of less than one decade. In May of 1939 Major General George Thomas,
former Chief of the Military-Economic Staff in the Reich War Ministry,
reported that the German Army had grown from seven Infantry divisions in
1933 to thirty-nine Infantry divisions, among them four fully motorized
and three mountain divisions; eighteen Corps Headquarters; five Panzer
divisions; twenty-two machine gun battalions. Moreover, General Thomas
stated that the German Navy had greatly expanded by the launching, among
other vessels, of two battleships of thirty-five thousand tons, four
heavy cruisers of ten thousand tons, and other warships; further, that
the Luftwaffe had grown to a point where it had a strength of two
hundred sixty thousand men, twenty-one squadrons, consisting of two
hundred forty echelons, and thirty-three Anti-Aircraft Batteries.
(_EC-28_) General Thomas further reported, in a lecture delivered on 24
May 1939 in the Nazi Foreign Office, that out of the few factories
permitted by the Versailles Treaty there had arisen * * *

    “The mightiest armament industry now existing in the world. It
    has attained the performances which in part equal the German
    wartime performances and in part even surpasses them. Germany’s
    crude steel production is today the largest in the world after
    the Americans. The aluminum production exceeds that of America
    and of the other countries of the world very considerably. The
    output of our rifle, machine gun, and artillery factories is at
    present larger than that of any other state.” (_EC-28_)

These results—about which General Thomas spoke in his book entitled
_Basic Facts for a History of German War and Armaments Economy_—were
achieved only by making preparation for war the dominating objective of
German economy. As General Thomas stated on page 479 of his book:

    “History will know only a few examples of cases where a country
    has directed, even in peace time, all its economic forces
    deliberately and systematically towards the requirements of war,
    as Germany was compelled to do in the period between the two
    World Wars.” (_2353-PS_)

The task of mobilizing the German economy for aggressive war began
promptly after the Nazi conspirators’ seizure of power. It was entrusted
principally to Schacht, Goering, and Funk.

Schacht was appointed President of the Reichsbank in March 1933, and
Minister of Economics in August 1934. The world did not know, however,
that the responsibility for the execution of this program was entrusted
to the office of the Four Year Plan under Goering (_EC-408_). Nor did
the world know that Schacht was designated Plenipotentiary for the War
Economy on 21 May 1935, with complete control over the German civilian
economy for war production in the Reich Defense Council, established by
a top secret Hitler decree.

A letter dated 24 June 1935, at Berlin, and signed by von Blomberg,
reads in part:

    “* * * The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has nominated the
    President of the directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, to
    be Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy. * * *

    “* * * I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more
    * * *.” (_2261-PS_)

Through Schacht’s financial genius monetary measures were devised to
restore German industry to full production; and through the control of
imports and exports, which he devised under his new plan of 1934, German
production was channeled in accordance with the requirements of the
German war machine.

In 1936, with an eye to the experience in the First World War, the Nazi
conspirators embarked on an ambitious plan to make Germany completely
self-sufficient in strategic war materials such as rubber, gasoline, and
steel, in a period of four years, so that Germany would be fully
prepared for aggressive war. The responsibility for the execution of
this program was entrusted to the office of the Four Year Plan under
Goering. A “memorandum on the Four Year Plan and Preparation of the War
Economy,” dated 30 December 1936, and marked “Secret Command Matter”,
sets out that the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has conferred powers in
regard to mobilization preparations in the economic field that need
further definition. The third paragraph refers specifically to
Minister-President, Generaloberst Goering as Commissioner of the Four
Year Plan, by authority of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor granted 18
October 1936. The existence of this program involved the reorganization
and control of the whole German economy for war. (_EC-408_)

The military objectives of the German economy were clearly stated by
General Thomas in a lecture on 28 February 1939, delivered at the Staff
Instructor’s course. He stated:

    “The National Socialist State, soon after taking over the power,
    has reorganized the German economy in all sections and directed
    it towards a military viewpoint, which had been requested by the
    Army for years. Due to the reorganization, agriculture, commerce
    and professions became those powerful instruments the Fuehrer
    needs for his extensive plans, and we can say today that
    Hitler’s mobile politics, as well as the powerful efforts of the
    Army and economy, would not have been possible without the
    necessary reorganization by the National Socialist Government.
    We can now say that the economic organization as a whole
    corresponds with the needs, although slight adjustments will
    have to be made yet. Those reorganizations made a new system of
    economics possible which was necessary in view of our internal
    and foreign political situation as well as our financial
    problems. The directed economy, as we have it today, concerning
    agriculture, commerce and industry, is not only the expression
    of the present State principles, but at the same time also the
    economy of the country’s defense.” (_EC-27_)

This program was not undertaken in a vacuum; it was deliberately
designed and executed to provide the necessary instrument of the Nazi
conspirators’ plans for aggressive war. In September 1934 Schacht
admitted to the American Ambassador in Berlin that the Hitler Party was
absolutely committed to war, and that the people too were ready and
willing. (_EC-461_) At the same time Schacht promulgated his new plan
for the control of imports and exports in the interest of rearmament. A
year later he was appointed Plenipotentiary for War Economy by top
secret decree. (_2261-PS_)

On 4 September 1936 Goering announced, at a Cabinet meeting attended by
von Blomberg, Schacht, and others, that Hitler had issued instructions
to the Reich War Minister on the basis that “the show-down with Russia
is inevitable,” and added that “all measures have to be taken just as if
we were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war.” (_EC-416_)

In the same month the office of the Four Year Plan was created with the
mission of making Germany self-sufficient for war in four years. Goering
regarded it as his task, within four years, to put the entire economy in
a state of readiness for war. (_EC-408_)

          2. COLLABORATION OF THE INDUSTRIALISTS IN REARMAMENT

Although the Nazi government officials provided the leadership in
preparing Germany for war, they received also the enthusiastic and
invaluable cooperation of the German industrialists.

On the invitation of Goering, approximately 25 of the leading
industrialists of Germany, together with Schacht, attended a meeting in
Berlin on 20 February 1933. This was shortly before the German election
of 5 March 1933. At this meeting Hitler announced the conspirators’ aim
to seize totalitarian control over Germany, to destroy the parliamentary
system, to crush all opposition by force, and to restore the power of
the _Wehrmacht_. Among those present at that meeting were Gustav Krupp,
head of the munitions firm, Alfried Krupp, A.G.; four leading officials
of the I. G. Farben Works, one of the world’s largest chemical concerns;
Albert Vogler, head of United Steel Works of Germany; and other leading
industrialists. This meeting is described in the following affidavit of
George von Schnitzler:

    “I, George von Schnitzler, a member of the Vorstand of I. G.
    Farben, make the following deposition under oath:

    “At the end of February 1933, four members of the Vorstand of I.
    G. Farben, including Dr. Bosch, the head of the Vorstand, and
    myself were asked by the office of the President of the
    Reichstag to attend a meeting in his house, the purpose of which
    was not given. I do not remember the two other colleagues of
    mine who were also invited. I believe the invitation reached me
    during one of my business trips to Berlin. I went to the meeting
    which was attended by about 20 persons, who I believe were
    mostly leading industrialists from the Ruhr.

    “Among those present I remember:

    “Dr. Schacht, who at that time was not yet head of the
    _Reichsbank_ again and not yet Minister of Economics.

    “Krupp von Bohlen, who in the beginning of 1933 presided over
    the _Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie_, which later on was
    changed into the semi-official organization ‘_Reichsgruppe
    Industrie_.’

    “Dr. Albert Vogler, the leading man of the _Vereinigte
    Stahlwerke_.

    “Von Lowenfeld from an industrial work in Essen.

    “Dr. Stein, head of the _Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria_, a mine
    which belongs to the I. G. Dr. Stein was an active member of the
    _Deutsche Volkspartei_.

    “I remember that Dr. Schacht acted as a kind of host.

    “While I had expected the appearance of Goering, Hitler entered
    the room, shook hands with everybody and took a seat at the top
    of the table. In a long speech, he talked mainly about the
    danger of communism over which he pretended that he just had won
    a decisive victory.

    “He then talked about the _Bundnis_—alliance—into which his
    party and the _Deutsch Nationale Volkspartei_ had entered. This
    latter party, in the meantime, had been reorganized by Herr von
    Papen. At the end he came to the point which seemed to me the
    purpose of the meeting. Hitler stressed the importance that the
    two aforementioned parties should gain the majority in the
    coming Reichstag election. Krupp von Bohlen thanked Hitler for
    his speech. After Hitler had left the room, Dr. Schacht proposed
    to the meeting the raising of an election fund of, as far as I
    remember, RM 3,000,000. The fund should be distributed between
    the two ‘allies’ according to their relative strength at the
    time being. Dr. Stein suggested that the _Deutsche Volkspartei_
    should be included * * *.” (_EC-439_)

In a speech delivered to the industrialists in Berlin on 20 February
1933, Hitler stated:

    “Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of
    democracy; it is conceivable only if the people have a sound
    idea of authority and personality. * * * I recognized even while
    in the hospital that one had to search for new ideas conducive
    to reconstruction. I found them in Nationalism, in the value of
    strength and power of individual personality. * * * If one
    rejects pacifism, one must put a new idea in its place
    immediately. Everything must be pushed aside, must be replaced
    by something better. * * * We must not forget that all the
    benefits of culture must be introduced more or less with an iron
    fist just as once upon a time the farmers were forced to plant
    potatoes.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “With the very same courage with which we go to work to make up
    for what had been sinned during the last 14 years, we have
    withstood all attempts to move us off the right way.”

    “* * * We must first gain complete power if we want to crush the
    other side completely. While still gaining power, one should not
    start the struggle against the opponent. Only when one knows
    that one has reached the pinnacle of power, that there is no
    further possible development, shall one strike. * * *

    “* * * Now we stand before the last election. Regardless of the
    outcome there will be no retreat, even if the coming election
    does not bring about a decision. * * *

    “The question of restoration of the _Wehrmacht_ will not be
    decided at Geneva but in Germany, when we have gained internal
    strength through internal peace.” (_D-203_)

In reply to these statements Goering, who was present at that same
meeting, declared:

    “That the sacrifice asked for surely would be much easier for
    industry to bear if it realized that the election of March 5th
    will surely be the last one for the next ten years, probably
    even for the next hundred years.” (_D-203_)

In a memorandum dated 22 February 1933, found in the personal files of
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Krupp briefly described this same
meeting, and recalled that he had expressed to Hitler the gratitude of
the 25 industrialists present. (_D-204_)

In April 1933, after Hitler had entrenched himself in power, Gustav
Krupp, as Chairman of the Reich Association of German Industry, which
was the largest association of German industrialists, submitted to
Hitler the plan of that association for the reorganization of German
industry. In connection therewith Krupp undertook to bring the
association into line with the aims of the conspirators, and to make it
an effective instrument for the execution of their policies. In a letter
of transmittal (_D-157_), Krupp stated that the plan of reorganization
which he submitted on behalf of the association of industrialists, was
characterized by the desire to coordinate economic measures and
political necessity, adopting the Fuehrer conception of the new German
state. In the plan of reorganization itself, Krupp stated:

    “The turn of political events is in line with the wishes which I
    myself and the board of directors have cherished for a long
    time. In reorganizing the Reich Association of German Industry,
    I shall be guided by the idea of bringing the new organization
    into agreement with the political aims of the Reich Government.”
    (_D-157_)

The ideas of Krupp were subsequently adopted.

Under the decree introducing the leadership principle into industry,
each group of industry was required to have a leader who was to serve
without compensation. The leaders were to be appointed and could be
removed at the discretion of the Minister of Economics. The charter of
each group was to be created by the leader, who was obligated to lead
his group in accordance with the principles of the National Socialist
State (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, Part I, 1194, Sec. 11, 12, 16). The
introduction of the leadership principle into the organizations of
business centralized authority and guaranteed the efficient execution of
orders, which the government issued to business, in the effort to
promote a war economy.

The overwhelming support given by the German industrialists to the Nazi
war program is described in a speech prepared by Gustav Krupp in January
1944, for delivery at the University of Berlin:

    “War material is life-saving for one’s own people, and whoever
    works and performs in those spheres can be proud of it. Here,
    enterprise as a whole, finds its highest justification of
    existence. This justification, I may inject this here,
    crystallized especially during the time of interregnum between
    1919 and 1933, when Germany was lying down disarmed. * * *

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “It is the one great merit of the entire German war economy that
    it did not remain idle during those bad years, even though its
    activity could not be brought to light for obvious reasons.
    Through years of secret work, scientific and basic groundwork
    was laid in order to be ready again to work for the German armed
    forces at the appointed hour without loss of time or experience.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Only through the secret activity of German enterprise, together
    with the experience gained meanwhile through production of
    peacetime goods, was it possible, after 1933, to fall into step
    with the new tasks arrived at, restoring Germany’s military
    power. Only through all that could the entirely new and various
    problems, brought up by the Fuehrer’s Four-Year Plan for German
    enterprise, be mastered. It was necessary to supply the new raw
    materials, to explore and experiment, to invest capital in order
    to make German economy independent and strong—in short, to make
    it war-worthy.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I think I may state here that the German enterprises followed
    the new ways enthusiastically, that they made the great
    intentions of the Fuehrer their own by fair competition and
    conscious gratitude, and became his faithful followers. How else
    could the tasks between 1933 and 1939, and especially those
    after 1939, have been overcome?” (_D-317_)

        3. THE USE OF ECONOMIC MEASURES TO FACILITATE REARMAMENT

It must be emphasized that the secret rearmament program was launched
immediately upon the seizure of power by the Nazi conspirators. On 4
April 1933 the Reich Cabinet passed a resolution establishing a Reich
Defense Council. The function of this council was secretly to mobilize
for war. At the second meeting of the working committee of the
Councillors for Reich Defense, the predecessor of the Reich Defense
Council, which was held on 22 May 1933, the chairman was Keitel. Keitel
stated that the Reich Defense Council would immediately undertake to
prepare for war emergency. He stressed the urgency of the task of
organizing a war economy, and announced that the council stood ready to
brush aside all obstacles. Fully aware of the fact that their action was
in flagrant violation of the Treaty of Versailles, Keitel emphasized the
extreme importance of absolute secrecy:

    “No document ought to be lost, since otherwise it may fall into
    the hands of the enemies’ intelligence service. Orally
    transmitted, matters are not provable; they can be denied by us
    in Geneva.” (_EC-177_)

The singleness of purpose with which the Nazi conspirators geared the
German economy to the forging of a war machine is further shown by the
secret minutes of the second meeting of the working committee of the
Reich Defense Council, held on 7 February 1934. At this meeting at which
Capt. Schmundt, Col. Guerian, Maj. Gen. von Reichenau, Maj. Warlimont,
and Jodl—then a Lt. Col.—were present, Lieutenant-General Beck pointed
out that:

    “The actual state of preparation is the purpose of this
    session.” (_EC-404_)

Detailed measures of financing a future war were discussed and it was
pointed out that the financial aspects of the war economy would be
regulated by the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank, which was
headed by Schacht. (_EC-404_)

Under his secret appointment as Plenipotentiary-General of the War
Economy, Schacht had the express function of placing all economic forces
of the nation in the services of the Nazi war machine. The secret
defense law of 21 May 1935 in effect gave Schacht charge of the entire
war economy. In case of war he was to be virtual economic dictator of
Germany. His task was to place all economic forces into service for the
conduct of war and to secure economically the life of the German people.
The Ministers of Economics, Food, Agriculture, Labor, and Forestry, as
well as all Reich agencies directly under the Fuehrer, were subordinated
to him. He was to be responsible for the financing as well as for the
conduct of the war; and he was further authorized to issue ordinances
within his sphere of responsibility, even if these deviated from
existing laws. (_2261-PS_)

The rearmament of Germany proceeded at a rapid pace. By summer of 1935
the Nazi conspirators were emboldened to make plans for the reoccupation
of the Rhineland, and at the tenth meeting of the working committee of
the council the question of measures to be taken in connection with the
proposed reoccupation of the Rhineland was discussed.

At that meeting, on 26 June 1935, it was said that the Rhineland
required special treatment because of the assurances given by Hitler to
the French that no military action was being undertaken in the
demilitarized zone. Among the matters requiring special treatment was
the preparation of economic mobilization, a task specifically entrusted
to Schacht as secret Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. In this
connection it was stated:

    “* * * Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at
    present under all circumstances, only these preparatory measures
    that are urgently necessary may be carried out. The existence of
    such preparations, or the intention of them must be kept in
    strictest secrecy in the zone itself as well as in the rest of
    the Reich.” (_EC-405_)

Preparations of various types were thereupon discussed.

The rapid success of German rearmament is attributable to the work of
Schacht. In the fall of 1934, the Nazi conspirators announced the “New
Plan”, which aimed at the control of imports and exports in order to
obtain the raw materials needed for armaments and the foreign currency
required to sustain the armament program. The “New Plan” was the
creation of Schacht. Under the plan, Schacht controlled imports by
extending the system of supervisory boards for import control, which was
previously limited to the main groups of raw materials, to all goods
imported into Germany. The requirement of licenses for imports enabled
the Nazi conspirators to restrict imports to those commodities which
served their war aims.

Subsequently, in February 1935, the _Devisen_ Law was passed
(_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1935, I, 105). Under it, all transactions involving
foreign exchange were subject to the approval of _Devisenstellen_
(Foreign Exchange Control Offices). By thus controlling the disposition
of foreign exchange, the conspirators were able to manipulate foreign
trade so as to serve their ends.

Every aspect of the German economy was geared to war under the guidance
of the Nazi conspirators, particularly Schacht. In a study of the
economic mobilization for war as of 30 September 1934, it was stated
that steps had already been taken to build up stock piles, to construct
new facilities for the production of scarce goods, to redeploy industry
to secure areas, and to control fiscal and trade policies. The task of
stock piling, it was announced, had been hampered by the requirement of
secrecy and camouflage. Reserves of automobile fuels and stocks of coal
were accumulated, and the production of synthetic oil was accelerated.
Civilian supply was purposely organized so that most plants would be
working for the German Armed Forces. Studies were made of the
possibility of barter trade with supposedly neutral countries in case of
war. (_EC-128_)

Financing of the armament program presented a difficult problem for the
conspirators. In 1934 and 1935, the German economy could by no
possibility have raised funds for the Nazis’ extensive rearmament
program through taxes and public loans. From the outset, the armament
program involved “the engagement of the last reserves.” Moreover, apart
from the problem of raising the huge sums required to sustain this
program, the Nazi conspirators were exceedingly anxious, in the early
stages, to conceal the extent of their armament activities.

After considering various techniques of financing the armament program,
Schacht proposed the use of “mefo” bills. One of the primary advantages
of this method was the fact that through its use figures indicating the
extent of rearmament, which would have become public through the use of
other methods, could be kept secret. “Mefo” bills were used exclusively
for armament financing. Transactions in “mefo” bills worked as follows:
“Mefo” bills were drawn by armament contractors and accepted by a
limited liability company. The spelling of the word “mefo” is taken from
the name of this company, _Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft,
m.b.h._ (_MEFO_). This company had a nominal capital of one million
Reichsmarks and was merely a dummy organization. The bills were received
by all German banks for possible rediscounting with the Reichsbank. The
bills were guaranteed by the Reich. Their secrecy was assured by the
fact that they appeared neither in the published statements of the
Reichsbank nor in the budget figures.

The “mefo” bill system continued to be used until 1 April 1938. Up to
that date 12 billion Reichsmarks of “mefo” bills for the financing of
rearmament had been issued. Since it was no longer deemed necessary to
conceal the vast progress of German rearmament, “mefo” financing was
discontinued at that time. (_EC-436_)

Further sources of funds upon which Schacht drew to finance the secret
armament program were the funds of political opponents of the Nazi
regime, and Marks of foreigners on deposit in the Reichsbank. As Schacht
boasted in a memorandum to Hitler dated 3 May 1935:

    “Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our
    political opponents.” (_1168-PS_)

The outstanding “mefo” bills represented at all times a threat to the
stability of the currency because they could be tendered to the
Reichsbank for discount, in which case the currency circulation would
automatically have to be increased. Thus, there was an ever-present
threat of inflation. Schacht nevertheless continued on his course,
because he stood with unswerving loyalty to the Fuehrer, because he
fully recognized the basic idea of National Socialism, and because he
felt that at the end, the disturbances, compared to the great task,
could be considered irrelevant.

High-ranking military officers paid tribute to Schacht’s contrivances on
behalf of the Nazi war machine. An article written for the “Military
Weekly Gazette” in January 1937 stated:

    “The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht today as one
    of the men who have done imperishable things for it and its
    development in accordance with directions from the Fuehrer and
    Reich Chancellor. The defense force owes it to Schacht’s skill
    and great ability that, in defiance of all currency difficulties
    it, according to plan, has been able to grow up to its present
    strength from an army of 100,000 men.”

After the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Nazi conspirators redoubled
their efforts to prepare Germany for a major war. The Four Year Plan was
proclaimed by Hitler in his address at the Nurnberg Party Convention on
9 September 1936. It was given a statutory foundation by the decree
concerning the execution of the Four Year Plan dated 18 October 1936
(_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1936, I, 887). By this decree Goering was put in
charge of the plan. He was authorized to enact any legal and
administrative measures deemed necessary by him for the accomplishment
of his task, and to issue orders and instructions to all government
agencies, including the highest Reich authorities. The purpose of the
plan was to enable Nazi Germany to attain complete self-sufficiency in
essential raw materials, notably motor fuel, rubber, textile fiber, and
non-ferrous metals, and to intensify preparations for war. The
development of synthetic products was greatly accelerated despite their
high costs.

Apart from the self-sufficiency program, however, the Nazi conspirators
required foreign exchange to finance propaganda and espionage activities
abroad. Thus, in a speech on 1 November 1937 before the
_Wehrmachtakademie_, General Thomas stated:

    “If you consider that one will need during the war considerable
    means in order to organize the necessary propaganda, in order to
    pay for the espionage service, and for similar purposes, then
    one should be clear that our internal Mark would be of no use
    therefore, and that Foreign Exchange will be needed.” (_EC-14_)

This need for foreign exchange was reduced in part by virtue of the
espionage and propaganda services rendered free of charge to the Nazi
state by leading German industrial concerns. A memorandum dated at Essen
on 12 October 1935, which was found in the files of the Krupp company,
contains the subheading: “Concerns:—distribution official propaganda
literature abroad with help of our foreign connections.” It goes on to
say that on the morning of 11 October the district representative of the
Ribbentrop Private Foreign Office, _Dienststelle Ribbentrop_, made an
appointment by telephone with Mr. Lachman to arrive at an appointed
time. The memorandum continues:

    “In answer to my question, with whom I was dealing and which
    official bureau he represented, he informed me that he was not
    himself the district representative of Ribbentrop’s Private
    Foreign Office, but that a Mr. Landrat Bollman was such and that
    he himself had come at Mr. Bollman’s order.” (_D-206_)

After discussing the confusion in the field of foreign propaganda, the
memorandum states that Ribbentrop’s Foreign Office is creating a private
organization for foreign propaganda, and that for this purpose the
support of the Krupp firm and especially an index of addresses are
needed. This request received the following response:

    “I informed Mr. Lachman that our firm has put itself years ago
    at the disposal of official bureaus for purposes of foreign
    propaganda, and that we had supported all requests addressed to
    us to the utmost.” (_D-206_)

These activities are demonstrated by another document found in the files
of the Krupp company. A memorandum prefaced by Herr Sonnenberg, on 14
October 1937, reports a meeting at Essen on 12 October 1937. The
government’s request for assistance in foreign intelligence activities
met this response:

    “On our part we undertook to supply information to the Combined
    Services Ministry (R.K.M.) as required.” (_D-167_)

Meanwhile the conspirators’ program of self-sufficiency was proceeding
with great speed. The production of steel, for example, as shown in
official German publication, rose as follows:

                                                 _Tons_
                1933                               74,000
                1934                              105,000
                1935                              145,000
                1936                              186,000
                1937                              217,000
                1938                              477,000

The production of gasoline increased at an even greater tempo: from
387,000 tons in 1934 to 1,494,000 tons in 1938 (_Statistical Yearbook of
the German Reich, 1939-1942_).

The Nazi conspirators pressed the completion of the armament program
with a sense of urgency betraying their awareness of the imminence of
war. At a meeting on 4 September 1936 Goering pointed out that “all
measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in the state of
imminent danger of war.” He pointed out that:

    “* * * if war should break out tomorrow we would be forced to
    take measures from which we might possibly still shy away at the
    present moment. They are therefore to be taken.” (_EC-416_)

The extreme urgency was manifested by Goering’s remark that

    “* * * existent reserves will have to be touched for the purpose
    of carrying us over this difficulty until the goal ordered by
    the Fuehrer has been reached; in case of war they are not a
    reliable backing in any case.” (_EC-416_)

Schacht was advised by a top secret letter dated 31 August 1936 that
Hitler ordered all formations of the air force to be ready by 1 April
1937. (_1301-PS_)

After their successes in Austria and the Sudetenland, the Nazi
conspirators redoubled their efforts to equip themselves for the war of
aggression which they planned to launch. In a conference on 14 October
1938, shortly before the Nazis made their first demands on Poland,
Goering stated:

    “* * * Everybody knows from the press what the world situation
    looks like, and therefore the Fuehrer has issued an order to him
    to carry out a gigantic program compared to which previous
    achievements are insignificant. There are difficulties in the
    way which he will overcome with the utmost energy and
    ruthlessness.” (_1301-PS_)

The supply of foreign currency had sunken because of preparations for
the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Replenishment was considered necessary.
At the same conference, on 14 October 1938, Goering declared:

    “These gains made through the export are to be used for an
    increased armament. The armament should not be curtailed by
    export activities.” (_1301-PS_)

Goering had received the order from the Fuehrer to increase armaments to
an abnormal extent, the air force having first priority, and interpreted
it as follows:

    “Within the shortest time, the air force should be increased
    five fold; also the navy should create war weapons more rapidly,
    and the army should produce large amounts of war weapons at a
    faster rate, particularly heavy artillery and heavy tanks. Along
    with this a larger production of armaments must go, especially
    fuel, rubber, powders and explosives must be moved to the
    foreground. This should be coupled with an accelerated expansion
    of highways, canals, and particularly of the railroads.”
    (_1301-PS_)

In the course of these preparations for war, a clash of wills ensued
between Goering and Schacht, as a result of which Schacht resigned his
position as head of the Ministry of Economics and Plenipotentiary for
the War Economy in November 1937. He was removed from the presidency of
the Reichsbank in January 1939. Regardless of the details of this
controversy, Schacht’s departure in no way implied any disagreement with
the major war aims of the Nazis. Schacht took particular pride in his
vast attainments in the financial and economic fields in aid of the Nazi
war machine. In a letter to General Thomas Schacht wrote:

    “I think back with much satisfaction to the work in the Ministry
    of Economics which afforded me the opportunity to assist in the
    rearmament of the German people in the most critical period, not
    only in the financial but also in the economic sphere. I have
    always considered a rearmament of the German people as condition
    _sine qua non_ of the establishment of a new German nation.”
    (_EC-257_)

In a letter written to General Von Blomberg, on 8 July 1937, Schacht
wrote:

    “The direction of the war economy by the plenipotentiary would
    in that event never take place entirely independent from the
    rest of the war mechanism but would be aimed at accomplishment
    of the political war purpose with the assistance of all economic
    forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this
    way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to
    the Defense Act.” (_EC-252_)

In the spring of 1937, Schacht participated with representatives of the
three branches of the armed forces in “war games in war economy” at
Godesberg. A report of these exercises, entitled “War economy tasks in
Godesberg undertaken by General Staff between the 25th of May and the
2nd of June,” records the speech welcoming Dr. Schacht:

    “Before I start with the discussion of the war game in war
    economy, I have to express how grateful we all are that you,
    President Dr. Schacht, have gone to the trouble personally to
    participate in our final discussion today despite all your other
    activities. This proves to us your deep interest in war economy
    tasks shown at all times and your presence is renewed proof that
    you are willing to facilitate for us soldiers the difficult
    war-economic preparations and to strengthen the harmonious
    cooperation with your offices.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I want to point out, however, that all matters and all
    information received has to be kept in strictest secrecy * * *.”
    (_EC-174_)

The annexation of Austria was apparently a goal which Schacht had long
sought, for in a speech to the employees of the former Austrian National
Bank he declared:

    “* * * Austria has certainly a great mission, namely, to be the
    bearer of German culture, to insure respect and regard for the
    German name, especially in the direction of the southeast. Such
    a mission can only be performed within the Great German Reich
    and based on the power of a nation of 75 millions, which,
    regardless of the wish of the opponents, forms the heart and the
    soul of Europe.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “We have read a lot in the foreign press during the last few
    days that this aim, the union of both countries, is to a certain
    degree justified, but that the methods of effecting this union
    was terrible. This method which certainly did not suit one or
    the other power was nothing but the consequence of countless
    perfidies and brutal acts and violence which foreign countries
    have practiced against us * * *.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * I am known for sometimes expressing thoughts which give
    offense and there I would not like to depart from this
    consideration. I know that there are even in this country a few
    people—I believe they are not too numerous—who find fault with
    the events of the last few days, but nobody, I believe, doubts
    the goal, and it should be said to all grumblers that you can’t
    satisfy everybody. One person says he would have done it maybe
    one way, but the remarkable thing is that they did not do it,
    and that it was only done by our Adolf Hitler; and if there is
    still something left to be improved, then those grumblers should
    try to bring about these improvements from the German Reich, and
    within the German community, but not to disturb us from
    without.” (_EC-297-A_)

A memorandum of 7 January 1939, written by Schacht and other directors
of the Reichsbank to Hitler, urged a balancing of the budget in view of
the threatening danger of inflation. The memorandum continued:

    “* * * From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the
    fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by
    the reconstruction of the German armed forces. It [the
    Reichsbank] therefore assumed to a very great extent the
    responsibility to finance the rearmament in spite of the
    inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was
    the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the
    background, to carry through the armament at once, out of
    nothing, and furthermore under camouflage, which made a
    respect-commanding foreign policy possible.” (_EC-369_)

The Reichsbank directors, as experts on money, believed that a point had
been reached where greater production of armaments was no longer
possible. That was merely a judgment on the situation and not a moral
stand, for there was no opposition to Hitler’s policy of aggression.
Doubts were merely entertained as to whether that policy could be
financed. Hitler’s letter to Schacht on the occasion of Schacht’s
departure from the Reichsbank paid high tribute to Schacht’s great
efforts in furthering the program of the Nazi conspirators. The armed
forces by now had enabled Hitler to take Austria and the Sudetenland.
Hitler, in his letter to Schacht declared:

    “Your name, above all, will always be connected with the first
    epoch of national rearmament.” (_EC-397_)

Even though dismissed from the presidency of the Reichsbank, Schacht was
retained as a minister without portfolio and special confidential
adviser to Hitler. Funk stepped into Schacht’s position as president of
the Reichsbank (_Voelkisher Beobachter_ of 21 January 1939). Funk was
uninhibited by fears of inflation, and like Goering, under whom he had
served in the Four Year Plan, he recognized no obstacles to the plan to
attack Poland. In a letter written on 25 August 1939, only a few days
before the attack on Poland, Funk reported to Hitler that the Reichsbank
was prepared to withstand any disturbances of the international currency
and credit system occasioned by a large-scale war. He said that he had
secretly transferred all available funds of the Reichsbank abroad into
gold, and that Germany stood ready to meet the financial and economic
tasks which lay ahead. (_699-PS_)

It seems clear that the Nazi conspirators directed the whole of the
German economy toward preparation for aggressive war. To paraphrase the
words of Goering, the conspirators gave the German people “guns instead
of butter.” They also gave history its most striking example of a nation
gearing itself in time of peace to the single purpose of aggressive war.
Their economic preparations, formulated and applied with the energy of
Goering, the financial wizardry of Schacht, and the willing complicity
of Funk, among others, were the indispensable prerequisites for their
subsequent campaign of aggression.

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
                             THE CONSPIRACY

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (E).  │  I   │      21
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *699-PS        │Letter from Funk to Hitler, 25 August   │      │
                │1939, reporting on economic affairs. (GB│      │
                │49)                                     │ III  │     509
                │                                        │      │
*1168-PS        │Unsigned Schacht memorandum to Hitler, 3│      │
                │May 1935, concerning the financing of   │      │
                │the armament program. (USA 37)          │ III  │     827
                │                                        │      │
*1301-PS        │File relating to financing of armament  │      │
                │including minutes of conference with    │      │
                │Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 October │      │
                │1938, concerning acceleration of        │      │
                │rearmament. (USA 123)                   │ III  │     868
                │                                        │      │
*2261-PS        │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme      │      │
                │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces,│      │
                │24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of    │      │
                │Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and    │      │
                │copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 │      │
                │May 1935 on the Council for defense of  │      │
                │the Reich. (USA 24)                     │  IV  │     934
                │                                        │      │
*2353-PS        │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic     │      │
                │Facts for History of German War and     │      │
                │Armament Economy. (USA 35)              │  IV  │    1071
                │                                        │      │
*3787-PS        │Report of the Second Meeting of the     │      │
                │Reich Defense Council, 25 June 1939.    │      │
                │(USA 782)                               │  VI  │     718
                │                                        │      │
*3901-PS        │Letter written November 1932 by Schacht,│      │
                │Krupp and others to the Reich President.│      │
                │(USA 851)                               │  VI  │     796
                │                                        │      │
*D-157          │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 25 April   │      │
                │1933, with enclosure. (USA 765)         │  VI  │    1063
                │                                        │      │
*D-167          │Memoranda by Sonnenberg and Dr. Conn    │      │
                │concerning exchange of intelligence     │      │
                │involving Krupp works. (USA 766)        │  VI  │    1069
                │                                        │      │
*D-203          │Speech of Hitler to leading members of  │      │
                │industry before the election of March   │      │
                │1933. (USA 767)                         │  VI  │    1080
                │                                        │      │
*D-204          │Statement of Krupp concerning political │      │
                │organization of state and economy, 22   │      │
                │February 1933 (USA 768)                 │  VI  │    1085
                │                                        │      │
*D-206          │Memorandum, 12 October 1939, on         │      │
                │distribution of propaganda abroad       │      │
                │through foreign connections of Krupp    │      │
                │firm. (USA 769)                         │  VI  │    1085
                │                                        │      │
*D-317          │Krupp speech, “Thoughts about the       │      │
                │Industrial Enterpriser”, January 1944.  │      │
                │(USA 770)                               │ VII  │      21
                │                                        │      │
*EC-14          │Speech before the Wehrmacht War College,│      │
                │1 November 1937, by Major-General       │      │
                │Thomas. (USA 758)                       │ VII  │     246
                │                                        │      │
*EC-27          │Address of Major-General Thomas before  │      │
                │the Staff Instructors’ Course, on 28    │      │
                │February 1939 in Saarow-Pieskow. (USA   │      │
                │759)                                    │ VII  │     250
                │                                        │      │
*EC-28          │Lecture of Major-General Thomas         │      │
                │delivered, 24 May 1939, at the Foreign  │      │
                │Office. (USA 760)                       │ VII  │     250
                │                                        │      │
*EC-128         │Report on state of preparations for     │      │
                │war-economic mobilization as of 30      │      │
                │September 1934. (USA 623)               │ VII  │     306
                │                                        │      │
*EC-174         │Summary “war economy” trip to Godesberg │      │
                │undertaken by General Staff between 25  │      │
                │May and 2 June 1937. (USA 761)          │ VII  │     326
                │                                        │      │
*EC-177         │Minutes of second session of Working    │      │
                │Committee of the Reich Defense held on  │      │
                │26 April 1933. (USA 390)                │ VII  │     328
                │                                        │      │
*EC-252         │Letter from Schacht to Blomberg, 8 July │      │
                │1937. (USA 762)                         │ VII  │     346
                │                                        │      │
*EC-257         │Personal letter from Schacht to Thomas, │      │
                │29 December 1937. (USA 763)             │ VII  │     347
                │                                        │      │
*EC-286         │Correspondence between Schacht and      │      │
                │Goering, March-April 1937, concerning   │      │
                │price control. (USA 833)                │ VII  │     380
                │                                        │      │
*EC-293         │Letter from Schacht to Reich and        │      │
                │Prussian Economics Minister, 24 December│      │
                │1935, concerning army demands for raw   │      │
                │material. (USA 834)                     │ VII  │     391
                │                                        │      │
*EC-297-A       │Address in Vienna of the Reichsbank     │      │
                │President, Dr. Schacht, 21 March 1938.  │      │
                │(USA 632)                               │ VII  │     394
                │                                        │      │
*EC-369         │Correspondence between Schacht and      │      │
                │Hitler, January 1939. (USA 631)         │ VII  │     426
                │                                        │      │
*EC-383         │Letter 16 January 1937 with             │      │
                │enclosure—article about Schacht         │      │
                │appearing in the Military weekly        │      │
                │Gazette. (USA 640)                      │ VII  │     436
                │                                        │      │
*EC-397         │Letter from Hitler to Schacht, 19       │      │
                │January 1939. (USA 650)                 │ VII  │     438
                │                                        │      │
*EC-404         │Minutes of conference of Sixth Session  │      │
                │of Working Committee of Reichs Defense  │      │
                │Council, held on 23 and 24 January 1934.│      │
                │(USA 764)                               │ VII  │     443
                │                                        │      │
*EC-405         │Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working     │      │
                │Committee of Reichs Defense Council, 26 │      │
                │June 1935. (GB 160)                     │ VII  │     450
                │                                        │      │
*EC-408         │Memorandum report about the Four Year   │      │
                │Plan and preparation of the war economy,│      │
                │30 December 1936. (USA 579)             │ VII  │     465
                │                                        │      │
*EC-416         │Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, September   │      │
                │1936. (USA 635)                         │ VII  │     471
                │                                        │      │
*EC-436         │Affidavit of Puhl, 2 November 4 1945.   │      │
                │(USA 620)                               │ VII  │     494
                │                                        │      │
*EC-439         │Affidavit of Schnitzler, 10 November    │      │
                │1945. (USA 618)                         │ VII  │     501
                │                                        │      │
*EC-461         │Extracts from Ambassador Dodd’s Diary,  │      │
                │1933-38. (USA 58)                       │ VII  │     515
                │                                        │      │
 Affidavit J    │Affidavit of Erhard Milch, 23 January   │      │
                │1946.                                   │ VIII │     653
                │                                        │      │
 Chart No. 9    │The Organization of German Business.    │ VIII │     778




                               Chapter IX
                     LAUNCHING OF WARS OF AGGRESSION


                   I. THE PLOTTING OF AGGRESSIVE WAR

The aggressive war phase of the case against the Nazi conspirators is,
in the view of the American prosecution, the heart of the case.
Everything else in this case, however dramatic, however sordid, however
shocking and revolting to the common instinct of civilized peoples, is
incidental or subordinate to, the fact of aggressive war.

All the dramatic story of what went on in Germany in the early phases of
the conspiracy—the ideologies used, the techniques of terror used, the
suppressions of human freedom employed in the seizure of power, and even
the concentration camps and the crimes against humanity, the
persecutions, tortures and murders committed—all these things would
have had little international juridical significance except for the fact
that they were the preparation for the commission of aggressions against
peaceful neighboring peoples. Even the aspects of the case involving
“war crimes” in the strict sense are merely the inevitable, proximate
result of the wars of aggression launched and waged by these
conspirators, and of the kind of warfare they waged. It was total war,
the natural result of the totalitarian party-dominated state that waged
it; it was atrocious war, the natural result of the doctrines, designs
and purposes of the Nazi conspirators.

The substantive rule of law which is controlling on this part of the
case is stated in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, which, so far as is pertinent here, reads as follows:

    “_Article 6._ The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred
    to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major
    war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the
    power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of
    the European Axis countries, either as individuals or as members
    of organizations, committed any of the following crimes.

    “The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within
    the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be
    individual responsibility:

    “(a) _Crimes against peace_: namely, planning, preparation,
    initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in
    violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances,
    or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
    accomplishment of any of the foregoing * * *”

    “Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating
    in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy
    to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all
    acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”

Five important principles are contained in these portions of the
Charter:

(1)  The Charter imposes “individual responsibility” for acts
constituting “crimes against peace”;

(2)  The term “Crimes against peace” embraces planning, preparation,
initiation, or waging of illegal war;

(3)  The term “Crimes against peace” also embraces participation in a
common plan or conspiracy to commit illegal war;

(4)  An illegal war consists of either a war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances; (these
two kinds of illegal war might not necessarily be the same; it will be
sufficient for the prosecution to show either that the war was
aggressive irrespective of breach of international treaties, agreements
or assurances, or that the war was in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances irrespective of whether or not it was
a war of aggression; but the American prosecution will undertake to
establish that the wars planned, prepared, initiated, and waged by the
Nazi conspirators were illegal for both reasons);

(5)  Individual criminal responsibility of a defendant is imposed by the
Charter not merely by reasons of direct, immediate participation in the
crime. It is sufficient to show that a defendant was a leader, an
organizer, instigator, or accomplice who participated either in the
formulation or in the execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit
crimes against peace. In this connection, the Charter declares that the
responsibility of conspirators extends not only to their own acts but
also to all acts performed by any persons in execution of the
conspiracy.

It is familiar law in the United States that if two or more persons set
out to rob a bank in accordance with a criminal scheme to that end, and
in the course of carrying out their scheme one of the conspirators
commits the crime of murder, all the participants in the planning and
execution of the bank robbery are guilty of murder, whether or not they
had any other personal participation in the killing. This is a simple
rule of law declared in the Charter. All the parties to a common plan or
conspiracy are the agents of each other and each is responsible as
principal for the acts of all the others as his agents.

The documentary evidence assembled on this aggressive war aspect of the
case will show the following: (1) the conspiratorial nature of the
planning and preparation which underlay the Nazi aggressions already
known to history; (2) the deliberate premeditation which preceded those
acts of aggression; (3) the evil motives which led to the attacks; (4)
the individual participation of named persons in the Nazi conspiracy for
aggression; (5) the deliberate falsification of the pretexts claimed by
the Nazi aggressors as they arose for their criminal activities.

The critical period between the Nazi seizure of power and the initiation
of the first war of aggression was very short. This critical period of
illegal preparation and scheming, which ultimately set the whole world
aflame, covered 6 years, from 1933 to 1939. Crowded into these 6 short
years is the making of tragedy for mankind.

A full understanding of these 6 years, and the 6 years of war that
followed, requires that this period be divided into phases that reflect
the development and execution of the Nazi master plan. These phases may
be said to be six. The first was primarily preparatory, although it did
involve overt acts. That phase covers roughly the period from 1933 to
1936. In that period the Nazi conspirators, having acquired government
control of Germany by the middle of 1933, turned their attention toward
utilization of that control for foreign aggression. Their plan at this
stage was to acquire military strength and political bargaining power to
be used against other nations. In this they succeeded.

The second phase of their aggression was shorter. As the conspiracy
gained strength it gained speed. During each phase the conspirators
succeeded in accomplishing more and more in less and less time until
toward the end of the period, the rate of acceleration of their
conspiratorial movement was enormous. The second phase of their
utilization of control for foreign aggression involved the actual
seizure and absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia, in that order. By
March 1939 they had succeeded in this phase.

The third phase may be measured in months rather than years, from March
to September 1939. The previous aggression being successful and having
been consummated without the necessity of resorting to actual war, the
conspirators had obtained much desired resources and bases and were
ready to undertake further aggressions by means of war, if necessary. By
September 1939 war was upon the world.

The fourth phase of the aggression consisted of expanding the war into a
general European war of aggression. By April 1941 the war which had
theretofore involved Poland, the United Kingdom, and France, had been
expanded by invasions into Scandinavia and into the Low Countries and
into the Balkans.

In the next phase the Nazi conspirators carried the war eastward by
invasion of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The sixth phase consisted of collaboration with and instigation of their
Pacific ally, Japan, and precipitated the attack on the United States at
Pearl Harbor.

The essential elements of the crime of aggressive war can be made out by
a mere handful of captured German documents. These documents will leave
no reasonable doubt concerning the aggressive character of the Nazi war
or concerning the conspiratorial premeditation of that war. After the
corpus of the crime has been demonstrated in this way, the documentary
evidence will be discussed in subsequent sections, in a more or less
chronological and detailed presentation of the relevant activities of
the conspirators from 1933 to 1941.

Each of the ten documents which will be discussed in this section has
been selected to establish the basic facts concerning a particular phase
of the development of the Nazi conspiracy for aggression. Each document
has met three standards of selection: each is conspiratorial in nature;
each is believed to have been hitherto unknown to history; and each is
self-contained and tells its own story.

A. _1933 to 1936._

The period of 1933 to 1936 was characterized by an orderly, planned
sequence of preparation for war. The essential objective of this period
was the formulation and execution of the plan to rearm and re-occupy and
fortify the Rhineland, in violation of the treaty of Versailles and
other treaties, in order to acquire military strength and political
bargaining powers to be used against other nations.

A secret speech of Hitler’s delivered to all supreme commanders on 23
November 1939, at 1200 hours, is sufficient to characterize this phase
of the Nazi conspiracy (_789-PS_). The report of the speech was found in
the OKW files captured at Flensberg. Hitler spoke as follows:

    “November 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to
    which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the
    following speech:

    “The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the
    world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of
    future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of
    our armed forces was only possible in connection with the
    ideological [_weltanschaulich_] education of the German people
    by the Party.

    “When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in
    final success was based on a thorough observation of the events
    of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence.
    Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of setbacks which
    were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has
    had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had
    a clear recognition of the probable course of historical events,
    and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision
    was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict became a
    politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was
    the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief
    that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new
    system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would
    take over the leadership. After 15 years I arrived at my goal,
    after strenuous struggles and many setbacks. When I came to
    power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay
    behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had
    to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people
    and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of
    the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist
    ideas, education to heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I
    undertook the second task: to release Germany from its
    international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be
    pointed out: secession from the League of Nations and
    denunciation of the disarmament conference. It was a hard
    decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would
    lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of
    believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which
    stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After
    that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous
    prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In
    1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that
    militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be
    impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in
    me was very small. Then beginning of the fortification of the
    whole country especially in the west.

    “One year later, Austria came. This step also was considered
    doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the
    Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step
    also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of
    all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not
    possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me
    from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the
    Sudeten-German territory. That was only partial solution. The
    decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the
    erection of the Protectorate, and with that basis for the action
    against Poland was laid, but I wasn’t quite clear at that time
    whether I should start first against the east and then in the
    west, or vice-versa”. (_789-PS_)

There are some curious antitheses of thought in that, speech, as in most
of Adolf Hitler’s speeches. In one sentence he combines guidance by
providence with the making of “brutal decisions.” He constantly speaks
of how very few people were with him, and yet the mass of the German
people were with him. But he does give a brief summary of this early
period: the organization of the mass of the people, the extension of
organization to the armed forces, and the various “brutal decisions”
that were made.

A top secret letter dated 24 June 1935, from General von Blomberg to the
Supreme Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces demonstrates the
preparations for war in which the Nazi conspirators were engaged during
this period. Attached to that letter is a copy of a Secret Reich Defense
law of 21 May 1935, and a copy of a decision of the Reichcabinet of 21
May 1935 on the Council for the Defense of the Reich (_2261-PS_). These
documents were captured in the OKW files at Fechenheim. Von Blomberg’s
letter reads as follows:

    “In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law for the
    defense of the Reich of the 21 May 1935, and of a decision of
    the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich’s Defense
    Council. The publication of the Reich’s defense law is
    temporarily suspended by order of the Fuehrer and Reich
    Chancellor.

    “The Fuehrer and the Reichschancellor has nominated the
    President of the directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht to
    be ‘Plenipotentiary-General for War economy’.

    “I request that the copies of the Reich’s defense law needed
    within the units of the armed forces be ordered before 1 July
    1935 at armed forces office (L) where it is to be established
    with the request that the law should only be distributed down to
    Corps Headquarters outside of the Reichministry of war.

    “I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.”
    (_2261-PS_)

Underneath von Blomberg’s signature is an indorsement, “Berlin, 3
September 1935; No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a. To Defense-Economic Group
G-3, copy transmitted (signed) Jodl.” (_2261-PS_)

Attached to this letter is the statute referred to as the Reich’s
Defense Law of 21 May 1935, enacted by the Reichscabinet. The law covers
in detail preparations for a state of defense, mobilization, and
appointment of the Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy (Schacht)
with plenipotentiary authority for the economic preparation of the war.
Part III provides for penalties. The law is signed, “The Fuehrer and
Reichschancellor, Adolf Hitler; the Reichsminister of War, von Blomberg;
the Reichsminister of the Interior, Frick.” At the bottom of it there is
this note:

    “Note on the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935.

    “The publication of the law for the defense of the Reich of 21
    May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May
    1935.

    “The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, Adolf Hitler.” (_2261-PS_)

Thus, although the publication itself stated the law was made public,
and although the law became effective immediately, publication was
suspended by Adolf Hitler.

There was also further attached to von Blomberg’s letter a copy of the
decision of the Reichscabinet of 21 May 1935 on the Council for the
Defense of the Realm. This decree deals largely with organization for
economic preparation for the war. This law of May 1935 was the
cornerstone of war preparations of the Nazi conspirators, and makes
clear the relationship of Schacht to this preparation. (_2261-PS_)

B. _Formulation and Execution of Plans to Invade Austria and
Czechoslovakia._

The next phase of aggression was the formulation and execution of plans
to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, in that order.

One of the most striking and revealing of all the captured documents
which have come to hand is one which has come to be known as the
Hossbach notes of a conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 5 November
1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours (_386-PS_). In the course of that meeting
Hitler outlined to those present the possibilities and necessities of
expanding their foreign policy, and requested, “That his statements be
looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.”
The recorder of the minutes of this meeting, Colonel Hossbach, was the
Fuehrer’s adjutant. Present at this conspiratorial meeting, among
others, were Erich Raeder, Constantin von Neurath, and Hermann Wilhelm
Goering. The minutes of this meeting reveal a crystalization towards the
end of 1937 in the policy of the Nazi regime (_386-PS_). Austria and
Czechoslovakia were to be acquired by force. They would provide
“_lebensraum_” (living space) and improve Germany’s military position
for further operations. While it is true that actual events unfolded
themselves in a somewhat different manner than that outlined at this
meeting, in essence the purposes stated at the meeting were carried out.
These notes, which destroy any possible doubt concerning the Nazi’s
premeditation of their crimes against peace, read as follows:

    “Berlin, 10 November 1937. Notes on the conference in the
    Reichskanzlei on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours.

    “Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor;

    “The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. Blomberg;

    “The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr v. Fritsch;

    “The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h.c. Raeder;

    “The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst Goering;

    “The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr v. Neurath;

    “Oberst Hossbach [the adjutant who took the minutes].

    “The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s
    conference was of such high importance, that its detailed
    discussion would certainly in other states take place before the
    Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided
    not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich
    Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements
    were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences
    of his four and a half years in government; he desired to
    explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the
    possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy
    and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that
    his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his
    last will and testament.

    “The Fuehrer then stated: The aim of German policy is the
    security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation.
    This is consequently a problem of space. The German nation
    comprises eighty-five million people, which, because of the
    number of individuals and the compactness of habitation form a
    homogeneous European racial body, the like of which can not be
    found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the
    demand for larger living space more than for any other nation.
    If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands
    of this racial body for living space then that is the result of
    historical development spread over several centuries and should
    this political condition continue to exist, it will represent
    the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation at
    its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the
    German element in Austria and in Czechoslovakia is just as
    little possible as the preservation of the present state in
    Germany itself.

    “Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a
    consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a
    number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are
    of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce
    the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence
    of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent
    exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a
    solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period,
    about one to three generations.

    “Before touching upon the question of solving the need for
    living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the
    German position with a good future can be attained, either by
    way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal
    commerce and industry.

    “Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict
    National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming
    this can be achieved the results are as follows:

    “A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but not total
    autarchy can be attained:

    “1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw
    materials autarchy is feasible.

    “2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult.
    Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by
    ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can not.

    “3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as
    sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not
    possible.

    “4. Edible fats—possible.

    “B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be
    answered with a definite NO.

    “The general increase of living standards, compared with thirty
    to forty years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the
    demand and an increase of personal consumption even among the
    producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the
    production increase in agriculture have been used for covering
    the increased demand, therefore they represent no absolute
    increase in production. A further increase in production by
    making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it
    already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of
    artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even
    with the greatest possible increase in production, participation
    in the world market could not be avoided.

    “The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food
    by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases
    catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The
    possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the
    increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births
    would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the
    child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

    “Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by
    lowering the standard of living and by rationing is impossible
    in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent
    standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem
    has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some
    small corrections in our agricultural home production will be
    possible, but not a wholesale alteration of the standard of food
    consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible,
    specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as
    generally.

    “Participation in world economy. There are limits to this which
    we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an
    obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position;
    international commercial agreements do not offer any guarantee
    for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that
    since the World War (1914-18), as industrialization has taken
    place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a
    period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies
    again approaches the condition which originally motivated
    colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis
    of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive
    Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have
    special difficulties in expanding economically.

    “The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy,
    due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis
    for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by
    the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a
    pronounced military weakness in those states who base their
    existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out
    over those sea lanes which are dominated by Britain, it is more
    a question of security of transport than one of foreign
    currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food
    situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear
    imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor
    which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states
    and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency
    finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied states. Should the
    security of our food situation be our foremost thought, then the
    space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we
    will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on
    exploiting colonies. It is not a case of conquering people, but
    of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more
    to the purpose to seek raw material-producing territory in
    Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this
    solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two
    generations. What would be required at a later date over and
    above this must be left to subsequent, generations. The
    development of great worldwide national bodies is naturally a
    slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root
    [Volksstamm] has for this purpose the most favorable foundations
    in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all
    times—Roman Empire, British Empire—has proved that every space
    expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking
    risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today
    has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes
    up against the proprietor.” (_386-PS_)

After this somewhat jumbled discussion of geopolitical economic theory
and of the need for expansion and “_Lebensraum_”, Adolf Hitler, in these
Hossbach notes, posed a question and proceeded to answer it:

    “The question for Germany is where the greatest possible
    conquest could be made at lowest cost.

    “German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies,
    England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the
    center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would
    oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and
    overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of
    all parties. Both countries would view the building of German
    military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas
    communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and
    retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in
    Europe.

    “England is not in a position to cede any of her colonial
    possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences
    in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has
    suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian
    ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected.
    Any resistance on England’s part would at best consist in the
    readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies
    which at the present moment are not in British hands, for
    example, Angola. French favors would probably be of the same
    nature.

    “A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us
    could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of
    emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The
    Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is
    unshakeable.

    “Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered
    territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and
    the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard
    to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a
    serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which
    originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into
    all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to
    subjugate Ancient Rome.

    “Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist
    which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able
    to defend its colonial possession only allied with other states
    and not by its own power. How could England alone, for example,
    defend Canada against attack by America, or its Far Eastern
    interests against an attack by Japan?

    “The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire
    unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot
    be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are
    significant pointers in this respect:

    “(a)  Ireland’s struggle for independence.

    “(b)  Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her
    half measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to
    utilize the non-fulfillment of constitutional promises as a
    weapon against Britain.

    “(c)  The weakening of the British position in the Far East by
    Japan.

    “(d)  The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which—by
    virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a
    genius—expands its power position and must consequently
    infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome
    of the Abyssinian War is a loss of prestige for Britain which
    Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in
    the Mohammedan World.

    “It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be
    held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in
    spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the
    populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland,
    is nine to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we
    expand in space, we must not allow the level of our population
    to become too low.

    “France’s position is more favorable than that of England. The
    French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of
    its colonial possessions represents a potential military
    increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal
    politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of
    the nations have parliamentary governments, whereas 90 per cent
    of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless, we have to
    take the following into our political consideration as power
    factors:

    “Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller states.

    “The German question can be solved only by way of force, and
    this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great
    for Silesia, and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had
    been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870
    had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place
    the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the
    following expositions, then we are left to reply to the
    questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In this regard we have to decide
    upon three different cases.

    “Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a change
    for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the Navy and the Air
    Force, as well as the formation of the Officers’ Corps, are
    practically concluded.

    “Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with further
    delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In
    particular the secrecy of ‘special weapons’ cannot always be
    safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the
    current recruiting age groups and an addition from older
    untrained groups would be no longer available.

    “In comparison with the rearmament, which will have been carried
    out at the time by other nations, we shall decrease in relative
    power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, dependent on the
    absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis,
    for the countering of which we do not possess the necessary
    foreign currency. This must be considered as a ‘point of
    weakness in the regime.’ Over and above that, the world will
    anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly.
    Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on
    the offensive.

    “What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one
    knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

    “On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for
    securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its
    leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the
    standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no
    other choice but to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it
    will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space
    problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before
    1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

    “Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an
    internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the
    French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war
    against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia
    has come.

    “Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against
    Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against
    another State that it cannot ‘proceed’ against Germany.

    “For the improvement of our military political position it must
    be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to
    conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria, simultaneously, in order to
    remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance
    Westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly
    be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on
    the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia’s desire to
    participate in the war will increase proportionally to the
    degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation
    could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards
    the North or the West.

    “Once Czechoslovakia is conquered—and a mutual frontier,
    Germany-Hungary is obtained—then a neutral attitude by Poland
    in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon.
    Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as
    Germany’s strength remains unshakeable; should Germany have any
    setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps
    also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account.

    “Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a
    planned attack on our part in the years 1943 to ’45, then the
    behaviour of France, England, Poland and Russia would probably
    have to be judged in the following manner.

    “The Fuehrer believes personally, that in all probability
    England and perhaps also France, have already silently written
    off Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that
    this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The
    difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being
    entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive
    factors in the nonparticipation of England in a war against
    Germany. The British attitude would certainly not remain without
    influence on France’s attitude. An attack by France, without
    British support, is hardly probable assuming that its offensive
    would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without
    England’s support, it would also not be necessary to take into
    consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and
    this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a
    conflict with France, as in every case it would have as a
    consequence, the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally we should in
    every case, have to bar our frontier during the operation of our
    attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken
    into consideration here that Czechoslovakia’s defence measures
    will increase in strength from year to year, and that a
    consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian Army will
    also be effected in the course of years. Although the population
    of Czechoslovakia, in the first place is not a thin one, the
    embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless
    constitute the conquest of food for five to six million people,
    on the basis that a compulsory emigration of two million from
    Czechoslovakia, and of one million from Austria could be carried
    out. The annexation of the two States to Germany, militarily and
    politically, would constitute a considerable relief, owing to
    shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel
    for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new
    armies up to a strength of about twelve Divisions, representing
    a new Division per one million population.

    “No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on
    the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would
    be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would depend
    largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.

    “The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland’s
    attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war
    against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear.

    “Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed
    of our operations; it is a question whether this needs to be
    taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan’s attitude.

    “Should Case 2 occur—paralyzation of France by a Civil
    War—then the situation should be utilized _at any time_ for
    operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany’s most dangerous
    enemy would be eliminated.

    “The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming near; it could develop from the
    existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur, he
    has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as
    early as 1938.

    “Following recent experiences in the course of events of the war
    in Spain, the Fuehrer does not see an early end to hostilities
    there. Taking into consideration the time required for past
    offensives by Franco, a further three years duration of war is
    within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the
    German point of view, a one hundred per cent victory by Franco
    is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of
    the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean.
    Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula, it
    would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of
    Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed
    towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our
    future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the
    Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions
    on the Balearic Isles can not be tolerated either by France or
    by England and could lead to a war by France and England against
    Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white [Franco’s]
    hands, could participate on the side of Italy’s enemies. A
    subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely.
    Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany.
    The Fuehrer believes that Italy’s military strategy would be to
    remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier
    and carry out operations against France from Libya, against the
    North African French colonial possessions.

    “As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can
    be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper
    Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably stagnate
    before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of
    communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent
    paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa
    to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany,
    France will have, at its disposal, solely the metropolitan
    fighting forces.

    “If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the
    Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must
    be assumed that England—being at war with Italy—would not
    decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British
    support, a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be
    anticipated.

    “The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be
    made independent of the course of the Italian-French-English war
    and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military
    operations by these three States. The Fuehrer was also not
    thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete
    independence and by exploiting this unique favorable
    opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against
    Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take
    place with the speed of lightning [_blitzartig schnell_].

    “Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in
    giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out
    that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they
    stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French Army to
    such an extent that it would not be in a position to commence
    operations on our Western frontier with superior forces.
    Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces which
    would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against
    Italy to be in the region of twenty divisions, so that a strong
    French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier.
    The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to
    advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which
    France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very
    small value of our then existing fortifications—which was
    pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarshal von
    Blomberg—the four motorized divisions which had been laid down
    for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With
    regard to our offensive in a Southeasterly direction,
    Fieldmarshal von Blomberg drew special attention to the strength
    of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which
    had, assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which would
    present extreme difficulties to our attack.

    “Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of
    a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the
    possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia
    with special consideration of the conquest of the
    Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also
    stated that owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have to
    relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on the 10
    November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuehrer, who
    gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to
    be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by
    Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch
    regarding England and France’s attitude, the Fuehrer repeated
    his previous statements and said that he was convinced of
    Britain’s nonparticipation and that consequently he did not
    believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the
    Mediterranean conflict already mentioned, lead to a general
    mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence
    operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the
    powers who are not participating in the war should declare their
    disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have
    to side with this attitude.

    “In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst
    Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or
    abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuehrer
    agreed to this, insofar as he believed this decision should be
    postponed for a suitable date.

    “The second part of the discussion concerned material armament
    questions.

    “(Signed) Hossbach”. (_386-PS_)

The record of what happened thereafter is well-known to history. The
Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure from the Nazis, occurred
in March 1938. Pressure on Czechoslovakia resulted in the Munich Pact of
September 1938. That Pact was violated, and Czechoslovakia invaded by
Germany on 15 March 1939.

Another captured document, a file kept by Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s
adjutant, reveals the truth concerning the deliberateness of the
aggressions against Czechoslovakia (_388-PS_). The file was found in a
cellar of the Platterhof at Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. It
consists of a work-file of originals and duplicates, incidental to the
preparations for the annexation of Czechoslovakia. The German title is
“_Grundlagen zur Studie Gruen_”, (Basic Principles for “Case Green”),
“Green” being a codeword for the aggression against Czechoslovakia. Item
No. 2 in this file is dated 22 April 1938. It is a summary, prepared by
Schmundt, the adjutant, of a discussion on 21 April 1938 between Hitler
and Wilhelm Keitel. This item, like the other items in the file, relates
to “Case Green”. This meeting occurred within approximately one month
following the successful annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of
the conspiracy, it became necessary to revise the “Plan Green”, to take
into account changed conditions, as a result of the bloodless success
against Austria. Item 2 reads:

    “Berlin, 22 April 1938.

    “Bases of the Dissertation on _Gruen_.

    “Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 21
    April:

    “A.  Political Aspect.

    “1.  Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any
    cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As
    result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a
    critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the
    elimination of the _last_ opponent on the mainland.

    “2.  Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually
    come to a crisis and lead to war.

    “3.  Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for
    example, assassination of German ambassador in connection with
    an anti-German demonstration.)

    “Military Conclusions.

    “1.  The preparations are to be made for the political
    possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since
    “_Gruen_” will have taken security measures.

    “2.  The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the
    divisions by rail—which is unavailable, but should be cut down
    as far as possible—must not impede a lightning-swift blow at
    the time of the action.

    “3.  ‘Separate thrusts’ are to be carried out immediately with a
    view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous
    points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts
    are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads,
    composition of the columns according to their individual tasks).
    Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.

    “The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example
    divebombers; sealing off installations at penetration points,
    hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal
    communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)

    “4.  Politically, the first four days of military action are the
    decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a
    European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must
    prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw
    Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize
    ‘_Gruen_.’

    “Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and
    employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and
    ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pilsen, Prague.)

    “5.  If possible, separation of transport movement ‘_Rot_’ from
    ‘_Gruen_’. [‘_Rot_’ was the code name for their then plan
    against the West.] A simultaneous strategic concentration
    ‘_Rot_’ can lead ‘_Rot_’ to undesired measures. On the other
    hand, it must be possible to put ‘_Case Rot_’ into operation at
    any time.

    “C.  Propaganda.

    “1.  Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia
    (_Gruenland_.)

    “2.  Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs
    (_Gruenen_).

    [Initialled by Schmundt]” (_388-PS_)

Particular attention should be drawn to paragraph 3 of this document,
under the heading “Political Aspect”, which reads as follows:

    “Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (example:
    Assassination of German ambassador as an upshot of an
    anti-German demonstration).” (_388-PS_)

The document as a whole establishes that the conspirators were planning
the creation of an incident to justify to the world their own aggression
against Czechoslovakia. It establishes that consideration was being
given to assassinating the German ambassador at Prague to create the
requisite incident.

C. _Formulation and Execution of the Plan to Invade Poland._

The next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of
the plan to attack Poland, resulting in the initiation of aggressive war
in September 1939. Here again the careful and meticulous record keeping
of Hitler’s adjutant, Schmundt, has provided a document in his own
handwriting which throws down the mask (_L-79_). The document consists
of minutes of a conference held on 23 May 1939. The place of the
conference was the Fuehrer’s Study in the New Reich Chancellery.
Goering, Raeder and Keitel were present. The subject of the meeting was,
“Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.”

The authenticity and accuracy of Schmundt’s record of the meeting of 23
May 1939 has been admitted by Keitel in a pretrial interrogation. The
minutes read as follows:

          “Top Secret

    “To be transmitted by officer only

    “Minutes of a Conference on 23 May 39”

    “Place: The Fuehrer’s Study, New Reich Chancellery.

    “Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

    “Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral
    Raeder, Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen.
    Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml.
    Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont,
    Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Commd.
    Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).

    “Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future
    aims.

    “The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:

    “1. Analysis of the situation.

    “2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from
    the situation.

    “3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.

    “4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting
    from these consequences.

    “Secrecy is the first essential for success.

    “The Fuehrer’s observations are given in systematized form
    below.

    “Our present situation must be considered from two points of
    view:

    “1. The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;

    “2. The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany
    lies.

    “In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields.

    Our military situation improved enormously.

    “Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained
    the same.

    “Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The
    balance of power had been effected without the participation of
    Germany.

    “This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the
    necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges
    as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as ‘Encroachments’.
    The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere
    than of the simple threat of force.

    “A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological
    problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No
    German can evade the creation of the necessary economic
    conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands
    courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem
    by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible.
    Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible
    without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign
    property.

    “Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is
    the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the
    problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The
    choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’
    time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German
    statesman can evade the question longer than that.

    “We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is
    shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

    “The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good
    use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in
    harmony with our aims.

    “After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:

    “The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved,
    apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be
    attained without the shedding of blood.

    “The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.

    “The Pole is no ‘supplementary enemy’. Poland will always be on
    the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship,
    Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every
    opportunity to do us harm.

    “Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a
    question of expanding our living space in the East and of
    securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic
    problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly
    populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility,
    thorough-going German exploitation will enormously increase the
    surplus.

    “There is no other possibility for Europe.

    “Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not
    solve the food problem. Remember—blockade.

    “If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession
    of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record
    harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than
    in peace.

    “The population of non-German areas will perform no military
    service, and will be available as a source of labour.

    “The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

    “Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is
    doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against
    Russia.

    “It is questionable whether military success in the West can be
    achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude
    of Poland.

    “The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia.
    Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will
    attempt to rob us of the victory.

    “There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are
    left with the decision:

    “_To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity._ [This
    sentence is underscored in the original German text.]

    “We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will
    be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the
    isolation will be decisive.

    “Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final
    order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the
    Western Powers [France and England].

    “If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not
    lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily
    against England and France.

    “Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland—beginning with
    an attack on Poland—will only be successful if the Western
    Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be
    better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same
    time.

    “The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.

    “Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various
    reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool
    and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan’s own interest to
    take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

    “Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political
    relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press
    comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to
    be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia
    take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become
    closer.

    “If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against
    Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack
    England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer
    doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We
    must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our
    development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken
    England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with
    England will be a life-and-death struggle.

    “_What will this struggle be like?_ [This sentence is
    underscored in the German original.]

    “England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few
    powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should
    be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood
    will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin
    will determine the duration of our resistance.

    “The Dutch and Belgium air bases will be occupied by armed
    forces. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England
    and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to
    a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their
    neutrality and make them build fortifications in order finally
    to force them into cooperation.

    “Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to
    pressure.

    “Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war,
    we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at
    securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.

    “The war with England and France will be a life-and-death
    struggle.

    “The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no
    such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a
    question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80
    million human beings.

    “_Question: Short or long war?_

    “Every country’s armed forces or government must aim at a short
    war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of
    10-15 years’ duration.

    “History has always shown that the people have believed that
    wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that
    it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea
    still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state
    will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers
    some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar
    weaknesses.

    “England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world
    power.

    “_England_ is the driving force against Germany.

    “Her strength lies in the following:

    “1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious,
    firm in resistance and gifted as organizers. They know how to
    exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure
    and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal.
    The German average is higher.

    “2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years.
    Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely
    something concrete, but must also be considered as a
    psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this
    immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.

    “3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a
    courageous air force.

    “_England’s weakness_:

    “If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two
    cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the
    morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England
    brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of this war.
    It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet. Landings had
    to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her
    own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.

    “The moment England’s food supply routes are cut, she is forced
    to capitulate. The import of food and fuel depends on the
    fleet’s protection.

    “If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will
    not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is
    destroyed immediate capitulation will be the result.

    “There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick
    decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to
    rely entirely on the element of surprise.

    “Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by—

    “1. Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles
    concerned.

    “2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole
    enterprise.

    “3. Human failings.

    “4. Weather conditions.

    “The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance.
    Beyond that time, the tension cannot be endured for long. It
    must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any
    surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

    “This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.

    “1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or
    the final decisive blow right at the start. Consideration of
    right and wrong or treaties do not enter into the matter. This
    will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with
    England on account of Poland.

    “2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparation for a long
    war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for
    England are eliminated.

    “The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and
    Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and
    held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions
    for a successful war against England will have been secured.

    “England can then be blockaded from Western France at close
    quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines
    extend the range of the blockade.

    “_Consequences_:

    “England will not be able to fight on the Continent:

    “Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her
    life-lines:

    “Germany will not bleed to death on land.

    “Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and
    subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for
    the following strategic considerations which are imperative—

    “1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a
    wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end
    would have been different.

    “2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is
    impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the
    lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense
    counter-measures.

    “3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

    “4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy,
    has taken the most important positions, industrial production
    will cease in flow in to the bottomless pit of the Army’s
    battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.

    “The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions.
    Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

    “Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

    “The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

    “A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning
    battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

    “This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be
    true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet
    had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the case
    in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be
    effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.

    “Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be
    decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise
    and by masterly handling. * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Purpose:

    “1. Study of the entire problem.

    “2. Study of the events.

    “3. Study of the means needed.

    “4. Study of the necessary training.

    “Men with great powers of imagination and high technical
    training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with
    sober sceptic powers of understanding.

    “Working principles:

    “1. No one is to take part in this who does not have to know of
    it.

    “2. No one can find out more than he must know.

    “3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest?
    No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it.

    “On Goering’s question, the Fuehrer decided that:

    “_a._ The armed forces determine what shall be built.

    “_b._ In the shipbuilding program, nothing is to be changed.

    “_c._ The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943
    or 1944.

    [Schmundt certified this text.]” (_L-79_)

These minutes demonstrate that the Nazi conspirators were proceeding in
accordance with a plan. They demonstrate the cold-blooded premeditation
of the assault on Poland. They demonstrate that the questions concerning
Danzig, which the Nazis had agitated with Poland as a political pretext,
were not true questions, but were false issues, issues agitated to
conceal their motive of aggressive, expansion for food, and
_Lebensraum_.

Just one week prior to the launching of the attack on Poland, Hitler
made an address to his chief military commanders, at Obersalzberg, on 22
August 1939. [Three reports of this meeting are available: (_L-3_;
_798-PS_; and _1014-PS_). The first of the three documents (_L-3_) was
obtained through an American newspaperman, and purported to be original
minutes of the Obersalzberg meeting, transmitted to the newspaperman by
some other person. There was no proof of actual delivery to the
intermediary by the person who took the notes. That document (_L-3_)
therefore, merely served as an incentive to search for something better.
The result was that two other documents (_798-PS_) and (_1014-PS_) were
discovered in the OKW files at Flensberg. These two documents indicate
that Hitler on that day made two speeches, one apparently in the morning
and one in the afternoon. Comparison of those two documents with the
first document (_L-3_) led to the conclusion that the first document was
a slightly garbled merger of the two speeches, and therefore was not
relied upon.]

On this day of 22 August 1939, Hitler addressed the supreme commanders
of the three branches of the armed forces, as well as the commanding
generals, (_Oberbefehlshabers_) as follows:

    “I have called you together to give you a picture of the
    political situation, in order that you may have insight into the
    individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in
    order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss
    military details.

    “It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come
    sooner or later. I had already made this decision in Spring.
    [Apparently this referred to (_L-79_).] But I thought I would
    first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards
    against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot
    close one’s eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted
    to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland, in order to
    fight first against the West, but this plan which was agreeable
    to me could not be executed, since essential points have
    changed.

    “It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a
    conflict in the West.

    “Poland wants access to the sea.

    “The further development became obvious after the occupation of
    the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the
    circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an
    unopportune moment.

    “I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two
    personal constitutions, my own personality, and that of
    Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence, because
    of my political activity.

    “Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have
    the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will
    probably never again be a man in the future with more authority.
    My existence is, therefore, a factor of great value. But I can
    be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.

    “The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also
    decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the
    alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the
    Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in
    the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with
    the strongest nerves in Italy.

    “The third factor, favorable for us is Franco. We can only ask
    benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco’s
    personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness
    of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the
    fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our
    internal unity.

    “On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive
    personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality
    in England or France.

    “For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to lose:
    we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our
    restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years.
    Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice; we must act.
    Our opponents risk much and gain only little. England’s stake in
    a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below
    average. No personalities, no masters, no men of action.

    “Besides the personal factor, the political situation is
    favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy,
    France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to the
    alarming of the Mohammedan world.

    “The English empire did not emerge from the last war
    strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was
    achieved: Conflict between England and Ireland, the south
    African Union became more independent, concessions had to be
    made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy industries.
    A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.

    “France’s position has also deteriorated, particularly in the
    Mediterranean.

    “Further favorable factors for us are these:

    “Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans.
    Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal
    situation.

    “Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and
    vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since
    Kemal’s death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady
    weak men.

    “All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in two
    to three years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore
    conflict better now.

    “The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement
    politically but militarily it was questionable, since it was
    achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is
    necessary to test the military, if at all possible, not by
    general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.

    “The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy
    hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My
    propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed by
    England’s intervention. Poland changed her tune towards us. The
    initiative cannot be allowed to pass to others. This moment is
    more favorable than in two to three years. An attempt on my life
    or Mussolini’s could only change the situation to our
    disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another
    with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded
    that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They
    talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was
    danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great
    that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with
    reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as
    a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to
    be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us
    with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which
    demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute
    some _Schweinhund_ will make a proposal for mediation.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance
    that the armed forces will do their duty.” (_798-PS_)

In his second speech on 22 August 1939 the Fuehrer had this to say:

    “It may also turn out differently regarding England and France.
    One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a
    trade-barrier, not on blockade, and with severance of relations.
    Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing.
    Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were
    determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers.
    Struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as
    she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors,
    greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by
    getting used to heaviest strain. A long period of peace would
    not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect
    everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each
    other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental
    factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In
    1918, the Nation fell down because the mental prerequisites were
    not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final success only
    through his mental power.

    “Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination
    of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war
    should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be
    the primary objective. Quick decision because of the season.

    “I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never
    mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
    asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting
    and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.

    “Have no pity. Brutal attitude. 80,000,000 people shall get what
    is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The strongest
    has the Right. Greatest severity.

    “Quick decision necessary. Unshakable faith in the German
    soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders
    give way.

    “First aim: advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical
    superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every
    newly-created Polish force shall again be broken at once.
    Constant war of attrition.

    “New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a
    protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be
    influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland
    is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until
    complete elimination.

    “Conviction that the German _Wehrmacht_ is up to the
    requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday
    morning.” (_1014-PS_)

D. _Expansion into General War of Aggression: Scandinavia, The Low
Countries, The Balkans._

The aggressive war having been initiated in September 1939, and Poland
having been defeated shortly after the initial assaults, the Nazi
aggressors converted the war into a general war of aggression extending
into Scandinavia, into the Low Countries, and into the Balkans. (Under
the division of the case agreed by the four Chief Prosecutors, this
phase of aggression was left for development to the British prosecuting
staff, and is discussed in Sections 9, 10 and 11 of this Chapter,
_infra_.)

E. _Aggression Against the U. S. S. R._

The attack upon Russia was preceded with premeditation and deliberation.
Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had
a code name for the secret operation, “Case Green”, so in the case of
aggression against the Soviet Union, they had a code name, “Case
Barbarossa”. A secret directive, Number 21, issued from the Fuehrer’s
Headquarters on 18 December 1940, relating to “Case Barbarossa,” was
captured among the OKW files at Flensberg (_446-PS_). This directive was
issued more than six months in advance of the attack. (Other evidence
shows that the planning occurred even earlier.) This order, signed by
Hitler and initialled by Jodl and Keitel, was issued in nine copies, of
which we have the fourth. The directive reads:

    “The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia
    in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England.
    (Case Barbarossa.)

    “For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available
    units with the reservation that the occupied territories will
    have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.

    “For the Eastern campaign the Air force will have to free such
    strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick
    completion of the ground operations may be expected and that
    damage of the Eastern German territories will be avoided as much
    as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East
    is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle
    and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently
    protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on
    England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted
    to break down.

    “Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains
    unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.

    “If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for
    action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended
    beginning of operations.

    “Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not
    yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15
    May 1941.

    “Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an
    attack will not be recognized.

    “The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the
    following basis:

    “I. _General Purpose_:

    “The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be
    destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges
    with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into
    the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.

    “In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the
    Russian Air force will no longer be able to attack German Reich
    territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from
    Asiatic Russian from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case
    of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to
    Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.

    In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet
    will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to
    fight.

    “Effective intervention by the Russian Air force is to be
    prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of the
    operations.” (_446-PS_)

Another secret document captured from the OKW files establishes the
motive for the attack on the Soviet Union (_2718-PS_). It also
establishes the full awareness of the Nazi conspirators of the Crimes
against Humanity which would result from their attack. The document is a
memorandum of 2 May 1941 concerning the results of a discussion on that
day with the State Secretaries concerning “Case Barbarossa.” The
memorandum reads in part:

    “Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files Ia. Second copy
    to General Schubert. May 2nd, 1941. Memorandum. About the result
    of today’s discussion with the State Secretaries about
    Barbarossa.

    “1. The war can only be continued if all armed forces are fed by
    Russia in the third year of war.

    “2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people
    will be starved to death if we take out of the country the
    things necessary for us.” (_2718-PS_)

F. _Collaboration with Japan: Precipitation Of The Pearl Harbor Attack._

With the unleashing of the German aggressive war against the Soviet
Union in June 1941, the Nazi conspirators and, in particular Ribbentrop,
called upon the Eastern co-architect of the New Order, Japan, to attack
in the rear. The Nazi’s incited and kept in motion a force reasonably
calculated to result in an attack on the United States. For a time, they
preferred that the United States not be involved in the conflict, due to
military considerations. However, their incitement resulted in the
attack on Pearl Harbor, and long prior to that attack, they had assured
the Japanese that they would declare War on the United States should a
United States-Japanese conflict occur. It was in reliance on these
assurances that the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.

These matters are disclosed in a document, captured from the files of
the German Foreign Office, which consists of notes dated 4 April 1941,
signed by Schmidt, regarding discussions between the Fuehrer and the
Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of Ribbentrop
(_1881-PS_). Pertinent parts of this document read as follows:

    “Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer
    should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as
    broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military
    Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly
    concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making
    available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as
    the latest technical improvements and inventions. * * *

    “Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United
    States. In case that the country should decide to attack
    Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for
    a fight with the United States, because in that case America
    would probably side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally
    believed, that the United States could be restrained by
    diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great
    Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worse
    situation, that is war against America. They were of the opinion
    that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would
    take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be
    fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German
    experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to
    Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted
    and how all the technical improvements of submarine, in all
    details such as periscopes and such like, could best be
    exploited by Japan. “To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the
    Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities
    would place at the disposal of the Japanese these developments
    and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by
    the Japanese.

    “The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too
    considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but
    that it had already made allowance for such a contingency. In
    Germany one was of the opinion that America’s contribution
    depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this
    again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany’s war
    against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely
    against England, but also against America. Germany has made her
    preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would
    conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats
    and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which
    would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would
    be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the
    German soldier naturally ranks high above the American.

    “In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed
    out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the
    consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United
    States. It did not matter with whom the United States would
    first get involved, if with Germany or with Japan. They would
    always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an
    understanding with the other country subsequently. Therefore
    Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in
    case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the
    strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action,
    their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten
    individually.

    “Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might
    give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German
    authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the
    latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to
    them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a
    conflict with the United States.

    “As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained
    further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner
    or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if
    Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion
    this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His
    argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not
    decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon
    herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps
    avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained
    predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan
    many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka
    was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous
    thoughts. He, however, stated that, if Japan continued to walk
    along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway
    and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances
    than at present.

    “The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation
    of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the
    clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed
    Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit
    favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow
    unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and
    full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by
    events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment
    instantly to reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia,
    be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let
    dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

    “Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling
    politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuver
    towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan
    on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave
    free passage to the consignment of rubber and tin to America to
    their place of destination. However, America would war against
    Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the
    intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. * * *

    “The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America
    did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope,
    that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they
    could advance against Japan together with Great Britain,
    whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would
    be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

    “The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans
    precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the
    powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other
    hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a
    joint action of Japan and Germany.

    “Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give
    to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude
    inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him
    regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as
    Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan
    itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the
    Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This
    would cause him serious damage in political and financial
    circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he
    became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close
    friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter
    had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of
    rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose
    energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under
    those circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he
    could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier
    or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully
    in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his
    decision at a favorable moment, to make a clean breast of his
    proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the
    decision would have to be made within a few days, because the
    plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

    “Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that
    would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of
    conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he
    succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He
    himself felt confident that he would succeed.

    “On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the
    Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the
    Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however,
    state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

    “Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in
    the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by
    cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a
    courier.

    “The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest
    entirely assured of German reticence.

    “Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but
    unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

    “The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some
    personal parting words.

    “Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

    “(signed)  SCHMIDT”  (_1881-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

   LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PLOTTING OF
                             AGGRESSIVE WAR

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6 (a).              │  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Section IV (F);  │      │
                │  V.                                    │  I   │  22, 29
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *386-PS        │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│      │
                │Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November   │      │
                │1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant,      │      │
                │Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937.   │      │
                │(USA 25)                                │ III  │     295
                │                                        │      │
 *388-PS        │File of papers on Case Green (the plan  │      │
                │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept │      │
                │by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant,         │      │
                │April-October 1938. (USA 26)            │ III  │     305
                │                                        │      │
  442-PS        │General Order No. 16 on the preparation │      │
                │of a landing operation against England, │      │
                │16 July 1940, initialled by Jodl and    │      │
                │Keitel.                                 │ III  │     399
                │                                        │      │
 *446-PS        │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed  │      │
                │by Hitler and initialled by Jodl,       │      │
                │Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, │      │
                │concerning the Invasion of Russia (case │      │
                │Barbarossa). (USA 31)                   │ III  │     407
                │                                        │      │
 *789-PS        │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,  │      │
                │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme  │      │
                │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23)       │ III  │     572
                │                                        │      │
 *798-PS        │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │      │
                │at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA   │      │
                │29)                                     │ III  │     581
                │                                        │      │
*1014-PS        │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │      │
                │22 August 1939. (USA 30)                │ III  │     665
                │                                        │      │
*1881-PS        │Notes on conference between Hitler and  │      │
                │Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop in   │      │
                │Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33)          │  IV  │     522
                │                                        │      │
*2261-PS        │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme      │      │
                │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces,│      │
                │24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of    │      │
                │Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and    │      │
                │copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 │      │
                │May 1935 on the Council for defense of  │      │
                │the Reich. (USA 24)                     │  IV  │     934
                │                                        │      │
*2718-PS        │Memorandum “About the result of today’s │      │
                │discussion with State Secretaries about │      │
                │Barbarossa”, 2 May 1941. (USA 32)       │  V   │     378
                │                                        │      │
 *D-660         │Extracts from Hutchinson’s Illustrated  │      │
                │edition of Mein Kampf. (GB 128)         │ VII  │     164
                │                                        │      │
**L-3           │Contents of Hitler’s talk to Supreme    │      │
                │Commander and Commanding Generals,      │      │
                │Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 28)  │      │
                │(Referred to but not offered in         │      │
                │evidence)                               │ VII  │     752
                │                                        │      │
 *L-79          │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939,     │      │
                │“Indoctrination on the political        │      │
                │situation and future aims”. (USA 27)    │ VII  │     847


                2. PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION: 1933-1936

By 1933 the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, had reached very substantial
proportions. At that time its plans called for the acquisition of
political control of Germany. This was indispensable for consolidation,
within the country, of all the internal resources and potentialities.

As soon as there was sufficient progress along this line of internal
consolidation, the next step was to become disengaged from some of the
external disadvantages of existing international limitations and
obligations.

The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development
of strength in all the fields necessary if Germany were to make war.
Although there had been an increasing amount of circumvention and
violation from the very time that the Versailles Treaty came into
effect, such operations under disguise and subterfuge could not attain
proportions adequate for the objectives of the Nazis. To get the Treaty
of Versailles out of the way was indispensable to the development of the
extensive military power which they had to have for their purposes. It
was as a part of the same plan and for the same reason that Germany
withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations.
It was impossible for the Nazis to carry out their plan on the basis of
existing international obligations or on the basis of the orthodox kind
of future commitments.

Every military and diplomatic operation undertaken by the Nazis was
preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all
participating forces. At the same time each event was part of a long
prepared plan of aggression. Each represented a necessary step in the
preparation of the schedule of aggressions which was subsequently
carried out.

Three of the steps in preparation for aggression were first, the
withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations;
second, the institution of compulsory military service; and, third, the
reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Each of these
steps was progressively more serious in the matter of international
relations. In each of these steps Germany anticipated the possibility of
sanctions being applied by other countries, and, particularly, a strong
military action from France with the possible assistance of England.
However, the conspirators were determined that nothing less than a
preventive war would stop them, and they also estimated correctly that
no one or combination of big powers would undertake the responsibility
for such a war. The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and from
the League of Nations was, of course, action that did not violate any
international obligation. The League Covenant provided the procedure for
withdrawal. These actions, however, cannot be disassociated from the
general conspiracy and the plan for aggression. The announcement of the
institution of universal military service was a more daring action. It
was a violation of the Versailles Treaty, but the Nazis got away with
it. Then came outright military defiance, with the occupation of the
demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

A. _Planning to Overthrow the Versailles Treaty._

The determination and the plans of the Nazi conspirators to remove the
restrictions of Versailles, started very early. This fact is confirmed
by their own statements, their boasts of long planning and careful
execution. Hitler, in his speech to all Supreme Commanders on 23
November 1939, stated that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles
(_789-PS_). And Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces,
delivered an address after four years of war, on 7 November 1943, in
which he traced the development of German strength (_L-172_). The
seizure of power to him meant the restoration of fighting sovereignty,
including conscription, occupation of the Rhineland, and rearmament,
with special emphasis on modern armor and air forces. In his speech,
entitled “The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th Year of
War,” General Jodl gave a retrospective summary of the war for the
benefit of the Reich and Gau leaders. He stated:

    “Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you
    a review today of the strategic position in the beginning of the
    5th Year of War.

    “I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I
    undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it
    justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say
    openly what is. No one—the Fuehrer has ordered—may know more
    or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I
    have no doubt at all in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a
    great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in
    your Gaus, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the
    enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours
    concentrate, that try to find themselves a plan among our
    people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides.
    All the cowards are seeking a way out, or—as they call it—a
    political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is
    still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of
    to attack the natural sense of the people, that in this war
    there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of
    the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy
    propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to
    know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am
    justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncolored account
    of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of
    secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the
    morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by
    the force of arms but by the will of the whole people. Germany
    was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home. Italy suffered
    not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down
    internally. The result has been not the peace she expected
    but—through the cowardice of these criminal traitors—a fate
    thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side
    would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you,
    Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data
    concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as
    your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without
    restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the
    people.

    “The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and
    everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of
    Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the
    danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western
    powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the
    direction of the Mediterranean, and in that of Russia—these
    also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war
    so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious
    set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to
    become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask
    itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could
    do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this
    questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for
    use in your own explanatory activities is one of the main points
    of my present lecture; I shall divide it into three parts:

        “I. A review of the most important development up to the
        present.

        “II. Consideration of the present situation.

        “III. The foundation of our morale and our confidence in
        victory.

    “In view of my position as military advisor to the Fuehrer, I
    shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own
    personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time
    that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this
    way be giving expression only to one side of events.

                              “I. _Review_

    “1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and its
    struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the
    outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is
    not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like
    however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful
    regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played
    by the National Socialist movement in reawakening the will to
    fight [_Wehrwillen_] in nurturing fighting strength
    [_Wehrkraft_] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all
    the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small _Reichswehr_
    would never have been able to cope with this task, if only
    because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the
    Fuehrer aimed at—and has so happily been successful in bringing
    about—was the fusion of these two forces.

    “2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first
    place restoration of fighting sovereignty
    [_Wehrhoheit_—conscription, occupation of the Rhineland] and
    rearmament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a
    modern armoured and air arm.

    “3. The Austrian ‘_Anschlluss_’ in its turn, brought with it not
    only the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the
    effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of
    materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till
    then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most
    menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction
    of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia),
    Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers.

    “Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that
    she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with
    rigour before effective aid from the West could be expected to
    arrive.

    “This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by
    the construction of the West Wall, which, in contra-distinction
    to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and
    resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active
    policy in the East.

    “4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn
    of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia
    rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that
    it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the
    basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.

    “This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and
    the question which next arises is whether the moment for the
    struggle with Poland—in itself unavoidable—was favorably
    selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in
    doubt since the opponent—after all, not inconsiderable in
    himself—collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers
    who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form
    a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the
    possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our
    hands. Concerning the course of the Polish campaign, nothing
    further need be said beyond that it proved in a measure which
    made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up
    till then had not been certain by any means; that is, the high
    state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Great Germany.”
    (_L-172_)

In this speech General Jodl identifies himself fully with the Nazi
movement. His own words show that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as
he is concerned, his speech identifies the military with the political,
it also shows the deliberation with which the Treaty of Versailles was
abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was
militarized and fortified.

In one of Adolf Hitler’s reviews of the six-year period between his
ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only
admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range
planning. The minutes of conference of the Fuehrer kept by Schmundt, his
adjutant, contain the following passage:

    “In the period 1933-1939 progress was made in all fields. Our
    military system improved enormously.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put to good
    use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in
    harmony with our aims.” (_L-79_)

B. _Economic and Financial Preparations for Aggressive War._

One of the most significant preparations for aggressive war is found in
the Secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 (_2261-PS_). The law went
into effect upon its passage. It stated at its outset that it was to be
made public instanter, but at the end of it Adolf Hitler signed the
decree ordering that it be kept secret. General Thomas, who was in
charge of War Armament Economy and for some time a high-ranking member
of the German High Command, refers, to this law as the cornerstone of
war preparations. He points out that, although the law was not made
public until the outbreak of war, it was put into immediate execution as
a program for preparations. These statements are made at page 25 of
General Thomas’ work, “A History of the German War and Armament Economy,
1923-1944.” (_2353-PS_)

This secret law remained in effect until 4 September 1939, at which time
it was replaced by another secret defense law (_2194-PS_) revising the
system of defense organization and directing more detailed preparations
for the approaching status of “mobilization,” which was clearly an
euphemism for war.

The covering letter, under which this second Reich Defense Law, was sent
to the Ministry for Economy and Labor for Saxony in Dresden, on 6
December 1939, was classified Top Secret and read as follows:

    “Transportation Section, attention of Construction Chief
    Counsellor Hirches, or representative in the office of the Reich
    Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, received Prague, 5 September
    1939, No. 274.

    “Inclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4
    September 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reich
    Minister of Transportation, dated 7 October 1938, RL 10.2212/38,
    top secret, and of 17 July 1939, RL/LV 1.2173/39, top secret.
    For your information and observance, by order, signed
    Kretzchmar. 3 inclosures completed to Dresden, 4 September 1939,
    signed Schneider 3 inclosures. Receipt for the letter of 4
    September 1939, with 3 inclosures, signed 5 September, 1939, and
    returned to construction Counsellor Kretzchmar.” (_2194-PS_)

Thus the second secret Reich Defense Law was transmitted under top
secret cover.

The general plan for the breach of the Treaty of Versailles and for the
ensuing aggressions was carried out in four ways: (1) secret rearmament
from 1933 to March 1935; (2) the training of military personnel (that
includes secret or camouflage training); (3) production of munitions of
war; (4) the building of an air force.

The facts of rearmament and of secrecy are self-evident from the events
that followed. The significant phase of this activity lies in the fact
that it was necessary in order to break the barriers of the Treaty of
Versailles and of the Locarno Pact, and to make ready for aggressive
wars which were to follow.

Those activities by their nature and extent, could only have been for
aggressive purposes. The highest importance which the German government
attached to the secrecy of the program is emphasized by the disguised
methods of financing utilized both before and after the announcement of
conscription, and the rebuilding of the army, on 16 March 1935.

The point is illustrated by an unsigned memorandum by Schacht dated 3
May 1935, entitled, “The Financing of the Armament program,
“_Finanzierung der Ruestung_.” (1168-PS) It is not signed by Schacht,
but in an interrogation on 16 October 1945, he identified it as being
his memorandum. The memorandum reads as follows:

    “Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler [identified by Schacht as
    Exhibit A, interrogation 16 October 1945, page 40] May 3, 1935.

    “Financing of Armament. The following explanations are based
    upon the thought, that the accomplishment of the armament
    program with speed and in quantity is _the_ problem of German
    politics, that everything else therefore should be subordinated
    to this purpose as long as the main purpose is not imperiled by
    neglecting all other questions. Even after March 16, 1935, the
    difficulty remains that one cannot undertake the open
    propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of
    armament without endangering our position internationally
    (without loss to our foreign trade). The already nearly
    impossible financing of the armament program is rendered hereby
    exceptionally difficult.

    “Another supposition must be also emphasized. The printing press
    can be used only for the financing of armament to such a degree,
    as permitted by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation
    increases the prices of foreign raw materials and increases the
    domestic prices, is therefore like a snail biting its own tail.
    The circumstance that our armament had to be camouflaged
    completely till March 16, 1935, and even since this date the
    camouflage had to be continued to a larger extent, making it
    necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already at
    the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have
    been natural, to start it (the printing press) at the final
    point of financing. In the porte-feuille of the Reichsbank are
    segregated notes for this purpose, that is, armament, of 3,775
    millions and 866 millions, altogether 4,641 millions, out of
    which the armament notes amount to Reichsmarks 2,374 millions,
    that is, of April 30, 1935. The Reichsbank has invested the
    amount of marks under its jurisdiction, but belonging to
    foreigners in blank notes of armament. Our armaments are also
    financed partly with the credits of our political opponents.
    Furthermore, 500 million Reichsmarks were used for financing of
    armament, which originated out of [_Reichsanleihe_], the federal
    loans, placed with savings banks. In the regular budget, the
    following amounts were provided. For the budget period 1933-34,
    Reichsmarks 750 millions; for the budget period 1934-35,
    Reichsmarks 1,100 millions; and for the budget period 1935-36,
    Reichsmarks 2,500 millions.

    “The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after
    the budget 1935-36 to 5 to 6 millions Reichsmarks. This total
    deficit is already financed at the present time by short term
    credits of the money market. It therefore reduces in advance the
    possibilities of utilization of the public market for the
    armament. The Minister of Finance [_Reichsfinanzminister_],
    correctly points out at the defense of the budget: As a
    permanent yearly deficit is an impossibility, as we cannot
    figure with security with increased tax revenues in amount
    balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, as on the
    other hand a balanced budget is the only secure basis for the
    impending great task of military policy. For all these reasons
    we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious budget
    policy which solves the problem of armament financing by organic
    and planned reduction of other expenditures not only from the
    point of receipt, but also from the point of expenditure, that
    is, by saving.

    “How urgent this question is, can be deduced from the following,
    that a large amount of task has been started by the state and
    party and which is now in process, all of which are not covered
    by the budget, but from contributions and credits, which have to
    be raised by industry in addition to the regular taxes.

    “The existing of various budgets side by side, which serve more
    or less public tasks, is the greatest impediment for gaining a
    clear view over the possibilities of financing the armaments. A
    whole number of ministries and various branches of the party
    have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities
    of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of
    finance of the state, but not subject to the control of the
    Minister of Finance and therefore also not subject to the
    control of the cabinet. Just as in the sphere of politics the
    much too far-reaching delegation of legislative powers to
    individuals brought about various states within the states,
    exactly in the same way the condition of various branches of
    state and party, working side by side and against each other,
    has a devastating effect on the possibility of financing. If on
    this territory concentration and unified control is not
    introduced very soon, the solution of the already impossible
    task of armament financing is endangered.

    “We have the following tasks:

    “(1) A deputy is entrusted with finding all sources and
    revenues, which have its origin in contributions to the federal
    government, to the state and party and in profits of public and
    party enterprises.

    “(2) Furthermore experts, entrusted by the Fuehrer, have to
    examine how these amounts were used and which of these amounts
    can in the future be withdrawn from their previous purpose.

    “(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all
    public and party organizations, to which extent this property
    can be used for the purpose of armament financing.

    “(4) The federal Ministry of Finance is to be entrusted to
    examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of new
    taxes or increasing of existing taxes.

    “The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank under
    existing political conditions was a necessity and the political
    success proved the correctness of this action. The other
    possibilities of armament financing have to be started now under
    any circumstances. For this purpose all absolutely non-essential
    expenditures for other purposes must not take place and the
    total financial strength of Germany, limited as it is, has to be
    concentrated for the one purpose of armament financing. Whether
    the problem of financing, as outlined in this program, succeeds,
    remains to be seen, but without such concentration, it will fail
    with absolute certainty.” (_1168-PS_)

C. _Renunciation of Armament Provisions of Versailles Treaty._

21 May 1935 was a very important date in the Nazi calendar. It was on
that date that the Nazis passed the secret Reich Defense Law
(_2261-PS_). The secrecy of their armament operations had already
reached the point beyond which they could no longer maintain successful
camouflage. Since their program called for still further expansion, they
unilaterally renounced the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty
on the same date, 21 May 1935. Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on that
day (_2288-PS_) was published in “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” under the
heading “The Fuehrer Notifies the World of the Way to Real Peace.”
Hitler declared:

    “1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva
    Resolution of 17 May.

    “The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany
    unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the dictate of
    Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated, by those
    powers who could not make up their minds to follow the
    disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as
    agreed upon by Treaty.

    “2. Because the other powers did not live up to their
    obligations under the disarmament program, the Government of the
    German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles,
    which are nothing but a discrimination against the German nation
    for an unlimited period of time, since, through them, Germany is
    being nailed down in a unilateral manner contrary to the spirit
    of the agreement.” (_2288-PS_)

In conjunction with other phases of planning and preparation for
aggressive war, there were various programs for direct and indirect
training of a military nature. They included not only the training of
military personnel, but also the establishment and training of other
military organizations, such as the Police Force, which could be and
were absorbed by the Army. The extent of this program for military
training is indicated by Hitler’s boast of the expenditure of ninety
billion Reichsmarks during the period 1933 to 1939, in the building up
of the armed forces.

In a speech by Adolf Hitler delivered on 1 September, 1939, (_2322-PS_),
which was published in the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” under the heading
“The Fuehrer announces the Battle for the Justice and Security of the
Reich”, the following passage occurred:

    “For more than six years now, I have been engaged in building up
    the German Armed Forces. During this period more than ninety
    billion Reichsmarks were spent building up the _Wehrmacht_.
    Today, ours are the best-equipped armed forces in the world, and
    they are superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can
    never be shaken.” (_2322-PS_)

The secret nature of this training program and the fact of its early
development is illustrated by a report to Hess, in 1932, concerning the
secret training of flying personnel, as well as the early plans to build
a military air force (_1143-PS_). This report was sent in a letter from
Schickedantz to Rosenberg, for delivery to Hess. Apparently Schickedantz
was very anxious that no one but Hess should get this letter, and
therefore sent it to Rosenberg for personal delivery to Hess. The letter
points out that the civilian pilots should be so organized as to enable
their transfer into the military air force organization. The letter
dated 20 October 1932, reads:

    “Dear Alfred [Rosenberg]: I am sending you enclosed a
    communication from the RWM forwarded to me by our confidential
    man (_Vertrauensmann_) which indeed is very interesting. I
    believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will
    not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report is not
    known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our
    tall friend.” [Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945,
    identified this “tall friend” as being Von Albensleben.] “I am
    enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to transmit
    the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to write a
    letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere. _Mit
    bestem Gruss_, Yours Amo.” (_1143-PS_)

Enclosed in the report is:

                        “Air Force Organization”

    “Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to
    provide for the case of the armament of the air force.

    “Entire management as a civilian organization will be
    transferred to Col. Von Willberg, at present commander of
    Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichwehr, is going
    on leave of absence.

    “(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air lines in such a way
    as to enable their transfer to the air force organization.

    “(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to
    be done within the organization for military flying of the
    Stahlhelm [steel helmet] which is being turned over to Col.
    Hanel, retired.

    “All existing organizations for sport flying are to be used for
    military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military
    flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The
    Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks per
    hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he
    himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided in case
    of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization,
    proprietor and crew in the proportion of 10:20:20. Military
    flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement (40). We
    therefore have to expect that most proprietors of planes or
    flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm organization.
    It must be achieved that equal conditions will be granted by the
    RWM, also the NSDAP organization.” (_1143-PS_)

D. _Secret Rearmament_

The program of rearmament and the objectives of circumventing and
breaching the Versailles Treaty are forcefully shown by a number of Navy
documents, showing the participation and cooperation of the German navy
in this rearmament program which was secret at first. When it was deemed
safe to say so, the Navy openly acknowledged that it had always been its
objective to break the Versailles Treaty.

In 1937 the Navy High Command (OKM) published a secret book entitled,
“The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles, 1919 to 1935”, written by Sea
Captain Schussler (_C-156_). The preface refers to the fight of the navy
against the unbearable regulations of the peace treaty of Versailles.
The table of contents includes a variety of navy activities, such as
saving of coastal guns from destruction as required by Versailles;
independent armament measures behind the back of the government and
behind the back of the legislative bodies; resurrection of the U-boat
arm; economic rearmament; and camouflaged rearmament from 1933 to the
freedom from the restrictions in 1935. (_C-156_)

This book points out the significant effect of seizure of power by the
Nazis in 1933 on increasing the size and determining the nature of the
rearmament program. It also refers to the far-reaching independence in
the building and development of the navy, which was only hampered
insofar as concealment of rearmament had to considered in compliance
with the Versailles Treaty (_C-156_). With the restoration of what was
called the military sovereignty of the Reich in 1935—the reoccupation
of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland—the external camouflage of
rearmament was eliminated.

This book of the German navy bears the symbol of the Nazi Party, the
Swastika, in the spread eagle on the cover sheet, and it is headed
“secret”, underscored (_C-156_). Raeder has identified this book in an
interrogation and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of
the Versailles Treaty and at the same time to make progress in naval
development. The following are pertinent extracts from the book:

    “The object and aim of this memorandum under the heading
    ‘Preface’, is to draw a technically reliable picture based on
    documentary records and the evidence of those who took part in
    the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the
    peace treaty of Versailles. It shows that the Reich navy after
    the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow
    did not rest, but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable
    enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man
    navy, the basis for a greater development in the future, and so
    create by work of soldiers and technicians the primary condition
    for a later rearmament. It must also distinguish more clearly
    the services of these men, who, without being known in wide
    circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal in
    responsibility in the service of the fight against the peace
    treaty; thereby stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they
    risked, particularly in the early days of their fight,
    themselves and their position unrestrainedly in the partially
    self-ordained task. This compilation makes it clearer, however,
    that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to
    a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the
    whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the
    soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even
    more important condition for an effective rearmament in the
    coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the
    political, financial and spiritual power, could the work of the
    soldier find its fulfillment. The framework of this peace
    treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed
    under the driving power of this united will, [signed] The
    Compiler”. (_C-156_)

The summary of the contents indicated in the chapter titles is
significant:

    “I. First, defensive action against the execution of the Treaty
    of Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the
    Ruhr, 1923).

    “1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction to removal of
    artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and machine weapons. *
    * *

    “3. Limitation of destruction in Heligoland.

    “II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich
    Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to the Lomann
    case in 1927).

    “1. An attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich
    Navy.

    “2. Contributing to the strengthening of patriotism among the
    people.

    “3. Activities of Captain Lohmann.

    “4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat arm.

    “5. Building up of the air force.

    “6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm (_Die Mine_).

    “7. Economic rearmament.

    “8. Miscellaneous measures.

        “a. The Aerogeodetic, and;

        “b. Secret evidence.

    “III. Planned armament work countenance by the Reich government
    but behind the back of the legislative body from 1927 to the
    seizure of power, 1933.

    “IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in
    camouflage (from 1933 to the freedom from restrictions, 1935).”
    (_C-156_)

The following is a passage from Chapter IV:

    “The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the
    taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of the decisive
    influence on the size and shape of further rearmament.

    “While the second chamber, _Reichsrat_, approached its
    dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, the _Reichstag_
    assumed a composition which could only take a one-sided attitude
    toward the rearmament of the armed forces. The government took
    over the management of the rearmament program upon this
    foundation.

                   “Development of the Armed Forces.”

    “This taking over of the management by the Reich Government
    developed for the armed forces in such a manner that the War
    Minister, General von Blomberg, and through him the three
    branches of the armed forces, received far-reaching powers from
    the Reich Cabinet for the development of the armed forces. The
    whole organization of the Reich was included in this way. In
    view of these powers the collaboration of the former inspecting
    body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then
    on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duty of
    the accounting office of the German Reich.

          “Independence of the Commander in Chief of the Navy”

    “The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, honorary
    doctor, had received the help of a far-reaching independence in
    the building and development of the navy. This was only hampered
    insofar as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be
    continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the
    public budget there remained the previous special budget, which
    was greatly increased in view of the considerable credit for the
    provision of labor, which was made available by the Reich. Wide
    powers in the handling of these credits were given to the
    Director of the Budget Department of the navy, up to 1934
    Commodore Schussler, afterwards Commodore Foerster. These took
    into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of
    the Budget.

                   “Declaration of Military Freedom”

    “When the Fuehrer, relying upon the strength of the armed forces
    executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the
    military sovereignty of the German Reich, the last-mentioned
    limitation on rearmament works namely, the external camouflage,
    was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered
    our ability to move freely on and under water, on land and in
    the air for one and a half decades, and carried by the
    newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the armed
    forces, and as part of it, the navy, can lead with full strength
    towards its completion the rearmament already under way with the
    goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the
    world.” (_C-156_)

An interrogation of Raeder concerning this book went as follows:

    “Q. I have here a document, _C-156_, which is a photostatic copy
    of the work prepared by the High Command of the Navy, and covers
    the struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919
    to 1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the
    work?

    “A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.

    “Q. Was that an official publication of the Germany navy?

    “A. This Captain Schuessler, indicated there, was Commander in
    the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, which was an idea of these
    officers to put all these things together.

    “Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the
    authorization to prepare such a work was given to him?

    “A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he
    told us here in the foreword.

    “Q. In the preparation of this work he had access to the
    official naval files, and based his work on the items contained
    therein?

    “A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons,
    and he would have had the files, which were necessary.

    “Q. Do you know whether before the work was published, a draft
    of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for
    comment?

    “A. No, I don’t think so. Not before it was published. I saw it
    only when it was published.

    “Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication?

    “A. It was a secret object. I think the upper commands in the
    Navy had knowledge of it.

    “Q. It was not circulated outside of the naval circles?

    “A. No.

    “Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained
    in the work regarding the circumventing of the provisions of the
    Versailles Treaty?

    “A. I don’t remember very exactly what is in here. I can only
    remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word
    of the Versailles Treaty, but wanted to have some advantages.
    But the flying men were exercised one year before they went into
    the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of
    Versailles was filled. They didn’t belong to the Navy, as long
    as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were
    developed but not in Germany, and not in the Navy, but in
    Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an
    Industrialist; in Finland, too, and they were built much later
    when we began to act with the English government about the
    Treaty of thirty-five to one-hundred, because we could see that
    then the Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a
    treaty with England, and so in order to keep the word of
    Versailles, we tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but
    tried to have advantages.

    “Q. Would the fair statement be that the Navy High Command was
    interested in avoiding the limited provisions of the Treaty of
    Versailles regarding the personnel and limits of armaments, but
    would it attempt to fulfill the letter of the treaty, although
    actually avoiding it?

    “A. That was their endeavor”.

Raeder had his explanations:

    “Q. Why was such a policy adopted?

    “A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war
    by danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia and so we
    tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in this
    way, and so all our efforts were directed to the aim to have a
    little more strength against the Poles, if they would attack us;
    it was nonsense to them of attacking the Poles in this state,
    and for the Navy a second aim was to have some defense against
    the entering of French forces into the Ostsee, or East Sea,
    because we knew the French had intentions to sustain the Poles
    from ships that came into the Ostsee Goettinger, and so the Navy
    was a defense against the attack by the Poles, and against the
    entrance of French shipping into an Eastern Sea. Quite defensive
    aims.

    “Q. When did the fear of attack from Poles first show itself in
    official circles in Germany would you say?

    “A. When the first years they took Wilma. In the same minute we
    thought that they would come to East Prussia. I don’t know
    exactly the year, because those judgments were the judgments of
    the German government ministers, of the Army and Navy Ministers,
    Groner and Noske.

    “Q. Then those views in your opinion were generally held
    existing perhaps as early as 1919 or 1920, after the end of the
    First World War?

    “A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and
    about those years in the beginning, I can not give you a very
    exact thing, because I was then two years in the Navy archives
    to write a book about the war, and how the cruisers fought in
    the first war. Two years, so I was not with these things.”

The same kind of aims and purposes are reflected in the table of
contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919 to 1939, found in
captured official files of the German Navy (_C-17_). Although a copy of
the book itself has not been found, the project was written by Oberst
Scherff, Hitler’s special military historian. The table of contents
however, is available. It refers by numbers to groups of documents and
notes in the documents, which evidently were intended as working
material for the basis of the chapters to be written in accordance with
the table of contents. The title of this table of contents fairly
establishes the navy planning and preparations that were to get the
Versailles Treaty out of the way, and to rebuild the navy strength
necessary for war. Some of the headings in the table of contents read:

    “_Part A (1919—The year of Transition.)_

       “Chapter VII.

    First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit
    its effects.

    “Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of naval
    offices in civil ministries, etc. Incorporation of greater
    sections of the German maritime observation station and the
    sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems-Jade-Canal,
    etc. into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934;

    “Noskos’ proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval
    Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin;

    “Formation of the “Naval Arsenal Kiel”.

    “(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and
    guns.

    “1. North Sea. Strengthening of fortifications with new
    batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking
    effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control
    Commission—information, drawings, visits of inspection, result
    of efforts.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “2. Baltic. Taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pilau and
    Swinemunde;

    “Salvage for the Army of one-hundred and eighty-five movable
    guns and mortars there.

    “3. The beginnings of coastal air defense.

    “_Part B (1920-1924. The Organizational New Order)_

    Chapter V.

                              “_The Navy_
         “_Fulfillment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty_
                          “_Foreign Countries_

    “(a) _The inter-allied Control Commissions._

    “(b) _Defense measures against the fulfillment of the Versailles
    Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich
    Government and the legislative bodies._

    “1. Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and
    automatic weapons.

    “2. Limitation of demolition work in Heligoland.

    “3. Attempt to strengthen personnel of the navy, from 1923.

    “4. The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous
    associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of
    “sports” unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in
    naval recruitment).

    “5. Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since
    1920. (Projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey,
    Argentine and Finland. Torpedo testing.)

    “6. Participation in the preparation for building of the
    Luftwaffe (preservation of aerodromes, aircraft construction,
    teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air raid
    defense, training of pilots).

    “7. Attempt to strengthen the mining branch.

        _Part C (1925-1932. Replacement of Tonnage)_ Chapter IV.
         “_The Navy, The Versailles Treaty, Foreign Countries._

    “(a) _The activities of the Inter-allied Control Commissions (up
    to 31.1.27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace
    Commission)_

    “_Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich
    Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case._

    “1. The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation), their
    significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work
    from 1935.

    “2. Preparation for the re-strengthening of the German U-boat
    arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection
    with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925,
    relationship to Spain, Argentine, Turkey: the first post war
    U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927; 250
    ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly;
    electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain
    and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an
    anti-U-boat school.

    “3. Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of
    the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparations for a Naval Air Arm,
    Finance Aircraft Company Sevra, later Luftdienst CMRH; Naval
    Flying School Warnemunde; Air Station List, training of sea
    cadet candidates, Military tactical questions “Air Defense
    Journeys”, technical development, experimental station planning,
    trials, flying boat development DOX etc., catapult aircraft,
    arming, engines ground organization, aircraft torpedoes, the
    Deutschland Flight 1925 and the Seaplane Race 1926.

    “4. Economic rearmament (“the Tebeg”—Technical Advice and Supply
    Company as a disguised Naval Office abroad for investigating the
    position of raw materials for industrial capacity and other War
    economic questions.)

    “5. Various measures. (The NV Aerogeodetic Company—secret
    investigations.)

    “(c) _Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich
    government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies_
    (1928 to the taking over of power.)

    “1. The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations;
    winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and
    carrying on of other work.

    “2. Finance question. (“Black Funds” and the Special Budget).

    “3. The Labor Committee and its objectives.

    “(d) _The Question of Marine Attaches_ (The continuation under
    disguise; open re-appointment 1932-1933).

    “(e) _The question of Disarmament of the Fleet abroad and in
    Germany_ (The Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London
    Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931.
    The League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932).

    “_Part D (1933-1939. The Germany Navy during the Military
    Freedom Period)_

    “I. National Socialism and the question of the Fleet and of
    prestige at sea.

    “II. Incorporation of the navy in the National Socialist State.”

    “III. The Re-armament of the Navy under the Direction of the
    Reich Government in a Disguised Way.” (_C-17_)

The policy development of the navy is also reflected from the financial
side. The planned organization of the navy budget for armament measures
was based on a co-ordination of military developments and political
objectives. Military-political development was accelerated after the
withdrawal from the League of Nations. (_C-17_)

A captured document, entitled “_Chef der Marineleitung_, Berlin, 12 May
1934,” and marked “Secret Commando Matter,” discusses the “Armament Plan
(A.P.) for the 3rd Armament Phase.” (_C-153_). This document, which
bears the facsimile signature of Raeder at the end, speaks of war tasks,
war and operational plans, armament target, etc., and shows that it was
distributed to many of the High Command of the Navy. Dated 12 May 1934,
it shows that a primary objective was readiness for a war without any
alert period. The following are pertinent extracts:

    * * * “The planned organization of armament measures is
    necessary for the realization of the target; this again requires
    a coordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This
    organization of financial measures over a number of years
    according to the military viewpoint is found in the armament
    program and provides

    “_a._ for the _military leaders_ a sound basis for their
    operational considerations and

    “_b._ for the political leaders a clear picture of what may be
    achieved with the military means available at a given time.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up
    with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert
    period.” (C-153)

The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations long
before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways.
Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-Boat
construction program; also the actual displacement and speed of certain
ships. Work on U-Boats had been going on, as already indicated, in
Holland and Spain. The Nazi theory was ingenious in that respect. The
Versailles Treaty forbade re-arming by the Germans in Germany, but the
Nazis said it did not forbid them to rearm in Holland, Spain, and
Finland.

Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval
negotiations with England. The subject was discussed in a conversation
between Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. The record of that
conversation (_C-189_) is not signed by Raeder, but in an interrogation
on 8 November 1945, Raeder admitted that (_C-189_) was a record of this
conversation, and that it was in his handwriting, though he did not sign
his name at the end. The report is headed, “Conversation with the
Fuehrer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the
Commanding Officer of the _Karlsruhe_.” It reads:

    “1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning displacement of D. and
    E. (defensive weapons).

    “Fuehrer’s instructions: No mention must be made of a
    displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton
    (ships). Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may be stated.

    “2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on the Fleet
    must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from
    1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35 c.m. guns
    (Like the King George Class).

    “3. The Fuehrer demands to keep the construction of the U-Boats
    completely secret. Plebiscite also in consideration of the
    Saar.” (_C-189_)

In order to continue the increase in navy strength, as planned, more
funds were needed than the navy had available. Hitler therefore proposed
to put funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the navy. This
appears from another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between Raeder
with Hitler, on 2 November 1934 (_C-190_). This report, again, is not
signed, but it was found in Raeder’s personal file and seems clearly his
memorandum. It is headed: “Conversation with the Fuehrer on 2.11.34 at
the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the “Emden”.
It reads:

    “1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available
    for the armed forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a
    fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible
    that the navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he
    did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He
    considered it necessary that the navy be speedily increased by
    1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need, he will get
    Dr. Ley to put 120-150 million from the Labor Front at the
    disposal of the navy, as the money would still benefit the
    workers. Later in a conversation with Minister Goering and
    myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the
    navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if
    the navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from
    Scandinavia.

    “2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have
    six U-Boats assembled at the time of the critical situation in
    the first quarter of 1935, he stated that he would keep this
    point in mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the
    assembling should commence.” (_C-190_)

Then there is an asterisk and a note at the bottom:

    “The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in
    the middle of June 35 according to plan.” (_C-190_)

The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign markets
was a program encouraged by the navy, so that this industry would be
able to supply the requirements of the navy in case of need. A directive
of Raeder, dated 31 January 1933, and classified “Secret Commando
Matter,” requires German industry to support the armament of the navy
(_C-29_). It provides:

                             “_TOP SECRET_
 _General directions for support given by the German Navy to the German
                           Armament Industry_

    “The effects of the present economic depression have led here
    and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an
    active participation of the German Armament Industry abroad,
    even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no
    profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting.
    Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing
    “self-sufficiency” would in any case make such participation
    superfluous.

    “However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the
    situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the
    following contradictory corrective points:

    “_a._ The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce
    be overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war
    politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the
    assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to
    a certain extent,

    “_b._ The consequent estimation of the duties of the German
    Armament Industry lies mainly in the _Military-political_
    sphere. It is impossible for this industry to satisfy,
    militarily and economically, the growing demands made of it by
    limiting the deliveries to our own armed forces. Its capacity
    must therefore be increased by the delivery of supplies to
    foreign countries over and above our own requirements.

    “_c._ Almost every country is working to the same end today,
    even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by
    restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and
    especially Italy are making supreme efforts to ensure markets
    for their armament industries. The use of their diplomatic
    representations, of the propaganda voyages of their most modern
    ships and vessels, of sending missions and also of the
    guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits are not
    merely to gain commercially advantageous orders for their
    armament industries, but first and foremost to expand their
    output from the point of view of military policy.

    “_d._ It is just when the efforts to do away with the
    restrictions imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy
    has an ever-increasing and really vital interest in furthering
    the German Armament Industry and preparing the way for it in
    every direction in the competitive battle against the rest of
    the world.

    “_e._ If, however the German Armament Industry is to be able to
    compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the _confidence_
    of its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for
    our own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to
    be kept secret under all circumstances in the interest of the
    defence of the country is comparatively small. I would like to
    issue a warning against the assumption that, at the present
    stage of technical development in foreign industrial states, a
    problem of vital military importance which we perhaps have
    solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today,
    which may become known, if divulged to a third person by
    naturally always possible indiscretion, have often been already
    superseded by new and better solutions on our part, even at that
    time or at any rate after the copy has been made. It is of
    greater importance that we should be technically well to the
    fore in any really fundamental matters, than that less important
    points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively.

    “_f._ To conclude: I attach particular importance to
    guaranteeing the continuous support of the industry concerned by
    the navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed.
    If the purchasers are not made confident that something special
    is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up
    to the competitive battle and therefore will not be able to
    supply the requirements of the German Navy in case of need.”
    (C-29)

This surreptitious rearmament, in violation of treaty obligations,
starting even before the Nazi came into power, is illustrated by a 1932
order of Raeder, chief of the naval command, addressed to the main naval
command, regarding the concealed construction of torpedo tubes in
E-Boats (_C-141_). He ordered that torpedo tubes be removed and stored
in the naval arsenal but be kept ready for immediate refitting. By using
only the number permitted under the Treaty, at a given time, and by
storing them after satisfactory testing, the actual number of
operationally effective E-Boats was constantly increased.

This German order for the concealed armament of E-Boats, issued by
Raeder on 10 February 1932, provides:

    “In view of our treaty obligations and the Disarmament
    Conference steps must be taken to prevent the 1st
    E-Boat-Half-Flotilla, which in a few months will consist of
    exactly similar newly built (E)-Boats, from appearing openly as
    a formation of torpedo-carrying boats as it is not intended to
    count these E-Boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats
    allowed us.

    “I therefore order:

    “1. S2-S5, will be commissioned in the shipyard Luerssen,
    Vegesack without armament, and will be fitted with easily
    removable cover-sheet-metal on the spaces necessary for
    torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I. [Inspectorate
    of Torpedoes and Mining] in agreement with the naval arsenal,
    for the Boat ‘S1’ which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes, on
    completion of the practice shooting, for fitting on another
    boat.

    “2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-Boats will be stored in the naval
    arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the
    torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a
    short time to be fitted and for practice shooting so that only
    one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public
    consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of
    temporary trials by the T.V.A. [Technical Research
    Establishment].

    “It should not anchor together with the other, unarmed boats of
    the Half-Flotilla because of the obvious similarity of type. The
    duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the
    torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible.

    “3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all E-Boats is intended as soon
    as the situation of the political control allows it.” (_C-141_)

Along similar lines the navy was also carrying on the concealed
preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation of
Transport Ships O. The preparations under this order were to be
completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of these
ships as commercial ships, plans were made for their conversion. This
was the result of a Top Secret order from the command office of the
navy, dated 12 March 1934, and signed in draft by Groos. This order
bears the seal of the _Reichministerium, Marineleitung_, over the draft
signature. It provides:

    “Subject: Preparation of Auxiliary Cruisers.

    “It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35
    (_AG-Aufstellungsgliederung_) a certain number of auxiliary
    cruisers which are intended for use in operations on the high
    seas.

    “In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations the
    ships will be referred to as “Transport Ships O”. It is
    requested that in future this designation only will be used.

    “The preparations are to be arranged so that they can be
    completed by 1.4.35.” (_C-166_)

In the official navy files, notes were kept year by year, from 1927 to
1940, on the reconstruction of the German Navy. One of these notes
discloses that the displacement of the battleship
“_Scharnhorst-Gneisenau_” was actually greater than the tonnage which
had been notified to the British under the treaty obligations:

    “The true displacement of the battleship
    ‘_Scharnhorst-Gneisenau_’ _and_ ‘F/G’ exceeds by 20 percent in
    both cases the displacement reported to the British.” (_C-23_)

There is annexed to this document a table with reference to different
ships, and two columns, headed “Displacement by Type”; one column reads
“Actual Displacement,” and the other, “Notified Displacement.” The
actual displacement of the “_Scharnhorst_”, is thus shown to be 31,300
tons, although the notified displacement was only 26,000 tons. On the
“F/G” actual was 41,700, while notified was 35,000. On the “HI”, actual
was 56,200 tons, while notified was 46,850. And so on down the list.
(_C-23_)

In these notes there also occurs the statement:

    “In a clear cut program for the construction, the Fuehrer and
    Reich Chancellor has set the navy the task of carrying out the
    aims of his foreign policy.” (_C-23_)

The German Navy constantly planned and committed violations of armament
limitation, and with characteristic German thoroughness had prepared
superficial pretexts to explain away these violations. Following a
conference with the chief of “A” section [the military department of the
Navy], an elaborate survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a
careful list of the quantity and type of German naval armament and
ammunition on hand under manufacture or construction (_C-32_). A
statement of the justification or defense that might be used was
included in those instances where the Versailles Treaty was violated or
its allotment has been exceeded. The list contained 30 items under
“Material Measures” and 14 items under “Measures of Organization.” The
variety of details covered necessarily involved several sources within
the navy, which must have realized their significance.

This Top Secret document, which is headed “A Survey Report of German
Naval Armament after Conference with Chief of “A” Section, dated 9
September 1933,” contains three columns, one headed “Measure,” one
headed “Material Measures, Details,” and the third headed “Remarks.” The
“Remarks” contain the pretext or justification for explaining away the
violations of the treaty. The following are examples:

“1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines.” Then figures are given.
“Remarks: Further mines are in part ordered, in part being delivered.”
(_C-32_)

“Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic
artillery batteries.” The remarks column reads, “Justification:
Necessity for over-hauling. Cheaper repairs.” (_C-32_)

“Number 6. Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area.” Remarks: “The offense
over and above that in serial number 3 lies in the fact that all
fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This justification will
make it less severe; pure defense measures.” (_C-32_)

“Number 7. Exceeding the calibre permitted for coastal batteries.”
Remarks: “Possible justification is that, though the calibre is larger,
the number of guns is less.” (_C-32_)

“Number 8. Arming of mine-sweepers.” Remarks: “The guns are taken from
the fleet reserve stores, have been temporarily installed only for
training purposes. All nations arm their mine-sweeping forces (equality
of rights).” (_C-32_)

“Number 13. Exceeding the number of machine guns, et cetera, permitted.”
Remarks: “Can be made light of.” (_C-32_)

“Number 18. Construction of U-boat parts.” Remarks: “Difficult to
detect. If necessary can be denied.” (_C-32_)

“Number 20. Arming of fishing vessels.” Remarks: “For warning shots.
Make little of it.” And so on throughout the list (_C-32_). This
document must have been used as a guide for negotiators who were
attending the Disarmament Conference, as to the position that they might
take.

E. _Withdrawal From the Disarmament Conference and the League of
Nations: Building of the Air Force._

At this point, on 14th October 1933, Germany withdrew from the
International Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. The
Nazis took this opportunity to break away from the international
negotiations and to take an aggressive position on an issue which would
not be serious enough to provoke reprisal from other countries. At the
same time, Germany attached so much importance to this action that it
considered the possibility of the application of sanctions by other
countries. In anticipation of the probable nature of such sanctions and
the countries which might apply them, plans were made for armed
resistance on land, at sea, and in the air. Military preparations were
ordered in a directive from the Reichsminister for Defense (von
Blomberg) to the head of the Army High Command (Fritsch), the head of
the Navy High Command, (Raeder), and the Reichsminister for Air,
(Goering) (_C-140_). This directive, dated 25 October 1933, 11 days
after the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of
Nations, provides:

    “1. The enclosed directive gives the basis for preparation of
    the armed forces in the case of sanctions being applied against
    Germany.

    “2. I request the chiefs of the Army and Navy High Command and
    the Reichsminister for Air to carry out the preparations in
    accordance with the following points:

    “(_a_) Strictest secrecy. It is of the utmost importance that no
    facts become known to the outside world from which preparation
    for resistance against sanctions can be inferred or which is
    incompatible with Germany’s existing obligations in the sphere
    of foreign policy regarding the demilitarized zone. If
    necessary, the preparations must take second place to this
    necessity.” (_C-140_)

One of the immediate consequences of this action was that following the
withdrawal from the League of Nations, Germany’s armament program was
still further increased. As it was ordered on 12 May, 1934:

    “5. Owing to the speed of military political development since
    Germany quitted Geneva and based on the progress of the army,
    the new A-Plan will only be drawn up for a period of two years.
    The third A phase lasts accordingly from 1.4.34 to 31.3.36.”
    (_C-153_)

On 10 March 1935, Goering announced that Germany was building a military
air force. At page 1830 of _Das Archiv_ it is stated:

    “The Reich Minister for Aviation, General of the Airmen,
    Goering, in his talk with the special correspondent of the Daily
    Mail, Ward Price, expressed himself on the subject of the German
    Air Force.

    “General Goering said:

    “In the extension of our national defense [_Sicherheit_], it was
    necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of
    defense in the air. As far as that is concerned, I restricted
    myself to those measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line
    of my actions was, not the creation of an aggressive force which
    would threaten other nations, but merely the completion of a
    military aviation which would be strong enough to repel, at any
    time, attacks on Germany.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In conclusion, the correspondent asked whether the German Air
    Force will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany. General
    Goering replied to that exactly as follows:

    “The German Air Force is just as passionately permeated with the
    will to defend the Fatherland to the last as it is convinced, on
    the other hand, that it will never be employed to threaten the
    peace of other nations.” (_2292-PS_)

Since they had gone as far as they could on rearmament and the secret
training of personnel, the next step necessary to the conspirators’
program for aggressive war was a large-scale increase in military
strength. This could no longer be done under disguise and camouflage,
and would have to be known to the world. Accordingly, on 16 March 1935,
there was promulgated a law for universal military service, in violation
of Article 173 of the Versailles Treaty. That law appeared in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Title I, Vol. I, 1935, page 369. The text of the
law itself provides:

    “In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the
    following law:

    “Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935.

    “The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is
    herewith promulgated:

    “Section 1.

    “Service in the Armed Forces is based upon compulsory military
    duty.

    “Section 2.

    “In peace time, the German Army, including the police troops
    transferred to it, is organized into: 12 Corps and 36 Divisions.

    “Section 3.

    “The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty of
    submitting immediately to the Reich Ministry detailed laws on
    compulsory military duty.” (_1654-PS_)

The law is signed first by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor Adolf
Hitler, and then by many other officials, including von Neurath, Frick,
Schacht, Goering, Hess, and Frank. (_1654-PS_)

F. _Assurances._

As a part of their program to weaken resistance in other states, the
Nazis followed a policy of making false assurances, thereby tending to
create confusion and a false sense of security. Thus, on 21 May 1935,
the same date on which Germany renounced the armament provisions of the
Versailles Treaty, Hitler announced the intent of the German Government
to respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles and Locarno
Treaties. In his speech in the Reichstag on that date Hitler stated:

    “Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely
    respect all other articles pertaining to the cooperation
    [_zusammenleben_] of the various nations including territorial
    agreements; revisions which will be unavoidable as time goes by
    it will carry out by way of a friendly understanding only.

    “The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to
    sign any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill.
    However, it will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even
    if it was composed before this government took over. Therefore,
    it will in particular adhere to all the allegations under the
    Locarno Pact as long as the other partners of the pact also
    adhere to it.” (_2288-PS_)

For convenient reference, the territorial limitations in the Locarno and
Versailles Treaties, include the following:

Article 1 of the Rhine Pact of Locarno, 16 October 1925, provides:

    “The High Contracting parties, collectively and severally,
    guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles: the
    maintenance of the territorial status quo, resulting from the
    frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and
    France and the inviolability of the said frontiers, as fixed by,
    or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Versailles, on
    June 28, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulation of
    Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty, concerning the
    demilitarized zone.”

That has reference, of course, to the demilitarized zone of the
Rhineland.

Article 42 of the Versailles Treaty, 28 June 1919, provides:

    “Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any
    fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the
    right bank, to the west of the line drawn 50 kilometers to the
    east of the Rhine.”

Article 43 provides:

    “In the area defined above, the maintenance and the assembly of
    armed forces, either permanently or temporarily and military
    maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent
    works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.”

G. _Reoccupation of the Rhineland._

The demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was a sore spot with the Nazis
ever since its establishment after World War I. Not only was this a blow
to their increasing pride, but it was a bar to any effective strong
position which Germany might want to take on any vital issues. In the
event of any sanctions against Germany, in the form of military action,
the French and other powers would get well into Germany east of the
Rhine, before any German resistance could even be put up. Therefore, any
German plans to threaten or breach international obligations, or for any
kind of aggression, required the preliminary reoccupation and
refortification of this open Rhineland territory. Plans and preparations
for the reoccupation of the Rhineland started very early.

A document apparently signed in the handwriting of von Blomberg, deals
with what is called “Operation _Schulung_”, meaning schooling or
training (_C-139_). It is dated 2 May 1935 and refers to prior staff
discussions on the subject. It is addressed to the Chief of the Army
Command, who at that time was Fritsch; the Chief of the Navy High
Command (Raeder); and the Reich Minister for Air (Goering). The document
does not use the name “Rhineland” and does not, in terms, refer to it.
It seems clear, however, that it was a plan for the military
reoccupation of the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles
and the Rhine Pact of Locarno. The first part, headed “Secret Document,”
provides:

    “For the operation, suggested in the last staff talks of the
    Armed Forces, I lay down the _Code name Schulung_ [training].

    “The supreme direction of the operation ‘_Schulung_’ rests with
    the Reich Minister of Defense as this is a joint undertaking of
    the three services.

    “Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according
    to the following directives:

    “1. General.

    “1. The operation must, on issue of the code word ‘Carry out
    _Schulung_,’ be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed.
    _Strictest_ secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only
    the very smallest number of officers should be informed and
    employed in the drafting of reports, drawings, etc., and these
    officers only in person.

    “2. There is no time for mobilization of the forces taking part.
    These will be employed in their peace-time strength and with
    their peace-time equipment.

    “3. The preparation for the operation will be made without
    regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every
    improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a
    greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better
    prospects of success.” (_C-139_)

The rest of the order deals with military details. There are certain
points in this order which are inconsistent with any theory that it was
merely a training order, or that it might have been defensive in nature.
The operation was to be carried out as a surprise blow at lightning
speed. The air forces were to provide support for the attack. There was
to be reinforcement by the East Prussian division. Furthermore, since
this order is dated 2 May 1935, which is about 6 weeks after the
promulgation of the Conscription Law of 16 March 1935, it could hardly
have been planned as a defensive measure against any expected sanctions
which might have been applied by reason of the passage of the
Conscription Law.

The actual reoccupation of the Rhineland did not take place until 7
March, 1936, and this early plan (_C-139_) necessarily underwent
revision to suit changed conditions and specific objectives. That the
details of this particular plan were not ultimately the ones that were
carried out in reoccupying the Rhineland does not detract from the fact
that as early as 2 May 1935, the Germans had already planned that
operation, not merely as a staff plan but as a definite operation. It
was evidently not on their timetable to carry out the operation so soon,
if it could be avoided. But they were prepared to do so if necessary.

It is significant to note the date of this order is the same as the date
of the signing of the Franco-Russian Pact, which the Nazis later
asserted as their excuse for the Rhineland reoccupation.

The military orders on the basis of which the Rhineland reoccupation was
actually carried into execution on 7 March 1936, were issued on 2 March
1936 by the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, von
Blomberg. They were addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
(Fritsch), the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (Raeder), and the Air
Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force (Goering) (_C-159_). That order,
classified “Top Secret”, in the original bears Raeder’s initial in green
pencil, with a red pencil note, “To be submitted to the C-in-C of the
Navy”.

The first part of the Order reads:

    “Supreme Command of the Navy:

    “1. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has made the following
    decision:

    “By reason of the Franco-Russian alliance, the obligations
    accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, as far as they apply
    to Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, which
    referred to the demilitarized zone, are to be regarded as
    obsolete.

    “2. Sections of the army and air force will therefore be
    transferred simultaneously in a surprise move to garrisons of
    the demilitarized zone. In this connection, I issue the
    following orders: * * *” (_C-159_)

There follow detailed orders for the military operation.

The order for Naval cooperation was issued on 6 March 1936, in the form
of an order on behalf of the Reich Minister for War, von Blomberg,
signed by Keitel, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy
(Raeder) (_C-194_). The order set out detailed instructions for the
Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and the admirals commanding the Baltic
and North Sea. The short covering letter is as follows:

    “To: C-in-C Navy:

    “The Minister has decided the following after the meeting:

    “1. The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German bay, not
    over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-Day onward, has
    been approved. C-in-C air force will instruct the air command VI
    from midday 7 March to hold in readiness single reconnaissance
    aircraft to be at the disposal of the C-in-C fleet.

    “2. The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-Boat
    reconnaissance on line, until the evening of 7 March. The
    immediate transfer of U-Boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven has
    been approved.

    “3. The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed
    Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as
    the first counter-measures to be taken against military
    preparations of neighboring states. It is far more essential to
    examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A,
    to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous
    measures could not be omitted.” (_C-194_)

The reoccupation and fortification of the Rhineland was carried out on 7
March 1936. For the historical emphasis of this occasion, Hitler made a
momentous speech on the same day, in which he declared:

    “Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the repeated
    friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by
    infringing the Reich pact through a military alliance with the
    Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany. In this
    manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner
    meaning and ceased in practice to exist. Consequently, Germany
    regards herself, for her part, as no longer bound by this
    dissolved treaty. The German government are now constrained to
    face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation
    which is rendered more acute by the fact that the Franco-Soviet
    treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance between
    Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in form. In
    accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its
    frontiers and ensure its possibilities of defense, the German
    government have today restored the full and unrestricted
    sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the
    Rhineland.” (_2289-PS_)

The German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland
caused extensive international repercussions. As a result of the
protests lodged with the League of Nations, the Council of the League
made an investigation and announced the following finding, which is
published in the League of Nations monthly summary, March, 1936, Volume
16, Page 78. [It is also quoted in the _American Journal of
International Law_, page 487 (1936)]:

    “That the German government has committed a breach of Article 43
    of the Treaty of Versailles, by causing on March 7, 1936,
    military forces to enter and establish themselves in the
    demilitarized zone, referred to in Article 42 and the following
    articles of that Treaty, and in the Treaty of Locarno. At the
    same time, on March 7, 1936, the Germans reoccupied the
    Rhineland in flagrant violation of the Versailles and Locarno
    Treaties. They again tried to allay the fears of other European
    powers and lead them into a false sense of security by
    announcing to the world ‘we have no territorial demands to make
    in Europe.’”

The last phrase occurred in Hitler’s speech on 7 March 1936:

    “We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above
    all that all the tensions resulting either from false
    territorial settlements or from the disproportion of the numbers
    of inhabitants to their living space cannot, in Europe, be
    solved by war.” (_2289-PS_)

The existence of prior plans and preparations for the reoccupation and
fortification of the Rhineland is indisputable. The method and sequence
of these plans and their accomplishments are clearly indicative of the
increasingly aggressive character of the Nazi objectives, international
obligations and considerations of humanity notwithstanding.

The Nazi conspirators were determined, as these documents have shown, to
use whatever means were necessary to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty
of Versailles and its restrictions upon the military armament and
activity of Germany. In this process, they conspired and engaged in
secret armament and training, the secret production of munitions of war,
and they built up an air force. They withdrew from the International
Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations on 14 October 1933.
They instituted universal military service on 16 March 1935. On 21 May
1935 they falsely announced that they would respect the territorial
limitations of Versailles and Locarno. On March 7 1936 they reoccupied
and fortified the Rhineland and at the same time, falsely announced that
they had no territorial demands in Europe.

The accomplishment of all these objectives, particularly the repudiation
of the Versailles Treaty restrictions, opened the gates for the numerous
aggressions which were to follow.

                 *        *        *        *        *

   LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PREPARATION FOR
                         AGGRESSION: 1933-1936

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6 (a).              │  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F)  │      │
                │  1, 2; V.                              │  I   │  22, 29
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
  *789-PS       │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,  │      │
                │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme  │      │
                │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23)       │ III  │     572
                │                                        │      │
 *1143-PS       │Letter from Schickendanz to Rosenberg,  │      │
                │20 October 1932, for personal           │      │
                │transmission to Hess concerning         │      │
                │organization of Air Force. (USA 40)     │ III  │     806
                │                                        │      │
 *1168-PS       │Unsigned Schacht memorandum to Hitler, 3│      │
                │May 1935, concerning the financing of   │      │
                │the armament program. (USA 37)          │ III  │     827
                │                                        │      │
 *1639-A-PS     │Mobilization book for the Civil         │      │
                │Administration, 1939 Edition, issued    │      │
                │over signature of Keitel. (USA 777)     │  IV  │     143
                │                                        │      │
**1654-PS       │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing      │      │
                │universal military conscription. 1935   │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369.      │      │
                │(Referred to but not offered in         │      │
                │evidence)                               │  IV  │     163
                │                                        │      │
 *2194-PS       │Top secret letter from Ministry for     │      │
                │Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich     │      │
                │Protector in Bohemia and Moravia,       │      │
                │enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense   │      │
                │Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36)       │  IV  │     843
                │                                        │      │
 *2261-PS       │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme      │      │
                │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces,│      │
                │24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of    │      │
                │Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and    │      │
                │copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 │      │
                │May 1935 on the Council for defense of  │      │
                │the Reich. (USA 24)                     │  IV  │     934
                │                                        │      │
 *2288-PS       │Adolf Hitler’s speech before the        │      │
                │Reichstag, published in Voelkischer     │      │
                │Beobachter, Southern Germany Special    │      │
                │Edition, No. 142a, 22 May 1935. (USA 38)│  IV  │     993
                │                                        │      │
 *2289-PS       │Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag, 7     │      │
                │March 1936, published in Voelkischer    │      │
                │Beobachter, Berlin Edition, No. 68, 8   │      │
                │March 1936. (USA 56)                    │  IV  │     994
                │                                        │      │
 *2292-PS       │Interview of Goering by representative  │      │
                │of London Daily Mail, concerning the    │      │
                │German Air Force, from German report in │      │
                │The Archive, March 1935, p. 1830. (USA  │      │
                │52)                                     │  IV  │     995
                │                                        │      │
 *2322-PS       │Hitler’s speech before the Reichstag, 1 │      │
                │September 1939. (USA 39)                │  IV  │    1026
                │                                        │      │
 *2353-PS       │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic     │      │
                │Facts for History of German War and     │      │
                │Armament Economy. (USA 35)              │  IV  │    1071
                │                                        │      │
  2907-PS       │Notes of conferences of Reich Ministers │      │
                │on 12 September 1933, 13 October 1933,  │      │
                │and 14 October 1933.                    │  V   │     572
                │                                        │      │
 *3054-PS       │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801
                │                                        │      │
 *3308-PS       │Affidavit by Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt,  │      │
                │28 November 1945. (GB 288)              │  V   │    1100
                │                                        │      │
 *3474-PS       │Manuscript notes by Bodenschatz on      │      │
                │conference of German Air Forces leaders,│      │
                │2 December 1936. (USA 580)              │  VI  │     199
                │                                        │      │
 *3575-PS       │Memorandum, 19 November 1938, concerning│      │
                │meeting of Reich Defense Council. (USA  │      │
                │781)                                    │  VI  │     267
                │                                        │      │
  3581-PS       │Letter from Minister of Interior to     │      │
                │Minister of Propaganda Goebbels, 20 July│      │
                │1934, concerning unauthorized press     │      │
                │releases about military affairs.        │  VI  │     278
                │                                        │      │
  3585-PS       │Letter from Chief of Staff of Army (von │      │
                │Fritsch) to Minister of War, 8 October  │      │
                │1934, enclosing memorandum signed by    │      │
                │Brauchitsch 29 September 1934, on       │      │
                │military situation in East Prussia.     │  VI  │     279
                │                                        │      │
  3586-PS       │Directive to Counter-Intelligence units,│      │
                │16 October 1934, directing that new     │      │
                │troop units which may be activated      │      │
                │should be listed in telephone books only│      │
                │under camouflage designations.          │  VI  │     281
                │                                        │      │
  3587-PS       │Memorandum from Beck, 14 November 1934, │      │
                │forbidding public use of designation    │      │
                │“General Staff”.                        │  VI  │     282
                │                                        │      │
  *C-17         │Extracts from History of the German Navy│      │
                │1919-1939. (USA 42)                     │  VI  │     819
                │                                        │      │
  *C-23         │Unsigned documents found in official    │      │
                │Navy files containing notes year by year│      │
                │from 1927 to 1940 on reconstruction of  │      │
                │the German Navy, and dated 18 February  │      │
                │1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA│      │
                │49)                                     │  VI  │     827
                │                                        │      │
  *C-29         │Directive of 31 January 1933 by Raeder  │      │
                │for German Navy to support the armament │      │
                │industry. (USA 46)                      │  VI  │     830
                │                                        │      │
  *C-32         │Survey report of German Naval Armament  │      │
                │after conference with Chief of “A”      │      │
                │Section, 9 September 1933. (USA 50)     │  VI  │     833
                │                                        │      │
  *C-135        │Extract from history of war organization│      │
                │and of the scheme for mobilization. (GB │      │
                │213)                                    │  VI  │     946
                │                                        │      │
  *C-139        │Directive for operation “Schulung”      │      │
                │signed by Blomberg, 2 May 1935. (USA 53)│  VI  │     951
                │                                        │      │
  *C-140        │Directive for preparations in event of  │      │
                │sanctions, 25 October 1935, signed by   │      │
                │Blomberg. (USA 51)                      │  VI  │     952
                │                                        │      │
  *C-141        │Order for concealed armament of E-boats,│      │
                │10 February 1932, signed by Raeder. (USA│      │
                │47)                                     │  VI  │     955
                │                                        │      │
  *C-153        │Naval Armament Plan for the 3rd Armament│      │
                │Phase, signed by Raeder, 12 May 1934.   │      │
                │(USA 43)                                │  VI  │     967
                │                                        │      │
  *C-156        │Concealed Rearmament under Leadership of│      │
                │Government of Reich, from “Fight of the │      │
                │Navy against Versailles 1919-1935”. (USA│      │
                │41)                                     │  VI  │     970
                │                                        │      │
  *C-159        │Order for Rhineland occupation signed by│      │
                │Blomberg, 2 March 1936. (USA 54)        │  VI  │     974
                │                                        │      │
  *C-166        │Order from Command Office of Navy, 12   │      │
                │March 1934, signed in draft by Groos,   │      │
                │concerning preparation of auxiliary     │      │
                │cruisers. (USA 48)                      │  VI  │     977
                │                                        │      │
  *C-175        │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation   │      │
                │for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │      │
                │from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA   │      │
                │69)                                     │  VI  │    1006
                │                                        │      │
  *C-189        │Conversation with the Fuehrer in June   │      │
                │1934 on occasion of resignation of      │      │
                │Commanding Officer of “Karlsruhe”. (USA │      │
                │44)                                     │  VI  │    1017
                │                                        │      │
  *C-190        │Memorandum of conversation with Hitler  │      │
                │on financing Naval rearmament and       │      │
                │assembling six submarines, 2 November   │      │
                │1934. (USA 45)                          │  VI  │    1018
                │                                        │      │
  *C-194        │Orders by Keitel and Commander-in-Chief │      │
                │of Navy, 6 March 1936, for Navy         │      │
                │cooperation in Rhineland occupation.    │      │
                │(USA 55)                                │  VI  │    1019
                │                                        │      │
  *EC-177       │Minutes of second session of Working    │      │
                │Committee of the Reich Defense held on  │      │
                │26 April 1933. (USA 390)                │ VII  │     328
                │                                        │      │
  *EC-404       │Minutes of conference of Sixth Session  │      │
                │of Working Committee of Reichs Defense  │      │
                │Council, held on 23 and 24 January 1934.│      │
                │(USA 764)                               │ VII  │     443
                │                                        │      │
  *EC-405       │Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working     │      │
                │Committee of Reichs Defense Council, 26 │      │
                │June 1935. (GB 160)                     │ VII  │     450
                │                                        │      │
  *EC-406       │Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs   │      │
                │Defense Council, 6 December 1935. (USA  │      │
                │772)                                    │ VII  │     455
                │                                        │      │
  *EC-407       │Minutes of Twelfth Meeting of Reichs    │      │
                │Defense Council, 14 May 1936. (GB 247)  │ VII  │     462
                │                                        │      │
  *L-79         │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939,     │      │
                │“Indoctrination on the political        │      │
                │situation and future aims”. (USA 27)    │ VII  │     847
                │                                        │      │
  *L-172        │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│      │
                │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture      │      │
                │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │      │
                │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII  │     920
                │                                        │      │
  *TC-44        │Notice by German government of existence│      │
                │of German Air Force, 9 March 1935. (GB  │      │
                │11) VIII                                │ 386  │
                │                                        │      │
   TC-45        │Proclamation to German People of 16     │      │
                │March 1935.                             │ VIII │     388
                │                                        │      │
   TC-46        │German memorandum to Signatories of     │      │
                │Locarno Pact reasserting full German    │      │
                │sovereignty over Rhineland, 7 March     │      │
                │1936.                                   │ VIII │     394
                │                                        │      │
Statement VII   │The Development of German Naval         │      │
                │Policy—1933-1939 by Erich Raeder,       │      │
                │Moscow, fall 1945.                      │ VIII │     684
                │                                        │      │
Statement XIV   │Hungarian Relations with Germany Before │      │
                │and During the War by Nicholas Horthy,  │      │
                │Jr., Nurnberg, 22 February 1946.        │ VIII │     756


                     3. AGGRESSION AGAINST AUSTRIA

A. _The Events Leading up to the Autumn of 1937 and the Strategic
Position of the National Socialists in Austria._

(1) _The National Socialist Aim of Absorption of Austria._ In order to
understand more clearly how the Nazi conspirators proceeded after the
meeting in the Reichschancellery on 5 November 1937, at which Hitler
laid plans for the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia (_386-PS_), it
is advisable to review the steps which had already been taken in Austria
by the National Socialists of both Germany and Austria. The position
which the Nazis had reached by the Fall of 1937 made it possible for
them to complete their absorption of Austria much sooner and with less
cost than was contemplated in this meeting.

The acquisition of Austria had long been a central aim of the German
National Socialists. On the first page of _Mein Kampf_, Hitler had
written, “German-Austria must return to the great German mother-land.”
He continued by stating that this purpose, of having common blood in a
common Reich, could not be satisfied by a mere economic union. This aim
was regarded as a serious program which the Nazis were determined to
carry out.

This fact is borne out by an affidavit executed in Mexico City on 28
August 1945 by George S. Messersmith, United States Ambassador in Mexico
City (_1760-PS_). Mr. Messersmith was Consul General of the United
States of America in Berlin from 1930 to the late Spring of 1934. He was
then made American Minister in Vienna, where he stayed until 1937. In
this affidavit he states that the nature of his work brought him into
frequent contact with German Government officials, many of whom were, on
most occasions, amazingly frank in their conversations, and made no
concealment of their aims.

In particular, Mr. Messersmith states that he had contact with the
following twenty governmental officials, among others: Hermann Goering,
General Milch, Hjalmar Schacht, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Count
Schwerin von Krosigk, Josef Goebbels, Richard Walter Darré, Robert Ley,
Hans Heinrich Lammers, Otto Meissner, Franz von Papen, Walter Funk,
General Wilhelm Keitel, Admiral Erich von Raeder, Admiral Karl Doenitz,
Dr. Behle, Dr. Stuckart, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, and Dr. Davidson. Mr.
Messersmith further states that in addition to this contact with
officials of the Government he maintained contact with individuals in
all parties in Germany in order to keep himself and the Government
informed of political developments in Germany.

With regard to the Austrian matter, he states that from the very
beginning of the Nazi Party he was told by both high and secondary
government officials in Germany that incorporation of Austria into
Germany was both a political and economic necessity and that this
incorporation was going to be accomplished “by whatever means were
necessary.” He further states:

    “I can assert that it was fully understood by everyone in
    Germany who had any knowledge whatever of what was going on that
    Hitler, and the Nazi Government were irrevocably committed to
    this end and the only doubt which ever existed in conversations
    or statements to me was ‘how’ and ‘when.’” (_1760-PS_).

As Mr. Messersmith relates, at the beginning of the Nazi regime in 1933
Germany was too weak to make open threats of force against any country.
It developed a policy of securing its aims in Austria in the same manner
as in Germany—by obtaining a foothold in the Cabinet, particularly in
the Ministry of Interior which controls the police, and quickly
eliminating the opposition elements. Mr. Messersmith states that
throughout his stay in Austria he was told on any number of occasions by
high officials of the Austrian Government, including Chancellor
Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, and President Miklas, that the German
Government kept up constant pressure upon the Austrian Government to
appoint ministers with Nazi orientation.

(2) _Pressure Used, Including Terror and Intimidation, Culminating in
the Unsuccessful Putsch of 25 July 1934._ To achieve their end the Nazis
used various pressures. They used economic pressure. The law of 24 March
1933 imposed a prohibitive 1,000 reichsmark penalty on trips to Austria,
thus bringing hardship to Austria, which relied heavily on its tourist
trade (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1933, I, 311). The Nazis used propaganda. And
they used terroristic acts, primarily bombings.

Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit (_1760-PS_) goes into some detail with
respect to these means. Although they were committed by National
Socialists in Austria, high Nazi officials in Germany admitted to Mr.
Messersmith that they were instigating and directing these waves of
terror in Austria. They made no effort to conceal their use of terror,
which they justified on the ground that terror was a necessary
instrument to impose the will of the party not only in Germany but in
other countries. Mr. Messersmith recalls specifically that General Milch
of the Air Force stated that the terrorism in Austria was being directed
by the Nazi Party in Berlin.

Mr. Messersmith points out that all these outrages were a common
occurrence. They had peaks and distinct periods, one in mid-1933 and
another in early 1934. He points out that the wave of outrages in May
and June 1934 diminished markedly for a few days during the meeting of
Hitler and Mussolini in Venice, in mid-June 1934. (At that time
Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and interested
in its independence.) Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit quotes extensively
from dispatches sent from the American Legation in Vienna to the State
Department during this period. These dispatches indicate that the terror
was often directed at Catholic Churches and institutions, and at
railways and tourist centers.

Mr. Messersmith also recalls that in addition, the Nazis maintained a
threat of violent action against Austria through the “Austrian Legion.”
This was a para-military force of several thousand men, armed by the
Nazis in Germany, and stationed in Germany near the Austrian border. It
included Austrian Nazis who fled from Austria after committing crimes.

These terroristic activities of the Nazis in Austria continued until
July 25, 1934. On that day members of the NSDAP attempted a
revolutionary putsch and killed Chancellor Dollfuss. A message from Mr.
Hadow, of the British Legation in Vienna, to Sir John Simon contains
details of the putsch (_2985-PS_). The official version of events given
verbally by the Austrian Government to the diplomatic Corps, as set
forth in this document, stated that approximately a hundred men
attempting the putsch seized the Federal Chancellery. Chancellor
Dollfuss was wounded in trying to escape, being shot twice at close
quarters. The Radio Building in the center of the town was overwhelmed,
and the announcer was compelled to broadcast the news that Dollfuss had
resigned and Doctor Rintelen had taken his place as Chancellor.

Although the putsch failed, the insurgents kept control of the
Chancellery Building and agreed to give it up only after they had a
safe-conduct to the German border. The insurgents contacted the German
Minister, Dr. Rieth, by telephone, and subsequently had private
negotiations with him in the building. At about 7:00 p. m. they yielded
the building, but Chancellor Dollfuss died about 6:00 p. m., not having
had the services of a doctor.

The German Government denied all complicity in the putsch and
assassination. Hitler removed Dr. Rieth as Minister on the ground that
he had offered a safe-conduct to the rebels without making inquiry of
the German Government, and had thus without any reason dragged the
German Reich into an internal Austrian affair. This statement appears in
the letter which Hitler sent to Franz von Papen on the 26th day of July
1934. (_2799-PS_)

Although the German Government denied any knowledge or complicity in
this putsch, there is ample basis for the conclusion that the German
Nazis bear responsibility for the events. Light is shed on this matter
in the extensive record of the trial of the Austrian Nazi, Planetta, and
others who were convicted for the murder, and in the Austrian Brown Book
issued after July 25. Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit offers further
evidence:

    “The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known
    for me to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only
    that there can be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and
    organized by the Nazi officials from Germany through their
    organization in Austria made up of German Nazis and Austrian
    Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna, was fully
    familiar with all that was going to happen and that was being
    planned. The German Legation was located directly across the
    street from the British Legation and the Austrian secret police
    kept close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation.
    The British had their own secret service in Vienna at the time
    and they also kept a discreet surveillance over people entering
    the German Legation. I was told by both British and Austrian
    officials that a number of the men who were later found guilty
    by the Austrian Courts of having been implicated in the Putsch
    had frequented the German Legation. In addition, I personally
    followed very closely the activities of Dr. Rieth and I never
    doubted on the basis of all my information that Dr. Rieth was in
    close touch and constant touch with the Nazi agents in Austria;
    these agents being both German and Austrian. Dr. Rieth could not
    have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the details in
    connection therewith. I recall too very definitely from my
    conversations with the highest officials of the Austrian
    Government after the Putsch, their informing me that Dr. Rieth
    had been in touch with von Rintelen, who it had been planned by
    the Nazis was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss had the Putsch been
    successful.

    “It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic
    with the plans for the Putsch but there is no question that he
    was fully familiar with all these plans and must have given his
    assent thereto and connived therein.

    “As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to
    overthrow the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of
    the Chancellor of Austria, I took occasion to verify at the time
    for myself various other items of evidence indicating that the
    Putsch was not only made with the knowledge of the German
    Government but engineered by it. I found and verified that
    almost a month before the Putsch, Goebbels told Signor Cerruti,
    the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a Nazi
    Government in Vienna in a month.” (_1760-PS_)

Mr. William Dodd, Ambassador of the United States to Germany, published
in 1941 his Diary, covering the years 1933-1938 (_2832-PS_). The diary
contains an entry for July 26, 1934, which makes the following
observations. First, Ambassador Dodd noted that in February, 1934, Ernst
Hanfstaengl had advised him that he had brought what was virtually an
order from Mussolini to Hitler to leave Austria alone and to dismiss and
silence Theodor Habicht, the German agent in Munich who had been
agitating for annexation of Austria. On 18 June, in Venice, Hitler was
reported to have promised Mussolini to leave Austria alone.

Mr. Dodd further states:

    “On Monday, July 23, after repeated bombings in Austria by
    Nazis, a boat loaded with explosives was seized on Lake
    Constance by the Swiss police. It was a shipment of German bombs
    and shells to Austria from some arms plant. That looked ominous
    to me, but events of the kind had been so common that I did not
    report it to Washington.

    “Today evidence came to my desk that last night, as late as
    eleven o’clock, the government issued formal statements to the
    newspapers rejoicing at the fall of Dollfuss and proclaiming the
    Greater Germany that must follow. The German Minister in Vienna
    had actually helped to form the new Cabinet. He had, as we now
    know, exacted a promise that the gang of Austrian Nazi murderers
    should be allowed to go into Germany undisturbed. But it was
    realized about 12 o’clock that, although Dollfuss was dead, the
    loyal Austrians had surrounded the government palace and
    prevented the organization of a new Nazi regime. They held the
    murderers prisoners. The German Propaganda Ministry therefore
    forbade publication of the news sent out an hour before and
    tried to collect all the releases that had been distributed. A
    copy was brought to me today by a friend.

    “All the German papers this morning lamented the cruel murder
    and declared that it was simply an attack of discontented
    Austrians, not Nazis. News from Bavaria shows that thousands of
    Austrian Nazis living for a year in Bavaria on German support
    had been active for ten days before, some getting across the
    border contrary to law, all drilling and making ready to return
    to Austria. The German propagandist Habicht was still making
    radio speeches about the necessity of annexing the ancient realm
    of the Hapsburgs to the Third Reich, in spite of all the
    promises of Hitler to silence him. But now that the drive has
    failed and the assassins are in prison in Vienna, the German
    Government denounces all who say there was any support from
    Berlin.

    “I think it will be clear one day that millions of dollars and
    many arms have been pouring into Austria since the spring of
    1933. Once more the whole world is condemning the Hitler regime.
    No people in all modern history has been quite so unpopular as
    Nazi Germany. This stroke completes the picture. I expect to
    read a series of bitter denunciations in the American papers
    when they arrive about ten days from now.” (_2832-PS_)

In connection with the German Government’s denial of any connection with
the putsch and the murder of Dollfuss, the letter of appointment which
Hitler wrote to Vice-Chancellor von Papen on 26 July 1934 is
significant. This letter appears in a standard German reference work,
_Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, II, Page 83_ (_2799-PS_). (In
considering the letter the report wide-spread at the time should be
recalled, that von Papen narrowly missed being purged on 30 June, 1944,
along with Ernst Roehm and others.) The letter reads as follows:

                                                       “26 July 1934

    “Dear Mr. von Papen

    “As a result of the events in Vienna I am compelled to suggest
    to the Reichs President the removal of the German Minister to
    Vienna, Dr. Rieth, from his post, because he, at the suggestion
    of Austrian Federal Ministers and the Austrian rebels
    respectively consented to an agreement made by both these
    parties concerning the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels to
    Germany without making inquiry of the German Reich Government.
    Thus the Minister has dragged the German Reich into an internal
    Austrian affair without any reason.

    “The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor which was
    strictly condemned and regretted by the German Government has
    made the situation in Europe, already fluid, more acute, without
    any fault of ours. Therefore, it is my desire to bring about if
    possible an easing of the general situation, and especially to
    direct the relations with the German Austrian State, which have
    been so strained for a long time, again into normal and friendly
    channels.

    “For this reason, I request you, dear Mr. von Papen, to take
    over this important task, just because you have possessed and
    continue to possess my most complete and unlimited confidence
    ever since we have worked together in the Cabinet—

    “Therefore, I have suggested to the Reichs President that you,
    upon leaving the Reich-Cabinet and upon release from the office
    of Commissioner for the Saar, be called on special mission to
    the post of the German Minister in Vienna for a limited period
    of time. In this position you will be directly subordinated to
    me.

    “Thanking you once more for all that you have at one time done
    for the coordination of the Government of the National
    Revolution and since then together with us for Germany, I
    remain,

                                            Yours, very sincerely,
                                                     Adolf Hitler.”
                                                        (_2799-PS_)

Four years later, on July 25, 1938, after the Anschluss with Austria,
German officials no longer expressed regrets over the death of Dollfuss.
They were eager and willing to reveal what the world already knew—that
they were identified with and sponsors of the murder of the former
Chancellor. A dispatch from the American Consul General in Vienna to the
Secretary of State, dated July 26, 1938, relates to the Nazis’
celebration of the murder of Dollfuss, held on July 24 and July 25,
1938, four years after the event. It states:

    “The two high points of the celebration were the memorial
    assembly on the 24th at Klagenfurt, capital of the province of
    Carinthia, where in 1934 the Vienna Nazi revolt found its widest
    response, and the march on the 25th to the former Federal
    Chancellery in Vienna by the surviving members of the S.S.
    Standarte 89, which made the attack on the Chancellery in
    1934—a reconstruction of the crime, so to say.

    “The assembled thousands at Klagenfurt were addressed by the
    Fuehrer’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, in the presence of the families
    of the 13 National Socialists who were hanged for their part in
    the July putsch. The Klagenfurt memorial celebration was also
    made the occasion for the solemn swearing in of the seven
    recently appointed Gauleiters of the Ostmark.

    “From the point of view of the outside world, the speech of
    Reichs Minister Hess was chiefly remarkable for the fact that
    after devoting the first half of his speech to the expected
    praise of the sacrifices of the men, women and youths of Austria
    in the struggle for a greater Germany, he then launched into a
    defense of the occupation of Austria and an attack on the ‘lying
    foreign press’ and on those who spread the idea of a new war.
    The world was fortunate, declared Hess, that Germany’s leader
    was a man who would not allow himself to be provoked. ‘The
    Fuehrer does what is necessary for his people in sovereign calm.
    * * * and labors for the peace of Europe’ even though
    provocators, ‘completely ignoring the deliberate threat to peace
    of certain small states,’ deceitfully claim that he is a menace
    to the peace of Europe.

    “The march on the former Federal Chancellery, now the
    Reichsstatthalterei, followed the exact route and time schedule
    of the original attack. The marchers were met at the Chancellery
    by the Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart, who addressed them and
    unveiled a memorial tablet. From the Reichsstatthalterei the
    Standarte marched to the old RAVAG broadcasting center from
    which false news of the resignation of Dollfuss had been
    broadcast, and there unveiled a second memorial tablet.
    Steinhausl, the present Police President of Vienna, is a member
    of the S. S. Standarte 89”. (_L-273_)

The original plaque is now rubble. But a photograph of it was found in
The National Library in Vienna. [The photograph was offered in evidence
at the trial. See _2968-PS_.] The plaque reads: “154 German men of 89 SS
Standarte stood up here for Germany on July 26, 1934. Seven found death
at the hands of the hangman”. The words chosen for this marble tablet,
and it may be presumed that they were words chosen carefully, reveal
clearly that the men involved were not mere malcontent Austrian
revolutionaries, but were regarded as German men, were members of a
para-military organization, who stood up here “for Germany.” In 1934
Hitler repudiated Dr. Rieth because he “dragged the German Reich into an
internal Austrian affair without any reason”. In 1938 Nazi Germany
proudly identified itself with this murder, took credit for it, and took
responsibility for it.

(3) _The Program Culminating in the Pact of July 11, 1936._ In
considering the activities of the Nazi conspirators in Austria between
25 July 1934 and November 1937, there is a distinct intermediate point,
the Pact of 11 July 1936. Accordingly, developments in the two-year
period, July 1934 to July 1936, will first be reviewed.

(_a_) _Continued Aim of Eliminating Austria’s Independence—Conversation
and Activities of von Papen._ The Nazi conspirators pretended to respect
the independence and sovereignty of Austria, notwithstanding the aim of
Anschluss stated in _Mein Kampf_. But in truth and in fact they were
working from the very beginning to destroy the Austrian State.

A dramatic recital of the position of von Papen in this regard is
provided in Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit. It states:

    “When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted
    me with ‘Now you are in my Legation and I can control the
    conversation.’ In the baldest and most cynical manner he then
    proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the
    borders of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he
    had been charged with the mission of facilitating German
    economic and political control over all this region for Germany.
    He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was
    to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in
    Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from
    Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the
    other states to the South and Southeast. He said that he
    intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain
    influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer,
    towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because
    the German Government was bound on this objective of getting
    this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which
    could stop it and that our own policy and that of France and
    England was not realistic.

    “The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the
    German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and
    of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I
    already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless
    shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I
    got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited
    representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit
    that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and
    destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely
    smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and
    that he would of course, not be talking to others so clearly
    about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard
    to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute
    frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of
    their objectives.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “On the surface, however, German activities consisted
    principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and
    influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds,
    including the use of the German Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and
    its facilities and personnel. Von Papen as German Minister
    entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. He approached
    almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as
    several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to
    prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning
    side if they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence
    under German control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave
    solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian
    independence and that all that she wished to do was to get rid
    of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor,
    Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and others,
    and replace them by a few ‘nationally-minded’ Austrians, which
    of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was
    to bring about Anschluss.

    “In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg,
    informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen,
    the latter had remarked ‘Yes, you have your French and English
    friends now and you can have your independence a little longer’.
    The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in German
    but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The Foreign
    Minister told me that he had replied to von Papen ‘I am glad to
    have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees with what
    your Chief has just said in the Saar and which you have taken
    such pains to deny.’

    “Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly
    with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored
    the ‘Grossdeutschum’ idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly
    disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience
    or scruple, von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his
    wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of
    these Austrians in this respect.” (_1760-PS_)

(_b_) _Continued Existence of Nazi Organizations with a Program of Armed
Preparedness._ The wiles of von Papen represented only one part of the
total program of the Nazi conspiracy. At the same time Nazi activities
in Austria, forced underground during this period, were carried on.

Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit discloses the following: The Nazi
organization, weakened in the events following the putsch, began
reorganization work. An informant furnished the Austrian Government with
a memorandum of a meeting of Austrian Nazi chiefs held in Bavaria,
September, 1934. The memorandum shows that they agreed to prepare for
new terroristic acts, to proceed brutally against persons cooperating
with the Schuschnigg Government when the next action against the
Government took place, and to appear disposed to negotiate but to arm
for the struggle. A copy of this memorandum was furnished to Mr.
Messersmith. At the same time the Austrian Legion was kept in readiness
in Germany. This large, organized hostile group constituted a continuing
menace for Austria. (_1760-PS_)

The fact of the reorganization of the Nazi party in Austria is
corroborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis, Rainer
(_812-PS_). (_812-PS_ contains three parts. First there is a letter
dated 22 August 1939 from Rainer, then Gauleiter at Salzburg, to
Seyss-Inquart, then Reich Minister. That letter encloses a letter dated
6 July 1939, written by Rainer to Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef
Buerckel. In that letter, in turn, Rainer inclosed a report on the
events in the NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to 11 March 1938, the day
before the invasion of Austria.)

The letter from Rainer to Buerckel indicates that he was asked to
prepare a short history of the role of the party. He states that after
the Anschluss Hitler and the general public gave Seyss-Inquart alone
credit for effecting the Anschluss. It is Rainer’s belief that credit
belongs to the entire Party, the leaders of which had to remain
underground. And so Rainer writes his report to show that the Party as a
whole is entitled to “the glory which was excessively ascribed to one
person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart”.

Apparently Seyss-Inquart heard from Buerckel what Rainer said, and wrote
to Rainer asking for an explanation. To avoid misunderstanding, Rainer
prepared for Seyss-Inquart a copy of his letter to Buerckel and his
report.

The Rainer report tells of the disorganization of the Nazi party in
Austria and of its reconstitution. The second and third paragraphs of
the report state:

    “Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the
    July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right,
    the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete
    destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of
    fighters through imprisonment or flight into the ‘Alt-Reich’;
    and with regard to the political relationship of Germany to
    Austria, a formal acknowledgment of the existence of the
    Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to
    PAPEN, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships
    between the two states, the Fuehrer had liquidated the first
    stage of the battle; and a new method of political penetration
    was to begin. By order of the Fuehrer the Landesleitung Munich
    was dissolved, and the party in Austria was left to its own
    resources.

    “There was no acknowledged leader for the entire party in
    Austria. New leaderships were forming in the nine Gaus. The
    process was again and again interrupted by the interference of
    the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and
    frequently there were two, three or more rival leaderships. The
    first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaus in
    Autumn 1934 was engineer REINTHALLER (already appointed
    Landesbauernfeuhrer (leader of the country’s farmers) by Hess).
    He endeavored to bring about a political appeasement by
    negotiations with the government, with the purpose of giving the
    NSDAP legal status again, thus permitting its political
    activities. Simultaneously Reinthaller started the
    reconstruction of the illegal political organization, at the
    head of which he had placed engineer NEUBACHER.” (_812-PS_)

(_c_) _Secret Contacts Between German Officials, Including Papen, and
the Austrian Nazis: the Use by the Austrian Nazis of “Front”
Personalities._ Two cardinal factors about the Nazi organization in
Austria should be borne in mind. First, although the Fuehrer had on the
surface cast the Austrian Nazis adrift, in fact German officials,
including Papen, maintained secret contact with the Austrian Nazis, in
line with Hitler’s desires. German officials consulted and gave advice
and support to the organization of the Austrian Nazis. In the second
place, the Austrian Nazis remained an illegal organization, organizing
for the eventual use of force in an “emergency.” But in the meanwhile
they deemed it expedient to act behind “front” personalities, such as
Seyss-Inquart, who had no apparent taint of illegality.

Mr. Messersmith relates in his affidavit that he obtained a copy of a
document outlining this Nazi program.

    “For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the
    Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic
    acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and as I recall in
    1935 and most of 1936; this inactivity was in accordance with
    directives from Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which
    came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January, the
    Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a
    document which I considered accurate in all respects and which
    stated:

        ‘The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion of
        his last visit to Berlin, was received three times by
        Chancellor Hitler for fairly long conversations, and he
        also took this opportunity to call on Schacht and von
        Neurath. In these conversations the following
        instructions were given to him:

        ‘During the next two years nothing can be undertaken
        which will give Germany external political difficulties.
        On this ground, everything must be avoided which could
        awaken the appearance of Germany interfering in the
        internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor Hitler will,
        therefore, also for this reason not endeavor to
        intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in
        the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is
        convinced that order could be brought into the Party at
        once through a word from him. This word, however, he
        will, for foreign political reasons, give all the less,
        as he is convinced that the, for him, desirable ends may
        be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor
        Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does
        not indicate any disinterestedness in the idea of
        Austria’s independence. Also, before everything, Germany
        cannot for the present withdraw Party members in
        Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the very real
        exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help
        to the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in
        Austria. As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht
        finally gave the authorization that from then on 200,000
        marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support
        of National Socialists in Austria). The control and the
        supervision of this monthly sum was to be entrusted to
        Engineer Reinthaller, who, through the fact that he
        alone had control over the money, would have a definite
        influence on the Party followers. In this way it would
        be possible to end most quickly and most easily the
        prevailing difficulties and division in the Austrian
        National Socialist Party.

        ‘The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that the
        recently authorized foundation of German “Ortsgruppen”
        of the National Socialist Party in Austria (made up of
        German citizens in Austria) would be so arranged as not
        to give the appearance that Germany is planning to
        interfere in Austrian internal affairs.’” (_1760-PS_)

The report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar Buerckel in July 1939,
outlines the further history of the party and the leadership squabbles
following the retirement of Reinthaller. In referring to the situation
in 1935, he mentions some of the contacts with the Reich Government in
the following terms:

    “In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which
    were, apart from the Gauleaders, also Globocnik and Rainer.
    SCHATTENFROH then claimed, because of an instruction received
    from the imprisoned LEOPOLD, to have been made deputy country
    leader. A group led by engineer RAFFELSBERGER had at this time
    also established connections with departments of the Alt-Reich
    (Ministry of Propaganda, German Racial Agency, etc.) and made an
    attempt to formulate a political motto in the form of a program
    for the fighting movement of Austria.” (_812-PS_)

The Rainer report sets forth the situation a little later in 1936:

    “The principles of the construction of the organization were:
    The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the
    trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple
    manner, and without compromise, according to the principle of
    organizing an elite to be available to the illegal land-party
    council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political
    opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal
    chances should be used without revealing any ties with the
    illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal
    party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at
    the top of the party leadership. All connections with the party
    in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the
    Fuehrer. These said that the German state should officially be
    omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP; and that
    auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, etc.
    should be established in the foreign countries bordering
    Austria.

    “Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who
    had connections with Dr. Wachter which originated from
    Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising. On the other side
    Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and
    especially well-established relations with Christian-Social
    politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the
    ‘Styrian Heimatschutz’ and became a party member when the entire
    ‘Styrian Heimatschutz’ was incorporated into the NSDAP. Another
    personality who had a good position in the legal field was Col.
    Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both sides. The agreement
    of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of
    these two persons. Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to the
    Fuehrer as being a trusted person.” (_812-PS_)

The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the Austrian Nazis
during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting developments. They were
maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, and using
“front” personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart. The
Nazis made good use of such figures, who were more discreet in their
activities and could be referred to as “Nationalists”. They presented,
supported, and obtained consideration of demands which could not be
negotiated by out-and-out Nazis like Captain Leopold. Seyss-Inquart did
not hold any public office until January 1937, when he was made
Councillor of State. But Rainer, describing him as a trustworthy member
of the Party through the ranks of the Styrian Heimatschutz, points him
out as one who strongly influenced the agreement of 11 July 1936.

That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to trust
Seyss-Inquart, is indicated by a letter, dated 14 July 1939, addressed
to Field Marshal Goering (_2219-PS_). The letter ends with the “Heil
Hitler” close and is not signed, but it was undoubtedly written by
Seyss-Inquart. It was found among Seyss-Inquart’s personal files. On the
first page of the letter there appears a note in ink, not indicated in
the partial English translation, reading: “Air Mail. 15 July, 1515
hours, Berlin, brought to Goering’s office.”

The main text of the letter consists of a plea for intercession in
behalf of one Muehlmann, who unfortunately got in Buerckel’s bad graces.
An extract from the letter, which shows Seyss-Inquart as one whose
loyalty to Hitler and the aims of the Nazi conspiracy led him to fight
for the Anschluss with all the means at his disposal, reads:

                                 At Present In Vienna, 14 July 1939

    “To the General Field Marshal

    Sir:

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I
    know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final
    decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced activism
    (_Aktivismus_) this will certainly be regarded as a fault in my
    personality. Yet I know that I cling with unconquerable tenacity
    to the goal in which I believe. That is Greater Germany
    (_Grossdeutschland_) and the FUEHRER. And if some people are
    already tired out from the struggle and some have been killed in
    the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready to go into
    action. This, after all, was also the development until the year
    1938. Until July 1934 I conducted myself as a regular member of
    the party. And if I had quietly, in whatever form, paid my
    membership dues the first one, according to a receipt, I paid in
    December 1931. I probably would have been an undisputed,
    comparatively old fighter and party member of Austria, but I
    would not have done any more for the union. I told myself in
    July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime on its own
    ground in order to give the Fuehrer a chance to use whatever
    method he desires. I told myself that this Austria was worth a
    mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination
    because I and my friends had to fight against the whole
    political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short, against
    everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we might
    have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political
    annihilation; it would have deprived the Fuehrer of the means
    and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for
    Austria, as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have
    been fully conscious of the fact that I am following a path
    which is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to my
    party comrades. I followed it calmly and would without
    hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied that at one
    point I could serve the FUEHRER as a tool in his work, even
    though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very worthy
    and honorable party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have
    never paid attention to such things because I am satisfied with
    the opinion which the FUEHRER and the men close to him have of
    me.” (_2210-PS_)

A letter from Papen to Hitler dated 27 July 1935 shows how Papen thought
the doctrines of National Socialism could be used to effect the aim of
Anschluss. It consists of a report entitled “Review and Outlook, One
Year after the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss.” After reviewing the
success that the Austrian Government had had in establishing Dollfuss as
a martyr and his principles as the patriotic principles of Austria,
Papen stated:

    “National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian
    ideology. If today it is contended in Austria that the NSDAP is
    only a centralized Reich German party and therefore unable to
    transfer the spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups
    of people of a different political make-up, the answer must
    rightly be that the national revolution in Germany could not
    have been brought about in a different way. But when the
    creation of the people’s community in the Reich will be
    completed, National socialism could, in a much wider sense than
    this is possible through the present party organization—at
    least apparently—, certainly become the rallying point for all
    racially German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in
    regard to Austria cannot be achieved today with any centralized
    tendency. If this recognition would once and for all be stated
    clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily become
    possible to effect a breakthrough into the front of the New
    Austria. A Nurnberg Party Day designated as ‘The German Day’ as
    in old times and the proclamation of a national socialistic
    peoples’ front, would be a stirring event for all beyond the
    borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the
    particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the
    legitimistic Count Dubsky wrote in his pamphlet about the
    ‘Anschluss’: The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will
    not be at all. National Socialism must win it or it will perish,
    if it is unable to solve this task * * *.” (_2248-PS_)

Other reports from Papen to Hitler, hereinafter mentioned, show that he
maintained covert contact with the National Socialist groups in Austria.
From the very start of his mission Papen was thinking of ways and means
of using the principle of National Socialism for “National Germans”
outside the borders of Germany. Papen was working for Anschluss, and
although he preferred to use the principles of National Socialism rather
than rely on the party organization, he was prepared to defend the party
organization as a necessary means of establishing those principles in
the German Reich.

(_d_) _Assurances and Reassurances._ The German Government did more than
keep up a pretense of noninterference with Austrian groups. It employed
the psychological inducement of providing assurances that it had no
designs on Austria’s independence. If Austria could but hope for the
execution of those assurances, she could find her way clear to the
granting of concessions, and obtain relief from the economic and
internal pressures.

A letter from Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated 17 May 1935,
indicated that a forthright, credible statement by Germany reassuring
Austria would be most useful for German diplomatic purposes and the
improvement of relationships between Austria and German groups in
Austria (_2247-PS_). Papen had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his
Social-Christian forces against Starhemberg, the Vice-Chancellor of
Austria, who was backed by Mussolini. He hoped to persuade Schuschnigg
to ally his forces with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious over
Starhemberg. Papen indicated that he obtained this idea from Captain
Leopold, leader of the illegal National Socialists. His letter states in
part:

    “* * * I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The
    fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his
    Christian-social Forces, who are opposed to a home front
    dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting
    the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should
    be afforded to him, in such way that he would submit the offer
    to the government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of
    interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of
    the NSDAP in Austria, Capt. Leopold, the totalitarian principle
    of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by a
    combination of that part of the Christian-elements which favors
    the Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes
    the national independence of Austria and guarantees full freedom
    to the Austrian national opposition, then as a result of such a
    compromise the Austrian government would be formed in the
    beginning by a coalition of these forces. A further consequence
    of this step would be the possibility of the participation of
    Germany in the Danube pact, which would take the sting out of
    its acuteness due to the settlement of relations between Germany
    and Austria. Such a measure would have a most beneficial
    influence on the European situation and especially on our
    relationship with England. One may object, that Mr. Schuschnigg
    will hardly be determined to follow such a pattern, that he will
    rather in all probability immediately communicate our offer to
    our opponents. Of course, one should first of all explore the
    possibility of setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through
    the use of ‘Go betweens’. The possibility exists. If Mr.
    Schuschnigg finally says ‘No’ and makes our offer known in Rome,
    then the situation would not be any worse but, on the contrary,
    the efforts of the Reich government to make peace with Austria
    would be revealed—without prejudice to other interests.
    Therefore even in the case of refusal this last attempt would be
    an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in view of the
    far spread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian
    course and in view of the sharp tensions within the federal
    government (_Bundesregierung_), Mr. Schuschnigg will grasp this
    last straw—always under the supposition that the offer could
    not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears
    all the mark of an actually honest compromise with Austria.
    Assuming success of this step, we would again establish our
    active intervention in Central European politics, which, as
    opposed to the French-Czech and Russian political maneuvers,
    would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically.
    Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in the
    way of explorations and Conferences, an immediate decision is
    necessary. The Reich Army Minister (_Reichswehrminister_) shares
    the opinion presented above and the Reich Foreign Minister
    (_Reichsaussenminister_) wanted to discuss it with you my
    Fuehrer.

                                  (Signed)    Papen”. (_2247-PS_)

In other words, Papen wanted a strong assurance and credible assurance,
of Austria’s independence. As he put it, Germany had nothing to lose
with what it could always call a mere effort at peace. And she might be
able to convince Schuschnigg to establish an Austrian coalition
government with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would vastly strengthen
her position in Europe. Finally, Papen urged haste.

Exactly four days later (21 May 1935) in a Reichstag address Hitler
responded to Papen’s suggestion, asserting:

    “Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal
    affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an
    Anschluss”. (_TC-26_)

Despite this assurance, Papen suggested and Hitler announced, for a
complexity of reasons, a policy completely at variance with their
intentions, which had been and continued to be to interfere in Austria’s
internal affairs and to conclude an Anschluss.

(_e_) _Temporary Continuance of a Quiet Pressure Policy._ On 1 May 1936
Hitler branded as a lie any statement that tomorrow or the day after
Germany would fall upon Austria. His words were published in the
_Voelkische-Beobachter_, SD, 2-3 May 1936, p. 2. (_2367-PS_)

If Hitler meant what he said, it was only in the most literal and
misleading sense that he would not fall upon Austria “tomorrow or the
day after”. For the conspirators well knew that the successful execution
of their purpose required for a while longer the quiet policy they had
been pursuing in Austria.

A memorandum of a conversation which occurred when William Bullitt,
American Ambassador to France, called upon von Neurath, German Minister
for Foreign Affairs, on 18 May 1936, recounts von Neurath’s explanation
why Germany was trying to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by
the Nazis in Austria (_L-150_). The Nazis were growing stronger in
Austria, anyway, in view of their appeal to the young people. And the
German Government was doing nothing active in foreign affairs until the
Rhineland, reoccupied two months before, had been “digested”, and until
fortifications were constructed on the French frontier. Finally, Italy
still had a conflicting interest in Austria, and Germany wished to avoid
any involvement with Italy.

(_f_) _The agreement of 11 July 1936._ But if Germany was not yet ready
for open conflict in Austria, its diplomatic position was vastly
improved over 1934, a fact which influenced Austria’s willingness to
make concessions to Germany and come to terms. As Mr. Messersmith points
out, Italy, formerly a protector of Austria, had embarked on her
Abyssinian adventure, and this, together with the refortification of the
Rhineland, strengthened Germany’s position (_1760-PS_). This weakening
of Austria helped pave the way for the Pact of 11 July 1936. (_TC-22_)

The formal part of the agreement of July 11, 1936, between the German
Government and the Government of the Federal State of Austria, looks
like a great triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to
the effect that Austria, in its policy, especially with regard to
Germany, will regard herself as a German state. But the other two
provisions clearly state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of
Austria, and that it regards the inner political order of Austria
(including the question of Austrian National Socialism) as an internal
concern of Austria upon which it will exercise neither direct nor
indirect influence.

But there was much more substance to the day’s events. Mr. Messersmith’s
summary, as set forth in his affidavit, is more revealing:

    “Even more important than the terms of the agreement published
    in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal
    understanding, the most important provisions of which were, that
    Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the
    Chancellor’s confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in
    the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the ‘national
    opposition’ a role in the political life of Austria and within
    the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all
    Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses. This
    amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and
    thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of
    the _Deutsche Nationaler_ into the Austrian Government was
    accomplished by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as
    Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund
    Glaise-Horstenau as Minister Without Portfolio”. (_1760-PS_)

These and other provisions of the secret part of the Agreement of July
11 are set forth briefly and in general terms in an affidavit by Kurt
Schuschnigg, former Chancellor of Austria, dated November 19, 1945
(_2994-PS_). By two of those provisions Austria agreed to permit Nazi
organizations on Austrian soil, and also use of the swastika and singing
of the Horst Wessel song—all for German subjects. On its credit side,
Austria was to get repeal of the 1,000 mark barrier on tourist trade,
and in general tourist trade between the two countries was to resume.

In view of the strategy and tactics of the Nazis, these were substantial
concessions made by Austria to obtain Germany’s diplomatic, formal
assurance of Austrian independence and non-intervention in Austrian
internal affairs. The release of imprisoned Nazis to the community
presented potential police problems. And as Mr. Messersmith pointed out
in a 1934 dispatch, quoted in his affidavit, any prospect that the
National Socialists might come to power would make it more difficult to
obtain effective police and judicial action against the Nazis for fear
of reprisals by the future Nazi Government against those taking action
against Nazis even in the line of duty (_1760-PS_). The preservation of
internal peace in Austria was thus dependent upon Germany’s living up to
its obligations under the Accord.

(4) _Germany’s Continuing Program of Weakening the Austrian Government._

(_a_) _Germany’s Instructions to the Austrian National Socialists
Concerning Future Plans._ In the pact of 11 July 1936 Germany agreed not
to influence directly or indirectly the internal affairs of Austria,
including the matter of Austrian National Socialism. On 16 July 1936,
just five days later, Hitler violated that provision. The report of
Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Buerckel states:

    “* * * At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the
    party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what
    Austrian National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner
    was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of
    the Austrian party. On 16 July 1936, Dr. Rainer and Globocnik
    visited the Fuehrer at the ‘Obersalzburg’ where they received a
    clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the
    Fuehrer. On 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif
    near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer
    on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions
    for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the
    Gauleiters received organizational instructions from Globocnik
    and Hiedler.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Fuehrer named Lt. Gen.
    (Gruppenfuehrer) Keppler as chief of the mixed commission which
    was appointed, in accordance with the state treaty of 11 July
    1936, to supervise the correct execution of the agreement. At
    the same time Keppler was given full authority by the Fuehrer
    for the party in Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his
    efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked together with Dr.
    Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaller as leader of the peasants,
    Kaltenbrunner as leader of the SS, and Dr. Jury as deputy-leader
    of the Austrian party, as well as with Glaise-Horstenau and
    Seyss-Inquart.” (_812-PS_)

A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr. Messersmith
describes it briefly in his affidavit:

    “The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have
    been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded
    happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under
    the leadership; of a certain Captain Leopold, who it was known
    definitely was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program
    was now to form an organization through which the Nazis could
    carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in
    Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations
    which had a legal basis but which were simply a device by which
    the Nazis in Austria could organize, and later seek inclusion as
    a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was
    the _Ostmarkischer Verein_, the sponsor of which was the
    Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence
    of Glaise-Horstenau and the pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this
    organization was declared legal by the Courts. I made specific
    mention of the foregoing because it shows the degree to which
    the situation in Austria had disintegrated as a result of the
    underground and open Nazi activities directed from Germany.”
    (_1760-PS_)

A report from Papen to Hitler dated 1 September 1936 indicates Papen’s
strategy after 11 July 1936 for destroying Austria’s independence. Papen
had taken a substantial step forward with the agreement of July 11.
Incidentally, after that agreement he was promoted from Minister to
Ambassador. Now his tactics were developed in the following terms, as
explained in the last three paragraphs of his letter of September 1:

    “* * * The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the
    present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the
    Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National
    Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of
    utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected
    prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of
    Finances (Finanzkontrolle) at Geneva. The Chancellor of the
    League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of his
    intention, to offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the
    Interior. As a guiding principle (Marschroute) I recommend on
    the tactical side, continued, patient psychological treatment,
    with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the
    regime. The proposed conference on economic relations, taking
    place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool for the
    realization of some of our projects. In discussion with
    government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal
    party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform completely with the
    agreement of July 11. I am trying to direct the next
    developments in such a manner to aim at corporative
    representation of the movement in the fatherland front
    (Vaterlaendischen Front) but nevertheless refraining from
    putting National Socialists in important positions for the time
    being. However such positions are to be occupied only by
    personalities, having the support and the confidence of the
    movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in
    Minister Glaise-Horstenau.

                                                 (Signature) Papen”
                                                        (_2246-PS_)

To recapitulate, this report of von Papen, discloses the following
plans:

    1. obtaining a change in personnel in Ministry of Security in
    due course;

    2. obtaining cooperative representation of the Nazi movement in
    the Fatherland Front;

    3. not putting avowed National Socialists in important positions
    yet, but using “nationalist” personalities;

    4. using economic pressure, and “patient psychological
    treatment, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing
    the regime.”

(_b_) _Nazi Demands and Demonstrations._ The Nazi demanded even more
open recognition. In January 1937 Captain Leopold submitted a memorandum
of demands. They are listed in Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit (_1760-PS_).
They were not formally received by the Austrian Cabinet, but they were
known to and considered by the Cabinet. They included the following
demands: (1) An amnesty for all punishments or privations suffered for
National Socialist or National activity or sympathy; (2) equal treatment
for National Socialists, including freedom of political activity and
cultural activity; (3) abolition of laws and sanctions used by the
Government against Nazi activity. The memorandum advocated cooperation
on the basis of political principles including: A broadening of the
Patriotic Front; changes in the Cabinet; an alliance with the Reich;
common racial stock as a political aim; the application of anti-Semitic
measures; and an early plebiscite on Anschluss.

Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit also states that these demands, and
Leopold’s petition for a nationalistic party, were supported by frequent
demonstrations and much propaganda work. As early as 29 July 1936, when
the Olympic Torch was carried through Vienna, there were violent Nazi
disorders. From that time on there were frequent arrests for
distributing illegal literature or staging illegal demonstrations.
(_1760-PS_)

(_c_) _Schuschnigg’s Concessions._ Gauleiter Rainer’s historical review
points out that due to the activities of the Reich officials and the
Austrians who acted as the Nazi “fronts”, it was possible to obtain the
appointment of Seyss-Inquart as _Staatsrat_ (Councillor of State) in
July, 1937. (_812-PS_)

Schuschnigg’s affidavit mentions the Olympic Torch incident, and in
addition the demonstration of the illegal Nazis at the time of the visit
of von Neurath to Vienna in February 1937. Schuschnigg also points out
other examples of the pressure increasingly exerted by Germany on
Austria. One of his main reasons for entering into the July 11 agreement
was to eliminate Germany’s 1,000 mark penalty on tourists to Austria.
The penalty was removed, but Germany made it illegal for a tourist to
bring more than 5 marks out of the country. And German buyers of cattle
and wood purchased only from Austrian Nazis. (_2994-PS_)

Schuschnigg further reports that the incidents and pressure culminated
in the so-called Tavs Plan, discovered by the Austrian police in
November, 1937, containing instructions for unrest to break out among
the Nazis at a prearranged time. The German Government would submit an
ultimatum that National Socialists must be brought into the Government
or the German Army would invade. (_2994-PS_)

It may be recalled that during this period Schuschnigg made concessions.
He appointed Seyss-Inquart as Councillor of State in July, 1937. He had
previously appointed a “Committee of Seven” to discuss with him the
desires of the national opposition. He played a delaying game,
presumably in the hope that a change in the foreign situation would
provide him with external support.

B. _Germany’s Diplomatic Preparations for Conquest._

The program of the Nazi conspiracy aimed at weakening Austria externally
and internally, by removing its support from without as well as by
penetrating within. This program was of the utmost significance, since
the events of 25 July 1934 inside Austria were overshadowed by the fact
that Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner Pass and poised
them there as a strong protector of his northern neighbor.

Accordingly, interference in the affairs of Austria, and steady increase
in the pressure needed to acquire control over that country, required
removal of the possibility that Italy or any other country would come to
Austria’s aid. But the program of the conspiracy for the weakening and
isolation of Austria was integrated with its foreign policy program in
Europe generally.

The Nazi conspirators’ diplomatic preparation for war is described in a
second affidavit of George S. Messersmith (_2385-PS_), which may be
summarized as follows: In 1933 the Nazis openly acknowledged the
ambition to expand the territorial borders of the Reich to include
Austria and Czechoslovakia. As for the other countries of Southeast
Europe, the professed objective was stated at that time not in terms of
territorial acquisition but rather in terms of political and economic
control. And the stated objectives were not limited to Southeast Europe,
for important Nazis even in 1933 were stating their desire for the
Ukraine as the granary of Germany.

When they came to power, the Nazis had two principal objectives. They
wanted to establish their power in Germany. And they wanted to rearm and
establish Germany’s armed power. They wanted peace until they were
ready. But they wanted to acquire the ability to carry out their program
in Europe by force if necessary, although preferably by a threat of
force. They accordingly embarked upon their vast rearmament program. It
proceeded very rapidly. Goering and General Milch often said to
Messersmith or in his presence that the Nazis were concentrating on air
power in their rearmament, as the weapon of terror most likely to give
Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed most
rapidly.

In addition to material preparation for war, there was preparation for
war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany youth of all ages
could be observed in military exercises and field maneuvers.

Moreover, as Mr. Messersmith also observes,

    “Military preparation and psychological preparation were coupled
    with _diplomatic_ preparation designed to so disunite and
    isolate their intended victims as to render them defenseless
    against German aggression.” (_2385-PS_)

In 1933 the difficulties facing Germany in the political and diplomatic
field loomed large. France was the dominant military power on the
continent. She had woven a system of mutual assistance in the West and
in the East. The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented by the
Franco-Belgian alliance, guaranteed the territorial status quo in the
West. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania were allied in the Little
Entente and each in turn was united with France by mutual assistance
pacts. Since 1922, France and Poland had likewise been allied against
external aggression. Italy had made plain her special interest in
Austrian independence.

Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up the
existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions among the
members of the Little Entente and the other Eastern European powers.

Specifically, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with promises of
economic gain for cooperating with Germans. To some of these countries
she offered extravagant promises of territorial and economic rewards.
She offered Carinthia, in Austria, to Yugoslavia. She offered part of
Czechoslovakia to Hungary and part of Poland. She offered Yugoslav
territory to Hungary at the same time that she was offering land in
Hungary to Yugoslavia.

As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit:

    “Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program
    of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors
    of these countries with promises of a share in the loot. To
    Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the
    Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time:

        ‘* * * The major factor in the internal situation in the
        last week has been the increase in tension with respect
        to the Austrian Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. * * * There
        is very little doubt but that Goering, when he made his
        trip to various capitals in Southeastern Europe about
        six months ago, told the Yugoslavs that they would get a
        part of Carinthia, when a National Socialist Government
        came into power in Austria. * * * The Nazi seed sown in
        Yugoslavia has been sufficient to cause trouble and
        there are undoubtedly a good many people there who look
        with a great deal of benevolence on those Nazi refugees
        who went to Yugoslavia in the days following July 25.’

    “Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and
    to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their
    acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As
    I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, von Papen and
    von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935, were spreading
    the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division
    Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland
    the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they
    knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.

    “The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make
    inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objectives. I
    recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or
    1935, that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav
    territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions
    of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later
    gave me the same information.

    “I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made
    these promises were not only the died-in-the-wool Nazis but more
    conservative Germans who already had begun to willingly lend
    themselves to the Nazi program. In an official despatch to the
    Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I wrote
    as follows:

        ‘* * * Europe will not get away from the myth that
        Neurath, Papen and Mackensen are not dangerous people
        and that they are “diplomats of the old school.” They
        are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just
        because the outside world looks upon them as harmless,
        they are able to work more effectively. They are able to
        sow discord just because they propagate the myth that
        they are not in sympathy with the regime.’” (_2385-PS_)

In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these divisions and
increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making
these promises men who on outward appearances were merely conservative
diplomats. It is true that Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of
international obligations. It is true that the real trump in Germany’s
hand was its rearmament and more than that its willingness to go to war.
And yet the attitude of the various countries was not influenced by
those considerations alone. Schuschnigg laid great stress upon, and was
willing to go to some lengths to obtain, an assurance of independence.
All these countries found it possible to believe apparently substantial
personages, like von Neurath, for example. They were led to rely on the
assurances given, which seemed more impressive since the diplomats
making them were represented as men who were not Nazis and would not
stoop to go along with the base designs of the Nazis.

Germany’s approach toward Great Britain and France was in terms of
limited expansion as the price of peace. They signed a naval limitations
treaty with England and discussed a Locarno Air Pact. In the case of
both France and England, they limited their statement of intentions and
harped on fears of Communism and war.

In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled by notions of
the sanctity of international obligations. High-ranking Nazis, including
Goering, Frick, and Frank, openly stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany
would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited
Germany’s interests to do so. As Mr. Messersmith states in his
affidavit:

    “High-ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official
    contact, particularly men such as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frick,
    Frank, Darré and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as to
    the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that
    Germany would observe her international undertakings only so
    long as it suited Germany’s interests to do so. Although these
    statements were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made
    to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any
    secret for on many occasions they expressed the same ideas
    publicly.” (_2385-PS_)

France and Italy worked actively in Southeastern Europe to counter
Germany’s moves. France made attempts to promote an East Locarno Pact
and to foster an economic accord between Austria and the other Danubian
powers. Italy’s effort was to organize an economic bloc of Austria,
Hungary, and Italy.

But Germany foiled these efforts by redoubling its promises of loot, by
continuing its armament, and by another significant stratagem. The Nazis
stirred up internal dissensions to disunite and weaken their intended
victims. They supported the Austrian Nazis and the Henlein Party in
Czechoslovakia. They probed what Goebbels called the “sore spots.” In
Yugoslavia they played on the differences between the Croats and the
Serbs, and in particular played on the fear of the restoration of the
Hapsburgs in Austria, a fear which was very real in Yugoslavia. In
Hungary, Poland, and Rumania they stirred up other fears and hatreds.
These measures had considerable effect in preventing these countries
from joining any which were opposed to German designs.

The Nazis consolidated their power in Germany very quickly. The German
people became increasingly imbued with the Nazi military spirit. Within
Germany, resistance to the Nazis disappeared. Army officers, including
many who originally aided the Nazis with the limited objective of
restoring the German Army, increasingly became imbued with aggressive
designs as they saw how remarkably their power was growing.

The power of Nazi Germany outside the borders of the Reich increased
correspondingly. Other countries feared its military might. Important
political leaders in Yugoslavia, in Hungary, and in Poland became
convinced that the Nazi regime would gain its ends and that the best
course was to play along with Germany. These countries became apathetic
toward the development of Anschluss with Austria and cooperative toward
the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Mr. Messersmith’s despatches from
Europe to the State Department, setting out the developments in these
countries, are included in his second affidavit. (_2385-PS_)

As for Italy, Germany’s initial objective was to sow discord between
Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia Italian territory,
particularly Trieste. This was to prevent France from reaching agreement
with them and to block an East Locarno Pact. As Mr. Messersmith states:

    “While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in
    1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the
    opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England,
    and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany’s program in
    exchange for German support of Italy’s plans in Abyssinia.”
    (_2385-PS_)

That paved the way for the Austro-German declaration of 11 July 1936.
And in the Fall of 1936, Germany extended the hand of friendship and
common purpose to Italy in an alliance—the Rome-Berlin Axis. This,
together with Germany’s alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure on
England and increased the relative strength of Germany.

And so, by means of careful preparation in the diplomatic field, among
others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for themselves so
that they could seriously consider plans for war and outline a
timetable. That timetable was developed in the conference with Hitler in
the Reichschancellery on 5 November 1937. (_386-PS_)

C. _Crystallization of the Plan to Wage Aggressive War in Europe and to
Seize Austria and Czechoslovakia._

At the meeting of the conspirators in the Reichschancellery on 5
November 1937, the Fuehrer insisted that Germany should have more space
in Europe (_386-PS_). It was concluded that the space required must be
taken by force, three different cases were outlined as possibilities,
and it was decided that the problem would have to be solved before the
period 1943 to 1945. The nature of a war in the near future was
envisaged, specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler said
that for the improvement of Germany’s military political position the
first aim of the Nazis in every case of entanglement by war must be to
conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove
any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards.
Hitler then calculated that the conquest of Czechoslovakia and Austria
would constitute the conquest of food for from five to six million
people, assuming that the comprehensive emigration of one million from
Austria could be carried out. He further pointed out that the annexation
of the two states to Germany would constitute a considerable relief,
both militarily and politically, since they would provide shorter and
better frontiers, would free fighting personnel for other purposes, and
would make possible the reconstitution of new armies. (_386-PS_)

The minutes of this meeting reveal a crystallization in the policy of
the Nazi conspirators. It had always been their aim to acquire Austria.
At the outset a revolutionary Putsch was attempted, using the personnel
of the Austrian Nazis, but that failed. The next period was one of
surface recognition of the independence of Austria and the use of
devious means to strengthen the position of the Nazis internally in
Austria. Now, however, it became clear that the need for Austria, in the
light of the larger aggressive purposes of the Nazi conspirators, was
sufficiently great to warrant the use of force in order to obtain
Austria with the desired speed. The Nazis were, in fact, able to secure
Austria, after having weakened it internally and removed from it the
support of other nations, merely by setting the German military machine
in motion and making a threat of force. The German armies were able to
cross the border and secure the country without the necessity of firing
a shot. Careful planning for war and the readiness to use war as an
instrument of political action made it possible in the end for the Nazis
to master Austria without having to fight for it.

The German High Command had previously considered preparations against
Austria. On 24 June 1937 the Reich Minister for War and Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces, General von Blomberg, issued a Top Secret
Directive (_C-175_). The importance of this directive, establishing a
unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war, is indicated by the
fact that the carbon copy received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy
was one of only four copies. This directive from General von Blomberg
stated that the general political situation indicated that Germany need
not consider an attack from any side, and also that Germany did not
intend to unleash a European war. It then stated, in point 1:

    “Nevertheless the politically fluid world situation, which does
    not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous
    preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces.

        “_a._ to counter attacks at any time

        “_b._ to enable the military exploitation of politically
        favorable opportunities should they occur.” (_C-175_)

The directive then indicated that there would be certain preparations of
a general nature for war.

        “2. The preparations of a general nature include:

        “_a._ The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the
        German Armed Forces, even before the completion of
        rearmament and full preparedness for war.

        “_b._ The further working on ‘Mobilization without
        public announcement’ in order to put the Armed Forces in
        a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both
        as regards strength and time.” (_C-175_)

The directive finally indicated, in Part 3, that there might be special
preparation for war in Austria:

    “Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the
    Monarchy.

    “The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed
    force to give up a restoration.

    “Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian
    people, the march in will be made in the general direction of
    Vienna and will break any resistance.” (_C-175_)

This plan is indicated in the document as having been superseded by new
and more detailed plans following the meeting of November 5, 1937.

The plans of the conspirators were further revealed in two conversations
held by William Bullitt, United States Ambassador to France with Schacht
and with Goering in November, 1937. Both Schacht and Goering told
Bullitt that Germany was determined to annex Austria. Goering further
added that there could be no final solution of the Sudeten-German
question other than inclusion in the Reich. (_L-151_)

D. _Pressure and Threats Resulting in Further Concessions:
Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938._

Chancellor Schuschnigg states in an affidavit (_2995-PS_) that in 1938
von Papen suggested to him that he should meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden.
After several discussions Schuschnigg agreed to go, provided three
conditions were met:

    (1) He must be invited by Hitler.

    (2) He must be previously informed of the precise agenda and assured
that the agreement of 11 July 1936 would be maintained.

    (3) There was to be an agreement in advance that the communique to
be published at the end of the meeting would affirm the 11 July 1936
agreement.

Von Papen brought back word from Hitler inviting Schuschnigg and
agreeing with these conditions, particularly the maintenance of the July
1936 treaty. (_2995-PS_)

The official German communique of this conference between Hitler and
Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938 was calm (_2461-PS_).
The communique stated that the unofficial meeting was caused by the
mutual desire to clarify by personal conversations the questions
relating to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria. The
communique listed, as among those present, Schuschnigg and his Foreign
Minister Schmidt, Hitler and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and von
Papen. The communique concluded: “Both statesmen are convinced that the
measures taken by them constitute at the same time an effective
contribution toward the peaceful development of the European situation.”
(_2461-PS_). A similar communique was issued by the Austrian Government.

In fact, as a result of the conference great concessions were obtained
by the German Government from Austria. The principal concessions are
contained in the official Austrian communique dated 16 February 1938
(_2464-PS_). The communique announced a reorganization of the Austrian
Cabinet, including the appointment of Seyss-Inquart to the position of
Minister of Security and Interior. In addition, announcement was made of
a general political amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes. (_2464-PS_)

Two days later, on 18 February 1938, another concession was divulged in
the official German and Austrian communique concerning the equal rights
of Austrian National Socialists in Austria (_2469-PS_). The communique
announced that pursuant to the Berchtesgaden conference, the Austrian
National Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland Front, the single
legal political party of Austria.

Schuschnigg’s affidavit on his Berchtesgaden visit on February 12, 1938
(_2995-PS_) points out that considerable pressure was brought to bear on
him at the Berghof. Several Generals—Keitel, Sperrle, and Reichenau,
names which were omitted from the formal communique later issued—were
present on his arrival. The conference started with a two-hour
conference between Schuschnigg and Hitler alone. Hitler made no precise
demands but attacked Schuschnigg violently. In the words of the
affidavit:

    “I furthermore state and affirm that, immediately after arriving
    at the Berghof, I commenced a conference with Hitler. Hitler and
    I were alone for two hours. Hitler attacked in a violent manner
    the politics of Austria, both of the past and present. He
    furthermore informed me that he, Hitler, had ‘decided to bring
    the Austrian question to a solution so-or-so, even if he had to
    immediately use military force.’ At no time during the first two
    hours of our conversation did Hitler ever make any precise
    demands or requests of me, but spent the whole of the two hours
    accusing me and menacing me as a traitor to Austrian politics.
    Especially he informed me that, according to his knowledge,
    Austria could no longer reckon with any assistance from other
    European Powers, and that Austria now stood alone in the world.
    He furthermore added—‘Schuschnigg, you now have the chance to
    put your name alongside the names of other famous German
    leaders, such as Goering, Hess, Frick, Epp, Goebbels, and
    others.’ * * * “. (_2995-PS_)

After Hitler’s violent threats, Schuschnigg had discussions of a calmer
nature with von Ribbentrop and von Papen. They talked soothingly and
comfortingly to Schuschnigg but reached the same conclusion, that he
should yield to German demands, which in practical effect meant Nazi
control of the Government of Austria.

    “I furthermore state and affirm that I was next called before
    Joachim von Ribbentrop with my Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
    Guido Schmidt, and, in the presence of Franz von Papen,
    Ribbentrop exhibited to me a typewritten draft containing the
    conditions and demands made by Hitler upon me and Austria. He
    furthermore added that Hitler has informed me, Ribbentrop, ‘that
    these demands that I now offer to you are the final demands of
    the Fuehrer and that he, Hitler, is not prepared to further
    discuss them’. He further stated that, ‘you must accept the
    whole of these demands herein contained’. Ribbentrop then
    advised me to accept the demands at once. I protested, and
    referred him to my previous agreements with von Papen, made
    prior to coming to Berchtesgaden, and made it clear to
    Ribbentrop that I was not prepared to be confronted with such
    unreasonable demands as he had then and there placed before me.
    Von Papen, still present, apologized and informed me that he,
    von Papen, was entirely surprised and not at all informed about
    the aims of the Fuehrer, as here laid down. He further stated,
    and informed me, that he, von Papen, could only offer his advice
    and that he should now accede to, and sign, these demands. He
    furthermore informed me that I could be assured that Hitler
    would take care that, if I signed these demands and acceded to
    them, that from that time on Germany would remain loyal to this
    Agreement and that there would be no further difficulties for
    Austria.” (_2995-PS_)

Finally, after obtaining some minor concessions from Ribbentrop,
Schuschnigg met with Hitler again. This time Hitler not only put
pressure upon Schuschnigg, but also, upon learning that the approval of
President Miklas of Austria was necessary, indicated clearly to
Schuschnigg that military action would follow if Miklas did not approve
the agreement. In the words of Schuschnigg’s affidavit:

    “I further state and say, that I then went before Hitler again.
    Hitler was very excited and informed me that he would make a
    final test with Austria, and stated further: ‘that you must
    fulfill the conditions of the demands made by me on you within
    three days, or else I will order the march into Austria.’ I
    replied: ‘I am not able to take over the obligation to fulfill
    your demands, for I am only the Chancellor of Austria, and that
    obligation you attempt to place upon me is the duty only of the
    Federal President, Miklas; I am only able to sign the draft and,
    when I arrive in Vienna, to present it to the Federal
    President’. Hitler then flung open the door and yelled ‘Keitel’.
    At the same time, Hitler asked me to wait outside. Keitel then
    came in to Hitler. After twenty minutes or more I was again
    called before Hitler and, when before him, he, Hitler, informed
    me as follows: ‘For the first time in my life, I have changed my
    mind. You must sign the demands that I have made upon you, then
    report them to the Federal President, Miklas, and within three
    days from now Austria must fulfill the Agreement, otherwise
    things will take their natural course’. I then agreed to sign
    the demands and, while waiting in Hitler’s private room, he,
    Hitler, in an entirely changed mood, said to Franz von Papen,
    who was also present, ‘Herr von Papen, through your assistance I
    was appointed Chancellor of Germany and thus the Reich was saved
    from the abyss of communism. I will never forget that’. Papen
    replied: ‘_Jawohl, Mein Fuehrer_’.

    “I furthermore say and affirm that I, in the presence of
    Ribbentrop, Guido Schmidt, von Papen, and Hitler, signed the
    demands, and retained a copy for the Austrian Government. “I
    further state and affirm that, on the way back to Vienna from
    Berchtesgaden, Franz von Papen accompanied me and my party.
    Between the Berghof and Berchtesgaden, von Papen informed me as
    follows: ‘Now, you have your own impression of how excited the
    Fuehrer can get, but that happens very seldom, and I am
    convinced that the next time you meet him, you will have an
    amicable conversation with him.’” (_2995-PS_)

The pressure put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden is also disclosed in
von Papen’s notes on his last meeting with Schuschnigg, on 26 February
1938, the last two paragraphs of which read:

    “I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion
    that he had acted under ‘brutal pressure’ in Berchtesgaden. I
    myself had been present and been able to state that he had
    always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The
    Chancellor replied he had actually been under considerable moral
    pressure, he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk
    which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he
    had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked
    him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to
    make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered:
    ‘To be honest, no!’ It appears to me of importance to record
    this statement.” (_1544-PS_)

For diplomatic purposes von Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, kept
up the pretense that there had been no pressure. But General Jodl,
writing the account of current events for his diary, was more candid.
This hand-written diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden
but also the fact that for some days thereafter, General Keitel and
Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure, in
order to coerce President Miklas into ratifying the agreement. And so
the Nazi conspirators kept up the military pressure, with threats of
invasion, for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference, in order to
produce the desired effect on Miklas. (_1780-PS_)

The following entries, for Feb. 11-Feb. 14 were made in Jodl’s diary:

    “_11 February_:

    “In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V.
    Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together
    with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and
    military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

    “_13 February_:

    “In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come
    to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s order is to the
    effect that military pressure by shamming military action should
    be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive
    maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone
    for approval.

    “_14 February_:

    “At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris
    went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and
    initiates the different measures.

    “The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
    created that Germany is undertaking serious military
    preparations.” (_1780-PS_)

    The proposals for deceptive maneuvers mentioned by Jodl were
    signed by Keitel. Underneath his signature appeared a pencilled
    note that the Fuehrer approved the proposals. Among the rumors
    which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of Austria were the
    following:

    “1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or
    Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

    “2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the
    conclusion of military preparations against Austria.

        “_a._ through V-men (V-Maenner) in Austria,

        “_b._ through our customs personnel (staff) at the
        frontier,

        “_c._ through travelling agents.

    “3. Such news could be:

        “_a._ Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the
        Sector of the VII A.K.

        “_b._ (Rolling Stock) is being assembled in Munich,
        Augsburg, and Regensburg.

        “_c._ Major General Muff, the Military Attache in Vienna
        has been called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter
        of fact, this is the case).

        “_d._ The Police Stations located at the frontier of
        Austria, have called up reinforcements.

        “_e._ Custom officials report about the imminent
        maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade (_Gebirgsbrigade_) in
        the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and
        Berchtesgaden.” (_1775-PS_)

The pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in due course,
as is shown in the communiques already referred to, President Miklas
ratified the Berchtesgaden agreement, which foreshadowed a National
Socialist Austria.

E. _Events Culminating in the German Invasion on 12 March 1938._

(1) _The Plebiscite._ The day after his appointment as Minister of the
Interior, Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler.
(_2484-PS_)

On 9 March 1938, three weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been put in charge
of the police, Schuschnigg announced that he would hold a plebiscite
throughout Austria on the following Sunday, 13 March 1938. The question
was: “Are you for an independent and social, a Christian, German and
united Austria?” A “yes” answer to this question was clearly compatible
with the agreement made by the German Government on 11 July 1936, and
carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Moreover, for a
long while the Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite on the question of
Anschluss. But the Nazis apparently appreciated the likelihood of a
strong “yes” vote on the question put by Schuschnigg, and they could not
tolerate the possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg
Government. They took this occasion to overturn the Austrian Government.

Although the Plebiscite was not announced until the evening of 9 March,
the Nazi Organization received word about it earlier in the day. It was
determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler what to do about the
situation, and that they would prepare a letter of protest against the
Plebiscite from Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg, and that pending Hitler’s
approval, Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg
about details of the plebiscite.

In the words of Gauleiter Rainer’s report to Reichscommissioner
Buerckel:

    “The _Landesleitung_ received word about the planned plebiscite
    through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.
    m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards,
    Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a
    few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had
    given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the
    talks he made us understand that the illegal information we
    received was based on truth, and that in view of the new
    situation, he had been cooperating with the _Landesleitung_ from
    the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and
    Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at
    10 a. m. There it was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be
    informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer
    to intervene must be given to him by way of an official
    declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and
    thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until
    clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer.
    Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to
    Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer
    by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.”
    (_812-PS_)

(2) _Germany’s Preparation for the Use of Force._ When news of the
Plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous amount of activity.
Hitler was determined not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he
called his military advisers and ordered preparation for the march into
Austria. He made diplomatic preparations by explaining in a letter to
Mussolini the reasons why he was going to march into Austria. In the
absence of von Ribbentrop, who was temporarily detained in London, von
Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again.

The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl’s diary give a
vivid account of the activity in Berlin. The entry for the 10th of March
1938 reads:

    “By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg
    ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13, March, which should bring
    strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or
    preparation.

    “Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March
    9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called
    back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is
    ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is
    with the District leader (_Gauleiter_) Buerckel in the
    Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He
    drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15,
    according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old
    draft.

    “Prepare case Otto.

    “1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and)
    Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath
    takes over the Foreign Office.

    “Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A
    personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are
    developed which force the Fuehrer to take action.

    “1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the
    8th Army (Corps Area 3) 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve
    Army.” (_1780-PS_)

In a directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 11
March 1938 and initialed by Jodl and Keitel, Hitler stated his mixed
political and military intentions:

    “1. If these measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade
    Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions
    and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German
    population.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this
    operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on
    the 12th of March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours.

    “I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying
    over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion.

    “5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we
    do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in
    our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out
    without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry
    welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be
    avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken
    ruthlessly by force of arms.” (_C-102_)

An implementing directive of 11 March 1938 issued by Jodl provided
further:

    “If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in
    Austria, they are to be regarded as hostile.

    “The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends especially
    as Mussolini has declared himself uninterested in the solution
    of the Austrian Question”. (_C-103_)

The military preparations for invasion were complete.

(3) _The Events of 11 March in Austria._ The events of 11 March 1938 in
Austria are available in three separate accounts. Although these
accounts differ in some minor details, they afford each other almost
complete corroboration with regard to the way in which the German
Government deprived Austria of its sovereignty.

The first account is contained in a third affidavit executed by
Schuschnigg (_2996-PS_). Schuschnigg first states that he had been
discussing the plebiscite with Seyss-Inquart, and that Seyss-Inquart had
made some procedural objections but in general indicated his general
willingness to support the plebiscite. Schuschnigg went to bed on March
10 thinking the plebiscite would be a success. But on the morning of
March 11 he was told that traffic from Germany had stopped, and that
German Army forces were moving to the border. After 10 a. m.
Seyss-Inquart came to Schuschnigg’s office with Glaise-Horstenau.
Glaise-Horstenau had just come from Berlin and reported that Hitler was
in a rage. (_2996-PS_)

Schuschnigg’s affidavit then relates the three ultimatums presented by
the German Government:

    “Seyss-Inquart was then and there called to the telephone and,
    upon his return, read to me from a scrap of paper which he held
    in his hand, the contents of a telephone call which he alleged
    was just then received by him from Goering in Berlin. The
    contents as he read it to me was as follows: ‘The Chancellor
    must revoke the proposed plebiscite within the time of one hour,
    and after three or four weeks, Austria must oblige herself to
    carry out a plebiscite concerning the Anschluss according to the
    SAAR status, otherwise the German Army is ordered to pass the
    Austrian frontier’.

    “I further state and say that after informing the Federal
    President of this demand made on Austria by Germany, we decided
    to recall the Plebiscite, and thereupon I informed Seyss-Inquart
    and Glaise-Horstenau of our intentions.

    “Seyss-Inquart said that he would go to the telephone and inform
    Goering in Berlin concerning the decision of the Austrian
    Government, at that time made. In a few minutes, he,
    Seyss-Inquart, returned to my office, and informed me further,
    as follows:

        ‘I have had a telephone conversation with Goering, and
        Goering has ordered me to inform the Federal Chancellor
        Schuschnigg, as follows:

        ‘“The situation can only be saved for Austria when
        Schuschnigg resigns as the Chancellor of Austria within
        two hours and Seyss-Inquart is appointed as the new
        Chief of the Austrian Government; if Seyss-Inquart does
        not inform me, Goering, within two hours, I, Goering,
        will suppose that you are hindered from doing so”’.

    “I then reported to the Federal President the new developments,
    and, after some conversation with him and other members of the
    Government, I decided to resign. The Federal President
    reluctantly accepted my resignation at 3:30 p. m. on the
    afternoon of the 11th of March 1938. He expressed himself
    unwilling to appoint Seyss-Inquart as the Federal Chancellor—he
    therefore asked me to continue my duties as caretaker Chancellor
    until he had decided who would succeed me as Federal Chancellor.
    I accepted and remained as ‘caretaker Chancellor’ from 3:30 p.
    m., 11 March 1938 until about 11:30 p. m. the same night, when
    Seyss-Inquart was appointed to the position of Federal
    Chancellor.

    “I further state and say that at about 3:30 p. m. on the
    afternoon of 11 March 1938, the Foreign Office of the Austrian
    Government contacted the Embassy of Germany in Vienna, to
    ascertain if the demands that had been then and there made by
    Goering on Austria were the official demands of the German
    Government. The Military Attache of Germany in Vienna, one
    Lieutenant General Muff, came before the Austrian Federal
    President, and repeated the contents of the German ultimatums
    that had previously been delivered to us by Seyss-Inquart.

    “I furthermore state and say, that the Federal President, at
    about 7:30 or 8:00 o’clock p. m. on the night of 11 March 1938
    ordered me, as caretaker Chancellor, to broadcast the events of
    the day and to protest against the demands made on Austria
    during that day by Germany. Furthermore, to inform the world
    that Austria had been forced to give in to those demands of
    Germany through superior force * * *.” (_2996-PS_)

The report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reichscommissioner Buerckel also
discusses the events of March 11. In general, Rainer’s report
corroborates Schuschnigg’s affidavit. (_812-PS_)

Another document recalls vividly the events of 11 March 1938. This
document, which was found in a building of the courtyard of the German
Air Ministry, is a binder containing typed transcripts of some 27
telephone conversations, held in Goering’s office in the Air Ministry on
11 March 1938 and up to 14 March 1938. Most of the conversations were
conducted by Goering, although at least one was held by Hitler
(_2949-PS_). (For purposes of convenience these telephone calls are
marked with an identifying letter, running from A through Z and then
beginning again with AA).

The first group of conversations took place between Field Marshal
Goering, who was identified as F., and Seyss-Inquart, who was identified
as S. The transcript is in part, in the language of these two persons
and is in part a summary of the actual conversations. At 2:45 p. m. the
following conversation occurred:

    “F: How do you do, doctor. My brother-in-law, is he with you?

    “S: No.

    “Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following
    turn:

    “F: How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do you have
    any news?

    “S. The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and
    therefore he has put S. and the other gentlemen in a difficult
    situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive
    precautionary measures are being ordered, among others curfew at
    8 p. m.

    “F: Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor
    Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment
    he could not commit himself officially. F. will take a clear
    stand very shortly. In calling off the elections, he could see a
    postponement only, not a change of the present situation which
    had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor
    Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.

    “Thereupon a conversation took place between F. and the Fuehrer.
    Afterwards F. phoned again S. This conversation was held at
    15:05.

    “F: Told S. that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the
    decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy
    any more the confidence of our government because he had broken
    the Berchtesgaden agreement, and therefore further confidence in
    his future actions did not exist. Consequently, the National
    Minister, S. and the others, are being requested to immediately
    hand in their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask the
    Chancellor to resign. F. added that if after a period of one
    hour no report had come through the assumption would be made
    that S. would no more be in the position to phone. That would
    mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. S. was
    then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon. As
    a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal
    President for S. to form a new cabinet would follow
    Schuschnigg’s resignation.” (_2949-PS, Part A_)

Thus Goering told Seyss-Inquart that it was not enough for Schuschnigg
to cancel the election. And twenty minutes later he telephoned
Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must resign. When informed at
about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned, he pointed out that
in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the
Cabinet.

An hour later Goering phoned Dombrowski at the German Embassy in Vienna.
He was concerned that the Nazi Party and all its formations should be
legalized promptly:

    “Goering: Now to go on. The Party has definitely been legalized?

    “Dombrowski: But that is * * * it isn’t necessary to even
    discuss that.

    “Goering: With all of its organizations.

    “Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this country.

    “Goering: In uniform?

    “Dombrowski: In uniform.

    “Goering: Good.

    “Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have
    already been on duty for one-half hour which means everything is
    all right.” (_2949-PS, Part C_)

In addition Goering stated that the Cabinet must be formed by 7:30 p.
m., and he transmitted instructions, to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart,
as to who should be appointed to the cabinet:

    “Goering: Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer
    and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One
    thing I have forgotten, Fishbeck must have the Department of
    Economy and Commerce.

    “Dombrowski: That’s understood.

    “Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security
    and Bahr is to have the armed forces. The Austrian Army is to be
    taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the
    Justice Department.

    “Dombrowski: Yes, yes.

    “Goering: Give me the name.

    “Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law. Isn’t that right?

    “Goering: Yes?

    “Dombrowski: Yes.

    “Goering: That’s right and then also Fishbeck.” (_2949-PS, Part
    C_)

About twenty minutes later, at 5:26 p. m., Goering received the news
that Miklas was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. He
issued instructions for an ultimatum to be delivered to Miklas. The
telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart went as
follows:

    “G: Now remember the following: You go immediately together with
    Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the
    conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately,
    the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the
    frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria
    will cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and
    demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please, do
    inform us immediately about Miklas’ position. Tell him, there is
    no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we
    received before action was delayed, but now the situation is
    that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of
    Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be
    held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas
    has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship. (There
    follows a sentence which is broken up) M. does not matter
    whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party
    with all its organizations (again interruption) and then call
    out all the National Socialists all over the country. They
    should now be in the streets. So remember, report must be given
    till 7:30. Lt. General Muff is supposed to come along with you.
    I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand
    it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4
    minutes.” (_2949-PS, Part E_)

An hour later, at 6:28 p. m. Goering had an extensively interrupted
telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When
told that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Goering replied:

    “Goering: Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him; just go
    upstairs again and just tell him plainly that SI shall call on
    the National Socialists guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will
    march in by my order”. (_2949-PS, Part H_)

After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed
Goering that Miklas was still sticking to his old viewpoint, although a
new person had gone in to talk to him and there might be definite word
in about ten minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows:

    “G: Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes
    back, then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich
    Chancellery—as usually, but it has to be done fast. I hardly
    can justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so;
    if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power; all
    right?

    “S. But if he threatens?

    “G. Yes.

    “S. Well, I see, then we shall be ready (_antreten_).

    “G. Call me via Blitz.” (_2949-PS, Part H_)

It is plain that Goering and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for
Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan
involved both the use of the National Socialist forces in Austria and
invasion by German troops.

Later that night, at about 8:00 o’clock, Goering and Seyss-Inquart had
another conversation. This was after the ultimatum had expired.
Seyss-Inquart informed Goering that Miklas was still refusing to name
Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows:

    “G: O.K. I shall give the order to march in and then you make
    sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the
    following which I shall tell you now! Everyone who offers
    resistance or organizes resistance, will immediately be
    subjected to our court-martial, the court-martial of our
    invading troops. Is that clear?

    “S: Yes.

    “G: Including leading personalities, it doesn’t make any
    difference.

    “S: Yes, they have given the order, not to offer any resistance.

    “G: Yes, it does not matter: The Federal President did not
    authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.

    “S: Yes.

    “G: Well, now you are officially authorized.

    “S: Yes.

    “G: Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.” (_2349-PS, Part I_)

Another historical event—the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent
to the German Government requesting it to send troops into Austria to
help put down disorder—was discussed over the telephone. A conversation
held at 8:48 between Goering and Keppler proceeded as follows:

    “G: Well, I do not know yet. Listen: The main thing is, that
    Inquart takes over all powers of the Government, that he keeps
    the radio stations occupied.

    “K: Well, we represent the Government now.

    “G: Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen carefully:
    The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart.
    Take the notes:

        ‘The provisional Austrian Government which after the
        dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, consider it its
        task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to
        the German Government the urgent request, to support it
        in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For
        this purpose it asks the German Government to send
        German troops as soon as possible’.

    “K: Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but
    everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the
    professional groups (?)” (_2949-PS, Part L_)

And a few minutes later the conversation continued as follows:

    “G: Then our troops will cross the border today.

    “K: Yes.

    “G: Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible.

    “K: Will send the telegram to SI in the office of the Federal
    Chancery.

    “G: Please, show him, the text of the telegram and do tell him
    that we are asking him—well, he does not even have to send the
    telegram—all he needs to do is to say: agreed.

    “K: Yes.

    “G: Either call me at the Fuehrer’s or at my place. Well, good
    luck. Heil Hitler!” (_2949-PS, Part L_)

It will be recalled that in the first conversation (Part A), held at
3:05 p. m., Goering had requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram
agreed upon. But now the matter was so urgent that Goering dictated the
exact wording of the telegram over the telephone.

And an hour later, at 9:54 p. m., a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in
Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went as follows:

    “D: I need the telegram urgently.

    “K: Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.

    “D: This is marvelous. Thank you.

    “K: Listen to the radio. News will be given.

    “D: Where?

    “K: From Vienna.

    “D: So Seyss-Inquart agrees?

    “K: _Jawohl!_” (_2949-PS, Part M_)

(4) _The Order to Invade Austria._ Communications with Austria were now
suspended. But the German military machine had been set in motion. A
Directive, dated 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces, initialled by General Jodl and signed by Hitler,
ordered the invasion of Austria because of its failure to comply with
the German ultimatum. The directive reads:

    “Re: Operation Otto

                           “_Directive No. 2_

    “1. The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian
    government have not been fulfilled.

    “2. The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in
    front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.

    “The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own
    accord.

    “3. To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of
    the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to
    directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

    “I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all
    forces to the full, as quickly as possible.

                                  (signed)  ADOLF HITLER” (_C-182_)

(5) _Communications with Rome—Avoidance of Disaster._ But at the very
time that Hitler and Goering had embarked on this military undertaking,
they still had a question mark in their minds—Italy. Italy had massed
forces on the Italian-Austrian border on the occasion of the 25 July
1934 putsch. Italy had traditionally been the political protector of
Austria.

At 10:25 p. m. that evening, however, Hitler heard from Prince Philip of
Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just returned from the
Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole affair in a
very-friendly manner. The telephone conversation went thus:

“Hesen: I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. The Duce accepted
the whole thing in a very-friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He
had been informed from Austria, Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had
then said it would be a complete impossibility. It would be a bluff,
such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately
arranged thus and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said
that Austria would be immaterial to him.

“Fuehrer: Then, please, tell Mussolini, I will never forget him for
this.

“H: Yes.

“F: Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a
quite different agreement with him.

“H: Yes, I told him that, too.

“F: As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to
go with him through thick and thin, nothing matters.

“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.

“F: Listen, I shall make any agreement—I am no longer in fear of the
terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had
gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so
much, never, never shall I forget that.

“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.

“F: I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever need
any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to
him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him.

“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.” (_2949-PS, Part N_)

It will be recalled that Jodl referred in his diary (_1780-PS_) to the
letter which Hitler sent to Mussolini. In this letter, dated 11 March
1938, after stating that Austria had been declining into anarchy, Hitler
wrote: “I have decided to reestablish order in my Fatherland, order and
tranquility, and to give to the popular will the possibility of settling
its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by its own decision.” He
stated that this was only an act of self-defense, that he had no hostile
intentions toward Italy. (_2510-PS_)

After the invasion, when in Linz, Austria, Hitler communicated his
gratitude to Mussolini once more, this time by telegraph: “Mussolini, I
will never forget you for this.” (_2467-PS_)

(6) _The Appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor._ Late in the
evening of March 11, President Miklas appointed Seyss-Inquart as
Chancellor. The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart’s appointment was
made at 11:15 p. m. (_2465-PS_)

(7) _Later Communications with London—Misleading Explanations._ On
Sunday, 13 March 1938, the day after the invasion, Goering, who had been
left in charge of the Reich by Hitler, telephoned Ribbentrop in London.
Their conversation disclosed the way in which the Nazis soothed and
misled other nations:

    “G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the
    administration of the current government procedures (_Fuehrung
    der Regierungsgeschaft_). And therefore I wanted to inform you.
    There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the
    radio.

    “R: Yes, it is fantastic, isn’t it?

    “G: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely
    overshadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me
    last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw
    his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political
    things. Well, this story we had given an ultimatum, that is just
    foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist
    ministers and the representatives of the people
    (_Volksreferenten_) have presented the ultimatum. Later on, more
    and more prominent people of the Movement Party participated,
    and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist
    ministers asked us to back them up, so they would not be
    completely beaten up against and be subjected to terror and
    civil war. Then we told them we would not allow Schuschnigg to
    provoke a civil war, under no circumstances. Whether by
    Schuschnigg’s direct order, or with consent the Communists and
    the Reds had been armed, and were already making demonstrations,
    which were photographed with “Heil Moskau” and so on; naturally;
    all these facts caused some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you
    have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling
    them the Fatherland Front (_Vaterlandische Front_) would fight
    to its last man; one could not know that they would capitulate
    like that and therefore Seyss-Inquart who already had taken over
    the government asked us to march in immediately. Before we had
    already marched up to the frontier since we could not know
    whether there would be a civil war or not. These are the actual
    facts which can be proved by documents. * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “G: No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you spoke
    already to these people. I want that you once more,—but no—not
    at all once more,—but generally speaking—tell the following to
    Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has
    given any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the
    ultimatum was presented to him by S-I, Glaise-Horstenau and
    Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an
    ultimatum to the Federal President, but it also was given by the
    others and as far as I know just a military-attache came along,
    asked by S-I, because of a technical question; he was supposed
    to ask whether in case S-I would ask for the support of German
    troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore, I want to
    state that S-I asked us expressly by phone as by telegram to
    send troops because he did not know about the situation in
    Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been
    distributed there. And then he could not know how the Fatherland
    Front might react since they always had had such a big mouth.

    “R: Mr. Goering, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna, is
    everything settled yet?

    “G: Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some
    companies, in order to secure the airfield and they were
    received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17 division
    marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also I want to
    point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw but that
    they got together and fraternized immediately with the German
    troops, wherever they were stationed.” (_2949-PS, Part W_)

In view of the previous conversations, these are interesting
explanations—that the ultimatum was made by Seyss-Inquart alone and not
by Goering; that Lt. Gen. Muff, the military attache, came along merely
to answer a technical question; and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly
by telephone and by telegram for troops. But perhaps this conversation
can best be understood in light of the actual physical scene of time and
place:

    “G: Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.

    “R: I shall see you this afternoon.

    “G: The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am sitting here
    on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in the fresh air,
    drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in, I have to make
    the speech, and the birds are twittering, and here and there I
    can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful
    over there.

    “R: That is marvelous.” (_2949-PS, Part W_)

The British Foreign Office had protested the tactics employed by the
German Government. In a letter dated 12 March 1938 Ambassador Neville
Henderson, at the British Embassy, Berlin, wrote to Lord Halifax,
Foreign Minister, as follows:

    “My Lord,

    “With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 11th, I have
    the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a
    letter which I addressed to Baron von Neurath in accordance with
    the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on
    the same evening.

    “The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron von
    Neurath at the same time.” (_3045-PS_)

The enclosure was the note of March 11th from the British Embassy to Von
Neurath and it reads as follows:

    “Dear Reich Minister,

    “My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was
    delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding _inter alia_, the
    resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the
    Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of
    the members were to be National Socialists, and the re-admission
    of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping
    order in Vienna.

    “I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to
    the German Government that if this report is correct, H.M.G. in
    the U.K. feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms
    against such use of coercion backed by force against an
    independent State in order to create a situation incompatible
    with its national independence.

    “As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been
    informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest
    reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.”
    (_3045-PS_)

Von Neurath wrote a letter of response dated 12 March 1938. He first
objected to the fact that the British Government was undertaking the
role of protector of Austria’s independence:

    “In the name of the German Government I must point out here that
    the Royal British Government has no right to assume the role of
    a protector of Austria’s independence. In the course of
    diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German
    Government never left any doubt with the Royal British
    Government that the formation of relations between Germany and
    Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern
    of the German people and that it did not affect third Powers.”
    (_3287-PS_)

Then, in response to the assertions regarding Germany’s ultimatum, Von
Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events:

    “* * * Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced, on the
    evening of the 9th of March, the surprising and arbitrary
    resolution, decided on by himself, to hold an election within a
    few days which, under the prevailing circumstances, and
    especially according to the details provided for the execution
    of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of
    oppressing politically the predominant majority of the
    population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this
    procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of
    Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria’s
    internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the
    then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for
    an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore, a
    crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of
    March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and
    in the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich
    used forceful pressure to bring about this development.
    Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former
    Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal
    President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention;
    according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed
    candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the
    proposals of the German Government, otherwise the invasion of
    Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the
    matter is that the question of sending military or police forces
    from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed
    Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the
    press, to the German Government, urgently asked for the dispatch
    of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace
    and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately
    threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German
    Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to
    it.

    “This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the
    attitude of the German Government, as asserted in your letter,
    could lead to some unforeseeable reactions. A complete picture
    of the political situation is given in the proclamation which,
    at noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the
    German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take
    place only if eventually a third party should try to exercise
    its influence, contrary to the peaceful intentions and
    legitimate aims of the German Government on the shaping of
    events in Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of
    self-government of the German people.” (_3287-PS_)

In light of the documents already adverted to, this version of events
given by von Neurath is palpably untrue.

F. _The Invasion and Absorption of Austria._

(1) _The Invasion and Immediate Events: Control of Austria in Fact._ In
accordance with the directive of March 11 (_C-182_), the German Army
crossed the Austrian border at daybreak on 12 March 1938. Hitler issued
a proclamation to the German people announcing and purporting to justify
the invasion (_TC-47_). The British Government and the French Government
filed protests.

The German Government and the Austrian National Socialists swiftly
secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart welcomed Hitler at Linz and
they both expressed their joy over events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in
his speech declared Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative.
(_2485-PS_)

A telegram from the American Legation in Vienna to the Secretary of
State, on 12 March 1938, gave a picture of what was happening in Vienna:

    “Secretary of State,

    Washington.

    70, March 12, noon.

    “Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets
    ‘National Socialist Germany greets its possession National
    Socialist Austria and its new government in true indivisible
    union’.

    “Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and
    impending arrival Austrian legion.

    “SS and SA in undisputed control in Vienna.

    “Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg and Schmidt rumored
    arrested.

    “Himmler and Hess here.

                                                    WILEY” (_L-292_)

(2) _Statutes of Consolidation: Control of Austria in Law._ The
law-making machine was put to work on the task of consolidation. First,
Miklas was caused to resign as President (_2466-PS_). Seyss-Inquart
became both Chancellor and President. He then signed a Federal
Constitutional Law of 13 March 1938, for the Reunion of Austria with the
German Reich, which in turn was incorporated into the Reich Statute of
Reunion passed the same day (_2307-PS_). This Federal Constitutional Law
declared Austria to be a province of the German Reich.

By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80
of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides:

    “Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of
    Austria within the frontier which may be fixed in a treaty
    between that State and the principle Allied and Associated
    Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable,
    * * *”

Similarly, the Austrian invasion violated Article 88 of the Treaty of
St. Germain, which provides:

    “The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with
    the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.
    Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of
    the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or
    indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence,
    particularly, and until her admission to membership of the
    League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another
    Power.”

This basic constitutional law provided for a plebiscite to be held on 10
April 1938, concerning the question of reunion. But this was a mere
formality. The plebiscite could only confirm the union. It could not
undo Germany’s union with and control over Austria. To illustrate the
way in which legal consolidation was swiftly assured, with Austria
occupied by troops, it is not necessary to do more than review some of
the statutes passed within the month. Hitler placed the Austrian Federal
Army under his command and required all members of the Army to take an
oath of allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander (_2936-PS_).
Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take an
oath of office swearing obedience to Hitler, Fuehrer of the German Reich
and People; Jewish officials, as defined, were not permitted to take the
oath. (_2311-PS_)

Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich laws,
including the law of 1933 against formation of new parties and the 1933
law for the preservation of unity of party and state (2310-PS). Hitler,
Frick, and Goering ordered that the Reich Minister of the Interior be
the central authority for carrying out the reunion of Austria with the
German Reich. (_1060-PS_)

In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign to ensure
acceptability of the German regime, Goebbels established a Reich
Propaganda Office in Vienna (_2935-PS_). The ballot, addressed to
soldiers of the former Austrian Army as “German soldier”, asked the
voters whether they agreed with the “accomplishment” and “ratification”
on March 13, 1938, of the reuniting of Austria with Germany (_1659-PS_).
The groundwork was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite “for
German men and women of Austria” promised in the basic law of March 13.
(_2307-PS_)

(3) _The Importance of Austria in Further Aggressions._ Germany’s desire
to consummate the Anschluss with Austria, and its determination to
execute that aim in the way and at the time that it did (with threat of
military force, quickly, and despite political risks), was due to the
importance of Austria in its further plans of aggression. The conference
of the conspirators held on November 5, 1937, which laid plans for
aggressive war in Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest
of food, through expulsion of a million people, and an increase in
fighting strength in part through the improvement in frontier.
(_386-PS_)

Austria yielded material resources. Moreover she provided ready cash,
taken from the Jews and from the Austrian Government. One of the first
orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed by Hitler, Frick,
Schwerin von Krosigk, and Schacht, for the transfer to the Reich of the
assets of the Austrian National Bank. (_2313-PS_)

Austria yielded human resources. Three months after Anschluss, there was
enacted a decree requiring 21-year-old men to report for active military
service. (_1660-PS_)

And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic position
of the German Army. In a lecture delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the
General Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the
Gauleiters, Jodl reviewed the situation in 1938:

    “The Austrian ‘Anschluss’ in its turn, brought with it not only
    the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect
    both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially
    improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the
    territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way
    right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and
    an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia),
    Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own
    strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was
    bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigor
    before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.”
    (_L-172_)

The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second part of
their second phase of their aggressions. Czechoslovakia was next.

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST
                                AUSTRIA

    Document     │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                 │                                        │      │
                 │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                 │  Tribunal, Article 6 (a).              │  I   │       5
                 │                                        │      │
                 │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                 │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 3│      │  23-24,
                 │  (a, b); V.                            │  I   │      29
                 │                 —————                  │      │
                 │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                 │document indicates that the document was│      │
                 │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                 │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                 │document number indicates that the      │      │
                 │document was referred to during the     │      │
                 │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                 │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                 │parentheses following the description of│      │
                 │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                 │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                 │description of the document, is the     │      │
                 │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                 │court.                                  │      │
                 │                 —————                  │      │
  *386-PS        │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│      │
                 │Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November   │      │
                 │1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant,      │      │
                 │Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937.   │      │
                 │(USA 25)                                │ III  │     295
                 │                                        │      │
  *812-PS        │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, 22 │      │
                 │August 1939 and report from Gauleiter   │      │
                 │Rainer to Reichskommissar Gauleiter     │      │
                 │Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on events in the  │      │
                 │NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to 11 March  │      │
                 │1938. (USA 61)                          │ III  │     586
                 │                                        │      │
**1060-PS        │Order pursuant to law concerning Reunion│      │
                 │of Austria with German Reich, 16 March  │      │
                 │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                 │249. (Referred to but not offered in    │      │
                 │evidence.)                              │ III  │     717
                 │                                        │      │
 *1544-PS        │Von Papen’s notes, 26 February 1938, on │      │
                 │his parting visit with Chancellor       │      │
                 │Schuschnigg. (USA 71)                   │  IV  │     103
                 │                                        │      │
**1659-PS        │Second Order concerning Plebiscite and  │      │
                 │Election for the Greater German         │      │
                 │Reichstag of 24 March 1938. 1938        │      │
                 │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 303.      │      │
                 │(Referred to but not offered in         │      │
                 │evidence.)                              │  IV  │     170
                 │                                        │      │
  1660-PS        │Decree for registration for active      │      │
                 │service in Austria in the year 1938 of  │      │
                 │16 June 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,   │      │
                 │Part I, p. 631.                         │  IV  │     171
                 │                                        │      │
 *1760-PS        │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 28  │      │
                 │August 1945. (USA 57)                   │  IV  │     305
                 │                                        │      │
 *1775-PS        │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14       │      │
                 │February 1938. (USA 73)                 │  IV  │     357
                 │                                        │      │
 *1780-PS        │Excerpts from diary kept by General     │      │
                 │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA │      │
                 │72)                                     │  IV  │     360
                 │                                        │      │
 *2219-PS        │Excerpt from letter from Seyss-Inquart  │      │
                 │to Goering, 14 July 1939. (USA 62)      │  IV  │     854
                 │                                        │      │
 *2246-PS        │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1        │      │
                 │September 1936, concerning Danube       │      │
                 │situation. (USA 67)                     │  IV  │     930
                 │                                        │      │
 *2247-PS        │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 17 May │      │
                 │1935, concerning intention of Austrian  │      │
                 │government to arm. (USA 64)             │  IV  │     930
                 │                                        │      │
 *2248-PS        │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 27 July  │      │
                 │1935, concerning National Socialism in  │      │
                 │Austria. (USA 63)                       │  IV  │     932
                 │                                        │      │
 *2307-PS        │Law concerning reunion of Austria with  │      │
                 │German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938       │      │
                 │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB  │      │
                 │133)                                    │  IV  │     997
                 │                                        │      │
**2310-PS        │First Decree of Fuehrer and Reich       │      │
                 │Chancellor concerning Introduction of   │      │
                 │German Reich Law into Austria, 15 March │      │
                 │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                 │247. (Referred to but not offered in    │      │
                 │evidence.)                              │  IV  │    1004
                 │                                        │      │
**2311-PS        │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor  │      │
                 │concerning Administration of the Oath to│      │
                 │Officials of Province of Austria, 15    │      │
                 │March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│      │
                 │I, p. 245. (Referred to but not offered │      │
                 │in evidence.)                           │  IV  │    1005
                 │                                        │      │
**2313-PS        │Order for Transfer of Austrian National │      │
                 │Bank to Reichsbank, 17 March 1938. 1938 │      │
                 │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 254.      │      │
                 │(Referred to but not offered in         │      │
                 │evidence.)                              │  IV  │    1006
                 │                                        │      │
**2367-PS        │Hitler’s speech of 1 May 1936, published│      │
                 │in Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern     │      │
                 │German edition, 2-3 May 1936. (Referred │      │
                 │to but not offered in evidence.)        │  IV  │    1101
                 │                                        │      │
 *2385-PS        │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30  │      │
                 │August 1945. (USA 68)                   │  V   │      23
                 │                                        │      │
 *2461-PS        │Official German communique of meeting of│      │
                 │Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February     │      │
                 │1938, published in Documents of German  │      │
                 │Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (GB    │      │
                 │132)                                    │  V   │     206
                 │                                        │      │
 *2463-PS        │Telegram from Seyss-Inquart to Hitler,  │      │
                 │11 March 1938, published in Documents of│      │
                 │German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │      │
                 │(USA 703)                               │  V   │     207
                 │                                        │      │
**2464-PS        │Official Austrian communique of the     │      │
                 │reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet  │      │
                 │and general political amnesty, 16       │      │
                 │February 1938, published in Documents of│      │
                 │German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │      │
                 │(Referred to but not offered in         │      │
                 │evidence.)                              │  V   │     208
                 │                                        │      │
**2465-PS        │Announcement of appointment of          │      │
                 │Seyss-Inquart as Federal Chancellor, 11 │      │
                 │March 1938, published in Documents of   │      │
                 │German Politics, 1938, Vol. VI, Part 1. │      │
                 │(Referred to but not offered in         │      │
                 │evidence.)                              │  V   │     209
                 │                                        │      │
**2466-PS        │Official communique of resignation of   │      │
                 │Austrian President Miklas, 13 March     │      │
                 │1938, published in Documents of German  │      │
                 │Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1.        │      │
                 │(Referred to but not offered in         │      │
                 │evidence.)                              │  V   │     209
                 │                                        │      │
  2467-PS        │Hitler’s telegram to Mussolini from     │      │
                 │Linz, 13 March 1938, published in       │      │
                 │Documents of German Politics, 1939, Vol.│      │
                 │VI, Part 1.                             │  V   │     210
                 │                                        │      │
**2469-PS        │Official German and Austrian communique │      │
                 │concerning equal rights of Austrian     │      │
                 │National Socialists in Austria, 18      │      │
                 │February 1938, published in Documents of│      │
                 │German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │      │
                 │(Referred to but not offered in         │      │
                 │evidence.)                              │  V   │     210
                 │                                        │      │
**2484-PS        │Official German communique of visit of  │      │
                 │Austrian Minister Seyss-Inquart to      │      │
                 │Hitler, Berlin, 17 February 1938,       │      │
                 │published in Documents of German        │      │
                 │Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1.        │      │
                 │(Referred to but not offered in         │      │
                 │evidence.)                              │  V   │     234
                 │                                        │      │
**2485-PS        │Address by Federal Chancellor           │      │
                 │Seyss-Inquart from Balcony of City Hall │      │
                 │at Linz, 12 March 1938, published in    │      │
                 │Documents of German Politics, Vol. VI,  │      │
                 │Part 1, p. 144-145. (Referred to but not│      │
                 │introduced in evidence.)                │  V   │     234
                 │                                        │      │
  2510-PS        │Hitler letter to Mussolini, 11 March    │      │
                 │1938, published in Documents of German  │      │
                 │Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 135-7,   │      │
                 │No. 24.                                 │  V   │     244
                 │                                        │      │
**2799-PS        │Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 26 July│      │
                 │1934, published in Documents of German  │      │
                 │Politics, Vol. II, p. 83, No. 38.       │      │
                 │(Referred to but not offered in         │      │
                 │evidence.)                              │  V   │     441
                 │                                        │      │
  2831-PS        │Letter from Office of Extraordinary and │      │
                 │Plenipotentiary Ambassador of German    │      │
                 │Government to Reich Chancellery,        │      │
                 │inclosing report on Political situation │      │
                 │in Austria, 14 January 1937.            │  V   │     498
                 │                                        │      │
 *2832-PS        │Entry for July 26, 1934 from Ambassador │      │
                 │Dodd’s diary. (USA 58)                  │  V   │     500
                 │                                        │      │
  2909-PS        │Affidavit of August Eigruber, 9 November│      │
                 │1945.                                   │  V   │     578
                 │                                        │      │
**2935-PS        │Order concerning establishment of Reich │      │
                 │Propaganda Office in Vienna, 31 March   │      │
                 │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                 │350. (Referred to but not offered in    │      │
                 │evidence.)                              │  V   │     604
                 │                                        │      │
**2936-PS        │Instruction of the Fuehrer and Reich    │      │
                 │Chancellor, concerning the Austrian     │      │
                 │Federal Army, 13 March 1938, published  │      │
                 │in Documents of German Politics, 1938,  │      │
                 │Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 150. (Referred to   │      │
                 │but not offered in evidence.)           │  V   │     604
                 │                                        │      │
 *2949-PS        │Transcripts of telephone calls from Air │      │
                 │Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA 76)    │  V   │     628
                 │                                        │      │
 *2968-PS        │Memorandum from U. S. Army officer      │      │
                 │concerning plaque erected in Austrian   │      │
                 │Chancellery in memoriam to killers of   │      │
                 │Dollfuss. (USA 60)                      │  V   │     677
                 │                                        │      │
  2985-PS        │Telephone message of Mr. Hadow, British │      │
                 │Legation, Vienna, to Sir John Simon, 26 │      │
                 │July 1934.                              │  V   │     687
                 │                                        │      │
**2994-PS        │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg,      │      │
                 │former Chancellor of Austria, concerning│      │
                 │Austrian-German Treaty of 11 July 1936. │      │
                 │(USA 66) (Objection to admission in     │      │
                 │evidence upheld)                        │  V   │     703
                 │                                        │      │
  2995-PS        │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg,      │      │
                 │former Chancellor of Austria, concerning│      │
                 │his visit to Berchtesgaden on 12        │      │
                 │February 1938.                          │  V   │     709
                 │                                        │      │
  2996-PS        │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg,      │      │
                 │former Chancellor of Austria, concerning│      │
                 │events of 11 March 1938.                │  V   │     713
                 │                                        │      │
 *3045-PS        │Letter, 12 March 1938, to British       │      │
                 │Embassy enclosing letter from Henderson │      │
                 │to Halifax, 11 March 1938. (USA 127)    │  V   │     765
                 │                                        │      │
 *3054-PS        │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                 │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                 │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801
                 │                                        │      │
  3062-PS        │Memorandum found in Goering’s office, 19│      │
                 │November 1936, concerning Guido Schmidt,│      │
                 │Foreign Minister of Austria under       │      │
                 │Schuschnigg.                            │  V   │     868
                 │                                        │      │
 *3254-PS        │The Austrian Question, 1934-1938, by    │      │
                 │Seyss-Inquart, 9 September 1945. (USA   │      │
                 │704)                                    │  V   │     961
                 │                                        │      │
 *3270-PS        │Goering’s speech on 27 March in Vienna, │      │
                 │published in Documents of German        │      │
                 │Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 183. (USA │      │
                 │703)                                    │  V   │    1047
                 │                                        │      │
 *3271-PS        │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Himmler, 19│      │
                 │August 1939. (USA 700)                  │  V   │    1047
                 │                                        │      │
 *3287-PS        │Letter from von Neurath to Henderson, 12│      │
                 │March 1938. (USA 128)                   │  V   │    1090
                 │                                        │      │
 *3308-PS        │Affidavit by Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt,  │      │
                 │28 November 1945. (GB 288)              │  V   │    1100
                 │                                        │      │
  3390-PS        │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 25│      │
                 │October 1937.                           │  VI  │     105
                 │                                        │      │
  3392-PS        │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 3 │      │
                 │September 1937.                         │  VI  │     109
                 │                                        │      │
  3395-PS        │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 3 │      │
                 │September 1937.                         │  VI  │     113
                 │                                        │      │
 *3396-PS        │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Dr. Jury.  │      │
                 │(USA 889)                               │  VI  │     114
                 │                                        │      │
 *3397-PS        │Letter from Keppler to Seyss-Inquart, 8 │      │
                 │January 1938. (USA 702)                 │  VI  │     115
                 │                                        │      │
  3400-PS        │Minutes of meeting of German            │      │
                 │Association, 28 December 1918, and      │      │
                 │Constitution and By-Laws thereof found  │      │
                 │in personal files of Seyss-Inquart for  │      │
                 │period of 1918 to 1943.                 │  VI  │     118
                 │                                        │      │
 *3425-PS        │Voluntary statement made by             │      │
                 │Seyss-Inquart with advice of counsel, 10│      │
                 │December 1945. (USA 701)                │  VI  │     124
                 │                                        │      │
  3467-PS        │Law on Limitation of travel to Republic │      │
                 │Austria 29 May 1933. 1933               │      │
                 │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 57, p.   │      │
                 │311.                                    │  VI  │     169
                 │                                        │      │
 *3471-PS        │Letter from Keppler to Bodenschatz, 21  │      │
                 │February 1938, with enclosures noting   │      │
                 │activity of Leopold as leader of        │      │
                 │Austrian Nazis and possible appointment │      │
                 │of Klausner as his successor. (USA 583) │  VI  │     195
                 │                                        │      │
 *3472-PS        │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 9       │      │
                 │February 1938, requesting that Leopold  │      │
                 │be forbidden to negotiate with          │      │
                 │Schuschnigg except with approval of     │      │
                 │Reich authorities. (USA 582)            │  VI  │     196
                 │                                        │      │
 *3473-PS        │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 6       │      │
                 │January 1938, giving details of Nazi    │      │
                 │intrigue in Austria. (USA 581)          │  VI  │     197
                 │                                        │      │
  3574-PS        │Filing notice regarding discussion      │      │
                 │between Chief of CI and Chief of Foreign│      │
                 │CI on 31 January 1938, 2 February 1938, │      │
                 │signed Canaris.                         │  VI  │     265
                 │                                        │      │
  3576-PS        │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 19      │      │
                 │February 1938, with enclosure reporting │      │
                 │on situation in Austria as of 18        │      │
                 │February.                               │  VI  │     271
                 │                                        │      │
  3577-PS        │Letter presumably from Buerkel to       │      │
                 │Goering, dated Vienna, 26 March 1938,   │      │
                 │concerning Aryanization of Jewish-held  │      │
                 │business in Austria and disposition of  │      │
                 │resulting funds.                        │  VI  │     275
                 │                                        │      │
    *C-102       │Document signed by Hitler relating to   │      │
                 │operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA   │      │
                 │74)                                     │  VI  │     911
                 │                                        │      │
    *C-103       │Directive signed by Jodl, 11 March 1938,│      │
                 │on conduct towards Czech or Italian     │      │
                 │troops in Austria. (USA 75)             │  VI  │     913
                 │                                        │      │
    *C-175       │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation   │      │
                 │for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │      │
                 │from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA   │      │
                 │69)                                     │  VI  │    1006
                 │                                        │      │
    *C-182       │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander  │      │
                 │Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 March │      │
                 │1938. (USA 77)                          │  VI  │    1017
                 │                                        │      │
    *L-150       │Memorandum of conversation between      │      │
                 │Ambassador Bullitt and von Neurath,     │      │
                 │German Minister for Foreign Affairs, 18 │      │
                 │May 1936. (USA 65)                      │ VII  │     890
                 │                                        │      │
    *L-151       │Report from Ambassador Bullitt to State │      │
                 │Department, 23 November 1937, regarding │      │
                 │his visit to Warsaw. (USA 70)           │ VII  │     894
                 │                                        │      │
    *L-172       │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│      │
                 │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture      │      │
                 │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │      │
                 │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII  │     920
                 │                                        │      │
    *L-273       │Report of American Consul General in    │      │
                 │Vienna to Secretary of State, 26 July   │      │
                 │1938, concerning anniversary of         │      │
                 │assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss.   │      │
                 │(USA 59)                                │ VII  │    1094
                 │                                        │      │
     L-281       │Text of Schuschnigg radio address of 11 │      │
                 │March 1938, contained in telegram from  │      │
                 │American Legation in Vienna to the      │      │
                 │Secretary of State, 11 March 1938.      │ VII  │    1096
                 │                                        │      │
     L-291       │Telegram from American Embassy Berlin to│      │
                 │Secretary of State, 11 March 1938,      │      │
                 │concerning Austrian situation.          │ VII  │    1097
                 │                                        │      │
    *L-292       │Telegram of American Consul General in  │      │
                 │Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March  │      │
                 │1938, concerning propaganda dropped over│      │
                 │Vienna. (USA 78)                        │ VII  │    1098
                 │                                        │      │
     L-293       │Telegram from American Legation in      │      │
                 │Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March  │      │
                 │1938.                                   │ VII  │    1098
                 │                                        │      │
   *TC-22        │Agreement between Austria and German    │      │
                 │Government and Government of Federal    │      │
                 │State of Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB 20) │ VIII │     369
                 │                                        │      │
   *TC-26        │German assurance to Austria, 21 May     │      │
                 │1935, from Documents of German Politics,│      │
                 │Part III, p. 94. (GB 19)                │ VIII │     376
                 │                                        │      │
    TC-47        │Hitler’s Proclamation of Invasion of    │      │
                 │Austria, 12 March 1938.                 │ VIII │     398
                 │                                        │      │
  Affidavit H    │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November  │      │
                 │1945.                                   │ VIII │     643
                 │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 11   │Aggressive Action 1938-39. (Enlargement │      │
                 │displayed to Tribunal.)                 │ VIII │     780
                 │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 12   │German Aggression. (Enlargement         │      │
                 │displayed to Tribunal.)                 │ VIII │     781
                 │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 13   │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and  │      │
                 │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to   │      │
                 │Tribunal.)                              │ VIII │     782


         4. THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A. _Development of the Nazi Program of Aggression._

In the period 1933-1936 the conspirators had initiated a program of
rearmament designed to give the Third Reich military strength and
political bargaining power to be used against other nations.
Furthermore, beginning in the year 1936 they had embarked on a
preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned out, was to last
until March 1939. This program was intended to shorten Germany’s
frontiers, to increase its industrial and food-reserves, and to place it
in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which the Nazis
could launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of
aggression. At the moment, in the early spring of 1938, when the Nazi
conspirators first began to lay concrete plans for the conquest of
Czechoslovakia they had reached approximately the halfway point in this
preliminary program.

The preceding autumn, at the conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 5
November 1937, Hitler had set forth the program which Germany was to
follow. The events of this conference are contained in the so-called
Hossbach minutes. The question for Germany, as the Fuehrer had informed
his military commanders at this meeting, is where the greatest possible
conquest can be made at the lowest cost (_386-PS_). At the top of his
agenda stood two countries: Austria and Czechoslovakia. On 12 March 1938
Austria was occupied by the German Army, and on the following day it was
annexed to the Reich. The time had come for a redefinition of German
intentions toward Czechoslovakia.

A little more than a month later Hitler and Keitel met to discuss plans
for the envelopment and conquest of the Czechoslovak State. On 21 April
1938, Hitler and Keitel discussed the pretexts which Germany might
develop to serve as an excuse for a sudden and overwhelming attack. They
considered the provocation of a period of diplomatic squabbling which,
growing more serious, would lead to the excuse for war. In the
alternative, and this alternative they found to be preferable, they
planned to unleash a lightning attack as the result of an “incident” of
their own creation. Consideration was given to the assassination of the
German Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident. The
necessity of propaganda to guide the conduct of Germans in
Czechoslovakia and to intimidate the Czechs was recognized. Problems of
transport and tactics were discussed with a view to overcoming all
Czechoslovak resistance within four days, thus presenting the world with
a fait accompli and forestalling outside intervention. (_388-PS, Item
2_)

Thus in mid-April 1938 the designs of the Nazi conspirators to conquer
Czechoslovakia had already reached the stage of practical planning.

B. _The Background of Friendly Diplomatic Relations._

This conspiracy must be viewed against a background of amicable
German-Czech diplomatic relations. Although they had in the fall of 1937
determined to destroy the Czechoslovak State, the leaders of the German
government were bound by a treaty of arbitration and by assurances
freely given to observe the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. By a formal
treaty signed at Locarno on 16 October 1925, Germany and Czechoslovakia
agreed, with certain exceptions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to
the Permanent Court of International Justice,

    “* * * all disputes of every kind between Germany and
    Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict
    as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible
    to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy. * * *”
    (_TC-14_)

The preamble of this treaty stated:

    “The President of the German Empire and the President of the
    Czechoslovak Republic; equally resolved to maintain peace
    between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful
    settlement of differences which might arise between the two
    countries; declaring that respect for the rights established by
    treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for
    international tribunals; agreeing to recognize that the rights
    of a State cannot be modified save with its consent; and
    considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful
    settlement of international disputes permits of resolving,
    without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause
    of division between States; have decided to embody in a treaty
    their common intentions in this respect. * * *” (_TC-14_)

Formal and categoric assurances of their good will toward Czechoslovakia
were forthcoming from the Nazi conspirators as late as March 1938. On 11
and 12 March 1938, at the time of the annexation of Austria, Germany had
a considerable interest in inducing Czechoslovakia not to mobilize. At
this time Goering assured M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in
Berlin, on behalf of the German Government that German-Czech relations
were not adversely affected by the developments in Austria and that
Germany had no hostile intentions toward Czechoslovakia. As a token of
his sincerity Goering accompanied his assurance with the statement:
“_Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort_” (“I give you my word of honor”)
(_TC-27_). At the same time von Neurath, who was handling German foreign
affairs during Ribbentrop’s stay in London, assured M. Mastny on behalf
of Hitler and the German government that Germany still considered
herself bound by the Arbitration Convention of 1925 (_TC-27_).

C. _Planning for Aggression._

Behind the screen of these assurances the Nazi conspirators proceeded
with their military and political plans for aggression. Ever since the
preceding fall it had been established that the immediate aim of German
policy was the elimination of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In both
countries the Nazi conspirators planned to undermine the will to resist
by propaganda and by fifth column activities, while the actual military
preparations were being developed. The Austrian operation, which
received priority for political and strategic reasons, was carried out
in February and March 1938. Thenceforth _Wehrmacht_ planning was devoted
to Case Green (_Fall Gruen_), the designation given to the operation
against Czechoslovakia.

The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in outline form as
early as June 1937. The OKW top secret “Directive for the Unified
Preparation of the Armed Forces for War”, signed by von Blomberg on 24
June 1937 and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year
beginning 1 July 1937, included as a probable warlike eventuality, for
which a concentration plan was to be drafted, Case Green (“War on two
fronts with the main struggle in the southeast”) (_C-175_). The original
section of this directive dealing with the “probable war” against
Czechoslovakia—it was later revised—opens with this supposition:

    “The war in the east can begin with a surprise German operation
    against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of
    a superior enemy coalition. The necessary conditions to justify
    such an action politically and in the eyes of international law
    must be created beforehand.” (_C-175_)

After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event of such
action, the directive continues as follows:

    “2. The task of the German Armed Forces is to make their
    preparations in such a way that the bulk of all forces can break
    into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, and with the greatest
    force, while in the West the minimum strength is provided as
    rear cover for this attack.

    “The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed
    Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning, and for
    the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the
    rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian
    Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base
    in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy
    armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.”
    (_C-175_)

The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its guiding
principles the following statement:

    “The politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude
    surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war on
    the part of the German Armed Forces * * * to make possible the
    military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities
    should they occur.” (_C-175_)

It ordered further work on the plan for mobilization without public
announcement “in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be able
to begin a war suddenly which will take the enemy by surprise both as
regards strength and time of attack.” (_C-175_). This directive is, of
course, a directive for staff planning. But the nature of the planning,
and the very tangible and ominous developments which resulted from it,
give it a significance that it would not have in another setting.

Planning along the lines of this directive was carried forward during
the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-1938. On the political level
this planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the approval
and support of Hitler in the conference with his military
commanders-in-chief on 5 November 1937 (_386-PS_). In early March 1938,
before the march into Austria, Ribbentrop and Keitel were concerned over
the extent of the information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to
be furnished to Hungary. On 4 March 1938 Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel,
enclosing for Keitel’s confidential cognizance the minutes of a
conference with Sztojay, the Hungarian ambassador to Germany, who had
suggested an interchange of views (_2786-PS_). An acknowledgment of the
receipt of this letter was signed by Keitel on 5 March. In his letter to
Keitel, Ribbentrop said:

    “I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should
    discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia,
    the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed
    about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you would notify me
    briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect.”
    (_2786-PS_)

D. _Development of Specific Plans._

At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, specific plans for
the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed for the first time (_388-PS,
Item 2_). This meeting was followed in the late spring and summer of
1938 by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing Case Green. These
notes and communications were carefully filed at Hitler’s headquarters
by Major Schmundt, the Fuehrer’s military adjutant, and were captured by
American troops in a cellar at Obersalzberg, Hitler’s headquarters, near
Berchtesgaden. This file, preserved intact, is document (_388-PS_).

The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any
narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators’ planning to launch an
unprovoked war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the Nazi leaders
displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning Czechoslovak
armament and defense. This interest is reflected in _Item 4_ of the
Schmundt file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler in General Jodl’s office
of the OKW to Schmundt at Hitler’s headquarters; _Item 12_, Short survey
of Armament of the Czech Army, dated Berlin 9 June 1938 and initialed
“Z” for Zeitzler; and _Item 13_, Questions of the Fuehrer, dated Berlin,
9 June 1938 and classified “Most Secret”. The following are four of the
questions on which Hitler wanted authoritative information:

    “Question 1:  Armament of the Czech Army?

    “Question 2:  How many battalions, etc., are employed in the
    West for the construction of emplacements?

    “Question 3:  Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still
    occupied in unreduced strength?

    “Question 4:  Frontier protection in the West?” (_388-PS, Item
    13_)

These questions were answered in detail by the OKW and initialed by
Colonel Zeitzler of Jodl’s staff.

As a precaution against French and British action during the attack on
Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators to rush the
preparation of fortification measures along the western frontier of
Germany. A telegram, presumably sent from Schmundt in Berchtesgaden to
Berlin, read in part as follows:

    “Inform Colonel General von Brauchitsch and General Keitel: * *
    * The Fuehrer repeatedly emphasized the necessity of pressing
    forward greatly the fortification work in the west.” (_388-PS,
    Item 8_)

In May, June, July, and August of 1938 conferences between Hitler and
his political and military advisers resulted in the issuance of a series
of constantly revised directives for the attack. It was decided that
preparations for X-day, the day of the attack, should be completed no
later than 1 October.

On the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler called a conference of his
principal military and political advisers in the winter garden of the
Reichs Chancellery in Berlin. This conference was the occasion on which
Hitler made known to the inner circle of the Nazi conspirators the
outlines of his plan to attack Czechoslovakia and issued the necessary
instructions. The meeting is described in an affidavit of Fritz
Wiedemann, who at that time was Hitler’s adjutant:

    “FRITZ WIEDEMANN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as
    follows:

    “From the month of January 1935 to January 1939 I served as
    adjutant to Hitler. In this time my duties were to handle
    correspondence and complaints addressed to the Fuehrer’s office.
    Occasionally I attended conferences held by the Fuehrer.

    “I recall that on the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler called a
    conference in the winter garden of the Reichs Chancellery of all
    the people who were important, from the Foreign Office, the
    Army, and the Command Staffs. Those present at this conference,
    as I recall, included Goering, Ribbentrop, von Neurath, General
    Beck, Admiral Raeder, General Keitel, and General von
    Brauchitsch. On this occasion Hitler made the following
    statement: ‘It is my unshakable will that Czechoslovakia shall
    be wiped off the map.’ Hitler then revealed the outlines of the
    plan to attack Czechoslovakia. Hitler addressed himself to the
    Generals, saying: ‘So, we will first tackle the situation in the
    East. Then I will give you three to four years’ time, and then
    we will settle the situation in the West.’ The situation in the
    West was meant to be the war against England and France.

    “I was considerably shaken by these statements, and on leaving
    the Reichs Chancellery I said to Herr von Neurath: ‘Well, what
    do you say to these revelations?’ Neurath thought that the
    situation was not so serious as it appeared and that nothing
    would happen before the spring of 1939.

                                             “/s/  Fr. Wiedemann.”
                                                     (_3037-PS_)

In the months after the occupation of the Sudetenland Hitler made no
secret of this meeting. In a speech before the Reichstag on 30 January
1939, Hitler spoke as follows:

    “On account of this intolerable provocation which had been
    aggravated by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of
    our Germans there, I had resolved to solve once and for all, and
    this time radically, the Sudeten-German question. On May 28 I
    ordered (1) that preparations should be made for military action
    against this state by October 2. I ordered (2) the immense and
    accelerated expansion of our defensive front in the West.”
    (_2360-PS_)

Hitler also referred to this conference in his meeting with President
Hacha on 15 March 1939. (_2798-PS_)

Two days after this conference, on 30 May 1938, Hitler issued the
revised military directive for Case Green. This directive is _Item 11_
in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_). Entitled “Two front war with main
effort in the Southeast,” this directive replaced the corresponding
section, Part 2, Section II, of the “Directive for Unified Preparation
for War” promulgated by von Blomberg on 24 June 1937 (_C-175_). This
directive represented a further development of the ideas for political
and military action discussed by Hitler and Keitel in their conference
on 21 April. It is an expansion of a rough draft submitted by Keitel to
Hitler on 20 May, which may be found as _Item 5_ in the Schmundt file
(_388-PS_). It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies were made. Three
copies were forwarded with a covering letter from Keitel to General von
Brauchitsch for the Army, to Raeder for the Navy, and to Goering for the
Luftwaffe. In his covering memorandum Keitel noted that its execution
must be assured “as from 1 October 1938 at the latest”. (_388-PS, Item
11_)

This document, which is the basic directive under which the _Wehrmacht_
carried out its planning for Case Green, reads as follows:

    “1. _Political Prerequisites._

    “It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by
    military action in the near future. It is the job of the
    political leaders to await or bring about the politically and
    militarily suitable moment.

    “An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia
    or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly
    favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may
    cause me to take early action.

    “The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a
    favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly
    the preparations are to be made at once.

    “2. _Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the
    Action._

    “The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended
    invasion:

        “_a._ suitable obvious cause and, with it

        “_b._ sufficient political justification,

        “_c._ action unexpected by the enemy, which will find
        him prepared to the least possible degree.

    “From a military as well as a political standpoint the most
    favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an
    incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way
    for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral
    justification of military action.

    “But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war,
    must terminate in sudden action on our part—which must have the
    elements of surprise as regards time and extent—before the
    enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be
    surpassed.

    “3. _Conclusions for the Preparation of “Fall Gruen”._

    _a._ For the _Armed War_ it is essential that the surprise
    element as the most important factor contributing to success be
    made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures already in
    peace-time and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action.
    Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four
    days which plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to
    intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military
    situation and which at the same time will give nations with
    territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene
    immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention
    by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected,
    especially if France—due to the obvious pro-German attitude of
    Italy—fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war
    by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give
    military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are
    to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the
    land operations within the first few days, a European crisis
    will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of
    all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.

    “_b._ The _Propaganda War_ must on the one hand intimidate
    Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on
    the other hand issue directions to national groups for support
    in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of
    thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the
    date.

    “4. _Tasks of the Armed Forces._

    “Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the following
    basis:

    “_a._ The mass of all forces must be employed against
    Czechoslovakia.

    “_b._ For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as
    rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the
    East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected,
    the Southern frontiers to be watched.

    “_c._ The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed
    must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision
    and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in
    the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them
    with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and
    timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be
    rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time _at
    the same time_ as the penetration by the Air Force before the
    enemy can become aware of our mobilization.

    “For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be
    worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for
    approval.

    “5. _Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces._

    “_a._ _Army_: The basic principle of the surprise attack against
    Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time
    required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail
    nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is
    first of all essential to the army that as many assault columns
    as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack
    by the Air Force. These assault columns—the composition of
    each, according to their tasks at that time—must be formed with
    troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to
    the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of
    readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into
    the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and
    in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a
    breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the
    success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten-German
    frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian
    army, with parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the
    sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has
    the task of frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of
    preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia,
    of forcing a battle, of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of
    occupying Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust
    into the heart of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest
    possible motorized and armored units using to the full the first
    successes of the assault columns and the effects of the Air
    Force operations. The rear cover provided for the _West_ must be
    limited in numbers and quality to the extent which suits the
    present state of fortifications. Whether the units assigned this
    will be transported to the Western frontier immediately or held
    back for the time being will be decided in my special order.
    Preparations must however, be made to enable security
    detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during
    the strategic concentration ‘Gruen’. Independent of this, a
    first security garrison must be improvised from the engineers at
    present employed in constructing fortifications and from
    formations of the Labor Corps. The _remaining frontiers_ as well
    as East Prussia, are to be only weakly protected. But, always
    depending on the political situation, the transfers by sea, of a
    part or even the bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into
    the Reich must be taken into account.

    “_b._ _Air Force._ While leaving a minimum of defensive forces
    in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a
    surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be
    flown over at the same time as it is crossed by the first
    section of the Army * * *.” (_388-PS, Item 11_)

After detailed instructions for action by the Luftwaffe and by the Navy
the directive continues as follows:

    “In war economy it is essential that in the field of the
    armament industry a maximum-deployment of forces is made
    possible through increased supplies. In the course of
    operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of
    the total war-economic strength by rapidly reconnoitering and
    restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of
    Czechoslovakian industrial and works installations—insofar as
    military operations permit.—can be of decisive importance to
    us.” (_388-PS, Item 11_)

In other words, the Nazi conspirators, four months before the date of
their planned attack, were already looking forward to the contribution
which the Czech industrial plant would make to the Nazi war economy. The
last paragraph of this directive reads as follows:

    “All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by
    OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to the
    requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their
    effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force.

                                           “(Signed)  ADOLF HITLER
                                                     “Certified copy
                                                 “(Signed)  Zeitzler
                              “Oberstleutnant on the General Staff.”
                                                 (_388-PS, Item 11_)

Three weeks later, on 18 June 1938, a draft for a new directive was
prepared and initialed by Keitel. It does not supersede the 30 May
directive. It reads, in part:

    “The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own,
    free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political
    intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable
    political opportunity to realize this aim.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia
    only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation
    of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France
    will not march and therefore England will not intervene.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself
    will be issued by me from time to time.”

                                            “K [Initialed by Keitel]
                                          Z [Initialed by Zeitzler]”
                                                 (_388-PS, Item 14_)

The second and third parts of this directive contain general directions
for the deployment of troops and for precautionary measures in view of
the possibility that, during the execution of Case Green, France or
England might declare war on Germany. Six pages of complicated schedules
which follow this draft in the original have not been translated into
English. These schedules, which constitute _Item 15_ in the Schmundt
file (_388-PS_), give a timetable of specific measures for the
preparation of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the contemplated
action.

Corroboration for the documents in the Schmundt file is found in three
entries in General Jodl’s diary written in the spring of 1938
(_1780-PS_). Although the first entry is not dated, it appears to have
been written several months after the annexation of Austria:

    “After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is
    no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be
    digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will
    have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly
    prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because
    of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see
    memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21
    April.

    “The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as
    yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop
    concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat
    and without the slightest cause for it.

    “Because of Germany’s self restraint, its consequences lead to a
    loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take
    once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for ‘green’ on 30
    May.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_23 May_:

    “Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further
    conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the
    Fuehrer take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High
    Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War
    Diary L).”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_30 May_:

    “The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final
    decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates
    military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions
    of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an
    immediate breakthrough into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day
    (X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force.
    Further details are derived from directive for strategic
    concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once
    more between the Fuehrer’s intuition that we must do it this
    year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as
    most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not
    as yet equal to them.” (_1780-PS_)

E. _Luftwaffe Participation in Early Planning for Case Green._

During the spring and summer of 1938 the Luftwaffe was also engaged in
planning in connection with the forthcoming Case Green and the further
expansion of the Reich. A Top Secret Document, dated 2 June 1938, was
issued by Air Group Command 3 and entitled “Plan Study 1938: Instruction
for Deployment and Combat: Case Red.” (_R-150_). This is another staff
plan, this time for mobilization and employment of the Luftwaffe in the
event of war with France. It is given significance by the considerable
progress, at this date, in planning for the attack on Czechoslovakia.
Various possibilities under which war with France may occur are noted:
all of them are predicated on the assumption of a German-Czech conflict:

    “France will

    “_a_ either interfere in the struggle between the Reich and
    Czechoslovakia in the course of ‘Case Green’, or

    “_b_ start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia.

    “_c_ It is possible but not likely that France will begin the
    fight, while Czechoslovakia still remains aloof.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of
    ‘Case Green’ or whether she makes the opening move of the war
    simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass of the
    German offensive formations will, in conjunction with the Army,
    first deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia.”
    (_R-150_)

By mid-summer direct and detailed planning for Case Green was being
carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August, at the direction of the
Luftwaffe General Staff, the German Air Attache in Prague reconnoitered
the Freudenthal area of Czechoslovakia, south of Upper Silesia, for
suitable landing grounds. This action is disclosed by a report of the
Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated 12 August 1938
(_1536-PS_). This was a Top Secret document, for General Officers only,
of which only two copies were made. Attached as an enclosure was the
report of Major Moericke, the German air attache in Prague, dated 4
August 1938. The first four paragraphs of the enclosure read:

    “I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to
    reconnoitre the land in the region Freudenthal/Freihermersdorf
    for landing possibilities.

    “For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal
    with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in
    Prague.

    “I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me
    to M, particularly about my official position.

    “I used my official car (_Dienst Pkw_) for the journey to
    Freudenthal, taking precautions against being observed.”
    (_1536-PS_)

By 25 August the imminence of the attack on Czechoslovakia compelled the
issuance by the Luftwaffe of a detailed intelligence memorandum entitled
“Extended Case Green,” which consisted of an estimate of possible action
by the Western Powers during the attack on Czechoslovakia (_375-PS_).
This Top Secret memorandum of the Intelligence Section of the Luftwaffe
General Staff is dated at Berlin, 25 August 1938. Based on the
assumption that Great Britain and France will declare war on Germany
during Case Green, this study contains an estimate of the strategy and
air strength of the Western Powers as of 1 October 1938, the target date
for Case Green. The first two sentences read as follows:

    “The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the
    Case Green. It is presumed that France will only decide upon war
    if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely
    assured.” (_375-PS_)

F. _Negotiations with Italy and Hungary about Case Green._

Knowledge of pending action against Czechoslovakia was not confined to a
close circle of high officials of the Reich. During the summer Germany’s
allies, Italy and Hungary, were apprised by one means or another of the
plans of the Nazi conspirators. A captured document from German Foreign
Office files contains a confidential memorandum of a conversation with
the Italian ambassador, Attolico, in Berlin on 18 July 1938 (_2800-PS_).
At the bottom is a handwritten note, headed “For the Reichsminister
[Ribbentrop] only.” This note reads:

    “Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to the
    Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He
    also knew the appointed time well enough so that he could take
    perhaps a two months’ holiday now which he could not do later
    on.

    “Giving an idea of the attitude of other governments Attolico
    mentioned that the Roumanian government had refused to grant
    application for leave to its Berlin Minister.” (_2800-PS_)

A month later Mussolini sent a message to Berlin, asking that he be told
the date on which Case Green would take place. The German response is
outlined in a German Foreign Office note on a conversation with
Ambassador Attolico, signed “R” (for Ribbentrop) and dated 23 August
1938:

    “On the voyage of the ‘Patria’ Ambassador Attolico explained to
    me that he had instructions to request the notification of a
    contemplated time for German action against Czechoslovakia from
    the German government.

    “In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against
    Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow, in six
    months or perhaps in a year. However, I could promise him, that
    the German government, in case of an increasing gravity of the
    situation or as soon as the Fuehrer made his decision, would
    notify the Italian Chief of Government as rapidly as possible.
    In any case, the Italian government will be the first one Who
    will receive such a notification.

                                                     “23 Aug 1938
                                                    “R (initial).”
                                                        (_2791-PS_)

Four days later Attolico again asked to be notified of the date of the
pending attack. The conversation is recorded in another German Foreign
Office Memorandum:

    “Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12 o’clock to
    communicate the following:

    “He had received another written instruction from Mussolini
    asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of
    action against Czechoslovakia. Mussolini asked for such
    notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order ‘to be able
    to take in due time the necessary measures on the French
    frontier.’

                                            “Berlin, 27 August 1938
                                                               “R

    “N. B. I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former
    demarche, that I could not impart any date to him, that,
    however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be
    informed of any decision.

                                        “Berlin, 2 September 1938.”
                                                        (_2792-PS_)

Hungary, which borders Czechoslovakia to the southeast, was from the
first considered to be a possible participant in Case Green. It will be
recalled that in early March 1938 Keitel and Ribbentrop had exchanged
letters on the question of bringing Hungary into the Nazi planning
(_2786-PS_). At that time the decision was in the negative. But by
mid-August 1938 the Nazi conspirators were attempting to persuade
Hungary to join in the attack.

From August 21st to 26th Admiral Horthy and some of his ministers
visited Germany. Admiral Horthy witnessed the launching of the _Prince
Eugen_ and conferred with Hitler. There were discussions of the
Czechoslovak question. A captured German Foreign Office document, signed
by von Weizsäcker, records the conversations between Hitler and
Ribbentrop and a Hungarian delegation consisting of Horthy, Imredy, and
Kanya aboard the S. S. _Patria_ on 23 August 1938 (_2796-PS_). In this
conference Ribbentrop inquired about the Hungarian attitude in the event
of a German attack on Czechoslovakia and suggested that such an attack
would prove to be a good opportunity for Hungary. The Hungarians, with
the exception of Horthy, who wished to put the Hungarian intention to
participate on record, proved reluctant to commit themselves. Thereupon
Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop’s statement, and said:

    “Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in
    the cooking as well.” (_2796-PS_)

Von Weizsäcker’s memorandum reads as follows:

    “Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary’s attitude would be if the
    Fuehrer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech
    provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two
    kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured
    if Hungary marches towards the North and perhaps the East.
    Moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and 1
    or 2 more years’ time for its development should be allowed.

    “Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the
    Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between the
    pincers of the Axis Powers. Rumania alone would therefore not
    move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England
    would not recklessly risk her Empire. She knew our newly
    acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the
    above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted
    since it would depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop
    repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good
    opportunity and participate.

    “The Hungarian reply thus, remained a conditional one. Upon, the
    question of von Ribbentrop, what purpose the desired General
    Staff conferences were to have, not much more was brought
    forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory of
    military material and preparedness for the Czech conflict. The
    clear political basis for such a conference—the time of
    Hungarian intervention—was not obtained.

    “In the meantime, more positive language was used by von Horthy
    in his talk with the Fuehrer. He wished not to hide his doubts
    with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put
    Hungary’s intention to participate on record. The Hungarian
    Ministers were and remained, even later, more skeptical since
    they feel more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary
    with its unprotected flanks.

    “When von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in the
    afternoon, he was very relieved _when the Fuehrer explained to
    him, that, in regard to the situation in question, he demanded
    nothing of Hungary_. He himself would not know the time. Whoever
    wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking
    as well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs,
    he would have no objections.” (_2796-PS_)

By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to note that in
the event of a German-Czech conflict Hungary would be sufficiently armed
for participation on 1 October. Another captured German Foreign Office
Memorandum reports a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25
August 1938. The last paragraph of this memorandum states:

    “Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness in case of a
    German-Czech conflict von Kanya mentioned several days ago that
    his country would need a period of one to two years in order to
    develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary. During today’s
    conversation von Kanya corrected this remark and said that
    Hungary’s military situation was much better. His country would
    be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take part in
    the conflict by October 1st of this year.” (_2797-PS_)

The signature to this document is not clear, but it appears to be that
of von Weizsäcker.

These accounts of the German-Hungarian conference are corroborated by
General Jodl’s diary. The entry for 21-26 August reads as follows:

    “_21-26 August_:

    “Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (_Reichsverweser_).
    Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign
    Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz.

    “They arrive with the idea that in the course of a great war,
    after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old
    state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the
    understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims
    against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second
    provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If
    they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

    “Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator
    between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe
    that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be
    indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia’s attitude.”
    (_1780-PS_)

The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a staff
conference on 6 September. Jodl’s diary entry for that day states:

    “_6 September_:

    “Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a
    conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.

    “Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of
    the Fuehrer—especially his order not to give any hint on the
    exact moment. The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.”
    (_1780-PS_)

G. _Final Preparations for the Attack._

The setting in which these events took place was that of the Munich Pact
and the international crisis which led to it. As this crisis was
developing in August and September 1938, frantic efforts were being made
by the statesmen of the world to preserve the peace of the world. These
statesmen, unfortunately, were unaware of the plans and designs of the
Nazi conspirators.

The documents captured by Allied troops reveal the hitherto-unknown
story underlying the Pact of Munich. These papers reveal the fraud and
deceit practiced by the Nazi conspirators in negotiating the Pact of
Munich as a stepping-stone toward further aggression. The hope for peace
which came with the Munich Pact, which later turned out to be a snare
and a deceit, was a trap carefully set by the Nazi conspirators. The
nature of the trap is indicated by the events of the weeks just
preceding the Munich agreement.

With a 1 October target date set for Case Green, there was a noticeable
increase in the tempo of the military preparations in late August and
September. Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were
well under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators were devoted to
technical details: the timing of X-day, questions of mobilization,
questions of transport and supply.

On 26 August Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled “Timing of the X-Order
and the Question of Advance Measures” (_388-PS, Item 17_). This
memorandum demonstrates clearly the complicity of the OKW and of Keitel
and Jodl, in the fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It
reveals the character of the attack that Germany was preparing to
launch. The memorandum reads as follows:

    “_TIMING OF THE X-ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES_

    “The Luftwaffe’s endeavor to take the enemy air forces by
    surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to
    oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the
    demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X
    minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany’s mobilization becoming
    known to Czechoslovakia on that day.

    “The army’s efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It
    intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus
    3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid
    working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKW _also
    demands_ that the X order be given _not later than 1400 on X
    minus 1_.

    “To this the following must be said:

    “Operation (Aktion) Green will be set in motion by means of an
    ‘incident’ in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation
    for military intervention. The fixing of the _exact time_ for
    this incident is of the utmost importance.

    “It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable
    for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour
    which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the
    afternoon of X minus 1.

    “It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X
    order at 1400 on X minus 1.

    “On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive
    an advance warning.

    “If the _Fuehrer_ intends to follow this plan of action, all
    further discussion is superfluous.

    “For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for
    which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise
    appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely
    essential advance measures must be given in good time and
    camouflaged with the help of the numerous maneuvers and
    exercises.

    “Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether
    all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy
    territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure
    from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

    “Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is
    impossible before the first air-attack, although the
    consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming
    victims of such an attack (e.g., death of representatives of
    friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)

    “If, for technical reasons, the _evening hours_ should be
    considered desirable for the incident, then the following day
    cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.

    “In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be
    done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and
    that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the
    incident. (X-Fall)

    “It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great
    interest the _Wehrmacht_ has in the incident and that it must be
    informed of the Fuehrer’s intentions in good time—insofar as
    the _Abwehr_ Section is not also charged with the organization
    of the incident.

    “I request that the Fuehrer’s decision be obtained on these
    points.

                                                   “J [Jodl] 26/8.”
                                                (_388-PS, Item 17_)

In handwriting at the bottom of the page are the notes of Schmundt,
Hitler’s adjutant. These reveal that the memorandum was submitted to
Hitler on 30 August; that Hitler agreed to act along these lines; and
that Jodl was so notified on 31 August.

On 3 September Keitel and von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at the
Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference (_388-PS, Item
18_). The first three paragraphs of these minutes state:

    “_Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch_: Reports on the exact time of the
    transfer of the troops to ‘exercise areas’ for ‘_Gruen_’. Field
    units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From here will then be ready
    for action. When X Day becomes known, field units carry out
    exercises in opposite directions.

    “_Fuehrer_: Has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day
    march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere.

    “?:        OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27
    September.” (_388-PS, Item 18_)

During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views on the
strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech
defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility of “drawing
in the Henlein people.” The situation in the West still troubled him.
Schmundt noted:

    “The Fuehrer gives orders for the development of the Western
    fortifications; improvement of advance positions around Aachen
    and Saarbrucken. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions
    (1600 artillery pieces.)” (_388-PS, Item 18_)

Five days later General Stulpnagel asked Jodl for written assurance that
the OKH would be informed five days in advance about the pending action.
In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals about the
coordination of ground and air operations at the start of the attack.
The 8 September entry in General Jodl’s diary states:

    “_8 September_:

    “General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army
    High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan
    is to take place. I agree and add that the overall
    meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only
    for two days in advance, and that therefore the plans may be
    changed up to this moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE).

    “General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders
    whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned.
    It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere
    decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to
    his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It
    must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is
    reserved.

    “I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change
    of opinion about political and military potentialities,
    according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May
    38, with the last statements.

    “In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other
    nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We
    must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people
    know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the
    only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of
    officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it
    circulate through anterooms as heretofore.

    “1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High
    Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present
    were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).

    “We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl),
    (X-1, 4 o’clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1,
    X-1 day, 7 o’clock). The ‘Y time’ has yet to be examined; some
    formations have an approach flight of one hour.” (_1780-PS_)

Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitler met with
Keitel and Generals von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nurnberg. Dr. Todt,
the construction engineer, later joined the conference, which lasted
from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt’s
minutes are _Item 19_ in his file (_388-PS_). In this meeting General
Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of the German armies being
committed to the attack: the 2d, 10th, 12th, and 14th. With his
characteristic enthusiasm for military planning, Hitler then delivered a
soliloquy on strategic considerations which should be taken into account
as the attack developed. The discussions proceeded as follows:

    “_General Oberst v. Brauchitsch_: Employment of motorized
    divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria
    and the difficulties in getting other divisions (ready to march)
    into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have
    to leave on the 20th of Sept, if X-Day remains as planned.
    Workers leave on the 23d, by relays. Specialist workers remain
    according to decision by Army Command 2.

    “_The Fuehrer_: Doesn’t see why workers have to return home as
    early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on
    mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around
    unnecessarily later on.

    “_General Keitel_: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of
    district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be
    assembled.

    “_v. Brauchitsch_: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will be
    drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the
    east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.” (_388-PS, Item
    19_)

From this date forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied with the
intricate planning required before the attack. On 11 September Jodl
conferred with a representative of the Propaganda Ministry about methods
of refuting German violations of International Law and exploiting those
of the Czechs. The 11 September entry in the Jodl diary reads as
follows:

    “_11 September_:

    “In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from
    the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent
    common tasks.

    “The joint preparations for refutation (_Wiederlegung_) of our
    own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its
    violations by the enemy, were considered particularly
    important.” (_1780-PS_)

This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by Section L,
Jodl’s section of the OKW (_C-2_). Seven copies of this captured
document were prepared and distributed on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the
OKM, the Luftwaffe, and the Foreign Office. In this study anticipated
violations of International Law in the invasion of Czechoslovakia are
listed and counter-propaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda
agencies. This document is presented in a tabular form, in which
possible incidents are listed in the left-hand column. In the second
column are given specific examples of the incidents; in the third and
fourth columns the position to be taken toward these incidents under
International Law and under the laws of warfare is set forth; the fifth
column, which is blank, is reserved for the explanation to be offered by
the Propaganda Minister. The first 10 hypothetical incidents, for which
justification must be found, and which are listed in column b of the
table are as follows:

    “1_a_. In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is
    destroyed.

    “2. Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed;

    “3. The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.

    “4. On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the
    firing of gas projectiles is ordered.

    “5. Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are caught in
    the act of sabotage (destruction of important bridges,
    destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered looting
    wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.

    “6. Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to
    do road work or to load munitions.

    “7. For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets,
    foodstuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the
    latter suffer from want.

    “8. Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily
    evacuated to the rear area.

    “9. Churches are used for military accommodation.

    “10. In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over
    Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with
    Czech aircraft.” (_C-2_)

From Nurnberg, on 10 September, Hitler issued an order bringing the
_Reichsarbeitsdienst_, the German labor service, under the OKW. This top
secret order, of which 25 copies were made, provides as follows:

    “1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the
    Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.

    “2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this
    organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader
    (_Reichsarbeitsfuehrer_) and on assignments from time to time to
    the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where
    questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final
    decision in accordance with my instructions.

    “3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to
    the departments and personnel immediately concerned.

                                          “(signed)  ADOLF HITLER.”
                                                (_388-PS, Item 20_)

Four days later, on 14 September, Keitel issued detailed instructions
for the employment of specific RAD units. This order is _Item 21_ in the
Schmundt file. A further order issued by Jodl on 16 September specified
RAD units which would receive military training. This is _Item 24_ in
the Schmundt file. (_388-PS_)

Two entries in Jodl’s diary give further indications of the problems of
the OKW in this period of mid-September, just two weeks before the
anticipated X-day. The entries for 15 and 16 September read as follows:

    “_15 September_:

    “In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and
    Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was
    discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on
    advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the
    situation.

    “_16 September_:

    “General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He
    graphically describes the results of the conference between
    Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place
    on the 21st or 22nd in Godesberg.

    “With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening
    by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to
    the Ministry of Finance, to line up the VGAD along the Czech
    border.

    “In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the
    empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the
    strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be
    transported starting 28 September.” (_1780-PS_)

The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available which General
Jodl referred to appears as _Item 22_ in the Schmundt file. In this
order Keitel told the railroads to be ready by 28 September but to
continue work on the western fortifications even after 20 September in
the interest of camouflage. The first and fourth paragraphs of this
order provide:

    “The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great
    numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization
    exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “However, in accordance with the Fuehrer’s directive, every
    effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as
    large quantities as feasible even after 20 September 1938, and
    this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue
    the important work of the Lines.” (_388-PS, Item 22_)

The penultimate stage of the aggression began on 18 September. From that
day until the 28th a series of orders were issued advancing preparations
for the attack. These orders are included in the Schmundt file
(_388-PS_). On the 18th the commitment schedule for the five
participating armies—the 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th—was set forth
(_388-PS, Item 26_). Hitler approved the secret mobilization of five
divisions in the west to protect the German rear during Case Green
(_388-PS, Item 31_). Further discussions were held between the Army and
the Luftwaffe about the time of day for the attack. Conference notes
initialed by Jodl and dated 27 September reveal the difference in views.
These notes are _Item 54_ in the Schmundt file. The first three
paragraphs read:

    “_COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY._

    “As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a
    coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.

    “The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615. It also
    wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night,
    which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.

    “Air Force’s time of attack depends on weather conditions. These
    could change the time of attack and also limit the area of
    operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance,
    would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to
    low ceiling in Bavaria.” (_388-PS, Item 54_)

A satisfactory solution appears to have been arrived at. The last two
paragraphs read:

    “_Thus it is proposed_:

    “Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the air
    force—at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for
    limited operations to take place before then, however, only to
    an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.

    “The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.

                                          (J)”  (_388-PS, Item 54_)

On the same day, 27 September, Keitel sent a most secret memorandum to
Hess and the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, for the guidance of Nazi Party
officials. This memorandum is _Item 32_ in the Schmundt file. It directs
the Party officials and organizations to comply with the demands of the
Army during the secret mobilization in such matters as turning over
equipment and facilities. The first four paragraphs of this message
read:

    “As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and
    Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed
    Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by
    issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.

    “Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is
    necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to
    the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are
    connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order,
    the advance measures or special code names.

    “The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be
    met (even if the code word has not been previously issued)
    immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.

    “OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate
    instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the
    Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.” (_388-PS,
    Item 32_)

Two additional entries from Jodl’s diary reveal the extent to which the
Nazi conspirators carried forward their preparations for attack even
during the period of the negotiations which culminated in the Munich
Agreement. The entries for 26 and 27 September read:

    “_26 September_:

    “Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army
    High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the
    advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet
    necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in
    before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech
    frontier need be given on the 27th only.

    “In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau,
    Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry
    for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with
    possible Czech propaganda transmissions. “Question by Foreign
    office whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross
    Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command:
    yes.

    “1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs
    General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations
    and about the Fuehrer’s opinion. In no case will X day be before
    the 30th.

    “It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn
    into military engagements because of false reports, before
    Prague replied.

    “A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on
    account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of
    the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the
    dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent
    fogs.

    “The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commander in chief
    who is to have priority.

    “The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has
    to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about
    commitment against Prague.

    “2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in
    an important speech at the Sportspalast.

    “_27 September_:

    “1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack
    being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the
    assembly area by 30 September.” (_1780-PS_)

The order referred to by General Jodl in the last entry was also
recorded by the faithful Schmundt. It appears as _Item 33_ of the file.
It is the order which brought the Nazi armies to the jumping-off point
for unprovoked aggression:

                                                       “MOST SECRET
                             “_MEMORANDUM_

    “At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the
    Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from
    their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.

    “The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7
    divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against ‘_Gruen_’
    on September 30, the decision having been made one day
    previously by 1200 noon.” (_388-PS, Item 33_)

There follows a pencil note by Schmundt:

    “This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major
    Schmundt.” (_388-PS, Item 33_)

H. _The Campaign Within Czechoslovakia._

The military preparations for aggression against Czechoslovakia had not
been carried out in vacuo. They had been preceded by a skillfully
conceived campaign designed to promote civil disobedience to the
Czechoslovak State. Using the techniques they had already developed in
other ventures, the Nazi conspirators over a period of years used money,
propaganda, and force to undermine Czechoslovakia. In this program the
Nazis focussed their attention on the persons of German descent living
in the Sudetenland, a mountainous area bounding Bohemia and Moravia on
the north, west, and south.

The Czechoslovak government’s official report for the prosecution and
trial of German major war criminals, entitled “German Crimes Against
Czechoslovakia,” shows the background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue.
(_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest days of the
NSDAP. In the years following the First World War a German National
Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), which maintained close contact with
Hitler’s NSDAP, was active in the Sudetenland. In 1932, ring-leaders of
the _Sudeten Volksport_, an organization corresponding to the Nazi SA,
openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler’s program, the first of which
demanded the union of all Germans in a Greater Germany. Soon thereafter
they were charged with planning armed rebellion on behalf of a foreign
power and were sentenced for conspiracy against the Czech Republic. Late
in 1933 the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia forestalled its
dissolution by voluntary liquidation, and several of its chiefs escaped
across the frontier. For a year thereafter Nazi activity in
Czechoslovakia continued underground. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

On 1 October 1934, with the approval and at the urging of the Nazi
conspirators, Konrad Henlein, an instructor of gymnastics, established
the “German Home Front” (_Deutsche Heimatfront_), which the following
spring became the Sudeten German Party (_Sudeten-deutsche Partei—SDP_).
Profiting from the experience of the Czech National Socialist Party,
Henlein denied any connection with the German Nazis. He rejected
pan-Germanism, and professed his respect for individual liberties and
his loyalty to “honest democracy” and to the Czech state. His party,
none-the-less, was built on the basis of the Nazi _Fuehrerprinzip_, and
he became its Fuehrer. By 1937, when the power of Hitler’s Germany had
become manifest, Henlein and his followers were striking a more
aggressive note, demanding, without definition, “complete Sudeten
autonomy“. The SDP laid proposals before the Czech Parliament which
would, in substance, have created a state within a state. (_998-PS_;
_3061-PS_)

After the annexation of Austria in March 1938 the Henleinists, who were
now openly organized after the Nazi model, intensified their activity.
Undisguised anti-Semitic propaganda started in the Henlein press; the
campaign against “bolshevism” was intensified; terrorism in the
Henlein-dominated communities increased. A storm troop organization,
patterned and trained on the principles of the Nazi SS, was established,
known as the FS (_Freiwilliger Selbstschutz_, or Voluntary Vigilantes).
On 24 April 1938, in a speech to the Party Congress in Karlovy Vary,
Henlein came into the open with his “Karlsbad Program”. In this speech,
which echoed Hitler in tone and substance, Henlein asserted the right of
the Sudeten-Germans to profess “German political philosophy”, which, it
was clear, meant National Socialism. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

As the summer of 1938 wore on, the Henleinists used every technique of
the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in the Czech official report, these
included:

(1) _Espionage._ Military espionage was conducted by the SDP, the FS,
and by other members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. Czech
defenses were mapped, and information on Czech troop movements was
furnished to the German authorities.

(2) _Nazification of German Organizations in Czechoslovakia._ The
Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the German
population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social and cultural
centers gradually underwent “_Gleichschaltung_”, i.e., “purification”,
by the SDP. Among the organizations conquered by the Henleinists were
sport societies, rowing clubs, associations of ex-service men, and
choral societies. The Henleinists were particularly interested in
penetrating as many business institutions as possible and in bringing
over to their side the directors of banks, the owners or directors of
factories, and the managers of commercial firms. In the case of Jewish
ownership or direction they attempted to secure the cooperation of the
clerical and technical staffs of the institution.

(3) _German Direction and Leadership._ The Henleinists maintained
permanent contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct
operations within Czechoslovakia. Meetings in Germany at which
Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity were
camouflaged by being held in conjunction with _Saenger Feste_ (choral
festivals), gymnastic shows and assemblies, and commercial gatherings
such as the Leipzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi conspirators needed
incidents for their war of nerves, it was the duty of the Henleinists to
supply them.

(4) _Propaganda._ Disruptive and subversive propaganda was beamed at
Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed in the German press.
Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a “nest of Bolshevism” and spread the
false report of “Russian troops and airplanes” centered in Prague. Under
direction from the Reich the Henleinists maintained whispering
propaganda in the Sudetenland, which contributed to the mounting tension
and to the creation of incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was smuggled
from Germany and widely distributed in the border regions. The Henlein
press more or less openly espoused Nazi ideology to the German
population.

(5) _Murder and Terrorism._ The Nazi conspirators provided the
Henleinists, and particularly the FS, with money and arms with which to
provoke incidents and to maintain a state of permanent unrest.
Gendarmes, customs officers, and other Czech officials were attacked. A
boycott was established against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen.
The Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population, and the Nazi
Gestapo crossed into border districts to carry Czechoslovak citizens
across the border to Germany. In several cases political foes of the
Nazis were murdered on Czech soil. Nazi agents murdered Professor
Theodor Lessing in 1933 and the engineer Formis in 1935. Both men were
anti-Nazis who had escaped from Germany after Hitler came to power and
had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

Some time afterwards, when there was no longer need for pretense and
deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and frank statement of the
mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. This statement was
made in a lecture by Konrad Henlein quoted on page 29 of “Four Fighting
Years”, a publication of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In this lecture, delivered by Henlein on 4 March 1941 in the Auditorium
of the University of Vienna under the auspices of the _Wiener
Verwaltungsakadamie_, he discussed the “fight for the liberation of the
Sudetens” in the following terms:

    “National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten-Germans. Our
    struggle was of a different character from that in Germany.
    Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of
    course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution
    in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for
    Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle
    could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National
    Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Fuehrer,
    whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the
    leader of the national group in its final struggle. When * * *
    in autumn, 1933, the leaders of the NSDAP asked me to take over
    the political leadership of the Sudeten-Germans, I had a
    difficult problem to solve. Should the National Socialist Party
    continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in
    the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten-Germans and
    in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle
    under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to
    the outside world? For us Sudeten-Germans only the second
    alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our
    national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier
    to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the
    heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism
    and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than
    doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled the
    political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the
    alliance against the German Reich.” (_2863-PS_)

I. _Evidence Implicating Nazi Conspirators in Czechoslovak Agitation._

The foregoing account of Nazi intrigue in Czechoslovakia is the outline
of this conspiracy as it had been pieced together by the Czechoslovak
government early in the summer of 1945. Since then captured documents
and other information made available since the defeat of Germany have
clearly and conclusively demonstrated the implication, which hitherto
could only be deduced, of the Nazi conspirators in the Sudetenland
agitation.

A telegram sent from the German Legation in Prague on 16 March 1938 to
the Foreign Office in Berlin, presumably written by the German Minister,
Eisenlohr, proves conclusively that the Henlein movement was an
instrument of the Nazi conspirators (_3060-PS_). The Henlein party, it
appears from this telegram, was directed from Berlin and from the German
Legation in Prague. It could have no policy of its own; even the
speeches of its leaders had to be coordinated with the German
authorities. This telegram reads as follows:

    “Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out
    matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with
    Frank separately and received following promises;

    “1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by the
    German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics
    of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied
    with implicitly.

    “2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly
    with my approval. The editorial staff of “_Zeit_” (Time) is to
    be improved.

    “3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which
    in the end might lead to political complications and adopts a
    line of gradual promotion of Sudeten-German interests. The
    objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and
    to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the
    protection of nationalities (_Volksschutzgesetze_) and
    ‘territorial autonomy’ are no longer to be stressed.

    “4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or
    desired before Henlein issues important statements on his
    program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the
    Mission.

    “5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German
    agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation.

    “6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, and will
    come to Prague at any time if requested.

    “I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control,
    as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in
    the interest of foreign policy. Please inform ministries
    concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans)
    and request them to support this uniform direction of the
    Sudeten German Party.” (_3060-PS_)

The dressing-down administered by Eisenlohr to Henlein had the desired
effect. The day after the telegram was dispatched from Prague, Henlein
addressed a humble letter to Ribbentrop, asking an early personal
conversation (_2789-PS_). This letter, dated 17 March 1938, and captured
in the German Foreign Office files, states:

    “Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:

    “In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in
    Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all
    those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our
    Fuehrer.

    “I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the
    sincere thanks of the Sudeten-Germans herewith.

    “We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by doubled
    efforts in the service of the Greater German policy.

    “The new situation requires a reexamination of the Sudeten
    German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the
    opportunity for a very early personal talk.

    “In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have
    postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled
    for 26th and 27th of March, 1938, for 4 weeks.

    “I would appreciate if the Minister, Dr. Eisenlohr, and one of
    my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the
    requested talks.

                                                    “Heil Hitler,
                                                   “Loyally yours,
                                             “/s/  Konrad Henlein.”
                                                        (_2789-PS_)

This letter makes it clear that Henlein was quite aware that the seizure
of Austria made possible the adoption of a new policy toward
Czechoslovakia. It also reveals that he was already in close enough
contact with Ribbentrop and the German minister in Prague to feel free
to suggest “early personal” talks.

Ribbentrop was not unreceptive to Henlein’s suggestion. The
conversations Henlein had proposed took place in the Foreign Office in
Berlin on 29 March 1938. The previous day Henlein had conferred with
Hitler himself. The captured German Foreign Office notes of the
conference on 29 March read as follows:

    “The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the necessity to
    keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret;
    he then explained, in view of the directives which the Fuehrer
    himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday
    afternoon that there were two questions which were of
    outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten
    German Party * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten
    German party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally
    this: to avoid entry into the Government by the extension and
    gradual specification of the demands to be made. It must be
    emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German
    Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the
    Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich Cabinet
    (_Reichsregierung_). The Reich Cabinet itself must refuse to
    appear toward the Government in Prague or toward London and
    Paris as the advocate or peacemaker of the Sudeten German
    demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite that during the
    impending discussion with the Czechoslovak Government the
    Sudeten-Germans would be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein,
    would maintain quiet and discipline, and would avoid
    indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad Henlein in
    this connection were satisfactory.

    “Following these general explanations of the Reich Minister the
    demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak
    Government as contained in the enclosure were discussed and
    approved in principle. For further cooperation, Konrad Henlein
    was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the
    Reichminister and the Head of the Central Office for Racial
    Germans (_mit dem Leiter der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle_), as
    well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local
    representative of the Foreign Minister. The task of the German
    Minister in Prague would be to support the demands of the
    Sudeten German Party as reasonable, not officially, but in more
    private talks with the Czechoslovak politicians without exerting
    any direct influence on the extent of the demands of the Party.

    “In conclusion there was a discussion whether it would be useful
    if the Sudeten German Party would cooperate with other
    minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The
    Foreign Minister decided that the Party should have the
    discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if
    the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear
    appropriate.

                                          “Berlin, 29 March 1938.
                                                      “R [Initial]”
                                                        (_2788-PS_)

Not the least interesting aspect of this secret meeting is the list of
those who attended. Konrad Henlein, his principal deputy, Karl Hermann
Frank, and two others represented the Sudeten German Party. Professor
Haushofer and SS Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz represented the
_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_, the Central Office for Racial Germans. The
Foreign Office was represented by a delegation of eight. These eight
included Ribbentrop, who presided at the meeting and did most of the
talking, von Mackensen, Weiszacker, and Minister Eisenlohr from the
German Legation at Prague. (_2788-PS_)

In May Henlein came to Berlin for more conversations with the Nazi
conspirators. At this time the plans for Case Green, the attack on
Czechoslovakia, were already on paper, and it may be assumed that
Henlein was briefed on the role he was to play during the summer months.
The entry for 22 May 1938 in General Jodl’s diary reads as follows:

    “22 May: Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K.
    Henlein” (see enclosure). (_1780-PS_)

The enclosure, unfortunately, is missing.

It will be recalled that in his speech in Vienna, Henlein had admitted
that he had been selected by the Nazi conspirators in the fall of 1933
to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans
(_2863-PS_). The foregoing documents show conclusively the nature of
Henlein’s mission. They demonstrate that Henlein’s policy, his
propaganda, even his speeches were controlled by Berlin. Furthermore,
from the year 1935 the Sudeten German Party had been secretly subsidized
by the German Foreign Office. A secret memorandum, captured in the
German Foreign Office files, signed by Woermann and dated Berlin, 19
August 1938, was occasioned by the request of the Henlein Party for
additional funds. This memorandum reads:

                              “MEMORANDUM

    “The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign
    Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of
    a monthly payment of 15,000 Marks; 12,000 Marks of this are
    transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement, and 3000
    Marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the party
    (Bureau Buerger). In the course of the last few months the tasks
    assigned to the Bureau Buerger have increased considerably due
    to the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The
    number of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated
    has risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown
    immensely; the expense accounts have increased especially
    because due to the necessity for continuous good information,
    the expenses for trips to Prague, London, and Paris (including
    the financing of travels of Sudeten-German deputies and agents)
    have grown considerably heavier. Under these conditions the
    Bureau Buerger is no longer able to get along with the monthly
    allowance of 3000 Marks if it is to do everything required.
    Therefore, Mr. Buerger has applied to this office for an
    increase of this amount, from 3000 Marks to 5500 Marks monthly.
    In view of the considerable increase in the business transacted
    by the Bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity of
    the Bureau in regard to the cooperation with the Foreign Office,
    this desire deserves the strongest support.

    “Herewith submitted to the Dep: Pers(onnel) with a request for
    approval. It is requested to increase the payments with
    retroactive effect from 1 August.^{*}

                                          “Berlin, 19 August 1938
                                                      /s/  Woermann

    ^{*} “_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_ (Central Office for Racial
    Germans) will be informed by the Political Dept. [handwritten
    marginal note].” (_3059-PS_; _also 3061-PS_)

As the military preparations to attack Czechoslovakia moved forward in
the late summer and early fall of 1938, the Nazi command made good use
of Henlein and his followers. About the first of August the Air Attache
at the German Legation in Prague, Major Moericke, acting on instructions
from Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin, visited the Sudeten-German leader
in Freudenthal. With his assistance, and in the company of the local
leader of the FS (the Henlein equivalent of the SS), he reconnoitered
the surrounding countryside to select possible airfield sites for German
use. The FS leader, a Czech reservist then on leave, was in the uniform
of the Czech army—a fact which, the attache noted, served as excellent
camouflage.

The Air Attache’s report reads in part as follows:

    “The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten-German Glider Pilots
    in Freudenthal and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted
    men. My personal impression fully confirmed this judgment. No
    hint of my identity was made to him, although I had the
    impression that M. knew who I was.

    “At my request, with which he complied without any question, M.
    travelled with me over the country in question. We used M.’s
    private car for the trip.

    “As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently
    well, he took with him the local leader of the FS, a Czech
    reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on
    leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was
    entirely in agreement with this—without actually saying so.

    “As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I
    photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said ‘Aha, so
    you’re looking for airfields!’ I answered that we supposed that,
    in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their
    airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications and that
    I had the intention of looking over the country from that point
    of view.” (_1536-PS_)

In the latter part of the Air Attache’s report reference is made to the
presence of reliable agents and informers (_V-Leute_) apparently drawn
from the ranks of the Henlein Party in this area. It was indicated that
these agents were in touch with the _Abwehrstelle_, the intelligence
office in Breslau. (_1536-PS_)

In September, when the propaganda campaign was reaching its height, the
Nazis were not satisfied with playing merely on the Sudeten demands for
autonomy. They attempted to use the Slovaks as well. On 19 September the
Foreign Office in Berlin sent the following telegram to the German
Legation in Prague:

    “Please inform deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get
    into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start
    their demands for autonomy tomorrow.

                                              “(signed)  ALTENBURG”
                                                        (_2858-PS_)

Kundt was Henlein’s representative in Prague.

As the harassed Czech government sought to stem the disorder in the
Sudetenland, the German Foreign Office turned to threatening diplomatic
tactics in a deliberate effort to increase the tension between the two
countries. Four telegrams from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the
Legation in Prague, dispatched between the 16th and 24th of September
1938, are self-explanatory. The first telegram is dated 16 September:

    “Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were
    arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest of
    Sudeten-Germans since the Fuehrer’s speech of 12 September. I
    request you to ascertain the number of Sudeten-Germans arrested
    since 12 September as extensively as possible. The number of
    those arrested there is estimated conservatively at 400 by the
    Gestapo. Cable report.

                                                        “Woermann.”
                                                        (_2855-PS_)

The second telegram is dated 17 September. The first two paragraphs
read:

    “I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the
    following:

    “The Reich Government has decided that:

    “(_a_) Immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent,
    Czech-speaking Jews included, will be arrested in Germany as
    Sudeten-Germans have been in Czechoslovakia since the beginning
    of the week.

    “(_b_) If any Sudeten-Germans should be executed pursuant to a
    death sentence on the basis of martial law, an equal number of
    Czechs will be shot in Germany.” (_2854-PS_)

The third telegram was sent on 24 September:

    “According to information received here Czechs have arrested 2
    German frontier-policemen, seven customs-officials and 30
    railway-officials. As countermeasure all the Czech staff in
    Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange the
    arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please
    approach Government there and wire result.

                                               “(signed)  WOERMANN”
                                                        (_2853-PS_)

On the same day the fourth telegram was dispatched. The last paragraph
read:

    “Confidential:

    “Yielding of the Czech hostages arrested here for the prevention
    of the execution of any sentences passed by military courts
    against Sudeten-Germans is, of course, out of question.

                                                         “WOERMANN”
                                                        (_2856-PS_)

In the latter half of September Henlein devoted himself and his
followers wholeheartedly to preparation for the coming German attack.
About 15 September, after Hitler’s provocative Nurnberg speech in which
he accused “this Benes” of “torturing” and planning the “extermination”
of the Sudeten-Germans, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, one of his
principal deputies, fled to Germany to avoid arrest by the Czech
government. In Germany Henlein broadcast over the powerful
_Reichssender_ radio station his determination to lead the
Sudeten-Germans “home to the Reich” and denounced “the Hussite Bolshevik
criminals of Prague”. From his headquarters in a castle at Dondorf,
outside Bayreuth, he kept in close touch with the leading Nazi
conspirators, including Hitler and Himmler. He directed activities along
the border and began the organization of the Sudeten German Free Corps,
an auxiliary military organization. These events are set forth in the
Czechoslovak official report. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

Henlein’s activities were carried on with the advice and assistance of
the Nazi leaders. Lt. Col. Koechling was assigned to Henlein in an
advisory capacity to assist with the Sudeten German Free Corps. In a
conference with Hitler on the night of 17 September Koechling received
far-reaching military powers. At this conference the purpose of the Free
Corps was frankly stated: the “maintenance of disorder and clashes”.
_Item 25_, of the Schmundt file (388-PS), a telegram labeled Most Secret
reads as follows:

    “Last night conference took place between Fuehrer and
    Oberstleutnant Koechling. Duration of conference 7 minutes. Lt.
    Col. Koechling remains directly responsible to OKW. He will be
    assigned to Konrad Henlein in an advisory capacity. He received
    far-reaching military plenary powers from the Fuehrer. The
    Sudeten German Free Corps remains responsible to Konrad Henlein
    alone. Purpose: Protection of the Sudeten-Germans and
    maintenance of disturbances and clashes. The Free Corps will be
    established in Germany. Armament only with Austrian weapons.
    Activities of Free Corps to begin as soon as possible.”
    (_388-PS, Item 25_)

General Jodl’s diary gives a further insight into the position of the
Henlein Free Corps. At this time the Free Corps was engaged in active
skirmishing along the Czech border, furnishing incidents and provocation
in the desired manner. Jodl’s entries for 19 and 20 September 1938
state:

    “_19 September_:

    “Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the
    Sudeten German Free Corps.

    “_20 September_:

    “England and France have handed over their demands in Prague,
    the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the
    Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring
    about, and already have brought about consequences harmful to
    the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the
    Czech Army to the proximity of the border.) By checking with Lt.
    Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal
    channels.

    “Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives
    permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the
    approval of the Corps HQ.” (_1780-PS_)

A report from Henlein’s staff, which was filed in Hitler’s headquarters,
boasted of the offensive operations of the Free Corps in the following
terms:

    “Since 19 Sept.—in more than 300 missions—the Free Corps has
    executed its task with an amazing spirit of _attack_ and with a
    willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified
    self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities:
    more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG’s and a large amount of other
    weapons and equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and
    wounded suffered by the _enemy_.” (_388-PS, Item 30_)

In this document the word “attack” was subsequently crossed out, and the
word “defense” substituted. Similarly “the enemy” was changed to read
“the Czech terrorists”.

In his headquarters in the castle at Dondorf, Henlein was in close touch
with Admiral Canaris of the Intelligence Division of the OKW and with
the SS and SA. The liaison officer between the SS and Henlein was
Oberfuehrer Gottlob Berger, who in later years became prominent in the
SS command. An affidavit executed by Berger reads as follows:

    “I, GOTTLOB BERGER, under oath and being previously sworn, make
    the following statement:

    “1. In the fall of 1938 I held the rank and title of Oberfuehrer
    in the SS. In mid-September I was assigned as SS Liaison Officer
    with Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten German Free Corps at their
    headquarters in the castle of Dondorf outside Bayreuth. In this
    position I was responsible for all liaison between the
    Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and Henlein and, in particular, I was
    delegated to select from the Sudeten-Germans those who appeared
    to be eligible for membership in the SS or VT (_Verfuegungs
    Truppe_). In addition to myself, Liaison Officers stationed with
    Henlein included an Obergruppenfuehrer from the NSKK, whose name
    I have forgotten, and Obergruppenfuehrer Max Juettner, from the
    SA. In addition, Admiral Canaris, who was head of the OKW
    _Abwehr_, appeared at Dondorf nearly every two days and
    conferred with Henlein.

    “2. In the course of my official duties at Henlein’s
    headquarters I became familiar with the composition and
    activities of the Free Corps. Three groups were being formed
    under Henlein’s direction: One in the Eisenstein area, Bavaria;
    one in the Bayreuth area; one in the Dresden area; and possibly
    a fourth group in Silesia. These groups were supposedly composed
    of refugees from the Sudetenland who had crossed the border into
    Germany, but they actually contained Germans with previous
    service in the SA and NSKK (Nazi Motor Corps) as well. These
    Germans formed the skeleton of the Free Corps. On paper the Free
    Corps had a strength of 40,000 men. I do not know its actual
    strength, but I believe it to be considerably smaller than the
    paper figure. The Corps was armed with Manlicher-Schoenauer
    rifles from Army depots in Austria. It was my understanding that
    about 18,000 rifles were issued to men under Henlein’s command.
    In addition, small numbers of machine guns[1], hand grenades,
    and 2 captured antitank guns were placed at Henlein’s disposal.
    Part of the equipment furnished to Henlein, mostly haversacks,
    cooking utensils, and blankets, were supplied by the SA.

    “3. In the days preceding the conclusion of the four-power pact
    at Munich I heard of numerous occasions on which the Henlein
    Free Corps was engaged in skirmishes with Czech patrols along
    the border of the Sudetenland. These operations were under the
    direction of Henlein, who went forward from his Headquarters
    repeatedly in order to take direct command of his men.

    “The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me
    voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this
    statement I have signed and executed the same.

                                         “(Signed)  Gottlob Berger”
                                                        (_3036-PS_)

-----

[1] “(Rifles and machine guns were of doubtful serviceability due to
inferior ammunition).”

Henlein and his Free Corps were also acting in collaboration with the
SD, (_Sicherheitsdienst_) Himmler’s intelligence organization. An
affidavit executed by Alfred Helmut Naujocks, a member of the SD, reads
as follows:

    “I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and
    state as follows:

    “1. In September 1938 I was working in Amt III of the SD. (The
    department which was then called Amt III later became Amt VI).
    In the course of my work I traveled between Berlin, Hof and
    Munich.

    “2. While in Hof, which is on the Czech border, I paid repeated
    visits to the SD Service Department, that is, Intelligence
    Office, which has been established there. This Service
    Department had the task of collecting all political intelligence
    emanating from the Czechoslovak border districts and passing it
    on to Berlin. Continuous day and night teleprinter
    communications had been established from Hof direct to Amt III
    of the SD in Berlin. To the best of my recollection the head of
    the Hof office was Daufeldt. The head of Amt III in Berlin at
    this time was Jost and his assistant was Filbert.

    “3. The bulk of the intelligence we collected came from Henlein
    Free Corps, which had its headquarters in a castle at Dondorf,
    outside Bayreuth; the distance between Hof and Bayreuth is not
    very great, and we had daily access to all intelligence received
    by the Free Corps. There was a continuous liaison maintained
    with Czech territory by runners. Exploitation of this
    Intelligence was carried out every day in Berlin and was placed
    before Heydrich and Himmler.

    “4. I remember that the Free Corps made continuous complaints
    that they had not received sufficient supply of arms.
    Negotiations by letter and teleprint message went on for a
    number of days with Berlin until it became quite a nuisance.
    After that arms were supplied from the army, but I believe it
    was only a small quantity.

    “5. Hof was the center for all intelligence collected by the SD
    on the Czechoslovak question. The SD had agents all along the
    border in every town. The names of these agents were reported to
    Hof, and two motor cars toured the border every day to collect
    the intelligence which had been unearthed. In addition, I
    remember that two or three companies of the SS-Totenkopf units
    were stationed in the neighborhood of Asch.

    “The facts stated above are true: this declaration is made by me
    voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this
    statement I have signed and executed the same at Nurnberg,
    Germany this 20th day of November 1945.

                                 “(signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks.”
                                                        (_3029-PS_)

Offensive operations along the Czechoslovak border were not confined to
skirmishes carried out by the Free Corps. Two SS _Totenkopf_ battalions
were operating across the border in Czech territory near Asch. _Item 36_
in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_), an OKW most secret order signed by Jodl
and dated 28 September, states:

    “Those SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch Promontory
    (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C
    Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when
    the Army crosses the German-Czech frontier.” (_388-PS, Item 36_)

According to the 25 September entry in General Jodl’s diary these SS
Totenkopf battalions were operating in this area on direct orders from
Hitler. (_1780-PS_)

As the time for X-day approached, the disposition of the Free Corps
became a matter of dispute. On 26 September Himmler issued an order to
the Chief of Staff of the Sudeten German Free Corps directing that the
Free Corps come under control of the Reichsfuehrer SS in the event of
German invasion of Czechoslovakia (_388-PS, Item 37_). On 28 September
Keitel directed that as soon as the German Army crosses the Czech border
the Free Corps will take orders from the OKH. In this most secret order
of the OKW Keitel discloses that Henlein’s men are already operating in
Czechoslovak territory:

    “For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the
    principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct
    from the Fuehrer and that they carry out their operations only
    in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The
    advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local
    commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the
    frontier.

    “Those units remaining forward of the frontier should—in their
    own interests—get into communication with the frontier guard as
    often as possible.

    “As soon as the army crosses the Czech border the Henlein Free
    Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient
    to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be
    fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.” (_388-PS, Item
    34_)

On 30 September, when it became clear that the Munich settlement would
result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland, Keitel ordered that
the Free Corps Henlein in its present composition be placed under
command of Himmler:

    “1. _Attachment of Henlein Free Corps_:

    “The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that
    the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed
    under command of Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police.

    “It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit
    for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of
    the police forces for police duties in agreement with the
    Reichsfuehrer SS.” (_388-PS, Item 38_)

J. _Occupation of the Sudetenland under the Terms of the Munich
Agreement._

Under the threat of war by the Nazi conspirators, and with war in fact
about to be launched, the United Kingdom and France concluded a pact
with Germany and Italy at Munich on the night of 29 September 1938. This
treaty provided for the cession of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to
Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. (_TC-23_)

On 1 October 1938 German troops began the occupation of the Sudetenland.

During the conclusion of the Munich Pact the _Wehrmacht_ had been fully
deployed for attack, awaiting only the word of Hitler to begin the
assault. With the cession of the Sudetenland new orders were issued. On
30 September Keitel promulgated Directive #1 on “Occupation of territory
separated from Czechoslovakia” (_388-PS, Item 39_). This directive
contained a timetable for the occupation of sectors of former Czech
territory between 1 and 10 October and specified the tasks of the German
armed forces. The fourth and fifth paragraphs provided:

    “2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:

    “The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be
    maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order
    for the rescinding of measures taken is held over. “The entry is
    to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into
    operation ‘_Gruen_’.” (_388-PS, Item 39_)

It contained one further provision about the Henlein forces:

    “Henlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the
    Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.” (_388-PS, Item
    39_)

The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW directives
giving instructions for the occupation of the Sudetenland and showing
the scope of the preparations of the OKW. Directives specifying the
occupational area of the army and the units under its command; arranging
for communications facilities, exchange facilities, supply, and
propaganda; and giving instructions to the civil departments of the
government were issued over Keitel’s signature on 30 September (_388-PS,
Items 40, 41, 42_). By 10 October von Brauchitsch was able to report to
Hitler that German troops had reached the demarcation line and that the
order for the occupation of the Sudetenland had been fulfilled. The OKW
requested Hitler’s permission to rescind Case Green, to withdraw troops
from the occupied area and to relieve the OKH of executive powers in the
Sudeten-German area as of 15 October. (_388-PS, Items 46, 47, 49_)

On 18 October, in a formal letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch, Hitler announced that the civil authorities
would take over responsibility for the Sudeten-German territory on 21
October and that the OKH would be relieved of executive powers as of
that date (_388-PS, Item 51_). On the same date additional
demobilization of the forces in the Sudetenland was ordered by Hitler
and Keitel. Three days later the OKW requested Hitler’s consent to the
reversion of the RAD from the control of the armed forces. (_388-PS,
Items 52, 53_)

As the German forces entered the Sudetenland Henlein’s _Sudetendeutsche
Partei_ was merged with the NSDAP of Hitler. The two men who had fled to
Hitler’s protection in mid-September, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank,
were appointed Gauleiter and Deputy Gauleiter, respectively, of the
_Sudetengau_. In the parts of the Czechoslovak Republic that were still
free the _Sudetendeutsche Partei_ constituted itself as the
_National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei in der
Tschechoslovakei_ (NSDAP in Czechoslovakia) under the direction of
Kundt, another of Henlein’s deputies. These events are set forth in the
Czechoslovak official report. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

The stage was now prepared for the next move of the Nazi conspirators.

K. _Planning for the Conquest of the Remainder of Czechoslovakia._

With the occupation of the Sudetenland and the inclusion of the
German-speaking Czechs within the Greater Reich it might have been
expected that the Nazi conspirators would be satisfied. Thus far in the
Nazi program of aggression the conspirators had used as a pretext for
their conquests the union of the _Volksdeutsche_, the people of German
descent, with the Reich. Now, after Munich, substantially all the
_Volksdeutsche_ in Czechoslovakia had been returned to German rule. On
26 September, at the Sportspalast in Berlin, Hitler spoke these words:

    “And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be
    solved and which will be solved. It is the last territorial
    claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is a claim from
    which I will not swerve, and which I will satisfy, God willing.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for
    all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people
    want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot
    go back beyond the limits of our patience.

    “I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
    problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for
    Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the
    moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to
    say when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other
    minorities peacefully and without oppression, I will no longer
    be interested in the Czech State. And that as far as I am
    concerned I will guarantee. We don’t want any Czechs at all.”
    (_2358-PS_)

Yet no more than two weeks later Hitler and Keitel were preparing
estimates of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak
resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. _Item 48_ of the Schmundt file is a
top secret telegram sent by Keitel to Hitler’s headquarters on 11
October 1938 in answer to four questions which Hitler had propounded to
the OKW. These were the questions:

    “Question 1: What reinforcements are necessary in the present
    situation to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia?

    “Question 2: How much time is required for the regrouping or
    moving up of new forces?

    “Question 3: How much time will be required for the same purpose
    if it is executed after the intended demobilization and return
    measures?

    “Question 4: How much time would be required to achieve the
    state of readiness of October 1st?” (_388-PS, Item 48_)

Whereupon, in the same telegram, Keitel reported to Hitler the
considered answers of the OKH and the Luftwaffe.

On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the
Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, a directive
outlining plans for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia was
signed by Hitler and initialed by Keitel. In this Top Secret Order, of
which 10 copies were made, the Nazi conspirators, only three weeks after
the winning of the Sudetenland, were already looking forward to new
conquests:

    “The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for
    the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down
    by me in a later Directive.

    “Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be
    prepared at all times for the following eventualities:

    “1. The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection
    against surprise air attacks.

    “2. The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.

    “3. The occupation of the Memelland.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of
    Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards
    Germany.

    “The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this
    contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those
    for ‘_Gruen_’; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and
    considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned
    mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The
    organization, order of battle and state of readiness of the
    units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so
    arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will
    be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The
    object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the
    cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that
    at the same time ‘_Grenzsicherung West_’ (the measures of
    frontier defense in the West) can be carried out.

    “The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:

    “_a. Army_

    “The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and
    several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise
    type of attack. Their number will be determined by the forces
    remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must
    be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be
    worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such
    a manner that they may be either committed in securing the
    frontiers or sent after the attack army.

    “_b. Air Force_

    “The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an
    early elimination of the Czech Air Force.

    “For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from
    peace-time bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose
    still stronger forces may be required can only be determined
    from the development of the military situation in
    Czechoslovakia. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the
    remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be
    prepared.” (_C-136_)

This order was signed by Hitler and authenticated by Keitel. It was
distributed to the OKH, to Goering’s Luftwaffe, and to Raeder at Navy
headquarters.

Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Keitel issued an appendix to the
original order stating that by command of the Fuehrer preparations for
the liquidation of Czechoslovakia are to continue. Distribution of this
Top Secret order was the same as for the 21 October order. The order
provides:

    “2. _COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38._

    “Reference ‘Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia’ the
    Fuehrer has given the following additional order:

    “The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the
    assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be
    expected.

    “To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is
    merely an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking.

    “The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time
    Armed Forces _only_, without reinforcements from mobilization.
    The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that
    the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by
    adjustment within the units.

    “Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march must, as
    a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior
    to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up
    systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for
    previous organization should be limited to the minimum and will
    be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if any,
    of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to the
    troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the
    approval of the Fuehrer.

    “The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar
    general directives.

    “For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the
    Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly
    occupied territory and only for a short period.

                                      “Chief of the Supreme Command
                                             of the Armed Forces.
                                                             “KEITEL”
                                                               (_C-138_)

This particular copy of the order, an original carbon signed in ink by
Keitel, was the one sent to the OKM, the German naval headquarters. It
bears the initials of Fricke, head of the Operational Division of the
Naval War Staff, of Schniewind, Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff,
and of Raeder.

As the _Wehrmacht_ moved forward with plans for what it clearly
considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign Office played its part.
In a discussion of means of improving German-Czech relations with the
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, in Berlin on 21 January
1939, Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech government a “quick reduction” in
the size of the Czech army. The captured German Foreign Office notes of
this discussion bear the following footnote, in Ribbentrop’s
handwriting:

    “I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in
    the Czech army would be decisive in our judgment.” (_2795-PS_)

L. _Extension of Fifth Column Activity_

As in the case of Austria and the Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators did
not intend to rely on the _Wehrmacht_ alone to accomplish their
calculated objective of “liquidating” Czechoslovakia. With the German
minority separated from Czechoslovakia, they could no longer use the
cry, “home to the Reich.” One sizeable minority, the Slovaks, remained
within the Czechoslovak State. The Czechoslovak Government had made
every effort to conciliate Slovak extremists in the months after the
cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had been granted to Slovakia, with
an autonomous cabinet and parliament at Bratislava. Nonetheless, despite
these concessions, it was in Slovakia that the Nazi conspirators found
men ready to take their money and do their bidding. The following
picture of Nazi operations in Slovakia is based on the Czechoslovak
official report. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

Nazi propaganda and “research” groups had long been interested in
maintaining close connections with the Slovak autonomist opposition.
When Bela Tuka, who later became Prime Minister of the puppet state of
Slovakia, was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence
established that he had already established connections with Nazi groups
within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close contact with
Slovak traitors living in exile and were attempting to establish more
profitable contacts in the semi-fascist Slovak Catholic Peoples Party of
Monsignor Andrew Hlinka. Out of sympathy with the predominantly
anti-clerical government in Prague, some Catholic elements in Slovakia
proved willing to cooperate with the Nazis. In February and July 1938
the leaders of the Henlein movement conferred with top men of Father
Hlinka’s party and agreed to furnish one another with mutual assistance
in pressing their respective claims to autonomy. This understanding
proved useful in the September agitation when, at the proper moment, the
Foreign Office in Berlin wired the Henlein leader, Kundt, in Prague to
tell the Slovaks to start their demands for autonomy. (See _2858-PS_.)

By this time, mid-summer 1938, the Nazis were in direct contact with
figures in the Slovak autonomist movement and had paid agents among the
higher staff of Father Hlinka’s party. These agents undertook to render
impossible any understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the
Slovak parties in the government at Prague. Franz Karmasin, later to
become _Volksgruppenfuehrer_, had been appointed Nazi leader in Slovakia
and professed to be serving the cause of Slovak autonomy while on the
Nazi pay roll. On 22 November the Nazis indiscreetly wired Karmasin to
collect his money at the German Legation in person. The telegram, sent
from the German Legation at Prague to Bratislava (Pressburg), reads as
follows:

    “Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin that he
    would appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is
    being kept for him at the treasury of the embassy.

                                              “HENCKE”  (_2859-PS_)

Karmasin proved to be extremely useful to the Nazi cause. A captured
memorandum of the German Foreign Office, dated Berlin, 29 November
1939—eight months after the conquest of Czechoslovakia—throws a
revealing light both on Karmasin and on the German Foreign Office:

    “_On the question of payments to KARMASIN_

    “Karmasin receives 30,000 Marks for the VDA (Peoples’ League for
    Germans Abroad) until 1 April 1940; from then on 15,000 Marks
    monthly.

    “Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial Germans
    (_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_) has deposited 300,000 Marks for
    Karmasin with the German Mission in Bratislava (Pressburg) on
    which he could fall back in an emergency.

    “Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister
    Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impossible to
    determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the
    payments will continue.

    “Therefore it appears that Karmasin has been provided with
    sufficient money; thus one could await whether he would put up
    new demands himself.

    “Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign Minister.

                                       “/s/  WOERMANN”  (_2794-PS_)

This document shows the complicity of the German Foreign Office in the
subsidization of illegal organizations abroad. More important, it shows
that the Germans still considered it necessary to supply their
under-cover representatives in Pressburg with substantial funds even
after the declaration of the so-called independent State of Slovakia.

Some time in the winter of 1938-1939 Goering conferred with Durcansky
and Mach, two leaders in the Slovak extremist group, who were
accompanied by Karmasin. The Slovaks told Goering of their desire for
what they called “independence,” with strong political, economic, and
military ties to Germany. They promised that the Jewish problem would be
solved as it had been in Germany and that the Communist Party would be
prohibited. The notes of the meeting report that Goering considered that
the Slovak efforts towards independence were to be supported, although
his motives were scarcely altruistic. The undated minutes of this
conversation between Goering and Durcansky, captured among the files of
the German Foreign Office, are jotted down in somewhat telegraphic
style:

    “To begin with DURKANSKY (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out
    declaration. Contents: Friendship for the Fuehrer; gratitude,
    that through the Fuehrer autonomy has become possible for the
    SLOVAKS. The SLOVAKS _never_ want to belong to HUNGARY. The
    SLOVAKS want _full independence_ with strongest political,
    economic and military ties to Germany. BRATISLAVA to be capital.
    The execution of the plan only possible if the army and police
    are SLOVAK.

    “An independent SLOVAKIA to be proclaimed at the meeting of the
    first SLOVAK Diet. In the case of a plebiscite the majority
    would favour a separation from PRAGUE. Jews will vote for
    Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the MARCH, where
    a large SLOVAK population lives.

    “The _Jewish problem_ will be solved similarly to that in
    Germany. The Communist party to be prohibited.

    “The _Germans_ in SLOVAKIA do not want to belong to Hungary but
    wish to stay in SLOVAKIA.

    “The _German influence_ with the SLOVAK Government considerable;
    the appointment of a German Minister (member of the cabinet) has
    been promised.

    “At present negotiations with HUNGARY are being conducted by the
    SLOVAKS. The CZECHS are more yielding towards the Hungarians
    than the SLOVAKS.

    “The Fieldmarshall considers; that the SLOVAK negotiations
    towards independence are to be supported in a suitable manner.
    Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy.

    “Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German
    Air Force for use against the East.” (_2801-PS_)

In mid-February 1939 a Slovak delegation journeyed to Berlin. It
consisted of Tuca, one of the Slovaks with whom the Germans had been in
contact, and Karmasin, the paid representative of the Nazi conspirators
in Slovakia. They conferred with Hitler and Ribbentrop in the Reichs
Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12 February 1939. The captured German
Foreign Office minutes of that meeting read as follows:

    “After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting this
    meeting. He addresses the Fuehrer with ‘My Fuehrer’ and he
    voices the opinion that he, though only a modest man himself,
    might well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech
    courts and prison gave him the right to make such a statement.
    He states that the Fuehrer had not only opened the Slovak
    question but that he had been also the first one to acknowledge
    the dignity of the Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will
    gladly fight under the leadership of the Fuehrer for the
    maintenance of European civilization. Obviously future
    association with the Czechs had become an impossibility for the
    Slovaks from a moral as well as economic point of view.”
    (_2790-PS_)

It is noteworthy that Tuca addressed Hitler as “My Fuehrer”. During this
meeting the Nazi conspirators apparently were successful in planting the
idea of insurrection with the Slovak delegation. The final sentence of
this document, spoken by Tuca, is conclusive:

    “I entrust the fate of my people to your care.” (_2790-PS_)

It is apparent from these documents that in mid-February 1939 the Nazis
had a well-disciplined group of Slovaks at their service, many of them
drawn from the ranks of Father Hlinka’s party. Flattered by the personal
attention of such men as Hitler and Ribbentrop, and subsidized by German
representatives, these Slovaks proved willing tools in the hands of the
Nazi conspirators.

In addition to the Slovaks, the Nazi conspirators made use of the few
Germans still remaining within the mutilated Czech republic. Kundt,
Henlein’s deputy who had been appointed leader of this German minority,
created as many artificial “focal points of German culture” as possible.
Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from
Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague and
to make it a center of aggressive Naziism. With the assistance of German
civil servants, a deliberate campaign of Nazi infiltration into Czech
public and private institutions was carried out, and the Henleinists
gave full cooperation with Gestapo agents from the Reich who appeared on
Czech soil. The Nazi “political activity” was designed to undermine and
to weaken Czech resistance to the commands from Germany. In the face of
continued threats and duress on both diplomatic and propaganda levels,
the Czech government was unable to take adequate measures against these
trespasses on its sovereignty. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

In early March, with the date for the invasion of Czechoslovakia already
close at hand, fifth column activity moved into its final phase. In
Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Henlein’s equivalent of the SS, were in
touch with the Nazi conspirators in the Reich and laid the groundwork
for the events of 14 and 15 March. An article by SS-Gruppenfuehrer Karl
Hermann Frank, published in _Boehmen und Maehren_, the official
periodical of the Reichs Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, March 1941,
page 79, reveals with considerable frankness the functions which the FS
and SS served and the pride the Nazi conspirators took in the activities
of these organizations:

                       “The SS on March 15, 1939

    “A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable
    without political troops. To these are allotted the special task
    of being the advance guard of the political will and the
    guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German
    folk-groups, which have their home in some other people’s state.
    Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized
    its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes (_Freiwilliger
    Selbstschutz_), called ‘FS’ for short. This troop was trained
    essentially in accordance with the principles of the SS, so far
    as these could be used in this region at that time. The troop
    was likewise assigned here the special task of protecting the
    homeland, actively, if necessary. It stood up well in its first
    test in this connection, wherever in the fall crisis of 1938 it
    had to assume the protection of the homeland, arms in hand.

    “After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau, the tasks of the FS
    were transferred essentially to the German student organizations
    as compact troop formations in Prague and Brunn, aside from the
    isolated German communities which remained in the second
    republic. This was also natural because many active students
    from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the FS. The student
    organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other
    Germans, during the crisis of March 1939 * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In the early morning hours of March 15, after the announcement
    of the planned entry of German troops in various localities,
    German men had to act in some localities in order to assure a
    quiet course of events, either by assumption of the police
    authority, as for instance in Brunn, or by corresponding
    instruction of the police president, etc. In some Czech offices,
    men had likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to
    burn valuable archives and the material of political files. It
    was also necessary to take measures here in order to prevent
    foolish destruction * * *. How significant the many-sided and
    comprehensive measures were considered by the competent German
    agencies, follows from the fact that many of the men either on
    March 15 itself or on the following days were admitted into the
    SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even through the
    Reichsfuehrer SS himself or through SS Group Leader Heydrich.
    The activities and deeds of these men were thereby designated as
    accomplished in the interest of the SS.

    “Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had
    marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had
    assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here
    placed themselves at once at their further disposition and
    became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators. * * *”
    (_2826-PS_)

The background of the German intrigue in Slovakia is outlined in two
British diplomatic despatches (_D-571_, _D-572_) and excerpts from
despatches sent by M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin to the
French Foreign Office between 13 and 18 March 1939, and published in the
French Yellow Book. (_2943-PS_)

In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day
the Czechoslovakian government dismissed those members of the Slovak
Cabinet who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them
Prime Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon
this act of the Czech government as an excuse for intervention. On the
following day, 11 March, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the
Slovak capital. It is related in the report of the British Minister in
Prague to the British government:

    “Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came
    at about 10 P. M. on the evening of Saturday, the 11th March,
    into a Cabinet meeting in progress at Bratislava, and told the
    Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of
    Slovakia. When M. Sidor (the Prime Minister) showed hesitation,
    Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr
    Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czecho-Slovakia
    definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her
    independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest
    himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this
    information, but said that he must discuss the situation with
    the Government at Prague.” (_D-571_)

Events were now moving rapidly. Durcansky, one of the dismissed
ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities
of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and
ammunition were brought from German Offices in Engerau, across the
Danube, into Slovakia where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka
Guard to create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis
as an excuse for military action. The situation at Engerau is described
in an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks:

    “I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and
    state as follows—

    “1. From 1934 to 1941 I was a member of the SD. In the winter of
    1939 I was stationed in Berlin, working in Amt VI, Chief Sector
    South East. Early in March, four or five days before Slovakia
    declared its independence, Heydrich, who was chief of the SD,
    ordered me to report to Nebe, the chief of the Reich Criminal
    Police. Nebe had been told by Heydrich to accelerate the
    production of explosives which his department was manufacturing
    for the use of certain Slovak groups. These explosives were
    small tins weighing approximately 500 grams.

    “2. As soon as forty or fifty of these explosives had been
    finished, I carried them by automobile to a small village called
    Engerau, just across the border from Pressburg in Slovakia. The
    Security Police had a Service Department in this village for the
    handling of SD activities. I turned over the explosives to this
    office and found there a group of Slovaks, including Karmasin,
    Mach, Tuka and Durcansky. In fact, three of these people then
    present later became ministers in the new Slovak government. I
    was informed that the explosives were to be turned over to the
    Hlinka Guards across the border in Slovakia and were to be used
    in incidents designed to create the proper atmosphere for a
    revolution.

    “3. I stayed in Engerau for a day and a half and then returned
    to Berlin.

    “4. One or two weeks later I met in Berlin the same Slovak
    delegation, including Mach, Tuka, Durcansky and Karmasin, which
    I had seen in Engerau. They had flown to Berlin for a conference
    with Goering. Heydrich asked me to look after them and to report
    to him what developed during the conference with Goering. I
    reported this conference in detail to Heydrich. It dealt
    principally with the organization of the new Slovak state. My
    principal recollection of the conference is that the Slovaks
    hardly got a word in because Goering was talking all the time.

    “The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me
    voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the
    statement I have signed and executed the same at NURNBERG,
    Germany this 20th day of November 1945.

                                     “(Signed)  Alfred Helmut Naujocks
                                          “ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS”
                                                             (_3030-PS_)

At this time the German press and radio launched a violent campaign
against the Czechoslovak government. And, significantly, an invitation
from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. Tiso, the dismissed prime
minister, was summoned by Hitler to an audience in the German capital. A
plane was awaiting him in Vienna. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_; _2943-PS_)

M. _Occupation of Czechoslovakia Under Threat of Military Force._

At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations for what
the Nazi leaders liked to call the “liquidation” of Czechoslovakia were
progressing with a gratifying smoothness. The military, diplomatic, and
propaganda machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in close
coordination. As during Case Green of the preceding summer, the Nazi
conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in the attack. It
appears from a letter Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, wrote to
Hitler on 13 March 1939, which was captured in the German Foreign Office
files, that Horthy was flattered by the invitation:

    “Your Excellency,

        “My sincere thanks.

    “I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water
    Region—I dislike using big words—is of vital importance to the
    life of Hungary.

    “In spite of the fact that our recruits have only been serving
    for 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasm.
    The dispositions have already been made. On Thursday, the 16th
    of this month, a frontier incident will take place which will be
    followed by the big blow on Saturday.

    “I shall never forget this proof of friendship and your
    Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times.

                         “Your devoted friend.
                                            “(Signed)  HORTHY”

    “Budapest. 13.3.1939.”  (_2816-PS_)

From this letter it may be inferred that the Nazi conspirators had
already informed the Hungarian government of their plans for military
action against Czechoslovakia. As it turned out, the timetable was
advanced somewhat.

On the diplomatic level Ribbentrop was active. On 13 March, the same day
on which Horthy wrote his letter, Ribbentrop sent a cautionary telegram
to the German minister in Prague, outlining the course of conduct he
should pursue during the coming diplomatic pressure:

                                         “_Telegram in secret code_

    “With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today.

    “In case you should get any written communication from President
    HACHA, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take
    any other action on them but pass them on here by cipher
    telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the
    Embassy to make a point of not being available if the Czech
    government wants to communicate with you during the next few
    days.

                               “(Signed)  RIBBENTROP”.  (_2815-PS_)

On the afternoon of 13 March, Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by Durcansky
and by Karmasin, the local Nazi leader, arrived in Berlin in response to
the summons from Hitler. Late that afternoon Tiso was received by Hitler
in his study in the Reichs Chancellery and was presented with an
ultimatum. Two alternatives were given him: either to declare the
independence of Slovakia or to be left, without German assistance, to
the mercies of Poland and Hungary. This decision, Hitler said, was not a
question of days, but of hours. The captured German Foreign Office
minutes of this meeting between Hitler and Tiso on 13 March show that in
the inducements Hitler held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed his
customary disregard for truth:

    “* * * Now he [Hitler] had permitted Minister Tiso to come here
    in order to make this question clear in a very short time.
    Germany had no interests east of the Carpathian mountains. It
    was indifferent to him what happened there. The question was
    whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He
    did not wish for anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his
    people or even a single soldier to something which was not in
    any way desired by the Slovak people. He would like to secure
    final confirmation as to what Slovakia really wished. He did not
    wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was
    preserving something which did not wish to be preserved at all.
    He took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general,
    but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication of
    interior instability. He would not tolerate it, and he had for
    that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his
    decision. It was not a question of days, but of hours. He had
    stated at that time that if Slovakia wished to make herself
    independent he would support this endeavor and even guarantee
    it. He would stand by his word so long as Slovakia would make it
    clear that she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did
    not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave
    the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, for which he was
    no longer responsible. In that case he would only intercede for
    German interests and those did not lie east of the Carpathians.
    Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged
    to Germany.

    “The Fuehrer asked the Reich Foreign Minister if he had any
    remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for
    his part the conception that in this case a decision was a
    question of hours not of days. He showed the Fuehrer a message
    he had just received which reported Hungarian troop movements on
    the Slovak frontiers. The Fuehrer read this report, mentioned it
    to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon decide
    clearly for herself.” (_2802-PS_)

Those present at this meeting included Ribbentrop, Keitel, State
Secretary Dietrich, State Secretary Keppler, and Minister of State
Meissner.

While in Berlin, the Slovaks also conferred separately with Ribbentrop
and with other high Nazi officials. Ribbentrop solicitously handed Tiso
a copy, already drafted in Slovak, of the law proclaiming the
independence of Slovakia. On the night of 13 March a German plane was
placed at Tiso’s disposal to carry him home. On 14 March, pursuant to
the wishes of the Nazi conspirators, the Diet of Bratislava proclaimed
the independence of Slovakia.

With Slovak extremists, acting at Nazi bidding, in open revolt against
the Czechoslovak government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to
move against Prague. On the evening of 14 March, at the suggestion of
the German Legation in Prague M. Hacha, the president of the
Czechoslovak republic, and M. Chvalkovsky, his foreign minister, arrived
in Berlin. The atmosphere in which they found themselves was hostile.
Since the preceding weekend the Nazi press had accused the Czechs of
using violence against the Slovaks and especially against members of the
German minority and citizens of the Reich. Both press and radio
proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in danger, that the situation
was intolerable and that it was necessary to smother as quickly as
possible the focus of trouble which Prague had become in the heart of
Europe.

After midnight on the 15 March, at 1:15 in the morning, Hacha and
Chvalkovsky were ushered into the Reichs Chancellery. They found there
Hitler, von Ribbentrop, Goering, Keitel, and other high Nazi officials.
The captured German Foreign Office account of this meeting furnishes a
revealing picture of Nazi behaviour and tactics. It must be remembered
that this account of the conference of the night of March 14-15 comes
from German sources, and must be read as an account biased by its
source.

Hacha opened the conference. He was conciliatory, even humble. He
thanked Hitler for receiving him and said he knew that the fate of
Czechoslovakia rested in the Fuehrer’s hands. Hitler replied that he
regretted that he had been forced to ask Hacha to come to Berlin,
particularly because of the great age of the President. (Hacha was then
in his seventies.) But this journey, Hitler told the President, could be
of great advantage to his country, because “it was only a matter of
hours until Germany would intervene.” The conference proceeded as
follows, with Hitler speaking:

    “Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him. If Slovakia had
    kept closer to Germany, it would have been an obligation to
    Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this obligation
    now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the
    Lower Carpathian Mts. Last autumn he had not wanted to draw the
    final consequences because he had believed that it was possible
    to live together. But even at that time, and also later in his
    conversations with Chvalkovsky, he made it clear that he would
    ruthlessly smash this state if Benes’ tendencies were not
    completely revised. Chvalkovsky understood this and asked the
    Fuehrer to have patience. The Fuehrer saw this point of view,
    but the months went by without any change. The new regime did
    not succeed in eliminating the old one psychologically. He
    observed this from the press, mouth to mouth propaganda,
    dismissals of Germans and many other things, which, to him, were
    a symbol of the whole situation. At first he had not understood
    this but when it became clear to him he drew his conclusions
    because, had the development continued in this way, the
    relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become
    the same as six months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not
    immediately reduce its army to a reasonable size? Such an army
    was a tremendous burden for such a state because it only makes
    sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the State.
    Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission,
    such an army is meaningless. He enumerates several examples
    which proved to him that the spirit in the army had not changed.
    This symptom convinced him that the army would be a severe
    political burden in the future. Added to this were the
    inevitable development of economic necessities and, further, the
    protests from national groups which could no longer endure life
    as it was.

    “Last Sunday, therefore, for me the die was cast. I summoned the
    Hungarian envoy and notified him that I was withdrawing my
    [restraining] hands from that country. We were now confronted
    with this fact. He had given the order to the German troops to
    march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into
    the German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest
    autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she ever
    had enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany’s attitude towards
    Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow and the day after
    tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian
    people and the Czechoslovakian military towards the German
    troops. He no longer trusts the government. He believes in the
    honesty and straight forwardness of Hacha and Chvalkovsky but
    doubts that the government will be able to assert itself in the
    entire nation. The German Army had already started out today,
    and at one barracks where resistance was offered, it was
    ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the
    deployment of heavy artillery.

    “At 6 o’clock in the morning the German army would invade
    Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German air force would
    occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The
    first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would
    lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by
    all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the
    invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that
    case it would be easy for the Fuehrer to give Czechoslovakia at
    the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own,
    autonomy and a certain national liberty.

    “We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He
    would not like to torture and de-nationalize the Czechs. He also
    did not do all that because of hatred but in order to protect
    Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not
    have yielded, the Czech people would have been exterminated.
    Nobody could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will
    that the Czech people should live a full national life and he
    believed firmly that a way could be found which would make
    far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting would
    break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in
    counter-pressure. One would annihilate one another and it would
    then not be possible any more for him to give the promised
    alleviations. Within two days the Czech army would not exist any
    more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would
    result in a hatred which would force him because of his instinct
    of self-preservation not to grant autonomy any more. The world
    would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people when
    he read the foreign press. It gave him the impression expressed
    in a German proverb: ‘The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may
    go.’

    “That was the state of affairs. There were two courses open to
    Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and
    wished in memory of the past that Czechoslovakia would be
    conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which
    corresponded with his proposals stated above.

    “That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This
    invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the
    Czech people. If it would come to a fight, the bloodshed would
    also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps
    prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a
    form of construction which would be much more far-reaching for
    Czechoslovakia than she could ever have hoped for in old
    Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for
    the German people.

    “The hours went past. At 6 o’clock the troops would march in. He
    was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to
    each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but
    planned with all generosity. He would advise him now to retire
    with Chvalkovsky in order to discuss what should be done.”
    (_2798-PS_)

In reply to this long harangue, Hacha, according to the German minutes,
said that he agreed that resistance would be useless. He expressed doubt
that he would be able to issue the necessary orders to the Czech Army in
the four hours left to him before the German Army crossed the Czech
border. He asked if the object of the invasion was to disarm the Czech
Army. If so, that might be arranged. Hitler replied that his decision
was final, that it was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant.
He turned to the circle of Nazi conspirators surrounding him, which
included Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel, for their support. The only
possibility of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said, was by the
intervention of the German Army. At this point Hacha and Chvalkovsky
retired from the room. (_2798-PS_)

A dispatch from the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, published
in the British Blue Book, describes a conversation with Goering in which
the events of this early morning meeting are set forth (_2861-PS_).
Dispatch No. 77 in the French Yellow Book from M. Coulondre, the French
Ambassador, gives another well-informed version of this same midnight
meeting (_2943-PS_). The following account of the remainder of this
meeting is drawn from these two sources, as well as from the captured
German minutes (_2787-PS_). (Cf. also _3061-PS_.)

When President Hacha left the conference room in the Reichs Chancellery,
he was in such a state of exhaustion that he needed medical attention
from a physician who was on hand for that purpose. It appears that he
was given an injection to sustain him during the ordeal. When the two
Czechs returned to the room the Nazi conspirators again told them of the
power and invincibility of the _Wehrmacht_. They reminded him that in
three hours, at 6 in the morning, the German Army would cross the
border. Goering boasted of what the German _Wehrmacht_ would do if Czech
forces resisted the invading Germans. If German lives were lost, Goering
said, his Luftwaffe would blast half Prague into ruins in two hours. And
that, Goering said, would be only the beginning. Under this threat of
imminent and merciless attack by land and air, the President of
Czechoslovakia at 4:30 in the morning signed the document with which the
Nazi conspirators confronted him. This Declaration of 15 March 1939
reads:

    “the President of the Czechoslovak State * * * entrusts with
    entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people and the Czech
    country to the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich.”
    (_TC-49_)

While the Nazi officials were threatening and intimidating the
representatives of the Czech government, the _Wehrmacht_ had in some
areas already crossed the Czech border. The Czech industrial centres of
Maehrisch-Ostrau and Witkowitz, close to the Silesian and Polish
borders, were occupied by German troops and SS units during the early
evening of 14 March. An article in the German military magazine, the
_Wehrmacht_, of 29 March 1939 describes the movement of German troops
during the occupation:

    “From Silesia, Saxony and Northern Bavaria and the Ostmark,
    seven Army Corps moved on the morning of March 15 past the
    former Czech border. On the evening of March 14 parts of the
    VIII Army Corps and the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, under the
    command of the Commanding General of the VIII Army Corps, had
    already occupied the industrial centers of Witkowitz and
    Maehrisch Ostrau.

    “The troops of Army Group 3 under the command of General of
    Infantry Blaskowitz were to take Bohemia under their protection,
    while the troops of Army Group 5 under General of Inf. List were
    given the same mission for Moravia.

    “For this purpose parts of the Air Force (particularly
    reconnaissance planes and antiaircraft artillery) as well as
    parts of the _SS Verfuegungstruppen_ were placed at the disposal
    of the two army groups.

    “On the evening of March 14, the march order was received by the
    troops. On March 15 at 6 A. M. the columns moved past the border
    and then moved on with utmost precision. * * *” (_3571-PS_)

(Other descriptions of the military movements of 14 and 15 March are
contained in documents _2860-PS_, _3618-PS_, and _3619-PS_.)

At dawn on 15 March German troops poured into Czechoslovakia from all
sides. Hitler issued an order of the day to the Armed Forces and a
proclamation to the German people, which stated succinctly,
“Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.” (_TC-50_)

On the following day, in direct contravention of Article 81 of the
Treaty of Versailles, Czechoslovakia was formally incorporated into the
German Reich under the name of the “Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia.” This decree, signed in Prague on 16 March 1939 by Hitler,
Lammers, Frick, and Ribbentrop, commenced with this declaration:

    “The Bohemian-Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to
    the living space of the German people.” (_TC-51_)

The remainder of the decree sets forth in bleak detail the extent to
which Czechoslovakia henceforth was to be subjugated to Germany. A
German Protector was to be appointed by the Fuehrer for the so-called
Protectorate. The German Government assumed charge of their foreign
affairs and of their customs and their excise. It was specified that
German garrisons and military establishments would be maintained in the
Protectorate. (_TC-51_)

At the same time the extremist leaders in Slovakia, who at German
insistence had done so much to undermine the Czech State, found that the
independence of their week-old state was in fact qualified. A Treaty of
Protection between Slovakia and the Reich was signed in Vienna on 18
March and by Ribbentrop in Berlin on 23 March (_1439-PS_). A secret
protocol to this treaty was also signed in Berlin on 23 March by
Ribbentrop for Germany, and by Tuka and Durcansky for Slovakia
(_2793-PS_). The first four articles of this treaty provide:

    “The German Government and the Slovak Government have agreed,
    after the Slovak State has placed itself under the protection of
    the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences
    resulting from this fact. For this purpose the undersigned
    representatives of the two governments have agreed on the
    following provisions.

    “ARTICLE 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political
    independence of the State of Slovakia and the integrity of its
    territory.

    “ARTICLE 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection
    undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall
    have the right, at all times, to construct military
    installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they
    deem necessary, in an area delimited on its western side by the
    frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a
    line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the
    White Carpathians and the Javornik Mountains.

    “The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to
    assure that the land required for these installations shall be
    conveyed to the German armed forces. Furthermore the Government
    of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for
    imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops
    and the supply of military installations.

    “Military sovereignty will be assumed by the German armed forces
    in the zone described in the first paragraph of this Article.

    “German citizens who, on the basis of private employment
    contracts, are engaged in the construction of military
    installations in the designated zone shall be subject to German
    jurisdiction.

    “ARTICLE 3. The Government of Slovakia will organize its
    military forces in close agreement with the German armed forces.

    “ARTICLE 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection
    agreed upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times
    conduct its foreign affairs in close agreement with the German
    Government.” (_1439-PS_)

The secret protocol provided for close economic and financial
collaboration between Germany and Slovakia. Mineral resources and
subsoil rights were placed at the disposal of the German government.
Article I, Paragraph 3, provided:

    “(3) Investigation, development and utilization of the Slovak
    natural resources. In this respect the basic principle is that
    insofar as they are not needed to meet Slovakia’s own
    requirements, they should be placed in first line at Germany’s
    disposal. The entire soil-research (_Bodenforschung_) will be
    placed under the Reich agency for soil-research (_Reichsstelle
    fuer Bodenforschung_). The government of the Slovak State will
    soon start an investigation to determine whether the present
    owners of concessions and privileges have fulfilled the
    industrial obligations prescribed by law and it will cancel
    concessions and privileges in cases where these duties have been
    neglected.” (_2793-PS_)

In their private conversations the Nazi conspirators gave abundant
evidence that they considered Slovakia a puppet State, in effect a
German possession. A memorandum of information given by Hitler to von
Brauchitsch on 25 March 1939 deals in the main with problems arising
from recently occupied Bohemia and Moravia and Slovakia. It states in
part:

    “Col. Gen. Keitel shall inform Slovak Government via Foreign
    Office that it would not be allowed to keep or garrison armed
    Slovak units (Hlinka Guards) on this side of the border formed
    by the river Waag. They shall be transferred to the new Slovak
    territory. Hlinka Guards should be disarmed.

    “Slovak shall be requested via Foreign Office to deliver to us
    against payment any arms we want and which are still kept in
    Slovakia. This request is to be based upon agreement made
    between Army and Czech troops. For this payment these millions
    should be used which we will pour anyhow into Slovakia.

    “_Czech Protectorate._

    “H. Gr. [translator’s note: probably Army groups] shall be asked
    again whether the request shall be repeated again for the
    delivery of all arms within a stated time limit and under the
    threat of severe penalties.

    “We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia _without_
    paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February
    though shall be paid for.

    “Bohemia-Moravia have to make annual contributions to the German
    treasury. Their amount shall be fixed on the basis of the
    expenses earmarked formerly for the Czech Army.” (_R-100_)

The German conquest of Czechoslovakia in direct contravention of the
Munich agreement was the occasion for formal protests from the British
(_TC-52_) and French (_TC-53_) governments, both dated 17 March 1939. On
the same day, 17 March 1939, the Acting Secretary of State of the United
States issued a statement which read in part as follows:

    “* * * This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the
    principles of human liberty and of democracy, cannot refrain
    from making known this country’s condemnation of the acts which
    have resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the liberties
    of a free and independent people with whom, from the day when
    the Republic of Czechoslovakia attained its independence, the
    people of the United States have maintained specially close and
    friendly relations.” (_2862-PS_)

N. _The Importance of Czechoslovakia in Future Aggressions._

With Czechoslovakia in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had
accomplished the program they had set for themselves in the meeting in
Berlin on 5 November 1937 (_386-PS_). This program of conquest had been
intended to shorten Germany’s frontiers, to increase its industrial and
food reserves, and to place it in a position, both industrially and
strategically, from which the Nazis could launch more ambitious and more
devastating campaigns of aggression. In less than a year and a half this
program had been carried through to the satisfaction of the Nazi
leaders.

Of all the Nazi conspirators perhaps Goering was the most aware of the
economic and strategic advantages which would accrue from the possession
of Czechoslovakia. The Top Secret minutes of a conference with Goering
in the Air Ministry, held on 14 October 1938—just two weeks after the
occupation of the Sudetenland—reports a discussion of economic
problems. At this date Goering’s remarks were somewhat prophetic:

    “The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means. General
    Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial
    assimilation of the Slovakia. Czechia and Slovakia would become
    German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The
    Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore
    have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary
    Keppler.” (_1301-PS, Item 10_)

In the summer of 1939, after the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia
into the Reich, Goering again revealed the great interest of the Nazi
leaders in the Czechoslovak economic potential. The minutes dated
Berlin, 27 July 1939, and signed Mueller, of a conference two days
earlier between Goering and a group of officials from the OKW and from
other agencies of the German government concerned with war production,
read as follows:

    “1. In a rather long statement the Field Marshal explained that
    the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy
    had taken place, among other reasons, to increase the German war
    potential by exploitation of the industry there. Letters, such
    as the decree of the Reich Minister for Economics—S 10 402/39
    of 10 July 39—as well as a letter with similar meaning to the
    JUNKERS firm, which might possibly lower the kind and extent of
    the armament measures in the Protectorate, are contrary to this
    principle. If it is necessary to issue such directives, this
    should be done only with his consent. In any case, he insists,
    in agreement with the directive by Hitler, that the war
    potential of the Protectorate is definitely to be exploited in
    part or in full and is to be directed towards mobilization as
    soon as possible. * * *” (_R-133_)

In addition to strengthening the Nazi economic potential for war, the
conquest of Czechoslovakia provided the Nazis with new bases from which
to wage their next war of aggression, the attack on Poland. It will be
recalled that the minutes of the conference between Goering and a
pro-Nazi Slovak delegation in the winter of 1938-39 state Goering’s
conclusions as follows:

    “Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German
    Air Force for use against the East.” (_2801-PS_)

In a conference between Goering, Mussolini, and Ciano on 15 April 1939,
one month after the conquest of Czechoslovakia, Goering told his junior
partners in the Axis of the progress of German preparations for war. He
compared the strength of Germany with the strength of England and
France. He mentioned the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in these
words:

    “However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any
    case, how dangerous this country could have been, even after
    Munich, in the event of a serious conflict. Because of Germany’s
    action the situation of both Axis countries was ameliorated,
    among other reasons because of the economic possibilities which
    result from the transfer to Germany of the great production
    capacity (armament potential) of Czechoslovakia. That
    contributes toward a considerable strengthening of the axis
    against the Western powers. Furthermore, Germany now need not
    keep ready a single division for protection against that country
    in case of a bigger conflict. This, too, is an advantage by
    which both axis countries will, in the last analysis, benefit.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * the action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be
    viewed as an advantage for the axis in case Poland should
    finally join the enemies of the axis powers. Germany could then
    attack this country from 2 flanks and would be within only 25
    minutes flying distance from the new Polish industrial center
    which had been moved further into the interior of the country,
    nearer to the other Polish industrial districts, because of its
    proximity to the border. Now by the turn of events it is located
    again in the proximity of the border.” (_1874-PS_)

The absorption of the Sudetenland, effected on 1 October 1938, in
practical effect destroyed Czechoslovakia as a military power. The final
conquest of Czechoslovakia came on 15 March 1939. This conquest had been
the intention and aim of the Nazi leaders during the preparations for
Case Green in the summer of 1938, and had been forestalled only by the
Munich agreement. With Czechoslovakia, less than six months after the
Munich agreement, securely in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had
achieved their objective. Bohemia and Moravia were incorporated into the
Reich, shortening German frontiers and adding the Czech manufacturing
plant to the German war potential. The puppet state of Slovakia,
conceived in Berlin and independent only in name, had been set up to the
east of Moravia. In this state, which outflanked Poland to the south,
the Nazi army, under the terms of the treaty drafted by Ribbentrop, took
upon itself the establishment of bases and extensive military
installations. From this state in September 1939 units of the German
Army did, in fact, carry out the attack on Poland.

Logic and premeditation are patent in each step of the German
aggression. Each conquest of the Nazi conspirators was deliberately
planned as a stepping-stone to new and more ambitious aggression. The
words of Hitler in the conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 23 May
1939, when he was planning the Polish campaign, are significant,

    “The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good
    use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in
    harmony with our aims.” (_L-79_)

It is appropriate to refer to two other speeches of the Nazi leaders. In
his lecture at Munich on 7 November 1943 Jodl spoke as follows:

    “The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of
    1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded
    off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now
    became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of
    more or less favourable strategic premises.” (_L-172_)

In the speech to his military commanders on 23 November 1939, Hitler
described the process by which he had rebuilt the military power of the
Reich:

    “The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also
    was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all,
    the western fortifications had to be finished. It was not
    possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me
    from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the
    Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The
    decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the
    erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the
    action against Poland was laid.” (_789-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EXECUTION OF THE
                     PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA

    Document     │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                 │                                        │      │
                 │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                 │  Tribunal, Article 6 (a).              │  I   │       5
                 │                                        │      │
                 │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                 │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 3│      │
                 │  (a, c); V.                            │  I   │  22, 29
                 │                 —————                  │      │
                 │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                 │document indicates that the document was│      │
                 │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                 │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                 │document number indicates that the      │      │
                 │document was referred to during the     │      │
                 │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                 │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                 │parentheses following the description of│      │
                 │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                 │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                 │description of the document, is the     │      │
                 │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                 │court.                                  │      │
                 │                 —————                  │      │
  *375-PS        │Case Green with wider implications,     │      │
                 │report of Intelligence Division,        │      │
                 │Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August 1938.│      │
                 │(USA 84)                                │ III  │     280
                 │                                        │      │
  *386-PS        │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│      │
                 │Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November   │      │
                 │1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant,      │      │
                 │Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937.   │      │
                 │(USA 25)                                │ III  │     295
                 │                                        │      │
  *388-PS        │File of papers on Case Green (the plan  │      │
                 │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept │      │
                 │by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant,         │      │
                 │April-October 1938. (USA 26)            │ III  │     305
                 │                                        │      │
  *789-PS        │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,  │      │
                 │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme  │      │
                 │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23)       │ III  │     572
                 │                                        │      │
  *998-PS        │“German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia”. │      │
                 │Excerpts from Czechoslovak Official     │      │
                 │Report for the prosecution and trial of │      │
                 │the German Major War Criminals by the   │      │
                 │International Military Tribunal         │      │
                 │established according to Agreement of   │      │
                 │four Great Powers of 8 August 1945. (USA│      │
                 │91)                                     │ III  │     656
                 │                                        │      │
 *1301-PS        │File relating to financing of armament  │      │
                 │including minutes of conference with    │      │
                 │Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 October │      │
                 │1938, concerning acceleration of        │      │
                 │rearmament. (USA 123)                   │ III  │     868
                 │                                        │      │
 *1439-PS        │Treaty of Protection between Slovakia   │      │
                 │and the Reich, signed in Vienna 18 March│      │
                 │and in Berlin 23 March 1939. 1939       │      │
                 │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 606. (GB  │      │
                 │135)                                    │  IV  │      18
                 │                                        │      │
 *1536-PS        │Report of Luftwaffe General Staff,      │      │
                 │Intelligence Division, 12 August 1938,  │      │
                 │on reconnaissance by German Air Attache │      │
                 │at Prague for airfields in              │      │
                 │Czechoslovakia, enclosing report of the │      │
                 │Air Attache, Major Moericke, 4 August   │      │
                 │1938. (USA 83)                          │  IV  │      96
                 │                                        │      │
 *1780-PS        │Excerpts from diary kept by General     │      │
                 │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA │      │
                 │72)                                     │  IV  │     360
                 │                                        │      │
 *1874-PS        │Notes on conference between Goering,    │      │
                 │Mussolini and Ciano, 15 April 1939. (USA│      │
                 │125)                                    │  IV  │     518
                 │                                        │      │
  2358-PS        │Speech by Hitler in Sportspalast,       │      │
                 │Berlin, 26 September 1938, from         │      │
                 │Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, │      │
                 │27 September 1938.                      │  IV  │    1100
                 │                                        │      │
 *2360-PS        │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 30   │      │
                 │January 1939, from Voelkischer          │      │
                 │Beobachter, Munich Edition, 31 January  │      │
                 │1939. (GB 134)                          │  IV  │    1101
                 │                                        │      │
 *2786-PS        │Letter from Ribbentrop to Keitel, 4     │      │
                 │March 1938. (USA 81)                    │  V   │     419
                 │                                        │      │
 *2788-PS        │Notes of conference in the Foreign      │      │
                 │Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad       │      │
                 │Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on      │      │
                 │program for Sudeten agitation, 29 March │      │
                 │1938. (USA 95)                          │  V   │     422
                 │                                        │      │
 *2789-PS        │Letter from Konrad Henlein to           │      │
                 │Ribbentrop, 17 March 1938. (USA 94)     │  V   │     424
                 │                                        │      │
 *2790-PS        │German Foreign Office minutes of        │      │
                 │conference between Hitler, Ribbentrop,  │      │
                 │Tuca and Karmasin, 12 February 1939.    │      │
                 │(USA 110)                               │  V   │     425
                 │                                        │      │
 *2791-PS        │German Foreign Office minutes of        │      │
                 │conversation between Ribbentrop and     │      │
                 │Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, 23    │      │
                 │August 1938. (USA 86)                   │  V   │     426
                 │                                        │      │
 *2792-PS        │German Foreign Office minutes of        │      │
                 │conversations between Ribbentrop and    │      │
                 │Attolico, 27 August 1938 and 2 September│      │
                 │1938. (USA 87)                          │  V   │     426
                 │                                        │      │
 *2793-PS        │Confidential protocol concerning        │      │
                 │economic and financial collaboration    │      │
                 │between the German Reich and State of   │      │
                 │Slovakia. (USA 120)                     │  V   │     427
                 │                                        │      │
 *2794-PS        │German Foreign Office memorandum on     │      │
                 │payments to Karmasin, 29 November 1939. │      │
                 │(USA 108)                               │  V   │     429
                 │                                        │      │
 *2795-PS        │Handwritten postscript by Ribbentrop to │      │
                 │German Foreign Office notes of          │      │
                 │Ribbentrop-Chvalkovsky conversation, 21 │      │
                 │January 1939. (USA 106)                 │  V   │     430
                 │                                        │      │
 *2796-PS        │German Foreign Office notes on          │      │
                 │conversations between Hitler, Ribbentrop│      │
                 │and von Weizsäcker and the Hungarian    │      │
                 │Ministers Imredy and von Kanya, 23      │      │
                 │August 1938. (USA 88)                   │  V   │     430
                 │                                        │      │
 *2797-PS        │German Foreign Office memorandum of     │      │
                 │conversation between Ribbentrop and von │      │
                 │Kanya, 25 August 1938. (USA 89)         │  V   │     432
                 │                                        │      │
 *2798-PS        │German Foreign Office minutes of the    │      │
                 │meeting between Hitler and President    │      │
                 │Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March 1939. │      │
                 │(USA 118; GB 5)                         │  V   │     433
                 │                                        │      │
*2800-PS         │German Foreign Office notes of a        │      │
                 │conversation with Attolico, the Italian │      │
                 │Ambassador, 18 July 1938. (USA 85)      │  V   │     442
                 │                                        │      │
 *2801-PS        │Minutes of conversation between Goering │      │
                 │and Slovak Minister Durkansky (probably │      │
                 │late fall or early winter 1938-39). (USA│      │
                 │109)                                    │  V   │     442
                 │                                        │      │
 *2802-PS        │German Foreign Office notes of          │      │
                 │conference on 13 March 1939 between     │      │
                 │Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime        │      │
                 │Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117)         │  V   │     443
                 │                                        │      │
 *2815-PS        │Telegram from Ribbentrop to the German  │      │
                 │Minister in Prague, 13 March 1939. (USA │      │
                 │116)                                    │  V   │     451
                 │                                        │      │
 *2816-PS        │Letter from Horthy, the Hungarian       │      │
                 │Regent, to Hitler, dated Budapest, 13   │      │
                 │March 1939. (USA 115)                   │  V   │     451
                 │                                        │      │
 *2826-PS        │The SS on March 15, 1939, an article by │      │
                 │SS-Gruppenfuehrer K. H. Frank, in       │      │
                 │magazine Bohemia and Moravia, May 1941, │      │
                 │p. 179. (USA 111)                       │  V   │     472
                 │                                        │      │
*2853-PS         │Telegram from German Foreign Office to  │      │
                 │German Legation in Prague, 24 September │      │
                 │1938. (USA 100)                         │  V   │     521
                 │                                        │      │
 *2854-PS        │Telegram from German Foreign Office to  │      │
                 │German Legation in Prague, 17 September │      │
                 │1938. (USA 99)                          │  V   │     521
                 │                                        │      │
 *2855-PS        │Telegram from German Foreign Office to  │      │
                 │German Legation in Prague, 16 September │      │
                 │1938. (USA 98)                          │  V   │     522
                 │                                        │      │
 *2856-PS        │Telegram from German Foreign Office to  │      │
                 │German Legation in Prague, 24 September │      │
                 │1938. (USA 101)                         │  V   │     522
                 │                                        │      │
 *2858-PS        │Telegram from German Foreign Office to  │      │
                 │German Legation in Prague, 19 September │      │
                 │1938. (USA 97)                          │  V   │     523
                 │                                        │      │
 *2859-PS        │Telegram from German Legation, Prague,  │      │
                 │to Consulate at Bratislava, 22 November │      │
                 │1938. (USA 107)                         │  V   │     523
                 │                                        │      │
 *2860-PS        │Document No. 10 in the British Blue     │      │
                 │Book. Speech by Lord Halifax in the     │      │
                 │House of Lords, 20 March 1939. (USA 119)│  V   │     523
                 │                                        │      │
 *2861-PS        │Document No. 12 in the British Blue     │      │
                 │Book. Dispatch from Sir Nevile Henderson│      │
                 │to British Foreign Office, 28 May 1939, │      │
                 │relating details of conversation with   │      │
                 │Goering. (USA 119)                      │  V   │     524
                 │                                        │      │
 *2862-PS        │Document No. 126 in Peace and War.      │      │
                 │Statement by Acting Secretary of State  │      │
                 │Sumner Welles, 17 March 1939. (USA 122) │  V   │     525
                 │                                        │      │
**2863-PS        │Lecture by Konrad Henlein, delivered in │      │
                 │Vienna, 4 March 1941. Quoted in “Four   │      │
                 │Fighting Years”, Czechoslovak Ministry  │      │
                 │of Foreign Affairs, London, 1943, pp.   │      │
                 │29-30. (Referred to but not offered in  │      │
                 │evidence.) (USA 92)                     │  V   │     525
                 │                                        │      │
  2906-PS        │German Foreign Office minutes of meeting│      │
                 │between Hitler and Chvalkovsky, the     │      │
                 │Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, 21       │      │
                 │January 1939.                           │  V   │     571
                 │                                        │      │
 *2943-PS        │Documents Numbers 55, 57, 62, 65, 66,   │      │
                 │73, 77 and 79 in the French Yellow Book.│      │
                 │Excerpts from eight dispatches from M.  │      │
                 │Coulondre, the French Ambassador in     │      │
                 │Berlin, to the French Foreign Office,   │      │
                 │between 13 and 18 March 1939. (USA 114) │  V   │     608
                 │                                        │      │
**3029-PS        │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20        │      │
                 │November 1945, on activities of the SD  │      │
                 │along the Czechoslovak border during    │      │
                 │September 1938. (USA 103) (Objection to │      │
                 │admission in evidence upheld.)          │  V   │     738
                 │                                        │      │
  3030-PS        │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20        │      │
                 │November 1945, on relationship between  │      │
                 │the SD and pro-Nazi Slovak groups in    │      │
                 │March 1939.                             │  V   │     739
                 │                                        │      │
**3036-PS        │Affidavit of Gottlob Berger on the      │      │
                 │composition and activity of the Henlein │      │
                 │Free Corps in September 1938. (Objection│      │
                 │to admission in evidence upheld.) (USA  │      │
                 │102)                                    │  V   │     742
                 │                                        │      │
  3037-PS        │Affidavit of Fritz Wiedemann, 21        │      │
                 │November 1945, on the meeting between   │      │
                 │Hitler and his principal advisers in    │      │
                 │Reichs Chancellery on 28 May 1938.      │  V   │     743
                 │                                        │      │
 *3054-PS        │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                 │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                 │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801
                 │                                        │      │
 *3059-PS        │German Foreign Office memorandum, 19    │      │
                 │August 1938, on payments to Henlein’s   │      │
                 │Sudeten-German Party between 1935 and   │      │
                 │1938. (USA 96)                          │  V   │     855
                 │                                        │      │
 *3060-PS        │Dispatch from German Minister in Prague │      │
                 │to Foreign Office in Berlin about policy│      │
                 │arrangements with Henlein, 16 March     │      │
                 │1938. (USA 93)                          │  V   │     856
                 │                                        │      │
 *3061-PS        │Supplement No. 2 to the Official        │      │
                 │Czechoslovak Report entitled German     │      │
                 │Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” (document│      │
                 │998-PS). (USA 126)                      │  V   │     857
                 │                                        │      │
  3571-PS        │Report of U. S. Military Attache,       │      │
                 │Berlin, including an article in magazine│      │
                 │Wehrmacht, 29 March 1939, describing    │      │
                 │occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by    │      │
                 │German troops.                          │  VI  │     264
                 │                                        │      │
  3618-PS        │Report of U. S. Military Attache in     │      │
                 │Berlin, 20 March 1939, concerning       │      │
                 │occupation of Czechoslovakia.           │  VI  │     389
                 │                                        │      │
  3619-PS        │Report of U. S. Military Attache in     │      │
                 │Berlin, 19 April 1939, concerning       │      │
                 │occupation of Czechoslovakia.           │  VI  │     398
                 │                                        │      │
  3638-PS        │Memorandum of Ribbentrop, 1 October     │      │
                 │1938, concerning his conversation with  │      │
                 │Ciano about the Polish demands made on  │      │
                 │Czechoslovakia.                         │  VI  │     400
                 │                                        │      │
 *3842-PS        │Statement of Fritz Mundhenke, 7 March   │      │
                 │1946, concerning the activities of      │      │
                 │Kaltenbrunner and SS in preparation for │      │
                 │occupation of Czechoslovakia. (USA 805) │  VI  │     778
                 │                                        │      │
 *C-2            │Examples of violations of International │      │
                 │Law and proposed counter-propaganda,    │      │
                 │issued by OKW, 1 October 1938. (USA 90) │  VI  │     799
                 │                                        │      │
 *C-136          │OKW Order on preparations for war, 21   │      │
                 │October 1938, signed by Hitler and      │      │
                 │initialled by Keitel. (USA 104)         │  VI  │     947
                 │                                        │      │
 *C-138          │Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed  │      │
                 │by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the   │      │
                 │OKW. (USA 105)                          │  VI  │     950
                 │                                        │      │
 *C-175          │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation   │      │
                 │for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │      │
                 │from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA   │      │
                 │69)                                     │  VI  │    1006
                 │                                        │      │
 *D-571          │Official report of British Minister in  │      │
                 │Prague to Viscount Halifax, 21 March    │      │
                 │1939. (USA 112)                         │ VII  │      88
                 │                                        │      │
 *D-572          │Dispatch from Mr. Pares, British Consul │      │
                 │in Bratislava to Mr. Newton, 20 March   │      │
                 │1939, describing German support of      │      │
                 │Slovak separatists. (USA 113)           │ VII  │      90
                 │                                        │      │
 *L-79           │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939,     │      │
                 │“Indoctrination on the political        │      │
                 │situation and future aims”. (USA 27)    │ VII  │     847
                 │                                        │      │
 *L-172          │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│      │
                 │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture      │      │
                 │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │      │
                 │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII  │     920
                 │                                        │      │
 *R-100          │Minutes of instructions given by Hitler │      │
                 │to General von Brauchitsch on 25 March  │      │
                 │1939. (USA 121)                         │ VIII │      83
                 │                                        │      │
 *R-133          │Notes on conference with Goering in     │      │
                 │Westerland on 25 July 1939, signed      │      │
                 │Mueller, dated Berlin 27 July 1939. (USA│      │
                 │124)                                    │ VIII │     202
                 │                                        │      │
 *R-150          │Extracts from Luftwaffe Group Command   │      │
                 │Three Study on Instruction for          │      │
                 │Deployment and Combat “Case Red”, 2 June│      │
                 │1938. (USA 82)                          │ VIII │     268
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-14          │Arbitration Treaty between Germany and  │      │
                 │Czechoslovakia, signed at Locarno, 16   │      │
                 │October 1925. (GB 14)                   │ VIII │     325
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-23          │Agreement between Germany, the United   │      │
                 │Kingdom, France and Italy, 29 September │      │
                 │1938. (GB 23)                           │ VIII │     370
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-27          │German assurances to Czechoslovakia, 11 │      │
                 │and 12 March 1938, as reported by M.    │      │
                 │Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister to   │      │
                 │London to Viscount Halifax. (GB 21)     │ VIII │     377
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-49          │Agreement with Czechoslovakia, 15 March │      │
                 │1939, signed by Hitler, von Ribbentrop, │      │
                 │Hacha and Chvalkovsky, from Documents of│      │
                 │German Politics, Part VII, pp. 498-499. │      │
                 │(GB 6)                                  │ VIII │     402
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-50          │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the      │      │
                 │German people and Order of the Fuehrer  │      │
                 │to the Wehrmacht, 15 March 1939, from   │      │
                 │Documents of German Politics, Part VII, │      │
                 │pp. 499-501. (GB 7)                     │ VIII │     402
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-51          │Decree establishing the Protectorate of │      │
                 │Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939. (GB │      │
                 │8)                                      │ VIII │     404
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-52          │Formal British protest against the      │      │
                 │annexation of Czechoslovakia in         │      │
                 │violation of the Munich Agreement, 17   │      │
                 │March 1939. (GB 9)                      │ VIII │     407
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-53          │Formal French protest against the       │      │
                 │annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in    │      │
                 │violation of the Munich Agreement, 17   │      │
                 │March 1939. (GB 10)                     │ VIII │     407
                 │                                        │      │
Affidavit H      │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November  │      │
                 │1945.                                   │ VIII │     643
                 │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 11   │Aggressive Action 1938-39. (Enlargement │      │
                 │displayed to Tribunal.)                 │ VIII │     780
                 │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 12   │German Aggression. (Enlargement         │      │
                 │displayed to Tribunal.)                 │ VIII │     781
                 │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 13   │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and  │      │
                 │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to   │      │
                 │Tribunal.)                              │ VIII │     782


               5. OPENING ADDRESS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

_The following address, opening the British presentation of the case
under Count II of the Indictment, was delivered by Sir Hartley
Shawcross, K.C., M.P., British Attorney General and Chief Prosecutor for
the United Kingdom, before the Tribunal on 4 December 1945._

                                 PART I

On an occasion to which reference has already been made Hitler, the
Leader of the Nazi Conspirators who are now on trial before you, said in
reference to their warlike plans:

    “I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war, never
    mind whether it be true or not. The victor shall not be asked
    later on whether we tell the truth or not. In starting and
    making a war not the right is what matters but victory—the
    strongest has the right.” (_1014-PS_)

The British Empire has twice been victorious in wars which have been
forced upon it within the space of one generation but it is precisely
because we realize that victory is not enough; that might is not
necessarily right; that lasting peace and the rule of International Law
is not to be achieved by the strong arm alone, that the British Nation
is taking part in this trial. There are those who would perhaps say that
these wretched men should have been dealt with summarily without trial
by “executive action”; that their personal power for evil broken, they
should be swept aside into oblivion without this elaborate and careful
investigation as to the part they played in plunging the world in war.
_Vae Victis._ Let them pay the penalty of defeat. But that is not the
view of the British Empire or of the British Government. Not so would
the Rule of Law be raised and strengthened on the international as well
as the municipal plane; not so would future generations realize that
right is not always on the side of the big battalions; not so would the
world be made aware that the waging of aggressive war is not only a
dangerous venture but a criminal one. Human memory is short. Apologists
for defeated nations are sometimes able to play upon the sympathy and
magnanimity of their victors so that the true facts, never
authoritatively recorded, become obscured and forgotten. One has only to
recall the circumstances following the last world war to see the dangers
to which, in the absence of any authoritative judicial pronouncement a
tolerant or a credulous people is exposed. With the passage of time the
former tend to discount, perhaps because of their very horror, the
stories of aggression and atrocity which may be handed down; the latter,
misled by fanatical and dishonest propagandists, come to believe that it
was not they but their opponents who were guilty of what they would
themselves condemn. And so we believe that this Tribunal, acting, as we
know it will act notwithstanding its appointment by the victorious
powers, with complete and judicial objectivity, will provide a
contemporary touchstone and an authoritative and impartial record to
which future historians may turn for truth and future politicians for
warning. From this record all generations shall know not only what our
generation suffered but also that our suffering was the result of crimes
against the laws of peoples which the peoples of the world enforced and
will continue in the future to uphold by international cooperation, not
based merely on military alliances but firmly grounded in the rule of
law.

Nor, though this procedure and this Indictment of individuals may be
novel, is there anything new in the principles which by this prosecution
we seek to enforce. Ineffective though, alas, the sanctions proved
themselves to be, the Nations of the world had, as it will be my purpose
to show, sought to make aggressive war an international crime, and
although previous tradition has sought to punish States rather than
individuals, it is both logical and right that if the act of waging war
is itself an offense against International Law those individuals who
shared personal responsibility for bringing such wars about should
answer personally for the course into which they lead their states.
Again, individual war crimes have long been regarded by International
Law as triable by the Courts of those States whose nationals have been
outraged at least so long as a state of war persists. It would indeed be
illogical in the extreme if those who, although they may not with their
own hands have committed individual crimes, were responsible for
systematic breaches of the laws of war affecting the nationals of many
States should escape. So also in regard to crimes against humanity. The
right of humanitarian intervention on behalf of the rights of man
trampled upon by the State in a manner shocking the sense of mankind has
long been considered to form part of the law of Nations. Here, too, the
Charter merely develops a pre-existing principle. If murder, raping and
robbery are indictable under the ordinary municipal laws of our
countries shall those who differ only from the common criminal by the
extent and systematic nature of their offenses escape accusation?

It is, as I shall show, the view of the British Government that in these
matters the Tribunal will apply to individuals not the law of the victor
but the accepted principles of international usage in a way which will,
if anything can, promote and fortify the rule of International Law and
safeguard the future peace and security of this war-stricken world.

By agreement between the Chief Prosecutors it is my task on behalf of
the British Government and of the other States associated on this
Prosecution to present the case on Count 2 of the Indictment and to show
how these Defendants in conspiracy with each other and with persons not
now before this Tribunal planned and waged a war of aggression in breach
of the Treaty obligations by which, under International Law Germany, as
other States, had sought to make such wars impossible.

That task falls into two parts. The first is to demonstrate the nature
and the basis of the Crime against Peace which, under the Charter of
this Tribunal, is constituted by waging wars of aggression and in
violation of Treaties. The second is to establish beyond doubt that such
wars were waged by these Defendants.

As to the first, it would no doubt be sufficient to say this. It is not
incumbent upon the Prosecution to prove that wars of aggression and wars
in violation of International Treaties are, or ought to be,
International Crimes. The Charter of this Tribunal has prescribed that
they are crimes and that the Charter is the Statute and the law of this
Court. Yet, though that is the clear and mandatory law governing the
jurisdiction of this Tribunal, we feel that we should not be fully
discharging our task in the abiding interest alike of international
justice and morality unless we showed the position of that provision of
the Charter against the whole perspective of International Law. For just
as some old English Statutes were substantially declaratory of the
Common Law, so this Charter substantially declares and creates a
jurisdiction in respect of what was already the Laws of Nations.

Nor is it unimportant to emphasize that aspect of the matter lest there
be some, now or hereafter, who might allow their judgment to be warped
by plausible catchwords or by an uninformed and distorted sense of
justice towards these Defendants. It is not difficult to be misled by
such phrases as that resort to war in the past has not been a crime;
that the power to resort to war is one of the prerogatives of the
sovereign State; that the Charter in constituting wars of aggression a
crime has imitated one of the most obnoxious doctrines of National
Socialist jurisprudence, namely _post factum_ legislation; that the
Charter is in this respect reminiscent of Bills of Attainder—and that
these proceedings are no more than a measure of vengeance, subtly
concealed in the garb of judicial proceedings which the Victor wreaks
upon the Vanquished. These things may sound plausible—yet they are not
true. It is, indeed, not necessary to doubt that some aspects of the
Charter bear upon them the imprint of significant and salutary novelty.
But it is our submission and conviction, which we affirm before this
Tribunal and the world that fundamentally the provision of the Charter
which constitutes such wars as these Defendants joined in waging and in
planning a crime is not in any way an innovation. That provision does no
more than constitute a competent jurisdiction for the punishment of what
not only the enlightened conscience of mankind but the Law of Nations
itself constituted an International Crime before this Tribunal was
established and this Charter became part of the public law of the world.

So first let this be said. Whilst it may be true that there is no body
of international rules amounting to law in the Austinian sense of a rule
imposed by a sovereign upon a subject obliged to obey it under some
definite sanction, yet for fifty years or more the people of the world,
striving perhaps after that ideal of which the poet speaks:

    When the War Drums throb no longer
    And the Battle Flags are furled,
    In the Parliament of Man,
    The Federation of the World

have sought to create an operative system of rules based on the consent
of nations to stabilize international relations, to avoid war taking
place at all and to mitigate the results of such wars as took place. The
first such treaty was of course the Hague Convention of 1899 for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. This was, indeed, of
little more than precatory effect and we attach no weight to it for the
purpose of this case, but it did establish agreement that in the event
of serious disputes arising between the signatory powers, they would so
far as possible submit to mediation. That Convention was followed in
1907 by another Convention reaffirming and slightly strengthening what
had previously been agreed. These early conventions fell indeed very far
short of outlawing war or of creating any binding obligation to
arbitrate. I shall certainly not ask you to say any crime was committed
by disregarding them. But at least they established that the contracting
powers accepted the general principle that if at all possible war should
be resorted to only if mediation failed.

Although these Conventions are mentioned in the Indictment I do not rely
on them save to show the historical development of the law. It is
unnecessary, therefore, to argue about their effect, for their place has
been taken by more effective instruments. They were the first steps.

There were, of course, other individual agreements between particular
States which sought to preserve the neutrality of individual countries
as, for instance, that of Belgium, but those agreements were, in the
absence of any real will to comply with them, entirely inadequate to
prevent the first World War in 1914.

Shocked by the occurrence of that catastrophe the Nations of Europe, not
excluding Germany, and of other parts of the World came to the
conclusion that in the interests of all alike a permanent organization
of the Nations should be established to maintain the peace. And so the
Treaty of Versailles was prefaced by the Covenant of the League of
Nations.

I say nothing at this moment of the general merits of the various
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. They have been criticized, some
of them perhaps justly, and they were made the subject of much warlike
propaganda in Germany. But it is unnecessary to enquire into the merits
of the matter, for however unjust one might for this purpose assume the
Treaty to be, it contained no kind of excuse for the waging of war to
secure an alteration in its terms. For not only was it a settlement by
agreement of all the difficult territorial questions which had been left
outstanding by the war itself but it established the League of Nations
which, if it had been loyally supported, could so well have resolved
those international differences which might otherwise have led, as they
did lead, to war. It set up in the Council of the League, in the
Assembly and in the Permanent Court of International Justice, a machine
not only for the peaceful settlement of international disputes but also
for the ventilation of all international questions by frank and open
discussion. At the time the hopes of the world stood high. Millions of
men in all countries—perhaps even in Germany—had laid down their lives
in what they believed and hoped to be a war to end war. Germany herself
entered the League and was given a permanent seat on the Council, on
which, as in the Assembly, German Governments which preceded that of the
Defendant Von Papen in 1932 played their full part. In the years from
1919 to 1932 despite some minor incidents in the heated atmosphere which
followed the end of the war, the peaceful operation of the League
continued. Nor was it only the operation of the League which gave good
ground for hope that at long last the rule of law would replace that of
anarchy in the international field.

The Statesmen of the world deliberately set out to make wars of
aggression an international Crime. These are no new terms, invented by
the Victors to embody in this Charter. They have figured prominently in
numerous treaties, in governmental pronouncements and in declarations of
Statesmen in the period preceding the Second World War. In treaties
concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other
States—such as Persia (1 October 1927), France (2 May 1935), China (21
August 1937)—the Contracting Parties undertook to refrain from any act
of aggression whatsoever against the other Party. In 1933 the Soviet
Union became a party to a large number of treaties containing a detailed
definition of aggression. The same definition appeared in the same year
in the authoritative Report of the Committee on Questions of Security
set up in connection with the Conference for the Reduction and the
Limitation of Armaments. But States went beyond commitments to refrain
from wars of aggression and to assist States victims of aggression. They
_condemned_ wars of aggression. Thus in the Anti-War Treaty of
Non-Aggression and Conciliation of 10 October 1933, a number of American
States—subsequently joined by practically all the States of the
American Continent and a number of European countries—the Contracting
Parties solemnly declared that “they condemned wars of aggression in
their mutual relations or in those of other States.” That Treaty was
fully incorporated into the Buenos Aires Convention of December 1936
signed and ratified by a large number of American countries, including
the United States of America. Previously, in February 1928, the Sixth
Pan-American Conference adopted a Resolution declaring that as “war of
aggression constitutes a crime against the human species * * * all
aggression is illicit and as such is declared prohibited.” In September
1927 the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a resolution
affirming the conviction that “a war of aggression can never serve as a
means of settling international disputes _and is, in consequence, an
international crime_” and declaring that “all wars of aggression are,
and shall always be, prohibited.” The first Article of the Draft Treaty
for Mutual Assistance of 1923 reads: “The High Contracting Parties,
affirming that aggressive war is an international crime, undertake the
solemn engagement not to make themselves guilty of this crime against
any other nation.” In the Preamble to the Geneva Protocol of 1924 it was
stated that “offensive warfare constitutes an infraction of solidarity
and an international crime.” These instruments remained unratified, for
various reasons, but they are not without significance or instruction.

These repeated condemnations of wars of aggression testified to the fact
that, with the establishment of the League of Nations and with the legal
developments which followed it, the place of war in International Law
had undergone a profound change. War was ceasing to be the unrestricted
prerogative of sovereign States. The Covenant of the League did not
totally abolish the right of war. It left certain gaps which probably
were larger in theory than in practice. In effect it surrounded the
right of war by procedural and substantive checks and delays which, if
the Covenant had been observed, would have amounted to an elimination of
war not only between Members of the League, but also, by virtue of
certain provisions of the Covenant, in the relations of non-Members.
Thus the Covenant restored the position as it existed at the dawn of
International Law, at the time when Grotius was laying the foundations
of the modern law of nations and established the distinction,
accompanied by profound legal consequences in the sphere of neutrality,
between just and unjust wars.

Neither was that development arrested with the adoption of the Covenant.
The right of war was further circumscribed by a series of
treaties—numbering nearly one thousand—of arbitration and conciliation
embracing practically all the nations of the world. The so-called
Optional Clause of Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice which conferred upon the Court compulsory
jurisdiction with regard to most comprehensive categories of disputes
and which constituted in effect the most important compulsory treaty of
arbitration in the post-war period, was widely signed and ratified.
Germany herself signed it in 1927; her signature was renewed and
renewed, for a period of five years, by the National-Socialist
Government in July 1933. (Significantly, that ratification was not
renewed on the expiration of its validity in March 1938.) Since 1928 a
considerable number of States signed and ratified the General Act for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which was designed to
fill the gaps left by the Optional Clause and the existing treaties of
arbitration and conciliation.

All this vast network of instruments of pacific settlement testified to
the growing conviction that war was ceasing to be the normal and
legitimate means of settling international disputes. The express
condemnation of wars of aggression, which has already been mentioned,
supplied the same testimony. But there was more direct evidence pointing
in that direction. The Treaty of Locarno of 16th October 1925, to which
I will refer later and to which Germany was a party, was more than a
treaty of arbitration and conciliation in which the parties undertook
definite obligations with regard to the pacific settlement of disputes
that might arise between them. It was, subject to clearly specified
exceptions of self-defense in certain contingencies, a more general
undertaking in which the parties agreed that “they will in no case
attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other”. This
constituted a general renunciation of war and was so considered to be in
the eyes of jurists and of the public opinion of the world. For the
Locarno Treaty was not just one of the great number of arbitration
treaties concluded at that time. It was regarded as the cornerstone of
the European settlement and of the new legal order in Europe in partial,
voluntary and generous substitution for the just rigours of the Treaty
of Versailles. With it the term “outlawry of war” left the province of
mere pacifist propaganda. It became current in the writings on
international law and in official pronouncements of governments. No
jurist of authority and no statesman of responsibility would have
associated himself, subsequent to the Locarno Treaty, with the plausible
assertion that, at least as between the parties, war had remained an
unrestricted right of sovereign States.

But although the effect of the Locarno Treaty was limited to the parties
to it, it had a wider influence in paving the way towards that most
fundamental and truly revolutionary enactment in modern international
law, namely, the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 27 August
1928, known also as the Pact of Paris, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or
the Kellogg Pact. That Treaty—a most deliberate and carefully prepared
piece of international legislation—was binding in 1939 upon more than
sixty nations, including Germany. It was—and has remained—the most
widely signed and ratified international instrument. It contained no
provision for its termination, and was conceived as the cornerstone of
any future international order worthy of that name. It is fully part of
international law as it stands today, and has in no way been modified or
replaced by the Charter of the United Nations. It is right, in this
solemn hour in the history of the world when the responsible leaders of
a State stand accused of a premeditated breach of this great Treaty
which was—and remains—a source of hope and faith for mankind, to set
out in detail its two operative Articles and its Preamble:

                             “The Preamble

    “The President of the German Reich, * * *

    “Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of
    mankind;

    “Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of
    war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the
    end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing
    between their peoples may be perpetuated;

    “Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another
    should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a
    peaceful and orderly progress, and that any signatory Power
    which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by
    resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this
    Treaty;

    “Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other
    nations of the world will join in this humane endeavour and by
    adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force
    bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent
    provisions, thus uniting civilized nations of the world in a
    common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national
    policy;

    *            *            *            *            *            *

                               “Article I

    “The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of
    their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for
    the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as
    an instrument of national policy in their relations with one
    another.

                              “Article II

    “The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or
    solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of
    whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall
    never be sought except by pacific means.”

In that General Treaty for the Renunciation of War practically the
entire civilized world abolished war as a legally permissible means of
enforcing the law and of changing it. The right of war was no longer of
the essence of sovereignty. Whatever the position may have been in 1914
or in 1918 (and it is not necessary to discuss it) no International
lawyer of repute, no responsible Statesman, no soldier concerned with
the legal use of Armed Forces could doubt that with the Pact of Paris on
the Statute Book a war of aggression was contrary to positive
International Law. Nor have the repeated violations of the Pact of the
Axis Powers in any way affected its validity. Let this be firmly and
clearly stated. Those very breaches, except to the cynic and the
malevolent, have added to its strength; they provoked the sustained
wrath of people angered by the contemptuous disregard of the great
Statute and determined to vindicate its provisions. The Pact of Paris is
the Law of Nations. This Tribunal will enforce it.

Let this also be said. The Pact of Paris was not a clumsy enactment
likely to become a signpost for the guilty. It did not enable Germany to
go to war against Poland and yet rely, as against Great Britain and
France, on any immunity from warlike action because of the provisions of
the Pact of Paris. For that Pact laid down expressly in its Preamble
that no State guilty of a violation of its provisions may invoke its
benefits. When on the outbreak of the Second World War Great Britain and
France communicated to the League of Nations the fact that a state of
war existed between them and Germany as from 3 September, 1939, they
declared that by committing an act of aggression against Poland Germany
had violated her obligations assumed not only towards Poland but also
towards other signatories of the Pact of Paris. A violation of the Pact
in relation to one signatory was an attack upon all the other
signatories and they were fully entitled to treat it as such. This point
is to be emphasized lest any of the defendants should seize upon the
letter of the Particulars of Count Two of the Indictment and maintain
that it was not Germany who initiated war with the United Kingdom and
France on 3 September 1939. The declaration of war came from the United
Kingdom and France; the act of war and its commencement came from
Germany in violation of the fundamental enactment to which she was a
party.

The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, the great constitutional
instrument of an international society awakened to the deadly dangers of
another Armageddon, did not remain an isolated effort soon to be
forgotten in the turmoil of recurrent international crises. It became,
in conjunction with the Covenant of the League of Nations or
independently of it, the starting point for a new orientation of
governments in matters of peace, war and neutrality. It is of importance
to quote some of these statements and declarations. In 1929, His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom said, in connection with the
question of conferring upon the Permanent Court of International Justice
jurisdiction with regard to the exercise of belligerent rights in
relation to neutral States:

    “* * * But the whole situation * * * rests, and International
    Law on the subject has been entirely built up, on the assumption
    that there is nothing illegitimate in the use of war as an
    instrument of national policy, and, as a necessary corollary,
    that the position and rights of neutrals are entirely
    independent of the circumstances of any war which may be in
    progress. Before the acceptance of the Covenant, the basis of
    the law of neutrality was that the rights and obligations of
    neutrals were identical as regards both belligerents, and were
    entirely independent of the rights and wrongs of the dispute
    which had led to the war, or the respective position of the
    belligerents at the bar of world opinion.

    “* * * Now it is precisely this assumption which is no longer
    valid as regards states which are members of the League of
    Nations and parties to the Peace Pact. The effect of those
    instruments, taken together, is to deprive nations of the right
    to employ war as an instrument of national policy, and to forbid
    the states which have signed them to give aid or comfort to an
    offender. As between such states, there has been in consequence
    a fundamental change in the whole question of belligerent and
    neutral rights. The whole policy of His Majesty’s present
    Government (and, it would appear, of any alternative government)
    is based upon a determination to comply with their obligations
    under the Covenant of the League and the Peace Pact. This being
    so, the situation which we have to envisage in the event of a
    war in which we were engaged is not one in which the rights and
    duties of belligerents and neutrals will depend upon the old
    rules of war and neutrality, but one in which the position of
    the members of the League will be determined by the Covenant and
    the Pact. * * *” (Memorandum on the Signature of His Majesty’s
    Government in the United Kingdom of the Optional Clause of the
    Statute, Misc. No. 12 (1929), Cmd. 3452, p. 9).

Chief of Counsel for the United States referred in his opening speech
before this Tribunal to the weighty pronouncement of Mr. Stimson, the
Secretary of State, in which, in 1932, he gave expression to the drastic
change brought about in International Law by the Pact of Paris. It is
convenient to quote the relevant passage in full:

    “War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the
    Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has become illegal
    throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be
    the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the
    principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights
    of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. Hereafter when two
    nations engage in armed conflict either one or both of them must
    be wrongdoers—violators of this general treaty law. We no
    longer draw a circle about them and treat them with the
    punctilios of the duelist’s code. Instead we denounce them as
    law-breakers.”

Nearly ten years later, when numerous independent States lay prostrate,
shattered or menaced in their very existence before the impact of the
war machine of the Nazi State, the Attorney-General of the United
States—subsequently a distinguished member of the highest tribunal of
that great country—gave weighty expression to the change which had been
effected in the law as the result of the General Treaty for the
Renunciation of War. He said on 27 March 1941:

    “* * * The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, in which Germany, Italy
    and Japan covenanted with us, as well as with other nations, to
    renounce war as an instrument of policy, made definite the
    outlawry of war and of necessity altered the dependent concept
    of neutral obligations.

    “* * * The Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the Argentine
    Anti-War Treaty deprived their signatories of the right of war
    as an instrument of national policy or aggression and rendered
    unlawful wars undertaken in violation of their provisions. In
    consequence, these treaties destroyed the historical and
    juridical foundations of the doctrine of neutrality conceived as
    an attitude of absolute impartiality in relation to aggressive
    wars. * * *

    “It follows that the state which has gone to war in violation of
    its obligations acquires no right to equality of treatment from
    other states, unless treaty obligations require different
    handling of affairs. It derives no rights from its illegality.

    “* * * In flagrant cases of aggression where the facts speak so
    unambiguously that world opinion takes what may be the
    equivalent of judicial notice, we may not stymie International
    Law and allow these great treaties to become dead letters.
    Intelligent public opinion of the world which is not afraid to
    be vocal and the action of the American States has made a
    determination that the Axis Powers are the aggressors in the
    wars today which is an appropriate basis in the present state of
    international organization for our policy. * * *”

There is thus no doubt that by the time the National-Socialist State had
embarked upon the preparation of the war of aggression against the
civilized world and by the time it had accomplished that design,
aggressive war had, in virtue of the Pact of Paris and of other
treaties, become illegal beyond all uncertainty and doubt. It is on that
Universal Treaty that Count 2 is principally based.

The Prosecution has deemed it necessary—indeed imperative—to establish
beyond all possibility of doubt, at what may appear to be excessive
length, that only superficial learning or culpable sentimentality can
assert that there is any significant element of retroactive law in the
determination of the authors of the Charter to treat aggressive war as
conduct which International Law has prohibited and stigmatized as
criminal. We have traced the progressive limitation of the right of war,
the renunciation and condemnation of wars of aggression, and, above all,
the total prohibition and condemnation of all war conceived as an
instrument of national policy. What statesman or politician in charge of
the affairs of a nation could doubt, from 1928 onwards, that aggressive
war, that all war—except in self-defense, or for the collective
enforcement of the law, or against a State which has itself violated the
Pact of Paris—was unlawful and outlawed? What statesman or politician
embarking upon such war could reasonably and justifiably count upon an
immunity other than that by a successful outcome of the criminal
venture? What more decisive evidence of a prohibition laid down by
positive International Law could any lawyer desire than that which has
been adduced here?

There are, it is true, some small town lawyers who deny the existence of
any International Law. Indeed, as I have said, the rules of the law of
Nations may not satisfy the Austinian test of being imposed by a
sovereign. But the legal regulation of International Relations rests
upon quite different juridical foundations. It depends upon consent, but
upon consent which cannot be withdrawn by unilateral action. In the
International field the source of law is not the command of a sovereign
but the treaty agreement binding upon every state which has adhered to
it. It is indeed true—and the recognition of its truth today by all the
great Powers of the World is vital to our future peace—that as M.
Litvinoff once said, and as Great Britain fully accepts, “Absolute
Sovereignty and entire liberty of action only belong to such states as
have not undertaken International obligations. Immediately a state
accepts International obligations it limits its sovereignty”.

Yet it may be argued that although war had been outlawed and forbidden
it was not criminally outlawed and forbidden. International Law, it may
be said, does not attribute criminality to states, still less to
individuals. But can it really be said on behalf of these Defendants
that the offense of these aggressive wars, which plunged millions of
peoples to their deaths, which by dint of war crimes and crimes against
humanity brought about the torture and extermination of countless
thousands of innocent civilians; which devastated cities; which
destroyed the amenities—nay the most rudimentary necessities of
civilization in many countries, which has brought the world to the brink
of ruin from which it will take generations to recover—will it
seriously be said that such a war is only an offense, only an
illegality, only a matter of condemnation and not a crime justiciable by
any Tribunal? No Law worthy of the name can permit itself to be reduced
to an absurdity. Certainly the Great Powers responsible for this Charter
have refused to allow it. They drew the inescapable consequences from
the renunciation, prohibition, and condemnation of war which had become
part of the law of Nations. They refused to reduce justice to impotence
by subscribing to the outworn doctrines that the sovereign state can
commit no crime and that no crime can be committed by individuals on its
behalf. Their refusal so to stultify themselves has decisively shaped
the law of this Tribunal.

If this be an innovation, it is innovation long overdue—a desirable and
beneficent innovation fully consistent with justice, with common sense
and with the abiding purposes of the law of Nations. But is it indeed so
clear an innovation? Or is it no more than the logical development of
the law? There was indeed a time when International lawyers used to
maintain that the liability of a State was, because of its sovereignty,
limited to contractual responsibility. International tribunals have not
accepted that view. They have repeatedly affirmed that a State can
commit a tort; that it may be guilty of trespass, of a nuisance, of
negligence. They have gone further. They have held that a State may be
bound to pay what are in effect penal damages for failing to provide
proper conditions of security to aliens residing within their territory.
In a recent case decided in 1935 between the United States and Canada an
arbitral commission, with the concurrence of its American member,
decided that the United States were bound to pay what amounted to penal
damages for an affront to Canadian sovereignty. On a wider plane the
Covenant of the League of Nations, in providing for sanctions,
recognized the principle of enforcement of the law against collective
units—such enforcement to be, if necessary, of a penal character. There
is thus nothing startlingly new in the adoption of the principle that
the State as such is responsible for its criminal acts. In fact, save
for the reliance on the unconvincing argument of sovereignty, there is
in law no reason why a State should not be answerable for crimes
committed on its behalf. In a case decided nearly one hundred years ago
Dr. Lushington, a great English Admiralty judge, refused to admit that a
State cannot be a pirate. History, very recent history, does not warrant
the view that a State cannot be a criminal. On the contrary, the
immeasurable potentialities for evil inherent in the State in this age
of science and organization would seem to demand imperatively means of
repression of criminal conduct even more drastic and more effective than
in the case of individuals. In so far therefore as the Charter has put
on record the principle of the criminal responsibility of the State it
must be applauded as a wise and far-seeing measure of international
legislation.

Admittedly, the conscience shrinks from the rigours of collective
punishment, which fall upon the guilty and the innocent alike—although,
it may be noted, most of those innocent victims would not have hesitated
to reap the fruits of the criminal act if it had been successful.
Humanity and justice will find means of mitigating any injustice of
collective punishment. Above all, much hardship can be obviated by
making the punishment fall upon the individuals directly responsible for
the criminal conduct of the State. It is here that the Powers who framed
the Charter took a step which justice, sound legal sense and an
enlightened appreciation of the good of mankind must acclaim without
cavil or reserve. The Charter lays down expressly that there shall be
individual responsibility for the crimes, including the crime against
the peace, committed on behalf of the State. The State is not an
abstract entity. Its rights and duties are the rights and duties of men.
Its actions are the actions of men. It is a salutory principle of the
law that politicians who embark upon a war of aggression should not be
able to seek immunity behind the intangible personality of the State. It
is a salutory legal rule that persons who, in violation of the law,
plunge their own and other countries into an aggressive war, do so with
a halter round their necks.

To say that those who aid and abet, who counsel and procure a crime are
themselves criminals is a commonplace in our own municipal
jurisprudence. Nor is the principle of individual international
responsibility for offenses against the law of nations altogether new.
It has been applied not only to pirates. The entire law relating to war
crimes—as distinguished from the crime of war—is based on that
principle. The future of International Law and, indeed, of the world,
depends on its application in a much wider sphere—in particular in that
of safeguarding the peace of the world. There must be acknowledged not
only, as in the Charter of the United Nations, fundamental human rights,
but also, as in the Charter of this Tribunal, fundamental human duties.
Of these none is more vital or more fundamental than the duty not to vex
the peace of nations in violation of the clearest legal prohibitions and
undertakings. If this is an innovation, then it is one which we are
prepared to defend and to justify. It is not an innovation which creates
a new crime. International Law had already, before the Charter was
adopted, constituted aggressive war a criminal act.

There is therefore in this respect no substantial retroactivity in the
provisions of the Charter. It merely fixes the responsibility for a
crime, clearly established as such by positive law, upon its actual
perpetrators. It fills a gap in international criminal procedure. There
is all the difference between saying to a man: “You will now be punished
for an act which was not a crime at the time you committed it”, and
telling him: “You will now pay the penalty for conduct which was
contrary to law and a crime when you executed it though, owing to the
imperfection of international machinery, there was at that time no court
competent to pronounce judgment against you.” If that be retroactivity,
we proclaim it to be most fully consistent with that higher justice
which, in the practice of civilized States, has set a definite limit to
the retroactive operation of laws. Let the defendants and their
protagonists complain that the Charter is in this as in other matters an
_ex parte_ fiat of the victor. These victors, composing as they do the
overwhelming majority of the nations of the world, represent also the
world’s sense of justice which would be outraged if the crime of war,
after this second World War, were to remain unpunished. In thus
interpreting, declaring and supplementing the existing law they are
content to be judged by the verdict of history. _Securus judicat orbis
terrarum._ In so far as the Charter of this Tribunal introduces new law,
its authors have established a precedent for the future—a precedent
operative against all, including themselves. In essence that law,
rendering recourse to aggressive war an international crime, had been
well established when the Charter was adopted. It is only by way of
corruption of language that it can be described as a retroactive law.

There remains the question, with which it will not be necessary to
detain the Tribunal for long, whether these wars launched by Germany and
her leaders in violation of treaties, agreements or assurances, were
also wars of aggression. A war of aggression is one which is resorted to
in violation of the international obligation not to have recourse to war
or, in cases in which war is not totally renounced, when it is resorted
to in disregard of the duty to utilize the procedure of pacific
settlement which a State has bound itself to observe. There was indeed,
in the period between the two World Wars, a divergence of view among
jurists and statesmen whether it was preferable to attempt in advance a
legal definition of aggression or to leave to the States concerned and
to the collective organs of the international community freedom of
appreciation of the facts in any particular situation that might arise.
Those holding the latter view urged that a rigid definition might be
abused by an unscrupulous State to fit in with its aggressive design;
they feared, and the British Government was for a time among those who
thought so, that an automatic definition of aggression might become “a
trap for the innocent and sign-post for the guilty”. Others held that in
the interest of certainty and security a definition of aggression, like
a definition of any crime in municipal law, was proper and useful; they
urged that the competent international organs, political and judicial,
could be trusted to avoid any particular case a definition of aggression
which might lead to obstruction or to an absurdity. In May 1933 the
Committee on Security Questions of the Disarmament Conference proposed a
definition of aggression on the following lines:

    “The aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to
    the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be
    considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of
    the following actions:

    “(1)  declaration of war upon another state;

    “(2)  invasion by its armed forces, with or without a
    declaration of war, of the territory of another State;

    “(3)  attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without
    a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of
    another State;

    “(4)  naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;

    “(5)  provision of support to armed bands formed in its
    territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or
    refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to
    take in its own territory all the measures in its power to
    deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.”

The various treaties concluded in 1933 by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and other States followed closely that definition. So did the
Draft Convention submitted in 1933 by His Majesty’s Government in the
United Kingdom to the Disarmament Conference.

However, it is unprofitable to elaborate here the details of the problem
or of the definition of aggression. This Tribunal will not allow itself
to be deflected from its purpose by attempts to ventilate in this Court
what is an academic and, in the circumstances, an utterly unreal
controversy as to what is a war of aggression. There is no definition of
aggression, general or particular, which does not cover abundantly and
irresistibly and in every material detail the premeditated onslaught by
Germany upon the territorial integrity and the political independence of
so many States.

This then being the law—that the peoples of the world by the Pact of
Paris had finally outlawed war and made it criminal—let us turn to the
facts and see how these Defendants under their Leader and with their
associates destroyed the high hopes of mankind and sought to revert to
international anarchy. And first in general terms let this be said, for
it will be established beyond doubt by the documents. From the moment
Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, with the Defendant Von Papen as
Vice-Chancellor, and with the Defendant Von Neurath as his Foreign
Minister, the whole atmosphere of the world darkened. The hopes of the
people began to recede. Treaties seemed no longer matters of solemn
obligation, but were entered into with complete cynicism as a means for
deceiving other States of Germany’s warlike intentions. International
Conferences were no longer to be used as a means for securing pacific
settlements but as occasions for obtaining by blackmail demands which
were eventually to be enlarged by war. The World came to know the War of
Nerves, the diplomacy of the fait accompli, of blackmail and bullying.

In October 1933 Hitler told his Cabinet that as the proposed Disarmament
Convention did not concede full equality to Germany, “It would be
necessary to torpedo the Disarmament Conference. It was out of the
question to negotiate: Germany would leave the Conference and the
League”. And on the 21st October 1933 she did so, and by so doing struck
a deadly blow at the fabric of security which had been built up on the
basis of the League Covenant. From that time on the record of their
foreign policy became one of complete disregard of all international
obligations and certainly not least of those solemnly concluded by
themselves. As Hitler had expressly avowed, “Agreements are kept only so
long as they serve a certain purpose” (_789-PS_). He might have added
that often the purpose was only to lull an intended victim into a false
sense of security. So patent, indeed, did this eventually become that to
be invited by the Defendant Ribbentrop to enter into a nonaggression
pact with Germany was almost a sign that Germany intended to attack the
state concerned. Nor was it only the formal treaty which they used and
violated as circumstances made expedient. These Defendants are charged,
too, with breaches of the less formal assurances which, in accordance
with diplomatic usage Germany gave to neighboring states. Today with the
advance of science the world has been afforded means of communication
and intercourse hitherto unknown, and as Hitler himself expressly
recognized, International relations no longer depend upon treaties
alone. The methods of diplomacy change. The Leader of one Nation can
speak to the Government and peoples of another. But though the methods
change the principles of good faith and honesty, established as the
fundamentals of civilized society, both in the national and the
International spheres, remain. It is a long time since it was said that
we are part, one of another. And if today the different states are more
closely connected and thus form part of a World Society more than ever
before, so also more than ever before is there that need of good faith
between them.

Let us see further how these Defendants, Ministers and High Officers of
the Nazi Government individually and collectively comported themselves
in these matters.

                                PART II

In the early hours of the 1st September 1939 under manufactured and, in
any event, inadequate, pretexts, the armed Forces of the German Reich
invaded Poland along the whole length of her Frontiers and thus launched
upon the world the war which was to bring down so many of the pillars of
our civilization. It was a breach of the Hague Conventions (_TC-2_). It
was a breach of the Treaty of Versailles which had established the
Frontiers between Germany and Poland. And however much Germany disliked
that Treaty—although Hitler had stated that he would respect its
territorial provisions—she was certainly not free to break it by
unilateral action. It was a breach of the Arbitration Treaty between
Germany and Poland concluded at Locarno on 16th October 1925 (_TC-15_).
By that Treaty Germany and Poland expressly agreed to refer any matters
of dispute not capable of settlement by ordinary diplomatic machinery to
the decision of an Arbitral Tribunal or of the Permanent Court of
International Justice. But that is not all. It was also a breach of a
more recent and, in view of the repeated emphasis laid on it by Hitler
himself, a more important engagement into which Nazi Germany had
entered. On the 26th January 1934 the German and Polish Governments had
signed a ten-year Pact of Non-aggression (_TC-21_). It was, as the
signatories stated, to introduce “a new era in the political relations
between Poland and Germany”. It was stated in the text of the Pact
itself that “the maintenance and guarantee of lasting Peace between the
two countries is an essential prerequisite for the general peace of
Europe”. The two Governments therefore agreed to base their mutual
relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris of 1928. They
declared that

    “In no circumstances * * * will they proceed to the application
    of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such
    disputes”. (_TC-21_)

That declaration and agreement was to remain in force for at least ten
years and thereafter would remain valid unless it was denounced by
either Government six months before the expiration of the ten years, or
subsequently a denunciation, with six months notice took place.

Both at the time of its signature and during the following four years
Hitler spoke of the German-Polish Agreement publicly as though it were a
cornerstone of his foreign policy. By entering into it he persuaded many
people that his intentions were genuinely pacific, for the re-emergence
of an independent Poland had cost Germany much territory and had
separated East Prussia from the Reich. That Hitler should of his own
accord enter into friendly relations with Poland; that in his speeches
on foreign policy he should proclaim his recognition of Poland’s right
to an exit to the sea, and the necessity for Germans and Poles to live
side by side in amity—these facts seemed to the world convincing proof
that Hitler had no “revisionist” aims which would threaten the peace of
Europe, and that he was even genuinely anxious to put an end to the
age-old hostility between the Teuton and the Slav. If his professions
were genuine his policy excluded a renewal of the _Drang nach Osten_ and
thereby would contribute to the stability of Europe. We shall have
occasion enough to see how little truth these pacific professions
contained. The history of the fateful years from 1934 to 1939 shows
quite clearly that the Germans used this Treaty, as they used other
Treaties, merely as an instrument of policy for furthering their
aggressive aims. It is clear from the documents now presented to the
Tribunal that these five years fall into two distinct phases in the
realization of aggressive aims which always underlay the Nazi policy.
There was first the period from the Nazi assumption of power in 1933
until the autumn of 1937. That was the preparatory period. During that
time there occurred the breaches of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties,
the feverish rearmament of Germany, the reintroduction of conscription,
the reoccupation and remilitarization of the Rhineland, and all the
other necessary preparatory measures for future aggression with which my
United States colleagues have already so admirably dealt. During that
time they lulled Poland into a false sense of security. Not only Hitler,
but also the Defendant Goering and the Defendant Ribbentrop made
statements approbating the Pact. In 1935 Goering was saying that “the
pact was not planned for a period of ten years but forever: there need
not be the slightest fear that it would not be continued.” Even though
Germany was steadily building up the greatest war machine that Europe
had ever known, and although, by January 1937, the German military
position was so secure that Hitler could refer openly to his strong
Army, he took pains also to say at the time that “by a series of
agreements we have eliminated existing tensions and thereby contributed
considerably to an improvement in the European atmosphere. I merely
recall the agreement with Poland which has worked out to the advantage
of both sides. * * *” (_2368-PS_). And so it went on—abroad
protestations of pacific intentions—at home “guns before butter”.

In 1937, however, this preparatory period drew to a close and Nazi
policy moved from general preparation for future aggression to specific
planning for the attainment of certain specific aggressive aims. Two
documents in particular mark this change.

The first of these was an important “Directive for unified preparation
for War” issued on June 29, 1937, by the Reich-Minister for War (von
Blomberg) and C-in-C of the Armed Forces (_C-175_). This document is
important, not only for its military directions, but for the
appreciation it contained of the European situation and for the
revelation it provides of the Nazi attitude towards it.

    “The general political position”, von Blomberg stated,
    “justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an
    attack from any side. Grounds for this are, in addition to the
    lack of desire for war in almost all Nations, particularly the
    Western Powers, the deficiencies in the preparedness for war of
    a number of States, and of Russia in particular”. (_C-175_)

He added, it is true, “The intention of unleashing an European War is
held just as little by Germany”. And it may be that that phrase was
carefully chosen, for Germany hoped to conquer the world in detail: to
fight on one front at a time, not to unleash a general European
conflict. But, he went on, “the politically fluid world situation, which
does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous
preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces (_a_) to counter attack
at any time (yet he had just said that there was no fear of any attack)
and (_b_) to enable the military exploitation of politically favorable
opportunities should they occur”. That phrase is no more than a
euphemistic description of aggressive war. It reveals the continued
adherence of the German military leaders to the doctrine that military
might, and if necessary war, should be an instrument of policy—the
doctrine explicitly condemned by the Kellogg Pact, to which Germany had
adhered. The document goes on to set out the general preparations
necessary for a possible war in the mobilization period 1937/1938. The
document is evidence at least for this—that the leaders of the German
Armed Forces had it in mind to use the military strength which they were
building up for aggressive purposes. “No reason”—they say—“to
anticipate attack from any side * * * there is a lack of desire for
war”. Yet they prepare to “exploit militarily favorable opportunities”.

Still more important as evidence of the transition to planned aggression
is the record of the important conference which Hitler held at the
Reichs Chancellery on November 5, 1937, at which von Blomberg, Reich
Minister for War, von Fritsch, C-in-C of the Army, Goering, C-in-C of
the Luftwaffe, Raeder, C-in-C of the Navy and von Neurath, then the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, were present. The minutes of that
conference have already been put in evidence (_386-PS_). I refer to them
now to emphasize those passages which make apparent the ultimate
intention to wage an aggressive war. As will be remembered, the burden
of Hitler’s argument at that conference was that Germany required more
territory in Europe. Austria and Czechoslovakia were specifically
envisaged. But Hitler realized that the process of conquering these two
countries might well bring into operation the treaty obligations of
Great Britain and France. He was prepared to take the risk.

    “The history of all times: Roman Empire, British Empire, has
    proved that every space expansion can only be effected by
    breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
    unavoidable: neither formerly nor today has space been found
    without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the
    proprietor. The question for Germany is where the greatest
    possible conquest can be made at the lowest possible cost”.

In the course of his address to that Conference Hitler had foreseen and
discussed the likelihood that Poland would be involved if the aggressive
expansionist aims which he put forward brought about a general European
war in the course of their realization by Germany. When, therefore, on
that very day Hitler assured the Polish Ambassador of the value of the
1934 Pact it can only be concluded that its real value in Hitler’s eyes
was that of keeping Poland quiet until Germany had acquired such a
territorial and strategic position that Poland would no longer be a
danger to her.

That view is confirmed by the events which followed. At the beginning of
February 1938 the change from Nazi preparation for aggression to active
aggression itself took place. It was marked by the substitution of
Ribbentrop for Neurath as Foreign Minister, and of Keitel for Blomberg
as head of OKW. Its first fruits were the bullying of Schuschnigg at
Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938, and the forcible absorption of
Austria in March. Thereafter the Green Plan (_Fall Gruen_) for the
destruction of Czechoslovakia was steadily developed—the plan partially
foiled, or of which the final consummation was at least delayed, by the
Munich Agreement.

With these developments of Nazi aggression my United States colleagues
have already dealt. But it is obvious that the acquisition of these two
countries, and of their resources in manpower and in the production of
munitions of war, immensely strengthened the position of Germany as
against Poland. It is, therefore, not surprising that, just as the
defendant Goering assured the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, at the
time of the Nazi invasion of Austria that Hitler recognized the validity
of the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty of 1925, and that Germany
had no designs against Czechoslovakia herself—“I give you my word of
honor” said Goering—so also continued assurances should be given during
1938 to Poland in order to keep that country from interfering with the
Nazi aggression on Poland’s neighbors.

Thus, on the 20th February 1938 on the eve of his invasion of Austria,
Hitler, referring to the fourth anniversary of the Polish Pact,
permitted himself to say this to the Reichstag:

    “* * * and so a way to a friendly understanding has been
    successfully paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig
    has today succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the
    relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into
    a sincere friendly cooperation. Relying on her friendships,
    Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which
    provides the foundation for the task ahead of us—Peace”.
    (_2357-PS_)

Still more striking are the cordial references to Poland in Hitler’s
speech in the Sportpalast at Berlin on the 26 September 1938. He then
said:

    “The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that
    of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and
    Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted
    to prevent this. I know well enough that I should not have been
    successful if Poland had had a democratic constitution. For
    these democracies which indulge in phrases about peace are the
    most bloodthirsty war agitators. In Poland there ruled no
    democracy, but a man: and with him I succeeded, in precisely
    twelve months, in coming to an agreement which, for ten years in
    the first instance, entirely removed the danger of a conflict.
    We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting
    pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which must
    live together and neither of which can do away with the other. A
    people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the
    sea. A way for understanding, then, had to be found, and it will
    be ever further extended. Certainly things were hard in this
    area. * * * But the main fact is that the two Governments, and
    all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples
    and in the two countries, possess the firm will and
    determination to improve their relations. It was a real work of
    peace, of more worth than all the chattering in the League of
    Nations Palace at Geneva”.

Thus flattery of Poland preceded the annexation of Austria and renewed
flattery of Poland preceded the projected annexation of Czechoslovakia.
The realities behind these outward expressions of goodwill are clearly
revealed in the documents relating to _Fall Gruen_, which are already
before the Tribunal. They show Hitler as fully aware that there was risk
of Poland, England and France being involved in war to prevent the
German annexation of Czechoslovakia, and that this risk though realized
was also accepted. On the 25th August top secret orders to the German
Air Force in regard to the operations to be conducted against England
and France if they intervened pointed out that, as the
French-Czechoslovak Treaty provided for assistance only in the case of
“unprovoked” attack, it would take a day or two for France and England
to decide whether legally the attack was unprovoked or not. A blitzkrieg
accomplishing its aims before effective intervention became possible was
the object to be aimed at.

On the same day an Air Force memorandum on future organization was
issued to which was attached a map on which the Baltic States, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia and Poland are all shown as part of Germany and
preparations for expanding the Air Force “as the Reich grows in area”,
as well as dispositions for a two-front war against France and Russia
are discussed (_L-43_; _Chart No. 10_). And on the following day von
Ribbentrop is being minuted about the reaction of Poland towards the
Czechoslovak problem:

    “The fact that after the liquidation of the Czech question it
    will be generally assumed that Poland will be next in turn” is
    recognized but, it is stated, “the later this assumption sinks
    in, the better”. (_TC-76_)

I will pause at the date of the Munich Agreement for a moment and ask
the Tribunal to consider what the evidence of documents and historical
facts shows up to that time. It has made undeniable the fact both of
Nazi aggressiveness and of active aggression. Not only does the
Conference of 1937 reveal Hitler and his associates deliberately
considering the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, if necessary
by war, but the first of those operations had been carried through in
March 1938 and a large part of the second, under threat of war, though
without actual need for its initiation, in September of the same year.
More ominous still, Hitler had revealed his adherence to his old
doctrines of _Mein Kampf_, those essentially aggressive to the
exposition of which in _Mein Kampf_ long regarded as the Bible of the
Nazi Party we shall draw attention. He is in pursuit of _Lebensraum_ and
he means to secure it by threats of force or, if they fail, by force, by
aggressive war.

So far actual warfare has been avoided because of the love of peace, the
lack of preparedness, the patience or the cowardice—which you will—of
the democratic Powers. But, after Munich, the questions which filled the
minds of all thinking people with acute anxiety was, “Where will this
end? Is Hitler now satisfied, as he declares he is? Or will his pursuit
of _Lebensraum_ lead to further aggressions, even if he has to make an
openly aggressive war to secure it?”

It was in relation to the remainder of Czechoslovakia and to Poland that
the answer to these questions was to be given. So far no direct and
immediate threat to Poland had been made. The two documents from which I
have just quoted (_L-43_; _TC-76_) show that high officers of the
defendant Goering’s Air Staff already regarded the extension of the
Reich and, it would appear, the destruction and absorption of Poland as
a foregone conclusion. They were already anticipating, indeed, the last
stage of Hitler’s policy stated in _Mein Kampf_, war to destroy France
and to secure _Lebensraum_ in Russia. And the writer of the Minute to
Ribbentrop already took it for granted that, after Czechoslovakia,
Poland would be attacked. More impressive than these two documents is
the fact that, as I have said, the record of the Conference of November
5, 1937, shows that war with Poland, if she should dare to attempt to
prevent German aggression against Czechoslovakia, had been coolly
contemplated and that the Nazi leaders were ready to take the risk. So
also had the risk of war with England and France under the same
circumstances been considered and accepted. Such a war would, of course,
have been an aggressive war on Nazi Germany’s part. For to force one
State to take up arms to defend another against aggression in order to
fulfill treaty obligations is to initiate aggressive war against the
first State.

Yet it remains true that until Munich the decision for direct attack
upon Poland and her destruction by aggressive war had apparently not as
yet been taken by Hitler and his associates. It is to the transition
from the intention and preparation of initiating an aggressive war,
evident in regard to Czechoslovakia, to the actual initiation and waging
of aggressive war against Poland that I now pass. That transition
occupies the eleven months from October 1, 1938 to the actual attack on
Poland on September 1, 1939.

Within six months of the signature of the Munich Agreement the Nazi
Leaders had occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia, which by that
agreement they had indicated their willingness to guarantee. On March
14th, 1939, the aged and infirm President of the “Rump” of
Czechoslovakia, Hacha, and his Foreign Minister, Chvalkowsky, were
summoned to Berlin. At a meeting held between 1.15 and 2.15 a. m. in the
small hours of the 15th March in the presence of Hitler and the
defendants Ribbentrop, Goering, and Keitel, they were bullied and
threatened and informed bluntly that Hitler “had issued the order for
the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia, and for the
incorporation of this country into the German Reich”. It was made quite
clear to them that resistance would be useless and would be crushed “by
force of arms with all available means”. It was thus that the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up and that Slovakia was
turned into a German satellite, though nominally independent, state. By
their own unilateral action, on pretexts which had no shadow of
validity, without discussion with the Governments of any other country,
without mediation and in direct contradiction of the sense and spirit of
the Munich Agreement, the Germans acquired for themselves that for which
they had been planning in September of the previous year, and indeed
much earlier, but which at that time they had felt themselves unable
completely to secure without too patent an exhibition of their
aggressive intentions. Aggression achieved whetted the appetite for
aggression to come. There were protests. England and France sent
diplomatic notes. Of course there were protests. The Nazis had clearly
shown their hand. Hitherto they had concealed from the outside world
that their claims went beyond incorporating into the Reich persons of
German Race living in bordering territory. Now for the first time, in
defiance of their own solemn assurances to the contrary, non-German
territory had been seized. This acquisition of the whole of
Czechoslovakia, together with the equally illegal occupation of Memel on
the 22d March, resulted in an immense strengthening of the German
position, both politically and strategically, as Hitler had anticipated
it would when he discussed the matter at his conference on November 5th,
1937. (_386-PS_)

Long before the consummation by the Nazi Leaders of their aggression
against Czechoslovakia, however, they had already begun to make demands
upon Poland. On October 25th, 1938, that is to say within less than a
month of Hitler’s reassuring speech about Poland already quoted and of
the Munich Agreement itself, M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin,
reported to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, that at a luncheon at
Berchtesgaden the day before (October 24th) the defendant Ribbentrop had
put forward demands for the reunion of Danzig with the Reich and for the
building of an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across
Pomorze, that is, the province which the Germans called the Corridor.
From that moment onwards until the Polish Government had made it plain,
during a visit of the defendant Ribbentrop to Warsaw which ended on
January 27th, 1939, that they would not consent to hand over Danzig to
German Sovereignty negotiations on these German demands continued. Even
after Ribbentrop’s return Hitler thought it worth while in his Reichstag
Speech on January 30th, 1939 to say—

    “We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion
    of our nonaggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be any
    difference of opinion today among the true friends of peace as
    to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself
    what might have happened to Europe if this agreement, which
    brought such relief, had not been entered into five years ago.
    In signing it, the great Polish marshal and patriot rendered his
    people just as great a service as the leaders of the
    National-Socialist State rendered the German people. During the
    troubled months of the past year the friendship between Germany
    and Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the
    political life of Europe”.

That utterance, however, was the last friendly word from Germany to
Poland and the last occasion upon which the Nazi Leader mentioned the
German-Polish Agreement with approbation. During February 1939 silence
fell upon German demands. But as soon as the final absorption of
Czechoslovakia had taken place, and Germany had also absorbed Memel,
Nazi pressure upon Poland was at once renewed. In two conversations
between himself and the defendant Ribbentrop, held on March 21st and
March 26th respectively (Polish White Book Number 61 and Number 63),
German demands upon Poland were renewed and further pressed. In view of
the fate which had overtaken Czechoslovakia and of the grave
deterioration in her strategical position towards Germany it is not
surprising that the Polish Government took alarm at these developments.
Nor were they alone in this. The events of March 1939 had at last
convinced both the English and French Governments that the Nazi designs
of aggression were not limited to men of German race and that the
spectre of European war resulting from further aggressions by Nazi
Germany had not been exorcised by the Munich Agreement.

As a result, therefore, of the concern of Poland, England, and France at
the events in Czechoslovakia and at the newly applied pressure on
Poland, conversations between the English and Polish Governments had
been taking place, and, on 31st March, 1939, Mr. Neville Chamberlain,
speaking in the House of Commons, stated that His Majesty’s Government
had given an assurance to help Poland in the event of any action which
clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government
accordingly considered it vital to resist (_TC-72, No. 17_). On 6th
April 1939 an Anglo-Polish communique stated that the two countries were
prepared to enter into an Agreement of a permanent and reciprocal
character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance
given by His Majesty’s Government. (_TC-72, No. 18_)

The justification for such concern is not difficult to find. With the
evidence which we now have of what was happening within the councils of
the German Reich and its armed forces during these months it is manifest
that the German Government were intent on seizing Poland as a whole,
that Danzig—as Hitler was to say himself a month later—“was not the
subject of the dispute at all”. The Nazi Government was intent upon
aggression and the demands and negotiations in respect of Danzig were
merely a cover and excuse for further domination.

As far back as September 1938 plans for aggressive war against Poland,
England, and France were well in hand. While Hitler, at Munich, was
telling the world that the German people wanted peace and that, having
solved the Czechoslovakian problem, Germany had no more territorial
problems in Europe, the staffs of his armed forces were already
preparing plans. On the 26th September 1938 he had said:

    “We have given guarantees to the States in the West. We have
    assured all our immediate neighbours of the integrity of their
    territory as far as Germany is concerned. That is no mere
    phrase. It is our sacred will. We have no interest whatever in a
    breach of the peace. We want nothing from these peoples.”

The world was entitled to rely upon these assurances. International
cooperation is impossible unless one can assume good faith in the
leaders of the various States. But within two months of that solemn and
considered undertaking, Hitler and his confederates were preparing for
the seizure of Danzig. To recognize these assurances, these pledges,
these diplomatic moves as the empty frauds they were, one must go back
to enquire what was happening within the inner councils of the Reich
from the time of the Munich Agreement.

Written some time in September 1938 is an extract from a file on the
Reconstruction of the German Navy (_C-23_). Under the heading “Opinion
on the Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England” it is stated:

    “1. If, according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to
    acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only
    sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval
    communications and secure access to the ocean.

    “2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to
    Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world
    powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful
    means. The decision to make Germany a world power, therefore,
    forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding
    preparations for war.

    “3. War against England means at the same time war against the
    Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a
    large number of countries overseas, in fact, against half to
    one-third of the world.

    “It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is
    prepared economically as well as politically and militarily and
    waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the
    ocean.” (_C-23_)

Here is something which is both significant and new. Until this date the
documents in our possession disclose preparations for war against
Poland, England, and France purporting at least to be defensive measures
to ward off attacks which might result from the intervention of those
powers in the preparatory aggression of Germany in Central Europe.
Hitherto aggressive war against Poland, England, and France has been
contemplated only as a distant objective. Now, for the first time, we
find a war of conquest by Germany against France and England openly
recognized as the future aim, at least of the German Navy.

On the 24th November 1938 an Appendix was issued by Keitel to a previous
order of the Fuehrer. In this Appendix there are set out the future
tasks for the armed forces and the preparation for the conduct of the
war which would result from those tasks.

    “The Fuehrer has ordered that besides the three eventualities
    mentioned in the previous Directive preparations are also to be
    made for the surprise occupation by German troops of the Free
    State of Danzig.

    “For the preparation the following principles are to be borne in
    mind—the primary assumption is the lightning seizure of Danzig
    by exploiting a favorable political situation and not war with
    Poland * * *. Troops which are going to be used for this purpose
    must not be held at the same time for the seizure of Memelland,
    so that both operations can take place simultaneously should
    such necessity arise.” (_C-137_)

Thereafter, as the evidence which has already been produced has shown,
final preparations for the invasion of Poland were taking place. On the
3d April 1939, three days before the issue of the Anglo-Polish
communique, Keitel issued to the High Command of the Armed Forces a
Directive in which it was stated that the Directive for the uniform
preparation of war by the armed forces in 1939-40 was being re-issued,
and that the part concerning Danzig would be issued in the middle of
April. The basic principles were to remain the same as in the previous
Directive. Attached to this document were the orders “_Fall Weiss_”, the
code name for the proposed invasion of Poland. Preparations for that
invasion were to be made in such a way that the operation could be
carried out at any time from the 1st September 1939 onwards. (_C-120_)

On the 11th April Hitler issued his Directive for the uniform
preparations of war by the armed forces 1939-40. In it he says:

    “I shall lay down in a later Directive future tasks of the armed
    forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these
    for the conduct of war. Until that Directive comes into force
    the armed forces must be prepared for the following
    eventualities:

    “1. Safeguarding of the frontiers.

    “2. _“Fall Weiss.”_

    “3. The annexation of Danzig.”

In an Annex to that document headed “Political Hypotheses and Aims” it
is stated that quarrels with Poland should be avoided. Should Poland,
however, change her present policy and adopt a threatening attitude
towards Germany, a final settlement would be necessary, notwithstanding
the pact with Poland. The Free City of Danzig was to be incorporated
into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. The policy
aims to limit the war to Poland and this is considered possible with the
internal crisis in France and resulting British restraint.

The wording of this document does not directly involve the intention of
immediate aggression. It is a plan of attack “if Poland changes her
policy and adopts a threatening attitude”. But the picture of Poland,
with her inadequate armaments, threatening Germany is ludicrous enough
and the real aim emerges in the sentence “The aim is then to destroy
Polish military strength and to create, in the East, a situation which
satisfies the requirements of defense”—a sufficiently vague phrase to
cover designs of any magnitude. Even now the evidence does not suffice
to prove that the actual decision to attack Poland has been taken. But
all preparations are being set in train in case that decision is
reached.

It was within three weeks of the date of this last document that Hitler
addressed the Reichstag (April 28th, 1939). In his speech he repeated
the German demands already made to Poland and proceeded to denounce the
German-Polish Agreement of 1934. Leaving aside for the moment the
warlike preparations for aggression, which Hitler had set in train
behind the scenes, I will ask the Tribunal to consider the nature of the
denunciation of an Agreement to which, in the past, Hitler had professed
to attach so high an importance.

In the first place Hitler’s denunciation was _per se_ ineffectual, since
the text of the Agreement made no provision for its denunciation by
either Party until six months before the expiration of the ten years for
which it was concluded. No denunciation could be legally affective,
therefore, until June or July 1943, and Hitler was speaking on April
28th 1939—more than five years too soon!

In the second place Hitler’s actual attack on Poland when it came on
September 1st, 1939, was made before the expiration of the six months
period after denunciation required by the Agreement before such a
denunciation became operative. In the third place the grounds for his
denunciation of the Agreement stated by Hitler in his speech to the
Reichstag are entirely specious. However one reads its terms it is
impossible to accept the view that the Anglo-Polish guarantee of mutual
assistance against aggression could render the Pact null and void. If
that were so then certainly the Pacts already entered into by Hitler
with Italy and Japan had already invalidated it, and Hitler might have
spared his breath. But the truth is that the text of the German-Polish
Agreement contains nothing whatever to support Hitler’s contention.

Why then did Hitler make this trebly invalid attempt to denounce his own
pet diplomatic child? Is there any other possible answer but that, the
Agreement having served its purpose, the grounds which he put forward
were chosen merely in an effort to provide Germany with some
justification for the aggression on which she was intent.

For Hitler sorely needed some kind of justification, some apparently
decent excuse, since nothing had happened, or was likely to happen, from
the Polish side to provide him with it. So far he had made demands upon
his Treaty partner which Poland, as a sovereign State had every right to
refuse. If dissatisfied with that refusal Hitler was bound, under the
terms of the Agreement itself, to “seek a settlement through other
peaceful means, without prejudice to the possibility of applying those
methods of procedure, in case of necessity, which are provided for such
a case in the other agreements between them that are in force”—a
reference, it can only be supposed, to the German-Polish Arbitration
Treaty signed at Locarno in 1925.

The very fact, therefore, that as soon as the Nazi leader cannot get
what he wants, but is not entitled to, from Poland by merely asking for
it, and that, on his side, he made no further effort to settle the
dispute “by peaceful means” in accordance with the terms of the
Agreement and of the Kellogg Pact, to which the Agreement pledged both
Parties, in itself creates a strong presumption of aggressive intentions
against Hitler and his associates. That presumption becomes a certainty
when the documents to which I shall now refer are studied.

On 10th May Hitler issued an order for the capture of economic
installations in Poland and on 16th May the Defendant Raeder, as
Commander in Chief of the Navy, issued a memorandum setting out the
Fuehrer’s instructions to prepare for the operation “Fall Weiss” at any
time from the 1st September 1939. (_C-120_)

But the decisive document is the record of the Conference held by Hitler
on May 23d, 1939 with various high-ranking officers, including the
defendants Goering, Raeder, and Keitel. Hitler then stated that the
solution of the economic problems could not be found without invasion of
foreign States and attacks on foreign property.

    “Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all: it is a
    question of expanding our living space in the East * * *. There
    is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with
    the decision: to attack Poland at the earliest opportunity. We
    cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be
    war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of this
    isolation will be decisive. The isolation of Poland is a matter
    of skillful politics.” (_L-79_)

He anticipated the possibility that war with England and France might
result. But a two-front war was to be avoided if possible. Yet England
was recognized as the most dangerous enemy. “England is the driving
force against Germany * * * the aim will always be to force England to
her knees.” More than once he repeated that the war with England and
France would be a life and death struggle. All the same, he concluded,
“We shall not be forced into war but we shall not be able to avoid one.”

On the 14th June, 1939, General Blaskowitz, then Commander in Chief of
the 3d Army Group, issued a detailed battle plan for the “_Fall Weiss_”
(_2327-PS_). The following day Von Brauchitsch issued a memorandum in
which it was stated that the object of the impending operating was to
destroy the Polish Armed Forces. “High Policy demands”—he said—“that
the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve
quick results (_C-126_). The preparations proceeded apace. On the 22d
June Keitel submitted a preliminary timetable for the operation which
Hitler seems to have approved and suggested that the scheduled manouevre
must be camouflaged “in order not to disquiet the population”. On the 3d
July Brauchitsch wrote to Raeder urging that certain preliminary naval
moves should be abandoned in order not to prejudice the surprise of the
attack. On the 12th and 13th August Hitler and Ribbentrop had a
conference with Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister.

At the beginning of the conversation Hitler emphasized the strength of
the German position, of its western and eastern fortifications and of
the strategic and other advantages that they held in comparison with
those of England, France, and Poland.

    “Since the Poles through their whole attitude had made it clear
    that in any case in the event of a conflict they would stand on
    the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick
    liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for
    the unavoidable conflict with the Western democracies. If a
    hostile Poland remained on Germany’s Eastern frontier, not only
    would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also
    further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This
    would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.
    Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the
    neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process
    could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one
    partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with
    an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a
    neutral of this kind.”

Ciano was for postponing the operation. Italy was not ready—she
believed that a conflict with Poland would develop into a general
European war. Mussolini was convinced that conflict with the Western
democracies was inevitable but he was making plans for a period two or
three years ahead. But the Fuehrer said that the Danzig question must be
settled one way or the other by the end of August. “He had, therefore,
decided to use the occasion of the next Polish provocation in the form
of an ultimatum.” On the 22d August Hitler called his Supreme Commanders
together at Obersalzburg and gave the order for the attack: in the
course of what he said he made it clear that the decision to attack had
in fact been made not later than the previous spring. He would give a
spurious cause for starting the war (_1014-PS_; _L-3_). At that time the
attack was timed for the early hours of the 26th August. On the day
before the British Government, in the hope that Hitler might still be
reluctant to plunge the world into war, and in the belief that a formal
treaty would impress him more than the informal assurances which had
been given previously, entered into an agreement for mutual assistance
with Poland, embodying the previous assurances. It was known to Hitler
that France was bound by the Franco-Polish Treaty of 1921, and by the
Guarantee Pact signed at Locarno in 1925 to intervene in Poland’s aid in
case of aggression. For a moment Hitler hesitated. Goering and
Ribbentrop agree that it was this Anglo-Polish Treaty which led him to
call off, or rather postpone the attack. Perhaps he hoped that there was
still some chance of repeating, after all, what he had called the Czech
affair. If so, his hopes were short-lived.

On the 27th August Hitler accepted Mussolini’s decision not at once to
come into the war, but asked for propaganda support and a display of
military activities to create uncertainty in the minds of the Allies.
Ribbentrop on the same day said that the Armies were marching.

In the meantime, of course, and particularly in the last month,
desperate attempts had been made by the Western Powers to avert war. You
will have details of them in evidence. Of the intervention of the Pope.
Of President Roosevelt’s message. Of the offer by Mr. Chamberlain to do
our utmost to create the conditions in which all matters in issue could
be the subject of free negotiations and to guarantee the resultant
decisions. This and all the other efforts of honest men to avoid the
horror of a European war were predestined to failure. The Germans were
determined that the day for war had come. On the 31st August Hitler
issued a top secret order for the attack to commence in the early hours
of the 1st September. The necessary frontier incidents duly
occurred—was it for these that Keitel had been instructed by Hitler to
supply Heydrich with Polish uniforms?—and thus, without a declaration
of war, without even giving the Polish Government an opportunity of
seeing Germany’s final demands the Nazi troops invaded Poland. On the 3d
September, Hitler sent a telegram to Mussolini thanking him for his
intervention but pointing out that the war was inevitable and that the
most promising moment had to be picked after cold deliberation
(_1831-PS_). And so Hitler and his Confederates now before this Tribunal
began the first of their wars of aggression for which they had prepared
so long and so thoroughly. They waged it so fiercely that within a few
weeks Poland was overrun.

On the 23d November 1939 Hitler reviewed the situation to his military
Commanders and in the course of his speech he said this:

    “One year later Austria came; this step was also considered
    doubtful. It brought about a tremendous reinforcement of the
    Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step
    also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of
    all the Western fortifications had to be finished * * *. Then
    followed the creation of the Protectorate and with that the
    basis of action against Poland was laid. But I wasn’t quite
    clear at that time whether I should start first against the East
    and then in the West or vice versa. The decision came to fight
    with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight again
    and again. In struggle, I see the fate of all human beings.”
    (_789-PS_)

He was not sure when to attack first. But that sooner or later he would
attack was never in doubt, and he had been warned not only by the
British and French Prime Ministers but even by his confederate Mussolini
that an attack on Poland would bring England and France into the war. He
chose what he considered the opportune moment—and he struck.

In these circumstances the intent to wage war against England and
France, and to precipitate it by an attack on Poland, is not to be
denied. Here was defiance of the most solemn treaty obligations: here
was neglect of the most pacific assurances. Here was aggression, naked
and unashamed, which was indeed to arouse the horrified and heroic
resistance of all civilized peoples but which was to tear down many of
the pillars of our civilization.

Once started upon the active achievement of their plan to secure the
domination of Europe, if not of the world, the Nazi Government proceeded
to attack other countries, as occasion offered. The first actually to be
invaded after the attack on Poland were Denmark and Norway.

On the 9th April 1940 the German Armed Forces invaded Norway and Denmark
without warning, without any declaration of war. It was a breach of the
Hague Convention of 1907. It was a breach of the Convention of
Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Denmark dated 2d June,
1926. It was, of course, a breach of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. It
was a violation of the Nonaggression Treaty between Germany and Denmark
made on the 31st May 1939. And it was a breach of the most explicit
assurances which had been given. After his annexation of Czechoslovakia
had shaken the confidence of the world, Hitler attempted to reassure the
Scandinavian States. On the 28th April, 1939, he affirmed that he had
never made any request to them which was incompatible with their
sovereignty and independence. On the 31st May, 1939, he signed a
nonaggression Pact with Denmark.

On the 2d September, the day after he had invaded Poland and seized
Danzig, he again expressed his determination to observe the
inviolability and integrity of Norway in an aide memoire which was
handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo
on that day. (_TC-31_)

A month later, on the 6th October 1939, he said in a public speech:

    “Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points
    of controversy with the Northern States, neither has she any
    today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered nonaggression
    pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they
    do not feel themselves threatened in any way.”

When the invasion of Norway and Denmark had already begun in the early
morning of the 9th April, a German memorandum was handed to the
Governments of those countries attempting to justify the German action.
Various allegations against the Governments of the invaded countries
were made. It was said that Norway had been guilty of breaches of
neutrality. It was said that she had allowed and tolerated the use of
her territorial waters by Great Britain. It was said that Britain and
France were making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway and that
the Government of that country was prepared to acquiesce in such an
event.

I do not propose to argue the question whether or not those allegations
were true or false. That question is irrelevant to the issue before this
Court. Even if the allegations were true (and they were patently false),
they would afford no conceivable justification for the action of
invading without warning, without declaration of war and without any
attempt at mediation or conciliation. Aggressive war is none the less
aggressive war because the State which wages it believes that other
states may take similar action. The rape of a nation is not justified
because it is thought she may be raped by another. Nor even in
self-defense are warlike measures justified except after all means of
mediation have failed and force is actually being exercised against the
State concerned.

In actual fact, with the evidence which we now possess it is clear that
the invasion of these countries was undertaken for quite different
purposes, that it had been planned long before any question of breach of
neutrality or occupation of Norway by England could ever have occurred.
It is clear also that the assurances repeated again and again throughout
the year 1939 were made for no other purpose than to lull suspicion in
those countries and to prevent them taking steps to resist the attack
against them which was under active preparation.

For some years, Rosenberg, in his capacity of Chief of the Foreign
Affairs Bureau (APA) of the NSDAP, had interested himself in the
promotion of fifth column activities in Norway, and close relationship
was established with the “Nasjonal Samling”, a political group headed by
the now notorious traitor, Vidkun Quisling (_007-PS_). During the winter
of 1938/39, APA was in contact with Quisling and later Quisling
conferred with Hitler, Raeder, and Rosenberg. In August 1939 a special
14 day course was held at the school of the office of Foreign Relations
in Berlin for 25 followers whom Quisling had selected to attend. The
plan was to send a number of selected and “reliable” men to Germany for
a brief military training in an isolated camp. These were to be area and
language specialists to German special troops who were taken to Oslo on
coal barges to undertake political action in Norway. The object was a
coup in which Quisling would seize his leading opponents in Norway,
including the King, and prevent all military resistance from the
beginning. Simultaneously Germany was making military preparations. On
the 2d September, 1939; Hitler had assured Norway of his intention to
respect her neutrality, and on 6th October he said that the Scandinavian
States were not menaced in any way, yet on 3d October 1939 Raeder was
pointing out that the occupation of bases, if necessary by force, would
greatly improve the strategic and economic position (_1546-PS_). On the
9th October Doenitz was recommending Trondheim as the main base with
Narvik as an alternative base for fuel supplies. Rosenberg was reporting
shortly afterwards on the possibility of a coup d’état by Quisling
immediately supported by German military and naval forces. On the 12th
December 1939 Raeder advised Hitler, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl,
that if Hitler was favourably impressed by Quisling, OKW should prepare
for the occupation of Norway, if possible with Quisling’s assistance,
but if necessary entirely by force. Hitler agreed but there was a doubt
whether action should be taken against the Low Countries or Scandinavia
first. Weather conditions delayed the march against the Low Countries.
In January instructions were given to the Germany Navy for the attack on
Norway, and on March 1st, 1940, a Directive for the occupation was
issued by Hitler. The general objective was not said to be to prevent
occupation by English Forces but in vague and general terms to prevent
British encroachment in Scandinavia and the Baltic and “to guarantee our
ore bases in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line
against Britain.” But the Directive went on:

    “* * * on principle we will do our utmost to make the operation
    appear as a peaceful occupation the object of which is the
    military protection of the Scandinavian States * * * it is
    important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western
    opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures. * * * In
    case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept
    secret the leader and the troops will be deceived with
    fictitious objectives.”

The form and success of the invasion are well known. In the early hours
of the 9th April 7 cruisers, 14 destroyers, and several torpedo boats
and other small craft carried advance elements of 6 divisions totalling
about 10,000 men, forced an entry and landed troops in the outer Oslo
Fjord, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. A small
number of troops were also landed at Arendal and Egersund on the
southern coast. In addition airborne troops were landed on aerodromes
near Oslo and Stavanger. The German attack came as a surprise and all
the invaded towns along the coast were captured according to plan with
only slight losses. Only the plan to capture the King and members of the
Government and the Parliament failed. Brave as the resistance was that
was hurriedly organized throughout the country, nothing could be done in
the face of the long-planned surprise attack and on 10 June military
resistance ceased. So was another act of aggression brought to
completion.

Almost exactly a month after the attack on Norway, on the 10th May 1940
the German Armed Forces, repeating what had been done 25 years before,
streamed into Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg according to
plan—the plan that is, of invading without warning and without
declaration of War.

What was done was of course a breach of the Hague Convention of 1907,
and is so charged. It was a violation of the Locarno Agreement and
Arbitration Convention with Belgium of 1925 which the Nazi Government
affirmed in 1935, only illegally to repudiate it two years later. By
that agreement all questions incapable of settlement by ordinary
diplomatic means were to be settled by arbitration. You will see the
comprehensive terms of these agreements. It was a breach of the Treaty
of Arbitration and Conciliation signed between Germany and the
Netherlands on the 20th May 1926; it was a violation of the similar
Treaty with Luxembourg on the 11th September 1929. It was a breach of
the Briand-Kellogg Pact. But those Treaties had not perhaps derived in
the minds of the Nazi Rulers of Germany any added sanctity from the fact
that they had been solemnly concluded by the Governments of pre-Nazi
Germany.

Let us consider the specific assurances and undertakings which the Nazi
Rulers themselves gave to the States which lay in the way of their plans
against France and England and which they always intended to attack. Not
once, not twice, but eleven times the clearest assurances were given to
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. On those assurances solemnly
and formally expressed, those countries were entitled to rely. In
respect of their breach these Defendants are charged. On the 30th
January, 1937 Hitler said:

    “As for the rest, I have more than once expressed the desire and
    the hope of entering into similar good and cordial relations
    with our neighbours. Germany has, and here I repeat this
    solemnly, given the assurance time and time again, that, for
    instance, between her and France there cannot be any humanly
    conceivable points of controversy. The German Government has
    further given the assurance to Belgium and Holland that it is
    prepared to recognize and to guarantee the inviolability and
    neutrality of these territories.”

After Hitler had remilitarized the Rhineland and had repudiated the
Locarno Pact, England and France sought to reestablish the position of
security for Belgium which Hitler’s action had threatened. They,
therefore, themselves gave to Belgium on the 24th April 1937, a specific
guarantee that they would maintain in respect of Belgium, undertakings
of assistance which they had entered into with her both under the
Locarno Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations. On the 13th
October 1937 the German Government also made a declaration assuring
Belgium of its intention to recognize the inviolability and integrity of
that country.

It is, perhaps, convenient to deal with the remaining assurances as we
review the evidence which is available as to the preparations and
intentions of the German Government prior to their invasion of Belgium
on the 10th May 1940.

As in the case of Poland, as in the case of Norway and Denmark, so also
here the dates speak for themselves.

As early as August 1938 steps were being made to utilize the Low
Countries as defense bases for decisive action in the West in the event
of France and England opposing Germany in its aggression upon
Czechoslovakia.

In an air force letter dated 25th August 1938 which deals with the
action to be taken if England and France should interfere in the
operation against Czechoslovakia, it is stated:

    “It is not expected for the moment that other States will
    intervene against Germany. The Dutch and the Belgian area
    assumes in this connection much more importance for the
    prevention of the war in Western Europe than during the world
    war. This mainly is an advance base for the air war.” (_375-PS_)

In the last paragraph of that order it is stated “Belgium and the
Netherlands when in German hands represent an extraordinary advantage in
the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against
France.” (_375-PS_)

That was in August 1938. Eight months later (on the 28th April 1939)
Hitler is declaring again, “I was pleased that a number of European
states availed themselves of this declaration by the German Government
to express and emphasize their desire to have absolute neutrality.”

A month later, on the 23d May, 1939, Hitler held the conference in the
Reich Chancellery, to which we have already referred. The Minutes of
that meeting report Hitler as saying:

    “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
    force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England
    and France enter the war between Germany and Poland they will
    support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality. * * *
    Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we
    must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at
    securing new defense lines on Dutch soil up to the Zuyder Zee”.
    (_L-79_)

Even after that he was to give his solemn declarations that he would
observe Belgian neutrality. On the 26th August 1939 when the crisis in
regard to Danzig and Poland was reaching its climax, declarations
assuring the Governments concerned of the intention to respect their
neutrality were handed by the German Ambassadors to the King of the
Belgians, the Queen of the Netherlands, and to the Government of the
Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg in the most solemn form. But to the Army—“If
Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held”—it was said—“a
successful war against England will be secured.”

On the 1st September Poland was invaded, and two days later England and
France came into the War against Germany in pursuance of the treaty
obligation already referred to. On the 6th October Hitler renewed his
assurances of friendship to Belgium and Holland. But on the 9th October,
before any kind of accusation had been made by the German Government of
breaches of neutrality by Belgium, the Netherlands, or Luxembourg,
Hitler issued a directive for the conduct of the war.

In that directive he stated:

    “1. If it becomes evident in the near future that England and
    France acting under her leadership, are not disposed to end the
    war, I am determined to take firm and offensive action without
    letting much time elapse.

    “2. A long waiting period results not only in the ending of the
    advantage to the Western Powers, of Belgium and perhaps also of
    Dutch neutrality, but also strengthens the military power of our
    enemies to an increasing degree, causes confidence of the
    neutrals in German final victory to wane, and does not help to
    bring Italy to our aid as brothers-in-arms.

    “3. I therefore issue the following orders for the further
    conduct of military operations:

    “(_a_) Preparations should be made for offensive action on the
    Northern flank of the Western front crossing the area of
    Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out
    as soon and as forcefully as possible.

    “(_b_) The object of this attack is to defeat as many strong
    sections of the French Fighting Army as possible, and her ally
    and partner in the fighting, and at the same time to acquire as
    great an area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as
    possible, to use as a base offering good prospects for waging
    aerial and sea warfare against England and to provide ample
    coverage for the vital district of the Ruhr.”

Nothing could state more clearly or more definitely the object behind
the invasion of these countries than that document.

On the 15th October 1939 Keitel wrote a most secret letter concerning
_Fall Gelb_, which was the code name for the operation against the Low
Countries. In it he stated:

    “The protection of the Ruhr area by moving A/C reporting service
    and the air defense as far forward as possible in the area of
    Holland is significant for the whole conduct of the war. The
    more Dutch territory we occupy the more effective can the
    defense of the Ruhr area be made. This point of view must
    determine the choice of objectives of the army even if the army
    and navy are not directly interested in such territorial gain.
    It must be the object of the army’s preparations, therefore, to
    occupy on receipt of a special order the territory of Holland in
    the first instance in the area of the Grebbe-Marse line. It will
    depend on the military and political attitude of the Dutch as
    well as on the effectiveness of their flooding, whether objects
    can and must be further extended.” (_C-62_)

The operation had apparently been planned to take place at the beginning
of November. We have in our possession a series of 17 letters dated from
7th November until the 9th May postponing almost from day to day the
D-day of the operation, so that by the beginning of November all the
major plans and preparations had been made. (_C-72_)

On the 10th January 1940 a German aeroplane force landed in Belgium. In
it was found the remains of a half-burnt operation order setting out
considerable details of the Belgian landing grounds that were to be
captured (_TC-58_). Many other documents have been found which
illustrate the planning and preparation for this invasion in the latter
half of 1939 and early 1940, but they carry the matter no further, and
they show no more clearly than the evidence to which I have already
referred, the plans and intention of the German Governments and its
armed forces.

On the 10th May 1940 at about 0500 hours in the morning the German
invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg began.

Once more the forces of aggression marched on. Treaties, assurances, the
rights of Sovereign States meant nothing. Brutal force, covered by as
great an element of surprise as the Nazis could secure, was to seize
that which was deemed necessary for striking the mortal blow against
England, the main Enemy. The only fault of these unhappy countries was
that they stood in the path of the German invader. But that was enough.

On the 6th April 1941 German armed forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia.
Again the blow was struck without warning and with the cowardice and
deceit which the World now fully expected from the self-styled
“_Herrenvolk_”. It was a breach of the Hague Convention of 1899. It was
a breach of the Pact of Paris of 1928. It was a breach of a specific
assurance given by Hitler on the 6th October 1939.

“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss”, he said, “I
informed Yugoslavia that, from now on, the frontier with this country
will also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in Peace
and Friendship with her”. (_TC-43_)

But the plan for aggression against Yugoslavia had, of course, been in
hand well before that. In the aggressive action eastward towards the
Ukraine and the Soviet territories security of the Southern flank and
the lines of communication had already been considered.

The history of events leading up to the invasion of Yugoslavia by
Germany is well known. At 3 o’clock on the morning of the 28th October
1940 a 3-hour ultimatum had been presented by the Italian Government to
the Greek Government and the presentation of this ultimatum was followed
by the aerial bombardment of Greek provincial towns and the advance of
Italian troops into Greek territory. The Greeks, not prepared for such
an assault, were at first forced to withdraw. Later the Italian advance
was first checked, then driven towards the Albanian frontier, and by the
end of 1940 the Italian Army had suffered severe reverses at Greek
hands.

Of German intentions there is the evidence of what occurred when, on
12th August 1939, Hitler held his meeting with Ciano.

You will remember Hitler said:

    “Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the
    neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process
    could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one
    partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with
    an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a
    neutral of this kind.” (_TC-77_)

Later again on the second day of the conversation, 13th August, he said:

    “In general, however, from success by one of the Axis partners
    not only strategical but also psychological strengthening of the
    other partner and also of the whole Axis would ensue. Italy
    carried through a number of successful operations in Abyssinia,
    Spain and Albania and each time against the wishes of the
    Democratic Entente. These individual actions have not only
    strengthened Italian local interests but have also reinforced
    her general position. The same was the case with German action
    in Austria and Czechoslovakia. * * * The strengthening of the
    Axis by these individual operations was of the greatest
    importance for the unavoidable clash with the Western Powers.”

Once again we see the same procedure being followed. That meeting had
taken place on the 12/13th August, 1939. Less than two months later, on
6 October 1939 Hitler was giving his assurance to Yugoslavia that
Germany only desired to live in peace and friendship with the Yugoslav
State, the liquidation of which by his Axis partner he had himself
suggested.

On the 28th October 1940 the Italians presented a 3 hour ultimatum to
Greece and commenced war against her. Eventually the advance was
checked, then driven back, and the Italians suffered considerable
reverses at Greek hands.

We have an undated letter from Hitler to Mussolini which must have been
written about the time of the Italian aggression against Greece.
(_2762-PS_)

    “Permit me at the beginning of this letter to assure you that
    within the last 14 days my heart and my thoughts have been more
    than ever with you. Moreover, Duce, be assured of my
    determination to do everything on your behalf which might ease
    the present situation for you. * * * When I asked you to receive
    me in Florence, I undertook the trip in the hope of being able
    to express my views prior to the beginning of the threatening
    conflict with Greece, about which I had only received general
    information. First, I wanted to request you to postpone the
    action, if possible until a more favorable time of year, at all
    events, however, until after the American presidential election.
    But in any case, however, I wanted to request you, Duce, not to
    undertake this action without a previous lightning-like
    occupation of Crete and, for this purpose, I also wanted to
    submit to you some practical suggestions in regard to the
    employment of a German parachute division and a further airborne
    division. * * * Yugoslavia must become disinterested, if
    possible, however from our point of view interested in
    cooperating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without
    assurances from Yugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful
    operation in the Balkans. * * * Unfortunately I must stress the
    fact that waging war in the Balkans before March is impossible.
    Hence it would also serve to make any threatening influence upon
    Yugoslavia of no purpose, since the Serbian General Staff is
    well aware of the fact that no practical action could follow
    such a threat before March. Here Yugoslavia must, if at all
    possible, be won over by other means and other ways.”

On the 12th November in his Top Secret Order No. 18 Hitler ordered the
OKH to make preparations to occupy Greece and Bulgaria if necessary.
Approximately 10 divisions were to be used in order to prevent Turkish
intervention. To shorten the time the German divisions in Rumania were
to be increased.

On the 13th December 1940 Hitler issued an order to OKW, OKL, OKH, OKM
and General Staff on the operation Marita, which was the invasion of
Greece. In that order it is stated that the invasion of Greece is
planned and is to commence as soon as the weather becomes advantageous.
Further orders were issued on the 13th December and 11th January.
(_448-PS_; _1541-PS_)

On the 28th January Hitler saw Mussolini. Jodl, Keitel, and Ribbentrop
were present at the meeting and it is from Jodl’s notes of what took
place that we know that Hitler stated that one of the purposes of German
troop concentrations in Rumania was for use in his plan for the
operation against Greece.

On the 1st March 1941 German troops entered Bulgaria and moved towards
the Greek frontier. In the face of this threat of an attack on Greece by
German as well as Italian forces British forces were landed in Greece on
the 3d March in accordance with the declaration which had been given by
the British Government on the 13th April 1939 that Great Britain would
feel bound to give Greece and Rumania respectively all the support in
her power in the event of either country becoming the victim of
aggression and resisting such aggression. Already the Italian aggression
had made this pledge operative.

On the 25th March 1941 Yugoslavia joined the 3-Power Pact which had
already been signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan. The preamble of the
Pact stated that the 3 Powers would stand side by side and work
together.

On the same day Ribbentrop wrote two notes to the Yugoslav Prime
Minister; assuring him of Germany’s full intention to respect the
sovereignty and independence of his country. That declaration was yet
another example of the treachery employed by German diplomacy. We have
seen already the preparations that had been made. We have seen Hitler’s
efforts to tempt the Italians into an aggression against Yugoslavia. We
have seen in January his orders for his own preparation to invade
Yugoslavia and Greece and now on the 25th March he is signing a pact
with that country and his Foreign Minister is writing assurances of
respect for her sovereignty and territorial integrity.

As a result of the signing of that Pact the anti-Nazi element in
Yugoslavia immediately accomplished a coup d’état and established a new
Government. Thereupon the decision was taken to invade immediately and
on the 27th March, two days after the 3-Power Pact had been signed by
Yugoslavia, Hitler issued instructions that Yugoslavia was to be invaded
and used as a base for the continuance of the combined German and
Italian offensive against Greece. (_C-127_)

Following this, further deployment and other instructions for the action
Marita were issued by Von Brauchitsch on the 30th March 1941. (_R-95_)

It is stated that “the orders issued with regard to the operation
against Greece remain valid so far as not affected by this order. On the
5th April, weather permitting, the Air Forces are to attack troops in
Yugoslavia, while simultaneously the attack of the 12th Army begins
against both Yugoslavia and Greece” (_R-95_). As we now know, the
invasion actually commenced in the early hours of the 6th April.

Treaties, Pacts, Assurances—obligations of any kind—are brushed aside
and ignored wherever the aggressive interests of Germany are concerned.

I turn now to the last act of aggression in Europe with which these Nazi
conspirators are charged—the attack upon Russia. In August 1939 Germany
although undoubtedly intending to attack Russia at some convenient
opportunity, sufficiently deceived the Russian Government to secure a
pact of nonaggression between them. It followed, therefore, that when
Belgium and the Low Countries were occupied and France collapsed in June
1940, England—although with the inestimably valuable moral and economic
support of the United States of America—was left alone as the sole
representative of Democracy in the face of the forces of aggression.
Only the British Empire stood between Germany and the achievement of her
aim to dominate the Western world. Only the British Empire—only England
as its citadel. But it was enough. The first, and possibly the decisive,
military defeat which the enemy sustained was in the campaign against
England, and that defeat had a profound influence on the future course
of the war. On the 16th July 1940 Hitler issued to Keitel and Jodl a
Directive for the invasion of England. It started off by stating—and
Englishmen will be forever proud of it—that

    “Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation, shows
    no signs of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to
    prepare a landing operation against England and if necessary to
    carry it out. The aim is * * * to eliminate the English homeland
    as a base for the carrying on of the war against Germany. The
    preparations for the entire operation must be completed by
    mid-August.” (_442-PS_)

But the first essential condition for that plan was “that the English
Air Force must morally and actually be so far overcome that it does not
any longer show any considerable aggressive force against the German
attack.” (_442-PS_)

The German Air Force made the most strenuous efforts to realize that
condition, but, in one of the most splendid pages of our history, it was
decisively defeated. And although the bombardment of England’s towns and
villages was continued throughout that dark winter of 1940-41 the enemy
decided in the end that England was not to be subjugated by these means,
and accordingly Germany turned back to the East, the first major aim
achieved.

On the 22d June 1941, German Armed Forces invaded Russia—without
warning, without declaration of war. It was a breach of the Hague
Conventions; it was a violation of the Pact of Paris of 1928: it was in
flagrant contradiction of the Treaty of nonaggression which Germany and
Russia had signed on the 23d August 1939.

But that Treaty, perhaps more blatantly than any other, was made without
any intention of being observed and only for the purpose of assisting
the German Government to carry out their aggressive plans against the
Western democracies before eventually turning east in their own good
time.

Hitler himself in referring to the Agreement said agreements were only
to be kept as long as they served a purpose. Ribbentrop was more
explicit. In an interview with the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on 23d
February 1941 he made it clear that the object of the Agreement had
merely been to avoid a two-front war. (_1834-PS_)

In contrast to what Hitler and Ribbentrop were planning within the
councils of Germany, we know what they were saying to the rest of the
world.

On the 19th July Hitler spoke in the Reichstag:

    “In these circumstances I consider it proper to negotiate as a
    first priority a sober definition of interests with Russia. It
    would be made clear once and for all what Germany believes she
    must regard as her sphere of interest to safeguard her future
    and, on the other hand, what Russia considers important for her
    existence.

    “From the clear delineation of the sphere of interest on either
    side, there followed the new regulation of Russo-German
    relations. Any hope that now at the end of the term of the
    agreement a new Russo-German tension could arise is childish.
    Germany has taken no step which would lead her outside her
    sphere of interest, nor has Russia. But England’s hope, to
    achieve an amelioration of her own position through the
    engineering of some new European crisis, is, in so far as it is
    concerned with Russo-German relations, an illusion.

    “British statesmen perceive everything somewhat slowly, but they
    too will learn to understand this in course of time.”

Yet it was not many months after that that the arrangements for
attacking Russia were put in hand. Raeder gives us the probable reasons
for this sudden decision in a note to Admiral Assmann.

    “The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the Autumn
    of 1940 could no longer be attained, a realization which the
    Fuehrer no doubt gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who
    were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on
    England (our own losses), surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back
    as August and September, to consider whether, even prior to
    victory in the West, an Eastern campaign would be feasible with
    the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the
    continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear,
    however, until well into September.”

He may not have told the Navy of his intentions until later in
September, but by the beginning of that month he had undoubtedly spoken
of them to Jodl.

Dated 6th September 1940 we have a directive of the OKW signed by Jodl:
“Directions are given for the occupation forces in the east to be
increased in the following weeks. For security reasons this should not
create the impression in Russia that Germany is preparing for an Eastern
offensive.” Directives are given to the German Intelligence Service
pertaining to the answering of questions by the Russian Intelligence
Service. “The total strength of the German troops in the East to be
camouflaged by frequent changes in this area. The impression is to be
created that the bulk of the troops in the south have moved whilst the
occupation in the north is only very small.” (_1229-PS_)

Thus we see the beginning of the operations.

On the 12th November 1940 Hitler issued a directive signed by Jodl in
which he stated that the political task to determine the attitude of
Russia had begun, but without reference to the result of preparations
against the East, which had been ordered orally before it could be
carried out.

On the same day Molotov visited Berlin. At the conclusion of
conversations between himself and the German Government a communique was
issued in the following terms:

    “The exchange of ideas took place in an atmosphere of mutual
    trust and led to a mutual understanding on all important
    questions interesting Germany and the Soviet Union.”

It is not to be supposed that the USSR would have taken part in those
conversations or agreed to that communique if it had been realized that
on the very day orders were being given for preparations to be made for
the invasion of Russia and that the order for the operation “Barbarossa”
was in preparation. Four days later that order was issued—“The German
armed forces have to be ready to defeat Soviet Russia in a swift
campaign before the end of the War against Great Britain” (_446-PS_).
And later in the same instruction,

    “All orders which shall be issued by the High Commanders in
    accordance with this instruction have to be clothed in such
    terms that they may be taken as measures of precaution in case
    Russia should change her present attitude towards ourselves.”
    (_446-PS_)

Keeping up the pretense of friendliness, on the 10th January,
1941—after the Plan Barbarossa for the invasion of Russia had been
decided upon—the German-Russo frontier treaty was signed. On the 3d
February 1941 Hitler held a conference, attended by Keitel and Jodl, at
which it was provided that the whole operation was to be camouflaged as
if it was part of the preparations for the “Seelowe” as the plan for
invasion of England was called. By March 1941 the plans were
sufficiently advanced to include provision for dividing the Russian
territory into 9 separate States to be administered under Reich
Commissars under the general control of Rosenberg. At the same time
detailed plans for the economic exploitation of the country were made
under the supervision of Goering, to whom the responsibility was
delegated by Hitler. You will hear something of the details of these
plans. It is significant that on the 2d May 1941 a conference of the
State Secretaries on the Plan Barbarossa noted:

    “1. The war can only be continued if all armed forces are fed
    out of Russia in the third year of the war.

    “2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people
    will be starved to death if we take out of the country the
    things necessary for us.”

But this apparently created no concern. The plan Oldenberg, as the
scheme for economic organization was called, went on. By the 1st May the
D date of the operation was fixed. By the 1st June preparations were
virtually complete and an elaborate time table was issued. It was
estimated that although there would be heavy frontier battles, lasting
perhaps 4 weeks, after that no serious opposition was to be expected.

On the 22d June at 3.30 in the morning the German Armies marched again.
As Hitler said in his Proclamation:

    “I have decided to give the fate of the German People and of the
    Reich and of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers.”

The usual false pretexts were of course given. Ribbentrop stated on the
28th June that the step was taken because of the threatening of the
German frontiers by the Red Army. It was untrue and Ribbentrop knew it
was untrue. On the 7th June his Ambassador in Moscow was reporting to
him that “All observations show that Stalin and Molotov who are alone
responsible for Russian foreign policy are doing everything to avoid a
conflict with Germany”. The staff records which you will see make it
clear that the Russians were making no military preparations and that
they were continuing their deliveries under the Trade Agreement to the
very last day. The truth was, of course, that the elimination of Russia
as a political opponent and the incorporation of the Russian territory
in the German _Lebensraum_ had long been one of the cardinal features of
Nazi policy, subordinated latterly for what Jodl called diplomatic
reasons.

And so, on the 22d June, the Nazi armies were flung against the Power
with which Hitler had so recently sworn friendship and Germany embarked
on that last act of aggression which, after long and bitter fighting,
was eventually to result in Germany’s own collapse.

                                PART III

This then is the case against these Defendants, as amongst the rulers of
Germany, under Count 2 of this Indictment. It may be said that many of
the documents which have been referred to were in Hitler’s name, that
the orders were Hitler’s orders, that these men were mere instruments of
Hitler’s will. But they were the instruments without which Hitler’s will
could not be carried out. And they were more than that. These men were
no mere willing tools, although they would be guilty enough if that had
been their role. They are the men whose support had built Hitler up into
the position of power he occupied: they are the men whose initiative and
planning perhaps conceived and certainly made possible the acts of
aggression made in Hitler’s name, and they are the men who enabled
Hitler to build up the Army, Navy and Air Force by which these
treacherous attacks were carried out, and to lead his fanatical
followers into peaceful countries to murder, to loot and to destroy.
They are the men whose cooperation and support made the Nazi Government
of Germany possible. The Government of a totalitarian country may be
carried on without the assistance of representatives of the people. But
it cannot be carried on without any assistance at all. It is no use
having a leader unless there are also people willing and ready to serve
their personal greed and ambition by helping and following him. The
dictator who is set up in control of the destinies of his country does
not depend upon himself alone either in acquiring power or in
maintaining it. He depends upon the support and backing which lesser
men, themselves lusting to share in dictatorial power, anxious to bask
in the adulation of their leader, are prepared to give. In the Criminal
Courts, where men are put upon their trial for breaches of the municipal
laws, it not infrequently happens that of a gang indicted together in
the Dock, one has the master mind, the leading personality. But it is no
excuse for the common thief to say “I stole because I was told to
steal”; for the murderer to plead “I killed because I was asked to
kill”. These men are in no different position for all that it was
nations they sought to rob, whole peoples they tried to kill. “The
warrant of no man excuseth the doing of an illegal act.” Political
loyalty, military obedience are excellent things. But they neither
require nor do they justify the commission of patently wicked acts.
There comes a point where a man must refuse to answer to his leader if
he is also to answer to his conscience. Even the common soldier, serving
in the ranks of his Army is not called upon to obey illegal orders. But
these men were no common soldiers: they were the men whose skill and
cunning, whose labour and activity made it possible for the German Reich
to tear up existing treaties, to enter into new ones and to flout them,
to reduce international negotiations and diplomacy to a hollow mockery,
to destroy all respect for and effect in International Law and finally
to march against the peoples of the world to secure that domination in
which as arrogant members of their self-styled master race they
professed their belief. If the crimes were in one sense the crimes of
Nazi Germany, they also are guilty as the individuals who aided,
abetted, counselled, procured and made possible the commission of what
was done.

The sum total of the crime these men have committed—so awful in its
comprehension—has many aspects. Their lust and sadism, their deliberate
slaughter and the degradation of so many millions of their fellow
creatures that the imagination reels incomprehensively, are but one side
only of this matter. Now that an end has been put to this nightmare and
we come to consider how the future is to be lived, perhaps their guilt
as murderers and robbers is of less importance and of less effect to
future generations of mankind than their crime of fraud—the fraud by
which they placed themselves in a position to do their murder and their
robbery. This is the other aspect of their guilt. The story of their
“diplomacy”, founded upon cunning, hypocrisy and bad faith, is a story
less gruesome but no less evil and deliberate. And should it be taken as
a precedent of behaviour in the conduct of international relations, its
consequences to mankind will no less certainly lead to the end of
civilized society. Without trust and confidence between Nations, without
the faith that what is said is meant and what is undertaken will be
observed, all hope of peace and of security is dead. The Governments of
the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, of the USA, of the
USSR, and of France, backed by and on behalf of every other peace-loving
Nation of the world, have therefore joined to bring the inventors and
perpetrators of this Nazi conception of international relationship
before the bar of this Tribunal.

They do so that these Defendants may be punished for their crimes. They
do so also that their conduct may be exposed in its naked wickedness.
And they do so in the hope that the conscience and good sense of all the
world will see the consequences of such conduct and the end to which
inevitably it must always lead. Let us once again restore sanity and
with it also the sanctity of our obligations towards each other.


             6. AGGRESSION AS A BASIC NAZI IDEA: MEIN KAMPF

Hitler’s _Mein Kampf_, which became the Nazi statement of faith, gave to
the conspirators adequate foreknowledge of the unlawful aims of the Nazi
leadership. It was not only Hitler’s political testament; by adoption it
became theirs.

_Mein Kampf_ may be described as the blueprint of the Nazi aggression.
Its whole tenor and content demonstrate that the Nazi pursuit of
aggressive designs was no mere accident arising out of an immediate
political situation in Europe and the world. _Mein Kampf_ establishes
unequivocally that the use of aggressive war to serve German aims in
foreign policy was part of the very creed of the Nazi party.

A great German philosopher once said that ideas have hands and feet. It
became the deliberate aim of the conspirators to see to it that the
idea, doctrines, and policies of _Mein Kampf_ should become the active
faith and guide for action of the German nation, and particularly of its
malleable youth. From 1933 to 1939 an extensive indoctrination in the
ideas of _Mein Kampf_ was pursued in the schools and universities of
Germany, as well as in the Hitler Youth, under the direction of Baldur
von Schirach, and in the SA and SS, and amongst the German population as
a whole, by the agency of Rosenberg.

A copy of _Mein Kampf_ was officially presented by the Nazis to all
newly married couples in Germany. [A copy of _Mein Kampf_ (_D-660_)
submitted by the prosecution to the tribunal contains the following
dedication on the fly-leaf:

    “To the newly married couple, Friedrich Rosebrock and Else
    Geborene Zum Beck, with best wishes for a happy and blessed
    marriage. Presented by the Communal Administration on the
    occasion of their marriage on the 14th of November, 1940. For
    the Mayor, the Registrar.”

This copy of _Mein Kampf_, which was the 1945 edition, contains the
information that the number of copies published to date amount to
6,250,000.]

As a result of the efforts of the conspirators, this book, blasphemously
called “The Bible of the German people,” poisoned a generation and
distorted the outlook of a whole people. For as the SS General von dem
Bach-Zelewski testified before the Tribunal, [on 7 January 1946] if it
is preached for years, as long as ten years, that the Slav peoples are
inferior races and that the Jews are subhuman, then it must logically
follow that the killing of millions of these human beings is accepted as
a natural phenomenon. From _Mein Kampf_ the way leads directly to the
furnaces of Auschwitz and the gas chambers of Maidanek.

What the commandments of _Mein Kampf_ were may be indicated by
quotations from the book which fall into two main categories. The first
category is that of general expression of Hitler’s belief in the
necessity of force as the means of solving international problems. The
second category is that of Hitler’s more explicit declarations on the
policy which Germany should pursue.

Most of the quotations in the second category come from the last three
chapters—13, 14, and 15—of Part II of _Mein Kampf_, in which Hitler’s
views on foreign policy were expounded. The significance of this may be
grasped from the fact that Part II of _Mein Kampf_ was first published
in 1927, less than two years after the Locarno Pact and within a few
months of Germany’s entry into the League of Nations. The date of the
publication of these passages, therefore, brands them as a repudiation
of the policy of international cooperation embarked upon by Stresseman,
and as a deliberate defiance of the attempt to establish, through the
League of Nations, the rule of law in international affairs.

The following are quotations showing the general view held by Hitler and
accepted and propagated by the conspirators concerning war and
aggression generally. On page 556 of _Mein Kampf_, Hitler wrote:

    “The soil on which we now live was not a gift bestowed by Heaven
    on our forefathers. But they had to conquer it by risking their
    lives. So also in the future our people will not obtain
    territory, and therewith the means of existence, as a favour
    from any other people, but will have to win it by the power of a
    triumphant sword.”

On page 145, Hitler revealed his own personal attitude toward war. Of
the years of peace before 1914 he wrote:

    “Thus I used to think it an ill-deserved stroke of bad luck that
    I had arrived too late on this terrestrial globe, and I felt
    chagrined at the idea that my life would have to run its course
    along peaceful and orderly lines. As a boy I was anything but a
    pacifist and all attempts to make me so turned out futile.”

On page 162 Hitler wrote of war in these words:

    “In regard to the part played by humane feeling, Moltke stated
    that in time of war the essential thing is to get a decision as
    quickly as possible and that the most ruthless methods of
    fighting are at the same time the most humane. When people
    attempt to answer this reasoning by highfalutin talk about
    aesthetics, etc., only one answer can be given. It is that the
    vital questions involved in the struggle of a nation for its
    existence must not be subordinated to any aesthetic
    considerations.”

Hitler’s assumption of an inevitable law of struggle for survival is
linked up in Chapter II of Book I of _Mein Kampf_, with the doctrine of
Aryan superiority over other races and the right of Germans in virtue of
this superiority to dominate and use other peoples for their own ends.
The whole of Chapter II of _Mein Kampf_ is dedicated to this “master
race” theory and, indeed, many of the later speeches of Hitler were
mainly repetitive of Chapter II.

On page 256, the following sentiments appear:

    “Had it not been possible for them to employ members of the
    inferior race which they conquered, the Aryans would never have
    been in a position to take the first steps on the road which led
    them to a later type of culture; just as, without the help of
    certain suitable animals which they were able to tame, they
    would never have come to the invention of mechanical power,
    which has subsequently enabled them to do without these beasts.
    For the establishment of superior types of civilization the
    members of inferior races formed one of the most essential
    prerequisites.”

In a later passage in _Mein Kampf_, at page 344, Hitler applies these
general ideas to Germany:

    “If in its historical development the German people had
    possessed the unity of herd instinct by which other people have
    so much benefited, then the German Reich would probably be
    mistress of the globe today. World history would have taken
    another course, and in this case no man can tell if what many
    blinded pacifists hope to attain by petitioning, whining and
    crying may not have been reached in this way; namely, a peace
    which would not be based upon the waving of olive branches and
    tearful misery-mongering of pacifist old women, but a peace that
    would be guaranteed by the triumphant sword of a people endowed
    with the power to master the world and administer it in the
    service of a higher civilization.”

These passages emphasize clearly Hitler’s love of war and scorn of those
whom he described as pacifists. The underlying message of this book,
which appears again and again, is, firstly, that the struggle for
existence requires the organization and use of force; secondly, that the
Aryan-German is superior to other races and has the right to conquer and
rule them; thirdly, that all doctrines which preach peaceable solutions
of international problems represent a disastrous weakness in a nation
that adopts them. Implicit in the whole of the argument is a fundamental
and arrogant denial of the possibility of any rule of law in
international affairs.

It is in the light of these general doctrines of _Mein Kampf_ that the
more definite passages should be considered, in which Hitler deals with
specific problems of German foreign policy. The very first page of the
book contains a remarkable forecast of Nazi policy:

    “German-Austria must be restored to the great German Motherland.
    And not, indeed on any grounds of economic calculation
    whatsoever. No, no. Even if the union were a matter of economic
    indifference, and even if it were to be disadvantageous from the
    economic standpoint, still it ought to take place. People of the
    same blood should be in the same Reich. The German people will
    have no right to engage in a colonial policy until they shall
    have brought all their children together in one State. When the
    territory of the Reich embraces all the Germans and finds itself
    unable to assure them a livelihood, only then can the moral
    right arise, from the need of the people, to acquire foreign
    territory. The plough is then the sword; and the tears of war
    will produce the daily bread for the generations to come.”

Hitler, at page 553, declares that the mere restoration of Germany’s
frontiers as they were in 1914 would be wholly insufficient for his
purposes:

    “In regard to this point I should like to make the following
    statement: To demand that the 1914 frontiers should be restored
    is a glaring political absurdity that is fraught with such
    consequences as to make the claim itself appear criminal. The
    confines of the Reich as they existed in 1914 were thoroughly
    illogical; because they were not really complete, in the sense
    of including all the members of the German nation. Nor were they
    reasonable, in view of the geographical exigencies of military
    defense. They were not the consequence of a political plan which
    had been well considered and carried out, but they were
    temporary frontiers established in virtue of a political
    struggle that had not been brought to a finish; and indeed, they
    were partly the chance result of circumstances.”

In further elaboration of Nazi policy, Hitler does not merely denounce
the Treaty of Versailles; he desires to see a Germany which is a world
power with territory sufficient for a future German people of a
magnitude which he does not define. On page 554 he declares:

    “For the future of the German nation the 1914 frontiers are of
    no significance * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “We National Socialists must stick firmly to the aim that we
    have set for our foreign policy, namely, that the German people
    must be assured the territorial area which is necessary for it
    to exist on this earth. And only for such action as is
    undertaken to secure those ends can it be lawful in the eyes of
    God and our German posterity to allow the blood of our people to
    be shed once again. Before God, because we are sent into this
    world with the commission to struggle for our daily bread, as
    creatures to whom nothing is donated and who must be able to win
    and hold their position as lord of the earth only through their
    own intelligence and courage. “And this justification must be
    established also before our German posterity, on the grounds
    that for each one who has shed his blood the life of a thousand
    others will be guaranteed to posterity. The territory on which
    one day our German peasants will be able to bring forth and
    nourish their sturdy sons will justify the blood of the sons of
    the peasants that has to be shed today. And the statesmen who
    will have decreed this sacrifice may be persecuted by their
    contemporaries, but posterity will absolve them from all guilt
    for having demanded this offering from their people.”

At page 557 Hitler writes:

    “Germany will either become a world power or will not continue
    to exist at all. But in order to become a world power, it needs
    that territorial magnitude which gives it the necessary
    importance today and assures the existence of its citizens.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “We must take our stand on the principles already mentioned in
    regard to foreign policy, namely, the necessity of bringing our
    territorial area into just proportion with the number of our
    population. From the past we can learn only one lesson, and that
    is that the aim which is to be pursued in our political conduct
    must be twofold, namely: (1) the acquisition of territory as the
    objective of our foreign policy and (2) the establishment of a
    new and uniform foundation as the objective of our political
    activities at home, in accordance with our doctrine of
    nationhood.”

Now, these passages from _Mein Kampf_ raise the question, where did
Hitler expect to find the increased territory beyond the 1914 boundaries
of Germany? To this Hitler’s answer is sufficiently explicit. Reviewing
the history of the German Empire from 1871 to 1918, he wrote, on page
132:

    “Therefore, the only possibility which Germany had of carrying a
    sound territorial policy into effect was that of acquiring new
    territory in Europe itself. Colonies cannot serve this purpose
    so long as they are not suited for settlement by Europeans on a
    large scale. In the nineteenth century it was no longer possible
    to acquire such colonies by peaceful means. Therefore, any
    attempt at such colonial expansion would have meant an enormous
    military struggle. Consequently it would have been more
    practical to undertake that military struggle for new territory
    in Europe, rather than to wage war for the acquisition of
    possessions abroad.

    “Such a decision naturally demanded that the nation’s undivided
    energies should be devoted to it. A policy of that kind, which
    requires for its fulfillment every ounce of available energy on
    the part of everybody concerned, cannot be carried into effect
    by half measures or in a hesitant manner. The political
    leadership of the German Empire should then have been directed
    exclusively to this goal. No political step should have been
    taken in response to other considerations than this task and the
    means of accomplishing it. Germany should have been alive to the
    fact that such a goal could have been reached only by war, and
    the prospect of war should have been faced with calm and
    collected determination. The whole system of alliances should
    have been envisaged and valued from that standpoint.

    “If new territory were to be acquired in Europe it must have
    been mainly at Russia’s cost, and once again the new German
    Empire should have set out on its march along the same road as
    was formerly trodden by the Teutonic Knights, this time to
    acquire soil for the German plough by means of the German sword
    and thus provide the nation with its daily bread.”

To this program of expansion in the East Hitler returns again, at the
end of _Mein Kampf_. After discussing the insufficiency of Germany’s
pre-war frontiers, he again points the path to the East and declares
that the _Drang nach Osten_, the drive to the East, must be resumed:

    “Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a line
    through the line of conduct followed by pre-war Germany in
    foreign policy. We put an end to the perpetual Germanic march
    towards the South and West of Europe and turn our eyes towards
    the lands of the East. We finally put a stop to the colonial and
    trade policy of pre-war times and pass over to the territorial
    policy of the future. But when we speak of new territory in
    Europe today we must principally think of Russia and the border
    states subject to her.”

Hitler was shrewd enough to see that his aggressive designs in the East
might be endangered by a defensive alliance between Russia, France, and
perhaps England. His foreign policy, as outlined in _Mein Kampf_, was to
detach England and Italy from France and Russia and to change the
attitude of Germany towards France from the defensive to the offensive.

On page 570 of _Mein Kampf_ he wrote:

    “As long as the eternal conflict between France and Germany is
    waged only in the form of a German defense against the French
    attack, that conflict can never be decided, and from century to
    century Germany will lose one position after another. If we
    study the changes that have taken place, from the twelfth
    century up to our day, in the frontiers within which the German
    language is spoken, we can hardly hope for a successful issue to
    result from the acceptance and development of a line of conduct
    which has hitherto been so detrimental for us.

    “Only when the Germans have taken all this fully into account
    will they cease from allowing the national will-to-live to wear
    itself out in merely passive defense; but they will rally
    together for a last decisive contest with France. And in this
    contest the essential objective of the German nation will be
    fought for. Only then will it be possible to put an end to the
    eternal Franco-German conflict which has hitherto proved so
    sterile.

    “Of course it is here presumed that Germany sees in the
    suppression of France nothing more than a means which will make
    it possible for our people finally to expand in another quarter.
    Today there are eighty million Germans in Europe. And our
    foreign policy will be recognized as rightly conducted only
    when, after barely a hundred years, there will be 250 million
    Germans living on this Continent, not packed together as the
    coolies in the factories of another Continent but as tillers of
    the soil and workers whose labour will be a mutual assurance for
    their existence.”

_Mein Kampf_, taken in conjunction with the facts of Nazi Germany’s
subsequent behavior towards other countries, shows that from the very
first moment that they attained power, and indeed long before that time,
Hitler and his confederates were engaged in planning and fomenting
aggressive war.

Events have proved that _Mein Kampf_ was no mere literary exercise to be
treated with easy indifference, as unfortunately it was treated for so
long. It was the expression of a fanatical faith in force and fraud as
the means to Nazi dominance in Europe, if not in the whole world. In
accepting and propagating the jungle philosophy of _Mein Kampf_, the
Nazi conspirators deliberately set about to push civilization over the
precipice of war.


                          7. TREATY VIOLATIONS

It might be thought, from the melancholy story of broken treaties and
violated assurances, that Hitler and the Nazi Government did not even
profess that it is necessary or desirable to keep the pledged word.
Outwardly, however, the professions were very different. With regard to
treaties, on the 18 October 1933, Hitler said, “Whatever we have signed
we will fulfill to the best of our ability.”

The reservation is significant—“Whatever we have signed.”

But, on 21 May 1935, Hitler said, “The German Government will
scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily signed, even though it
was concluded before their accession to power and office.”

On assurances Hitler was even more emphatic. In the same speech, the
Reichstag Speech of 21 May 1935, Hitler accepted assurances as being of
equal obligation, and the world at that time could not know that that
meant of no obligation at all. What he actually said was,

    “And when I now hear from the lips of a British statesman that
    such assurances are nothing and that the only proof of sincerity
    is the signature appended to collective pacts, I must ask Mr.
    Eden to be good enough to remember that it is a question of
    assurance in any case. It is sometimes much easier to sign
    treaties with the mental reservations that one will consider
    one’s attitude at the decisive hour than to declare before an
    entire nation and with full opportunity one’s adherence to a
    policy which serves the course of peace because it rejects
    anything which leads to war.”

And then he proceeded with the illustration of his assurance to France.

In this connection the position of a treaty in German law should not be
forgotten. The appearance of a treaty in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ makes
it part of the statute law of Germany, so that a breach thereof is also
a violation of German domestic law.

(This section deals with fifteen only of the treaties which Hitler and
the Nazis broke. The remainder of the 69 treaties which the German Reich
violated between 1933 and 1941 are dealt with in other sections of this
chapter.)

A. _Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
signed at the Hague on the 29th of July, 1899._

The Hague Conventions are of course only the first gropings towards the
rejection of the inevitability of war. They do not render the making of
aggressive war a crime, but their milder terms were as readily broken as
more severe agreements.

On 29 July, 1899, Germany, Greece, Serbia, and 25 other nations signed a
convention (_TC-1_). Germany ratified the convention on 4 September
1900, Serbia on the 11 May 1901, Greece on the 4 April 1901.

By Article 12 of the treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, signed at the St.
Germaine-en-Laye on 10 September 1919, the new Kingdom succeeded to all
the old Serbian treaties, and later changed its name to Yugoslavia.

The first two articles of this Hague Convention read:

    “Article 1: With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse
    to force in the relations between states, the signatory powers
    agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement
    of International differences.

    “Article 2: In case of serious disagreement or conflict, before
    an appeal to arms the signatory powers agree to have recourse,
    as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation
    of one or more friendly powers.” (_TC-1_)

B. _Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
signed at the Hague on 18 October 1907._

This Convention (_TC-2_) was signed at the Hague by 44 nations, and it
is in effect as to 31 nations, 28 signatories, and three adherents. For
present purposes it is in force as to the United States, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Russia.

By the provisions of Article 91 it replaces the 1899 Convention as
between the contracting powers. As Greece and Yugoslavia are parties to
the 1899 convention and not to the 1907, the 1899 Convention is in
effect with regard to them, and that explains the division of countries
in Appendix C.

The first article of this treaty reads:

    “1: With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to
    force in the relations between States, the contracting powers
    agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement
    of international differences.” (_TC-2_)

C. _Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, signed at the
Hague on 18 October 1907._

This Convention (_TC-3_) applies to Germany, Poland, Norway, Denmark,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Russia. It relates to a
procedural step in notifying one’s prospective opponent before opening
hostilities against him. It appears, to have had its immediate origin in
the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, when Japan attacked Russia without any
previous warning. It will be noted that it does not fix any particular
lapse of time between the giving of notice and the commencement of
hostilities, but it does seek to maintain an absolutely minimum standard
of International decency before the outbreak of war.

The first article of this treaty reads:

    “The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between them
    must not commence without a previous and explicit warning in the
    form of either a declaration of war, giving reasons, or an
    ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.” (_TC-3_)

D. _Convention 5, Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons in Case of War on Land, signed at the Hague on 18 October 1907._

Germany was an original signatory to this Convention (_TC-4_), and the
treaty is in force as a result of ratification or adherence between
Germany and Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the
USSR, and the United States.

Article 1 reads:

    “The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.” (_TC-4_)

A point arises on this Convention. Under Article 20, the provisions of
the present Convention do not apply except between the contracting
powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the
Convention.

As Great Britain and France entered the war within two days of the
outbreak of the war between Germany and Poland, and one of these powers
had not ratified the Convention, it is arguable that its provisions did
not apply to the Second World War.

Since there are many more important treaties to be considered, the
charge will not be pressed that this treaty was likewise breached. The
terms of Article 1 are cited merely as showing the state of
International opinion at the time, and as an element in the aggressive
character of the war.

E. _Treaty of Peace between the Allies and the Associated Powers of
Germany, signed at Versailles on 28 June 1919._

Part I of this treaty (_TC-5 thru TC-10_) contains the Covenant of the
League of Nations, and Part II sets the boundaries of Germany in Europe.
These boundaries are described in detail. Part II makes no provision for
guaranteeing these boundaries. Part III, Articles 31 to 117, contains
the political clauses for Europe. In it, Germany guarantees certain
territorial boundaries in Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Czechoslovakia,
France, Poland, Memel, Danzig, etc.

This treaty is interwoven with the next, which is the Treaty of
Restoration of Friendly Relations between the United States and Germany.
Parts I, II, and III of the Versailles Treaty are not included in the
United States Treaty. Parts IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, and XV
are all repeated _verbatim_ in the United States Treaty from the Treaty
of Versailles. This case is concerned with Part V, which are the
military, naval, and air clauses. Parts VII and XIII are not included in
the United States Treaty.

(1) _Territorial Guarantees._

(_a_) _The Rhineland._ The first part with which this case is concerned
is Articles 42 to 44 dealing with the Rhineland (_TC-5_). These are
repeated in the Locarno Treaty. They read as follows:

    “Article 42: Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any
    fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the
    right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east
    of the Rhine.

    “Article 43: In the area defined above the maintenance and the
    assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and
    military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all
    permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.

    “Article 44: In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the
    provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as
    committing a hostile act against the powers signatory of the
    present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the
    world.”

(The speech by Hitler on 7 March 1936, giving his account of the breach
of this treaty (_2289-PS_), is discussed in Section 2, _supra_.)

(_b_) _Austria._ The next part of the Treaty deals with Austria:

    “Article 80: Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the
    independence of Austria within the frontiers which may be fixed
    in a treaty between that State and the principal Allied and
    Associated powers; she agrees that this independence shall be
    inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the
    League of Nations.” (_TC-6_)

(The proclamation of Hitler dealing with Austria (_TC-47_), is discussed
in Section 3 _supra_.)

(_c_) _Memel._ Germany also gave guarantee with respect to Memel:

    “Germany renounces, in favor of the principal Allied and
    Associated powers, all rights and title over the territories
    included between the Baltic, the Northeastern frontier of East
    Prussia as defined in Article 28 of Part II (Boundaries of
    Germany) of the present treaty, and the former frontier between
    Germany and Russia. Germany undertakes to accept the settlement
    made by principal Allied and Associated powers in regard to
    these territories, particularly insofar as concerns the
    nationality of inhabitants.” (_TC-8_)

The formal document by which Germany incorporated Memel into the Reich,
reads as follows:

    “The transfer Commissioner for the Memel territory, _Gauleiter
    und Oberpraesident_ Erich Koch, effected on 3 April 1939, during
    a conference at Memel, the final incorporation of the late Memel
    territory into the National Socialist Party Gau of East Prussia
    and into the state administration of the East Prussian
    _Regierungsbezirk_ of Grunbinnen.” (_TC-53-A_)

(_d_) _Danzig._ Article 100 of the treaty relates to Danzig:

    “Germany renounces, in favor of the principal Allied and
    Associated Powers, all rights and title over the territory
    comprised within the following limits * * * (The limits are set
    out and are described in a German map attached to the Treaty.)
    (_TC-9_)

(_e_) _Czechoslovakia._ In Article 81, Germany made pledges regarding
Czechoslovakia:

    “Germany, in conformity with the action already taken by the
    Allied and Associated Powers, recognizes the complete
    independence of the Czechoslovak State, which will include the
    autonomous territory of the Ruthenians to the South of the
    Carpathians. Germany hereby recognizes the frontiers of this
    State as determined by the principal Allied and Associated
    Powers and other interested states.” (_TC-7_)

Captured minutes of the German Foreign Office record in detail the
conference between Hitler and President Hacha, and Foreign Minister
Chvalkowsky of Czechoslovakia, at which Goering and Keitel were present
(_2798-PS_). The agreement subsequently signed by Hitler and Ribbentrop
for Germany, and by Dr. Hacha and Dr. Chvalkowsky for Czechoslovakia,
reads as follows:

    “Text of the Agreement between the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
    Adolf Hitler and the President of the Czechoslovak State, Dr.
    Hacha.

    “The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor today received in Berlin, at
    their own request, the President of the Czechoslovak State, Dr.
    Hacha, and the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Chvalkowsky,
    in the presence of Herr Von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister of
    the Reich. At this meeting the serious situation which had
    arisen within the previous territory of Czechoslovakia owing to
    the events of recent weeks, was subjected to a completely open
    examination. The conviction was unanimously expressed on both
    sides that the object of all their efforts must be to assure
    quiet, order and peace in this part of Central Europe. The
    President of the Czechoslovak State declared that, in order to
    serve this end and to reach a final pacification, he confidently
    placed the fate of the Czech people and of their country in the
    hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich. The Fuehrer accepted
    this declaration and expressed his decision to assure to the
    Czech people, under the protection of the German Reich, the
    autonomous development of their national life in accordance with
    their special characteristics. In witness whereof this document
    is signed in duplicate.” (_TC-49_)

Hitler’s proclamation to the German people, dated 15 March 1939, reads
as follows:

    “Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the German people, 15 March
    1939.

    “To the German People:

    “Only a few months ago Germany was compelled to protect her
    fellow-countrymen, living in well-defined settlements, against
    the unbearable Czechoslovakian terror regime; and during the
    last weeks the same thing has happened on an ever-increasing
    scale. This is bound to create an intolerable state of affairs
    within an area inhabited by citizens of so many nationalities.

    “These national groups, to counteract the renewed attacks
    against their freedom and life, have now broken away from the
    Prague Government. Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.

    “Since Sunday at many places wild excesses have broken out,
    amongst the victims of which are again many Germans. Hourly the
    number of oppressed and persecuted people crying for help is
    increasing. From areas thickly populated by German-speaking
    inhabitants, which last autumn Czechoslovakia was allowed by
    German generosity to retain, refugees robbed of their personal
    belongings are streaming into the Reich.

    “Continuation of such a state of affairs would lead to the
    destruction of every vestige of order in an area in which
    Germany is vitally interested particularly as for over one
    thousand years it formed a part of the German Reich.

    “In order definitely to remove this menace to peace and to
    create the conditions for a necessary new order in this living
    space, I have today resolved to allow German troops to march
    into Bohemia and Moravia. They will disarm the terror gangs and
    the Czechoslovakian forces supporting them, and protect the
    lives of all who are menaced. Thus they will lay the foundations
    for introducing a fundamental reordering of affairs which will
    be in accordance with the 1,000-year old history and will
    satisfy the practical needs of the German and Czech peoples”.
    (_TC-50_)

A footnote contains an order of the Fuehrer to the German armed forces
of the same date, in which they are told to march in to safeguard lives
and property of all inhabitants and not to conduct themselves as
enemies, but as an instrument for carrying out the German Reich
Government’s decision. (_TC-50_)

Next came the decree establishing the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia. (_TC-51_)

In a communication from Foreign Minister Halifax to Sir Neville
Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, the British Government
protested against these actions:

    “Foreign Office, March 17, 1939:

    “Please inform German Government that His Majesty’s Government
    desire to make it plain to them that they cannot but regard the
    events of the past few days as a complete repudiation of the
    Munich Agreement and a denial of the spirit in which the
    negotiators of that Agreement bound themselves to cooperate for
    a peaceful settlement.

    “His Majesty’s Government must also take this occasion to
    protest against the changes effected in Czechoslovakia by German
    military action, which are, in their view, devoid of any basis
    of legality.” (_TC-52_)

The French Government also made a protest on the same date:

    “* * * The French Ambassador has the honor to inform the
    Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich of the formal protest
    made by the Government of the French Republic against the
    measures which the communication of Count de Welzeck records.

    “The Government of the Republic consider, in fact, that in face
    of the action directed by the German Government against
    Czechoslovakia, they are confronted with a flagrant violation of
    the letter and the spirit of the agreement signed at Munich on
    September 9, 1938.

    “The circumstances in which the agreements of March 15 have been
    imposed on the leaders of the Czechoslovak Republic do not, in
    the eyes of the Government of the Republic, legalize the
    situation registered in that agreement.

    “The French Ambassador has the honor to inform His Excellency,
    the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich, that the
    Government of the Republic can not recognize under these
    conditions the legality of the new situation created in
    Czechoslovakia by the action of the German Reich.” (_TC-53_)

(2) _Armament Limitations._ Part V of the Treaty, containing Military,
Naval and Air Clauses reads as follows:

    “In order to render possible the initiation of a general
    limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes
    strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which
    follow.

    “Section 1. Military Clauses. Effectives and Cadres of the
    German Army * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Article 159. The German military forces shall be demobilized
    and reduced as prescribed hereinafter.

    “Article 160. By a date which must not be later than March 31,
    1920, the German Army must not comprise more than seven
    divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry.

    “After that date, the total number of effectives in the army of
    the States constituting Germany must not exceed 100,000 men,
    including officers and establishments of depots. The army shall
    be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the
    territory and to the control of the frontier.

    “The total effective strength of officers, including the
    personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed
    4,000.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    (2) “Divisions and Army Corps headquarters staffs, shall be
    organized in accordance with Table Number 1 annexed to this
    Section. The number and strength of units of infantry,
    artillery, engineers, technical services and troops laid down in
    the aforesaid table constitute maxima which must not be
    exceeded.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or
    of other organizations for the command of troops or for
    preparation for war is forbidden.

    “The great German General Staff and all similar organizations
    shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.”
    (_TC-10_)

Article 163 provides the steps by which the reduction will take place.
Chapter 2 which deals with armament, provides that up till the time at
which Germany is admitted as a member of the League of Nations, the
armaments shall not be greater than the amount fixed in Table Number 11.
In other words, Germany agrees that after she has become a member of the
League of Nations, the armaments fixed in the said table shall remain in
force until they are modified by the Council of the League of Nations.
Furthermore, she hereby agrees strictly to observe the decisions of the
Council of the League on this subject. (_TC-10_)

Article 168 reads:

    “The manufacture of arms, munitions or any war material shall
    only be carried out in factories or works, the location of which
    shall be communicated to and approved by the governments of the
    Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and the number of which
    they retain the right to restrict. * * *” (_TC-10_)

Article 173, under the heading “Recruiting and Military Training”, deals
with one matter, the breach of which is of great importance:

    “Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in
    Germany. The German Army may only be reconstituted and recruited
    by means of voluntary enlistment.” (_TC-10_)

The succeeding articles deal with the method of enlistment in order to
prevent a quick rush through the army of men enlisted for a short time.

Article 180 provides:

    “All fortified works, fortresses and field works situated in
    German territory to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to
    the east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled. * * *”
    (_TC-10_)

Article 181 contains naval limitations:

    “After a period of two months from the coming into force of the
    present Treaty the German naval forces in commission must not
    exceed:

    Six battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen type

    Six light cruisers

    Twelve destroyers

    Twelve torpedo boats

    or an equal number of ships constructed to replace them as
    provided in Article 190.

    “No submarines are to be included.

    “All other warships, except where there is provision to the
    contrary in the present Treaty, must be placed in reserve or
    devoted to commercial purposes.” (_TC-10_)

Article 183 limits naval personnel to fifteen thousand, including
officers and men of all grades and corps.

Article 191 provides:

    “The construction or acquisition of any submarines, even for
    commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Germany.” (_TC-10_)

Article 198, the first of the Air Clauses, commences:

    “The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or
    naval air forces.” (_TC-10_)

The formal statement made at the German Air Ministry about the
reinauguration of the Air Corps is reproduced in _TC-44_. The public
proclamation of compulsory military service is contained in _TC-45_.

F. _Treaty between the United States and Germany Restoring Friendly
Relations._

The purpose of this treaty (_TC-11_) was to complete the official
cessation of hostilities between the United States of America and
Germany; it also incorporated certain parts of the Treaty of Versailles.
The relevant portion is Part 5, which repeats the clauses of the Treaty
of Versailles which have been discussed immediately above.

G. _Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great
Britain, and Italy, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925._

Several treaties were negotiated at Locarno; they all go together and
are to a certain extent mutually dependent. At Locarno, Germany
negotiated five treaties: (_a_) the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between
Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy (_TC-12_); (_b_) the
Arbitration Convention between Germany and France; (_c_) the Arbitration
Convention between Germany and Belgium; (_d_) the Arbitration Treaty
between Germany and Poland; and (_e_) an Arbitration Treaty between
Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Article 10 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (_TC-12_) provided that it
should come into force as soon as ratifications were deposited at Geneva
in the archives of the League of Nations, and as soon as Germany became
a member of the League of Nations. The ratifications were deposited on
14 September 1926, and Germany became a member of the League of Nations.

The two arbitration conventions and the two arbitration treaties
provided that they shall enter into force under the same conditions as
the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. (Article 21 of the arbitration
conventions and Article 22 of the arbitration treaties.)

The most important of the five agreements is the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee (_TC-12_). One of the purposes was to establish in perpetuity
the borders between Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France. It
contains no provision for denunciation or withdrawal therefrom and
provides that it shall remain in force until the Council of the League
of Nations decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient
protection to the parties to the Treaty—an event which never happened
in which case the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee shall expire one year
later.

The general scheme of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee is that Article 1
provides that the parties guarantee three things: the border between
Germany and France, the border between Germany and Belgium, and the
demilitarization of the Rhineland.

Article 2 provides that Germany and France, and Germany and Belgium
agree that they will not attack or invade each other, with certain
inapplicable exceptions; and Article 3 provides that Germany and France,
and Germany and Belgium agree to settle all disputes between them by
peaceful means. (_TC-12_)

The first important violation of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee appears
to have been the entry of German troops into the Rhineland on 7 March
1936. The day after, France and Belgium asked the League of Nations
Council to consider the question of the German reoccupation of the
Rhineland and the purported repudiation of the treaty. On 12 March,
after a protest from the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Belgium,
France, Great Britain, and Italy recognized unanimously that the
reoccupation was a violation of this treaty. On 14 March, the League
Council duly and properly decided that reoccupation was not permissible
and that the Rhineland clauses of the pact were not voidable by Germany
because of the alleged violation by France in the Franco-Soviet Mutual
Assistance Pact.

That is the background to the treaty. The relevant articles are 1, 2,
and 3, already mentioned; 4, which provides for the bringing of
violations before the Council of the League, as was done; and 5, which
deals with the clauses of the Versailles Treaty already mentioned. It
provides:

    “The provisions of Article 3 of the present Treaty are placed
    under the guarantee of the High Contracting Parties as provided
    by the following stipulations:

    “If one of the Powers referred to in Article 3 refuses to submit
    a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral
    or judicial decision and commits a violation of Article 2 of the
    present Treaty or a breach of Article 42 or 43 of the Treaty of
    Versailles, the provisions of Article 4 of the present Treaty
    shall apply.” (_TC-12_)

That is the procedure requiring reference to the League in the case of a
flagrant breach or of more stringent action.

It may be recalled that Hitler had promised that the German Government
would scrupulously maintain their treaties voluntarily signed, even
though they were concluded before Hitler’s accession to power. No one
has ever argued that Stresemann was in any way acting involuntarily when
he signed this Locarno Pact on behalf of Germany, along with the other
representatives. (The signature is not in Stresemann’s name, but by Herr
Hans Luther.) This treaty, which repeats the violated provisions of the
Versailles Treaty, was freely entered into and binds Germany in that
regard. Article 8 deals with the preliminary enforcement of the Treaty
by the League:

    “The present Treaty shall be registered at the League of Nations
    in accordance with the Covenant of the League. It shall remain
    in force until the Council, acting on a request of one or other
    of the High Contracting Parties notified to the other signatory
    Powers three months in advance, and voting at least by a
    two-thirds majority, decides that the League of Nations ensures
    sufficient protection to the High Contracting Parties; the
    Treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period
    of one year from such decision.” (_TC-12_)

Thus, in signing this Treaty, the German representative clearly placed
the question of repudiation or violation of the Treaty in the hands of
others. Germany was at the time a member of the League, and a member in
the Council of the League. Germany left the question of repudiation or
violations to the decision of the League.

H. _Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia, signed at
Locarno in October 1925._

Article I is the governing clause of this treaty (_TC-14_). It provides:

    “All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia
    with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as to their
    respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle
    amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted
    for decision either to an arbitral tribunal, or to the Permanent
    Court of International Justice as laid down hereafter. It is
    agreed that the disputes referred to above include, in
    particular, those mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant of the
    League of Nations. This provision does not apply to disputes
    arising out of or prior to the present Treaty and belonging to
    the past. Disputes for the settlement of which a special
    procedure is laid down on other conventions in force between the
    High Contracting Parties, shall be settled in conformity with
    the provisions of those Conventions.”

This treaty was registered with the Secretariat of the League in
accordance with Article 22, the second sentence of which shows that the
Treaty was entered into and its terms in force under the same conditions
as the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. (_TC-12_)

This is the Treaty to which President Benes unsuccessfully appealed
during the crisis in the Autumn of 1938.

I. _Arbitration Convention Between Germany and Belgium, signed at
Locarno, October 1925._

(This treaty, _TC-13_, is discussed in Section 10 of this chapter
dealing with the invasion of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg.)

J. _Arbitration Treaty Between Germany and Poland, signed at Locarno, 16
October 1925._

(This treaty, _TC-15_, is discussed in Section 8 of this chapter dealing
with the invasion of Poland.)

K. _Declaration of the Assembly of the League of Nations of 24 September
1927._

Germany had become a member of the League of Nations on 10 September
1926, a year before this Declaration was made.

The importance of this Declaration is not only its effect on
International Law, but to the fact that it was unanimously adopted by
the Assembly of the League of Nations, of which Germany was a free and
active member at the time. Referring to the unanimous adoption of the
Declaration, M. Sokal, the Polish Rapporteur, had this to say:

    “The Committee was of opinion that, at the present juncture, a
    solemn resolution passed by the Assembly, declaring that wars of
    aggression must never be employed as a means of settling
    disputes between States, and that such wars constitute an
    international crime, would have a salutary effect on public
    opinion, and would help to create an atmosphere favorable to the
    League’s future work in the matter of security and disarmament.

    “While recognizing that the draft resolution does not constitute
    a regular legal instrument, which would be adequate in itself
    and represent a concrete contribution towards security, the
    Third Committee unanimously agreed as to its great moral and
    educative value.” (_TC-18_)

M. Sokal then asked the Assembly to adopt the draft resolution, the
terms of which show what so many nations, including Germany, had in mind
at that time. The resolution recited that the Assembly—

    “* * * recognizing the solidarity which unites the community of
    nations, being inspired by a firm desire for the maintenance of
    general peace, being convinced that a war of aggression can
    never serve as a means of settling international disputes, and
    in consequence an international crime; considering that the
    solemn renunciation of all wars of aggression would tend to
    create an atmosphere of general confidence calculated to
    facilitate the progress of the work undertaken with a view to
    disarmament:

    “Declares: 1. That all wars of aggression are and shall always
    be prohibited.

    “2. That every pacific means must be employed to settle disputes
    of every description, which may arise between States.

    “That the Assembly declares that the States Members of the
    League are under an obligation to conform to these principles.”
    (_TC-18_)

The fact of the solemn renunciation of war was taken in the form of a
roll call, and the President announced that:

    “All the delegations having pronounced in favour of the
    declaration submitted by the Third Committee, I declare it
    unanimously adopted.” (_TC-18_)

L. _The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928._

(This treaty, _TC-19_, is discussed in Sir Hartley Shawcross’s opening
address for Great Britain, to be found in Section 5, _supra_.)

M. _Assurances._

(1) _Austria._ On 21 May 1935 Hitler made a speech containing this
assurance:

    “Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the domestic
    affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to attach that country
    to her. The German people and the German Government have,
    however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of the
    simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent,
    that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed not
    only to foreign nations, but to the German people everywhere.

    “I myself believe that no regime which is not anchored in the
    people, supported by the people, and desired by the people, can
    exist permanently.” (_TC-26_)

Similarly, in the Agreement between the German Government and the
Government of the Federal State of Austria, on July 11, 1936, paragraph
one stated as follows:

    “The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the
    Federal State of Austria in the sense of the pronouncements of
    the German Leader and Chancellor of the 21st May, 1935.”
    (_TC-22_)

(2) _Czechoslovakia._ The German Assurance to Czechoslovakia is
contained in the letter from M. Jan Masaryk to Viscount Halifax on the
date of 12 March 1938 (_TC-27_). The first paragraph shows that Field
Marshall Goering used the expression “_Ich gebe Ihnen Mein Ehrenwort_.”
That means, “I give my word of honor.” The third paragraph shows that
Goering had asked that there would not be a mobilization of the
Czechoslovak Army. The fourth paragraph reads:

    “M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding
    assurances on this subject, and today he spoke with Baron von
    Neurath, who, among other things, assured him on behalf of Herr
    Hitler that Germany still considers herself bound by the
    German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno
    in October 1925.” (_TC-27_)

So that in 1935 Baron von Neurath was speaking on behalf of Germany on
an agreement voluntarily concluded. Had there been the slightest doubt
of that question, von Neurath gave the assurance on behalf of Hitler
that Germany still considered itself bound by the German-Czechoslovakia
Arbitration Convention on the 12 March 1938, six months before Dr. Benes
made a hopeless appeal to it before the crisis in the Army in 1938.

Czechoslovakia’s difficult position is set out in the pregnant last
paragraph:

    “They can not however fail to view with great apprehension the
    sequel of events in Austria between the date of the bi-lateral
    agreement between Germany and Austria, 11 July 1936, and
    yesterday, 11 March 1938.” (_TC-27_)

On 26 September 1938, Hitler made an assurance to Czechoslovakia which
contains important points as to the alleged German policy of getting
Germans together in the Reich, for which the Nazi conspirators had
purported to request a considerable time:

    “I have a little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain
    for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German
    people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I
    can not go back beyond the limits of our patience.” (_TC-28_)

(This occurred between the Godesberg Treaty and the Munich Pact).

    “I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
    problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for
    Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the
    moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to
    say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their
    other minorities peacefully, and without oppression, I will no
    longer be interested in the Czech State. And that, as far as I
    am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs. But
    I must also declare before the German people that in the
    Sudeten-German problem my patience is now at an end. I made an
    offer to Herr Benes which was no more than the realization of
    what he had already promised. He now has peace or war in his
    hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the
    Germans their freedom, or we will get this freedom for
    ourselves.” (_TC-28_)

The Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938 (_TC-23_) was signed by
Hitler, later by Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Daladier, and Mussolini. It is
largely a procedural agreement by which the entry of German troops into
Sudeten-Deutsche territory is regulated. That is shown by the
preliminary clause:

    “Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into
    consideration the agreement which has been already reached in
    principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten-German
    territory have agreed on the following terms and conditions
    governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon,
    and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for
    the steps necessary to secure fulfillment.” (_TC-23_)

Article 4 states that “The occupation by stages of the predominantly
German territory by German troops will begin on 1 October.” The four
territories are marked on the attached map. Article 6 provides that “The
final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the
international commission.” (_TC-23_)

The agreement provides also for various rights of option and release
from the Czech forces of Sudeten-Germans (TC-23). That was what Hitler
was asking for in the somewhat rhetorical passage previously referred to
(_TC-28_).

There is an annex to the Munich Agreement which is most significant:

    “Annex to the Agreement:

    “His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the French
    Government have entered into the above Agreement on the basis
    that they stand by the offer contained in Paragraph 6 of the
    Anglo-French Proposal of the 19th September, relating to an
    international guarantee of the new boundaries of the
    Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

    “When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in
    Czechoslovakia has been settled Germany and Italy, for their
    part, will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.” (_TC-23_)

The provision concerns “the Polish and Hungarian minorities,” not the
question of Slovakia. That is why that the German action of the 15th of
March was a flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of that
Agreement. (For fuller discussion see Section 4 of this Chapter relating
to aggression against Czechoslovakia.)

                 *        *        *        *        *

  LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO TREATY VIOLATIONS

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6 (a).              │  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections V; VI;  │      │ 29, 30,
                │  Appendix C.                           │  I   │      73
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
*2289-PS        │Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag, 7     │      │
                │March 1936, published in Voelkischer    │      │
                │Beobachter, Berlin Edition, No. 68, 8   │      │
                │March 1936. (USA 56)                    │  IV  │     994
                │                                        │      │
*2798-PS        │German Foreign Office minutes of the    │      │
                │meeting between Hitler and President    │      │
                │Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March 1939. │      │
                │(USA 118; GB 5)                         │  V   │     433
                │                                        │      │
*TC-1           │Hague Convention for Pacific Settlement │      │
                │of International Disputes signed at The │      │
                │Hague, 29 July 1899. (GB 1)             │ VIII │     273
                │                                        │      │
*TC-2           │Hague Convention (1) for Pacific        │      │
                │Settlement of International             │      │
                │Disputes—1907. (GB 2)                   │ VIII │     276
                │                                        │      │
*TC-3           │Hague Convention (3) Relative to opening│      │
                │of Hostilities. (GB 2)                  │ VIII │     279
                │                                        │      │
*TC-4           │Hague Convention (5) Respecting Rights  │      │
                │and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons│      │
                │in War on Land. (GB 2)                  │ VIII │     282
                │                                        │      │
*TC-5           │Versailles Treaty, Article 42-44. (GB 3)│ VIII │     288
                │                                        │      │
*TC-6           │Versailles Treaty, Section VI, Article  │      │
                │80, Austria. (GB 3)                     │ VIII │     289
                │                                        │      │
*TC-7           │Versailles Treaty, Section VII, Article │      │
                │81, Czecho-Slovak State. (GB 3)         │ VIII │     289
                │                                        │      │
*TC-8           │Versailles Treaty, Section X, Article   │      │
                │99, Memel. (GB 3)                       │ VIII │     289
                │                                        │      │
*TC-9           │Versailles Treaty, Section XI, Article  │      │
                │100, Free City of Danzig. (GB 3)        │ VIII │     290
                │                                        │      │
*TC-10          │Versailles Treaty, Part V, Military,    │      │
                │Naval and Air Clauses. (GB 3)           │ VIII │     291
                │                                        │      │
*TC-11          │Treaty between the United States and    │      │
                │Germany restoring friendly relations, 25│      │
                │August 1921. (USA 12)                   │ VIII │     308
                │                                        │      │
*TC-12          │Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between      │      │
                │Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain │      │
                │and Italy, done at Locarno, 16 October  │      │
                │1925. (GB 13)                           │ VIII │     313
                │                                        │      │
*TC-13          │Arbitration Convention between Germany  │      │
                │and Belgium at Locarno, 16 October 1925.│      │
                │(GB 15)                                 │ VIII │     320
                │                                        │      │
*TC-14          │Arbitration Treaty between Germany and  │      │
                │Czechoslovakia, signed at Locarno, 16   │      │
                │October 1925. (GB 14)                   │ VIII │     325
                │                                        │      │
*TC-15          │Arbitration. Treaty between Germany and │      │
                │Poland at Locarno, 16 October 1925. (GB │      │
                │16)                                     │ VIII │     331
                │                                        │      │
*TC-18          │Declaration concerning wars of          │      │
                │aggression; resolution of 3rd Committee │      │
                │of League of Nations, 24 September 1927.│      │
                │(GB 17)                                 │ VIII │     357
                │                                        │      │
*TC-19          │Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris. 1929      │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp.  │      │
                │97-101. (GB 18)                         │ VIII │     359
                │                                        │      │
*TC-21          │German-Polish Declaration, 26 January   │      │
                │1934. (GB 24)                           │ VIII │     368
                │                                        │      │
*TC-22          │Agreement between Austria and German    │      │
                │Government and Government of Federal    │      │
                │State of Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB 20) │ VIII │     369
                │                                        │      │
*TC-23          │Agreement between Germany, the United   │      │
                │Kingdom, France and Italy, 29 September │      │
                │1938. (GB 23)                           │ VIII │     370
                │                                        │      │
*TC-25          │Non-aggression Treaty between Germany   │      │
                │and USSR and announcement of 25         │      │
                │September 1939 relating to it. (GB 145) │ VIII │     375
                │                                        │      │
*TC-26          │German assurance to Austria, 21 May     │      │
                │1935, from Documents of German Politics,│      │
                │Part III, p. 94. (GB 19)                │ VIII │     376
                │                                        │      │
*TC-27          │German assurances to Czechoslovakia, 11 │      │
                │and 12 March 1938, as reported by M.    │      │
                │Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister to   │      │
                │London to Viscount Halifax. (GB 21)     │ VIII │     377
                │                                        │      │
*TC-28          │German assurance to Czechoslovakia, 26  │      │
                │September 1938, from Documents of German│      │
                │Politics, Part VI, pp. 345-346. (GB 22) │ VIII │     378
                │                                        │      │
*TC-44          │Notice by German government of existence│      │
                │of German Air Force, 9 March 1935. (GB  │      │
                │11)                                     │ VIII │     386
                │                                        │      │
 TC-45          │Proclamation to German People of 16     │      │
                │March 1935.                             │ VIII │     388
                │                                        │      │
 TC-46          │German memorandum to Signatories of     │      │
                │Locarno Pact reasserting full German    │      │
                │sovereignty over Rhineland, 7 March     │      │
                │1936.                                   │ VIII │     394
                │                                        │      │
 TC-47          │Hitler’s Proclamation of Invasion of    │      │
                │Austria, 12 March 1938.                 │ VIII │     398
                │                                        │      │
*TC-49          │Agreement with Czechoslovakia, 15 March │      │
                │1939, signed by Hitler, von Ribbentrop, │      │
                │Hacha and Chvalkovsky, from Documents of│      │
                │German Politics, Part VII, pp. 498-499. │      │
                │(GB 6)                                  │ VIII │     402
                │                                        │      │
*TC-50          │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the      │      │
                │German people and Order of the Fuehrer  │      │
                │to the Wehrmacht, 15 March 1939, from   │      │
                │Documents of German Politics, Part VII, │      │
                │pp. 499-501. (GB 7)                     │ VIII │     402
                │                                        │      │
*TC-51          │Decree establishing the Protectorate of │      │
                │Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939. (GB │      │
                │8)                                      │ VIII │     404
                │                                        │      │
*TC-52          │Formal British protest against the      │      │
                │annexation of Czechoslovakia in         │      │
                │violation of the Munich Agreement, 17   │      │
                │March 1939. (GB 9)                      │ VIII │     407
                │                                        │      │
*TC-53          │Formal French protest against the       │      │
                │annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in    │      │
                │violation of the Munich Agreement, 17   │      │
                │March 1939. (GB 10)                     │ VIII │     407
                │                                        │      │
*TC-53-A        │Marginal note to decree of final        │      │
                │incorporation of Memel with German      │      │
                │Reich, 23 March 1939, from Documents of │      │
                │German Politics, Part VII, p. 552. (GB  │      │
                │4)                                      │ VIII │     408
                │                                        │      │
*TC-54          │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to German   │      │
                │Armed Forces, 1 September 1939. (GB 73) │ VIII │     408
                │                                        │      │
*TC-54-A        │“Danzig’s return to the Reich”, from    │      │
                │Documents of German Politics, Part VII, │      │
                │p. 575. (GB 73)                         │ VIII │     409
                │                                        │      │
 TC-62          │German declaration of war on U.S.A., 11 │      │
                │December 1941, from Documents of German │      │
                │Politics, Part IV, p. 497.              │ VIII │     432
                │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 13  │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and  │      │
                │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to   │      │
                │Tribunal.)                              │ VIII │     782


             8. AGGRESSION AGAINST POLAND, DANZIG, ENGLAND
                               AND FRANCE

A. _Treaties Breached._

In addition to the general treaties involved—The Hague Convention in
respect of the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (_TC-2_);
other Hague Conventions of 1907 (_TC-3_; _TC-4_); the Versailles Treaty
(_TC-9_) in respect of the Free City of Danzig; and the Kellogg-Briand
Pact (_TC-19_)—two specific agreements were violated by the German
attack on Poland. These were the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and
Poland, signed at Locarno on 16 October 1925, and the Declaration of
Non-Aggression which was entered into between Germany and Poland on 26
January 1934.

The German-Polish Arbitration Treaty (_TC-15_) declares in the preamble
and Articles 1 and 2:

    “The President of the German Empire and the President of the
    Polish Republic:

    “Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Poland
    by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might
    arise between the two countries;

    “Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or
    resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for
    international tribunals;

    “Agreeing to recognize that the rights of a State cannot be
    modified save with its consent;

    “And considering that sincere observance of the methods of
    peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of
    resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become
    the cause of division between States;

    “Have decided . . .”

    “Article 1: All disputes of every kind between Germany and
    Poland with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as to
    their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to
    settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be
    submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the
    Permanent Court of International Justice, as laid down
    hereafter.”

    “Article 2: Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure
    before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute
    may, by agreement between the Parties, be submitted, with a view
    to amicable settlement, to a permanent international commission,
    styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in
    accordance with the present Treaty.” (_TC-15_)

Thereafter the treaty goes on to lay down the procedure for arbitration
and for conciliation. Germany, however, in September 1939 attacked and
invaded Poland without having first attempted to settle its disputes
with Poland by peaceful means.

The second specific treaty, the German-Polish Declaration of 26 January
1934, reads in part:

    “The German Government and the Polish Government consider that
    the time has come to introduce a new era in the political
    relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding
    between the States. They have therefore decided to establish by
    the present declaration a basis for the future shaping of those
    relations.

    “The two Governments assume that the maintenance and assurance
    of a permanent peace between their countries is an essential
    condition for general peace in Europe.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The declaration shall remain in effect for a period of ten
    years counting from the day of exchange of instruments of
    ratification. In case it is not denounced by one of the two
    governments six months before the expiration of that period of
    time, it shall continue in effect but can then be denounced by
    either government at a time of six months and at any time in
    advance.” (TC-21)

B. _German Intentions Before March 1939._

It has been previously shown that the actions against Austria and
Czechoslovakia were in themselves part of the preparation for further
aggression. Even at that time, before the Germans had seized the whole
of Czechoslovakia, they were perfectly prepared to fight England,
Poland, and France, if necessary, to achieve those aims. They
appreciated the whole time that they might well have to do so.
Furthermore, although not until after March 1939, did they commence upon
their immediate and specific preparations for a specific war against
Poland, nevertheless, they had for a considerable time before had it in
mind specifically to attack Poland once Czechoslovakia was completely
theirs.

During this period also—and this happens throughout the whole story of
the Nazi regime in Germany—as afterwards, while they were making their
preparations and carrying out their plans, they were giving to the
outside world assurance after assurance so as to lull them out of any
suspicion of their real object.

When the agreement with Poland was signed in January 1934, Hitler had
this to say:

    “When I took over the Government on the 30th of January, the
    relations between the two countries seemed to me more than
    unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing differences
    which were due to the Territorial Clauses of the Treaty of
    Versailles and the mutual tension resulting therefrom would
    gradually crystalize into a state of hostility which, if
    persisted, might too easily acquire the character of a dangerous
    traditional enmity.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In the spirit of this Treaty the German Government is willing
    and prepared to cultivate economic relations with Poland in such
    a way that here, too, the state of unprofitable suspicion can be
    succeeded by a period of useful cooperation. It is a matter of
    particular satisfaction to us that in this same year the
    National Socialist Government of Danzig has been enabled to
    effect a similar clarification of its relations with its Polish
    neighbor.” (_TC-70_)

That was in 1934. Three years later, again on 30 January, speaking in
the Reichstag, Hitler said:

    “By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tension
    and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the
    European atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland
    which has worked out to the advantage of both sides. True
    statesmanship will not overlook reality but consider them. The
    Italian nation and the new Italian state are realities. The
    German nation and the German Reich are equally realities, and to
    my own fellow citizens I would say that the Polish nation and
    the Polish state have also become a reality.” (_2868-PS_)

That was on 30 January 1937.

On 24 June 1937, a “Top Secret Order (_C-175_) was issued by the Reich
Minister for War and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, signed “Von
Blomberg”. There is the notation at the top, “Written by an Officer.
Outgoing documents in connection with this matter and dealing with it in
principle are to be written by an officer.” With it is enclosed a
Directive for the Unified Preparation for War of the Armed Forces, to
come into force on 1 August 1937. The enclosed directive is divided into
Part 1, “General Guiding Principle”; Part 2, “Likely Warlike
Eventualities”; Part 3, “Special Preparations”. The substance of the
document justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an
attack from any side.

The second paragraph states:

    “* * * The intention to unleash a European war is held just as
    little by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world
    situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands
    a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces.

    “To counter attacks at any time, and to enable the military
    exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they
    occur.” (_C-175_)

The preparations which are to be made are then set forth:

    “* * * The further working on mobilization without public
    announcement in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to
    begin a war suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength
    and time.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Special preparations are to be made for the following
    eventualities: Armed intervention against Austria; warlike
    entanglement with Red Spain.” (_C-175_)

Another passage shows clearly how they appreciated at that time that
their actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia might well involve them
in war.

    “* * * England, Poland, Lithuania take part in a war against
    us.” (_C-175_)

Part 2 of this directive, dealing with “Probable warlike
eventualities—Concentrations,” states:

    “1. War on two fronts with focal point in the West.

    “Suppositions. In the West France is the opponent. Belgium may
    side with France, either at once or later or not at all. It is
    also possible that France may violate Belgium’s neutrality if
    the latter is neutral. She will certainly violate that of
    Luxembourg.” (_C-175_)

Part 3, which deals in part with “Special Case—Extension Red-Green,”
declares:

    “The military political starting point used as a basis for
    concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either
    England, Poland or Lithuania join on the side of our opponents.
    Thereupon our military position would be worsened to an
    unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will
    therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above
    all England and Poland.” (_C-175_)

The date of this order is June 1937, and it seems clear that at that
date, anyway, the Nazi Government appreciated the likelihood, if not the
probability, of fighting England and Poland and France, and were
prepared to do so. On 5 November 1937, Hitler held his conference in the
Reichschancellery, the minutes of which, referred to as the Hossbach
notes, contain the remarks made by Hitler in respect of England, Poland,
and France:

    “The Fuehrer then stated: ‘The aim of German policy is the
    security and preservation of the nation and its propagation.
    This is consequently a problem of space’.” (_386-PS_)

Hitler then went on to discuss what he described as “participation in
world economy”, and declared:

    “The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the
    securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times
    has been the cause of the formation of states and movements of
    nations.” (_386-PS_)

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The history of all times, Roman Empire, British Empire, has
    proved that every space expansion can only be effected by
    breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
    unavoidable. Neither formerly nor today has space been found
    without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the
    proprietor.” (_386-PS_)

On the same day as this Hossbach meeting in the Reichschancellery was
taking place, a communique was being issued as a result of the Polish
ambassador’s audience with Hitler (_TC-73 No. 33_). In the course of
this conversation, the communique stated:

    “It was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet
    with difficulty because of the Danzig question.” (_TC-73 No.
    33_)

On 2 January 1938, some unknown person wrote a memorandum for the
Fuehrer. This document is headed, “Very Confidential—Personal Only”,
and is entitled “Deduction on the report, German Embassy, London,
regarding the future form of Anglo-German relations.” It states in part:

    “With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a
    status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a
    military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an
    agreement will slowly disappear among Germanophile British
    politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that
    has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will
    Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate
    camps and will they march against each other one day? To answer
    this question, one must realize the following:

    “Change of the status quo in the east in the German sense can
    only be carried out by force. So long as France knows that
    England, which so to speak has, taken on a guarantee to aid
    France against Germany, is on her side, France’s fighting for
    her eastern allies is probable in any case, always possible, and
    thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies then
    even if England does not want war. England, believing she must
    attend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in
    automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between
    England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who
    could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way
    of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows therefore
    that war between Germany and England on account of France can be
    prevented only if France knows from the start that England’s
    forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common
    victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby
    France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-France
    coalition would never tolerate.

    “This position would arise for instance if England, through
    insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by
    a superior coalition of powers, e.g., Germany, Italy, Japan,
    thereby tying down her military forces in other places, would
    not be able to assure France of sufficient support in Europe:”

The writer goes on to discuss the possibility of a strong partnership
between Italy and Japan, and then reaches a summary:

    “Paragraph five: Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us.

    “1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to
    the protection of the interests of our friends.

    “2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted
    tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a
    tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan; also the
    winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours
    directly or indirectly.

    “Close and confidential cooperation of the diplomats of the
    three great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we
    confront England be it in a settlement or in war. England is
    going to be a hard, astute opponent in this game of diplomacy.

    “The particular question whether in the event of a war by
    Germany in central Europe France and thereby England would
    interfere, depends on the circumstances and the time at which
    such a war commences and ceases, and on military considerations
    which cannot be gone into here.” (_TC-75_)

Whoever it was who wrote that document, appears to have been on a fairly
high level, because he concludes by saying, “I should like to give the
Fuehrer some of these viewpoints verbally.” (_TC-75_)

On 20 February 1938, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag. In that speech he
said:

    “In the fifth year following the first great foreign political
    agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification
    to be able to state that in our relations with the state with
    which we had had perhaps the greatest difference, not only has
    there been a ‘detente,’ but in the course of the years there has
    been a constant improvement in relations. This good work, which
    was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has stood
    the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations finally
    gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed
    a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner,
    this most dangerous spot from the point of view of European
    peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State
    respects the national conditions in this state, and both the
    city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way
    to an understanding has been successfully paved, an
    understanding which beginning with Danzig has today, in spite of
    the attempts of certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally
    taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and
    Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly
    cooperation.

    “To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone
    unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for
    the task which is ahead of us—peace.” (_2357-PS_)

A memorandum dated 2 May 1938, and entitled, “Organizational Study
1950,” originated in the office of the Chief of the Organizational Staff
of the General Staff of the Air Force. Its purpose was said to be: “The
task is to search, within a framework of very broadly-conceived
conditions, for the most suitable type of organization of the Air
Force.” (_L-43_). The result gained is termed, “Distant Objective.” From
this is deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the
process, which is called, “Final Objective 1942.” This in turn yields
what is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of
the staffs of the Air Force Group Commands, Air Gaus, Air Divisions,
etc. (_L-43_)

The Table of Contents is divided into various sections. Section I is
entitled, “Assumptions.” In connection with the heading “Assumption I,
frontier of Germany”, a map is enclosed (_Chart No. 10_). The map shows
that on 2 May 1938 the Air Force was in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, all of which are shown as
within the boundaries of the Reich.

The following is a pertinent extract from the memorandum:

    “Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of
    the assumptions for war and peace made in Section 1:

    “1. Attack Forces: Principal adversaries: England, France, and
    Russia.” (_L-43_)

The study then goes on to show all the one hundred forty-four
_Geschwader_ employed against England, very much concentrated in the
Western half of the Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such
a way that by making full use of their range, they can reach all English
territory down to the last corner. Under the paragraph “Assumption”
double heading 2, the “Organization of Air Force in peacetime” is shown
and seven group commands are indicated: (1) Berlin; (2) Brunswick; (3)
Munich; (4) Vienna; (5) Budapest; (6) Warsaw; and (7) Koenigsberg.
(_L-43_)

Finally, the study declares:

    “The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air Force
    grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have
    locally bound commands * * *” (_L-43_)

The original of this document is signed by an officer who is not at the
top rank in the German Air Force, and the inferences that can be drawn
from it should therefore not be over-emphasized. At least, however, it
shows the lines upon which the General Staff of the Air Force were
thinking at that time.

On the 26 August 1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister
succeeding von Neurath, a document was addressed to him as “The Reich
Minister, via the State Secretary.” The document reads as follows:

    “The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem,
    might easily, but must not lead to a conflict with the Entente.
    Neither France nor England are looking for trouble regarding
    Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to
    herself, if she should, without direct foreign interference and
    through internal signs of disintegration, due to her own faults,
    suffer the fate she deserves. This process, however, would have
    to take place step by step and would have to lead to a loss of
    power in the remaining territory by means of a plebiscite and an
    annexation of territory.

    “The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any
    immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and
    not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly.
    Germany cannot fix any definite time and this fruit could be
    plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the
    desired developments.

    “For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at present
    of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten-Germans, which we have
    intentionally not used up to now, is to be taken up gradually.
    The international conviction that the choice of nationality was
    being withheld from these Germans will do useful spadework,
    notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of
    dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may not be
    finally speeded up by the mechanical means as well. The fate of
    the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet be
    clearly decided by this, but would nevertheless be definitely
    sealed.

    “This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be
    recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is
    unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of
    boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and
    northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact [is] that after
    the liquidation of the Czech question, it will be generally
    assumed that Poland will be the next in turn.

    “But the later this assumption sinks in in international
    politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however,
    it is important for the time being, to carry on the German
    policy, under the well known and proved slogans of ‘the right to
    autonomy’ and ‘Racial unity’. Anything else might be interpreted
    as pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance to our
    plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically,
    than our forces could stand up to.” (_TC-76_)

That was on 26 August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was leading up to
the Munich settlement. While at Munich, a day or two before the Munich
agreement was signed, Herr Hitler made a speech. On 26 September he
said:

    “I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
    problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for
    Germany in Europe.” (_TC-29_)

A letter from Admiral Carl, dated some time in September, with no
precise date, and entitled “Opinion on the ‘Draft Study of Naval Warfare
against England’,” stated as follows:

    “There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “If according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to acquire a
    position as a world power who needs not only sufficient colonial
    possessions but also secure naval communications and secure
    access to the ocean.” (_C-23_)

That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich agreement in
September 1938. The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the
Nazi Government had hoped and intended. As a result, the conspirators
were not prepared straight away to start any further aggressive action
against Poland or elsewhere. But with the advantages that were gained by
the seizure of Czechoslovakia, it is obvious now that they intended and
had taken the decision to proceed against Poland so soon as
Czechoslovakia had been entirely occupied. As Jodl and Hitler said on
subsequent occasions, Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for the
attack on Poland.

It is known now from what Hitler said in talking to his military
commanders at a later date, that, in his own words, from the first he
never intended to abide by the Munich agreement, but that he had to have
the whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed
in full force against Poland, after September 1938 they did at once
begin to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig until the whole of
Czechoslovakia had been taken in March. Immediately after the
Sudetenland had been occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir up
trouble with Poland, which would and was to eventually lead to the Nazi
excuse or justification for their attack on that country.

The earlier discussions between the German and Polish governments on the
question of Danzig, which commenced almost immediately after the Munich
crisis in September 1938, began as cautious and friendly discussions,
until the remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March
of the following year. A document taken from the Official Polish White
Book, gives an account of a luncheon which took place at the Grand
Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on 25 October, where Ribbentrop had discussions
with M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador to Germany. The report states:

    “In a conversation on 24 October, over a luncheon at the Grand
    Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, M. von
    Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of
    issues (_Gesamtloesung_) between Poland and Germany. This
    included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland
    would be assured the retention of railway and economic
    facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an
    extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze. In
    exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an
    extension of the Polish-German Agreement by twenty-five years
    and a guarantee of Polish-German frontiers.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von Ribbentrop that I
    could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion
    of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to
    communicate the substance of this conversation to you.” (_TC-73
    No. 44_)

It seems clear that the whole question of Danzig, as indeed Hitler
himself said, was no question at all. Danzig was raised simply as an
excuse, a justification, not for the seizure of Danzig but for the
invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland. As the story unfolds it
will become ever more apparent that that is what the Nazi conspirators
were really aiming at, only providing themselves with some kind of
crisis which would afford some kind of justification for attacking
Poland.

Another document taken from the Polish White Book (_TC-73 No. 45_) sets
out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, gave to
Mr. Lipski to hand to the German government in reply to the suggestions
put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on 24 October. The first part
reviews the history of Polish-German relationship and emphasizes the
needs of Poland in respect to Danzig. Paragraph 6 of the document
states:

    “In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish
    government, the Danzig question is governed by two factors: the
    right of the German population of the city and the surrounding
    villages to freedom of life and development; and the fact that
    in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is
    connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the
    majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely
    bound up with Poland.” (_TC-73 No. 45_)

The document then sets out the guarantees to Poland under the statute,
and continues as follows:

    “Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and
    desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a
    friendly understanding with the government of the German Reich,
    the Polish government proposes the replacement of the League of
    Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bi-lateral
    Polish-German Agreement. This agreement should guarantee the
    existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of
    national and cultural life to its German majority, and also
    should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the
    complications involved in such a system, the Polish government
    must state that any other solution, and in particular any
    attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must
    inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form
    of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of
    Polish-German understanding in all its aspects.

    “In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am
    ready to have final conversations personally with the governing
    circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you
    should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that
    my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would
    be dangerous for the future.” (_TC-73 No. 45_)

The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely successful from
the German point of view. The Nazis had put forward a proposal, the
return of the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well have
known would have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable and the Polish
government had warned the Nazi government that it would be. The Poles
had offered to enter into negotiations, but they had not agreed, which
is exactly what the German government had hoped for. They had not agreed
to the return of Danzig to the Reich. The first stage in producing the
crisis had been accomplished.

Shortly afterwards, within a week or so, and after the Polish government
had offered to enter into discussions with the German government,
another top secret order was issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces, signed by Keitel (_C-137_). Copies went to the OKH, OKM, and
OKW. The order is headed “First Supplement to Instruction dated 21
October 1938,” and reads:

    “The Fuehrer has ordered: Apart from the three contingencies
    mentioned in the instructions of 21 October 1938, preparations
    are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be
    occupied by German troops by surprise.

    “The preparations will be made on the following basis: Condition
    is _quasi-revolutionary_ occupation of Danzig, exploiting a
    politically favorable situation, _not a war against Poland_.”
    (_C-137_)

The remainder of Czechoslovakia had not yet been seized, and therefore
the Nazis were not yet ready to go to war with Poland. But Keitel’s
order shows how the German government answered the Polish proposal to
enter into discussions.

On 5 January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler. (_TC-73 No.
48_). Ribbentrop was also present. In the first part of that
conversation, of which that document is an account, Hitler offered to
answer any questions. He said he had always followed the policy laid
down by the 1934 agreement. He discussed the question of Danzig and
emphasized that in the German view it must sooner or later return to
Germany. The conversation continued:

    “Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult
    problem. He added that in the Chancellor’s suggestion he did not
    see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish
    opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest
    spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this
    matter.

    “In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this
    problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite
    new, some new form, for which he used the term ‘_Korperschaft_,’
    which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the
    German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In
    addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be
    quite at ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig and
    nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the
    Polish Government.” (_TC-73 No. 48_)

It will be recalled that in the previous document discussed (_C-137_)
orders had already been issued for preparations to be made for the
occupation of Danzig by surprise. Yet some six weeks later Hitler
assured the Polish Foreign Minister that there would be no fait accompli
and that he should be quite at his ease.

On the day after the conversation between Beck and Hitler, Beck and
Ribbentrop conferred, as follows:

    “Mr. Beck asked M. Von Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that
    whereas previously, after all his conversations and contacts
    with German statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today for
    the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in
    regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the
    Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In answer M. Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany
    was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy
    towards Poland was still a desire for the further building up of
    friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of
    clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and
    interests of the two parties concerned.” (_TC-73 No. 49_)

Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with that one expression of good
faith. On the 25th of the same month, January 1939, he was in Warsaw and
made another speech, of which the following is a pertinent extract:

    “In accordance with the resolute will of the German National
    Leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly
    relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing
    agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German
    foreign policy. The political foresight, and the principles
    worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take
    the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that all
    other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of
    events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard
    to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of
    both sides. Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the
    future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual
    relations.” (_2530-PS_)

Hitler spoke in the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, and gave further
assurances of the good faith of the German Government. (_TC-73 No. 57_)

In March 1939 the remainder of Czechoslovakia was seized and the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up. That seizure, as was
recognized by Hitler and Jodl, had immensely strengthened the German
position against Poland. Within a week of the completion of the
occupation of Czechoslovakia heat was beginning to be applied on Poland.

On 21 March M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador, saw Ribbentrop. The nature
of the conversation was generally very much sharper than that of the
discussion between Ribbentrop and Beck a little time back at the Grand
Hotel, Berchtesgaden:

    “I saw M. Von Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked
    me to call on him in order to discuss Polish-German relations in
    their entirety.

    “He complained about our Press, and the Warsaw students’
    demonstrations during Count Ciano’s visit.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Further, M. von Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at
    Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler
    put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland’s frontiers in
    exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig in the
    Reich. He said that there had been further conversations between
    you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had pointed
    out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these
    suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an
    unfavorable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had
    received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his
    suggestions. M. von Ribbentrop had had a talk with the
    Chancellor only yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was
    still in favor of good relations with Poland, and had expressed
    a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the subject
    of our mutual relations. M. von Ribbentrop indicated that he was
    under the impression that difficulties arising between us were
    also due to some misunderstanding of the Reich’s real aims. The
    problem needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his
    opinion our two States were dependent on each other.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I [Lipski] stated that now, during the settlement of the
    Czechoslovakian question, there was no understanding whatever
    between us. The Czech issue was already hard enough for the
    Polish public to swallow, for, despite our disputes with the
    Czechs they were after all a Slav people. But in regard to
    Slovakia the position was far worse. I emphasized our community
    of race, language and religion, and mentioned the help we had
    given in their achievement of independence. I pointed out our
    long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in
    the street could not understand why the Reich had assumed the
    protection of Slovakia, that protection being directed against
    Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a serious
    blow to our relations.

    “Ribbentrop reflected a moment, and then answered that this
    could be discussed.

    “I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation
    between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might
    go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk over this matter.
    He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the
    Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was
    rejecting all his offers.

    “Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his
    conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania.

    “Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys on the
    latter’s return from Rome, and they had discussed the Memel
    question, which called for a solution.” (_TC-73 No. 61_)

That conversation took place on 21 March. The world soon learned what
the solution to Memel was. On the next day German armed forces marched
in.

As a result of these events, considerable anxiety was growing both in
the government of Great Britain and the Polish government, and the two
governments therefore had been undertaking conversations between each
other. On 31 March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the
House of Commons. He explained the results of the conversations that had
been taking place between the British and Polish Governments:

    “As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding
    with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the
    position of His Majesty’s government in the meantime before
    those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the
    House that during that period, in the event of any action which
    clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish
    government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their
    national forces, His Majesty’s government would feel themselves
    bound at once to lend the Polish government all support in their
    power. They have given the Polish government an assurance to
    this effect.

    “I may add that the French government have authorized me to make
    it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as
    do His Majesty’s Government.” (_TC-72 No. 17_)

On 6 April, a week later, a formal communique was issued by the
Anglo-Polish governments, which repeated the assurance the Prime
Minister had given a week before, and in which Poland assured Great
Britain of her support should Great Britain be attacked. (_TC-72 No.
18_)

The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and Great Britain
were feeling at that time appears to have been justified. During the
same week, on 3 April, an order, signed by Keitel, emanated from the
High Command of the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3 April 1939. The
subject is “Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40.” The order reads:

    “Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the Armed
    Forces for 1939/40 is being reissued.

    “Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part III (Danzig) will be issued
    in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

    “Part II ‘_Fall Weiss_’ [the code name for the operation against
    Poland] is attached herewith. The signature of the Fuehrer will
    be appended later.

    “The Fuehrer has added the following Directives to ‘_Fall
    Weiss_’:

    “1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operations
    can be carried out at any time from 1st September 1939 onwards.

    “2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to
    draw up a precise timetable for ‘_Fall Weiss_’ and to arrange by
    conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches
    of the armed forces.

    “3. The plan of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details
    for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by the 1st of
    May, 1939.” (C-120)

This order was distributed to the OKH, OKM, and OKW.

Another document, dated 11 April, and signed by Hitler, is annexed. It
reads:

    “I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the
    Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with
    these for the conduct of the war.

    “Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be
    prepared for the following eventualities:

    “I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and
    protection against surprise air attacks.

    “II. ‘_Fall Weiss_’.

    “III. The annexation of Danzig.

    “Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of military
    authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike
    development.” (_C-120_)

Again, copies of that document went to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. Annex I to
this order, which concerns the safeguarding of the frontiers of the
German Reich, declares:

    “* * * Legal Basis: It should be anticipated that a state of
    Defense or State of War, as defined in the Reichdefense law of
    the 4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures
    and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be
    based on the laws valid in peacetime.” (_C-120_)

The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, followed by
the Anglo-Polish communique of 6 April, was seized upon by the Nazi
government to urge on the crisis which they were developing in Danzig
between themselves and Poland.

On 28 April the German government issued a memorandum in which they
alleged that the Anglo-Polish declaration was incompatible with the 1934
Agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of entering
into or by reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had
unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement. The following are pertinent
passages from that memorandum:

    “The German government have taken note of the Polish-British
    declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations
    recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According
    to this declaration there had been concluded between the Polish
    government and the British government a temporary understanding
    to be released shortly by a permanent agreement which will
    provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great
    Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two
    states being directly or indirectly threatened.” (_TC-72 No.
    14_)

The memorandum goes on to set out in the next three paragraphs the
history of German friendship towards Poland. It continues:

    “* * * The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish
    government with the British government is in such obvious
    contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago
    that the German government can take note only with surprise and
    astonishment of such a violent reversal of Polish policy.

    “Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may
    be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement
    is intended as a regular Pact of Alliance, which, by reason of
    its general sense and of the present state of political
    relations, is directed exclusively against Germany.

    “From the obligation now accepted by the Polish government, it
    appears that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take
    an active part in any possible German-British conflict, in the
    event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict
    not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open
    blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in
    the 1934 declaration.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Polish government, however, by their recent decision to
    accede to an alliance directed against Germany have given it to
    be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third
    power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German government.
    In view of this, the German government are obliged to conclude
    that the Polish government do not at present attach any
    importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by
    means of direct, friendly discussion with the German government.
    The Polish government have thus abandoned the path traced out in
    1934 to the shaping of German-Polish relations.” (_TC-72 No.
    14_)

All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the fact that
orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and the Armed
Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable.

The memorandum goes on to set out the history of the last negotiations
and discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st which the German
government had made for the return of Danzig, the autobahn, and the
railway. It mentions the promise by Germany of the twenty-five year
guarantee, and continues:

    “The Polish government did not avail themselves of the
    opportunity offered to them by the German government for a just
    settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of
    Poland’s frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent
    strengthening of the friendly, neighbourly relations between the
    two countries. The Polish government even rejected German
    proposals made with this object.

    “At the same time the Polish government accepted, with regard to
    another state, political obligations which are not compatible
    either with the spirit, the meaning or the text of the
    German-Polish declaration of the 26 of January, 1934. Thereby,
    the Polish government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this
    declaration null and void.” (_TC-72 No. 14_)

In the last paragraph the German government says, that nevertheless,
they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland.

On the same day that memorandum was issued, 28 April, Hitler made a
speech in the Reichstag, in which he repeated, in effect, the terms of
the memorandum. He repeated the demands and offers that Germany made in
March, and went on to say that the Polish government have rejected his
offer. He expressed his disappointment:

    “I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the
    Polish government. But that alone is not the decisive fact. The
    worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia, a year ago,
    believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign,
    that it must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has
    not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in
    any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very
    regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was
    really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me.
    This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a
    question which intimately affects the German people, by a truly
    unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both
    countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving
    party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party,
    because it should be beyond all doubt, that Danzig will never
    become Polish. The intention to attack on the part of Germany,
    which was merely invented by the International Press, led, as
    you know, to the so-called guarantee offer, and to an obligation
    on the part of the Polish government for mutual assistance. * *
    *” (_TC-72 No. 13_)

The speech demonstrates how completely dishonest was everything that the
German government was saying at that time. Hitler, who may very well
have had a copy of the orders for “_Fall Weiss_” in his pocket as he
spoke, announced publicly, that the intention to attack by Germany was
an invention of “the International Press.”

In answer to that memorandum and that speech, the Polish government
issued a memorandum on 5 May. It sets out the objectives of the 1934
agreement to renounce the use of force and to carry on friendly
relationship between the two countries; to solve difficulties by
arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish government states its
awareness of the difficulties about Danzig and declares that it has long
been ready to carry out discussions. The Polish government sets out
again its part of the recent discussions. The Polish government states
that it communicated its views to the German government on 26 March, and
that it then proposed joint guarantees by the Polish and German
governments of the City of Danzig, based on the principles of freedom
for the local population in internal affairs. The Poles stated their
preparedness to examine the possibilities of a motor road and railway
facilities. They received no reply to those proposals. The Polish
position is summarized in one sentence:

    “It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates
    demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands
    unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration
    of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and
    dignity of Poland” (_TC-72 No. 16_).

The Polish government proceeds to reject the German accusation that the
Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the 1934 German-Polish
agreement. It states that Germany herself has entered into similar
agreements with other nations, and lastly it announces that it is still
willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should Germany wish to do
so. (_TC-72 No. 16_)

The German answer was contained in a letter from the Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces, is signed by Hitler, and dated 10 May (_C-120_).
Copies went to the various branches of the OKW, and with them apparently
were enclosed “Instructions for the economic war and the protection of
our own economy.” Not only were military preparations being carried out
throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every other kind of
preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment.

This period of preparation, up to May 1939, concluded with the
conference in the Reichschancellery on 23 May. The report of this
meeting is known as the Schmundt Minutes (_L-79_). In his address to the
conference Hitler cried out for _lebensraum_ and said that Danzig was
not the dispute at all. It was a question of expanding their living room
in the east, and he said that the decision had been taken to attack
Poland.

Goering, Raeder and Keitel, among many others, were present. The
following is a significant paragraph:

    “If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against
    Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack
    England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer
    doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England.”
    (_L-79_)

So that, not only has the decision been taken definitely to attack
Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France.

C. _Final Preparations: June-September 1939_

(1) _Final Preparations of the Armed Forces._ A precise timetable for
the attack had been called for. On 22 June 1939 it was ready. It
provided as follows:

    “The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the
    Fuehrer and Supreme Commander a ‘preliminary timetable’ for
    ‘_Fall Weiss_’ based on the particulars so far available from
    the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days
    preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not
    included in this timetable.

    “The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in
    agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force
    and made the following comments on individual points:—

    “1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up
    reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers
    scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments,
    employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be
    told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and
    for the exercise units it is intended to form for these
    maneuvers.

    “It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to
    subordinate establishments.” (_C-126_)

All this became relevant later, when the German government made
allegations of mobilization on the part of the Poles. This order shows
that in June the Germans were mobilizing, only doing so secretly. The
order continues:

    “For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area
    of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed
    should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried
    out.” (_C-126_)

The order is signed by Keitel.

A short letter, dated 2 August, which is attached to that order, reads
in part:

    “Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of
    U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of
    precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out ‘_Fall
    Weiss_’ remaining unchanged. F.O. U-Boats [Doenitz] is handing
    in his Operation Orders by 12 August.” (_C-126_)

Another letter, dated 27 July, contains orders for the Air and Sea
Forces for the occupation of the German Free City of Danzig. It
provides:

    “The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
    ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the
    Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy the Danzig
    Free State immediately in order to protect the German
    population. There will be no hostile intention on the part of
    Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force
    of arms.” (_C-30_)

The letter then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this
again becomes more relevant in the subsequent discussion of the
diplomatic action of the last few days before the war, when Germany was
making specious offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful
means. This letter is evidence that the decision had been taken, and
that nothing would change that decision. During July, right up to the
time of the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig
and to prepare them to take part in the coming occupation.

The reports which were coming back almost daily during this period from
Mr. Shepherd, British Consul-General in Danzig, to the British Foreign
Minister, and published in the British Blue Book, show the kind of thing
that was happening. The report dated 1 July 1939 reads as follows:

    “Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived
    here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig _Heimwehr_.

    “All approaches to hills and dismantled fort, which constitute a
    popular public promenade on western fringe of the city, have
    been closed with barbed wire and ‘_verboten_’ notices.

    “The walls surrounding the shipyards bear placards: ‘Comrades
    keep your mouths shut lest you regret consequence.’

    “Master of British steamer ‘High Commissioner Wood’ whilst he
    was roving Koenigsberg from 28th June to 30th June, observed
    considerable military activity, including extensive shipment of
    camouflaged covered lorries and similar material by small
    coasting vessels. On 28th June four medium-sized steamers,
    loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, etc., left
    Koenigsberg, ostensibly returning to Hamburg after maneuvers,
    but actually proceeding to Stettin.” (_TC-71_).

And again, as another example, the report dated 10 July states:

    “The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me
    that on 8th July he personally saw about thirty military lorries
    with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofsberg, where
    numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges. There
    were also eight large anti-aircraft guns in position, which he
    estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three
    six-barreled light anti-aircraft machine guns. There were about
    500 men drilling with rifles, and the whole place is extensively
    fortified with barbed wire.” (_TC-71_).

On 12 and 13 August, when preparations were practically complete, Hitler
and Ribbentrop at last disclosed their intentions to their allies, the
Italians. It will be recalled that one of the passages in Hitler’s
speech on 23 May, in regard to the proposed attack on Poland, had said,
“Our object must be kept secret even from the Italians and the
Japanese.” (_L-79_). Now, when the preparations were complete, Hitler
disclosed his intentions to his Italian comrades in the hope that they
would join him. Ciano was surprised at Hitler’s attempt to persuade the
Italians to come into the war with him. He had no idea, as he said, of
the urgency of the matter, and they are not prepared. He therefore tried
to dissuade Hitler from starting off until the Duce could have a little
more time to prepare himself. (_TC-77_)

The minutes of that meeting show quite clearly the German intention to
attack England and France ultimately, if not at the same time as Poland.
In trying to show the strength of Germany and its certainty of winning
the war as a means of persuading the Italians to come in, Hitler
declared:

    “At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements
    in prospect. Some time would elapse before any of the ships now
    under construction could be taken into service. As far as the
    land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription
    60,000 men had been called to the colors. If England kept the
    necessary troops in her own country she could send to France, at
    the most, two infantry divisions and one armored division. For
    the rest she could supply a few bomber squadrons but hardly any
    fighters since, at the outbreak of war, the German Air Force
    would at once attack England and the English fighters would be
    urgently needed for the defense of their own country.

    “With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer said that in
    the event of a general war, after the destruction of
    Poland—which would not take long—Germany would be in a
    position to assemble hundreds of divisions along the West Wall
    and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her
    available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier
    and elsewhere on her own Maginot Line, for the life and death
    struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also thought that
    the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian
    fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano
    showed signs of extreme doubt. The Polish Army was most uneven
    in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were
    large numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak in
    anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense and at the moment neither
    France nor England could help her in this respect.

    “If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western
    powers, over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and
    German superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to
    the fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow, the population of their areas
    was different. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the
    position of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one
    and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews,
    and nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much
    less in number than the total population and, as already said,
    their striking power was not to be valued highly. In these
    circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in
    the shortest time.

    “Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it
    clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would
    stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick
    liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for
    the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a
    hostile Poland remained on Germany’s eastern frontier, not only
    would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also
    further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This
    would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Coming back to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said that it
    was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement
    with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol,
    but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid
    giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be
    taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had
    justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly and
    northeasterly direction of a German policy. The east and
    northeast, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been
    Germany’s undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial,
    as the Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy.
    For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and
    timber from these eastern regions.” (_TC-77_)

Now the truth of this matter appears. It is not the persecution of
German minorities on the Polish frontiers, but economic reasons—the
need for foodstuffs and timber from Poland. The minutes of the
Italo-German meeting continue:

    “In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material,
    although the city had the greatest harbour in the Baltic. Danzig
    was a Nurnberg of the North, an ancient German city awakening
    sentimental feelings for every German, and the Fuehrer was bound
    to take account of this psychological element in public opinion.
    To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that
    Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a large Italian minority
    was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be
    difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over
    anything of this kind.

    “Count Ciano, in replying to the Fuehrer’s statement, first
    expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the
    completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in
    the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during
    his Berlin visit had there been any sign from the German side
    that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the
    contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion the Danzig
    question would be settled in the course of time. On these
    grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that a conflict
    with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he
    should make his preparations for this event; he had made plans
    for a period of two or three years. If immediate conflict were
    unavoidable, the Duce, as he had told Ciano, would certainly
    stand on the German side, but for various reasons he would
    welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later
    time.

    “Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy
    in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict
    with Poland would not be limited to that country but would
    develop into a general European war.” (_TC-77_)

Thereafter, Ciano tried to dissuade Hitler from any immediate action. He
argued further:

    “For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should
    make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful
    intentions of Italy and Germany.” (_TC-77_)

The Fuehrer’s answer was clear:

    “The Fuehrer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem
    no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn,
    the more difficult would military operations in Eastern Europe
    become. From the middle of September, weather conditions made
    air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the
    condition of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass
    by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible
    for motorized forces. From September to May, Poland was a great
    marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations.
    Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in September and Germany
    would not be able to do anything about it since they obviously
    could not bombard or destroy the place.” (_TC-77_)

The Germans could not possibly bombard or destroy any place such as
Danzig where there happened to be Germans living. The discussion
continued:

    “Ciano asked how soon, according to the Fuehrer’s view, the
    Danzig question must be settled. The Fuehrer answered that this
    settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August.
    To the question of Ciano’s as to what solution the Fuehrer
    proposed, Hitler answered that Poland must give up political
    control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would
    obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior must
    contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted
    whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since, up to
    the present, the German proposals had been refused. The Fuehrer
    had made this proposal personally to Beck at his visit to
    Obersalzberg. They were extremely favorable to Poland. In return
    for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete
    guarantee of Polish interests and the establishment of a
    connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would
    have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-year pact of friendship
    and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck
    had received the proposal with the remark that he was willing to
    examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of
    English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen
    clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia,
    and even proposed to advance to Berlin.” (_TC-77_)

The meeting was held over that night, and it continued on the following
day:

    “The Fuehrer had therefore come to two definite conclusions: (1)
    in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately
    attack; (2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her
    political intention, she must be forced to do so.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist
    further in the world through lack of space; not only was there
    no more space, but existing space was completely blockaded by
    its present possessors; they sat like misers with their heaps of
    gold and deluded themselves about their riches. The Western
    Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the world and
    would not regard Germany and Italy as their class. This
    psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst thing
    about the whole business. It could only be settled by a life and
    death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet more
    easily because their interests did not clash on any point.

    “The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for
    which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself had
    summed up the position to him in the words that Italy already
    was the dominant power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand,
    the Fuehrer said that Germany must take the old German road
    eastwards and that this road was also desirable for economic
    reasons, and that Italy had geographical and historical claims
    to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck had recognized it
    and had said as much in his well-known letter to Mazzini. The
    interests of Germany and Italy went in quite different
    directions and there never could be a conflict between them.

    “Ribbentrop added that if the two problems mentioned in
    yesterday’s conversations were settled, Italy and Germany would
    have their backs free for work against the West. The Fuehrer
    said that Poland must be struck down so that for 50 years she
    would be incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the
    West could be settled.

    “Ciano thanked the Fuehrer for his extremely clear explanation
    of the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would
    give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite
    information on one point in order that the Duce might have all
    the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no
    decision because the Fuehrer believed that the conflict with
    Poland could be localized on the basis of long experience.
    He—Ciano—quite saw that so far the Fuehrer had always been
    right in his judgment of the position. If, however, Mussolini
    had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of
    precaution, and therefore Ciano would put the following
    question:

    “The Fuehrer had mentioned two conditions under which he would
    take Poland (1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation,
    and (2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The
    first of these conditions depended on the decision of the
    Fuehrer, and German reaction could follow it in a moment. The
    second condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano
    therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must have
    satisfied Germany about her political condition. He realized
    that this date depended upon climatic conditions.

    “The Fuehrer answered that the decision of Poland must be made
    clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the
    decisive part of military operations against Poland could be
    carried out within a period of 14 days and the final liquidation
    would need another four weeks, it could be finished at the end
    of September or the beginning of October. These could be
    regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore, that the last
    dates on which he could begin to take action was the end of
    August.

    “Finally, the Fuehrer assured Ciano that since his youth he had
    favored German-Italian cooperation, and that no other view was
    expressed in his books. He had always thought that Germany and
    Italy were naturally suited for collaboration, since there were
    no conflicts of interest between them. He was personally
    fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there
    was one other statesman who would stand out great and unique in
    history; that he could be this man’s friend was for him a matter
    of great personal satisfaction, and if the hour of common battle
    struck, he would always be found on the side of the Duce.”
    (_TC-77_)

(2) _Economic Preparations._ If the military preparations were
throughout this period nearing their completion, at the same time the
economists had not been idle. A letter dated 25 August 1939, from Funk
to the Feuhrer, reads:

    “My Fuehrer!

    “I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most friendly and
    kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday. How happy and how
    grateful to you we ought to be for being granted the favor of
    experiencing these overwhelmingly great and world-changing times
    and taking part in the mighty events of these days.

    “The information given to me by Field Marshal Goering, that you,
    my Fuehrer, yesterday evening approved in principle the measures
    prepared by me for financing the war and for shaping the
    relationship between wages and prices and for carrying through
    emergency sacrifices, made me deeply happy. I hereby report to
    you with all respect that I have succeeded by means of
    precautions taken during the last few months, in making the
    Reichsbank internally so strong and externally so unassailable,
    that even the most serious shocks in the international money and
    credit market cannot affect us in the least. In the meantime I
    have quite inconspicuously changed into gold all the assets of
    the Reichsbank and of the whole of German economy abroad which
    it was possible to lay hands on. Under the proposals I have
    prepared for a ruthless elimination of all consumption which is
    not of vital importance and of all public expenditure and public
    works which are not of importance for the war effort, we will be
    in a position to cope with all demands on finance and economy,
    without any serious shocks. I have considered it my duty as the
    General Plenipotentiary for Economy appointed by you to make
    this report and solemn promise to you, my Fuehrer.

    “Heil my Fuehrer  /signed/  Walter Funk.” (_699-PS_)

It is difficult in view of that letter to see how Funk can claim that he
did not know of the preparations and of the intentions of the German
government to wage war.

(3) _The Obersalzburg Speech._ On 22 August 1939, Hitler addressed his
commanders in chief at Obersalzburg. (_1014-PS_). At this date
preparations were complete. In the course of his speech Hitler declared:

    “Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were
    determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination
    of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war
    should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be
    the primary objective.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war—never
    mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
    asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In starting and
    making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come
    sooner or later. I had already made this decision in spring, but
    I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few
    years, and only afterwards against the East.” (_1014-PS_)

These passages emphasize the intention of the Nazi government not only
to conquer Poland but ultimately, in any event, to wage aggressive war
against the Western Democracies.

In another significant passage, Hitler stated:

    “We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us
    with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which
    demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute
    some _Schweinehund_ will make a proposal for mediation.

    “The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for
    the destruction of England’s hegemony. The way is open for the
    soldier, after I have made the political preparations.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance
    that the armed forces will do their duty.” (_798-PS_)

(4) _Diplomatic Preparations: Provoking the Crisis._ On 23 August 1939,
the Danzig Senate passed a decree whereby Gauleiter Forster was
appointed head of the State of the Free City of Danzig, a position which
did not exist under the statute setting up the constitution of the Free
City. (_TC-72 No. 62_). That event was, of course, aimed at stirring up
feeling in the Free City at that time.

At the same time, frontier incidents were being manufactured by the Nazi
Government with the aid of the SS. The affidavit of General Lahousen
(_Affidavit A_) refers to the provision of Polish uniforms to the SS
Forces for these purposes, so that dead Poles could be found lying about
on the German side of the frontier. Three short reports found in the
British Blue Book corroborate this affidavit. They are reports from the
British ambassador in Warsaw.

The first of them is dated 26 August, and reads:

    “Series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German
    frontier.

    “Polish patrol met party Germans one kilometre from East
    Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire. Polish patrol
    replied, killing leader, whose body is being returned.

    “German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo,
    twice near Rybnik and twice elsewhere, firing shots and
    attacking blockhouses and customs posts with machine guns and
    hand grenades. Poles have protested vigorously to Berlin.

    “_Gazeta Polska_, in inspired leader, today says these are more
    than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of aggression of
    para-military disciplined detachments supplied with regular
    army’s arms, and in one case it was a regular army detachment.
    Attacks more or less continuous.

    “These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong
    attitude of defence. Facts spoke for themselves and acts of
    aggression came from German side. This was best answer to
    ravings of German press.

    “Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment
    has since shot Pole across frontier and wounded another.”
    (_TC-72 No. 53_)

The next report is dated the same date, 26 August and reads:

    “Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story recounted
    by Herr Hitler to French Ambassador that twenty-four Germans
    were recently killed at Lodz and eight at Bielsko. Story is
    without any foundation whatever.” (_TC-72 No. 54_)

The report of the next day, 27 August, reads as follows:

    “So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-treatment
    of German minority by Polish authorities are gross exaggeration,
    if not complete falsification.

    “2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by
    Polish civil authorities. Warsaw, and so far as I can ascertain,
    the rest of Poland is still completely calm.

    “3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda methods
    regarding Czechoslovakia last year.

    “4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German
    provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since March
    [when the rest of Czechoslovakia was seized] exacerbated feeling
    between the two nationalities. I suppose this has been done with
    object (a) creating war spirit in Germany (b) impressing public
    opinion abroad (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent
    aggression in Poland.

    “5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two latter
    objects.

    “6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by Herr
    Hitler.

    “7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority is
    apparently negligible factor compared with alleged sufferings of
    Germans in Poland where, be it noted, they do not amount to more
    than 10 per cent of population in any commune.

    “8. In face of these facts it can hardly be doubted that, if
    Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole purpose of
    destroying Polish independence.

    “9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister for
    Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything possible to prove
    that Herr Hitler’s allegations regarding German minority are
    false.” (_TC-72 No. 55_)

Further corroboration of General Lahousen’s affidavit is contained in a
memorandum of a conversation between the writer and Keitel. That
conversation with Keitel took place on 17 August, and went as follows:

    “I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that he
    would not pay any attention to this action, as the Fuehrer had
    not informed him, and had only let him know that we were to
    furnish Heydrich with Polish uniforms. He agrees that I instruct
    the General Staff. He says that he does not think much of
    actions of this kind. However, there is nothing else to be done
    if they have been ordered by the Fuehrer, that he could not ask
    the Fuehrer how he had planned the execution of this special
    action. In regard to Dirschau, he has decided that this action
    would be executed only by the Army.” (_795-PS_)

That was the position at the end of the third week in August 1939. On 22
August the Russian-German Non-aggression Pact was signed in Moscow. The
orders to invade Poland were given immediately after the signing of that
treaty, and the H-hour was actually to be in the early morning of 25 of
August.

(5) _Pleas for peace._ On the same date, 22 August, news reached England
that the German-Russian agreement was being signed. The significance of
that pact from a military point of view as to Germany was obvious, and
the British government immediately made their position clear in one last
hope, that the German government might possibly think better. The Prime
Minister wrote to Hitler as follows:

    “Your Excellency.

    “Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures
    taken by His Majesty’s Government, and announced in the press
    and on the wireless this evening.

    “These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government,
    been rendered necessary by the military movements which have
    been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the
    announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some
    quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great
    Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need
    be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may
    prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it can
    not alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland, which His
    Majesty’s Government have stated in public repeatedly and
    plainly, and which they are determined to fulfill.

    “It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government had made
    their position clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have
    been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that
    allegation, His Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this
    occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.

    “If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to
    employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is
    impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It
    would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts,
    it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the
    several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been
    secured.” (_TC-72 No. 56_).

The Prime Minister therefore urged the German government to try to solve
the difficulty without recourse to the use of force. He suggested that a
truce should be declared while direct discussions between the two
governments, Polish and German, might take place. Prime Minister
Chamberlain concluded:

    “At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a
    catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the
    grave consequences to humanity, which may follow from the action
    of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with
    the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put
    before you.” (_TC-72 No. 56_).

On the following day, 23 August, Hitler replied to Prime Minister
Chamberlain. He started off by saying that Germany has always sought
England’s friendship, and went on to say that Germany, “like every other
State, possesses certain definite interests which it is impossible to
renounce.” The letter continued as follows:

    “Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig, and of
    the Corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a
    proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegations
    disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization against
    Poland, the assertion of aggressive designs towards Roumania,
    Hungary, etc., as well as the so-called guarantee declarations,
    which were subsequently given, had, however, dispelled Polish
    inclination to negotiate on a basis of this kind which would
    have been tolerable for Germany also.

    “The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland that she
    would render assistance to that country in all circumstances
    regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring,
    could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement
    thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave
    of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German
    inhabitants living in Poland.

    “The atrocities which then have been taking place in that
    country are terrible for the victims, but intolerable for a
    great power such as the German Reich, which is expected to
    remain a passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has
    been guilty of numerous breaches of her legal obligations
    towards the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the
    character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic
    strangulation.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the persecution of
    the Germans.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The German Reich government has received information to the
    effect that the British government has the intention to carry
    out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements
    contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against
    Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since
    Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures
    other than those of a defensive character against England, or
    France, and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended,
    and does not in the future intend, to attack England, or France,
    it follows that this announcement, as confirmed by you, Mr.
    Prime Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a
    contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich. I,
    therefore, inform your Excellency that in the event of these
    military announcements being carried into effect, I shall order
    immediate mobilization of the German forces.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The question of the treatment of European problems on a
    peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but
    primarily on those who since the crime committed by the
    Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any
    peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of
    the responsible powers can there be any real change in the
    relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life
    fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by
    British diplomacy—at any rate up to the present—has, however,
    convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be
    any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be
    happier than I.” (_TC-72 No. 60_).

On 25 August the formal Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance was
signed in London. Each government undertook to give assistance to the
other in the event of aggression against either by any third power.
(_TC-73 No. 91_)

A few days later the French Prime Minister Daladier addressed a letter
to Hitler, which reads as follows:

    “The French ambassador in Berlin has informed me of your
    personal communication * * *.

    “In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility
    which two heads of the governments can possibly take upon
    themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great
    nations, who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to
    you personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate of
    peace still rests in your hands.

    “You cannot doubt what are my own feelings towards Germany, nor
    France’s peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman has
    done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations not
    only peace, but also sincere cooperation in their own interests,
    as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world. Unless you
    credit the French people with a lower sense of honor, than I
    credit the German Nation with; you cannot doubt that France
    loyally fulfills her obligations towards other powers, such as
    Poland, which as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace
    with Germany.

    “These two convictions are fully compatible.

    “Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution
    of the international crisis, with all honor and dignity for all
    nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides.

    “Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all
    her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland’s
    readiness, which she has always shown to submit to the mutual
    application of a method of open settlement, as it can be
    imagined between the governments of two sovereign nations. With
    the clearest conscience I can assure you that among the
    differences which have arisen between Germany and Poland over,
    the question of Danzig, there is not one which could not be
    submitted to such a method, the purpose of reaching a peaceful
    and just solution.

    “Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing in
    France’s clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies,
    which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my
    country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not
    prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state
    of mind.

    “In so serious an hour, I sincerely believe that no high-minded
    human being could understand it, if a war of destruction was
    started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful
    settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace
    could in all certainty work for this aim, without any prejudice
    to German honor. I, who desire good harmony between the French
    and the German people, and who am on the other hand bound to
    Poland by bonds of friendship, and by a promise, am prepared, as
    head of the French government, to do everything an upright man
    can do to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion.

    “You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You know, as I
    do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war
    have left in the conscience of the peoples; without any regard
    to its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind’s eye of your
    outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road
    of peace, towards the fulfillment of its task in the common work
    of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion.

    “If French and German blood should be shed again, as it was shed
    25 years ago, in a still longer and more murderous war, then
    each of the two nations will fight, believing in its own
    victory. But the most certain victors will be—destruction and
    barbarity.” (_TC-78_)

On 27 August Hitler replied to M. Daladier’s letter of 26 August. The
sense of it was very much the same as that which he wrote to the British
Prime Minister in answer to the letter which he had received from him
earlier in the week. (_TC-79_)

After the letters from Chamberlain and Daladier, the German Government
could no longer be in any doubt as to the position of both the British
and French Governments in the event of German aggression against Poland.
But the pleas for peace did not end there. On 24 August President
Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and to the President of the Polish
Republic (_TC-72 No. 124_). His letter stated in part:

    “In the message which I sent to you on the 14th April, I stated
    that it appeared to me that the leaders of great nations had it
    in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that
    impended, but that unless the effort were immediately made with
    good will on all sides to find a peaceful and constructive
    solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world
    was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe
    appears to be very near at hand indeed.

    “To the message which I sent you last April I have received no
    reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world
    peace—which is the cause of humanity itself—rises above all
    other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with
    the hope that the war which impends and the consequent disaster
    to all peoples may yet be averted.

    “I therefore urge with all earnestness—and I am likewise urging
    the President of the Republic of Poland—that the Government of
    Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any
    positive act of hostility for a reasonable stipulated period,
    and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the
    controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three
    following methods:

    “First, by direct negotiation;

    “Second, by the submission of these controversies to an
    impartial arbitration in which they can both have confidence; or

    “Third, that they agree to the solution of these controversies
    through the procedure of conciliation.” (_TC-72 No. 124_).

Hitler’s answer to that letter was the order to his armed forces to
invade Poland on the following morning. The reply to Mr. Roosevelt’s
letter from the President of the Polish Republic, however, was an
acceptance of the offer to settle the differences by any of the peaceful
methods suggested. (_TC-72 No. 126_)

On 25 August, no reply having been received from the German Government,
President Roosevelt wrote again:

    “I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply
    to the message which I addressed to your Excellency and to him
    last night.”

The Polish reply is then set out.

    “Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims
    and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable.

    “In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it
    plain that the Polish Government is willing, upon the basis set
    forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has
    arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by
    direct negotiation or the process of conciliation.

    “Countless human lives can yet be saved and hope may still be
    restored that the nations of the modern world may even now
    construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier
    relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will
    agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the
    Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too,
    will accept.” (_TC-72 No. 127_)

But Germany would not accept those proposals, nor would it pay heed to
the Pope’s appeal on the same date, 24 August (_TC-72 No. 139_). It is
an appeal in similar terms. There was yet a further appeal from the Pope
on 31 August:

    “The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations
    may lead to a just pacific solution such as the whole world
    continues to pray for.” (_TC-72 No. 141_).

Those negotiations, on the last days of August, to which the Pope
referred as “pending negotiations”, were unhappily, completely bogus
negotiations insofar as Germany was concerned. They were put forward
simply as an endeavor to dissuade England, either by threat or by bribe,
from meeting her obligations to Poland. The final German “offers” were
no offers in the accepted sense of the word. There was never any
intention behind them of entering into discussions, negotiation,
arbitration, or any other form of peaceful settlement with Poland. They
were merely an attempt to make it easier to seize and conquer Poland
than it would likely be if England and France were to observe the
obligations they had undertaken.

(6) _Events of the Last Week in August, 1939._ This was the progress of
those last negotiations: On 22 August the German-Soviet Pact was signed.
On 24 August, orders were given to the German armies to march the
following morning. After those orders had been given, the news
apparently reached the German Government that the British and Polish
Governments had signed a formal pact of nonaggression and of mutual
assistance. Up until that time, the position was that the British Prime
Minister had made a statement in the House of Commons and a joint
communique had been issued, on 6 April, that the two nations would in
fact assist one another if either were attacked; but no formal agreement
had been signed.

Now, on 24 August, after the orders to march had been given by Hitler,
the news came that such a formal document had been signed. The invasion
was thereupon postponed for the sole purpose of making one last effort
to keep England and France out of the war—not to cancel the war, but
solely to keep England and France out of it. On 25 August, having
postponed the invasion, Hitler issued a verbal communique to Sir Neville
Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin, which was a mixture of
bribe and threat, and with which he hoped to persuade England to keep
out.

On 28 August, Sir Neville Henderson handed the British Government’s
reply to that communique to Hitler. That reply stressed that the
differences ought to be settled by agreement. The British Government put
forward the view that Danzig should be guaranteed, and that any
agreement reached should be guaranteed by other powers. Whether or not
these proposals would have been acceptable or unacceptable to Germany
are of no great matter. For once it had been made clear—as it was in
the British Government’s reply of 28 August—that England would not be
put off assisting Poland in the event of German aggression, the German
Government had no concern with further negotiation but was concerned
only to afford itself some kind of justification and to prevent itself
from appearing too blatantly to turn down all the appeals to reason that
were being put forward.

On 29 August, at 7:15 p. m. in the evening, Hitler handed to Sir Neville
Henderson the German Government’s answer to the British Government’s
reply of the 28th. It seems quite clear that the whole object of this
letter was to put forward something which was quite unacceptable. Hitler
agreed to enter into direct conversations as suggested by the British
Government, but he demanded that those conversations must be based upon
the return to the Reich, of Danzig and also of the whole of the
Corridor.

It will be recalled that hitherto, even when he had alleged that Poland
had renounced the 1934 agreement, Hitler had put forward as his demands
the return of Danzig alone, plus the arrangement for an
extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through the Corridor to
East Prussia. That demand was unacceptable at that time. To make quite
certain of refusal, Hitler now demanded the whole of the Corridor. There
was no question of an Autobahn or railway. The whole territory must
become German.

Even so, to make doubly certain that the offer would not be accepted,
Hitler stated: “On those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion,
but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a plenipotentiary with
full powers from the Polish Government to be here in Berlin by midnight
tomorrow night, the 30th of August.”

This offer was made at 7:15 p. m. on the evening of the 29th. That offer
had to be transmitted, first, to London; and from London to Warsaw; and
from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give authority to their
Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible, if
indeed it were possible, to get authority to the Polish Ambassador in
Berlin by midnight the following night. It allowed Poland no opportunity
for discussing the matters at all. As Sir Neville Henderson described
it, the offer amounted to an ultimatum.

At midnight on 30 August, at the time by which the Polish
Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Neville Henderson handed a
further message to Ribbentrop in reply to the message that had been
handed to him the previous evening. Ribbentrop read out in German a
two- or three-page document which purported to be the German proposal to
be discussed at the discussions between them and the Polish Government.
He read it out quickly in German. He refused to hand a copy of it to the
British Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish
Ambassador. So that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles
ever having before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously
and magnanimously offering to discuss.

On the following day, 31 August, Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, saw
Ribbentrop, and could get no further than to be asked whether he came
with full powers. When he replied that he did not, Ribbentrop said that
he would put the position before the Fuehrer. But, in actual fact, it
was much too late to put any position to the Fuehrer by that time,
because on 31 August Hitler had already issued his Directive No. 1 for
the conduct of war, in which he laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to
five the following morning, 1 September. And on the evening of 31
August, at 9 o’clock, the German radio broadcast the proposals which
Ribbentrop had read out to Sir Neville Henderson the night before,
saying that these were the proposals which had been made for discussion,
but that as no Polish Plenipotentiary had arrived to discuss them, the
German Government assumed that they were turned down. That broadcast at
9 o’clock on the evening of 31 August was the first that the Poles had
ever heard of the proposal, and it was the first that the British
Government or its representatives in Berlin knew about them, other than
what had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused to
give a written copy on the evening of the 30th.

After that broadcast, at 9:15—perhaps while the broadcast was still in
its course—a copy of those proposals was handed to Sir Neville
Henderson for the first time.

This summary of events during that last week of August 1939 is based
upon the contents of several documents which will now be alluded to.

In a pre-trial interrogation on 29 August 1945, Goering was asked the
question:

    “When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London
    brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty at the end of March or the
    beginning of April, was it not fairly obvious that a peaceful
    solution was impossible?” (_TC-90_)

This was Goering’s answer:

    “Yes, it seemed impossible according to my conviction, but not
    according to the convictions of the Fuehrer. When it was
    mentioned to the Fuehrer that England had given her guarantee to
    Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Rumania, but
    then when the Russians took Bessarabia nothing happened, and
    this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At
    this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The
    guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of
    the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to
    Poland the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that
    he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then
    whether this was just temporary or for good. He said, ‘No, I
    will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’
    So then I asked him, ‘Do you think that it will be any different
    within four or five days?’ At this same time—I don’t know
    whether you know about that, Colonel—I was in connection with
    Lord Halifax by a special courier outside the regular diplomatic
    channels to do everything to stop war with England. After the
    guarantee I held an English declaration of war inevitable. I
    already told him in the Spring of 1939 after occupying
    Czechoslovakia, I told him that from now on if he tried to solve
    the Polish question he would have to count on the enmity of
    England. 1939, that is after the Protectorate.” (_TC-90_)

The interrogation of Goering proceeded as follows:

    “Question: ‘Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign
    against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed
    by the end of August 1939?’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’

    “Question: ‘And that the final issuance of the order for the
    campaign against Poland came some time between the 15th and 20th
    of August 1939 after the signing of the treaty with Soviet
    Russia.’ [The dates obviously are wrong].

    “Answer: ‘Yes, that is true.’

    “Question: ‘Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign
    was ordered for the 25th of August, but on the 24th of August in
    the afternoon it was postponed until September the 1st in order
    to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the
    English Ambassador?’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’” (_TC-90_)

In this interrogation Goering purported not to have wanted war with
England. It will be recalled, however, that after the speech of Hitler
on 22 August to his commanders-in-chief, Goering got up and thanked the
Fuehrer for his exhortation and assured him that the armed forces would
play their part. (_798-PS_)

Hitler’s verbal communique, as it is called in the British Blue Book,
which he handed to Sir Neville Henderson on 25 August, after he had
heard of the signing of the Anglo-Polish agreement, in an endeavor to
keep England from aiding Poland, commences by stating Hitler’s desire to
make one more effort to prevent war. In the second paragraph he asserts
again that Poland’s provocations were unbearable:

    “Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these
    Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier and, what is more,
    to do so in the interests of quiet and order, but also in the
    interests of European peace.

    “The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. The
    British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the
    least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At
    the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and
    incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would
    be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the last
    war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts.
    Agreement with Russia was unconditional and signified a change
    in foreign policy of the Reich which would last a very long
    time. Russia and Germany would never again take up arms against
    each other. Apart from this, the agreements reached with Russia
    would also render Germany secure economically for the longest
    period of war.” (_TC-72 No. 68_)

Then comes the bribe.

    “The Fuehrer declared the German-Polish problem must be solved
    and will be solved. He is however prepared and determined after
    the solution of this problem to approach England once more with
    a large, comprehensive offer. He is a man of great decisions,
    and in this case also he will be capable of being great in his
    action. And then magnanimously he accepts the British Empire and
    is ready to pledge himself personally for its continued
    existence and to place the power of the German Reich at its
    disposal on condition that his colonial demands, which are
    limited, should be negotiated by peaceful means. * * *” (_TC-72
    No. 68_)

Again Hitler stressed irrevocable determination never to enter into war
with Russia. He concluded as follows:

    “If the British Government would consider these ideas a blessing
    for Germany and also for the British empire, a peace might
    result. If it rejects these ideas there will be war. In no case
    will Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved it. The
    Fuehrer repeats that he himself is a man of ad infinitum
    decisions by which he is bound, and that this is his last
    offer.” (_TC-72 No. 68_)

The British Government was not of course aware of the real object that
lay behind that message, and, taking it at its face value, wrote back oh
28 August saying that they were prepared to enter into discussions. They
agreed with Hitler that the differences must be settled, as follows:

    “In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government a reasonable
    solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and
    should be effected by agreement between the two countries on
    lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland’s essential
    interests, and they recall that in his speech of the 28th of
    April the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these
    interests to Poland.

    “But as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the
    German Chancellor of the 22nd of August, His Majesty’s
    Government consider it essential for the success of the
    discussions which would precede the agreement that it should be
    understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be
    guaranteed by other powers. His Majesty’s Government would be
    ready if desired to make their contribution to the effective
    operation of such a guarantee.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “His Majesty’s Government have said enough to make their own
    attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between
    Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will
    not think that, because His Majesty’s Government are scrupulous
    concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to
    use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution
    which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland.” (_TC-72
    No. 74_)

That reply knocked the German hopes on the head. The Nazis had failed
despite their tricks and their bribes to dissuade England from observing
her obligations to Poland, and it was now only a matter of getting out
of their embarrassment as quickly as possible and saving face as much as
possible.

In his interview with Hitler, Sir Neville Henderson emphasized the
British attitude that they were determined in any event to meet their
obligations to Poland. The interview concluded as follows:

    “In the end I asked him two straight questions: Was he willing
    to negotiate direct with the Poles? and Was he ready to discuss
    the question of any exchange of population? He replied in the
    affirmative as regards the latter. There I have no doubt that he
    was thinking at the same time of a rectification of frontiers.
    As regards to the first, he said he could not give me an answer
    until after he had given the reply of His Majesty’s Government
    the careful consideration which such a document deserved. In
    this connection he turned to Ribbentrop and said, ‘We must
    summon Field Marshal Goering to discuss it with him.’” (_TC-72
    No. 75_)

The German reply, as outlined before, was handed to Sir Neville
Henderson at 7.15 P. M. on 29 August. The reply sets out the suggestion
submitted by the British Government in a previous note, and goes on to
say that the German Government is prepared to enter into discussion on
the basis that the whole of the Corridor as well as Danzig shall be
returned to the Reich. The reply continues:

    “The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the
    revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to this territory
    which has always been recognized as being necessary; viz.,
    return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the safeguarding
    of the existence of the German national group in the territories
    remaining to Poland.” (_TC-72 No. 78_)

It is only just now, as I emphasized before, that the right to the
Corridor has been “recognized” for so long. On 28 April, Hitler demands
consisted only of Danzig, the Autobahn, and the railway. But now
Hitler’s aim was to manufacture justification and to put forth proposals
which under no circumstances could either Poland or Great Britain
accept. The note states:

    “The British Government attach importance to two considerations:
    (1) that the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be
    eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation, and (2)
    that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it
    would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded
    in the economic and political sphere by means of international
    guarantees.

    “On this subject, the German Government makes the following
    declaration:

    “Though skeptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome,
    they are nevertheless prepared to accept the English proposal
    and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as has already
    been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made
    upon them by the written statement received from the British
    Government that they too desire a pact of friendship in
    accordance with the general lines indicated to the British
    Ambassador.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government
    have never had any intention of touching Poland’s vital
    interests of questioning the existence of an independent Polish
    State. The German Government, accordingly, in these
    circumstances agree to accept the British Government’s offer of
    their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a
    Polish Emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of
    this Emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August, 1939.

    “The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a
    solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place
    these at the disposal of the British Government before the
    arrival of the Polish negotiators.” (_TC-72 No. 78_)

That was at 7:15 in the evening of 29 August. As previously explained,
insufficient time was allowed for the Polish Emissary to reach Berlin by
midnight the following night.

Sir Neville Henderson’s account of his interview on the evening of 29
August summarizes what took place then:

    “I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but
    after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr von
    Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress
    urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilized armies were
    standing face to face.” (_TC-72 No. 79_)

Again the British Government replied and Sir Neville Henderson handed
this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous meeting on midnight of 30 August,
at the time the Polish Emissary had been expected. The reply stated that
the British Government reciprocated the desire for improved relations.
It stressed again that it cannot sacrifice its interest to other friends
in order to obtain an improvement in the situation. It understood that
the German Government accepts the condition that the settlement should
be subject to international guarantee. The British Government makes a
reservation as to the demands that the Germans put forward in their last
letter, and is informing the Polish Government immediately. Lastly, the
British understand that the German Government is drawing up the
proposals. (_TC-72 No. 89_)

Sir Neville Henderson gave this account of that interview at midnight on
30 August:

    “I told Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty’s
    Government found it difficult to advise Polish Government to
    accept procedure adumbrated in German reply, and suggested that
    he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that when German proposals
    were ready to invite Polish Ambassador to call and to hand him
    proposals for transmission to his Government with a view to
    immediate opening of negotiations. I added that if basis
    afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty’s Government could
    be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw to temporize
    negotiations.

    “Herr von Ribbentrop’s reply was to produce a lengthy document
    which he read out in German aloud at top speed. Imagining that
    he would eventually hand it to me I did not attempt to follow
    too closely the sixteen or more articles which it contained.
    Though I cannot therefore guarantee accuracy the main points
    were: * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in
    accordance with undertaking the German reply of yesterday, he
    asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had
    not arrived in Berlin by midnight.

    “I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that request
    for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on 30th August
    constituted in fact, an ultimatum in spite of what he and Herr
    Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he denied, saying that
    idea of an ultimatum was figment of my imagination. Why then I
    asked could he not adopt normal procedure and give me copy of
    proposals and ask Polish Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr
    Hitler had summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for
    communication to Polish Government. In the most violent terms
    Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador
    to visit him. He hinted that if Polish Ambassador asked him for
    interview it might be different. I said that I would naturally
    inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said while those
    were his personal views he would bring all that I had said to
    Herr Hitler’s notice. It was for Chancellor to decide.

    “We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr von
    Ribbentrop’s demeanor during an unpleasant interview was aping
    Herr Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against
    Polish mobilization, but I retorted that it was hardly
    surprising since Germany had also mobilized as Herr Hitler
    himself had admitted to me yesterday.” (_TC-72 No. 92_)

Henderson of course did not know at that time that Germany had also
given the orders to attack Poland some days before. On the following
day, 31 August, at 6:30 in the evening, M. Lipski, the Polish
Ambassador, had an interview with Ribbentrop. This is M. Lipski’s
account of the conversation:

    “I carried out my instructions. M. von Ribbentrop asked if I had
    special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations. I said
    no. He then asked whether I had been informed that on London’s
    suggestion the German Government had expressed their readiness
    to negotiate directly with a delegate of the Polish Government,
    furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to have
    arrived on the preceding day, August 30. I replied that I had no
    direct information on the subject. In conclusion M. von
    Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought I would be empowered to
    negotiate. He would communicate my demarche to the Chancellor.”
    (_TC-73 No. 112_)

But it was too late. The orders had already been given on that day to
the German Army to invade. A “Most Secret order” signed by Hitler,
described as his “Direction No. 1 for the conduct of the war,” dated 31
August 1939, reads in part:

    “Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by
    peaceful means of a situation of the Eastern Frontier which is
    intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a
    solution by force.

    “The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with
    the preparations made for ‘_Fall Weiss_’, with the alterations
    which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it
    has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.

    “Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.

    “Date of attack—1 September 1939

    “Time of attack—04:45 [inserted in red pencil]

    “This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay of
    Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.

    “In the West it is important that the responsibility for the
    opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England
    and France. At first purely local action should be taken against
    insignificant frontier violations.” (_C-126_)

That evening, 31 August, at nine o’clock, the German radio broadcast the
terms of the German proposals about which they were willing to enter
into discussions with the Polish Government. The proposals were set out
at length. By this time, neither Sir Neville Henderson nor the Polish
Government nor their Ambassador had yet been given their written copy of
them. This is a document which seems difficult to explain other than as
an exhibition or an example of hypocrisy. The second paragraph states:

    “Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able
    to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding
    available to the British Government by the time the Polish
    negotiator arrived in Berlin.”

The manner in which they did that has been shown. The German Broadcast
continued, that instead of the arrival of an authorized Polish
personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich received to
their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish
mobilization; and that only toward 12 o’clock on the night of 30 August
1939 did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness
to help towards the commencement of negotiations. The fact that the
Polish negotiator expected by the Reich did not arrive, removed the
necessary conditions for informing His Majesty’s Government of the views
of the German Government as regards the possible basis for negotiation.
Since His Majesty’s Government themselves had pleaded for direct
negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador on the occasion of the
presentation of the last British note, precise information as to the
text of the German proposals which will be regarded as a basis for
negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary.
The Broadcast thereafter went on to set out the Nazi version of the
story of the negotiations over the last few days. (_TC-73 No. 113_)

On 1 September, when his armies were already crossing the Polish
frontier, Hitler issued this proclamation to his Armed Forces:

    “The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good neighborly
    relations as aimed at by me, wants to force the issue by way of
    arms.

    “The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror
    and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier violation
    which cannot be tolerated by a great power show that Poland is
    no longer prepared to respect the Reich’s frontiers. To put an
    end to these mad acts I can see no other way but from now
    onwards to meet force with force.

    “The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up
    the struggle for the honor and the vital rights of the German
    people.

    “I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of
    the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the
    last.

    “Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the
    representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany.

    “Long live our people and the Reich.” (_TC-54_)

So that at last Hitler had kept his word to his generals. He had
afforded them their propagandistic justification, and at that time,
anyway, it did not matter what people said about it afterwards.

    “The view shall not appear, asked later on, whether we told the
    truth or not. Might is what counts—or victory is what counts
    and not right.” (_1014-PS_)

On that day, 1 September, when news came of this invasion of Polish
ground, the British Government, in accordance with their treaty
obligations, sent an ultimatum to the German Government, in which it
stated:

    “I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the
    German Government are prepared to give His Majesty’s Government
    satisfactory assurances that the German Government have
    suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared
    promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His
    Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will without
    hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland.” (_TC-72 No.
    110_)

At 9 o’clock on 3 September the British Government handed a final
ultimatum to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. It read in part:

    “* * * Although this communication was made more than
    twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received but German
    attacks upon Poland have been continued and intensified. I have
    accordingly the honor to inform you that, unless not later than
    eleven o’clock, British Summer Time, today 3d September,
    satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given by
    the German Government, and have reached His Majesty’s Government
    in London, a state of war will exist between the two countries
    as from that hour.” (_TC-72 No. 118_)

And so it was that at 11 o’clock on 3 September a state of war existed
between Germany and England and between Germany and France. The plans,
preparations, intentions, and determination to carry out this assault
upon Poland which had been going on for months, for years before, had
come to fruition despite all appeals to peace, all appeals to reason. It
mattered not what anybody but the German Government had in mind or
whatever rights anybody else but the German nation thought they had. If
there is any doubt left about this matter, two more documents remain for
consideration. Even now, on 3 September, Mussolini offered some chance
of peace. At 6:30 hours on 3 September Mussolini sent a telegram to
Hitler:

    “The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the
    Duce’s order following copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
    and for the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:

    “Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision
    to the Fuehrer, that it still has a chance to call a conference
    with France, England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice
    which would leave the Army Corps where they are at present. 2.
    Calling the conference within two or three days. 3. Solution of
    the Polish-German controversy which would be certainly favorable
    for Germany as matters stand today.

    “This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost
    exponent in France.

    “Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already
    securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany
    has had already its ‘moral satisfaction.’ If it would accept the
    plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at the
    same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect of
    being universal and of extremely long duration.” (_1831-PS_)

Perhaps even Mussolini did not appreciate what all Germany’s aims were,
for his offer was turned down in the illuminating letter which Hitler
was to write in reply:

    “Duce:

    “I first want to thank you for your last attempt at mediation. I
    would have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that
    there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that
    the conference would be successful. Because, for the last two
    days the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid
    advance in Poland. It would have been impossible to devaluate
    the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues.
    Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found, if
    England would not have been determined to wage war under all
    circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because,
    Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for
    more than one-half year or one year. Under these circumstances,
    I thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was
    better for resistance. At present, the superiority of the German
    armed forces in Poland is so overwhelming in all fields that the
    Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt whether
    this fast success could be achieved in one or two years. England
    and France would have armed their allies, to such an extent that
    the crushing technical superiority of the German Armed Forces
    could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware, Duce,
    that the fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own
    fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware
    that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one
    has to choose after cold deliberation the moment for resistance
    in such a way that the probability of the success is guaranteed
    and I believe in this success, Duce, with the firmness of a
    rock. Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you
    think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I acknowledge
    this in advance with, sincere thanks. But I believe also—even
    if we march now over different roads—that fate will finally
    join us. If the National Socialist Germany were destroyed by the
    Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a
    grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of
    the future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce,
    think the same way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to
    make the brief remark that we lay aside, of course, all
    unimportant things, that we do not waste any man in unimportant
    tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of great operational
    considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is the Corridor,
    has already been completely encircled by our action. It will be
    either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations
    proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops
    are far beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air
    force is complete, although scarcely one-third of it is in
    Poland. In the West I will be on the defensive. France can here
    sacrifice its blood first. Then the moment will come when we can
    confront the enemy also there with the full power of the nation.
    Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your assistance which you have
    given to me in the past and I ask you not to deny it to me in
    the future.” (_1831-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST
                   POLAND, DANZIG, ENGLAND AND FRANCE

    Document     │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                 │                                        │      │
                 │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                 │  Tribunal, Article 6 (a).              │  I   │       5
                 │                                        │      │
                 │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                 │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F)  │      │
                 │  4; V.                                 │  I   │  26, 29
                 │                 —————                  │      │
                 │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                 │document indicates that the document was│      │
                 │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                 │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                 │document number indicates that the      │      │
                 │document was referred to during the     │      │
                 │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                 │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                 │parentheses following the description of│      │
                 │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                 │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                 │description of the document, is the     │      │
                 │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                 │court.                                  │      │
                 │                 —————                  │      │
  *386-PS        │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│      │
                 │Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November   │      │
                 │1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant,      │      │
                 │Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937.   │      │
                 │(USA 25)                                │ III  │     295
                 │                                        │      │
  *388-PS        │File of papers on Case Green (the plan  │      │
                 │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept │      │
                 │by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant,         │      │
                 │April-October 1938. (USA 26)            │ III  │     305
                 │                                        │      │
  *699-PS        │Letter from Funk to Hitler, 25 August   │      │
                 │1939, reporting on economic affairs. (GB│      │
                 │49)                                     │ III  │     509
                 │                                        │      │
  *789-PS        │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,  │      │
                 │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme  │      │
                 │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23)       │ III  │     572
                 │                                        │      │
  *795-PS        │Keitel’s conference, 17 August 1939,    │      │
                 │concerning giving Polish uniforms to    │      │
                 │Heydrich. (GB 54)                       │ III  │     580
                 │                                        │      │
  *798-PS        │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │      │
                 │at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA   │      │
                 │29)                                     │ III  │     581
                 │                                        │      │
 *1014-PS        │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │      │
                 │22 August 1939. (USA 30)                │ III  │     665
                 │                                        │      │
 *1639-A-PS      │Mobilization book for the Civil         │      │
                 │Administration, 1939 Edition, issued    │      │
                 │over signature of Keitel. (USA 777)     │  IV  │     143
                 │                                        │      │
 *1780-PS        │Excerpts from diary kept by General     │      │
                 │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA │      │
                 │72)                                     │  IV  │     360
                 │                                        │      │
  1796-PS        │Notes to the War Diary from March 1939  │      │
                 │to January 1940.                        │  IV  │     370
                 │                                        │      │
  1822-PS        │Telegram from Minister of Foreign       │      │
                 │Affairs in Rome to Minister of Foreign  │      │
                 │Affairs in Berlin, 25 August 1939,      │      │
                 │concerning conference with Mussolini and│      │
                 │Ciano.                                  │  IV  │     459
                 │                                        │      │
  1823-PS        │Hitler reply to Mussolini, 27 August    │      │
                 │1939, concerning attitude of Italy in   │      │
                 │conference of 25 August 1939.           │  IV  │     462
                 │                                        │      │
  1828-PS        │Memorandum handed to German Foreign     │      │
                 │Office by Count Magistrate in Rome, 7   │      │
                 │August 1939.                            │  IV  │     463
                 │                                        │      │
 *1831-PS        │Correspondence between Hitler and       │      │
                 │Mussolini, September 1939. (GB 75)      │  IV  │     463
                 │                                        │      │
  1832-PS        │Telephone report of Reich Minister for  │      │
                 │Foreign Affairs in Rome, 27 August 1939.│  IV  │     468
                 │                                        │      │
  1889-PS        │Account of conference of Fuehrer and    │      │
                 │Italian Ambassador Attolico, 31 August  │      │
                 │1939.                                   │  IV  │     528
                 │                                        │      │
 *2327-PS        │Two top secret memoranda, 14 June 1939, │      │
                 │concerning operation “Fall Weiss”. (USA │      │
                 │539)                                    │  IV  │    1035
                 │                                        │      │
 *2357-PS        │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 20   │      │
                 │February 1938, published in Documents of│      │
                 │German Politics, Part VI, 1, pp. 50-52. │      │
                 │(GB 30)                                 │  IV  │    1099
                 │                                        │      │
 *2368-PS        │Hitler’s speech before Reichstag, 30    │      │
                 │January 1937, published in Documents of │      │
                 │German Politics, Part VI, 2, p. 42. (GB │      │
                 │26)                                     │  IV  │    1102
                 │                                        │      │
 *2530-PS        │Ribbentrop’s speech in Warsaw, 25       │      │
                 │January 1939, published in Voelkischer  │      │
                 │Beobachter, 1 February 1939. (GB 36)    │  V   │     267
                 │                                        │      │
 *2751-PS        │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20        │      │
                 │November 1945. (USA 482)                │  V   │     390
                 │                                        │      │
  2817-PS        │Telegram from German Embassy, Rome, to  │      │
                 │Ribbentrop, concerning answer of Duce to│      │
                 │Hitler’s second letter, 27 August 1939. │  V   │     452
                 │                                        │      │
 *2818-PS        │Secret additional protocol to the       │      │
                 │Friendship and Alliance Pact between    │      │
                 │Germany and Italy. (GB 292)             │  V   │     453
                 │                                        │      │
  2834-PS        │Letter from Mussolini to Fuehrer, 25    │      │
                 │August 1939.                            │  V   │     502
                 │                                        │      │
 *2835-PS        │German Foreign Office memorandum on     │      │
                 │conversation between Ribbentrop and the │      │
                 │Duce, 10 March 1940. (GB 291)           │  V   │     502
                 │                                        │      │
 *2846-PS        │Affidavit of Edwin Lahousen, 13 November│      │
                 │1945.                                   │  V   │     507
                 │                                        │      │
 *2897-PS        │Telegram from German Ambassador in      │      │
                 │Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July 1941.│      │
                 │(USA 156)                               │  V   │     566
                 │                                        │      │
 *3054-PS        │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                 │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                 │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801
                 │                                        │      │
 *C-23           │Unsigned documents found in official    │      │
                 │Navy files containing notes year by year│      │
                 │from 1927 to 1940 on reconstruction of  │      │
                 │the German Navy, and dated 18 February  │      │
                 │1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA│      │
                 │49)                                     │  VI  │     827
                 │                                        │      │
 *C-30           │Air-Sea Forces Orders for Occupation    │      │
                 │Danzig, 27 July 1939. (GB 46)           │  VI  │     831
                 │                                        │      │
 *C-120          │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 for │      │
                 │“Fall Weiss”, operation against Poland. │      │
                 │(GB 41)                                 │  VI  │     916
                 │                                        │      │
 *C-126          │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall Weiss” │      │
                 │and directions for secret mobilization. │      │
                 │(GB 45)                                 │  VI  │     932
                 │                                        │      │
 *C-137          │Keitel’s appendix of 24 November 1938 to│      │
                 │Hitler Order of 21 October 1938. (GB 33)│  VI  │     949
                 │                                        │      │
 *C-142          │Intention of the Army High Command and  │      │
                 │Orders, signed by Brauchitsch. (USA 538)│  VI  │     956
                 │                                        │      │
 *C-172          │Order No. 1 for “Fall Weiss” signed by  │      │
                 │Doenitz. (GB 189)                       │  VI  │    1002
                 │                                        │      │
 *C-175          │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation   │      │
                 │for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │      │
                 │from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA   │      │
                 │69)                                     │  VI  │    1006
                 │                                        │      │
 *D-738          │Memorandum on second conference between │      │
                 │German Foreign Minister with Hungarian  │      │
                 │Prime and Foreign Minister on 1 May     │      │
                 │1939. (GB 290)                          │ VII  │     193
                 │                                        │      │
 *L-43           │Air Force “Organizational Study 1950”, 2│      │
                 │May 1938. (GB 29) (See Chart No. 10.)   │ VII  │     788
                 │                                        │      │
 *L-79           │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939,     │      │
                 │“Indoctrination on the political        │      │
                 │situation and future aims”. (USA 27)    │ VII  │     847
                 │                                        │      │
 *L-172          │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│      │
                 │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture      │      │
                 │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │      │
                 │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VIII │     920
                 │                                        │      │
 *R-100          │Minutes of instructions given by Hitler │      │
                 │to General von Brauchitsch on 25 March  │      │
                 │1939. (USA 121)                         │ VIII │      83
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-2           │Hague Convention (1) for Pacific        │      │
                 │Settlement of International             │      │
                 │Disputes—1907. (GB 2)                   │ VIII │     276
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-3           │Hague Convention (3) Relative to opening│      │
                 │of Hostilities. (GB 2)                  │ VIII │     279
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-9           │Versailles Treaty, Section XI, Article  │      │
                 │100, Free City of Danzig. (GB 3)        │ VIII │     290
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-15          │Arbitration Treaty between Germany and  │      │
                 │Poland at Locarno, 16 October 1925. (GB │      │
                 │16)                                     │ VIII │     331
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-18          │Declaration concerning wars of          │      │
                 │aggression; resolution of 3rd Committee │      │
                 │of League of Nations, 24 September 1927.│      │
                 │(GB 17)                                 │ VIII │     357
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-19          │Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris. 1929      │      │
                 │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp.  │      │
                 │97-101. (GB 18)                         │ VIII │     359
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-21          │German-Polish Declaration, 26 January   │      │
                 │1934. (GB 24)                           │ VIII │     368
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-28          │German assurance to Czechoslovakia, 26  │      │
                 │September 1938, from Documents of German│      │
                 │Politics, Part VI, pp. 345-346. (GB 22) │ VIII │     378
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-29          │German assurances to Poland, 26         │      │
                 │September 1938, from Documents of German│      │
                 │Politics, Part VI, p. 336. (GB 32)      │ VIII │     378
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-53-A        │Marginal note to decree of final        │      │
                 │incorporation of Memel with German      │      │
                 │Reich, 23 March 1939, from Documents of │      │
                 │German Politics, Part VII, p. 552. (GB  │      │
                 │4)                                      │ VIII │     408
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-54          │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to German   │      │
                 │Armed Forces, 1 September 1939. (GB 73) │ VIII │     408
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-70          │Hitler’s Reichstag speech concerning    │      │
                 │agreement with Poland, 30 January 1934, │      │
                 │from Voelkischer Beobachter, 31 January │      │
                 │1934. (GB 25)                           │ VIII │     433
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-71          │Reports of British Consul in Danzig,    │      │
                 │July 1939. (GB 47)                      │ VIII │     434
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 13   │British Blue Book. Hitler’s Reichstag   │      │
                 │speech, 28 April 1939. (GB 43)          │ VIII │     438
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 14   │British Blue Book. German memorandum    │      │
                 │renouncing 1934 agreement, 28 April     │      │
                 │1939. (GB 42)                           │ VIII │     441
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 16   │British Blue Book. Polish Government’s  │      │
                 │reply, 5 May 1939, to 28 April memo. (GB│      │
                 │44)                                     │ VIII │     445
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 17   │British Blue Book. British Prime        │      │
                 │Minister’s statement in House of        │      │
                 │Commons, 31 March 1939. (GB 39)         │ VIII │     450
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 18   │British Blue Book. Anglo-Polish         │      │
                 │communique issued 6 April 1939. (GB 40) │ VIII │     450
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 53   │British Blue Book. Report of British    │      │
                 │Ambassador, Warsaw, 26 August 1939. (GB │      │
                 │51)                                     │ VIII │     451
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 54   │British Blue Book. Report of British    │      │
                 │Ambassador, Warsaw, 26 August 1939. (GB │      │
                 │52)                                     │ VIII │     452
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 55   │British Blue Book. Report of British    │      │
                 │Ambassador, Warsaw, 27 August 1939. (GB │      │
                 │53)                                     │ VIII │     452
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 56   │British Blue Book. British Prime        │      │
                 │Minister’s letter to Hitler, 22 August  │      │
                 │1939. (GB 55)                           │ VIII │     453
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 60   │British Blue Book. Hitler’s reply to    │      │
                 │British Prime Minister, 23 August 1939. │      │
                 │(GB 56)                                 │ VIII │     455
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 62   │British Blue Book. Danzig Senate Decree │      │
                 │appointing Forster Head of State, 23    │      │
                 │August 1939. (GB 50)                    │ VIII │     457
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 68   │British Blue Book. Hitler’s verbal      │      │
                 │communique to Sir Neville Henderson, 25 │      │
                 │August 1939. (GB 65)                    │ VIII │     458
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 74   │British Blue Book. British Government’s │      │
                 │reply, 28 August 1939, to Hitler’s      │      │
                 │message of 25 August. (GB 66)           │ VIII │     460
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 75   │British Blue Book. Hitler and Sir N.    │      │
                 │Henderson conversation, 28 August 1939. │      │
                 │(GB 67)                                 │ VIII │     463
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 78   │British Blue Book. Hitler’s reply to    │      │
                 │British Government, 29 August 1939. (GB │      │
                 │68)                                     │ VIII │     466
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 79   │British Blue Book. Hitler and Sir N.    │      │
                 │Henderson conversation, 29 August 1939. │      │
                 │(GB 69)                                 │ VIII │     469
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 89   │British Blue Book. British Government’s │      │
                 │reply, 30 August 1939, to German        │      │
                 │communication of 29 August. (GB 70)     │ VIII │     470
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 92   │British Blue Book. Ribbentrop and Sir N.│      │
                 │Henderson conversation, midnight 30     │      │
                 │August 1939. (GB 71)                    │ VIII │     472
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 110  │British Blue Book. British Government’s │      │
                 │ultimatum, 1 September 1939. (GB 74)    │ VIII │     473
                 │                                        │      │
  TC-72 No. 113  │British Blue Book. Copy German proposals│      │
                 │handed to Sir N. Henderson 9:15 P.M., 31│      │
                 │August 1939.                            │ VIII │     474
                 │                                        │      │
  TC-72 No. 118  │British Blue Book. British Government’s │      │
                 │final ultimatum, 3 September 1939.      │ VIII │     474
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 124  │British Blue Book. President Roosevelt’s│      │
                 │appeal to Hitler, 24 August 1939. (GB   │      │
                 │59)                                     │ VIII │     475
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 126  │British Blue Book. President Moscicki’s │      │
                 │reply to President Roosevelt,           │      │
                 │25 August 1939. (GB 60)                 │ VIII │     476
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 127  │British Blue Book. President Roosevelt’s│      │
                 │second appeal to Hitler, 25 August 1939.│      │
                 │(GB 61)                                 │ VIII │     477
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 139  │British Blue Book. The Pope’s appeal, 24│      │
                 │August 1939. (GB 62)                    │ VIII │     477
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-72 No. 141  │British Blue Book. The Pope’s appeal, 31│      │
                 │August 1939. (GB 63)                    │ VIII │     480
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-73 No. 33   │Polish White Book. German-Polish        │      │
                 │communique, 5 November 1937. (GB 27)    │ VIII │     480
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-73 No. 44   │Polish White Book. Lipski, Ribbentrop   │      │
                 │luncheon, conversation, 24 October 1938.│      │
                 │(GB 27-A)                               │ VIII │     483
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-73 No. 45   │Polish White Book. Beck’s instructions  │      │
                 │to Lipski, 31 October 1938. (GB 27-B)   │ VIII │     484
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-73 No. 48   │Polish White Book. Beck and Hitler      │      │
                 │conversation, 5 January 1939. (GB 34)   │ VIII │     486
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-73 No. 49   │Polish White Book. Beck and Ribbentrop  │      │
                 │conversation, 6 January 1939. (GB 35)   │ VIII │     488
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-73 No. 57   │Polish White Book. Hitler’s Reichstag   │      │
                 │speech, 30 January 1939. (GB 37)        │ VIII │     488
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-73 No. 61   │Polish White Book. Ribbentrop and Lipski│      │
                 │conversation, 21 March 1939. (GB 38)    │ VIII │     489
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-73 No. 91   │Polish White Book. Anglo-Polish         │      │
                 │Agreement, 25 August 1939. (GB 57)      │ VIII │     492
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-73 No. 112  │Polish White Book. Ribbentrop-Lipski    │      │
                 │conversation, 31 August 1939. (GB 72)   │ VIII │     494
                 │                                        │      │
  TC-73 No. 113  │Polish White Book. German broadcast 9   │      │
                 │P.M. 31 August 1939.                    │ VIII │     495
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-75          │Memo for the Fuehrer, 2 January 1938,   │      │
                 │concerning Anglo-German relations. (GB  │      │
                 │28)                                     │ VIII │     513
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-76          │Note for Reichsminister, 26 August 1938.│      │
                 │(GB 31)                                 │ VIII │     515
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-77          │Memorandum of conversation between      │      │
                 │Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano, 12 August │      │
                 │1939. (GB 48)                           │ VIII │     516
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-78          │French Prime Minister’s letter to       │      │
                 │Hitler, 26 August 1939. (GB 58)         │ VIII │     529
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-79          │Hitler’s reply to French Prime Minister,│      │
                 │27 August 1939. (GB 58)                 │ VIII │     531
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-90          │Goering’s interrogation, 29 August 1945.│      │
                 │(GB 64)                                 │ VIII │     534
                 │                                        │      │
 *TC-91          │Ribbentrop’s interrogation, 29 August   │      │
                 │1945. (GB 276)                          │ VIII │     535
                 │                                        │      │
 Affidavit A     │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 January │      │
                 │1946, substantially the same as his     │      │
                 │testimony on direct examination before  │      │
                 │the International Military Tribunal at  │      │
                 │Nurnberg 30 November and 1 December     │      │
                 │1945.                                   │ VIII │     587
                 │                                        │      │
 *Chart No. 10   │1938 Proposals for Luftwaffe Expansion  │      │
                 │1938-1950. (L-43; GB 29)                │ VIII │     779
                 │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 12   │German Aggression. (Enlargement         │      │
                 │displayed to Tribunal.)                 │ VIII │     781
                 │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 13   │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and  │      │
                 │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to   │      │
                 │Tribunal.)                              │ VIII │     782


                9. AGGRESSION AGAINST NORWAY AND DENMARK

In the early hours of the morning of 9 April 1940 Nazi Germany invaded
Norway and Denmark. Those invasions constituted wars of aggression, and
also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and
assurances.

A. _Treaties and Assurances Violated._

The invasions constituted violations of the Hague Convention and of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact. In addition there were specific agreements between
Germany and Norway and Denmark. There was the Treaty of Arbitration and
Conciliation between Germany and Denmark, which was signed at Berlin on
2 June, 1926 (_TC-17_). The first Article of that Treaty is in these
terms:

    “The Contracting Parties undertake to submit to the procedure of
    arbitration or conciliation, in conformity with the present
    Treaty, all disputes of any nature whatsoever which may arise
    between Germany and Denmark and which it has not been possible
    to settle within a reasonable period by diplomacy or to bring
    with the consent of both Parties before the Permanent Court of
    International Justice.

    “Disputes for the solution of which a special procedure has been
    laid down in other Conventions in force between the Contracting
    Parties shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of
    such Conventions.” (_TC-17_)

The remaining Articles deal with the machinery for arbitration.

There was also the treaty of nonaggression between Germany and Denmark
which was signed by Ribbentrop on 31 May 1939, ten weeks after the Nazi
seizure of Czechoslovakia (_TC-24_). The preamble and Articles 1 and 2
read as follows:

    “His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland and the Chancellor
    of the German Reich,

    “Being firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and
    Germany in all circumstances, have agreed to confirm this
    resolve by means of a treaty and have appointed as their
    Plenipotentiaries: His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland
    and the Chancellor of the German Reich.

    “Article I: The Kingdom of Denmark and the German Reich shall in
    no case resort to war or to any other use of force one against
    the other.

    “Should action of the kind referred to in Paragraph 1 be taken
    by a third Power against one of the Contracting Parties, the
    other Contracting Party shall not support such action in any
    way.

    “Article II: The Treaty shall come into force on the exchange of
    the instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a
    period of ten years from that date.” (_TC-24_)

The Treaty is dated 31 May 1939. At the bottom of the page there appears
the signature of Ribbentrop. The invasion of Denmark by the Nazi forces
less than a year after the signature of this treaty showed the utter
worthlessness of treaties to which Ribbentrop put his signature.

With regard to Norway, Ribbentrop and the Nazi conspirators were party
to a similar perfidy. Hitler gave an assurance to Denmark, Norway, and
the Netherlands on 28 April 1939 (_TC-30_). That, of course, was after
the annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the confidence of the world,
and was presumably an attempt to try to reassure the Scandinavian
States. Hitler said:

    “I have given binding declarations to a large number of States.
    None of these States can complain that even a trace of a demand
    contrary thereto has ever been made to them by Germany. None of
    the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend that a
    request has ever been put to them by the German Government or by
    the German public opinion which was incompatible with the
    sovereignty and integrity of their State.

    “I was pleased that a number of European States availed
    themselves of these declarations by the German Government to
    express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality.
    This applies to Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, etc.”
    (_TC-30_)

A further assurance was given by the Nazi Government on 2 September
1939, the day after the Nazi invasion of Poland. On that day an aide
memoire was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German
Minister in Oslo. It reads:

    “The German Reich Government is determined, in view of the
    friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under
    no circumstances, to prejudice the inviolability and integrity
    of Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State.
    In making this declaration the Reich Government naturally
    expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable
    neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches
    of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur.
    Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ
    from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party
    recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled
    to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the
    resulting situation might dictate.” (_TC-31_)

There followed a further German assurance to Norway in a speech by
Hitler on 6 October 1939 in which he said:

    “Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points
    of controversy with the Northern States; neither has she any
    today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered nonaggression
    pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they
    do not feel themselves threatened in any way.” (_TC-32_)

These treaties and assurances were the diplomatic background to the Nazi
aggression on Norway and Denmark. These assurances were simply given to
lull suspicion and cause the intended victims of Nazi aggression to be
unprepared to meet the Nazi attack. For it is now known that as early as
October 1939 the conspirators were plotting the invasion of Norway, and
that the most active conspirators in that plot were Raeder and
Rosenberg.

B. _Early Planning for Invasion._

The Norwegian invasion is in one respect not a typical Nazi aggression,
in that Hitler had to be persuaded to embark upon it. The chief
instruments of persuasion were Raeder and Rosenberg; Raeder because he
thought Norway strategically important, and because he coveted glory for
his Navy; Rosenberg because of his political connections in Norway,
which he sought to develop. And in the Norwegian, Vidkun Quisling,
Rosenberg found a very model of the Fifth Column agent.

The early stages of the Nazi conspiracy to invade Norway are disclosed
in a letter which Raeder wrote on 10 January 1944 to Admiral Assmann,
the official German Naval historian (_C-66_). It is headed “Memorandum
for Admiral Assmann for his own information; not to be used for
publications.” The first part deals with “Barbarossa” (the plan to
invade Russia). The next part is headed “(b) _Weseruebung_,” which was
the code name for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. The following is a
pertinent passage from the letter:

    “During the weeks preceding the report on the 10th of October
    1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a
    detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an
    occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed this
    letter on to C/SKl (the Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff)
    for their information and prepared some notes based on this
    letter for my report to the Fuehrer, which I made on the 10th of
    October 1939, since my opinion was identical with that of
    Admiral Carls, while at that time the SKl was more dubious about
    the matter. In these notes, I stressed the disadvantages which
    an occupation of Norway by the British would have for
    us—control of the approaches to the Baltic, outflanking of our
    naval operations and of air attacks on Britain, pressure on
    Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for us of the occupation
    of the Norwegian coast—outlet to the North Atlantic, no
    possibility of a British mine barrier, as in the year 1917-18.
    Naturally at the time, only the coast and bases were considered;
    I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the course of our
    correspondence thought that Narvik could be excluded. The
    Fuehrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem;
    he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to
    consider the question himself.” (_C-66_)

This report of Raeder shows that the evolution of this Nazi campaign
against Norway affords a good example of the participation of the German
High Command in the Nazi conspiracy to attack inoffensive neighbors.

Before this report of October 1939 was made to the Fuehrer, Raeder
sought a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion. On 3 October 1939, he
made out a questionnaire headed, “Gaining of Bases in Norway (extract
from War Diary)” (_C-122_). It reads:

    “The Chief of the Naval War Staff considers it necessary that
    the Fuehrer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of
    the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the
    operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it
    is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure
    of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving our strategic
    and operational position. The following questions must be given
    consideration:

    “(_a_) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?

    “(_b_) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s
    will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?

    “(_c_) What are the possibilities of defense after the
    occupation?

    “(_d_) Will the harbors have to be developed completely as
    bases, or have they already advantages suitable for supply
    position?”

    “F.O.U.-boats” [a reference to Doenitz] “already considers such
    harbors extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for
    Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily.”)

    “(_e_) What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of
    the war at sea in gaining bases in North Denmark, e.g. Skagen?”
    (_C-122_)

A memorandum written by Doenitz on Norwegian bases presumably relates to
the questionnaire of Raeder, which was in circulation about that time.
Doenitz’s document is headed, “Flag Officer Submarines, Operations
Division,” and is marked “Most Secret.” The subject is “Base in Norway.”
Then there are set out “suppositions”, “advantages and disadvantages”,
and then “conclusions”. The last paragraph (III) reads:

    “The following is therefore proposed:

    “(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:

    “_a._ Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen,
    provisions.

    “_b._ Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an encounter.

    “_c._ Good opportunities for accommodating U-boat crews.

    “_d._ Flak protection, L.A. armament, petrol and M/S units.

    “Secondly, establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in
    Narvik as an alternative.” (_C-5_)

In October 1939 Hitler was merely considering the Norwegian aggression
and had not yet committed himself to it. Raeder persevered in pressing
his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this stage he found a
powerful ally in Rosenberg.

C. _Use of the Fifth Column: Quisling._

The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of treachery as a
political weapon are now proven historical facts. Should further proof
be required, it is found in a “Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign
Affairs Bureau of the Party (_Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP_) from
1933 to 1943” (_007-PS_). This was Rosenberg’s Bureau. The report reads:

    “When the Foreign Affairs Bureau (_Aussenpolitische Amt_) was
    established on the 1st of April 1933, the Fuehrer directed that
    it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency, but
    should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and
    suggestions.

    “Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude adopted
    by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning, the
    newly-established Bureau devoted particular attention to
    internal conditions in the Soviet Union, as well as to the
    effects of World Bolshevism primarily in other European
    countries. It entered into contact with the most variegated
    groups inclining towards National Socialism in combatting
    Bolshevism, focussing its main attention on Nations and States
    bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand, those Nations
    and states constituted an _Insulating Ring_ encircling the
    Bolshevist neighbor; on the other hand they were the laterals of
    German living space and took up a flanking position towards the
    Western Powers, especially Great Britain. In order to wield the
    desired influence by one means or another, the Bureau was
    compelled to use the most varying methods, taking into
    consideration the completely different living conditions, the
    ties of blood, intellect and history of the movements observed
    by the Bureau in those countries.

    “In Scandinavia an outspokenly pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude, based
    on economic consideration, had become progressively more
    dominant after the World War of 1914-18. There the Bureau put
    the entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations
    with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic
    Society in Luebeck under its protection. The Reich conventions
    of this society were attended by many outstanding personalities,
    especially from Finland. While there were no openings for purely
    political cooperation in Sweden and Denmark, an association
    based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very
    close relations were established with its founder, which led to
    further consequences.” (_007-PS_)

There follows an account of the activity of Rosenberg’s Bureau in
various parts of the world. The last paragraph of the main body of the
report reads in part:

    “With the outbreak of war, the Bureau was entitled to consider
    its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal
    connections in many lands can be resumed under a different
    guise.” (_007-PS_)

The Annex to the report shows what the “exploitation of personal
connections” involved. Annex One to the document is headed, “To Brief
Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party
from 1933 to 1943.” The subheading is “The Political Preparation of the
Military Occupation of Norway During the War Years 1939-1940”. The annex
reads:

    “As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in
    Scandinavia, only ‘_Nasjonal Samling_’ led in Norway by the
    former Minister of War and Major of the Reserve, Vidkun
    Quisling, deserved serious political attention. This was a
    fighting political group, possessed by the idea of a Greater
    Germanic Community. Naturally, all ruling powers were hostile
    and attempted to prevent, by any means, its success among the
    population. The Bureau maintained constant liaison with Quisling
    and attentively observed the attacks he conducted with tenacious
    energy on the middle class, which had been taken in tow by the
    English.

    “From the beginning, it appeared probable that without
    revolutionary events, which would stir the population from their
    former attitude, no successful progress of _Nasjonal Samling_
    was to be expected. During the winter 1938-1939, Quisling was
    privately visited by a member of the Bureau.

    “When the political situation in Europe came to a head in 1939,
    Quisling made an appearance at the convention of the Nordic
    Society in Luebeck in June. He expounded his conception of the
    situation, and his apprehensions concerning Norway. He
    emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically decisive
    importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area, and to the
    advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the
    Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between the Greater German
    Reich and Great Britain.

    “Assuming that his statement would be of special interest to the
    Marshal of the Reich Goering for aero-strategical reasons,
    Quisling was referred to State Secretary Koerner by the Bureau.
    The Staff Director of the Bureau handed the Chief of the Reich
    Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Fuehrer.”
    (_007-PS_)

This document is another illustration of the close interweaving between
the political and military leadership of the Nazi State. Raeder, in his
report to Admiral Assmann, admitted his collaboration with Rosenberg
(_C-66_). The second paragraph of the Raeder report, headed
“_Weseruebung_,” reads as follows:

    “In the further developments, I was supported by Commander
    Schreiber, Naval Attache in Oslo and the M-Chief personally—in
    conjunction with the Rosenberg Organization. Thus, we got in
    touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the
    beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me—with
    the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.” (_C-66_)

The details of the manner in which Raeder made contact personally with
Quisling are not clear. In a report from Rosenberg to Raeder, however,
the full extent of Quisling’s preparedness for treachery and his
potential usefulness to the Nazi aggressors was reported and disclosed
to Raeder. The second paragraph of this report reads as follows:

    “The reasons for a coup, on which Quisling made a report, would
    be provided by the fact that the Storthing (the Norwegian
    Parliament) had, in defense of the constitution, passed a
    resolution prolonging its own life which is to become operative
    on January 12th. Quisling still retains in his capacity as a
    long-standing officer and a former Minister of War, the closest
    relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of
    a letter which he had received only a short time previously from
    the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter,
    Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact that, if things
    went on as they were going at present, Norway was finished.”
    (_C-65_)

Then came the details of a plot to overthrow the government of Norway by
the traitor Quisling, in collaboration with Rosenberg:

    “A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of
    a coup, and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians
    to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a
    purpose, being allotted their exact tasks, and provided with
    experienced and die-hard National Socialists, who are practiced
    in such operations. These trained men should then proceed with
    all speed to Norway, where details would then require to be
    further discussed. Some important centers in Oslo would have to
    be taken over immediately, and at the same time the German
    Fleet, together with suitable contingents of the German Army,
    would go into operation when summoned specially by the new
    Norwegian Government in a specified bay at the approaches to
    Oslo. Quisling has no doubts that such a coup, having been
    carried out with instantaneous success—would immediately bring
    him the approval of those sections of the Army with which he at
    present has connections, and thus it goes without saying that he
    has never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the
    King is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an
    accomplished fact. * * *

    “Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required
    which accord with German calculations.” (_C-65_)

Subsequent developments are indicated in a report by Raeder of his
meeting with Hitler on 12 December 1939 at 1200 hours, in the presence
of Keitel, Jodl and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to Hitler.
The report is headed “Norwegian Question”, and the first sentence reads:

    “C-in-C Navy” (Raeder) “has received Quisling and Hagelin.
    Quisling creates the impression of being reliable.” (_C-64_)

There then follows, in the next, two paragraphs, a statement of
Quisling’s views. The fourth paragraph reads:

    “The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that
    he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg
    once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a
    long while. C-in-C Navy” [Raeder] “suggests that if the Fuehrer
    forms a favorable impression, the OKW should obtain permission
    to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out
    of the occupation.

    “(_a_) By peaceful means; that is to say, German forces summoned
    by Norway, or

    “(_b_) To agree to do so by force.” (_C-64_)

It was at a meeting on 12 December that Raeder made the above report to
Hitler.

Raeder’s record of these transactions reports the next event:

    “Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to
    Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the
    Fuehrer by me, with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.”
    (_C-66_)

A note at the bottom of the page states:

    “At the crucial moment, R” (presumably Rosenberg) “hurt his
    foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of the
    14th of December.” (_C-66_)

That is Raeder’s note, and it indicates the extent of his contact in
this conspiracy.

The report continues:

    “On the grounds of the Fuehrer’s discussion with Quisling and
    Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December, the Fuehrer
    gave the order that the preparations for the Norwegian operation
    were to be made by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

    “Until that moment, the Naval War Staff had taken no part in the
    development of the Norwegian question, and continued to be
    somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations, which were
    undertaken by Captain Kranke in the Supreme Command of the Armed
    Forces, were founded, however, on a memorandum of the Naval War
    Staff.” (_C-66_)

Raeder’s note referring to the “crucial” moment was an appropriate one,
for on the same day that it was written, 14 December, Hitler gave the
order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by
the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Rosenberg’s report on the activities of his organization deals with
further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in December. The
extract reads:

    “Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Fuehrer on 16
    December, and once more on 18 December. In the course of this
    audience the Fuehrer emphasized repeatedly that he personally
    would prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway, as well as
    of the whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the
    theatre of war and to draw still other nations into the
    conflict. * * *”

    “Should the enemy attempt to extend the war however, with the
    aim of achieving further throttling and intimidation of the
    Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself
    against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance
    increasing enemy propaganda activity, he promised Quisling
    financial support of his movement, which is based on Greater
    German ideology. Military exploitation of the question now
    raised was assigned to the special military staff, which
    transmitted special missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg
    was to take over political exploitation. Financial expenses were
    to be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs [Ribbentrop’s
    organization], the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Ribbentrop]
    being kept continuously informed by the Foreign Affairs Bureau
    [Rosenberg’s organization].

    “Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison
    with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was
    assigned to the Naval Attache in Oslo. Orders were given that
    the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy.” (_007-PS_)

Here again is a further indication of the close link between the Nazi
politicians and the Nazi service chiefs.

D. _Operational Planning_

The information available on the events of January 1940 is not full, but
it is clear that the agitation of Raeder and Rosenberg bore fruit. An
order signed by Keitel, dated 27 January 1940, marked “Most Secret, five
copies; reference, Study ‘N’”, (an earlier code name for the
_Weseruebung_ preparations) and classified "Access only through an
officer,” stated:

    “C-in-C of the Navy [Raeder] has a report on this * * *

    “The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces wishes
    that Study ‘N’ should be further worked on under my direct and
    personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the
    general war policy. For these reasons the Fuehrer has
    commissioned me to take over the direction of further
    preparations.

    “A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the
    Armed Forces Headquarters for this purpose, and this represents
    at the same time the nucleus of a future operational staff.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “All further plans will be made under the cover name
    ‘_Weseruebung_.’” (_C-63_)

The importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and
to the date of this important decision, is this: Prior to this date, 27
January 1940, the planning of the various aspects of the invasion of
Norway and Denmark had been confined to a relatively small group, whose
aim had been to persuade Hitler of the desirability of undertaking the
operation. The issuance of this directive of Keitel’s on 27 January
1940, was the signal that the Supreme Command of the German Armed
Forces, the OKW, had accepted the proposition of the group that was
pressing for the Norwegian adventure, and had turned the combined
resources of the German military machine to the task of producing
practical and coordinated plans for the Norwegian operation. From
January onward the operational planning for the invasion of Norway and
Denmark was started through the normal channels.

Certain entries in the diary of Jodl reveal how the preparations
progressed (_1809-PS_). The entry for 6 February commences:

    “New idea: Carry out ‘H’ [_Hartmundt_, another code word for the
    Norwegian and Danish invasion] and Weser Exercise only and
    guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war.”
    (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 21 February reads:

    “Fuehrer has talked with General von Falkenhorst, and charges
    him with preparation of ‘Weser Exercise.’ Falkenhorst accepts
    gladly. Instructions issued to the three branches of the armed
    forces.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 28 February reads:

    “I propose, first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer,
    that Case Yellow [the code name for the invasion of the
    Netherlands] and Weser Exercise [the invasion of Norway and
    Denmark] must be prepared in such a way that they will be
    independent of one another as regards both time and forces
    employed. The Fuehrer completely agrees, if this is in any way
    possible.” (_1809-PS_)

It will be observed that the new idea of 6 February, that the neutrality
of Belgium might be preserved, had been abandoned by 28 February.

The entry for 29 February reads:

    “Fuehrer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen
    and a plan, elaborated in detail, showing how individual coastal
    batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont, _Chef
    Landesverteidigung_, instructed to make out immediately the
    order of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Director of Armed
    Forces to make out a similar order regarding the strengthening
    of the staff.” (_1809-PS_)

Then came Hitler’s order to complete the preparations for the invasion
of Norway and Denmark (_C-174_). It bears the date of 1 March 1940, and
reads as follows:

    “The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Most
    Secret.

    “Directive for _Fall Weseruebung_.

    “The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the
    making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and
    Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces—_Fall Weseruebung_.
    This operation should prevent British encroachment on
    Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore
    base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start
    line against Britain.

    “In view of our military and political power in comparison with
    that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the
    _Fall Weseruebung_ will be kept as small as possible. The
    numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and
    surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make
    the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of
    which is the military protection of the neutrality of the
    Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted
    to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If
    necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force will
    provide the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance
    should be met with, all military means will be used to crush
    it.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the
    operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of
    the 21st Army Corps, General von Falkenhorst. * * *”

    “The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway
    must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the operations
    must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy
    seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply
    immediately our own counter-measures.

    “It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as
    the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our
    measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and
    of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be
    made with this factor in mind.

    “In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept
    secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with
    fictitious objectives.” (_C-174_)

The section on “The Occupation of Denmark” which is given the code name
of “_Weseruebung Sued_”, provides:

    “The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of
    Fuenen immediately after occupation of Seeland.

    “Added to this, having secured the most important places, the
    Group will break through as quickly as possible from Fuenen to
    Skagen and to the east coast.” (_C-174_)

There then follow other instructions with regard to the operation.

The section on “The Occupation of Norway”, given the code name of
“_Weseruebung Nord_”, provides:

    “The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most
    important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.

    “The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the
    transport by sea of the landing troops. * * * The Air Force,
    after the occupation has been completed, will ensure air defense
    and will make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against
    Britain.” (_C-174_)

Whilst these preparations were being made, and just prior to the final
decision of Hitler, reports were coming in through Rosenberg’s
organization from Quisling. The third paragraph in Annex I, the section
dealing with Norway, has this information:

    “Quisling’s reports, transmitted to his representative in
    Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of
    intervention by the Western Powers in Norway with tacit consent
    of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by January.
    These increasingly better substantiated communications were in
    sharpest contrast to the views of the German Legation in Oslo,
    which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian
    Nygardszvold Cabinet, and was convinced of that government’s
    intention and readiness to defend Norway’s neutrality. No one in
    Norway knew that Quisling’s representative for Germany
    maintained closest relations to him; he therefore succeeded in
    gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the
    Nygardszvold cabinet and in listening to the cabinet members’
    views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the Bureau
    [Rosenberg’s bureau], which conveyed the news to the Fuehrer
    through Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the night of the 16th to
    17th of February, English destroyers attacked the German steamer
    ‘Altmark’ in Jessingjord.* * *” (_007-PS_)

(That is a reference to the action by the British destroyer _Cossack_
against the German naval auxiliary vessel _Altmark_, which was carrying
three hundred British prisoners, captured on the high seas, to Germany
through Norwegian territorial waters. The position of the British
delegation with regard to that episode is that the use that was being
made by the _Altmark_ of Norwegian territorial waters was in fact a
flagrant abuse in itself of Norwegian neutrality, and that the action
taken by H.M.S. _Cossack_, which was restricted to rescuing the three
hundred British prisoners on board, no attempt being made to destroy the
_Altmark_ or to capture the armed guards on board her, was fully
justified under international law.)

The Rosenberg report continues:

    “The Norwegian Government’s reaction to this question permitted
    the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived
    at between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. Such
    assumption was confirmed by reports of Section Scheidt, who in
    turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even
    after this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the
    opposite view, and went on record as believing in the good
    intentions of the Norwegians.” (_007-PS_)

And so the Nazi Government preferred the reports of the traitor Quisling
to the considered judgment of German diplomatic representatives in
Norway. The result of the receipt of reports of that kind was the Hitler
decision to invade Norway and Denmark. The culminating details in the
preparations for the invasion are again found in Jodl’s diary. The entry
for 3 March relates:

    “The Fuehrer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of
    a swift entry into N [Norway] with strong forces.

    “No delay by any branch of the armed forces. Very rapid
    acceleration of the attack necessary.” (_1809-PS_)

The last entry for 3 March reads:

    “Fuehrer decides to carry out ‘Weser Exercise’ before case
    ‘Yellow’ with a few days interval.” (_1809-PS_)

Thus, the important issue of strategy which had been concerning the
German High Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the
fate of Scandinavia was to be sealed before the fate of the Low Country.
It will be observed from those entries of 3 March that by that date
Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of aggression
against Norway.

The entry in Jodl’s diary for 5 March reads:

    “Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about ‘Weser
    Exercise.’ Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till
    now. Won’t listen to anyone and wants to show that all
    preparations so far made are worthless.

    “Result: (_a_) Stronger forces to Narvik.

    “(_b_) Navy to leave ships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in
    Trondheim).

    “(_c_) Christiansand can be left out at first.

    “(_d_) Six divisions envisaged for Norway.

    “(_e_) A foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen.”
    (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 13 March is one of the most remarkable in the
documentation of this case.

    “Fuehrer does not give order yet for ‘W’ [Weser Exercise]. He is
    still looking for an excuse.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry of the next day, 14 March, shows a similar preoccupation on
the part of Hitler with the search for an excuse for this aggression. It
reads:

    “English keep vigil in the North Sea with fifteen to sixteen
    submarines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations
    or prevent operations by Germans. Fuehrer has not yet decided
    what reason to give for ‘Weser Exercise.’” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 21 March reads:

    “Misgivings of Task Force 21 [Falkenhorst’s Force, detailed to
    conduct the invasion] about the long interval between taking up
    readiness positions at 05.30 hours and close of diplomatic
    negotiations. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as
    otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If
    resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political
    plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken,
    and even exaggerate them.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry of 28 March reads:

    “Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the
    Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the
    other two commanders are worrying about matters which are none
    of their business. Franke sees more disadvantages than
    advantages.

    “In the evening the Fuehrer visits the map room and roundly
    declares that he won’t stand for the Navy clearing out of the
    Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim and Oslo will have
    to remain occupied by naval forces.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 2 April reads:

    “Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the
    Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All confirm
    preparations completed. Fuehrer orders carrying out of the Weser
    Exercise for April 9th.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 4 April reads:

    “Fuehrer drafts the proclamation. Piepenbrock, Chief of Military
    Intelligence 1, returns with good results from the talks with
    Quisling in Copenhagen.” (_1809-PS_)

From the large number of operation orders that were issued in connection
with the aggression against Norway and Denmark, two may be cited to
illustrate the extent of the secrecy and deception that was used by the
conspirators in the course of that aggression. The first dated 4 April
1940, reads in part:

    “* * * The barrage-breaking vessels (_Sperrbrechers_) will
    penetrate inconspicuously, and with lights on, into Oslo Fjord,
    disguised as merchant steamers.

    “Challenge from coastal signal stations and lookouts are to be
    answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers.
    I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the
    operation before zero hour.” (_C-115_)

An order for reconnaissance forces, dated 24 March 1940, entitled
“Behavior during entrance into the harbor,” reads in part:

    “The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as
    possible. All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will be
    answered in English. In answer to questions a text with
    something like the following content will be chosen:

    “Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent.

    “Challenges to be answered with names of British warships:

 “Koeln                                                     H.M.S. Cairo
 “Koenigsberg                                            H.M.S. Calcutta
 “Bromso                                                 H.M.S. Faulkner
 “Karl Peters                                             H.M.S. Halcyon
 “Leopard                                              British destroyer
 “Wolf                                                 British destroyer
 “E-boats                                    British motor torpedo boats

    “Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be
    illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke.” (_C-115_)

An order dated 24 March 1940, classified “Most Secret,” provides:

    “Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our
    own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of
    passing craft. To challenge in case of the ‘Koeln’ H.M.S. Cairo.
    Then to order to stop: (1) Please repeat last signal. (2)
    Impossible to understand your signal. In case of a warning shot:
    Stop firing. British ship. Good friend. In case of an inquiry as
    to destination and purpose: Going Bergen. Chasing German
    steamers.” (_C-115_)

Doenitz’s order in connection with this operation is headed “Top Secret,
Operation Order ‘_Hartmut_.’”

    “Occupation of Denmark and Norway. This order comes into force
    on the codeword ‘_Hartmut_.’ With its coming into force the
    orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose their
    validity.

    “The day and hour are designated as ‘Weser-Day’ and
    ‘Weser-Hour’, and the whole operation is known as
    ‘_Weseruebung_’.

    “The operation ordered by the codeword has its objective the
    rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously
    Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land side.
    * * * The naval force will as they enter the harbor fly the
    British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at
    Narvik.” (_C-151_)

E. _Nazi Justification of Invasion._

On 9 April 1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and almost
unarmed people of Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions
had already begun, a German memorandum was handed to the governments of
Norway and Denmark attempting to justify the German action (_TC-55_).
That memorandum alleges that England and France were guilty in their
maritime warfare of breaches of international law; that Britain and
France are making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway; and that
the government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation.
The memorandum further states:

    “The German troops therefore do not set foot on Norwegian soil
    as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use
    of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations
    against England, so long as it is not forced to do so by
    measures taken by England and France. German military operations
    aim much more exclusively at protecting the north against
    proposed occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French
    forces.” (_TC-55_)

In connection with that statement it may be recalled that in his
operation order on 1 March Hitler had given orders to the Air Force to
make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain. That was on
1 March. And this is the memorandum which was produced as an excuse on 9
April. The last two paragraphs of the German memorandum to Norway and
Denmark are a classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocrisy and
military threat:

    “The Reich Government thus expects that the Royal Norwegian
    Government and the Norwegian people will respond with
    understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to
    it. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all
    possible means by the German forces employed, and would
    therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal
    Norwegian Government is therefore requested to take all measures
    with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the German
    troops can take place without friction and difficulty. In the
    spirit of the good German-Norwegian relations that have always
    existed, the Reich Government declares to the Royal Norwegian
    Government that Germany has no intention of infringing by her
    measures the territorial integrity and political independence of
    the Kingdom of Norway now or in the future.” (_TC-55_)

What the Nazis meant by “protection of the kingdom of Norway” was shown
by their conduct on 9 April.

A report by the Commander in Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces states:

    “* * * The Germans, considering the long lines of communications
    and the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the
    necessity of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In order
    to paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend their
    country and at the same time to prevent allied intervention it
    was planned to capture all the more important towns along the
    coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament
    and other military and civilian people occupying important
    positions were to be arrested before organized resistance could
    be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new
    government with Quisling as the head.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns
    along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight
    losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser ‘Blucher’,
    carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division,
    technical staffs and specialists who were to take over the
    control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and
    members of the Government and Parliament failed in spite of the
    surprise of the attack; resistance was organized throughout the
    country.” (_TC-56_)

What happened in Denmark is described in a memorandum prepared by the
Royal Danish Government (_D-628_). An extract from it reads:

    “Extracts from the Memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude
    towards Denmark before and during the occupation, prepared by
    the Royal Danish Government.

    “On the 9th of April, 1940 at 4.20 hours the German Minister
    appeared at the private residence of the Danish Minister for
    Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air Attache of the Legation.
    The appointment had been made by a telephone call from the
    German Legation to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for
    Foreign Affairs at 4.00 o’clock the same morning. The Minister
    said at once that Germany had positive proof that Great Britain
    intended to occupy bases in Denmark and Norway. Germany had to
    safeguard Denmark against this. For this reason German soldiers
    were now crossing the frontier and landing at various points in
    Zealand including the port of Copenhagen; in a short time German
    bombers would be over Copenhagen; their orders were not to bomb
    until further notice. It was now up to the Danes to prevent
    resistance as any resistance would have the most terrible
    consequences. Germany would guarantee Denmark’s territorial
    integrity and political independence. Germany would not
    interfere with the internal government of Denmark, but wanted
    only to make sure of the neutrality of the country. For this
    purpose the presence of the German Wehrmacht in Denmark was
    required during the war.

    “The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the
    allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was
    completely without foundation; there was no possibility of
    anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested
    against the violation of Denmark’s neutrality which according to
    the German Minister’s statement was in progress. The Minister
    for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could not give a
    reply to the demands, which had to be submitted to the King and
    the Prime Minister, and further observed that the German
    Minister knew, as everybody else, that the Danish armed forces
    had orders to oppose violations of Denmark’s neutrality so that
    fighting presumably already took place. In reply the German
    Minister expressed that the matter was very urgent, not least to
    avoid air bombardment.” (_D-628_)

What happened thereafter is described in a dispatch from the British
Minister in Copenhagen to the British Foreign Secretary (_D-627_). That
dispatch reads:

    “The actual events of the 9th April have been pieced together by
    members of my staff from actual eye-witnesses or from reliable
    information subsequently received and are given below. Early in
    the morning towards 5 o’clock three small German transports
    steamed into the approach to Copenhagen harbor, whilst a number
    of airplanes circled overhead. The northern battery, guarding
    the harbor approach, fired a warning shot at these planes when
    it was seen that they carried German markings. Apart from this,
    the Danes offered no further resistance, and the German vessels
    fastened alongside the quays in the Free Harbor. Some of these
    airplanes proceeded to drop leaflets over the town urging the
    population to keep calm and cooperate with the Germans. I
    enclose a specimen of this leaflet, which is written in a
    bastard Norwegian-Danish, a curiously un-German disregard of
    detail, together with a translation. Approximately 800 soldiers
    landed with full equipment, and marched to Kastellet, the old
    fortress of Copenhagen and now a barracks. The door was locked,
    so the Germans promptly burst it open with explosives and
    rounded up all the Danish soldiers within, together with the
    womenfolk employed in the mess. The garrison offered no
    resistance, and it appears that they were taken completely by
    surprise. One officer tried to escape in a motor car, but his
    chauffeur was shot before they could get away. He died in
    hospital two days later. After seizing the barracks, a
    detachment was sent to Amalienborg, the King’s palace, where
    they engaged the Danish sentries on guard, wounding three, one
    of them fatally. Meanwhile, a large fleet of bombers flew over
    the city at low altitudes.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “It has been difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred in
    Jutland. It is clear, however, that the enemy invaded Jutland
    from the south at dawn on the 9th April and were at first
    resisted by the Danish forces, who suffered casualties. The
    chances of resistance were weakened by the extent to which the
    forces appear to have been taken by surprise. The chief
    permanent official of the Ministry of War, for instance, motored
    into Copenhagen on the morning of the 9th April and drove
    blithely past a sentry who challenged him, in blissful ignorance
    that this was not one of his own men. It took a bullet, which
    passed through the lapels of his coat, to disillusion him.”
    (_D-627_)

The German memorandum to the Norwegian and Danish governments spoke of
the German desire to maintain the territorial integrity and political
independence of those two small countries. Two documents indicate the
kind of territorial integrity and political independence the Nazi
conspirators contemplated for the victims of their aggression. An entry
in Jodl’s diary for 19 April reads:

    “Renewed crisis. Envoy Braver is recalled: since Norway is at
    war with us, the task of the Foreign Office is finished. In the
    Fuehrer’s opinion, force has to be used. It is said that
    Gauleiter Terboven will be given a post. Field Marshal
    [presumably a reference to Goering] is moving in the same
    direction. He criticizes as defects that we didn’t take
    sufficiently energetic measures against the civilian population,
    that we could have seized electrical plant, that the Navy didn’t
    supply enough troops. The Air Force can’t do everything.”
    (_1809-PS_)

It will be seen from that entry and the reference to Gauleiter Terboven
that already by 19 April, rule by Gauleiters had replaced rule by
Norwegians.

A memorandum dated 3 June 1940, signed by Fricke, at that date the head
of the Operations Division of the German Naval War Staff, which was a
key appointment in the very nerve center of German naval operations,
relates to questions of territorial expansion and bases (_C-41_). It
reads:

    “These problems are preeminently of a political character and
    comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it
    is not the Navy’s province to answer, but they also materially
    affect the strategic possibilities open—according to the way in
    which this question is answered—for the subsequent use and
    operation of the Navy.

    “It is too well known to need further mention that Germany’s
    present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight and in
    the Baltic—bordered as it is by a whole series of States and
    under their influence—is an impossible one for the future of
    Greater Germany. If, over and above this, one extends these
    strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not
    continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural
    geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other
    an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the
    war.

    “The solution could perhaps be found among the following
    possibilities.

    “1. The territories of Denmark, Norway and Northern France
    acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied
    and organized that they can in future be considered as German
    possessions.

    “This solution will recommend itself for areas where the
    severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy
    and where a gradual ‘Germanizing’ of the territory appears
    practicable.

    “2. The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct
    connection with Germany’s main body, and which, like the Russian
    solution in Hango, remain permanently as an enclave in the
    hostile State. Such areas might be considered possibly around
    Brest and Trondjem.

    “3. The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas acquired
    in this war should result in the existing population of these
    areas feeling themselves politically, economically and
    militarily to be completely dependent on Germany. If the
    following results are achieved—that expansion is undertaken (on
    a scale I shall describe later) by means of the military
    measures for occupation taken during the war, that French powers
    of resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, Armed
    Forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of
    the question, that the smaller States such as the Netherlands,
    Denmark and Norway are forced into a dependence on us which will
    enable us in any circumstances and at any time easily to occupy
    these countries again, then in practice the same, but
    psychologically much more, will be achieved.” (_C-41_)

Then Fricke recommends:

    “The solution given in 3, therefore, appears to be the proper
    one, that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium, part of North
    and East France, to allow the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway to
    exist on the basis indicated above.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Time will show how far the outcome of the war with England will
    make an extension of these demands possible.” (_C-41_)

The submission of the prosecution is that that and other documents which
have been submitted tear apart the veil of Nazi pretense. These
documents reveal the menace behind the good-will of Goering; they expose
as fraudulent the diplomacy of Ribbentrop; they show the reality behind
the ostensible political ideology of tradesmen in treason like
Rosenberg; and finally and above all, they render sordid the
professional status of Keitel and of Raeder.

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST
                           NORWAY AND DENMARK

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6 (a).              │  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F)  │      │
                │  5; V.                                 │  I   │  27, 29
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
  *004-PS       │Report submitted by Rosenberg to Deputy │      │
                │of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940, on the    │      │
                │Political Preparation of the Norway     │      │
                │Action. (GB 140)                        │ III  │      19
                │                                        │      │
  *007-PS       │Report on activities of the Foreign     │      │
                │Affairs Bureau from 1933 to 1943 signed │      │
                │Rosenberg. (GB 84)                      │ III  │      27
                │                                        │      │
  *957-PS       │Rosenberg’s letter to Ribbentrop, 24    │      │
                │February 1940. (GB 139)                 │ III  │     641
                │                                        │      │
  1546-PS       │Raeder memorandum, 9 April 1940,        │      │
                │concerning occupation of Norway.        │  IV  │     104
                │                                        │      │
 *1809-PS       │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February 1940│      │
                │to May 1940. (GB 88)                    │  IV  │     377
                │                                        │      │
 *3054-PS       │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801
                │                                        │      │
  3596-PS       │Covering memorandum and notes of        │      │
                │conversation on 8 August 1940, between  │      │
                │Chief Custodian of Army Archives GOES   │      │
                │and Major-General Himmler.              │  VI  │     299
                │                                        │      │
 *C-5           │Memorandum to Supreme Command of the    │      │
                │Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939,        │      │
                │concerning base in Norway. (GB 83)      │  VI  │     815
                │                                        │      │
 *C-41          │Memorandum by Fricke, 3 June 1940, on   │      │
                │questions of territorial expansion and  │      │
                │bases. (GB 96)                          │  VI  │     868
                │                                        │      │
 *C-63          │Keitel order on preparation for         │      │
                │“Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB 87) │  VI  │     883
                │                                        │      │
 *C-64          │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on   │      │
                │meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. (GB│      │
                │86)                                     │  VI  │     884
                │                                        │      │
 *C-65          │Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder concerning │      │
                │visit of Quisling. (GB 85)              │  VI  │     885
                │                                        │      │
 *C-66          │Memorandum from Raeder to Assmann, 10   │      │
                │January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa”   │      │
                │and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81)              │  VI  │     887
                │                                        │      │
 *C-115         │Naval deception and camouflage in       │      │
                │invasion of Norway taken from file of   │      │
                │naval operation orders for operation    │      │
                │“Weseruebung”. (GB 90)                  │  VI  │     914
                │                                        │      │
 *C-122         │Extract from Naval War Diary.           │      │
                │Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 October│      │
                │1939. (GB 82)                           │  VI  │     928
                │                                        │      │
 *C-151         │Details for execution of operation      │      │
                │“Weseruebung”, 3 March 1940, signed by  │      │
                │Doenitz. (GB 91)                        │  VI  │     965
                │                                        │      │
 *C-174         │Hitler Order for operation              │      │
                │“Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89)    │  VI  │    1003
                │                                        │      │
 *D-627         │Dispatch from British Minister in       │      │
                │Copenhagen to Foreign Secretary, 25     │      │
                │April 1940. (GB 95)                     │ VII  │      97
                │                                        │      │
 *D-628         │Memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude│      │
                │towards Denmark before and during       │      │
                │occupation. (GB 94)                     │ VII  │      98
                │                                        │      │
 *D-629         │Letter from Keitel to Ribbentrop, 3     │      │
                │April 1940. (GB 141)                    │ VII  │      99
                │                                        │      │
 *L-323         │Entry in Naval War Diary concerning     │      │
                │operation “Weseruebung”. (USA 541)      │ VII  │    1106
                │                                        │      │
 *M-156         │Year Book of the Ausland (Foreign)      │      │
                │Organization of the NSDAP for 1942. (GB │      │
                │284)                                    │ VIII │      49
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-17         │Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation  │      │
                │between Germany and Denmark, signed at  │      │
                │Berlin, 2 June 1926. (GB 76)            │ VIII │     346
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-24         │Treaty of nonaggression between German  │      │
                │Reich and Kingdom of Denmark, 31 May    │      │
                │1939. (GB 77)                           │ VIII │     373
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-30         │German assurance to Denmark, Norway,    │      │
                │Belgium, and the Netherlands, 28 April  │      │
                │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│      │
                │Part VII, I, pp. 139, 172-175. (GB 78)  │ VIII │     379
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-31         │German assurance to Norway, 2 September │      │
                │1939. (GB 79)                           │ VIII │     380
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-32         │German assurance to Norway, 6 October   │      │
                │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│      │
                │Vol. VII, p. 350. (GB 80)               │ VIII │     381
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-55         │German ultimatum to Norway and Denmark, │      │
                │9 April 1940, from Documents of German  │      │
                │Politics, Part VIII, pp. 21-31. (GB 92) │ VIII │     410
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-56         │German Plans for Invasion of Norway, 1  │      │
                │October 1945. (GB 93)                   │ VIII │     414
                │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 12  │German Aggression. (Enlargement         │      │
                │displayed to Tribunal.)                 │ VIII │     781
                │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 13  │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and  │      │
                │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to   │      │
                │Tribunal.)                              │ VIII │     782


            10. AGGRESSION AGAINST BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS,
                             AND LUXEMBOURG

The independence of Belgium, which for so many centuries was the cockpit
of Europe, was guaranteed by the great European powers in 1839. That
guarantee was observed for 75 years, until it was broken by the Germans
in 1914, who brought all the horrors of war, and the even greater
horrors of German occupation, to Belgium. History was to repeat itself
in a still more catastrophic fashion some 25 years after, in 1940.

Among the applicable treaties are the Hague Convention of 1907 (_TC-3_;
_TC-4_), the Locarno Arbitration and Conciliation Convention of 1925, in
which Belgium’s independence and neutrality were guaranteed by Germany;
the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, by which all the Powers renounced
recourse to war; and the Hague Convention of Arbitration and
Conciliation May 1926 between Germany and the Netherlands (_TC-16_).
Article I of the latter treaty provides:

    “The contracting parties” (the Netherlands and the German Reich)
    “undertake to submit all disputes of any nature whatever which
    may arise between them which it has not been possible to settle
    by diplomacy, and which have not been referred to the Permanent
    Court of International Justice, to be dealt with by arbitration
    or conciliation as provided.” (_TC-16_)

Subsequent clauses deal with the machinery of conciliation. The last
article, Article 21, provides that the Convention shall be valid for ten
years, and then shall remain in force for successive periods of five
years until denounced by either party. And this treaty never was
denounced by Germany at all.

The last of the applicable treaties, all of which belong to the days of
the Weimar Republic, is the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation
between Germany and Luxembourg, executed at Geneva in 1929 (_TC-20_).
The first few words of Article 1 are familiar:

    “The contracting parties undertake to settle by peaceful means
    all disputes of any nature whatever which may arise between them
    and which it may not be possible to settle by

Then follow clauses dealing with the machinery for peaceful settlement
of disputes, which are in the common form.

Those were the treaty obligations between Germany and Belgium at the
time when the Nazi Party came into power in 1933. Hitler adopted and
ratified the obligations of Germany under the Weimar Republic with
regard to the treaties which had been entered into. Nothing more
occurred to alter the position of Belgium until March 1936. Germany
reoccupied the Rhineland and announced the resumption of conscription.
And Hitler, on 7 March 1936 purported in a speech to repudiate the
obligations of the German Government under the Locarno Pact, the reason
being given as the execution of the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. There
was no legal foundation for this claim that Germany was entitled to
renounce obligations under the Locarno Pact. But Belgium was left in the
air, in the sense that it had itself entered into various obligations
under the Locarno Pact in return for the liabilities which other nations
acknowledged, and now one of those liabilities, namely, the liability of
Germany to observe the Pact, had been renounced.

And so on 30 January 1937, perhaps because Hitler realized the position
of Belgium and of the Netherlands, Hitler gave solemn assurance—he used
the word “solemn”—which amounted to a full guarantee (_TC-33_). In
April 1937, France and England released Belgium from her obligations
under the Locarno Pact. Belgium gave guarantees of strict independence
and neutrality, and France and England gave guarantees of assistance
should Belgium be attacked. It was because of those facts that Germany,
on 13 October 1937, gave a clear and unconditional guarantee to Belgium:

    “I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to make the
    following communication to Your Excellency: The German
    Government has taken cognizance with particular interest of the
    public declaration in which the Belgium Government defines the
    international position of Belgium. For its part, it has
    repeatedly given expressions, especially through the declaration
    of the Chancellor of the German Reich in his speech of January
    30th, 1937, to its own point of view. The German Government has
    also taken cognizance of the declaration made by the British and
    French Governments on the 24th of April 1937 * * *

    “Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of
    Locarno may still take some time, and being desirous of
    strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries, the
    German Government regards it as appropriate to define now its
    own attitude towards Belgium. To this end, it makes the
    following declaration: First, the German Government has taken
    note of the views which the Belgian Government has thought fit
    to express. That is to say, (_a_) of the policy of independence
    which it intends to exercise in full sovereignty; (_b_) of its
    determination to defend the frontiers of Belgium with all its
    forces against any aggression or invasion and to prevent Belgian
    territory from being used for purposes of aggression against
    another state as a passage or as a base of operation by land, by
    sea, or in the air, and to organize the defense of Belgium in an
    efficient manner to this purpose. Two: The German Government
    considers that the inviolability and integrity of Belgium are
    common interests of the Western Powers. It confirms its
    determination that in no circumstances will it impair this
    inviolability and integrity and that it will at all times
    respect Belgian territory except, of course, in the event of
    Belgium’s taking part in a military action directed against
    Germany in an armed conflict in which Germany is involved. The
    German Government, like the British and French Governments, is
    prepared to assist Belgium should she be subjected to an attack
    or to invasion. * * *” (_TC-34_)

The following reply was made:

    “The Belgian Government has taken note with great satisfaction
    of the declaration communicated to it this day by the German
    Government. It thanks the German Government warmly for this
    communication.” (_TC-34_)

Thus, in October 1937, Germany gave a solemn guarantee to this small
nation of its peaceful aspiration towards her, and its assertion that
the integrity of the Belgian frontier was a common interest between her
and Belgium and the other Western Powers. Yet eighteen months afterwards
Germany had violated that assurance.

That this declaration of October 1937 meant very little to the leaders
and to the high command of Germany can be seen from a document which
came into existence on 24 August 1938, at the time when the
Czechoslovakia drama was unfolding, and when it was uncertain whether
there would be war with the Western Powers. This Top Secret document is
addressed to the General Staff of the 5th Section of the German Air
Force, and deals with the subject, “Extended Case Green—Appreciation of
the Situation with Special Consideration of the Enemy.” Apparently some
staff officer had been asked to prepare this appreciation. The last
paragraph (No. H) reads:

    “Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy. * * *

    “Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent
    an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war
    against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is
    held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the
    conditions under which an occupation of this area could be
    carried out and how long it would take, and in this case it
    would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great
    Britain.” (_375-PS_)

It was apparently assumed by the staff officer who prepared this
document, and assumed quite rightly, that the leaders of the German
nation and the High Command would not pay the smallest attention to the
fact that Germany had given her word not to invade Holland or Belgium.
It was recommended as a militarily advantageous thing to do, with the
knowledge that, if the commanders and the Fuehrer agreed with that view,
treaties would be completely ignored. Such was the honor of the German
Government and of its leaders.

In March of 1939, the remainder of Czechoslovakia had been peacefully
annexed, and the time had come for further guarantees. Assurances which
were accordingly given to Belgium and the Netherlands on the 28th of
April 1939 (_TC-30_). A guarantee was also made to Luxembourg in a
speech by Hitler in the Reichstag, in which he dealt with a
communication from Mr. Roosevelt, who was feeling a little uneasy as to
Hitler’s intentions (_TC-42-A_). In “The Nazi Plan,” a motion picture
shown to the Tribunal by the American prosecution (_3054-PS_), the
delivery by Hitler of this part of this speech was shown. Hitler
appeared in one of his jocular moods, as his words were greeted and
delivered in a jocular vein. The film shows that Goering, who sits above
Hitler in the Reichstag, appreciated very much the joke, the joke being
this: That it is an absurd suggestion to make that Germany could
possibly go to war with any of its neighbors.

In this speech Hitler declared:

    “Finally Mr. Roosevelt demands the readiness to give him an
    assurance that the German fighting forces will not attack the
    territory or possessions of the following independent nations,
    and above all, that they will not march into them. And he goes
    on to name the following as the countries in question: Finland,
    Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland,
    Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain,
    Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania,
    Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, Arabia, Syria,
    Palestine, Egypt, and Iran.

    “Answer: I started off by taking the trouble to find out in the
    case of the countries listed, firstly, whether they feel
    themselves threatened, and secondly and particularly, whether
    this question Mr. Roosevelt has asked us was put as the result
    of a demarche by them or at least with their consent.

    “The answer was a general negative, which in some cases took the
    form of a blunt rejection. Actually, this counter-question of
    mine could not be conveyed to some of the states and nations
    listed, since they are not at present in possession of their
    liberty (as for instance Syria), but are occupied by the
    military forces of democratic states, and therefore, deprived of
    all their rights.

    “Thirdly, apart from that, all the states bordering on Germany
    have received much more binding assurances and, above all, much
    more binding proposals than Mr. Roosevelt asked of me in his
    peculiar telegram.” (_TC-42-A_)

Although that is sneering at Mr. Roosevelt, it is suggesting in the
presence, among others, of Goering, as being quite absurd that Germany
should nurture any warlike feeling against its neighbors. The hollow
falsity of that declaration and of the preceding guarantee is shown by
the minutes of Hitler’s conference of the 23rd of May (_L-79_). The
first page shows that those present included the Fuehrer, Goering,
Raeder, von Brauchitsch, Keitel, Warlimont (Jodl’s deputy), and various
others. The purpose of the conference was an analysis of the situation,
which proceeded in this fashion:

    “What will this struggle be like?”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
    force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war,
    we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at
    securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.”
    (_L-79_)

In Hitler’s speech on 22 August, the following passage occurred:

    “Attack from the West from the Maginot Line: I consider this
    impossible.

    “Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and
    Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well
    as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available
    means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of
    these countries.” (_798-PS_)

Nevertheless, a further assurance was given by the Ambassador of Germany
to the Belgian Government:

    “In view of the gravity of the international situation, I am
    expressly instructed by the Head of the German Reich to transmit
    to Your Majesty the following communication:

    “Though the German Government is at present doing everything in
    its power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the questions at
    issue between the Reich and Poland, it nevertheless desires to
    define clearly, here and now, the attitude which it proposes to
    adopt towards Belgium should a conflict in Europe become
    inevitable.

    “The German Government is firmly determined to abide by the
    terms of the declaration contained in the German note of October
    13, 1937. This provides in effect that Germany will in no
    circumstances impair the inviolability of Belgium and will at
    all times respect Belgium territory. The German Government
    renews this undertaking; however, in, the expectation that the
    Belgium Government, for its part, will observe an attitude of
    strict neutrality and that Belgium will tolerate no violations
    on the part of a third power, but that, on the contrary, she
    will oppose it with all the forces at her disposal. It goes
    without saying that if the Belgium Government were to adopt a
    different attitude, the German Government would naturally be
    compelled to defend its interests in conformity with the new
    situation thus created.” (_TC-36_)

It seems likely that the decision having been made to violate Belgian
neutrality, those last words were put in to afford some excuse in the
future.

A similar document assurance was communicated to Her Majesty the Queen
of the Netherlands on the same day, 26 August 1939 (_TC-40_). Likewise
assurances were given to Luxembourg at the same time. It is in the same
terms as the other two assurances, and amounts to a complete guarantee
with the sting in the tail (_TC-42_). Poland was occupied by means of a
lightning victory, and in October 1939 German armed forces were free for
other tasks. The first step that was taken, so far as the Netherlands
and Belgium are concerned, was a German assurance on 6 October 1939, as
follows:

    “Belgium.

    “Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the state I
    tried to create friendly relations with Belgium. I renounced any
    revision or any desire for revision. The Reich has not made any
    demands which would in any way be likely to be considered in
    Belgium as a threat.” (_TC-32_)

A similar assurance was made to the Netherlands on the same day:

    “The new Reich has endeavored to continue the traditional
    friendship with Holland. It has not taken over any existing
    differences between the two countries and has not created any
    new ones.” (_TC-32_)

The value of these pledges of Germany’s good faith is shown by an order
issued on the very next day, 7 October. This order was from the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von Brauchitsch, and was addressed to
various Army Groups. The third paragraph provided:

    “The Dutch Border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only.

    “At the same time, Army Group B has to make all preparations
    according to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and
    Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands.”
    (_2329-PS_)

Two days later, on 9 October, Hitler directed that:

    “Preparations should be made for offensive action on the
    northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of
    Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out
    as soon and as forcefully as possible. * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The object of this attack is to acquire as great an area of
    Holland, Belgium and Northern France as possible.” (_C-62_)

That document is signed by Hitler himself. It is addressed to the
Supreme Commander of the Army, Keitel; Navy, Raeder; and Air Minister
and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Goering. On 15 October 1939, a
supplementary order was issued from the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces. It was signed by Keitel in his familiar red pencil signature,
and was addressed to Raeder, Goering, and the General Staff of the Army.
It declared, in part:

    “It must be the object of the Army’s preparations, therefore, to
    occupy—on receipt of a special order—the territory of Holland,
    in the first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas line.” (_C-62_)

The second paragraph deals with the taking possession of the
West-Frisian islands.

It is clear that from that moment the decision to violate the neutrality
of these three countries had been made. All that remained was to work
out the details, to wait until the weather became favorable, and in the
meantime, to give no hint that Germany’s word was about to be broken
again. Otherwise, these small countries might have had some chance of
combining with themselves and their neighbors.

Another Keitel directive, again sent to the Supreme Commanders of the
Army, Navy, and Air Forces, gives details of how the attack is to be
carried out. The following are pertinent passages:

    “Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended
    against Holland may be carried out without a special order which
    the general attack will start.

    “The attitude of the Dutch armed forces cannot be anticipated
    ahead of time.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Wherever there is no resistance, the entry should carry the
    character of a peaceful occupation.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “At first the Dutch area, including the West-Frisian islands
    situated just off the coast, for the present without Texel, is
    to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line.”

    “The 7th Airborne Division will be committed for the airborne
    operation only after the possession of bridges across the Albert
    Canal” (in Belgium) “has been assured.” (_440-PS_)

In addition to Belgium and Holland, the document, in paragraph (5) and
(6)(b) mentions Luxembourg. The signature of Keitel is typed. It is
authenticated by a staff officer.

A later order of 28 November 1939, over the signature of Keitel, in the
usual red pencil, is addressed to the Army, Navy, and Airforce. It
states that if a quick breakthrough should fail north of Liege, other
machinery for carrying out the attack will be used. Paragraph 2 shows
clearly that the Netherlands is to be violated. It speaks of “The
occupation of Walcheren Island and thereby Flushing harbor, or of some
other southern Dutch island especially valuable for our sea and air
warfare,” and “_b_ Taking of one or more Maas crossings between Namur
and Dinant * * *.” (_C-10_)

From November until March of 1940 the High Command and the Fuehrer were
waiting for favorable weather before A-Day, as they called it. That
referred to the attack on Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. The
successive postponements are shown in a series of orders which range in
date from 7 November 1939 until 9 May 1940, and which are all signed
either by Keitel or by Jodl. (_C-72_)

On 10 January 1940, a German airplane made a forced landing in Belgium.
The occupants endeavored to burn the orders of which they were in
possession, but they were only partially successful. Among the papers
which were captured is an order to the Commander of the Second Army
Group, Air Force Group—Luftflotte—the Second Air Force Fleet, clearly
for offensive action against France, Holland, and Belgium. It deals with
the disposition of the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army covers the
Liege-Antwerp Line. Then it deals with the disposition of the Dutch
Army. The German Western Army is accordingly directing its attack
between the North Sea and the Moselle, with the strongest possible
air-force support, through the Belgo-Luxembourg region. The rest
consists of operational details as to the bombing of the various targets
in Belgium and in Holland. (_TC-58_)

The nature of the Army’s planning is shown in the 1 February 1940 entry
in Jodl’s diary, which reads in part as follows:

    “1. Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they have
    to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute
    force. The 7th Division intends to drop units near the town.

    “2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent
    action against the Dutch air force.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 2 February 1940 states that “landings can be made in the
centre of The Hague.” On 26 February Jodl wrote: “Fuehrer raises the
question whether it is better to undertake the Weser Exercise before or
after case ‘Yellow.’” On 3 March, he recorded the answer: “Fuehrer
decides to carry out Weser Exercise before case ‘Yellow’, with a few
days’ interval.” And on May 8, two days before the invasion, Jodl made
this entry:

    “Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs,
    evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according
    to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked
    for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.”
    (_1809-PS_)

In other words, the Germans objected because the Dutch were actually
making some preparation to resist their endeavor. Furthermore, the Dutch
armies, according to the Germans’ own intelligence reports, were still
adhering properly to their neutrality.

At 4:30 a. m. on 10 May, the months of planning bore fruit, and Holland,
Belgium, and Luxembourg were violently invaded with all the fury of
modern warfare. No warning was given by Germany and no complaint was
made by Germany of any breaches of neutrality before this action was
taken.

After the invasion of each of the three countries was a fait accompli,
the German Ambassador called upon representatives of the three
Governments some hours later and handed them documents which were
similar in each case, and which are described as memoranda or
ultimatums. An account of what happened in Belgium is contained in an
official Belgian report:

    “From 4:30 information was received which left no shadow of
    doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported in the
    east. At five o’clock came news of the bombing of two
    Netherlands aerodromes, the violation of the Belgian frontier,
    the landing of German soldiers at the Eben-Emael Fort, the
    bombing of the Jemelle station.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “At 8:30 the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room, he began to take a
    paper from his pocket. M. Spaak” [Belgian Foreign Minister]
    “stopped him ‘I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I will speak
    first.’ And in an indignant voice, he read the Belgian
    Government’s protest: ‘Mr. Ambassador, the German Army has just
    attacked our country. This is the second time in twenty-five
    years that Germany has committed a criminal aggression against a
    neutral and loyal Belgium. What has just happened is perhaps
    even more odious than the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no
    note, no protest of any kind has ever been placed before the
    Belgian Government. It is through the attack itself that Belgium
    has learned that Germany has violated the undertakings given by
    her on October 13th, 1937, and renewed spontaneously at the
    beginning of the war. The act of aggression committed by
    Germany, for which there is no justification whatever, will
    deeply shock the conscience of the world. The German Reich will
    be held responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend
    herself. Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot be
    vanquished’.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had brought:
    ‘I am instructed by the Government of the Reich,’ he said, ‘to
    make the following declaration: In order to forestall the
    invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, for which Great
    Britain and France have been making preparations clearly aimed
    at Germany, the Government of the Reich is compelled to ensure
    the neutrality of the three countries mentioned by means of
    arms. For this purpose, the Government of the Reich will bring
    up an armed force of the greatest size, so that resistance of
    any kind will be useless. The Government of the Reich guarantees
    Belgium’s European and colonial territory, as well as her
    dynasty, on condition that no resistance is offered. Should
    there be any resistance, Belgium will risk the destruction of
    her country and loss of her independence. It is therefore, in
    the interests of Belgium that the population be called upon to
    cease all resistance and that the authorities be given the
    necessary instructions to make contact with the German Military
    Command.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In the middle of this communication, M. Spaak, who had by his
    side the Secretary-General of the Department, interrupted the
    Ambassador: ‘Hand me the document’, he said. ‘I should like to
    spare you so painful a task.’ After studying the note, M. Spaak
    confined himself to pointing out that he had already replied by
    the protest he had just made. * * *” (_TC-58_)

The so-called ultimatum, which was delivered some hours after the
invasion had started, read in part as follows:

    “The Reich Government has for a long time had no doubts as to
    what was the chief aim of the British and French war policy. It
    consists of the spreading of the war to other countries, and of
    the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and mercenary troops
    for England and France.

    “The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy
    Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new
    front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany’s last
    minute action which upset the project. Germany has furnished
    documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world.

    “Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia
    miscarried, England and France took up their policy of war
    expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the
    retreat in flight of the British troops from Norway was still
    going on, the English Prime Minister announced that, as a result
    of the altered situation in Scandinavia, England was once more
    in a position to go ahead with the transfer of the full weight
    of her navy to the Mediterranean, and that English and French
    units were already on the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean
    now became the center of English-French war propaganda. This was
    partly to gloss over the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of
    prestige before their own people and before the world, and
    partly to make it appear that the Balkans had been chosen for
    the next theater of war against Germany.

    “In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the
    Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another
    purpose. It was nothing but a diversion manoeuvre in grand
    style, to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next
    English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government has long
    been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully
    prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the
    West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region
    of the Ruhr.

    “Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of
    Belgium and Holland, it being of course understood that these
    two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England
    and France would maintain the strictest neutrality.

    “Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.”
    (_TC-57_)

The so-called ultimatum goes on to complain of the hostile expressions
in the Belgian and the Netherlands Press, and to allege attempts by the
British Intelligence to bring a revolution into Germany with the
assistance of Belgium and the Netherlands. Reference is made to military
preparation of the two countries, and it is pointed out that Belgium has
fortified the Belgian frontier. A complaint was made in regard to
Holland, that British aircraft had flown over the Netherlands country.
Other charges were made against the neutrality of these two countries,
although no instances were given (_TC-57_). The document continued:

    “In this struggle for existence forced upon the German people by
    England and France, the Reich Government is not disposed to
    await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow
    them to carry the war over Belgium and the Netherlands into
    German territory. It has therefore now issued the command to
    German troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all
    the military means at the disposal of the Reich.” (_TC-57_)

It is unnecessary, in view of the documents previously adverted to, to
emphasize the falsity of that statement. It is now known that for months
preparations had been made to violate the neutrality of these three
countries. This document is merely saying, “The orders to do so have now
been issued.”

A similar document, similar in terms altogether, was handed to the
representatives of the Netherlands Government; and a memorandum was sent
to the Luxembourg Government, which enclosed with it a copy of the
document handed to the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands. The
second paragraph of the latter declared:

    “In defense against the imminent attack, the German troops have
    now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two
    countries * * *”. (_TC-60_)

The protest of the Belgium Government against the crime which was
committed against her is contained in _TC-59_.

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST
                BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND LUXEMBOURG

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6 (a).              │  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F)  │      │
                │  5; V.                                 │  I   │  27, 29
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
  *375-PS       │Case Green with wider implications,     │      │
                │report of Intelligence Division,        │      │
                │Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August 1938.│      │
                │(USA 84)                                │ III  │     280
                │                                        │      │
  *440-PS       │Directive No. 8 signed by Keitel, 20    │      │
                │November 1939, for the conduct of the   │      │
                │war. (GB 107)                           │ III  │     397
                │                                        │      │
  *798-PS       │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │      │
                │at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA   │      │
                │29)                                     │ III  │     581
                │                                        │      │
 *1809-PS       │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February 1940│      │
                │to May 1940. (GB 88)                    │  IV  │     377
                │                                        │      │
 *2329-PS       │Order by Commander in Chief of the Army,│      │
                │7 October 1939. (GB 105)                │  IV  │    1037
                │                                        │      │
 *3054-PS       │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801
                │                                        │      │
 *C-10          │OKW directive, 28 November 1939, signed │      │
                │by Keitel, subject: Employment of 7th   │      │
                │Flieger Division. (GB 108)              │  VI  │     817
                │                                        │      │
 *C-62          │Directive No. 6 on the conduct of war,  │      │
                │signed by Hitler, 9 October 1939;       │      │
                │directive by Keitel, 15 October 1939 on │      │
                │Fall “Gelb”. (GB 106)                   │  VI  │     880
                │                                        │      │
 *C-72          │Orders postponing “A” day in the West,  │      │
                │November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109)     │  VI  │     893
                │                                        │      │
 *L-52          │Memorandum and Directives for conduct of│      │
                │war in the West, 9 October 1939. (USA   │      │
                │540)                                    │ VII  │     800
                │                                        │      │
 *L-79          │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939,     │      │
                │“Indoctrination on the political        │      │
                │situation and future aims”. (USA 27)    │ VII  │     847
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-3          │Hague Convention (3) Relative to opening│      │
                │of Hostilities. (GB 2)                  │ VIII │     279
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-4          │Hague Convention (5) Respecting Rights  │      │
                │and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons│      │
                │in War on Land. (GB 2)                  │ VIII │     282
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-13         │Arbitration Convention between Germany  │      │
                │and Belgium at Locarno, 16 October 1925.│      │
                │(GB 15)                                 │ VIII │     320
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-16         │Convention of Arbitration and           │      │
                │conciliation between Germany and the    │      │
                │Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 20 May│      │
                │1926. (GB 97)                           │ VIII │     337
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-19         │Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris. 1929      │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp.  │      │
                │97-101. (GB 18)                         │ VIII │     359
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-20         │Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation  │      │
                │between Germany and Luxembourg, signed  │      │
                │at Geneva, 11 September 1929. (GB 98)   │ VIII │     362
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-30         │German assurance to Denmark, Norway,    │      │
                │Belgium, and the Netherlands, 28 April  │      │
                │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│      │
                │Part VII, I, pp. 139, 172-175. (GB 78)  │ VIII │     379
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-32         │German assurance to Norway, 6 October   │      │
                │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│      │
                │Vol. VII, p. 350. (GB 80)               │ VIII │     381
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-33         │German assurance to Belgium and the     │      │
                │Netherlands, 30 January 1937, from      │      │
                │Documents of German Politics, Part IV,  │      │
                │pp. 42-43. (GB 99)                      │ VIII │     381
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-34         │German Declaration to the Belgian       │      │
                │Minister of 13 October 1937. (GB 100)   │ VIII │     381
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-36         │Declaration made by Ambassador of       │      │
                │Germany on 26 August 1939. (GB 102)     │ VIII │     382
                │                                        │      │
  TC-37         │German assurance to Belgium, 6 October  │      │
                │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│      │
                │Vol. VII, p. 351.                       │ VIII │     383
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-40         │Declaration of German Minister to the   │      │
                │Netherlands, 26 August 1939. (GB 103)   │ VIII │     383
                │                                        │      │
  TC-41         │German assurance to the Netherlands, 6  │      │
                │October 1939, from Documents of German  │      │
                │Politics, Vol. VII, p. 351.             │ VIII │     384
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-42         │German assurance to Luxembourg, 26      │      │
                │August 1939. (GB 104)                   │ VIII │     384
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-42-A       │German assurance to Luxembourg, 28 April│      │
                │1939. (GB 101)                          │ VIII │     385
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-57         │German ultimatum to Belgium and the     │      │
                │Netherlands, 9 May 1940, from Documents │      │
                │of German Politics, Part VIII, pp.      │      │
                │142-150. (GB 112)                       │ VIII │     416
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-58         │“Belgium, the official account of what  │      │
                │happened 1939-1940”. (GB 111)           │ VIII │     421
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-58-A       │Secret instruction to the Commander of  │      │
                │2nd Luftflotte found in German Aeroplane│      │
                │of 10 January 1940. (GB 110)            │ VIII │     423
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-59         │Protest from Belgium, 10 May 1940,      │      │
                │following German aggression. (GB 111)   │ VIII │     429
                │                                        │      │
 *TC-60         │German memorandum to Luxembourg, 9 May  │      │
                │1940, from Documents of German Politics,│      │
                │Part VIII, pp. 150-151. (GB 113)        │ VIII │     431
                │                                        │      │
  Affidavit H   │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November  │      │
                │1945.                                   │ VIII │     643
                │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 12  │German Aggression. (Enlargement         │      │
                │displayed to Tribunal.)                 │ VIII │     781
                │                                        │      │
**Chart No. 13  │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and  │      │
                │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to   │      │
                │Tribunal.)                              │ VIII │     782


              11. AGGRESSION AGAINST GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA

A. _Treaties and Assurances Breached._

The invasions of Greece and of Yugoslavia by the Germans, which took
place in the early hours of the morning of 6 April 1941, constituted
direct breaches of The Hague Convention of 1899 on the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of
1928. In the case of Yugoslavia, the invasion further constituted a
breach of an express assurance by the Nazis. The assurance was
originally given in a German Foreign Office release made in Berlin on 28
April 1938 (_2719-PS_), but was subsequently repeated by Hitler himself
on 6 October 1939 in a speech he made in the Reichstag. The German
Foreign Office release on 28 April 1938 reads, in part:

    “Berlin, 28 April 1938. The State Secretary of the German
    Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives.

    “As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich, we
    have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland,
    Liechtenstein, and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded by us
    as final and inviolable. On this point the following special
    declarations have been made:”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “3. Yugoslavia.

    “The Yugoslav Government have been informed by authoritative
    German quarters that German policy has no aims beyond Austria,
    and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case remain
    untouched. In his speech made at Graz on 3 April, the Fuehrer
    and Chancellor stated that, in regard to the reunion of Austria,
    Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the same attitude as Italy.
    We were happy to have frontiers there which relieved us of all
    anxiety about providing military protection for them.”
    (_2719-PS_)

In a speech made on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince
Regent of Yugoslavia on 1 June 1939, Hitler declared:

    “The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a
    spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of
    the tragic confusion of the world war. The German soldier then
    learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent.
    I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual
    respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural and
    economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’s
    present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and
    at the same time on that account we derive from it the hope that
    German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop in
    the future and to grow ever closer.

    “In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also
    perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange
    of views which, and of this I am convinced, in this sense can
    only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this
    all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship
    of Germany to Yugoslavia, now that, owing to historical events,
    we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all
    time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two
    peoples and countries, but can also represent an element of calm
    to our nerve-wracked continent. This peace is the goal of all
    who are disposed to perform really constructive work.” (_TC-92_)

As is now known this speech was made at the time when Hitler had already
decided upon the European war. It occurred a week after the
Reichschancellery conference recorded in the Schmundt note (_L-79_). The
reference to “nerve-wracked continent” might perhaps be attributed to
the war of nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many
months. The German Assurance to Yugoslavia on 6 October 1939 was in
these terms:

    “Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed
    Yugoslavia that, from now on, the frontier with this country
    would also be an unalterable one, and that we only desire to
    live in peace and friendship with her.” (_TC-43_)

B. _Planning for Invasion: Collaboration with Italy and Bulgaria._

Despite the obligation of Germany, under the Convention of 1899, and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, and under the foregoing Assurance which I have
read, the fate of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as is now known, been
sealed ever since the meeting between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ciano at
Obersalzberg, 12 and 13 August 1939 (_TC-77_). The effect of the meeting
was that Hitler and Ribbentrop, only two months after the dinner to the
Prince Regent, were seeking to persuade Italy to make war on Yugoslavia
at the same time that Germany was to commence hostilities against
Poland, which Hitler had decided to do in the very near future. Ciano
while evidently in entire agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as to the
desirability of liquidating Yugoslavia, and while himself anxious to
secure Salonika, stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general
European war. Thus, despite all the persuasion which Hitler and
Ribbentrop exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for the Nazi
conspirators to reassure their intended victim, Yugoslavia, since in
fact Italy maintained its position and did not enter the war when
Germany invaded Poland, and since the Germans themselves were not yet
ready to strike in the Balkans. If was apparently for this reason that
on 6 October, through Hitler’s speech, the Nazis repeated the assurance
they had made in April 1938. It is a matter of history that after the
defeat of the Allied Armies in May and June 1940, the Italian Government
declared war on France and that subsequently, at three o’clock in the
morning on 28 October 1940, the Italian Minister at Athens presented the
Greek Government with a 3 hour ultimatum, upon the expiration of which
Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece.

This event was reported by the British Minister at Athens in these
words:

    “The president of the council has assured himself an outstanding
    place in Greek history and, whatever the future may bring, his
    foresight in quietly preparing his country for war and his
    courage in rejecting without demur the Italian ultimatum when
    delivered in the small hours of that October morning, will
    surely obtain an honorable mention in the story of European
    statecraft. He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated
    and this reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation.”

A letter from Hitler to Mussolini, which is undated but which—this is
clear from the contents—must have been written shortly after the
Italian invasion of Greece on 28 November [transcriber's note: October]
1940, contained these sentiments:

    “Jugoslavia must become disinterested, if possible however from
    our point of view interested in cooperating in the liquidation
    of the Greek question. Without assurances from Jugoslavia, it is
    useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans.

    “Unfortunately, I must stress the fact that waging a war in the
    Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore, any threatening
    move towards Jugoslavia would be useless, since the
    impossibility of a materialization of such threats before March
    is well known to the Serbian general staff. Therefore,
    Jugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by other means
    and other ways.” (_2762-PS_)

It was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive
in the Spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the
north. It was an integral part of those plans that Yugoslavia should be
induced to cooperate in them or at least to maintain a disinterested
attitude towards the liquidation of the other Balkan States. These facts
are disclosed in a “Top Secret Directive” issued from the Fuehrer’s
Headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by Jodl, and dated 12 November
1940. This order reads, in part:

    “_Directive No. 18._

    “The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the prosecution of
    the war in the near future are to be made along the following
    lines.* * *” (_444-PS_)

After sections dealing with operations against Gibraltar and an
offensive against Egypt, the order continues:

    “_Balkans_

    “The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for
    occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of
    need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use
    of German air force units against targets in the Eastern
    Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases
    which are threatening the Rumanian oil area.

    “In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep
    Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate
    strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning
    and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to
    count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving
    these forces into position.

    “So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment,
    preparations will be made for an early increase in the German
    Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted
    to me.

    “_The commander-in-chief of the Air Force_ will make
    preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South
    East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern
    border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground
    operations.” (_444-PS_)

The positions of the Italian invading forces in Greece in December 1940
may be summarized in the words in which the British Minister reported to
Foreign Secretary Eden:

    “The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the
    highest, and our own naval and land successes at Tarento and in
    the Western Desert have done much to maintain it. With
    relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and
    modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior
    Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the
    bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not
    unworthy of the ancient tradition of their country and that
    they, like their distant forbears, are prepared to fight against
    odds to maintain their freedom.”

In fact, the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that
Hitler came to the rescue with the order for the German attack on
Greece.

This Directive of 13 December 1940, which is Top Secret Directive number
20, dealing with Operation _Marita_, bears a distribution list which
shows that copies went to the Commander of the Navy (Raeder), to the
Commander of the Air Force (Goering), to the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces (Keitel), and to the Command Staff (Jodl). The first two
paragraphs state:

    “The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive.
    Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly
    necessary that the British endeavour be foiled to create air
    bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be
    dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil
    fields.

    “My plan, therefore, is (_a_) to form a slowly increasing task
    force in Southern Rumania within the next months. (_b_) After
    the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send
    the task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by
    way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek
    mainland (Operation _Marita_). The support of Bulgaria is to be
    expected.” (_1541-PS_)

The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and paragraph 4
deals with the operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5 states:

    “The Military preparations which will produce exceptional
    political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all
    the necessary measures by the General Staff. The transport
    through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported step
    by step by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and are to be
    explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission
    in Rumania.

    “Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may
    point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians
    are each subject to my consent, also the sending of scouting
    missions and advanced parties.” (_1541-PS_)

Another “Top Secret Directive” carries the plan a little farther. It
deals with decisive action in support of the Italian forces in Tripoli
and in Albania. The first short paragraph reads:

    “The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations
    demands for strategical political and psychological reasons
    German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by
    England against our allies.” (_448-PS_)

Paragraph three, after dealing with the forces to be transferred to
Albania, sets out what the duties of the German forces will be:

    “_a._ To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an
    emergency case, should new crises arise there.

    “_b._ To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later
    attacking with the aim:

    “To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a
    far-reaching operation.

    “To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in order
    to support thereby the frontal attack of List’s Army.”
    (_448-PS_)

That directive was signed by Hitler, and, as shown on the original, was
initialed by both Keitel and Jodl. A copy went to Raeder, and the copy
sent to Foreign Intelligence presumably reached Ribbentrop.

A conference took place on 19 and 20 January between Keitel and the
Italian General, Guzzoni. This was followed by a meeting between Hitler
and Mussolini, at which Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl were present. In
the speech which the Fuehrer made on 20 January 1941, after the
conference with the Italians, he declared:

    “* * * The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold
    purpose:

    “_a._ An operation against Greece.

    “_b._ Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey.

    “_c._ Safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania.

    “Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces,
    altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far
    from our base requires a long time.

    “Desirable that this deployment is completed without
    interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late
    as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the
    last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest
    possible moment.” (_C-134_)

At a conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians, on 8
February, the following plans were discussed:

    “Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives of
    the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German Supreme
    Command—General Field Marshal List—in connection with the
    possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their
    commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she
    should involve herself in the war.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * The Bulgarian and the German general staff will take all
    measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the
    operations and to assure in this way the most favorable
    conditions for the execution of the German operations as
    planned.

    “The representatives of the two general staffs consider it to be
    suitable to inform their governments that it will be good to
    take the necessity of secrecy and surprise into consideration
    when the three-power treaty is signed by Bulgaria, in order to
    assure the success of the military operations.” (_1746-PS_)

A further top secret directive of 19 February sets the date for the
Operation _Marita_ (_C-59_). It states that the bridge across the Danube
is to be begun on 28 February, the river crossed on 2 March, and the
final orders to be issued on 26 February at the latest. On the original
of this order the actual dates are filled in in the handwriting of
Keitel.

The position of Bulgaria at this moment was this: Bulgaria adhered to
the Three-Power Pact on 1 March 1941. On the same day the entry of
German troops into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan _Marita_
and associated directives already referred to. The landing of British
troops in Greece on 3 March, in accordance with the guarantee given in
the spring of 1939 by the British Government, may have accelerated the
movement of the German forces. In any event, as has been shown, the
invasion of Greece had been planned long beforehand and was already in
progress at this time.

A short extract from a report by Raeder on an interview with Hitler,
which the original shows took place in the presence of Keitel and Jodl
at 1600 hours on 18 March, shows the ruthless nature of the German
intentions:

    “The C in C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of
    Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful
    settlement.

    “_Fuehrer_: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any
    settlement.” (_C-167_)

This report shows, it seems clear, that the Nazi conspirators, in
accordance with their principle of liquidating any neutral which did not
remain disinterested, had made every preparation by the end of January
and were at this date in the process of moving the necessary troops to
ensure the final liquidation of Greece, which was already at war with,
and getting the better of, their Italian allies.

C. _Lulling the Unsuspecting Victim._

They were not yet, however, ready to deal with Yugoslavia, towards which
their policy accordingly remained one of lulling the unsuspecting
victim. On 25 March, in accordance with this policy, the adherence of
Yugoslavia to the Three-Power Pact was secured. This adherence followed
a visit on 15 February 1941 by the Yugoslav Premier Cvetkovic and the
Foreign Minister Cinkar-Markvic to Ribbentrop at Salzburg and
subsequently to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers
were induced to sign the Pact at Vienna on 25 March. On this occasion
Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance. The first made this
guarantee:

    “Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade.

    “At the same time, when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia
    to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the governments of the Axis
    Powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following
    identical notes:

    “‘Mr. Prime Minister:

    “‘In the name of the German Government and at its behest, I have
    the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:

    “‘On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the
    Tri-Partite Pact, the German Government confirms its
    determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial
    integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.’” (_2450-PS_)

That letter was signed by Ribbentrop, who was present at the meeting in
August 1939 when he and Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade
Yugoslavia. It was in fact 11 days after this letter was written that
the Germans did invade Yugoslavia, and two days after the letter was
written that they issued the necessary order.

The second letter reads:

    “Mr. Prime Minister:

    “With reference to the conversations that occurred in connection
    with the Yugoslavian entry into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have the
    honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of the
    Reich Cabinet [Reichsregierung], that in the agreement between
    the Axis powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government, the
    governments of the Axis powers during this war will not direct a
    demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of
    troops through Yugoslavian national territory.” (_2450-PS_)

The position at this stage, 25 March 1941, was therefore that German
troops were already in Bulgaria moving towards the Greek frontier, while
Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler’s own term in his letter to Mussolini,
“become disinterested” in the cleaning up of the Greek question.

The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three-Power Pact
appears very clearly from an extract from the minutes of a meeting
between Hitler and Ciano. The first paragraph states:

    “The Fuehrer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia’s
    joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the resulting definition of her
    position. This is of special importance in view of the proposed
    military action against Greece, for, if one considers that for
    350 to 400 kilometers the important line of communication
    through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometers of the Yugoslav
    border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia
    an undertaking against Greece would have been militarily an
    extremely foolhardy venture.” (_2765-PS_)

Again, it is a matter of history that on the night of 26 March 1941,
when the two Yugoslav ministers returned to Belgrade, General Simovic
and his colleagues effected their removal by a _coup d’état_, and
Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of 27 March ready to defend, if need
be, its independence.

D. _Further Planning for Attack._

The Nazis reacted rapidly to this altered situation, and the immediate
liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on. A conference of Hitler and the
German High Command on the situation in Yugoslavia took place on 27
March 1941. Those present included the Fuehrer; the Reich Marshall
(Goering); Chief, OKW, (Keitel); and the Chief of the _Wehrmacht
Fuehrungstab_, (Jodl). A report of the conference notes that “later on
the following persons were added,” and among them is included Ribbentrop
(_1746-PS_). Hitler’s statement proceeded as follows:

    “The Fuehrer describes Yugoslavia’s situation after the _coup
    d’état_. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in
    regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard to
    the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were
    never pro-German.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The present moment is for political and military reasons
    favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the
    country and the country’s attitude toward us, for if the
    overthrow of the Government would have happened during the
    Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have
    been considerably more serious.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty
    declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in
    order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit.
    No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented.
    Assurances of the Yugoslav government, which cannot be trusted
    anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will
    start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.

    “It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible.
    An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate
    in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia
    is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of
    Bulgaria too. Roumania’s main task is the protection against
    Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassador have already
    been notified. During the day a message will still be addressed
    to the Duce.

    “Politically, it is especially important that the blow against
    Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the
    military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In
    this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the
    campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a
    favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to
    our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment
    (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against
    Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary and
    Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to
    these states; the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary,
    and Macedonia for Bulgaria.

    “This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all
    preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav
    collapse will take place within the shortest time.” (_1746-PS_)

Thus it appears that two days after Yugoslavia had signed the
Tri-Partite Pact and the Nazis had given assurances, simply because
there had been a _coup d’état_ and it was possible that the operations
against Greece might be affected, the destruction of Yugoslavia was
decided on without any question of taking the trouble to ascertain the
views of the new Government.

The report of the meeting continues:

    “5. The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as
    possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force
    ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrade in
    attacks by waves.” (_1746-PS_)

It is again a matter of history that the residential areas of Belgrade
were bombed at 7 o’clock on the following Sunday morning, 6 April 1941.

At that same meeting of 27 March 1941 a tentative plan, drawn up by
Jodl, was offered:

    “In the event that the political development requires an armed
    intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to
    attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to
    destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national
    territory.” (_1746-PS_)

An order (Directive No. 25) was issued after the meeting of 27 March.
The first paragraph reads:

    “The military putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political
    situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her
    protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as an
    enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible.”
    (_C-127_)

As another result of the meeting, a telegram, containing a letter from
Hitler to Mussolini, was forwarded to the German Ambassador in Rome by
Hitler and Ribbentrop. It was written to advise Mussolini of the course
decided on, and under the guise of somewhat fulsome language the Duce
was given his orders. The first five paragraphs read:

    “Duce, Events force me to give you, Duce, by this the quickest
    means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which
    may result from it.

    “(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as a
    dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from
    the purely military point of view, German intervention in the
    war in Thrace would not be at all justified, as long as the
    attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous and she could threaten
    the left flank of the advancing columns, on our enormous front.

    “(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly have
    endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together
    by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet
    with success, or they were begun too late to produce any
    definite result. Today’s reports leave no doubt as to the
    imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.

    “(3) I don’t consider this situation as being catastrophic, but
    nevertheless a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid any
    mistake if we do not want in the end to endanger our whole
    position.

    “(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary
    measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary
    military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has
    been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request
    you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in
    the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that
    you should cover and screen the most important passes from
    Yugoslavia into Albania with all available forces.

    “These measures should not be considered as designed for a long
    period of time, but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent
    for at least fourteen days to three weeks a crisis arising.

    “I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce
    your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available
    means and with utmost speed.

    “(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which
    we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only
    personalities who necessarily must be notified know anything
    about them. These measures will completely lose their value
    should they become known.” (_1835-PS_)

Hitler continues with a further emphasis on the importance of secrecy.
An operational order (_R-95_) followed, which was signed by General von
Brauchitsch, and which merely passed to the Armies the orders contained
in Directive No. 25. (_C-127_)

E. _Explanations._

The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place in the morning of 6
April 1941. On that day Hitler issued a proclamation (_TC-93_). The
following passage is an extract:

    “From the beginning of the struggle it has been England’s
    steadfast endeavor to make the Balkans a theatre of war. British
    diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War,
    succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her,
    and then finally in misusing her for Britain’s purposes.

    “The documents published today [the German ‘White Book’] afford
    a glimpse of a practice which, in accordance with very old
    British recipes, is a constant attempt to induce others to fight
    and bleed for British interests.

    “In the face of this I have always emphasized that:

    “(1) The German people have no antagonism to the Greek people
    but that

    “(2) We shall never, as in the World War, tolerate a power
    establishing itself on Greek territory with the object at a
    given time of being able to advance thence from the southeast
    into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free
    of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in
    the south.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it has
    been my endeavor since the day of my assumption of power above
    all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have
    consciously put out of mind everything that once took place
    between Germany and Serbia. I have not only offered the Serbian
    people the hand of the German people, but in addition have made
    efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all
    difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State and
    various Nations allied to Germany.” (_TC-93_)

One can only think that when he issued that proclamation Hitler must
momentarily have forgotten the meeting with Ciano in August 1939, and
the meeting with Ribbentrop and the others on 27 March, a few days
earlier.

In a lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943, he sets out his
views, two and a half years later on the action taken in April, 1941. In
Paragraph 11 he stated:

    “What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of
    affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in
    consequence of the ‘extra-turn’ of the Italians against Greece.
    The attack, which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from
    Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all
    agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part
    which—taking a long view of the matter—would have become
    necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on
    Greece from the North was not executed merely as an operation in
    aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from
    gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil
    area from that country.” (_L-172_)

F. _Summary._

To summarize: The invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as
November or December 1940 and was scheduled for the end of March or the
beginning of April, 1941. No consideration was at any time given to any
obligations under treaties or conventions which might make such invasion
a breach of International Law. Care was taken to conceal the
preparations so that the German Forces might have an unsuspecting
victim.

In the meanwhile, Yugoslavia, although to be liquidated in due course,
was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was made to
secure her cooperation for the offensive against Greece, or at least to
ensure that she would abstain from any interference.

The _coup d’état_ of General Simovic upset this plan and it was then
decided that, irrespective of whether or not his Government had any
hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks,
Yugoslavia must be liquidated.

It was not worth while to the Nazis to take any steps to ascertain
Yugoslavia’s intentions, for it would be so little trouble, now that the
German troops were deployed, to destroy her militarily and as a national
unit. Accordingly, in the early hours of Sunday morning, 6 April 1941,
German troops marched into Yugoslavia without warning and into Greece
simultaneously. The formality was observed of handing a note to the
Greek Minister in Berlin, informing him that the German forces were
entering Greece to drive out the British. M. Koryzis, the Greek
Minister, in replying to information of the invasion from the German
Embassy, replied that history was repeating itself and that Greece was
being attacked by Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned,
he said, the same reply as it had given to the Italians in the preceding
October.

G. _The Pattern of Aggression._

There is one common factor which runs through the whole of the Nazi
aggressions. It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression,
which was used with singular consistency, not only by the Nazis
themselves, but also by their Italian friends. Their technique was
essentially based upon securing the maximum advantage from surprise,
even though only a few hours of unopposed military advance into the
country of the unsuspecting victim could thus be secured. Thus, there
was, of course, no declaration of war in the case of Poland.

The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small hours of the
night of April 8-9 1940, and was well under way as a military operation,
before the diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the
Danish Foreign Minister, at 4:20 a. m. on the morning of the 9th, and to
the Norwegian Minister, between half past four and five on that morning.

The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than
five o’clock, in the small hours of 10 of May, 1940, while the formal
ultimatum, delivered in each case with the diplomatic excuses and
explanations, was not presented until afterwards. In the ease of Holland
the invasion began between three and four in the morning. It was not
until about six, when The Hague had already been bombed, that the German
Minister asked to see M. van Kleffens. In the case of Belgium, where the
bombing began at five, the German Minister did not see M. Spaak until
eight. The invasion of Luxembourg began at four and it was at seven when
the German Minister asked to see M. Beck.

Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o’clock on the morning of 28
October 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented a three hour
ultimatum to General Metaxas.

The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, also, both began in the small
hours of 6 April 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia no diplomatic exchange
took place even after the event, but a proclamation was issued by Hitler
at five o’clock that Sunday morning, some two hours before Belgrade was
bombed. In the case of Greece, it was at twenty minutes past five that
M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek
territory.

The manner in which this long series of aggressions was carried out is,
in itself, further evidence of the essentially aggressive and
treacherous character of the Nazi regime: to attack without warning at
night to secure an initial advantage, and to proffer excuses or reasons
afterwards. This is clearly the method of the State which has no respect
for its own pledged word, nor for the rights of any people but its own.

It is impossible not to speculate whether this technique was evolved by
the “honest broker” himself or by his honest clerk, Ribbentrop.

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST
                         GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6 (a).              │  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F)  │      │
                │  5; V.                                 │  I   │  27, 29
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *444-PS        │Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer’s│      │
                │Headquarters signed by Hitler and       │      │
                │initialled by Jodl, 12 November 1940,   │      │
                │concerning plans for prosecution of war │      │
                │in Mediterranean Area and occupation of │      │
                │Greece. (GB 116)                        │ III  │     403
                │                                        │      │
 *448-PS        │Hitler Order No. 22, initialled by      │      │
                │Keitel and Jodl, 11 January 1941,       │      │
                │concerning participation of German      │      │
                │Forces in the Fighting in the           │      │
                │Mediterranean Theater of Operations. (GB│      │
                │118)                                    │ III  │     413
                │                                        │      │
*1195-PS        │Keitel Order, 12 April 1941, for        │      │
                │provisional directions for partition of │      │
                │Yugoslavia. (GB 144)                    │ III  │     838
                │                                        │      │
*1541-PS        │Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13  │      │
                │December 1940. (GB 117)                 │  IV  │     101
                │                                        │      │
*1746-PS        │Conference between German and Bulgarian │      │
                │Generals, 8 February 1941; speech by    │      │
                │Hitler to German High Command on        │      │
                │situation in Yugoslavia, 27 March 1941; │      │
                │plan for invasion of Yugoslavia, 28     │      │
                │March 1941. (GB 120)                    │  IV  │     272
                │                                        │      │
*1834-PS        │Report on conference between Ribbentrop │      │
                │and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) │  IV  │     469
                │                                        │      │
*1835-PS        │Letter from Hitler to Mussolini, 28     │      │
                │March 1941. (GB 126)                    │  IV  │     475
                │                                        │      │
*1842-PS        │Meeting of Mussolini and Ribbentrop in  │      │
                │Rome, 19 September 1940. (GB 143)       │  IV  │     477
                │                                        │      │
*1871-PS        │Report on Hitler and Ciano meeting, 12  │      │
                │August 1939. (GB 142)                   │  IV  │     508
                │                                        │      │
*2450-PS        │Two letters from Ribbentrop to Prime    │      │
                │Minister of Yugoslavia, as published in │      │
                │Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, │      │
                │26 March 1941. (GB 123)                 │  V   │     186
                │                                        │      │
 2719-PS        │German assurance to Yugoslavia; official│      │
                │announcement by German Foreign Office,  │      │
                │28 April 1938, to German Diplomatic     │      │
                │Representatives, published in Documents │      │
                │of the Origin of War, 1939, No. 2, p.   │      │
                │324.                                    │  V   │     378
                │                                        │      │
*2762-PS        │Letter from Hitler to Mussolini         │      │
                │(probably early November 1940). (GB 115)│  V   │     410
                │                                        │      │
*2765-PS        │Extract from notes of conference between│      │
                │Hitler and Ciano in Vienna, 25 March    │      │
                │1941. (GB 124)                          │  V   │     411
                │                                        │      │
*2987-PS        │Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA   │      │
                │166)                                    │  V   │     689
                │                                        │      │
*3054-PS        │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801
                │                                        │      │
*C-59           │Order signed by Warlimont for execution │      │
                │of operation “Marita”, 19 February 1941.│      │
                │(GB 121)                                │  VI  │     879
                │                                        │      │
*C-127          │Extract from Directive No. 25 by Hitler,│      │
                │27 March 1941. (GB 125)                 │  VI  │     938
                │                                        │      │
*C-134          │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum on│      │
                │conference between German and Italian   │      │
                │Generals on 19 January and subsequent   │      │
                │speech by Hitler, 20 January 1941. (GB  │      │
                │119)                                    │  VI  │     939
                │                                        │      │
 C-147          │Extracts from Directive No. 18, signed  │      │
                │by Hitler, 12 November 1940.            │  VI  │     957
                │                                        │      │
*C-167          │Report of meeting between Raeder and    │      │
                │Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122)         │  VI  │     977
                │                                        │      │
*L-79           │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939,     │      │
                │“Indoctrination on the political        │      │
                │situation and future aims”. (USA 27)    │ VII  │     847
                │                                        │      │
*R-95           │Army Order signed by von Brauchitsch, 30│      │
                │March 1941, concerning deployment       │      │
                │instructions for “Action 25” and        │      │
                │supplementary instruction for action    │      │
                │“Marita”. (GB 127)                      │ VIII │      70
                │                                        │      │
 TC-43          │German assurance to Yugoslavia, 6       │      │
                │October 1939, from Documents of German  │      │
                │Politics, Vol. VII, p. 352.             │ VIII │     386
                │                                        │      │
*TC-77          │Memorandum of conversation between      │      │
                │Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano, 12 August │      │
                │1939. (GB 48)                           │ VIII │     516
                │                                        │      │
*TC-92          │Hitler’s address at dinner for Prince   │      │
                │Regent of Yugoslavia, 1 June 1939. (GB  │      │
                │114)                                    │ VIII │     536
                │                                        │      │
*TC-93          │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the      │      │
                │German people, 6 April 1941, from       │      │
                │Documents Concerning the Conflict with  │      │
                │Yugoslavia and Greece. (GB 114)         │ VIII │     537


                  12. AGGRESSION AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.

A. _Inception of the Plan._

The point of departure for the story of the aggression against the
Soviet Union is the date, 23 August 1939. On that day—just a week
before the invasion of Poland—the Nazi conspirators caused Germany to
enter into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. This Treaty
(_TC-25_) contained two significant articles:

    “Article 1: The two contracting parties undertake to refrain
    from any act of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack
    against one another, whether individually or jointly with other
    powers.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Article 5: Should disputes or conflicts arise between the
    contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever,
    the two partners would clear away these disputes or conflicts
    solely by friendly exchanges of views or if necessary by
    arbitration commission.” (_TC-25_)

The Treaty was signed for the U.S.S.R. by the Soviet Foreign Minister
Molotov, and for the German Government by Ribbentrop. Its announcement
came as somewhat of a surprise to the world, since it appeared to
constitute a reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy. The
explanation for this about face was provided, however, by Ribbentrop
himself, in a discussion which he had with the Japanese Ambassador,
Oshima, at Fuchel on 23 February 1941. A report of that conference was
forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German diplomats in the field for
their strictly confidential and purely personal information (_1834-PS_).
Ribbentrop told Oshima the reason for the Pact with the U.S.S.R. in the
following words:

    “Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with
    Russia—a necessity for avoiding a two-front war. Perhaps this
    moment was difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the
    interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as
    rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by the
    treaty with Russia.” (_1834-PS_)

In view of this spirit of opportunism which motivated the Nazi
Conspirators in entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and
nonaggression, it is not surprising to find that they regarded it, as
they did all Treaties and Pledges, as binding on them only so long as it
was expedient for them to do so. That they did so regard it is evident
from the fact that, even while the campaign in the West was still in
progress, they began to consider the possibility of launching a war of
aggression against the U.S.S.R. In a speech to the Reichsleiters and
Gauleiters at Munich in November 1943, Jodl admitted that:

    “Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily
    growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the
    Bolshevik East—that danger which has been only too little
    perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had
    deliberately to be ignored. However, the Fuehrer himself has
    always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as
    during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental
    decision to take steps against this danger the moment our
    military position made it at all possible.” (_L-172_)

At the time this statement was made, however, the Western Campaign was
still in progress and so any action in the East necessarily had to be
postponed for the time being. On 22 June 1940, however, the
Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiegne and the campaign in the
West, with the exception of the war against Britain, came to an end. The
view that Germany’s key to political and economic dominance lay in the
elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor, and in the
acquisition of _lebensraum_ at her expense, had long been basic in Nazi
ideology. This idea had never been completely forgotten, even while the
war in the West was in progress. Now, flushed with the recent success of
their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat
Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the
Nazi conspirators began serious consideration of the means for achieving
their traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union. The situation
in which Germany now found herself made such action appear both
desirable and practicable.

As early as August of 1940, General Thomas received a hint from Goering
that planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union was already under
way. Thomas at that time was the Chief of the _Wirtschaft Rustung Amt_,
or Office for Economy and Armaments, of the OKW (_Wi Rue Amt_). General
Thomas tells about receiving this information from Goering in his draft
of a work entitled “Basic Facts For a History of German War and
Armaments Economy,” which he prepared during the Summer of 1944
(_2353-PS_). On pages 313 to 315 of this work, Thomas discusses the
Russo-German trade agreement of 1939 and relates that, since the Soviets
were delivering quickly and well under this agreement and were
requesting war materials in return, there was much pressure in Germany
until early 1940 for increased delivery on the part of the Germans.
However, at page 315 he has the following to say about the change of
heart expressed by the German leaders in August of 1940:

    “On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference with
    Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Fuehrer desired
    punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later
    on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying
    the Russian demands. This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to
    give priority to matters concerning Russian War Economy.”
    (_2353-PS_)

This statement will be referred to again later in the discussion of
preparations for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory. At that
time too, evidence will be presented that in November of 1940 Goering
categorically informed Thomas that a campaign was planned against the
U.S.S.R.

Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet
Union necessarily entailed, even this many months in advance of the date
of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction
projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be
expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet intelligence service.
Counter-intelligence measures were obviously called for. In an OKW
directive signed by Jodl and issued to the Counter-Intelligence Service
Abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures were ordered (_1229-PS_). This
directive pointed out that the activity in the East must not be
permitted to create the impression in the Soviet Union that an offensive
was being prepared and outlined the line for the counter-intelligence
people to take to disguise this fact. The text of the directive
indicates, by necessary implication, the extent of the preparations
already underway. It provides:

    “The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to
    come. By the end of October the status shown on the enclosed map
    is supposed to be reached.

    “These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that
    we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand,
    Russia will realize that strong and highly trained German troops
    are stationed in the Gouvernement, in the Eastern provinces, and
    in the Protekterat; she should draw the conclusion that we can
    at any time protect our interests—especially on the
    Balkan—with strong forces against Russian seizure.

    “For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the
    answer to questions of the Russian intelligence service, the
    following directives apply:

    “1. The respective total strength of the German troops in the
    East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a
    frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be
    explained by movements into training camps, regroupings.

    “2. The impression is to be created that the center of the
    massing of troops is in the Southern part of the Gouvernement,
    in the Protekterat and in Austria, and that the massing in the
    North is relatively unimportant.

    “3. When it comes to the equipment situation of the units,
    especially of the armored divisions, things are to be
    exaggerated, if necessary.

    “4. By suitable news the impression to be created that the
    _antiaircraft protection_ in the East has been increased
    considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that
    it continues to be increased with captured French material on
    all important targets.

    “5. Concerning improvements on _railroads_, _roads_,
    _airdromes_, _etc._, it is to be stated that the work is kept
    within normal limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly
    won Eastern territories, and serves primarily economical
    traffic.

    “The supreme command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent
    correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of
    garrisons, etc., will be made available to the defense for
    purposes of counter espionage.

    “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,

     By order of
                                       /signed/  Jodl.” (_1229-PS_)

Early in November 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders and called
for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more definite
instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a general outline
of the army’s operational plans. This order was contained in a Top
Secret directive from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters No. 18, dated 12
November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl (_444-PS_). The
directive begins by saying that:

    “The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters for the
    prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along
    the following lines.” (_444-PS_)

It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regarding
relations with other countries and says regarding the U.S.S.R.:

    “* * * 5. _Russia_

    “Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of
    clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of
    the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East
    which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.

    “Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general
    outline of the Army’s operational plans has been submitted to,
    and approved by me.” (_444-PS_)

On 5 December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, at that
time General Halder, reported to the Fuehrer concerning the progress of
the plans for the coming operation against the U.S.S.R. A report of this
conference with Hitler is set forth in a folder containing many
documents, all labelled annexes and all bearing on _Fall Barbarossa_
(_1799-PS_). This folder was discovered with the War Diary of the
_Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab_ and was apparently an inclosure to that Diary.
Annex No. 1, dated 5 December 1940, indicates the state which planning
for this aggression had reached six and a half months before it
occurred:

    “Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940.

    “The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about
    the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the
    geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in
    the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed
    operational plans and adds the following: The most important
    goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed
    front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian
    air force will be unable to attack the territory of the German
    Reich and, on the other hand, the German air force will be
    enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial
    territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the
    annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its
    regeneration.

    “The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a
    way to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions
    in the rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned
    for the entire operation is sufficient.” (_1799-PS_)

B. _Plan Barbarossa._

By 18 December 1940 the general outline of the army’s operational plans
having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the
High Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces for
_Barbarossa_—Directive No. 21—was issued (_446-PS_). This directive
marks the first time the plan to invade the U.S.S.R. was specifically
referred to in an order, although the order was classified Top Secret.
It also marked the first use of the code word _Barbarossa_ to denote the
operation against the Soviet Union. One of the most significant passages
in that directive is the opening sentence:

    “The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia
    in a quick campaign even before the end of the war against
    England. (Case Barbarossa).” (_446-PS_)

The directive continues:

    “Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not
    yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed not
    later than 15 May 1941.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an
    attack will not be recognized.” (_446-PS_)

The directive then outlined the broad strategy on which the intended
invasion was to proceed and the parts which the Army, Navy, and Air
Forces were to play therein, and called for oral reports to Hitler by
the Commanders-in-Chief. The directive concluded as follows:

    “V. I am expecting the reports of the Commanders-in-Chief on
    their further plans based on this letter of instructions.

    “The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces
    are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in
    regard to their time.” (_446-PS_)

The directive is signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, Keitel,
Warlimont, and one illegible signature.

It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well
as from its history, which has been outlined, that this directive was no
mere staff planning exercise. It was an order to prepare for an act of
aggression which was intended to occur and which actually did occur. The
various services which received the order understood it as an order to
prepare for action and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem.
This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they
immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth
in the basic directive.

C. _Military Planning and Preparation for the Implementation of
Barbarossa._

The Naval War Diary for 30 January 1941 indicates the early compliance
of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21 (_446-PS_) which ordered
progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High
Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary contains a
substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy’s part
in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself
to play that part (_C-35_). The following passage shows that the Navy
was actively preparing for the attack at this early date:

    “_30 January 1941_

    7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the
    “Barbarossa” case to be submitted to the High Command of the
    Armed Forces”. (_C-35_)

”Ia” is, in this case, the abbreviation for a deputy head of the
Operations Division of the Naval War Staff.) Then follows a list of the
Navy’s objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many
tasks for the Navy are listed, one of which is sufficiently typical to
give an idea of all:

    “II. _Objectives of War Against Russia._

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    _d._ To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:

    “1. Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air
    force units against strong points and combat vessels in the
    Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea.” (_C-35_)

This document indicates the detailed thinking and planning which was
being carried out to implement _Barbarossa_ almost six months before the
operation actually got underway. It is but another piece in the mosaic
of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the
invasion of the Soviet Union was undeniably a premeditated attack.

Similarly, the Naval War Diary for the month of February contains at
least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming
campaign (_C-33_). The entry for 19 February 1941 is typical:

    “In regard to the impending operation ‘Barbarossa’ for which all
    S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of some can
    only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa
    operations.” (_C-33_)

On 3 February 1941 the Fuehrer held a conference to assess the progress
thus far made in the planning for _Barbarossa_. The conference also
discussed the plans for _Sonnenblume_, which was the code name for the
North African Operation. Attending this conference were, in addition to
Hitler, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel;
the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Jodl; the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army
General Staff, Halder; as well as several others including, Colonel
Schmundt, Hitler’s Adjutant (_872-PS_). During the course of this
conference, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave a long report about
enemy strength as compared with German strength, and about the general
overall operational plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated
at various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer. An extract from this
report, although written in a semishorthand form, is at least
sufficiently clear to disclose that elaborate timetables had already
been set up for the deployment of troops, as well as for industrial
operations:

    “_The intended time period_ was discussed with a plan.

        1st Deployment Staffel (_Aufmarschstaffel_)

        2nd      “         “            “

    transfer now, Front—Germany—East from the middle of March will
    give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups
    and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There
    are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear
    area. From now on, Attila [the code word for the operation for
    the occupation of unoccupied France] can be carried out only
    under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport
    movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached
    about the march through. Three deployment staffels from the
    middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main
    part of the artillery is being entrained. [Felix is the code
    word for the occupation of Canary Islands, North Africa and
    Gibraltar.]

    “_In industry_ the full capacity timetable is in force. No more
    camouflage.

    “From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces
    from the West. (Seeloewe [Seeloewe was the code word for the
    planned operation against England] can no longer be carried
    out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite
    recognizable.

    “The full capacity timetable remains. 8 Marita [Marita was the
    code word for the action against Greece] divisions complete the
    picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.

    “_C-in-C Army_ requested that he no longer have to employ 5
    control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as
    reserves for commanders in the West.

    “_Fuehrer_ When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its
    breath and make no comment.” (_872-PS_)

This much, when read with the conference conclusions, is sufficient to
show that the Army as well as the Navy regarded _Barbarossa_ as an
action directive and were far along with their preparations even as
early as February 1941—almost five months prior to 22 June, the date
when the attack was actually launched. The conference report summarized
the conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affected
_Barbarossa_, as follows:

    “_Conclusions_:

    “1. _Barbarossa_

        “_a._ The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the
        operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must
        be remembered that the _main aim_ is to gain possession
        of the Baltic States and Leningrad.

        “_b._ The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the
        plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon
        as possible.

        “_c._ Agreements with neighbouring states, who are
        taking part, may not be concluded until there is no
        longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is
        Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldaw.

        “_d._ It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out
        Attila (auxiliary measure).

        “_e._ The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be
        camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary
        measure Marita.” (_872-PS_)

As the plans for the invasion became more detailed, involved, and
complete, more and more agencies outside the Armed Forces had to be
brought into the picture, let in on the secret, and assigned their
respective parts. For example, early in March, 1941, Keitel drafted a
letter to be sent to Reich Minister Todt, then Reich Minister of
Armaments and Munitions and head of the organization Todt. In this
letter Keitel explained the principles on which the camouflage for the
operation was based and requested that the organization Todt follow the
same line (_874-PS_). This letter illustrates the elaborate deceit with
which the Nazi conspirators sought to hide the preparations for their
treacherous attack:

                             “_Top Secret_
              “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
                                      “Hq. of the Fuehrer 9 March 41
                                                           DRAFT

    “Honorable Reich Minister! (TODT)

    “For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed
    Forces in the East, extensive measures for the diversion and
    deception of friend and foe are necessary prerequisites for the
    success of the operations.

    “The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding
    rules for the deception in accordance with more detailed
    directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at
    continuing preparations for the attack against England in an
    increasing degree. Simultaneously the actual preparations for
    deployment in the East should be represented as a diversionary
    maneuvre to divert from plans which are being pursued for an
    attack against England. In order to insure success for these
    measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are
    being also followed on the part of the Organization Todt.

                                  “K. J. W.”
                                  [Initials of
                                  Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont] (_874-PS_)

On 13 March 1941 Keitel signed an operational supplement to Fuehrer
Order #21 (_446-PS_), which was issued in the form of “Directives for
Special Areas” (_447-PS_). This detailed operational order, which was
issued more than three months in advance of the attack, indicates how
complete were the plans on practically every phase of the operation.
Section I of the directive is headed “Area of Operations and Executive
Power” and outlines who was to be in control of what and where. It
states that while the campaign is in progress, the Supreme Commander of
the Army has the executive power in territory through which the army is
advancing. During this period, however, the Reichsfuehrer SS is
entrusted with “special tasks.” This assignment is discussed in
paragraph 2b:

    “* * * _b._ In the area of operations, the _Reichsfuehrer SS_
    is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with _special tasks_ for
    the preparation of the _political administration_, tasks which
    result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two
    opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the
    Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own
    responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme
    Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him
    shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the
    Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks
    military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be
    arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.”
    (_447-PS_)

The order then states that, in time, political administration will be
set up under Commissioners of the Reich. The relationship of these
officials to the army is discussed in paragraphs 2c and 3:

    “_c._ As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient
    depth, it is to be _limited in the rear_. The newly occupied
    territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given
    its own _political_ administration. For the present, it is to be
    divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions
    of the Army Groups, into _North_ (_Baltic countries_), _Center_
    (_White Russia_) _and South_ (_Ukraine_). In these territories
    _the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners
    of the Reich_ who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.

    “3. For the execution of all _military tasks_ within the areas
    under political administration in the rear of the area of
    operations, _commanding officers_ who are responsible to the
    Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

    “The commanding officer is the _supreme representative of the
    Armed Forces_ in the respective areas and the bearer of the
    _military sovereign rights_. He has _the tasks of a Territorial
    Commander_ and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a
    Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily
    for the following tasks.

    “_a._ Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in
    order to support him in his political task.

    “_b._ Exploitation of the country and securing its economic
    values for use by German industry (see par. 4). (_447-PS_)

The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of
economy in the conquered territory. This provision is also contained in
Section I, paragraph 4:

    “4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of _the
    administration of economy_ in the area of operations and in the
    territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who
    has delegated the Chief of the ‘Wi Rue Amt’ with the execution
    of the task. Special orders on that will come from the
    OKW/Wi/Rue/Amt.” (_447-PS_)

The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and
communication traffic. Section III of the order deals with the relations
with certain other countries and states, in part, as follows:

    “III. _Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and
    Finland._

    9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made
    by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to
    the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should
    become necessary during the course of the operations to grant
    special rights, applications for this purpose are to be
    submitted to the OKW.” (_447-PS_)

The document closes with a section regarding Sweden:

    “IV. _Directives regarding Sweden._

    12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no
    special authority is to be granted the commander of the German
    troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the
    immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and
    attacks.

    “The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

                                                 “signed:  KEITEL”
                                                         (_447-PS_)

As was hinted in the original Barbarossa Order, Directive No. 21
(_446-PS_), the plan originally contemplated that the attack would take
place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime, however, the Nazi
conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the Balkans and
were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this
postponement is found in a document (_C-170_) which has been identified
by Raeder as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff
War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the
Admiralty files and contains file references to the papers which were
the basis for each entry. This item dated 3 April 1941 reads as follows:

    “_Balkan Operations delayed ‘Barbarossa’ at first for about five
    weeks._ All measures which can be construed as _offensive
    actions_ are to be stopped according to Fuehrer order.”
    (_C-170_)

By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out
to permit the Fuehrer definitely to set D-Day as 22 June—more than
seven weeks away. A “Top Secret” report of a conference with the Chief
of the Section _Landsverteidigung_ of the _Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab_ on 30
April 1941 states, in the first two paragraphs:

    “1. _Timetable Barbarossa_:

    The Fuehrer has decided:

    _Action Barbarossa_ begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop
    movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations
    the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas.

    “2. _Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa:
    Sector North_: German and Russian forces approximately of the
    same strength.

    _Sector Middle_: Great German superiority.

    _Sector South_: Russian superiority.” (_873-PS_)

Early in June, approximately three weeks before D-Day, preparations for
the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to
issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the disposition and
missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This timetable (_C-39_) was
prepared in 21 copies. The copy reproduced here was the third copy,
which was given to the High Command of the Navy. Page 1 is in the form
of a transmittal and reads as follows:

                         “_Top Military Secret_
    “Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
    Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/Abt.L (I op)
                                            “Fuehrer’s Headquarters
                                                        (no date)
    “Top Secret (_Chefsache_)
    _Only through officer_

                                                   “_21 copies_
                                                      3rd copy Ob. d. m.
                                                      I op.00845/41
                                                      Received 6 June
                                                      Enclosures:—

    “The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a
    foundation for further preparations for ‘Barbarossa’. If
    alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme
    Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.

    “Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

                                                   signed:  Keitel”
                                                           (_C-39_)

The document then proceeds to outline the state of preparations as of 1
June 1941. The outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that
date under six headings: General; Negotiations with Friendly States;
Army; Navy; Air Force, and Camouflage. The remainder of the document is
in tabular form with six columns headed from left to right at the top of
each page—Date; Serial No.; Army; Navy; OKW; Remarks. The item
appearing under date 21 June and Serial No. 29, provides in the columns
for Army, Navy, and Air Forces that, “Till 1300 hours latest time at
which operation can be cancelled (_spaetester Anhaltetermin_)” (_C-39_).
Under the column headed OKW appears the note: “Cancelled by code word
‘Altona’ or further confirmation of start of attack by code word:
‘Dortmund’” (_C-39_). In the Remarks column appears the statement that:
“Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main
effort (_Schwerpunkt_), concentration of armour and artillery must be
reckoned with” (_C-39_). The entry for 22 June, under serial number 31,
gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the Army, Air Force,
Navy, and OKW and provides as follows:

                            “_Invasion Day_

    “H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing
    of the frontier by the Air Forces. 0330 hours”. (_C-39_)

In the Remarks column it is stated that:

    “Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to
    weather on the part of the Air Force.” (_C-39_)

The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted and
give great detail concerning the disposition and missions of the various
components of the Armed Forces.

On 9 June 1941 the order of the Fuehrer went out for final reports on
Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941—8 days before “D-Day”
(_C-78_). This order, signed by Hitler’s Adjutant, Schmundt, reads as
follows:

                              “TOP SECRET
                            Only by Officer
    “Office of Wehrmacht Adjutant
                                                “at Berchtesgaden
                                                       9th June 1941

    “_To the Fuehrer_

    Br. B. No. 7 Top Secret

                             “_Top Secret_

    “_Re: Conference ‘Barbarossa’_

    “1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces have
    ordered reports on ‘Barbarossa’ by the Commanders of Army
    Groups, armies, and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.

    “2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the
    Reich Chancellery, Berlin.

 “3. _Time Table._
 “_a._ 11.00 hrs.                                   “Silver Fox”
 “_b._ 12.00 hrs-14.00 hrs.                         Army Group South
 “_c._ 14.00 hrs-15.30 hrs.                         Lunch party for all
                                                    participants in
                                                    conference
 “_d._ From 15.30 hrs.                              Baltic, Army Group
                                                    North, Army Group
                                                    “Center” in this
                                                    order.

    Participants see enclosed list of participants.

    (list of names, etc. follows)

                                              “(signed)  Schmundt
                           Colonel of the General Staff and Chief
                              Wehrmacht Adjutant to the Fuehrer”.
                                                           (_C-78_)

There is attached a list of participants and the order in which they
will report. The list includes a large number of the members of the High
Command and General Staff Group as of that date. Among those to
participate were Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.

The foregoing documents are sufficient to establish the premeditation
and calculation which marked the military preparations for the invasion
of the U.S.S.R. Starting almost a full year before the launching of the
attack, the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared every military detail
of their aggression against the Soviet Union with all that thoroughness
and meticulousness which has come to be associated with the German
character. The leading roles were performed in this preparation by the
military figures—Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.

D. _Plans for the Economic Exploitation and Spoliation of the U.S.S.R._

Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a purely
military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed planning was
undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to insure that their aggression
would prove economically profitable. The motives which led the
conspirators to plan and launch attack were both political and economic.
The economic basis may be simply summarized as the greed of the Nazi
conspirators for the raw material, food, and other supplies which their
neighbor possessed and which they conceived of themselves as needing for
the maintenance of their war machine. To the Nazi conspirators a need
was translated as a right, and they early began planning and preparing
with typical care and detail to insure that every bit of the plunder
which it would be possible to reap in the course of their aggression
would be exploited to their utmost benefit.

As early as August 1940 General Thomas, Chief of the _Wi Rue Amt_,
received a hint from Goering about a possible attack on the U.S.S.R.,
which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war economy. In
November 1940—8 months before the attack—Thomas was categorically
informed by Goering of the planned operation in the East, and
preliminary preparations were commenced for the economic plundering of
the territories to be occupied in the course of such operation
(_2353-PS_). Goering played the overall leading role in this activity by
virtue of his position at the head of the Four Year Plan. Thomas
describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early planning in these
terms:

    “* * * In November, 1940, the Chief of the _Wi Rue_ together
    with Secretaries of state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General
    von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action
    planned in the East.

    “By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for
    the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rue at
    the end of 1940.

    “The preliminary preparations for the action in the East
    included first of all the following tasks:

    “1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament
    industry, its location, its capacity and its associate
    industries.

    “2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament
    centers and their dependency one on the other.

    “3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of
    the Soviet Union.

    “4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum
    (crude oil).

    “5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament
    industries in the Soviet Union.

    “These points were concentrated in one big compilation ‘War
    Economy of the Soviet Union’ and illustrated with detailed maps,
    etc.”

    “Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important
    factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the
    German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy
    Organization.

    “For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was
    created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later
    on in charge of Brigadier General Schubert. The work was carried
    out according to the directives from the Chief of the Office,
    resp. the group of depts. for foreign territories (Ausland) with
    the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any
    other persons, possessing information on Russia. Through these
    intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of
    material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for
    carrying out the operations and for administering the
    territory.” (_2353-PS_)

By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had proceeded to a
point where a broader plan of organization was needed. General Thomas
held a conference, with his subordinates on 28 February 1941 to call for
such a plan. A memorandum of this conference classified Top Secret and
dated 1 March 1941, reads as follows:

    “The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be
    drafted for the Reich Marshal.

    “Essential Points:

    “1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich
    Marshal. _Purpose_: Support and extension of the measures of the
    four-year plan.

    “2. The organization must include everything concerning war
    economy, excepting only food, which is said to be made already a
    special mission of State Secretary Backe.

    “3. Clear statement that _the organization is to be independent
    of the military or civil administration_. Close cooperation, but
    instructions direct from the central office in Berlin.

    “4. Scope of activities to be divided in two steps:

    _a._ Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front
    lines, in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to
    secure the removal of important goods.

    _b._ Administration of the occupied industrial districts and
    exploitation of economically complimentary districts.

    “5. In view of the extended field of activity, the term _war
    economy_ inspection is to be used preferably, instead of
    armament inspection.

    “6. In view of the great field of activity, the organization
    must be generously equipped and personnel must be
    correspondingly numerous. _The main mission of the organization_
    will consist of _seizing raw materials and taking over all_
    _important concerns_. For the latter mission reliable persons
    from German concerns will be interposed suitably from the
    beginning, since successful operation from the beginning can
    only be performed by the aid of their experiences, (for example,
    lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum).

    “After the discussion of further details, Lt. Col. Luther was
    instructed to make an initial draft of such an organization
    within one week.

    “Close cooperation with the individual sections in the building
    is essential. An officer must still be appointed for Wi and Rue,
    with whom the operational staff can remain in constant contact.
    Wi is to give each section chief and Lt. Col. Luther a copy of
    the new plan regarding Russia.

    “Major General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the
    second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are
    ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are to
    report to the Office Chief at the end of next week.

                                               “(signed:) Hamann”.
                                                        (_1317-PS_)

Hamann, who signed the report is listed among those attending as a
Captain, was apparently the junior officer present. Presumably it fell
naturally to his lot to prepare the minutes of the meeting.

The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas was
organizing at the direction of Goering was clearly recognized by Keitel
in his operational order of 13 March 1941 (_447-PS_). The order stated
that the Fuehrer had entrusted the uniform direction of the
administration of economy in the area of operations and political
administration to the Reichsmarshal (Goering) who in turn had delegated
his authority to the Chief of the _Wi Rue Amt_ (Thomas). (_447-PS_)

The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the meeting on
28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April 1941 a
conference was held with various branches of the Armed Forces to explain
the organizational set-up of Economic Staff _Oldenburg_. (_Oldenburg_
was the code name given to this economic counterpart of _Barbarossa_.)
Section I of the report of this conference (_1157-PS_) deals with the
general organization of Economic Staff _Oldenburg_ as it had developed.
The report begins:

“_Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours on 29th
                              April 1941_
                                   I.
                               _Welcome_

    “Purpose of meeting: introduction to the organizational
    structure of the economic sector of the action.

                        “_Barbarossa—Oldenburg_

    “As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous procedure,
    has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand
    of _all_ economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal
    with the overall direction of the economic administration in the
    area of operations and in the areas under political
    administration.

    “The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an economic
    general staff, working under the director of the industrial
    armament office (_Chef Wi Rue Amt_).

    “Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general staff, the
    supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is the
    _Economic Staff Oldenburg for special duties_ under the command
    of Major General (Generalleutnant) Schubert.

    “His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided are:

        5 economic inspectorates

        23 economic commands

        12 sub-offices, which are distributed among important
        places within the area of the economic commands.

    “These offices are used in the _military rear area_; the idea is
    that in the territory of each Army Group an economic
    inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander
    of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will
    supervise the economic exploitation of the territory.

    “A distinction must be made between the military rear area on
    the one hand and the battle area proper and the rear area of the
    army on the other hand. In the last economic matters are dealt
    with by the IV Econ (IV Wi) of the Army Headquarters Commands,
    i.e. the liaison officer of the industrial armament office
    within the supreme command of the armed forces at the army
    headquarters commands. For the battle area he has attached to
    him: technical battalions, reconnaissance and recovery troops
    for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery, in
    particular tractors and means of production.

    “In the territory between the battle and the military rear area,
    the rear area of the Army, group IV Econs at the various field
    commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of
    the industrial armaments office in order to support the army
    headquarters commands specialists responsible for supplying the
    troops from the country’s resources and for preparing the
    subsequent general economic exploitation.

    “While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates,
    economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in
    the locality.

    “The new feature inherent in the organization under the command
    of the Economic Staff _Oldenburg_ is that it does not only deal
    with military industry, but comprises the _entire_ economic
    field. Consequently, all offices are no longer to be designated
    as offices of the military industries or armaments, but quite
    generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands, etc.

    “This also corresponds with the internal organization of the
    individual offices which, from the Economic Staff _Oldenburg_
    down to the economic commands, requires a standard subdivision
    into three large groups, i.e.

    “_Group H_ dealing with troop requirements, armaments,
    industrial transport organization.

    “_Group L_ which concerns itself with all questions of feed and
    agriculture, and

    “_Group W_ which is in charge of the entire field of trade and
    industry, including raw materials and suppliers; further
    questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy property,
    commerce and exchange of commodities and manpower allocation.

    “Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and
    Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within
    the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General v.
    Hanneken.” (_1157-PS_)

The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions, personnel
and staffing problems, and similar details.

These documents portray the calculated method with which the Nazi
conspirators prepared months in advance to rob and loot their intended
victim. They show that the conspirators not only planned to stage an
attack on a neighbor they had pledged to security, but that they also
intended to strip that neighbor of its food, its factories, and all its
means of livelihood. The Nazi conspirators made these plans for plunder
being fully aware that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin
and starvation for millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. (The
story of how this plot was executed forms a part of the case to be
presented by the Soviet prosecuting staff.)

E. _Preparation for the Political Phase of the Aggression._

As has already been indicated, and as will be later more fully
developed, there were both economic and political motives for the action
of the Nazi conspirators in invading the Soviet Union. The economic
aspects have been discussed. Equally elaborate planning was engaged in
by the Nazi conspirators to insure the effectuation of the political aim
of their aggression. That political aim may be described as the
elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a powerful political factor in Europe,
and the acquisition of _Lebensraum_. For the accomplishment of these
purposes the Nazi conspirators selected as their agent Rosenberg.

As early as 2 April 1941 Rosenberg, or a member of his staff, prepared a
memorandum on the U.S.S.R. (_1017-PS_). This memorandum speculates on
the possibility of a disagreement with the U.S.S.R. which would result
in a quick occupation of an important part of that country. The
memorandum then considers what the political goal of such occupation
should be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal. This memorandum
begins:

    “_Subject: The U.S.S.R._

    “Bolshevik Russia, just as the one-time Czarist Russia, is a
    conglomeration of peoples of very different types, which has
    come into being through the annexation of states of a related or
    even of an essentially alien character.

    “A military conflict with the U.S.S.R. will result in an
    extraordinarily rapid occupation of an important and large
    section of the U.S.S.R. It is very probable that military action
    on our part will very soon be followed by the military collapse
    of the U.S.S.R. The occupation of these areas would then present
    not so many military as administrative and economic
    difficulties. Thus arises the first question:

    “Is the occupation to be determined by purely military and/or
    economic needs, or is the laying of political foundations for a
    future organization of the area also a factor in determining how
    far the occupation shall be extended? If so, it is a matter of
    urgency to fix the _political_ goal which is to be attained, for
    it will, without doubt, also have an effect on military
    operations.

    “If the Political overthrow of the Eastern Empire, in the weak
    condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of
    military operations, one may conclude that:

    “1. The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions;

    “2. From the very beginning, the treatment of individual
    sections of territory should, as regards administration, as well
    as economics and ideology, be adapted to the political ends we
    are striving to attain;

    “3. Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast areas,
    such as, in particular, the ensuring of essential supplies for
    the continuation of the war against England, the maintenance of
    production which this necessitates and the great directives for
    the completely separate areas, should best be dealt with all
    together in one place.

    “It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the
    arguments which follow of course only hold good once the
    supplies from the area to be occupied which are essential to
    Greater Germany for the continuance of the war, have been
    assured.

    “Anyone who knows the East, sees in a map of Russia’s population
    the following national or geographical units:

    “_a._ Greater Russia with Moscow as its centre.

    “_b._ White Russia with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital.

    “_c._ Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

    “_d._ The Ukraine and the Crimea with Kiev as its centre.

    “_e._ The Don area with Rostov as its capital.

    “_f._ The area of the Caucasus.

    “_g._ Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan.” (_1017-PS_)

The memorandum then proceeds to discuss each of the areas or
geographical units thus listed in some detail. At the end of the paper
the writer sums up his thoughts and briefly outlines his plan in these
terms:

    “_Summary_

    “The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from
    the points briefly outlined here:

    “1. The creation of a central department for the occupied areas
    of the U.S.S.R., to be confined more or less to wartime.

    “Working in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich
    authorities, it would be the task of this department—

    “_a._ To issue binding political instructions to the separate
    administration area, having in mind the situation existing at
    the time and the goal which is to be achieved.

    “_b._ To secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from
    all the occupied areas.

    “_c._ To make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying
    out, in main outline, of the primarily important questions for
    all areas, as for instance, those of finance and funds,
    transport, and the production of oil, coal and food;

    “2. The carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in the
    separate administration area, grouped together by race or by
    reason of political economy, for the carrying out of the totally
    dissimilar tasks assigned to them.

    “As against this, an administrative department, regulating
    matters in principle, and to be set up on a purely economic
    basis, as is at present envisaged, might very soon prove to be
    inadequate, and fail in its purpose. Such a central office would
    be compelled to carry out a common policy for all areas,
    dictated only by economic considerations, and this might impede
    the carrying out of the political task and, in view of its being
    run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even prevent
    it.

    “The question therefore arises, whether the opinions which have
    been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be
    taken into consideration from the very beginning when organizing
    the administration of the territory on a basis of war economy.
    In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties of
    administration which arise from that alone, and also in view of
    the living conditions created by Bolshevism, which are totally
    different from those of Western Europe, the whole question of
    the U.S.S.R. would require different treatment from that which
    has been applied in the individual countries of Western Europe.

    “2.4.41” (_1017-PS_)

It is evident that the “presently envisaged” administration operating on
a purely economic basis, to which this memorandum objects, was the
Economic Staff _Oldenburg_ which was set up under Goering and Thomas.

Rosenberg’s statement of the political purpose of the invasion and his
analysis of methods for achieving it apparently did not fall on deaf
ears. By a Fuehrer Order dated 20 April 1941 he was named “Commissioner
for the Central Control of Questions Connected with the East-European
Region”. This order is part of a correspondence file regarding
Rosenberg’s appointment (_865-PS_). Hitler’s order reads as follows:

    “I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my Commissioner for the
    central control of questions connected with the East-European
    Region.

    “An office, which is to be established in accordance with his
    orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the
    carrying out of the duties thereby entrusted to him.

    “The necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the
    Reich Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum.

                           “Fuehrer’s Headquarters 20th April 1941.
                                                     “The Fuehrer
                                             (signed)  Adolf Hitler
                    “Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery
                                             (signed)  Dr. Lammers”
                                                         (_865-PS_)

This particular copy of the Fuehrer’s Order was enclosed in a letter
which Dr. Lammers wrote to Keitel requesting cooperation for Rosenberg
and asking that Keitel appoint a Deputy to work with Rosenberg. This
letter reads as follows:

           “The Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery
                                       “Berlin W8 21st April 1941
                                                      VossStrasse 6

                                                   At present Fuehrer
                                                   Headquarters, mail
                                                   without exception to
                                                   be sent to the Berlin
                                                   address.

    “To: The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
    General Field Marshal Keitel

    “Personal.              By courier.

    “My dear General Field Marshal.

    “Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Fuehrer’s Decree by
    which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his
    Commissioner for the central control connected with the
    East-European Region. In this capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is
    to make the necessary preparations for the probable emergency
    with all speed. The Fuehrer wishes that Rosenberg shall be
    authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest cooperation of
    the highest Reich authorities, receive information from them,
    and summon the representatives of the Highest Reich Authorities
    to conferences. In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of
    the commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the time
    being only those of the highest Reich Authorities should be
    informed, on whose cooperation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will
    primarily depend. There are: the Commissioner for the Four Year
    plan, the Reich Minister of Economics and you, yourself.

    “Therefore may I ask you, in accordance with the Fuehrer’s
    wishes, to place your cooperation at the disposal of
    Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in the carrying out of the task imposed
    upon him.

    “It is recommended in the interests of secrecy, that you name a
    representative in your office, with whom the office of the
    Reichsleiter can communicate and who in addition to your usual
    deputy should be the only one to whom you should communicate the
    contents of this letter.

    “I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of
    this letter.

                                                    “Heil Hitler,
                                             Yours very sincerely,
                                                      Dr. Lammers.”
                                                         (_865-PS_)

Keitel wrote Lammers acknowledging receipt of his letter and telling of
his compliance with the request:

              “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
                                                   “25 April 1941
                              “Most Secret
                                                     “By courier

    “To:

    “The Head of the Reich Chancellery,

    Reich Minister Dr. Lammers.

    “Personal

    “Dear Reich Minister.

    “I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Fuehrer’s Decree in
    which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his
    Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with
    the East-European Region. I have named General of the Artillery
    Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff as my permanent
    Deputy and Major General Warlimont as his Deputy.

                                                     “Heil Hitler
                                            “Yours very sincerely,
                                                                “K.
                                                              25/4”
                                                         (_865-PS_)

Keitel also wrote Rosenberg, telling of his compliance with Lammers’
request:

               “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
                                                 “25th April 1941
                              “Most Secret
                                                     “By courier

    “To:

    “Reichsleiter Rosenberg

    “_Personal._

    “Dear Reichsleiter,

    “The Head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the
    Fuehrer’s Decree, by which he has appointed you his Commissioner
    for the central control of questions connected with the
    East-European Region. I have charged General of the Artillery
    Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff and his Deputy,
    Major General Warlimont with the solving of these questions, as
    far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now
    I ask you, as far as your Office is concerned, to deal with him
    only.

                                                     “Heil Hitler
                                            “Yours very sincerely,
                                                                “K.
                                                   25/4” (_865-PS_)

Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler, Rosenberg began
building his organization, conferring with the various ministries,
issuing his instructions, and generally making the detailed plans and
preparations necessary to carry out his assigned mission. Although
Rosenberg’s files, which were captured intact, were crowded with
documents evidencing both the extent of the preparation and its purpose,
the citation of a small number which are typical should be sufficient.
All the documents now discussed were found in Rosenberg’s files.

In a memorandum dated 8 May 1941, entitled “General Instructions for all
Reichcommissars in the occupied Eastern Territories”, Rosenberg gives
instructions to his chief henchmen and outlines clearly the political
aims and purposes of the attack. In the second two paragraphs of the
English translation the following remarks appear:

    “The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free
    the German Reich from the Great Russian (_gross-russisch_)
    pressure for centuries to come. This does not only correspond
    with German interests, but also with historical justice, for
    Russian Imperialism was in a position to accomplish its policy
    of conquest and oppression almost unopposed, whilst it
    threatened Germany again and again. Therefore, the German Reich
    has to beware of starting a campaign against Russia with a
    historical injustice, meaning the reconstruction of a Great
    Russian Empire, no matter of what kind. On the contrary, all
    historical struggles of the various nationalities against Moscow
    and Petersburg have to be scrutinized for their bearing on the
    situation today. This has been done on the part of the National
    Socialist movement to correspond to the Leader’s political
    testament as laid down in his book, that now the military and
    political threat, from the East shall be eliminated forever.

    “Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its
    historical and racial conditions into Reichs-Commissariats, each
    of which bears within itself a different political aim. The
    Reich Commissariat Eastland (_Ostland_) including White Ruthenia
    will have the task, to prepare, by way of development into a
    Germanized Protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with
    Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent state in
    alliance with Germany and Caucasia with the contiguous Northern
    Territories a Federal State with a German plenipotentiary.
    Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future.
    These general viewpoints are explained in the following
    instructions for each Reich Commissar. Beyond that there are
    still a few general considerations which possess validity for
    all Reich Commissars.” (_1030-PS_)

The fifth paragraph presents an interesting rationalization of a
contemplated robbery:

    “The German people has achieved, in the course of centuries,
    tremendous accomplishments in the Eastern European area. Nearly
    its entire real estate property was confiscated without
    indemnification, hundreds of thousands (in the South, on the
    Volga) starved or were deported or, like in the Baltic
    territories, were cheated out of the fruits of their cultural
    work during the past 700 years. The German Reich will now have
    to proclaim the principle, that after the occupation of the
    Eastern Territories, the former German assets have become
    property of the people of Greater Germany, irrespective of the
    consent of the former individual proprietors where the German
    Reich may reserve the right (assuming that it has not already
    been done during resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The
    manner of compensation and restitution of this national
    property, will be subject to different treatment by each Reich
    Commissariat.” (_1030-PS_)

“An Instruction for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and White
Russia” (_1029-PS_) is typical of the directives issued to each of the
appointed commissioners. This order is amazingly frank in outlining the
intentions of the Nazi conspirators toward the country they intended to
occupy in the course of their aggression. It begins:

    “All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have, constantly been
    in close relationship with the German people. A 700 year old
    history has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the
    races living there in a European direction, and has added this
    region to the living space of Greater Germany.

    “The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania
    and White Russia [last words added in pencil] must be to strive
    to achieve the form of a German Protectorate, and then transform
    the region into part of the Greater German Reich by germanizing
    racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic races and
    banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must become a
    Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of Greater Germany.

    “For certain cattle-raising products, the Baltic region was a
    land of surplus, and the Reich Commissar must endeavor to make
    this surplus once more available to the German people, and, if
    possible, to increase it. With regard to the process of
    germanizing or resettling, the Esthonian people are strongly
    germanized to the extent of 50% by Danish, German and Swedish
    blood and can be considered as a kindred nation. In Latvia, the
    section capable of being assimilated is considerably smaller
    than in Esthonia. In this country stronger resistance will have
    to be reckoned with and banishment on a larger scale will have
    to be envisaged. A similar development may have to be reckoned
    with in Lithuania, for here too the emigration of racial Germans
    is called for in order to promote very intensive Germanization
    (on the East Prussian border).”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The task of a Reich Commissar with his seat of office in Riga
    will therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one. A
    country which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights built
    up by the Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant influx
    of German blood, together with Swedish elements, was a
    predominantly Germanized land, is to be established as a mighty,
    German borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are
    available everywhere, and the German Reich will be able to
    guarantee the right to a later emigration to all those who have
    distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of
    those who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who
    fought in the Baltic campaign never once lost courage, fought on
    in the hour of despair and delivered Baltic civilization from
    Bolshevism. For the rest, the solution of the colonization
    problem is not a Baltic question, but one which concerns Greater
    Germany, and it must be settled on these lines.” (_1029-PS_)

These two directives are sufficiently typical of the lot to show the
extent of the planning and preparation for this phase of the aggression
as well as the political purpose it was hoped would be achieved thereby.
They are reinforced by a later report of Rosenberg’s. On 28 June 1941,
less than a week after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared a full
report of his activities since his appointment on the 20th of April
(_1039-PS_). This report makes disclosures concerning the number of
conspirators who worked with and assisted Rosenberg in the planning and
preparation for this phase of the aggression and the extent to which
practically all the ministries and offices of both the State and the
Party were involved in this operation. The report was found in
Rosenberg’s files and, although it is rather long, it is of sufficient
importance in implicating persons, groups and organizations to justify
quotation in full:

    “_Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern European Questions_

    “Immediately after the notification of individual Supreme Reich
    offices regarding the Fuehrer’s decree of 20.4.1941 a conference
    with the Chief of the OKW [Armed Forces High Command] took
    place. After presentation of the various political aims in the
    proposed Reichskommissariats and presentation of personal
    requirements for the East, the Chief of the OKW explained that a
    deferment (_OK-stellung_) would be too complicated in this case
    and that this matter could be carried out best by direct
    cancellation (_Abkommandierung_) by command of the Chief of the
    OKW. Generalfeldmarschall Keitel then issued an appropriate
    command which established the basis for the coming requirements.
    He named as deputy and liaison officer General Jodl and Maj.
    Gen. Warlimont. The negotiations which then commenced relative
    in all questions of the Eastern Territory were carried on by the
    gentlemen of the OKW in collaboration with officials of my
    office.

    “A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that
    under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no
    way deal with any representatives of people of the East-European
    area. I asked him to do this insofar as the Military
    intelligence required it, and then to name persons to me who
    could count as political personalities over and above the
    military intelligence in order to arrange for their eventual
    commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my
    wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants
    would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed
    in accordance with my indications.

    “Later on I informed Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch and
    Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political
    conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we
    agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme
    Commander of the Army, respectively to the chief quartermaster
    and to the army groups for questions relative to political
    configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has
    been done.

    “Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of
    Economy (_Reichswirtschaftsminister_) Funk, who appointed as his
    permanent deputy Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schlotterer. Almost
    daily conferences were then held with Dr. Schlotterer with
    reference to the war-economic intentions of the Economic
    Operational Staff (_Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab_) East. In this
    connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State
    Secretary (_Staatssekretaer_) Koerner, State Secretary Backe,
    Ministerial Director Riecke, General Schubert and others.
    Far-reaching agreement was reached in the eastern questions as
    regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few
    problems regarding the relationship of the proposed Reich
    ministry toward the four-year plan are still open and will be
    subject, after submission, to a decision of the Fuehrer. In
    principle I declared that I am in no way intended to found an
    economic department in my office, economics would rather be
    handled substantially and practically by the Reichsmarschall and
    the persons appointed by him, however the two responsible
    department heads, namely Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer
    for industrial economics and Ministerial Director Riecke for
    food economies, would be placed in my office as permanent
    liaison men, to coordinate here political aims with the economic
    necessities, in a department which would have to unite yet other
    persons for such coordinating work, depending on later and for
    work (political leadership of labor unions, construction etc.).
    After notification of the Reich foreign minister, the latter
    appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my
    office. For the requested representation in the political
    department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr.
    Leibbrandt) the foreign ministry released General Counsel Dr.
    Braeutigam, who is known to me for many years, speaks Russian,
    and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations which if necessary
    will be placed before the Fuehrer are under way with the foreign
    office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its
    representatives to the future Reich commissioners.

    “The propaganda ministry appointed State Secretary Gutterer as
    permanent liaison man, and a complete agreement was reached to
    the effect that the decisions on all political and other essays,
    speeches, proclamations, etc. would be made in my office; a
    great number of substantial works for propaganda would be
    delivered and the papers prepared by the propaganda ministry
    would be modified here if necessary. The whole practical
    employment of propaganda will undisputedly be subject to the
    Reich ministry of public enlightenment and propaganda. For the
    sake of closer cooperation the propaganda ministry assigns yet
    another person directly to my department ‘Enlightenment and
    Press’ (_Aufklaerung und Presse_) and in addition appoints a
    permanent press liaison man. All these activities have been
    going on for some time, and without attracting attention to my
    office in any way, this agreement on contents and terminology
    takes place continually every day.

    “Thorough discussions took place with Reichsminister Ohnesorge
    concerning future transmission of communication and setting up
    of all technical necessities in future occupied territories;
    with Reichsminister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with
    Reichsminister Frick (State Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form
    on the assignment of numerous necessary officials for the
    commissariats. According to the present estimate there will be
    four Reichs Kommissariats, as approved by the Fuehrer. I shall
    propose to the Fuehrer for political and other reasons to set up
    a suitable number of General Commissariats (24) Main
    Commissariats (about 80) and Regional (_Gebiet_) Commissariats
    (over 900). A General Commissariat would correspond to a former
    Generalgovernment, a Main Commissariat to a Maingovernment. A
    Regional Commissariat contains 3 or 4 Districts (_Kreise_). In
    view of the huge spaces that is the minimum number which appears
    necessary for a future civil government and/or administration. A
    portion of the officials has already been requested on the basis
    of the above-named command of the Chief of the OKW.

    “In the same manner conferences have taken place with the Reich
    Physicians Leader (_Reichsaerztefuehrer_) Dr. Conti, the
    Inspector of the Army Veterinary Service, and all specialists
    belonging thereto. The difficulties of medical and veterinary
    supply were thoroughly discussed and the measures were
    previewed, in order to insure well-prepared employment of the
    forces mentioned after the end of the operations. A conference
    with Reichsminister Dr. Todt resulted in the assignment first of
    all of 4 higher leaders of the Construction Service, whereupon
    Dr. Todt proposed to unite administratively under one leadership
    the whole Construction Service.

    “Discussions took place with Reich Leader Amann and his chief of
    staff Rienhardt regarding the publication of four German
    newspapers in the Reich Commissariats to start with. Furthermore
    a number of newspapers in the prospective native tongues were
    considered. According to the latest information the technical
    forces, for this work are already at the border and may be
    committed at any time to determine whether the prerequisites for
    printing shops are present.

    “Discussions are also under way with Corpsleader
    (_Korpsfuehrer_) Huehnlein and with the Reich youth leadership
    to assure a necessary and suitable mobilization. Intensive talks
    also took place with the Chief of Staff (_Stabschef_) of the SA.
    He was asked to make available a number of the most reliable SA
    leaders for this gigantic territory, which he agreed to do. The
    personnel suggestions together with other suggestions will be
    submitted to the Fuehrer. The same agreement has been reached
    with the Reich organizational leader
    (_Reichsorganisationsleiter_), who has instructed the commander
    of Kroessinsee, Gohdes, to carry out the swelling channelling of
    requested persons, to admit them into Kroessinsee for schooling
    and instruction on the whole problem and prepare them in the
    best manner for commitment. On the orders of Dr. Ley party
    member Marrenbach was then employed in order to take over
    already now the leadership of Russian labor unions in connection
    with the Wehrmacht. That appeared as an eminently important
    problem, particularly also in connection with the economic
    leadership, because the labor unions undoubtedly have been a
    powerful support of the Soviets and especially have the
    commitment of the German Labor Front appeared necessary under
    certain conditions.

    “Lengthy discussions regarding the relationship of the Police to
    the new order in the East have taken place. Certain proposed
    changes thereto have been suggested by the Reichsfuehrer SS and
    on his order by Gruppenfuehrer [SS Lt Gen] Heydrich which do not
    appear supportable to me for the complete authority of the
    German Reich government in the East. Also the documents of this
    problem will have to be laid before the Fuehrer for decision.

    “Aside from these negotiations I received the responsible
    deputies of the entire propaganda, namely Ministerial Director
    Fritsche, Ambassador Schmidt, Reich Superintendent of
    Broadcasting Glasmeier, Dr. Grothe OKW, and others. Without
    going into details of political objectives I instructed the
    above-named persons in confidence about the necessary attitude,
    with the request to tone down the whole terminology of the
    press, without issuing any statements.

    “The works for substantial coverage of the Eastern question
    prepared long ago appeared in my office, which I turned over to
    the propaganda deputies. I enclose a few samples thereof. These
    pamphlets, which may later be turned over to the press for
    development, deal with the whole structure and organization of
    the USSR, the economic possibilities of the East, Agriculture,
    the peoples of the Soviet Union, the work of the Komintern since
    1889, the Jews in the Soviet Union since 1933, statistical
    results of the poll taken among the Germans in Russia, the
    history of the Ukraine, of the Caucasus, of Turkestan. Extensive
    works are in preparation for the foundation of legal
    administration: German law in the Ukraine, German art in the
    Ukraine, influence of the German language on the Ukrainian
    language, the Ukrainians from the viewpoint of the Germans. In
    addition a number of articles are being prepared in Russian
    language which have the purpose of enlightening the people of
    the Soviet Union about true conditions in Germany. These
    articles are also suitable as the basis for newspaper articles
    in the newly occupied territories. Finally, after extensive
    work, an ethnological map of the East based on the most recent
    statistical reports has been printed in great number and made
    available to all offices. This map can be used as the basis of
    eventual fixing of boundaries in the north as well as in the
    south, and offers points of departure for fixing the boundaries
    of the future Reich Commissariats.

    “As a result of these conferences, conducted for the most part
    by myself, continuous consultation and organizational
    preparation is under way through my office and through those of
    the liaison men delegated from the other offices of the Party
    and the State. I may say that all the work, inasmuch as it is at
    all possible under present condition, is in full swing. Aside
    from the General and Chief commissariats more than 900 Regional
    Commissariats are planned, which must all be manned by political
    leaders, representatives of the department and officials of the
    Reich Ministry of the Interior. The work in the East differs
    basically from the conditions in the West. Whereas we can count
    on every technical installation and a cultured population here
    in the big cities, that is not the case in the East. There
    literally everything will have to be prepared and taken along,
    additionally for the gigantic spaces—not only an auto park but
    a great number of typewriters, office material, above all
    medical supplies and much more down to the bed sheets. It does
    not appear possible to accomplish such a project suddenly in 14
    days, therefore all these arrangements had to be set in full
    motion already now on my responsibility on the basis of the
    Fuehrer’s decree.

    “The structure of my office itself is temporarily organized as
    follows in carrying out the Fuehrer’s order. I have requested
    Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter Dr. Meyer as my permanent
    representative. He has negotiated personally and thoroughly,
    through the whole time with all pertinent offices, in order to
    develop all aspects down to the details. A political department
    has been founded for the execution of the substantial work,
    under my co-worker of many years Dr. Leibbrandt (deputy General
    Consul Dr. Braeutigam), who prepares the various books and
    pamphlets for information. A great number of propaganda leaflets
    have been composed by him which will then have been scattered
    over the Russian front in huge numbers by the armed forces. Also
    for a specific time other leaflets are ready which are addressed
    directly to the individual races. I do not care to decide on
    this date for myself, and will lay these originals before the
    Fuehrer at the first opportunity with the request to check the
    contents and determine the time of the eventually approved
    appeals. The political department is also undertaking a thorough
    investigation of all those, with the exception of Russians, who
    eventually can be used as advisors for the administration of the
    various nationalities. Continuous discussions about this subject
    are under way with representatives of the OKW, the propaganda
    ministry, etc. Secondly a department of economic—political
    cooperation has been founded under direction of
    Oberbereichsleiter Malletke. A department of ‘Law, Finance, and
    Administration’ has been taken over by Regierungspraesident
    Runte. A department for Culture and Science is as yet unoccupied
    since the development of this question does not appear urgent.
    Also the department ‘Enlightenment and Press’. It is occupied by
    Major of the Air Force Carl Cranz, deputy Job Zimmermann.
    Integrated here are co-workers who command the Russian,
    Ukrainian, and other languages. The wishes of the Reich Press
    Chief (_Reichspressechef_) for setting up one press chief for
    each Reichskommissar are under discussion in order to decide
    them in that sense if possible.

    “Thus I hope that when, after preliminary conclusion of the
    military action the Fuehrer has the possibility for a report
    from me, I shall be able to report to the Fuehrer far-reaching
    preparations, up to those points of special and personal nature
    which the Fuehrer alone can decide.” (_1039-PS_)

(As a part of the case to be presented by the Soviet prosecuting staff,
it will be shown how all this planning and preparation for the
elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor were actually carried
out. The planned execution of intelligentsia, and other Russian leaders
was, for example, but a part of the actual operation of the program to
destroy the Soviet Union politically and make impossible its early
resurrection as a European Power.)

Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the invasion of the
Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to carry out their plans
and on 22 June 1941 hurled their armies across the borders of the
U.S.S.R. In announcing this act of perfidy to the world, Hitler issued a
proclamation on the day of the attack, which declared: “I have therefore
today decided to give the fate of Europe again into the hands of our
soldiers.”

This announcement told the world that the die had been cast; that the
plans darkly conceived almost a full year before and secretly and
continuously developed since then, had now been brought to fruition. The
Nazi conspirators, having carefully and completely planned and prepared
this war of aggression, now proceeded to initiate and wage it.

F. _The Motives for the Attack._

It should first be pointed out that not only was Germany bound by solemn
covenant not to attack the U.S.S.R., but throughout the entire period
from August 1939 to the invasion in 1941, the Soviet Union was faithful
to its agreements with Germany and displayed no aggressive intentions
toward the territories of the German Reich. General Thomas, for example,
points out in his draft of “Basic Facts for a History of the German War
and Armaments Economy” (_2353-PS_), that insofar as the German-Soviet
trade agreement of 11 August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets carried out
their deliveries thereunder up to the very end. Thomas points out that
deliveries by the Soviets were usually made quickly and well, and since
the food and raw material being thus delivered was considered essential
to the German economy, efforts were made to keep up their side too.
However, as preparations for the campaign proceeded, the Nazis cared
less about maintaining their obligations. At page 315 of his book Thomas
says:

    “Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as
    preparations for the campaign in the East were already under
    way.

    “The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up
    to the start of the attack; even during the last few days,
    transports of India-rubber from the Far East were completed by
    Express transit trains.” (_2353-PS_)

Again at page 404, Thomas brings this point out even more forcefully:

    “In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June, 1941, the
    negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of
    attention. The Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to
    camouflage German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed
    in Germany must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the
    Russians only made grain deliveries, when the Germans delivered
    orders placed by the Russians, and since in the case of
    individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it impossible
    for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it was
    necessary for the Wi Rue office to enter into numerous
    individual negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate
    Russian orders with those of the German from the standpoint of
    priority. In accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Office,
    German industry was instructed to accept all Russian orders,
    even if it were impossible to fill them within the limits of the
    time set for manufacture and delivery. Since in May especially,
    large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were
    instructed to allow the equipment to go through the Russian
    Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour
    during its transportation as to make it impossible for it to be
    delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German
    attack.” (_2353-PS_)

Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to its treaty obligations with
Germany, but she had no aggressive intentions toward German territory. A
file on Russo-German relations found in the files of the Naval High
Command, covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack
(_C-170_), demonstrates this point conclusively. It will be sufficient
to quote a few entries, which include reports from the German ambassador
in Moscow as late as June 1941. Entry 165 reads:

    “165 A 22.29 4 June

    “Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia.
    Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian
    government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict
    with Germany.” (_C-170_)

Entry 167 reads:

    “167 A 22.53 6 June

    “Ambassador in Moscow reports * * * Russia will only fight if
    attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much more
    serious than up to now. All military preparations have been made
    quietly—as far as can be recognized only defensive. Russian
    policy still strives as before to produce the best possible
    relationship to Germany as good.” (_C-170_)

Entry 169 also reiterates this point:

    “169 A 22.65 7 June

    “From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow * * *. All
    observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are
    responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to
    avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the
    Government, as well as the attitude of the press, which reports
    all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner,
    support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty
    with Germany proves the same thing.” (_C-170_)

The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union
could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. No doubt, as has
been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning and
preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the Nazi
conspirators to launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of
them, however, appear to blend into one grand motif of Nazi policy. The
pattern into which these varied reasons fall is the traditional Nazi
ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This
Nazi version of an earlier imperial imperative, “_Drang Nach Osten_,”
had been a cardinal principle of the Party almost since its birth, and
rested on the twin bases of political strategy and economic
aggrandizement. Politically, such action meant elimination of the
powerful force to the East, which might constitute a threat to German
ambition, and acquisition of _Lebensraum_. Economically, it offered
opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of food, raw materials,
and other supplies. Undoubtedly the demands of the German War economy
for food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness of the
economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was
experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators
the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a
political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent.

As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in _Mein
Kampf_, where he stated, at page 641 of the Houghton Mifflin English
edition:

    “There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special
    examination the relation of Germany to Russia:

    “1. Here perhaps we are dealing with the most decisive concern
    of all German foreign affairs; and

    “2. This question is also the touchstone for the political
    capacity of the young National Socialist movement to think
    clearly and to act correctly.”

Again, at page 654 of the same edition:

    “And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath
    the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up
    where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless
    German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward
    the land in the east. At long last we break off the colonial and
    commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil
    policy of the future.

    “If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in
    mind only Russia and her vassal border states.”

The political portion of this dichotomy of purpose is clearly reflected
in the stated purposes, previously discussed, of the organization which
Rosenberg set up to administer the occupied Eastern Territories. In a
speech which Rosenberg delivered, two days before the attack, to the
people most interested in the problem of the East, he restated in his
usual somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and
its interrelationship with the economic goal (_1058-PS_). A short
extract from that speech reads as follows:

    “The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without
    a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims on the East;
    and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will
    have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people.
    We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to
    feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus
    territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any
    feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without
    any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard
    years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to
    determine to which extent industries can still be maintained
    there (Wagon Factories, etc.). The consideration and execution
    of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the German
    Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means negative task,
    as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the
    evacuation into consideration. The conversion of Russian
    dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the strongest
    characters. Perhaps, this decision will also be approved by a
    coming Russia later, not in 30 but maybe in a 100 years. For the
    Russian soul has been torn in the struggle of the last 200
    years. The original Russians are excellent artistic craftsmen,
    dancers and musicians. They have certain hereditary talents, but
    these talents are different from these of the Western people.
    The fight between Turgenjew and Dostejewsky was symbolic for the
    nation. The Russian soul found no outlet, either way. If we now
    close the West to the Russians, they might become conscious of
    their own inborn, proper forces and of the area to which they
    belong. An historian will maybe see this decision in a different
    light, in hundreds of years than it might appear to a Russian
    today.” (_1058-PS_)

As has been indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat
Britain had served further to strengthen them in their belief in the
political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European factor
before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of
Europe.

The economic motive for the aggression was disclosed in the previous
discussion of the organization set up under Goering and General Thomas
to carry out the economic exploitation of the territory to be occupied.
The purely materialistic basis for the attack was unmistakable. If any
doubt existed that at least one of the main purposes of the invasion was
to steal the food and raw material needed for the Nazi war machine,
regardless of the consequences to the Russian people which such robbery
would entail, that doubt is dispelled by a memorandum showing clear and
conscious recognition by the Nazis that their plans would no doubt
result in starving to death millions of people. (_2718-PS_)

On 20 June 1941 General Thomas wrote a memorandum along a similar line,
in which he stated that Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler’s present
conception of the German economic policy concerning raw materials
(_1456-PS_). This policy expressed the theory that less manpower would
be used in the conquest of sources of raw materials than would be
necessary to produce synthetics in lieu of such raw materials. This
memorandum reads, in part:

    “The following is the new conception of the Fuehrer, which
    Minister Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed
    later on by Field Marshal Keitel:

    “1. The course of the war shows that we went too far in our
    autarchical endeavors. It is impossible to try and manufacture
    everything we lack, by synthetic procedures, or other measures.
    For instance, it is impossible to develop our motor fuel economy
    to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All these
    autarchical endeavors ask for a tremendous amount of manpower,
    and it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose
    another way. What one does not have, but needs, one must
    conquer. The commitment of men which is necessary one single
    time, will not be as great as the one that is currently needed
    for the running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim
    must also be to secure all territories, which are of special
    interest to us for the war economy, by conquering them.

    “At the time the 4-year-plan was established, I issued the
    statement where I made it clear that a completely autarchical
    economy is impossible for us, because the need of men will be
    too great. Nevertheless, my solution was always to provide the
    necessary reserves for missing stocks respectively to secure the
    delivery in wartime through economic alliances.” (_1456-PS_)

On this macabre note the story of this aggression comes to an end. In
view of the solemn pledge of nonaggression; the base and sinister
motives involved; the months of secret planning and preparation; and the
suffering intentionally and deliberately wrought; it may perhaps not be
too much to say that in the history of relations between sovereign
nations, a blacker chapter has never been written than the one which
tells of the Nazi conspirators’ unprovoked invasion of the territory of
the Soviet Union.

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST
                                THE USSR

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6 (a)               │  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F)  │      │
                │  6; V.                                 │  I   │  27, 29
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *444-PS        │Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer’s│      │
                │Headquarters signed by Hitler and       │      │
                │initialled by Jodl, 12 November 1940,   │      │
                │concerning plans for prosecution of war │      │
                │in Mediterranean Area and occupation of │      │
                │Greece. (GB 116)                        │ III  │     403
                │                                        │      │
 *446-PS        │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed  │      │
                │by Hitler and initialled by Jodl,       │      │
                │Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, │      │
                │concerning the Invasion of Russia (case │      │
                │Barbarossa). (USA 31)                   │ III  │     407
                │                                        │      │
 *447-PS        │Top Secret Operational Order to Order   │      │
                │No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March 1941,│      │
                │concerning Directives for special areas.│      │
                │(USA 135)                               │ III  │     409
                │                                        │      │
 *864-PS        │Top Secret Note, 20 October 1939, on    │      │
                │conference between Hitler and Chief OKW │      │
                │concerning future relations of Poland to│      │
                │Germany, 17 October 1939. (USA 609)     │ III  │     619
                │                                        │      │
 *865-PS        │Correspondence between Keitel, Rosenberg│      │
                │and Lammers, April 1941, concerning     │      │
                │appointment of Jodl and Warlimont as OKW│      │
                │representatives with Rosenberg. (USA    │      │
                │143)                                    │ III  │     621
                │                                        │      │
 *872-PS        │Memorandum of Discussion between the    │      │
                │Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case    │      │
                │“Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” (African │      │
                │operation). (USA 134)                   │ III  │     626
                │                                        │      │
 *873-PS        │Top secret memorandum of discussion with│      │
                │the Chief “L”, 30 April 1941, about the │      │
                │invasion of Russia. (USA 137)           │ III  │     633
                │                                        │      │
  874-PS        │Draft letter to Todt, initialled K, J,  │      │
                │and W, 9 March 1941, concerning         │      │
                │Deception measures.                     │ III  │     634
                │                                        │      │
  876-PS        │Letter from Keitel, 12 May 1941,        │      │
                │concerning Deception of the enemy.      │ III  │     635
                │                                        │      │
  886-PS        │Fuehrer decree, 13 May 1941, on         │      │
                │courts-martial and treatment of enemy   │      │
                │civilians in the district “Barbarossa”, │      │
                │signed by Keitel for Hitler, and        │      │
                │initialled by Jodl.                     │ III  │     637
                │                                        │      │
*1017-PS        │Memorandum entitled “Memorial No. 1     │      │
                │regarding USSR”, 2 April 1941, found in │      │
                │Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 142)    │ III  │     674
                │                                        │      │
*1019-PS        │Appendix to Memorandum No. 2.           │      │
                │Recommendation as to the personnel for  │      │
                │the Reich Commissariats in the East and │      │
                │for the Political Central Office in     │      │
                │Berlin, 7 April 1941. (USA 823)         │ III  │     681
                │                                        │      │
*1029-PS        │Paper entitled “Instructions for a Reich│      │
                │Commissar in the Baltic States”, 8 May  │      │
                │1941, found in Rosenberg’s “Russia      │      │
                │File”. (USA 145)                        │ III  │     690
                │                                        │      │
*1030-PS        │General instructions for all Reich      │      │
                │Commissars in the Occupied Eastern      │      │
                │Territories, 8 May 1941, found in       │      │
                │Rosenberg file. (USA 144)               │ III  │     692
                │                                        │      │
 1034-PS        │Minutes of discussion concerning        │      │
                │Construction and Administration, 22 June│      │
                │1941.                                   │ III  │     693
                │                                        │      │
*1039-PS        │Report concerning preparatory work      │      │
                │regarding problems in Eastern           │      │
                │Territories, 28 June 1941, found in     │      │
                │Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146)    │ III  │     695
                │                                        │      │
*1058-PS        │Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941, by │      │
                │Rosenberg before people most intimately │      │
                │concerned with Eastern Problem, found in│      │
                │his “Russia File”. (USA 147)            │ III  │     716
                │                                        │      │
 1156-PS        │Report to Goering from Chief of Office  │      │
                │for War Mobilization of Economy, 19     │      │
                │March 1941.                             │ III  │     808
                │                                        │      │
*1157-PS        │Report on conference, 29 April 1941,    │      │
                │concerning top secret plan for Economic │      │
                │exploitation of Soviet Areas (Oldenburg │      │
                │Plan). (USA 141)                        │ III  │     811
                │                                        │      │
*1229-PS        │OKW Directive to the German Intelligence│      │
                │Service in the East, signed by Jodl, 6  │      │
                │September 1940. (USA 130)               │ III  │     849
                │                                        │      │
 1316-PS        │Top secret note for files on conference │      │
                │of 21 March 1941 concerning employment  │      │
                │of Quartermaster General.               │ III  │     908
                │                                        │      │
*1317-PS        │Top secret notes taken by Hamann of a   │      │
                │discussion of the economic exploitation │      │
                │of Russia, presided over by General     │      │
                │Thomas, 28 February 1941. (USA 140)     │ III  │     911
                │                                        │      │
*1456-PS        │Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel  │      │
                │consulted about resources of USSR. (USA │      │
                │148)                                    │  IV  │      21
                │                                        │      │
*1517-PS        │Memorandum from Rosenberg concerning    │      │
                │discussion with the Fuehrer, 14 December│      │
                │1941. (USA 824)                         │  IV  │      55
                │                                        │      │
*1799-PS        │Annex 1 to report of Chief of General   │      │
                │Staff of the Army, 5 December 1940,     │      │
                │concerning planned operation in the     │      │
                │East. (USA 131)                         │  IV  │     374
                │                                        │      │
*1834-PS        │Report on conference between Ribbentrop │      │
                │and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) │  IV  │     469
                │                                        │      │
*2353-PS        │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic     │      │
                │Facts for History of German War and     │      │
                │Armament Economy. (USA 35)              │  IV  │    1071
                │                                        │      │
*2718-PS        │Memorandum “About the result of today’s │      │
                │discussion with State Secretaries about │      │
                │Barbarossa”, 2 May 1941. (USA 32)       │  V   │     378
                │                                        │      │
 3014-PS        │Affidavit of General Ernst Koestring,   │      │
                │former German military attache in       │      │
                │Moscow, concerning planning for the     │      │
                │attack on the USSR in early August 1940.│  V   │     734
                │                                        │      │
 3031-PS        │Affidavit of General Warlimont, 21      │      │
                │November 1945, stating that first       │      │
                │directive for campaign against USSR was │      │
                │issued in August 1940.                  │  V   │     740
                │                                        │      │
 3032-PS        │Affidavit of General Walter Warlimont,  │      │
                │21 November 1945, stating that the      │      │
                │projected campaign against USSR was     │      │
                │first made known to him at conference   │      │
                │with Jodl, 29 July 1940.                │  V   │     741
                │                                        │      │
*3054-PS        │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801
                │                                        │      │
 3579-PS        │Memorandum, signed Schnurre, on the     │      │
                │status of deliveries under              │      │
                │German-Russian economic agreement, 28   │      │
                │September 1940.                         │  VI  │     276
                │                                        │      │
*C-33           │Entries in Naval War Diary, concerning  │      │
                │operation “Barbarossa” and “Marita”.    │      │
                │(USA 133)                               │  VI  │     846
                │                                        │      │
*C-35           │Entry in Naval War Diary, January 1941, │      │
                │p. 401. (USA 132)                       │  VI  │     852
                │                                        │      │
 C-37           │References to operation “Barbarossa” in │      │
                │the German Naval War Diary, June 1941.  │  VI  │     854
                │                                        │      │
*C-38           │Letter, 13 June 1941, requesting        │      │
                │decision on action against enemy        │      │
                │submarines and Order to attack Soviet   │      │
                │submarines, 15 June 1941. (GB 223)      │  VI  │     855
                │                                        │      │
*C-39           │Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by   │      │
                │Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138)  │  VI  │     857
                │                                        │      │
*C-50           │Covering letters and Order of 13 May    │      │
                │1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless      │      │
                │treatment of civilians in the USSR for  │      │
                │offenses committed by them. (USA 554; GB│      │
                │162)                                    │  VI  │     871
                │                                        │      │
 C-51           │Order signed by Keitel, 27 July 1941,   │      │
                │for destruction of all copies of Order  │      │
                │of 13 May 1941 (document C-50) without  │      │
                │affecting its validity.                 │  VI  │     875
                │                                        │      │
 C-53           │Order signed by Keitel, 20 September    │      │
                │1940, concerning Military Missions to   │      │
                │Rumania.                                │  VI  │     877
                │                                        │      │
 C-54           │Fuehrer Order, 23 May 1941, concerning  │      │
                │military activities in Rumania.         │  VI  │     877
                │                                        │      │
*C-77           │Memorandum from Chief of High Command to│      │
                │Navy High Command, 18 May 1941. (GB 146)│  VI  │     908
                │                                        │      │
*C-78           │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941,        │      │
                │convening conference on Barbarossa on 14│      │
                │June. (USA 139)                         │  VI  │     909
                │                                        │      │
 C-150          │Letter from Hitler to General Antonescu,│      │
                │18 June 1941.                           │  VI  │     963
                │                                        │      │
*C-170          │File of Russo-German relations found in │      │
                │OKM files covering period 25 August 1939│      │
                │to 22 June 1941. (USA 136)              │  VI  │     977
                │                                        │      │
*L-172          │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│      │
                │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture      │      │
                │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │      │
                │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII  │     920
                │                                        │      │
*TC-25          │Non-aggression Treaty between Germany   │      │
                │and USSR and announcement of 25         │      │
                │September 1939 relating to it. (GB 145) │ VIII │     375
                │                                        │      │
 Statement XIV  │Hungarian Relations with Germany Before │      │
                │and During the War by Nicholas Horthy,  │      │
                │Jr., Nurnberg, 22 February 1946.        │ VIII │     756
                │                                        │      │
 Statement XV   │Why Hungary Went to War Against the     │      │
                │Soviet Union by Nicholas Horthy, Jr.,   │      │
                │Nurnberg, 3 May 1946.                   │ VIII │     767


               13. COLLABORATION WITH ITALY AND JAPAN AND
                AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES:
                     NOVEMBER 1936 TO DECEMBER 1941

In the course of two years, the swastika had been carried forward by
force of arms from a tightly controlled and remilitarized Germany to the
four corners of Europe. The conspirators then projected the Nazi plan
upon a universal screen, involving the old World of Asia and the New
World of the United States of America. As a result, the wars of
aggression that were planned in Berlin and launched across the frontiers
of Poland ended some six years later, almost to the day, in surrender
ceremonies aboard a United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay
of Tokyo.

A. _Formal German—Japanese—Italian Alliances._

The first formal alliance between Hitler’s Germany and the Japanese
Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on 25 November
1936 (_2508-PS_). This agreement, on its face, was directed against the
activities of the Communist International. It was subsequently adhered
to by Italy on 6 November 1937 (_2506-PS_).

It is an interesting fact—especially in light of the evidence to be
presented regarding Ribbentrop’s active participation in collaboration
with the Japanese—that Ribbentrop signed the Anti-Comintern Pact for
Germany, at Berlin, even though at that time, November 1936, Ribbentrop
was not the German Foreign Minister, but simply Hitler’s Special
Ambassador Plenipotentiary.

On 27 September 1940, some four years after the Anti-Comintern Pact was
signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German,
Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin—a
ten-year military-economic alliance (_2643-PS_). Again Ribbentrop signed
for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign Minister: This
Tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to support of, and
collaboration with each other in the establishment of a “new order” in
Europe and East Asia. The agreement stated, in part:

    “The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as a
    condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the
    world be given its own proper place. They have therefore decided
    to stand together and to cooperate with one another in their
    efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe,
    wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a
    new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and
    welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of
    the three Governments to extend this cooperation to such nations
    in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to their
    endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that their
    aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may thus be
    realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy, and
    Japan have agreed as follows:

    “Article 1: Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of
    Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

    “Article 2: Germany and Italy recognize and respect the
    leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in
    Greater East Asia.

    “Article 3: Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to cooperate in
    their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to
    assist one another with all political, economic and military
    means, if one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a
    Power at present not involved in the European war or in the
    Chinese-Japanese conflict.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Article 6: The present Pact shall come into force immediately
    upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the
    date of its coming into force.” (_2643-PS_)

The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold announcement to
the world that the leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy had cemented a
full military alliance to achieve world domination and to establish the
“new order” presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the
Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi overflow into Austria
early in 1938.

A statement by Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States at
the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, is relevant in this
connection. Mr. Hull declared:

    “The reported agreement of alliance does not, in the view of the
    Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation
    which has existed for several years. Announcement of the
    alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long
    existed in effect and to which this Government has repeatedly
    called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of
    conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has
    been fully taken into account by the Government of United States
    in the determining of this country’s policies.” (_2944-PS_)

No attempt is made here to trace the relationships and negotiations
leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27 November 1940. Nevertheless, one
example of the type of German-Japanese relationship existing before the
formalization of the Tripartite Pact is noteworthy—the record of a
conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler and General Oshima,
Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. This record, which is signed by Himmler
in crayon, reads:

    “_File Memorandum_

    “Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over
    the following subjects:

    “1. The Fuehrer speech, which pleased him very much, especially
    because it had been spiritually warranted in all its features.

    “2. We discussed conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the
    triangle Germany/Italy/Japan into an even firmer mold. He also
    told me that, together with German counter-espionage (_Abwehr_),
    he was undertaking long-range projects aimed at the
    disintegration of Russia and emanating from the Caucasus and the
    Ukraine. However, this organization was to become effective only
    in case of war.

    “3. Furthermore he had succeeded up to now to send 10 Russians
    with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These Russians had the
    mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians, whom he
    had also sent across, had been shot at the frontier.”
    (_2195-PS_)

B. _Nazi Encouragement of Aggression by Japan_

The Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic alliance with
Japan had been formalized, exhorted the Japanese to aggression against
those nations with whom they were at war and against those with whom
they contemplated war. In this the Nazi conspirators pursued a course
strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship with the
other member of the European Axis. On 10 June 1940, in fulfillment of
her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried out her “stab in the back”
by declaring war against France and Great Britain. The Nazi conspirators
set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other side of the
world.

The nations against whom the German-Japanese collaboration was aimed, at
various times, were the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America.

(1) _Exhortations to Attack the British Commonwealth._ At least as early
as 23 February 1941 the Nazi conspirators undertook to exploit their
alliance with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the
British Commonwealth. Again the figure of Ribbentrop appears. On that
date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima, the
Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese open
hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as possible.
(_1834-PS_)

As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation of the
report of that conference, Ribbentrop on 2 March sent copies of an
extract of the record of this conference to his various ambassadors and
ministers for their “strictly confidential and purely personal
information,” with the further note that “these statements are of
fundamental significance for orientation in the general political
situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.” The report stated, in
part:

                                                  “Strictly secret
                                “Extract

    “from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister
    with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM [Reich
    Foreign Minister] declared that Ambassador Oshima had been
    proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in
    the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in
    the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He [the RAM]
    regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which
    he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already,
    had come into being only after various detours, but public
    opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main
    thing was, however, that they are together now.

    “* * * Now the _German-Japanese alliance_ has been concluded.
    Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the
    Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of
    its further _development_ now stands in the foreground. How is
    the situation in this respect? (_1834-PS_)

Ribbentrop subsequently proceeded to shape the argument for Japanese
intervention against the British. First outlining the intended air and
U-boat warfare against England, he said:

    “* * * Thereby England’s situation would take catastrophic shape
    overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution,
    however, depends on various factors, above all on weather
    conditions.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her.
    Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a
    combined English-American air force at any time. The number of
    pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our
    airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned
    ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing about
    the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead.
    On order of the Fuehrer the antiaircraft defense too would be
    greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond
    its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the
    ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense
    stock of material), production would now be concentrated on
    submarines, airplanes and antiaircraft guns.

    “Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won
    today militarily, economically and politically. We had the
    desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for
    peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully
    convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick
    and victorious end. To this end the cooperation with Japan was
    of importance. However, Japan in its own interest, should come
    in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s key
    position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus
    secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could
    acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick
    action:

    “1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the
    center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare,
    etc.) The effect upon the morale of the British people would be
    very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of
    the war.

    “2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America
    out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet
    and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West
    of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan
    would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not
    even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of
    lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was
    very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would
    have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines
    without America being able to do anything about it.

    “3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the
    interest of Japan also to secure for herself already during the
    war the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time
    of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and
    said that he would do everything to carry through this policy.”
    (_1834-PS_)

The subtlety of Ribbentrop’s argument is noteworthy. First he told the
Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already practically won the war by
herself. Nevertheless, he suggested that the war could be successfully
terminated more quickly with Japan’s aid and that the moment was
propitious for Japan’s entry. Then, referring to the spoils of conquest,
he indicated that Japan would be best advised to pick up by herself
during the war the positions she wanted, implying that she would have to
earn her share of the booty.

The remainder of Ribbentrop’s argument shows something of the real
nature of the German-Japanese alliance:

    “The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was
    Japan’s friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the
    Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had
    been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of
    interest in China. Germany’s victory on the continent has
    brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great
    advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the
    Far East (Indo-China). England too was considerably weakened;
    Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus,
    Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the
    future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical
    situation we should have to carry the main burden of the final
    battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia
    should arise we should have to carry the main burden also in
    this case. If Germany should ever weaken Japan would find itself
    confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all
    in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined
    now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The
    interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat
    of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic
    idea. “Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements
    and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its
    imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the
    great problems which would arise after the war for the parties
    of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in
    Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a
    bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place,
    but a solution should be found on a basis of parity,
    particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich
    Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of
    trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a
    liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the
    leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of
    interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for
    example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements
    directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere,
    as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and
    make trade agreements with the independent countries within the
    Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina,
    etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each
    should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to
    third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this
    thought.” (_1834-PS_)

The instigation to war by Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, is
clear. The participation of the German military representatives in the
encouragement and provocation of wars of aggression is shown in a Top
Secret order signed by Keitel as Chief of the OKW and entitled “Basic
Order No. 24 Regarding Collaboration with Japan” (_C-75_). It is dated 5
March 1941, about a week and a half after Ribbentrop’s conference with
Oshima, just discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest
commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as to the Foreign
Office. Two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten
notations presumably made by the recipients, were turned up by the
prosecution. Document _C-75_ is Copy No. 2 of the order, distributed to
the Naval War Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (the OKM).
Copy No. 4, designed for the _Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab_—the Operations
Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces—was found in the OKW
files at Flensburg. The head of this Operations Staff was Jodl.

Basic Order No. 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration
with Japan (_C-75_). It reads:

                              “TOP SECRET
                            “Only by Officer

    “Armed Forces High Command (OKW)

      Joint Operations Staff, Branch L (I Op.)

    No. 44 282/41 Top Secret

                                            “Fuehrer’s Headquarters
                                                      5 March 1941
                       [Various handwritten notations and stamps]
                                                       “14 copies
                                                        “2nd copy
                          “Basic Order No. 24
                   regarding collaboration with Japan

    “The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding
    collaboration with Japan:

    “1. It must be the _aim_ of the collaboration based on the Three
    Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible _to take active
    measures in the Far East_. Strong British forces will thereby be
    tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the
    United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.

    “The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of
    success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness
    for war on the part of its adversaries. The “Barbarossa”
    operation will create particularly favorable political and
    military prerequisites for this. [Marginal note—“slightly
    exaggerated”]

    “2. _To prepare the way_ for the collaboration it is essential
    to strengthen the _Japanese military potential_ with all means
    available.

    “For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed
    Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with
    Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat
    experience and for assistance in military economics and in
    technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor
    should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should
    naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have
    the most immediate application in waging war.

    “In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions to himself.

    “3. The _harmonizing of the operational plans of the two
    parties_ is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.

    “This will be subject to the following guiding principles:

    “_a._ The _common aim_ of the conduct of war is to be stressed
    as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the
    United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no
    political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which
    would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese
    intentions.

    “_b._ The great successes achieved by Germany in _mercantile
    warfare_ make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong
    Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every
    opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be
    exploited.

    “_c._ The _raw material situation_ of the _pact powers_ demands
    that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which
    it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the
    United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out
    even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of
    vital importance to Germany.

    “_d._ The _seizure of Singapore_ as the key British position in
    the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire
    conduct of war of the Three Powers.

    “In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval
    power—extending to those of American naval power only if the
    entry of the United States into the war cannot be
    prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power
    in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
    communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
    (Australia).

    “A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet
    be fixed.

    “4. In the _military commissions_ to be formed in accordance
    with the _Three Power Pact_, only such questions are to be dealt
    with as equally concern the _three_ participating powers. These
    will include primarily the problems of _economic warfare_.

    “The working out of the details is the responsibility of the
    “Main Commission” with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High
    Command.

    “5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the
    Barbarossa operation.

    “The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command

    “Signed in draft:  Keitel

                                         “Correctness certified by
                                                            JUNGE
                                     Lieutenant Commander” (_C-75_)

It appears from this document that the Nazi conspirators’ cardinal
operational principle in their collaboration with Japan was, as early as
March 1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and
other British Far Eastern bases.

A meeting was held on 18 March 1941, about two weeks after the issuance
of Basic Order No. 24 (_C-75_) and was attended by Hitler, Raeder,
Keitel, and Jodl. The top secret record of this meeting discloses that
Raeder, then Commander in Chief of the Navy, made the following
calculations:

    “Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
    since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole
    English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U. S. A. for war
    against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-à-vis the
    Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action,
    but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she
    will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.
    Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring
    Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East
    Asiatic questions regarding the U. S. A. and England are thereby
    solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

    “Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U. S. A. She can
    do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.”
    (_C-152_)

The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff
conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the
activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge
their immediate attack on Singapore. Another passage in the record of
this meeting establishes this:

    “Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but
    according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will
    only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.”
    (_C-152_)

Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the Japanese to
eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the
contract.

Meanwhile, Ribbentrop continued to make further efforts to induce the
Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On 29 March
1941, he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who was then
in Berlin. The following is a report of their conversations, found in
the German Foreign Office Archives:

“REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH
                                 1941.

    “The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about
    the latter’s impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where
    they had left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would
    probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry
    the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how
    the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain,
    namely, that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia
    ever attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive
    assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on
    Singapore, without fear of possible complications with Russia.
    The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern
    frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at
    any time. He (the RAM), however, believed that Russia would try
    to avoid development leading to war. Should Germany however
    enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished
    off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of course even
    less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants to advance on
    Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain from such an
    undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.

    “He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would
    develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify
    his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM)
    wanted to point out to Matsuoka, in any case, that a conflict
    with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any
    case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his
    return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was
    impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, that such a
    conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be
    considered possible.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view
    of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by
    submarines, based on the Philippines, and of the intervention of
    the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again
    discussed the situation with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter
    had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its
    hands so full in the English home waters and in the
    Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single
    ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the
    U. S. submarines as so bad that Japan need not bother about them
    at all.

    “Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very
    low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held
    the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it
    would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However it
    was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with
    their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might
    perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused
    considerable worry in Japan.

    “The RAM replied that America could not do anything against
    Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this
    reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on
    active measures against Japan. For while on one hand he could
    not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was
    the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the
    American president, of course, this would mean a considerable
    loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament, he
    would have nothing to offset such a loss.

    “In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing
    everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as
    if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of
    England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his
    attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words
    and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He
    assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British,
    but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American
    elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the
    attack on Singapore.

    “In this connection, Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based
    on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against
    Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow.
    (“Nothing succeeds like success,” the RAM remarked.) He followed
    here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman,
    addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the
    Russo-Japanese war: “You open fire, then the nation will be
    united.” The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all,
    as an Oriental, he believed in fate, which would come, whether
    you wanted it or not.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in
    the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to
    him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written
    promise of assistance.

    “The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions
    with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of
    Singapore in order that the Fuehrer—who probably must be
    considered the greatest expert on military questions at the
    present time—could advise Japan on the best method of attack
    against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would
    be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their
    European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of divebombers
    from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in
    Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear
    from Singapore immediately.

    “Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the
    British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.

    “The RAM replied that here, too, the Fuehrer had developed new
    methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions,
    such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could
    make available to the Japanese.

    “Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger,
    expert Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his,
    were of the opinion that the Japanese naval forces would need
    three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious
    Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he
    could stave off any danger which threatened from America, for
    six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still
    more time and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for
    a year, the situation with America would become extremely
    critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.

    “If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East
    Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on
    this area, the oilfields would be set afire. They could be
    brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

    “The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over the
    Netherland East Indies simultaneously with the capture of
    Singapore.” (_1877-PS_)

On 5 April, about a week after the conference just noted, Ribbentrop
again met with Matsuoka and again pushed the Japanese another step along
the road to aggressive war. The notes of this conference, which were
also found in German Foreign Office Archives, reveal the following
exchange:

    “* * * In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now
    awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take
    action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the
    Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course,
    to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the Fuehrer
    had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland,
    with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the
    resignation from the League of Nations.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich
    would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient
    traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which
    in its time was the only dominant power on the European
    Continent.

    “In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized
    the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him
    from his trip:

    “1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year
    the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede
    it, if it had not collapsed before then, and America would also
    have to resign herself to this fact.

    “2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan and
    Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the
    long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far
    East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.

    “3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it
    would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry
    into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than
    in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which
    would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national
    objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for
    her to play a really leading role in East Asia.” (_1882-PS_)

Here again, in the portions just quoted, Ribbentrop is seen pursuing the
same tack previously noted: Germany has already won the war for all
practical purposes. Japan’s entry will hasten the inevitable end. _And_
Japan had better get the positions she wants _during_ the war.
Ribbentrop’s assurances, (_1877-PS_) that Japan likewise had nothing to
fear from the Soviet Union if Japan entered the conflict, and his
continual references to the weakness of the United States scattered
throughout his conversations, were other means used to hurry along the
Japanese.

The success of the Nazi methods is shown in a top secret report, dated
24 May 1941, from the German Military Attache in Tokyo to the
Intelligence Division of the OKW. The last sentence in paragraph 1,
states:

    “The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.”
    (_1538-PS_)

The fact appears from this sentence that the German military were
keeping in close touch with the Japanese operational plans against
Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators had fostered.

(2) _Exhortations to Japanese Aggression Against the U.S.S.R._

The Nazi conspirators also directed their efforts to induce a Japanese
“stab in the back” against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here
again Ribbentrop appears as a central figure.

For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order No. 24 regarding
collaboration with Japan (_C-75_), the Nazi conspirators had been
preparing “_Fall Barbarossa_”, the plan for attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic
Order No. 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese “must not be given any
intimation of the Barbarossa operation”. (_C-75_)

In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on 29
March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24,
Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. Ribbentrop assured
Matsuoka that the largest part of the German Army was on the Eastern
frontiers of the Reich fully prepared to open the attack at any time.
Ribbentrop then added that, although he believed that the U.S.S.R. would
try to avoid developments leading to war, nevertheless a conflict with
the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would have to be considered
possible. (_1877-PS_)

Whatever conclusions the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in
April 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed their
aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of
Ribbentrop’s remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July 1941, Ribbentrop
despatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo
(_2896-PS_). Pertinent passages in that telegram read as follows:

    “Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador
    in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be convenient
    if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way. In
    summing up, I would like to say: I have now, as in the past,
    full confidence in the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese
    Foreign Minister, first of all because the present Japanese
    government would really act inexcusably toward the future of its
    nation if it would not take this unique opportunity to solve the
    Russian problem, as well as to secure for all time its expansion
    to the South and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as
    reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect
    close to collapse, a report which coincides with our own
    observations as far as we are able to judge at the present war
    situation, it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the
    matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her
    military preparations are completed.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “However, I ask you to employ all available means in further
    insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war against Russia at the
    soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to
    Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is.
    The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands
    on the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After the
    collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power
    Pact states in the world will be so gigantic, that the question
    of England’s collapse or the total destruction of the English
    islands, respectively, will only be a matter of time. An America
    totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced
    with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the
    British Empire which are important for the Three Power Pact
    countries. I have the unshakable conviction that a carrying
    through of the new order as desired by us will be a matter of
    course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the
    countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and
    encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I
    ask you to report in the near future as often as possible and in
    detail on the political situation there.” (_2896-PS_)

Ott’s reply to this telegram (_2897-PS_), dated 13 July 1941, was as
follows:

                                                          “Telegram
                                             (Secret Cipher System)
    “Tokyo   14 July 1941  0230 hrs.
    Arrived  14 July 1941  1120 hrs.
                                               As fast as possible!
    “#1217 dated 13.7
    for Minister for Foreign Affairs.

    Answer to telegram 10, #108 Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs

    Arrived Tokyo 12 July 1941

    “I am trying with all means to work toward Japan’s entry into
    the war against Russia as soon as possible. Especially using
    arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram
    cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the
    Foreign Office, Military elements, Nationalists and friendly
    business men. I believe that, according to military
    preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The
    greatest obstacles against which one has to fight thereby is the
    disunity among Activist groups which, without unified command,
    follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the
    changed situation.

                                                 Ott.”  (_2897-PS_)

On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to induce
the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. Three documents,
covering July of 1942 and March and April of 1943, record these
exhortations.

The first discussion occurred between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese
Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As a matter of background, it may
be noted that at that time German armies were sweeping forward in the
U.S.S.R. and the fall of Sevastapol had just been announced. The
discussion proceeded as follows:

    “_Notes concerning the discussion between the Minister for
    Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Oshima at Steinort, on 9 July
    1942._

    “He, the German Foreign Minister, had asked to see the
    Ambassador at this time when the situation was as described,
    because now a question of fateful importance had arisen
    concerning the joint conduct of the war: if Japan felt itself
    sufficiently strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack
    Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that, if Japan
    attacked Russia now, it would lead to her (Russia’s) final moral
    collapse; at least it would hasten the collapse of her present
    system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an
    opportunity as existed at present, to eliminate once and for all
    the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia. He had discussed this
    question with the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer was of the same
    opinion, but he wanted to emphasize one point right away: Japan
    should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for
    such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese
    operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at the halfway
    mark, and we do not want to urge Japan into an action that is
    not mutually profitable.” (_2911-PS_)

Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima had another conference on 6 March 1943.
It is noted, again for background, that the strategic military situation
in the broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat. In the
previous month, February 1943, the Soviet Armies had completely defeated
the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted severe losses. To the
north and west their winter offensive had recovered large areas from the
hands of the invaders. In addition, combined U. S. and British forces
had already landed in North Africa. The tone of Ribbentrop’s argument
reflects the changed military situation. The familiar Japanese refrain
of “so sorry please” likewise appears to have crept in. It is noted, in
this regard, that the month of February 1943 had also seen the end of
organized Japanese resistance on the island of Guadalcanal. The
conference went as follows:

    “Ambassador Oshima declared that he had received a telegram from
    Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his government to the
    Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (RAM) the following: The
    suggestion of the German Government, to attack Russia, was the
    subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government
    and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was
    discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the
    following: the Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the
    danger which threatens from Russia, and completely understands
    the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part will also
    enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for
    the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation,
    to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it
    would be in the common interest not to start the war against
    Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would
    never disregard the Russian question.

    “The Japanese Government has the intention to become aggressive
    again in the future on other fronts.

    “The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the
    Ambassador, of how the continued waging of the war is envisaged
    in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages the war against the common
    enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly
    behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that
    all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their
    forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia together.
    It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot
    overstrain the German national strength. He has worried silently
    that certain forces work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion and
    who propagate it, that Germany would come through the fight
    victoriously, and that therefore Japan should consolidate itself
    further at first, before it makes further and utmost efforts.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on
    Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight on
    the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a
    maritime problem, and on all fronts—except those in
    China—there are mostly very few ground forces committed.
    Therefore the attack on Russia is primarily an army affair, and
    he asked himself whether the necessary forces would not be ready
    for that”. (_2954-PS_)

Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about
three weeks later, on 18 April 1943. The top secret notes of this
conference reveal the following:

    “The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that
    without any doubt this year presented the most favorable
    opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had
    sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia,
    which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the
    moment.” (_2929-PS_)

(3) _Nazi Preparations and Collaboration with the Japanese Against the
United States._ The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the
Japanese against the United States present a twofold aspect: one of
preparations by the Nazis themselves for attack from across the
Atlantic; the other of the fomenting of war in the Pacific.

In the previous discussion of the Nazi exhortations to the Japanese to
war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., reference has
been made to certain documents relating to the United States. Those
documents will be taken up again, in their relevant passages, to show
their particular application. In the treatment of Ribbentrop’s urging
the Japanese to war against the U.S.S.R., documents have been introduced
chronicling conferences which took place after the dates of 7 December
and 11 December 1941 when the Japanese and German Governments,
respectively, initiated and declared aggressive war against the United
States. These documents have indicated that Nazi awareness and
acceptance of the direction in which their actions were leading, as well
as the universal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with
the Japanese.

(_a_) _Preliminary Nazi Preparations Against the United States._ The
Nazi conspirators’ intentions against the United States must be viewed
in the focus of both their over-all plan and their immediate commitments
elsewhere. That their over-all plan involved ultimate aggressive war
against the United States was intimated by Goering in a speech on 8 July
1938, when the Nazi conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria
and were perfecting their plans for occupation of Czechoslovakia. This
speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft industry and the
copy which the prosecution has obtained was transmitted as the enclosure
to a secret memorandum from Goering’s adjutant to General Udet, who was
then in charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe (_R-140_). The
statement in the covering memorandum notes that the enclosure is a “copy
of the shorthand minutes of the conference”. In the course of his long
speech, Goering called for increased aircraft production and referred to
the necessity for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. He
continued:

    “I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons
    of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely
    happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to
    stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there.”
    (_R-140_)

Goering’s fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at
that time, either technically or in the face of the Nazi conspirators’
schedule of aggression that has already been outlined. During the period
of their preparation for and waging of aggressive war in Europe, up
through the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R., it is only
reasonable to believe that the Nazi conspirators were not disposed to
involve the United States in war—_at that time_.

Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940, the prosecution of war against
the United States of America at a later date was on the military agenda.
This is clearly shown in a document which was found in the files of the
OKL, the German Air Force (_376-PS_). This memorandum is marked
“_Chefsache_”—the German designation for Top Secret—and is directed
from a Major von Falkenstein to an unspecified General, presumably a
Luftwaffe General. Falkenstein, who was a Major of the General Staff,
was at that time the Luftwaffe Liaison Officer with the Operations Staff
of the OKW, which was the staff headed by Jodl. His memorandum, which he
characterizes as a “brief resumé of the military questions current
here”, is dated 29 October 1940. It covers several questions. Paragraph
5 states:

    “5. The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the
    occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the
    prosecution of war against America at a later date.
    Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here.
    Essential conditions are at the present:—

    “a. No operational commitment

    “b. Portuguese neutrality

    “c. Support of France and Spain

    “A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding
    air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF.

    “Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic
    Kurfurst (C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel
    Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied with the information he
    desires.” (_376-PS_)

The Nazi Military interest in the United States is further indicated by
paragraph 7:

    “7. General von Boetticher has made repeated reference,
    especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in
    his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American
    aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The
    matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I
    pointed out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but have
    taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own
    merits.” (_376-PS_)

Again in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from
early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Fuehrer signed
an order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the
United States. This top secret order, found in files of the German Navy,
reads:

    “By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32, for
    the further conduct of the War, I lay down the following
    principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material
    supplies:

    “1. _In general_: The military domination of Europe after the
    defeat of Russia will enable the strength of the _Army_ to be
    considerably reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced
    strength of the Army will allow, the Armoured units will be
    greatly increased.

    “_Naval_ armament must be restricted to those measures which
    have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against
    England and, should the case arise, against America. “The main
    effort in armament will be shifted to the _Air Force_, which
    must be greatly increased in strength.” (_C-74_)

(_b_) _Collaboration with the Japanese Against the United States._ From
the documents just quoted, it appears that the Nazi conspirators were
making at least preliminary military plans of their own against the
United States. The Nazi over-all plan with regard to the United States,
however, was a complex one, involving in addition collaboration with the
Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations to the
Japanese to undertake an assault against British possessions in the
Pacific-Far East, they again considered war against the United States.

It will be recalled that in Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration
with the Japanese (_C-75_), which was issued on 5 March 1941, the Nazi
policy was stated in subparagraph 3_a_ as aiming at “forcing England to
the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the
war”. Nevertheless the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated within the
framework of that policy the possibility of the United States’ entry
into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were instigating. This
could result from an attack by Japan on United States’ possessions
practically simultaneously with the assault on the British Empire (as
actually happened). Other possibilities of involvement of the United
States were also discussed. Thus, Basic Order No. 24 stated in
subparagraph 3 (_c_):

    “_c. The raw material situation of the pact powers_ demands that
    Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it
    needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United
    States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even
    after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital
    importance to Germany.” (_C-75_)

The order continues, in the unnumbered paragraph immediately below
subparagraph 3 (_d_):

    “In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval
    power—extending to those of American naval power only if the
    entry of the United States into the war cannot be
    prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power
    in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
    communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
    (Australia).” (_C-75_)

In these passages there is a clear envisionment of U.S. involvement, as
well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to United States’
interests if Japan were to capture Singapore was also clearly envisaged
by Raeder in his meeting of March 1941 with Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl, in
which he stated:

    “Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
    since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole
    English Fleet contained: unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war
    against Japan: inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the
    Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action,
    but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she
    will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.
    Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring
    Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East
    Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby
    solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

    “Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do
    so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.”
    (_C-152_)

Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of U.S. involvement as a
result of the course of aggression that he was urging on the Japanese.
In his meeting of 23 February 1941 with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima,
the notes of which are contained in (_1834-PS_), Ribbentrop assured
Matsuoka that a surprise intervention by Japan was bound to keep the
United States out of the war since she was unarmed and could not risk
either her fleet or the possibility of losing the Philippines as the
result of a declaration of war. Two paragraphs later, Ribbentrop
practically dropped the pretense that the United States would not be
involved:

    “The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America
    should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this
    would mean that America had had the intention to enter the war
    sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to
    avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be
    by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of
    the countries of the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister
    further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the
    British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be
    cancelled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary
    to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to
    send their Navy, in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far
    East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries
    of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He,
    the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would
    then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this that
    unfortunately he does not think the Americans would do it, but
    he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.”
    (_1834-PS_)

In the paragraphs that follow, Ribbentrop again stresses the mutual
interdependence of the Tripartite Pact powers and suggests coordinated
action. He indulged in a typical bit of Nazi cynicism:

    “The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question,
    explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting
    powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the
    U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy
    were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the
    Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but
    also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes
    of the people in the U.S.A. to the situation and under certain
    conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public
    opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America
    found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the
    signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in
    propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the
    time.” (_1834-PS_)

Again on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop—this time in a conference with the
Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka—discussed the possible involvement
of the United States. (_1877-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were urging the
Japanese to undertake both threatened the vital interests of the United
States and could lead the U.S. to involvement in the contemplated Far
Eastern conflict. This fact is clear from the report of the conference
between Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 4
April 1941 (_1881-PS_). The report states, in part:

    “* * * Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the Fuehrer
    should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as
    broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military
    Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly
    concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making
    available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as
    the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do
    her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that
    the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese
    Navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United
    States, because in that case America probably would side with
    Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed that the United
    States would be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering
    the war at the side of Great Britain. The Army and Navy had,
    however, to count on the worst situation, that is, with war
    against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would
    extend for five years or longer and would take the form of
    guerrilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the
    South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her
    guerrilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a
    question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the
    technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as
    periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.

    “To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it
    that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal
    of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning
    Navy and Army, which were needed by the Japanese.

    “The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too
    considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but
    that it had already made allowances for such a contingency.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Fuehrer might
    give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German
    authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the
    latest improvement and inventions, which are of interest to
    them, because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a
    conflict with the United States.

    “As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained
    further that he has always declared in his country that sooner
    or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if
    Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion
    this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His
    argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not
    decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon
    herself of a fight against America?” (_1881-PS_)

The passages just quoted show not only a realization of the probable
involvement of the United States in the Far Eastern conflict that the
Nazis were urging, but also a knowledge on their part that the Japanese
Army and Navy were actually preparing war plans against the United
States. Furthermore, the Nazis knew at least a part of what those war
plans were. This fact is revealed in a secret telegram from the German
military-attache in Tokyo, dated 24 May 1941 (_1538-PS_). The attache
reports the conferences he has had regarding Japan’s entry in the war in
the event Germany should become involved in war with the United States.
In paragraph 1, this sentence appears:

    “Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.”
    (_1538-PS_).

A review of the Nazi position with regard to the United States at this
point, the Spring of 1941, shows that in view of their press of
commitments elsewhere and their aggressive plans against the U.S.S.R.,
set for execution in June of 1941, their temporary strategy was
naturally a preference that the United States not be involved in war at
that time. Nevertheless they had been considering their own preliminary
plans against the United States, as seen in the Atlantic Islands
document (_376-PS_). They were repeatedly urging the Japanese to
aggression against the British Commonwealth, just as they would urge
them to attack the U.S.S.R. soon after the launching of the Nazi
invasion. They were aware that the course along which they were pushing
the Japanese in the Far East would probably lead to involvement of the
United States. Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Hitler
this in so many words, and their own military men had fully realized the
implications of the move against Singapore. They knew also that the
Japanese Army and Navy were preparing operational plans against the
United States. They knew at least part of those plans.

The Nazi conspirators not only knew all these things. They accepted the
risk of the aggressive course they were urging on the Japanese and
pushed their Eastern allies still farther along that course. On 4 April
1941, Hitler told the Japanese Foreign Minister that in the event Japan
were to become involved in war with the United States, Germany would
immediately take the consequences and strike without delay. The
following is a passage from the notes of the Hitler-Matsuoka conference
in Berlin on 4 April 1941:

    “In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out
    that Germany on her part would immediately take the
    consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United
    States. It did not matter with whom the United States would
    first get involved, if with Germany or with Japan. They would
    always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an
    understanding with the other country subsequently, but to
    liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would
    strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a
    conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the
    tripartite powers lies in their joined action. Their weakness
    would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.”
    (_1881-PS_)

Hitler then encouraged Matsuoka in his decision to strike against the
United States:

    “The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation
    of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the
    clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed
    Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit
    favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow
    unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and
    full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by
    events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to
    instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be
    it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers
    come to them, but who will bravely face them.” (_1881-PS_)

Here, in the passages just quoted, were assurance, encouragement, and
abetment by the head of the German State, the leading Nazi
co-conspirator, in April 1941. But the Nazi encouragement and promise of
support did not end there. Another telegram from the German Ambassador
in Tokyo regarding conversations with the Japanese Foreign Minister,
dated 30 November 1941, one week before Pearl Harbor, read as follows:

    “The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his viewpoint
    that the difference of opinion between Japan and the U.S. is
    very great. The Japanese Government since it sent Ambassador
    Kurusu has taken a firm stand, as he told me. He is convinced
    that this position is in our favor and makes the United States
    think that her entry into the European war would be risky
    business. The new American proposal of 25 November showed great
    divergences in the viewpoints of the two nations. These
    differences of opinion concern, for example, the further
    treatment of the Chinese question. The biggest (one word
    missing) however resulted from the U. S. attempt to make the
    three-power agreement ineffective. U. S. suggested to Japan to
    conclude treaties of nonaggression with the U. S., the British
    Empire, the Soviet Union, and other countries in order to
    prevent Japan’s entry into the war on the side of the Axis
    powers. Japan, however, insisted upon maintaining her treaty
    obligations and for this reason American demands are the
    greatest obstacles for adjusting Japanese-American relations. He
    avoided discussing concessions promised by the U. S. and merely
    mentioned that grave decisions were at stake. “The U.S. is
    seriously preparing for war and is about to operate a
    considerable part of its fleet from Southern Pacific bases. The
    Japanese Government is busy working out an answer in order to
    clarify its viewpoint. But he has no particulars at that moment.
    He thinks the American proposals, as a whole, unacceptable.

    “Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations and she
    hopes that in that case Germany and Italy, according to the
    Three Power Agreement, would stand at her side. I answered that
    there could be no doubt about Germany’s future position. The
    Japanese Foreign Minister thereupon stated that he understood
    from my words that Germany in such a case would consider her
    relationship to Japan as that of a community of fate. I
    answered, according to my opinion, Germany was certainly ready
    to have mutual agreement between the two countries over this
    situation.

    “Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was possible that
    he would come back to this point soon. The conversation with the
    Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed the impression that the U.
    S. note, in fact, is very unsatisfactory even for the
    compromise-seeking politicians here. For these circles America’s
    position, especially in the China question, is very
    disappointing. The emphasis upon the Three Power Pact as being
    the main obstacle between successful Japanese-U. S. negotiations
    seems to point to the fact that the Japanese Government is
    becoming aware of the necessity of close cooperation with the
    Axis powers.” (_2898-PS_)

Extracts from the handwritten diary of Count Galleazzo Ciano during the
period 3 December to 8 December 1941 fill in the picture (_2987-PS_).
These are taken from notes which Ciano jotted down in the course of his
daily business as Foreign Minister of Italy. The entries for 3, 4, and 5
December read:

    “_December 3._

    _Wednesday_

    “Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience
    with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of
    the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion
    that they have reached a dead end. Then, invoking the
    appropriate clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy
    declare war on America immediately after the outbreak of
    hostilities and proposes the signature of an agreement not to
    conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this
    request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest
    assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before
    giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the communication and
    said: “We are now on the brink of the inter-continental war
    which I predicted as early as September 1939.” What does this
    new event mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt has
    succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war
    immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by
    letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event
    also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and
    further removed, and that it is now easy—much too easy—to
    predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is
    on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin’s
    answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the
    southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to
    give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive.

    “_December 4._

    _Thursday_

    “Berlin’s reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious.
    Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but
    the idea of provoking America’s intervention pleases the Germans
    less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about
    it. * * *”

    “_December 5._

    _Friday_

    “A night interrupted by Ribbentrop’s restlessness. After
    delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the
    Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackenson to my
    house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to
    Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate
    peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and
    the latter was very glad I hadn’t * * *.” (_2987-PS_)

It appears from the last entry that some sort of agreement was reached.
On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japan without previous warning or
declaration of war commenced an attack against the United States at
Pearl Harbor and against the British Commonwealth of Nations in the
Southwest Pacific. On the morning of 11 December, four days after the
Japanese assault in the Pacific, the German Government declared war on
the United States. (_2507-PS_)

The same day, 11 December 1941, the Congress of the United States
resolved that “the state of war between the United States and the
Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United States
is hereby formally declared”. (_2945-PS_)

It thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive intentions and
declaration of war against the United States, the Nazi conspirators in
their collaboration with Japan incited and kept in motion a force
reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. While
maintaining their preference that the United States not be involved in
the war at the time, they nevertheless foresaw the distinct possibility,
even probability of such involvement as a result of the actions they
were encouraging; they were aware that the Japanese had prepared plans
for attack against the United States; and they accepted the consequences
by assuring the Japanese that they would declare war on the United
States should a U.S.-Japanese conflict result. In dealing with captured
documents of the enemy, the completeness of the plan is necessarily
obscured. But those documents which have been discovered, and introduced
into evidence before the Tribunal, show that the Japanese attack was the
proximate and foreseeable consequence of their collaboration policy, and
that their exhortations and encouragement of the Japanese as surely led
to Pearl Harbor as though Pearl Harbor itself had been mentioned.

The entry in the Ciano Diary for 8 December 1941 gives an interesting
sidelight on Ribbentrop’s reaction to the Japanese sneak attack:

    “_December 8._

    _Monday._

    “A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is overjoyed about
    the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I
    am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final
    advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain: that
    America will enter the conflict, and that the conflict will be
    so long that she will be able to realize all her potential
    force. This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased
    about the event. He ended by admitting that in the “long run” I
    may be right. Mussolini was happy too. For a long time he has
    favored a definite clarification of relations between America
    and the Axis.” (_2987-PS_)

A conference was held between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima on
14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 hours, in the presence of the Reich
Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop. The subject matter was the Pearl Harbor
attack. The top secret notes of this conference read in part:

    “* * * First the Fuehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with the
    Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold.
    With cordial words he acknowledges his services in the
    achievement of German-Japanese cooperation, which has now
    obtained its culmination in a close brotherhood of arms.

    “General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and
    emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now
    come about between Germany and Japan.

    “The Fuehrer continues: “You gave the right declaration of war!”
    This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly
    and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as
    long as possible. But if one sees that the other is interested
    only in putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is
    not willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike—as
    hard as possible, indeed—and not waste time declaring war. It
    was heartwarming to him to hear of the first operations of the
    Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times,
    for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then
    realized, that the other did not want to come to an agreement,
    he struck suddenly and without formalities. He would continue to
    go this way in the future.” (_2932-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO COLLABORATION WITH
 ITALY AND JAPAN AND AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES: NOVEMBER
                         1936 TO DECEMBER 1941

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6 (a).              │  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F)  │      │
                │  7; V.                                 │  I   │  28, 29
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *376-PS        │Top secret memorandum signed by Major   │      │
                │Falkenstein, 29 October 1940, concerning│      │
                │current military questions, including   │      │
                │question of occupation of Atlantic      │      │
                │Islands referring to the United States. │      │
                │(USA 161)                               │ III  │     288
                │                                        │      │
*1538-PS        │Report from German Military Attache in  │      │
                │Tokyo to Office Foreign Intelligence, 24│      │
                │May 1941. (USA 154)                     │  IV  │     100
                │                                        │      │
*1834-PS        │Report on conference between Ribbentrop │      │
                │and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) │  IV  │     469
                │                                        │      │
*1866-PS        │Record of conversation between Reich    │      │
                │Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May   │      │
                │1941. (GB 273)                          │  IV  │     499
                │                                        │      │
*1877-PS        │Report on conversation between          │      │
                │Ribbentrop and Matsuoka in Berlin, 29   │      │
                │March 1941. (USA 152)                   │  IV  │     520
                │                                        │      │
*1881-PS        │Notes on conference between Hitler and  │      │
                │Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop, in  │      │
                │Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33)          │  IV  │     522
                │                                        │      │
*1882-PS        │Notes on conference between Ribbentrop  │      │
                │and Matsuoka in Berlin, 5 April 1941.   │      │
                │(USA 153)                               │  IV  │     526
                │                                        │      │
*2195-PS        │File memorandum on conversation with    │      │
                │Oshima, 31 January 1939, signed Himmler.│      │
                │(USA 150)                               │  IV  │     852
                │                                        │      │
 2506-PS        │Protocol of Adherence by Italy to       │      │
                │Anti-Comintern Pact, 6 November 1937,   │      │
                │published in Documents of German        │      │
                │Politics, 1940, 4th edition.            │  V   │     239
                │                                        │      │
*2507-PS        │Note from Ribbentrop to U. S. Charge    │      │
                │d’Affaires in Berlin, 11 December 1941, │      │
                │containing German Declaration of War on │      │
                │United States, published in Documents of│      │
                │German Politics, Vol. IX, Part 1, No.   │      │
                │74, pp. 497-9. (USA 164)                │  V   │     241
                │                                        │      │
*2508-PS        │German-Japanese Agreement against the   │      │
                │Communist International, 25 November    │      │
                │1936, signed by Ribbentrop. Documents of│      │
                │German Politics, Vol. 4. (GB 147)       │  V   │     242
                │                                        │      │
*2643-PS        │Announcement concerning Three-Power Pact│      │
                │between Germany, Italy and Japan, 27    │      │
                │September 1940, signed by Ribbentrop for│      │
                │Germany. 1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part   │      │
                │II, No. 41, p. 279. (USA 149)           │  V   │     355
                │                                        │      │
*2896-PS        │Telegram from Ribbentrop to German      │      │
                │Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, 10 July 1941. │      │
                │(USA 155)                               │  V   │     564
                │                                        │      │
*2897-PS        │Telegram from German Ambassador in      │      │
                │Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July 1941.│      │
                │(USA 156)                               │  V   │     566
                │                                        │      │
*2898-PS        │Telegram from German Ambassador to      │      │
                │Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 30 November  │      │
                │1941. (USA 163)                         │  V   │     566
                │                                        │      │
*2911-PS        │Notes on conversation between Ribbentrop│      │
                │and Oshima, 9 July 1942. (USA 157)      │  V   │     580
                │                                        │      │
*2929-PS        │Notes on conversation between Ribbentrop│      │
                │and Oshima, 18 April 1943. (USA 159)    │  V   │     603
                │                                        │      │
*2932-PS        │Notes on conference between Hitler and  │      │
                │Oshima, 14 December 1941. (USA 165)     │  V   │     603
                │                                        │      │
 2944-PS        │Statement by U. S. Secretary of State,  │      │
                │27 September 1940, published in Peace   │      │
                │and War, U. S. Foreign Policy,          │      │
                │1931-1941.                              │  V   │     624
                │                                        │      │
 2945-PS        │Joint resolution by the U. S. Senate and│      │
                │House of Representatives declaring state│      │
                │of war with Germany, 11 December 1941,  │      │
                │published in Peace and War, U. S.       │      │
                │Foreign Policy, 1931-1941.              │  V   │     625
                │                                        │      │
*2954-PS        │Minutes of conversation between         │      │
                │Ribbentrop and Oshima, 6 March 1943.    │      │
                │(USA 158; GB 150)                       │  V   │     658
                │                                        │      │
*2987-PS        │Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA   │      │
                │166)                                    │  V   │     689
                │                                        │      │
*3054-PS        │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion     │      │
                │picture composed of captured German     │      │
                │film. (USA 167)                         │  V   │     801
                │                                        │      │
 3598-PS        │Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic message,│      │
                │Tokyo to Berlin, 30 November 1941. VI   │ 308  │
                │                                        │      │
 3599-PS        │Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic message,│      │
                │Rome to Tokyo, 3 December 1941.         │  VI  │     310
                │                                        │      │
 3600-PS        │Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic message,│      │
                │Tokyo to Berlin, 6 December 1941.       │  VI  │     312
                │                                        │      │
 3733-PS        │Minutes of interview held on 19 August  │      │
                │1941, between Vice-Minister Aman and    │      │
                │Ambassador Ott.                         │  VI  │     545
                │                                        │      │
*3780-PS        │Record of Fuehrer’s conference with     │      │
                │Oshima, 27 May 1944, concerning Japanese│      │
                │treatment of American terror pilots. (GB│      │
                │293)                                    │  VI  │     655
                │                                        │      │
*3817-PS        │File of correspondence and reports by   │      │
                │Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. (USA│      │
                │790)                                    │  VI  │     752
                │                                        │      │
*C-74           │Top Secret Order concerning personnel   │      │
                │and materiel program, signed by Hitler, │      │
                │14 July 1941. (USA 162)                 │  VI  │     905
                │                                        │      │
*C-75           │OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, signed│      │
                │Keitel, 5 March 1941, concerning        │ (USA │
                │collaboration with Japan.               │ 151) │      VI
                │                                        │      │
 C-147          │Extracts from Directive No. 18, signed  │      │
                │by Hitler, 12 November 1940.            │  VI  │     957
                │                                        │      │
*C-152          │Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18  │      │
                │March 1941, concerning audience of      │      │
                │C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March  │      │
                │1941. (GB 122)                          │  VI  │     966
                │                                        │      │
*D-656          │Extract of 29 November 1941 from        │      │
                │Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by │      │
                │Japanese Government between 1 July and 8│      │
                │December 1941. (GB 148)                 │ VII  │     160
                │                                        │      │
*D-657          │Extract of 8 December 1941 from         │      │
                │Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by │      │
                │Japanese Government between 1 July and 8│      │
                │December 1941. (GB 149)                 │ VII  │     163
                │                                        │      │
*R-140          │Secret letter from Goering’s adjutant,  │      │
                │Major Conrath, 11 July 1938, enclosing  │      │
                │transcript of Goering’s speech of 8 July│      │
                │to representatives of aircraft industry.│      │
                │(USA 160)                               │ VIII │     221




                               Chapter X
                        THE SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM,
                      THE ILLEGAL USE OF PRISONERS
                 OF WAR, AND THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY
                      OF SAUCKEL AND SPEER THEREFOR


In general terms, the basic elements of the Nazi foreign labor policy
consisted of mass deportation and mass enslavement. It was a policy of
underfeeding and overworking foreign laborers, of subjecting them to
every form of degradation and brutality. It was a policy which compelled
foreign workers and prisoners of war to manufacture armaments and to
engage in other operations of war directed against their own countries.
It was, in short, a policy which constituted a flagrant violation of the
laws of war and the laws of humanity.

Fritz Sauckel and Albert Speer are principally responsible for the
formulation of this policy and for its execution. Sauckel, the Nazi’s
Plenipotentiary General for Manpower, directed the recruitment,
deportation, and allocation of foreign civilian labor. Sanctioning and
directing the use of force as a means of recruitment, he was responsible
for the mistreatment of the enslaved millions. Speer—as Reichsminister
for Armaments and Munitions, Director of the Organization Todt, and
member of the Central Planning Board—bears responsibility for the
determination of the numbers of foreign slaves required by the German
war machine, for the decision to recruit by force, and for the use and
brutal treatment of foreign civilians and prisoners of war in the
manufacture of armaments and munitions, in the construction of
fortifications, and in active military operations.

Hermann Goering, as Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan, is
also responsible for all the crimes involved in the Nazi slave labor
program. In addition, Alfred Rosenberg as Reichsminister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories, Hans Frank as Governor-General of the
Government-General of Poland, Artur Seyss-Inquart as Reichskommissar for
the Occupied Netherlands, and Wilhelm Keitel as chief of the OKW share
responsibility for the recruitment by force and terror and for the
deportation to Germany of the citizens of the areas overrun or
subjugated by the _Wehrmacht_.

                 1. PLANNING FOR THE USE OF SLAVE LABOR

The use of vast numbers of foreign workers was planned before Germany
went to war and was an integral part of the conspiracy for waging
aggressive war. On 23 May 1939 a meeting was held in Hitler’s study at
the Reichs Chancellery. Goering, Raeder, and Keitel were present.
According to the minutes of this meeting, (_L-79_) Hitler stated that he
intended to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. He further
stated:

    “* * * If fate brings us into contact with the West, the
    possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous.
    We shall be able to rely upon record harvests, even less in time
    of war than in peace.

    “The population of non-German areas will perform no military
    service, and will be available as a source of labor”. (_L-79_)

The slave labor program was designed to achieve two purposes. The
primary purpose was to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war
machine by compelling foreign workers, in effect, to make war against
their own countries and its allies. The secondary purpose was to destroy
or weaken peoples deemed inferior by the Nazi racialists, or deemed
potentially hostile by the Nazi planners of world supremacy. These
purposes were expressed by the conspirators themselves. In Sauckel’s
Labor Mobilization Program (_016-PS_) which he sent to Rosenberg on 20
April 1942, Sauckel declared:

    “* * * The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to
    use all the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured
    for us by our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of
    Adolf Hitler, for the armament of the Armed Forces and also for
    the nutrition of the Homeland. The raw materials as well as the
    fertility of the conquered territories and their human labor
    power are to be used completely and conscientiously to the
    profit of Germany and their allies.” (_016-PS_)

The theory of the “master race,” which underlay the conspirators’ labor
policy in the East, was expressed in the following words by Erich Koch,
Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, at a meeting of the National Socialist
Party on 5 March 1943 in Kiev:

    “1. We are the master race and must govern hard but just * * *.

    “2. I will draw the very last out of this country. I did not
    come to spread bliss. I have come to help the Fuehrer. The
    population must work, work, and work again * * * for some people
    are getting excited, that the population may not get enough to
    eat. The population cannot demand that, one has only to remember
    what our heroes were deprived of in Stalingrad * * *. We
    definitely did not come here to give out manna. We have come
    here to create the basis for victory.

    “3. We are a master race, which must remember that the lowliest
    German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more
    valuable than the population here”. (_1130-PS_)

And in a speech delivered to a group of SS Generals on 4 October 1943 at
Posen, Himmler stated:

    “* * * What happens to a Russian, to a Czech, does not interest
    me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of
    good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary by kidnapping
    their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations
    live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only in so
    far as we need them as slaves for our _Kultur_: otherwise, it is
    of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down
    from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me
    only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished *
    * *.” (_1919-PS_)

A Top Secret memorandum prepared for the Ministry of the Occupied
Eastern Territories on 12 June 1944, and approved by Rosenberg, contains
the following plans:

    “The Army Group ‘Center’ has the intention to apprehend
    40-50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 who are in the Army
    territory and to transport them to the Reich * * *.”

    “It is intended to allot these juveniles primarily to the German
    trades as apprentices to be used as skilled workers after 2
    years’ training. This is to be arranged through the Organization
    Todt which is especially equipped for such a task through its
    technical and other set-ups. This action is being greatly
    welcomed by the German trade since it represents a decisive
    measure for the alleviation of the shortage of apprentices.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “1. This action is not only aimed at preventing a direct
    reinforcement of the enemy’s military strength, but also at a
    reduction of his biological potentialities as viewed from the
    perspective of the future. These ideas have been voiced not only
    by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS but also by the Fuehrer.
    Corresponding orders were given during last year’s withdrawals
    in the southern sector * * *.”(_031-PS_)

Rosenberg’s approval is at the end of the document:

    “regarding the above—Obergruppenfuehrer Berger received the
    memorandum on June 14. Consequently the Reichsminister has
    approved the Action.” (_031-PS_)

                2. EXECUTION OF THE SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM

The purposes of the slave labor program, namely, the strengthening of
the Nazi war machine and the destruction or weakening of peoples deemed
inferior, were achieved by the impressment and deportation of millions
of persons into Germany for forced labor, by the separation of husbands
from their wives and children from their parents, and by the imposition
of conditions so inhuman that countless numbers perished.

A. _Poland._

Poland was the first victim. Frank, as Governor of the
Government-General of Poland, announced that under his program 1,000,000
workers were to be sent to Germany, and recommended that police surround
Polish villages and seize the inhabitants for deportation. These
intentions appear in the following letter from Frank to Goering, dated
25 January 1940 (_1375-PS_):

    “1. In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the
    defense industry, it is at present fundamentally impossible to
    carry on a long term economic policy in the
    General-Gouvernement. Rather, it is necessary so to steer the
    economy of the General Gouvernement that it will, in the
    shortest possible time, accomplish results representing the
    maximum that can be gotten out of the economic strength of the
    General-Gouvernement for the immediate strengthening of our
    capacity for defense.

    “2. In particular the following performances are expected of the
    total economy of the General-Gouvernement * * *.”

    “(g) Supply and transportation of at least 1 million male and
    female agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich—among
    them at least 7,500,000 [sic] agricultural workers of which at
    least 50% must be women—in order to guarantee agricultural
    production in the Reich and as a replacement

The methods by which these workers were to be supplied were outlined by
Frank in his diary entry for Friday, 10 May 1940 (_2233-A-PS_):

    “* * * Then the Governor-General deals with the problem of the
    _Compulsory Labor Service_ of the Poles. Upon the demands from
    the Reich it has now been decreed that compulsion may be
    exercised in view of the fact that sufficient manpower was not
    voluntarily available for service inside the German Reich. This
    compulsion means the possibility of arrest of male and female
    Poles. Because of these measures a certain disquietude had
    developed which, according to individual reports, was spreading
    very much, and which might produce difficulties everywhere.
    General Fieldmarshal Goering some time ago pointed out in his
    long speech the necessity to deport into the Reich a million
    workers. The supply so far was 160,000. However, great
    difficulties had to be overcome. Therefore it would be advisable
    to consult the district and town chiefs in the execution of the
    compulsion, so that one could be sure from the start that this
    action would be reasonably successful. The arrest of young Poles
    when leaving church service or the cinema would bring about an
    increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally speaking, he had
    no objections at all if the rubbish, capable of work yet often
    loitering about, would be snatched from the streets. The best
    method for this, however, would be the organization of a raid,
    and it would be absolutely justifiable to stop a Pole in the
    street and to question him what he was doing, where he was
    working etc.” (_2233-A-PS_)

Another entry in the diary of Frank, for 16 March 1940, contains the
following discourse on methods:

    “* * * The Governor-General remarks that he had long
    negotiations in Berlin with representatives of the Reich
    Ministry for Finance and the Reich Ministry for Food. One has
    made the urgent demand there that _Polish farm workers_ should
    be sent to the Reich in greater numbers. He has made the
    statement in Berlin that he, if it is demanded from him, can
    naturally exercise force in such a manner that he has the police
    surround a village and get the men and women, in question, out
    by force, and then send them to Germany. But one can also work
    differently, besides these police measures, by retaining the
    unemployment compensation of those workers in question.”
    (_2233-B-PS_)

The instruments of force and terror used to carry out this program
reached into many phases of Polish life. German labor authorities raided
churches and theatres, seized those present, and shipped them to
Germany. These facts appear in a memorandum to Himmler dated 17 April
1943, written by Dr. Lammers, chief of the Reichs Chancellery, with
regard to the situation in the Government General of Poland:

    “* * * As things were, the utilization of manpower had to be
    enforced by means of more or less forceful methods, such as the
    instances when certain groups appointed by the Labor Offices,
    caught Church and Movie-goers here and there and transported
    them into the Reich. That such methods not only undermine the
    people’s willingness to work and the people’s confidence to such
    a degree that it cannot be checked even with terror, is just as
    clear as the consequences brought about by a strengthening of
    the political resistance movement”. (_2220-PS_)

Polish farmland was confiscated with the aid of the SS, distributed to
German inhabitants, or held in trust for the German community. The farm
owners were thereupon employed as laborers or transported to Germany
against their will. A report of the SS entitled “Achievement of
Confiscations of Polish Agricultural Enterprises with the Purpose to
Transfer the Poles to the old Reich and to Employ Them as Agricultural
Workers,” contains these disclosures:

    “* * * It is possible without difficulty to accomplish the
    confiscation of small agricultural enterprises in the villages
    in which larger agricultural enterprises have been already
    confiscated and are under the management of the East German
    Corporation for agricultural development. * * * _The former
    owners of Polish farms, together with their families will be
    transferred to the old Reich by the employment agencies for
    employment as farm workers._ In this way many hundreds of Polish
    agricultural workers can be placed at the disposal of
    agriculture in the old Reich in the shortest and simplest
    manner. This way the most pressing shortage is removed that is
    now in a very disagreeable manner felt especially in the
    root-crop districts.” (_1352-PS_)

Pursuant to the directions of Sauckel, his agents and the SS deported
Polish men to Germany without their families, thereby accomplishing the
basic purposes of the program: supplying labor for the German war effort
and weakening the reproductive potential of the Polish people. Thus, in
a letter from Sauckel to the Presidents of the “Landes” Employment
Offices, dated 26 November 1942, it is stated that:

    “In agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the SD,
    Jews who are still in employment are, from now on, to be
    evacuated from the territory of the Reich and are to be replaced
    by Poles, who are being deported from the General-Gouvernement.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure
    will be put into concentration camps and put to work where they
    are criminal or asocial elements. The remaining Poles where they
    are suitable for labor, will be transported—without
    family—into the Reich, particularly to Berlin; there they will
    be put at the disposal of the labor allocation offices to work
    in armament factories instead of the Jews who are to be
    replaced.” (_L-61_)

The Nazi campaign of force, terror, and abduction was described in a
letter to Frank written by the Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee,
at Cracow, in February 1943. The letter states:

    “The general nervousness is still more enhanced by the wrong
    methods of finding labor which have been used more and more
    frequently in recent months.

    “The wild and ruthless man-hunt as exercised everywhere in towns
    and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at
    night in houses, has badly shaken the feeling of security of the
    inhabitants. Everybody is exposed to the danger, to be seized
    anywhere and at any time by members of the police, suddenly and
    unexpectedly and to be brought into an assembly camp. None of
    his relatives knows what has happened to him, only months later
    one or the other gives news of his fate by a postcard.”
    (_1526-PS_)

And in enclosure 5 of the letter it is related that:

    “In November of last year an inspection of all males of the age
    groups 1910 to 1920 was ordered in the area of Zaleschozyki
    (district of Czortkow). After the men had appeared for
    inspection, all those who were chosen were arrested at once,
    loaded into trains and sent to the Reich. Such recruiting of
    laborers for the Reich also took place in other areas of this
    district. Following some interventions the action was then
    stopped”. (_1526-PS_)

The resistance of the Polish people to this Nazi enslavement program and
the necessity for increased force were described by Sauckel’s deputy
Timm at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, Hitler’s wartime
planning agency, which was composed of Speer, Field Marshal Milch, and
State Secretary Koerner. The Central Planning Board was the highest
level economic planning agency, and exercised production controls by
allocating raw materials and labor to industrial users. Timm’s
statement, which was made at the 36th conference of the Board, is as
follows:

    “* * * Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is
    extraordinarily serious. It is well known that vehement battle
    occurred just because of these actions. The resistance against
    the administration established by us, is very strong. Quite a
    number of our men have been exposed to increased dangers, and it
    was just in the last two or three weeks that some of them were
    shot dead, e.g. the Head of the Labor Office of Warsaw who was
    shot in his office, and yesterday another man again. This is how
    matters stand presently, and the recruiting itself even if done
    with the best will remains extremely difficult unless police
    reinforcements are at hand.” (_R-124_)

B. _The Occupied Eastern Territories._

Deportation and enslavement of civilians reached unprecedented levels in
the Occupied Eastern Territories as a direct result of labor demands
made by Sauckel on Rosenberg, Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories, on Rosenberg’s subordinates, and on the Armed Forces. On 5
October 1942, for example, Sauckel wrote to Rosenberg stating that
2,000,000 more foreign laborers were required, and that the majority of
these would have to be drafted from the recently occupied Eastern
Territories and especially from the Ukraine. The letter, (_017-PS_)
reads as follows:

    “The Fuehrer has worked out new and most urgent plans for the
    armament which require the quick mobilization of two more
    million foreign labor forces. The Fuehrer therefore has granted
    me, for the execution of my decree of 21 March 1942, new powers
    for my new duties, and has especially authorized me to take
    whatever measures I think are necessary in the Reich, the
    Protectorate, the General-Gouvernement, as well as in the
    occupied territories, in order to assure at all costs an orderly
    mobilization of labor for the German armament industry. The
    additional required labor forces will have to be drafted for the
    majority from the recently occupied Eastern Territories,
    especially from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Therefore, the
    Reichskommissariat Ukraine must furnish:

    “225,000 labor forces by 31 December 1942 and 225,000 more by 1
    May 1943.

    “I ask you to inform Reichskommissar Gauleiter party fellow
    member Koch about the new situation and requirements and
    especially to see to it that he will support personally in any
    possible way the execution of this new requirement.

    “I have the intention to visit Party member Koch shortly and I
    would be grateful to you if you could inform me as to where and
    when I could meet him for a personal discussion.

    “Right now though, I ask that the procurement be taken up at
    once with every possible pressure and the commitment of all
    powers especially also of the experts of the labor offices. All
    the directives which had limited temporarily the procurement of
    Eastern laborers are annulled. The Reichs procurement for the
    next months must be given priority over all other measures.

    “I do not ignore the difficulties which exist for the execution
    of this new requirement, but I am convinced that with the
    ruthless commitment of all resources, and with the full
    cooperation of all those interested, the execution of the new
    demands can be accomplished for the fixed date. I have already
    communicated the new demands to the Reichskommissar Ukraine via
    mail. In reference to our long distance phone call of today I
    will send you the text of the Fuehrer’s decree at the beginning
    of next week.” (_017-PS_)

Again on 17 March 1943 Sauckel wrote Rosenberg, demanding the
importation of another 1,000,000 men and women from the Eastern
territories within the following four months (_019-PS_). Sauckel said:

    “After a protracted illness my Deputy for Labor Supply in the
    occupied Eastern Territories, State Councillor Peukert, is going
    there to regulate the labor supply both for Germany and the
    territories themselves.

    “I ask you sincerely, dear party member Rosenberg, to assist him
    to your utmost on account of the pressing urgency of Peukert’s
    mission. Already now I may thank you for the hitherto good
    reception accorded to Peukert. He himself has been charged by me
    with the absolute and completely unreserved cooperation with all
    bureaus of the Eastern Territories.

    “Especially the labor supply for the German agriculture, and
    likewise for the most urgent armament production programs
    ordered by the Fuehrer make the fastest importation of
    approximately 1 million women and men from the Eastern
    Territories within the next four months a must. Starting 15
    March the daily shipment must have reached 5,000 female and male
    workers respectively, while beginning of April this number has
    to be stepped up to 10,000. This is a requisite of the most
    urgent programs, and the spring tillage, and other agricultural
    tasks are not to suffer for the detriment of the nutrition and
    of the armed forces.

    “I have foreseen the allotment of the draft quotas for the
    individual territories in agreement with your experts for the
    labor supply as follows:—

    “Daily quota starting 15 March 1943:

                                                                _People_
 “From General Commissariat White Ruthenia                           500
 “Economic Inspection Center                                         500
 “Reichs Commissariat Ukraine                                      3,000
 “Economic Inspection South                                        1,000
                                                                     ———
 Total                                                             5,000

    “Starting 1 April 1943 the daily quota is to be doubled
    corresponding to the doubling of the entire quota.

    “I hope to visit personally the Eastern Territories towards the
    end of the month, and ask you once more for your kind support.”
    (_019-PS_)

Sauckel travelled to Kauen in Lithuania to press his demands. A synopsis
of a report of the City Commissioner of Kauen and minutes of a meeting
in which Sauckel participated, reveal that:

    “In a lecture which the Plenipotentiary for the
    _Arbeitseinsatz_, Gauleiter Sauckel made on 18 July 1943 in
    Kauen and in an official conference following it, between
    Gauleiter Sauckel and the General Commissar, the pool of labor
    in the Reich was again brought up urgently: Gauleiter Sauckel
    again demanded that Lithuanian labor be furnished in greater
    volume for the purposes of the Reich.” (_204-PS_)

Sauckel also visited Riga, Latvia, to assert his demands. The purpose of
this visit is described in a letter from the Reich Commissar for the
Ostland to the Commissioner General in Riga, dated 3 May 1943. The
letter states, in part:

    “In reference to the basic statements of the Plenipotentiary
    General for manpower, Gauleiter Sauckel on the occasion of his
    visit to Riga on 21 April 1943, and in view of the critical
    situation and in disregard of all contrary considerations, it
    was decided that a total of 183,000 workers have to be supplied
    from the Ostland for the Reich territory. This task must
    absolutely be accomplished within the next four months and at
    the latest must be completed by the end of August.” (_2280-PS_)

Sauckel asked the German Army for assistance in the recruitment and
deportation of civilian labor from the Eastern Territories. A secret
organization order of the Army Group South, dated 17 August 1943, is to
the following effect:

    “The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Employment ordered the
    recruitment and employment of all born during two years for the
    whole, newly occupied Eastern territory in Decree Az. VI A
    5780.28 (Inclosure 1), copy of which is inclosed. The Reich
    Minister for Armament and Munition approved this order.

    “According to this order by the Plenipotentiary General for
    Labor Employment (BGA) you have to recruit and to transport to
    the Reich immediately all labor forces in your territory born
    during 1926 and 1927. The decree relative labor duty and labor
    employment in the theater of operations of the newly occupied
    Eastern territory of the 6 February 1943 and the executive
    orders therefore are the authority for the execution of this
    measure. Enlistment must be completed by 30 Sept. 43 at the
    latest.” (_3010-PS_)

Clearly, the demands made by Sauckel did result in the deportation of
civilians from the occupied Eastern territories. Speer has stated in a
record of conferences with Hitler on 10, 11, and 12 August 1942 that:

    “Gauleiter Sauckel promises to make Russian labor available for
    the fulfillment of the iron and coal program and reports
    that—if required—he can supply a further million Russian
    laborers for the German armament industry up to and including
    October 1942. So far, he has already supplied 1 million for
    industry and 700,000 for agriculture. In this connection the
    Fuehrer states that the problem of providing labor can be solved
    in all cases and to any extent; he authorizes Gauleiter Sauckel
    to take all measures required.

    “He would agree to any necessary compulsion (_zwangsmassnahmen_)
    in the East as well as in the West if this question could not be
    solved on a voluntary basis.” (_R-124_)

           3. VIOLENT METHODS OF DEPORTATION FOR SLAVE LABOR

In order to meet these demands, the Nazi conspirators made terror,
violence, and arson the staple instruments of their policy of
enslavement. Twenty days after Sauckel’s demands of 5 October 1942, a
high official in Rosenberg’s Ministry by the name of Braeutigam, in a
Top Secret memorandum dated 25 October 1942 described measures taken to
meet these demands:

    “* * * We now experienced the grotesque picture of having to
    recruit millions of laborers from the Occupied Eastern
    Territories, after prisoners of war have died of hunger like
    flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within
    Germany. Now the food question no longer existed. In the
    prevailing limitless abuse of the Slavic humanity ‘recruiting’
    methods were used which probably have their origin in the
    blackest periods of the slave trade. A regular manhunt was
    inaugurated. Without consideration of health or age the people
    were shipped to Germany where it turned out immediately that
    more than 100,000 had to be sent back because of serious
    illnesses and other incapabilities for work.” (_294-PS_)

Rosenberg on 21 December 1942 wrote to Sauckel, the instigator of these
brutalities, as follows:

    “The reports I have received show, that the increase of the
    guerilla bands in the occupied Eastern Regions is largely due to
    the fact that the methods used for procuring laborers in these
    regions are felt to be forced measures of mass deportations, so
    that the endangered persons prefer to escape their fate by
    withdrawing into the woods or going to the guerilla bands.”
    (_018-PS_)

An attachment to Rosenberg’s letter, consisting of parts excerpted from
letters of residents of the Occupied Eastern territories by Nazi
censors, relates that:

    “At our place, new things have happened. People are being taken
    to Germany. On Dec. 5, some people from the Kowkuski district
    were scheduled to go, but they didn’t want to and the village
    was set afire. They threatened to do the same thing in
    Borowytschi, as not all who were scheduled to depart wanted to
    go. Thereupon 3 truck loads of Germans arrived and set fire to
    their houses. In Wrasnytschi 12 houses and in Borowytschi 3
    houses were burned.

    “On Oct. 1 a new conscription of labor forces took place. From
    what has happened, I will describe the most important to you.
    You can not imagine the bestiality. You probably remember what
    we were told about the Soviets during the rule of the Poles. At
    that time we did not believe it and now it seems just as
    incredible. The order came to supply 25 workers, but no one
    reported. All had fled. Then the German militia came and began
    to ignite the houses of those who had fled. The fire became very
    violent, since it had not rained for 2 months. In addition the
    grain stacks were in the farm yards. You can imagine what took
    place. The people who had hurried to the scene were forbidden to
    extinguish the flames, beaten and arrested, so that 7 homesteads
    burned down. The policemen meanwhile ignited other houses. The
    people fell on their knees and kiss their hands, but the
    policemen beat them with rubber truncheons and threaten to burn
    down the whole village. I don’t know how this would have ended
    if I Sapurkany had not intervened. He promised that there would
    be laborers by morning. During the fire the militia went through
    the adjoining villages, seized the laborers and brought them
    under arrest. Wherever they did not find any laborers, they
    detained the parents, until the children appeared. That is how
    they raged throughout the night in Bielosirka. The workers which
    had not yet appeared till then, were to be shot. All schools
    were closed and the married teachers were sent to work here,
    while the unmarried ones go to work in Germany. They are now
    catching humans like the dog-catchers used to catch dogs. They
    are already hunting for one week and have not yet enough. The
    imprisoned workers are locked in at the schoolhouse. They cannot
    even go out to perform their natural functions, but have to do
    it like pigs in the same room. People from many villages went on
    a certain day to a pilgrimage to the monastery Potschaew. They
    were all arrested, locked in, and will be sent to work. Among
    them there are lame, blind and aged people”. (_018-PS_)

Rosenberg, nevertheless, countenanced the use of force in order to
furnish slave labor to Germany and admitted his responsibility for the
“unusual and hard measures” that were employed. The transcript of an
interrogation of Rosenberg under oath on 6 October 1945, contains the
following admissions:

    “* * * Q. You recognized, did you not, that the quotas set by
    Sauckel could not be filled by voluntary labor, and you didn’t
    disapprove of the impressment of forced labor; isn’t that right?

    “A. I regretted that the demands of Sauckel were so urgent that
    they could not be met by a continuation of voluntary recruitment
    and thus I submitted to the necessity of forced impressment.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Q. The letters that we have already seen between you and
    Sauckel, do not indicate, do they, any disagreement on your part
    with the principle of recruiting labor against their will; they
    indicate, as I remember, that you were opposed to the treatment
    that was later accorded these workers; that you did not oppose
    their initial impressment.

    “A. That is right. In those letters I mostly discussed the
    possibility of finding the least harsh methods of handling the
    matter; whereas, in no way, I placed myself in opposition to the
    orders that he was carrying out for the Fuehrer.”

Moreover, in a letter dated 21 December 1942 Rosenberg stated:

    “* * * Even if I do not close my eyes to the necessity that the
    numbers demanded by the Reichs Minister for weapons and
    ammunition as well as by the agricultural economy justify
    unusual and hard measures, I have to ask, due to the
    responsibility for the occupied Eastern Territories which lies
    upon me, that in the accomplishment of the ordered tasks such
    measures be excluded, the toleration and prosecution of which
    will some day be held against me, and my collaborators.”
    (_018-PS_)

Arson was used as a terror device in the Ukraine to enforce conscription
measures. One instance is reported in a document from an official of the
Rosenberg Ministry dated 29 June 1944, enclosing a copy of a letter from
Paul Raab, a district commissioner in the territory of Wassilkow, to
Rosenberg. Raab’s letter reads as follows:

    “According to a charge by the Supreme Command of the Armed
    Forces I burned down a few houses in the territory of
    Wassilkow/Ukr. belonging to insubordinate people ordered for
    work-duty (_Arbeitseinsatzpflichtigen_). This accusation is
    true.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “During the year 1942, the conscription of workers was
    accomplished by way of propaganda. Only very rarely was force
    necessary. Only in August 1942, measures had to be taken against
    2 families in the villages Glewenka and Salisny-Chutter, each of
    which were to supply one person for labor. Both were requested
    in June for the first time, but didn’t obey although requested
    repeatedly. They had to be brought up by force, but succeeded
    twice to escape from the collecting camp, or when being on
    transport. Before the second arrest, the fathers of both of the
    men were taken into custody, to be kept as hostages and to be
    released only when their sons would show up. When, after the
    second escape, rearrest of both the fathers and boys was
    ordered, the police patrols ordered to do so, found the houses
    to be empty.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “That time I decided to take measures to show the increasingly
    rebellious Ukrainian youth that our orders have to be followed.
    I ordered the burning down of the houses of the fugitives.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “After the initial successes, a passive resistance of the
    population started, which finally forced me to start again on
    making arrests, confiscations, and transfers to labor camps.
    After a while a transport of people, obliged to work, overran
    the police in the railroad station in Wassilkow and escaped. I
    saw again the necessity for strict measures. A few ring leaders,
    which of course escaped before they were found in Plissezkoje
    and in Mitnitza. After repeated attempts to get hold of them,
    their houses were burned down.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “My actions against fugitive people obliged to work
    (_Arbeitseinsatzpflichtige_), were always reported to district
    commissioner Doehrer, in office in Wassilkow, and to the
    general-commissioner (_Generalkommissar_) in Kiev. Both of them
    know the circumstances and agreed with my measures, because of
    their success.” (_254-PS_)

The village of Biloserka in the Ukraine was also the victim of arson as
has already been related in the quotation from the enclosure to
Rosenberg’s letter of 21 December 1942 to Sauckel (_018-PS_). Additional
proof of resort to arson in this village is furnished by other
correspondence originating within the Rosenberg Ministry and dated 12
November 1943:

    “But even if Mueller had been present at the burning of houses
    in connection with the national conscription in Biloserka, this
    should by no means lead to the relief of Mueller from office. It
    is mentioned specifically in a directive of the Commissioner
    General in Lusk of 21 Sept 1942, referring to the extreme
    urgency of the national conscription.

    ‘Estates of those who refuse to work are to be burned, their
    relatives are to be arrested as hostages and to be brought to
    forced labor camps.’” (_290-PS_)

The SS was directed to participate in the abduction of slave laborers,
and in the case of raids on villages or burning of villages, to turn the
entire population over for slave labor in Germany. A secret SS order
dated 19 March 1943 (_3012-PS_) states:

    “The activity of the labor offices, resp. of recruiting
    commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible.
    It will not be possible always to refrain from using force.
    During a conference with the Chief of the Labor Commitment
    Staffs, an agreement was reached stating that whatever prisoners
    can be released, they should be put at the disposal of the
    Commissioner of the Labor Office. When searching (_Uberholung_)
    villages, resp., when it has become necessary to burn down
    villages, the whole population will be put at the disposal of
    the Commissioner by force.” (_3012-PS_)

From Shitomir, where Sauckel appealed for more workers for the Reich,
the Commissioner General reported on the brutality of the conspirators’
program, which he described as a program of coercion and slavery. This
is revealed in a secret report of a conference between the Commissioner
General of Shitomir and Rosenberg in Winniza on 17 June 1943 (_265-PS_).
The report is dated 30 June 1943 and is signed by Leyser. It reads as
follows:

    “The symptoms created by the recruiting of workers are, no
    doubt, well known to the Reichs Minister through reports and his
    own observations. Therefore, I shall not report them. It is
    certain that a recruitment of labor, in this sense of the word,
    can hardly be spoken of. In most cases, it is nowadays a matter
    of actual conscription by force.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “But as the Chief Plenipotentiary for the mobilization of labor
    explained to us the gravity of the situation, we had no other
    device. I consequently have authorized the commissioners of the
    areas to apply the severest measures in order to achieve the
    imposed quota. The deterioration of morale in conjunction with
    this does not necessitate any further proof. It is nevertheless
    essential to win the war on this front too. The problem of labor
    mobilization cannot be handled with gloves.” (_265-PS_)

These recruitment measures enslaved so many citizens of occupied
countries that entire areas were depopulated. Thus, a report from the
Chief of Main Office III with the High Command in Minsk, dated 28 June
1943, to Ministerialdirektor Riecke, a top official in the Rosenberg
Ministry states:

    “The recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, had
    disastrous effects. The recruitment measures in the last months
    and weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an irreparable
    political and economic effect. From White Ruthenia, approx.
    50,000 people have been obtained for the Reich so far. Another
    130,000 are to be obtained. Considering the 2.4 million total
    population these figures are impossible. * * *

    “Due to the sweeping drives (_Grossaktionen_) of the SS and
    police in November 1942, about 115,000 hectar farmland is not
    used, as the population is not there and the villages have been
    razed. * * *” (_3000-PS_)

The conspirators’ policy, of permanently weakening the enemy through the
enslavement of labor and breaking up of families, was applied in the
Occupied Eastern Territories after Rosenberg’s approval of a plan for
the apprehension and deportation of 40,000 to 50,000 youths of the ages
from 10 to 14. The stated purpose of this plan, approved by Rosenberg,
was to prevent a reinforcement of the enemy’s military strength and to
reduce the enemy’s biological potentialities. (_031-PS_)

Further evidence of the Nazi conspirators’ plan to weaken their enemies
in utter disregard of the rules of International Law is contained in a
secret order issued by a rear-area Military Commandant, to the District
Commissar at Kasatin on 25 December 1943. The order provided in part
that:

    “1. The able-bodied male population between 15 and 65 years of
    age and the cattle are to be shipped back from the district East
    of the line Belilowka-Berditschen-Shitomir (places excluded).”
    (_1702-PS_)

The program of enslavement and its accompanying measures of brutality
were not limited to Poland and the Eastern Occupied Territories, but
extended to Western Europe as well. Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Belgians, and
Italians all came to know the Nazi slavemasters. In France these
slavemasters intensified their program in the early part of 1943
pursuant to instructions which Speer telephoned to Sauckel from Hitler’s
headquarters at eight in the evening of 4 January 1943. These
instructions are found in a note for the files signed by Sauckel, dated
5 January 1943, which states:

    “1. On 4 January 1943 at 8 p. m. Minister Speer telephones from
    the Fuehrer’s headquarters and communicates that on the basis of
    the Fuehrer’s decision, it is no longer necessary to give
    special consideration to Frenchmen in the further recruiting of
    specialists and helpers in France. The recruiting can proceed
    with emphasis and sharpened measures.” (_556-13-PS_)

To overcome the resistance to his enslavement program, Sauckel
improvised new impressment measures which were applied in both France
and Italy by his own agents and which he himself labelled as grotesque.
At a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944 Sauckel
stated:

    “The most abominable point made by my adversaries is their claim
    that no executive had been provided within these areas in order
    to recruit in a sensible manner the Frenchmen, Belgians and
    Italians and to dispatch them to work. Thereupon I even
    proceeded to employ and train a whole batch of French male and
    female agents who for good pay just as was done in olden times
    for “shanghaiing” went hunting for men and made them drunk by
    using liquor as well as words, in order to dispatch them to
    Germany.

    “Moreover, I charged some able men with founding a special labor
    supply executive of our own, and this they did by training and
    arming with the help of the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer, a
    number of natives, but I still have to ask the Munitions
    Ministry for arms for the use of these men. For during the last
    year alone several dozens of very able labor executive officers
    have been shot dead. All these means I have to apply, grotesque
    as it sounds, to refute the allegation there was no executive to
    bring labor to Germany from these countries.” (_R-124_)

As in France, the slave hunt in Holland was accompanied by terror and
abduction. The “Statement of the Netherlands Government in view of the
Prosecution and Punishment of the German Major War Criminals”,
(_1726-PS_) contains the following account of the deportation of
Netherlands workmen to Germany:

    “Many big and reasonably large business concerns, especially in
    the metal industry, were visited by German commissions who
    appointed workmen for deportation. This combing out of the
    concerns was called the “Sauckel-action”, so named after its
    leader, who was charged with the appointment of foreign workmen
    in Germany.

    “The employers had to cancel the contracts with the appointed
    workmen temporarily, and the latter were forced to register at
    the labour offices, which then took care of the deportation
    under supervision of German ‘_Fachberater_.’

    “Workmen who refused (relatively few) were prosecuted by the
    _Sicherheitsdeinst_ (SD). If captured by this service, they were
    mostly lodged for some time in one of the infamous prisoners
    camps in the Netherlands and eventually put to work in Germany.

    “In this prosecution the _Sicherheitsdienst_ was supported by
    the German Police Service, which was connected with the labour
    offices, and was composed of members of the N.S.B. and the like.

    “At the end of April 1942 the deportation of working labourers
    started on a grand scale. Consequently in the months of May and
    June the number of deportees amounted to not less than 22,000,
    resp. 24,000 of which many were metal workers.

    “After that the action slackened somewhat, but in October 1942
    another top was reached (2,600). After the big concerns, the
    smaller ones had, in their turn, to give up their personnel.

    “This changed in November 1944. The Germans then started a
    ruthless campaign for manpower, passing by the labour offices.
    Without warning, they lined off whole quarters of the towns,
    seized people in the streets or in the houses and deported them.

    “In Rotterdam and Schiedam where these raids (razzia’s) took
    place on 10 and 11 November, the amount of people thus deported
    was estimated at 50,000 and 5,000 respectively.

    “In other places where the raids were held later, the numbers
    were much lower, because one was forewarned by the events. The
    exact figures are not known as they have never been published by
    the occupants.

    “The people thus seized were put to work partly in the
    Netherlands, partly in Germany * * *.” (_1726-PS_)

A document found in the OKH files furnishes further evidence of the
seizure of workers in Holland. This document contains the partial text
of a lecture delivered by a Lieutenant Haupt of the German _Wehrmacht_
concerning the situation of the war economy in the Netherlands:

    “There had been some difficulties with the _Arbeitseinsatz_,
    i.e., during the man-catching action (_Menchenfang Aktion_)
    which became very noticeable because it was unorganized and
    unprepared. People were arrested in the streets and taken out of
    their homes. It has been impossible to carry out a unified
    release procedure in advance, because for security reasons, the
    time for the action had not been previously announced.
    Certificates of release, furthermore, were to some extent not
    recognized by the officials who carried out the action. Not only
    workers who had become available through the stoppage of
    industry but also those who were employed in our installations
    producing things for our immediate need. They were apprehended
    or did not dare to go into the streets. In any case it proved to
    be a great loss to us. * * *” (_3003-PS_)

                 4. RESULTS OF THE SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM

The hordes of displaced persons in Germany today reflect the extent to
which the Nazi conspirators’ labor program succeeded. The best available
Allied and German data reveal that as of January 1945 approximately
4,795,000 foreign civilian workers had been put to work for the German
war effort in the old Reich, among them slave laborers of more than 14
different nationalities. An affidavit executed by Edward L. Deuss, an
economic analyst, contains the following statistical summation:

“_APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS PUT TO WORK FOR THE GERMAN WAR EFFORT
                           IN THE OLD REICH_”
                         [Status January 1945]

   Nationality  │   Workers   │    P/W’s    │ Politicals  │    Total
                │             │             │             │
 Russians       │    1,900,000│      600,000│       11,000│    2,500,000
                │      764,000│      750,000│             │    1,525,000
 Poles          │      851,000│       60,000│             │      911,000
 Italians       │      227,000│      400,000│             │      627,000
 Dutch          │      274,000│             │        2,300│      277,000
 Belgians       │      183,000│       63,000│        8,900│      254,000
 Yugoslavs      │      230,000│             │             │      230,000
 Czechoslovaks  │      140,000│             │             │      140,000
 Balts          │      130,000│             │             │      130,000
 Greeks         │       15,000│             │             │       15,000
 Luxembourgers  │       14,000│             │        1,000│       15,000
 Hungarians     │       10,000│             │             │       10,000
 Rumanians      │        5,000│             │             │        5,000
 Bulgarians     │        2,000│             │             │        2,000
 Others         │       50,000│             │             │       50,000
                │         ————│         ————│         ————│         ————
     Totals     │    4,795,000│    1,873,000│       23,200│    6,691,000

    “Note: Of the estimated 6,691,000 approximately 2,000,000
    civilian foreigners and 245,000 prisoners of war were employed
    directly in the manufacture of armaments and munitions (end
    products or components) on the 31 December 1944, according to
    Speer Ministry tabulations. The highest number of prisoners of
    war so employed was 400,000 in June 1944, the decrease to
    December 1944 being accounted for in part by a change in status
    from prisoners to civilian workers. A figure of 2,070,000
    Russians uncovered in the American, British and French zones,
    given in ‘Displaced Persons Report No. 43,’ of the Combined
    Displaced Persons’ Executive, c/o G-5 Division, USFET, 30
    September 1945, was increased by 430,000 to allow for Russians
    estimated to have been found on German territory conquered by
    the Red Army.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The designation ‘Politicals’ at the head of the third column in
    the table should be taken to mean persons who upon being
    uncovered in Germany by the Allied forces asserted that they
    were arrested in their native countries for subversive
    activities against the Nazis, and were transported to Germany
    for incarceration. The figures do not include racial or
    religious deportees, nor persons imprisoned for crimes allegedly
    committed in Germany * * *.” (_2520-PS_)

Only a small proportion of the foreign workers brought to Germany were
volunteers. At the 1 March 1944 meeting of the Central Planning Board,
Sauckel made clear the vast scale of slavery. He stated:

    “* * * Out of five million foreign workers who arrived in
    Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily.” (_R-124_)

              5. CONDITIONS OF DEPORTATION AND SLAVE LABOR

The Nazi conspirators were not satisfied to tear 5,000,000 persons from
their families, their homes, and their country. They insisted that these
5,000,000 wretches, while being deported to Germany or after their
arrival, be degraded, beaten, and permitted to die for want of food,
clothing, and adequate shelter. Conditions of deportation are vividly
described in a report to Rosenberg concerning treatment of Ukrainian
labor (_054-PS_):

    “The starosts esp. village elders are frequently corruptible,
    they continue to have the skilled workers, whom they drafted,
    dragged from their beds at night to be locked up in cellars
    until they are shipped. Since the male and female workers often
    are not given any time to pack their luggage, etc., many skilled
    workers arrive at the Collecting Center for Skilled Workers with
    equipment entirely insufficient (without shoes, only two
    dresses, no eating and drinking utensils, no blankets, etc.). In
    particularly extreme cases new arrivals therefore have to be
    sent back again immediately to get the things most necessary for
    them. If people do not come along at once, threatening and
    beating of skilled workers by the above-mentioned militia is a
    daily occurrence and is reported from most of the communities.
    In some cases women were beaten until they could no longer
    march. One bad case in particular was reported by me to the
    commander of the civil police here (Colonel Samek) for severe
    punishment (place Sozolinkow, district Dergatschi). The
    encroachments of the starosts and the militia are of a
    particularly grave nature because they usually justify
    themselves by claiming that all that is done in the name of the
    German Armed Forces. In reality the latter have conducted
    themselves throughout in a highly understanding manner toward
    the skilled workers and the Ukrainian population. The same,
    however, can not be said of some of the administrative agencies.
    To illustrate this be it mentioned, that a woman once arrived
    being dressed with barely more than a shirt.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * On the basis of reported incidents, attention must be
    called to the fact that it is irresponsible to keep workers
    locked in the cars for many hours so that they cannot even take
    care of the calls of nature. It is evident that the people of a
    transport must be given an opportunity from time to time in
    order to get drinking water, to wash, and in order to relieve
    themselves. Cars have been showed in which people had made holes
    so that they could take care of the calls of nature. When
    nearing bigger stations persons should, if possible, relieve
    themselves far from these stations.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The following abuses were reported from the delousing stations:

    “In the women’s and girls’ shower rooms, services were partly
    performed by men or men would mingle around or even helped with
    the soaping; and vice versa, there were female personnel in the
    men’s shower rooms; men also for some time were taking
    photographs in the women’s shower rooms. Since mainly Ukrainian
    peasants were transported in the last months, as far as the
    female portion of these are concerned, they were mostly of a
    high moral standard and used to strict decency, they must have
    considered such a treatment as a national degradation. The
    above-mentioned abuses have been, according to our knowledge,
    settled by the intervention of the transport commanders. The
    reports of the photographing were made from Halle; the reports
    about the former were made from Kiewerce. Such incidents in
    complete disregard of the honor and respect of the Greater
    German Reich may still occur again here or there.” (_054-PS_)

Sick and infirm citizens of the occupied countries were taken
indiscriminately with the rest. Those who managed to survive the trip
into Germany, but who arrived too sick to work, were returned like
cattle, together with those who fell ill at work, because they were of
no further use to the Germans. The return trip took place under the same
conditions as the initial journey, and without any kind of medical
supervision. Death came to many, and their corpses were unceremoniously
dumped out of the cars with no provision for burial. Thus, the report
continues:

    “* * * Very depressing for the morale of the skilled workers and
    the population is the effect of those persons shipped back from
    Germany for having become disabled or not having been fit for
    labor commitment from the very beginning. Several times already
    transports of skilled workers on their way to Germany have
    crossed returning transports of such disabled persons and have
    stood on the tracks alongside of each other for a longer period
    of time. Those returning transports are insufficiently cared
    for. Nothing but sick, injured of weak people, mostly 50-60 to a
    car, are usually escorted by 3-4 men. There is neither
    sufficient care or food. The returnees made frequently
    unfavourable—but surely exaggerated—statements relative to
    their treatment in Germany and on the way. As a result of all
    this and of what the people could see with their own eyes, a
    psychosis of fear was evoked among the specialist workers resp.
    the whole transport to Germany. Several transport leaders of the
    62d and the 63d in particular reported thereto in detail. In one
    case the leader of the transport of skilled workers observed
    with own eyes how a person who died of hunger was unloaded from
    a returning transport on the side track. (1st Lt. Hofman of the
    63rd transport Station Darniza). Another time it was reported
    that 3 dead had to be deposited by the side of the tracks on the
    way and had to be left behind unburied by the escort. It is also
    regrettable that these disabled persons arrive here without any
    identification. According to the reports of the transport
    commanders one gets the impression that these persons unable to
    work are assembled, penned into the wagons and are sent off
    provided only by a few men escort, and without special care for
    food and medical or other attendance. The Labor Office at the
    place of arrival as well as the transport commanders confirm
    this impression.” (_054-PS_)

Mothers in childbirth shared cars with those infected with tuberculosis
or venereal diseases. Babies when born were hurled out of windows. Dying
persons lay on the bare floors of freight cars without even the small
comfort of straw. These conditions are revealed in an interdepartmental
report prepared by Dr. Gutkelch in Rosenberg’s Ministry, dated 30
September 1942, from which the following quotation is taken:

    “How necessary this interference was is shown by the fact that
    this train with returning laborers had stopped at the same place
    where a train with newly recruited Eastern laborers had stopped.
    Because of the corpses in the train-load of returning laborers,
    a catastrophe might have been precipitated had it not been for
    the mediation of Mrs. Miller. In this train women gave birth to
    babies who were thrown out of the windows during the journey,
    people having tuberculosis and venereal diseases rode in the
    same car, dying people lay in freight cars without straw, and
    one of the dead was thrown on the railway embankment. The same
    must have occurred in other returning transports.” (_084-PS_)

Some aspects of Nazi transport were described by Sauckel himself in a
decree which he issued on 20 July 1942, (_2241-PS_). The original decree
is published in section B1a, page 48e of a book entitled “_Die
Beschaeftigung von auslaendischen Arbeitskraeften in Deutschland_.” The
decree reads, in part, as follows:

    “According to reports of transportation commanders
    (_Transportleiters_) presented to me, the special trains
    provided by the German railway have frequently been in a really
    deficient condition. Numerous windowpanes have been missing in
    the coaches. Old French coaches without lavatories have been
    partly employed so that the workers had to fit up an emptied
    compartment as a lavatory. In other cases, the coaches were not
    heated in winter so that the lavatories quickly became unusable
    because the water system was frozen and the flushing apparatus
    was therefore without water.” (_2241-PS_)

Many of the foregoing documents, it will be noted, consist of complaints
by functionaries of the Rosenberg ministry or by others concerning the
conditions under which foreign workers were recruited and compelled to
live. These documents establish not only the facts therein recited, but
also show that the Nazi conspirators had knowledge of such conditions.
Notwithstanding their knowledge of these conditions, however, the Nazi
conspirators continued to countenance and assist in the enslavement of a
vast number of citizens of occupied countries.

Once within Germany, slave laborers were subjected to treatment of an
unusually brutal and degrading nature. The character of Nazi treatment
was in part made plain by the conspirator’s own statements. Sauckel
declared on one occasion:

    “All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as
    to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest
    conceivable degree of expenditure.” (_016-PS_)

Force and brutality as instruments of production found a ready adherent
in Speer who, in the presence of Sauckel, said at a meeting of the
Central Planning Board:

    “We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the
    sick-list decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in factories
    where doctors are on the staff who are examining the sick men.
    There is nothing to be said against SS and police taking drastic
    steps and putting those known as slackers into concentration
    camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen several times and
    the news will soon go round.” (_R-124_)

At a later meeting of the Central Planning Board, Field Marshall Milch
agreed that so far as workers were concerned,

    “The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler’s
    trustworthy hands.” (_R-124_)

Milch made particular reference to foreign workers by stating:

    “It is therefore not possible to exploit fully all the
    foreigners unless we compel them by piece-work or we have the
    possibility of taking measures against foreigners who are not
    doing their bit.” (_R-124_)

The policy as actually executed was even more Draconian than the policy
as planned by the conspirators. Impressed workers were underfed and
overworked. They were forced to live in grossly overcrowded camps where
they were held as virtual prisoners and were otherwise denied adequate
shelter. They were denied adequate clothing, adequate medical care and
treatment and, as a result, suffered from many diseases and ailments.
They were generally forced to work long hours up to and beyond the point
of exhaustion. They were beaten and subjected to inhuman indignities.

An example of this mistreatment is found in the conditions which
prevailed in the Krupp factories. Foreign laborers at the Krupp Works
were given insufficient food to enable them to perform the work required
of them. A memorandum upon Krupp stationery to Mr. Hupe, director of the
Krupp Locomotive Factory in Essen, dated 14 March 1942, states:

    “During the last few days we established that the food for the
    Russians employed here is so miserable, that the people are
    getting weaker from day to day.

    “Investigations showed that single Russians are not able to
    place a piece of metal for turning into position for instance,
    because of lack of physical strength. The same conditions exist
    at all places of work where Russians are employed.” (_D-316_)

The condition of foreign workers in Krupp workers camps is described in
detail in an affidavit executed in Essen, Germany, on 15 October 1945 by
Dr. Wilhelm Jager, who was the senior camp doctor. Dr. Jager makes the
following statement:

    “* * * Conditions in all these camps were extremely bad. The
    camps were greatly overcrowded. In some camps there were twice
    as many people in a barrack as health conditions permitted. At
    Kramerplatz, the inhabitants slept in treble-tiered bunks, and
    in the other camps they slept in double-tiered bunks. The health
    authorities prescribed a _minimum_ space between beds of 50 cm.
    but the bunks in these camps were separated by a _maximum_ of
    20-30 cm.

    “The diet prescribed for the eastern workers was altogether
    insufficient. They were given 1,000 calories a day less than the
    minimum prescribed for any German. Moreover, while German
    workers engaged in the heaviest work received 5,000 calories a
    day, the eastern workers in comparable jobs received only 2,000
    calories. The eastern workers were given only 2 meals a day and
    their bread ration. One of these two meals consisted of a thin,
    watery soup. I had no assurance that the eastern workers, in
    fact, received the minimum which was prescribed. Subsequently,
    in 1943, when I undertook to inspect the food prepared by the
    cooks, I discovered a number of instances in which food was
    withheld from the workers.

    “The plan for food distribution called for a small quantity of
    meat per week. Only inferior meats, rejected by the veterinary
    such as horse meat or tuberculin infested was permitted for this
    purpose. This meat was usually cooked into a soup.

    “The clothing of the eastern workers was likewise completely
    inadequate. They worked and slept in the same clothing in which
    they had arrived from the east. Virtually all of them had no
    overcoats and were compelled, therefore, to use their blankets
    as coats in cold and rainy weather. In view of the shortage of
    shoes many workers were forced to go to work in their bare feet,
    even in the winter. Wooden shoes were given to some of the
    workers, but their quality was such as to give the workers sore
    feet. Many workers preferred to go to work in their bare feet
    rather than endure the suffering caused by the wooden shoes.
    Apart from the wooden shoes, no clothing of any kind was issued
    to the workers until the latter part of 1943, when a single blue
    suit was issued to some of them. To my knowledge, this
    represented the sole issue of clothing to the workers from the
    time of their arrival until the American forces entered Essen.

    “Sanitary conditions were exceedingly bad. At Kramerplatz, where
    approximately 1,200 eastern workers were crowded into the rooms
    of an old school, the sanitary conditions were atrocious in the
    extreme. Only 10 children’s toilets were available for the 1,200
    inhabitants. At Dechenschule, 15 children’s toilets were
    available for the 400-500 eastern workers. Excretion
    contaminated the entire floors of these lavatories. There were
    also few facilities for washing. The supply of bandages,
    medicine, surgical instruments, and other medical supplies at
    these camps was likewise altogether insufficient. As a
    consequence, only the very worst cases were treated.

    “The percentage of eastern workers who were ill was twice as
    great as among the Germans. Tuberculosis was particularly
    widespread among the eastern workers. The T. B. rate among them
    was 4 times the normal rate of (2 percent eastern workers,
    German .5 percent). At Dechenschule approximately 2½ percent of
    the workers suffered from open T. B. These were all active T. B.
    cases. The Tartars and Kirghis suffered most; as soon as they
    were overcome by this disease they collapsed like flies. The
    cause was bad housing, the poor quality and insufficient
    quantity of food, overwork, and insufficient rest.

    “These workers were likewise afflicted with spotted fever. Lice
    the carrier of this disease, together with countless fleas, bugs
    and other vermin tortured the inhabitants of these camps. As a
    result of the filthy conditions of the camps nearly all eastern
    workers were afflicted with skin disease. The shortage of food
    also caused many cases of Hunher-Oedem, Nephritis, and
    Shighakruse.

    “It was the general rule that workers were compelled to go to
    work unless a camp doctor had prescribed that they were unfit
    for work. At Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germanistrasse,
    Kapitanlehmannstrasse, and Dechenschule, there was no daily sick
    call. At these camps, the doctors did not appear for two or
    three days. As a consequence, workers were forced to go to work
    despite illnesses.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Camp Humboldstrasse has been inhabitated by Italian prisoners
    of war. After it had been destroyed by an air raid, the Italians
    were removed and 600 Jewish females from Buchenwald
    Concentration Camp were brought in to work at the Krupp
    factories. Upon my first visit at Camp Humboldstrasse, I found
    these females suffering from open festering wounds and other
    diseases.

    “I was the first doctor they had seen for at least a fortnight.
    There was no doctor in attendance at the camp. There was no
    medical supplies in the camp. They had no shoes and went about
    in their bare feet. The sole clothing of each consisted of a
    sack with holes for their arms and head. Their hair was shorn.
    The camp was surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded by SS
    guards.

    “The amount of food in the camp was extremely meagre and of very
    poor quality. The houses in which they lived consisted of the
    ruins of former barracks and they afforded no shelter against
    rain and other weather conditions. I reported to my superiors
    that the guards lived and slept outside their barracks as one
    could not enter them without being attacked by 10, 20 and up to
    50 fleas. One camp doctor employed by me refused to enter the
    camp again after he had been bitten very badly. I visited this
    camp with a Mr. Green on two occasions and both times we left
    the camp badly bitten. We had great difficulty in getting rid of
    the fleas and insects which had attacked us. As a result of this
    attack by insects of this camp, I got large boils on my arms and
    the rest of my body. I asked my superiors at the Krupp works to
    undertake the necessary steps to de-louse the camp so as to put
    an end to this unbearable, vermin-infested condition. Despite
    this report, I did not find any improvement in sanitary
    conditions at the camp on my second visit a fortnight later.

    “When foreign workers finally became too sick to work or were
    completely disabled they were returned to the Labour Exchange in
    Essen and from there, they were sent to a camp at
    Friedrichsfeld. Among persons who were returned over to the
    Labour Exchange were aggravated cases of tuberculosis, malaria,
    neurosis, career which could not be treated by operation, old
    age, and general feebleness. I know nothing about conditions at
    this camp because I have never visited it. I only know that it
    was a place to which workers who no longer of any use to Krupp
    were sent.

    “My colleagues and I reported all of the foregoing matters to
    Mr. Ihh, Director of Friedrich Krupp A. G. Dr. Wiels, personal
    physician of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Senior Camp
    Leader Kupke, and at all times to the health department.
    Moreover, I know that these gentlemen personally visited the
    camps.

                           “(Signed) Dr. Wilhelm Jager.” (_D-288_)

The conditions just described were not confined to the Krupp factories
but existed throughout Germany. A report of the Polish Main Committee to
the Administration of the Government-General of Poland, dated 17 May
1944, describes in similar terms the situation of Polish workers in
Germany (_R-103_):

    “The cleanliness of many overcrowded camp rooms is contrary to
    the most elementary requirements. Often there is no opportunity
    to obtain warm water for washing; therefore the cleanest parents
    are unable to maintain even the most primitive standard of
    hygiene for their children or often even to wash their only set
    of linen. A consequence of this is the spreading of scabies
    which cannot be eradicated * * *

    “We receive imploring letters from the camps of Eastern workers
    and their prolific families beseeching us for food. The quantity
    and quality of camp rations mentioned therein—the so-called
    fourth grade of rations—is absolutely insufficient to maintain
    the energies spent in heavy work. 3.5 kg. of bread weekly and a
    thin soup at lunch time, cooked with swedes or other vegetables
    without any meat or fat, with a meager addition of potatoes now
    and then is a hunger ration for a heavy worker.

    “Sometimes punishment consists of starvation which is inflicted,
    i.e. for refusal to wear the badge, ‘East’. Such punishment has
    the result that workers faint at work (Klosterteich Camp,
    Gruenheim, Saxony). The consequence is complete exhaustion, an
    ailing state of health and tuberculosis. The spreading of
    tuberculosis among the Polish factory workers is a result of the
    deficient food rations meted out in the community camps because
    energy spent in heavy work cannot be replaced * * *.

    “The call for help which reaches us, brings to light starvation
    and hunger, severe stomach intestinal trouble especially in the
    case of children resulting from the insufficiency of food which
    does not take into consideration the needs of children. Proper
    medical treatment or care for the sick are not available in the
    mass camps. * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In addition to these bad conditions, there is lack of
    systematic occupation for and supervision of these hosts of
    children which affects the life of prolific families in the
    camps. The children, left to themselves without schooling or
    religious care, must run wild and grow up illiterate. Idleness
    in rough surroundings may and will create unwanted results in
    these children * * *. An indication of the awful conditions this
    may lead to is given by the fact that in the camps for Eastern
    workers—(camp for Eastern workers, ‘Waldlust’, Post Office
    Lauf, Pegnitz)—there are cases of 8-year old delicate and
    undernourished children put to forced labor and perishing from
    such treatment.

    “The fact that these bad conditions dangerously affect the state
    of health and the vitality of the workers is proved by the many
    cases of tuberculosis found in very young people returning from
    the Reich to the General-Government as unfit for work. Their
    state of health is usually so bad that recovery is out of the
    question. The reason is that a state of exhaustion resulting
    from overwork and a starvation diet is not recognized as an
    ailment until the illness betrays itself by high fever and
    fainting spells.

    “Although some hostels for unfit workers have been provided as a
    precautionary measure, one can only go there when recovery may
    no longer be expected—(Neumarkt in Bavaria). Even there the
    incurables waste away slowly, and nothing is done even to
    alleviate the state of the sick by suitable food and medicines.
    There are children there with tuberculosis whose cure would not
    be hopeless and men in their prime who if sent home in time to
    their families in rural districts, might still be able to
    recover.

    “No less suffering is caused by the separation of families when
    wives and mothers of small children are away from their families
    and sent to the Reich for forced labor.* * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “If, under these bad conditions, there is no moral support such
    as is normally based on regular family life, then at least such
    moral support which the religious feelings of the Polish
    population require should be maintained and increased. The
    elimination of religious services, religious practice and
    religious care from the life of the Polish workers, the
    prohibition of church attendance at a time when there is a
    religious service for other people and other measures show a
    certain contempt for the influence of religion on the feelings
    and opinions of the workers.” (_R-103_)

Particularly harsh and brutal treatment was reserved for workers
imported from the conquered Eastern territories. They lived in bondage,
were quartered in stables with animals, and were denied the right of
worship and the pleasures of human society. A document entitled
“Directives on the Treatment of Foreign Farmworkers of Polish
Nationality”, issued by the Minister for Finance and Economy of Baden on
6 March 1941, describes this treatment (_EC-68_):

    “The agencies of the Reich Food Administration
    (_Reichsnaehrstand_) State Peasant Association of Baden have
    received the result of the negotiations with the Higher SS and
    Police Officer in Stuttgart on 14 February 1941, with great
    satisfaction. Appropriate memoranda have already been turned
    over to the District Peasants’ Associations. Below, I promulgate
    the individual regulations, as they have been laid down during
    the conference and how they are now to be applied accordingly:

    “1. Fundamentally, farmworkers of Polish nationality no longer
    have the right to complain, and thus no complaints may be
    accepted any more by any official agency.

    “2. The farmworkers of Polish nationality may not leave the
    localities in which they are employed, and have a curfew from 1
    October to 31 March from 2000 hours to 0600 hours, and from 1
    April to 30 September from 2100 hours to 0500 hours.

    “3. The use of bicycles is strictly prohibited. Exceptions are
    possible for riding to the place of work in the field if a
    relative of the employer or the employer himself is present.

    “4. The visit of churches, regardless of faith, is strictly
    prohibited, even when there is no service in progress.
    Individual spiritual care by clergymen outside of the church is
    permitted.

    “5. Visits to theaters, motion pictures or other cultural
    entertainment are strictly prohibited for farmworkers of Polish
    nationality.

    “6. The visit of restaurants is strictly prohibited to
    farmworkers of Polish nationality except for one restaurant in
    the village, which will be selected by the Rural Councillor’s
    office (_Landratsamt_), and then only one day per week. The day,
    which is determined as the day to visit the restaurant, will
    also be determined by the _Landratsamt_. This regulation does
    not change the curfew regulation mentioned above under No. 2.

    “7. Sexual intercourse with women and girls is strictly
    prohibited, and where it is established, it must be reported.

    “8. Gatherings of farmworkers of Polish nationality after work
    is prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables, or
    in the living quarters of the Poles.

    “9. The use of railroads, buses or other public conveyances by
    farmworkers of Polish nationality is prohibited.

    “10. Permits to leave the village may only be granted in very
    exceptional cases, by the local police authority (Mayor’s
    office). However, in no case may it be granted if he wants to
    visit a public agency on his own, whether it is a labor office
    or the District Peasants Association or whether he wants to
    change his place of employment.

    “11. Arbitrary change of employment is strictly prohibited. The
    farmworkers of Polish nationality have to work daily so long as
    the interests of the enterprise demands it, and as it is
    demanded by the employer. There are no time limits to the
    working time.

    “12. Every employer has the right to give corporal punishment
    toward farmworkers of Polish nationality, if instructions and
    good words fail. The employer may not be held accountable in any
    such case by an official agency.

    “13. Farmworkers of Polish nationality should, if possible, be
    removed from the community of the home and they can be quartered
    in stables, etc. No remorse whatever should restrict such
    action.

    “14. Report to the authorities is compulsory in all cases, when
    crimes have been committed by farmworkers of Polish nationality,
    which are to sabotage the enterprise or slow down work, for
    instance unwillingness to work, impertinent behavior; it is
    compulsory even in minor cases. An employer, who loses his Pole
    who must serve a longer prison sentence because of such a
    compulsory report, will receive another Pole from the competent
    labor office on request with preference.

    “15. In all other cases, only the state police is still
    competent.

    “For the employer himself, severe punishment is contemplated if
    it is established that the necessary distance from farmworkers
    of Polish nationality has not been kept. The same applies to
    women and girls. Extra rations are strictly prohibited.
    Noncompliance to the Reich tariffs for farmworkers of Polish
    nationality will be punished by the competent labor office by
    the taking away of the worker.” (_EC-68_)

The women of the conquered territories were led away against their will
to serve as domestics. Sauckel described this program as follows:

    “* * * In order to relieve considerably the German housewife,
    especially the mother with many children and the extremely busy
    farmwoman, and in order to avoid any further danger to their
    health, the Fuehrer also charged me with procurement of
    400,000-500,000 selected, healthy and strong girls from the
    territories of the East for Germany.” (_016-PS_)

Once captured, these Eastern women, by order of Sauckel, were bound to
the household to which they were assigned, permitted at the most three
hours of freedom a week, and denied the right to return to their homes.
The decree issued by Sauckel containing instructions for housewives
concerning Eastern household workers, provides in part, as follows:

    “* * * There is no claim for free time. Female domestic workers
    from the East may, on principle, leave the household only to
    take care of domestic tasks. As a reward for good work, however,
    they may be given the opportunity to stay outside the home
    without work for 3 hours once a week. This leave must end with
    the onset of darkness, at the latest at 20:00 hours. It is
    prohibited to enter restaurants, movies, or other theatres and
    similar establishments provided for German or foreign workers.
    Attending church is also prohibited. Special events may be
    arranged for Eastern domestics in urban homes by the German
    Workers’ Front, for Eastern domestics in rural homes by the
    Reich Food Administration with the German Women’s League
    (_Deutsches Frauenwerk_). Outside the home, the Eastern domestic
    must always carry her work card as a personal pass.

    “10. Vacations, Return to Homes.

    “Vacations are not granted as yet. The recruiting of Eastern
    domestics is for an indefinite period.” (_3044-B-PS_)

At all times the shadow of the Gestapo and the concentration camp
hovered over the enslaved workers. As with the other major programs of
the Nazi conspirators, Himmler’s black-shirted SS formations were the
instruments employed for enforcement. A secret order dated 20 February
1942, issued by Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler to SD and security police
officers spells out the violence which was applied against the Eastern
workers. (_3040-PS_):

    “III. Combatting violations against discipline.

    “(1) According to the equal status of the manpower from the
    original Soviet Russian territory with prisoners of war, a
    strict discipline must be exercised in the quarters and at the
    working place. Violations against discipline, including work
    refusal and loafing at work, will be fought exclusively by the
    secret State police. The smaller cases will be settled by the
    leader of the guard according to instruction of the State police
    administration offices with measures as provided for in the
    enclosure. To break acute resistance, the guards shall be
    permitted to use also physical power against the manpower. But
    this may be done only for a cogent cause.

    The manpower should always be informed about the fact that they
    will be treated decently when conducting themselves with
    discipline and accomplishing good work.

    “(2) In severe cases, that is in such cases where the measures
    at the disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the
    State police office has to act with its means. Accordingly, they
    will be treated, as a rule, only with strict measures, that is
    with transfer to a concentration camp or with special treatment.

    “(3) The transfer to a concentration camp is done in the usual
    manner.

    “(4) In especially severe cases special treatment is to be
    requested at the Reich Security Main Office, stating personnel
    data and the exact history of the act.

    “(5) Special treatment is hanging. It should not take place in
    the immediate vicinity of the camp. A certain number of manpower
    from the original Soviet Russian territory should attend the
    special treatment; at that time they are warned about the
    circumstances which led to this special treatment.

    “(6) Should special treatment be required within the camp for
    exceptional reasons of camp discipline, this is also to be
    requested.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “VI. Sexual Intercourse.

    “Sexual intercourse is forbidden to the manpower of the original
    Soviet Russian territory. By means of their closely confined
    quarters they have no opportunity for it. Should sexual
    intercourse be exercised nevertheless—especially among the
    individually employed manpower on the farms—the following is
    directed:

    “(1) For every case of sexual intercourse with German countrymen
    or women, special treatment is to be requested for male manpower
    from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a
    concentration camp for female manpower.

    “(2) When exercising sexual intercourse with other foreign
    workers, the conduct of the manpower from the original Soviet
    Russian territory is to be punished as severe violation of
    discipline with transfer to a concentration camp.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “VIII. Search.

    “(1) Fugitive workers from the original Soviet Russian territory
    are to be announced principally in the German search book
    (_Fanndungsbuch_). Furthermore, search measures are to be
    decreed locally.

    “(2) When caught, the fugitive must receive special treatment *
    * *.” (_3040-PS_)

             6. USE OF SLAVE LABOR IN GERMAN WAR INDUSTRIES

The primary purpose of the slave labor program was to compel the people
of the occupied countries to work for the German war economy. The decree
appointing Sauckel Plenipotentiary-General for Manpower declares the
purpose of the appointment to be to facilitate acquisition of the
manpower required for German war industries, and in particular the
armaments industry, by centralizing under Sauckel responsibility for the
recruitment and allocation of foreign labor and prisoners of war in
these industries (_1666-PS_). This decree, signed by Hitler, Lammers and
Keitel, and dated 21 March 1942, provides:

    “In order to secure the manpower requisite for the war
    industries as a whole, and particularly for armaments, it is
    necessary that the utilization of all available manpower,
    including that of workers recruited (_angeworbenen_) abroad and
    of prisoners of war, should be subject to a uniform control,
    directed in a manner appropriate to the requirements of war
    industry, and further that all still incompletely utilized
    manpower in the Greater German Reich, including the
    Protectorate, and in the General Government and in the occupied
    territories should be mobilized.

    “_Reichsstatthalter_ and _Gauleiter_ Fritz Sauckel will carry
    out this task within the framework of the Four Year Plan, as
    Plenipotentiary General, for the utilization of labor. In that
    capacity he will be directly responsible to the Commissioner for
    the Four Year Plan.

    “Section III (Wages) and Section V (Utilization of labor) of the
    Reich Labor Ministry, together with their subordinate
    authorities, will be placed at the disposal of the
    Plenipotentiary General for the accomplishment of his task.”
    (_1666-PS_)

Sauckel’s success can be gauged from a letter he wrote to Hitler on 15
April 1943, containing a report on one year’s activities:

    “1. After one year’s activity as Plenipotentiary for the
    Direction of Labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign
    workers were given to the German war economy from 1 April of
    last year to 31 March this year.

    “2. The 3,638,056 are distributed amongst the following branches
    of the German war economy

    Armament—1,568,801.” (_407-VI-PS_)

Further evidence of this use of enslaved foreign labor is found in a
report of a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 16 February 1944,
during which Field Marshal Milch stated:

    “The armament industry employs foreign workmen to a large
    extent; according to the latest figures—40 percent.” (_R-124_)

Moreover, according to tabulations of Speer’s Ministry, as of 31
December 1944 approximately two million civilian foreign workers were
employed directly in the manufacture of armaments and munitions (end
products or components). (_2520-PS_)

Sauckel, Speer, and Keitel also succeeded in forcing foreign labor to
construct military fortifications. Thus, citizens of France, Holland,
and Belgium were compelled against their will to engage in the
construction of the “Atlantic Wall”. Hitler, in an order dated 8
September 1942, initialed by Keitel, decreed that:

    “The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be
    erected in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that in
    the occupied territory all available workers should be committed
    and should give the fullest extent of their productive
    capacities. The previous allotment of domestic workers is
    insufficient. In order to increase it, I order the introduction
    of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing the place of
    employment without permission of the authorities in the occupied
    territories. Furthermore, the distribution of food and clothing
    ration cards to those subject to labor draft should in the
    future depend on the possession of a certificate of employment.
    Refusal to accept an assigned job, as well as abandoning the
    place of work without the consent of the authorities in charge,
    will result in the withdrawal of the food and clothing ration
    cards. The GBA (Deputy General for _Arbeitseinsatz_) in
    agreement with the military commander as well as the Reich
    Commissar, will issue the corresponding decrees for execution.”
    (_556-2-PS_)

Sauckel boasted to Hitler concerning the contribution of the forced
labor program to the construction of the Atlantic Wall by Speer’s
Organization Todt (OT). In a letter to Hitler dated 17 May 1943, Sauckel
wrote:

    “* * * In addition to the labor allotted to the total German
    economy by the Arbeitseinsatz since I took office, the
    Organization Todt was supplied with new labor continually. * * *

    “Thus, the Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make
    possible the completion of the Atlantic Wall.” (_407-VIII-PS_)

Similarly, Russian civilians were forced into labor battalions and
compelled to build fortifications to be used against their own
countrymen. A memorandum of the Rosenberg Ministry states that:

    “* * * men and women in the theaters of operations have been and
    will be conscripted into labor battalions to be used in the
    construction of fortifications * * *.” (_031-PS_)

In addition, the Nazi conspirators compelled Prisoners of War to engage
in operations of war against their own country and its Allies. At a
meeting of the Central Planning Board held on February 19, 1943,
attended by Speer, Sauckel, and Field Marshal Milch, the following
conversation occurred:

    “Sauckel: If any prisoners are taken, there, they will be
    needed.

    “Milch: We have made a request for an order that a certain
    percentage of men in the antiaircraft artillery must be
    Russians. 50,000 will be taken altogether; 30,000 are already
    employed as gunners. This is an amusing thing that Russians must
    work the guns.” (_R-124_)

(At this point a series of official German Army photographs were offered
in evidence. The first one shows Russian Prisoners of War acting as
ammunition bearers during the attack upon Tschudowo. The second group
consists of a series of official German Army photographs taken in July
and August 1941 showing Russian prisoners of war in Latvia and the
Ukraine being compelled to load and unload ammunition trains and trucks
and being required to stack ammunition.)

This use of prisoners of war was in flagrant disregard of the rules of
international law, particularly Article 6 of the Regulations annexed to
Hague Convention Number 4 of 1907, which provides that the tasks of
prisoners of war shall have no connection with the operations of war.

The Nazi conspirators made extensive use of prisoners of war not only in
active operations of war but also in the German armament industry. A
secret letter from the Reichminister of Labor to the Presidents of the
Regional Labor Exchange Offices refers to an order of Goering to the
effect that:

    “Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal, 100,000 men are to be
    taken from among the French PWs not yet employed in armament
    industry, and are to be assigned to the armament industry
    (airplanes industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting
    therefrom will be filled by Soviet PWs. The transfer of the
    above-named French PWs is to be accomplished by 1 October.”
    (_3005-PS_)

A similar policy was followed with respect to Russian prisoners of war.
In a secret memorandum issued from Hitler’s headquarters on 31 October
1942, Keitel directed the execution of Hitler’s order to use such
prisoners in the German war economy (_EC-194_):

    “The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous
    hindrance for the future German war and armament industry. The
    expected relief through discharges from the armed forces is
    uncertain as to the extent and date; however, its possible
    extent will by no means correspond to expectations and
    requirements in view of the great demand.

    “The Fuehrer has now ordered that even the working power of the
    Russian prisoner of war should be utilized to a large extent by
    large scale assignment for the requirements of the war industry.
    The prerequisite for production is adequate nourishment. Also
    very small wages are to be planned for the most modest supply
    with a few consumers’ goods (_Genussmittel_) for every day’s
    life, eventual rewards for production.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “II. _Construction and Armament Industry._

    “_a._ Work units for constructions of all kind, particularly for
    the fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers,
    unloading units for essential war plants).

    “_b._ Suitable armament factories which have to be selected in
    such a way that their personnel should consist in the majority
    of prisoners of war under guidance and supervision (eventually
    after withdrawal and other employment of the German workers).

    “III. _Other War Industries._

    “_a._ Mining as under II _b._

    “_b._ Railroad construction units for building tracks etc.

    “_c._ Agriculture and forestry in closed units. The utilization
    of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the basis of
    above examples by:

    “To I. The armed forces

    “To II. The Reich Minister for Arms and Ammunition and the
    Inspector General for the German road system in agreement with
    the Reich Minister for Labor and Supreme Commander of the Armed
    Forces (_Wi Rue Amt_). Deputies of the Reich Minister for Arms
    and Ammunition are to be admitted to the prisoner of war camps
    to assist in the selection of skilled workers.” (_EC-194_)

Goering, at a conference at the Air Ministry on 7 November 1941, also
discussed the use of prisoners of war in the armament industry. The Top
Secret notes on Goering’s instructions as to the employment and
treatment of prisoners of war in many phases of the German war industry
read as follows (_1206-PS_):

    “The Fuehrer’s point of view as to employment of prisoners of
    war in war industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5
    million prisoners of war—employed so far 2 million.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “For 4) _In the Interior and the Protectorate_, it would be
    ideal if entire factories could be manned by Russian PW’s except
    the employees necessary for direction. For employment in the
    Interior and the Protectorate the following are to have
    priority:

    “_a._ _At the top coal mining industry._

    “Order by the Fuehrer to investigate all mines as to suitability
    for employment of Russians. At times manning the entire plant
    with Russian laborers.

    “_b._ _Transportation_ (construction of locomotives and cars,
    repair shops).

    “Railroad-repair and industry workers are to be sought out from
    the PW’s. Railroad is most important means of transportation in
    the East.

    “_c._ _Armament industries_

    “Preferably factories of armor and guns. Possibly also
    construction of parts for airplane engines. Suitable complete
    sections of factories to be manned exclusively by Russians. For
    the remainder employment in columns. Use in factories of tool
    machinery, production of farm tractors, generators, etc. In
    emergency, erect in individual places barracks for occasional
    workers which are used as unloading details and similar
    purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior through communal
    authorities.)

    “OKW/AWA is competent for _transporting_ Russian PW’s employment
    through “_Planning Board for Employment of all PW’s_
    (_Planstelle fuer den Einsatz fuer alle Kriegsgefangenen_).” If
    necessary, offices of Reich Commissariates.

    “No employment where _danger to men_ or their supply exists,
    i.e. factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks,
    etc. No contact with German population, especially no
    ‘solidarity.’ German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians.

    “Food is a matter of the Four Years’ Plan. Supply their own food
    (cats, horses, etc.)

    “_Clothes_, _billeting_, _messing_ somewhat better than at home
    where part of the people live in caverns.

    “_Supply of shoes_ for Russians as a rule wooden shoes, if
    necessary install Russian shoe repair shops.

    “Examination of _physical fitness_, in order to avoid
    importation of diseases.

    “_Clearing of mines_ as a rule by Russians if possible by
    selected Russian engineers.” (_1206-PS_)

Speer also sponsored and applied the policy of using prisoners of war in
the armament industry. In a speech to the Nazi Gauleiters on 24 February
1942, Speer said:

    “I therefore proposed to the Fuehrer at the end of December that
    all my labor force, including specialists be released for mass
    employment in the East. Subsequently the remaining PW’s, about
    10,000 were put at disposal of the armaments industry by me.”
    (_1435-PS_)

Speer also reported at the 36th meeting of the Central Planning Board,
held on 22 April 1943, that only 30% of the Russian prisoners of war
were engaged in the armament industry. This he found unsatisfactory.
Speer continued:

    “There is a specified statement showing in what sectors the
    Russian PW’s have been distributed, and this statement is quite
    interesting. It shows that the armaments industry only received
    30%. I always complained about this.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The 90,000 Russian PW’s employed in the whole of the armaments
    industry are for the greatest part skilled men.” (_R-124_)

Sauckel, who was appointed Plenipotentiary General for the utilization
of labor for the express purpose, among others, of integrating prisoners
of war into the German war industry, made it plain that prisoners of war
were to be compelled to serve the German armament industry. His labor
mobilization program contains the following statement:

    “All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well
    as of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely
    incorporated into the German armament and nutrition industries.
    Their production must be brought to the highest possible level.”
    (_016-PS_)

    7. THE CONCENTRATION CAMP PROGRAM OF EXTERMINATION THROUGH WORK

A special Nazi program combined the brutality and the purposes of the
slave labor program with those of the concentration camp. The Nazis
placed Allied nationals in concentration camps and forced them, along
with the other inmates of the concentration camps, to work in the
armaments industry under conditions designed to exterminate them. This
was the Nazi program of extermination through work.

The program was initiated in the spring of 1942. It was outlined as
follows in a letter to Himmler, dated 30 April 1942, from his
subordinate Pohl, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS:

    “Today I report about the present situation of the concentration
    camps and about measures I have taken to carry out your order of
    the 3rd March 1942.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “1. The war has brought about a marked change in the structure
    of the concentration camps and has changed their duties with
    regard to the employment of the prisoners. The custody of
    prisoners for the sole reasons of security, education, or
    prevention is no longer the main consideration. The mobilization
    of all prisoners who are fit for work for purposes of the war
    now, and for purposes of construction in the forthcoming peace,
    come to the foreground more and more.

    “2. From this knowledge some necessary measures result with the
    aim to transform the concentration camps into organizations more
    suitable for the economic tasks, whilst they were formerly
    merely politically interested.

    “3. For this reason I have gathered together all the leaders of
    the former inspectorate of Concentration Camps, all Camp
    Commanders, and all managers and supervisors of work on the 23rd
    and 24th of April, 1942; I have explained personally to them
    this new development. I have compiled in the order attached the
    main essentials, which have to be brought into effect with the
    utmost urgency if the commencement of work for purposes of the
    armament industry is not to be delayed.” (_R-129_)

The order referred to in paragraph 3 above set the framework for a
program of relentless exploitation, providing in part as follows:

    “4. The camp commander alone is responsible for the employment
    of the labor available. This employment must be, in the true
    meaning of the word, exhaustive, in order to obtain the greatest
    measure of performance. Work is allotted by the Chief of the
    Department D centrally and alone. The camp-commanders themselves
    may not accept on their own initiative work offered by third
    parties and may not negotiate about it.

    “5. There is no limit to working hours. Their duration depends
    on the kind of working establishments in the camps and the kind
    of work to be done. They are fixed by the camp commanders alone.

    “6. Any circumstances which may result in a shortening of
    working hours (e.g. meals, roll-calls) have therefore to be
    restricted to the minimum which cannot be condensed any more. It
    is forbidden to allow long walks to the place of working and
    noon intervals only for eating purposes.” (_R-129_)

This armaments production program was not merely a scheme for mobilizing
the manpower potential of the camps. It was directly integrated into the
larger Nazi program of extermination. A memorandum of an agreement
between Himmler and the Minister of Justice, Thierack sets for the Nazi
objective of extermination through work:

    “* * * 2. The delivery of anti-social elements from the
    execution of their sentence to the Reich Fuehrer of SS to be
    worked to death. Persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies,
    Russians and Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences,
    Czechs and Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to
    the decision of the Reich Minister for Justice. First of all the
    worst anti-social elements amongst those just mentioned are to
    be handed over. I shall inform the Fuehrer of this through
    Reichsleiter Bormann.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “14. It is agreed that, in consideration of the intended aims of
    the Government for the clearing up of the Eastern problems, in
    future Jews, Poles, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians are no
    longer to be judged by the ordinary courts, so far as punishable
    offenses are concerned, but are to be dealt with by the Reich
    Fuehrer of SS. This does not apply to civil lawsuits, nor to
    Poles whose names are announced or entered in the German Racial
    Lists.” (_654-PS_)

In September, 1942, Speer arranged to bring this new source of labor
within his jurisdiction. Speer convinced Hitler that significant
production could be obtained only if the concentration camp prisoners
were employed in factories under the technical control of the Speer
Ministry instead of in camps. In fact, without Speer’s cooperation, it
would have been difficult to utilize the prisoners on any large scale
for war production since he would not allocate to Himmler the machine
tools and other necessary equipment. Accordingly, it was agreed that the
prisoners were to be exploited in factories under Speer’s control. To
compensate Himmler for surrendering this jurisdiction to Speer, Speer
proposed, and Hitler agreed, that Himmler would receive a share of the
armaments output, fixed in relation to the man hours contributed by his
prisoners. The minutes of Speer’s conference with Hitler on 20, 21, 22
September 1942, are as follows (_R-124_):

    “* * * I pointed out to the Fuehrer that, apart from an
    insignificant amount of work, no possibility exists of
    organizing armament production in the concentration camps,
    because:

    “1. the machine tools required are missing,

    “2. there are no suitable premises.

    “Both these assets would be available in the armaments industry,
    if use could be made of them by a second shift.

    “The Fuehrer agrees to my proposal, that the numerous factories
    set up outside towns for ARP reasons, should release their
    workers for supplementing the second shift in town factories and
    should in return be supplied with labor from the concentration
    camps—also two shifts.

    “I pointed out to the Fuehrer the difficulties which I expect to
    encounter if Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler should be able, as he
    requests, to exercise authoritative influence over these
    factories. The Fuehrer, too, does not consider such an influence
    necessary.

    “The Fuehrer however agrees that Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler should
    draw advantages from making his prisoners available; he should
    get equipment for his division.

    “I suggest to give him a share in kind (war equipment) in ratio
    to the working hours done by his prisoners. A 3-5% share is
    discussed, the equipment also being calculated according to
    working hours. The Fuehrer would agree to such a solution.

    “The Fuehrer is prepared to order the additional delivery of
    this equipment and weapons to the SS, according to a list
    submitted to him.” (_R-124_)

After a demand for concentration camp labor had been created, and a
mechanism set up by Speer for exploiting this labor in armament
factories, measures were evolved for increasing the supply of victims
for extermination through work. A steady flow was assured by the
agreement between Himmler and the Minister of Justice mentioned above.
This was implemented by such programs as the following, expressed in
Sauckel’s letter of 26 November 1942 to Presidents of Landes Employment
Offices regarding the program for the evacuation of Poles from the
Lublin district:

    “The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure
    will be put into concentration camps and put to work where they
    are criminal or asocial elements.” (_L-61_)

General measures were supplemented by special drives for persons who
would not otherwise have been sent to concentration camps. For example,
for “reasons of war necessity” Himmler ordered on 17 December 1942 that
at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work should be transferred
immediately to concentration camps, (_1063-D-PS_). The order provided
that:

    “For reasons of war necessity not to be discussed further here,
    the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police on 14
    December 1942 has ordered that until the end of January 1943, at
    least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work, are to be sent to the
    concentration camps. In order to reach this number, the
    following measures are required:

    “1. As of now (so far until 1 Feb. 1943) all eastern workers or
    such foreign workers who have been fugitives, or who have broken
    contracts, and who do not belong to allied, friendly or neutral
    States are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest
    concentration camps * * *.

    “2. The commanders and the commandants of the security police
    and the security service, and the chiefs of the State Police
    Headquarters will check immediately on the basis of a close and
    strict ruling

    _a._ the prisons

    _b._ the labor reformatory camps

    “All prisoners qualified for work, if it is essentially and
    humanly possible, will be committed at once to the nearest
    concentration camp, according to the following instructions, for
    instance also if penal procedures were to be established in the
    near future. Only such prisoners who in the interest of
    investigation procedures are to remain absolutely in solitary
    confinement can be left there.

    “_Every single laborer counts!_” (_1063-D-PS_)

Measures were also adopted to insure that extermination through work was
practiced with maximum efficiency. Subsidiary concentration camps were
established near important war plants. Speer has admitted that he
personally toured Upper Austria and selected sites for concentration
camps near various munitions factories in the area. This admission
appears in the transcript of an interrogation of Speer under oath on 18
October 1945, in which Speer stated:

    “The fact that we were anxious to use workers from concentration
    camps in factories and to establish small concentration camps
    near the factories in order to use the manpower that was
    available there was a general fact. But it did not only come up
    in connection with this trip.” [i.e. Speer’s trip to Austria].
    (_3720-PS_)

Goering endorsed this use of concentration camp labor and asked for
more. In a teletype which Goering sent to Himmler on 14 February 1944,
he stated:

    “At the same time I ask you to put at my disposal as great a
    number of concentration camp (KZ-) convicts as possible for air
    armament, as this kind of manpower proved to be very useful
    according to previous experience. The situation of the air war
    makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work of
    this kind concentration camp (KZ-) convicts can be especially
    well concentrated at work and in the camp.” (_1584-I-PS_)

Speer subsequently assumed responsibility for this program, and Hitler
promised Speer that if the necessary labor for the program could not be
obtained, a hundred thousand Hungarian Jews would be brought in by the
SS. Speer’s record of conferences with Hitler on April 6 and 7, 1944,
contain the following quotation:

    “* * * Suggested to the Fuehrer that, due to lack of builders
    and equipment, the second big building project should not be set
    up in German territory, but in close vicinity to the border on
    suitable soil (preferable on gravel base and with transport
    facilities) on French, Belgian or Dutch territory. The Fuehrer
    agrees to this suggestion if the works could be set up behind a
    fortified zone. For the suggestion of setting this plant up in
    French territory speaks mainly the fact that it would be much
    easier to procure the necessary workers. Nevertheless, the
    Fuehrer asks an attempt be made to set up the second works in a
    safer area, namely in the Protectorate. If it should prove
    impossible there, too, to get hold of the necessary workers, the
    Fuehrer himself will contact the Reichsfuehrer SS and will give
    an order that the required 100,000 men are to be made available
    by bringing in Jews from Hungary. Stressing the fact that the
    building organization of the _Industriegemeinschaft Schlesien
    Silesia_ was a failure, the Fuehrer demands that these works
    must be built by the O.T. exclusively and that the workers
    should be made available by the Reichsfuehrer SS. He wants to
    hold a meeting shortly in order to discuss details with all the
    men concerned.” (_R-124_)

The character of the treatment inflicted on Allied nationals and other
victims of concentration camps while they were being worked to death is
described in an official report prepared by a U.S. Congressional
Committee which inspected the liberated camps at the request of General
Eisenhower (_L-159_). The report states in part:

    “* * * The treatment accorded to these prisoners in the
    concentration camps was generally as follows: They were herded
    together in some wooden barracks not large enough for one-tenth
    of their number. They were forced to sleep on wooden frames
    covered with wooden boards in tiers of two, three and even four,
    sometimes with no covering, sometimes with a bundle of dirty
    rags serving both as pallet and coverlet.

    “Their food consisted generally of about one-half of a pound of
    black bread per day and a bowl of watery soup for noon and
    night, and not always that. Owing to the great numbers crowded
    into a small space and to the lack of adequate sustenance, lice
    and vermin multiplied, disease became rampant, and those who did
    not soon die of disease or torture began the long, slow process
    of starvation. Notwithstanding the deliberate starvation program
    inflicted upon these prisoners by lack of adequate food, we
    found no evidence that the people of Germany as a whole were
    suffering from any lack of sufficient food or clothing. The
    contrast was so striking that the only conclusion which we could
    reach was that the starvation of the inmates of these camps was
    deliberate.

    “Upon entrance into these camps, newcomers were forced to work
    either at an adjoining war factory or were placed ‘in commando’
    on various jobs in the vicinity, being returned each night to
    their stall in the barracks. Generally a German criminal was
    placed in charge of each ‘block’ or shed in which the prisoners
    slept. Periodically he would choose the one prisoner of his
    block who seemed the most alert or intelligent or showed the
    most leadership qualities. These would report to the guards’
    room and would never be heard from again. The generally-accepted
    belief of the prisoners was that these were shot or gassed or
    hanged and then cremated. A refusal to work or an infraction of
    the rules usually meant flogging and other types of torture,
    such as having the fingernails pulled out, and in each case
    usually ended in death after extensive suffering. The policies
    herein described constituted a calculated and diabolical program
    of planned torture and extermination on the part of those who
    were in control of the German Government * * *.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “On the whole, we found this camp to have been operated and
    administered much in the same manner as Buchenwald had been
    operated and managed. When the efficiency of the workers
    decreased as a result of the conditions under which they were
    required to live, their rations were decreased as punishment.
    This brought about a vicious circle in which the weak became
    weaker and were ultimately exterminated.” (_L-159_)

Such was the cycle of work, torture, starvation and death for
concentration camp labor—labor which Goering, while requesting that
more of it be placed at his disposal, said had proved very useful; labor
which Speer was “anxious” to use in the factories under his control.

                8. THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SAUCKEL

Sauckel bears special responsibility for the Nazi slave labor program
and the manner in which it was executed. Sauckel was appointed as
Plenipotentiary General for Manpower because he was an old and trusted
Nazi. He has certified, on 17 November 1945, that he held the following
positions:

    “1. Member of _Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei_
    (1925-1945). (Member of National Socialist German Workers Party.
    Member No. 1395.)

    2. Member of Reichstag (_Mitglied des Reichstags_) (1933-1945).

    3. Gauleiter of Thuringia (1927-1945).

    4. Member of Thuringian legislature (_Landtag_) (1927-1933/34).

    5. Minister of Interior and head of Thuringian State Ministry
    (May 1933).

    6. _Reichsstatthalter_ for Thuringia (1933-1945).

    7. SA Obergruppenfuehrer (November 1937-1945).

    8. SS Obergruppenfuehrer (January 1942-1945).

    9. Administrator Berlin-Suhler Waffen & Fahrzeugwerke (1935).

    10. Head of Gustloff-Werke Nationalsozialistische
    Industrie-Stiftung (1936). Honorary Head of Foundation.

    11. General Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation
    (_Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer den Arbeitseinsatz_) (21 March
    1942-1945).” (_2974-PS_)

Sauckel’s official responsibilities are borne out by other evidence. His
appointment as Plenipotentiary-General for Manpower was effected by a
decree of 21 March 1942 signed by Hitler, Lammers, and Keitel. By that
decree (_1666-PS_) Sauckel was given authority as well as responsibility
subordinate only to that of Hitler and Goering for all matters relating
to recruitment, allocation, and handling of foreign and domestic
manpower. Goering, to whom Sauckel was directly responsible, abolished
the recruitment and allocation agencies for the Four Year Plan,
delegated their powers to Sauckel and placed his far-reaching authority,
as deputy for the Four Year Plan, at Sauckel’s disposal. This was the
result of Goering’s decree dated 27 March 1942 (_1666-PS_) and providing
as follows:

    “In pursuance of the Fuehrer’s Decree of 21 March 1942 (RGBl I,
    179), I decree as follows:

    “1. My manpower sections (_Geschaeftsgruppen Arbeitseinsatz_)
    are hereby abolished (circular letter of 22 Oct 1936/St M. Dev.
    265). Their duties (recruitment and allocation of manpower,
    regulations for labor conditions (_Arbeitsbedingungen_)) are
    taken over by the Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz,
    who is directly under me.

    “2. The Plenipotentiary General for _Arbeitseinsatz_ will be
    responsible for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy)
    employed in the Reich Territory, having regard to the
    requirements of _Arbeitseinsatz_.

    “3. The Plenipotentiary General for _Arbeitseinsatz_ is part of
    the Four Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required,
    or existing laws required to be modified, he will submit
    appropriate proposals to me.

    “4. The Plenipotentiary General for _Arbeitseinsatz_ will have
    at his disposal for the performance of his task the right
    delegated to me by the Fuehrer for issuing instructions to the
    higher Reich authorities, their branches and the Party offices,
    and their associated organisms and also the Reich Protector, the
    General Governor, the Commander-in-Chief, and heads of the civil
    administrations. In the case of ordinances and instructions of
    fundamental importance a report is to be submitted to me in
    advance.” (_1666-PS_)

By a Hitler decree of 30 September 1942 Sauckel was given extraordinary
powers over the civil and military authorities of the territories
occupied by Germany. The decree (_1903-PS_) provided as follows:

    “I herewith authorize the Deputy General for the
    _Arbeitseinsatz_, Reich-governor and district leader (Gauleiter)
    Fritz Sauckel to take all necessary measures for the enforcement
    of my decree referring to a Deputy General for the
    _Arbeitseinsatz_ of 21 March 1942 (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, page
    179) according to his own judgment in the Greater German Reich,
    in the Protectorate, and in the Government General
    (_General-gouvernement_) as well as in the occupied territories,
    measures which will safeguard under all circumstances the
    regulated deployment of labor (_Geordneter Arbeitseinsatz_) for
    the German war-economy. For this purpose he may appoint
    commissioners (_Beauftragte_) to the bureaux of the military and
    civilian administration. These are subordinated directly to
    Deputy General for the _Arbeitseinsatz_. In order to carry out
    their tasks, they are entitled to issue directives to the
    competent military and civilian authorities in charge of the
    _Arbeitseinsatz_ and of wage-policy.

    “More detailed directives will be issued by the Deputy General
    for the _Arbeitseinsatz_.

    “Fuehrer-Headquarters, 30 Sept. 1942.

                                                     “The Fuehrer
                             “(signed)  Adolph Hitler.” (_1903-PS_)

Within a month after his appointment, Sauckel sent Rosenberg his “Labor
Mobilization Program”, which might more appropriately be termed
Sauckel’s “Charter of Enslavement.” This program envisaged the forcible
recruitment and the maximum exploitation of the entire labor resources
of the conquered areas and of prisoners of war in the interests of the
Nazi war machine, at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure to the
German State. Sauckel explained his plans in these terms:

    “It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous
    number of foreign labor has to be found for the Reich. The
    greatest pool for that purpose are the occupied territories of
    the East. Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the
    human reserves of the Conquered Soviet Territory to the fullest
    extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary amount
    of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately institute
    conscription or forced labor.

    “Apart from the prisoners of war still in the occupied
    territories, we must, therefore, requisition skilled or
    unskilled male and female labor from the Soviet territory from
    the age of 15 up for the labor mobilization * * *.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the
    use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men
    and women, has become an undisputable necessity for the solution
    of the mobilization of labor program in this war.” (_016-PS_)

Sauckel proceeded to implement this “Charter of Enslavement” with
certain basic directives. In Regulation No. 4, which he issued on 7 May
1942, Sauckel provided that if voluntary recruitment of foreign workers
was unsuccessful, compulsory service should be instituted. This
regulation provides:

    “The recruitment of foreign labor will be done on the
    fundamental basis of volunteering. Where, however, in the
    occupied territories the appeal for volunteers does not suffice,
    obligatory service and drafting must, under all circumstances,
    be resorted to. This is an indisputable requirement of our labor
    situation.” (_3044-PS_)

Sauckel provided also for the allocation of foreign labor in the order
of its importance to the Nazi war machine. Sauckel’s regulation No. 10
of 22 August 1942 had these aims:

    “* * * 3. The resources of manpower that are available in the
    occupied territories are to be employed primarily to satisfy the
    requirements of importance for the war, in Germany itself. In
    allocating the said labor resources in the Occupied Territories,
    the following order of priority will be observed:

    “(_a_) Labor required for the troops, the occupation
    authorities, and the civil authorities;

    “(_b_) Labor required for the German armaments (_Ruestungen_);

    “(_c_) Labor required for food and agriculture;

    “(_d_) Labor required for industrial work other than armaments,
    which is in the interest of Germany;

    “(_e_) Labor required for industrial work in the interests of
    the population of the territory in question.” (_3044-A-PS_)

Sauckel and agencies subordinate to him exercised exclusive authority
over the recruitment of workers from every area in Europe occupied by,
controlled by, or friendly to the German nation. Sauckel affirmed this
authority in the following decree:

    “The recruitment of foreign labor in the areas occupied by
    Germany, in allied, friendly or neutral states will be carried
    out exclusively by my commissioners, or by the competent German
    military or civil agencies for the tasks of labor mobilization.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “For the carrying out of recruitment in allied, friendly or
    neutral foreign countries, my commissioners are solely
    responsible.” (_3044-PS_)

Sauckel participated in the formulation of overall labor requirements
for Germany and assigned quotas to be filled by and with the assistance
of the individuals and agencies mentioned above, with knowledge that
force and brutality were the only means whereby his demands could be
met. Thus, the Lammer’s report states (_1292-PS_):

    “1. A conference took place with the Fuehrer today which was
    attended by:

    “The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor Gauleiter
    Sauckel,

    “The Secretary for Armament and War Production, Speer,

    “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army, General Field
    Marshal Keitel, General Field Marshal Milch,

    “The Acting Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture State
    Secretary Backe,

    “The Minister of the Interior, Reichfuehrer SS Himmler, and
    myself.

    (The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National
    Economy had repeatedly asked to be permitted to participate
    prior to the Conference, but the Fuehrer did not wish their
    attendance.)

    “The Fuehrer declared in his introductory remarks:

        ‘I want a clear picture:

        (1) How many workers are required for the maintenance of
        German War Economy?

        (_a_) For the maintenance of present output?

        (_b_) To increase its output?

        (2) How many workers can be obtained from Occupied
        Countries, or how many can still be gained in the Reich
        by suitable means (increased output)? For one thing, it
        is this matter of making up for losses by death,
        infirmity, the constant fluctuation of workers, and so
        forth, and further it is a matter of procuring
        additional workers.’

    “The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Sauckel,
    declared that, in order to maintain the present pool of workers,
    he would have to add at least 2½ but probably 3 million new
    workers in 1944. Otherwise production would fall off.
    Reichsminister Speer declared that he needs an additional 1.3
    million laborers. However, this would depend on whether it will
    be possible to increase production of iron ore. Should this not
    be possible, he would need no additional workers. Procurement of
    additional workers from Occupied Territory would, however, be
    subject to the condition that these workers will not be
    withdrawn from armament and auxiliary industries already working
    there. For this would mean a decrease of production of these
    industries which he could not tolerate. Those, for instance, who
    are already working in France in industries mentioned above,
    must be protected against being sent to work in Germany by the
    Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor. The Fuehrer agreed
    with the opinions of Reichsminister Speer and emphasized that
    the measures taken by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of
    Labor should order no circumstances which would lead to the
    withdrawal of workers from armament and auxiliary industries
    working in occupied territories, because such a shift of workers
    would only cause disturbance of production in occupied
    countries.

    “The Fuehrer further called attention to the fact that at least
    250,000 laborers will be required for preparations against air
    attacks in the field of civilian air raid protection. For Vienna
    alone, 2,000-2,500 are required immediately. The Plenipotentiary
    for the Employment of Labor must add at least 4 million workers
    to the manpower pool, considering that he requires 2½ million
    workers for maintenance of the present level, that Reich
    Minister Speer needs 1.3 million additional workers, and that
    the above-mentioned preparations for security measures against
    air attacks call for 0.25 million laborers.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Reichsfuehrer SS explained that the enforcement agents put
    at his disposal are extremely few, but that he would try helping
    the Sauckel project to succeed by increasing them and working
    them harder. The Reichsfuehrer SS made immediately available
    2,000 to 2,500 men from concentration camps for air raid
    preparations in Vienna.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_Results of the Conference_:

    “(1) The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor shall procure
    at least 4 million new workers from occupied territories.”
    (_1292-PS_)

Moreover, Sauckel, in requesting the assistance of the Army for the
recruitment of 1,000,000 men and women from the occupied Eastern
territories, informed Keitel that prompt action was required; and that,
as in all other occupied countries, pressure had to be used if other
measures were not successful (_3012-PS_). Finally, Sauckel was informed
by Rosenberg that the enslavement of foreign labor was achieved by force
and brutality (_018-PS_). Notwithstanding his knowledge of conditions,
Sauckel continued to request greater supplies of manpower from the areas
in which the most ruthless methods had been applied. Indeed, when German
Field Commanders on the Eastern Front attempted to resist Sauckel’s
demands, because forced recruitment was swelling the ranks of the
partisans and making the army’s task more difficult, Sauckel sent a
telegram to Hitler, dated 10 March 1943, in which he implored him to
intervene:

    “Therefore, my Fuehrer, I ask you to abolish all orders which
    oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor * * *.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “If the obligation for labor and the forced recruiting of
    workers in the East is not possible any more, then the German
    war industry and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the
    full extent.” (_407-II-PS_)

In addition to being responsible for the recruitment of foreign civilian
labor by force, Sauckel was responsible for the conditions under which
foreign workers were deported to Germany and for the treatment to which
they were subjected within Germany. The conditions under which Sauckel’s
slaves were transported to Germany, were known to Sauckel (_2241-PS_).
Moreover, he accepted responsibility for these conditions. Regulation
Number 4 of 7 May 1942, issued by Sauckel as Plenipotentiary General for
the Mobilization of Labor, deals with recruitment, care, lodging,
feeding, and treatment of foreign workers of both sexes (_3044-PS_). By
this decree, Sauckel expressly directed that the assembly and operation
of rail transports and the supplying of food therefor was the
responsibility of his agents until the transports arrived in Germany. By
the same regulation, Sauckel directed that within Germany the care of
foreign industrial workers was to be carried out by the German Labor
Front and that care of foreign agricultural workers was to be carried
out by the Reich Food Administration. By the terms of the regulation,
Sauckel reserved for himself ultimate responsibility for all aspects of
care, treatment, lodging, and feeding of foreign workers while in
transit to and within Germany. The regulation reads (_3044-PS_):

    “The care of foreign labor will be carried out.

    “_a._ up to the Reichs border
    “by my commissioners or—in the occupied areas by the competent
    military or civil labor mobilization agencies. Care of the labor
    will be carried out in cooperation with the respective competent
    foreign organization.

    “_b._ Within the area of the Reich
    “1. By the German Labor Front in the cases of non-agricultural
    workers.
    “2. By the Reich Food administration in the case of agricultural
    workers.
    “The German Labor Front and the German Food Administration are
    bound by my directives in the carrying out of their tasks of
    caring for the workers.

    “The agencies of the labor mobilization administration are to
    give far-reaching support to the German Labor Front and the
    German Food Administration in the fulfillment of their assigned
    tasks.

    “My competence for the execution of the care of foreign labor is
    not prejudiced by the assignment of these tasks to the German
    Labor Front and the Reichs Food Administration.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_b._ Composition and operation of the transports.

    “The composition and operations of the transports up to the
    place of work is the task of my representatives, in the occupied
    territories of the labor mobilization agencies of the military
    and civil administration. In the countries in which foreign
    representatives are to direct the transports up to the frontier,
    the German recruiting agency must take part in the supervision
    and care of the transports.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_c._ Supply for the Transports.

    “The food supply for the industrial workers in transit within
    the Reich, is the duty of the (DAF) German workers front, office
    for labor mobilization.

    For the rest, my offices effect the supply for the transport.”
    (_3044-PS_)

Sauckel, in an agreement with Ley, the head of the German Labor Front
(DAF) dated 2 June 1943, again emphasized his ultimate responsibility by
creating a central inspectorate charged with examining the working and
living conditions of foreign workers, and reporting thereon to Sauckel’s
agency (_1913-PS_). The agreement reads in part as follows:

    “* * * 2. The Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front,
    Reichsorganisationleiter Dr. Ley, in collaboration with the
    Plenipotentiary General for the _Arbeitseinsatz_, Gauleiter
    Sauckel, will establish a ‘central inspection’ for the
    continuous supervision of all measures concerning the care of
    the foreign workers mentioned under 1. This will have the
    designation:

    ‘Central inspection for care of foreign workers.’

    “The central inspection for the care of foreign workers
    exercises its functions upon directives and in the name of the
    Plenipotentiary General for the _Arbeitseinsatz_ and of the
    Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front. In order to avoid all
    duplication of work, it will be its sole responsibility, to
    scrutinize all measures taken for the care of foreign workers
    employed in the factories and camps, also to remove immediately
    all defects discovered—as far as possible—on the spot and to
    issue the necessary instructions for this.

    “The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the
    _Arbeitseinsatz_ to empower the members of his staff and the
    presidents of the state employment offices to get direct
    information on the conditions regarding the employment of
    foreigners in the factories and camps, will remain untouched.

    “3. The central inspection for the care of foreign workers will
    be continuously in touch with the main office VI of the
    Plenipotentiary General for the _Arbeitseinsatz_. It will
    instruct the office on the general observations made and will
    make suggestions for changes, if that should become necessary.

    “4. The offices of the administration of the _Arbeitseinsatz_
    will be constantly informed by the ‘central inspection for the
    care of foreign workers’ of its observations, in particular
    immediately in each case in which action of State organizations
    seems to be necessary.” (_1913-PS_)

Sauckel was also responsible for compelling citizens of the occupied
countries against their will to manufacture implements of war for use in
operations against their own country and its allies. These functions
were included in the terms of Sauckel’s appointment. (_1666-PS_)

In a series of reports to Hitler, Sauckel described how successful he
had been in carrying out his program. One such report, dated 14 April
1943, states that in a single year Sauckel had incorporated 1,622,829
prisoners of war into the German economy:

    “My Fuehrer,

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “1. After having been active as Plenipotentiary for
    _Arbeitseinsatz_ for one year I have the honor to report to you
    that 3,638,056 new foreign workers have been added to the German
    war economy between April 1st. of the last year and March 31st
    of this year.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Besides the foreign civilian workers another 1,622,829
    prisoners of war are employed in the German economy.”
    (_407-V-PS_)

A subsequent report dated 3 June 1943, states that 846,511 additional
foreign laborers and prisoners of war were incorporated into the German
war industry:

    “My Fuehrer:

    “1. I beg to be permitted to report to you on the situation of
    the _Arbeitseinsatz_ for the first five months of 1943. For the
    first time the following number of new foreign laborers and
    prisoners of war were employed in the German war industry: * * *
    Total: 846,511”. (_407-IX-PS_)

        9. THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL CONSPIRATORS

In addition, the following conspirators who were informed by Sauckel of
the quotas of foreign laborers which he required, collaborated with
Sauckel and his agents in filling these quotas:

A. _Keitel, Chief of the OKW._

The record of a telephone conversation of the Chief of the Economic
Staff East of the German Army, dated 11 March 1943, reads in part as
follows (_3012-PS_):

    “The plenipotentiary for the _Arbeitseinsatz_, Gauleiter
    Sauckel, points out to me in an urgent teletype, that the
    _Arbeitseinsatz_ in German agriculture as well as all the most
    urgent armament programs, ordered by the Fuehrer, make the most
    rapid procurement of approx. 1 million women and men from the
    newly occupied territories an imperative necessity. For this
    purpose, Gauleiter Sauckel demands the shipment of 5,000 workers
    daily beginning 15 March, 10,000 workers male and female
    beginning 1 April from the newly occupied territories.

    “The daily quota of 5,000 (10,000) workers was distributed with
    the consent of the GBA as follows:

    Reich Commissioner Ukraine daily 3,000 (6,000) workers.

    Wl Jn South daily 1,000 (2,000) workers.

    Wl Jn Center daily 500 (1,000) workers.

    Commissioner General White Ruthenia daily 500 (1,000) workers.

    “In consideration of the extraordinary losses of workers, which
    occurred in German war industry because of the developments of
    the past months, it is now necessary, that the recruiting of
    workers be taken up again everywhere with all emphasis. The
    tendency momentarily noticeable in that territory, to limit
    and/or entirely stop the Reich recruiting program is absolutely
    not bearable in view of this state of affairs. Gauleiter
    Sauckel, who is informed about these events, has because of
    this, turned immediately to General Fieldmarshal Keitel on 10
    March 1943, in a teletype, and has emphasized on this occasion,
    that, as in all other occupied territories, there, where all
    other methods fail, by order of the Fuehrer a certain pressure
    must be used.” (_3012-PS_)

Confirmation of Keitel’s collaboration with Sauckel is also found in the
transcript of an interrogation under oath of Sauckel held on the morning
of 5 October 1945:

    “Q. Was it necessary in order to accomplish the completion of
    the quotas given to have liaison with the OKW?

    “A. I remember that the Fuehrer had given directives to Marshal
    Keitel, telling him that my task was a very important one, and
    I, too, have often conferred with Keitel after such discussions
    with the Fuehrer, when I asked him for his support.

    “Q. It was his task to supervise the proper performance of the
    military commanders in the occupied countries in carrying out
    their missions, was it not?

    “A. Yes, the Fuehrer had told me that he would inform the Chief
    of the OKW, and the Chief of the Reichs chancellery, as to these
    missions. The same applies to the Foreign Minister.” (_3722-PS_)

B. _Alfred Rosenberg, Reichs Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories._

The following colloquy is taken from the transcript of an interrogation
under oath of Alfred Rosenberg on the afternoon of 6 October 1945:

    “Q. Isn’t it a fact, that Sauckel would allocate to the various
    areas under your jurisdiction the number of persons to be
    obtained for labor purposes?

    “A. Yes.

    “Q. And that thereafter, your agents would obtain that labor, in
    order to meet the quota which had been given; isn’t that right?

    “A. Sauckel, normally, had very far-reaching desires, which one
    couldn’t fulfill unless one looked very closely into the matter.

    “Q. Never mind about Sauckel’s desires being far-reaching or not
    being far-reaching. That has nothing to do with it. You were
    given quotas for the areas over which you had jurisdiction, and
    it was up to you to meet that quota?

    “A. Yes; it was the responsibility of the administrative
    officials to receive this quota and to distribute the allotments
    over the districts in such a way, according to number and
    according to the age groups, so they would be most reasonably
    met.

    “Q. These administrative officials were part of your
    organization, isn’t that right?

    “A. They were functionaries or officials of the Reichskommissar
    for the Ukraine, but, as such, they were placed in their office
    by the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories.”
    (_3719-PS_)

Corroboration is to be found in letters written by Sauckel to Rosenberg
requesting the latter’s assistance in the recruitment of additional
foreign laborers. (_017-PS_; _019-PS_)

C. _Seyss-Inquart, Reichscommissar for the Occupied Netherlands._

The transcript of an interrogation under oath of Sauckel on the morning
of 5 October 1945, reads in part, as follows:

    “Q. For a moment, I want to turn our attention to Holland. It is
    my understanding that the quotas for the workers from Holland
    were agreed upon, and then the numbers given to the
    Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart to fulfill, is that correct?

    “A. Yes, that is correct.

    “Q. After the quota was given to Seyss-Inquart, it was his
    mission to fulfill it with the aid of your representatives; was
    it not?

    “A. Yes. This was the only possible thing for me to do and the
    same applied to other countries.” (_3722-PS_)

D. _Frank, Governor-General of the Government-General of Poland._

The transcript of interrogation under oath of Sauckel on the morning of
5 October 1945 reveals the part played by Frank:

    “Q. Was the same procedure substantially followed of allocating
    quotas in the General Government Poland?

    “A. Yes. I have to basically state again that the only
    possibility I had in carrying through these missions was to get
    in touch with the highest German military authority in the
    respective country and to transfer to them the orders of the
    Fuehrer and ask them very urgently, as I have always done, to
    fulfill these orders.

    “Q. Such discussions in Poland, of course, were with the General
    Governor Frank?

    “A. Yes. I spent a morning and afternoon in Krakov twice or
    three times, and I personally spoke to General Governor Frank.
    Naturally, there was also present Secretary Dr. Goebble.”
    (_3722-PS_)

E. _The SS, as in all matters involving the use of force and brutality,
extended its assistance._

This is clearly indicated in Reichschancellor Lammers’ report of a
conference with Hitler attended by, among others, Sauckel, Speer, and
Himmler (the Reichsfuehrer SS). The conference proceeded as follows:

    “The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared
    that he will attempt with fanatical determination to obtain
    these workers. Until now, he has always kept his promises as to
    the number of workers to be furnished. With the best of
    intentions, however, he is unable to make a definite promise for
    1944. He will do everything in his powers to furnish the
    requested manpower in 1944. Whether it will succeed depends
    primarily on what _German_ enforcement agents will be made
    available. His project cannot be carried out with domestic
    enforcement agents. The Reichsfuehrer SS explained that the
    enforcement agents put at his disposal are extremely few, but
    that he would try helping the Sauckel project to succeed by
    increasing them and working them harder.” (_1292-PS_)

                10. THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SPEER

The use of prisoners of war in the manufacture of arms and munitions,
allocated thereto by Sauckel, was confirmed by Speer. Speer stated in an
interrogation under oath on 18 October 1945 that 40% of all prisoners of
war were employed in the production of weapons and munitions and in
subsidiary industries:

    “* * * A. In the last phase of production, that is, in the year
    1944 when everything collapsed, I had 40% of all prisoners of
    war employed in the production. I wanted to have this percentage
    increased.

    “Q. And when you say employed in the production, you mean in
    these subsidiary industries that you have discussed and also in
    the production of weapons and munitions, is that right?

    “A. Yes. That is the total extent of my task.” (_3720-PS_)

The minutes of the 36th Meeting of the Central Planning Board, of 22
April 1943, report Speer’s statement that:

    “* * * 90,000 Russian prisoners of war employed in the whole of
    the armament industry are for the greatest part skilled men.”
    (_R-124_)

Speer actively participated in the planning and execution of the vast
program of forcible deportation and enslavement of the citizens of the
occupied countries. As Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions and
Chief of the Organization Todt, both of which positions he acquired on
15 February 1942, and by virtue of his later acquisition of control over
the armament offices of the Army, Navy and Airforce and the production
offices of the Ministry of Economics, Speer was responsible for the
entire war production of the Reich, as well as for the construction of
fortifications and installations for the _Wehrmacht_. Proof of the
positions held by Speer is supplied by his signed statement. (_2980-PS_)

The industries under Speer’s control were the most important users of
manpower in Germany. According to Sauckel, Speer’s labor requirements
received unconditional priority over all other demands for labor. In an
interrogation under oath on 22nd September 1945, Sauckel stated:

    “The others I only got whatever was left. Because Speer told me
    once in the presence of the Fuehrer that I am here to work for
    Speer and that mainly I am his man.” (_3721-PS_)

Speer has admitted under oath that he participated in the discussions
during which the decision to use foreign forced labor was made, that he
concurred in the decision, and that it was the basis for the program of
bringing foreign workers into Germany by compulsion. The transcript of
the interrogation under oath of Speer, on 18 October 1945, contains the
following colloquy:

    “Q. But is it clear to you Mr. Speer, that in 1942 when the
    decisions were being taken concerning the use of forced foreign
    labor that you participated in the discussions yourself?

    “A. Yes.

    “Q. So that I take it that the execution of the program of
    bringing foreign workers into Germany by compulsion under
    Sauckel was based on earlier decisions that had been taken with
    your agreement?

    “A. Yes, but I must point out that only a very small part of the
    manpower that Sauckel brought into Germany was made available to
    me; a far larger part of it was allocated to other departments
    that demanded them.” (_3720-PS_)

This admission is confirmed by minutes of Speer’s conferences with
Hitler on 10, 11, and 12 August 1942 (_R-124_). In these meetings Speer
related the outcome of negotiations concerning the forcible recruitment
of a million Russian laborers for the German armaments industry, and
stated that Hitler would agree to any necessary compulsion.

The use of force was again discussed by Hitler and Speer on 4 January
1943. It was decided that stronger measures were to be used to
accelerate the conscription of French civilian workers. (_556-13-PS_).

Speer demanded foreign workers for the industries under his control and
used these workers with the knowledge that they had been deported by
force and were being compelled to work. Speer has stated under oath, in
an interrogation on 18 October 1945 that:

    “I do not wish to give the impression that I want to deny the
    fact that I demanded manpower and foreign manpower from Sauckel
    very energetically.” (_3720-PS_)

Speer also admitted, in the course of the same interrogation, that he
knew he was obtaining foreign labor, a large part of which was forced
labor:

    “Q. So that during the period when you were asking for labor, it
    seems clear, does it not, that you knew that you were obtaining
    foreign labor as well as domestic labor in response to your
    requests and that a large part of the foreign labor was forced
    labor.

    “A. Yes.

    “Q. So that, simply by way of illustration, suppose that on
    January 1, 1944 you required 50,000 workers for a given purpose,
    would you put in a requisition for 50,000 workers, knowing that
    in that 50,000 there would be forced foreign workers?

    “A. Yes.” (_3720-PS_)

Speer has furthermore stated under oath that he knew at least as early
as September 1942 that workers from the Ukraine were being forcibly
deported for labor in Germany. He also knew that the great majority of
the workers of the Western occupied countries were slave laborers forced
against their will to come to Germany. These facts are revealed in his
interrogation under oath on 18 October 1945:

    “Q. When did you first find out then that some of the manpower
    from the Ukraine was not coming voluntarily?

    “A. It is rather difficult to answer this here, that is, to name
    a certain date to you. However, it is certain that I knew that
    at some particular point of time that the manpower from the
    Ukraine did not come voluntarily.

    “Q. And does that apply also to the manpower from other occupied
    countries, that is, did there come a time when you knew that
    they were not coming voluntarily?

    “A. Yes.

    “Q. When, in general, would you say that time was, without
    placing a particular month of the year?

    “A. As far as the Ukraine situation goes, I believe that they
    did not come voluntarily any more after a few months, because
    immense mistakes were made in their treatment by us. I should
    say offhand that this time was either in July, August or
    September of 1942.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Q. But many workers did come from the West, did they not, to
    Germany?

    “A. Yes.

    “Q. That means then that the great majority of the workers that
    came from the Western countries, the Western occupied countries,
    came against their will to Germany.

    “A. Yes.” (_3720-PS_)

This admission is borne out by other evidence. In April 1943 Speer was
informed at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, that in all
countries conscription for work in Germany could be carried out only
with the active assistance of the police, and that the prevailing
methods of recruitment had provoked such violence that many German
recruiting agents had been killed (_R-124_). Again, at a meeting with
Hitler to discuss overall manpower requirements for 1944, Speer was
informed by Sauckel that labor requirements for the German war economy
(including Speer’s requirements of 1,300,000 additional laborers) could
be met only if German enforcement agents were furnished to carry out the
enslavement program in the occupied countries. (_1292-PS_)

Notwithstanding his knowledge that foreign workers were being
conscripted and deported for use as slave laborers in Germany, Speer
formulated requirements for the foreign workers and requested their
allocation to industries subject to his control. At another meeting of
the Central Planning Board, Speer stated:

    “_Speer_: Now, the labor problem in Germany. I believe it is
    still possible to transfer some from the western territories.
    The Fuehrer stated only recently he wishes to dissolve these
    foreign volunteers as he had the impression that the army groups
    were carting around with them a lot of ballast. Therefore, if we
    cannot settle this matter ourselves, we shall have to call a
    meeting with the Fuehrer to clear up the coal situation. Keitel
    and Zeitzler will be invited to attend in order to determine the
    number of Russians from the rear army territories who can be
    sent to us. However, I see another possibility; we might
    organize another drive to screen out workers for the mines from
    the Russian Ps/W in the Reich. But this possibility is none too
    promising.” (_R-124_)

At another meeting of the Central Planning Board, Speer rejected a
suggestion that labor for industries under his control be furnished from
German sources instead of from foreign countries, for these reasons:

    “_Speer_: We do it that way: Kehrl collects the demands for
    labor necessary to complete the coal-and-iron-plan and
    communicates the numbers to Sauckel. Probably there will be a
    conference at the Reich Marshal’s in the next week, and an
    answer from Sauckel should have arrived by then. The question of
    recruitment for the armaments industry will be solved together
    with Weger.

    “_Kehrl_: I wish to urge that the allotments to the mines should
    not be made dependent on the recruitment of men abroad. We were
    completely frustrated these last three months because this
    principle had been applied. We ended December with a deficit of
    25,000 and we never get replacements. The number must be made up
    by men from Germany.

    “_Speer_: No, nothing doing!” (_R-124_)

Speer also advocated terror and brutality as a means of maximizing
production by slave laborers who worked in the industries under his
control. In the course of a discussion concerning the supply and
exploitation of labor, Speer stated:

    “_Speer_: We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained
    that the sick list decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in
    factories where doctors are on the staff who are examining the
    sick men. There is nothing to be said against SS and Police
    taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into
    concentration camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen
    several times and the news will soon go round.” (_R-124_)

Speer is also guilty of compelling Allied nationals and prisoners of war
to engage not only in the production of armaments and munitions, but
also in direct military operations, against their own country and its
actively resisting allies. Speer, as Chief of the Organization Todt, is
accountable for its policies which were in direct conflict with the laws
of war. The Organization Todt, in violation of the laws of war,
impressed allied nationals into its service. Proof of its activity is
furnished by an International Labor Office Study of Exploitation of
Foreign Labor by Germany:

    “The methods used for the recruitment of foreign workers who
    were destined for employment in the Organization did not greatly
    differ from the methods used for the recruitment of foreigners
    for deportation to Germany. The main difference was that, since
    the principal activities of the Organization lay outside the
    frontiers of Germany, foreigners were not transported to
    Germany, but had either to work in their own country or in some
    other occupied territory.

    “In the recruitment drives for foreign workers for the
    Organization methods of compulsion as well as methods of
    persuasion were used, the latter usually with very little result
    * * *.” (_L-191_)

Similar violations of the laws of warfare are disclosed in
(_407-VIII-PS_).

As Chief of German war production, Speer sponsored and approved the use
of prisoners of war in the production of armaments and munitions which
were used against their own country and its actively resisting allies.
This fact has been demonstrated by the evidence already discussed. To
recapitulate:

1. After Speer assumed responsibility for armament production, his
primary concern in his discussions with his co-conspirators was to
secure a larger allocation of prisoners of war for his armament
factories. In a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 22 April 1943,
Speer complained that only 30% of the Russian prisoners of war were
engaged in the armament industry. (_R-124_)

2. In an earlier speech, Speer stated that 10,000 prisoners of war were
put at the disposal of the armaments industry upon his orders.
(_1435-PS_)

3. Finally, Speer advocated returning escaped prisoners of war to
factories as convicts. He said, at a meeting of the Central Planning
Board:

    “We have to come to an arrangement with the Reichsfuehrer SS as
    soon as possible so that prisoners of war he picks up are made
    available for our purposes. The Reichsfuehrer SS gets from 30 to
    40,000 men per month. First of all they have to be divided up.
    From what classes do these people come, anyhow? There certainly
    is a certain percentage of miners among these people who are
    picked up. These few thousand men have to go to the mines
    automatically. Certainly, some educational work has to be done.
    The men should be put into the factories as convicts. But they
    have to return to the factories where they were before * * *.”
    (_R-124_)

Speer is also guilty of having approved and sponsored the program for
using concentration camp labor in Nazi armament factories, which was
part of the larger program of extermination through work. The proof of
this activity may be summarized and supplemented as follows:

1. Speer proposed measures for the exploitation of the concentration
camp labor in armament factories under his jurisdiction. At a meeting
with Hitler Speer proposed and Hitler agreed that armament production
should not be established within concentration camps but that
concentration camp labor should be made available to established
armament factories. (_R-124_)

2. Speer, by arranging for the use of concentration camp laborers in
factories under his control, created an increasing demand for such
labor. This demand was filled in part by placing in concentration camps
persons who would not ordinarily have been sent there. (_1063-D-PS_)

3. Speer participated in the exploitation of the victims of the Nazi
program of extermination through work. He personally selected sites for
subsidiary concentration camps which were established near factories in
Upper Austria, and knew and approved of the general practice of locating
concentration camps near industrial plants which they supplied with
labor (Speer’s interrogation under oath on 18 October 1945. (_3720-PS_)

Speer visited the concentration camp Mauthaussen and factories such as
those of Krupp, where concentration camp labor was exploited under
barbarous conditions. Despite personal and first-hand knowledge of these
conditions, Speer continued to direct the use of concentration camp
labor in factories under his jurisdiction. In Speer’s interrogation
under oath on 18 October 1945, he stated:

    “Q. But, in general, the use of concentration camp labor was
    known to you and approved by you as a source of labor?

    “A. Yes.

    “Q. And you knew also, I take it, that among the inmates of the
    concentration camps there were both Germans and foreigners?

    “A. I didn’t think about it at that time.

    “Q. As a matter of fact you visited the Austrian concentration
    camp personally, did you not?”

    “A. I didn’t—well I was in Mauthaussen once but at that time I
    was not told just to what categories the inmates of the
    concentration camps belonged.

    “Q. But in general everybody knew, did they not, that foreigners
    who were taken away by the Gestapo, or arrested by the Gestapo,
    as well as Germans, found their way into the concentration
    camps?

    “A. Of course, yes. I didn’t mean to imply anything like that.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Q. Did you ever discuss, by the way, the requirements of Krupp
    for foreign labor?

    “A. It is certain that it was reported to me what Krupp had in
    foreign workers.

    “Q. Did you ever discuss it with any of the members of the Krupp
    first?

    “A. I cannot say that exactly, but during the time of my
    activities I visited the Krupp factory more than once and it is
    certain that this was discussed, that is, the lack of manpower.”
    (_3720-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

   LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE SLAVE LABOR
     PROGRAM, THE ILLEGAL USE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND THE SPECIAL
              RESPONSIBILITY OF SAUCKEL AND SPEER THEREFOR

     Document     │             Description              │ Vol. │  Page
                  │                                      │      │
                  │Charter of the International Military │      │
                  │  Tribunal, Article 6 (b, c).         │  I   │        5
                  │                                      │      │
                  │International Military Tribunal,      │      │
                  │  Indictment Number 1, Sections III;  │      │  15, 39,
                  │  VIII (B, C, H); X; Appendix A.      │  I   │  41, 50,
                  │                                      │      │
  3737-PS         │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting   │      │
                  │  the Laws and Customs of War on Land,│      │590, 597,
                  │  Annex, Articles 6, 46, 52.          │  VI  │      598
                  │                                      │      │
  3738-PS         │Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to │      │
                  │  treatment of Prisoners of War,      │      │
                  │  Articles 2, 3, 6.                   │  VI  │ 600, 601
                  │                —————                 │      │
                  │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a  │      │
                  │document indicates that the document  │      │
                  │was received in evidence at the       │      │
                  │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│      │
                  │before a document number indicates    │      │
                  │that the document was referred to     │      │
                  │during the trial but was not formally │      │
                  │received in evidence, for the reason  │      │
                  │given in parentheses following the    │      │
                  │description of the document. The USA  │      │
                  │series number, given in parentheses   │      │
                  │following the description of the      │      │
                  │document, is the official exhibit     │      │
                  │number assigned by the court.         │      │
                  │                —————                 │      │
  *016-PS         │Sauckel’s Labor Mobilization Program, │      │
                  │20 April 1942. (USA 168)              │ III  │       46
                  │                                      │      │
  *017-PS         │Letter from Sauckel to Reichminister  │      │
                  │for the Occupied Eastern Territories, │      │
                  │5 October 1942, concerning            │      │
                  │mobilization of foreign labor forces. │      │
                  │(USA 180)                             │ III  │       60
                  │                                      │      │
  *018-PS         │Letter from Rosenberg to Sauckel, 21  │      │
                  │December 1942, concerning labor in the│      │
                  │East. (USA 186)                       │ III  │       61
                  │                                      │      │
  *019-PS         │Letter from Sauckel to Rosenberg, 17  │      │
                  │March 1943, concerning draft of       │      │
                  │workers from the East. (USA 181)      │ III  │       65
                  │                                      │      │
  *031-PS         │Memorandum, 12 June 1944, concerning  │      │
                  │evacuation of youths from the         │      │
                  │territory of Army Group “Center”, and │      │
                  │interoffice memorandum, Ministry for  │      │
                  │Occupied Eastern Territories, 14 June │      │
                  │1944. (USA 171)                       │ III  │       71
                  │                                      │      │
  *054-PS         │Report to Reich Ministry for Occupied │      │
                  │Eastern Territories, 7 October 1942,  │      │
                  │concerning treatment of Ukrainian     │      │
                  │Specialists. (USA 198)                │ III  │       90
                  │                                      │      │
  *084-PS         │Interdepartmental report of Ministry  │      │
                  │for Occupied Eastern Territories, 30  │      │
                  │September 1942, concerning status of  │      │
                  │Eastern laborers. (USA 199)           │ III  │      130
                  │                                      │      │
  *204-PS         │Memorandum of conference,             │      │
                  │18 February 1944, concerning release  │      │
                  │of Indigenous Labor for purposes of   │      │
                  │the Reich. (USA 182)                  │ III  │      215
                  │                                      │      │
  *254-PS         │Letter from Raab to Reichminister for │      │
                  │Occupied Eastern Territories, 7 June  │      │
                  │1944, concerning burning of houses in │      │
                  │Wassilkow district. (USA 188)         │ III  │      231
                  │                                      │      │
  *265-PS         │Memorandum of oral report by Lyser to │      │
                  │Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, on situation │      │
                  │in district Shitomir. (USA 191)       │ III  │      234
                  │                                      │      │
  *290-PS         │Letter from Rosenberg Ministry, 12    │      │
                  │November 1943, concerning burning of  │      │
                  │houses in Mueller’s district. (USA    │      │
                  │189)                                  │ III  │      240
                  │                                      │      │
  *294-PS         │Top secret memorandum signed by       │      │
                  │Brautigam, 25 October 1942, concerning│      │
                  │conditions in Russia. (USA 185)       │ III  │      242
                  │                                      │      │
  *407-II-PS      │Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 10     │      │
                  │March 1943, concerning difficulty in  │      │
                  │recruiting of workers in former Soviet│      │
                  │territories. (USA 226)                │ III  │      389
                  │                                      │      │
  *407-V          │                                      │      │
    and VI-PS     │Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 15     │      │
                  │April 1943, concerning labor          │      │
                  │questions. (USA 209; USA 228)         │ III  │      391
                  │                                      │      │
  *407-VIII-PS    │Telegram from Sauckel to Hitler, 17   │      │
                  │May 1943, concerning foreign labor.   │      │
                  │(USA 210)                             │ III  │      394
                  │                                      │      │
  *407-IX-PS      │Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 3 June │      │
                  │1943, concerning foreign labor        │      │
                  │situation. (USA 229)                  │ III  │      395
                  │                                      │      │
  *556-2-PS       │Order initialled by Keitel, 8         │      │
                  │September 1942, for civilians to work │      │
                  │on “West Wall”. (USA 194)             │ III  │      443
                  │                                      │      │
  *556-13-PS      │Sauckel note for the files, 5 January │      │
                  │1943. (USA 194)                       │ III  │      444
                  │                                      │      │
  *654-PS         │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942,  │      │
                  │on discussion with Himmler concerning │      │
                  │delivery of Jews to Himmler for       │      │
                  │extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III  │      467
                  │                                      │      │
 *1063-D-PS       │Mueller’s order, 17 December 1942,    │      │
                  │concerning prisoners qualified for    │      │
                  │work to be sent to concentration      │      │
                  │camps. (USA 219)                      │ III  │      778
                  │                                      │      │
 *1130-PS         │Note, 11 April 1943, and report of    │      │
                  │speech by Koch in Kiev on 5 March     │      │
                  │1943, concerning treatment of civilian│      │
                  │population in Ukraine. (USA 169)      │ III  │      797
                  │                                      │      │
 *1206-PS         │Notes of Goering’s remarks at the Air │      │
                  │Ministry, 7 November 1941, concerning │      │
                  │employment of laborers in war         │      │
                  │industries. (USA 215)                 │ III  │      841
                  │                                      │      │
 *1292-PS         │Memorandum of conference with Hitler, │      │
                  │4 January 1944, concerning allocation │      │
                  │of labor, 1944. (USA 225)             │ III  │      866
                  │                                      │      │
 *1352-PS         │Reports concerning the confiscation of│      │
                  │Polish agricultural properties, 16 and│      │
                  │29 May 1940, signed Kusche. (USA 176) │ III  │      916
                  │                                      │      │
 *1375-PS         │Letter from Frank to Goering, 25      │      │
                  │January 1940. (USA 172)               │ III  │      925
                  │                                      │      │
  1381-PS         │Secret report of the Reich Ministry   │      │
                  │for the Occupied Eastern Territories  │      │
                  │on Political and Economic Situation in│      │
                  │these Territories, December 1942.     │ III  │      932
                  │                                      │      │
 *1435-PS         │Speech of Speer to Gauleiters, 24     │      │
                  │February 1942. (USA 216)              │  IV  │       16
                  │                                      │      │
 *1526-PS         │Letter from Ukrainian Main Committee  │      │
                  │to Frank, February 1943. (USA 178)    │  IV  │       79
                  │                                      │      │
 *1584-I-PS       │Teletype from Goering to Himmler, 14  │      │
                  │February 1944, concerning formation of│      │
                  │7th Airforce Group squadron for       │      │
                  │special purposes. (USA 221)           │  IV  │      117
                  │                                      │      │
 *1666-PS         │Decree appointing Sauckel General     │      │
                  │Plenipotentiary for Manpower, 21 March│      │
                  │1942 and decree of Goering conferring │      │
                  │certain powers on Sauckel, 27 March   │      │
                  │1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │      │
                  │pp. 179-180. (USA 208)                │  IV  │      182
                  │                                      │      │
 *1702-PS         │Report on evacuation of Kasatin       │      │
                  │November-December 1943. (USA 193)     │  IV  │      205
                  │                                      │      │
 *1726-PS         │Statement of Netherlands Government in│      │
                  │view of Prosecution and punishment of │      │
                  │the German Nazi War Criminals. (USA   │      │
                  │195)                                  │  IV  │      227
                  │                                      │      │
 *1742-PS         │Directives to Army Commands from      │      │
                  │Goering, 26 October 1942, concerning  │      │
                  │combatting of partisan activities.    │      │
                  │(USA 789)                             │  IV  │      262
                  │                                      │      │
 *1903-PS         │Decree of Fuehrer on execution of     │      │
                  │decree concerning Deputy General for  │      │
                  │mobilization of labor. Decrees,       │      │
                  │Regulations, Announcements, Vol. II,  │      │
                  │p. 510. (USA 206)                     │  IV  │      546
                  │                                      │      │
 *1913-PS         │Agreement between Plenipotentiary     │      │
                  │General for Arbeitseinsatz and German │      │
                  │Labor Front concerning care of        │      │
                  │non-German workers. 1943              │      │
                  │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 588.    │      │
                  │(USA 227)                             │  IV  │      547
                  │                                      │      │
 *1919-PS         │Himmler’s speech to SS                │      │
                  │Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA │      │
                  │170)                                  │  IV  │      558
                  │                                      │      │
 *2220-PS         │Lammers report to Himmler, 12 April   │      │
                  │1943, concerning the situation in the │      │
                  │Government General. (USA 175)         │  IV  │      855
                  │                                      │      │
 *2233-A-PS       │Frank Diary,                          │      │
                  │Abteilungsleitersitzungen, 1939-1940. │      │
                  │Minutes of conferences, December and  │      │
                  │May 1940. (USA 173)                   │  IV  │      883
                  │                                      │      │
 *2233-B-PS       │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1940. Part I.  │      │
                  │January-March. (USA 174)              │  IV  │      885
                  │                                      │      │
 *2241-PS         │Sauckel Order, 20 July 1942,          │      │
                  │concerning employment of foreign labor│      │
                  │forces in Germany. (USA 200)          │  IV  │      923
                  │                                      │      │
 *2280-PS         │Letter from Reichs Commissar for      │      │
                  │Ostland, 3 May 1943, concerning       │      │
                  │recruiting of manpower in Baltic      │      │
                  │Countries for Reich territories. (USA │      │
                  │183)                                  │  IV  │      969
                  │                                      │      │
 *2520-PS         │Affidavit of Edward L. Deuss, 1       │      │
                  │November 1945, concerning approximate │      │
                  │number of foreigners put to work for  │      │
                  │German War Effort in Old Reich. (USA  │      │
                  │197)                                  │  V   │      257
                  │                                      │      │
 *2974-PS         │Statement by Fritz Sauckel concerning │      │
                  │positions held. (USA 15)              │  V   │      680
                  │                                      │      │
 *2980-PS         │Statement of Albert Speer, concerning │      │
                  │positions held. (USA 18)              │  V   │      685
                  │                                      │      │
 *3000-PS         │Report, from Chief of Main Office III │      │
                  │with the High Command in Minsk to     │      │
                  │Reicke, 28 June 1943, on experiences  │      │
                  │in political and economic problems in │      │
                  │the East, particularly White Ruthenia.│      │
                  │(USA 192)                             │  V   │      726
                  │                                      │      │
 *3003-PS         │Report of Lt. Haupt concerning the    │      │
                  │situation of war economy in           │      │
                  │Netherlands. (USA 196)                │  V   │      726
                  │                                      │      │
 *3005-PS         │Letter from Reich Labor Ministry to   │      │
                  │Presidents of Regional Labor Offices, │      │
                  │26 August 1941, concerning use of     │      │
                  │Russian PWs. (USA 213)                │  V   │      727
                  │                                      │      │
 *3010-PS         │Secret organization order from        │      │
                  │Economic Inspection South, 17 August  │      │
                  │1943, concerning recruitment of       │      │
                  │Workers for the Reich. (USA 184)      │  V   │      728
                  │                                      │      │
 *3012-PS         │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March   │      │
                  │1943, to all group leaders of Security│      │
                  │Service, and record of telephone      │      │
                  │conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│      │
                  │1943. (USA 190)                       │  V   │      731
                  │                                      │      │
 *3040-PS         │Secret order of Reichsfuehrer SS, 20  │      │
                  │February 1942, concerning commitment  │      │
                  │of manpower from the East. (USA 207)  │  V   │      744
                  │                                      │      │
 *3044-PS         │Sauckel Order Number 4, 7 May 1942,   │      │
                  │published in Decrees, Regulations,    │      │
                  │Announcements. (USA 206)              │  V   │      756
                  │                                      │      │
  3044-A-PS       │Sauckel Order Number 10, 22 August    │      │
                  │1942, published in Decrees,           │      │
                  │Regulations, Announcements.           │  V   │      764
                  │                                      │      │
  3044-B-PS       │Instructions concerning Eastern       │      │
                  │Household workers, published in       │      │
                  │Decrees, Regulations, Announcements.  │  V   │      765
                  │                                      │      │
  3057-PS         │Statement of Fritz Sauckel, 5         │      │
                  │September 1945.                       │  V   │      853
                  │                                      │      │
**3719-PS         │Testimony of Alfred Rosenberg, 6      │      │
                  │October 1945. (USA 187) (Referred to  │      │
                  │but not offered in evidence.)         │  VI  │      436
                  │                                      │      │
 *3720-PS         │Testimony of Albert Speer, 18 October │      │
                  │1945. (USA 220)                       │  VI  │      438
                  │                                      │      │
 *3721-PS         │Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 22        │      │
                  │September 1945. (USA 230)             │  VI  │      458
                  │                                      │      │
 *3722-PS         │Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 5 October │      │
                  │1945. (USA 224)                       │  VI  │      459
                  │                                      │      │
 *3787-PS         │Report of the Second Meeting of the   │      │
                  │Reich Defense Council, 25 June 1939.  │      │
                  │(USA 782)                             │  VI  │      718
                  │                                      │      │
 *3819-PS         │Letter from Sauckel to Fuehrer, 17    │      │
                  │March 1944; letter from Speer to      │      │
                  │Fuehrer, 5 April 1944; and Minutes of │      │
                  │conference on 11 July 1944 concerning │      │
                  │Labor Problem. (GB 306)               │  VI  │      760
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-288           │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Jaeger, 15   │      │
                  │October 1945. (USA 202)               │ VII  │        2
                  │                                      │      │
  D-305           │Affidavit of Heinrich Buschhauer, 5   │      │
                  │October 1945.                         │ VII  │       13
                  │                                      │      │
 *D-316           │Memorandum to Mr. Hupe, 14 March 1942,│      │
                  │concerning employment of Russians.    │      │
                  │(USA 201)                             │ VII  │       20
                  │                                      │      │
 *EC-68           │Confidential letter from Minister of  │      │
                  │Finance and Economy, Baden, containing│      │
                  │directives on treatment of Polish     │      │
                  │Farmworkers, 6 March 1941. (USA 205)  │ VII  │      260
                  │                                      │      │
 *EC-194          │Secret memorandum of Keitel concerning│      │
                  │use of prisoners of war in the war    │      │
                  │industry, 31 October 1941. (USA 214)  │ VII  │      336
                  │                                      │      │
 *L-61            │Express letter from Sauckel to        │      │
                  │Presidents of Landes Employment       │      │
                  │Offices, 26 November 1942, concerning │      │
                  │employment of Jews and exchange of    │      │
                  │Jews in essential employment against  │      │
                  │Polish labor. (USA 177)               │ VII  │      816
                  │                                      │      │
 *L-79            │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939,   │      │
                  │“Indoctrination on the political      │      │
                  │situation and future aims”. (USA 27)  │ VII  │      847
                  │                                      │      │
 *L-191           │“The Exploitation of Foreign Labor by │      │
                  │Germany” (International Labor Office  │      │
                  │Study). (USA 231)                     │ VII  │     1026
                  │                                      │      │
 *R-103           │Letter from Polish Main Committee to  │      │
                  │General Government of Poland on       │      │
                  │situation of Polish workers in the    │      │
                  │Reich, 17 May 1944. (USA 204)         │ VIII │      104
                  │                                      │      │
 *R-124           │Speer’s conference minutes of Central │      │
                  │Planning Board, 1942-44, concerning   │      │
                  │labor supply. (USA 179)               │ VIII │      146
                  │                                      │      │
 *R-129           │Letter and enclosure from Pohl to     │      │
                  │Himmler, 30 April 1942, concerning    │      │
                  │concentration camps. (USA 217)        │ VIII │      198
                  │                                      │      │
  Statement XII   │Political Testament of Robert Ley     │      │
                  │written in Nurnberg Prison, October   │      │
                  │1945.                                 │ VIII │      742
                  │                                      │      │
  Statement XIII  │Outline of Defense of Dr. Robert Ley, │      │
                  │written in Nurnberg Prison, 24 October│      │
                  │1945.                                 │ VIII │      751




                               Chapter XI
                           CONCENTRATION CAMPS


The Concentration Camp, used against the people of Germany and allied
nationals, was one of the fundamental institutions of the Nazi regime.
It was a pillar of the system of terror by which the Nazis consolidated
their power over Germany. It was a primary weapon in the battle against
the Jews, against the Christian church, against labor, against those who
wanted peace, against opposition or non-conformity of any kind. It
involved the systematic use of terror to achieve the cohesion within
Germany which was necessary for the execution of the conspirators’ plans
for aggression. It was the final link in a chain of terror and
repression which involved the SS and the Gestapo and which resulted in
the apprehension of victims and their confinement without trial, often
without charges, generally with no indication of the length of their
detention.

The SS through its espionage system tracked down the victims; the
criminal police and the Gestapo seized them and brought them to the
concentration camps; and the concentration camps were administered by
the SS. No attempt will be made to present a complete catalogue of
individual brutalities. The emphasis will rather be upon the fundamental
purposes for which these camps were used, the techniques of terror which
were employed, the large number of their victims, and the death and
anguish which they caused.

                1. THE BEGINNING OF “PROTECTIVE CUSTODY”

The Nazis realized early that without the most drastic repression of
actual and potential opposition they could not consolidate their power
over the German people. Immediately after Hitler became Chancellor, the
conspirators promptly destroyed civil liberties by issuing the
Presidential Emergency Decree of 28 February 1933 (_1390-PS_). It was
this decree which was the basis for “_Schutzhaft_”, that is, “protective
custody”—the power of the Gestapo to imprison people without judicial
proceedings. This is made clear by a typical order for protective
custody:

    “_Order of Protective Custody._ Based on Article 1 of the Decree
    of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State of
    28 February 1933 (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ I, p. 83), you are taken
    into protective custody in the interest of public security and
    order.

    “Reason: Suspicion of activities inimical toward the State.”
    (_2499-PS_)

Goering, in a book entitled “_Aufbau Einer Nation_” and published in
1934, sought to give the impression that the camps originally were
directed at those whom the Nazis considered “Communists” and “Social
Democrats”. At page 89 of this book he stated:

    “We had to deal ruthlessly with these enemies of the State. It
    must not be forgotten that at the moment of our seizure of power
    over 6 million people officially voted for Communism and about 8
    million for Marxism in the Reichstag elections in March.

    “Thus the concentration camps were created, to which we had to
    send first thousands of functionaries of the Communist and
    Social Democratic parties.” (_2324-PS_)

In practical operations, the power to order confinement was almost
without limit: Frick, in an order which he issued on 25 January 1938, as
Minister of Interior, made this clear. Article 1 of this order provided:

    “Protective custody can be decreed as a coercive measure of the
    Secret State Police against persons who endanger the security of
    the people and the State through their attitude in order to
    counter all aspirations of enemies of the people and State.”
    (_1723-PS_)

This order further provides:

    “* * * In a summary of all the previously issued decrees on the
    cooperation between the Party and the Gestapo I refer to the
    following and ordain:

    “1. To the Gestapo has been entrusted the mission by the Fuehrer
    to watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the
    National Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of
    all kinds directed against both. The successful solution of this
    mission forms one of the most essential prerequisite for the
    unhampered and frictionless work of the Party. The Gestapo, in
    their extremely difficult task, is to be granted support and
    assistance in every possible way by the NSDAP.” (_1723-PS_)

A. _Persecution of Pacifists._

The conspirators, then, were directing their apparatus of terror against
the “enemies of the State”, against “disintegrating forces”, and against
those people who endangered the State “with their attitudes”. Whom did
they consider as belonging in these broad categories? First, they were
the men in Germany who wanted peace. In this connection an affidavit by
Gerhart H. Segar declares as follows:

    “* * * 2. During the period after World War I up until my
    commitment to the Leipzig jail and Oranienburg concentration
    camp in the spring of 1933 following the Nazis’ accession to
    power in January of that year, my business and political
    affiliations exposed me to the full impact of the Nazi theories
    and practice of violent regimentation and terroristic tactics.
    My conflict with the Nazis by virtue of my identification with
    the peace movement, and as duly elected member of the Reichstag
    representing a political faith (Social Democratic Party) hostile
    to National Socialism, clearly demonstrated that, even in the
    period prior to 1933, the Nazis considered crimes and terrorism
    a necessary and desirable weapon in overcoming democratic
    opposition * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * (e). That the Nazis had already conceived the device of
    the concentration camp as a means of suppressing and regimenting
    opposition elements was forcefully brought to my attention
    during the course of a conversation which I had with Dr. Wilhelm
    Frick in December 1932. Frick at that time was Chairman of the
    Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag of which I was a
    member. When I gave an emphatic answer to Frick concerning the
    particular matter discussed, he replied, ‘Don’t worry, when we
    are in power we shall put all of you guys into concentration
    camps.’ When the Nazis came into power, Frick was appointed
    Reichminister of Interior and promptly carried out his threat in
    collaboration with Goering, as Chief of the Prussian State
    Police, and Himmler.” (_L-83_)

Thus, even before the Nazis had seized power in Germany they had
conceived of the plan to repress any potential opposition by terror.

Frick’s statement to Gerhart Segar is completely consistent with an
earlier statement which he made on 18 October 1929. Frick at that time
declared:

    “This fateful struggle will first be taken up with the ballot,
    but this cannot continue indefinitely, for history has taught us
    that in a battle, blood must be shed, and iron broken. The
    ballot is the beginning of this fateful struggle. We are
    determined to promulgate by force that which we preach. Just as
    Mussolini exterminated the Marxists in Italy, so must we also
    succeed in accomplishing the same through dictatorship and
    terror.” (_2513-PS_)

There are many additional cases of the use of the concentration camp
against the men who wanted peace. There was, for example, a group called
the “_Bibel Forscher_” (Bible Research Workers), most of whom were
Jehovah’s Witnesses. Since they were pacifists, the conspirators
provided not only for their prosecution in the regular courts, but also
for confining them in concentration camps after they had served the
judicial sentences. An order by the Secret State Police, Berlin, dated 5
August 1937, provided:

    “The Reichsminister of Justice had informed me that he does not
    share the opinion voiced by subordinate departments on various
    occasions, according to which, the arrest of the
    _Bibelforschers_ after they have served a sentence, is supposed
    to jeopardize the authority of the law courts. He is fully aware
    of the necessity for measures by the State Police after the
    sentence has been served. He asks, however, not to bring the
    _Bibelforschers_ into protective custody under circumstances
    detrimental to the respect of the law courts * * *.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “2. If information regarding the impending release of a
    _Bibelforscher_ from arrest is received from the authorities
    carrying out the sentence, my decision regarding the ordering of
    measures by the State Police, will be asked for in accordance
    with my circular decree dated 22.4.37, so that transfer to a
    concentration camp can take place immediately after the sentence
    has been served. Should a transfer into a concentration camp
    immediately after the serving of the sentence not be possible,
    _Bibelforschers_ will be detained in police prisons.” (_D-84_)

B. _Persecution of Trade Union Members._

Labor unions, traditionally opposed to wars of aggression, also felt the
full force of Nazi terror. The concentration camp was an important
weapon in the campaign against the trade unions. Goering made it plain,
for instance, that members of the Social Democratic Party were to be
confined in concentration camps (_2324-PS_). Labor leaders were largely
members of that party and soon learned the meaning of “protective
custody”.

In this connection, an order that one Joseph Simon should be placed in
protective custody, is pertinent (_2330-PS_). The “reasons” given were
as follows:

    “Simon was for many years a member of the Socialist Party and
    temporarily a member of the Union Socialiste Populaire. From
    1907 to 1918 he was _Landtag_ deputy of the Socialist Party;
    from 1908 to 1930 Social Democratic City Counsellor (_Stadtrat_)
    in Nurnberg. In view of the decisive role which Simon played in
    the international trade unions and in regard to his connection
    with international Marxist leaders and central agencies, which
    he continued after the national recovery, he was placed under
    protective custody on 3 May 1933, and was kept, until 25 January
    1934, in the Dachau concentration camp. Simon is under the
    urgent suspicion that even after this date he played an active
    part in the illegal continuation of the Socialist Party. He took
    part in meetings which aimed at the illegal continuation of the
    Socialist Party and propagation of illegal Marxist printed
    matter in Germany.

    “Through this radical attitude which is hostile to the State,
    Simon directly endangers public security and order.” (_2330-PS_)

Further instances of this persecution of members of trade unions are
contained in (_2334-PS_) and (_2928-PS_).

C. _Persecution of Jews._

Thousands of Jews, were, of course, confined in concentration camps.
(For a fuller discussion of this point see Chapter XII.) Among the
wealth of evidence showing the confinement of Germans only because they
were Jews, a teletype from SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich is typical. This
order is dated 10 November 1938, and is addressed to all headquarters of
the State Police and all districts and sub-districts of the SD
(_3051-PS_). Paragraph 5 of this teletype, which was entitled “Measures
against Jews tonight,” provided:

    “* * * 5. Inasmuch as in the course of the events of this night
    the employment of officials used for this purpose would be
    possible, in all districts as many Jews, especially rich ones,
    are to be arrested as can be accommodated in the existing
    prisons. For the time being only healthy men not too old are to
    be arrested. Upon their arrest, the appropriate concentration
    camps should be contacted immediately, in order to confine them
    in these camps as fast as possible.” (_3051-PS_)

Himmler in 1943 indicated that use of the concentration camp against the
Jews had been motivated, not simply by Nazi racialism, but also by a
fear that the Jews might have been an obstacle to aggression. In a
speech delivered at a meeting of the SS Major Generals at Posen on 4
October 1943, Himmler sought to justify the Nazi anti-Jewish policy:

    “I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermination of the
    Jewish race. It’s one of those things it is easy to talk
    about—‘The Jewish race is being exterminated’, says one party
    member, ‘that’s quite clear, it’s in our program, elimination of
    the Jews, and we’re doing it, exterminating them’. And then they
    come, 80 million worthy Germans, and each one has his decent
    Jew. Of course, the others are vermin, but this one is an A-1
    Jew. Not one of all those who talk this way has witnessed it,
    not one of them has been through it. Most of you must know what
    it means when 100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500 or
    1,000. To have stuck it out and at the same time—apart from
    exceptions caused by human weakness—to have remained decent
    fellows, that is what has made us hard. This is a page of glory
    in our history which has never been written and is never to be
    written, for we know how difficult we should have made it for
    ourselves, if—with the bombing raids, the burden and
    deprivations of war—we still had Jews today in every town as
    secret saboteurs, agitators and trouble-mongers.” (_1919-PS_)

It is clear from the foregoing evidence that prior to the launching of a
Nazi aggression, the concentration camp had been one of the principal
weapons by which the conspirators achieved the social cohesion which was
needed for the execution of their plans for aggression. After the
conspirators launched their aggression and their armies swept over
Europe, they brought the concentration camp and the whole system of Nazi
terror to occupied countries. In addition, they brought the citizens of
the occupied countries to Germany and subjected them to the whole
apparatus of Nazi brutality. In a communication to Himmler dated 16
December 1942, Mueller, for the Chief of the Security Police and SD,
deals with the seizure of Polish Jews for deportation to concentration
camps in Germany. I should like to quote the body of this communication:

    “In connection with the increase in the transfer of labor to the
    _concentration camps_, ordered to be completed by 30 January
    1943, the following procedure may be applied in the Jewish
    section.

    “1. Total number: 45,000 Jews.

    “2. Start of transportation: 11 January 1943; End of
    transportation: 31 January 1943. (The Reich railroads are unable
    to provide special trains for the evacuation during the period
    from 15 December 1942 to 10 January 1943 because of the
    increased traffic of armed forces leave trains).

    “3. Composition: The 45,000 Jews are to consist of 30,000 Jews
    from the district of _Byalystock_. 10,000 Jews from the Ghetto
    _Theresienstadt_, 5,000 of whom are Jews fit for work who
    heretofore had been used for smaller jobs required for the
    Ghetto, and 5,000 Jews who are generally incapable of working,
    also over 60 year old Jews * * *. As heretofore only such Jews
    would be taken for the evacuation who do not have any particular
    connections and who are not in possession of any high
    decorations. 3,000 Jews from the occupied Dutch territories,
    2,000 Jews from Berlin—45,000. The figure of 45,000 includes
    the invalid (old Jews and children). _By use of a practical
    standard_, the screening of the arriving Jews in Auschwitz
    should yield at least 10,000 to 15,000 people fit for work.”
    (_R-91_)

The Jews of Hungary suffered the same fate. Between 19 March 1944 and 1
August 1944 more than 400,000 Hungarian Jews were rounded up. Many of
these were put in wagons and sent to extermination camps. An affidavit
made in London by Dr. Rudolph Kastner, a former official of the
Hungarian Zionist Organization, states in part:

    “19 March 1944: Together with the German military occupation
    arrived in Budapest a ‘Special Section Commando’ of the German
    Secret Police with the sole object of liquidating the Hungarian
    Jews * * * They arrested and later deported to Mauthausen, all
    the leaders of Jewish political and business life and
    journalists, together with the Hungarian democratic and
    anti-Fascist politicians * * *.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Up to 27 June 1944, 475,000 Jews were deported.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “According to statements of Krumey and Wislicseny in February or
    March 1945 a conference of the officers of IV.B. was called to
    Berlin by Eichmann in the spring of 1942. He then informed them
    that the government decided in favor of the complete
    annihilation of the European Jews and that this will be carried
    out silently in the gas-chambers. ‘Victory is ours,’ declared
    Eichmann. ‘The end of the war is near. We must hurry as this is
    the last chance to free Europe of the Jews. After the war it
    will not be possible to utilize such methods.’”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Commanders of the death-camps gassed only on direct or indirect
    instructions of Eichmann. The particular officer of IV.B. who
    directed the deportations from some particular country had the
    authority to indicate whether the train should go to a death
    camp or not, and what should happen to the passengers. The
    instructions were usually carried by the SS-NCO escorting the
    train. The letters ‘A’ or ‘M’ on the escorting instruction
    documents indicated Auschwitz or Majdanek; it meant that the
    passengers were to be gassed. * * * Regarding Hungarian Jews the
    following general ruling was laid down in Auschwitz: children up
    to the age of 12 or 14, older people above 50, as well as the
    sick, or people with criminal records (who were transported in
    specially marked wagons) were taken immediately on their arrival
    to the gas chambers.

    “The others passed before an SS doctor who, on sight indicated
    who was fit for work, and who was not. Those unfit were sent to
    the gas chambers, while the others were distributed in various
    labor camps.” (_2605-PS_)

            2. “CHARGES” AGAINST CONCENTRATION CAMP INMATES

In the Eastern territories, these victims were apprehended for
extermination in concentration camps without any charges having been
made against them. In the Western occupied territories, charges were
apparently made against some of the victims. Some of the charges which
the Nazis considered sufficient basis for confinement in a concentration
camp are illustrated in a summary of the file of the dossier of 25
persons arrested in Luxembourg for commitment to various concentration
camps and sets forth the charges made against each person (_L-215_).
These charges read as follows:

    “Name                       Charge                       Place of
                                                            Confinement

 HENRICY—     By associating with members of illegal      Natzweiler
                resistance movements and making money for
                them violating legal foreign exchange
                rates, by harming the interests of the
                Reich and being expected in the future to
                disobey official administrative
                regulations and act as an enemy of the
                Reich.


 KRIER—       By being responsible for advanced sabotage  Buchenwald
                of labor and causing fear because of his
                political and criminal past. Freedom
                would only further his anti-social urge.


   *      *             *      *      *      *               *      *


 MONTI—       By being strongly suspected of aiding       Sachsenhausen
                desertion.


 JUNKER—      Because as a relative of a deserter he is   Sachsenhausen
                expected to endanger the interests of the
                German Reich if allowed to go free.


 JAEGER—      Because as a relative of a deserter he is   Sachsenhausen
                expected to take advantage of every
                occasion to harm the German Reich.


   *      *             *      *      *      *               *      *


 LUDWIG—      For being strongly suspected of aiding      Dachau
                desertion.” (_L-215_)

           3. USE OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

Not only civilians of the occupied territories, but also prisoners of
war were subjected to the concentration camp. A memorandum to all
officers of the State Police, signed by Mueller, Chief of the Gestapo,
dated 9 November 1941, discusses the “Transportation of Russian
Prisoners of War, Destined for Execution, into the Concentration Camps.”
(_1165-PS_). This memorandum states in part:

    “The commandants of the concentration camps are complaining that
    5 to 10% of the Soviet Russians destined for execution are
    arriving in the camps dead or half dead. Therefore the
    impression has arisen that the Stalags are getting rid of such
    prisoners in this way.

    “It was particularly noted that, when marching, for example,
    from the railroad station to the camp, a rather large number of
    PWs collapsed on the way from exhaustion, either dead or half
    dead, and had to be picked up by a truck following the convoy.

    “It cannot be prevented that the German people take notice of
    these occurrences.

    “Even if the transportation to the camps is generally taken care
    of by the Wehrmacht, the population will attribute this
    situation to the SS.

    “In order to prevent, if possible, similar occurrences in the
    future, I therefore order that, effective from today on, Soviet
    Russians, declared definitely suspect and obviously marked by
    death (for example with typhus) and who therefore would not be
    able to withstand the exertions of even a short march on foot,
    shall in the future, as a matter of basic principle, be excluded
    from the transport into the concentration camps for execution.”
    (_1165-PS_)

Additional evidence of the confinement of Russian prisoners of war in
concentration camps is found in an official report of the investigation
of the Flossenburg concentration camp by Headquarters Third United
States Army, Judge Advocate Section, War Crimes Branch, dated 21 June
1945 (_2309-PS_). This report states:

    “In 1941 an additional stockade was added at the Flossenburg
    Camp, to hold 2,000 Russian prisoners. From these 2,000
    prisoners only 102 survived.” (_2309-PS_)

Soviet prisoners of war found their allies in the concentration camps.
The same official report continues:

    “The victims of Flossenburg included among the Russian,
    civilians and prisoners of war, German nationals, Italians,
    Belgians, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, British and American
    prisoners of war. No practical means was available to complete a
    list of victims of this camp, however, since the foundation of
    the camp in 1938 until the day of liberation it is estimated
    that more than 29,000 inmates died.” (_2309-PS_)

Escaped prisoners of war were sent to concentration camps, which were
specially set up as extermination centers. A communication from the
Secret State Police Office, Cologne, dated 4 March 1944, transmitted the
following orders of the OKW—for which Keitel is responsible—concerning
escaped prisoners of war:

    “1. Every captured escaped prisoner of war who is an officer or
    a non-working non-commissioned officer, except British and
    American prisoners of war, is to be turned over to the Chief of
    the Security Police and of the Security Service under the
    classification ‘Step III’ regardless of whether the escape
    occurred during a transport, whether it was a mass escape or an
    individual one.

    “2. Since the transfer of the prisoners of war to the Security
    Police and Security Service may not become officially known to
    the outside under any circumstances other prisoners of war may
    by no means be informed of the capture. The captured prisoners
    are to be reported to the Army Information Bureau as ‘escaped
    and not captured’. Their mail is to be handled accordingly.
    Inquiries of representatives of the Protective Power of the
    International Red Cross, and of other aid societies will be
    given the same answer.” (_1650-PS_)

The same communication carried a copy of an order of SS General Mueller,
acting for the Chief of the Security Police and SD, which directed the
Gestapo to transport escaped prisoners directly to Mauthausen. The first
two paragraphs of Mueller’s order provide:

    “The State Police Directorates will accept the captured escaped
    officer prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camp
    commandants and will transport them to the Concentration Camp
    Mauthausen following the procedure previously used, unless the
    circumstances render a special transport imperative. The
    prisoners of war are to be put in irons on the transport—not on
    the station if it is subject to view by the public. The camp
    commandant at Mauthausen is to be notified that the transfer
    occurs within the scope of the action ‘Kugel’. The State Police
    Directorates will submit semi-yearly reports on these transfers
    giving merely the figures, the first report being due on 5 July
    1944 (sharp). * * * For the sake of secrecy, the Supreme Command
    of the Armed Forces has been requested to inform the prisoner of
    war camps to turn the captured prisoners over to the local State
    Police Office and not to send them directly to Mauthausen.”
    (_1650-PS_)

It is no coincidence that the literal translation for the German word
“_Kugel_” is “bullet”, since Mauthausen, where the escaped prisoners
were sent, was an extermination center.

                 4. THE NETWORK OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS

Nazi conquest was marked by the establishment of concentration camps
over all of Europe. The following report on the location of
concentration camps, signed by Pohl, an SS General who was in charge of
concentration camp labor policies, indicates the scope of these
activities:

    “1. At the outbreak of war there existed the following
    concentration camps:

    a Dachau, 1939, 4,000 prisoners, today 8,000.

    b Sachsenhausen, 1939, 6,500 prisoners, today 10,000.

    c Buchenwald, 1939, 5,300 prisoners, today 9,000.

    d Mauthausen, 1939, 1,500 prisoners, today 5,500.

    e Flossenburg, 1939, 1,600 prisoners, today 4,700.

    f Ravensbrueck, 1939, 2,500 prisoners, today 7,500.

    “2. In the years 1940 to 1942 nine further camps were erected,
    viz.:

    a. Auschwitz (Poland)

    b. Neuengamme

    c. Gusen (Austria)

    d. Natzweiler (France)

    e. Gross-Rosen

    f. Lublin (Poland)

    g. Niederhagen

    h. Stutthof (near Danzig)

    i. Arbeitsdorf.” (_R-129_)

In addition to these camps in occupied territory, there were many
others. The official report by the Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, Judge
Advocate Section, War Crimes Branch, contains the following evidence:

    “Concentration Camp Flossenburg was founded in 1938 as a camp
    for political prisoners. Construction was commenced on the camp
    in 1938 and it was not until April 1940 that the first transport
    of prisoners was received. From this time on prisoners began to
    flow steadily into the camp. * * * Flossenburg was the mother
    camp and under its direct control and jurisdiction were 47
    satellite camps or outer-commandos for male prisoners and 27
    camps for female workers. To these outer-commandos were supplied
    the necessary prisoners for the various work projects
    undertaken.

    “Of all these outer-commandos Hersbruck and Leitmeritz (in
    Czechoslovakia), Oberstaubling, Mulsen and Sall, located on the
    Danube, were considered to be the worst.” (_2309-PS_)

          5. THE CONCENTRATION CAMP AS AN INSTRUMENT OF TERROR

The savage treatment which was inflicted in these concentration camps
upon allied nationals, prisoners of war, and other victims of Nazi
terror has been depicted in motion picture evidence. Verbal discussion
of this subject may therefore be brief.

The minutes of the Central Planning Committee, on which Speer sat, and
where the high strategy of Nazi armament production was formulated,
record a conference on the question of squeezing more work out of slave
laborers. Speer, who was not generally considered a fanatic like Frick,
or a man of Blood and Iron like Goering, handled the problem in this
fashion:

    “Speer: We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained
    that the sick list decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in
    factories where doctors are on the staff who are examining the
    sick men. There is nothing to be said against SS and Police
    taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into
    concentration camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen
    several times and the news will soon go around.” (_R-124_)

The deterrent effect of the concentration camps upon the public was
carefully planned. To heighten the atmosphere of terror surrounding the
concentration camps, they were shrouded in secrecy. What went on behind
the barbed wire enclosures was a matter of fearful conjecture in Germany
and the countries under Nazi control.

This was the policy from the very beginning, when the Nazis first came
into power in Germany and set up their concentration camp system. An
order issued in 1 October 1933 by the Camp Commander of Dachau
prescribes a program of floggings, solitary confinement, and executions
for the inmates for infractions of the rules. (_778-PS_) Among the
rules were those prescribing a rigid censorship concerning conditions
within the camp:

    “By virture of the law on revolutionaries, the following
    offenders, considered as _agitators, will be hung_. Anyone who,
    for the purpose of agitating, does the following in the camp, at
    work, in the quarters, in the kitchens and workshops, toilets
    and places of rest: politicizes, holds inciting speeches and
    meetings, forms cliques, loiters around with others; who for the
    purpose of supplying the propaganda of the opposition with
    atrocity stories, collects true or false information about the
    concentration camp and its institution; receives such
    information, buries it, talks about it to others, smuggles it
    out of the camp into the hands of foreign visitors or others by
    means of clandestine or other methods, passes it on in writing
    or orally to released prisoners or prisoners who are placed
    above them, conceals it in clothing or other articles, throws
    stones and other objects over the camp wall containing such
    information; or produces secret documents; who, for the purpose
    of agitating, climbs on barracks’ roofs and trees, seeks contact
    with the outside by giving light or other signals, or induces
    others to escape or commit a crime, gives them advices to that
    effect or supports such undertakings in any way whatsover.”
    (_778-PS_)

Censorship concerning the camps was complemented by an officially
inspired rumor campaign outside the camps. Concentration camps were
spoken of in whispers, and the whispers were spread by agents of the
secret police. A “Top Secret” order, relating to concentration camps,
issued by the Head of the Gestapo and distributed to appropriate police
officers, and dated 26 October 1939, provides:

    “In order to achieve a further deterrent effect, the following
    must, in future, be observed in each individual case * * *

    “3. _The length of the period of custody must in no case be made
    known_, even if the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German
    Police or the Chief of the Security Police and the SD has
    already fixed it.

    “The term of commitment to a concentration camp is to be openly
    announced as ‘until further notice.’

    “In most serious cases, there is no objection to the increasing
    of the deterrent effect by the spreading of cleverly carried out
    _rumour propaganda_, more or less to the effect that, according
    to hearsay, in view of the seriousness of his case, the arrested
    man will not be released for 2 or 3 years.

    “4. In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the
    German Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a
    concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in future, also be
    transmitted to the State Police District Office concerned. In
    this case too, there is no objection to spreading the rumor of
    this increased punishment as laid down in Section 3, paragraph
    3, in so far as this appears suitable, to add to the deterrent
    effect.

    “5. Naturally, particularly suitable and reliable people are to
    be chosen for the spreading of such news.” (_1531-PS_)

             6. THE TREATMENT OF CONCENTRATION CAMP VICTIMS

The deterrent effect of the concentration camps was based on the promise
of savage brutality. This promise was fulfilled, to an extent which
defies description. Once in the custody of the SS guards, the victim was
beaten, tortured, starved, and often murdered through the so-called
“extermination through work” program, or through mass execution gas
chambers and furnaces of the camps (which were portrayed in the motion
picture evidence). The reports of official government investigations
furnish additional evidence of conditions within the concentration
camps. The official report concerning the concentration camp
Flossenberg, prefaced by the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the
United States Army, dated 21 June 1945, and supported by attached
affidavits and testimony, contains this description:

    “The work at these camps mainly consisted of underground labor,
    the purpose being the construction of large underground
    factories, storage rooms, etc. This labor was performed
    completely underground and as a result of the brutal treatment,
    working and living conditions, a daily average of 100 prisoners
    died. To the one camp Oberstaubling, 700 prisoners were
    transported in February 1945 and on the 15th of April 1945 only
    405 of these men were living. During the 12 months preceding the
    liberation, Flossenburg and the branch camps under its control
    accounted for the death of 14,739 male inmates and 1,300 women.
    These figures represent the deaths as were obtained from the
    available records in the camp, however, they are in no way
    complete as many secret mass executions and deaths took place.
    In 1941 an additional stockade was added at the Flossenburg
    camp, to hold 2,000 Russian prisoners. From these 2,000
    prisoners only 102 survived.

    “Flossenburg Concentration Camp can best be described as a
    factory dealing in death. Although this camp had in view the
    primary object of putting to work the mass slave labor, another
    of its primary objectives was the elimination of human lives by
    the methods employed in handling the prisoners.

    “Hunger and starvation rations, sadism, housing facilities,
    inadequate clothing, medical neglect, disease, beatings,
    hangings, freezing, hand hanging, forced suicides, shooting, all
    played a major role in obtaining their objective. Prisoners were
    murdered at random; spite killings against Jews were common.
    Injections of poison and shooting in the neck were everyday
    occurrences. Epidemics of typhus and spotted fever were
    permitted to run rampant as a means of eliminating prisoners.
    Life in this camp meant nothing. Killing became a common thing,
    so common that a quick death was welcomed by the unfortunate
    ones.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “On Christmas 1944 a number of prisoners were hung at one time.
    The prisoners were forced to view this hanging. By the side of
    the gallows was a decorated Christmas tree and as expressed by
    one prisoner ‘it was a terrible sight, that combination of
    prisoners hanging in the air and the glistening Christmas tree’.

    “In March or April, 13 American or British parachutists were
    hung. They had been delivered to this camp sometime before and
    had been captured while trying to blow up bridges.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “On April 20, 1945, approximately 15,000 prisoners were
    assembled to make a forced march in the direction of
    Concentration Camp Dachau. The evacuation of these prisoners was
    caused by the impending capture of the camp by the Allies. These
    15,000 prisoners were lined up in three groups and started on
    this march. Only those prisoners who could walk were taken and
    before leaving Flossenburg, many were executed, as also were
    those who collapsed in rank awaiting the movement to start the
    trek. No provision was made for the feeding of these prisoners
    or sleeping on this trip. They marched in long columns guarded
    by SS Guards.

    “Thousands were killed on the way and the paths which they took
    were littered with the dead. Groups of from 5 to 50 were taken
    out and forced to dig pits and then were shot. Many graves were
    not even covered. As the already starved and weakened prisoners
    fell from exhaustion, a group of SS guards bringing up the rear
    would kill them by a shot in the back of the head. All who fell
    out of line were immediately executed in this manner. Death was
    also caused by beatings or bashings in the skulls.

    “The prisoners marched from Friday till Monday during which time
    they received only 100 grams of bread. They marched in the rain
    and slept in the fields in the mud and water. Many died from
    exhaustion. On the 23rd day of April 1945, between the towns of
    Cham and Roding, they were liberated by the American troops.”
    (_2309-PS_)

Conditions at Mauthausen, one of the most notorious extermination
centers, are thus described in an official report of the office of the
Judge Advocate General of the Third United States Army, dated 17 June
1945:

    “V. _Conclusions._ There is no doubt that Mauthausen was the
    basis for long term planning. It was constructed as a gigantic
    stone fortress on top of a mountain flanked by small barracks.

    “Mauthausen, in addition to its permanency of construction had
    facilities for a large garrison of officers and men, and had
    large dining rooms and toilet facilities for the staff. It was
    conducted with the sole purpose in mind of exterminating any
    so-called prisoner who entered within its walls. The so-called
    branches of Mauthausen were under direct command of the SS
    officials located there. All records, orders, and administrative
    facilities were handled for these branches through Mauthausen.
    The other camps, including Gusen and Ebensee, its two most
    notorious and largest branches, were not exclusively used for
    extermination but prisoners were used as tools in construction
    and production until they were beaten or starved into
    uselessness, whereupon they were customarily sent to Mauthausen
    for final disposal.” (_2176-PS_)

It is clear from both the motion picture and these reports, which could
be supplemented by many similar ones, that the brutal conditions in all
concentration camps followed the same general pattern. The widespread
incidence of these conditions makes it clear that they were not the
result of sporadic excesses on the part of individual jailers, but were
the result of policies deliberately imposed from above.

The crimes committed by the Nazis in the concentration camp were on so
vast a scale that individual atrocities pale into insignificance. But
there are two exhibits in the possession of the prosecution which
illustrate the contempt in which the Nazis held human values. The first
is a frame showing sections of human skin, taken from human bodies in
Buchenwald Concentration Camp and preserved as ornaments. (This was
offered by the prosecution as a physical exhibit.) They were selected
because of the tattooing which appeared on the skin. Attached to this
exhibit is an extract of an official U. S. Army report describing the
circumstances under which this exhibit was obtained (_3420-PS_):

    “Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No. 2

                        PW INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

    “No. 2/20

                                                    19 December 1944
        “Address Briefs and Requests to HQ, FID, MIS, APO 887
                               “_EXTRACT_

    “13. _Concentration Camp, Buchenwald._

    “_Preamble._ The author of this account is PW Andreas
    Pfaffenberger, 1 Coy, 9 Landesschuetzen Bn. 43 years old and of
    limited education, he is a butcher by trade. The substantial
    agreement of the details of his story with those found in PWIS
    (H)/LF/736 establishes the validity of his testimony.

    “PW has not been questioned on statements which, in the light of
    what is known, are apparently erroneous in certain details, nor
    has any effort been made to alter the subjective character of
    PW’s account, which he wrote without being told anything of the
    intelligence already known. Results of interrogation on
    personalities at Buchenwald have already been published (PWIB No
    2/12 Item 31).”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In 1939, all prisoners with tattooing on them were ordered to
    report to the dispensary. No one knew what the purpose was. But
    after the tattooed prisoners had been examined, the ones with
    the best and most artistic specimens were kept in the
    dispensary, and then killed by injections, administered by Karl
    Beigs, a criminal prisoner. The corpses were then turned over to
    the pathological department, where the desired pieces of
    tattooed skin were detached from the bodies and treated. The
    finished products were turned over to SS Standartenfuehrer
    Koch’s wife, who had them fashioned into lampshades and other
    ornamental household articles. I myself saw such tattooed skins
    with various designs and legends on them, such as “Hans’l und
    Gret’l”, which one prisoner had had on his knee, and ships from
    prisoners’ chests. This work was done by a prisoner named
    Wernerbach.” (_3420-PS_)

The following certificate is also attached to the exhibit:

    “I, George C. Demas, Lieut., USNR., associated with the United
    States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality,
    hereby certify that the attached exhibit, consisting of
    parchment, was delivered by the War Crimes Section, Judge
    Advocate General, U. S. Army, to me in my above capacity, in the
    usual course of official business, as an exhibit found in
    Buchenwald Camp and captured by military forces under the
    command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces.”
    (_3421-PS_)

This is the conclusion reached in an official U. S. Army report attached
to the exhibit:

    “Based on the findings in paragraph 2, all three specimens are
    tattooed human skin”. (_3423-PS_)

One more example of this pathological phase of Nazi culture, another
Nazi trophy, is a human head with the skull bone removed, shrunken,
stuffed, and preserved. (This was offered by the prosecution as a
physical exhibit.) This head probably belonged to a foreign worker,
kidnapped by Sauckel to work in Speer’s armament industry. The Nazis had
one of their many victims decapitated after having had him hanged for
fraternizing with a German woman; they fashioned this ornament from his
head. This represents the end product of the Nazi system, representing
both the degradation of the Nazi “master” and the anguish of his victim.
The official U. S. Army report attached to this exhibit deals with the
manner in which this exhibit was acquired. It reads in part:

    “There I also saw the shrunken heads of two young Poles who had
    been hanged for having relations with German girls. The heads
    were the size of a fist, and the hair and the marks of the rope
    were still there.” (_3423-PS_)

                        7. THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS

No accurate estimate of how many persons died in the concentration camps
can be made. Although the Nazis were generally meticulous record
keepers, the records they kept about concentration camps appear to have
been incomplete.

Occasionally there is a death book, or a set of index cards, but for the
most part, the victims apparently faded into an unrecorded death. The
scale of the concentration camp operations is suggested by a set of
seven books, the death ledger of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp
(physically offered to the court). Each book bears on its cover
“_Totenbuch_” or Death Book—Mauthausen. In these books were recorded
the names of some of the inmates who died or were murdered in this camp.
The books cover the period from January 1939 to April 1945. They give
the name, place of birth, the assigned cause of death and time of death
of each individual recorded. In addition each corpse is assigned a
serial number. Addition of the serial numbers for the five-year period
produces a total figure of 35,318.

Examination of the books reveals the camp’s routine of death. For
example, pages 568 to 582 of Volume 5 cover death entries made for 19
March 1945 between fifteen minutes past one in the morning until 2
o’clock in the afternoon. In this space of 12¾ hours, 203 persons are
reported as having died. They were assigned serial numbers running from
8390 to 8593. The names of the dead are listed. The victims are all
recorded as having died of the same ailment—“heart trouble”. They died
at brief intervals. They died in alphabetical order. The first who died
was a man named Ackermann who died at one fifteen A.M. The last was a
man named Zynger who died at 2 o’clock P.M.

At twenty minutes past two o’clock on the afternoon of the same day, 19
March 1945, the fatal roll call began again, and continued until half
past four o’clock. In a space of two hours, 75 more persons died. Once
again they died from heart failure and in alphabetical order. The
entries are recorded in the same volume, from pages 582 through 586.

Another death book was found at Camp Mauthausen. This is a single
volume, which has on its cover the words—“Death Book—Prisoners of
War”. Pages 234 through 246 contain entries recording the names of 208
prisoners of war, apparently Russians, who at 15 minutes past midnight
on the 10th day of May 1942, were executed at the same time. The book
notes that the execution was directed by the Chief of the SD and the
SIPO (Heydrich).

It is common knowledge that the anguish of the concentration camp was
spread, not only over the Continent of Europe, but over all the world.
Even today all over the world people are still seeking word of their
friends and relatives who vanished into the Nazi concentration camps and
left no trace behind. This fact is emphasized by the 23 November 1945
issue of the weekly newspaper, “_Aufbau_”, published in the German
language in New York City. On the back pages—8, 9, 10, and 11—are
published both notices requesting information about friends and
relatives, and notices announcing the deaths of persons who were last
heard of in a Nazi concentration camp. The personal tragedies, which
these notices represent, multiplied an incalculable number of times, is
part of the legacy which the Nazi conspirators have left to the world.

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO CONCENTRATION CAMPS

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6 (b, c).           │  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections III;    │      │ 15, 31,
                │  VIII (A, C); X.                       │  I   │  41, 53
                │                                        │      │
 3737-PS        │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the │      │
                │  Laws and Customs of War on Land,      │      │
                │  Annex, Article 46.                    │  VI  │     597
                │                                        │      │
 3738-PS        │Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to   │      │
                │  treatment of Prisoners of War,        │      │
                │  Articles 2, 3.                        │  VI  │     600
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *374-PS        │TWX Series of Orders signed by Heydrich │      │
                │and Mueller, issued by Gestapo          │      │
                │Headquarters Berlin, 9-11 November 1938,│      │
                │concerning treatment of Jews. (USA 729) │ III  │     277
                │                                        │      │
 *392-PS        │Official NSDAP circular entitled “The   │      │
                │Social Life of New Germany with Special │      │
                │Consideration of the German Labor       │      │
                │Front”, by Prof. Willy Mueller (Berlin, │      │
                │1938). (USA 326)                        │ III  │     380
                │                                        │      │
 *641-PS        │Report of Public Prosecutor General in  │      │
                │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder  │      │
                │of Dr. Strauss in Dachau by an SS guard.│      │
                │(USA 450)                               │ III  │     453
                │                                        │      │
*642-PS         │Report to Public Prosecutor General in  │      │
                │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder  │      │
                │of Hausmann in Dachau by an SS guard.   │      │
                │(USA 451)                               │ III  │     454
                │                                        │      │
 *644-PS        │Report to Public Prosecutor General in  │      │
                │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder  │      │
                │of Schloss in Dachau by an SS guard.    │      │
                │(USA 452)                               │ III  │     455
                │                                        │      │
 *645-PS        │Report to Public Prosecutor General in  │      │
                │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder  │      │
                │of Nefzger in Dachau by an SS guard.    │      │
                │(USA 453)                               │ III  │     457
                │                                        │      │
 *778-PS        │Disciplinary and Penal Measures for     │      │
                │Concentration Camp Dachau and Service   │      │
                │Regulations for the Camp Personnel,     │      │
                │signed by Eicke, 1 October 1933. (USA   │      │
                │247)                                    │ III  │     550
                │                                        │      │
  833-PS        │Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head of│      │
                │the Abwehr, 2 February 1942, concerning │      │
                │prosecution of crimes against the Reich │      │
                │or occupying forces in the occupied     │      │
                │territories.                            │ III  │     600
                │                                        │      │
*1063-A-PS      │Order of Chief of SIPO and SD, 2 January│      │
                │1941, concerning classification of      │      │
                │concentration camps. (USA 492)          │ III  │     775
                │                                        │      │
*1063-B-PS      │Letter signed by Kaltenbrunner, 26 July │      │
                │1943, concerning establishment of Labor │      │
                │Reformatory camps. (USA 492)            │ III  │     777
                │                                        │      │
*1063-D-PS      │Mueller’s order, 17 December 1942,      │      │
                │concerning prisoners qualified for work │      │
                │to be sent to concentration camps. (USA │      │
                │219)                                    │ III  │     778
                │                                        │      │
 1063-E-PS      │Copy of Mueller’s order, 25 June 1942,  │      │
                │concerning increased shipments to       │      │
                │concentration camps.                    │ III  │     780
                │                                        │      │
 1151-P-PS      │Letter from WVHA, 28 March 1942,        │      │
                │concerning “Action 14 F 13” from files  │      │
                │of Gross Rosen Concentration camp.      │ III  │     808
                │                                        │      │
*1165-PS        │Letter from Commandant of concentration │      │
                │Camp Gross Rosen, 23 October 1941, and  │      │
                │letter of Mueller to all Gestapo        │      │
                │offices, 9 November 1941, concerning    │      │
                │execution of Russian PWs. (USA 244)    │ III  │     821
                │                                        │      │
*1166-PS        │Interoffice memorandum of WVHA, 15      │      │
                │August 1944, concerning number of       │      │
                │prisoners and survey of prisoners’      │      │
                │clothing. (USA 458)                     │ III  │     824
                │                                        │      │
 1216-PS        │Typewritten memorandum, “Important      │      │
                │Incidents in Concentration camp Dachau”.│ III  │     846
                │                                        │      │
 1390-PS        │Decree of the Reich President for the   │      │
                │Protection of the People and State, 28  │      │
                │February 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,  │      │
                │Part I, p. 83.                          │ III  │     968
                │                                        │      │
*1531-PS        │Directive from RSHA, 26 October 1939,   │      │
                │concerning execution of protective      │      │
                │custody, and directive, 12 June 1942,   │      │
                │concerning third degree. (USA 248)      │  IV  │      93
                │                                        │      │
*1584-I-PS      │Teletype from Goering to Himmler, 14    │      │
                │February 1944, concerning formation of  │      │
                │7th Airforce Group squadron for special │      │
                │purposes. (USA 221)                     │  IV  │     117
                │                                        │      │
*1584-III-PS    │Correspondence between Himmler and      │      │
                │Goering, 9 March 1944, concerning use of│      │
                │concentration camp inmates in aircraft  │      │
                │industry. (USA 457)                     │  IV  │     118
                │                                        │      │
 1616-PS        │Letter from Dr. Rascher to Himmler, 17  │      │
                │February 1943, concerning freezing      │      │
                │experiments.                            │  IV  │     133
                │                                        │      │
*1650-PS        │Directive to State Police Directorates  │      │
                │from Chief of SIPO and SD by Mueller, 4 │      │
                │March 1944, concerning captured escaped │      │
                │PWs except British and American PWs.    │      │
                │(USA 246)                               │  IV  │     158
                │                                        │      │
*1723-PS        │Order concerning cooperation of Party   │      │
                │offices with the Secret State Police, 25│      │
                │January 1938, published in Decrees,     │      │
                │Regulations, Announcements, 1937, Vol.  │      │
                │II, pp. 430-439. (USA 206)              │  IV  │     219
                │                                        │      │
*1919-PS        │Himmler’s speech to SS Gruppenfuehrers, │      │
                │4 October 1943. (USA 170)               │  IV  │     558
                │                                        │      │
 1956-PS        │Meaning and Tasks of the Secret State   │      │
                │Police, published in The Archives,      │      │
                │January 1936, Vol. 22-24, p. 1342.      │  IV  │     598
                │                                        │      │
 2107-PS        │Law on Secret State Police of 10        │      │
                │February 1936. 1936 Preussische         │      │
                │Gesetzsammlung, pp. 21-22.              │  IV  │     732
                │                                        │      │
 2108-PS        │Decree for execution of Law on Secret   │      │
                │State Police of 10 February 1936. 1936  │      │
                │Preussische Gesetzsammlung, pp. 22-24.  │  IV  │     732
                │                                        │      │
 2169-PS        │Quarterly report of the SS medical      │      │
                │officer of Hmb. Neuengamme concentration│      │
                │camp, 29 March 1945.                    │  IV  │     799
                │                                        │      │
 2171-PS        │U. S. Government report B-2833 on       │      │
                │Numerical Expansion of Buchenwald       │      │
                │Concentration Camp, during years        │      │
                │1937-1945.                              │  IV  │     800
                │                                        │      │
*2176-PS        │Report on Mauthausen concentration camp,│      │
                │by investigating officer, Office of     │      │
                │Judge Advocate, Third U. S. Army, 17    │      │
                │June 1945. (USA 249).                   │  IV  │     836
                │                                        │      │
 2187-PS        │Order from Main SS economic             │      │
                │administration office, 14 July 1943,    │      │
                │concerning beating of female prisoners. │  IV  │     842
                │                                        │      │
*2189-PS        │Orders from Department D of Economic and│      │
                │Administrative Main Office, 11 August   │      │
                │1942, concerning punishment by beating. │      │
                │(USA 460)                               │  IV  │     842
                │                                        │      │
 2222-PS        │Report of investigation of Buchenwald   │      │
                │Concentration Camp, by Judge Advocate   │      │
                │Section, Third United States Army, 25   │      │
                │May 1945.                               │  IV  │     860
                │                                        │      │
*2285-PS        │Affidavit, 13 May 1945, by two French   │      │
                │officers, about shooting of prisoners at│      │
                │Mauthausen. (USA 490)                   │  IV  │     991
                │                                        │      │
*2309-PS        │Report by Headquarters Third United     │      │
                │States Army, 21 June 1945, concerning   │      │
                │Flossenburg Concentration Camp. (USA    │      │
                │245)                                    │  IV  │     999
                │                                        │      │
*2324-PS        │Extracts from Reconstruction of a       │      │
                │Nation, by Hermann Goering, 1934. (USA  │      │
                │233)                                    │  IV  │    1033
                │                                        │      │
*2330-PS        │Order of Protective Custody, Police     │      │
                │Directorate of Nurnberg-Fuerth of Josef │      │
                │Simon, Chairman of German Shoemaker’s   │      │
                │Union, 29 August 1935. (USA 237)        │  IV  │    1038
                │                                        │      │
*2334-PS        │Affidavits of Lorenz Hagen, Chairman of │      │
                │Local Committee, German Trade Unions,   │      │
                │Nurnberg. (USA 238)                     │  IV  │    1041
                │                                        │      │
 2344-PS        │Reconstruction of a Nation by Goering,  │      │
                │1934, p. 89.                            │  IV  │    1065
                │                                        │      │
 2347-PS        │Court decisions from 1935               │      │
                │Reichsverwaltungsblatt, Vol. 56, pp.    │      │
                │577-578, 20 July 1935.                  │  IV  │    1066
                │                                        │      │
 2476-PS        │Affidavit of Josef Buehler, 4 November  │      │
                │1945.                                   │  V   │     228
                │                                        │      │
*2477-PS        │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4        │      │
                │November 1945. (USA 518)                │  V   │     229
                │                                        │      │
 2478-PS        │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4        │      │
                │November 1945.                          │  V   │     230
                │                                        │      │
*2499-PS        │Original Protective Custody Order served│      │
                │on Dr. R. Kempner, 15 March 1935. (USA  │      │
                │232)                                    │  V   │     236
                │                                        │      │
*2513-PS        │Extract from The National Socialist     │      │
                │Workers’ Party as an Association Hostile│      │
                │to State and to Republican Form of      │      │
                │Government and Guilty of Treasonable    │      │
                │Activity. (USA 235)                     │  V   │     252
                │                                        │      │
 2533-PS        │Extract from article “Legislation and   │      │
                │Judiciary in Third Reich”, from Journal │      │
                │of the Academy for German Law, 1936, pp.│      │
                │141-142.                                │  V   │     277
                │                                        │      │
*2605-PS        │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastner, former │      │
                │President of the Hungarian Zionist      │      │
                │Organization, 13 September 1945. (USA   │      │
                │242)                                    │  V   │     313
                │                                        │      │
 2615-PS        │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5      │      │
                │November 1945.                          │  V   │     338
                │                                        │      │
 2655-PS        │Concordat between the Holy See and the  │      │
                │German Reich, Article 31. 1933          │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, p. 679,     │      │
                │687-8.                                  │  V   │     364
                │                                        │      │
*2663-PS        │Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag, 30    │      │
                │January 1939, quoted from Voelkischer   │      │
                │Beobachter, Munich edition, 1 February  │      │
                │1939. (USA 268)                         │  V   │     367
                │                                        │      │
*2745-PS        │Order for commitment to concentration   │      │
                │camp, 7 July 1943, Kaltenbrunner’s      │      │
                │signature. (USA 519)                    │  V   │     383
                │                                        │      │
*2753-PS        │Affidavit of Alois Hoellriegl, 7        │      │
                │November 1945. (USA 515)                │  V   │     393
                │                                        │      │
*2928-PS        │Affidavit of Mathias Lex, deputy        │      │
                │president of the German Shoemakers      │      │
                │Union. (USA 239)                        │  V   │     594
                │                                        │      │
*3051-PS        │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to  │      │
                │all stations of State Police, 10        │      │
                │November 1938, on measures against Jews,│      │
                │and one order from Heydrich on          │      │
                │termination of protest actions. (USA    │      │
                │240)                                    │  V   │     797
                │                                        │      │
*3249-PS        │Affidavit of Dr. Franz Blaha, 24        │      │
                │November 1945. (USA 663)                │  V   │     949
                │                                        │      │
*3420-PS        │U. S. Army report on human skin exhibits│      │
                │at Buchenwald Concentration Camp. (USA  │      │
                │252)                                    │  VI  │     122
                │                                        │      │
*3421-PS        │Certificate accompanying human skin     │      │
                │exhibit. (USA 253)                      │  VI  │     123
                │                                        │      │
*3423-PS        │U. S. Army report on identification of  │      │
                │tattooed human skins. (USA 252)         │  VI  │     123
                │                                        │      │
*3590-PS        │Charges and findings against Weiss and  │      │
                │others tried by U. S. Military Court at │      │
                │Dachau. (USA 664)                       │  VI  │     288
                │                                        │      │
*3601-PS        │Affidavit of Sidney Mendel, 28 December │      │
                │1945, concerning the connection of      │      │
                │Frick’s Ministry of Interior with       │      │
                │concentration camps. (GB 324)           │  VI  │     313
                │                                        │      │
*3751-PS        │Diary of the German Minister of Justice,│      │
                │1935 concerning prosecution of church   │      │
                │officials and punishment in             │      │
                │concentration camps. (USA 828; USA 858) │  VI  │     636
                │                                        │      │
*3762-PS        │Affidavit of SS Colonel Kurt Becher, 8  │      │
                │March 1946, concerning the              │      │
                │responsibility of Kaltenbrunner for     │      │
                │concentration camp executions. (USA 798)│  VI  │     645
                │                                        │      │
*3844-PS        │Statement of Josef Niedermayer, 7 March │      │
                │1946, concerning Kaltenbrunner’s part in│      │
                │“bullet” orders at Mauthausen           │      │
                │concentration camp. (USA 801)           │  VI  │     782
                │                                        │      │
*3846-PS        │Interrogation of Johann Kanduth, 30     │      │
                │November 1945, concerning crematorium at│      │
                │Mauthausen and the activities of        │      │
                │Kaltenbrunner there. (USA 796)          │  VI  │     788
                │                                        │      │
*3868-PS        │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand     │      │
                │Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning         │      │
                │execution of 3,000,000 people at        │      │
                │Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA    │      │
                │819)                                    │  VI  │     787
                │                                        │      │
*3870-PS        │Affidavit of Hans Marsalek, 8 April     │      │
                │1946, concerning Mauthausen             │      │
                │Concentration Camp and dying statement  │      │
                │of Franz Ziereis, the Commandant. (USA  │      │
                │797)                                    │  VI  │     790
                │                                        │      │
*D-84           │Gestapo instructions to State Police    │      │
                │Departments, 5 August 1937, regarding   │      │
                │protective custody for Bible students.  │      │
                │(USA 236)                               │  VI  │    1040
                │                                        │      │
*D-569          │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer SS,│      │
                │the OKW, Inspector of Concentration     │      │
                │Camps, Chief of Security Police and SD, │      │
                │dating from 29 October 1941 through 22  │      │
                │February 1944, relative to procedure in │      │
                │cases of unnatural death of Soviet PW,  │      │
                │execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277)   │ VII  │      74
                │                                        │      │
*D-728          │Circular, 15 March 1945, from NSDAP     │      │
                │Gauleitung Hessen-Nassau to the         │      │
                │“Kreis”-Leaders of the Gau, concerning  │      │
                │Action by the Party to keep Germans in  │      │
                │check until end of the War. (GB 282)    │ VII  │     174
                │                                        │      │
*D-745-A        │Deposition of Anton Kaindl, 8 March     │      │
                │1946, concerning SS personnel           │      │
                │supervising concentration camps. (USA   │      │
                │811)                                    │ VII  │     208
                │                                        │      │
*D-745-B        │Deposition of Anton Kaindl, 19 March    │      │
                │1946, concerning SS personnel           │      │
                │supervising concentration camps. (USA   │      │
                │812)                                    │ VII  │     209
                │                                        │      │
*D-746-A        │Deposition of Fritz Suhren, 8 March     │      │
                │1946, concerning SS personnel           │      │
                │supervising concentration camps. (USA   │      │
                │813)                                    │ VII  │     209
                │                                        │      │
*D-746-B        │Deposition of Fritz Suhren,             │      │
                │19 March 1946, concerning SS personnel  │      │
                │supervising concentration camps. (USA   │      │
                │814)                                    │ VII  │     210
                │                                        │      │
*D-748          │Affidavit of Karl Totzauer, 15 March    │      │
                │1946, concerning SS personnel           │      │
                │supervising concentration camps. (USA   │      │
                │816)                                    │ VII  │     211
                │                                        │      │
*D-749-B        │Statement of Rudolf Hoess,              │      │
                │20 March 1946, concerning SS personnel  │      │
                │supervising concentration camps. (USA   │      │
                │817)                                    │ VII  │     212
                │                                        │      │
*D-750          │Deposition of August Harbaum,           │      │
                │19 March 1946, concerning SS personnel  │      │
                │supervising concentration camps. (USA   │      │
                │818)                                    │ VII  │     213
                │                                        │      │
*L-83           │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July  │      │
                │1945. (USA 234)                         │ VII  │     859
                │                                        │      │
*L-215          │File of orders and dossiers of 25       │      │
                │Luxembourgers committed to concentration│      │
                │camps at various times in 1944. (USA    │      │
                │243)                                    │ VII  │    1045
                │                                        │      │
*R-91           │Telegram from Mueller, SS Gruppenfuehrer│      │
                │to Reichsfuehrer SS, 16 December 1942.  │      │
                │(USA 241)                               │ VIII │      60
                │                                        │      │
*R-124          │Speer’s conference minutes of Central   │      │
                │Planning Board, 1942-44, concerning     │      │
                │labor supply. (USA 179)                 │ VIII │     146
                │                                        │      │
*R-129          │Letter and enclosure from Pohl to       │      │
                │Himmler, 30 April 1942, concerning      │      │
                │concentration camps. (USA 217)          │ VIII │     198




                              Chapter XII
                       THE PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS


It had long been a German theory that the First World War ended in
Germany’s defeat because of a collapse behind the lines. In planning for
future wars it was determined that the home front must be secured to
prevent a repetition of this 1918 debacle. Unification of the German
people was essential to successful planning and waging of war. Hence,
the Nazi political goal must be sought:—“One race, one State, one
Fuehrer.” Free trade unions must be abolished, political parties (other
than the NSDAP) must be outlawed, civil liberties must be suspended, and
opposition of every kind must be swept away. Loyalty to God, church, and
scientific truth was declared to be incompatible with the Nazi regime.

The anti-Jewish policy was part of this plan for unification because it
was the conviction of the Nazis that the Jews would not contribute to
Germany’s military program, but on the contrary would hamper it. The Jew
must therefore be eliminated. This view is clearly borne out by a
statement contained in a speech of Himmler’s at a meeting of SS Major
Generals on 4 October 1943:

    “We know how difficult we should have made it for ourselves if
    with the bombing raids, the burdens and deprivations of war, we
    still had the Jews today in every town as secret saboteurs,
    agitators, and trouble-mongers; we would now probably have
    reached the 1916-17 stage when the Jews were still in the German
    national body.” (_1919-PS_)

The treatment of the Jews within Germany was as much a part of the Nazi
plan for aggressive war as was the building of armaments and the
conscription of manpower.

                    1. HATE-PROPAGANDA AGAINST JEWS

The objective of the elimination and extermination of the Jews, could
not be accomplished without certain preliminary measures. One of these
was the indoctrination of the German people with hatred against the
Jews.

The first evidence of the Party policies in this direction was expressed
in the Party program of February 1920 (_1708-PS_). Paragraphs (4) and
(6) of that program declared:

    “* * * Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of
    the race can only be one who is of German blood without
    consideration of confession.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * The right to determine matters concerning administration
    and law belongs only to the citizen; therefore, we demand that
    every public office of any sort whatsoever, whether in the
    Reich, the county or municipality, be filled only by citizens.”
    (_1708-PS_)

Hitler, at page 724 and 725 of _Mein Kampf_, spoke of the Jew. If the
National Socialist movement was to fulfill its task, he declared:

    “It must open the eyes of the people with regard to foreign
    nations and must remind them again and again of the true enemy
    of our present day world. In the place of hate against
    Aryans—from whom we may be separated by almost everything, to
    whom, however, we are tied by common blood or the great tide of
    a common culture—it must dedicate to the general anger the evil
    enemy of mankind as the true cause of all suffering.

    “It must see to it, however, that at least in our country he be
    recognized as the most mortal enemy and that the struggle
    against him may show, like a flaming beacon of a better era, to
    other nations too, the road to salvation for a struggling Aryan
    mankind.” (_2662-PS_)

A flood of abusive literature of all types and for all age groups was
published and circulated throughout Germany. Illustrative of this type
of publication is the book _Der Giftpilz_. (_1778-PS_). This book brands
the Jew as a persecutor of the labor class, a race defiler, a devil in
human form, a poisonous mushroom, and a murderer. This particular book
was used to instruct school children to recognize the Jew by caricatures
of his physical features, (pages 6 and 7); and to teach them that the
Jew abuses little boys and girls, (page 30), and that the Jewish Bible
permits all crimes (pages 13-17). Streicher’s periodical, _Der
Stuermer_, (issue no. 14 for April 1937) in particular, went to such
extremes as to publish the statement that Jews at the ritual celebration
of their Passover slaughtered Christians:

    “The numerous confessions made by the Jews show that the
    execution of ritual murders is a law to the Talmud Jew. The
    former chief rabbi, and later monk, Teofite, declared that the
    ritual murders take place especially on the Jewish Purim in
    memory of the Persian murders, and Passover in memory of the
    murder of Christ. The instructions are as follows:

    “The blood of the victims is to be tapped by force. On Passover
    it is to be used in wine and matzos. Thus, a small part of the
    blood is to be poured into the dough of the matzos and into the
    wine. The mixing is done by the Jewish head of the family. The
    procedure is as follows:

    “The family head empties a few drops of the fresh and powdered
    blood into the glass, wets the fingers of the left hand with it
    and sprays, blesses, with it everything on the table. The head
    of the family then says, ‘Thus we ask God to send the ten
    plagues to all enemies of the Jewish faith.’ Then they eat, and
    at the end the head of the family exclaims, ‘May all Gentiles
    perish, as the child whose blood is contained in the bread and
    wine.’

    “The fresh, or dried and powdered blood of the slaughtered is
    further used by young married Jewish couples, by pregnant
    Jewesses, for circumcision and so on. Ritual murder is
    recognized by all Talmud Jews. The Jew believes he absolves
    himself thus of his sins.” (_2699-PS_)

The Jew-baiting publication, _Der Stuermer_, was published by
Streicher’s publishing firm (_2697-PS_). In one issue of this
periodical, Streicher, speaking of the Jewish faith, said:

    “The Holy Scripture is a horrible criminal romance abounding
    with murder, incest, fraud and indecency.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Talmud is the great Jewish book of crimes that the Jew
    practices in his daily life.” (_2698-PS_)

This propaganda campaign of hate, of which the above quotations are but
random samples, was too widespread and notorious to require further
elaboration.

                 2. DISCRIMINATORY DECREES AGAINST JEWS

When the Nazi Party gained control of the German State, the conspirators
used the means of official decrees as a weapon against the Jews. In this
way the force of the state was applied against them.

Jewish immigrants were denaturalized (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I,
page 480, signed by Frick and Neurath).

Native Jews were precluded from citizenship (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 1146, signed by Frick).

Jews were forbidden to live in marriage or to have extra-marital
relations with persons of German blood (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part
I, page 1146, signed by Frick and Hess).

Jews were denied the right to vote (1936 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I,
page 133, signed by Frick).

Jews were denied the right to hold public office or civil service
positions (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 277, signed by Frick).

Jews were relegated to an inferior status by the denial of common
privileges and freedoms. Thus, they were denied access to certain city
areas, sidewalks, transportation, places of amusement, restaurants (1938
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1676).

Progressively, more and more stringent measures were applied, even to
the denial of private pursuits. They were excluded from the practice of
dentistry (1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 47, signed by Hess).

The practice of law was denied to them (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part
I, page 1403, signed by Frick and Hess).

The practice of medicine was forbidden them (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, page 969, signed by Frick and Hess).

They were denied employment by press and radio (1933
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 661).

They were excluded from stock exchanges and stock brokerage (1934
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 661).

They were excluded from farming (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
685).

In 1938 they were excluded from business in general and from the
economic life of Germany (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1580,
signed by Goering).

The Jews were also forced to pay discriminatory taxes and huge atonement
fines. Their homes, bank accounts, real estate, and intangibles were
expropriated.

A report of a conference under the chairmanship of Goering, and attended
by Funk, among others, which was held at 11 o’clock on 12 November 1938
at the Reich Ministry for Air, quotes Goering as saying:

    “One more question, gentlemen, what would you think the
    situation would be if I’d announced today that Jewry shall have
    to contribute this one billion as a punishment.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I shall choose the wording this way that German Jewry shall, as
    punishment for their abominable crimes, etc., etc., have to make
    a contribution of one billion; that’ll work. The pigs won’t
    commit another murder. I’d like to say again that I would not
    like to be a Jew in Germany.” (_1816-PS_)

Following these whimsical remarks a decree was issued over the signature
of Goering, fining German Jews the sum of one billion Reichsmarks (1938
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1579, dated 12 November 1938, signed
by Goering).

Similar decrees are contained in 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
282, signed by Goering; and in 1941 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page
722, signed by Frick and Bormann.

Finally, in 1943, the Jews were placed beyond the protection of any
judicial process by a decree signed by Bormann and Frick, among others;
the police were made the sole arbiters of punishment and death (1943
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 372, signed by Frick and Bormann).

              3. ANTI-JEWISH BOYCOTTS, RAIDS, AND VIOLENCE

Simultaneously with the passage of these decrees and their execution,
still another weapon was wielded by the Party and the party-controlled
state. This was the openly sponsored and official anti-Jewish boycotts.
The published diary of Joseph Goebbels, at page 290, contains this entry
for 29 March 1933:

    “The boycott appeal is approved by the entire cabinet.”
    (_2409-PS_)

Again, on 31 March 1933, he wrote:

    “We are having a last discussion among a very small circle and
    decide that the boycott is to start tomorrow with all severity.”
    (_2409-PS_)

Streicher and Frank, together with Himmler, Ley, and others, were
members of a central committee who conducted the 1933 boycott against
the Jews. Their names are listed in National Socialist Party
correspondence for 29 March 1933. (_2156-PS_)

In this early 1933 violence against the Jews, raids were conducted on
synagogues by uniformed Nazis. Attending members of the synagogues were
assaulted, and religious insignia and emblems were desecrated. A report
of such an occurrence was contained in an official dispatch from the
American Consul General in Leipzig, dated 5 April, 1943, which stated:

    “In Dresden several weeks ago uniformed Nazis raided the Jewish
    prayer house, interrupted the evening religious service,
    arrested 25 worshippers, and tore the holy insignia or emblems
    from their headcovering worn while praying.” (_2709-PS_)

At a meeting in Nurnberg, before the representatives of the German
press, Streicher and Mayor Liebel of Nurnberg revealed in advance to the
gathered members of the press that the Nurnberg synagogue was to be
destroyed. The minutes of this meeting, dated 4 August 1938, read as
follows:

                   “The breaking up of the synagogue
                   (information must still be secret)

    “On August 10, 1938 at 10 o’clock a. m., the breakup of the
    synagogues will commence. Gauleiter Julius Streicher will
    personally set the crane into motion with which the Jewish
    symbols, Star of David, etc., will be torn down. This should be
    arranged in a big way. Closer details are still unknown.”
    (_1724-PS_)

Streicher himself supervised the demolition, according to a newspaper
account of 11 August 1938, which described the scene:

    “In Nurnberg the Synagogue is being demolished; Julius Streicher
    himself inaugurates the work by a speech lasting more than an
    hour and a half. By his order then—so to speak as a prelude of
    the demolition—the tremendous Star of David came off the
    cupola.” (_2711-PS_)

These accounts of violence were not localized anti-Semitic
demonstrations, but were directed and ordered from a centralized
headquarters in Berlin. This fact is established by a series of teletype
messages sent by the Berlin Secret State Police Headquarters to police
chiefs throughout Germany on 10 November 1938, which contained
instructions pertaining to the prearranged demonstration (_3051-PS_).
One of these confidential orders, signed by Heydrich, provides:

    “Because of the attempt on the life of the Secretary of the
    Legation von Rath in Paris tonight, 9-10 November 1938,
    demonstrations against Jews are to be expected throughout the
    Reich. The following instructions are given on how to treat
    these events:

    “1. The Chiefs of the State Police, or their deputies, must get
    in telephonic contact with the political leaders who have
    jurisdiction over their districts and have to arrange a joint
    meeting with the appropriate inspector or commander of the Order
    Police to discuss the organization of the demonstrations. At
    these discussions the political leaders have to be informed that
    the German police has received from the Reichsfuehrer SS and
    Chief of the German Police the following instructions, in
    accordance with which the political leaders should adjust their
    own measures.

    “_a._ Only such measures should be taken which do not involve
    danger to German life or property. (For instance synagogues are
    to be burned down only when there is no danger of fire to the
    surroundings.)

    “_b._ Business and private apartments of Jews may be destroyed
    but not looted. The police is instructed to supervise the
    execution of this order and to arrest looters.” (_3051-PS_)

          4. THE PROGRAM FOR THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF JEWRY

At this point the gradual and mounting campaign against the Jews was
prepared for the achievement of its ultimate violent ends. The German
people had been indoctrinated, and the seeds of hatred had been sown.
The German state was armed and prepared for conquest. The force of world
opinion could now safely be ignored. Already the Nazi conspirators had
forced out of Germany 200,000 of its former 500,000 Jews. The
Nazi-controlled German state was therefore emboldened, and Hitler in
anticipation of the aggressive wars already planned cast about for a
provocation.

In his speech before the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, Hitler declared:

    “If the international Jewish financiers within and without
    Europe succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world
    war, the result will not be the Bolshevication of the world and
    the victory of Jewry, but the obliteration of the Jewish race in
    Europe.” (_2663-PS_)

The chief editor of the official organ of the SS, the “_Schwarze
Korps_,” expressed similar sentiments on 8 August 1940:

    “Just as the Jewish question will be solved for Germany only
    when the last Jew has been deported, so the rest of Europe
    should also realize that the German peace which awaits it must
    be a peace without Jews.” (_2668-PS_)

Other officials of the Party and State voiced the same views. Rosenberg
wrote for the publication “World Struggle,” which in the April and
September 1941 issues declared:

    “The Jewish question will be solved for Europe only when the
    last Jew has left the European continent.” (_2665-PS_)

Hans Frank entered this apologetic note in his diary:

    “Of course, I could not eliminate all lice and Jews in only a
    year’s time. But in the course of time, and above all, if you
    will help me, this end will be attained.” (_2233-C-PS_)

A. _Registration._

The first step in accomplishing the purpose of the Nazi Party and the
Nazi-dominated state, to eliminate the Jew, was to require a complete
registration of all Jews. Inasmuch as the anti-Jewish policy was linked
with the program of German aggression, such registration was required
not only within the Reich, but successively within the conquered
territories. For example, registration was required, by decree, within
Germany (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ Part I, 1938, page 922, 23 July, signed by
Frick); within Austria (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Volume 1, 1940, page 694,
29 April); within Poland (_Kurjer Krakowski_, 24 October, 1939); in
France (_Journal Official_ No. 9, page 92, 30 September, 1940); in
Holland (_Verordnungsblatt_, No. 16, 10 January, 1941, signed by
Seyss-Inquart).

B. _Segregation into Ghettos._

The second step was to segregate and concentrate the Jews within
restricted areas, called ghettos. This policy was carefully worked out,
as is illustrated by the confidential statement taken from the files of
Rosenberg (_212-PS_). This memorandum of Rosenberg’s, entitled
“Directions for Handling of the Jewish Question”, states:

    “The first main goal of the German measures must be strict
    segregation of Jewry from the rest of the population. In the
    execution of this, first of all, is the seizing of the Jewish
    population by the introduction of a registration order and
    similar appropriate measures * * *.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * All rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. They
    are to be placed in ghettos and at the same time are to be
    separated according to sexes. The presence of many more or less
    closed Jewish settlements in White Ruthenia and in the Ukraine
    makes this mission easier. Moreover, places are to be chosen
    which make possible the full use of the Jewish manpower in case
    labor needs are present. These ghettos can be placed under the
    supervision of a Jewish self-government with Jewish officials.
    The guarding of the boundaries between the ghettos and the outer
    world, is, however, the duty of the Police.

    “Also, in the cases in which a ghetto could not yet be
    established, care is to be taken through strict prohibitions and
    similar suitable measures that a further intermingling of blood
    of the Jews and the rest of the populace does not continue.”
    (_212-PS_)

In May 1941 Rosenberg, as the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories, issued directions confining the Jews to ghettos in the
Ukraine:

    “After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices,
    the Jewish question will have to have a decisive solution,
    through the institution of ghettos.” (_1028-PS_)

The policies set forth in the foregoing utterances of Rosenberg were not
accidental, isolated, or the views of one individual. They were the
expressed State policies. Von Schirach played his part in the program of
ghettoization. His speech before the European Youth Congress held in
Vienna on 14 September 1942 was reported on page 2, column 2 of the
Vienna edition of the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” of 15 September, as
follows:

    “Every Jew who exerts influence in Europe is a danger to
    European culture. If anyone reproaches me with having driven
    from this city, which was once the European metropolis of Jewry,
    tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the ghetto
    of the East, I feel myself compelled to reply: I see in this an
    action contributing to European culture.” (_3048-PS_)

One of the largest ghettos was within the city of Warsaw. The official
report made by SS Major General Stroop concerning this ghetto is
entitled “The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More.” (_1061-PS_)

The report thus describes the ghetto:

    “The Ghetto thus established in Warsaw was inhabited by about
    400,000 Jews. It contained 27,000 apartments with an average of
    2½ rooms each. It was separated from the rest of the city by
    partition and other walls, and by walling-up of the
    thoroughfares, windows, doors, open spaces, etc. * * *”
    (_1061-PS_)

Conditions within this ghetto are indicated in the statement of the
report that an average of six persons lived in every room. (_1061-PS_)

Himmler received a report from the SS Brigade Fuehrer Group A, dated 15
October 1941, which further illustrates the establishment and operation
of the ghettos. (_L-180_) The report states:

    “Apart from organizing and carrying out measures of execution,
    the creation of ghettos was begun in the larger towns at once
    during the first day of operations. This was especially urgent
    in Knowno because there were 30,000 Jews in a total population
    of 152,400.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In Riga the so-called ‘_Moskau Suburb_’ was designated as a
    ghetto. This is the worst dwelling district of Riga, already now
    mostly inhabited by Jews. The transfer of the Jews into the
    ghetto district proved rather difficult because the Latvians
    dwelling in that district had to be evacuated and residential
    space in Riga is very crowded. 24,000 of the 28,000 Jews living
    in Riga have been transferred into the ghetto so far. In
    creating the ghetto, the Security Police restricted themselves
    to mere policing duties, while the establishment and
    administration of the ghetto as well as the regulation of the
    food supply for the inmates of the ghetto were left to civil
    administration; the labor officers were left in charge of Jewish
    labor.

    “In the other towns with a larger Jewish population ghettos
    shall be established likewise.” (_L-180_)

Jews were forced into ghettos in the Polish Province of Galicia. The
conditions in these ghettos are described in the report from Katzmann,
Lt. General of Police, to Krueger, General of the Police East, dated 20
June 1943, and entitled “Solution of Jewish Question in Galicia.”
(_L-18_):

    “Nothing but catastrophical conditions were found in the ghettos
    of Rawa-Ruska and Rohatyn * * *.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * The Jews of Rawa-Ruska, fearing the evacuation, had
    concealed those suffering from spotted fever in underground
    holes. When evacuation was to start the police found that 3,000
    Jews suffering from spotted fever lay about in this ghetto. In
    order to destroy this center of pestilence at once every police
    officer inoculated against spotted fever was called into action.
    Thus we succeeded to destroy this plague-boil, losing thereby
    only one officer. Almost the same conditions were found in
    Rohatyn * * *.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Since we received more and more alarming reports on the Jews
    becoming armed in an ever-increasing manner, we started during
    the last fortnight in June 1943 an action throughout the whole
    of the district of Galicia with the intent to use strongest
    measures to destroy the Jewish gangsterdom. Special measures
    were found necessary during the action to dissolve the ghetto in
    Lwow where the dug-out mentioned above had been established.
    Here we had to act brutally from the beginning, in order to
    avoid losses on our side; we had to blow up, or to burn down
    several houses. On this occasion the surprising fact arose that
    we were able to catch about 20,000 Jews instead of 12,000 Jews
    who had registered. We had to pull at least 3,000 Jewish corpses
    out of every kind of hiding places; they had committed suicide
    by taking poison. * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * Despite the extraordinary burden heaped upon every single
    SS-Police officer during these actions, mood and spirit of the
    men were extraordinarily good and praiseworthy from the first to
    the last day * * *.” (_L-18_)

These acts of removal and slaughter were not entirely without profit.
The report continues:

    “Together with the evacuation action, we executed the
    confiscation of Jewish property. Very high amounts were
    confiscated and paid over to the Special Staff ‘Reinhard’. Apart
    from furniture and many textile goods, the following amounts
    were confiscated and turned over to Special Staff ‘Reinhard’ * *
    *

   “20.952 kilograms of gold wedding rings.
         7 Stamp collections, complete.
         1 Suit case with pocket knives.
         1 basket of fountain pens and propelled pencils.
         3 bags filled with rings—not genuine.
        35 wagons of furs.” (_L-18_)

The thoroughness of the looting is illustrated by an item listing 11.73
kilograms of gold teeth and inlays. (_L-18_)

By the end of 1942, Jews in the General Government of Poland had been
crowded into fifty-five localities, whereas before the German invasion
there had been approximately 1,000 Jewish settlements within this same
area. This fact is reported in the 1942 Official Gazette for the General
Government, No. 94, page 665, 1 November 1942.

C. _Forced Labor._

The Jews, having been registered and confined within the ghettos, now
furnished a reservoir for slave labor. The difference between slave
labor and “labor duty” was this: the latter group were entitled to
reasonable compensation, stated working hours, medical care and
attention, and other social security measures, while the former were
granted none of these advantages, being in fact, on a level below that
of slaves.

Rosenberg set up within his organization for the Occupied Eastern
Territories a department which, among other things, was to seek a
solution for the Jewish problem by means of forced labor. His plans,
contained in a memorandum entitled “General Organizations and Tasks of
our Office for the General Handling of Problems in the Eastern
Territory,” and dated 29 April 1941, read as follows:

    “A general treatment is required for the Jewish problem for
    which a temporary solution will have to be determined (forced
    labor for the Jews, creation of Ghettos, etc.).” (_1024-PS_)

Thereafter Rosenberg issued instructions that Jewish forced labor should
be utilized for every manual labor task:

    “The standing rule for the Jewish labor employment is the
    complete and unyielding use of Jewish manpower regardless of age
    in the reconstruction of the occupied eastern territories.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Violations against German measures, especially against the
    forced labor regulations, are to be punished by death to the
    Jews.” (_212-PS_)

From the ghettos Jewish labor was selected and sent to a concentration
area. Here the usable Jews were screened from those considered
worthless. For example, a contingent of 45,000 Jews could be expected to
yield 10,000 to 15,000 usable laborers. This estimate is based on an
RSHA telegram to Himmler, marked “Urgent” and “Secret”, and dated 16
December 1942.

    “In the total of 45,000 are included physically handicapped and
    others (old Jews and children). In making a distribution for
    this purpose, at least 10,000 to 15,000 laborers will be
    available when the Jews arriving at Auschwitz are assigned.”
    (_1472-PS_)

The report from Lieutenant General of Police, Katzmann, to General of
the Police East, Krueger, clearly outlines the nature of the Jewish
forced labor:

    “The best remedy consisted of the formation, by the SS and
    Police Leader, of forced labor camps. The best opportunity for
    labor was offered by the necessity to complete the ‘Dg.4’ road
    which was extremely important and necessary for the whole of the
    southern part of the front, and which was in a catastrophically
    bad condition. On October 15th 1941, the establishment of camps
    along the road was commenced, and despite considerable
    difficulties there existed, after a few weeks only, seven camps
    containing 4,000 Jews.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Soon more camps followed these first ones, so that after a very
    short time the completion of fifteen camps of this kind could be
    reported to the Superior Leader of SS and Police. In the course
    of time about 20,000 Jewish laborers passed through these camps.
    Despite the hardly imaginable difficulties occurring at this
    work I can report today that about 160 kilometers of the road
    are completed.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “At the same time all other Jews fit for work were registered
    and distributed for useful work by the labor agencies.

    * * * When the Jews were marked by the Star of David, as well as
    when they were registered by the labor agencies, the first
    symptoms appeared in their attempts to dodge the order of the
    authorities. The measures which were introduced thereupon led to
    thousands of arrests. It became more and more apparent that the
    civil administration was not in a position to solve the Jewish
    problem in an approximately satisfactory manner. Then, for
    instance, the municipal administration at Lwow had no success in
    their attempts to house the Jews within a closed district which
    would be inhabited only by Jews. This question, too, was solved
    quickly by the SS and Police Leaders through subordinate
    officials. This measure became the more urgent as in the winter,
    1941, big centers of spotted fever were noted in many parts of
    the town.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “During this removal of the Jews into a certain quarter of the
    town several sluices were erected at which all the work-shy and
    asocial Jewish rabble were caught during the screening and
    treated in a special way. Owing to the peculiar fact that almost
    90% of artisans working in Galicia were Jews, the task to be
    solved could be fulfilled only step by step, since an immediate
    evacuation would not have served the interest of War Economy.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * Cases were discovered where Jews, in order to acquire any
    certificate of labor, not only renounced all wages, but even
    paid money themselves. Moreover, the organizing of Jews for the
    benefit of their employers grew to such catastrophical extent
    that it was deemed necessary to interfere in the most energetic
    manner for the benefit of the German name. Since the
    administration was not in a position and showed itself too weak
    to master this chaos, the SS and Police Leader simply took over
    the entire disposition of labor for Jews. The Jewish labor
    agencies, which were manned by hundreds of Jews, were dissolved.
    All certificates of labor given by firms or administrative
    offices were declared invalid, and the cards given to the Jews
    by the labor agencies were revalidated by the police offices by
    stamping them. In the course of this action, again, thousands of
    Jews were caught who were in possession of forged certificates
    or who had obtained, surreptitiously, certificates of labor by
    all kinds of pretexts. These Jews also were exposed to special
    treatment.” (_L-18_)

D. _Extermination._

(At this point a strip of motion picture footage taken, presumably, by a
member of the SS, and captured by the United States military forces in
an SS barracks near Augsburg, Germany, was shown to the tribunal. The
film depicts what is believed to be the extermination of a ghetto by
Gestapo agents, assisted by military units.

The following scenes are representative:

Scene 2: A naked girl running across the courtyard.

Scene 3: An older woman being pushed past the camera, and a man in SS
uniform standing at the right of the scene.

Scene 5: A man with a skull cap and a woman are manhandled.

Scene 14: A half-naked woman runs through the crowd.

Scene 15: Another half-naked woman runs out of the house.

Scene 16: Two men drag an old man out.

Scene 18: A man in German military uniform, with his back to the camera,
watches.

Scene 24: A general shot of the street, showing fallen bodies and naked
women running.

Scene 32: A shot of the street, showing five fallen bodies.

Scene 37: A man with a bleeding head is hit again.

Scene 39: A soldier in German military uniform, with a rifle, stands by
as a crowd centers on a man coming out of the house.

Scene 44: A soldier with a rifle, in German military uniform, walks past
a woman clinging to a torn blouse.

Scene 45: A woman is dragged by her hair across the street.)

The means of accomplishing the extermination of the Jews are discussed
in the diary of Hans Frank, then Governor-General of Occupied Poland
(_2233-D-PS_). In a cabinet session on Tuesday, 16 December 1941 in the
Government Building at Cracow, Frank made a closing address, as follows:

    “As far as the Jews are concerned, I want to tell you quite
    frankly that they must be done away with in one way or another.
    The Fuehrer said once: ‘Should united Jewry again succeed in
    provoking a world-war, the blood of not only the nations which
    have been forced into the war by them, will be shed, but the Jew
    will have found his end in Europe’. I know that many of the
    measures carried out against the Jews in the Reich at present
    are being criticized. It is being tried intentionally, as is
    obvious from the reports on the morale, to talk about cruelty,
    harshness, etc. Before I continue, I want to beg you to agree
    with me on the following formula: We will principally have pity
    on the German people only, and nobody else in the whole world.
    The others, too, had no pity on us. As an old
    National-Socialist, I must say: This war would only be a partial
    success if the whole lot of Jewry would survive it, while we
    would have shed our best blood in order to save Europe. My
    attitude towards the Jews will, therefore, be based only on the
    expectation that they must disappear. They must be done away
    with. I have entered negotiations to have them deported to the
    East. A great discussion concerning that question will take
    place in Berlin in January, to which I am going to delegate the
    State Secretary Dr. Buehler. That discussion is to take place in
    the Reich Security Main Office with SS-Lt. General Heydrich. A
    great Jewish migration will begin, in any case.

    “But what should be done with the Jews? Do you think they will
    be settled down in the ‘Ostland’, in villages? This is what we
    were told in Berlin: Why all this bother? We can do nothing with
    them either in the ‘Ostland’ nor in the ‘Reichskommissariat’. So
    liquidate them yourself.

    “Gentlemen, I must ask you to rid yourself of all feeling of
    pity. We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them and
    wherever it is possible, in order to maintain there the
    structure of the Reich as a whole. This will, naturally, be
    achieved by other methods than those pointed out by Bureau Chief
    Dr. Hummel. Nor can the judges of the Special Courts be made
    responsible for it, because of the limitations of the framework
    of the legal procedure. Such outdated views cannot be applied to
    such gigantic and unique events. We must find at any rate a way
    which leads to the goal, and my thoughts are working in that
    direction.

    “The Jews represent for us also extraordinarily malignant
    gluttons. We have now approximately 2,500,000 of them in the
    General Government, perhaps with the Jewish mixtures and
    everything that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews. We cannot shoot or
    poison those 3,500,000 Jews, but we shall nevertheless be able
    to take measures, which will lead, somehow, to their
    annihilation, and this in connection with the gigantic measures
    to be determined in discussions from the Reich. The General
    Government must become free of Jews, the same as the Reich.
    Where and how this is to be achieved is a matter for the offices
    which we must appoint and create here. Their activities will be
    brought to your attention in due course.” (_2233-D-PS_)

This was not the planning and scheming of an irresponsible individual,
but the expression by the Governor-General of Occupied Poland, of the
official policy of the German State.

Rosenberg’s notion of the means to be taken against the Jews is
expressed in a secret “Document Memorandum for the Fuehrer—Concerning:
Jewish Possessions in France,” dated 18 December 1941. Rosenberg urges
plundering and death:

    “* * * In compliance with the order of the Fuehrer for
    protection of Jewish cultural possessions, a great number of
    Jewish dwellings remained unguarded. Consequently, many
    furnishings have disappeared because a guard could, naturally,
    not be posted. In the whole East the administration has found
    terrible conditions of living quarters, and the chances of
    procurement are so limited that it is not practical to procure
    any more. Therefore, I beg the Fuehrer to permit the seizure of
    all Jewish home furnishings of Jews in Paris, who have fled or
    will leave shortly, and that of Jews living in all parts of the
    occupied West, to relieve the shortage of furnishings in the
    administration in the East.

    “2. A great number of leading Jews were, after a short
    examination in Paris, again released. The attempts on the lives
    of members of the armed forces have not stopped; on the contrary
    they continue. This reveals an unmistakable plan to disrupt the
    German-French cooperation, to force Germany to retaliate, and,
    with this, evoke a new defense on the part of the French against
    Germany. I suggest to the Fuehrer that, instead of executing 100
    Frenchmen, we substitute 100 Jewish bankers, lawyers, etc. It is
    the Jews in London and New York who incite the French communists
    to commit acts of violence, and it seems only fair that the
    members of this race should pay for this. It is not the little
    Jews, but the leading Jews in France, who should be held
    responsible. That would tend to awaken the Anti-Jewish
    sentiment.

                             “(Signed)  A. Rosenberg.”  (_001-PS_)

(1) _Starvation._ Chief among the methods utilized for the annihilation
of the Jewish people was starvation. Policies were designed and adopted
to deprive the Jews of the most elemental necessities of life. Hans
Frank, then Governor-General of Poland, wrote in his diary that hunger
rations were introduced in the Warsaw Ghetto (_2233-E-PS_). Referring to
the new food regulations of August 1942, he noted that by these food
regulations more than one million Jews were virtually condemned to
death.

    “That we sentence 1,200,000 Jews to die of hunger should be
    noted only marginally. It is a matter of course that should the
    Jews not starve to death it would we hope result in a speeding
    up of the anti-Jewish measures.” (_2233-E-PS_)

In pursuance of the deliberate policy of Jewish starvation, Jews were
prohibited from pursuing agricultural activities in order to cut them
off from access to sources of food. A document entitled “Provisional
Directives on the Treatment of Jews”, issued by the Reichscommissar for
the Ostland, provided:

    “Jews must be cleaned out from the countryside. The Jews are to
    be removed from all trades, especially from trade with
    agricultural products and other foodstuffs.” (_1138-PS_)

Jews were also excluded from the purchase of basic food, such as wheat
products, meat, eggs, and milk. A decree dated 18 September 1942, from
the Ministry of Agriculture, provided:

    “Jews will no longer receive the following foods, beginning with
    the 42nd distribution period (19 October 1942): meat, meat
    products, eggs, wheat products (cake, white bread, wheat rolls,
    wheat flour, etc.) whole milk, fresh skimmed milk, as well as
    such food distributed not on food ration cards issued uniformly
    throughout the Reich but on local supply certificates or by
    special announcement of the nutrition office on extra coupons of
    the food cards. Jewish children and young people over ten years
    of age will receive the bread ration of the normal consumer.”
    (_1347-PS_)

The sick, the old, and pregnant mothers were excluded from the special
food concessions allotted to non-Jews. Seizure by the State Police of
food shipments to Jews from abroad was authorized, and Jewish ration
cards were distinctly marked with the word “Jew” in color across the
face of the cards, so that the store-keepers could readily identify and
discriminate against Jewish purchasers.

According to page 110 of an official document of the Czechoslovakian
government published in 1943 and entitled “Czechoslovakia Fights Back,”
Jewish food purchases were confined to certain areas, to certain days,
and to certain hours. As might be expected, the period permitted for the
purchases occurred during the time when food stocks were likely to be
exhausted. (_1689-PS_)

By Special Order No. 44 for the Eastern Occupied Territories, dated 4
November 1941, Jews were limited to rations as low as only one-half of
the lowest basic category of other people, and the Ministry of
Agriculture was empowered to exclude Jews entirely or partially from
obtaining food thus exposing the Jewish community to death by
starvation. A bulletin issued by the Polish Ministry of Information,
dated 15 December 1942, concludes that upon the basis of the nature of
the separate rationing and the amount of food available to Jews in the
Warsaw and Cracow ghettos, the system was designed to bring about
starvation:

    “In regard to food supplies they are brought under a completely
    separate system, which is obviously aimed at depriving them of
    the most elemental necessities of life.” (_L-165_)

(2) _Annihilation._ Annihilation within the ghettos is illustrated and
glorified in the report of Major General of the Police Stroop, entitled
“The Warsaw Ghetto is No More.” (_1061-PS_)

This report bound in leather profusely illustrated, typed on heavy bond
paper, and almost 75 pages in length, is the almost unbelievable recital
of a proud accomplishment by Stroop, who signed the report with a bold
hand. Stroop in his report first pays tribute to the bravery and heroism
of the German forces who participated in the ruthless actions against a
defenseless group of Jews numbering, to be exact 56,065—including
infants and women. His report relates day-by-day progress in the
accomplishment of his mission—to destroy and to obliterate the Warsaw
Ghetto. According to this report, the ghetto, which was established in
Warsaw in November 1940, was inhabited by about 400,000 Jews; and prior
to the action for the destruction of this Ghetto, some 316,000 had
already been deported.

These are some of the boastful and vivid account’s of the scenes within
the Warsaw Ghetto:

    “The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could be broken
    only by relentlessly using all our forces and energy by day and
    night. On 23 April 1943 the Reichsfuehrer SS issued through the
    Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East at Cracow his order to
    complete the combing out of the Warsaw Ghetto with the greatest
    severity and relentless tenacity. I therefore decided to destroy
    the entire Jewish residential area by setting every block on
    fire, including the blocks of residential buildings near the
    armament works. One concern after the other was systematically
    evacuated and subsequently destroyed by fire. The Jews then
    emerged from their hiding places and dugouts in almost every
    case. Not infrequently, the Jews stayed in the burning buildings
    until, because of the heat and the fear of being burned alive,
    they preferred to jump down from the upper stories after having
    thrown mattresses and other upholstered articles into the street
    from the burning buildings. With their bones broken, they still
    tried to crawl across the street into blocks of buildings which
    had not yet been set on fire or were only partially in flames.
    Often the Jews changed their hiding places during the night, by
    moving into the ruins of burnt-out buildings, taking refuge
    there until they were found by our patrols. Their stay in the
    sewers also ceased to be pleasant after the first week.
    Frequently from the street, we could hear loud voices coming
    through the sewer shafts. Then the men of the Waffen SS, the
    Police or the _Wehrmacht_ Engineers courageously climbed down
    from the shafts to bring out the Jews and not infrequently they
    then stumbled over Jews already dead, or were shot at. It was
    always necessary to use smoke candles to drive out the Jews.
    Thus one day we opened 183 sewer entrance holes, and at a fixed
    time lowered smoke candles into them, with the result that the
    bandits fled from what they believed to be gas in the center of
    the former Ghetto, where they could then be pulled out of the
    sewer holes there. A great number of Jews who could not be
    counted were exterminated by blowing up sewers and dugouts.

    “The longer the resistance lasted the tougher the men of the
    Waffen SS, Police, and _Wehrmacht_ became. They fulfilled their
    duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship, and stood together
    as models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often
    lasted from early morning until late at night. At night search
    patrols with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels
    of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they
    caught and killed Jews who used the night hours for
    supplementing their stores from abandoned dugouts and for
    contacting neighboring groups or exchanging news with them.

    “Considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen SS
    had only been trained for three to four weeks before being
    assigned to this action, high credit should be given to the
    pluck, courage and devotion to duty which they showed. It must
    be stated that the _Wehrmacht_ Engineers, too, executed the
    blowing up of dugouts, sewers and concrete buildings with
    indefatigability and great devotion to duty. Officers and men of
    the police, a large part of whom had already been at the front,
    again excelled by their dashing spirit.

    “Only through the continuous and untiring work of all involved
    did we succeed in catching a total of 56,065 Jews whose
    extermination can be proved. To this should be added the number
    of Jews who lost their lives in explosions or fires, but whose
    number could not be ascertained.” (_1061-PS_)

At the beginning of his report Stroop lists the losses of German troops:

    “For the Fuehrer and their country the following fell in the
    battle for the destruction of Jews and bandits in the former
    ghetto of Warsaw * * *” [Fifteen names are thereafter listed].

    “Furthermore, the Polish police sergeant Julian Zielinski, born
    13 November 1891, 8th Commissariat, fell on 19 April 1943 while
    fulfilling his duty. They gave their utmost, their life. We
    shall never forget them.

    “The following were wounded * * *” [There follow the names of 60
    Waffen SS personnel] “11 watchmen from training camps, probably
    Lithuanians; 12 Security Police officers in SS units; 5 men of
    the Polish Police; and 2 regular army personnel, engineers.”
    (_1061-PS_)

The story continues in the daily teletype reports, from which the
following are excerpts:

    “Our setting the block on fire achieved the result in the course
    of the night that those Jews whom we had not been able to find
    despite all our search operations left their hideouts under the
    roofs, in the cellars, and elsewhere, and appeared on the
    outside of the buildings, trying to escape the flames. Masses of
    them—entire families—were already aflame and jumped from the
    windows or endeavored to let themselves down by means of sheets
    tied together or the like. Steps had been taken so that these
    Jews as well as the remaining ones were liquidated at once.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “When the blocks of buildings mentioned above were destroyed,
    120 Jews were caught and numerous Jews were destroyed when they
    jumped from the attics to the inner courtyards, trying to escape
    the flames. Many more Jews perished in the flames or were
    destroyed when the dugouts and sewer entrances were blown up.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Not until the blocks of buildings were well aflame and were
    about to collapse did a further considerable number of Jews
    emerge, forced to do so by the flames and the smoke. Time and
    again the Jews try to escape even through burning buildings.
    Innumerable Jews whom we saw on the roofs during the
    conflagration perished in the flames. Others emerged from the
    upper stories in the last possible moment and were only able to
    escape death from the flames by jumping down. Today we caught a
    total of 2,283 Jews, of whom 204 were shot, and innumerable Jews
    were destroyed in dugouts and in the flames.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Jews testify that they emerge at night to get fresh air,
    since it is unbearable to stay permanently within the dugouts
    owing to the long duration of the operation. On the average the
    raiding parties shoot 30 to 50 Jews each night. From these
    statements it was to be inferred that a considerable number of
    Jews are still underground in the Ghetto. Today we blew up a
    concrete building which we had not been able to destroy by fire.
    In this operation we learned that the blowing up of a building
    is a very lengthy process and takes an enormous amount of
    explosives. The best and only method for destroying the Jews
    therefore still remains the setting of fires.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Some depositions speak of three to four thousand Jews who still
    remain in underground holes, sewers, and dugouts; The
    undersigned is resolved not to terminate the large-scale
    operation until the last Jew has been destroyed.” (_1061-PS_)

The teletype message of 15 May 1945 indicates that the operation is in
its last stage:

    “A special unit once more searched the last block of buildings
    which was still intact in the Ghetto, and subsequently destroyed
    it. In the evening the chapel, mortuary, and all other buildings
    in the Jewish cemetery were blown up or destroyed by fire.”
    (_1061-PS_)

On 24 May 1943 the final figures were compiled by Major General Stroop:

    “Of the total of 56,065 caught, about 7,000 were destroyed in
    the former Ghetto during large-scale operation. 6,929 Jews were
    destroyed by transporting them to T.II [believed to be Treblinka
    Camp No. 2]. The sum total of Jews destroyed is therefore
    13,929. Beyond the number of 56,065 an estimated number of 5 to
    6,000 Jews were destroyed by being blown up or by perishing in
    the flames.” (_1061-PS_)

It was not always necessary, or perhaps desirable, to place the Jews
within Ghettos to effect elimination. In the Baltic States a more direct
course of action was followed. According to a report by SS Brigade
Fuehrer Stahlecker to Himmler, dated 15 October 1941, entitled “Action
Group A,” which was found in Himmler’s private files, 135,567 persons,
nearly all Jews, were murdered in accordance to basic orders directing
the complete annihilation of Jews. SS Brigade Fuehrer Stahlecker
continues his report:

    “* * * To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in motion
    an extensive pogrom against the Jews. Klimatis, the leader of
    the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this
    purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis
    of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in
    Kowno and in such a way that no German order or German
    instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first
    pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June the Lithuanian partisans
    did away with more than 1,500 Jews, setting fire to several
    synagogues or destroying them by other means and burning down a
    Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During
    the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a
    similar way. * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “It was possible, though, through similar influences on the
    Latvian auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against the Jews
    also in Riga. During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed
    and about 400 Jews were killed.” (_L-180_)

Nazi ingenuity reached its zenith with the construction and operation of
the gas van as a means of mass annihilation of the Jews. A description
of the operation of these vehicles of death is fully set forth in a
captured Top Secret document dated 16 May 1942, addressed to SS
Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff, 8 Prince Albrecht-Strasse, Berlin, from Dr.
Becker, SS Untersturmfuehrer. The report reads in part:

    “The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While
    the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the
    weather is not too bad, the vans of the second series (_Saurer_)
    stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained for instance
    for only one half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply
    skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is
    only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at
    the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that
    place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of
    execution is usually 10 to 15 km away from the highways and is
    difficult of access because of its location; in damp or wet
    weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be
    executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize
    immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be
    avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load
    them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot.

    “I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as
    house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each
    side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans,
    such as one often sees on farm houses in the country. The vans
    became so well-known, that not only the authorities but also the
    civilian population called the van ‘death van’, as soon as one
    of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion the van cannot be
    kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Because of the rough terrain and the indescribable road and
    highway conditions the caulkings and rivets loosen in the course
    of time. I was asked if in such cases the vans should be brought
    to Berlin for repair. Transportation to Berlin would be much too
    expensive and would demand too much fuel. In order to save those
    expenses I ordered them to have smaller leaks soldered and if
    that should no longer be possible, to notify Berlin immediately
    by radio, that Pol. Nr. is out of order. Besides that I ordered
    that during application of gas all the men were to be kept as
    far away from the vans as possible, so they should not suffer
    damage to their health by the gas which eventually would escape.
    I should like to take this opportunity to bring the following to
    your attention: several commands have had the unloading after
    the application of gas done by their own men. I brought to the
    attention of the commanders of those S.K. concerned the immense
    psychological injuries and damages to their health which that
    work can have for those men, even if not immediately, at least
    later on. The men complained to me about headaches which
    appeared after each unloading. Nevertheless they don’t want to
    change the orders, because they are afraid prisoners called for
    that work, could use an opportune moment to flee. To protect the
    men from those damages, I request orders be issued accordingly.

    “The application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In
    order to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses
    the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons
    to be executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by
    dozing off as was planned. My directions now have proved that by
    correct adjustment of the levers death comes faster and the
    prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces and
    excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer noticed.

    “Today I shall continue my journey to group B, where I can be
    reached with further news.

    “Signed: Dr. Becker, SS Untersturmfuehrer.”  (_501-PS_)

A letter signed by Hauptsturmfuehrer Truehe on the subject of S-vans,
addressed to the Reich Security Main Office, Room 2-D-3-A, Berlin, and
marked “Top Secret,” establishes that the vans were used for the
annihilation of the Jews. The message reads:

    “A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way,
    arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security
    Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.

    “The three S-vans which are there are not sufficient for that
    purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (five tons). At
    the same time I request the shipment of twenty gas hoses for the
    three S-vans on hand (two Diamond, one Saurer), since the ones
    on hand are leaky already.

    (signed) The Commandant of the Security Police and the Security
    Service, Ostland.” (_501-PS_)

It appears that a certain amount of discord existed between officials of
the German government as to the proper means and methods to be used in
connection with the extermination program. A secret report dated 18 June
1943, addressed to Rosenberg, complained that five thousand Jews killed
by the police and SS might have been used for forced labor, and chided
them for failing to bury the bodies of those liquidated:

    “The fact that Jews receive special treatment requires no
    further discussion. However, it appears hardly believable that
    this is done in the way described in the report of the General
    Commissioner of 1 June 1943. What is Katyn against that? Imagine
    only that these occurrences would become known to the other side
    and exploited by them! Most likely such propaganda would have no
    effect only because people who hear and read about it simply
    would not be ready to believe it.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “To lock men, women, and children into barns and to set fire to
    them does not appear to be a suitable method of combatting
    bands, even if it is desired to exterminate the population. This
    method is not worthy of the German cause and hurts our
    reputation severely.” (_R-135_)

Gunther, the prison warden at Minsk, in a letter dated 31 May 1943,
addressed to the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia, was critical
by implication. This letter, entitled, “Action Against Jews,” reads:

    “On 13 April 1943 the former German dentist Ernst Israel
    Tichauer and his wife, Elisa Sara Tichauer, nee Rosenthal, were
    committed to the court prison by the Security Service. Since
    that time all German and Russian Jews who were turned over to us
    had their golden bridgework, crowns, and fillings pulled or
    broken out. This happens always one to two hours before the
    respective action.

    “Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews have been
    finished off. On the basis of a definite investigation gold was
    taken only in two actions—on 14 April 1943 from 172, and on 27
    April 1943 from 164 Jews. About fifty percent of the Jews had
    gold teeth, bridgework, or fillings. _Hauptscharfuehrer_ Rube of
    the Security Service was always personally present and he took
    the gold along, too.

    “Before 13 April 1943 this was not done.

    (signed)  Gunther, Prison Warden.” (_R-135_)

The foregoing letter was forwarded to Rosenberg, as Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories, on June 1943. The covering letter to
Rosenberg reads:

    “The enclosed official report from the warden of the prison in
    Minsk is submitted to the Reich Minister and the Reich Commissar
    for Information.

    “(signed)  The General Commissar in Minsk.”  (_R-135_)

A further complaint is contained in a secret letter addressed to General
of Infantry, Thomas, Chief of the International Armament Department,
dated 2 December 1941 (_3257-PS_). The writer of this letter
apprehensively stated his reason for not forwarding the communication
through official channels:

    “For the personal information of the Chief of the Industrial
    Armament Department I am forwarding a total account of the
    present situation in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in which the
    difficulties and tensions encountered so far and the problems
    which give rise to serious anxiety are stated with unmistakable
    clarity.

    “Intentionally I have desisted from submitting such a report
    through official channels or to make it known to other
    departments interested in it because I do not expect any results
    that way, but to the contrary am apprehensive that the
    difficulties and tensions and also the divergent opinions might
    only be increased due to the peculiarity of the situation.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Jewish problem:

    “Regulation of the Jewish question in the Ukraine was a
    difficult problem because the Jews constituted a large part of
    the urban population. We therefore have to deal—just as in the
    General Government—with a mass problem of policy concerning the
    population. Many cities had a percentage of Jews exceeding fifty
    percent. Only the rich Jews had fled from the German troops. The
    majority of Jews remained under German administration. The
    latter found the problem more complicated through the fact that
    these Jews represented almost the entire trade and even a part
    of the manpower in small and medium industries besides the
    business which had in part become superfluous as a direct or
    indirect result of the war. The elimination therefore
    necessarily had far-reaching economic consequences and even
    direct consequences for the armament industry (production for
    supplying the troops).”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The attitude of the Jewish population was anxious—obliging
    from the beginning. They tried to avoid everything that might
    displease the German administration. That they hated the German
    administration and army inwardly goes without saying and cannot
    be surprising. However, there is no proof that Jewry as a whole
    or even to a greater part was implicated in acts of sabotage.
    Surely there were some terrorists or saboteurs among them just
    as among the Ukrainians. But it cannot be said that the Jews as
    such represented a danger to the German armed forces. The output
    produced by Jews who, of course, were prompted by nothing but
    the feeling of fear, was satisfactory to the troops and the
    German administration.

    “The Jewish population remained temporarily unmolested shortly
    after the fighting. Only weeks, sometimes months later,
    specially detached formations of the police executed a planned
    shooting of Jews. The action as a rule proceeded from east to
    west. It was done entirely in public with the use of the
    Ukrainian militia, and unfortunately in many instances also with
    members of the armed forces taking part voluntarily. The way
    these actions, which included men and old men, women, and
    children of all ages were carried out was horrible. The great
    masses executed make this action more gigantic than any similar
    measure taken so far in the Soviet Union. So far about 150,000
    to 200,000 Jews may have been executed in the part of the
    Ukraine belonging to the Reichskommissariat; no consideration
    was given to the interests of economy.

    “Summarizing, it can be said that the kind of solution of the
    Jewish problem applied in the Ukraine which obviously was based
    on the ideological theories as a matter of principle had the
    following results:

    “(_a_) Elimination of a part of partly superfluous eaters in the
    cities.

    “(_b_) Elimination of a part of the population which hated us
    undoubtedly.

    “(_c_) Elimination of badly needed tradesmen who were in many
    instances indispensable even in the interests of the armed
    forces.

    “(_d_) Consequences as to foreign policy—propaganda which are
    obvious.

    “(_e_) Bad effects on the troops which in any case get indirect
    contact with the executions.

    “(_f_) Brutalizing effect on the formations which carry out the
    execution—regular police.” (_3257-PS_)

Lest it be thought that these conditions existed only in the East, the
official Netherlands government report by the Commissioner for
Repatriation as relates similar treatment of the Jews in the West
(_1726-PS_). The German measures taken against the Dutch
Jews—discriminatory decrees, anti-semitic demonstrations, burning of
synagogues, purging of Jews from the economic life of their country,
food restrictions, forced labor, concentration camp confinement,
deportation, and death—all these measures follow the same pattern that
was effected throughout Nazi-occupied Europe. The official Netherlands
report states that full Jews, liable to deportation, numbered 140,000.
The total number of actual Jewish deportees was 117,000, representing
more than eighty-three per cent of all the Jews in the Netherlands. Of
these, 115,000 were deported to Poland for slave labor, and after
departure all trace of them was lost. Regardless of victory or defeat to
Germany, the Jew was doomed. It was the expressed intent of the Nazi
state that whatever the German fate might be the Jew would not survive.
(_1726-PS_)

A Top Secret message from the commandant of the SIPO and SD for the
Radom District, addressed to SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Thiel on the subject,
“Clearance of Prisons,” reads as follows:

    “I again stress the fact that the number of inmates of the SIPO
    and SD prisons must be kept as low as possible. In the present
    situation, particularly, those suspects handed over by the civil
    police need only be subjected to a short, formal interrogation,
    provided there are no serious grounds for suspicion. They are
    then to be sent by the quickest route to a concentration camp,
    should no court-martial proceeding be necessary or should there
    be no question of discharge. Please keep the number of
    discharges very low. Should the situation at the front
    necessitate it, early preparations are to be made for the total
    clearance of prisons. Should the situation develop suddenly in
    such a way that it is impossible to evacuate the prisoners, the
    prison inmates are to be liquidated and their bodies disposed of
    as far as possible (burning, blowing up the building, etc.). If
    necessary, Jews still employed in the armament industry or on
    other work are to be dealt with in the same way.

    “The liberation of prisoners or Jews by the enemy, be it the WB
    [perhaps means ‘West-Bund,’ or ‘Western Ally’] or the Red Army,
    must be avoided under all circumstances, nor may they fall into
    their hands alive.” (_L-53_)

(3) _Mass Disposal of Jews in Concentration Camps._ The concentration
camps were utilized to dispose of literally millions of Jews, who died
by mass shooting, gas, poison, starvation, and other means. The part
which the concentration camps played in the annihilation of the Jewish
people is indicated in an official Polish report on Auschwitz
Concentration Camp (_L-161_). In Auschwitz during July 1944 Jews were
killed at the rate of 12,000 daily:

    “* * * During July 1944, they were being liquidated at the rate
    of 12,000 Hungarian Jews daily, and as the crematory could not
    deal with such numbers, many bodies were thrown into large pits
    and covered with quick lime.” (_L-161_)

The official Polish Government Commission Report on the Investigation of
German crimes in Poland describes the concentration camp at Treblinka in
these terms:

    “* * * In March 1942, the Germans began to erect another camp,
    Treblinka B, in the neighborhood of Treblinka A, intended to
    become a place of torment for Jews.

    “The erection of this camp was closely connected with the German
    plans aiming at a complete destruction of the Jewish population
    in Poland which necessitated the creation of a machinery by
    means of which the Polish Jews could be killed in large numbers.
    Late in April 1942, the erection of the first three chambers was
    finished in which these general massacres were to be performed
    by means of steam. Somewhat later the erection of the real death
    building was finished, which contains ten death chambers. It was
    opened for wholesale murders early in autumn 1942 * * *.”
    (_3311-PS_)

The report of the Polish commission describes graphically the procedure
for extermination within the camp:

    “* * * The average number of Jews dealt with at the camp in
    summer 1942 was about two railway transports daily, but there
    were days of much higher efficiency. From autumn 1942 this
    number was falling.

    “After unloading in the siding all victims were assembled in one
    place where men were separated from women and children. In the
    first days of the existence of the camp the victims were made to
    believe that after a short stay in the camp, necessary for
    bathing and disinfection, they would be sent farther east, for
    work. Explanations of this sort were given by SS men who
    assisted at the unloading of the transports and further
    explanations could be read in notices stuck up on the walls of
    the barracks. But later, when more transports had to be dealt
    with, the Germans dropped all pretenses and only tried to
    accelerate the procedure.

    “All victims had to strip off their clothes and shoes, which
    were collected afterwards, whereupon all victims, women and
    children first, were driven into the death chambers. Those too
    slow or too weak to move quickly were driven on by rifle-butts,
    by whipping and kicking, often by Sauer himself. Many slipped
    and fell, the next victims pressed forward and stumbled over
    them. Small children were simply thrown inside. After being
    filled up to capacity the chambers were hermetically closed and
    steam was let in. In a few minutes all was over. The Jewish
    menial workers had to remove the bodies from the platform and to
    bury them in mass graves. By and by, as new transports arrived,
    the cemetery grew, extending in eastern direction.

    “From reports received, it may be assumed that several hundred
    thousands of Jews have been exterminated in Treblinka.”
    (_3311-PS_)

An official United States government report issued by the Executive
Office of the President of the United States, War Refugee Board, on the
German camps at Auschwitz and Birkenau, sets forth the number of Jews
gassed in Birkenau in the two-year period between April 1942 and April
1944. The figure printed in this report is not a typographical error.
The number is 1,765,000. (_L-22_)

                5. RESULTS OF THE EXTERMINATION PROGRAM

The huge scale of the Jewish eliminations is also reflected in the
bookkeeping and statistics of the Germans themselves. The 16 December
1941 entry in the diary of Hans Frank contains these figures:

    “The Jews for us also represent extraordinarily malignant
    gluttons.

    “We have now approximately 2,500,000 of them in General
    Government—perhaps with the Jewish mixtures, and everything
    that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews.” (_2233-D-PS_)

On 25 January 1944, three years and one month later, Frank wrote in his
diary these words:

    “At the present time we still have in the General Government
    perhaps 100,000 Jews.” (_2233-F-PS_)

Thus, in this period of three years, according to the records of the
then Governor-General of Occupied Poland, between 2,400,000 and
3,400,000 Jews had been eliminated.

The total number of Jews who died by Nazi hands can never be definitely
ascertained. It is known, however, that 4 million Jews died in
concentration camps, and that 2 million Jews were killed by the State
Police in the East, making a total of 6 million murdered Jews. The
source of these figures is Adolph Eichmann, Chief of the Jewish Section
of the Gestapo. The figures are contained in an affidavit made by Dr.
Wilhelm Hoettl, Deputy Group Leader of the Foreign Section of the
Security Section, AMT VI, of the RSHA. Hoettl, in his affidavit, states
as follows:

    “Approximately 4 million Jews had been killed in the various
    concentration camps, while an additional 2 million met death in
    other ways, the major part of which were shot by operational
    squads of the Security Police during the campaign against
    Russia.” (_2738-PS_)

Hoettl describes the source of his information as follows:

    “According to my knowledge, Eichmann was at that time the leader
    of the Jewish Section of the Gestapo, and in addition to that he
    had been ordered by Himmler to get a hold of the Jews in all the
    European countries and to transport them to Germany. Eichmann
    was then very much impressed with the fact that Rumania had
    withdrawn from the war in those days. Moreover, he had come to
    me to get information about the military situation which I
    received daily from the Hungarian Ministry of War and from the
    Commander of the Waffen-SS in Hungary. He expressed his
    conviction that Germany had now lost the war and that he
    personally had no further chance. He knew that he would be
    considered one of the main war criminals by the United Nations,
    since he had millions of Jewish lives on his conscience. I asked
    him how many that was, to which he answered that although the
    number was a great Reich secret, he would tell me since I, as a
    historian, would be interested, and that he would probably not
    return anyhow from his command in Rumania. He had, shortly
    before that, made a report to Himmler, as the latter wanted to
    know the exact number of Jews who had been killed.” (_2738-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PERSECUTION OF
                                THE JEWS

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6 (b, c).           │  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (D) 3│      │
                │  (d); X (B).                           │  I   │  20, 55
                │                                        │      │
  3737-PS       │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the │      │
                │  Laws and Customs of War on Land,      │      │
                │  Annex, Article 46.                    │  VI  │     597
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
  *001-PS       │Memorandum for the Fuehrer signed       │      │
                │Rosenberg, 18 December 1941, concerning │      │
                │Jewish possessions in France. (USA 282) │ III  │       1
                │                                        │      │
  *014-PS       │Report to Fuehrer, 20 March 1941,       │      │
                │concerning shipment of Jewish property. │      │
                │(USA 784)                               │ III  │      40
                │                                        │      │
  *015-PS       │Letter and report of Rosenberg to       │      │
                │Hitler, 16 April 1943, concerning       │      │
                │seizure of ownerless Jewish art         │      │
                │possessions. (USA 387)                  │ III  │      41
                │                                        │      │
  *025-PS       │Conference report of 4 September 1942   │      │
                │concerning the importation of domestic  │      │
                │workers from the East into the Reich.   │      │
                │(USA 698)                               │ III  │      67
                │                                        │      │
   041-PS       │Memorandum, Rosenberg to Hitler, 3      │      │
                │October 1942, concerning seizure of     │      │
                │Jewish property.                        │ III  │      80
                │                                        │      │
   053-PS       │Interoffice report from Hans Koch to    │      │
                │Rosenberg, 5 October 1941, concerning   │      │
                │political situation in Ukraine.         │ III  │      83
                │                                        │      │
  *069-PS       │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 17    │      │
                │January 1939, enclosing order of 28     │      │
                │December 1938, concerning decisions on  │      │
                │Jewish question. (USA 589)              │ III  │     116
                │                                        │      │
   078-PS       │Regulations issued by Heydrich, 28 June │      │
                │1941, for treatment of political        │      │
                │prisoners of war.                       │ III  │     123
                │                                        │      │
  *136-PS       │Certified copy of Hitler Order, 29      │      │
                │January 1940, concerning establishment  │      │
                │of “Hohe Schule”. (USA 367)             │ III  │     184
                │                                        │      │
  *141-PS       │Goering Order, 5 November 1940,         │      │
                │concerning seizure of Jewish art        │      │
                │treasures. (USA 368)                    │ III  │     188
                │                                        │      │
  *154-PS       │Letter from Lammers to high State and   │      │
                │Party authorities, 5 July 1942,         │      │
                │confirming Rosenberg’s powers. (USA 370)│ III  │     193
                │                                        │      │
   155-PS       │“Einsatzstab”, administrative           │      │
                │regulations, 30 September 1942.         │ III  │     194
                │                                        │      │
  *171-PS       │Undated report on “Library for          │      │
                │Exploration of the Jewish Question” by  │      │
                │the Hohe Schule District Office. (USA   │      │
                │383)                                    │ III  │     200
                │                                        │      │
   197-PS       │Memorandum of a conference in HQ OKH    │      │
                │Quartermaster General, 27 August 1941,  │      │
                │concerning transfer of administration of│      │
                │Ukraine from Wehrmacht to civilian      │      │
                │authorities; signed by Labs, Ministerial│      │
                │Director.                               │ III  │     210
                │                                        │      │
  *212-PS       │Memorandum from Rosenberg file          │      │
                │concerning instructions for treatment of│      │
                │Jews. (USA 272)                         │ III  │     222
                │                                        │      │
   285-PS       │Henlein letter to Rosenberg, 31 October │      │
                │1938.                                   │ III  │     238
                │                                        │      │
   286-PS       │Rosenberg letter to Henlein, 15 October │      │
                │1938.                                   │ III  │     239
                │                                        │      │
  *374-PS       │TWX Series of Orders signed by Heydrich │      │
                │and Mueller, issued by Gestapo          │      │
                │Headquarters Berlin, 9-11 November 1938,│      │
                │concerning treatment of Jews. (USA 729) │ III  │     277
                │                                        │      │
   406-PS       │Memorandum by Gauleiter Streicher, 14   │      │
                │April 1939, concerning certain acts     │      │
                │against Jews.                           │ III  │     388
                │                                        │      │
  *501-PS       │Collection of four documents on         │      │
                │execution by gas, June 1942, one signed │      │
                │by Dr. Becker, SS Untersturmfuehrerat   │      │
                │Kiev, 16 May 1942. (USA 288)            │ III  │     418
                │                                        │      │
  *502-PS       │Order, 17 July 1941, entitled           │      │
                │“Regulations for the Commandos of the   │      │
                │Chief of the SIPO and SD which are to be│      │
                │activated in Stalags”. (USA 486)        │ III  │     422
                │                                        │      │
   579-PS       │Three letters, District Commissioner,   │      │
                │Employment Director at Riga, and        │      │
                │Economic Directorate in Latvia, 21 July │      │
                │1941, 10 February 1942 and 6 July 1942, │      │
                │concerning forced Jewish labor in Riga  │      │
                │and Latvia.                             │ III  │     444
                │                                        │      │
  *654-PS       │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, on │      │
                │discussion with Himmler concerning      │      │
                │delivery of Jews to Himmler for         │      │
                │extermination through work. (USA 218)   │ III  │     467
                │                                        │      │
   682-PS       │Thierack’s notes on discussion with     │      │
                │Goebbels, 14 September 1942, concerning │      │
                │groups to be exterminated.              │ III  │     496
                │                                        │      │
  *701-PS       │Letter from Minister of Justice to      │      │
                │Prosecutors, 1 April 1943, concerning   │      │
                │Poles and Jews who are released from    │      │
                │Penal institutions of Department of     │      │
                │Justice. (USA 497)                      │ III  │     510
                │                                        │      │
   765-PS       │Teletype message from Heydrich to all SD│      │
                │and Police, 10 November 1938, concerning│      │
                │“Measures against Jews tonight”.        │ III  │     545
                │                                        │      │
   841-PS       │Secret Order of Goering, 28 December    │      │
                │1938, concerning Jewish problem.        │ III  │     606
                │                                        │      │
   847-PS       │Hitler Decree, 5 July 1942, stating     │      │
                │Rosenberg’s powers.                     │ III  │     610
                │                                        │      │
   878-PS       │Draft of Order signed by Keitel, 12     │      │
                │September 1941, providing that Jews may │      │
                │be put in labor-columns.                │ III  │     636
                │                                        │      │
  *998-PS       │“German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia”. │      │
                │Excerpts from Czechoslovak Official     │      │
                │Report for the prosecution and trial of │      │
                │the German Major War Criminals by the   │      │
                │International Military Tribunal         │      │
                │established according to Agreement of   │      │
                │four Great Powers of 8 August 1945. (USA│      │
                │91)                                     │ III  │     656
                │                                        │      │
  1012-PS       │Teletype from OKH to Military Commander │      │
                │of France, 3 February 1942, concerning  │      │
                │consultation of Hitler and Keitel about │      │
                │shooting of Jews and Communists.        │ III  │     664
                │                                        │      │
  1015-B-PS     │Report on activities of Special Staff   │      │
                │for Pictorial Art, October 1940 to July │      │
                │1944.                                   │ III  │     666
                │                                        │      │
 *1024-PS       │Memorandum, 29 April 1941, concerning   │      │
                │organization for handling problems in   │      │
                │the Eastern Territories. (USA 278)      │ III  │     685
                │                                        │      │
 *1028-PS       │Memorandum from Rosenberg file, 7 May   │      │
                │1941, concerning instructions for a     │      │
                │Reichskommissar in the Ukraine. (USA    │      │
                │273)                                    │ III  │     690
                │                                        │      │
 *1061-PS       │Official report of Stroop, SS and Police│      │
                │Leader of Warsaw, on destruction of     │      │
                │Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. (USA 275)          │ III  │     718
                │                                        │      │
 *1138-PS       │Enclosure in letter from Reich          │      │
                │Commissioner for Baltic States to       │      │
                │Rosenberg, 13 August 1941, concerning   │      │
                │provisional directives on treatment of  │      │
                │Jews in area of Reichskommissariat      │      │
                │Ostland. (USA 284)                      │ III  │     800
                │                                        │      │
 *1166-PS       │Interoffice memorandum of WVHA, 15      │      │
                │August 1944, concerning number of       │      │
                │prisoners and survey of prisoners’      │      │
                │clothing. (USA 458)                     │ III  │     824
                │                                        │      │
  1189-PS       │Special Order No. 44, 4 November 1941,  │      │
                │concerning feeding of civilian          │      │
                │population in Occupied Eastern          │      │
                │Territories.                            │ III  │     833
                │                                        │      │
 *1301-PS       │File relating to financing of armament  │      │
                │including minutes of conference with    │      │
                │Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 October │      │
                │1938, concerning acceleration of        │      │
                │rearmament. (USA 123)                   │ III  │     868
                │                                        │      │
 *1347-PS       │Extract of decree, 18 September 1942,   │      │
                │Ministry of Agriculture, concerning food│      │
                │supply for Jews. (USA 285)              │ III  │     914
                │                                        │      │
  1384-PS       │Stenographic report of Hitler discussion│      │
                │with Keitel and Zeitzler, 8 June 1943.  │ III  │     959
                │                                        │      │
  1412-PS       │Decree relating to payment of fine by   │      │
                │Jews of German nationality, 12 November │      │
                │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│      │
                │1579.                                   │  IV  │       6
                │                                        │      │
  1415-PS       │Police regulation concerning appearahce │      │
                │of Jews in public, 28 November 1938.    │      │
                │1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1676.│  IV  │       6
                │                                        │      │
 *1472-PS       │Copy of telegram from Mueller to        │      │
                │Himmler, 16 December 1942, concerning   │      │
                │recruiting Jewish labor. (USA 279)      │  IV  │      49
                │                                        │      │
 *1517-PS       │Memorandum from Rosenberg concerning    │      │
                │discussion with the Fuehrer, 14 December│      │
                │1941. (USA 824)                         │  IV  │      55
                │                                        │      │
 *1689-PS       │“Czechoslovakia Fights Back”, a document│      │
                │of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign │      │
                │Affairs, 1943. (USA 286)                │  IV  │     198
                │                                        │      │
 *1708-PS       │The Program of the NSDAP. National      │      │
                │Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. (USA│      │
                │255; USA 324)                           │  IV  │     208
                │                                        │      │
 *1724-PS       │Announcement in Press Conference, 4     │      │
                │August 1938 of breaking up of synagogue.│      │
                │(USA 266)                               │  IV  │     224
                │                                        │      │
 *1726-PS       │Statement of Netherlands Government in  │      │
                │view of Prosecution and punishment of   │      │
                │the German Nazi War Criminals. (USA 195)│  IV  │     227
                │                                        │      │
 *1778-PS       │Book “The Poisonous Mushroom”, published│      │
                │in Nurnberg 1938, concerning Jews. (USA │      │
                │257)                                    │  IV  │     358
                │                                        │      │
 *1816-PS       │Stenographic report of the meeting on   │      │
                │The Jewish Question, under the          │      │
                │Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, 12│      │
                │November 1938. (USA 261)                │  IV  │     425
                │                                        │      │
 *1919-PS       │Himmler’s speech to SS Gruppenfuehrers, │      │
                │4 October 1943. (USA 170)               │  IV  │     558
                │                                        │      │
 *1948-PS       │Letter from Governor in Vienna, 7       │      │
                │November 1940, evidencing RSHA          │      │
                │instructions to recruit Jews from forced│      │
                │labor. (USA 680)                        │  IV  │     586
                │                                        │      │
  2000-PS       │Law for protection of German blood and  │      │
                │German honor, 15 September 1935. 1935   │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 100, p.  │      │
                │1146.                                   │  IV  │     636
                │                                        │      │
 *2124-PS       │Decree introducing the Nurnberg Racial  │      │
                │Laws into Austria, 20 May 1938. 1938    │      │
                │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 594. (GB  │      │
                │259)                                    │  IV  │     755
                │                                        │      │
  2153-PS       │Defeat the Enemy of the World, published│      │
                │in National Socialist Party             │      │
                │Correspondence No. 358, 30 March 1933.  │      │
                │(GB 166)                                │  IV  │     760
                │                                        │      │
 *2154-PS       │Streicher decrees, published in National│      │
                │Socialist Party Correspondence, No. 359,│      │
                │31 March 1933. (GB 167)                 │  IV  │     760
                │                                        │      │
 *2156-PS       │Announcement of Central Committee for   │      │
                │defense against Jewish horror and       │      │
                │boycott agitation, 29 March 1933,       │      │
                │published in National Socialist Party   │      │
                │Correspondence No. 357. (USA 263)       │  IV  │     761
                │                                        │      │
 *2233-C-PS     │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1940. Part IV.   │      │
                │October-December. (USA 271)             │  IV  │     890
                │                                        │      │
 *2233-D-PS     │Frank Diary. Regierungsitzungen. 1941.  │      │
                │October-December. Entry of 16 December  │      │
                │1941 at pp. 76-77. (USA 281)            │  IV  │     891
                │                                        │      │
 *2233-E-PS     │Frank Diary.                            │      │
                │Regierungs-Hauptabteilungsleiter-Sitzung│      │
                │en. 1942. Entry of 24 August 1942. (USA │      │
                │283)                                    │  IV  │     893
                │                                        │      │
 *2233-F-PS     │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1 January 1944-28│      │
                │February 1944. Entry of 25 January 1944 │      │
                │at p. 5. (USA 295)                      │  IV  │     902
                │                                        │      │
  2237-PS       │Letter from Reich Commissar for Reunion │      │
                │of Austria with the German Reich to     │      │
                │Goering, 18 November 1938, concerning   │      │
                │actions against the Jews in November    │      │
                │1938.                                   │  IV  │     918
                │                                        │      │
 *2409-PS       │Extracts from The Imperial House to the │      │
                │Reich Chancellery by Dr. Joseph         │      │
                │Goebbels. (USA 262)                     │  V   │      83
                │                                        │      │
  2583-PS       │Quotation from speech made by Streicher,│      │
                │31 October 1939.                        │  V   │     311
                │                                        │      │
  2602-PS       │Telegram, Wilson to Secretary of State, │      │
                │Washington, 10 November 1938.           │  V   │     311
                │                                        │      │
  2603-PS       │Letter from Kemp, U. S. Consul General  │      │
                │in Bremen, to Secretary of State, 10    │      │
                │November 1938, concerning Anti-Jewish   │      │
                │demonstrations in Bremen.               │  V   │     312
                │                                        │      │
  2604-PS       │Report of American Consul General to    │      │
                │Wilson, U. S. Ambassador in Berlin, 12  │      │
                │November 1938, concerning Anti-semitic  │      │
                │persecution in Stuttgart Consular       │      │
                │District.                               │  V   │     312
                │                                        │      │
 *2605-PS       │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastner, former │      │
                │President of the Hungarian Zionist      │      │
                │Organization, 13 September 1945. (USA   │      │
                │242)                                    │  V   │     313
                │                                        │      │
  2613-PS       │Extracts from “The Black Book of        │      │
                │Poland”.                                │  V   │     332
                │                                        │      │
  2617-A-PS     │Reports of Department Interior          │      │
                │Administration from the Office of Chief │      │
                │of District Warsaw, published by The    │      │
                │General Government for Poland, 1940, p. │      │
                │59.                                     │  V   │     339
                │                                        │      │
 *2662-PS       │Extract from Mein Kampf, 39th edition,  │      │
                │1933, pp. 724-725. (USA 256)            │  V   │     366
                │                                        │      │
 *2663-PS       │Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag, 30    │      │
                │January 1939, quoted from Voelkischer   │      │
                │Beobachter, Munich edition, 1 February  │      │
                │1939. (USA 268)                         │  V   │     367
                │                                        │      │
 *2665-PS       │The Jewish Question Past and Present,   │      │
                │from World Battle. (USA 270)            │  V   │     367
                │                                        │      │
 *2668-PS       │“And Don’t Forget the Jews”, from the   │      │
                │Black Corps, 8 August 1940, No. 32, p.  │      │
                │2. (USA 269)                            │  V   │     367
                │                                        │      │
  2671-PS       │Decree regarding the Designation of     │      │
                │Business Enterprises in the Government  │      │
                │General, from Verordnungsblatt of       │      │
                │Governor-General for Occupied Polish    │      │
                │Territory, No. 8, p. 61, 30 November    │      │
                │1939.                                   │  V   │     367
                │                                        │      │
  2672-PS       │Decree concerning designation of Jews   │      │
                │and Jewesses in the Government General, │      │
                │from Verordnungsblatt of the            │      │
                │Governor-General for Occupied Polish    │      │
                │Territory, 1939, p. 61.                 │  V   │     368
                │                                        │      │
  2673-PS       │Extract from “The Archive”, No. 90, 30  │      │
                │October 1941, p. 495.                   │  V   │     369
                │                                        │      │
  2682-PS       │Excerpts from Voelkischer Beobachter    │      │
                │concerning restriction against Jews, 5  │      │
                │December 1938, No. 339, p. 5.           │  V   │     369
                │                                        │      │
  2683-PS       │Universities barred for Jews, published │      │
                │in Voelkischer Beobachter, 16 November  │      │
                │1938.                                   │  V   │     371
                │                                        │      │
 *2697-PS       │Article: “The Chosen People of the      │      │
                │Criminals” from Der Stuermer, No. 2,    │      │
                │January 1935. (USA 259)                 │  V   │     372
                │                                        │      │
 *2698-PS       │Article: “Two little Talmud Jews”, from │      │
                │Der Stuermer, No. 50, December 1938.    │      │
                │(USA 260)                               │  V   │     372
                │                                        │      │
 *2699-PS       │Article on Ritual Murder, from Der      │      │
                │Stuermer, No. 14, April 1937. (USA 258) │  V   │     372
                │                                        │      │
  2700-PS       │Article: “The Ritual Murder”, from Der  │      │
                │Stuermer, No. 28, July 1938.            │  V   │     373
                │                                        │      │
  2704-PS       │Decree concerning Prohibition of Jewish │      │
                │Religious Slaughter, from               │      │
                │Verordnungsblatt of the Governor-General│      │
                │for Occupied Polish Territory, 1939, p. │      │
                │7.                                      │  V   │     373
                │                                        │      │
 *2709-PS       │Report by Ralph C. Busser, American     │      │
                │Consul-General in Leipzig, 5 April 1933,│      │
                │concerning Anti-Jewish movement in      │      │
                │Central Germany. (USA 265)              │  V   │     375
                │                                        │      │
  2710-PS       │Adolf Hitler Speaks, quoted from        │      │
                │Voelkischer Beobachter, 26 February     │      │
                │1938, No. 57, p. 4.                     │  V   │     376
                │                                        │      │
 *2711-PS       │Article: “Symbolic Action”, published in│      │
                │Fraenkische Tageszeitung-Nurnberg, 11   │      │
                │August 1938. (USA 267)                  │  V   │     376
                │                                        │      │
  2712-PS       │Anti-Jewish demonstrations throughout   │      │
                │the Reich, from Voelkischer Beobachter, │      │
                │11 November 1938, No. 315, p. 2.        │  V   │     376
                │                                        │      │
  2715-A-PS     │Anti-semitic demonstrations in the      │      │
                │Entire Reich, published in Voelkischer  │      │
                │Beobachter, No. 315, 11 November 1938,  │      │
                │p. 2.                                   │  V   │     377
                │                                        │      │
  2736-PS       │Time without Precedent, by Dr. Joseph   │      │
                │Goebbels, 4th edition, 1942, p. 531.    │  V   │     380
                │                                        │      │
  2737-PS       │The Party Program, Nature, Fundamentals │      │
                │and Goals of the NSDAP, by Alfred       │      │
                │Rosenberg, 25th Printing, 1943, p. 27.  │  V   │     380
                │                                        │      │
 *2738-PS       │Affidavit of Wilhelm Hoettl, 26 November│      │
                │1945. (USA 296)                         │  V   │     380
                │                                        │      │
**3047-PS       │File notes on conference in Fuehrer’s   │      │
                │train on 12 September 1939; report on   │      │
                │execution of Jews in Borrisow; and      │      │
                │entries from diary of Admiral Canaris.  │      │
                │(USA 80) (Referred to but not offered in│      │
                │evidence.)                              │  V   │     766
                │                                        │      │
 *3048-PS       │Speech by von Schirach before European  │      │
                │Youth Congress in Vienna, published in  │      │
                │Voelkischer Beobachter, 15 September    │      │
                │1942. (USA 274)                         │  V   │     776
                │                                        │      │
 *3051-PS       │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to  │      │
                │all stations of State Police, 10        │      │
                │November 1938, on measures against Jews,│      │
                │and one order from Heydrich on          │      │
                │termination of protest actions. (USA    │      │
                │240)                                    │  V   │     797
                │                                        │      │
 *3058-PS       │Letter from Heydrich to Goering, 11     │      │
                │November 1938, reporting action against │      │
                │the Jews. (USA 508)                     │  V   │     854
                │                                        │      │
 *3063-PS       │Letters of transmission enclosing report│      │
                │about events and judicial proceedings in│      │
                │connection with anti-semitic            │      │
                │demonstrations of 9 November 1938. (USA │      │
                │332)                                    │  V   │     868
                │                                        │      │
  3253-PS       │Affidavit, 26 November 1945, of Dr.     │      │
                │Benno F. T. Martin.                     │  V   │     959
                │                                        │      │
 *3257-PS       │Letter from Armament Inspector in the   │      │
                │Ukraine to General Thomas, Chief of the │      │
                │Industrial Armament Department, 2       │      │
                │December 1941, enclosing report by Prof.│      │
                │Seraphim on Jewish Problem in Ukraine.  │      │
                │(USA 290)                               │  V   │     994
                │                                        │      │
 *3311-PS       │Charge No. 6 against Hans Frank,        │      │
                │submitted by Polish Government to       │      │
                │International Military Tribunal. (USA   │      │
                │293)                                    │  V   │    1104
                │                                        │      │
 *3319-PS       │Foreign Office Correspondence and       │      │
                │reports on anti-Jewish action in foreign│      │
                │countries. (GB 287)                     │  VI  │       4
                │                                        │      │
 *3358-PS       │German Foreign Office circular, 31      │      │
                │January 1939, “The Jewish Question as a │      │
                │factor in German Foreign Policy in the  │      │
                │year 1938”. (GB 158)                    │  VI  │      87
                │                                        │      │
 *3428-PS       │Letter from Kube, 31 July 1942,         │      │
                │concerning combatting of Partisans and  │      │
                │action against Jews in White Ruthenia.  │      │
                │(USA 827)                               │  VI  │     131
                │                                        │      │
 *3663-PS       │Letter, 31 October 1941, and reply 15   │      │
                │November 1941, concerning execution of  │      │
                │Jews. (USA 825)                         │  VI  │     401
                │                                        │      │
 *3666-PS       │Letter from Braeutiger to Reich         │      │
                │Commissioner for East, 18 December 1941,│      │
                │concerning Jewish question. (USA 826)   │  VI  │     402
                │                                        │      │
  3688-PS       │Notice from the Foreign Office, 24      │      │
                │September 1942, concerning evacuation of│      │
                │Jews from Occupied Territories.         │  VI  │     403
                │                                        │      │
 *3762-PS       │Affidavit of SS Colonel Kurt Becher, 8  │      │
                │March 1946, concerning the              │      │
                │responsibility of Kaltenbrunner for     │      │
                │concentration camp executions. (USA 798)│  VI  │     645
                │                                        │      │
 *3803-PS       │Covering letter enclosing a letter from │      │
                │Kaltenbrunner dated 30 June 1944,       │      │
                │concerning forced labor of Jews in      │      │
                │Vienna. (USA 802)                       │  VI  │     737
                │                                        │      │
 *3840-PS       │Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February  │      │
                │1946, concerning the elimination of the │      │
                │Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803)                │  VI  │     775
                │                                        │      │
 *3841-PS       │Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer      │      │
                │Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946,       │      │
                │concerning elimination of the Warsaw    │      │
                │Ghetto. (USA 804)                       │  VI  │     776
                │                                        │      │
 *3846-PS       │Interrogation of Johann Kanduth, 30     │      │
                │November 1945, concerning crematorium at│      │
                │Mauthausen and the activities of        │      │
                │Kaltenbrunner there. (USA 796)          │  VI  │     783
                │                                        │      │
 *3868-PS       │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand     │      │
                │Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning         │      │
                │execution of 3,000,000 people at        │      │
                │Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA    │      │
                │819)                                    │  VI  │     787
                │                                        │      │
 *3870-PS       │Affidavit of Hans Marsalek, 8 April     │      │
                │1946, concerning Mauthausen             │      │
                │Concentration Camp and dying statement  │      │
                │of Franz Ziereis, the Commandant. (USA  │      │
                │797)                                    │  VI  │     790
                │                                        │      │
  D-229         │Extract from pamphlet “Judges Letters”  │      │
                │concerning judgment of Lower Court, 24  │      │
                │April 1942, on concealment of Jewish    │      │
                │identification.                         │  VI  │    1091
                │                                        │      │
  D-251         │Lieberman memorandum, 27 September 1945,│      │
                │describing method of transport, gassing,│      │
                │and cremation.                          │  VI  │    1100
                │                                        │      │
  D-734         │Note of conversation between Reich      │      │
                │Foreign Minister and Duce in presence of│      │
                │von Mackenson, Alfieri and Bastianini,  │      │
                │25 February 1943.                       │ VII  │     188
                │                                        │      │
 *D-736         │Notes on discussion between Fuehrer and │      │
                │Horthy on 17 April 1943. (GB 283)       │ VII  │     190
                │                                        │      │
  EC-265        │German Foreign Office telegram, 1       │      │
                │October 1940, concerning the Jews in    │      │
                │Occupied French Territory.              │ VII  │     375
                │                                        │      │
 *L-18          │Official report, Katzmann to General of │      │
                │Police Krueger, 30 June 1943, concerning│      │
                │“Solution of Jewish Question in         │      │
                │Galicia”. (USA 277)                     │ VII  │     755
                │                                        │      │
 *L-22          │Public reports of War Refugee Board,    │      │
                │Washington, on German Extermination     │      │
                │Camps Auschwitz and Birkenau, April     │      │
                │1944. (USA 294)                         │ VII  │     771
                │                                        │      │
 *L-53          │Order from Commandant of the SIPO and SD│      │
                │for the Radom District to Branch Office │      │
                │in Tomaschow, 21 July 1944, on clearance│      │
                │of prisons. (USA 291)                   │ VII  │     814
                │                                        │      │
 *L-161         │British War Office Report “Poland       │      │
                │(Auschwitz) Concentration Camp”, 31 May │      │
                │1945. (USA 292)                         │ VII  │     908
                │                                        │      │
 *L-165         │Polish Ministry of Information, Press   │      │
                │Bulletin, published in Polish           │      │
                │Fortnightly Review, 15 December 1942,   │      │
                │concerning Jewish Food Situation. (USA  │      │
                │287)                                    │ VII  │     908
                │                                        │      │
 *L-180         │Report by SS Brigade Commander          │      │
                │Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group A”,│      │
                │15 October 1941. (USA 276)              │ VII  │     978
                │                                        │      │
 *R-135         │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret    │      │
                │reports from Kube on German atrocities  │      │
                │in the East, 18 June 1943, found in     │      │
                │Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289)     │ VIII │     205
                │                                        │      │
Statement XI    │Farewell Message of Robert Ley Found in │      │
                │Nurnberg prison, 25 October 1945, after │      │
                │discovery of his suicide.               │ VIII │     740
                │                                        │      │
Statement XII   │Political Testament of Robert Ley       │      │
                │written in Nurnberg Prison, October     │      │
                │1945.                                   │ VIII │     742
                │                                        │      │
Statement XIII  │Outline of Defense of Dr. Robert Ley,   │      │
                │written in Nurnberg Prison, 24 October  │      │
                │1945.                                   │ VIII │     749
                │                                        │      │
Statement XIV   │Hungarian Relations with Germany Before │      │
                │and During the War by Nicholas Horthy,  │      │
                │Jr., Nurnberg, 22 February 1946.        │ VIII │     756




                              Chapter XIII
                      GERMANIZATION AND SPOLIATION


The Nazi conspirators had made plans for the Germanization and
spoliation of their conquered territories. Plans to Germanize meant
plans to assimilate conquered territories politically, culturally,
socially, and economically into the German Reich. Germanization meant
the obliteration of the former national character of the conquered
territories and the extermination of all elements which could not be
reconciled with the Nazi ideology. Plans for spoliation meant plans to
plunder public and private property and, in general, to exploit the
people and natural resources of occupied countries.

                               1. POLAND

Poland was, in a sense, the testing ground for the conspirators’
theories of “lebensraum.” The four western provinces of Poland were
purportedly incorporated into Germany by an order of 8 October 1939.
This order, which was signed by Hitler, Lammers, Goering, Frick, and
Hess, is set forth in 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, p. 2042. These
areas of Poland are frequently referred to in correspondence between the
conspirators as the “incorporated Eastern territories”. The remainder of
Poland which was seized by the Nazi invaders was established as the
Government-General of Poland by an order of Hitler, dated 12 October
1939. By that same order, Hans Frank was named Governor-General of the
newly-created Government-General, and Seyss-Inquart was named Deputy
Governor-General. This order is set forth in 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part I, p. 2077.

The plans with respect to Poland, which will appear gradually from the
individual documents hereafter discussed, followed a broad pattern, as
follows:

_First_: The conspirators specifically planned to exploit the people and
material resources of the Government-General of Poland in order to
strengthen the Nazi war machine, to impoverish the Government-General,
and to reduce it to a vassal state. At a later stage, plans were
formulated for creating islands of German settlements in the more
fertile regions of the Government-General in order to engulf the native
Polish population and accelerate the process of Germanization.

_Second_: The incorporated area of Poland, which was deemed to be a part
of the German Reich, was to be ruthlessly Germanized. To that end, the
conspirators planned:

(_a_) To permit the retention of the productive facilities in the
incorporated area, all of which were to be dedicated to the Nazi war
machine.

(_b_) They planned to deport to the Government-General many hundreds of
thousands of Jews, members of the Polish intelligentsia, and other
noncompliant elements. The Jews deported to the Government-General were
doomed to speedy annihilation. Moreover, since the conspirators felt
that members of the Polish intelligentsia could not be Germanized and
might serve as a center of resistance against their “new order”, they
too were to be eliminated.

(_c_) They planned to deport all able-bodied Polish workers to Germany
for work in the Nazi war machine. This was to serve the twofold purpose
of helping to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war machine and
preventing the propagation of a new generation of Poles.

(_d_) They planned to mold all persons in the incorporated area who were
deemed to possess German blood, into German subjects who would
religiously adhere to the principles of National Socialism. To that end,
the conspirators set up an elaborate racial register. Those who resisted
or refused to cooperate in this program were sent to concentration
camps.

(_e_) They planned to bring thousands of German subjects into the
incorporated area for purposes of settlement.

(_f_) They planned to confiscate the property—particularly the
farms—of the Poles, the Jews, and all dissident elements. The
confiscation of the property of Jews was part of the conspirators’
larger program of extermination of the Jews. Confiscation likewise
served three additional purposes: (1) it provided land for the new
German settlers and enabled the conspirators to reward their adherents;
(2) dispossessed Polish property owners could be shipped to Germany for
work in the production of implements of war; and (3) the separation of
Polish farmers from their wives furthered the plan to prevent the growth
of a new generation of Poles.

These plans are developed in the specific documents which follow.

A. _The Program in the Incorporated Area._

(1) _Economic Spoliation._ A report of an interview with Frank on 3
October 1939, which was included in a large report prepared in the OKW
by one Captain Varain at the direction of General Thomas, then Chief of
the Military Economic Staff of the OKW, states:

    “In the first interview which the chief of the Central Division
    and the liaison officer between the Armament Department Upper
    East and the Chief Administrative Officer (subsequently called
    Governor-General) had with Minister Frank on October 3, 1939 in
    Posen, Frank explained the directive, and the economic and
    political responsibilities which had been conferred upon him by
    the Fuehrer and according to which he intended to administer
    Poland. According to these directives, Poland can only be
    administered by utilizing the country through means of ruthless
    exploitation, deportation of all supplies, raw materials,
    machines, factory installations, etc., which are important for
    the German war economy, availability of all workers for work
    within Germany, reduction of the entire Polish economy to
    absolute minimum necessary for bare existence of the population,
    closing of all educational institutions, especially technical
    schools and colleges in order to prevent the growth of the new
    Polish intelligentsia. ‘Poland shall be treated as a colony; the
    Poles shall be the slaves of the Greater German World Empire’. *
    * *

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “By destroying Polish industry, its subsequent reconstruction
    after the war would become more difficult, if not impossible, so
    that Poland would be reduced to its proper position as an
    agrarian country which would have to depend upon Germany for
    importation of industrial products.” (_EC-344-16 & 17_)

The conspirators planned a difference in treatment for the incorporated
area of Poland, and for the Government-General. A directive issued and
signed by Goering on 19 October 1939, which was found among captured
files of the OKW, stated, _inter alia_:

    “In the meeting of October 13th, I have given detailed
    instructions for the economical administration of the occupied
    territories. I will repeat them here in short: 1. The task for
    the economic treatment of the various administrative regions is
    different depending on whether a country is involved which will
    be incorporated politically into the German Reich or whether we
    deal with the Government-General, which, in all probability,
    will not be made a part of Germany.

    “In the first mentioned territories the reconstruction and
    expansion of the economy, the safeguarding of all their
    production facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well as
    a complete incorporation into the Greater German economic system
    at the earliest possible time. On the other hand, there must be
    removed from the territories of the Government-General all raw
    materials, scrap materials, machines etc., which are of use for
    the German war economy. Enterprises which are not absolutely
    necessary for the meager maintenance of the naked existence of
    the population must be transferred to Germany, unless such
    transfer would require an unreasonably long period of time and
    would make it more practical to exploit these enterprises by
    giving them German orders to be executed at their present
    location.” (_EC-410_)

Once the Government-General had been stripped of its industrial
potential, the conspirators planned to leave the country desolate. Not
even the war damage was to be repaired. This is the clear import of an
order dated 20 November 1939, issued by Hess in his capacity as Deputy
Fuehrer, and found in captured OKW files. Hess stated:

    “I hear from Party members who came from the Government-General
    that various agencies, as, for instance, the Military Economic
    Staff, the Reich Ministry for Labor, etc., intend to reconstruct
    certain industrial enterprises in Warsaw. However, in accordance
    with a decision by Minister Dr. Frank, as approved by the
    Fuehrer, Warsaw shall not be rebuilt nor is it the intention of
    the Fuehrer to rebuild or reconstruct any industry in the
    Government-General.” (_EC-411_)

(2) _Deportation and Resettlement._ The Academy of German Law in January
1940 prepared a secret report on plans for the mass migration of Poles
and Jews from incorporated areas of Poland to the Government-General,
and for the forcible deportation of able-bodied Poles to Germany. (The
date of the report does not appear in the English translation, but it is
clearly set forth on the cover page of the original document, as January
1940.) It should be recalled that the decree of 11 July 1934
(_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, p. 605, 11 July 1934) provided that the
Academy of German Law would be a public corporation of the Reich under
the supervision of the Reich Ministers of Justice and the Interior, and
that its task would be:

    “To promote the reconstruction of German legal life, and to
    realize, in constant close collaboration with the competent
    legislative organizations, the National Socialist program in the
    entire sphere of the law.”

It should also be stated that Frank was the president of the Academy of
German Law during the period when this secret report was made
(_2749-PS_). The report stated:

    “For the carrying out of costly and long term measures for the
    increase of agricultural production, the Government-General can
    at the most absorb 1 to 1.5 million resettlers, as it is already
    over-populated. * * * By further absorption of 1.6 million
    resettlers, the 1925 Reich census figure of 133 inhabitants per
    square kilometer would be reached, which practically because of
    already existing rural over-population and lack of industry
    would result in a double over-population.

    “This figure of 1.6 million will barely suffice to transfer from
    the Reich:

    “The Jews from the liberated East (over 600,000), parts of the
    remaining Jews, preferably the younger age groups from Germany
    proper, Austria, Sudetengau and the Protectorate (altogether
    over 1 million). * * *” (_661-PS_)

The report then goes on to say that the following groups of people
should be deported:

    “The Polish intelligentsia who have been politically active in
    the past, and potential political leaders; the leading economic
    personalities, comprising owners of large estates,
    industrialists and businessmen, etc.; the peasant population, so
    far as it has to be removed in order to carry out by strips of
    German settlements the encirclement of Polish territories in the
    East * * *.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In order to relieve the living space of the Poles in the
    Government-General as well as in the liberated East, one should
    remove cheap labor temporarily by the hundreds of thousands,
    employ them for a few years in the old Reich, and thereby hamper
    their native biological propagation. (Their assimilation into
    the old Reich must be prevented.) * * *” (_661-PS_)

Finally, the report stated:

    “Strictest care is to be taken that secret circulars, memoranda
    and official correspondence which contain instructions
    detrimental to the Poles are kept steadily under lock and key so
    that they will not some day fill the White Books printed in
    Paris or the U.S.A.” (_661-PS_)

Frank made the following entry in his diary:

    “The Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) wishes that all Jews be
    evacuated from the newly gained Reich territories. Up to
    February approximately 1,000,000 people are to be brought in
    this way into the Government-General. The families of good
    racial extraction present in the occupied Polish territory
    (approximately 4,000,000 people) should be transferred into the
    Reich and individually housed and thereby be uprooted as a
    people.” (_2233-G-PS_)

The top secret minutes of a meeting held on 12 February 1940 on
“questions concerning the East,” at which Goering was chairman and
Himmler and Frank were present, stated, among other things:

    “By way of introduction, the General Field Marshal (_Goering_)
    explained that the strengthening of the war potential of the
    Reich must be the chief aim of all measures to be taken in the
    East. * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_Agriculture_:

    “The task consists of obtaining the greatest possible
    agriculture production from the new Eastern Gaus disregarding
    questions of ownership. * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “_Special questions concerning the Government-General_:

    “The Government-General will have to receive the Jews who are
    ordered to emigrate from Germany, and the New Eastern Gaus.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The following reported on the situation in the Eastern
    territories: * * *

    “2. Reichsstatthalter Gauleiter Forster: The population of the
    Danzig/West Prussia Gau (newly acquired territories) is 1.5
    million, of whom 240,000 are Germans, 850,000 well-established
    Poles and 300,000 immigrant Poles, Jews and asocials (1,800
    Jews). 87,000 persons have been evacuated, 40,000 of these from
    Gotenhafen. From there, also the numerous shirkers, who are now
    looked after by welfare, will have to be deported to the
    Government-General. Therefore, an evacuation of 20,000 further
    persons can be counted on for the current year. * * *”
    (_EC-305_)

Comparable reports were made by other Gauleiters at this meeting. These
figures, it may be noted, were only as of February 1940.

These forcible deportations did not involve merely ordering the victims
to leave their homes, and to take up new residences elsewhere. These
deportations were accomplished, according to plan, in a brutal and
inhuman manner. This is shown in a speech delivered by Himmler to
officers of the SS on a day commemorating the presentation of the Nazi
flag. The exact date of the speech does not appear in the document, but
its contents plainly show that it was delivered sometime after Poland
had been overrun. In this speech Himmler said:

    “Very frequently the member of the Waffen-SS thinks about the
    deportation of this people here. These thoughts came to me today
    when watching the very difficult work out there performed by the
    Security Police, supported by your men, who help them a great
    deal. Exactly the same thing happened in Poland in weather 40
    degrees below zero, where we had to haul away thousands, ten
    thousands, hundred thousands; where we had to have the toughness
    * * * you should hear this but also forget it again—to shoot
    thousands of leading Poles.” (_1918-PS_)

Such Poles from the incorporated area as managed to survive the journey
to the Government-General could look forward at best to extreme
hardship, and exposure to degradation and brutality. For the Jews who
were forcibly deported to the Government-General there was no hope.
Frank, by his own admissions, had dedicated himself to their complete
annihilation. In his diary Frank wrote:

    “We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them, and
    wherever it is possible.” (_2233-D-PS_)

(3) _Forcible Return of Racial Germans to the Reich._ The conspirators
had planned the forcible Germanization of persons in the incorporated
area who were deemed to possess German blood. Such persons were given
the choice of the concentration camp, or submission to Germanization.
Himmler was the chief executioner of this program. In a secret decree
signed by Hitler, Goering, and Keitel, dated 7 October 1939, Himmler was
entrusted with the task of executing the conspirators’ Germanization
program. The decree provided, among other things:

    “The Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) has the obligation in accordance
    with my directives:

    “1. To bring back for final return into the Reich all German
    nationals, and racial Germans in the foreign countries.

    “2. To eliminate the harmful influence of such alien-parts of
    the population, which represent a danger to the Reich, and the
    German folk community.

    “3. The forming of new German settlements by re-settling, and in
    particular by settling of the returning German citizens and
    racial Germans from abroad.

    “The Reichsfuehrer SS is authorized to take all necessary
    general and administrative measures for the execution of this
    obligation.” (_686-PS_)

Himmler’s conception of his tasks under this decree were plainly stated
in the foreword which he wrote for the “_Deutsche Arbeit_” issue of
June/July 1942. He wrote:

    “It is not our task to Germanize the East in the old sense, that
    is, to teach the people there the German language and German
    law, but to see to it that only people of purely German,
    Germanic blood live in the East.” (_2915-PS_)

The 1940 Edition of “_Der Menscheneinsatz_,” a confidential publication
issued by Himmler’s Office for the Consolidation of German Nationhood,
contained the following statements:

    “The removal of foreign races from the incorporated Eastern
    Territories is one of the most essential goals to be
    accomplished in the German East. This is the chief national
    political task, which has to be executed in the incorporated
    Eastern Territories by the Reichsfuehrer SS, Reich Commissioner
    for the strengthening of the national character of the German
    people.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “* * * there are the following two primary reasons, which make
    the regaining of lost German blood an urgent necessity.

    “1. Prevention of a further increase of the Polish
    intelligentsia, through families of German descent even if they
    are Polonized.

    “2. Increase of the population by racial elements desirable for
    the German nation, and the acquisition of ethno-biologically
    unobjectionable forces for the German reconstruction of
    agriculture and industry.” (_2916-PS_)

Further light upon the goals which the conspirators had set for their
Germanization program in conquered Eastern areas, is contained in a
speech delivered by Himmler on 14 October 1943. This speech was
published by the National Socialist Leadership staff of the OKW. The
following are excerpts from this speech:

    “I consider that in dealing with members of a foreign country,
    especially some Slav nationality, we must not start from German
    points of view, and we must not endow these people with decent
    German thoughts, and logical conclusions of which they are not
    capable, but we must take them as they really are * * *.”

    “Obviously in such a mixture of peoples, there will always be
    some racially good types. Therefore, I think that it is our duty
    to take their children with us, to remove them from their
    environment, if necessary by robbing, or stealing them. Either
    we win over any good blood that we can use for ourselves and
    give it a place in our people, or * * * we destroy that blood.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “For us the end of this war will mean an open road to the East,
    the creation of the Germanic Reich in this way or that * * * the
    fetching home of 30 million human beings of our blood, so that
    still during our lifetime we shall be a people of 120 million
    Germanic souls. That means that we shall be the sole decisive
    power in Europe. That means that we shall then be able to tackle
    the peace, during which we shall be willing for the first twenty
    years to rebuild and spread out our villages and towns, and that
    we shall push the borders of our German race 500 kilometers
    further out to the East.” (_L-70_)

(4) _The Racial Register._ In furtherance of these plans, the
conspirators established a Racial Register in the incorporated area of
Poland. The Racial Register was, in effect, an elaborate classification
of persons deemed to be of German blood, and contained provisions
setting forth some of the rights, privileges, and duties of the persons
in each classification. Persons were classified into four groups:

(1) Germans who had actively promoted the Nazi cause.

(2) Germans who had been more or less passive in the Nazi struggle, but
had retained their German nationality.

(3) Persons of German extraction who, although previously connected with
the Polish nation, were willing to submit to Germanization.

(4) Persons of German descent, who had been “politically absorbed by the
Polish nation”, and who would be resistant to Germanization.

The Racial Register was inaugurated under a decree of 12 September 1940,
issued by Himmler as Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German
Nationhood. The following are pertinent extracts:

    “The list of ‘ethnic Germans’ will be divided into four parts
    (limited to interoffice use).

    “1. Ethnic Germans who fought actively in the ethnic struggle.
    Besides the membership of a German organization, every other
    activity in favor of the German against a foreign nationality
    will be considered an active manifestation.

    “2. Ethnic Germans, who did not actively intervene in favor of
    the German nationality, but who preserved their traceable German
    nationality.

    “3. Persons of German descent, who became connected with the
    Polish nation in the course of the years, but have on account of
    their attitude, the prerequisites to become full-fledged members
    of the German national community. To this group belong also
    persons of non-German descent who live in a people’s mixed
    marriage with an ethnic German in which the influence of the
    German spouse has prevailed. Persons of Masurian, Slonzak, or
    upper Silesian descent who are to be recognized as ethnic
    Germans, usually belong to this group 3.

    “4. Persons of German descent, politically absorbed by the
    Polish nation (renegades).

    “Persons not included on the list of ethnic Germans are Poles,
    or foreign nationals. Their treatment is regulated by BII.

    “Members of groups 1 and 2 are ethnic Germans who will be used
    for the reconstruction in the East. The differentiation between
    the groups 1 and 2 is important for the National Socialist
    Party; primarily only members of group 1 should be accepted in
    the Party according to the instructions of the deputy of the
    Fuehrer.

    “Members of groups 3 and 4 have to be educated as full Germans,
    that is, have to be re-Germanized in the course of time through
    an intensive educational training in old Germany.

    “The establishment of members of group 4 has to be based on the
    doctrine, that German blood must not be utilized in the interest
    of a foreign nation. Against those who refuse re-Germanization,
    Security Police measures are to be taken.” (_2916-PS_)

The basic idea of creating a racial register for persons of German
extraction was later incorporated into a decree of 3 March 1941, signed
by Himmler, Frick, and Hess. This decree is set forth in the 1941
_Reichsgesetzblatt_ Part 1, page 118.

The entire apparatus of the SS was thrown behind the vigorous execution
of these decrees. Proof of this fact is contained in the following
extracts from directives issued by Himmler as the Reich Commissioner for
the Consolidation of German Nationhood:

    “I. Where Racial Germans have not applied for entry in the
    ‘German Ethnical List,’ you will instruct the subordinate
    agencies to turn over their names to the State Police (Superior)
    Office. Subsequently, you will report to me (Himmler).

    “II. The Local State Police (Superior) Office, will charge the
    persons whose names are turned over to them to prove within
    eight days that they have applied for entry in the ‘German
    Ethnical List.’

    “If such proof is not submitted, the person in question is to be
    taken into protective custody for transfer into a concentration
    camp.” (_R-112_)

The measures taken against persons in the fourth category, “Polonized
Germans,” were particularly harsh. These persons were resistant to
Germanization, and ruthless measures calculated to break their
resistance were prescribed. Where the individual’s past history
indicated that he could not be effectively Germanized, he was thrown
into a concentration camp. In the words of Himmler’s decree of 16
February 1942:

    “II. The Re-Germanization of the Polonized Germans presupposes
    their complete separation from Polish surroundings. For that
    reason the persons entered in Division 4 of the German Ethnical
    List are to be dealt with in the following manner:

    “A. They are to be re-settled in Old Reich territory.

    “1. The Superior SS and Police Leaders are charged with
    evacuating and resettling them according to instructions which
    will follow later.

    “2. Asocial persons and others who are of inferior hereditary
    quality will not be included in the resettlement. Their names
    will be turned over at once by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer
    (Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service) to the
    competent State Police (Superior) Office. The latter will
    arrange for their transfer into a concentration camp.

    “3. Persons with a particularly bad political record will not be
    included in the resettlement action. Their names will also be
    given by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer (Inspectors of
    Security Police and Security Service) to the competent State
    Police (Superior) Office for transfer into a concentration camp.
    The wives and children of such persons are to be resettled in
    old Reich territory and to be included in the Germanization
    measures. Where the wife also has a particularly bad political
    record, and cannot be included in the resettlement action, her
    name, too, is to be turned over to the competent State Police
    (Superior) Office with a view to imprisoning her in a
    concentration camp. In such cases the children are to be
    separated from their parents and to be dealt with according to
    III, paragraph 2 of this decree. Persons are to be considered as
    having a particularly bad political record who have offended the
    German nation to a very great degree (e.g., who participated in
    persecutions of Germans, or boycotts of Germans, etc.).”
    (_R-112_)

(5) _Nazi Colonization._ Coincident with the program of Germanizing
persons of German extraction in the incorporated areas, the
conspirators, as previously indicated, undertook to settle large numbers
of Germans of proven Nazi convictions in that area. This aspect of their
program is clearly shown by an article by SS Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of the Police, Wilhelm Koppe, who was one of Himmler’s trusted
agents. The following is an excerpt from this article:

    “The victory of the German weapons in the East must therefore be
    followed by the victory of the German race over the Polish race,
    if the regained Eastern sphere—according to the Fuehrer’s
    will—henceforth shall for all time remain an essential
    constituent part of the Greater German Reich. It is therefore of
    decisive importance to penetrate the regained German region with
    German farmers, laborers, civil servants, merchants, and
    artisans so that a living and deep-rooted bastion of German
    people can be formed as a protective wall against foreign
    infiltration, and possibly as a starting point for the racial
    penetration of the territories further East.” (_2915-PS_)

B. _The Program in the Government-General_

(1) _Germanization._ In the Government-General there were relatively few
persons, at the outset, who qualified as Germans by the conspirators’
standards. Hence, little would be served by the introduction of a Racial
Register, categorizing persons of German extraction on the model of the
one instituted in the incorporated area; and it is not known that any
such Racial Register was prescribed in the Government-General. Rather,
the plan seems to have been (_a_) to make the Government-General a
colony of Germany, which was an objective announced by Frank (_EC-344-16
& 17_), and (_b_) to create so-called “German island settlements” in the
productive farming areas. These island settlements were to be created by
an influx of German persons who faithfully adhered to the principles of
National Socialism.

In this connection, secret notes bearing the date line, “Department of
the Interior, Krakow, 30th March, 1942,” reveal some of Himmler’s ideas
on the “planned Germanization” of the Government-General. The following
extracts are pertinent:

    “The Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) developed further trains of
    ideas to the effect that in the first five-year plan for
    re-settlement after the war the new German Eastern territories
    should first be filled; afterwards it is intended to provide at
    this time the Crimea and the Baltic countries with a German
    upper-class at least. Into the Government-General perhaps
    further German Island Settlements should be newly transplanted
    from European nations. An exact decision in this respect,
    however, has not been issued. In any case, it is wished that at
    first a heavy colonization along the San and the Brig be
    achieved so that the parts of Poland are encircled with alien
    populations. Hitherto, it has been always proved that this kind
    of encirclement leads most quickly to the desired
    nationalization.” (_910-PS_)

An entry in Frank’s Diary (1941, volume II, page 317) bears on the same
point:

    “Thanks to the heroic courage of our soldiers, this territory
    has become German, and the time will come when the valley of the
    Vistula, from its source to its mouth at the sea, will be as
    German as the Valley of the Rhine.” (_2233-H-PS_)

(2) _Confiscation of Property._ The conspirators had made plans to
confiscate the property of Poles, Jews, and dissident elements. These
plans were designed to accomplish a number of objectives. Insofar as the
Jews were concerned, they were part of the conspirators’ over-all
program of extermination. Confiscation was also a means of providing
property for German settlers and of rewarding those who had rendered
faithful service to the Nazi State. This phase of their program likewise
made dispossessed Polish farmers available for slave labor in Germany,
and operated to further the conspirators’ objective of preventing the
growth of another generation of Poles.

Proof of these matters appears in a number of reports by Kusche, who
appears to have been one of Himmler’s chief deputies in Poland. In one
of these reports Kusche pointed out that it was possible, without
difficulty, to confiscate small farms and that

    “The former owners of Polish farms together with their families
    will be transferred to the old Reich by the employment agencies
    for employment as farm workers.” (_1352-PS_)

In another secret report by Kusche dated 22 May 1940, and entitled
“Details of the Confiscation in the Bielitz Country”, the following
appears:

    “Some days ago the commandant of the concentration camp being
    built at Auschwitz spoke at Staff Leader Muller’s and requested
    support for the carrying out of his assignments. He said that it
    was absolutely necessary to confiscate the agricultural
    enterprises within a certain area around the concentration camp,
    since not only the fields but also the farm houses of these
    border directly on the concentration camp. A local inspection
    held on the 21st of this month revealed the following: there is
    no room for doubt that agricultural enterprises bordering on the
    concentration camp must be confiscated at once. Further than
    this, the camp commandant requests that further plots of
    farmland be placed at his disposal, so that he can keep the
    prisoners busy. This too can be done without further delay since
    enough land can be made available for the purpose. The owners of
    the plots are all Poles.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I had the following discussion with the head of the labor
    office in Bielitz:

    “The lack of agricultural laborers still exists in the old
    Reich. The transfer of the previous owners of the confiscated
    enterprises, together with their entire families, to the Reich
    is possible without any further consideration. It is only
    necessary for the labor office to receive the lists of the
    persons in time, in order to enable it to take the necessary
    steps (collection of transportation, distribution over the
    various regions in need of such labor)”.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The confiscation of these Polish enterprises in Alzen will also
    be carried out within the next few days. The commandant of the
    concentration camp will furnish SS men and a truck for the
    execution of the action. Should it not yet be possible to take
    the Poles from Alzen to Auschwitz, they should be transferred to
    the empty castle at Zator. The liberated Polish property is to
    be given to the needy racial German farmers for their use.”
    (_1352-PS_)

On 17 September 1940, Goering issued a decree which was designed to
regularize the program of confiscation (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1940, Part
I, page 1270). Under Section 2 of this decree, sequestration of movable
and immovable property, stores, and other intangible property interests
of Jews and “persons who have fled or are not merely temporarily absent”
was made mandatory. In addition, sequestration was authorized under
Section 2, sub-section 2, if the property were required “for the public
welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense or the
strengthening of Germanism.” By section 9 of the decree, confiscation of
sequestrated property was authorized “if the public welfare,
particularly the defense of the Reich, or the strengthening of
Germanism, so requires.” However, Section 1, sub-section 2, provided
that property of German nationals was not subject to sequestration and
confiscation; and section 13 provided that sequestration would be
suspended if the owner of the property asserted that he was a German.
The decree, on its face, clearly indicates a purpose to strip Poles,
Jews, and dissident elements of their property. It was, moreover,
avowedly designed to promote Germanism.

Apparently some question arose at one point as to whether the decree
required that a determination be made in each case involving the
property of a Pole that the property was required “for the public
welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense or the
strengthening of Germanism.” The answer supplied by the conspirators was
firm and clear: In _any_ case in which the property of a Pole was
involved, the “strengthening of Germanism” required its seizure. On 15
April 1941, on paper bearing the letterhead of the Reich Leader SS,
Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, instructions
were given “for internal use on the application of the law concerning
property of the Poles of 17 September 1940.” The following is an
excerpt:

    “The conditions permitting seizure according to section II,
    sub-section 2, are always present if the property belongs to a
    Pole. For the Polish real estate will be needed without
    exception for the consolidation of the German nationhood.”
    (_R-92_)

In the Government-General, Frank promulgated a decree on 24 January
1940, authorizing sequestration “in connection with the performance of
tasks serving the public interest”, and liquidation of “anti-social or
financially unremunerative concerns.” The decree is embodied in the
_Verordnungsblatt_ of the Government-General, No. 6, 27 January 1940,
page 23. The undefined criteria in this decree clearly empowered Nazi
officials in the Government-General to engage in wholesale seizure of
property.

The magnitude of the conspirators’ confiscation program in Poland was
staggering. The Nazis’ own statistics show that as of 31 May 1943, a
total of 693,252 estates, comprising 6,097,525 hectares, had been
seized, and 9,508 estates, comprising 270,446 hectares had been
confiscated by the Estate Offices Danzig-West Prussia, Poznan, Zichenau,
and Silesia (_R-92_). This, it will be noted, represented the seizures
and confiscations which were effected by only four offices. Figures are
not available at this time for other offices maintained by the
conspirators for these purposes.

                           2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The conspirators had given much thought to their plans to Germanize
Bohemia and Moravia. Three plans, each characterized by severity, were
discussed, and finally the Fuehrer decided on plan (_c_), which involved
the assimilation of about one-half the Czech population by the Germans
and the extermination of the other half. Moreover, this plan envisaged a
large influx into Czechoslovakia of Germans whose loyalty to the Fuehrer
was unquestioned.

These matters appear from a top secret report dated 15 October 1940,
written by General Friderici, Deputy General of the Wehrmacht in Bohemia
and Moravia. On the face of the document, it appears that only four
copies were made. The original document bears the handwritten letters
“K” and “J” on the first page on the left side, and the handwriting is
unquestionably that of Keitel and Jodl. The report states:

    “On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector
    held an official conference in which State Secretary SS Lt.
    General K. H. Frank spoke about the following: [SS
    Gruppenfuehrer K. H. Frank was Secretary of State under Von
    Neurath, who at the date of this report was the Protector of
    Bohemia and Moravia].

    “Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
    Party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the
    central authorities of Berlin have had difficulties about the
    solution of the Czech problem.

    “After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his
    views about the various plans in a memorandum. In this way,
    three ways of solution were indicated:

    “_a._ German infiltration of Moravia and reduction of the Czech
    nationality to a residual Bohemia. This solution is considered
    unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in a
    diminished form, will continue to exist.

    “_b._ Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical
    solution, namely, the deportation of all the Czechs. Therefore,
    the memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried
    out within a reasonable period of time.

    “_c._ Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e., absorption of about half
    of the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of
    importance by being valuable from a racial or other standpoint.
    This will take place, among other things, also by increasing the
    _Arbeitseinsatz_ of the Czechs in the Reich territory (with the
    exception of the Sudeten-German border district), in other
    words, by dispersing the closed Czech nationality.

    “The other half of the Czech nationality must be deprived of its
    power, eliminated and shipped out of the country by all sorts of
    methods. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid
    part and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter
    can scarcely be converted ideologically and would represent a
    burden by constantly making claims for the leadership over the
    other Czech classes and thus interfering with a rapid
    assimilation.

    “Elements which counteract the planned Germanization ought to be
    handled roughly and should be eliminated.

    “The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx
    of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.

    “After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen solution (_c_)
    (Assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech
    problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the
    Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be
    carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich
    Protector for years to come.

    “From the above no particular conclusions are drawn by the armed
    forces. This is the direction which has always been represented
    from here. In this connection, I refer to my memorandum which
    was sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
    Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file number 6/39, top secret,
    entitled: “The Czech Problem.” (Attached as annex.)

    “The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector
    in Bohemia and Moravia.”

                                             “(Signed)  FRIDERICI
                                 Infantry Lt. General.”  (_862-PS_)

Solution (_a_), as outlined in the foregoing report, would have called
for German infiltration into Moravia and the forcible removal of the
Czechs from that area to Bohemia. Moravia lies between Bohemia and
Slovakia. Thus, solution (_a_) would have involved the erection of a
German state between Bohemia and Slovakia, and would have prevented
effective inter-communications between the Czechs and the Slovaks. In
this manner, the historic desire for unity of these two groups of people
and the continued existence of their Czechoslovakian State would have
been frustrated. Solution (_a_) was rejected because the surviving
Czechs, even though compressed into a “residual Bohemia,” would have
remained to plague the conspirators.

Solution (_b_), which involved the forcible deportation of all Czechs,
was rejected, not because its terms were deemed too drastic but rather
because a more speedy resolution of the problem was desired.

Solution (_c_) was regarded as the most desirable, and was adopted. This
solution first provided for the assimilation of about one-half of the
Czechs. This meant two things: (_a_) enforced Germanization for those
who were deemed racially qualified, and (_b_) deportation to slave labor
in Germany for others. “Increasing the _Arbeitseinsatz_ of the Czechs in
the Reich territory”, as stated in the report, meant, in reality, slave
labor in Germany.

Solution (_c_) further provided for the elimination and deportation “by
all sorts of methods” of the other half of the Czech population,
particularly intellectuals and those who did not meet Nazi racial
standards. Czech intellectuals, as the conspirators well know, had a
conspicuous record of resistance to the Nazi ideology. They were,
therefore, to be exterminated. That section of the report which stated,
“elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be handled
roughly and should be eliminated,” meant that intellectuals and other
dissident elements were either to be thrown in concentration camps or
immediately exterminated.

In short, the provisions of solution (_c_) were simply a practical
application of the conspirators’ philosophy as expressed in Himmler’s
speech referred to above:

    “Either we win over any good blood that we can use for ourselves
    * * * or we destroy this blood.” (_L-70_)

                           3. THE U. S. S. R.

(The Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet Union has assumed the task of
introducing detailed evidence showing the results of the execution of
this program. The American prosecution confined itself to showing the
plan.)

The evidence, individual items of which will be discussed hereafter,
shows the following:

A. The conspirators planned to remove to Germany all foodstuffs and raw
materials from the south and southeast of the Soviet Union, over and
above the needs of the Nazi invading forces and the absolute minimum
necessary to supply the bare needs of the people in these particular
regions who produced the materials which were to be removed to Germany.
This region had previously supplied the northern area of the Soviet
Union, which the conspirators called the “Forest Zone”. The latter zone
embraced some of the leading industrial areas of the Soviet Union,
including Moscow and Leningrad.

B. They deliberately and systematically planned to starve millions of
Russians. Starvation was to be accomplished by the following means:

(1) As indicated under A above, products from the south and southeast of
the Soviet Union which ordinarily were sent to the industrial regions of
the north were to be forcibly diverted to Germany. Moreover, all
livestock in the industrial regions was to be seized for use by the
_Wehrmacht_ and the German civilian population. The necessary
consequence was that the population of the northern regions would be
reduced to starvation.

(2) They established the following order of priority in which food
produced by the Russians would be allocated:

    First, the combat troops.

    Second, the remainder of troops in enemy territory.

    Third, troops stationed in Germany.

    Fourth, the German civilian population, and

    Lastly, the population of the occupied countries.

Thus, even Russians in the food-surplus area of the Ukraine, who were
not essential to the production of products for the German war machine,
were systematically to be starved.

C. They planned the permanent destruction of all industry in the
northern area of the Soviet Union in order that the remnants of the
Russian population would be completely dependent upon Germany for
consumer goods.

D. They planned to incorporate a part of Galicia and all of the Baltic
countries into Germany and to convert the Crimea, an area north of the
Crimea, the Volga territory, and the district around Baku, into German
colonies.

By a directive issued by Goering’s office for “The Operation of the
Economy in the newly-occupied Eastern Territories,” there was
established the Economic Executive Staff, East, which was directly
responsible to Goering, under which was created the Economic Staff,
East. The Economic Staff, East, in turn was subdivided into four groups:
the Chief of the Economic Staff, Group LA, Group W, and Group M. The
functions of Group LA were stated to be as follows:

    “Group LA. (Functions: nutrition and agriculture, the economy of
    all agricultural products, provision of supplies for the Army,
    in cooperation with the Army groups concerned.)” (_EC-472_)

A report was made on 23 May 1941 (which was before the invasion of the
Soviet Union) on the subject, “Economic Policy Directives for Economic
Organization, East, Agricultural Group.” (_EC-126_). It was prepared by
the Economic Staff, East, Group LA, the Agricultural Group, which (as
shown by _EC-472_) was an important part of the organization which
Goering had established to formulate plans for the economic
administration of Russia. The report begins by a recitation of figures
pertaining to the production of agricultural products in the Soviet
Union. It states that the grain surplus of Russia is determined by the
level of domestic consumption and that this fact affords the basis upon
which the planners must predicate their actions and economic policy. The
report continues:

    “The surplus territories are situated in the black soil district
    (that is in the south and southeast) and in the Caucasus. The
    deficit areas are principally located in the forest zone of the
    north. Therefore, an isolation of the black soil areas must, in
    any case, place greater or lesser surpluses in these regions at
    our disposal. The consequences will be cessation of supplies to
    the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial
    centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “This (the cessation of supplies) means:

    “1. All industry in the deficit area, particularly the
    manufacturing industries in the Moscow and Petersburg regions as
    well as the Ural industrial regions will be abandoned. It may be
    assumed that these regions today absorb an annual five to ten
    million tons from the food production zone.

    “2. The Trans-Caucasian oil district will have to be excepted,
    although it is a deficit area. This source of oil, cotton,
    manganese, copper, silk, and tea must continue to be supplied
    with food in any case, for special political and economic
    reasons.

    “3. No further exceptions with a view to preserving one or the
    other industrial region or industrial enterprise must be
    permitted.

    “4. Industry can only be preserved so far as it is located in
    the surplus region. This applies, apart from the above-mentioned
    oil field regions in the Caucasus, particularly to the heavy
    industries in the Donets district (Ukraine). Only the future
    will show to what extent it will prove possible to maintain in
    full these industries, and in particular the Ukrainian
    manufacturing industries, after the withdrawal of the food
    surpluses required by Germany.

    “The following consequences result from this situation, which
    has received the approval of the highest authorities, since it
    is in accord with the political tendencies (preservation of the
    small Russians, preservation of the Caucasus, of the Baltic
    provinces, of White Russia, to the prejudice of the Great
    Russians).

    “I. _For the forest belt_:

    “_a._ Production in the forest belt (the food-deficit area) will
    become ‘naturalized,’ similar to the events during the World War
    and the Communistic tendencies of the war, etc., namely:
    agriculture in that territory will begin to become a mere ‘home
    production.’ The result will be that the planting of products
    destined for the market such as, in particular, flax and hemp,
    will be discontinued, and the area used therefor will be taken
    over for products for the producer (grain, potatoes, etc.)
    Moreover, discontinuance of fodder for that area will lead to
    the collapse of the dairy production and pig producing in that
    territory.

    “_b._ Germany is not interested in the maintenance of the
    productive power of these territories, except for supplying the
    troops stationed there. The population, as in the old days, will
    utilize arable land for growing its own food. It is useless to
    expect grain or other surpluses to be produced. Only after many
    years can these extensive regions be intensified to an extent
    that they might produce genuine surpluses. The population of
    these areas, in particular the urban population, will have to
    face most serious distress from famine. It will be necessary to
    divert the population into the Siberian spaces. Since rail
    transport is out of the question, this too, will be an extremely
    difficult problem.

    “_c._ In this situation, Germany will only draw substantial
    advantages by quick, nonrecurrent seizure, that is, it will be
    vitally necessary to make the entire flax harvest available for
    German needs, not only the fibers but also the oleaginous seeds.

    “It will also be necessary to utilize for German purposes the
    livestock which has no fodder base of its own, that is, it will
    be necessary _to seize livestock holdings_ immediately, and to
    make them available to the troops not only for the moment, but
    in the long run, and also for exportation to Germany. Since
    fodder supplies will be cut off, pig and cattle holdings in
    these areas will of necessity drastically decline in the near
    future. If they are not seized by the Germans at an early date,
    they will be slaughtered by the population for its own use,
    without Germany getting anything out of it.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “It has been demanded by the Fuehrer that the reduction in the
    meat ration should be made good by the fall. This can only be
    achieved by the most drastic seizures of Russian livestock
    holdings, particularly in areas which are in a favorable
    transport situation in relation to Germany.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “In future, southern Russia must turn its face toward Europe.
    Its food surpluses, however, will only be paid for if it
    purchases its industrial consumer goods from Germany, or Europe.
    Russian competition from the forest zone must, therefore, be
    abolished.

    “It follows from all that has been said that the German
    administration in these territories may well attempt to mitigate
    the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly will take
    place, and to accelerate the return to primitive agricultural
    conditions. An attempt might be made to intensify cultivation in
    these areas by expanding the acreage under potatoes or other
    important food crops giving a high yield. However, these
    measures will not avert famine. Many tens of millions of people
    in this area will become redundant and will either die or have
    to emigrate to Siberia. Any attempt to save the population there
    from death by starvation by importing surpluses from the black
    soil zone would be at the expense of supplies to Europe. It
    would reduce Germany’s staying power in the war, and would
    undermine Germany’s and Europe’s power to resist the blockade.
    This must be clearly and absolutely understood.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I. Supplies for the Army

    “Germany’s food situation in the third year of war demands it
    imperatively that the _Wehrmacht_, in all its provisioning, must
    not live off Greater German territory or that of incorporated or
    friendly areas from which this territory receives imports. This
    minimum aim, the provisioning of the _Wehrmacht_ from enemy
    territory in the third year, and if necessary in later years,
    must be attained at any price. This means that one-third of the
    _Wehrmacht_ must be fully provisioned by French deliveries to
    the army of occupation. The remaining two-thirds (and even
    slightly more in view of the present size of the Wehrmacht) must
    without exception be provisioned from the Eastern _space_.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Thus it is not important, under any circumstances, to preserve
    what has existed, but what matters is a deliberate turning away
    from the existing situation and introducing Russian food
    resources into the European framework. This will inevitably
    result in an extinction of industry as well as a large part of
    the people in what so far have been the food-deficit areas.

    “It is impossible to state an alternative in sufficiently hard
    and severe terms.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “Our problem is not to replace intensive food production in
    Europe through the incorporation of new space in the East, but
    to replace imports from overseas by imports from the East. The
    task is twofold:

    “1. We must use the eastern spaces for overcoming the food
    shortages during and after the war. This means that we must not
    be afraid of drawing upon the capital substance of the East.
    Such an intervention is much more acceptable from the European
    standpoint than drawing upon the capital substance of Europe’s
    agriculture.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “2. For the future new order, the food-producing areas in the
    East must be turned into a permanent and substantial
    complementary source of food for Europe, through intensified
    cultivation and resulting higher yields.

    “The first-named task must be accomplished at any price, even
    through the most ruthless cutting down of Russian domestic
    consumption, which will require discrimination between the
    consuming and producing zones.” (_EC-126_)

It is submitted that this document discloses, on its face, a studied
plan to murder millions of people through starvation. It reveals a
program of premeditated murder on a scale so vast as to stagger human
imagination. This plan was the logical culmination of general objectives
clearly announced by Adolf Hitler in _Mein Kampf_. (See Section 6 of
Chapter IX.)

A top secret memorandum, dated 16 July, 1941, of a conference at the
Fuehrer’s headquarters concerning the war in the East, seems to have
been prepared by Bormann, because his initials appear at the top of page
one (_L-221_). The text of the memorandum indicates that the conference
was attended by Hitler, Lammers, Goering, Keitel, Rosenberg, and
Bormann. This memorandum throws light upon the conspirators’ plans to
Germanize conquered areas of the Soviet Union. It also discloses the
fraudulent character of the Nazi propaganda program; and shows how the
conspirators sought to deceive the entire world; how they pretended to
pursue one course of action when their aims and purposes were to follow
precisely the opposite course. The following portions are particularly
relevant.

    “Now it was essential that we did not publicize our aims before
    the world; also there was no need for that, but the main thing
    was that we ourselves knew what we wanted. By no means should we
    render our task more difficult by making superfluous
    declarations. Such declarations were superfluous because we
    could do everything wherever we had the power, and what was
    beyond our power we would not be able to do anyway.

    “What we told the world about the motives for our measures ought
    to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We ought to
    act here in exactly the same way as we did in the cases of
    Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. In these cases too we did
    not publish our aims, and it was only sensible to continue in
    the same way.

    “Therefore, we shall emphasize again that we were forced to
    occupy, administer, and secure a certain area; it was in the
    interest of the inhabitants that we provided order, food,
    traffic, etc., hence our measures. Nobody shall be able to
    recognize that it initiates final settlement. This need not
    prevent our taking all necessary measures—shooting,
    de-settling, etc.—and we shall take them.

    “But we do not want to make any people into enemies prematurely
    and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as though we wanted to
    exercise a mandate only. At the same time we must know clearly
    that we shall never leave those countries.

    “Our conduct therefore ought to be:

    “1. To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement, but
    to prepare for it only in secret. * * *”

    “2. To emphasize that we are liberators.

    “In particular: The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners
    and to be settled by Germans only. In the same way the former
    Austrian part of Galicia will become Reich territory.

    “Our present relations with Roumania are good, but nobody knows
    what they will be at any future time. This we have to consider,
    and we have to draw our frontiers accordingly. One ought not to
    be dependent on the good will of other people. We have to plan
    our relations with Roumania in accordance with this principle.

    “On principle, we have now to face the task of cutting up the
    giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able—

        “first, to dominate it;

        “second, to administer it, and;

        “third, to exploit it.

    “The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our
    front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it
    enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us.

    “Principles: Never again must it be possible to create a
    military power west of the Urals, even if we have to wage war
    for a hundred years in order to attain this goal. Every
    successor of the Fuehrer should know: security for the Reich
    exists only if there are no foreign military forces west of the
    Urals; it is Germany who undertakes the protection of this area
    against all possible danger. Our iron principle is and has to
    remain: We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry
    arms.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “The Fuehrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic country will have
    to be incorporated into Germany.

    “At the same time the Crimea, including a considerable
    hinterland, (situated north of the Crimea) should become Reich
    territory; the hinterland should be as large as possible.

    “Rosenberg objects to this because of the Ukrainians living
    there.

    “Incidental question: It occurred to me several times that
    Rosenberg has a soft spot for the Ukrainians; thus he desires to
    aggrandize the former Ukraine to a considerable extent.”

    “The Fuehrer emphasizes furthermore that the Volga Colony, too,
    will have to become Reich territory, also the district around
    Baku; the latter will have to become a German concession
    (military colony).”

    “The Finns wanted East Carelia, but the Kola Peninsula will be
    taken by Germany because of the large nickel mines there.

    “The annexation of Finland as a federated state should be
    prepared with caution. The area around Leningrad is wanted by
    the Finns; the Fuehrer will raze Leningrad to the ground and
    then hand it over to the Finns.” (_L-221_)

Thus, the program, as outlined by the conspirators at this meeting of 16
July, 1941, called for the unlawful incorporation of a part of Galicia
and all the Baltic countries into Germany; and for the unlawful
conversion of the Crimea and areas north of it, the Volga territory and
the district around Baku, into German colonies.

This point is reinforced by a directive entitled, “Instruction for a
Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and White Russia,” which states:

    “The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
    and White Russia [last two words added in pencil] must be to
    strive to achieve the form of a German protectorate, and then
    transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by
    Germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic
    races, and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must
    become a Germanic inland sea, under the guardianship of Greater
    Germany.” (_1029-PS_)

Even in the food-surplus areas of the occupied regions of the Ukraine,
the conspirators planned to allocate food on a basis which left
virtually nothing for those persons who were not engaged in the
compulsory production of commodities for the German war machine. This
was in violation of the explicit provision in Article 52 of the Hague
Regulations of 1907, that requisitions in kind and services shall not be
demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the
army of occupation. This program was disclosed in a top secret
memorandum, dated 18 September, 1941, concerning a meeting of German
military officials presided over by Goering (_EC-3_). The memorandum was
signed by General Nagl, liaison officer between Goering’s Four Year Plan
Office and the OKW. The memorandum states:

    “At this conference which was concerned with the better
    exploitation of the occupied territories for the German food
    economy, the Reich Marshal (Goering) called attention to the
    following:”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “It is clear that a graduated scale of food allocations is
    needed.

    “First in line are the combat troops, then the remainder of
    troops in enemy territory, and then those troops stationed at
    home. The rates are adjusted accordingly. The supply of the
    German nonmilitary population follows and only then comes the
    population of the occupied territories.” (_EC-3_)

Another memorandum, dated 25 November 1941, relating to the general
principles of economic policy in the newly-occupied eastern territories,
as prescribed in a conference held in Berlin on 8 November 1941, also
bears out this point. This memorandum was also written by General Nagl.
It is on the stationery of the Supreme Headquarters Armament Procurement
Office. The following portions are pertinent:

    “I. For the duration of the war the requirements of the war
    economy will be the all-dominant factor of any economic measures
    in the newly-occupied Eastern territories.

    “II. Seen from a long range point of view the newly-occupied
    eastern areas will be exploited economically from the point of
    view of colonial administration and by colonial methods.

    “Exceptions will be made only for those parts of the Eastland
    which are to be Germanized by order of the Fuehrer, but even
    they are subject to the principle expressed in paragraph I.

    “III. The main emphasis of all economic work rests with the
    production of food and raw materials.

    “The highest possible production surplus for the supply of the
    Reich and of other European countries is to be attained by cheap
    production based on the maintenance of the low living standard
    of the native population. Besides covering thereby the European
    needs for food supplies and raw materials as far as possible,
    this measure is intended to create a source of income for the
    Reich which will make it possible to liquidate in a few decades,
    with utmost consideration for the German taxpayer, an essential
    part of the debts incurred in the financing of the war.”
    (_EC-3_)

On 17 July, 1941, Hitler and Keitel issued a decree appointing Rosenberg
as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. This was the day
following the meeting at the Fuehrer’s headquarters, which is reported
in the document previously quoted from (_L-221_). This decree states,
_inter alia_:

    “The Civil Administration in the newly-occupied Eastern
    territories where these territories are not included in the
    administration of the territories bordering on the Reich or the
    Government-General, is subject to the Reich Minister for the
    Occupied Eastern Territories.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “I appoint Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for
    the occupied Eastern territories. He will hold office in
    Berlin.” (_1997-PS_)

Rosenberg’s views well fitted him for his task as one of the chief
executioners of the conspirators’ plans in the Soviet Union. His views
were plainly expressed in a speech delivered on 20 June 1941:

    “The job of feeding the German people, stands, this year,
    without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims on
    the East; and here the southern territories and the northern
    Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the
    German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on
    our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of
    that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity,
    bare of any feelings.” (_1058-PS_)

These views were implemented in the directives issued by Rosenberg in
his capacity as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
Among his directives were these:

    “The principal task of the civilian administration in the
    occupied Eastern territories is to represent the interest of the
    Reich. This basic principle is to be given precedence in all
    measures and considerations. Therefore, the occupied
    territories, in the future, may be permitted to have a life of
    their own in a form not as yet to be determined. However, they
    remain parts of the Greater German living space and are always
    to be governed according to this guiding principle.

    “The regulations of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which
    concern the administration of a country occupied by a foreign
    belligerent power, are not applicable, since the USSR is to be
    considered dissolved, and therefore the Reich has the obligation
    of exercising all governmental and other sovereign functions in
    the interests of the country’s inhabitants. Therefore, any
    measures are permitted which the German administration deems
    necessary and suitable for the execution of this comprehensive
    task.” (_EC-347_)

Implicit in Rosenberg’s statement that the Hague Regulations are not
applicable to the Soviet Union is the recognition by him that the
conspirators’ action in the Soviet Union flagrantly violated the Hague
Regulations and applicable principles of International Law.

A top secret memorandum, dated 5 October 1942, written by Braeutigam,
who was a high official in Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern
Territories, made the following statements:

    “In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war for
    the destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of the
    greater Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition of
    colonial territory for colonizing purposes and economic
    exploitation.

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “With the inherent instinct of the Eastern peoples the primitive
    man soon found out also that for Germany the slogan: ‘Liberation
    from Bolshevism’ was only a pretext to enslave the Eastern
    peoples according to her own methods.” (_294-PS_)

Certain German industrialists and financiers aided and abetted Himmler
in his relentless program of Germanization, exploitation, oppression,
and destruction. A letter from the banker, Baron Kurt von Schroeder to
Himmler, dated 27 August 1943, stated:

    “My very honorable Reichsfuehrer:

    “With great joy I learn of your appointment as Reichsminister of
    the Interior and take the liberty to extend my heartiest
    congratulations to you on assuming your new post.

    “A strong hand is now very necessary in the operation of this
    Department and it is universally welcomed but especially by your
    friends that it was you who were chosen for this by the Fuehrer.
    Please be assured that we will always do everything in our power
    at all times to assist you in every possible way.

    “I am pleased to inform you at this opportunity that your circle
    of friends has again placed at your disposal this year a sum
    slightly in excess of RM 1 million for ‘special purposes.’ An
    exact list showing the name of the contributors will be sent to
    you shortly.

    “Again all my very best wishes—as well as those of my family—I
    remain yours, in old loyalty and esteem.

“Heil Hitler!                 Yours truly.”                   (_EC-454_)

A later letter from von Schroeder to Himmler, dated 21 September 1943,
enclosed the list of contributors. The letter stated:

    “Dear Reichsleader:

    “I thank you very much for your kind letter of the 14th of this
    month with which you made me very happy. At the same time, I am
    enclosing a list with the total amount of funds made available
    to you by your circle of friends and totalling RM 1,000,000. We
    are very glad indeed to render some assistance to you in your
    special tasks and to be able to provide some small relief for
    you in your still further extended sphere of duties.

    “Wishing you, dear Reichsleader, the best of luck, I remain in
    old loyalty and esteem.

“Heil Hitler!              Yours very truly.”                (_EC-453_)

The Himmler “circle of friends,” it may be noted, was a relatively
small, select group. It did not include all, or even a majority of the
industrialists and financiers in Germany. These contributions were not
like the “_Hitler Spende_” or the Winter Relief contributions which were
exacted from all industrialists by the Nazi state. These were
contributions by a small group of very influential industrialists and
financiers who, for selfish reasons, were anxious to “do everything in
our power at all times to assist you “(Himmler)” in every possible way.”
By a rather strange coincidence, firms like I. G. Farben, the Flick
Combine, and the Herman Goering Werke, which are on the list of
contributors to Himmler, were among the chief beneficiaries of the
conspirators’ program of plunder of public and private property in the
occupied countries. (_EC-453_)

                   4. THE WESTERN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

(This section is based on a brief originally prepared for submission by
the United States Prosecution in support of the allegation, in Count One
of the Indictment, of a plan or conspiracy to commit war crimes. The
evidence relating to the plan or conspiracy, however, proved to be
inseparable from that on the execution thereof, a subject assigned to
the French Prosecution. The materials contained herein were accordingly
made available to the French for such use as they might deem appropriate
in connection with the proof of their case.)

A. _The Nazi Conspirators Obtained Enormous Quantities of Foodstuffs,
Raw Materials and Equipment From the Occupied Western Countries._

(1) _The Nazis planned in advance of the invasion to secure from the
conquered territories the strategic materials which Germany lacked and
without which Germany could not prevail in a war of long duration._ In
this war, as in the last, German resources were sufficient only for a
conflict of short duration. As early as the winter of 1939-40, following
the swift and crushing defeat of Poland, Germany suffered from a
critical shortage of essential raw materials (_EC-615_). The Nazi
leaders were thus faced with the question whether to conserve their
supplies for a long war or to commit their limited reserves in the hope
of obtaining an early decision. Hitler decided on the latter course. As
Goering told General Thomas:

    “The Fuehrer is firmly convinced that he will succeed in
    reaching a decision * * * in the year 1940 by a big attack in
    the West. He reckons that Belgium, Holland, and Northern France
    will get into our possession and * * * had figured out that the
    industrial areas of Douai and Lens and those of Luxembourg,
    Longwy, and Briey could, from the point of view of raw material,
    replace the supplies from Sweden. Therefore, the Fuehrer had
    decided now to make use of our reserve of raw materials without
    regard to future times. * * *” (_EC-606_)

Careful plans were made in advance of the invasion in 1940 to secure for
Germany the raw material resources of the to-be-occupied countries. A
manual of directives and decrees issued by the Quartermaster, OKH, for
the economic administration of the military government set forth an
exhaustive list of important raw materials to be seized wherever found
(_EC-155_). Directives were issued to the so-called economic squads
(_Wirtschafts Truppe_) attached to the tactical units on the procedures
to be followed in locating, seizing, and preparing such materials for
shipment to Germany (_EC-618_). Also included in the manual mentioned
were drafts of decrees to be promulgated by the German occupation
authorities, for the establishment in the occupied countries of Goods
Offices, modeled after the German rationing boards, to control
production and distribution in the occupied countries in the German
interest. (_EC-155_)

(2) _The occupied Western countries were ruthlessly exploited according
to plan._ The occupied areas were systematically stripped of their
economic resources to feed the German war machine. The extent of German
exploitation is partially indicated by the staggering totals of the
occupation levies and the “credit” balances of the local central banks
under clearing arrangements imposed by the Nazis, the principal sources
of the funds with which Germany financed the spoliation of Western
Europe. (For a brief explanation of the clearing system, see _infra_
under D, 2.)

The total occupation charges exacted from France alone were
31,600,000,000 RM from 25 June, 1940, to 5 September, 1944 (_3615-PS_).
They averaged more than 7,000,000,000 RM annually, a sum more than four
times the German annual payments under the Dawes and Young Plans. This
sum is in addition to a “credit” of the Bank of France under the
Franco-German clearing, which, as of September, 1943, amounted to
4,400,000,000 RM (_3615-PS_). For the period May 1942-43, the tribute
exacted from Belgium (mainly from occupation charges and clearing
credits) amounted to more than two-thirds of the Belgium national income
(_ECR-149_). These figures, large as they are, take no account of the
substantial quantities of materials seized and removed to the Reich
without compensation (see _infra_ under B, (1)) nor do they reflect the
windfall to the Reich resulting from the substantial over-valuation of
the Reichsmark, particularly in the case of France and Belgium.
(_EC-86_)

A few illustrative examples of specific items, taken from the report of
the German Military Commander for France of 10 September, 1942
(_EC-267_), will serve to show even more concretely than monetary
figures, the extent to which materials and equipment were taken from the
occupied countries for the benefit of the Reich. Since the Armistice,
according to this report, the French contributed to the Germans 73
percent of the normal annual French consumption of iron, amounting to
nearly 5 million tons. From the Armistice to July, 1942, 225,000 tons of
copper and 5,700 tons of nickel were delivered by France to Germany,
amounting to 80 percent and 86 percent of French supplies respectively;
also 55 percent of the French aluminum and 80 percent of the magnesium
production. For her own needs France retained only 30 percent of the
normal production of the wool industry, 16 percent of the cotton
production, and 13 percent of the linen production. The total French
production of locomotives and the major part of the machine tool
industry were put at the disposal of the Germans. (_EC-267_)

B. _The Foodstuffs, Raw Materials and Equipment Delivered to Germany
were Obtained by Compelling the Nationals of the Conquered Countries to
Produce and Distribute in Accordance with German War Requirements, by
Seizure and Requisition, and by Purchases Financed with Funds Exacted
from the Occupied Countries and Their Nationals._

(1) _Much of the material and equipment removed to Germany was obtained
by seizure, requisition, and confiscation of private property._ During
the first phase of the occupation, the Nazis systematically removed to
the Reich almost all available supplies to satisfy the immediate German
requirements. This phase, according to the German Military Commander’s
description of the practice in France, was one of “stripping” occupied
areas of “foodstuffs, raw materials and machinery”, leaving only enough
to secure the “bare subsistence” of the population (_EC-614_). In the
words of the report of the Wi-Rue Staff in France:

    “In this period the legal concepts of the Hague Regulations
    regarding Land Warfare are not yet strictly observed. The main
    purpose is to get out of France through seizure _Beschlagnahme_
    or purchase at infinitesimal prices the materials of use for the
    German armament.” (_EC-422_)

By order of the German High Command, booty was defined to include not
merely public property but “beyond the Hague Regulations on Land
Warfare,” also “privately owned finished and semi-finished products if
they were manufactured in fulfillment of an order of the French armed
forces” (_EC-422_). At the same time, payments made by the French armed
forces on account of war material orders were likewise treated as war
booty. Even goods in transit were arbitrarily placed in this category
(_EC-422_). Machinery and equipment affixed to the realty were seized
and shipped to Germany in wilful disregard of the limitations of the
Hague Regulations authorizing seizure only of chattels. (_EC-84_)

The “stripping phase” of Nazi spoliation was relatively short-lived.
Decision was soon reached to utilize at least part of the industrial
capacity of the occupied areas to relieve the burden on the armament
plants in Germany (_EC-620_). Throughout the period of occupation,
however, the Nazis continued the seizure and requisition of machinery
and certain raw materials in short supply in the Reich. From December,
1942, to the end of the occupation, for example, 242 German demands for
Belgian machinery were met, of which 110 were fulfilled by requisitions
(_ECH-10_). In 79 instances the requisitioned equipment was shipped to
Germany. (_ECH-10_)

Support for such requisitions was found in an order of the Military
Commander of Belgium of 6 August 1942. This order was explained as
embodying the “modern” German view that, as “total war is no longer
limited in space but has become a struggle of peoples and nations
against each other,” requisitions under Article 52 of the Hague
Regulations should no longer be limited to the “needs of the occupying
forces” but may also be used in the “general interest of the German war
effort”; and that requisitioned articles may be used not only in the
territory in which they were obtained but also “in other territories in
the sphere of the occupying power.” (_ECH-10_)

In April 1941, Goering ordered the removal of church bells in France
“which represent the most important and last reserve of copper and tin,”
stressing that “no church bells would be removed in Germany before all
bells had been removed in France” (_EC-323_). In 1943, after the removal
of church bells from the other occupied countries and even from the
Reich, Hitler ordered their removal from Belgium (_ECH-11_). The
Belgians protested, invoking the Hague Regulations, and refused an offer
to buy; thereupon the Germans requisitioned the bells against receipt.
(_ECH-11_)

By circular letter, dated 23 June 1943, Speer ordered that scientific
instruments and apparatus be taken out of the laboratories and research
institutes in the occupied Western countries, directing that
applications for instruments be made through channels and that the
requisitions be made by the Military Government. (_ECH-14_)

In many cases, representatives of German scientific institutions sought
to acquire scientific instruments in order to modernize their own
installations, appearing in Army uniforms to give the impression that
the requisition was a military measure (_ECH-15_). The Military
Government of Belgium decided that Articles 52 and 56 of the Hague
Regulations were inapplicable because the Allies had destroyed a number
of German scientific installations in the Reich through bombing, which
therefore had to be replaced from the occupied territories, and that “in
a total war, no consideration could be given to the cited articles of
the Hague Regulations”. (_ECH-16_)

As part of the design to supply the armament industry in Germany with
material from the occupied Western territories, a program for the
removal of copper and lead from transmission installations of power
distribution plants in the occupied Western countries was instituted by
a decree of Speer dated 31 May, 1943 (_EC-101_). The plan contemplated
from the outset that the transmission of facilities would not be
restored (as required by the second paragraph of Article 53 of the Hague
Regulations) but that an equivalent amount of metal would be returned
after the war. (_EC-101_)

(2) _The Nazis purchased war materials and consumer goods_ _in the
regular and black markets for shipment to the Reich, all with funds
exacted from the occupied countries._ Following the initial “stripping”
phase of the occupation, the Nazis promptly instituted an extensive
“buying-out” program (_061-PS_) with the object of procuring not merely
materials required for the German war effort, but to obtain also
consumer goods, including luxury items, for the civilian population of
Germany (_EC-485_).

No limitations, legal or moral, were observed in the execution of this
program. Supplies which could not be obtained through normal channels
were purchased on the black market. The disastrous effects of
competition among various German agents led the central occupational
authorities in Belgium, France, and Holland to take over black market
operation directly (_1765-PS_). On 13 June 1942, by order of Goering,
Col. Veltjens was appointed to direct black market purchases in all
occupied territories and a new agency, the so-called UEWA, was placed at
his disposal. (_ECH-7_)

The actual purchases were made by several corporations, including
Pimetex, an agency of the Speer Ministry of Armament and Munitions. The
goods were distributed through Roges according to directives of the
Central Planning Board (Speer, Koerner, Milch) and in appropriate cases
by the German Ministry of Economics and the _Reichsstellen_ (_ECH-7_).
Black market operations were finally abolished by order of Goering dated
2 April, 1943, confirmed in Belgium by circular of the Military
Commander of 19 June, 1943. (_ECH-9_)

Certain of the purchases made through the black market while under the
direction of Col. Veltjens are of special interest:

    _Christmas Drive._ On 22 September 1942, Goering ordered a
    special drive in the Western occupied countries to purchase
    presents for the civil population in Germany for the coming
    Christmas. The Roges Company effected the distribution of the
    articles in Germany.

    _Special Drive WABO._ This drive was pursuant to Hitler’s order
    to Speer to procure Christmas packages for the soldiers. The O.
    Todt Cantine accepted offers of sale on the black market and
    Pimetex did the buying.

    _Special Drive LOWA_ (Degenkolb locomotive program). The
    purchase were made by Pimetex. (_ECH-7_)

As of 15 January 1943, black market purchases totaled approximately
1,100,000,000 RM, including:

    RM 929,100,000 in France.

    RM 103,881,929 in Belgium, and

    RM 73,685,162.64 in Holland. (_1765-PS_)

Payment in France was made out of occupation funds, in Belgium out of
such funds and through the clearing, and in Holland through “normal bank
transactions” (_1765-PS_; _ECR-132_). As appears very clearly from the
report of Col. Veltjens of 15 January, 1943, substantially all the goods
so purchased were shipped to the Reich. (_1765-PS_)

(3) _The Nazi conspirators compelled the nationals of the occupied
countries to produce and distribute materials and equipment in
accordance with the German general war requirements._ The “stripping”
and “buying-out” phases of the Nazi spoliation were both gradually
superseded by a regulated program for the utilization of the industrial
plant of the occupied areas and the transfer of orders (subcontracting)
to local concerns. The Nazi conspirators established comprehensive
rationing controls under which essential raw materials were made
available only to those who produced in the German interest; those
reluctant to produce on German order were placed under compulsory
administration. “This,” Keitel noted in commenting on the controls
established in France, “is * * * booty of the victor”. (_EC-613_)

                               _Belgium_

The means employed in Belgium were typical. Production quotas for coal,
iron and steel, textiles and leather, and other products were fixed by
the Ministry of Economics and its _Reichsstellen_, in some cases after
consultation with the Reich Minister (Funk). (_ECH-2_)

Comprehensive production controls were established in Belgium to assure
the fulfillment of these quotas. Pursuant to plans developed in advance
of the invasion (_EC-155_), a decree was issued by the Military
Commander on 27 May, 1940, creating so-called “Goods Offices,” endowed
with authority to issue general and special orders to Belgian firms
requiring production of designated products, and the sale thereof to
designated buyers, and with the further power to prohibit production or
sale without license (_3604-PS_). By decree of the Military Commander of
29 April, 1941, the appointment of a commissar to direct operations of
private plants was authorized. (_3610-PS_)

The German Goods Offices (_ECH-3_) were transferred to similar units
established by Belgian decree of 3 September, 1940. (Whether this decree
was issued on German order or suggestion does not appear.) The Germans
supervised the Belgian Goods Offices and adopted as German orders both
the Belgian decree establishing the Offices and the orders issued
thereunder, and prescribed punishment by fine and imprisonment for
violations. (_3609-PS_)

For the first two years of the occupation, German control was exercised
mainly through prohibitions and restrictions, that is, by a priority
system (_ECH-4_), although even then important sectors of the Belgian
economy, notably textiles and leather products, were controlled by
“positive” orders directing the amount in kind to be produced and the
persons to whom distribution must be made (_ECH-4_; _ECH-2_). During
this period the Military Commander issued instructions to the Goods
Offices through “command channels,” that is, through the Belgian
Minister of Economics. (_ECH-3_)

On 6 August, 1942, the Military Commander, however, published a decree
reaffirming explicitly the power to compel production of designated
articles (_3612-PS_), a signal for the introduction of “positive”
controls. In 1943, on instructions from the Reich Ministry of Economics,
German representatives selected from the _Reichsstellen_ were attached
directly to the Belgian Goods Offices (_ECH-3_). At the end of 1943, the
office of the “Ruestungsobmann” of the Speer Ministry for Armaments and
War Production began issuing “positive orders” for production to
individual concerns directly, without clearing with the Goods Offices,
pursuant to decree of the Minister for Armaments and War Production
(Speer). (_ECH-3_)

Production facilities in Belgium which were not deemed to serve the
German interest were shut down. By order of 30 March 1942, the Military
Commander prohibited the enlargement of existing plants and the
construction of new ones without German authorization, and provided for
the closing down of factories at his discretion (_3616-PS_). In the iron
and metal industry alone at least 400 plants “not important for the war
effort” had been closed down by 15 April 1943 (_EC-335_). By the end of
the occupation, 1360 put of a total of 2164 plants in the textile
industry had been closed down. (_ECH-19_)

                          _France and Holland_

Substantially the same system was put into effect in France and Holland.
German Goods Offices were established in Occupied France at the same
time as in Belgium (_3604-PS_). These were subsequently abolished in
November, 1940, however, when the Vichy Government, at the “suggestion”
of the Nazis, created raw material rationing boards, on which delegates
of the German Military Administration served as technical advisers
(_EC-613_; _EC-616_). In the Netherlands, controls were exercised by the
local German Armament Inspectorate (_EC-471_; _EC-472-A_), who, it is
believed, made use of the rationing boards set up in Holland before the
outbreak of war.

C. _The Nazi Conspirators Acquired Ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and
French Participations in European Industries by Means of Governmental
Pressure and Through the Use of Funds Unlawfully Exacted from the
Occupied Countries and Their Nationals._

The Nazi conspirators were not content with securing for Germany the
supplies necessary for the period of the war. They aimed at obtaining
permanent ownership and domination of European industry to the fullest
extent possible, and embarked on a program to that end even during the
progress of the war.

(1) _The Nazi conspirators established a program to acquire for German
interests ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and French participations during
the war._ On 23 May 1940, recommendation was made that it would be
opportune to secure all Dutch and Belgian stocks “in order, especially
in the case of holding companies, to win influence * * * over the
controlled companies” (_EC-41_). The memorandum recommended the taking
possession of stocks of the dominated companies located in foreign
countries and influencing the decisions of members of holding companies
located in Holland and Belgium or of other owners of such stock. Because
of the provisions of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations prohibiting
confiscation of private property, it was deemed more advisable to
influence members of holding companies through careful guiding than
through plain force. (_EC-41_)

At a meeting held in the Reich Ministry of Economics on 3 June 1940 on
the subject of “Belgian and Dutch capital shares in southeastern
European countries,” it was decided that regulations should be issued
immediately by the Military Commander for Belgium prohibiting the
destruction, transfer, or disposition of any bonds or stocks of these
countries, and that registration should be required of owners and
trustees. (_1445-PS_)

In a memorandum of 2 August 1940 Goering declared that the goal of the
Germans’ economic policy was the “increase of German influence with
foreign enterprises,” that it was “necessary already now that any
opportunity is used to make it possible for the German economy to start
the penetration even during the war of the interesting objects of the
economy of the occupied countries,” and directed that the transfer of
capital from Germany to the occupied countries be facilitated to make
possible the immediate purchase of enterprises in the occupied
countries. (_EC-137_)

At a meeting at the Reich Ministry of Economics on 8 August 1940 on the
subject of “Acquisition of shares of important foreign enterprises in
southeastern Europe,” Dr. Schlotterer of the Reich Ministry of Economics
commented that “private economical penetration of the Southeast area by
German influence is desirable, likewise the supplanting of British and
French interests in that territory” (_EC-43_). The group present,
including representatives of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the
Reichsbank, agreed that “attempts should be made immediately to acquire
shares” and that “in doing so the tendency should be preserved to
present a bill for the shares at the peace conference.” It was further
agreed that “it should be attempted if possible to transfer the shares
into private hands” but that “in order to make the right selection it
appears necessary to introduce an intermediary stage” in which “first of
all, enterprises should be taken over through banks, thereupon the
plants should be managed as a matter of trusteeship for the Reich with
the aim that the Reich (Reich Marshal Goering)” undertake handing them
over to private industry. (_EC-43_)

(2) _The Nazi conspirators carried out this program by compulsory sale
where necessary and by purchases financed out of occupation charges and
under clearing agreements with the occupied countries._

                               _Belgium_

Immediate steps were taken to implement these measures in Belgium. The
annual report of the Commissar at the National Bank from May 1940-41
states:

    “According to the directions of the Reichsmarshal Goering as
    early as September 1940 the first measures for a closer
    formation of capital ties between the Belgian and German economy
    were taken. Two different procedures were concerned here:

    “1. Direct negotiations between German industrialists and
    Belgian industrialists, for the purpose of obtaining
    constructive participations in important Belgian enterprises
    which offer the basis for collaboration between the two
    economies even after the war. Furthermore, it is desired to
    transfer to German hands important Belgian participations in
    foreign enterprises whose administration is located in Belgium,
    particularly so far as enterprises are concerned which are
    located in the Balkans and in which a general German interest
    exists.

    “2. Ties which result from purchases of stock by German parties
    on the Belgian stock markets. For this purpose the Reich
    Economic Minister has given general permission to 32 German
    banks to obtain participation rights, particularly stocks, in a
    limited quantity in Belgium. Till now use has been made of this
    permission in the amount of about 25 million RM, to which can be
    added an additional 10 million RM for the procurement of Belgian
    participations in Rumania, Bulgaria, and the former Poland.”
    (_ECR-24_)

In his report for November 1940 the Military Commander for Belgium
stated:

    “A certain readiness exists on the part of the Belgians to give
    up investments in stocks in such countries which, at the present
    time, are being ruled militarily or economically by Germany.
    Among the important business deals of this kind which have been
    concluded should be mentioned the taking over by the
    _Kreditanstalt, Wien_ (Credit Institute, Vienna) of an essential
    interest in the _Allgemeiner Jugoslawischer Bankverein_ (General
    Yugoslav Bank Association) from the _Societé Generale_ (capital
    approximately 1 million RM) and the taking over by the _Deutsche
    Bank_ of the overwhelming majority [translator’s note: of
    shares] of the _Banca Commerciala Romana_ from the _Societé
    Generale_ (capital approximately 2 million RM). The _Deutsche
    Bank_ also succeeded in acquiring shares of the _Kreditanstalt,
    Wien_, of approximately 800,000 RM nominally from the _Societé
    Generale_ and from one of its subsidiaries. Negotiations between
    the _Deutsche Bank_ and the _Societé Generale_ on the transfer
    of approximately 25% of the capital of the _Banque Generale du
    Luxembourg_ are about to be concluded. Through this deal the
    _Deutsche Bank_ together with the other German groups obtains
    the absolute majority of the Luxembourger Bank (approximately
    70% of the shares). The _Deutsche Bank_ gets the right to
    acquire another 25% of the shares which for the time being,
    remained with the _Societé Generale_.” (_EC-34_)

While the Military Commander of Belgium may have given some assurance
that the owners would not be compelled to sell (_ECH-22_), in at least
one instance, purchase could be effected only by military order
(_EC-335_). In this instance the procurement for the Main Branch of
Trustees East of shares of the Belgian “Trust Metallurgique” in
electricity and road enterprises of East Silesia and the General
Government, as well as purchase of shares in the iron works Ostrovica
for the Reichswerk Hermann Goering had “to be done, at the request of
the Reich Ministry for Economics, forcibly, as an agreement on a
financial basis could not be obtained.” (_EC-335_)

The German acquisition of Belgian stock participations was financed
through the Belgium-German clearing. The Belgian clearing balances of 20
March 1940 included an item of 296 millions bfrs., which “is explained
by out-payment of large clearing transfers to purchase Belgian capital
participations in Balkan enterprises” (_ECR-14_). Increasing transfers
resulting from the German capital penetration program precipitated a
controversy with the Emission Bank, which was resolved by the
Commissar’s issuance of an order requiring the bank to make payment
(_ECR-24_). As a sequel, “capital” payments were separated from those
for “goods and services” and financed by a separate “capital” clearing
agreement covering purchases of securities and other “capital”
transactions (_ECR-24_). The Belgian clearing “credit” under the capital
clearing, as of 31 July 1943, amounted to 1,071,000,000 bfrs
(_ECR-173_). As shown below, (see _infra_, D, 2) the Belgian credit
under the capital clearing traffic represents a forced loan, exacted for
a purpose not even remotely related to the needs of the occupation army.

                          _France and Holland_

The limited evidence, in the presently available German documents
indicates that similar methods were employed in French and Dutch
participations. The procedure followed in the Netherlands is indicated
below in the discussion of the removal of restrictions on the free
transfer of Reichsmarks in that country. (See _infra_, D, 5.) In France,
participations of a value of 121,000,000 RM were purchased for German
interests, paid for in part out of occupation funds and in part through
the clearing. (_1991-PS_)

D. _The Nazi Conspirators Compelled the Occupied Countries and Their
Nationals to Furnish the Monetary Requirements for the German
Exploitation, by Means of Occupation Levies, Forced Loans, and the
Requisition of Gold and Foreign Exchange in Amounts Far in Excess of the
Needs of the Occupation Armies._

Except for the early period of the occupation, during which
_Reichskreditkassen_ certificates were issued to finance the needs of
the occupation troops (Lemkin, _Axis Rule In Occupied Europe_, p. 329),
the Nazis obtained the necessary local currency through the levy of
excessive occupation charges, the imposition of clearing arrangements
under which the local central banks were compelled to finance exports to
the Reich, and by requisition of gold and foreign exchange.

(1) _The Nazi conspirators exacted excessive occupation charges from the
conquered countries._

                               _Belgium_

The Nazi conspirators demanded from Belgium both “internal occupation
costs” and “external occupation costs” (_ECR-32_). The former was
defined as “those sums which are gotten out of the country to finance
the needs of the German military formations located in the country”
(_ECR-32_). The term “external occupation costs” was used
interchangeably with the title “antibolshevistic contribution”
(_EC-401_). Under whatever theory, the exaction of occupation charges
was made “to the limit of capacity”. (_ECR-59_)

Throughout the period of German occupation, a substantial part of the
contribution charges obtained from Belgium was used as a matter of
regular practice “not for occupation cost purposes” (_ECR-166_;
_ECR-155-A_; _ECR-35_), including:

(_a_) Exports to Germany, Holland, and France (_ECR-89_; _ECR-104_).

(_b_) Exchange for Belgian francs of RKK certificates, a “not
inconsiderable part” of which did “not have the least thing to do with
occupation costs” (_ECR-39_; _ECR-142_).

(_c_) “Political purposes (that is, SS, Propaganda, Hitler Youth)”
(_ECR-106_).

(_d_) Purchases in the “black market” (_ECR-106_), many of them destined
for export. (See _supra_, B, (2).)

(_e_) General war expenses, including the supply of troops based in
Belgium for military operations against England (_ECH-5_); the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army rejected a recommendation of the Military
Commander that a distinction be drawn between occupation troops and
those for military operations (_ECH-5_).

Notwithstanding the extensive use of occupation levies for
non-occupation purposes, the contributions exacted from Belgium

    “were not only sufficient to cover the needs of the _Wehrmacht_
    * * * but also made it possible * * * to fund a cash reserve
    which reached at certain times about 2,500,000,000 bfrs”.
    (_ECH-5_)

                                _France_

The occupation cost accounts of the _Reichskreditkasse_ in Paris
disclose on their face that a large part of the occupation funds was
obtained and used for nonoccupational purposes. Two sets of occupation
cost accounts, were maintained: Account A, into which payments were made
on behalf of various Reichs ministeries and agencies, and for specified
purposes; and Account B, into which payments were made for disposal for
the _Wehrmacht_ (_3615-PS_). The funds in Account A were used for
obviously nonoccupational purposes, as follows:

                                                       _June 1940 to end
                                                             1943_
    A           I. Reich Minister for Economic Affairs
                     (primarily for the buying agency,
                     “Roges,” also for the purchase of
                     securities and devisen)             RM 1,518,000,000
    A          II. Foreign Office (for propaganda
                     purposes in France)                       27,000,000
    A         III. Payment of support to dependents of
                     laborers recruited in France for
                     work in Germany                            1,500,000
    A          IV. Reich Minister for Transportation
                     (purchase of securities)                   2,500,000
    A           V. Paris Agency of the
                     _Reichstierstelle_ (Reich Agency
                     for Animals)—imports of meat and
                     meat products                             19,000,000
    A          VI. Exchange by the Bank of France of
                     RM notes for persons evacuated
                     from Alsace-Lorraine                         900,000
    A         VII. Financing purchases of raw sugar in
                     North France by sugar refinery in
                     South Germany                              1,285,000
    A        VIII. Compensation for war damage to
                     _Reichsdeutsche_ and
                     _Volkdeutsche_ in France                   8,500,000
    A          IX. Sale of French francs to the Reich
                     (Commodity imports into
                     Alsace-Lorraine)                          66,000,000
    A           X. Reich Minister of Education
                     (Purchases for libraries in the
                     Reich of books destroyed in air
                     raids)                                     1,000,000
                                                              (_3615-PS_)

The available records do not disclose the full extent to which the
_Wehrmacht_ used the funds at its disposal in Account B for
nonoccupational purposes. It is certain, however, that large sums were
expended for such purposes. Thus, a communication of the OKW to the
Foreign Office of 6 November 1942, explaining the decrease in reserve
for Account B, states:

    “In addition, payments to a considerable extent had to be made
    from the occupation cost funds which were not allotted to meet
    the demands of those units of the German Wehrmacht stationed in
    France. On 15 January the B account of occupation costs was
    approximately 3 bill. RM. The reason for the decrease appears
    from the following compilation:

                                                               _Million
                                                                 RM._
 _a._ For procurement of goods exported from France during
 the period of 1 Jan.-31 Oct. 1942 an estimated 10 × 90 mill.
 RM                                                            900
 _b._ To Roges Raw Material Trading Company Ltd. for
 purchases on black market                                     700
 _c._ For procurement of foreign bills by the Navy (the
 purchase of foreign bills with French francs was necessary
 to buy and repair merchant ships in Spanish harbors. These
 merchant ships are to serve for supplying Rommel’s Panzer
 army in Africa)                                               40
 _d._ Reimbursement to Foreign Office (account Syria)          4
 _e._ Allotments in favor of families of French workersw
 orking in Germany                                             1.5
 _f._ Special commissioner Rumania                             1.3
 _g._ Costs of building completions for directors of French
 powder factories                                              0.2
                                                               ———
                                                               1,647

    Therefrom it appears that the decrease of reserves of occupation
    cost funds amounting to 3,000 mill. RM on 15 January 1942 is
    primarily due to expenditures for purposes unrelated to the
    occupation.” (_1741-PS_)

                               _Holland_

Occupation charges were fixed at about 100,000,000 gulden a month
(_ECR-174_; _EC-86_). (100 RM = 75 gulden, approximately (_EC-468_)).

Expenditures were divided between “occupation” purposes and
“nonoccupation” purposes, according to whether “the products purchased
or produced on orders of the armed forces of the Netherlands remain in
the Netherlands (occupation cost) or leave the Netherlands
(nonoccupation cost)” (_ECR-174_). During the 20-month period from March
1941 to October 1942, inclusive (the only period for which figures are
available), out of the total occupation charges of 1,545,500,000 gulden,
433,800,000 gulden were expended for “nonoccupation” purposes
(_ECR-175-193_). A large part of the “pure” occupation expenditure,
moreover, was for general war expenses, including the construction of
fortifications and airfields, and the letting of shipbuilding contracts.
(_ECR-180, 181, 183, 187, 191_)

In theory, only the “occupation” costs were supposed to be charged to
the Netherlands (_ECR-174_); until April 1941, the “nonoccupation”
expenditures were returned to the Military Commander in the Netherlands
(_ECR-175_). The claim of the Netherlands to the sums “returned,”
however, was rejected. Moreover, as appears from the above cited reports
(_ECR-175-193_), nonoccupation expenditure continued even after April
1941, when reimbursements ceased. (_ECR-176_)

During the first year of the occupation Germany exacted an additional
levy from the Netherlands under the heading of “external occupation
costs,” amounting to 500,000,000 RM (_ECR-194_). Of this sum,
100,000,000 RM was paid in gold; the remainder was paid by a transfer of
the clearing balance of the Netherlands Bank at the _Verrechnungskasse_
to the German Ministry of Finance, that is, was used to reduce a credit
which arose by reason of exports to the Reich. (_ECR-194_)

In April 1942, “at the instigation of the Reich Commissioner
Seyss-Inquart,” the Netherlands began to pay a “voluntary contribution
to the war against Bolshevism” of 50,000,000 guilders per month,
retroactive to 1 July 1941, of which 10,000,000 per month was paid in
gold (_ECR-195_). By 31 March 1944, this “contribution” amounted to
2,150,000,000 RM. (_EC-86_)

It is immaterial whether this “contribution” was made at the direction
of Seyss-Inquart or was in fact the “voluntary” act of the then
President of the Netherlands Bank and Treasurer in the Ministry of
Finance, Van Tonningen. Van Tonningen was appointed by Seyss-Inquart and
acted in the German interest. His acts, like that of civilian
administrators in occupied territories generally, must be charged to the
occupant. (See _infra_, _Conclusion_.) The spirit in which he discharged
his duties is sympathetically described by the German Commissar at the
Netherlands Bank as follows:

    “The new President of the Netherlands Bank, Mr. Rost Van
    Tonningen, is, in contrast to a large part of the leadership,
    penetrated in his movements and his official acts by the greater
    German thought, and convinced of the necessity of the creation
    of a greater European economic space. This ideological attitude
    in itself gives him the correct position on financial and
    monetary policy questions for his country in relation to the
    greater German economic space. Furthermore, it makes easier
    cooperation with my office, a fact which deserves special
    mention in consideration of the frequently observed passive
    conduct of the Netherlands agencies before the entrance into
    office of the new President. I consider as a fortunate solution
    the fact that the Reichskommissar for the Occupied Dutch Areas
    has also entrusted Mr. Rost Van Tonningen with the Treasury of
    the Ministry of Finance (_Schatzamt des Finanzministeriums_).
    Mr. Rost Van Tonningen took over this office at the end of the
    month of April. Thus there is a guarantee that the financial and
    monetary policy of the country will be conducted according to
    unified points of view.” (_ECR-196_)

(2) _The Nazi conspirators financed exports from the occupied countries
to Germany by means of forced loans under the guise of clearing
agreements._

                               _Belgium_

The principle of the clearing system is as follows:

The importer makes a deposit of the purchase price in his own currency
at the national clearing agency of his country, which places the same
amount to the credit of the clearing agency of the exporting country.
The latter institution then pays the exporter in his own currency. Thus
if trade between two countries is unequal the clearing agency of one
acquires a claim against the agency of the other which, however, is
satisfied only when a shift in the balance of trade gives rise to an
offsetting claim.

In the order establishing the German-Belgium clearing, the Belgium
clearing agency was the National Bank of Belgium (_3608-PS_). The
administration of the clearing was shortly thereafter transferred to
Emission Bank, an organization originally incorporated by Belgian
interests pursuant to order of the Military Commander of 27 June 1940
(_ECR-24_). The change was one in name only, however, since at this time
the management of the two banks was substantially identical and the
Emission Bank obtained its currency by loan from the National Bank. The
Emission Bank was, by its charter terms, subject to orders of the
Commissar at the National Bank; the Commissar obtained the same powers
over the National Bank by German order of 16 December 1940. (_ECR-24_)

The Belgian total “credit” under the clearing, as of 31 July 1944,
amounted to 60,837,000,000 bfrs = 4,867,000,000 RM, of which
54,993,000,000 bfrs = 4,399,000,000 RM arose from the Belgian-German
clearing for goods and services. (_ECR-173_)

The continued increase in the Belgian “credit” was due mainly to “the
increasing Belgian export to Germany for which there are only small
imports from Germany on the other side of the account.” (_ECR-149_)

The entire Belgian credit under the clearing constitutes a forced loan,
largely for nonoccupation purposes:

(_a_) The Belgian-German clearing was established by circular of the
Reichs Minister of Economics, 4 July 1940 (_ECH-6_), which was published
to the Belgians by proclamation of the Military Commander of 10 July
1940 (_EC-604_; _3608-PS_).

(_b_) “Since it was to be foreseen that as the result of the increased
deliveries from Belgium to the Reich, which were not matched by opposite
accounts, particularly in the early period, the clearing status would
develop to the favor of the Emission Bank” (_ECR-24_), an agreement was
signed by the Emission Bank and the German Reichsbank on 16/17 August
1940 under which each undertook to pay out clearing transfers
immediately (_ECR-24_; _ECH-5_).

(_c_) This agreement did not prescribe what must be financed through the
clearing; it merely provided for immediate payment of claim arising
thereunder without waiting until the account should be balanced by
equalizing of imports and exports. As the Military Commander stated, the
German-Belgian clearing was “not regulated by an agreement, but has been
regulated unilaterally by my proclamation of 10 July 1940” (_EC-604_).
The Military Commander made clear the absolute power asserted by the
German authorities over the Belgian Note Banks (as the Germans described
the Emission and National Banks). He stated:

    “* * * The claim made to the Commissar that the Emission Bank is
    entitled to ask in every case for detailed explanation of
    compensation payments coming from Germany is incorrect. The
    clearing activities between Germany and Belgium are not
    regulated by an agreement but have been regulated unilaterally
    by my proclamation on July 10, 1940 and are not subject to any
    Belgian control. Inter-alia the transfer of all payments which
    have been specially authorized by the Reich Ministry of Economy
    has been expressly permitted * * *.” (_EC-604_)

(_d_) The Commissar freely invoked his directive power over the Note
Banks.

    1. When, in April 1941, the clearing balance of the Emission
    Bank exceeded 1,500,000 bfrs the Emission Bank refused to pay
    out several large sums arising by virtue of German-Belgian
    “capital” transactions. Thereupon, the Commissar issued an order
    directing the bank to make the payment. (_ECR-24_)

    2. In December 1941, the Emission Bank refused to pay out a sum
    of 43,256,000 RM transferred from Paris. The Commissar thereupon
    issued an order directing the bank to do so. (_ECR-172_)

    3. In October 1942, the Emission Bank refused to pay out certain
    amounts expended for purchases on the Belgian black market. The
    military administrator, however, “held down the increasing
    resistance of the Note Banks which culminated at the end of
    October of this year in a public threat of resignation by the
    Governor of the National Bank, by the heaviest pressure, and
    forced the Note Banks, while emphasizing his willingness to
    negotiate on certain Belgian proposals, again to take up the
    global clearing transfers for German procurement agencies which
    were cut off for a period” (_ECR-132_). The nature of this
    pressure is explicitly shown in the following communication from
    the Commissar to the President of the Emission Bank dated 29
    October 1942:

    “The Military Commander has ordered me to inform you of the
    following:

    “The requested extension of time for the resumption of business
    relations with the Armed Forces Clearing Institute
    (_Wehrmachtverrechnungskasse_) and for the payment of the
    arrears of RM 60 million have been denied. An official will
    determine tomorrow at 10 a. m. whether payment has been made.

    “Severest measures against you and all responsible parties must
    be expected in case of failure to pay.

    “If acts of sabotage occur on the equipment and the values of
    the National Bank or the Emission Bank, you and the gentlemen
    designated on the enclosed list will be held responsible
    personally and your property will be seized. Your liability is a
    joint one.” (_EC-605_)

                                _France_

The “credit” balance of the Bank of France under the Franco-German
clearing established on 14 November 1940 amounted to 4,400,000,000 RM as
of September 1943 (_3615-PS_). The clearing arrangement was designed, of
course, principally for the financing of exports, that is, for purposes
not related to the needs of the occupation army. (_EC-619_)

Coercion in the establishment of the Franco-German clearing is readily
demonstrable. Extreme pressure was brought to bear, particularly in
regard to the rate of exchange established in the agreement, by
threatening to cut off communications between “occupied” and
“nonoccupied” zones in France (_3602-PS_; _3603-PS_), a step which would
have destroyed the last vestige of economic order in France. The harsh
terms of the agreement, which required the Bank of France to make
immediate payment for exports to Germany regardless of the balance of
trade, fixed the rate of exchange at 20 francs to the mark (as compared
to 10 to 1 before the war), and gave Germany a unilateral option to
cancel at any time, forcibly suggest that the agreement would not
voluntarily have been accepted. (_EC-619_)

                               _Holland_

The clearing system between Holland and Germany was of short duration,
being cancelled effective 1 April 1941, when free transfer of
Reichsmarks to Holland was introduced. (See _infra_, D, (5).) It is
therefore not deemed of sufficient importance to warrant discussion at
this point.

(3) _The Nazi conspirators unlawfully took over the gold reserve of the
National Bank of Belgium and the Netherlands Bank in the interest of the
German general war effort._

                               _Belgium_

The gold of the National Bank, deposited with the Bank of France and
transferred to Dakar, was brought to Berlin pursuant to German-French
“agreement” in the amount of 545,700,000 RM (_ECR-149_), and there
deposited with the Reichsbank in Berlin (_ECR-24_). Because of the “high
demands on gold and foreign exchange” which led to a “considerable
straining of the reserves” (_EC-401_), the “Reich Government felt itself
required to lay claim to the gold of the National Bank for the Reich”
(_ECR-149_). A decision to proceed by requisitioning under paragraph 52
of the Hague Regulations (_EC-401_) was not executed, apparently because
of fears on the part of the Reichsbank that title thus acquired would
not be recognized (_ECR-115_). On order of Goering (_ECH-5, part 9,
Annex XIII_), the gold was then “requisitioned on 19 September 1942 by
the Oberpraesident of the Province of Mark Brandenburg for the Deputy of
the Four-Year Plan, on the basis of the Reich Contribution Law
(_Reichsleistungsgesetz_) of 1.IX.1939 (Sec. 15, paragraph 1, No. 5, and
Sec. 2a)” (_ECR-149_).

                               _Holland_

As shown above, part of the Dutch “voluntary” contribution to the “war
against Bolshevism” was paid in gold. The gold was, in fact, taken from
the Netherlands Bank. (_EC-401_)

(4) _The Nazi conspirators unlawfully compelled the nationals of the
occupied countries to surrender and offer for sale all precious metals
and foreign exchange to the local central banks, which delivered them to
the German Reichsbank._

                               _Belgium_

By German decree of 17 June 1940 and administrative orders issued
pursuant thereto the Belgians were required to surrender gold and
foreign exchange notes to the Emission Bank, which in turn, delivered
the loot to the Reichsbank (_ECR-24_).

By May 1943, the Reichsbank had acquired in this fashion gold and
foreign exchange of the value of 23,400,000 RM. (_ECR-149_)

                               _Holland_

Gold and foreign exchange delivered by the Netherlands Bank to the
Reichsbank “on the basis of the direction of the Reichsmarshal”
(Goering) amounted to 74,000,000 RM through November 1940. (_EC-465_)

                                _France_

It is believed that the same practice was followed in France, but
evidence as to details has not been found in the German documents
presently available.

(5) _The Nazi conspirators used German Reichsmarks as currency in the
Netherlands, for purposes unrelated to the needs of the occupational
troops, which currency they caused to be freely exchanged for gulden by
the Netherlands Bank._ The Nazi conspirators, animated in part by the
view that the Netherlands were “akin in blood to the German nation”
(_3613-PS_), sought to promote a “mutual interpenetration of the German
and Netherlands economies” through the acquisition by Germans of Dutch
participations (_EC-468_) and Dutch investment in German securities.
(_ECR-174_)

To this end, restrictions on the free transfer of Reichsmark and gulden
across the German-Dutch border were removed. Conversations between the
Reich Economics and Finance Ministers in October 1940 led to the first
step in this direction, the issuance by the Economics Minister of a
Circular (_Runderlass_)—No. 89/40—which produced substantial changes
in the foreign exchange control along the German-Dutch borders
(_EC-468_). This provided, _inter-alia_, that RM 1,000 or its equivalent
in gulden could be taken across the German-Dutch border by travelers or
in border trade without permit, and permitted Germans to transfer to
Holland up to 5,000 RM per person per month for any purpose except
purchase of goods without any permission (_EC-468_).

These relaxations were made effective in Holland by free exchange of
Reichsmarks for gulden by the Netherlands Bank, introduced “on the
initiative” of the Commissar, and by enforced acceptance of Reichsmark
currency by the Dutch business population. (_EC-468_)

The Reichsmarks thus made available in the Netherlands were mainly used
to purchase Dutch securities on the stock exchange (_EC-468_).
Permission to make such purchases was extended to a large number of
German banks by the German Ministry of Economics. The transfers were
made with “reluctance” by the Dutch, in connection with which the Reich
Commissar at the Netherlands Bank observed, “it may be pointed out with
some justification that an out-payment of gulden made against a
Reichsmark credit, which can only result through the burdening of the
Netherlands State credit, represents no genuine transfer” (_EC-468_).

Notwithstanding the objections of the then Commissar at the Netherlands
Bank (_EC-468_), circular 87/40 was soon followed by No. 29/41 of 31
March 1941, which abolished almost completely all restrictions on the
free use of the Reichsmark in Holland (_ECR-197_). Circular 29/41
provided that all foreign exchange transactions between Germany and the
Netherlands were freed of control, the only important exception being
that German investments of more than 100,000 gulden in Holland required
permission of the Reichskommissar in the Netherlands. The clearing
agreement was abolished, and payments between Germany and the
Netherlands were permitted by simple bank checks, drafts, or postal
money orders. A simultaneous order by the Reich Commissar for the
Occupied Netherlands Areas lifted all restrictions set by Netherlands
foreign exchange law on such transactions (_ECR-197_).

After this “introduction of free payments traffic” or “removal of the
foreign exchange frontiers,” payments for exports from Holland were made
in Germany “through the accounts of the banks, mainly through the
account of the Netherlands Bank, which takes on the exchange into gulden
means of payment without further formalities.” (_ECR-174_)

This exchange presumably merely continued the practice introduced
earlier at the “instigation” of Seyss-Inquart. At all events, the
President of the Bank, Van Tonningen, was a Nazi agent, and his acts may
be charged to the Nazi conspirators.

The result of this radical step was this:

    “Ever since the introduction of free payments traffic the status
    of the Netherlands Bank is mainly influenced by the taking up of
    Reichsmarks. On 31 March 1941, the day before the introduction
    of free payments traffic, the Netherlands Bank had a total stock
    of about 83 million RM of Reichsmark credits, on 30 April 1941
    of about 213 million RM, and on 31 May 1941 of about 366 million
    RM. Thus, in the two months after the removal of the foreign
    exchange frontier, it has taken up about 283 million RM, the
    gulden equivalent, at the rate of RM 132.7 equals florin 100, on
    the basis of the transfer agreement with the Reichsbank.”
    (_ECR-174_)

Thus the Netherlands Bank was caused to pledge its credit (in the form
of Dutch currency) in exchange for a Reichsmark credit. In this manner
the Nazi conspirators were enabled to exact from the bank a loan
unlimited in quantity and beyond the bank’s control, by the simple
expedient of writing out a check in Germany.

E. _Argument and Conclusion._

The acts of the Nazi conspirators as revealed by the evidence constitute
war crimes within the meaning of Article 6 (B) of the charter of the
International Military Tribunal. Two general observations should be made
at the outset. In the first place, the pertinent provisions of the Hague
Regulations (_3737-PS_) are controlling. The Germans entered into an
Armistice Agreement with only one of the countries under discussion
(France), and the Franco-German Armistice Agreement of 22 June 1940
contains nothing which purports to confer on the occupant powers broader
than those which may be exercised under the Hague Regulations. Article 3
of the Armistice reserves to Germany in the occupied zone “all the
rights of the occupying power.” No other provision is material here. The
language of Article 3 plainly does not purport to qualify in any way the
otherwise binding terms of the Hague Regulations. The German position
(_EC-113_) that “the rights of Article 3 are more extensive than the
rights of the occupation power in the Hague Regulations” and permitted
Germany to base thereon “all measures which are, according to her own
judgment, necessary for the continuation of the war against England,” is
therefore plainly untenable.

Secondly, the collaboration of certain French, Dutch, and Belgian
officials is legally immaterial and does not serve to shield the Nazi
conspirators from responsibility for the acts done in the territory
under German control. Belgium, Holland, and a large part of France were
under German occupation throughout the period in question and, after 10
November 1942, so-called Vichy France was overrun and occupied as well.
It is accepted doctrine that governmental authority is completely,
albeit temporarily, vested in the occupant during the period of its
control. Whether the occupant elects to employ the existing
administrative machinery and personnel or substitute its own, is solely
a question of political and administrative convenience; the choice is
without legal significance. The civil administration of an occupied
country, it may be confidently asserted, has no independent legal status
whatever.

(1) _The acts of the Nazi conspirators as revealed by the evidence are
prohibited by the Hague Regulations._

(_a_) _The forcible removal of machinery, foodstuffs, and raw
materials._ It has been shown above that the Nazis forcibly removed
large quantities of machinery, foodstuffs, and raw materials to Germany,
including even church bells and the strategic metals contained in the
transmission systems of the occupied countries. Articles 52 and 53 of
the Hague Regulations (the only pertinent provisions) provide no basis
for such action.

Article 52 of the Hague Regulations declares that requisitions in kind
and services shall not be demanded except for “the needs of the
occupation army,” a limitation deliberately substituted for the less
restrictive one of “military necessity” which had previously been
contained in the Brussels Declaration of 1874 (_Conference
Internationale de la Paix, La Haye_, 1899, Part I, p. 60; Part III, pp.
45, 181). It is settled that requisitions for export to the country of
the occupying power is violative of Article 52 (see Feilchenfeld, _The
International Law of Belligerent Occupation_, Washington, 1942, pars.
148-149, and cases cited).

The argument, advanced by the Germans in defense of such requisitions
during the first World War (see Garner, _International Law and World
War_, Vol. II, p. 126, n.) and frequently again during the recent
conflict (_EC-344-7_; _ECH-16_), that the limitations of Article 52 may
be disregarded in case of military necessity, is not well founded.
Article 23g, which permits the destruction of private property when
“imperatively demanded by the necessities of war,” is included among the
provisions relating to the rights of belligerents in the conduct of
military operations, and has no relation to the powers of a belligerent
in an occupied area in which conflict has ceased (see Garner, _loc. cit.
supra_). The latter are governed, so far as material here, by Articles
42-56.

Apart from Article 23g, there is no basis whatever for the German
position. The Hague Regulations are limitations on the powers which may
be exercised under the plea of military necessity (II, Oppenheim,
_International Law_, 6th Edition Revised, edited by Lauterpacht, p. 185,
n.1). An exception for cases of alleged military necessity, therefore,
cannot be implied. The deliberate substitution of the present
terminology in lieu of the vague limitations of “military necessity” as
contained in the Brussels Declaration of 1874, moreover, would seem to
remove all basis for a contrary construction.

Article 53 provides no better support for the Nazis’ action. The second
paragraph, relating to private property, states:

    “All appliances, whether on land, on sea, or in the air, adapted
    for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or
    things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms
    and, generally, all kinds of munitions of war, may be seized
    even if they belong to private individuals, but must be restored
    and compensation fixed when peace is made.”

This Article, it may be conceded, authorizes not only the sequestration
but the use of all matters within its reach. The term “munitions of
war,” however, clearly refers only to chattels (Feilchenfeld, _supra_,
par. 351). It does not, therefore, include machinery affixed to the
realty. The German legal advisors uniformly so conceded during this war
(_EC-560_; _EC-84_; _EC-263_; _EC-344-7_). The suggestion that Article
53 is subject to an implied exception in the case of military necessity
(_EC-344-7_) is, for reasons noted above, untenable. It is equally clear
that the deliberate removal of the metal content of the transmission
systems in the occupied areas is without legal basis. Article 53 in
terms requires restoration when peace is made and, whatever exceptions
may be implied in case of munitions which are necessarily consumed by
use, no basis can be found for the deliberate destruction of
transmission facilities.

The question as to the class of chattels included within the
deliberately general term “munitions of war” is not free from doubt. The
right of seizure is based on military necessity, namely, the danger of
leaving at large things which are peculiarly adapted to warlike purposes
(Spaight, _War Rights on Land_, p. 512). It should accordingly be
limited to those things which are “susceptible of direct military use”
(see British Manual of Military Law, 1929, Amendment No. 12, par. 415;
U. S. Army Basic Field Manual on Rules of Land Warfare, FM 27-10, 1940,
par. 332). Article 53, which contains no limitation restricting seizures
to the needs of the occupation army, would otherwise completely nullify
the deliberate limitations on the right of requisition imposed in
Article 52. In this view, raw materials and even semi-finished goods,
save perhaps such goods as are normally part of military equipment,
would seem outside the reach of Article 53.

(_b_) _The control and direction of production and distribution in the
German interest._ The planned control and direction of the economy of
the occupied countries in the interest of the German war effort
constitute a violation of Article 52. This seems clearly true to the
extent that production and sale for export to Germany were ordered by
the _Ruestungsobmann_ pursuant to Speer’s directive late in 1943. It
would seem equally true of the earlier method of control by prohibitions
and restrictions. For the net effect of the priority system was to leave
no alternative to producing in the German interest save to cease
operations. And even this alternative was not available, since the power
to appoint a commissar in case of recalcitrant plants was expressly
reserved.

Article 53, which is limited to chattels and has no relation to the
demanding of personal services in any event, provides not even a remote
basis for the imposition of the controls in question.

In what has been said, it is not meant to be suggested that an occupant
is without power to institute a system of rationing for articles in
short supply with the aim of securing an equitable distribution among
the population of the occupied area. Such a measure is plainly related
to the promotion of economic order and there is nothing in the Hague
Regulations which restricts even requisition for the needs of the local
population. The Nazi controls, however, were exercised, not in the
interest of the local population, but to fulfill the general war
requirements of Germany, in the Reich as well as in the occupied area.

(_c_) _Levy of occupation charges for purposes not related to the needs
of the occupation army._ Article 49 of the Hague Regulations limits the
levy of occupation charges to the “needs of the army or of the
administration of the territory in question.” The only purpose for which
such contributions may be levied (other than for the financing of the
costs of administration, a matter not material here), is to supply the
needs of the army of occupation (_Conference Internationale de la Paix,
La Haye_, 1899, Pt. I, p. 60; Feilchenfeld, _supra_, par. 167; Spaight,
_supra_, pp. 384-392). The power to levy contributions is reserved in
order to permit an equitable distribution among the entire community of
costs which, if supplies were requisitioned, would fall directly and
solely on the owners of the requisitioned property (Spaight, _supra_,
pp. 387-389). Accordingly, the levy of contributions to finance exports
or for other purposes unrelated to the needs of the army in the
territory in question would seem plainly forbidden (Feilchenfeld,
_supra_, par. 167; Spaight, _supra_, pp. 384-392).

Moreover, as Article 49 refers to the occupation army only, the levy of
contributions to support the troops engaged in military operations
against an enemy located outside the boundaries of the occupied country
or to finance other general war expenses would seem prohibited.

(_d_) _Forced loans._ Forced loans can be justified only as
contributions and are therefore subject to the same limitations
(Feilchenfeld, _supra_, par. 185). The forced loans under the
Belgian-German and Franco-German clearing arrangements, were executed
largely to finance exports to Germany, that is, for nonoccupation
purposes.

(_e_) _The exchange of reichsmarks for gulden by the Netherlands Bank._
These transactions, whether viewed as resulting in a loan or merely in
an exchange, constitute a contribution of money for nonoccupation
purposes. It may be assumed that they were carried out “voluntarily”
while the Netherlands Bank was under the immediate direction of Rost Van
Tonningen. This circumstance is immaterial, however, since Van Tonningen
was a civil official appointed by Seyss-Inquart, and his authority, like
that of civilian officials in occupied areas generally, was derived
solely from that of the occupant.

(_f_) _The taking over of gold of the National Bank of Belgium and the
Netherlands Bank._ That the gold of the National Bank of Belgium was
private property is not disputed; the Nazi conspirators proceeded on
this view in the original decision to requisition under Article 52
(_EC-401, second enclosure_). Confiscation under Article 53, first
paragraph, therefore, was not open to the Nazi conspirators; so far as
appears they never considered such a step.

It may be assumed for purposes of argument that gold is subject to
requisition under the Hague Regulations. Requisition may be made,
however, only for the needs of the occupation army. It cannot be
resorted to to relieve the “considerable straining of the reserves” of
Germany.

The gold reserve of the Netherlands Bank, it is believed, is private
property, no less than that of the National Bank of Belgium. In this
view, the taking over of the gold of the Netherlands Bank was likewise
illegal. There is, of course, no basis in law for exacting a
contribution for the so-called “war against Bolshevism,” to use the
Nazis’ phrase. And, for the reasons indicated above, it is immaterial
whether these “contributions” were “voluntarily” made by Van Tonningen.

(_g_) _The compulsory surrender of gold and foreign exchange._ The
requirement of surrender of gold and foreign exchange for ultimate
delivery to the Reichsbank amounts in substance to a requisition and
cannot be supported because obviously done solely to maintain the
reserves of foreign exchange for the total war effort, not for the needs
of the occupation army alone.

(_h_) _The acquisition of business interests._ The Nazis’ acquisition of
Belgian, Dutch, and French participations was unlawful. That this is so
in the case of the sales ordered by the Ministry of Economics is clear
(_EC-43_). The conclusion should be the same even when sale was not
expressly ordered. These purchases were financed through the clearing
system (which, as shown above, constituted a forced loan) and out of
occupation cost funds. Since such expenditures bore no relation to the
needs of the occupation army or, indeed, served any purpose other than
to enrich the Nazi conspirators and their nominees, the Nazi program for
acquisition of participations was in plain violation of Article 49 of
the Hague Regulations.

(2) _Such acts constitute “plunder of public or private property” within
the meaning of Article 6 (B) of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal._ Save as they may be authorized by International Law
(and hence “consented” to by the occupied countries), the acts
complained of are of a character condemned by the criminal code of the
occupied countries and, indeed, of all civilized nations. Absent such
authority, the forcible permanent taking of money or other property
whether from Government agencies or private persons, constitutes larceny
or, as known in the international law of belligerent occupation,
“pillage” (Garner, _supra_, pp. 472-473). The question of which court or
courts may try and punish for the offense is one of jurisdiction only
(see Garner, _supra_, pp. 475-480) and has been resolved by the
Agreement and Charter of the International Military Tribunal.

                 *        *        *        *        *

  LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO GERMANIZATION AND
                               SPOLIATION

    Document    │              Description               │ Vol. │  Page
                │                                        │      │
                │Charter of the International Military   │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (b, │      │
                │  c).                                   │  I   │       5
                │                                        │      │
                │International Military Tribunal,        │      │
                │  Indictment Number 1, Sections III;    │      │ 15, 43,
                │  VIII (E, J).                          │  I   │      51
                │                                        │      │
 3737-PS        │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the │      │
                │  Laws and Customs of War on Land,      │      │
                │  Annex, Articles 49, 52, 53, 55.       │  VI  │598, 599
                │                 —————                  │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a    │      │
                │document indicates that the document was│      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg    │      │
                │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a  │      │
                │document number indicates that the      │      │
                │document was referred to during the     │      │
                │trial but was not formally received in  │      │
                │evidence, for the reason given in       │      │
                │parentheses following the description of│      │
                │the document. The USA series number,    │      │
                │given in parentheses following the      │      │
                │description of the document, is the     │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the │      │
                │court.                                  │      │
                │                 —————                  │      │
 *061-PS        │Secret Bormann letter, 11 January 1944, │      │
                │concerning large-scale organization for │      │
                │withdrawal of commodities from occupied │      │
                │territories for use of bombed-out       │      │
                │population in Germany. (USA 692)        │ III  │     105
                │                                        │      │
 *294-PS        │Top secret memorandum signed by         │      │
                │Brautigam, 25 October 1942, concerning  │      │
                │conditions in Russia. (USA 185)         │ III  │     242
                │                                        │      │
 *661-PS        │Secret thesis from the Academy of German│      │
                │Law, January 1940, on Resettlement. (USA│      │
                │300)                                    │ III  │     472
                │                                        │      │
 *686-PS        │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich         │      │
                │Chancellor to strengthen German Folkdom,│      │
                │7 October 1939, signed by Hitler,       │      │
                │Goering, Lammers and Keitel. (USA 305)  │ III  │     496
                │                                        │      │
 *862-PS        │Memorandum by General Friderici,        │      │
                │Plenipotentiary of the Wehrmacht to the │      │
                │Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, │      │
                │initialled by Keitel, Jodl and          │      │
                │Warlimont, 15 October 1940, concerning  │      │
                │plan to Germanize Czechoslovakia. (USA  │      │
                │313)                                    │ III  │     618
                │                                        │      │
 *910-PS        │Notes on Himmler’s plan for             │      │
                │Germanization of Poland, 27 and 30 March│      │
                │1942, from the Main Office, Interior    │      │
                │Administration, initialled “Dr. S. H.”. │      │
                │(USA 310)                               │ III  │     639
                │                                        │      │
  997-PS        │Top secret report by Seyss-Inquart      │      │
                │concerning the situation in the         │      │
                │Netherlands—Exploitation and            │      │
                │Nazification in period 29 May to 19 July│      │
                │1940.                                   │ III  │     641
                │                                        │      │
*1029-PS        │Paper entitled “Instructions for a Reich│      │
                │Commissar in the Baltic States”, 8 May  │      │
                │1941, found in Rosenberg’s “Russia      │      │
                │File”. (USA 145)                        │ III  │     690
                │                                        │      │
*1058-PS        │Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941, by │      │
                │Rosenberg before people most intimately │      │
                │concerned with Eastern Problem, found in│      │
                │his “Russia File”. (USA 147)            │ III  │     716
                │                                        │      │
*1352-PS        │Reports concerning the confiscation of  │      │
                │Polish agricultural properties, 16 and  │      │
                │29 May 1940, signed Kusche. (USA 176)   │ III  │     916
                │                                        │      │
 1445-PS        │Report on conference at Ministry of     │      │
                │Economics regarding use of Belgian and  │      │
                │Dutch capital investments in            │      │
                │southeastern European enterprises, 15   │      │
                │June 1940.                              │  IV  │      20
                │                                        │      │
*1456-PS        │Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel  │      │
                │consulted about resources of USSR. (USA │      │
                │148)                                    │  IV  │      21
                │                                        │      │
 1741-PS        │Collection of documents relating to the │      │
                │French Armistice.                       │  IV  │     228
                │                                        │      │
 1765-PS        │Report of the Commissioner for the Four │      │
                │Year Plan Plenipotentiary for Special   │      │
                │Missions on Black Market Activities, 15 │      │
                │January 1943.                           │  IV  │     325
                │                                        │      │
*1918-PS        │Speech by Himmler to SS officers on day │      │
                │of Metz. (USA 304)                      │  IV  │     553
                │                                        │      │
 1991-PS        │Sixth report on activity and final      │      │
                │report of the German Armistice          │      │
                │Delegation for Economy, and of Delegate │      │
                │of Reich Government for Economic and    │      │
                │Financial Questions with French         │      │
                │Government, 1 July 1943 to 17 August    │      │
                │1944.                                   │  IV  │     605
                │                                        │      │
*1997-PS        │Decree of the Fuehrer, 17 July 1941,    │      │
                │concerning administration of Newly      │      │
                │Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA 319) │  IV  │     634
                │                                        │      │
 2149-PS        │Letter, 11 December 1942, to Foreign    │      │
                │Office, enclosing statement of German   │      │
                │Reichsbank concerning question of an    │      │
                │increase of French contributions to     │      │
                │Occupation expenses.                    │  IV  │     758
                │                                        │      │
*2233-D-PS      │Frank Diary. Regierungsitzungen. 1941.  │      │
                │October-December. Entry of 16 December  │      │
                │1941 at pp. 76-77. (USA 281)            │  IV  │     891
                │                                        │      │
*2233-G-PS      │Frank Diary. 1939. 25 October to 15     │      │
                │December. (USA 302)                     │  IV  │     903
                │                                        │      │
*2233-H-PS      │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1941. Part II.   │      │
                │Entry of 19 April 1941. (USA 311)       │  IV  │     904
                │                                        │      │
*2749-PS        │Title page of publication of Academy for│      │
                │German Law, 7th year, 1940. (USA 301)   │  V   │     390
                │                                        │      │
*2915-PS        │Extracts from German Labor, June-July   │      │
                │1942. (USA 306)                         │  V   │     580
                │                                        │      │
*2916-PS        │Commitment of Manpower                  │      │
                │Doctrines-Orders-Directives, published  │      │
                │by Office of Reich Commissioner for     │      │
                │strengthening of National Character of  │      │
                │German People, December 1940. (USA 307) │  V   │     581
                │                                        │      │
 3602-PS        │Report on conversation (interview)      │      │
                │between Mr. Hemmen and Mr. de Boisanger,│      │
                │4 October.                              │  VI  │     314
                │                                        │      │
 3603-PS        │Report on conversation between Mr.      │      │
                │Hemmen and Mr. de Boisanger, 10 October.│  VI  │     314
                │                                        │      │
 3604-PS        │Decree concerning rationing of          │      │
                │industrial goods from Official Gazette  │      │
                │of Military Commander in Belgium and    │      │
                │Northern France, 1940-41, p. 37, Sec. 1.│  VI  │     315
                │                                        │      │
 3605-PS        │Rationing decree, 27 May 1940, from     │      │
                │Official Gazette of Military Commander  │      │
                │in Belgium and Northern France, 1940-41,│      │
                │p. 37, Sec. 4.                          │  VI  │     315
                │                                        │      │
 3606-PS        │Rationing decree, 27 May 1940, from     │      │
                │Official Gazette of Military Commanders │      │
                │in Belgium and Northern France, 1940-41,│      │
                │p. 38, Sec. 10.                         │  VI  │     316
                │                                        │      │
 3607-PS        │Public Notice on Board of Directors of  │      │
                │Reichskreditkasse, from Official Gazette│      │
                │of Military Commander in Belgium and    │      │
                │Northern France, 1940-41, p. 65.        │  VI  │     316
                │                                        │      │
 3608-PS        │Public Notice of Establishment of a     │      │
                │Clearing system between Belgium and     │      │
                │German Reich, 10 July 1940, from        │      │
                │Official Gazette of Military Commander  │      │
                │in Belgium and Northern France.         │  VI  │     317
                │                                        │      │
 3609-PS        │Decree for execution of rationing decree│      │
                │in Belgium, 5 November 1940, from       │      │
                │Official Gazette of Military Commander  │      │
                │in Belgium and Northern France.         │  VI  │     318
                │                                        │      │
 3610-PS        │Decree regarding Plant Commissars, 29   │      │
                │April 1941, from Official Gazette of    │      │
                │Military Commander in Belgium and       │      │
                │Northern France, 1940-41, p. 599.       │  VI  │     319
                │                                        │      │
 3611-PS        │Decree on economic measures against     │      │
                │Jews, 31 May 1941, from Official Gazette│      │
                │of Military Commander in Belgium and    │      │
                │Northern France, 1940-41, p. 620, Sec.  │      │
                │17.                                     │  VI  │     320
                │                                        │      │
 3612-PS        │Decree regarding prohibition of         │      │
                │manufacturing of certain products, 6    │      │
                │August 1942, from Official Gazette of   │      │
                │Military Commander in Belgium and       │      │
                │Northern France, 1942, p. 986, Sec. 1.  │  VI  │     321
                │                                        │      │
 3613-PS        │Proclamation to Netherlands population, │      │
                │25 May 1940, from Official Gazette for  │      │
                │Occupied Dutch Territory, No. 1, 5 June │      │
                │1940.                                   │  VI  │     321
                │                                        │      │
 3615-PS        │Report by Ostrow on examination of      │      │
                │records of Reichskreditkasse, 29        │      │
                │September 1945.                         │  VI  │     322
                │                                        │      │
 3616-PS        │Decree on prohibition to establish and  │      │
                │enlarge enterprises and on shutting down│      │
                │enterprises, 30 March 1942, from        │      │
                │Official Gazette of Military Commander  │      │
                │in Belgium and Northern France, 1942, p.│      │
                │865.                                    │  VI  │     388
                │                                        │      │
*EC-3           │Letter of Liaison Staff at Supreme      │      │
                │Headquarters, Armament Procurement      │      │
                │Office directed to General Thomas, Chief│      │
                │of Wi Rue Amt, Berlin, 25 November 1941.│      │
                │(USA 318)                               │ VII  │     242
                │                                        │      │
 EC-21          │Memorandum of Posse, 8 January 1940.    │ VII  │     249
                │                                        │      │
 EC-34          │Report No. 1 on activities of Military  │      │
                │Administration for month of November    │      │
                │1940.                                   │ VII  │     254
                │                                        │      │
 EC-41          │Notice concerning seizure of security   │      │
                │properties of Dutch and Belgian         │      │
                │holdings, 23 May 1940.                  │ VII  │     255
                │                                        │      │
 EC-43          │Report on conferences at Ministry of    │      │
                │Economics, 20 August 1940, regarding    │      │
                │acquisition of shares in important      │      │
                │foreign enterprises in Southeast Europe.│ VII  │     258
                │                                        │      │
 EC-69          │Memorandum of General Holder, 13        │      │
                │December 1939, regarding treatment of   │      │
                │economical questions at the OKH.        │ VII  │     262
                │                                        │      │
 EC-84          │Report of Lt. Colonel Helder on         │      │
                │reconversion of the economy, 7 December │      │
                │1940.                                   │ VII  │     263
                │                                        │      │
 EC-86          │Report on financial contributions of the│      │
                │Occupied Areas.                         │ VII  │     264
                │                                        │      │
 EC-87          │Report on contribution of Netherlands   │      │
                │for German War economy.                 │ VII  │     278
                │                                        │      │
 EC-101         │Affidavit by Schmid-Lossberg, 21        │      │
                │September 1945, concerning Holland,     │      │
                │Belgium and France.                     │ VII  │     280
                │                                        │      │
 EC-113         │Covering letter, 8 July 1940, to letter │      │
                │from Supreme Command of Armed Forces,   │      │
                │concerning decision of Fuehrer in       │      │
                │Armistice questions, and memorandum of  │      │
                │Goering, 5 July 1940.                   │ VII  │     291
                │                                        │      │
*EC-126         │Economic Policy Directive for Economic  │      │
                │Organization, East, Agricultural Group, │      │
                │23 May 1941. (USA 316)                  │ VII  │     295
                │                                        │      │
 EC-137         │Memorandum of Goering, 2 August 1940,   │      │
                │regarding extension of German interests │      │
                │in foreign enterprise, and covering     │      │
                │letter.                                 │ VII  │     309
                │                                        │      │
 EC-155         │Collection of planned decrees on        │      │
                │economic matters, from Military         │      │
                │Administration-Economy, pp. 50-74.      │ VII  │     312
                │                                        │      │
 EC-256         │Letter from Dr. Lammers to Goering and  │      │
                │Funk, 12 October 1937.                  │ VII  │     346
                │                                        │      │
 EC-261         │Letter from Funk to all Ministries, 14  │      │
                │March 1938, regarding appointment of    │      │
                │Sarnow, deputy of Plenipotentiary for   │      │
                │War Economy.                            │ VII  │     371
                │                                        │      │
 EC-263         │Note on draft of decree on confiscation │      │
                │of private Polish property.             │ VII  │     373
                │                                        │      │
 EC-267         │Development and Position of French      │      │
                │Industry in area of Military Commander, │      │
                │France, in 1941, from Report on Economy │      │
                │by Military Commander, France.          │ VII  │     376
                │                                        │      │
*EC-305         │Minutes of meeting on 12 February 1940, │      │
                │under Chairmanship of Goering concerning│      │
                │labor supply in the East. (USA 303)     │ VII  │     402
                │                                        │      │
 EC-323         │Telegram signed Schleier, dated Paris 26│      │
                │April 1941.                             │ VII  │     406
                │                                        │      │
 EC-335         │Report of the Military Administration in│      │
                │Belgium and Northern France,            │      │
                │January-March 1943.                     │ VII  │     407
                │                                        │      │
 EC-336         │Report of the Reich Minister for        │      │
                │Occupied Eastern Territories, 26        │      │
                │November 1942, concerning treatment of  │      │
                │Poles under his jurisdiction.           │ VII  │     408
                │                                        │      │
 EC-344-7       │Report on Armament Economy in           │      │
                │Poland, 1939-1940.                      │ VII  │     416
                │                                        │      │
*EC-344 16 and  │Thomas report, 20 August 1940,          │      │
17              │summarizing experience with German      │      │
                │Armament Industry in Poland 1939-40 and │      │
                │extract from report by Captain Dr.      │      │
                │Varain on same subject. (USA 297)       │ VII  │     419
                │                                        │      │
*EC-347         │Directives for operation of the Economy │      │
                │in Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA   │      │
                │320)                                    │ VII  │     421
                │                                        │      │
 EC-401         │Letter from Office Four Year Plan, 8    │      │
                │July 1942, on seizure of Belgian gold.  │ VII  │     439
                │                                        │      │
*EC-410         │Appendix to Goering’s directive of 19   │      │
                │October 1939 concerning the economic    │      │
                │administration of Occupied Territories. │      │
                │(USA 298)                               │ VII  │     466
                │                                        │      │
*EC-411         │Order by Hess concerning the            │      │
                │reconstruction of certain industrial    │      │
                │enterprises in Poland, 20 November 1939.│      │
                │(USA 299)                               │ VII  │     469
                │                                        │      │
 EC-422         │Extracts from History of the War        │      │
                │Economy—and Armament Staff in France.   │ VII  │     481
                │                                        │      │
 EC-427         │Letter from Lammers to Reichsbank       │      │
                │Directorate, 20 January 1939, on        │      │
                │appointment of Funk as President of     │      │
                │Reichsbank.                             │ VII  │     484
                │                                        │      │
*EC-453         │Letter to Himmler, 21 September 1943,   │      │
                │and list of contributions by his        │      │
                │friends. (USA 322)                      │ VII  │     510
                │                                        │      │
*EC-454         │Letter to Himmler, 27 August 1943,      │      │
                │regarding contributions by his friends. │      │
                │(USA 321)                               │ VII  │     512
                │                                        │      │
 EC-465         │Letter from Commissar with the          │      │
                │Netherlands Bank, 9 December 1940, with │      │
                │November report to Fuehrer.             │ VII  │     518
                │                                        │      │
 EC-468         │Letter from Commissar at the Netherlands│      │
                │Bank, 10 February 1941, with report for │      │
                │January 1941 to Fuehrer.                │ VII  │     524
                │                                        │      │
 EC-469         │Memorandum on meeting in Duesseldorf, 25│      │
                │May 1940.                               │ VII  │     536
                │                                        │      │
 EC-470         │Special Events in the field of          │      │
                │procurement of means of production, raw │      │
                │material, semi-finished products.       │ VII  │     538
                │                                        │      │
 EC-471         │Armament Inspectorate Netherlands—War   │      │
                │Diary for time from 1 January-31 March  │      │
                │1943.                                   │ VII  │     538
                │                                        │      │
*EC-472         │Directives of Reich Marshal Goering     │      │
                │concerning economic organization of     │      │
                │Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA 315) │ VII  │     539
                │                                        │      │
 EC-472-A       │War Diary of Armament Inspectorate from │      │
                │10 April 1940-30 September 1942.        │ VII  │     540
                │                                        │      │
 EC-473         │Extract from History of Armament        │      │
                │Inspectorate—Netherlands.               │ VII  │     542
                │                                        │      │
 EC-474         │Letter, 1 June 1940, enclosing report of│      │
                │Armament Inspectorate Netherlands.      │ VII  │     542
                │                                        │      │
 EC-485         │Minutes on Goering Meeting, 1 October   │      │
                │1940, on the economic exploitation of   │      │
                │Occupied Territories.                   │ VII  │     543
                │                                        │      │
 EC-560         │Extract from War Diary of Armament      │      │
                │Inspectorate—Belgium 21 January 1941,   │      │
                │regarding right to remove machinery.    │ VII  │     584
                │                                        │      │
 EC-604         │Letter from Military Commander in       │      │
                │Belgium and Northern France, 1 May 1942.│ VII  │     584
                │                                        │      │
 EC-605         │Letter of the Commissar with the        │      │
                │Emission Bank in Brussels, 29 October   │      │
                │1942, with enclosure.                   │ VII  │     585
                │                                        │      │
 EC-606         │Minutes concerning conference with Field│      │
                │Marshal Goering at Karinhall, 30 January│      │
                │1940.                                   │ VII  │     588
                │                                        │      │
 EC-613         │Memorandum on contributions of French   │      │
                │economy in favor of France performed at │      │
                │instigation of Military Commander in    │      │
                │France.                                 │ VII  │     602
                │                                        │      │
 EC-614         │Memorandum of the Military Commander in │      │
                │France.                                 │ VII  │     602
                │                                        │      │
 EC-615         │Notes by General Thomas on Meeting with │      │
                │Colonel General Keitel, 1 December 1939.│ VII  │     603
                │                                        │      │
 EC-616         │Interference of War Economy and Armament│      │
                │Staff with raw material rationing boards│      │
                │from Situation Report of War Economy and│      │
                │Armament Staff of France.               │ VII  │     603
                │                                        │      │
 EC-617         │Extracts from Situation Report of War   │      │
                │Economy and Armament Staff of France.   │ VII  │     604
                │                                        │      │
 EC-618         │Service instructions for Economic       │      │
                │Squads.                                 │ VII  │     604
                │                                        │      │
 EC-619         │Clearing agreement of 14 November 1940, │      │
                │for French-German payments.             │ VII  │     608
                │                                        │      │
 EC-620         │Directive of Goering on exploitation of │      │
                │the Occupied Western Territories, 26    │      │
                │August 1940.                            │ VII  │     608
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-1          │Final report of Military Commander      │      │
                │Belgium, Part 10, Section I, concerning │      │
                │German-Belgian trade.                   │ VII  │     609
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-2          │Report on Economic Planning of Military │      │
                │Commander Belgium and Northern France,  │      │
                │13 September 1940.                      │ VII  │     610
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-3          │Final Report of Chief of Military       │      │
                │Administration in Belgium and Northern  │      │
                │France.                                 │ VII  │     611
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-4          │Annual report of Military Commander of  │      │
                │Belgium and Northern France, 15 July    │      │
                │1941.                                   │ VII  │     613
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-5          │Final Report of Military Commander in   │      │
                │Belgium and Northern France.            │ VII  │     615
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-6          │Final report of Military Commander in   │      │
                │Belgium and Northern France.            │ VII  │     620
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-7          │Final Report of Supervisory Office with │      │
                │Military Commander in Belgium and       │      │
                │Northern France on legalized            │      │
                │exploitation of black market in Belgium │      │
                │and Northern France.                    │ VII  │     622
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-9          │Circular of Military Commander, 19 June │      │
                │1943, concerning prohibition of black   │      │
                │market purchase.                        │ VII  │     629
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-10         │Final Report of Military Commander on   │      │
                │machinery clearing.                     │ VII  │     629
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-11         │Final Report of Military Commander on   │      │
                │Church Bell drive in Belgium.           │ VII  │     631
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-12         │Report of Activity Department for       │      │
                │“Protection of Art” of Military         │      │
                │Commander Belgium and Northern France.  │ VII  │     632
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-14         │Letter from Speer, 23 June 1943, with   │      │
                │covering letter.                        │ VII  │     632
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-15         │Draft of letter to Falkenhausen, 22 May │      │
                │1944.                                   │ VII  │     634
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-16         │Memorandum from Military Administration │      │
                │Department for Culture, 17 May 1944,    │      │
                │concerning requisition of scientific    │      │
                │instruments.                            │ VII  │     635
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-19         │Final Report of Military Commander      │      │
                │showing total picture of consolidation  │      │
                │of Belgian Textile Industry.            │ VII  │     636
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-21         │Letter from Military Commander in       │      │
                │Belgium and Northern France to General  │      │
                │Falkenhausen, 12 October 1940, and      │      │
                │annexes.                                │ VII  │     637
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-22         │Final Report of Military Commander,     │      │
                │concerning foreign exchange and gold.   │ VII  │     639
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-23         │Report of Military Commander on supplies│      │
                │in the German interest in Belgium and   │      │
                │Northern France in 1941.                │ VII  │     641
                │                                        │      │
 ECH-24         │Introduction to Final Report of Military│      │
                │Commander by Dr. Beyer.                 │ VII  │     642
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-14         │Memorandum from Commissar at the Belgian│      │
                │National Bank on Clearing Transfers, 24 │      │
                │March 1941.                             │ VII  │     642
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-24         │Annual report of the Commissar at the   │      │
                │National Bank of Belgium, covering      │      │
                │period May 1940-May 1941.               │ VII  │     642
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-32         │Memorandum from Reich Marshal of the    │      │
                │Greater German Reich Commissioner for   │      │
                │the Four Year Plan, 11 June 1941, on    │      │
                │occupation costs in Belgium and covering│      │
                │letters.                                │ VII  │     667
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-35         │Memorandum from Special Commissioner    │      │
                │West of the Reichskreditkassen, 2 August│      │
                │1941.                                   │ VII  │     670
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-39         │Memorandum from Military Commander in   │      │
                │Belgium and Northern France, 2 August   │      │
                │1941, concerning procurement of         │      │
                │Occupation Costs in Belgium, and        │      │
                │covering letter.                        │ VII  │     671
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-59         │Memorandum from Military Commander in   │      │
                │Belgium and Northern France, 2 October  │      │
                │1941, on contributions from Belgium to  │      │
                │the limit of its capacity, and covering │      │
                │letter.                                 │ VII  │     676
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-72         │Memorandum from Special Commissioner    │      │
                │West of RKK, 22 December 1941, ordering │      │
                │Emission Bank to pay out clearing       │      │
                │transfer.                               │ VII  │     681
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-89         │Letter from Military Commander in       │      │
                │Belgium and Northern France, 2 March    │      │
                │1942, concerning payment for German     │      │
                │Military Expenditures in Belgium through│      │
                │clearing; and letter of transmittal.    │ VII  │     682
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-104        │Letter from Military Commander in       │      │
                │Belgium and Northern France, 24 April   │      │
                │1942, concerning payment of expenses of │      │
                │German Armed Forces in Belgium in       │      │
                │clearing.                               │ VII  │     685
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-106        │Memorandum from Commissar at the        │      │
                │National Bank of Belgium, 1 May 1942, on│      │
                │use of occupation funds for black market│      │
                │purchases and political purposes.       │ VII  │     686
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-115        │Teletype, 27 July 1942, on position of  │      │
                │Reichsbank regarding requisition of     │      │
                │Belgian gold.                           │ VII  │     689
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-132        │Report of the Commissar at the National │      │
                │Bank of Belgium, 1 December 1942,       │      │
                │covering period August-October 1942.    │ VII  │     690
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-142        │Letter from Military Commander in       │      │
                │Belgium and Northern France, 22 February│      │
                │1943, on exchange of RKK notes in       │      │
                │Belgium.                                │ VII  │     695
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-149        │Third Annual Report of the Commissar at │      │
                │the National Bank of Belgium, 5 June    │      │
                │1943.                                   │ VII  │     700
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-155-A      │Memorandum from Special Commissioner    │      │
                │West of Reichskreditkassen, 7 December  │      │
                │1943, on occupation costs.              │ VII  │     716
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-166        │Memorandum from Special Commissioner    │      │
                │West of Reichskreditkassen, 10 May 1944,│      │
                │concerning cash situation of Chief      │      │
                │Paymaster at Military Commander in      │      │
                │Belgium and Northern France.            │ VII  │     718
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-172        │Letter from Reichskommissar for Occupied│      │
                │Territories of Belgium and Northern     │      │
                │France, 21 July 1944, concerning        │      │
                │equalization of monthly balance in giro │      │
                │traffic of Reichskreditkassen.          │ VII  │     720
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-173        │Report of Commissar at the National Bank│      │
                │of Belgium, 15 August 1944, on total    │      │
                │occupation charges and Belgium clearing │      │
                │balance.                                │ VII  │     721
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-174        │Report of the Commissar of the          │      │
                │Netherlands Bank for the month May 1941,│      │
                │dated 12 June 1941.                     │ VII  │     726
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-175        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Brussels, 18 May  │      │
                │1941, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     732
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-176        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Brussels, 27 May  │      │
                │1941, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     733
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-177        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 June   │      │
                │1941, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     735
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-178        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 25 July   │      │
                │1941, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     735
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-179        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 28 August │      │
                │1941, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     735
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-180        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30        │      │
                │September 1941, concerning occupation   │      │
                │costs.                                  │ VII  │     736
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-181        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 28 October│      │
                │1941, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     737
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-182        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 29        │      │
                │November 1941, concerning occupation    │      │
                │costs.                                  │ VII  │     737
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-183        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 6 January │      │
                │1942, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     738
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-184        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 January│      │
                │1942, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     739
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-185        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 27        │      │
                │February 1942, concerning occupation    │      │
                │costs.                                  │ VII  │     740
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-186        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 28 March  │      │
                │1942, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     740
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-187        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 April  │      │
                │1942, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     741
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-188        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 13 July   │      │
                │1942, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     742
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-189        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 13 August │      │
                │1942, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     743
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-190        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 31 August │      │
                │1942, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     743
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-191        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30        │      │
                │September 1942, concerning occupation   │      │
                │costs.                                  │ VII  │     744
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-192        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 6 November│      │
                │1942, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     744
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-193        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 7 December│      │
                │1942, concerning occupation costs.      │ VII  │     745
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-194        │Letter of Commissar at the Netherlands  │      │
                │Bank Amsterdam, enclosing report on     │      │
                │contributions of Holland for Germany    │      │
                │during the first year of occupation, 28 │      │
                │May 1941.                               │ VII  │     745
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-195        │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central    │      │
                │Administration of RKK Berlin, 21 April  │      │
                │1942, concerning Dutch East Help.       │ VII  │     747
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-196        │Report of the Commissar of the          │      │
                │Netherlands Bank, 9 May 1941.           │ VII  │     748
                │                                        │      │
 ECR-197        │Circular of the Reichsminister of       │      │
                │Economics in foreign exchange matters,  │      │
                │31 March 1941.                          │ VII  │     749
                │                                        │      │
*L-70           │Speech by Himmler at Bad Schachen, 14   │      │
                │October 1943, on the Question of        │      │
                │Security. (USA 308)                     │ VII  │     818
                │                                        │      │
*L-221          │Bormann report on conference of 16 July │      │
                │1941, concerning treatment of Eastern   │      │
                │populations and territories. (USA 317)  │ VII  │    1086
                │                                        │      │
*R-92           │Instruction for internal use on         │      │
                │application of law concerning property  │      │
                │of Poles of 17 September 1940; copy of  │      │
                │monthly report 31 May 1942 with         │      │
                │statistics on farms and estates seized  │      │
                │and confiscated in the Incorporated     │      │
                │Eastern Territories; copy of letter from│      │
                │SS officer to Himmler, 20 November 1940.│      │
                │(USA 312)                               │ VIII │      61
                │                                        │      │
*R-112          │Orders issued by Reich Commissioner for │      │
                │the Consolidation of German nationhood, │      │
                │16 February 1942, 1 July 1942, 28 July  │      │
                │1942. (USA 309)                         │ VIII │     108
                │                                        │      │
*R-114          │Memoranda of conferences, 4 and 18      │      │
                │August 1942, concerning directions for  │      │
                │treatment of deported Alsatians. (USA   │      │
                │314)                                    │ VIII │     122




                              Chapter XIV
                      THE PLUNDER OF ART TREASURES


                      1. THE EINSATZSTAB ROSENBERG

A. _Formation, Purpose, Powers._

On 29 January 1940 Hitler issued a decree in the following terms:

    “The ‘Hohe Schule’ is supposed to become the center for national
    socialistic ideological and educational research. It will be
    established after the conclusion of the war. I order that the
    already initiated preparations be continued by Reichsleiter
    Alfred Rosenberg, especially in the way of research and the
    setting up of the library.

    “All sections of Party and State are requested to cooperate with
    him in this task.” (_136-PS_)

What began as a project for the establishment of a research library
developed into a project for the seizure of cultural treasures.
(_141-PS_)

On 1 March 1942 Hitler issued a decree in which he asserted that Jews,
Freemasons, and affiliated opponents of National Socialism are the
authors of the War against the Reich, and that a systematic spiritual
battle against them is a military necessity. The decree thereupon
authorized Rosenberg to search libraries, archives, lodges, and cultural
establishments, to seize relevant material from these establishments as
well as cultural treasures which were the property or in the possession
of Jews, which were ownerless, or the origin of which could not be
clearly established. The decree directed the cooperation of the
_Wehrmacht_ High Command and indicated that Rosenberg’s activities in
the West were to be conducted in his capacity as Reichsleiter and in the
East in his capacity as Reichsminister. (_149-PS_)

This decree was implemented by a letter from Dr. Lammers, Reichsminister
and Chief of Chancellory, directed to the “Highest Reich Authorities and
the Services directly subordinate to the Fuehrer.” The letter reiterated
the terms of the Hitler decree and requested support of the Reich
authorities in Rosenberg’s fulfillment of his task. (_154-PS_)

B. _Scope of Activities._

Rosenberg’s activities in fulfillment of the above decrees were
extended, in the West, to France (_138-PS_), Belgium (_139-PS_), the
Netherlands (_140-PS_), Luxembourg (_137-PS_), and Norway and Denmark.
(_159-PS_)

In the East activities were carried out throughout the Occupied Eastern
Territories (_153-PS_), including the Baltic states and the Ukraine
(_151-PS_), as well as in Hungary (_158-PS_), Greece (_171-PS_), and
Yugoslavia. (_071-PS_)

The function of the Rosenberg Organization included not only the seizure
of books and scientific materials specified in the original Hitler Order
(_171-PS_), but the seizure of private art treasures (_1015-B-PS_),
public art treasures (_055-PS_), and household furnishings. (_L-188_)

C. _Cooperating Agencies._

On 5 July 1940 Keitel (Chief of the OKW) informed the Chief of the Army
High Command (OKH) and the Chief of the Armed Forces in The Netherlands
that the Fuehrer had ordered that Rosenberg’s suggestion be followed, to
the effect that certain libraries and archives, chancelleries of high
church authorities, and lodges be searched for documents valuable to
Germany or indicating political maneuvers directed against Germany, and
that such material be seized. The letter further stated that Hitler had
ordered the support of the Gestapo and that the Chief of the Sipo
(Security Police), SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich, had been informed and
would communicate with the competent military commanders. (_137-PS_)

Keitel issued a further order to the Chief of the OKH, France, on 17
September 1940, providing:

    “The ownership status before the war in France, prior to the
    declaration of war on 1 September 1939, shall be the criterion.

    “Ownership transfers to the French state or similar transfers
    completed after this date are irrelevant and legally invalid
    (for example, Polish and Slovak libraries in Paris, possessions
    of the Palais Rothschild or other ownerless Jewish possessions).
    Reservations regarding search, seizure and transportation to
    Germany on the basis of the above reasons will not be
    recognized.

    “Reichsleiter Rosenberg and/or his deputy
    Reichshauptstellenleiter Ebert has received clear instructions
    from the Fuehrer personally governing the right of seizure; he
    is entitled to transport to Germany cultural goods which appear
    valuable to him and to safeguard them there. The Fuehrer has
    reserved for himself the decision as to their use.

    “It is requested that the services in question be informed
    correspondingly.” (_138-PS_)

The above order was extended to Belgium on 10 October 1940 (_139-PS_),
and an identical order was issued by the Chief of the OKH to the Armed
Forces Commander in The Netherlands on 17 September 1940. (_140-PS_)

Hitler’s order of 1 March 1942 stated:

    “Directions for carrying out this order in cooperation with the
    Wehrmacht will be issued by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High
    Command in agreement with Reichsleiter Rosenberg.” (_149-PS_)

Dr. Lammers’ order of 5 July 1942 declared that the Chief of the OKH, in
agreement with Keitel, would issue regulations governing the cooperation
with the Wehrmacht and the Police Services for assistance in making
seizures. (_154-PS_)

An official of the Rosenberg Ministry for the Occupied East declared the
Wehrmacht to be one of the primary agencies engaged in removing art
treasures from Russia. (_1107-PS_)

Cooperation of the SS and the SD was indicated by Rosenberg in a letter
to Bormann on 23 April 1941:

    “* * * It is understood that the confiscations are not executed
    by the regional authorities but that this is conducted by the
    Security Service as well as by the police. * * * it has been
    communicated to me in writing by a Gauleiter, that the chief
    office of the Reich Security (RSHA) of the SS has claimed the
    following from the library of a monastery: * * *.” (_071-PS_)

The above letter also points out that there has been

    “* * * close cooperation on the widest scale with the Security
    Service and the military commanders. * * *

    “This affair (Operations in Salonika) has already been executed
    on our side with the Security Service (SD) in the most loyal
    fashion.” (_071-PS_)

The National Socialist Party financed the operations of the _Einsatzstab
Rosenberg_. (_090-PS_; _145-PS_)

In a letter to Goering, 18 June 1942, Rosenberg voiced the opinion that
all art objects and other confiscated items should belong to the
National Socialist Party because the Party has been bearing the brunt of
the battle against the persons and forces from whom this property was
taken. (_1118-PS_)

D. _Cooperation of Hermann Goering._

On 5 November 1940, Goering issued an order specifying the distribution
to be made of art objects brought to the Louvre. The order lists as
second in priority of disposition, “Those art objects which serve to the
completion of the Reichsmarshal’s collection” and states that the
objects will “be packed and shipped to Germany with the assistance of
the Luftwaffe.” (_141-PS_)

On 1 May 1941 Goering issued an order to all Party, State, and Wehrmacht
Services requesting them:

    “* * * to give all possible support and assistance to the Chief
    of Staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s Staff,
    Reichshauptstellenleiter Party Comrade Utikal, and his deputy
    DRK-Feldfuehrer Party Comrade von Behr, in the discharge of
    their duties. The above-mentioned persons are requested to
    report to me on their work, particularly on any difficulties
    that might arise.” (_1117-PS_)

On 30 May 1942, Goering claimed credit for the success of the
_Einsatzstab_:

    “* * * On the other hand I also support personally the work of
    your _Einsatzstab_ wherever I can do so, and a great part of the
    seized cultural goods can be accounted for because I was able to
    assist the _Einsatzstab_ by my organizations.” (_1015-I-PS_)

E. _Method of Operation._

The staff of the _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_ seized not only “abandoned” art
treasures but also treasures which had been hidden, or were left in the
custody of depots or warehouses, including art treasures that were
already packed for shipment to America. (_1015-B-PS_)

Robert Scholz, Chief of the Special Staff for Pictorial Art, described
the thoroughness with which the _Einsatzstab_ conducted investigations
and seizures:

    “* * * These seizures were carried out on the basis of
    preliminary exhaustive investigations into the address lists of
    the French Police authorities, on the basis of Jewish handbooks,
    warehouse inventories and order books of French shipping firms
    as well as on the basis of French art and collection catalogs.

    “* * * The seizure of ownerless Jewish works of art has
    gradually extended over the whole French territory.”
    (_1015-B-PS_)

In the East, members of Rosenberg’s staff operated directly behind the
front in close cooperation with the infantry. (_035-PS_)

Von Behr, in a progress report dated 8 August 1944, described the method
of seizing household furnishings:

    “The confiscation of Jewish homes was effected in most cases in
    such a way that the so-called confiscation officials went from
    house to house when no records were available of the addresses
    of Jews who had departed or fled, as was the case for example,
    in Paris * * * They drew up inventories of these homes and
    subsequently sealed them . . . . . . . . .

    “The goods are dispatched first, to large collecting camps from
    where they are turned over, sorted out and loaded for Germany.

    “* * * work shops were established for cabinet-makers,
    watchmakers, shoemakers, electricians, radio experts, furriers,
    etc. All incoming goods were diligently sorted out and those not
    ready for use were repaired. Moreover special boxes were
    dispatched for the use of special trades * * *

    “For the sorting out of the confiscated furniture and goods on
    the invisible assembly line and for the packing and loading,
    exclusive use was made of interned Jews. Because of its
    experience as to confiscation, as to working systems within the
    camps, and as to transportation, the Office West was able to
    reorganize their entire working system and thus to succeed in
    providing for the use in Germany of even things which appeared
    to be valueless such as scrap paper, rags, salvage, etc. * * *”
    (_L-188_).

F. _Nature, Extent, and Value of Property Seized._

(1) _Books, manuscripts, documents, and incunabula._ A report on the
library of the “_Hohe Schule_,” prepared by Dr. Wunder, lists the most
significant book collections belonging to the library and confiscated by
the _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_ in accordance with the orders of the
Fuehrer, as follows (_171-PS_):

                                                             (approx.)
 Alliance Israelite Universelle                             40,000  Vols.
 Ecole Rabbinique                                           10,000  Vols.
 Federation de Societé des Juifs de France                   4,000  Vols.
 Lipschuetz Bookstore, Paris                                20,000  Vols.
 Rothschild Family, Paris                                   28,000  Vols.
 Rosenthaliana, Amsterdam                                   20,000  Vols.
 Sefardischen Jewish Community, Amsterdam                   25,000  Vols.
 Occupied Eastern Territories                              280,000  Vols.
 Jewish Community, Greece                                   10,000  Vols.
 “Special Action”, Rhineland                                 5,000  Vols.
 Other sources                                             100,000  Vols.
                                                               ———
                                                           552,000

An undated report on the activities of the _Einsatzstab_ Working Group,
Netherlands, lists Masonic Lodges and other organizations whose
libraries and archives have been seized. The report states that 470
cases of books had already been packed and reports materials seized from
92 separate lodges of the “_Droit Humain_”, the “_Groot Oosten_”, the
“IOOF” and the “Rotary Club”. An additional 776 cases containing
approximately 160,000 volumes were seized from the International
Institute for Social History at Amsterdam. An additional 170 cases were
seized from the “Theosophischen Society” and other organizations.
(_176-PS_)

The report further states that the value of the above works is between
30 million and 40 million Reichsmarks. Additional materials to be
derived from other sources, including 100,000 volumes from the
“Rosenthaliana” collection, are estimated to have a value of three times
that of the above, or an additional 90 million to 120 million
Reichsmarks. The estimated over-all value is thus between 120 and 160
million Reichsmarks. (_176-PS_)

(2) _Household furnishings._ The entire furniture seizure action, known
as “Action M”, is summarized in a report of Von Behr, Chief of the
Office West, dated 8 August 1944. The report furnishes the following
statistics on results up to 1 July 1944:

      Jewish homes confiscated                                71,619
      Loading capacity required                 cu. ms.    1,079,373
      Railroad cars required                                  26,984
      Foreign currency and securities
        confiscated                                  RM   11,695,516
      Scrap metal, scrap paper, and textiles
        dispatched                                kgms.    3,191,352
                                                           (_L-188_)

The report goes on to list in detail the number of boxes of
miscellaneous items seized, including china (199 boxes), curtains (72
boxes), coat hangers (120 boxes), toys (99 boxes), bottles (730 boxes),
etc. The report concludes with an itemized statement of the number of
wagons dispatched to various cities throughout Germany, to German camps,
to SS Divisions, the German State Railways, the Postal Service, and the
Police. (_L-188_)

(3) _Works of Art (East)._ With reference to the work of the
_Einsatzstab_ in the Eastern Territories, Robert Scholz reported as
follows:

    “In the course of the evacuation of the territory several
    hundred most valuable Russian ikons, several hundred Russian
    paintings of the 18th and 19th centuries, individual articles of
    furniture and furniture from castles were saved in cooperation
    with the individual Army Groups, and brought to a shelter in the
    Reich.” (_1015-B-PS_)

In August 1943, just prior to the loss of Charcow by the Germans, 300
paintings of West European masters and Ukrainian painters, and 25
valuable Ukrainian carpets, mostly from the Charcow museum, were packed
and shipped by the _Einsatzstab_. (_707-PS_)

Reporting on the withdrawal from the Ukraine, Staff Director Utikal
accounted for the removal of the following materials:

     From the Museum of Art at Charcow:
       Ukrainian paintings                                        96
       Western European paintings                                185
       Wood carvings and etchings                                 12
       Carpets and tapestries                                     25

     From the Ukrainian museum in Kiev:
       Textiles of all sorts.
       Collection of valuable embroidery patterns.
       Collection of brocades.
       Numerous items of wood, etc.                       (_035-PS_)

In addition Utikal reported shipment of a total of 131 cases containing:
10,186 books, the catalog of the “East” library, art folios, samples of
magazines, Bolshevist pictures, and Bolshevist films. Utikal also
stated:

    “Moreover an essential part of the prehistoric museum was
    transported away.” (_035-PS_)

Another report on the shipment of works of art from the Ukraine, 12
September 1944, indicated the value of the contents of 85 chests of art
objects:

    “There are a great many of the oldest ikons, works of famous
    masters of the German, Dutch and Italian schools of the 16th,
    17th and 18th centuries, as well as works of the best Russian
    artists of the 18th and 19th centuries. On the whole, the
    contents include the most valuable works of the known Ukrainian
    art possession, which in themselves represent a value of many
    millions after a cursory appraisal.” (_055-PS_)

Attached to the above report is a detailed inventory listing hundreds of
individual objects.

Additional evidence as to the extent of material seized in Kiev is found
in a secret note, 17 June 1944, dealing with measures taken prior to the
Russian Occupation. The note reported the taking of materials from
museums, archives, institutions, etc., during the autumn of 1943 on the
order of the _Einsatzstab_ and of the Reichs-commissar. During October
there were sent to the Reich 40 railway trucks, carrying mostly goods
belonging to the Central Research Institute of the Ukraine. The report
concluded with the statement that when the Soviets entered the town
nothing of value was left. (_1109-PS_)

On 28 September 1941, the General Commissar for White Ruthenia reported
the seizure of art treasures in the area of Minsk, destined for
Konigsberg and Linz. The value of these confiscations was stated to
amount to millions of marks. (_1099-PS_)

(4) _Works of Art (West)._ The Robert Scholz report declared that:

    “During the period from March 1941 to July 1944, the Special
    Staff for Pictorial Art brought into the Reich:
    _29 large shipments_ including _137 freight cars_ with _4,174
    cases of art works_.” (_1015-B-PS_)

The report stated that a total of 21,903 art objects of all types had
been counted and inventoried, and stated:

    “With this scientific inventory of a material unique in its
    scope and importance and of a value hitherto unknown to art
    research, the Special Staff for Pictorial Art has conducted a
    work important to the entire field of art. _This inventory work
    will form the basis of an all-inclusive scientific catalog in
    which should be recorded history, scope and scientific and
    political significance of this historically unique art
    seizure._” (_1015-B-PS_)

The following is a summary of the inventory attached to the report:

 Paintings                                                        10,890
 Plastics                                                            583
 Furniture                                                         2,477
 Textiles                                                            583
 Hand-made art objects                                             5,825
 East Asiatic objects                                              1,286
 Antiquities                                                         259
                                                                     ———
   Total                                                          21,903
                                                           (_1015-B-PS_)

The report stated that the above figures would be increased since
seizures in the West were not yet completed and it had not been possible
to make a scientific inventory of part of the seized objects because of
the lack of experts. (_1015-B-PS_)

As early as 28 January 1941, Rosenberg stated, with reference to
properties seized in France alone:

    “* * * the value involved will come close to a billion
    Reichsmarks.” (_090-PS_)

Scholz, in his report on activities from March 1941 to July 1944,
expressed the value of the seizures as follows:

    “The extraordinary artistic and material value of the seized art
    works cannot be expressed in figures. The paintings, period
    furniture of the 17th and 18th Centuries, the Gobelins, the
    antiques and renaissance jewelry of the Rothschild’s are objects
    of such a unique character that their evaluation is impossible,
    since no comparable values have so far appeared on the art
    market.

    “A short report, moreover, can only hint at the artistic worth
    of the collections. Among the seized paintings, pastels and
    drawings there are several hundred works of the first quality,
    masterpieces of European art, which could take first place in
    any museum. Included therein are absolutely authenticated signed
    works of Rembrandt Van Rijn, Rubens, Frans Hals, Vermeer van
    Delft, Valasquez, Murillo, Goya, Sebastiano del Piombo, Palma
    Vecchio, etc.

    “Of first importance among the seized paintings are the works of
    the famous French painters of the 18th Century, with
    masterpieces of Boucher, Watteau, Rigaud, Largielliere, Rattler,
    Fragonard, Pater, Danloux and de Troy.

    “This collection can compare with those of the best European
    museums. It includes many works of the foremost French masters,
    who up to now have been only inadequately represented in the
    best German museums. Very important also is the representation
    of masterpieces of the Dutch Painters of the 17th and 18th
    Centuries. First of all should be mentioned the works of Van
    Dyck, Saloman and Jacob Ruisdal, Wouvermann, Terborch, Jan
    Weenix, Gabriel Metsu, Adrian van Ostade, David Teniers, Pieter
    de Hooch, Willem van der Velde, etc.

    “Of foremost importance also are the represented works of
    English painting of the 18th and early 19th centuries, with
    masterpieces of Reynolds, Romney, and Gainsborough. Cranach and
    Amberger, among the German masters, should be mentioned.

    “The collection of French furniture of the 17th and 18th
    centuries is perhaps even more highly to be evaluated. This
    contains hundreds of the best preserved and, for the most part,
    signed works of the best known cabinet-makers from the period
    between Louis XIV to Louis XVI. Since German cabinetmakers
    played an important part in this golden age of French cabinetry,
    now recognized for the first time in the field of art, this
    collection is of paramount importance.

    “The collection of Gobelins and Persian tapestries contains
    numerous world-famous objects. The collection of handicraft
    works and the Rothschild collection of renaissance jewelry is
    valuable beyond comparison.” (_1015-B-PS_)

The report refers to 25 portfolios of pictures of the most valuable
works of the art collections seized in the West, which portfolios were
presented to the Fuehrer. Ten additional portfolios are stated to be
attached to the report and additional portfolios are said to be in
preparation. Thirty-nine leatherbound volumes prepared by the
_Einsatzstab_ contain photographs of paintings, textiles, furniture,
candelabra, and numerous other objects of art and illustrate the
magnitude and value of the collection made by _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_.

                      2. THE GENERAL-GOUVERNEMENT

A. _Confiscatory Laws and Decrees_

In October 1939 Goering issued a verbal order to Dr. Muehlmann asking
him to undertake the immediate securing of all Polish art treasures.
(_1709-PS_)

On 15 November 1939, Hans Frank, Governor-General for the Occupied
Polish Territories, issued a decree providing in part:

    “Article 1. 1. All movable and stationary property of the Former
    Polish State * * * will be sequestered for the purpose of
    securing all manner of public valuables.” (_1773-PS_).

On 16 December 1939, Frank issued a decree providing in part:

    “Article 1. All art objects in public possession in the General
    Gouvernement will be confiscated for the fulfillment of public
    tasks of common interest insofar as it has not already been
    seized under the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the
    former Polish State in the General Gouvernement of 15 November
    1939 (_Verordnungsblatt GGP_, p. 37).

    “Article 2. With the exception of art collections and art
    objects which were the property of the former Polish State, art
    objects will be considered as owned by the public:

    “1. Private art collections which have been taken under
    protection by the special commissioner for the seizure and
    safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures.

    “2. All ecclesiastical art property with the exception of those
    objects required for the daily performance of liturgic actions.

    “Article 3. 1. In order to determine whether art objects are
    public property in the sense of this regulation, every private
    and ecclesiastical art possession has to be registered with
    exact data on the kind, nature and number of pieces.

    “2. Everyone who possessed or at the present time is in
    possession of or else is entitled to dispose of such objects of
    art since 15 March 1939, is obliged to register the same.”
    (_1773-PS_)

In order to implement the above decree, the following registration
decree was issued in the name of the Governor-General by Dr. Muehlmann,
Special Deputy for the Securing of Art Treasures:

    “Article 2. 1. Objects of artistic, cultural-historical and
    historical value which originate from the time before 1850, have
    to be registered.

    “2. The registration includes the following:

        “_a._ Paintings.

        “_b._ Sculpture.

        “_c._ Products of handicraft (for instance antique
        furniture, chinaware, glass, golden and silver objects,
        Gobelins, rugs, embroideries, lacework, paramente,
        etc.).

        “_d._ Drawings, engravings, woodcuts, etc.

        “_e._ Rare manuscripts, musical manuscripts, autographs,
        book-paintings, miniatures, prints, covers, etc.

        “_f._ Weapons, armors, etc.

        “_g._ Coins, medals, seals, etc.

    “3. Regarding the art objects mentioned in section 2, detailed
    information has to be given if possible, on the master, the time
    of production, the contents of the representation, measurements
    and material (for instance, wood, canvas, bronze, etc.).”
    (_1773-PS_)

The seizures authorized by the above decrees ripened into confiscation
and assumption of ownership by the General Gouvernement, with the
issuance of the following decree by Frank on 24 September 1940:

    “Article 1. The property sequestered on the basis of Article 1,
    section 1 of the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the
    former Polish State within the General Gouvernement of 15
    November 1939 (_Verordnungsblatt GGP_, page 37) will be
    transferred to the ownership of the General Gouvernement.”
    (_1773-PS_)

Heinrich Himmler, as Reichscommissioner for the Strengthening of
Germanism, issued an “urgent decree” to the regional officers of the
Secret Police in the Annexed Eastern Territories and the Commanders of
Security Service in Krakau (Charkow), Radom, Warsaw, and Lublin. The
decree, 1 December 1939, was circulated on 16 December 1939, the same
date as the promulgation of the decree of Dr. Muehlmann, above referred
to (_1773-PS_). The Himmler decree contained administrative directions
for execution of the Art Seizure program. (_R-143_)

B. _Purpose of Art Seizures._

The purpose of the Seizure Program is indicated in the aforementioned
Himmler decree:

                                   “I

    “1. To strengthen Germanism in the defense of the Reich all
    articles mentioned in Section II of this decree are hereby
    confiscated. This applies to all articles located in the
    territories annexed by the Fuehrer’s and Reich Chancellor’s
    decree of 12/10/39, and the General Government for the Occupied
    Polish Territories. They are confiscated for the benefit of the
    German Reich and are at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner
    for the Strengthening of Germanism.”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

                                   IV

    “All confiscations made before this decree by authorities of the
    Reich Fuehrer SS and the Chief of German Police and the Reich
    Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism are hereby
    confirmed. They are to be regarded as made for the benefit of
    the German Reich and are at the disposal of the Reich
    Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism.” (_R-143_)

The methodical nature of the Art Seizure Program, and the existence of a
general policy of confiscation of art treasures, is indicated in section
V of Himmler’s decree:

    “In due course the usual questionnaires for cataloguing
    confiscated articles are to be sent to the Chief Custodian
    East.” (_R-143_)

The intention to enrich Germany by the seizures rather than merely to
protect the seized objects is indicated in a report by Dr. Hans Posse,
Director of the Dresden State Picture Gallery:

    “I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private
    collections as well as clerical property in Cracow and Warsaw.
    It is true that we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from
    the acquisition of great Art works, of paintings and sculptures,
    with the exception of the Veit-Stoss Altar and the plates of
    Hans Von Kulmbach in the Church of Maria in Cracow . . . . . .
    and several other works from the National Museum in Warsaw. * *
    *” (_1600-PS_)

The avowed purpose of the art treasure seizures was the promulgation of
German Culture throughout the Occupied East:

    “* * * the result is put down in the catalogue together with
    reproductions, and this is a definite proof of the penetration
    of the East by the German Cultural urge.” (_1233-PS_)

C. _Nature, Extent, and Value of Property Seized._

Virtually the entire art possession of Poland, private as well as
public, was seized by the General Gouvernement (_1233-PS_). In a
catalogue of the more important works of art seized by the General
Gouvernement, paragraph 1 of the Foreword contains the following
admission:

    “On the basis of the decree of the General Governor for the
    Occupied Polish Territories of December 16, 1939, the Special
    Delegate for the Safeguarding of Treasures of Art and Culture
    was able in the course of six months to secure almost the entire
    art treasure of the country, with one single exception: the
    Flemish Gobelin series from the castle in Cracow. According to
    the latest information, these are kept in France, so that it
    will be possible to secure them eventually.” (_1233-PS_)

The nature and extent of materials seized by the General Gouvernement is
indicated in Document _1709-PS_. The document inventories the objects
seized, and divides them into two classifications: those of primary
importance (“Reich-important”), and those of secondary importance.
Articles of primary importance, totaling 521 separate objects, are also
set forth in a descriptive catalogue. (_1233-PS_)

The articles catalogued include paintings by German, Italian, Dutch,
French, and Spanish masters, rare illustrated books, Indian and Persian
miniatures, woodcuts, the famous Veit-Stoss hand-carved altar,
handicraft articles of gold and silver, antique furniture, articles of
crystal, glass and porcelain, tapestries, antique weapons, rare coins,
and medals. The objects were seized from both public and private
sources, including the National Museum in Cracow and the National Museum
in Warsaw, the cathedrals of Warsaw and Lublin, a number of churches and
monasteries, the Chateau of the Kings in Warsaw, university and other
libraries, and a large number of private collections of the Polish
nobility. (_1709-PS_)

Items placed in the second category are of the same nature as those
placed in category I. Approximately 500 separate items are catalogued,
many of the items including a large number of separate objects treated
under a single catalogue heading. (_1709-PS_)

The value of the objects seized from 22 collections is stated to be
9,437,000 Zloty. The materials referred to are only a portion of those
selected as being of secondary importance. No valuation is given as to
the balance of the items of secondary importance or as to the 521
objects selected as being of primary importance. (_1709-PS_)

D. _Evidence That Seizures Were Not Merely for Protective Purposes._

In Dr. Posse’s report (_1600-PS_), a number of items are referred to
which may be found in the catalogue of art objects “made secure”
(_1233-PS_):

    “I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private
    collections as well as clerical property in Cracow and Warsaw.
    It is true that we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from
    the acquisition of great Art works, of paintings and sculptures,
    with the exception of the Veit-Stoss altar and the plates of
    Hans von Kulmbach in the Church of Maria in Cracow, the Raphael,
    Leonardo and Rembrandt from the collection Czartoryski, and
    several other works from the National Museum in Warsaw, * * *
    works of a rather high value of whose existence we in Germany
    had already known. Richer and more extensive is the Polish stock
    of ‘objects d’art’, such as handicraft in gold and silver, of
    German origin to a large part, particularly from the Church of
    Maria and the Cathedral of Wawel, tapestries, arms, porcelains,
    furniture, bronzes, coins, valuable parchment scrips, books,
    etc. * * *”

    *            *            *            *            *            *

    “As I said before, I shall not be able to make proposals
    regarding the distribution as long as an inventory of the entire
    material does not exist. However, I should like to reserve for
    the museum at Linz the three most important paintings of the
    Czartoryski collection, namely the Raphael, Leonardo and
    Rembrandt which are at present in the Kaiser-Frederick Museum in
    Berlin. We in Dresden are particularly interested in the
    interior decorations of the castle of the Kings in Warsaw since
    Saxonian architects and artists have created them; therefore,
    the suggestion is made that the salvaged parts of it
    (panellings, doors, inlaid floors, sculptures, mirrors,
    glass-chandeliers, porcelains, etc.) be used for the interior
    decoration of the Pavillion of the ‘Zivinges’ in Dresden.”
    (_1600-PS_)

The following items listed in the above report are also listed in the
catalogue:

 _Item_                                                    _Catalog No._
 Veit-Stoss Altar                                                    241
 Hans Vol Kulmbach Works                                              22
 Raphael                                                             141
 Leonardo                                                            134
 Rembrandt                                                            81
 Church of Maria Handicraft                            262-265, 279, 280
 From Jagellonic Library                    166, 167, 186, 199-203, 206,
                                                       209, 212, 215-224
                                             (_See 1233-PS_; _1600-PS_.)

Appendix 8 of Document _1709-PS_ lists a large number of objects which
were turned over to Architect Koettgen. The items listed include, in
addition to paintings, tapestries, etc., plates, dishes, cups and
saucers, vases, cream pitchers, glasses, a bread basket, a service tray,
and other items of table service. These objects were turned over to the
architect for the purpose of furnishing the Castle at Cracow and Schloss
Kressendorf for the Governor. (_1709-PS_)

A number of objects were transported out of Poland and placed in Berlin
in the Depot of the Special Deputy or in the safe of the Deutsche Bank
(_1709-PS_). Items at this location are also listed in the catalog
(_1233-PS_) as numbers 4, 17, 27, 35, 42, 45, 47, 51, 138, 141, 145, and
148.

Thirty-one sketches by Durer were taken from the collection Lubomierski
in Lemberg:

    “The Special Deputy has personally handed over these sketches in
    July 1941 to the Reichsmarshal who took them to the Fuehrer at
    headquarters where they remain at the present time. On express
    direction of the Fuehrer they will stay in his possession for
    the time being.” (_1709-PS_)

All art objects seized were screened for those which were important from
the German point of view:

    “The Reich-important pieces were collected in a catalogue of the
    so called ‘First Choice’. One copy of this catalogue has been
    submitted to the Fuehrer who reserved to himself the first
    decision as to location and use of the art objects of the ‘First
    Choice’”. (_1709-PS_)

Dr. Muehlmann, the “Special Deputy for the Safeguarding of Art
Treasures” in the General Government, has confirmed that it was the
policy and purpose of the art seizure program to confiscate the art
treasures and to retain them for the benefit of Germany:

“I confirm, that it was the official policy of the Governor General,
Hans Frank, to take into custody all important art treasures, which
belonged to Polish public institutions, private collections and the
Church. I confirm, that the art treasures, mentioned, were actually
confiscated, and it is clear to me, that they would not have remained in
Poland in case of a German victory, but that they would have been used
to complement German artistic property.” (_3042-PS_)

                 *        *        *        *        *

 LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PLUNDER OF ART
                               TREASURES

    Document    │                Description                │ Vol. │ Page
                │                                           │      │
                │Charter of the International Military      │      │
                │  Tribunal, Article 6 (b).                 │  I   │     5
                │                                           │      │
                │International Military Tribunal, Indictment│      │
                │  Number 1, Sections III; VIII (E).        │  I   │15, 43
                │                                           │      │
 3737-PS        │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the    │      │
                │  Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex,  │      │  597,
                │  Articles 46, 47, 56.                     │  VI  │   599
                │                   —————                   │      │
                │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a       │      │
                │document indicates that the document was   │      │
                │received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial.│      │
                │A double asterisk (**) before a document   │      │
                │number indicates that the document was     │      │
                │referred to during the trial but was not   │      │
                │formally received in evidence, for the     │      │
                │reason given in parentheses following the  │      │
                │description of the document. The USA series│      │
                │number, given in parentheses following the │      │
                │description of the document, is the        │      │
                │official exhibit number assigned by the    │      │
                │court.                                     │      │
                │                   —————                   │      │
 *015-PS        │Letter and report of Rosenberg to Hitler,  │      │
                │16 April 1943, concerning seizure of       │      │
                │ownerless Jewish art possessions. (USA 387)│ III  │    41
                │                                           │      │
  035-PS        │Report, 26 October 1943, regarding security│      │
                │measures by Main Division Ukraine during   │      │
                │withdrawal of Armed Forces.                │ III  │    75
                │                                           │      │
  055-PS        │Report, 12 September 1944, concerning works│      │
                │of art shipped from the Ukraine.           │ III  │    99
                │                                           │      │
 *071-PS        │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April 1941,│      │
                │replying to Bormann’s letter of 19 April   │      │
                │1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA 371)          │ III  │   119
                │                                           │      │
 *090-PS        │Letter from Rosenberg to Schwarz, 28       │      │
                │January 1941, concerning registration and  │      │
                │collection of art treasures. (USA 372)     │ III  │   148
                │                                           │      │
 *136-PS        │Certified copy of Hitler Order, 29 January │      │
                │1940, concerning establishment of “Hohe    │      │
                │Schule”. (USA 367)                         │ III  │   184
                │                                           │      │
 *137-PS        │Copy of Order from Keitel to Commanding    │      │
                │General of Netherlands, 5 July 1940, to    │      │
                │cooperate with the Einsatzstab Rosenberg.  │      │
                │(USA 379)                                  │ III  │   185
                │                                           │      │
  138-PS        │Copy of Order from Keitel to Commanding    │      │
                │General of France, 17 September 1940, to   │      │
                │cooperate with the Einsatzstab Rosenberg.  │ III  │   186
                │                                           │      │
  139-PS        │Reineke order, 10 October 1940, concerning │      │
                │instructions to be given to Military       │      │
                │Administration in Belgium to cooperate with│      │
                │Einsatzstab Rosenberg.                     │ III  │   187
                │                                           │      │
  140-PS        │Reineke order, 30 October 1940,            │      │
                │supplementing order of 17 September 1940   │      │
                │(Document 138-PS).                         │ III  │   187
                │                                           │      │
 *141-PS        │Goering Order, 5 November 1940, concerning │      │
                │seizure of Jewish art treasures. (USA 368) │ III  │   188
                │                                           │      │
 *145-PS        │Order signed by Rosenberg, 20 August 1941, │      │
                │concerning safeguarding the cultural goods │      │
                │in the Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA  │      │
                │373)                                       │ III  │   189
                │                                           │      │
 *149-PS        │Hitler Order, 1 March 1942, establishing   │      │
                │authority of Einsatzstab Rosenberg. (USA   │      │
                │369)                                       │ III  │   190
                │                                           │      │
  151-PS        │Rosenberg Order, 7 April 1942, concerning  │      │
                │safeguarding of cultural goods, research   │      │
                │material and Scientific Institutions in    │      │
                │Occupied Eastern Territories.              │ III  │   191
                │                                           │      │
 *153-PS        │Rosenberg Order, 27 April 1942, for        │      │
                │formation of central unit for seizure of   │      │
                │art treasures in occupied Eastern          │      │
                │Territories. (USA 381)                     │ III  │   192
                │                                           │      │
 *154-PS        │Letter from Lammers to high State and Party│      │
                │authorities, 5 July 1942, confirming       │      │
                │Rosenberg’s powers. (USA 370)              │ III  │   193
                │                                           │      │
 *158-PS        │Message, 1 June 1944, initialled Utikal,   │      │
                │Chief of Einsatzstab, concerning missions  │      │
                │in Hungary. (USA 382)                      │ III  │   199
                │                                           │      │
 *159-PS        │Message, 6 June 1944, initialled Utikal,   │      │
                │Chief of Einsatzstab, concerning missions  │      │
                │in Denmark and Norway. (USA 380)           │ III  │   199
                │                                           │      │
 *171-PS        │Undated report on “Library for Exploration │      │
                │of the Jewish Question” by the Hohe Schule │      │
                │District Office. (USA 383)                 │ III  │   200
                │                                           │      │
 *176-PS        │Report on Einsatzstab Rosenberg, Working   │      │
                │Group Netherlands, signed Schimmer. (USA   │      │
                │707)                                       │ III  │   203
                │                                           │      │
  707-PS        │Letters, June-October 1943 concerning      │      │
                │evacuation of the museum of Charkow.       │ III  │   516
                │                                           │      │
 1015-B-PS      │Report on activities of Special Staff for  │      │
                │Pictorial Art, October 1940 to July 1944.  │ III  │   666
                │                                           │      │
*1015-I-PS      │Letter from Goering to Rosenberg, 30 May   │      │
                │1942. (USA 385)                            │ III  │   670
                │                                           │      │
 1015-GG-PS     │Inventory of art objects—attached to a     │      │
                │report (Document 1015-B-PS).               │ III  │   671
                │                                           │      │
 1099-PS        │Letter from Kube, General Commissar White  │      │
                │Ruthenia, to Rosenberg, 28 September 1941. │ III  │   781
                │                                           │      │
 1107-PS        │Office memorandum, 17 May 1944, in         │      │
                │Rosenberg Ministry concerning the          │      │
                │Wehrmacht’s function in removing treasures │      │
                │from the USSR.                             │ III  │   789
                │                                           │      │
 1109-PS        │Note signed by Dr. Ullman, 17 June 1944,   │      │
                │concerning Bolshevic Atrocity Propaganda.  │ III  │   791
                │                                           │      │
*1117-PS        │Goering Order, 1 May 1941 concerning       │      │
                │establishment of Einsatzstab Rosenberg in  │      │
                │all Occupied Territories. (USA 384)        │ III  │   793
                │                                           │      │
 1118-PS        │Letter from Rosenberg to Goering, 18 June  │      │
                │1942, and related correspondence.          │ III  │   793
                │                                           │      │
*1233-PS        │Printed catalog undated, concerning secured│      │
                │objects of art in the Government General   │      │
                │(Poland). (USA 377)                        │ III  │   850
                │                                           │      │
*1600-PS        │Bormann correspondence, 1940-1941,         │      │
                │concerning confiscation of religious art   │      │
                │treasures. (USA 690)                       │  IV  │   128
                │                                           │      │
*1709-PS        │Report of Special Delegate for art         │      │
                │seizures, July 1943. (USA 378)             │  IV  │   211
                │                                           │      │
*1773-PS        │Decree on sequestration of property of     │      │
                │former Polish State in the General         │      │
                │Government, 15 November 1939, published in │      │
                │The Law of the General Government, pp.     │      │
                │E810, E845, E846. (USA 376)                │  IV  │   346
                │                                           │      │
*2523-PS        │Account of conversation between Goering and│      │
                │Bunjes. (USA 783)                          │  V   │   258
                │                                           │      │
*3042-PS        │Affidavit of Dr. Kajetan Muehlmann, 19     │      │
                │November 1945. (USA 375)                   │  V   │   754
                │                                           │      │
 3766-PS        │Report prepared by the German Army in      │      │
                │France 1942 concerning removal of French   │      │
                │art objects through the German Embassy and │      │
                │the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in France.       │  VI  │   646
                │                                           │      │
 3814-PS        │Correspondence between Hans Frank, Lammers │      │
                │and various witnesses to the conduct of    │      │
                │Frank, February 1945.                      │  VI  │   739
                │                                           │      │
*L-188          │Report of 8 August 1944, on confiscation up│      │
                │to 31 July 1944. (USA 386)                 │ VII  │  1022
                │                                           │      │
 R-143          │Himmler decree, 1 December 1939, concerning│      │
                │procedure for confiscation of works of art,│      │
                │archives, and documents.                   │ VIII │   246




                           TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred including missing periods or commas for
periods. American spelling occurs throughout the document. There are
differences in spellings of cities depending on whether the source is
the prosecutor or part of a quoted statement. Multiple occurrences of
the following spellings which differ and are found throughout this
volume are as follows:

                           Luxemburg Luxembourg
                            Esthonia Estonia
                                Kiew Kiev
                            Roumania Rumania
                     Czecho-Slovakia Checkoslovakia

Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as presented read into the
record and reflects the actual translations of the various national
documents presented as material for the trial(s). This volume had no
German, Polish, Czech, Russian or other eastern European diacritics,
only French diacritics. As a result, Goering and Fuehrer are spelled
without umlauts throughout.

A correction of fact has been made on page 778 regarding “. . . the
Italian invasion of Greece on 28 November 1940. . . .” It should be “28
October 1940”. In this ebook, “November” is marked with overstrike and
“[October]” has been added.

An attempt has been made to produce this ebook in a format as close as
possible to the original document's presentation and layout. As a
result, the reader will find that the quoted texts in the first six
chapters have indented paragraphs and the remaining chapters have
quotations which are not indented, just as in the original document.

[The end of _Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Vol. I)_, by Anonymous.]





End of Project Gutenberg's Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Vol. I), by Various