Produced by Donald Cummings, Adrian Mastronardi and the
Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
(This file was produced from images generously made
available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)










                                  CHESS
                               GENERALSHIP

                                   BY
                            FRANKLIN K. YOUNG

                                _Vol. I._
                          GRAND RECONNAISSANCE.

    “_He who first devised chessplay, made a model of the Art
    Militarie, representing therein all the concurrents and
    contemplations of War, without omitting any._”

    “_Examen de Ingenios._”

                                                     _Juan Huarte, 1616._

    “_Chess is the deepest of all games; it is constructed to carry
    out the principal of a battle, and the whole theory of Chess lies
    in that form of action._”

                                                        _Emanuel Lasker._

                                 BOSTON
                      INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING CO.
                                  1910

                           _Copyright, 1910_,
                          BY FRANKLIN K. YOUNG.

                     _Entered at Stationers’ Hall._

                         _All rights reserved._

    “_Chess is the gymnasium for the mind--it does for the brain what
    athletics does for the body._”

                                                   _Henry Thomas Buckle._

              GEORGE E. CROSBY CO., PRINTERS, BOSTON, MASS.




YOUNG’S CHESS WORKS


    MINOR TACTICS OF CHESS                                     $1.00
    An eminently attractive treatment of the game of
    Chess.--_Scientific American._

    MAJOR TACTICS OF CHESS                                      2.50
    In this book one finds the principles of strategy
    and logistics applied to Chess in a unique and
    scientific way.--_Army and Navy Register._

    GRAND TACTICS OF CHESS                                      3.50
    For the student who desires to enter the broader
    channels of Chess, the best books are by FRANKLIN
    K. YOUNG: his “Minor Tactics” and his more elaborate
    “Grand Tactics” are the most important productions
    of modern Chess literature.--_American Chess Magazine._

    CHESS STRATEGETICS ILLUSTRATED                              2.50
    We know no work outside of the masterpieces of Newton,
    Hamilton and Darwin, which so organizes and systematizes
    human thought.--_Chicago Evening Post._


       *       *       *       *       *

    _“There are secrets that the children_
    _Are not taught in public school;_
    _If these secrets were broadcasted,_
    _How could we the masses rule?_
    _If they understood Religion,_
    _Jurisprudence, Trade and War,_
    _Would they groan and sweat and labor--_
    _Make our bricks and furnish straw?”_

    _Anon._

       *       *       *       *       *

    TO
    The Memory
    OF
    EPAMINONDAS
    THE INVENTOR
    OF
    SCIENTIFIC WARFARE

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“I leave no sons_
      _To perpetuate my name;_
      _But I leave two daughters--_
    _LEUCTRA and MANTINEA_
      _Who will transmit my fame_
      _To remotest posterity.”_

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“For empire and greatness it importeth most that a people
    do profess arms as their principal honor, study and
    occupation.”--Sir Francis Bacon._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“There is nothing truly imposing but Military Glory.”--Napoleon._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“The conquered in war, sinking beneath the tribute exacted
    by the victor and not daring to utter their impotent hatred,
    bequeath to their children miseries so extreme that the aged have
    not further evil to fear in death, nor the youthful any good to
    hope in life.”--Xenocles._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“War is an element established by the Deity in the order of
    the World; perpetual peace upon this Earth we inhabit is a
    dream.”--Von Moltke._




PREFACE

    _“To become a good General one well may begin by playing at
    Chess.”--Prince de Condé._


_Except the theatre of actual Warfare, no spot known to man furnishes
such facilities for the practice of combined strategy, tactics and
logistics as does the surface of the Chess-board._

To those familiar with the Science of Strategetics, it needs no proof
that ability to play a good game at Chess, indicates the possession of
faculties common to all great military commanders.

At a certain point, the talent of Morphy for Chess-play and the talent of
Napoleon for Warfare become merged; and beyond this point, their methods
of thought and of action are identical.

Opportunity to display, and in most spectacular fashion, their singular
and superlative genius, was not wanting to either.

But unlike the ferocious Corsican, whose “only desire is to find myself
on the battlefield,” the greatest of all Masters at Chess, found in the
slaughter of his fellow-creatures no incentive sufficient to call forth
those unsurpassed strategetical powers, which recorded Chess-play shows
he possessed.

From this sameness of talent, common to the great Chess-player and the
great military commander, arises the practical utility of the Royal Game.

For by means of Chess-play, one may learn and practice in their highest
interpretation, mental and physical processes of paramount importance to
the community in time of extreme peril.

From such considerations and for the further reason that in a true
Republic all avenues to greatness are open to merit, scientific
Chess-play should be intelligently and systematically taught in the
public schools. “A people desirous of liberty will entrust its defense to
none but themselves,” says the Roman maxim, and in crises, woe to that
land where the ruler is but a child in arms, and where the disinclination
of the people towards its exercise is equalled by their unfamiliarity
with the military habit.

Despite the ethics of civilization, the optimism of the “unco guid” and
the unction even of our own heart’s deep desire, there seems no doubt but
that each generation will have its wars.

“_Pax perpetua_,” writes Leibnitz, “exists only in God’s acre.” Here on
earth, if seems that men forever will continue to murder one another for
various reasons; all of which, in the future as in the past, will be good
and sufficient to the fellow who wins; and this by processes differing
only in neatness and despatch.

Whether this condition is commendable or not, depends upon the point
of view. Being irremediable, such phase of the subject hardly is worth
discussing. However, the following by a well-qualified observer, is
interesting and undeniably an intelligent opinion, viz.:


From the essay on “WAR,” read by Prof. John Ruskin at Woolwich, (Eng.)
Military Academy.

“All the pure and noble arts of Peace are founded on War; no great Art
ever rose on Earth, but among a nation of soldiers.

“As Peace is established or extended the Arts decline. They reach an
unparalleled pitch of costliness, but lose their life, enlist themselves
at last on the side of luxury and corruption and among wholly tranquil
nations, wither utterly away.

“So when I tell you that War is the foundation of all the Arts, I mean
also that it is the foundation of all the high virtues and faculties of
men.

“It was very strange for me to discover this and very dreadful--but I saw
it to be quite an undeniable fact.

“We talk of Peace and Learning, of Peace and Plenty, of Peace and
Civilization; but I found that those were not the words which the Muse of
History coupled together; but that on her lips the words were--Peace and
Selfishness, Peace and Sensuality, Peace and Corruption, Peace and Death.

“I found in brief, that all great nations learned their truth of word and
strength of thought in War; that they were nourished in War and wasted in
Peace; taught by War and deceived by Peace; trained by War and betrayed
by Peace; that they were born in War and expired in Peace.

“Creative, or foundational War, is that in which the natural
restlessness and love of contest among men, is disciplined into modes of
beautiful--though it may be fatal--play; in which the natural ambition
and love of Power is chastened into aggressive conquest of surrounding
evil; and in which the natural instincts of self-defence are sanctified
by the nobleness of the institutions which they are appointed to defend.

“For such War as this all men are born; in such War as this any man may
happily die; and forth from such War as this have arisen throughout the
Ages, all the highest sanctities and virtues of Humanity.”

       *       *       *       *       *

That our own country may escape the common lot of nations, is something
not even to be hoped.

Defended by four almost bottomless ditches, nevertheless it is a
certainty that coming generations of Americans must stand in arms, not
only to repel foreign aggression, but to uphold even the integrity of the
Great Republic; and with the hand-writing of coming events flaming on the
wall, posterity well may heed the solemn warning of by-gone centuries:

“_As man is superior to the brute, so is a trained and educated soldier
superior to the merely brave, numerous and enthusiastic._”

       *       *       *       *       *

_“The evils to be apprehended from a standing army are remote and in
my judgment, not to be dreaded; but the consequence of lacking one is
inevitable ruin.”--Washington._




CONTENTS


                                         PAGE

    PREFACE                               VII

    INTRODUCTORY                         XIII

    CHESS GENERALSHIP                       3

    GRAND RECONNAISSANCE                   23
      Military Examples                    28

    ORGANIZATION                           45
      Military Examples                    59

    TOPOGRAPHY                             73
      Military Examples                    85

    MOBILITY                               97
      Military Examples                   116

    NUMBERS                               123
      Military Examples                   127

    TIME                                  139
      Military Examples                   142

    POSITION                              147
      Military Examples                   158

    PRIME STRATEGETIC MEANS               169

    PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION         185

    _“The progress of Science universally is retarded, because
    sufficient attention is not paid to explaining essentials in
    particular and exactly to define the terms employed.”--Euclid._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“The first care of the sage should be to discover the true
    character of his pupils. By his questions he should assist them
    to explain their own ideas and by his answers he should compel
    them to perceive their falsities. By accurate definitions he
    should gradually dispel the incongruities in their earlier
    education and by his subtlety in arousing their doubts, he should
    redouble their curiosity and eagerness for information; for the
    art of the instructor consists in inciting his pupils to that
    point at which they cannot endure their manifest ignorance._

    _“Many, unable to undergo this trial and confounded by offended
    self-conceit and lacking the fortitude to sustain correction,
    forsake their master, who should not be eager to recall them.
    Others who learn from humiliation to distrust themselves should
    no longer have snares spread for their vanity. The master should
    speak to them neither with the severity of a censor nor with
    the haughtiness of a sophist, nor deal in harsh reproaches nor
    importunate complaints; his discourse should be the language of
    reason and friendship in the mouth of experience.”--Socrates._




INTRODUCTORY

    _“The test is as true of cerebral power, as if a hundred thousand
    men lay dead upon the field; or a score of hulks were swinging
    blackened wrecks, after a game between two mighty admirals.”--Dr.
    Oliver Wendell Holmes._

    (Opening Address at Morphy Banquet, Boston, 1859.)


_Men whose business it is to understand war and warfare often are amused
by senseless comparisons made by writers who, as their writings show, are
ignorant even of the rudiments of military art and science. Of course a
certain license in expression of thought is not to be denied the layman;
he cannot be expected to talk with the exactness of the man who knows. At
the same time there is a limit beyond which the non-technical man passes
at his peril, and this limit is reached when he poses as a critic and
presumes to dogmatize on matters in regard to which he is uninformed._

The fanciful conjectures of such people, well are illustrated by the
following editorial _faux pas_, perpetrated by a leading metropolitan
daily, viz.:

    “_Everyone knows now that a future war between states having
    similar and substantially equal equipments will be a different
    affair from any war of the past; characterized by a different
    order of generalship and a radically novel application of the
    principles of strategy and tactics._”

Many in the struggle to obtain their daily bread, are tempted to essay
the unfamiliar, and for a stipulated wage to pose as teachers to the
public.

Such always will do well to write modestly in regard to sciences which
they have not studied and of arts which they never practiced, and
especially in future comments on Military matters, such people may profit
by the appended modicum of that ancient history, which newspaper men as a
class so affect to despise, and in regard to which, as a rule, they are
universally and lamentably, ignorant.

What orders of Generalship can exist in the future, different from those
which always have existed since war was made, viz.: good generalship and
bad generalship?

Ability properly to conduct an army is a concrete thing; it does not
admit of comparison. Says Frederic the Great:

“There are only two kinds of Generals--those who know their trade and
those who do not.”

Hence, “a different order of Generalship,” suggested by the editorial
quoted, implies either a higher or a lesser degree of ability in the
“general of the future”; and as obviously, it is impossible that he can
do worse than many already have done, it is necessary to assume that the
commander of tomorrow will be an improvement over his predecessors.

Consequently, to the military mind it becomes of paramount interest to
inquire as to the form and manner in which such superiority will be
tangibly and visibly manifested, viz.:

Will the general of the future be a better general than Epaminondas,
Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene,
Frederic, Washington, Napoleon, Von Moltke?

Will he improve upon that application of the principles of strategy and
tactics to actual warfare which comes down to us of today, stamped with
the approval of these superlative military geniuses?

Will the general of the future know a better way for making war than
acting against the enemy’s communications?

Will he devise a better method of warfare than that whose motive is the
concentration of a superior force upon the strategetic objective?

Will the processes of his prime logistic operations be preferable to
those of men who won their victories before their battles were fought, by
combining with their troops the topography of the country, and causing
rivers and mountains to take the place of corps d’armee?

Will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless that
military organization founded centuries before the Christian Era, by the
great Theban, Epaminondas, the father of scientific warfare; that system
adopted by every captain of renown and which may be seen in its purity in
the greater military establishments from the days of Rome to the present
Imperial North German Confederation?

Will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless that
system of Minor Tactics utilized by every man who has made it his
business to conquer the World? Will he propose to us something more
perfect than the primary formation of forces depicted in Plate XIII of
the Secret Strategical Instructions of Frederic II?

Will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless those
intricate, but mathematically exact, evolutions of the combined arms,
which appertain to the Major Tactics of men who are remembered to this
day for the battles that they won?

Will he invent processes more destructive than those whereby Epaminondas
crushed at Leuctra and Mantinea the power of Sparta, and the women of
Lacedaemon saw the smoke of an enemy’s camp fire for the first time in
six hundred years?

Than those whereby Alexander, a youth of eighteen, won Greece for his
father at Chaeronea and the World for himself at Issus and Arbela? Than
those whereby Hannibal destroyed seriatim four Roman armies at Trebia,
Thrasymenus, Cannae and Herdonea?

Will he find out processes more sudden and decisive than those whereby
Caesar conquered Gaul and Pompey and the son of Mithridates, and which
are fitly described only in his own language; “Veni, vidi, vici”?

What will the general of the future substitute for the three contiguous
sides of the octagon whereby Tamerlane the Great with his 1,400,000
veterans at the Plains of Angora, enveloped the Emperor Bajazet and
900,000 Turks in the most gigantic battle of record?

Will he eclipse the pursuit of these latter by Mizra, the son of
Tamerlane, who with the Hunnish light cavalry rode two hundred and thirty
miles in five days and captured the Turkish capital, the Emperor Bajazet,
his harem and the royal treasure?

Will he excel Gustavus Adolphus, who dominated Europe for twenty years,
and Turenne, the military Atlas who upheld that magnificent civilization
which embellishes the reign of Louis XIV?

Will he do better than Prince Eugene, who victoriously concluded eighteen
campaigns and drove the Turks out of Christendom?

Will he discover processes superior to those whereby Frederic the Great
with 22,000 troops destroyed at Rosbach a French army of 60,000 regulars
in an hour and a half, at the cost of three hundred men; and at Leuthern
with 33,000 troops, killed, wounded or captured 54,000 out of 93,000
Austrians, at a cost of 3,900 men?

Will he improve on those processes whereby Napoleon with 40,000 men,
destroyed in a single year five Austrian armies and captured 150,000
prisoners? Will he improve on Rivoli, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland,
Wagram, Dresden, and Ligny?

Will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless that
system of Grand Tactics, by means of which the mighty ones of Earth have
swept before them all created things?

Will his system surpass in grandeur of conception and exactness of
execution the march of Alexander to the Indus? Will he reply to his
rival’s prayers for peace and amity as did the great Macedonian; “There
can be but one Master of the World”; and to the dissuasions of his
friend; “So would I do, were I Parmenio”?

Will he do things more gigantic than Hannibal’s march across the Alps?

Than the operation of Alesia by Caesar; where the Romans besieging one
Gallic army in a fortified city, and themselves surrounded by a second
Gallic army, single handed destroyed both? Than the circuit of the
Caspian Sea by the 200,000 light cavalry of Tamerlane, a feat of mountain
climbing which never has been duplicated? Than that marvelous combination
of the principles of tactics and of field fortification, whereby in the
position of Bunzelwitz, Frederic the Great, with 55,000 men, successfully
upheld the last remaining prop of the Prussian nation, against 250,000
Russian and Austrian regular troops, commanded by the best generals of
the age?

Will he conceive anything more scientific and artistic than the manoeuvre
of Trenton and Princeton by Washington? Than the capture of Burgoyne at
Saratoga and Cornwallis at Yorktown? Than the manoeuvres of Ulm, of Jena,
of Landshut? Than the manoeuvres of Napoleon in 1814? Than the manoeuvre
of Charleroi in 1815, declared by Jomini to be Napoleon’s masterpiece?
Will he excel the manoeuvres of Kutosof and Wittsengen in 1812-13 and
of Blucher on Paris in 1814 and on Waterloo in 1815; each of which
annihilated for the time being the military power of France?

Will he devise military conceptions superior to those whereby Von Moltke
overthrew Denmark in six hours, Austria in six days, and France in six
weeks?

       *       *       *       *       *

The sapient race of quill-drivers ever has hugged to its breast
many delusions; some of which border upon the outer intellectual
darkness. One of these delusions is that most persistently advertised,
least substantial, but forever darling first favorite of timid and
inexperienced minds: “_The pen is mightier than the sword._”

Explanation of the invincible ignorance of the penny-a-liner is simple,
viz.:

Of the myriad self-appointed educators to the public, few are familiar
even with the rudimentary principles of Military Science and almost none
are acquainted even with the simplest processes of Strategetic Art.
Hence, like all who discourse on matters which they do not understand,
such writers continually confound together things which have no
connection.

Ignorant of war and the use of weapons; bewildered by the prodigious
improvements in mechanical details, they immoderately magnify the
importance of such improvements, oblivious to the fact that these latter
relate exclusively to elementary tactics and in no way affect the system
of Strategy, Logistics, and the higher branches of Tactics.

Of such people, the least that can be said and that in all charity, is,
that before essaying the role of the pedagogue, they should endeavor to
grasp that most obvious of all truths:

    “_A man cannot teach what he never has learned._”

Says Frederic the Great: “Improvements and new discoveries in implements
of warfare will be made continually; and generals then alive must modify
tactics to comply with these novelties. But the Grand Art of taking
advantage of topographical conditions and of the faulty disposition of
the opposing forces, ETERNALLY WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED in the military
system.”

       *       *       *       *       *

Naturally, the student now is led to inquire:

What then is this immutable military system? What are its text books,
where is it taught and from whom is it to be learned?

In answer it may be stated:

At the present day, private military schools make no attempt to teach
more than elementary tactics. Even the Governmental academy curriculum
aims little higher than the school of the battalion.

Scientific Chess-play begins where these institutions leave off, and ends
at that goal which none of these institutions even attempt to reach.

Chess teaches to conduct campaigns, to win battles, and to move troops
securely and effectively in the presence of and despite the opposition of
an equal or superior enemy.

Military schools graduate boys as second-lieutenants commanding a
platoon. Chess graduates Generals, able to mobilize Corps d’armee,
whatever their number or location; to develop these into properly posted
integers of a grand Strategic Front and to manoeuvre and operate the army
as a Strategetic Unit, in accordance to the laws of the Strategetic art
and the principles of the Strategetic science.

By precept and by actual practice, Chess teaches what is _NOT_ taught in
any military school--that least understood and most misunderstood; that
best guarded and most invaluable of all State Secrets--

The profession of

GENERALSHIP.

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“Books will speak plain when counsellors blanch. Therefore it
    is good to be conversant with them; especially the books of such
    as themselves have been actors upon the stage.”--Sir Francis
    Bacon._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“At this moment, Europe, which fears neither God nor devil,
    grovels in terror before a little man hardly five feet in height;
    who, clad in a cocked hat and grey great-coat and mounted upon a
    white horse, plods along through mud and darkness; followed by
    the most enthusiastic, most devoted and most efficient band of
    cut-throats and robbers, the world has ever seen.”_

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“Many good soldiers are but poor generals.”--Hannibal._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“No soldier serving under a victorious commander, ever has
    enough of war.”--Caesar._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“Officers always should be chosen from the nobility and never
    from the lower orders of society; for the former, no matter how
    dissolute, always retain a sense of honor, while the latter,
    though guilty of atrocious actions, return to their homes
    without compunction and are received by their families without
    disapprobation.”--Frederic the Great._

       *       *       *       *       *

    At the terrible disaster of Cannae, the Patrician Consul Aemilius
    Paulus and 80,000 Romans died fighting sword in hand; while
    the Plebian Consul, Varro, fled early in the battle. Upon the
    return of the latter to Rome, the Senate, instead of ordering his
    execution, with withering sarcasm formally voted him its thanks
    and the thanks of the Roman people, “that he did not despair of
    the Republic.”

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“Among us we have a man of singular character--one Phocion.
    He seems not to know that he lives in our modern age and at
    incomparable Athens. He is poor, yet is not humiliated by his
    poverty; he does good, yet never boasts of it; and gives advice,
    though he is certain it will not be followed. He possesses talent
    without ambition and serves the state without regard to his own
    interest. At the head of the army, he contents himself with
    restoring discipline and beating the enemy. When addressing the
    assembly, he is equally unmoved by the disapprobation or the
    applause of the multitude._

    _“We laugh at his singularities and we have discovered an
    admirable secret for revenging ourselves for his contempt. He
    is the only general we have left--but we do not employ him; he
    is the most upright and perhaps the most intelligent of our
    counsellors--but we do not listen to him. It is true, we cannot
    make him change his principles, but, by Heaven, neither shall he
    induce us to change ours; and it never shall be said that by the
    example of his superannuated virtues and the influence of his
    antique teachings, Phocion was able to correct the most polished
    and amiable people in the world.”--Callimedon._




GENERALSHIP




CHESS GENERALSHIP

    _“In Chess the soldiers are the men and the General is the mind
    of the player.”--Emanuel Lasker._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“It is neither riches nor armies that make a nation formidable;
    but the courage and genius of the Commander-in-Chief.”--Frederic
    the Great._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“Ho! Ye Macedonians! Because together we have conquered the
    World, think ye to give law to the blood of Achilles and to
    withstand the dictates of the Son of Jupiter?_

    _“Choose ye a new commander, draw yourselves up for battle; I
    will lead against you those Persians whom ye so despise, and if
    you are victorious, by Mehercule, I will do everything that you
    desire.”--Alexander the Great._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“It is I and I alone, who give you your glory and your
    success.”--Napoleon._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways, My
    ways, saith the Lord.”--Holy Bible._


_By authority indisputable, the ex-cathedra dictum of the greatest of the
Great Captains, we have been informed that the higher processes of the
military system, eternally will remain unchanged._

_As a necessary corollary, it follows that these processes always have
been and always will be comprehended and employed by every great Captain._

_Equally, it is self-evident, that capability to comprehend these higher
processes, united with ability properly to utilize them to win battles
and campaigns, constitutes genius for Warfare._

Moreover, we are further informed by the same unimpeachable authority,
that so irresistible is genius for warfare, that united to courage, it
is formidable beyond the united financial and military resources of the
State. In corroboration of this, we have the testimony of well-qualified
judges. Says the Count de Saxe:

“Unless a man is born with talent for war and this talent is brought
to perfection, it is impossible for him to be more than an indifferent
general.”

       *       *       *       *       *

In these days, more or less degenerate from the soldierly standpoint, the
fantastic sophistries of Helvetius have vogue, and most people believe
book-learning to be all-in-all.

Many are so weak-minded, as really to believe, that because born in
the Twentieth Century, they necessarily are the repository of all
the virtues, and particularly of all the knowledge acquired by their
ancestors from remotest generations. Few seem to understand that the
child, even of ultra-modern conditions, is born just as ignorant and
often invincibly so, as were the sons of Ham, Shem and Japhet, and most
appear to be unaware, that:

_Only by intelligent reflection upon their own experience and upon the
experiences of others, can one acquire knowledge._

The triviality of crowding the memory with things that may or may not be
true, is the merest mimicry of education.

Real education is nothing more than the fruit of experience; and he who
acts in conformity to such knowledge, alone is wise. Thus to act, implies
ability to comprehend. But there are those in whom capability is limited;
hence, all may not be wise who wish to be so, and these necessarily
remain through life very much as they are born.

The use of knowledge would be infinitely more certain, if our
understanding of its accurate application were as extensive as our needs
require. We have only a few ideas of the attributes of matter and of the
laws of mechanics, out of an infinite number of secrets which mankind
never can hope to discover. This renders our feeble adaptations in
practice of the knowledge we possess, oftimes inadequate for the result
we desire; and it seems obvious that if Nature had intended man to attain
to the superlative, she would have endowed him with intelligence and have
communicated to him information, infinitely superior to that we possess.

The universal blunder of mankind arises from an hallucination that all
minds are created equal; and that by mere book-learning, _i.e._, simply
by memorizing what somebody says are facts it is possible for any man to
attain to superior and even to superlative ability.

       *       *       *       *       *

Such profoundly, but utterly mis-educated people, not unnaturally may
inquire, by what right speaks the eminent warrior previously quoted.
These properly may be informed in the words of Frederic the Great:

    “_The Count de Saxe is the hero of the bravest action ever done
    by man._” viz.,

A great battle was raging.

Within a magnificent Pavilion in the centre of the French camp, the King,
the nobility and the high Ecclesiastics of the realm were grouped about a
plain iron cot.

Prone upon this cot, wasted by disease, lay the Count de Saxe, in that
stupor which often precedes and usually presages dissolution.

The last rites of the Church had been administered, and the assemblage in
silence and apprehension, awaited the approach of a victorious enemy and
the final gasp of a general who had never lost a battle.

The din of strife drawing nearer, penetrated the coma which enshrouded
the soul of the great Field-Marshal.

Saxe opened his eyes. His experienced ear told him that his army, routed
and disordered, was flying before an exultant enemy.

The giant whose pastime it was to tear horseshoes in twain with his bare
hands and to twist nails into corkscrews with his fingers, staggered to
his feet, hoarsely articulating fierce and mandatory ejaculations.

Hastily clothed, the Count de Saxe was placed in a litter and borne out
of his pavilion into that chaos of ruin and carnage which invariably
accompanies a lost battle. Around him, behind and in front, swarmed his
broken battalions and disorganized squadrons; while in pursuit advanced
majestically in solid column, the triumphant English.

Saxe demanded his horse and armor.

Clad in iron and supported in the saddle on either hand, this modern
Achilles galloped to the front of his army; then, at the head of the
Scotch Guards, the Irish Brigade, and French Household troops, Saxe in
person, led that series of terrific hand-to-hand onslaughts which drove
the English army from the field of battle, and gained the famous victory
of Fontenoy.

       *       *       *       *       *

“Furthermore,” declares this illustrious Generalissimo of Louis XIV;

    “_It is possible to make war without trusting anything to
    accident; this is the highest point of skill and perfection
    within the province of a general._”

“Most men,” writes Vergetius, “imagine that strength and courage are
sufficient to secure victory. Such are ignorant that when they exist,
stratagem vanquishes strength and skill overcomes courage.”

In his celebrated work, _Institutorum Rei Militaris_, that source from
whence all writers derive their best knowledge of the military methods
of the ancients; and by means of which, he strove to revive in his
degenerate countrymen that intelligent valor which distinguishes their
great ancestors--the famous Roman reiterates this solemn warning:

    “Victory in war depends not on numbers, nor on courage; skill and
    discipline only, can ensure it.”

The emphasis thus laid by these great warriors on genius for warfare is
still further accentuated by men whose dicta few will dispute, viz.,

    “The understanding of the Commander,” says Frederic the Great,
    “has more influence on the outcome of the battle or campaign,
    than has the prowess of his troops.”

Says Napoleon:

    “The general is the head, the whole of an army. It was not the
    Roman army that subjugated Gaul, it was Caesar; nor was it the
    Carthagenian army that made the Republic tremble to the gates
    of Rome, it was Hannibal; it was not the Macedonian army which
    reached the Indus, it was Alexander; it was not the French army
    which carried war to the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne; it
    was not the Prussian army which for seven years defended Prussia
    against the three strongest powers of Europe, it was Frederic the
    Great.”

From such opinions by men whose careers evince superlative knowledge of
the subject, it is clear, that:

    I. _There exists a system of Strategetics common to all great
    commanders_;

    II. _That understanding of this system is shown by the skillful
    use of it_;

    III. _That such skill is derived from innate capability_;

    IV. _That those endowed by Nature with this talent, must bring
    their gifts to perfection, by intelligent study_.

So abstruse are the processes of this greatest of all professions, that
comprehension of it has been evidenced by eleven men only, viz.:

Epaminondas, Alexander, Caesar, Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne,
Eugene, Frederic, Washington, Napoleon, Von Moltke.

Comprehension of this system can be attained, only by innate capability
brought to perfection by intelligent study of the words and achievements
of these great Captains.

For life is so short and our memories in general so defective, that we
ought to seek instruction only from the purest sources.

None but men endowed by Nature with the military mind and trained in the
school of the great Captains, are able to write intelligently on the acts
and motives of generals of the first order. All the writings of mere
literati relative to these uncommon men, no matter how excellent such
authors may be, never can rise to anything more than elegant phraseology.

It is of enlightened critics, such as the former, that the youthful
student always is first in need. Such will guide him along a road, in
which he who has no conductor may easily lose himself. They will correct
his blunders considerately, recollecting that should these be ridiculed
or treated with severity, talent might be stifled which might hereafter
bloom to perfection.

It is a difficult matter to form the average student, and to impart to
him that degree of intelligent audacity and confident prudence which is
requisite for the proper practice of the Art of Strategetics.

To secure proficiency, the student from the beginning must cheerfully
submit himself to a mental discipline, which properly may be termed
severe; in order to make his faculties obedient to his will.

Secondly, he must regularly exercise these faculties, in order to make
them active and to acquire the habit of implicitly conforming to the laws
of the Art; to make himself familiar with its processes, and to establish
in his mind that confidence in its practice which can come only through
experience.

The student daily should exercise his mind in the routine of deployments,
developments, evolutions, manoeuvres, and operations, both on the
offensive and on the defensive. These exercises should be imprinted on
the memory by closely reviewing the lesson of the previous day.

Even with all this severe and constant effort, time is necessary for
practical tactics to become habitual; for the student must become so
familiar with these movements and formations that he can execute them
instantly and with precision.

To acquire this degree of perfection, much study is necessary; it is a
mistake to think otherwise. But this study is its own sufficient reward,
for the student soon will find that it has extended his ideas, and _that
he is beginning to think in the GREAT_.

At the same time the student should thoroughly instruct himself in
military history, topography, logic, mathematics, and the science of
fortification. With all of these the strategist must be familiar.

But his chief aim must be to perfect his judgment and to bring it to the
highest degree of broadness and exactness.

This is best done by contemplation of the works of the Great Masters.

The past history of Chess-play, is the true school for those who aspire
to precedence in the Royal Game. It is their first duty to inform
themselves of the processes of the great in every age, in order to shun
their errors and to avail of their methods.

It is essential to grasp that system of play common to the Masters; to
pursue it step by step. Particularly is it necessary to learn that he who
can best deduce consequences in situations whose outcome is in doubt,
is the competitor who will carry off the prize from others who act less
rationally than himself.

Especially, should the student be wary in regard to what is termed chess
analysis, as applied to the so-called “openings” and to the mid-game.
Most chess analysts are compilers of falsities occasionally interspersed
with truth. Among the prodigious number of variations which they pretend
to establish or refute, none may be implicitly relied on in actual play;
few are of value except for merely elementary purposes, and many are
fallacies fatal to the user.

The reason for this is: whenever men invited by curiosity, seek to
examine circumstantially even the less intricate situations on the
Chess-board, they at once become lost in a labyrinth abounding in
obscurities and contradictions. Those, who ignorant of the synthetic
method of calculation, are compelled to depend upon their analytic
powers, quickly find that these, on account of the number of unknown
quantities, are utterly inadequate.

Any attempt to calculate the true move in Chess-play by analysis, other
than in situations devoid of unknown quantities, is futile.

Yet it is of such folly that the mediocre mind is most enamoured.
Content with seeing much, it is oblivious to what it cannot see; and the
analytical system consists merely in claiming that there is nothing to
see, other than what it does see.

This is that slender reed upon which the so-called “chess-analyst” hangs
his claims, oblivious to the basic truth that in analysis, unless all is
known, nothing is known.

Many delude themselves to the contrary and strive to arrive at correct
conclusions without first having arranged clearly before their minds all
the facts.

Hence, their opinions and judgments, being founded in ignorance of
all the facts, are to that extent defective; and their conclusions
necessarily wrong.

Through action taken upon incomplete knowledge, men are beguiled into
error; and it is to such unreason that most human catastrophes are to be
attributed.

       *       *       *       *       *

Most of those who attempt to write on Strategetics, and whether applied
to Chess-play or to Warfare, very quickly are compelled to seek refuge in
vague phrases; in order to conceal their uncertain grasp on the subject
discussed. The uninformed believe in them, because of their reputation,
and are satisfied that the thing is so, without understanding _WHY_.

Words intended to convey instruction, should not be used except in their
proper meaning. Each word should be defined for the student and its use
regulated. The true use of words being established, there is no longer
danger from a play upon them; or, from different and confused ideas
annexed to them, either by the persons who read, or who employ them.

By means of this warning, the student easily may detect the empty
mouthings of enthusiastic inexperience, and equally so, the casuistries
of the subtle expert; who often uses language merely to conceal from
youthful talent, knowledge which if imparted, might be fatal to his
domination.

As the student progresses toward proficiency, he, sooner or later, will
come to realize, that of all disgusting things, to a mind which revolts
at nonsense, reasoning ill is the worst.

It is distressing, to be afflicted with the absurdities of men, who,
victims of the fancy, confound enthusiasm with capability and mistake
mania for talent. The world is full of such people, who, in all honesty
thinking themselves philosophers, are only visionaries enamoured of their
own lunatic illusions.

The true discipline for the student who aspires to proficiency at
Chess-play, is, in every succeeding game, to imitate more closely the
play of the Great Masters; and to endeavor to take his measures with more
attention and judgment than in any preceding.

Every player at Chess has defects; many have very great ones. In
searching for these one should not treat himself tenderly, and when
examining his faults, he should grant himself no quarter.

Particularly should the student cultivate confidence in and rigidly
adhere to the standard of skill, as interpreted by that immutable System
of Chess-play, of which Morphy is the unapproachable and all-sufficient
exponent.

Observing the lack of method displayed by the incompetent
Chess-commander, the student of this system will remark with
astonishment, the want of plan and the entire absence of co-operation
between the various Chessic corps d’armee, which under such leadership
are incapable of a general effort.

How dense is such a leader in the selection of a project, how slow and
slovenly in its execution; how many opportunities does he suffer to
escape him and how many enormous faults does he not commit? To such
things, the numerically weaker but more skillful opponent, often is
indebted for safety and ultimately for success.

One who is opposed by such blockheads, necessarily must gain advantages
continually; for conduct so opposite to all the laws of the Art, is, in
itself, sufficient to incur ruin. It is for such negligence on his own
part that one often has cause bitterly to reproach himself. But such
errors, especially on the part of great players, are exemplary lessons
for the student, who from them may learn to be more prudent, circumspect,
and wise.

       *       *       *       *       *

Those who make a mere pastime of Chess, who have no desire for the true
benefit of the game, do not deserve information.

Such people are more numerous than may be supposed. They have few
coherent ideas and are usually influenced by mere chatter and by writers
whose sole excuse is enthusiasm.

These players at the game cannot benefit by example. The follies
of others afford them no useful lesson. Each generation of such
“wood-shifters,” has blindly followed in the footsteps of those preceding
and daily is guilty of errors which times innumerable have been fully
exposed.

It is the darling habit of such folk to treat the great things in Chess
with levity and to dignify those insignificant matters which appertain to
the game when used as a plaything.

Such people are merely enthusiastic; usually they are equally frivolous.
They do everything from fancy, nothing from design. Their zeal is strong,
but they can neither regulate nor control it.

Such bear about their Chessic disabilities in their character. Inflated
in good fortune, groveling in adversity, these players never attain to
that sage contemplation, which renders the scientific practice of Chess
so indescribably beautiful.

There is another class of Chess-players who from mere levity of mind are
incapable of steadily pursuing any fixed plan; but who overturn, move by
move, even such advantages as their good fortune may have procured. There
are others, who, although possessed of great vivacity of mind and eager
for information, yet lack that patience necessary to receive instruction.

Lastly, there are not a few whose way of thinking and the validity of
whose calculations, depend upon their good or ill digestion.

It is in vain that such people endeavor to divine things beyond their
understanding. Hence it is, that among those incapable of thought, or
too indolent for mental effort, the game proceeds in easy fashion until
routine is over. Afterward, at each move, the most probable conjecture
passes for the best reason and victory ultimately rests with him whose
blunders are least immediately consequential.

       *       *       *       *       *

Understanding of high art is dispensed only to the few; the great mass
neither can comprehend nor enjoy it. In spite of the good natured
Helvetius, all are not wise who wish to be so and men ever will remain
what Nature made them. It is impossible for the stream to rise higher
than its source.

“The progress of human reason,” writes the great Frederic, “is more slow
than is imagined; the true cause of which is that most men are satisfied
with vague notions of things and but few take time for examination and
deep inquiry.

“Some, fettered by prejudice from their infancy, wish not, or are unable
to break their chains; others, delighting in frivolity know not a word
of mathematics and enjoy life without allowing their pleasures to be
interrupted by a moment of reflection. Should one thinking man in a
thousand be discovered it will be much; and it is for him that men of
talent write.

“The rest naturally are offended, for nothing so enrages the mediocre
mind as to be compelled to admit to itself its own inferiority.
Consequently, they consign book, author, and reader conjointly to Satan.
So much easier is it to condemn than to refute, or to learn.”

       *       *       *       *       *

The early success of many young students does not permit them to observe
that they often have departed from the rules of the Art. As they have
escaped punishment for their errors, they remain unacquainted with the
dangers to which they were exposed. Constant good fortune finally makes
them over-confident and they do not suspect it necessary to change their
measures, even when in the presence of an able foe.

Thus, the youthful tyro, inconsiderate, inconsistent, and turbulent, and
oblivious to the innumerable dangers by which he is surrounded, plays
his pieces hither and thither, as fancy and inclination dictate, culling
bouquets of the most gorgeous flowers of the imagination; thoughtless of
the future and perfectly happy because he cannot reflect.

To reason exactly, the student first must rid his mind of all
preconceived notions; he must regard the matter under consideration
as a blank sheet of paper, upon which nothing is to be written save
those things which by the processes of logic and demonstration, are
established as facts.

There is much difference between the Art of Logic and mere conjecture.

The calculations of arithmeticians, though rigorous and exact, are never
difficult; because they relate to known quantities and to the palpable
objects of nature. But when it is required to argue from combining
circumstances, the least ignorance of uncertain and obscure facts breaks
the chain and we are deceived every moment.

This is no defect of the understanding, but error arising from plausible
ideas, which wear the face of and are too quickly accepted for truth.
A long chapter can be written on the different ways in which men lose
themselves in their conjectures. Innumerable examples of this are not
wanting, and all because they have suffered themselves to be hurried away
and thus to be precipitate in drawing their conclusions.

The part that the General, whether in Chess-play or in Warfare, has
to act, always is more difficult because he must not permit himself
the least mistake, but is bound to behave with prudence and sagacity
throughout a long series of intricate processes. A single false
deduction, or a movement of the enemy unintelligible to a commander,
may lead him to commit an irremediable error; and in cases wherein the
situation is beyond comprehension, his ignorance is invincible.

For however extensive the human mind may be, it never is sufficiently so
to penetrate those minute combinations necessary to be developed in order
to foresee and regulate events, the sequence, utility and even existence
of which, depend upon future contingencies.

Incidents which are past, can be explained clearly, because the reasons
therefor are manifest. But men easily deceive themselves concerning the
future, which, by a veil of innumerable and impenetrable secondary
causes, is concealed from the most prying inspection.

In such situations, how puerile are the projects even of the greatest
Strategist. To him, as much as to the tyro, is the future hidden; he
knows not what shall happen, even on the next move. How then may he
foresee those situations which secondary causes later may produce?

Circumstances most often oblige him to act contrary to his wishes; and
in the flux and reflux of fortune, it is the part of prudence to conform
to system and to act with consistency. It is impossible to foresee all
events.

       *       *       *       *       *

“It is not possible,” writes the Count de Saxe, “to establish a
system without first being acquainted with the _principles_ that must
necessarily support it.”

In corroboration of this is the opinion of Frederic the Great:

“Condemned by my unfortunate stars to philosophies on contingencies and
on probabilities I employ my whole attention to examine the _principle_
on which my argument must rest and to procure all possible information on
that point. Deprived of such precaution, the edifice I erect, wanting a
base, would fall like a house of cards.”

Everyone who does not proceed on principle, is inconsistent in his
conduct. Equally so, whenever the principle on which one acts is false,
_i.e._, does not apply to the existing situation; all deductions based
thereon, if applied to the existing situation, necessarily are false.

“Those principles which the Art of Warfare prescribes, never should be
departed from,” writes Frederic the Great, “and generals rigidly should
adhere to those circumspections and never swerve from implicit obedience
to laws, upon whose exact observance depends the safety of their armies
and the success of their projects.”

Thus the student will clearly see that all other calculations, though
never so ingeniously imagined, are of small worth in comparison with
comprehension of the use of Strategetic principles. By means of these
latter, we are taught to control the raging forces which dominate in the
competitive arts and to compel obedience from friend and foe alike.

“To the shame of humanity it must be confessed,” writes Frederic the
Great, “that what often passes for authority and consequence is mere
assumption, used as a cloak to conceal from the layman the extreme of
official indolence and stupidity.

“To follow the routine of service, to be busied concerning food and
clothing, and to eat when others eat, to fight when others fight, are the
whole warlike deeds of the majority and constitute what is called having
seen service and grown grey in arms.

“The reason why so many officers remain in a state of mediocrity, is
because they neither know, nor trouble themselves to inquire into the
causes either of their victories or defeats, although such causes are
exceedingly real.”

In this connection, writes Polybius, the friend and biographer of
Hannibal:

“Having made ourselves masters of the subject of Warfare, we shall no
longer ascribe success to Fortune and blindly applaud mere conquerors,
as the ignorant do; but we shall approve and condemn from Principle and
Reason.”

To the Chess-student nothing can be more conclusive than the following:

“My success at Chess-play,” writes Paul Morphy, “is due to rigid
adherence to fixed rules and Principles.”

       *       *       *       *       *

_“Chess is best fought on Principles, free from all deception and
trickery.”--Wilhelm Steinitz._




GRAND RECONNAISSANCE

    _“Man can sway the future, only by foreseeing through a clear
    understanding of the present, to what far off end matters are
    tending.”--Caesar._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“From the erroneous ideas they form in regard to good and evil,
    the ignorant, the mis-educated and the inexperienced always act
    without precisely knowing what they ought to desire, or what they
    ought to fear; and it is not in the end they propose, but in the
    choice of means, that most deceive themselves.”--Aristotle._




GRAND RECONNAISSANCE

    _“In every situation the principal strategical requirements must
    clearly be defined and all other things must be subordinated to
    these considerations.”--Frederic the Great._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“One should seek to obtain a knowledge of causes, rather than
    of effects; and should endeavor to reason from the known, to the
    unknown.”--Euclid._


_The province of Grand Reconnaissance is exactly to determine the
relative advantages and disadvantages in time, numbers, organization,
topography, mobility and position, which appertain to hostile armies
contained in the same strategetic plane; and to designate those Corps
d’armee by which such advantages are materially expressed._

Those processes which appertain to the making of Grand Reconnaissance,
necessarily are argumentative; inasmuch as all the facts never are
determinate.

Consequently, talent of the highest order is required for the deducing
of conclusions which never can be based upon exact knowledge, and which
always must contemplate the presence of numerous unknown quantities.

The responsibilities inherent to Grand Reconnaissance never are to be
delegated to, nor thrust upon subordinates. Scouts, spies, and informers
of every kind, have their manifold and proper uses, but such uses never
rise above furnishing necessary information in regard to topographical,
tactical, and logistic details.

The Commander-in-chief alone is presumed to possess knowledge and skill
requisite to discern what strategetically is fact and what is not fact;
and to ascribe to each fact its proper place and sequence.

Lack of military talent and of Strategetic knowledge, never is more
strikingly shown than by negligence or inability in this regard.

Incompetents, ignorant of this truth, and oblivious to its importance,
devolve such vital responsibility upon subordinates; and later, these
legalized murderers palliate the slaughter of their troops and the
national shame by publicly reprimanding men serving at shillings per
month, for failing in a service, which were the latter able to perform,
would entitle them to the gold epaulets and general’s pay, of which their
commander is the unfit recipient.

       *       *       *       *       *

Knowledge of the number, organization, position and movements of the
enemy’s troops is the basic element for correct calculation in campaign
and battle.

Such things to be accurately estimated must be closely inspected.
All speculation and all conjecture in regard to these matters is but
frivolity.

It is by being precipitate and hasty in making such conclusions, that men
are deceived, for to judge rightly of things before they become clearly
shown is most difficult.

_To act on uncertainty is WRONG._

We do not know all the facts and a single iota of light later on may
oblige us to condemn that which we previously have approved.

       *       *       *       *       *

In the making of Grand Reconnaissance, one always must be wary of placing
too much confidence in appearances and in first impressions. Especially
must care be taken not to magnify the weaknesses of the hostile army, nor
the efficacy of the kindred position.

Also, one never should underrate:

    1. The talents of the opposing commander; nor

    2. The advantages possessed by the opposing army:

    (a) In numbers,

    (b) In organization,

    (c) In position,

    (d) In topography,

    (e) In time,

    (f) In mobility.

It is a first essential, constantly to note the movements of the enemy,
in order to detect his plans and the exact location of his corps.

These things are the only reliable guides for determining the true course
of procedure. It must be left to the enemy to show by his movements and
the posts which he occupies, the measures he projects for the future, and
until these are known, it is not proper to _ACT_. Hence:


PRINCIPLE

_All movements of Corps Offensive should be governed by the POSITION of
the hostile army, and all movements of Corps Defensive should be governed
by the MOVEMENTS of the hostile army._

As soon as the enemy begins a movement, his intentions become clear. It
is then possible to make precise calculations.

But be not hasty to build conclusions upon uncertain information and
do not take any resolutions until certain what are the numbers, the
position, the objectives, and the projects of the enemy.

However interesting an undertaking may appear, one should not be seduced
by it while ill-informed of the obstacles to be met and the possibility
of not having sufficient force in the theatre of action.

Chimerical schemes should be abandoned at their inception. Reason,
instead of extravagancies of the fancy, always must be the guide. Men,
most courageous, often undertake fearful difficulties, but impracticable
things they leave to lunatics.

In all situations, one must beware of venturing beyond his depth. It is
wiser to keep within the limits which the knowledge we possess shall
prescribe.

Especially in crises, one must proceed most cautiously until sure
information is acquired; for over-haste is exceedingly dangerous,
when exact knowledge is lacking of the enemy’s numbers, position, and
movements.


PRINCIPLE

_Situations always should be contemplated as they EXIST, never as they
OUGHT to be, or, perhaps, MAY be._

In every important juncture, each step must be profoundly considered; as
little as possible should be left to chance.

Particularly, must one never be inflated and rendered careless and
negligent by success; nor made spiritless and fearful by reverses. At all
times the General should see things only as they are and attempt what
is dictated by that Strategetic Principle which dominates the given
situation. Fortune often does the rest.

       *       *       *       *       *

_“Napoleon bending over and sometimes lying at full length upon his
map, with a pair of dividers opened to a distance on the scale of from
17 to 20 miles, equal to 22 to 25 miles over country, and marking the
positions of his own and of the hostile armies by sticking into the map
pins surmounted by little balls made of diverse colored sealing wax; in
the twinkling of an eye calculated those wonderful concentrations of his
Corps d’armee upon decisive points and dictated those instructions to his
Marshals which in themselves are a title to glory.”--Baron de Jomini._


MILITARY EXAMPLES

    _“Phillip, King of Macedonia, is the single confidant of his
    own secrets, the sole dispenser of his treasure, the most able
    general of all Greece, the bravest soldier in his army. He
    foresees and executes everything himself; anticipates events,
    derives all possible advantages from them and yields to them when
    to yield is necessary._

    _His troops are extremely well disciplined, he exercises them
    incessantly. Always himself at their head, they perform with
    arms and baggage marches of three hundred stadia with alarming
    expedition and making no difference between summer or winter,
    between fatigue and rest._

    _He takes no step without mature reflection, nor proceeds to a
    second until he is assured of the success of the first and his
    operations are always dominated by considerations of time and
    place.”--Apollodorus._

The facility with which one familiar with the Strategetic Art may make
Grand Reconnaissance, even of an invisible theatre of action, and may
evolve accurate deductions from a mass of inexact and contradictory
reports is illustrated by the following practical examples, viz.:


FIRST EXAMPLE.

(From the _New York Journal_, Dec. 26, 1899 By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“The position of the British armies is deplorable.

“With the single exception of Gen. Buller’s force, the situation of these
bodies of British troops, thus unfortunately circumstanced, is cause for
the greatest anxiety.

“Strong indications point to a grand offensive movement on the part of
the Boers, with the object of terminating the war in one campaign and by
a single blow.

“True, this movement may be but a feint, but if it be a true movement, it
is difficult to over-estimate the gravity of the situation of the British
in South Africa.

“For if this movement is a true military movement, it shows as clearly
as the sun in the sky to those who know the Strategetic Art, that the
Boer armies are in transition from the defensive to an offensive plan of
campaign, with the purpose of capturing DeArr and from thence advancing
in force against the chief British depot, Capetown.”

       *       *       *       *       *

The United States War Department, _Report on the British-Boer War_,
published June 14, 1901, contains the following:

(By =Capt. S. L’H. Slocum=, December 25, 1899. U. S. Military Attache
with the British Army.)

“I consider the present situation to be the most critical for the English
forces, since hostilities began. Should the Boers assume offensive
operations, the English armies with their long and thinly guarded lines
of communication, would be placed in great jeopardy.”

       *       *       *       *       *

(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, war correspondent with Gen. Buller and Lord
Roberts in the South African Campaign. MacMillan & Co., 1902.)

“Had the defence (of Cape Colony) been entrusted to less capable hands
than those of Gen. French, who, with a mere handful of troops succeeded
not only in checking the Boer advance, but in driving them back on
Colesberg, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the enemy would have
been able to push on south and west to Craddock and Hex River range and
thus bring about a state of affairs which might have shaken British rule
in South Africa to its foundation.”


SECOND EXAMPLE.

(_Boston Globe_, Jan. 12, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“Lord Roberts’ first object will be the rescue of Lord Methuen’s army now
blockaded near Magersfontein by Gen. Conje.

“As the first step to effect this, the British commander-in-chief at once
and with all his force, will occupy the line from Naauwpoort to De Arr.
There, he will await the arrival of twenty-two transports now en route
from England.

“With these reinforcements, he will advance directly to the Modder River
by the route previously taken by Lord Methuen.”

       *       *       *       *       *

(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, Sp. Cor. British Army.)

“Slow to recognize their opportunities, the enemy were still in the midst
of preparation, when Gen. French reached De Arr. Meanwhile a detachment
under Major McCracken occupied Naauwpoort, to which place thirty days’
supplies for 3000 men and 1100 animals had been ordered.

“In the ten weeks of fighting which ensued, prior to the arrival of the
British main army, Gen. French by his skillful tactics held a powerful
force of Boers at bay, checked their descent into the southern part of
the colony, defeated their attempt to display the Vierkleur across the
cape peninsular, and materially influenced, if not absolutely determined,
the entire future of the campaign.”

       *       *       *       *       *

(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, Sp. Cor. with British Army.)

“Arriving at Capetown on Jan. 10, Lord Roberts decided that the line of
march should lead by way of Bloemfontein to Pretoria, initiating the
operation by the concentration of large forces on the Modder River,
forming there an advanced base.”


THIRD EXAMPLE.

(_Boston Globe_, Jan. 21, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“It is plain that when the Boers took position at Colenso they prepared
their plan for the protection of their flanks; to deny this would be to
assume that men who had displayed superb military sagacity were ignorant
of the simplest processes of warfare.

“What that plan is will be unfolded very rapidly should Gen. Buller
attempt to pierce the line of Boer vedettes posted upon the Spion Kop and
concealing as near as can be determined from the present meagre facts,
either the Second, or the Fourth Ambuscade.

“In either case it signifies that the Boers are confident of annihilating
Gen. Buller’s army if it should cross the Tugela.

“About this time the Boers are watching Gen. Warren and his command and
watching him intently. Something may happen to him.”

       *       *       *       *       *

(_London Times_, Jan. 22, 1900.)

“On Friday, Jan. 19, Gen. Warren began a long, circuitous march to the
westward for the purpose of turning the right of the Boer position.

“This attempt was abandoned on account of the long ridge running from
Spion Kop being occupied by the Boers in such strength as to command the
entire route.

“Saturday, Jan. 20, Gen. Warren, having crossed the Tugela River with the
bulk of his troops, ordered a frontal attack. Our men behaved splendidly
under a heavy cross-fire for seven hours. Our casualties were slight.
Three lines of rifle fire[1] were visible along the Boer main position.”

[1] The Second Ambuscade. Vide “Secret Instructions” of Frederic the
Great.

       *       *       *       *       *

(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 22, 1900.)

“Gen. Warren has been engaged all day chiefly on his left, which he has
swung forward a couple of miles.”

                                                  (Signed)      _Buller._

       *       *       *       *       *

(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 24, 1900.)

“Gen. Warren holds the position he gained two days ago. The Boer position
is on higher ground than ours and can be approached only over bare and
open slopes. An attempt will be made tonight to seize Spion Kop.”

                                                  (Signed)      _Buller._

       *       *       *       *       *

(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 25, 1900.)

“Gen. Warren’s troops last night occupied Spion Kop, surprising the
small[2] garrison which fled.”

                                                  (Signed)      _Buller._

[2] Merely the outposts and vedettes of the Second Ambuscade.

       *       *       *       *       *

(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 26, 1900.)

“Gen. Warren’s garrison, I am sorry to say, I find this morning had in
the night abandoned Spion Kop.”

                                                  (Signed)      _Buller._

       *       *       *       *       *

(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 28, 1900.)

“I decided that a second attack on Spion Kop was useless[3] and that the
enemy’s right was too strong to allow me to force it. Accordingly I
decided to withdraw the troops to the south side of the Tugela River.”

                                                  (Signed)      _Buller._

[3] The proffer of an untenable post always is the bait of the Second
Ambuscade.

       *       *       *       *       *

(_London Daily Mail_, Jan. 29, 1900.)

“The richest and what was hitherto considered the most powerful nation
in the world is today in the humiliating position of seeing its armies
beaten back with heavy losses by two small states.”


FOURTH EXAMPLE.

(_Boston Globe_, Feb. 16, 1900, by =Franklin K. Young=.)

“Lord Roberts’ communications for nearly two hundred miles are exposed
to the attack of an enemy, who at any moment is liable to capture and
destroy his supply and ammunition trains and to reduce the British army
to a condition wherein it will be obliged to fight a battle under most
disadvantageous circumstances.”

       *       *       *       *       *

(From United States War Department _Report on the British Boer War_. By
=Capt. S. L’H. Slocum=, U. S. Attache with British Army.)

“Feb. 15, 1900. The main supply park of the army was attacked by the
enemy near Watervale Drift.

“This park consisted of one hundred ox-wagons containing rations and one
hundred more wagons filled with ammunition. One hundred and fifty of
these wagons and three thousand oxen were captured by the Boers.

“The loss of these rations and munitions was a most serious blow. Lord
Roberts was here confronted by a crisis which would have staggered and
been the undoing of many commanders-in-chief placed as he was.

“He was in the enemy’s country, cut off from his base of supplies on the
railroad and with an unknown number of the enemy in his rear and upon his
line of communication. His transport was nearly all captured and his army
was suddenly reduced to three days full rations on the eve of a great
movement and the country afforded no food whatever. The crisis still
further developed when a courier brought the report that the Boers were
in position at Watervale Drift and commanding the ford with artillery.”


FIFTH EXAMPLE.

(_Boston Globe_, Feb. 25, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“There is reason to believe that should worse come to worse, the Boer
Army, should it be compelled to abandon its position, will be able to
save its personnel by a rapid flight across the Modder. Of course, in
this case, the Boers would lose their supplies and cannon.”

       *       *       *       *       *

(From United States War Department, _Report on the British Boer War_. By
=Capt. S. L’H. Slocum=, U. S. Attache, with British Army.)

“The enemy, under Cronje, with all his transport was in all practical
effect surrounded, although by abandoning his wagons and supplies, a
large number of the Boers undoubtedly could have escaped.”

       *       *       *       *       *

(_Boston Sunday Times_, March, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“Cronje’s conduct was heroic and imbecile in the extreme. As the
commander on the ground he is entitled to all the glory and must assume
all the blame. One of the ablest of the Boer generals, he is the only one
in the whole war to make a mistake.

“Cronje’s first duty was to decide whether he should stand or run; he
decided to run, which was proper, but having so decided he should have
run at once and not have stopped running until safe on the north bank of
the Vaal River.

“Properly he sent his siege guns and trains off to the north across the
Vaal and improperly held his position in force on the British front,
instead of withdrawing his personnel after his material.

“This blunder, like all blunders of a commander-in-chief, quickly
produced blunders by his subordinates. Commander Ferrera permitted French
to get around Cronje’s left flank without a battle. The presence of this
force on his rear cut Cronje off from his natural line of retreat across
the Vaal and compelled him to flee toward Bloemfontein.

“Even now Cronje was all right; he easily and brilliantly out-manoeuvred
the British and gained the protection of the Modder River. But a second
time he blundered. Instead of first executing Ferrera and then abandoning
everything and devoting all his efforts to saving his men, he neglected
an obvious and imperative military duty and clung to his slow-moving
cannon and wagons.

“Finally he took position on the Modder and resolved to fight the whole
British army. This was fatal.

“Then for the fourth time he blundered. Having made his decision to
fight he should not have surrendered to the British on the anniversary
of Majuba Hill. On the contrary, surrounded by the mightiest army the
British empire ever put in the field and enveloped in the smoke of a
hundred cannon, Cronje, upon a rampart formed by his dead army and with
his last cartridge withstanding the destroyers of his country, would have
presented to posterity a more spectacular and seemingly a more fitting
termination of the career of the Lion of South Africa.”

       *       *       *       *       *

_“Mere hope of attaining their desires, coupled with ignorance of the
processes necessary to their accomplishment, is the common delusion and
the certain destruction of the inexperienced.”--Plato._




ORGANIZATION

    _“To employ in warfare an uninstructed people is to destroy the
    nation.”--Chinese Saying._

       *       *       *       *       *

    Antiochus, King of Syria, reviewing his immense but untrained and
    undisciplined army at Ephesus, asked of Hannibal, “if they were
    not enough for the Romans.”

    “Yes,” replied the great Carthagenian, “enough to glut the
    bloodthirstiness, even of the Romans.”

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“A man in the vigor of life and capable of sustaining the
    heaviest fatigues, but untrained in warfare, is fitted not to
    bear arms, but to bear baggage.”--Timoleon._




ORGANIZATION

    _“The chief distinction between an army and a mob is the good
    order and discipline of the former and the disorderly behavior of
    the latter.”--Washington._

       *       *       *       *       *

    “It is the duty of the commander-in-chief frequently to assemble
    the most prudent and experienced of his generals and to consult
    with them as to the state of his own and of the enemies’ troops.

    “He must examine which army has the better weapons, which is the
    better trained and disciplined; superior in condition and most
    resolute in emergencies.

    “He must note whether himself or the adversary has the superior
    infantry, cavalry or artillery, and particularly must he discern
    any marked lack in quantity and quality of men or horses, and any
    difference in equipment of those corps which necessarily will be
    or because of such reason, advantageously may be opposed to each
    other.

    “Advantages in Organization determine the field of battle to
    be preferred, which latter should be selected with the view of
    profiting to the uttermost by the use of specially equipped
    corps, to whom the enemy is not able to oppose similar troops.

    “If a general finds himself superior to his enemy he must use all
    means to bring on an engagement, but if he sees himself inferior,
    he must avoid battle and endeavor to succeed by surprises,
    stratagems and ambuscades; which last skillfully managed often
    have gained the victory over foemen superior in numbers and in
    strength.”--_Vergetius._


_Advantage in Organization consists in having one or more Corps d’armee
which in equipment or in composition are so superior to the hostile
corps to which they may become opposed, as entails to them exceptional
facilities for the execution of those major tactical evolutions that
appertain to any tactical area made up of corresponding geometric or
sub-geometric symbols._


PRINCIPLE

_Advantage in Organization determines the choice of a prospective
battlefield; and the latter always should be composed of those tactical
areas which permit of the fullest exercise of the powers peculiar to
kindred corps d’armee._

Every corps d’armee thus especially equipped should be constantly and
energetically employed in the prospective battle; and usually it will
eventuate as the Prime Tactical Factor in the decisive Major Tactical
evolution.

       *       *       *       *       *

Notions most mistaken prevail in regard to the Pawns and Pieces of the
Chessboard.

To suppose that the Chessmen _per se_ may be utilized to typify the
different arms of the military service is a fallacy.

Many unfamiliar with the technicalities of Strategetic Science delude
themselves that the Pawns, on account of their slow and limited
movements properly are to be regarded as Infantry; that the Knights
because topped by horses’ heads thereby qualify as light Cavalry; the
Bishops, for reasons unknown, often are held to represent Artillery; the
Rooks, because of their swift, direct and far-reaching movements are
thought to duplicate heavy Cavalry; while the Queen, in most of these
unsophisticated philosophies, is supposed to constitute a Reserve.

Nothing can be further from the truth than such assumptions.

As a fundamental of military organization applied to Chessplay, each
Chesspiece typifies in itself a complete Corps d’armee. Each of these
Chessic corps d’armee is equal to every other in strength, but all
differ, more or less, in construction and in facilities, essential to the
performance of diverse and particular duties.

Thus it is that while every Chesspiece represents a perfectly appointed
and equally powerful body of troops, these corps d’armee in Chessplay as
in scientific warfare are not duplicates, except to others of their own
class. Each of these corps d’armee is made up of Infantry, Cavalry and
Artillery in correct proportion to the service they are to perform and
such proportions are determined not by simple arithmetic, but by those
deployments, developments, evolutions, and manoeuvres, which such corps
d’armee is constructed promptly and efficiently to execute.

The Chessmen, therefore, do not as individuals represent either infantry,
cavalry or artillery.

But in the same manner as the movements of troops over the surface of
the earth, exemplify the attributes of the three kindred grand columns
in the greater logistics of a campaign; so do those peculiarities which
appertain to the moves of the different Chesspieces exemplify the action
of the three chief arms of the military service; either singly or in
combination against given points in given times, in the evolutions of the
battlefield, viz.:


CORPS D’ARMEE EN MARCH.

The march of:

    (_a_) Infantry, alone, or of

    (_b_) Cavalry, alone, or of

    (_c_) Artillery, alone, or of

    (_d_) Infantry and Cavalry, or of

    (_e_) Infantry and Artillery, or of

    (_f_) Cavalry and Artillery, or of

    (_g_) Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery,

is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an
unoccupied adjacent point.

The march of:

    (_a_) Cavalry, alone, or of

    (_b_) Artillery, alone, or of

    (_c_) Cavalry and Artillery,

is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an
unoccupied point, _not_ an adjacent point.


CORPS D’ARMEE EN ASSAULT.

The _Charge of Infantry_ is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece
from a given point to an occupied adjacent point; posting itself thereon
and capturing the adverse piece there located.

The _Charge of Cavalry_ is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece
from a given point to an occupied point _not_ an adjacent point; posting
itself thereon and capturing the adverse piece there located.


CORPS D’ARMEE FIRE EFFECT.

_Infantry:_

_Offensive Fire Effect._ Compelling an adverse piece to withdraw from its
post upon an adjacent occupied point.

_Defensive Fire Effect._ Preventing an adverse piece from occupying an
adjacent unoccupied point.

_Artillery:_

_Offensive Fire Effect._ Compelling an adverse piece to withdraw from its
post upon an occupied point not an adjacent point.

_Defensive Fire Effect._ Preventing an adverse piece from occupying an
unoccupied point not an adjacent point.


CHESSIC CORPS D’ARMEE.

The _Corps d’armee of the Chessboard_ are divided into two classes: viz.:

    I. Corps of Position.

    II. Corps of Evolution.


CORPS D’ARMEE OF POSITION.

    _“The Pawns are the soul of Chess; upon their good or bad
    arrangement depends the gain or loss of the game.”--Philidor._

_The eight Pawns_, by reason of their limited movements, their inability
to move backward and the peculiarity of their offensive and defensive
powers, are best adapted of the Chesspieces to perform those functions
which in the Military Art appertain to Corps of Position.

Each Corps of Position has its particular and designated Point of
Mobilization and of Development, which differ with the various Strategic
Fronts.

Upon each Corps of Position devolves the duties of maintaining itself
as a consistent integer of the established, or projected kindred Pawn
Integral; as a possible kindred Promotable Factor and as a Point of
Impenetrability upon the altitude of an opposing Pawn.

Corps of Position take their individual appelation from their posts in a
given formation, viz.:

    1. Base Corps.

    2. Pivotal Corps.

    3. Minor Vertex Corps.

    4. Minor Corps Aligned.

    5. Major Vertex Corps.

    6. Major Corps Aligned.

    7. Corps Enpotence.

    8. Minor Corps Enceinte.

    9. Major Corps Enceinte.

    10. Corps Echeloned.

    11. Corps En Appui.

    12. Base Corps Refused.

    13. Pivotal Corps Refused.

    14. Minor Vertex Corps Refused.

    15. Minor Corps Aligned Refused.

    16. Major Vertex Corps Refused.

    17. Major Corps Aligned Refused.

    18. Major Corps Refused Enpotence.

    19. Corps en Major Crochet.

    20. Corps en Minor Crochet.

    21. Corps en Crochet Aligned.

    22. Corps Doubly Aligned.

    23. Grand Vertex Corps.

The above formations by Corps of Position are described and illustrated
in detail in preceding text-books by the author, entitled:

    The Minor Tactics of Chess.

    The Grand Tactics of Chess.

The normal use of Corps of Position is limited to Lines of Mobilization,
of Development and to the Simple Line of Manoeuvre.


CORPS D’ARMEE OF EVOLUTION.

    _“Every man in Alexander’s army is so well trained and obedient
    that at a single word of command, officers and soldiers make any
    movement and execute any evolution in the art of warfare._

    _“Only such troops as themselves can check their career and
    oppose their bravery and expertness.”--Caridemus._

_The eight Pieces_, by reason of their ability to move in all directions,
the scope of their movements and the peculiar exercises of their
offensive and defensive powers, are best adapted of the Chesspieces to
perform those functions which in the Military Art appertain to Corps of
Evolution.

_Corps of Evolution_ acting offensively, take their individual
appelations from the points which constitute their objective in the true
Strategetic Horizon, viz.:

    1. Corps of the Right.

    2. Corps of the Centre.

    3. Corps of the Left.

_Corps of Evolution_ acting defensively, take their individual
appelations from the particular duties they are required to perform, viz.:

    1. Supporting Corps.

    2. Covering Corps.

    3. Sustaining Corps.

    4. Corps of Impenetrability.

    5. Corps of Resistance.

The normal use of Corps of Evolution is limited to Lines of Manoeuvre.
When acting on a Simple Line of Manoeuvre, a Corps of Evolution may
deploy on the corresponding Line of Mobilization; but it has nothing in
common with the Line of Development, which latter appertains exclusively
to Corps of Position.

Any corps d’armee, whether of Position or of Evolution may be utilized
upon a Line of Operations.


THE KING.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the King marches as infantry,
cavalry and artillery; but it attacks as infantry exclusively and never
as cavalry or artillery.

Although every situation upon the Chessboard contemplates the presence of
both Kings, either, or neither, or both, may, or may not be present in
any given Strategetic Horizon.

Whenever the King is present in a given Strategetic Horizon the effect of
his co-operation is mathematically outlined, thus:

I. At his maximum of efficiency, the King occupies the centre of a circle
of one point radius. His offensive power is equally valid against all
eight points contained in his circumference, but his defensive power is
valid for the support from a minimum of one point to a maximum of five
points.

II. At his medium of efficiency the King occupies the centre of a
semi-circle of one point radius.

His offensive power is valid against all five points contained in his
semi-circumference, and his defensive power is valid for the support from
a minimum of one, to a maximum of five points.

III. At his minimum of efficiency, the King occupies the centre of a
quadrant of one point radius. Both his offensive and his defensive powers
are valid against all three points contained in his segment.


THE QUEEN.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Queen marches and attacks as
infantry, cavalry and artillery.

Either, neither, or both Queens may be present in any given Strategetic
Horizon; and whenever present the effect of her co-operation
mathematically is outlined, viz.:

At her maximum of efficiency the Queen occupies the common vertex of one
or more unequal triangles, whose aggregate area is from a minimum of 21
to a maximum of 27 points. Her offensive power is equally valid against
all of these points; but her defensive power is valid for the support
from a minimum of one point to a maximum of five points.


THE ROOK.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Rook marches and attacks as
infantry, cavalry and artillery.

From one to four Rooks may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon;
and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is
outlined, viz.:

At her maximum of efficiency, the Rook occupies the common angle of four
quadrilaterals, whose aggregate area always is 14 points. The Offensive
Power of the Rook is equally valid against all these points, but his
defensive power is valid for the support of only two points.


THE BISHOP.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the Bishop marches and attacks as
infantry, cavalry and artillery.

From one to four Bishops may be present in any Strategetic Horizon;
and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is
outlined, viz.:

At its maximum of efficiency, the Bishop occupies the common vertex
of four unequal triangles, having a maximum of 13 and a minimum of 9
points. His offensive power is valid against all of these points but his
defensive power is valid only for the support of two points.


KNIGHT.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Knight marches and attacks as
cavalry and artillery.

From one to four Knights may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon;
and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is
outlined, viz.:

At its maximum of efficiency, the Knight occupies the centre of an
octagon of two points radius, having a minimum of two points and a
maximum of eight points area. His offensive power is equally valid
against all of these eight points, but his defensive power is valid for
the support of only one point.


THE PAWN.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the Pawn at its normal post marches
as infantry and cavalry. Should an adverse corps, however, take post
within the kindred side of the Chessboard; that Pawn upon whose altitude
the adverse Piece appears, at once loses its equestrian attributes and
marches and attacks exclusively as infantry.

Located at any other point than at its normal post, the Pawn is composed
exclusively of infantry and never acts either as cavalry or artillery.

From one to eight Pawns may be present in any Strategetic Horizon;
and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is
outlined as follows:

At its maximum of efficiency the Pawn occupies the vertex of a triangle
of two points. Its offensive power is equally valid against both of these
points; but its defensive power is valid for the support of only one
point.


POTENTIAL COMPLEMENTS.

Subjoined is a table of the potential complements of the Chesspieces.

    The King     6⁹⁄₁₆ units.
    The Queen    22¼     ”
    The Rook     14      ”
    The Bishop   8¾      ”
    The Knight   5¼      ”
    The Pawn     1½      ”

The student clearly should understand that this table does not indicate
prowess, but relates exclusively to normal facilities for bringing force
into action.

       *       *       *       *       *

The relative advantage in Organization possessed by one army over an
opposing army always can be determined by the following, viz.:


_RULE._

1. Above a line, set down in order those abbreviations which properly
designate the White corps d’armee present in a given Strategetic
Situation; and below the line, set down those abbreviations which in like
manner designate the Black corps d’armee, viz.:

    K+Q+R+R+P+P+P+P
    ----------------
    K+Q+R+B+P+P+P+P+P

2. Cancel all like symbols and resolve the unlike symbols remaining, into
their respective Potential complements, viz.:

     R              14
    --- = ------- = ---
    B+P   8¾ + 1½   10¼

3. Subtract the lesser Potential total from the greater and the
difference will be the relative advantage in Organization.

4. To utilize the relative advantage in Organization select a battlefield
in which the Strategic Key, the Tactical Keys and the Points of Command
of the True Strategetic Horizon are situated upon the perimeters of those
geometric and sub-geometric symbols which appertain to the corps d’armee
whose superior potentiality is established by Section 2.

5. To neutralize the relative disadvantage in Organization, occupy the
necessary posts upon the battlefield selected in such a manner that the
kindred decisive points are situated _not_ upon the perimeters of the
geometric and sub-geometric symbols appertaining to the adverse corps
d’armee of superior potentiality; while the adverse decisive points _are_
situated upon the perimeters of the geometric and sub-geometric symbols
which appertain to the kindred corps d’armee of inferior potentiality.


MILITARY EXAMPLES

    _“Men habituated to luxury cannot contend with an army accustomed
    to fatigue and inured to want.”--Caesar._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“That wing with which you propose to engage the enemy should be
    composed of your best troops.”--Epaminondas._

The _Sacred Band_ of the Thebans was composed of men selected for valor
and character. Epaminondas called them _Comrades_ and by honorable
rewards and distinctions induced them to bear without murmur the hardest
fatigues and to confront with intrepidity the greatest dangers.

At Leuctra (371 B.C.) and again at Mantinea (362 B.C.) the right wing
of the Lacedaemonian Army, composed exclusively of Spartans and for six
hundred years invincible, was overthrown and destroyed by the Sacred Band
led by Epaminondas.

This formidable body of Theban warriors was massacred by Alexander the
Great at the Battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.)

       *       *       *       *       *

The _Macedonian Phalanx_ was devised by Philip, King of Macedon. It was
made up of heavy infantry accoutred with cuirass, helmet, greaves, and
shield. The principal weapon was a pike twenty-four feet long.

The Phalanx had a front of two hundred and fifty-six files and a depth of
sixteen ranks. A file of sixteen men was termed Lochos; two files were
called Dilochie; four files made a Tetrarchie; eight files a Taxiarchie
and thirty-two of the last constituted a simple Phalanx of 4096 men.
A grand Phalanx had a front of one thousand and twenty-four files and
a depth of sixteen ranks. It was made up of four simple Phalanxes and
contained 16,384 men.

With this formation of his infantry, Alexander the Great, when eighteen
years of age, destroyed the Allied Athenian--Theban--Boeotian army at
Chaeronea, the hosts of Persia at the river Grancius (334 B.C.) at Issus
(333 B.C.) and Arbela (331 B.C.) and conquered Porus, King of India at
the Hydaspes (326 B.C.).

       *       *       *       *       *

The _Spanish Heavy Cavalry_ and _Nubian Infantry_ of Hannibal was a
reproduction of that Macedonian organization whereby Alexander the Great
had conquered the world.

With this formation Hannibal maintained himself for fifteen years in
the richest provinces of Italy and destroyed seven Roman armies, at the
Trebia (218 B.C.) at Lake Trasymenus (217 B.C.) at Cannae (216 B.C.) and
at Herdonea (212 B.C.) at Herdonea (210 B.C.) at Locri (208 B.C.) and at
Apulia (208 B.C.).

At Zama (202 B.C.) Hannibal’s effacement as a military factor was
directly due to his lack of that organization which had been the
instrument of his previous successes; a circumstance thus commented on by
the victorious Roman commander, Scipio Africanus;

    “Hitherto I have been opposed by an army without a general; now
    they send against me a General without an army.”

       *       *       *       *       *

The _Tenth Legion_ of Caesar was the quintessence of that perfection
in elementary tactics devised by the Romans to accord with the use of
artillery.

The fundamentals of minor tactics as elucidated by Epaminondas and
exploited by Alexander the Great and Hannibal are unchanged in the
Legion, but by subdivision of the simple Phalanx into ten Cohorts, a
necessary and maximum gain in mobility was effected.

The Roman Legion consisted of 6100 infantry and 726 cavalry, divided
into the Militarain Cohort of 1105 heavy foot, 132 Cuirassiers and nine
ordinary Cohorts, each containing 555 heavy foot and 66 Cuirassiers.
The Legion was drawn up in three lines; the first of which was termed
Principes, the second Hastati, and the third Triarii. The infantry were
protected by helmet, cuirass, greaves and shield; their arms were a long
sword, a short sword, five javelins and two large spears.

With this formation Caesar over-run Spain, Gaul, Germany, Britain,
Africa, Greece, and Italy. The Scots alone withstood him and the ruins
of a triple line of Roman entrenchments extending from the North to
the Irish Seas to this day mark the southern boundary of the Scottish
Highlands and the northern limit of Roman dominion.

At Pharseleus, Pompey made the inexplicable blunder of placing his best
troops in his right wing, which was covered by the river Enipeus and
inferior troops on his left wing which was in the air. By its first
charge, the Tenth Legion destroyed the latter, outflanked the entire
Pompeian army, drove it backward into the river and single handed won for
Caesar undisputed dominion of the Earth.

       *       *       *       *       *

The _Scots Volunteers_ of Gustavus Adolphus consisted of two brigades
aggregating about 12,000 foot, made up of Scottish gentlemen who for
various reasons were attracted to the Continental Wars.

At Leipsic, (Sept. 7, 1631) 20,000 Saxons, constituting one-half of the
allied Protestant army, were routed at the first charge, put to flight
and never seen again. Tilly’s victorious right wing then turned upon the
flank of the King’s army. Three regiments of the Scots Volunteers on foot
held in check in open field 12,000 of the best infantry and cavalry in
Europe, until Gustavus had destroyed the Austrian main body and hastened
to their aid with the Swedish heavy cavalry.

The Castle of Oppenheim was garrisoned by 800 Spanish infantry. Gustavus
drew up 2,000 Swedes to escalade the place. Thirty Scots Volunteers,
looking on observed that the Spaniards, intently watching the King had
neglected to guard the opposite side of the fortress. Beckoning to their
aid about a hundred of their comrades, they scaled the wall, captured the
garrison and opened the gates to the king. Gustavus entered on foot, hat
in hand. “My brave Scots,” said he, “you carry in your scabbards, the key
to every castle in Europe.”

       *       *       *       *       *

The _Van-Guard_ of Frederic the Great is the perfect adaptation of the
minor tactics of Epaminondas to gunpowder. This choice body was made
up of the best troops in the army divided into infantry, cuirassiers,
dragoons and light artillery.

The Van-Guard, a miniature army in itself, always marched between the
main body and the enemy; it always led in the attack, followed by that
wing containing the best soldiers, in two lines; and supported by the
heavy cavalry on that flank.

At Rosbach (Nov. 5, 1757) the Prussian Van-Guard, composed of 4,800
infantry, 2,500 cavalry and 30 guns, annihilated 70,000 French regular
troops, by evolutions so rapidly executed that the Prussian main army
was unable to overtake either pursuers or pursued and had no part in the
battle, other than as highly interested spectators.

The _Continentals_ of the Revolutionary army under Washington were made
up of troops enlisted for the war and trained by Baron von Steuben, a
Major-General in the Prussian service, who had served throughout the
Seven Years War under Frederic the Great.

The Continentals, without firing a shot, carried by assault, Stony
Point (July 16, 1779), Paulus Hook (July 20, 1779) and the British
intrenchments at Yorktown (Oct. 19, 1781). Of these troops, the Baron von
Steuben writes:

    “I am satisfied with having shown to those who understand the
    Art of Warfare, an American army worthy of their approbation;
    officers who know their profession and who would do honor to any
    army in Europe; an infantry such as England has never brought
    into the field, soldiers temperate, well-drilled and obedient and
    the equal of any in the world.”

       *       *       *       *       *

The _Consular Guard_ was the reproduction of the Van Guard of Frederic
the Great, but its sphere of action was strangely restricted by
Bonaparte, who, instead of placing his best troops in the front of his
army, as is the practice of all other of the Great Captains; subordinated
their functions to that of a reserve and to personal attendance upon
himself.

This Corps d’elite was but once notably in action; at Marengo (June 14,
1800) it undoubtedly saved the day for France, by maintaining the battle
until the arrival of Gen. Desaix and his division.

       *       *       *       *       *

The _Imperial Guard_ of Napoleon was the development of the Consular
Guard of Bonaparte. Under the Empire the Guard became an independent
army, consisting of light and heavy infantry, horse and field artillery,
cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars and chasseurs, and composed of the best
troops in the French service.

The functions of this fine body, like that of its prototype, was limited
to the duties of a reserve and to attendance upon the person of the
Emperor; and perhaps next to announcement of victory, Napoleon’s favorite
bulletin always read, “The Imperial Guard was not engaged.”

Many were the unavailing remonstrances made by his advisors against this
policy, which judged by the practice of the great masters of warfare, is
putting the cart before the horse; and seemingly is that speck of cloud
in Napoleon’s political sky, which properly may be deemed a precursor of
St. Helena.

At Austerlitz (Dec. 2, 1805), the cuirassiers of the French Imperial
Guard routed a like body of Russian cavalry. At Eylau (Nov. 7, 1807) the
Guard, as at Marengo again saved the day, after the corps d’armee of
Soult and Angereau had been destroyed, by maintaining the battle until
the arrival of Ney and Davoust. In the retreat from Russia (1812) the
Guard then numbering 64,000 men was nearly destroyed. What was left of
it won at Ligny (June 16, 1815), Napoleon’s last victory and at Waterloo
(June 18, 1815), one of its two surviving divisions covered the flight of
the French army, while the other escorted Napoleon in safety to Paris.

       *       *       *       *       *

The _Royal Prussian Guard_, under Von Moltke, was organized and utilized
in accord with the teachings of Frederic the Great.

Its most notable achievement occurred in the campaign of 1870. The right
flank of the French having been turned by the battle of Woerth (Aug.
4, 1870) and Marshal MacMahon’s army being driven to the westward, it
became the paramount object of Von Moltke to seize the country in rear of
Metz and thus prevent the retreat of Marshall Bazine across the Moselle
River.

The Royal Prussian Guard out-marching both friends and enemies first
reached the Nancy road (Aug. 18, 1870) and until the German corps reached
the battlefield this body of picked troops successfully withstood the
assault of nearly the entire French army. In the first half-hour the
Guard lost 8,000 men.

As the result of all this, Marshal Bazine with 150,000 men was forced
back into and taken in the intrenched camp at Metz; and the Emperor
Napoleon III, Marshal MacMahon and a second French army of 140,000 men
was captured at Sedan (Sept. 1, 1870), in an attempt to rescue Marshal
Bazine.

_“I must tell you beforehand this will be a bloody touch. Tilly has a
great army of old lads with iron faces that dare look an enemy in the
eye; they are confident of victory, have never been beaten and do not
know what it means to fly. Tilly tells his men he will beat me and the
old man is as likely to do it as to say it.”--Gustavus Adolphus._

“Tilly’s men were rugged, surly fellows; their faces mangled by wounds
and scars had an air of hardy courage. I observed of them that their
clothes were always dirty, their armor rusty from winter storms and
bruised by musket-balls, their weapons sharp and bright. They were
used to camp in the open fields and to sleep in the frosts and rain.
The horses like the men were strong and hardy and knew by rote their
exercises. Both men and animals so well understood the trade of arms that
a general command was sufficient; every man was fit to command the whole,
and all evolutions were performed in order and with readiness, at a note
of the trumpet or a motion of their banners.

“The 7th of Sept. (1631) before sunrise, the Swedish army marched from
Dieben to a large field about a mile from Leipsic, where we found old
Tilly’s army in full battalia in admirable order, which made a show both
glorious and terrible.

“Tilly, like a fair gamester, had taken up but one side of the plain,
and left the other side clear and all the avenues open to the King’s
approach, nor did he stir to the charge until the Swedish army was
fully drawn up and was advancing toward him. He had with him 44,000 old
soldiers and a better army I believe never was so soundly beaten.…

“Then was made a most dreadful slaughter, and yet there was no flying.
Tilly’s men might be killed or knocked down, but no man turned his back,
nor would give an inch of ground, save as they were marched, wheeled, or
retreated by their officers.… About six o’clock the field was cleared of
the enemy except at one place on the King’s front, where some of them
rallied; and though they knew that all was lost, they would take no
quarter, but fought it out to the last man, being found dead the next day
in rank and file as they were drawn up.”

       *       *       *       *       *

Perfection in Organization is attained when troops instantly and
intelligently act according to order and execute with exactness and
precision any and every prescribed evolution.




TOPOGRAPHY

    _“Let us not consider where we shall give battle, but where we
    may gain the victory.”--Phocion._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“There can be no discretion in a movement which forsakes the
    advantage in ground.”--Gustavus Adolphus._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“That battlefield is best which is adapted to the full use of
    the chief constituents of your army and unfavorable to the mass
    of the enemy.”--Napoleon._




TOPOGRAPHY

    _“The ground is the CHESSBOARD of we cannibals; and it is the
    selection and use made of it, that decides the knowledge or the
    ignorance of those by whom it is occupied.”--Frederic the Great._


_The highest use of Topography consists in reducing a superior adverse
force to the inferior force, by minimizing the radius of action of the
hostile Corps d’armee._

_This is effected by so posting the kindred corps that in the resulting
Strategetic Horizons, impassable natural barriers are presented to the
march of hostile corps toward their respective objectives._

On the surface of the earth such natural barriers are formed by
mountains, rivers, lakes, swamps, forests, deserts, the ocean, and the
boundaries of neutral States.

On the Chess-board these topographical conditions are typified by
peculiarities and limitations in the movements of the Chess-pieces, viz.:

I. The sides of the Chess-board which terminate all movements of the
chess pieces.

II. That limitation of the movements of the Chesspieces which makes it
impossible for them to move other than in straight lines.

III. The inability of the Queen to move on obliques.

IV. The inability of the Rook to move either on obliques or on diagonals.

V. The inability of the Bishop to move either on obliques, verticals, or
horizontals.

VI. The inability of the Knight to move either on diagonals, verticals,
or horizontals, and the limitation of its move to two squares distance.

VII. The inability of the Pawn to move either on obliques or horizontals,
and the limitation of its first move to two squares and of its subsequent
moves to one square.

VIII. The limitation of the King’s move to one square.

These limitations and impediments to the movements of the Chess-pieces,
are equivalent in Chess-play to obstacles interposed by Nature to the
march of troops over the surface of the earth.

Prefect Generalship, in its calculations, so combines these
insurmountable barriers with the relative positions of the contending
armies, that the kindred army becomes at every vital point the superior
force.

This effect is produced by merely causing rivers and mountains to take
the place of kindred Corps d’armee.

It is only by the study of Chessic topography that the tremendous
problems solved by the chess player become manifest:

_Instead of calculations limited to one visible and unchangeable
Chess-board of sixty-four squares, the divinations of the Chess-master
comprehend and harmonize as many invisible Chess-boards as there are
Chess-pieces contained in the Topographical Zone._

Furthermore, all these surfaces differ to the extent and in conformity to
that particular sensible horizon, appertaining to the Chess-piece from
which it emanates.

The enormous difficulties of Chess-play, like those of warfare, arise
from the necessity of combining in a single composite topographical
horizon, all those differing, sensible horizons which appertain, not
merely to the kindred, but also to the hostile corps; and to do this in
such a manner, as to minimize the hostile powers for offence and defence,
by debarring one or more of the hostile pieces from the true Strategetic
Horizon.

_To divide up the enemy’s force, by making natural barriers take the
place of troops, is the basis of those processes which dominate Grand
Manoeuvres._

Of all the deductions of Chess-play and of warfare, such combinations of
Strategy and Topography are the most subtle and intangible. The highest
talent is required in its interpretation, and mastery of it, more than of
any other branch of Strategetics, proclaims the great Captain at war, or
at chess.


TOPOGRAPHY OF THE KING

From the view-point of the _King_, the surface of the Chess-board takes
on the topographical aspect of a vast expanse of open, level country.

This vista is void of insurmountable natural obstacles, other than the
sides and extremities. The latter collectively may be regarded, for
strategical purposes, either as the Ocean, or the boundaries of neutral
States.

To the King, this vast territory is accessible in all directions. At his
pleasure he may move to and occupy either of the sixty-four squares of
the Chess-board, in a minimum of one and in a maximum of seven moves. The
only obstacles to his march are distance and the opposition of an enemy.

The Strategical weakness of the Topographical Horizon peculiar to the
King arises from its always taking on and maintaining the physical form
of a plain. Consequently it is vulnerable to attack from all sides
and what is far worse, it readily is commanded and from a superior
topographical post, by every adverse piece, except the King and Pawn.

Thus, the hostile Queen, without being attacked in return, may enfilade
the King along all verticals, horizontals and diagonals; the Rooks, along
all verticals and horizontals; the Bishops, along all diagonals of like
color; and the Knights along all obliques.


TOPOGRAPHY OF THE QUEEN

From the view-point of the _Queen_, the surface of the Chess-board
takes on the topographical aspect of a series of wide, straight valleys
separated by high, impassable mountain ranges, unfordable rivers, and
impenetrable forests and morasses. These valleys, which number never less
than three, nor more than eight, in the same group, are of varying length
and always converge upon and unite with each other at the point occupied
by the Queen.

These valleys contained in the Queen’s topographical horizon may be
classified, viz.:

Class I, consists of those groups made up of three valleys.

Class II, of those groups made up of five valleys.

Class III, of those groups made up of eight valleys of lesser area; and

Class IV, of those groups made up of eight valleys of greater area.

Groups of the first class always have an area of twenty points; those of
the second have an area of twenty-three points; those of the third have
an area of twenty-five points, and those of the fourth have an area of
twenty-seven points. Such areas always are exclusive of that point upon
which the Queen is posted.

Although impassable natural barriers restrict the movement of the Queen
to less than one-half of the Topographical Zone, these obstacles always
are intersected by long stretches of open country formed by intervening
valleys.

Hence, the march of this most mobile of the Chesspieces always is open
either in three, five, or eight directions, and it always is possible for
her, unless impeded by the interference of kindred or hostile corps, to
reach any desired point on the Chess-board in two moves.

The weakness peculiar to the Topographical Horizon which appertains to
the Queen, originates in the fact that it never commands the origins of
obliques. Consequently, every post of the Queen, is open to unopposed
attack by the hostile Knights.


TOPOGRAPHY OF THE ROOK

From the view-point of the _Rook_, the surface of the Chess-board takes
on a topographical aspect which varies with the post occupied.

Placed at either R1 or R8 the Rook occupies the central point of a great
valley, 15 points in length, which winds around the slope of an immense
and inaccessible mountain range. This latter, in extent, includes the
remainder of the Topographical Zone.

With the Rook placed at R2 or R7, this great mountain wall becomes
pierced by a long valley running at right angles to the first, but the
area open to the movement of the Rook is not increased.

Placed at Kt2, B3, K4, or Q4, the Rook becomes enclosed amid impassable
natural barriers. But although in such cases it always occupies the
point of union of four easily traversed although unequal valleys, its
area of movement is neither increased nor diminished, remaining always at
fourteen points open to occupation.

Unless impeded by the presence of kindred or adverse corps on its
logistic radii, the Rook always may move either in two, three, or four
directions, and it may reach any desired point on the Chess-board in two
moves.

The weakness peculiar to the Topographical Horizon of the Rook lies in
the fact that it never commands the origins of diagonals or obliques.
Hence it is open to unopposed attack along the first from adverse Queen,
King, Bishops and Pawns, and along the second from adverse Knights.


TOPOGRAPHY OF THE BISHOP

From the view-point of the _Bishop_, the surface of the Chess-board takes
on a topographical aspect most forbidding.

To this Chess-piece at least one-half of the Topographical Zone is
inaccessible, and under any circumstances his movements are limited to
the thirty-two squares of his own color.

Thus, the Topographical Horizon of the Bishop takes the form of a broken
country, dotted with high hills, deep lakes, impenetrable swamps, and
thick woodlands. But between these obstacles thus set about by Nature,
run level valleys, varied in extent and easy of access. This fact so
modifies this harshest of all sensible horizons as to make the Bishop
next in activity to the Rook.

Within its limited sphere of action, the Bishop may move in either one or
four directions with a minimum of nine and a maximum of fourteen points
open to his occupation. Unimpeded by other corps blocking his route of
march, the Bishop may reach any desired point of his own color on the
chess board in two moves.

The weakness peculiar to the topographical horizon of the Bishop is its
liability to unopposed attack along verticals and horizontals by the
hostile King, Queen and Rooks; and along obliques by the hostile Knights.


TOPOGRAPHY OF THE KNIGHT

From the view-point of the _Knight_, the surface of the Chess-board takes
on the aspect of a densely wooded and entirely undeveloped country; made
up of a profusion of ponds, rivulets, swamps, etc., none of which are
impassable although sufficient to impede progress.

Unless interfered with by kindred or hostile corps, or the limitations
of the Chess-board, the Knight always may move either in two, four, six,
or eight directions. It may reach any desired point in a minimum of one
and a maximum of six moves, and may occupy the sixty-four squares of the
Chess-board in the same number of marches.

The weakness of the topographical horizon of the Knight lies in the fact
that it never commands adjacent points, nor any of those distant, other
than the termini of its own obliques. Hence it is open to unopposed
attack along verticals and horizontals from the adverse King, Queen and
Rooks, and along diagonals from the adverse King, Queen, Bishop and Pawns.


TOPOGRAPHY OF THE PAWN

From the point of view of the _Pawn_, the surface of the Chess-board
takes on the topographical aspect of a country which as it is entered,
constantly becomes wilder and more rugged.

The march of the Pawn always is along a valley situated between
impracticable natural barriers, and the possible movements of the Pawn
always decrease as the distance traveled increases.

Unhindered by either kindred or hostile corps, the Pawn may reach any
point of junction in the kindred Logistic Horizon, which is contained
within its altitude, in a minimum of five and in a maximum of six moves.
It may march only in one direction, except in capturing, when it may
acquire the option of acting in three directions.

The weakness of the topographical horizon of the Pawn originates in its
inability to command the adjacent country. Therefore, it is exposed to
unopposed attack along verticals and horizontals by the hostile King,
Queen and Rooks; along diagonals by the adverse King, Queen and Bishops,
and along obliques by the adverse Knights.


TOPOGRAPHY OF THE TOPOGRAPHICAL ZONE

That normal and visible surface of the _Chess-board_ termed the
Topographical Zone is bounded by four great natural barriers, impassable
to any Chess-piece.

The two sides of the zone may be held to typify either the Ocean or the
boundaries of neutral States. The two extremities of the Chess-board
while holding the previously announced relation to Chess-pieces contained
in the Topographical Zone, also holds another and radically different
relation to those Chess-pieces _not_ contained in the Topographical Zone,
viz.:

In the latter case, the two extremities of the chessboard are to be
regarded as two great mountain ranges, each of which is pierced by eight
defiles, the latter being the sixteen points of junction contained in the
kindred and adverse logistic horizons.

In the arena thus formed by these four great natural barriers, two
hostile armies composed of the thirty-two Chess-pieces, are contending
for the mastery.

Meanwhile, beyond these great mountain ranges, are advancing to the
aid of the combatants, two other armies, represented by the power of
promotion possessed by the Pawns. Each of these two hypothetical armies
is assailing the outer slope of that range of mountains which lies in the
rear of the hostile force. Its effort is to pass one of the eight defiles
and by occupying a Point of Junction in the kindred Logistic Horizon,
to gain entrance into the Topographical Zone. Then in the array of a
Queen, or some other kindred piece, it purposes to attack decisively, the
adverse Strategetic Rear.

To oppose the attack of this hypothetical hostile army, whose movements
always are typified by the advance of the adverse Pawns, is the duty of
the kindred column of manoeuvre.

Primarily this labor falls upon the kindred Pawns. Upon each Pawn
devolves the duty of guarding that defile situated directly on its
front, by maintaining itself as a Point of Impenetrability between the
corresponding hostile pawn and the kindred Strategic Rear.

Conversely, a second duty devolves upon each Pawn; and as an integer
of the Column of Support, it continually must threaten and whenever
opportunity is presented it decisively must assault the defile on its
front, for the purpose of penetrating to the kindred logistic horizon
and becoming promoted to such kindred piece, as by attacking the adverse
Determinate Force in flank, in rear, or in both, may decide the victory
in favor of the kindred army.

Every variety of topography has peculiar requirements for its attack and
its defence; and situations even though but little different from each
other, nevertheless must be treated according to their particular nature.

In order to acquire the habit of selecting at a glance the correct posts
for an army and of making proper dispositions of the kindred corps
with rapidity and precision, topography should be studied with great
attention, for most frequently it happens that circumstances do not allow
time to do these things with deliberation.


PRINCIPLE

_Acting either offensively or defensively, one never should proceed in
such a way as to allow the enemy the advantage of ground;_

That is to say: Kindred corps never should be exposed to unopposed
adverse radii of offence, when the effect of such exposure is the loss of
kindred material, or of time much better to be employed, than in making a
necessary and servile retreat from an untenable post.

On the contrary, every kindred topographical advantage should
unhesitatingly be availed of; and particular attention continually should
be paid to advancing the kindred corps to points offensive where they
cannot be successfully attacked.

Pains always must be taken to select advantageous ground. Indifferent
posts must never be occupied from sheer indolence or from over-confidence
in the strength of the kindred, or the weakness of the adverse army.

Particularly must one beware of permitting the enemy to retain advantages
in topography; always and at once he should be dislodged from posts whose
continued occupation may facilitate his giving an unforeseen and often a
fatal blow.

The full importance of topography perhaps is best expressed in the
following dictum by the great Frederic:


PRINCIPLE

“_Whenever a general and decisive topographical advantage is presented,
one has merely to avail of this, without troubling about anything
further._”

The relative advantage in Topography possessed by one army over an
opposing army, always can be determined by the following, viz.:


RULE

1. If the principal adverse Corps of Position are situated upon points
of a given color, and if the principal Kindred Corps of Position are
situated upon points _not_ of the given color, then:

That army which has the _more_ Corps of Evolution able to act against
points of the given color, and the _equality_ in Corps of Evolution able
to act against points of the opposite color, has the relative advantage
in Topography.

2. To utilize the relative advantage in Topography, construct a position
in which the kindred Corps of Position necessary to be defended shall
occupy a point upon the sub-geometric symbol of a kindred Corps of
Evolution; which point shall be a Tactical Key of a True Strategetic
Horizon of which the kindred Corps of Evolution is the Corps of the
Centre and of which either the adverse King or an undefendable adverse
piece is the second Tactical Key.

3. To neutralize the relative disadvantage in Topography, eliminate
that adverse Corps d’armee which is able to act simultaneously by its
geometric symbol against the principal Kindred Corps of Position upon a
given color; and by its sub-geometric symbol against points of opposite
color.

       *       *       *       *       *

Perfection in Defensive Topography is attained whenever the ground
occupied nullifies hostile advantages in Time, Organization, Mobility,
Numbers and Position.

Perfection in Offensive Topography is attained whenever the ground
occupied accentuates the kindred advantages in Time, Organization,
Mobility, Numbers and Position.


MILITARY EXAMPLES

    _“When you intend to engage in battle endeavor that your
    CHIEF advantage shall arise from the ground occupied by your
    army.”--Vegetius._

To cross the Granicus, Alexander the Great selected a fordable spot
where the river made a long, narrow bend, and attacked the salient and
both sides simultaneously. The Persians thus outflanked were easily and
quickly routed; whereupon the Grecian army in line of Phalanxes, both
flanks covered by the river and its retreat assured by the fords in rear,
advanced to battle in harmony with all requirements of Strategetic Art.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Issus, Alexander the Great so manoeuvred that the Persian army of more
than a million men was confined in a long valley not over three miles in
width, having the sea on the left hand and the Amanus Mountains on the
right, thus the Grecians had a battlefield fitted to the size of their
army, and fought in Phalanxes in line, both wings covered by impassable
natural barriers and retreat assured, by open ground in rear.

       *       *       *       *       *

At the Trebia, Hannibal by stratagems now undiscernible, induced the
consul Sempronius to pass the river and following along the easterly bank
to take position with his army upon the lowlands between an unfordable
part of the stream and the Carthagenians.

Upon this, Hannibal detached his youngest brother Margo to cut off the
retreat of the Romans from the ford by which they had crossed the Trebia;
advanced his infantry by Phalanxes in line and overthrowing the few
Roman horse, assailed the hostile left wing with 10,000 heavy cavalry.
The destruction of the Roman army was completed by the simultaneous
attack of their right wing by Margo and the impossibility of repassing
the river in their rear.

       *       *       *       *       *

By one of the most notable marches in surprise recorded in military
annals, Hannibal crossed the seemingly impassible marshes of the river
Po, and turned the left flank of the Roman army, commanded by the Consul
C. Flaminius. Then the great Carthagenian advanced swiftly toward the
city of Rome, devasting the country on either hand.

In headlong pursuit the Consul entered a long narrow valley, having Lake
Trasymenus on the one hand and the mountains on the other.

Suddenly while entombed in this vast ravine, the Roman army was attacked
by infantry from the high ground along its right flank; and in front and
rear by the Carthagenian heavy cavalry, while the lake extending along
its left flank made futile all attempts to escape.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Cannae, Hannibal reproduced the evolutions of Alexander the Great
at the passage of the Granicus. Selecting a long bend in the Aufidus,
Hannibal forded the river and took position by Phalanxes in line, his
flanks covered by unfordable parts of the stream and his retreat assured
by the fords by which he had crossed, while as at Issus, the ground on
his front though fitting his own army, was so confined as to prevent the
Romans engaging a force greater than his own. Beyond Hannibal’s front,
the hostile army was posted in a wide level plain, suited to the best
use of the vastly superior Carthagenian heavy cavalry, both for the
evolutions of the battle and the subsequent pursuit and massacre of the
Romans.

       *       *       *       *       *

At the River Arar (58 B.C.) Caesar achieved his first victory. Following
leisurely but closely the marauding Helvetii, he permitted three-fourths
of their army to cross to the westerly side of the river; then he fell
upon the remainder with his whole army.

       *       *       *       *       *

An eye-witness thus describes the famous passage of the Lech by Gustavus
Adolphus:

    “Resolved to view the situation of the enemy, his majesty went
    out the 2nd of April (1632) with a strong body of horse, which
    I had the honor to command. We marched as near as we could to
    the bank of the river, not to be too much exposed to the enemy’s
    cannon; and having gained a height where the whole course of
    the river might be seen, we drew up and the king alighted and
    examined every reach and turning of the river with his glass.
    Toward the north, he found the river fetching a long reach and
    doubling short upon itself. ‘There is the point will do our
    business,’ says the king, ‘and if the ground be good, we will
    pass there, though Tilly do his worst’.”

He immediately ordered a small party of horse to bring him word how high
the bank was on each side and at the point, “and he shall have fifty
dollars” says the king, “who will tell me how deep the water is.”

… The depth and breadths of the stream having been ascertained, and the
bank on our side being ten to twelve feet higher than the other and
of a hard gravel, the king resolved to cross there; and himself gave
directions for such a bridge as I believe never army passed before nor
since.

The bridge was loose plank placed upon large tressels as bricklayers
raise a scaffold to build a wall. The tressels were made some higher and
some lower to answer to the river as it grew deeper or shallower; and all
was framed and fitted before any attempt was made to cross.

At night, April 4th the king posted about 2,000 men near the point and
ordered them to throw up trenches on either side and quite around it;
within which at each end the king placed a battery of six pieces and six
cannon at the point, two guns in front and two at each side. By daylight,
all the batteries were finished, the trenches filled with musketeers and
all the bridge equipment at hand in readiness for use. To conceal this
work the king had fired all night at other places along the river.

At daylight, the Imperialists discovered the king’s design, when it
was too late to prevent it. The musketeers and the batteries made such
continual fire that the other bank twelve feet below was too hot for the
Imperialists; whereupon old Tilly to be ready for the king on his coming
over on his bridge, fell to work and raised a twenty-gun battery right
against the point and a breast-work as near the river as he could to
cover his men; thinking that when the King should build his bridge, he
might easily beat it down with his cannon.

But the King had doubly prevented him; first by laying his bridge so low
that none of Tilly’s shot could hurt it, for the bridge lay not above
half a foot above the water’s edge; and the angle of the river secured it
against the batteries on the other side, while the continual fire beat
the Imperialists from those places where they had no works to cover them.

Now, in the second place, the King sent over four hundred men who cast
up a large ravelin on the other bank just where he planned to land; and
while this was doing the King laid over his bridge.

Both sides wrought hard all the day and all the night as if the spade,
not the sword, was to decide the controversy; meanwhile the musketry
and cannon-balls flew like hail and both sides had enough to do to make
the men stand to their work. The carnage was great; many officers were
killed. Both the King and Tilly animated the troops by their presence.

About one o’clock about the time when the King had his bridge finished
and in heading a charge of 3000 foot against our ravelin was brave old
Tilly slain by a musket bullet in the thigh.

We knew nothing of this disaster befallen them, and the King, who looked
for blows, the bridge and ravelin being finished, ordered to run a line
of palisades to take in more ground and to cover the first troops he
should send over. This work being finished the same night, the King sent
over his Guards and six hundred Scots to man the new line.

Early in the morning a party of Scots under Capt. Forbes of Lord Rae’s
regiment was sent abroad to learn something of the enemy and Sir John
Hepburn with the Scots Brigade was ordered to pass the bridge, draw up
outside the ravelin, and to advance in search of the enemy as soon as the
horse were come over.

The King was by this time at the head of his army in full battle array,
ready to follow his van-guard and expecting a hot day’s work of it. Sir
John sent messenger after messenger entreating for permission to advance,
but the King would not suffer it; for he was ever on his guard and would
not risk a surprise. So the army continued on this side of the Lech all
day and the next night.

In the morning the King ordered 300 horse, 600 horse and 800 dragoons
to enter the wood by three ways, but sustaining each other; the Scots
Brigade to follow to the edge of the wood in support of all, and a
brigade of Swedish infantry to cover Sir John’s troops. So warily did
this famous warrior proceed.

The next day the cavalry came up with us led by Gustavus Horn; and the
King and the whole army followed, and we marched on through the heart of
Bavaria. His Majesty when he saw the judgment with which old Tilly had
prepared his works and the dangers we had run, would often say, “That
day’s work is every way equal to the victory of Leipsic.”

       *       *       *       *       *

With but 55,000 troops in hand and surrounded by the united Austrian
and Russian armies aggregating a quarter of a million men; Frederic the
Great availing of a swamp, a few hills, a rivulet and a fortified town,
constructed a battlefield upon which his opponents dared not engage him.

This famous camp of Bunzlewitz is one of the wonders of the military
art. It also is an illustration of the inability of the Anglo-Saxon to
reason; for to this day many who wear epaulets, accepting the dictum of
a skillfully hoodwinked French diplomat at the siege of Neisse, (Dec.,
1740) commonly assert that “the great Frederic was a bad engineer.”

       *       *       *       *       *

Washington compelled the British to evacuate Boston, merely by occupying
with artillery Dorchester Heights, the tactical key of the theatre of
action and thus preventing either ingress or egress from the harbor.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Trenton the Hessian column was unable to escape from Washington’s
accurate evolutions, on account of being imprisoned in an angle formed by
the unfordable Delaware river.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Yorktown, the British army under Lord Cornwallis was captured entire,
being cut off from all retreat by the ocean on the right flank and the
James river in rear.

       *       *       *       *       *

Bonaparte made his reputation at Toulon (1793) merely by following the
method employed by Washington in the siege of Boston.

       *       *       *       *       *

Bonaparte gained his first success in Italy because the allied
Piedmontese and Austrian armies, although thrice his numbers, were
separated by the Apennine mountains.

       *       *       *       *       *

Bonaparte’s success at Castiglione was due to the separation of the
Austrian army into two great isolated columns by the Lake of Garda.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Arcola, Bonaparte occupied a great swamp upon the hostile strategic
center and the Austrian army was destroyed by its efforts to dislodge him.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Rivoli, the Austrian army purposed to unite its five detached wings
upon a plateau of which Bonaparte was already in possession. All were
ruined in the effort to dislodge the French from this Tactical Center.

       *       *       *       *       *

The Austrian army was unable to escape after Marengo on account of the Po
river in its rear.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Austerlitz the left wing of the Austro-Russian army was caught between
the French army and a chain of lakes and rivulets and totally destroyed.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Friedland the Russian army was caught between the French in front and
the Vistula river in rear and totally destroyed.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Krasnoe, the Russians under Kutosof, occupied the strategic center
and were covered by the Dnieper. To force the passage of the river cost
Napoleon 30,000 men.

       *       *       *       *       *

At the Beresina, the Russians under Benningsen, occupied the Strategic
Center and were covered by the unfordable river. To force the passage
cost Napoleon 20,000 men.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Leipsic, Napoleon was caught between the allied army and the Elbe. The
retreat across the river cost the French 50,000 men.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Waterloo, the high plateau sloping gradually to a plain, various
hamlets on front and flank and the forest in rear, made a perfect
topography for a defensive battle.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Sedan, the Emperor, Napoleon III, and his army were enclosed between
the Prussian army and the frontier of Belgium and captured.

       *       *       *       *       *

_“Where the real general incessantly sees prepared by Nature means
admirably adapted for his needs, the commander lacking such talents sees
nothing.”--Hannibal._




MOBILITY

    _“Success in an operation depends upon the secrecy and celerity
    with which the movements are made.”--Napoleon._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“An eye unskilled and a mind untutored can see but little where
    a trained observer detects important movements.”--Von Moltke._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“Caesar is a marvel of vigilance and rapidity, he finishes a war
    in a march.”--Cicero._




MOBILITY

    _“Victory lies in the legs of the soldier.”--Frederic the Great._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“The principal part of the soldier’s efficiency depends upon his
    legs._

    _“The personal abilities required in all manoeuvres and in
    battles are totally confined to them._

    _“Whoever is of a different opinion is a dupe to ignorance and a
    novice in the profession of arms.”--Count de Saxe._


_“It is easier to beat an enemy than commonly is supposed,” says
Napoleon, “the great Art lies in making nothing but decisive movements.”_

To the proficient in Strategetics the truth of the foregoing dictum is
self-evident. Nevertheless, it remains to instruct the student how to
select from a multitude of possible movements, that particular movement
or series of movements, which in a given situation are best calculated to
achieve victory.

Whatever may be such series of movements, obviously, it must have an
object, _i.e._, a specific and clearly defined purpose. Equally so, all
movements made on such line of movement must each have an objective,
_i.e._, a terminus. These objectives, like cogs in a gear, intimately are
connected with other objectives or termini, so that the project thus
formed constitutes always an exact and often a vast scheme.

Frequently it happens that the occupation of an objective, valid in a
given situation, is not valid in an ensuing situation for the reasons:

    1. That the object of the given line of movement is become
    unattainable, or,

    2. Because it has become no longer worth attaining, or,

    3. Because such belated attainment may be direct cause of
    disaster.


PRINCIPLE

_In order to select the decisive movement in a given situation it is
necessary first to determine both the object and the objective, not
merely of the required movement, but also of that series of movements,
which collectively constitute the projected line of movement; together
with the object and the objective of every movement contained therein._

The mathematician readily will perceive, and the student doubtless will
permit himself to be informed, that:

Before the true object and the true objective of any movement can be
determined it first is necessary to deduce the common object of all
movement.

       *       *       *       *       *

As is well known, the combined movements of the Chess-pieces over the
surface of the Chess-board during a game at Chess are infinite.

These calculations are so complex that human perception accurately can
forecast ultimate and even immediate results only in comparatively few
and simple situations. Such calculable outcomes are limited to the
earlier stages of the opening, to the concluding phases of a game; and
to situations in the mid-game wherein the presence of but few adverse
pieces minimizes the volume of effort possible to the opponent.

Consequently, it is self-evident, that:


PRINCIPLE

_Situations on the Chess-board require for their demonstration a degree
of skill which decreases as the hostile power of resistance decreases._

All power for resistance possessed by an army emanates from its ability
to move. This faculty of Mobility is that inestimable quality without
which nothing and by means of which everything, can be done.

From this truth it is easy to deduce the common object of all movement,
which obviously is:

    _To minimize the mobility of the opposing force._

The hostile army having the ability to move and consequently a power for
resistance equal to that possessed by the kindred army; it becomes of the
first importance to discover in what way the kindred army is superior to
that adverse force, which in the Normal Situation on the Chess-board is
its exact counterpart in material, position and formation.

Such normal superiority of the White army over the Black army is found in
the fact that:

    1. _The former has the privilege of making the initial move of
    the game._

    2. _This privilege of first move is the absolute advantage in
    Time._

While no mathematical demonstration of the outcome of a game at Chess is
possible, nevertheless there are rational grounds for assuming that with
exact play, White should win.

This decided and probably decisive advantage possessed by White can be
minimized only by correcting a mathematical blemish in the game of Chess
as at present constructed; which blemish, there is reason to believe, did
not originally exist.

This imperfection seemingly is the result of unscientific modifications
of the Italian method of Castling; which latter, from the standpoint
of mathematics and of Strategetics, embodies the true spirit of that
delicate and vital evolution.

To the mathematician and to the Strategist, it is clear that Chess as
first devised was geometrically perfect. The abortions played during
successive ages and in various parts of the Earth, merely are crude and
unscientific deviations from the perfect original.

Thus, strategetically, the correct post of deployment for the Chess-King
is at the extremity of a straight line drawn from the center of that
Grand Strategic Front which appertains to the existing formation.

Hence, in the grand front by the right, the King in Castling K R,
properly goes in one move to KKt1, his proper post. Conversely, in
Castling Q R, he also should go in one move to QKt1, his proper post
corresponding to the grand front by the left.

Again, whenever the formation logically points to the grand front by the
right refused, the King should go in one move from K1 to KR1. When the
formations indicate the grand front by the left refused, the King should
go in one move from K1 to QR1.

In each and every case the co-operating Rook should be posted at the
corresponding Bishop’s square, in order to support the alignment by P-B4,
of the front adopted.

The faulty mode of castling today in vogue clearly is not the product
either of the mathematic nor of the strategetic mind.

The infantile definition of “the books,” viz., “The King in Castling
moves two squares either to the right or to the left,” displays all that
mania for the commonplace, which characterizes the dilettante.

All that can be done is to call attention to this baleful excrescence on
the great Game. Of course, it is useless to combat it. In the words of
the Count de Saxe:

    “The power of custom is absolute. To depart from it is a
    crime, and the most inexcusable of all crimes is to introduce
    innovations. For most people, it is sufficient that a thing is
    so, to forever allow it to remain so.”

Says the great Frederic;

    “Man hardly may eradicate in his short lifetime all the
    prejudices that are imbibed with his mother’s milk; and it is
    well nigh impossible to successfully wrestle with custom, that
    chief argument of fools.”

Also bearing in mind the irony of Cicero, who regarded himself fortunate
in that he had not fallen victim to services rendered his countrymen, it
suffices to say:

The true Chessic dictum in regard to the double evolution of the King and
Rook should read:

    “_The King of Castling should deploy in one move to that
    point where, as the Base of Operations, it mathematically
    harmonizes with that Strategic Front, which is, or must become,
    established._”

The change in the present form of Castling, herein suggested, should be
made in the true interests of the Royal Game.

The instant effect of such change will be:

    1. Largely to increase the defensive resources both of White and
    Black;

    2. To minimize the handicap on the second player, due to White’s
    advantage of first move;

    3. To permit open play on the Queen’s side of the board and thus
    provide a broader and more resplendent field for Strategetic
    genius.

       *       *       *       *       *

In all our modern-day mis-interpretations of the ethics of Chess and
our characteristic Twentieth Century looseness of practice as applied
to Chess-play, perhaps there exists no greater absurdity, than that
subversion of ordinary intelligence, daily evinced by permitting a piece
which cannot move, to give check.

It is a well known and in many ways a deserved reproach, cast by the
German erudite, that the mind of the Anglo-Saxon is not properly
developed, that it is able to act correctly only when dealing with known
quantities, and is inadequate for the elucidation of indeterminate things.

In consequence, they say, the argumentative attempts of the Anglo-Saxon
are puerile; the natural result of a mental limitation which differs from
that of monkeys and parrots, merely in ability to count beyond two.

Surely it would seem that a very young child readily would sense that:

A Chess-piece, which by law is debarred from movement, is, by the same
law, necessarily debarred from capturing adverse material; inasmuch as in
order to capture, a piece must move.

Nevertheless consensus of opinion today among children of every growth
and whether Anglo-Saxon or German, universally countenance the paradox
that:

A piece which is pinned on its own King, can give check _i.e._, threaten
to move and capture the adverse King.

To argue this question correctly and to deduce the logical solution, it
is necessary to revert to first principles and to note that:

It is a fundamental of Chess mathematics that the King cannot be exposed
to capture.

Furthermore, it is to be noted as equally fundamental, that:

    1. A piece exerts no force against that point upon which it is
    posted;

    2. That whatever power a piece exerts, always is exerted against
    some other point than the point upon which it stands; and that;

    3. In order to exert such power, it is an all-essential that the
    piece move from the point which it occupies to the point at which
    its power is to be exerted.

Hence, it is obvious and may be mathematically demonstrated, that,

    1. A piece which cannot move, cannot capture.

    2. A piece which cannot capture, does not exercise any threat of
    capture; and

    3. Consequently, a piece deprived of its right to move; which
    cannot capture nor exercise any threat to capture, obviously and
    by mathematical demonstration, cannot give check, inasmuch, as
    “check” merely is the threat by a piece to move and capture the
    adverse King.

Therefore, whatever may be the normal area of movement belonging to a
piece, whenever from any cause such piece loses its power of movement,
then,

It no longer can capture, nor exercise any threat of capture, upon the
points contained within said area; and consequently such points so far
as said immovable piece is concerned, may be occupied in safety by any
adverse piece including the adverse King, for the reason that:

An immovable piece cannot move; and not being able to move it cannot
capture, and not being able to capture, it does not exercise any threat
of capture, and consequently it cannot give check.

This incongruity of permitting an immovable piece to give check
constitutes the second mathematical blemish in the game of Chess, as at
present constructed.

This fallacy, the correction of which any schoolboy may mathematically
demonstrate, is defended, even by many who would know better, if they
merely would take time for reflection; by the inane assumption, that:

A piece which admittedly is disqualified and rendered dormant by all
the fundamentals of the science of Chess, and which therefore cannot
legally move and consequently cannot legally capture anything; by some
hocus-pocus may be made to move and to capture that _most_ valuable
of _all_ prizes, the adverse King; and this at a time and under
circumstances when, as is universally allowed, it cannot legally move
against, nor legally capture _any other_ adverse piece.

The basis of this illogical, illegal, and untenable assumption is:

The pinned piece, belonging to that force which has the privilege of
moving, can abandon its post, and capture the adverse King; this stroke
ends the game and the game being ended, the pinning piece never can avail
of the abandonment of the covering post by the pinned piece to capture
the King thus exposed.

The insufficiency of this subterfuge is clear to the mathematical
mind. Its subtlety lies in confounding together things which have no
connection, viz.:

Admittedly the given body of Chess-pieces has the right to move, but it
is of the utmost importance to note that this privilege of moving extends
only to a single piece and from this privilege of moving the pinned piece
is debarred by a specific and fundamental law of the game, which declares
that:

    “A piece shall not by removing itself uncover the kindred King to
    the attack of a hostile piece.”

Thus, it is clear, that a pinned piece is a disqualified piece; its
powers are dormant and by the laws of the game it is temporarily reduced
to an inert mass, and deprived of every faculty normally appertaining
to it as a Chess-piece. On the other hand, as is equally obvious, the
pinning piece is in full possession of its normal powers and is qualified
to perform every function.

To hold that a piece disqualified by the laws of the game can nullify the
activities of a piece in full possession of its powers, is to assert that
black is white, that the moon is made of green cheese, that the tail can
wag the dog, or any other of those things which have led the German to
promulgate his caustic formula on the Anglo-Saxon.

Hence, artificially to nullify the normal powers of an active and
potential piece which is operating in conformity to the laws of the game,
and artificially to revivify the dormant powers of a piece disqualified
by the same laws; to debar the former from exercising its legitimate
functions and to permit the latter to exercise functions from which by
law, it specifically is debarred, is a self-evident incongruity and any
argument whereby such procedure is upheld, necessarily and obviously, is
sophistry.

       *       *       *       *       *

No less interesting than instructive and conclusive, is reference of this
question to those intellectual principles which give birth to the game of
Chess, _per se_, viz.:

As a primary fundamental, with the power to give check, is associated
concurrently the obligation upon the King thus checked, not to remain in
check.

Secondly: The totality of powers assigned to the Chess-pieces is the
ability to move, provided the King be free from check. This totality of
powers may be denoted by the indefinite symbol, X.

The play thus has for its object:

The reduction to zero of the adverse X, by the operation of the kindred X.

This result is checkmate in its generalized form. In effect, it is the
destruction of the power of the adverse pieces to move, by means of check
made permanent.

By the law of continuity it is self-evident that:

The power to move appertaining either to White or to Black, runs from
full power to move any piece (a power due to freedom from check), down
to total inability to move any piece, due to his King being permanently
checked, _i.e._, checkmated.

This series cannot be interrupted without obvious violation of the ethics
of the game; because, so long as any part of X remains, the principle
from which the series emanated still operates, and this without regard to
quantity of X remaining unexpended.

Thus, a game of Chess is a procedure from total ability to total
disability; _i.e._, from one logical whole to another; otherwise, from X
to zero.

Checkmate, furnishes the limit to the series; the game and X vanish
together.

This is in perfect keeping with the law of continuity, which acts and
dominates from beginning to end of the series, and so long as any part of
X remains.

Hence to permit either White or Black to move any piece, leaving his King
in check, is an anomaly.

       *       *       *       *       *

Denial to the Pawn of ability to move to the rear is an accurate
interpretation of military ethics.

Of those puerile hypotheses common to the man who does not know, one of
the most entrancing to the popular mind, is the notion that Corps d’armee
properly are of equal numbers and of the same composition.

This supposition is due to ignorance of the fact that the multifarious
duties of applied Strategetics, require for their execution like variety
of instruments, which diversity of means is strikingly illustrated by the
differing movements of the Chess-pieces.

The inability of the Pawn to move backward strategically harmonizes with
its functions as a Corps of Position, in contradiction to the movements
of the pieces, which latter are Corps of Evolution.

This restriction in the move of the Pawn is in exact harmony with the
inability of the Queen to move on obliques, of the Rook to move on
obliques or on diagonals, of the Bishop to move on obliques, verticals
and horizontals, of the Knight to move on diagonals, verticals, and
horizontals, and of the King to move like any other piece.

       *       *       *       *       *

Possessed of the invaluable privilege of making the first move in
the game, knowing that no move should be made without an object,
understanding that the true object of every move is to minimize the
adverse power for resistance and comprehending that all power for
resistance is derived from facility of movement, the student easily
deduces the true object of White’s initial move in every game of Chess,
viz.:


PRINCIPLE

_To make the first of a series of movements, each of which shall increase
the mobility of the kindred pieces and correspondingly decrease the
mobility of the adverse pieces._

As the effect of such policy, the power for resistance appertaining to
Black, ultimately must become so insufficient that he no longer will be
able adequately to defend:

    1. His base of operations.

    2. The communications of his army with its base.

    3. The communications of his corps d’armee with each other, or,

    4. To prevent the White hypothetical force penetrating to its
    Logistic Horizon.

To produce this fatal weakness in the Black position by the advantage of
the first move is much easier for White than commonly is supposed.

The process consists in making only those movements by means of which the
kindred corps d’armee, progressively occupying specified objectives, are
advanced, viz.:

    I. _To the Strategetic Objective, when acting against the
    communications of the adverse Determinate Force and its Base of
    Operations._

    II. _To the Logistic Horizon, when acting against the
    communications between the adverse Determinate and the adverse
    Hypothetical Forces._

    III. _To the Strategic Vertices, when acting against the
    communications of the hostile corps d’armee with each other._

To bring about either of these results against an opponent equally
equipped and capable, of course is a much more difficult task than to
checkmate an enemy incapable of movement.

Yet such achievement is possible to White and with exact play it
seemingly is a certainty that he succeeds in one or the other, owing to
his inestimable privilege of first move.

For the normal advantage that attaches to the first move in a game of
Chess is vastly enhanced by a peculiarity in the mathematical make-up of
the surface of the Chess-board, whereby, he who makes the first move may
secure to himself the advantage in mobility, and conversely may inflict
upon the second player a corresponding disadvantage in mobility.

This peculiar property emanates from this fact:

    _The sixty-four points, i.e., the sixty-four centres of the
    squares into which the surface of the Chess-board is divided,
    constitute, when taken collectively, the quadrant of a circle,
    whose radius is eight points in length._

Hence, in Chessic mathematics, the sides of the Chessboard do not form a
square, but the segment of a circumference.

To prove the truth of this, one has but to count the points contained
in the verticals and horizontals and in the hypothenuse of each
corresponding angle, and in every instance it will be found that the
number of points contained in the base, perpendicular, and hypothenuse,
is the same.

For example:

Let the eight points of the King’s Rook’s file form the perpendicular of
a right angle triangle, of which the kindred first horizontal forms the
base; then, the hypothenuse of the given angle, will be that diagonal
which extends from QR1 to KR8. Now, merely by the processes of simple
arithmetic, it may be shown that there are,

    1. Eight points in the base.

    2. Eight points in the perpendicular.

    3. Eight points in the hypothenuse.

Consequently the _three_ sides of this given right angled triangle are
_equal_ to each other, which is a geometric _impossibility_.

Therefore, it is self-evident that there exists a mathematical
incongruity in the surface of the Chess-board.

That is, what to the eye _seems_ a right angled triangle, is in its
relations to the _movements_ of the Chess-pieces, an equilateral
triangle. Hence, the Chess-board, in its relations to the pieces when
the latter are at _rest_, properly may be regarded as a great _square_
sub-divided into sixty-four smaller squares; but on the contrary,
in those calculations relating to the Chess-pieces in _motion_, the
Chess-board must be regarded as the _quadrant_ of a circle of eight
points radius. The demonstration follows, viz.:

Connect by a straight line the points KR8 and QR8. Connect by another
straight line the points QR8 and QR1. Connect each of the fifteen points
through which these lines pass with the point KR1, by means of lines
passing through the least number of points intervening.

Then the line KR8 and QR8 will represent the segment of a circle of
which latter the point KR1 is the center. The lines KR1-KR8 and KR1-QR1
will represent the sides of a quadrant contained in the given circle and
bounded by the given segment, and the lines drawn from KR1 to the fifteen
points contained in the given segment of the given circumference, will be
found to be fifteen equal radii each eight points in length.

       *       *       *       *       *

Having noted the form of the Static or positional surface of the
Chess-board and its relations to the pieces at rest, and having
established the configuration of the Dynamic surface upon which the
pieces move, it is next in sequence to deduce that fundamental fact and
to give it that geometric expression which shall mathematically harmonize
these conflicting geometric figures in their relations to Chess-play.

As the basic fact of applied Chessic forces, it is to be noted, that:


PRINCIPLE

_The King is the SOURCE from whence the Chess-pieces derive all power of
movement; and from his ability to move, emanates ALL power for attack and
for defence possessed by a Chessic army._

This faculty of mobility, derived from the existence of the kindred King,
is the all essential element in Chess-play, and to increase the mobility
of the kindred pieces and to reduce that of the adverse pieces is the
simple, sure and only scientific road to victory; and by comparison of
the Static with the Dynamic surface of the Chess-board, the desired
principle readily is discovered, viz.,

    The Static surface of the Chess-board being a square, its least
    division is into two great right angled triangles having a common
    hypothenuse.

    The Dynamic surface being the quadrant of a circle, its least
    division also is into two great sections, one of which is a right
    angled triangle and the other a semi-circle.

Comparing the two surfaces of the Chess-board thus divided, it will
be seen that these three great right angled triangles are equal, each
containing thirty-six points; and having for their common vertices, the
points KR1, QR1 and R8.

Furthermore, it will be seen that the hypothenuse common to these
triangles, also is the chord of that semi-circle which appertains to the
Dynamic surface.

Again, it will be perceived that this semi-circle, like the three right
angled triangles, is composed of thirty-six points, and consequently that
all of the four sub-divisions of the Static and Dynamic surfaces of the
Chess-board are equal.

Thus it obviously follows, that:

    1. The great central diagonal, always is one side of each of
    the four chief geometric figures into which the Chess board is
    divided; that:

    2. It mathematically perfects each of these figures and
    harmonizes each to all, and that:

    3. By means of it each figure becomes possessed of eight more
    points than it otherwise would contain.

Hence, the following is self-evident:


PRINCIPLE

_That Chessic army which can possess itself of the great central
diagonal, thereby acquires the larger number of points upon which to act
and consequently greater facilities for movement; and conversely:_

_By the loss of the great central diagonal, the mobility of the opposing
army is correspondingly decreased._

It therefore is clear that the object of any series of movements by a
Chessic army acting otherwise than on Line of Operations, should be:


PRINCIPLE

_Form the kindred army upon the hypothenuse of the right angled triangle
which is contained within the Dynamic surface of the Chess-board; and
conversely,_

_Compel the adverse army to act exclusively within that semi-circle which
appertains to the same surface._

Under these circumstances, the kindred corps will be possessed of
facilities for movement represented by thirty-six squares; while the
logistic area of the opposing army will be restricted to twenty-eight
squares.

There are, of course, two great central diagonals of the Chess-board; but
as the student is fully informed that great central diagonal always is to
be selected, which extends towards the Objective Plane.

       *       *       *       *       *

Mobility, _per se_, increases or decreases with the number of squares
open to occupation.

But in all situations there will be points of no value, while other
points are of value inestimable; for the reason that the occupation of
the former will not favorably affect the play, or may even lose the game;
while by the occupation of the latter, victory is at once secured.

But it is not the province of Mobility to pass on the values of points;
this latter is the duty of Strategy. It is sufficient for Mobility that
it provide superior facilities for movement; it is for Strategy to define
the Line of Movement; for Logistics, by means of this Line of Movement,
to bring into action in proper times and sequence, the required force,
and for Tactics, with this force, to execute the proper evolutions.

Mobility derives its importance from three things which may occur
severally or in combination, viz.:

    1. All power for offense or for defense is eliminated from a
    Chess-piece the instant it loses its ability to move.

    2. The superiority possessed by corps acting offensively over
    adverse corps acting defensively, resides in that the attack of
    a piece is valid at every point which it menaces; while the
    defensive effort of a piece, as a rule, is valid only at a single
    point. Consequently:


PRINCIPLE

_Increased facilities for movement enhance the power of attacking pieces
in a much greater degree than like facilities enhance the power of
defending pieces._

Such increasing facilities for movement ultimately render an attacking
force irresistible, for the reason that it finally becomes a physical
impossibility for the opposing equal force to provide valid defences for
the numerous tactical keys, which at a given time become simultaneously
assailed. Hence:


PRINCIPLE

_Superior facilities for occupying any point at any time and with any
force, always ensure the superior force at a given point, at a given
time._

The relative advantage in mobility possessed by one army over an opposing
army always can be determined by the following, viz.:


RULE

1. That army whose strategic front of operations is established upon the
Strategetic Center has the relative advantage in Mobility.

2. To utilize the advantage in Mobility extend the Strategic Front in the
direction of the objective plane.

3. To neutralize the relative disadvantage in Mobility eliminate that
adverse Corps d’armee which tactically expresses such adverse advantage;
or so post the Prime Strategetic Point as to vitiate the adverse
Strategic front.

Advantage in Mobility is divided into two classes, viz.:

    I. General Advantage in Mobility.

    II. Special Advantage in Mobility.

A General Advantage in Mobility consists in the ability to act
simultaneously against two or more vital points by means of interior
logistic radii due to position between:--

    1. The adverse army and its Base of Operations.

    2. Two or more adverse Grand Columns.

    3. The wings of a hostile Grand Column.

    4. Two or more isolated adverse Corps d’armee.

Such position upon interior lines of movement is secured by occupying
either of the Prime Offensive Origins, _i.e._:

    1. Strategic Center _vs._ Adverse Formation in Mass.

    2. Logistic Center _vs._ Adverse Formation by Grand Columns.

    3. Tactical Center _vs._ Adverse Formation by Wings.

    4. Logistic Triune _vs._ Adverse Formation by Corps.

Special Advantage in Mobility consists in the ability of a corps d’armee
to traverse greater or equal distances in lesser times than opposing
corps.


MILITARY EXAMPLES

    _“Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a false
    movement.”--Napoleon._

In the year (366 B.C.) the King of Sparta, with an army of 30,000 men
marched to the aid of the Mantineans against Thebes. Epaminondas took
up a post with his army from whence he equally threatened Mantinea and
Sparta. Agesilaus incautiously moved too far towards the coast, whereupon
Epaminondas, with 70,000 men precipitated himself upon Lacedaemonia,
laying waste the country with fire and sword, all but taking by storm the
city of Sparta and showing the women of Lacedaemonia the campfire of an
enemy for the first time in six hundred years.

       *       *       *       *       *

Flaminius advancing incautiously to oppose Hannibal, the latter took up a
post with his army from whence he equally threatened the city of Rome and
the army of the Consul. In the endeavor to rectify his error, the Roman
general committed a worse and was destroyed with his entire army.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Thapsus, April 6, 46 B.C., Caesar took up a post with his army from
whence he equally threatened the Roman army under Scipio and the African
army under Juba. Scipio having marched off with his troops to a better
camp some miles distant, Caesar attacked and annihilated Juba’s army.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Pirna, Frederic the Great, captured the Saxon army entire, and at
Rossbach, Leuthern and Zorndorf destroyed successively a French, an
Austrian and a Russian army merely by occupying a post from whence he
equally threatened two or more vital points, awaiting the time when one
would become inadequately defended.

       *       *       *       *       *

Washington won the Revolutionary War merely by occupying a post from
whence he equally threatened the British armies at New York and
Philadelphia; refusing battle and building up an army of Continental
regular troops enlisted for the war and trained by the Baron von Steuben
in the system of Frederic the Great.

       *       *       *       *       *

Bonaparte won at Montenotte, Castiglione, Arcola, Rivoli and Austerlitz
his most perfect exhibitions of generalship, merely by passively
threatening two vital points and in his own words: “By never interrupting
an enemy when he is making a false movement.”

       *       *       *       *       *

Perfection in Mobility is attained whenever the kindred army is able to
act unrestrainedly in any and all directions, while the movements of the
hostile army are restricted.




NUMBERS

    _“In warfare the advantage in numbers never is to be
    despised.”--Von Moltke._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“Arguments avail but little against him whose opinion is voiced
    by thirty legions.”--Roman Proverb._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“That king who has the most iron is master of those who merely
    have the more gold.”--Solon._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“It never troubles the wolf how many sheep there
    are.”--Agesilaus._




NUMBERS

    _“A handful of troops inured to Warfare proceed to certain
    victory; while on the contrary, numerous hordes of raw and
    undisciplined men are but a multitude of victims dragged to
    slaughter.”--Vegetius._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“Turenne always was victorious with armies infinitely inferior
    in numbers to those of his enemies; because he moved with
    expedition, knew how to secure himself from being attacked in
    every situation and always kept near his enemy.”--Count de Saxe._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“Numbers are of no significance when troops are once thrown into
    confusion.”--Prince Eugene._


Humanity is divisible into two groups, one of which relatively is small
and the other, by comparison, very large.

The first of these groups is made up comparatively of but a few persons,
who, by virtue of circumstances are possessed of everything except
adequate physical strength; and the second group consists of those vast
multitudes of mankind, which are destitute of everything except of
incalculable prowess, due to their overwhelming numbers.

Hence, at every moment of its existence, organized Society is face to
face with the possibility of collision into the Under World; and because
of the knowledge that such encounter is inevitable, unforeseeable and
perhaps immediately impending, Civilization, so-called, ever is beset by
an unspeakable and all-corroding fear.

    _To deter a multitude, destitute of everything except the power
    to take, from despoiling by means of its irresistible physique,
    those few who are possessed of everything except ability to
    defend themselves, in all Ages has been the chiefest problem of
    mankind; and to the solution of this problem has been devoted
    every resource known to Education, Legislation, Ecclesiasticism
    and Jurisprudence._

This condition further is complicated by a peculiar outgrowth of
necessary expedients, always more or less unstable, due to that falsity
of premise in which words do not agree with acts.

Of these expedients the most incongruous is the arming and training of
the children of the mob for the protection of the upper stratum; and that
peculiar mental insufficiency of hoi polloi, whereby it ever is induced
to accept as its leaders the sons of the Patrician class.

That a social structure founded upon such anomalies should endure,
constitutes in itself the real Nine Wonders of the World; and is proof
of that marvellous ingenuity with which the House of Have profits by
the chronic predeliction of the House of Want to fritter away time and
opportunity, feeding on vain hope.

       *       *       *       *       *

_The advantage in Numbers consists in having in the aggregate more Corps
d’armee than has the adversary._

All benefit to be derived from the advantage in Numbers is limited to
the active and scientific use of every corp d’armee; otherwise excess of
Numbers, not only is of no avail, but easily may degenerate into fatal
disadvantage by impeding the decisive action of other kindred corps. Says
Napoleon: “It is only the troops brought into action, that avails in
battles and campaigns--the rest does not count.”

A loss in Numbers at chess-play occurs only when two pieces are lost
for one, or three for two, or one for none, and the like. No diminution
in aggregate of force can take place on the Chess-board, so long as the
number of the opposing pieces are equal.

This is true although all the pieces on one side are Queens and those of
the other side all Pawns.

The reason for this is:

All the Chess-pieces are equal in strength, one to the other. The Pawn
can overthrow and capture any piece--the Queen can do no more.

That is to say, at its turn to move, any piece can capture any adverse
piece; and this is all that any piece can do.

It is true that the Queen, on its turn to move, has a maximum option
of twenty-seven squares, while the Pawn’s maximum never is more than
three. But as the power of the Queen can be exerted only upon one point,
obviously, her observation of the remaining twenty-six points is merely
a manifestation of mobility, and her display of force is limited to a
single square. Hence, the result in each case is identical, and the
display of force equal.

The relative advantage in Numbers possessed by one army over an opposing
army always can be determined by the following, viz.:


RULE

_That army which contains more Corps d’armee than an opposing army has
the relative advantage in Numbers._

    _“With the inferiority in Numbers, one must depend more upon
    conduct and contrivance than upon strength.”--Caesar._


MILITARY EXAMPLES

    _“He who has the advantage in Numbers, if he be not a blockhead,
    incessantly will distract his enemy by detachments, against all
    of which it is impossible to provide a remedy.”--Frederic the
    Great._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“He that hath the advantage in Numbers usually should exchange
    pieces freely, because the fewer that remain the more readily are
    they oppressed by a superior force.”--Dal Rio._

At Thymbra, Cyrus the Great, king of the Medes and Persians, with 10,000
horse cuirassiers, 20,000 heavy infantry, 300 chariots and 166,000 light
troops, conquered Croesus, King of Assyria whose army consisted of
360,000 infantry and 60,000 cavalry. This victory made Persia dominant in
Asia.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Marathon, 10,000 Athenian and 1,000 Plataean heavy infantry, routed
110,000 Medes and Persians. This victory averted the overthrow of Grecian
civilization by Asiatic barbarism.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Leuctra, Epaminondas, general of the Thebans, with 6000 heavy
infantry and 400 heavy horse, routed the Lacedaemonean army, composed
of 22,000 of the bravest and most skillful soldiers of the known world,
and extinguished the military ascendency which for centuries Sparta had
exercised over the Grecian commonwealths.

At Issus, Alexander the Great with 40,000 heavy infantry and 7,000 heavy
cavalry destroyed the army of Darius Codomannus, King of Persia, which
consisted of 1,000,000 infantry, 40,000 cavalry, 200 chariots and 15
elephants. This battle, in which white men encountered elephants for the
first time, established the military supremacy of Europe over Asia.

       *       *       *       *       *

Alexander the Great invaded Asia (May, 334 B.C.) whose armies aggregated
3,000,000 men trained to war; with 30,000 heavy infantry, 4000 heavy
cavalry, $225,000 dollars in money and thirty days’ provisions.

At Arbela, Alexander the Great with 45,000 heavy infantry and 8,000 heavy
horse, annihilated the last resources of Darius and reduced Persia to a
Greek province. The Persian army consisted of about 600,000 infantry and
cavalry, of whom 300,000 were killed.

       *       *       *       *       *

Hannibal began his march from Spain (218 B.C.) to invade the Roman
commonwealth, with 90,000 heavy infantry and 12,000 heavy cavalry. He
arrived at Aosta in October (218 B.C.) with only 20,000 infantry and
6,000 cavalry to encounter a State that could put into the field 700,000
of the bravest and most skillful soldiers then alive.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Cannae, Hannibal destroyed the finest army Rome ever put in the field.
Out of 90,000 of the flower of the commonwealth only about 3,000 escaped.
The Carthagenian army consisted of 40,000 heavy infantry and 10,000 heavy
cavalry.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Alesia, (51 B.C.) Caesar completed the subjugation of Gaul, by
destroying in detail two hostile armies aggregating 470,000 men. The
Roman army consisted of 43,000 heavy infantry, 10,000 heavy cavalry and
10,000 light cavalry.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Pharsaleus, (48 B.C.) Caesar with 22,000 Roman veterans routed 45,000
soldiers under Pompey and acquired the chief place in the Roman state.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Angora, (1402) Tamerlane, with 1,400,000 Asiatics, destroyed the
Turkish army of 900,000 men, commanded by the Ottoman Sultan Bajazet, in
the most stupendous battle of authentic record.

After giving his final instructions to his officers, Tamerlane, it is
recorded, betook himself to his tent and played at Chess until the crisis
of the battle arrived, whereupon he proceeded to the decisive point and
in person directed those evolutions which resulted in the destruction of
the Ottoman army.

The assumption that the great Asiatic warrior was playing at Chess during
the earlier part of the battle of Angora, undoubtedly is erroneous. Most
probably he followed the progress of the conflict by posting chess-pieces
upon the Chessboard and moving these according to reports sent him
momentarily by his lieutenants.

Obviously, in the days when the field telegraphy and telephone were
unknown, such method was entirely feasible and satisfactory to the Master
of Strategetics and far superior to any attempt to overlook such a
confused and complicated concourse.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Bannockburne (June 24, 1314), Robert Bruce, King of Scotland, with
30,000 Scots annihilated the largest army that England ever put upon a
battlefield.

This army was led by Edward II and consisted of over 100,000 of
the flower of England’s nobility, gentry and yeomanry. The victory
established the independence of Scotland and cost England 30,000 troops,
which could not be replaced in that generation.

       *       *       *       *       *

Gustavus Adolphus invaded Germany with an army of 27,000 men, over
one-half of whom were Scots and English. At that time the Catholic armies
in the field aggregated several hundred thousand trained and hardened
soldiers, led by brave and able generals.

At Leipsic, after 20,000 Saxon allies had fled from the battlefield,
Gustavus Adolphus with 22,000 Swedes, Scots and English routed 44,000
of the best troops of the day, commanded by Gen. Tilly. This victory
delivered the Protestant princes of Continental Europe from Catholic
domination.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Zentha (Sept. 11, 1697), Prince Eugene with 60,000 Austrians routed
150,000 Turks, commanded by the Sultan Kara-Mustapha, with the loss of
38,000 killed, 4,000 prisoners and 160 cannon. This victory established
the military reputation of this celebrated French General.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Turin (Sept. 7, 1706) Prince Eugene with 30,000 Austrians routed
80,000 French under the Duke of Orleans. Gen. Daun, whose brilliant
evolutions decided the battle, afterward, as Field-Marshal of the
Austrian armies, was routed by Frederic the Great at Leuthern.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Peterwaradin (Aug. 5, 1716) Prince Eugene with 60,000 Austrians
destroyed 150,000 Turks. This victory delivered Europe for all time from
the menace of Mahometan dominion.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Belgrade (Aug. 26, 1717) Prince Eugene with 55,000 Austrians destroyed
a Turkish army of 200,000 men.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Rosbach (Nov. 5, 1757) Frederic the Great with 22,000 Prussians, in
open field, destroyed a French army of 70,000 regulars commanded by the
Prince de Soubisse.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Leuthern (Dec. 5, 1757) Frederic the Great with 33,000 Prussians
destroyed in open field, an Austrian army of 93,000 regulars, commanded
by Field-Marshal Daun. The Austrians lost 54,000 men and 200 cannon.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Zorndorf (Aug. 25, 1758) Frederic the Great with 45,000 Prussians
destroyed a Russian army of 60,000 men commanded by Field-Marshal Fermor.
The Russians left 18,000 men dead on the field.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Leignitz (Aug. 15, 1760) Frederic the Great with 30,000 men
out-manoeuvred, defeated with the loss of 10,000 men and escaped from the
combined Austrian and Russian armies aggregating 130,000 men.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Torgau (Nov. 5, 1760) Frederic the Great with 45,000 Prussians
destroyed an Austrian army of 90,000 men, commanded by Field-Marshal Daun.

       *       *       *       *       *

Washington, with 7,000 Americans, while pursued by 20,000 British and
Hessians under Lord Cornwallis, captured a Hessian advance column at
Trenton (Dec. 25, 1776) and destroyed a British detachment at Princeton,
(Jan. 3, 1777).

       *       *       *       *       *

Bonaparte, with 30,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 40 cannon, invaded
Italy, (March 26, 1796) which was defended by 100,000 Piedmontese and
Austrian regulars under Generals Colli and Beaulieu. In fifteen days
he had captured the former, driven the latter to his own country and
compelled Piedmont to sign a treaty of peace and alliance with France.

At Castiglione, Arcole, Bassano and Rivoli, with an army not exceeding
40,000 men Bonaparte destroyed four Austrian armies, each aggregating
about 100,000 men.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Wagram, Napoleon, with less than 100,000 men, overthrew the main
Austrian army of 150,000 men, foiled the attempts at succor of the
secondary Austrian army of 40,000 men, and compelled Austria to accept
peace with France.

In the campaign of 1814, Napoleon, with never more than 70,000 men, twice
repulsed from the walls of Paris and drove backward nearly to the Rhine
River an allied army of nearly 300,000 Austrians, Prussians and Russians.

       *       *       *       *       *

In the year 480 B.C., Xerxes, King of Persia, invaded Greece with an
army, which by Herodotus, Plutarch and Isocrates, is estimated at
2,641,610 men at arms and exclusive of servants, butlers, women and camp
followers.

Arriving at the Pass of Thermopolae, the march of the invaders was
arrested by Leonidas, King of Sparta, with an army made up of 300
Spartans, 400 Thebans, 700 Thespians, 1,000 Phocians and 3,000 from
various Grecian States, posted behind a barricade built across the
entrance.

This celebrated defile is about a mile in length. It runs between Mount
Oeta and an impassible morass, which forms the edge of the Gulf of Malia
and at each end is so narrow that a wagon can barely pass.

Xerxes at once sent a herald who demanded of the Grecians the surrender
of their arms, to which Leonidas replied:

    “_Come and take them._”

On the fifth day the Persian army attacked, but was unable to force an
entrance into the pass. On the sixth day the Persian Immortals likewise
were repulsed, and on the seventh day these troops again failed.

That night Ephialtes, a Malian, informed Xerxes of a foot path around
the mountains to the westward, and a Persian detachment was sent by a
night march en surprise against the Grecian rear. On the approach of this
hostile body, the Phocians, who had been detailed by Leonidas to guard
this path, abandoned their post without fighting and fled to the summit
of the mountains, leaving the way open to the enemy, who, wasting no time
in pursuit, at once marched against the rear of the Grecian position.

At the command of Leonidas, all his allies, with the exception of the 700
Thespians, who refused to leave him, abandoned Thermopolae in haste and
returned safely to their own countries.

Xerxes waited until day was well advanced and his detachment had
taken post upon the Grecian rear. Then both Persian columns attacked
simultaneously. The first part of this final conflict was fought outside
and to the north of the barricade. Leonidas being slain and their
numbers reduced over half, the remaining Greeks retired behind the
barricade and took post upon a slight elevation, where one after another
they were killed by arrows and javelins. The four days of fighting cost
the Persians over 20,000 of their best troops.

Upon the summit of the hill where the Spartans perished a marble lion was
erected, bearing the inscription:

    “Go tell the Lacedymonians, O, Stranger,
    That we died here in obedience to the law.”

A second inscription engraved upon a stone column erected upon the scene
of conflict read:

    “Upon this spot four thousand Pelleponesians contended against
    three hundred myriads.”

       *       *       *       *       *

The largest army commanded by Epaminondas was about 70,000 men. Alexander
the Great, after Arbela, had 135,000 trained troops. Hannibal never led
more than 60,000 men in action, nor Caesar more than 80,000. Gustavus
Adolphus, just before Lutzen, marshalled 75,000 of the best soldiers in
the world under the banners of Protestantism. Turenne never fought with
more than 40,000 troops; Prince Eugene often had 150,000 in hand, and
Frederic the Great several times commanded 200,000 men. At Yorktown,
Washington had 16,000 Continentals, 6,000 French regulars and 18,000
Provincial volunteers: Napoleon’s largest army, that of the Austerlitz
campaign, consisted of 180,000 men, while von Moltke personally directed
at Sadowa, 250,000 men; at Gravelotte, 211,000 men and at Sedan, 200,000
men.

       *       *       *       *       *

_Perfection in Numbers is attained whenever the kindred army has the most
troops in the theatre of decisive action._




TIME

    _“You lose the time for action in frivolous deliberations. Your
    generals instead of appearing at the head of your armies, parade
    in processions and add splendor to public ceremonies. Your armies
    are composed of mercenaries, the dregs of foreign nations, vile
    robbers, a terror only to yourselves and your allies. Indecision
    and confusion prevail in your counsels; your projects have
    neither plan nor foresight. You are the slaves of circumstance
    and opportunities continually escape you. You hurry aimlessly
    hither and thither and arrive only in time to witness the success
    of your enemy.”--Demosthenes._




TIME

    _“That greatest of all advantages--TIME!”--Frederic the Great._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“Ask me for anything except--TIME.”--Napoleon._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“Time is the cradle of hope, the grave of ambition, the solitary
    counsel of the wise and the stern corrector of fools. Wisdom
    walks before it, opportunities with it and repentance behind it.
    He that hath made it his friend hath nothing to fear from his
    enemies, but he that hath made it his enemy hath little to hope
    even from his friends.”--Anon._


_The absolute advantage of Time consists in being able to move while the
adversary must remain stationary._

_The conditioned advantage in Time i.e., the Initiative, consists in
artificially restricting the adverse ability to move._

Advantage in Time is divided into two classes:

    I. The Initiative.

    II. Absolute.

The Initiative treats of restrictions to the movements of an army, due
to the necessity of supporting, covering or sustaining Points or corps
d’armee, menaced with capture by adverse corps offensive.

The absolute advantage in Time is the ability to move, while the adverse
army must remain immovable.

Whenever the right to move is unrestricted, any desired Piece may be
moved to any desired Point.

But whenever the right to move is restricted it follows that the Piece
desired cannot be moved; or, that if moved it cannot be moved to the
desired Point; or, that a piece not desired, must be moved and usually to
a Point not desired.

Such restrictions of the right to move, quickly produce fatal defects
in the kindred Formation; and from the fact that such fatal defects in
Formation can be produced by restricting the right to move, arises the
inestimable value of the advantage in Time.

Perfection in Time is attained whenever the kindred army is able to move
while the hostile army must remain stationary.

The object of the active or absolute advantage in Time always is to
remain with the Initiative, or Passive Advantage in Time; which consists
in operating by the movement made, such menaces, as compel the enemy:

1. To move corps d’armee which he otherwise would not move and

2. Prevents him from moving corps d’armee which he otherwise would move.


PRINCIPLE

_Given superior brute strength and no matter how blunderingly and
clumsily it be directed, it always will end by accomplishing its purpose,
unless it is opposed by Skill._

Skill is best manifested by the proper use of Time. Such ability is
acquired only through study and experience, guided by reflection, and it
can be retained only by systematic and unremitting practice.

Most people imagine that Skill is to be attained merely from study; many
believe it but the natural and necessary offshoot of long experience; and
there are some of the opinion that dilettante dabbling in book lore is
an all-sufficient substitute for that sustained and laborious mental and
physical effort, which alone can make perfect in the competitive arts.

Only by employing his leisure in reflection upon the events of the Past
can one get to understand those things which make for success in Warfare
and in Chessplay, and develop that all-essential ability to detect
equivalents in any situation.

For in action there is no time for such reflection, much less for
development.

Then, moments of value inestimable for the achieving of results are not
to be wasted in the weighing and comparison of things, whose relative
importance should be discerned in the twinkling of an eye, by reason of
prior familiarity with similar conditions.

The relative advantage in time possessed by one army over an opposing
army always can be determined by the following, viz.:


RULE

1. _That army which is in motion while the opposing army must remain
stationary has the absolute advantage in Time._

2. _That army which although at rest can dictate the movement of an
opposing army in motion has the conditioned advantage in Time, i.e., the
Initiative._

       *       *       *       *       *

_“One may lose more by letting slip a decisive opportunity than
afterwards can be gained by ten battles.”--Gustavus Adolphus._

_“It is the exact moment that must be seized; one minute too soon or too
late and the movement is utterly futile.”--Napoleon._


MILITARY EXAMPLES

    _“The movements of an army should be characterized by decision
    and rapidity.”--Hannibal._

       *       *       *       *       *

    _“In order to escape from a dilemma it first of all is necessary
    to gain Time.”--Napoleon._

Thebes having revolted, Alexander the Great marched 400 miles in fourteen
days; attacked and captured the city and razed it to the ground (335
B.C.) sparing only the house and family of Pindar, the poet; massacred
all males capable of bearing arms and sold 30,000 women and children into
slavery.

       *       *       *       *       *

To gain time to occupy the Strategic center and to cut the communications
with Rome of the army of the Consul Flaminius, Hannibal marched his army
for three days and nights through the marshes of the Po.

       *       *       *       *       *

Caesar marched from Rome to Sierra-Modena in Spain, a distance of 1350
miles in twenty-three days.

       *       *       *       *       *

Frederic the Great in order to gain time usually marched at midnight.

       *       *       *       *       *

Bonaparte finished his first Italian campaign by winning the battles of
St. Michaels, Rivoli and Mantua, marching 200 miles and taking 20,000
prisoners, all in less than four days. In 1805, the French infantry in
the manoeuvres which captured 60,000 Austrians, marched from 25 to 30
miles a day. In 1806 the French infantry pursued the Prussians at the
same speed. In 1814, Napoleon’s army marched at the rate of 30 miles
per day, besides fighting a battle every 24 hours. Retrograding for the
succor of Paris, Napoleon marched 75 miles in thirty-six hours. On the
return from Elba, 1815, the Imperial Guard marched 50 miles the first
day, 200 miles in six days and reached Paris, a distance of 600 miles, in
twenty days.

       *       *       *       *       *

_“The fate of a battle always is decided by the lack of the
few minutes required to bring separated bodies of troops into
co-operation.”--Napoleon._




POSITION




POSITION

    _“War is a business of position.”--Napoleon._


By the term Position is signified those relative advantages and
disadvantages in location, which appertain to the aggregate posts
occupied by the kindred army, as compared with the aggregate posts
occupied by the adverse army.

Advantages and disadvantages in Position are of three classes, viz.:

    (a) Those which appertain to the Column of Attack

    (b) Those which appertain to the Column of Support.

    (c) Those which appertain to the Column of Manoeuvre.


STRATEGETIC SITUATIONS

A Strategic Situation, and whether in warfare or in Chess-play, is
produced by the presence, in any Strategetic Plane, _i.e._, theatre
of conflict, of two or more opposing Strategetic Entireties, _i.e._,
contending armies.

These latter are of four classifications and are denominated as follows:

    (a) The Kindred Determinate Force.

    (b) The Adverse Determinate Force.

    (c) The Kindred Hypothetical Force.

    (d) The Adverse Hypothetical Force.


RULE I

_Given the Strategetic Entireties present in a given Strategetic
Situation, designate the opposing Prime Strategetic Factors and express
the relative values of each in the terms of the Strategic Syllogism._


THE STRATEGIC SYLLOGISM

Having classified the existing Strategetic Situation, it is necessary
next to designate the opposing Columns of Attack, of Support, and of
Manoeuvre.

Then, by comparing these Prime Strategetic Factors, to determine the
net advantage, disadvantage, or equality that exist between them and to
express this condition in the terms of the resulting Strategic Syllogism.

In the construction of a Strategic Syllogism, the Strategic, _i.e._,
the positional value of each of the opposing Prime Strategetic Factors
contained in a given Strategetic Situation, is expressed in terms made up
of letters and symbols, viz.,

    A Signifies Column of Attack.
    S    ”      Column of Support.
    M    ”      Column of Manoeuvre.
    +    ”      Advantage in Position.
    -    ”      Disadvantage in Position.
    =    ”      Equality in Position.

The positional values of the several Prime Strategetic Factors are
obtained as follows:


COLUMN OF ATTACK

That Column of Attack which is posted upon the superior Strategic front
as compared to the front occupied by the immediately opposing formation
(cf, Grand Tactics, pp. 117 to 275), has the advantage in position.

This relative advantage and disadvantage in position of the Column of
Attack is expressed by the first term of the Strategic Syllogism, viz.:

    (I.)
     +A
    ----
     -A

or

    (II.)
     -A
    -----
     +A

In the first instance (I), the White Column of Attack has the advantage
and the Black formation has the disadvantage; in the second case (II),
this condition is reversed.


COLUMN OF SUPPORT

A Column of Support has the superiority in position, as compared with the
adverse Column of Support, whenever it contains more than the latter of
the following advantages, viz.:

    I. One, or more, Passed Pawns.

    II. Two united Pawns, overlapping an adverse Pawn.

    III. Two isolated Pawns adjacent to a single adverse Pawn.

    IV. Three, or more, united Pawns at their fifth squares, opposed
    by a like number of adverse Pawns posted on their Normal Base
    Line.

    V. A majority of kindred Pawns on that side of the Board farthest
    from the adverse King.

The relative advantage and disadvantage of one Column of Support, over
the opposing Column of Support, is expressed by the second term of the
Strategic Syllogism, thus:

    (I.)
     +S
    ----
     -S

or

    (II.)
     -S
    -----
     +S

In the first case (I), White has the advantage and Black has the
disadvantage. In the second case (II), this condition is reversed.


COLUMN OF MANOEUVRE

Columns of Manoeuvre are not compared with each other. The advantage of
one over another is determined by comparing their respective powers of
resistance to the attack of the corresponding adverse Columns of Support.

That Column of Manoeuvre which longest can debar the adverse promotable
Factors from occupying a point of junction on the kindred Strategetic
Rear, has the advantage.

The relative advantage and disadvantage of the column of Manoeuvre is
expressed by the third term of the Strategic Syllogism, viz.:

    (I.)
     +M
    ----
     -M

or

    (II.)
     -M
    -----
     +M

In the first case (I), White, has the advantage and Black the
disadvantage. In the second case (II), this condition is reversed.

In recording the values of the opposing Prime Strategetic Factors, the
terms relating to White are written above and those relating to Black,
below the line.

The terms expressing the relative values of the Columns of Attack always
are placed at the left; those for the Columns of Support in the center,
and those for the Columns of Manoeuvre at the right.

The Strategic Syllogisms are twenty-seven in number and are formulated,
viz.:


TABLE OF STRATEGIC SYLLOGISMS

    No. 1.   +A+S+M
             ------
             -A-S-M

    No. 2.   +A+S=M
             ------
             -A-S=M

    No. 3.   +A+S-M
             ------
             -A-S+M

    No. 4.   +A=S+M
             ------
             -A=S-M

    No. 5.   +A=S=M
             ------
             -A=S=M

    No. 6.   +A=S-M
             ------
             -A=S+M

    No. 7.   +A-S+M
             ------
             -A+S-M

    No. 8.   +A-S=M
             ------
             -A+S=M

    No. 9.   +A-S-M
             ------
             -A+S+M

    No. 10.  =A+S+M
             ------
             =A-S-M

    No. 11.  =A+S=M
             ------
             =A-S=M

    No. 12.  =A+S-M
             ------
             =A-S+M

    No. 13.  =A=S+M
             ------
             =A=S-M

    No. 14.  =A=S=M
             ------
             =A=S=M

    No. 15.  =A=S-M
             ------
             =A=S+M

    No. 16.  =A-S+M
             ------
             =A+S-M

    No. 17.  =A-S=M
             ------
             =A+S=M

    No. 18.  =A-S-M
             ------
             =A+S+M

    No. 19.  -A+S+M
             ------
             +A-S-M

    No. 20.  -A+S=M
             ------
             +A-S=M

    No. 21.  -A+S-M
             ------
             +A-S+M

    No. 22.  -A=S+M
             ------
             +A=S-M

    No. 23.  -A=S=M
             ------
             +A=S=M

    No. 24.  -A=S-M
             ------
             +A=S+M

    No. 25.  -A-S+M
             ------
             +A+S-M

    No. 26.  -A-S=M
             ------
             +A+S=M

    No. 27.  -A-S-M
             ------
             +A+S+M


_STRATEGIC ELEMENTALS._

_Each of the terms contained in the Strategic Syllogism should have its
counterpart in a tangible and competent mass of troops._

This principle of Strategetics, when applied to warfare, is absolute,
and admits of no exception. The catastrophies sustained by the French
armies in the campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815 are each and every
one directly due to the persistent violation by Napoleon of this basic
truth, in devolving the duties of a column of support and a column of
manoeuvre upon a single Strategic Elemental.

In solemn contrast to that fatal and indefensible rashness which cost
Napoleon five great armies and ultimately his crown, is the dictum by one
whose transcendent success in warfare, is the antithesis of the utter
ruination which terminated the career of the famous Corsican.

Says Frederic the Great:

    “_I adhere to those universal laws which all the elements obey;
    these, for me are sufficient._”

Singularly enough, it seemingly has escaped the notice of the great
in warfare, owing to the subtle mathematical construction of the
Chess-board, its peculiar relations to the moves of the Chess-pieces, and
of the latter to each other, that:


PRINCIPLE

I. _The functions of all three terms contained in a Strategic Syllogism
may be combined in a single chess Pawn, and, that:_

II. _All three functions are contemplated in and should be expressed by
every movement of every Chess-piece; and every move upon the Chess-board
is weak and unscientific, to the extent that it disregards either of
these obligations._

       *       *       *       *       *

Those advantages in position, which are denoted by the plus signs of the
Strategic Syllogism, have their material manifestation upon the surface
of the earth by Corps d’armee, and by Pieces which are equivalents of
these latter, upon the Chess-board.

The _sign +A in the Strategic Syllogism_ denotes the superior Strategic
Front. That point whose occupation by a kindred piece demonstrates such
superiority in position is termed the _Key of Position_. The kindred
Corps occupying such point constitutes a _Corps en Line_, and is termed
the _First Strategic Elemental_.

The _sign +S in the Strategic Syllogism_ denotes the _larger number_
of pawn altitudes open to the kindred promotable factors. Those points
occupied by such kindred promotable factors are termed _Logistic
Origins_. The kindred Corps which occupy such points constitute _Corps en
Route_ and collectively are termed the _Second Strategic Elemental_. The
objective of Corps en Route always is the Kindred Logistic Horizon.

The _sign +M in the Strategic Syllogism_ denotes that the _shortest_ open
pawn altitude is occupied by a kindred promotable factor. Such kindred
promotable factor is termed the _Corps en Touch_, and the point occupied
by such Corps is termed the _Point of Proximity_. The Objective of such
Corps always is a designated Point of Junction in the Kindred Logistic
Horizon, and such Corps constitutes the _Third Strategic Elemental_.

In Warfare it is imperative that each of these Strategic Elementals be
represented by one or more Corps d’armee. But it is a second peculiarity
of the Chessic mechanism that a single Chessic Corps d’armee may
represent in itself, one, two or three Strategic Elementals and thus
constitute even the entire _Strategic Ensemble_.

Hence, in Chess play, the Strategic Ensemble may be either single,
double, or triple, viz.:

A Single Strategic Ensemble consists either of:

    (a) 1. Major Vertex.

        2. Grand Vertex.

    (b) Logistic Origin.

    (c) Point of Proximity.

A _Double Strategic Ensemble_ consists of either:

    (a) 1. Major Vertex, plus a Kindred Logistic Origin.

        2. Grand Vertex, plus a Kindred Logistic Origin.

    (b) 1. Major Vertex, plus a Kindred Point of Proximity.

        2. Grand Vertex, plus a Kindred Point of Proximity.

    (c) Logistic Origin, plus a Kindred Point of Proximity.

A _Triple Strategic Ensemble_ consists of:

    1. Major Vertex, plus a Kindred Logistic Origin, plus a Kindred
    Point of Proximity.

    2. Grand Vertex, plus a Kindred Point of Proximity, plus a
    Kindred Logistic Origin.


PRINCIPLE

_The relative positional advantage expressed by the plus signs of
the Strategic Syllogism decreases as the number of plus signs in the
Strategic Syllogism exceeds the number of corresponding Strategic
Elementals._

Failure to observe the amalgamation of the duties of the three Grand
Columns in each and every move upon the Chess-board, and to note that
the tangible and material expression of these powers and advantages may
be expressed either by three, by two, or even by a single Chessic Corps
d’armee, has caused doubt of the exact analogy between Chess and War;
and hence a like doubt of the utility of Chess-play.

Recognizing the truth of the foregoing, the Asiatic conqueror, Tamerlane,
sought to rectify this discrepancy between the mechanism of Chess and
that of War, by increasing the size of the Chess-board to one hundred and
forty-four squares, and the number of pieces to forty-eight.

By this innovation the geometric harmony existing between the Dynamic and
the Static surfaces of the Chess-board was destroyed; and this without
substituting therefor another like condition of mathematic perfection.
Ultimately, this remedy was abandoned, a fate which sooner or later, has
overtaken all attempts to improve that superlative intellectual exercise
of which says Voltaire:

    “Of all games, Chess does most honor to the human mind.”

The reason why the scheme devised by Tamerlane did not satisfy even
himself, and why all attempted alterations in the machinery of Chess
prove unacceptable in practice, is due to the present perfect adaptation
of the Board and the Pieces for exemplifying the processes of Strategetic
Art.

Any change in the construction of the Chess-board and the Chess-pieces,
to be effective, must largely increase the number of Chessmen,
correspondingly increase the number of squares, and equally so, increase
the number of moves permitted to each player at his turn to play.

That is to say: Such innovation to be correct must permit each player
at his turn to play to move one of the Corps d’armee contained in the
Column of Attack, a second in the Column of Support, and a third in the
Column of Manoeuvre. Necessarily, the number of pieces must be increased
in order to provide Corps d’armee for the make-up of each Grand Column,
and obviously, the Board must be sufficiently enlarged to accommodate
not merely this increased mass, but also to permit full scope for the
increased number of possible movements.

    _The student thus readily will perceive, that it is only one step
    from such an elaboration of Chess, to an army and the theatre of
    actual campaigning._

       *       *       *       *       *

Perfection in Position is attained whenever the kindred army is acting or
is posted as a unit, while the hostile army is not so posted nor able so
to act.


MILITARY EXAMPLES


COLUMN OF ATTACK

    _“Frontal attacks are to be avoided, and the preference always is
    to be given to the assault of a single wing, with your center and
    remaining wing held back; because if your attack is successful
    you equally destroy the enemy without the risk of being routed if
    you fail.”--Frederic the Great._

At Leuctra and Mantinea, Epaminondas won by the oblique or Strategic
order of battle. Alexander the Great won by the same order at Issus
and the Haspades. Cyrus won at Thymbra and Hannibal won at Trebia,
Thrasymene, Cannae and Herdonea, by the three sides of an octagon or
enveloping formation. Caesar won by the oblique order at Pharsaleus.

       *       *       *       *       *

Gustavus Adolphus won at Leipsic by acting from the Tactical Center and
Turenne and Prince Eugene gained their victories by the same means.

       *       *       *       *       *

Frederic the Great won at Hohenfriedberg, Sohr, Rosbach, Leuthern,
Zorndorf and Leignitz by the oblique order and at Torgau by acting from
the tactical center.

       *       *       *       *       *

Washington won at Trenton and Princeton acting by three contiguous sides
of an octagon.

Bonaparte won at Montenotte, Castiglione, Arcola, Rivoli, Ulm,
Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram and Ligny, by acting from the
tactical center. Never did he attack by the oblique order of battle.

       *       *       *       *       *

Von Moltke’s victories all were won by acting in strict accord with the
system laid down for the use of the Prussian army by Frederic the Great.


COLUMN OF SUPPORT

The most magnificent illustration both of the proper and of the improper
use of the Column of Support is found in that Grand Operation executed
by the Roman consuls, Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius, whereby the
Carthagenian Army under Hasdrubal was destroyed at the river Metaurus 207
B.C.

Hannibal, with the main Carthagenian army, posted in the south of Italy
near Canusium, was observed by Nero and his troops; while in the west,
Hasdrubal, observed by Livius was slowly advancing southward to form a
junction with his brother, a most unscientific procedure.

Livius permitted Hasdrubal to penetrate into Italy to a point a few
miles south of the Metaurus River; whereupon Nero, taking 7,000 of his
best troops, by a rapid march of 200 miles united with Livius; and the
two consuls at once falling upon Hasdrubal utterly annihilated the
Carthagenian army. Nero returned at all speed and the first news of his
march and of the death blow to the Carthagenian projects against Rome
was furnished by the sight of his brother’s head, which Nero cast into
Hannibal’s camp from a military machine.

The true method for uniting the Columns of Support to a Column of Attack
is thus shown by Gustavus Adolphus:

    “We encamped about Nuremberg the middle of June, the army after
    so many detachments was not above 11,000 infantry and 8,000 horse
    and dragoons. The King posted his army in the suburbs and drew
    intrenchments around the circumference so that he begirt the
    whole city with his army. His works were large, the ditch deep,
    planked by innumerable bastions, ravelins, horn-works, forts,
    redoubts, batteries and palisades, the incessant labor of 8000
    men for fourteen days.

    “On the 30th of June the Imperialists, joined to the Bavarian
    army arrived and sat down 60,000 strong, between the city and the
    friendly states; in order to intercept the King’s provisions and
    to starve him out.

    “The King had three great detachments and several smaller ones,
    acting abroad, reducing to his power the castles and towns of the
    adjacent countries and these he did not hasten to join him until
    their work was done.

    “The two chief armies had now lain for five or six weeks in
    sight of each other and the King thinking all was ready, ordered
    his generals to join him. Gustavus Horn was on the Moselle,
    Chancellor Oxenstern about Mentz and Cologne and Dukes William
    and Bernard and Gen. Bannia in Bavaria.

    “Our friends were not backward in obeying the King’s command, and
    having drawn together their forces from various parts and _ALL_
    joined the chancellor Oxenstern, they set out in full march for
    Nuremburg, where they arrived Aug. 21, being 30,000 old soldiers
    commanded by officers of the greatest conduct and experience in
    the world.”

       *       *       *       *       *

Only once, at the battle of Torgau, (Nov. 5, 1760) did Frederick the
Great rely upon the co-operation of his Columns of Support for victory.

As the result, his Column of Attack of 25,000 men fought the entire
battle and was so ruined by the fire and sabres of 90,000 enemies and 400
pieces of artillery that, as the sun went down the King charged at the
head of two battalions, his sole remaining troops. At this moment Gen.
Zeithen, with the Column of Support, of 22,000 men occupied Siptka Hill,
the tactical key of the battlefield, and fired a salvo of artillery to
inform the King of their presence. The astonished Austrians turned and
fled; the King’s charge broke their line of battle and Frederic grasped a
victory, “for which” says Napoleon, “he was indebted to Fortune and the
only one in which he displayed no talent.”

This comment of course is not true. Frederic displayed magnificent
talent that day, by holding in check a force of thrice his numbers and
so shattering it by his incessant attacks that it crumbled to pieces
before the mere presence and at sight of his fresh and vigorous Column
of Support. Had Napoleon displayed such talent in the personal conduct
of battles during 1813, 1814 and 1815 it is possible that he would have
terminated his career at some other place than at St. Helena.

The experience, however, was enough to fully satisfy Frederic, and never
again did he attempt a Logistic battle.

       *       *       *       *       *

The capture of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown is perhaps the nearest
approach to the achievement of Nero and Livius in the annals of the
military art. Decoyed by the retrograde movements of Gen. Greene, the
British army was deluded into taking up a position at Yorktown, having
the unfordable James River in rear, and within striking distance of the
main American army under Washington about New York City.

Lafayette was ordered to reinforce Greene; Count d’Esting was induced to
bring the French fleet from the West Indies to Chesapeake Bay to prevent
the rescue of Cornwallis by British coming by the ocean, and Count
Rochambeau was requested to join Washington with the French army then in
Rhode Island.

All this took time, but everything was executed like clockwork. The
French fleet arrived in the Chesapeake; the next day came a British
fleet to rescue the Earl’s army. In the naval fight which ensued, the
British were driven to sea and so damaged as to compel their return to
New York. By a swift march, Washington, with his Continentals and the
French, joined Greene and Lafayette, and two of his redoubts being taken
by storm, Lord Cornwallis surrendered. This victory established the
independence of the American Colonies.

       *       *       *       *       *

The Logistic Battle, _i.e._, the combination of the Columns of Attack
and of Support was first favorite with Napoleon and to his partiality
for this particular form of the tactical offensive was due both the
spectacular successes and the annihilating catastrophes which mark his
astonishing career.

The retrieving of his lost battle of Marengo, by the fortuitous arrival
of Dessaix column, seems to have impressed Napoleon to the extent that he
ever after preferred to win by such process, rather than by any other.

The first attempt to put his new hypothesis into practice was at Jena.
Single handed his column of attack destroyed the Prussian main body,
while Davoust with the column of manoeuvre held in check over three times
his numbers.

The French Column of Support under Bernadotte did not arrive in season to
fire a shot.

       *       *       *       *       *

At Eylau, the French Column of Support under Davoust was four hours
in advancing six miles against the opposition of the Russian general
Doctoroff. The second French Column of Support under Ney did not reach
the field until the battle was over.

       *       *       *       *       *

In the retreat from Russia, the French Column of Support under the Duke
of Belluno was driven from its position at Smolensko, thus permitting the
Russians under Kutosof to occupy the Strategic center, which disaster
cost Napoleon 30,000 men in clearing his communications.

       *       *       *       *       *

In 1813, the Column of Support under Ney at Bautzen was misdirected and
the battle rendered indecisive by its lack of co-operation with the
French Column of Attack.

       *       *       *       *       *

In 1814, Napoleon conformed to the Art by acting in three columns, but
yielding to his besetting military sin, he joined his Column of Support
to his Column of Attack and through the open space thus created in the
French Strategetic Front, Blucher advanced triumphantly to Paris.

       *       *       *       *       *

In the Waterloo campaign, Napoleon properly began with three Grand
Columns. At the battle of Ligny, his Column of Support arrived upon
Blucher’s left flank and then without firing a shot, wheeled about and
marched away.

At Waterloo, by uniting his Columns of Attack and of Support prematurely,
Napoleon permitted Blucher to penetrate the French Strategetic Front and
to win in the same manner and as decisively as he did at Paris.

       *       *       *       *       *

Von Moltke won the battle of Sadowa by the arrival of the Prussian Column
of Support, commanded by Prince Frederic William. But in the interim, the
German main army was driven in several miles by the Austrians, and Prince
Bismark’s first white hairs date from that day.


COLUMN OF MANOEUVRE

    _“A small body of brave and expert men, skillfully handled and
    favored by the ground, easily may render difficult the advance of
    a large army.”--Frederic the Great._

At the river Metaurus, the Roman Consul Livius gave a fine example of the
duties of a Column of Manoeuvre which are slowly and securely to retreat
before an advancing enemy and never to be induced into a pitched battle
until the arrival of the kindred main body.

       *       *       *       *       *

Frederic the Great made great use of Columns of Manoeuvre. In the Seven
Years War he constantly maintained such a column against the armies of
each State with whom Prussia was at war; while himself and his brother
Henry operated as Columns of Attack.

       *       *       *       *       *

In the Revolutionary War, Washington maintained a Column of Manoeuvre
against the British in Rhode Island, another against the British in the
south and a third against the hostile Indian tribes of the southwest.

       *       *       *       *       *

Napoleon constantly used Columns of Manoeuvre in all his campaigns;
notably at Montenotte, Castiglione, Arcole, Rivoli, Ulm, Austerlitz,
Jena, in 1812, 1813, 1814 and at Ligny and Waterloo in 1815.




PRIME STRATEGETIC MEANS




PRIME STRATEGETIC MEANS

    _“It is necessary exactly to weigh the means we possess in
    opposition to the enemy in order to determine beforehand which
    must ultimately predominated.”--Frederic the Great._


_Those elemental quantities whose comparative values are determined by
Grand Reconnaissance and which are termed: Organization, Topography,
Mobility, Numbers, Time, and Position, collectively constitute Prime
Strategetic Means whose proper employment is the basis of every true
Prime Strategetic Process._


POLICY OF CAMPAIGN

That relative advantage in Numbers expressed by the larger aggregate of
Chess-pieces is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by additional
geometric and sub-geometric symbols.

Excess or deficiency in Numbers determines the policy of Campaign. The
policy of the inferior force is:

    1. To preserve intact its Corps d’armee, and

    2. To engage in battle only when victory can be assured by other
    advantages in Strategetic means, which nullify the adverse
    advantage in Numbers; and even then only when such victory is
    decisive of the Campaign.

Hence, the policy of Campaign of that army superior in Numbers, is:

Incessantly to proffer battles which:

    (a) Accepted, constantly reduces the inferior army and increases
    its disproportion in numbers, or,

    (b) Evaded, compels the inferior army to abandon important posts,
    for whose defence it cannot afford the resulting loss of troops;
    thus permitting to the numerically superior army a continually
    increasing advantage in Position.


PRINCIPLE

_All else being equal the advantage of Numbers is decisive of victory in
battle and Campaign._

_Things being unequal, the advantage in Numbers may be nullified by
adverse advantages in Organization, Topography, Mobility, Time and
Position._

_Victory resulting from advantage in Numbers is achieved by
simultaneously attacking two or more Tactical Keys from a Kindred
Strategic Key and two or more Kindred Points of Command._


TO LOCATE THE AREA OF CONCENTRATION

That _relative advantage in Mobility_ expressed by the situation of the
Strategic Front upon the Strategetic Center is materially manifested
upon the Chess-board by Kindred Chess-pieces posted upon that great
central diagonal which extends towards the Objective Plane. Such
advantage determines those points which should be occupied in the proper
development of the front so posted; and consequently designates the
direction and location of that battlefield upon which the kindred army
may concentrate in overwhelming force, despite all possible resistance by
the enemy.


MOST FAVORABLE BATTLEFIELD

That _relative advantage in Organization_ expressed by superior potential
totality, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the geometric
and sub-geometric symbols of those Chess-pieces possessed of the superior
potential complement. Such symbols taken in combination, describe that
field of battle most favorable for the execution of those Major Tactical
evolutions which appertain to the Chess-pieces of superior organization.


POSTS OF MAXIMUM SECURITY

That _relative defensive advantage in Topography_ expressed by
inaccessibility to hostile attack is materially manifested upon the
Chess-board by Corps of Position, posted upon points of different color
to that occupied by the adverse Bishop; and this advantage designates
those posts situated on a projected field of battle which may be occupied
with the maximum of security.

That _relative offensive advantage in Topography_ expressed by
accessibility to kindred attack is materially manifested upon the
Chess-board by Corps of Position posted upon points of the same color as
that occupied by the kindred Bishop; and this advantage designates those
posts situated on a projected field of battle which may be attacked with
the maximum facility.


CHARACTER OF THE MOST FAVORABLE BATTLE

That _relative advantage in Position with the Column of Attack_,
expressed:

    1. By superior location, direction and development of the Kindred
    Strategic Front of Operations; and

    2. By the occupation of Points of Departure, of Manoeuvre, of
    Command and of the Strategic Key of a True Strategic Horizon,
    indicates that a Strategic Grand Battle in the first instance;
    and in the second case that a Tactical Grand Battle is most
    favorable in the existing situation.

That _relative advantage in Position with the Column of Support_,
expressed by superior facilities for occupying with the Kindred
Promotable Factors their corresponding Points of Junction in the Kindred
Logistic Horizon, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by
the larger number of Pawn Altitudes which either are open, or may be
opened, despite all possible resistance by the enemy; and such advantage
designates those adverse Points of Impenetrability and Points of
Resistance to the march of the Kindred Promotable Factors, which it is
necessary to nullify.

That _relative advantage in Position with the Column of Manoeuvre_,
expressed by the security of the Kindred and the exposure of the
adverse Strategetic Rear to attack by the Kindred Column of Support, is
materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the occupation by a Kindred
Promotable Factor of the Point of Proximity; and such advantage indicates
that the advance with all possible celerity of such Promotable Factor
and Point of Proximity toward the corresponding Point of Junction is a
dominating influence in the existing situation.


PROJECTED GRAND BATTLE

From the advantage in Position appertaining to the three Grand Columns is
deduced the character of the Grand Battle properly in sequence.

_Advantage in Position with the Column of Attack_ indicates the
opportunity, all else being equal, to engage in a victorious Strategic
Grand Battle against the hostile Formation in Mass, or in a Tactical
Grand Battle against the hostile Formation by Wings.

_Advantage in Position with the Column of Support_ indicates the
opportunity to engage effectively in a series of minor battles, as though
having the advantage in Numbers.

_Advantage in Position with the Column of Manoeuvre_ indicates the
opportunity to engage in a victorious Logistic Grand Battle against the
adverse Formation by Grand Columns.


LEAST FAVORABLE ADVERSE CONDITION

That _relative advantage in Time_ expressed by restrictions of the
adversary’s choice of movements at his turn to play, is materially
manifested upon the Chess-board by Feints operated by Kindred
Chess-pieces against adverse vital points; and such advantage of the
Initiative dictates the next move of the opposing army.

The _advantage of the Initiative_ determines which of the adverse corps
d’armee may and may not move.

The material expression of this advantage always is a Feint by a Kindred
Corps against a vital point either occupied or unoccupied, which
necessitates that upon his next move, the enemy either evacuate, support,
cover or sustain the post so menaced.

Such feint, therefore, restricts the move of the enemy to those of his
corps as are able to obviate the threatened loss and proportionately
reduces the immediate activity of his army.


RELATIVE ADVANTAGES IN LOCATION

    _“It is only the force brought into action that avails in battles
    and campaigns--the rest does not count.”--Napoleon._

_The distance which separates opposing Corps d’armee always modifies the
values of the Prime Strategetic Means._

Hence in the making of Grand Reconnaissance, it is next in sequence to
determine whether the Chess-pieces are:

    I. In Contact.

    II. In Presence.

    III. At Distance.

Corps d’armee are _in Contact_ with each other whenever their logistic
radii intersect; or, their radii offensive and the corresponding adverse
radii defensive are opposed to each other.

Corps d’armee are _in Presence_ whenever the posts which they occupy are
contained within the same Strategic front, the same Strategetic Horizon,
or are in communication with their corresponding posts of mobilization,
development, or manoeuvre.

Corps d’armee are _at Distance_ when the posts which they occupy are not
in communication with Kindred Corps d’armee posted upon the strategic
front adopted, or with posts of mobilization or development contained
within the corresponding Primary Base of Operations, or, within the True
Strategetic Horizon.


REQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNING

Every Campaign, whether upon the surface of the Earth or upon the
Chess-board is decided and usually is terminated by a Grand Battle.

Those movements of opposing Grand Columns, whereby such decisive
conflict is brought about under circumstances which ensure victory, by
reason of superior advantages in Strategetic Means, are termed Grand
Manoeuvres; and a proper series of Grand Manoeuvres, combined with their
corresponding feints, strategems, ambuscades and minor battles, the whole
terminated by a resulting Grand Battle, is termed a Grand Operation.

Those processes of Grand Manoeuvre, which produce an opportunity to
victoriously engage in battle, are the most subtle and difficult known to
the Strategetic Art.

_Successful application of these processes in practice depends wholly
upon proper use of the MEANS at hand and the doing of the utmost that can
be done in the TIME available._

Nothing can be more repugnant to high art in Strategetics than those
crudities termed in the specious mouthings of pretentious mediocrity
“waiting moves,” “delayed strokes,” “defensive-offensives,” “masterly
inactivities,” and the like.

“Time past is gone and cannot be regained; time future is not and may
never be; time present is” and with it Opportunity, which an instant
later may be gone.

The gain of but “a foot of ground and a minute of time” would have saved
the French army at Rosbach and have cost Frederic the Great one of his
most lustrous victories and perhaps his army and his crown.


PRINCIPLE

_In Strategetics there is but a single method whereby Opportunity may
be availed of, and that is by so augmenting kindred advantages and so
depreciating adverse advantages as to acquire for the kindred army that
particular advantage of Strategetic means which in the given situation is
the proper basis of the Strategetic movement next in sequence._

       *       *       *       *       *

_At Distance._

_The chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse army at
Distance, is the advantage in MOBILITY._

The primary process is that of a Grand Manoeuvre against an adverse army
acting in the formation by Grand Columns, and the object of such Grand
Manoeuvre always is, by superior celerity of movement, to occupy:

1. The Strategic Center by the Kindred Column of Attack, thus
intersecting the Route of Communication between the adverse main body and
its Base of Operation; or to occupy:

2. The Logistic Center with the Kindred Columns of Support and of
Manoeuvre, thus intersecting the Route of Communication between the
adverse main body and its Chief Supporting Column and clearing the way
for the advance of the Kindred Column of Support against the flank and
rear of the adverse Main Body.

Obviously, the united Kindred Columns of Attack and of Support always
will constitute an overwhelming superiority in Numbers as compared with
the adverse main body.

_In Presence._

_The chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse Grand
Column in Presence, is the advantage in POSITION._

The primary process is that of a Grand Manoeuvre against an adverse army
acting in the Formation by Wings, and the object of such Grand Manoeuvre
always is, by availing to the uttermost of its situation upon the
Tactical Center, _i.e._, upon the area midway between the adverse Wings
thus isolated from each other; to act in overwhelming Numbers, first
against one and then against the other hostile bodies.

_In Contact._

_The chief requisite for success when acting offensively against an
adverse Grand Column, or Wing, or Corps d’armee, in Contact, is the
advantage in NUMBERS._

The primary process is that of a Grand Battle in which the kindred army
has an overwhelming superiority in Numbers in contact, and at least the
equality in all other Prime Strategetic Means.

In this circumstance, the object of such Grand Battle always is:

1. To attack the hostile Formation in Mass frontally at the center, and
upon both wings obliquely; all three attacks being made simultaneously
and the evolutions so executed that the hostile army never is able to
penetrate between either kindred wing and the kindred center, nor to
outflank that kindred wing which may be in the air.

2. In case the kindred army has the equality or inferiority in all
other Prime Strategetic Means, then the object of a Grand Battle on the
Offensive is to attack the hostile Formation in Mass obliquely with the
whole kindred army, and preferably upon that wing which covers the
route of communication of the adverse army with its Base of Operations,
but always upon that wing which contains the Tactical Key of the actual
Battlefield.

Obviously, the concentration of the entire kindred army against a single
adverse wing always will constitute an overwhelming superiority in
Numbers.

In making such attack obliquely against a single adverse wing, the center
and remaining wing of the kindred army must not engage until the kindred
Van and Corps of Position of the attacking wing first have formed the
_center_ of three sides of an octagon; of which the Kindred Corps of
Evolution will form the _farthest_ side and the Kindred Center and left
wing Corps d’armee will form the _nearest_ and latest constructed side.

       *       *       *       *       *

_The chief requisite for success when acting defensively against a Grand
Column, or Wing, or Corps d’armee is the advantage in TOPOGRAPHY._

The primary process is that of a Grand Battle in which the kindred army,
decidedly inferior in Numbers in the aggregate, has the advantage in
Topography and equality in all other Prime Strategetic Means.

In this case the object is to support both flanks of the inferior army
upon impassable natural barriers, strengthening both wings at the expense
of the center, both in quantity and in quality of troops.

If the Tactical Defensive be selected, the center should retire before
the oncoming of the hostile army in order to enclose it between the
Kindred Wings, which will then overwhelm it by superior Numbers, while
the natural barriers on the flanks being impassable will prevent the
remaining hostile corps from participating in the battle otherwise than
as spectators.

Should the Tactical Offensive be selected, that kindred wing best adapted
for attack should engage supported by all kindred Corps of Evolution,
while advancing the Kindred Center in reserve and holding the remaining
wing refused and in observation.

All else being equal, relative advantage in either branch of Prime
Strategetic Means is sufficient to ensure victory in battle, and the
proper use of such advantage for securing victory is outlined thus:


PRINCIPLE

_Utilize advantage in Prime Strategetic Means to obtain the superiority
in Numbers at the Point of Contact in an Offensive Battle; and to nullify
the adverse superiority in Numbers at the point of contact in a Defensive
Battle._

       *       *       *       *       *

Between War and Chess there is a seeming incongruity, which is the basis
of that doubt of the utility of Chess-play, so commonly held by laymen,
and which fallacy few, even among proficients, are competent to combat.

This doubt most frequently is voiced by the query:

    If Chess and War are analagous, why was not Napoleon a Master
    Chess-player and Morphy a great military Commander?

This query readily is answered in the words of Frederic the Great, viz.:

    “To be possessed of talent is not sufficient. Opportunity to
    display such talent and to its full extent is necessary. All
    depends on the time in which we live.”

The Strategetic talent possessed in common by Morphy and Napoleon, in
both was brought to perfection by long and expert training.

But circumstances placed the twelve year old Napoleon in the midst of
soldiers and in an era of war, while circumstances placed the twelve year
old Morphy in the midst of Chess-players and in an era of Peace.

Napoleon was educated a General; Morphy was educated a lawyer.

To develop his self-evident and superlative Strategetic talent,
Napoleon’s education was of the best; to develop his self-evident and
superlative Strategetic talent, Morphy’s education was of the worst.

Napoleon succeeded as a General; Morphy failed as a lawyer.

The innate capability of Napoleon for Strategetics was developed in the
direction of Warfare; the innate capability of Morphy for Strategetics
was developed in the direction of Chess-play.

In War, Napoleon is superlative; in Chess, Morphy is superlative.

Educated in the law, Napoleon might have proved like Morphy a non-entity;
educated in Chess, Napoleon might have proved like Morphy a phenomenon.

Educated in War, Morphy might have rivalled Napoleon.

For the Chess-play of Morphy displays that perfect comprehension of
Strategetics, to which none but the great Captains in warfare have
attained.

Perfection in Strategetics consists in exactly interpreting in battle and
campaign, the System of Warfare invented by Epaminondas.

Those able to do this in War have achieved greatness, and the great at
Chess-play are those who best have imitated that exactness with which
Morphy employed this system on the Chess-board.

To those who imagine that Strategetic talent, as exemplified in Warfare,
is different from Strategetic talent as exemplified in Chess-play, the
following may afford matter for reflection.

       *       *       *       *       *

_“Frederic the Great was one of the finest Chess-players that Germany
ever produced.”--Wilhelm Steinitz._




PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION

SECTION ONE




PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION

SECTION ONE


(FIRST PHASE.)

In the consideration of every Strategetic Situation possible in Warfare,
or in Chess-play, the initial process always is a Grand Reconnaissance.

Grand Reconnaissance is that exact scrutiny of existing conditions,
whereby is determined the relative advantages and disadvantages possessed
by the opposing armies in:

    1. Time.

    2. Numbers.

    3. Position.

    4. Organization.

    5. Mobility.

    6. Topography.

The _First Phase_ in the demonstration of every Prime Strategetic
Proposition consists:

    1. _In determining by comparison of the relative advantages and
    disadvantages in Time, which of the opposing armies has the
    ability to MOVE, while the other must remain stationary._

    2. _In deducing the MOTIF of such movement._

    3. _In designating the DIRECTION of such movement._

The making of Grand Reconnaissance is a special privilege which
exclusively appertains to the advantage in _Time_. It always should be
made by the Commander-in-chief of that army which is able to put itself
in motion, while the opposing army must remain stationary, and it never
should be confounded with the advance of the Cavalry Corps, nor confused
with the work of scouts and spies; all of which are matters entirely
separate and distinct from Grand Reconnaissance.

In the Grand Reconnaissance of any given Strategetic Situation the
element of Numbers _primarily_ is to be considered, for the reason that
the basic fact of the Science of Strategetics is:

    _“THE GREATER FORCE ALWAYS OVERCOMES THE LESSER.”--Napoleon._

Hence, unless more immediately vital considerations prevent, superiority
in Numbers, of itself, is _decisive_ of victory; and thus it readily
is to be deduced that all else being equal, the advantage in Time plus
the advantage in Numbers constitutes the easiest and simplest winning
combination known to Strategetic Art.

But it so happens that the advantage in Time may be combined not only
with the greater force, but also with an equal, or even with the lesser
force, and from this it is self-evident that Strategetic Situations are
divided into three classes, viz.:

    I. Numerical superiority, plus right to move.

    II. Numerical equality, plus right to move.

    III. Numerical inferiority, plus right to move.

There are _two primary methods_ for availing of superiority in Numbers to
destroy the opposing lesser force, viz.:

    1. _By the Process of Attrition, i.e., by maintaining an
    incessant tactical offensive and thus wearing down the opposing
    army by exchanging pieces at every opportunity._

    2. _By Acting in Detachments, i.e., by means of the extra corps,
    simultaneously to attack more points of vital importance than the
    hostile army is able simultaneously to defend._

From the foregoing it is obvious that conversely there are two principal
considerations, which all else being equal, must dominate the procedure
of the Numerically inferior force, viz.:

    I. To avoid further diminution of its aggregate.

    II. To avoid creating indefensible vital points.

       *       *       *       *       *

The _second consideration_ in the making of a Grand Reconnaissance by
the commander-in-chief of an army having the advantage in Time, is the
element of _Position_; for the reason that by unscientific posting of
Corps d’armee, relative advantages in Time, or in Numbers or in both, may
be rendered nugatory, on account of inability of the kindred Columns of
Attack, of Support and of Manoeuvre to perform their functions.

In case the Corps are scientifically posted and are in positions to
avail of advantage in Time and Numbers, those adverse vital points
whose occupation may be effected by superior force, always will be the
objectives of the movements of the latter.

Hence, the following:


PRINCIPLE

_As the advantage in Time gives the right to MOVE and the advantage
in Numbers indicates the MOTIF of movement; so does the advantage in
Position, as expressed by the Strategic Syllogism, specify the DIRECTION
of that movement which normally appertains to the army having the
advantage in Time._

The proper _direction_ of that movement which normally appertains to the
advantage in Time always is indicated by the plus signs in the Strategic
Syllogism, viz.:

    +A.     Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army
            having the advantage in Time is along the Strategetic Center
            towards the Objective Plane.

    +S.     Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army
            having the advantage in Time is along one or more pawn
            altitudes towards the Kindred Logistic Horizon.

    +M.     Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army
            having the advantage in Time is along the shortest open pawn
            altitude towards the Kindred Point of Junction.

    -------
    +A+S.   Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army
            having the advantage in Time is double, _i.e._,

            +A. towards the Objective Plane.

            +S. along one or more open Pawn altitudes toward the
                Kindred Logistic Horizon.

    -------
    +A+M.   Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army
            having the advantage in Time, is double, _i.e._,

            +A. towards the Objective Plane.

            +M. Along the shortest open pawn altitude toward the
                Kindred Point of Junction.

    -------
    +S+M.   Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army
            having the advantage in Time is double, _i.e._,

            +S. Along one or more open Pawn altitudes toward the
                Kindred Logistic Horizon.

            +M. Along the shortest open Pawn Altitude toward the
                Kindred Point of Junction.

    -------
    +A+S+M. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement is triple,
            _i.e._,

            +A. Toward the Objective Plane.

            +S. Along one or more open Pawn altitudes, toward the
                Kindred Logistic Horizon.

            +M. Along the shortest open Pawn altitude, toward the
                Kindred Point of Junction.

The First Phase in the demonstration of every Strategetic Proposition is
determined by the following:


THEOREM

_Given the Normal ability to move, to determine the Normal motif and
direction of movement._

1. Designate that army having the advantage in Time and express such
advantage by the symbol +T, express the corresponding disadvantage
in Time which appertains to the opposing army, by the symbol -T, and
such symbols will constitute the First Term of the First Phase of the
demonstration of any Prime Strategetic Proposition.

2. Express that superiority, equality, or inferiority in Numbers, which
appertains to each of the opposing armies by the symbols +N, =N,-N,
respectively; and such symbols will constitute the Second Term of the
First Phase of the demonstration of any Prime Strategetic Proposition.

3. Express the objectives designated by the plus terms of the Strategic
Syllogism, viz.:

    (a) Objective of +A = Objective Plane, _i.e._, O. P.

    (b)     ”        +S = Logistic Horizon, _i.e._, L. H.

    (c)     ”        +M = Point of Junction, _i.e._, P. J.

and the symbols denoting such objectives will constitute the Third
Term in the First Phase of the demonstration of any Prime Strategetic
Proposition.

4. Combine those three terms which appertain to the advantage in Time,
then combine those three terms which appertain to the disadvantage in
Time, and the resulting equation when expanded will depict:

    (a) The normal ability to move.

    (b) The normal motif of movement.

    (c) The normal directions of movement which appertain to each of
    the opposing armies.


EXAMPLE

    White. (+T+N) + (+A+S+M)
           -----------------
    Black. (-T-N) + (-A-S-M)


EXPANDED

    First Term.  +T = Normal ability to move.

    Second Term. +N = Normal motif of movement,
                      (a) Detachments, (b) Exchanges.

    Third Term   +O. P. = Normal objective of +A.
                 +L. H. =   ”       ”       ” +S.
                 +P. J. =   ”       ”       ” +M.

Hence, in the foregoing example the normal direction of movement for
White may be either toward the Objective Plane with the Column of Attack,
or toward the Logistic Horizon, or the Point of Junction with the Column
of Support, or toward both objectives, with both columns simultaneously.

Meanwhile, the Black army having the disadvantage in Time is unable to
move, and consequently is stationary.

Furthermore, White having the superiority in Numbers may move with an
equal force against either objective designated by the Third Term of the
equation, and with his excess force against one or more adverse vital
points, simultaneously, against which latter movement, Black obviously
has no adequate defence.


TACTICO-LOGISTIC INEQUALITY

The Tactico-Logistic Inequality is the algebraic expression of the
relative advantages and disadvantages in Time and in Numbers appertaining
to opposing Strategetic Entireties.

Such advantages and disadvantages are denoted by the terms, viz.:

+T. Signifies the absolute advantage in Time, _i.e._, the ability of
an army, a grand column, a wing or a corps d’armee to move, while the
opposing force must remain stationary.

-T. Signifies the absolute disadvantage in Time, _i.e._, the obligation
of an army, a grand column, a wing, or a corps d’armee to remain
stationary, while the opposing force is in motion.

+N. Signifies the absolute advantage in Numbers, _i.e._, the larger
number of corps d’armee.

-N. Signifies the absolute disadvantage in Numbers, _i.e._, the smaller
number of corps d’armee.

=N. Signifies the equality in Numbers, _i.e._, the same number of corps
d’armee.

There are six forms of the Tactico-Logistic Inequality, viz.:

    1.  +T+N
       ------
        -T-N

    2.  +T=N
       ------
        -T=N

    3.  +T-N
       ------
        -T+N

    4.  -T+N
       ------
        +T-N

    5.  -T=N
       ------
        +T=N

    6.  -T-N
       ------
        +T+N


INITIAL STRATEGETIC EQUATION

The Initial Strategetic Equation is made up of those terms which compose
the Strategic Syllogism and the Tactico-Logistic Inequality, viz.:

    -----------------   -----------------
    (+A+S+M) + (+T+N) - (-A-S-M) + (-T-N) =
    the Normal Motif and Direction of Effort.


RULE

1. _Set down in parenthesis those terms of the Strategic Syllogism which
appertain to White._

_Set down in parenthesis those terms of the Tactico-Logistic Inequality
which appertain to White._

_Connect the two kindred terms thus constructed, by the sign of addition,
to show that each is to augment the other, and superscore all by the same
vincula to show that all are to be taken together to form one side of the
resulting equation._

       *       *       *       *       *

2. _Repeat this process for the Black terms to construct the second side
of the Initial Strategetic Equation, and separate the White from the
Black terms by a minus sign._


STRATEGETIC VALUES

The Strategetic Values of the terms contained in the Strategic Syllogism
and in the Tactico-Logistic Inequality are shown by the appended tables,
viz.:


TABLE OF STRATEGIC VALUES.

   _Term._    _Post._         _Direction._          _Motif._

  1.  +A  Grand Vertex     Tactical Key of       To give checkmate
                           Objective Plane

  2.  +M  Point Proximity  Point of Junction     To queen a Pawn
          en command

  3.  +A  Major Vertex     1. Grand Vertex       To gain winning Position
                           2. Point Aligned      with Column of Attack
                           3. Point en Potence

  4.  +M  Point Proximity  Point en Command      To gain winning Position
          en Menace                              with Column of Support

  5.  +M  Point Proximity  Point en Menace       To gain winning Position
          en Presence                            with Column of Support

  6.  +A  Minor Vertex     1. Major Vertex       To gain Superior Position
                           2. Point Aligned      with Column of Attack

  7.  +S  Point Proximity  Point en Presence     To gain Superior Position
          en Observation                         with Column of Support

  8.  +S  Point Proximity  Point en Observation  To gain superior Position
          en Route                               with Column of Support

  9.  +S  Point Proximity  Point en Route        To gain advantage with
          Remote                                 Column of Support


TABLE OF LOGISTIC VALUES

    _Term._

  1.  +T  Unrestricted privilege to move any Piece.

  2.  +T  Restricted to moving a Sustaining Piece en counter attack.

  3.  +T  Restricted to moving an aggressive Covering Piece.

  4.  +T  Restricted to moving a Passive Covering Piece.

  5.  +T  Restricted to moving a Supporting Piece.

  6.  +T  Restricted to moving the King out of check.

  7.  +T  Restricted to moving the King from an untenable Objective Plane.

  8.  +T  Restricted to moving a Piece to reduce the value of the Kindred
          King’s Logistic Radii.


TABLE OF TACTICAL VALUES

    _Term._

  1.  +N  Larger numbers of Grand Corps d’armee of Evolution.

  2.  +N  Larger numbers of Major Corps d’armee of Evolution.

  3.  +N  Larger numbers of Minor Corps d’armee of Evolution.

  4.  +N  Larger numbers of Corps d’armee of Position.




PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION

SECTION TWO




PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION

SECTION TWO


THEOREM.

_Given any Strategetic Situation to determine the True Tactical Sequence._


DEMONSTRATION.

(_First Phase._)

Let the term +A in its degree represent the relative advantage in
Position of the Column of Attack; +S in its degree the relative advantage
in Position of the Column of Support, and +M in its degree the relative
advantage in Position of the Column of Manoeuvre; let equality in
Position of the several Columns be represented by the terms =A, =S, =M,
and let inferiority in Positions of the several Columns be represented
by the terms -A, -S, -M, and let those terms appertaining to the White
Columns be written above a line and those terms appertaining to the Black
Columns be written below the line, and let that collection of terms
containing the plus and equal signs of greater Strategetic value be the
Major Premise and that collection of terms containing the signs of lesser
strategetic value be the Minor Premise of the _Strategic Syllogism_ thus
constructed.

Let the ability to move while the opposing force must remain stationary
be represented by the term +T, and let the converse be represented by
the term -T, and let superiority in Numbers be represented by the term
+N; the equality in Numbers by the term =N, and inferiority in Numbers
by the term -N, and let the combining of any form of the terms T and N
constitute a _Tactico-Logistic Inequality_.

Let any combination of that Strategic Syllogism which appertains to a
given Strategetic Situation with the corresponding Tactico-Logistic
Inequality, form the _Initial Strategetic Equation_.

Let the plus terms and the equality terms, which are contained in the
Initial Strategetic Equation, be expanded into their highest forms
according to the table of Strategetic Values, and annex to each of such
terms that numeral which expresses the relative rank of such term in
those calculations which appertain to the pending Prime Strategetic
Proposition.

Compare the values so obtained and let the highest _Strategetically_ be
regarded as the menace most immediately decisive, then:

If the term +T appertain to the Piece operating such menace, let such
Piece be regarded as the Corps d’armee en Menace, and the Objective of
such menace as the Prime Decisive Point; the occupation of such Point
by such Piece as the Normal Motif of Offensive Effort, and the Logistic
Radius connecting the Point of Departure occupied by such Piece and the
Prime Decisive Point as the Normal Direction of Offensive Effort.

If the term +T does NOT apply to that menace which combined with the term
+T would be most immediately decisive, then:

By further comparison of the terms of the Initial Strategetic Equation,
select that Decisive Menace strategetically next in sequence to which
the term +T does appertain; and let the Piece operating such Decisive
Menace be regarded as the Corps d’armee en Menace; the Objective of such
menace as the Prime Decisive Point; the occupation of such Point by such
Piece as the Normal Motif of Offensive Effort, and the Logistic Radius
connecting the Point of Departure occupied by such Piece and the Prime
Decisive Points as the Normal direction of Offensive Effort.

Provided:

Whenever the term +T appertains to a Menace not so immediately decisive
as another menace operated by an adverse army, column, wing or corps
d’armee, but to which the term +T does _not_ appertain, then: the Normal
motif of Effort is _defensive_, and the Normal direction of Defensive
Effort is along the Logistic Radius between the Point of Departure of
that Kindred Piece, which by the advantage of the term +A, is able to
nullify the adverse most immediately Decisive Menace and that Point of
Command which is the Objective of such Effort en Defence and from whence
such adverse most immediately Decisive Menace may be nullified.

       *       *       *       *       *

The second or Intermediate Phase of the Prime Strategetic Proposition
appertains to Grand Manoeuvres; and the third, or Final Phase, appertains
to Grand Operations.

_However vast one’s capabilities may be, there is no mind so
comprehensive but that it has much to learn from other minds which have
preceded it, and no talent is so potential but that its development is
proportional to its exercise._

_For no matter how broad and exact one’s knowledge, the application of
such knowledge alone constitutes Art, and the value of such knowledge
always is commensurate to the degree of skill attained in the use of it._

_Hence, there is a training of the physical senses which gives quickness
and strength to the eye, the ear and the hand; a training of the nervous
organism which gives courage to the heart, clearness to the brain, and
steadiness to the body; a training of the intellect which fructifies in
originality, ingenuity, profundity and exactness of calculation._

_Such training is to be acquired only from systematic study of the best
productions by Masters of the Art, and by incessant practice with the
best proficients._