Produced by Al Haines








[Illustration: Map--The Balkan Peninsula in 1914]




  THE
  NEW MAP OF EUROPE

  (1911-1914)

  THE STORY OF THE RECENT EUROPEAN
  DIPLOMATIC CRISES AND WARS AND OF
  EUROPE'S PRESENT CATASTROPHE

  BY

  HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, PH.D.

  AUTHOR OF "THE FOUNDATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE",
  "PARIS REBORN," ETC.



  NEW YORK
  THE CENTURY CO.
  1916




  COPYRIGHT, 1914, BY
  THE CENTURY CO.

  _Published, November, 1914
  Second Edition, March, 1915
  Third Edition, August, 1915
  Fourth Edition, December, 1915_




  To
  MY CHILDREN

  CHRISTINE ESTE of Adana,

  LLOYD IRVING of Constantinople,
  and
  EMILY ELIZABETH of Paris.

  Born in the midst of the wars and changes that this book describes,
  may they lead lives of peace!




There are general causes, moral or physical, which act in each State,
elevate it, maintain it, or cast it down; every accident is submitted
to these causes, and if the fortune of a battle, that is to say a
particular cause, has ruined a State, there was a general cause which
brought it about that that State had to perish by a single battle.

MONTESQUIEU.




CONTENTS

  I.  Germany in Alsace and Lorraine
  II.  The "Weltpolitik" of Germany
  III.  The "Bagdadbahn"
  IV.  Algeciras and Agadir
  V.  The Passing of Persia
  VI.  The Partitioners and their Poles
  VII.  Italia Irredenta
  VIII.  The Danube and the Dardanelles
  XIX.  Austria-Hungary and her South Slavs
  X.  Racial Rivalries in Macedonia
  XI.  The Young Turk _Régime_ in the Ottoman Empire
  XII.  Crete and European Diplomacy
  XIII.  The War between Italy and Turkey
  XIV.  The War between the Balkan States and Turkey
  XV.  The Rupture between the Allies
  XVI.  The War between the Balkan Allies
  XVII.  The Treaty of Bukarest
  XVIII.  The Albanian Fiasco
  XIX.  The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Servia
  XX.  Germany Forces War upon Russia and France
  XXI.  Great Britain Enters the War

Index




MAPS

I. The Balkan Peninsula according to the Treaties of San Stefano,
Berlin, Lausanne, and Bukarest

II. Partitions of Poland

III. Europe in 1911

IV. Europe in Africa in 1914

V. Belgium and the Franco-German Frontier

VI. Europe in 1914




{ix}

FOREWORD

On a July day in 1908, two American students, who had chosen to spend
the first days of their honeymoon in digging the musty pamphleteers of
the _Ligue_ out of the Bodleian Library, were walking along the High
Street in Oxford, when their attention was arrested by the cry of a
newsboy.  An ha'penny invested in a London newspaper gave them the news
that Niazi bey had taken to the Macedonian highlands, and that a
revolution was threatening to overthrow the absolutist _régime_ of
Abdul Hamid.  The sixteenth century was forgotten in the absorbing and
compelling interest of the twentieth.

Two weeks later the students were entering the harbour of Smyrna on a
French steamer which was bringing back to constitutional Turkey the
Young Turk exiles, including Prince Sabaheddine effendi of the Royal
Ottoman House.  From that day to this, the path of the two Americans,
whose knowledge of history heretofore had been gained only in
libraries, has led them through massacres in Asia Minor and Syria, and
through mobilizations and wars in Constantinople, Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Greece, and Albania, back westward to Austria-Hungary, {x} Italy, and
France, following the trail of blood and fire from its origin in the
Eastern question to the great European conflagration.

On the forty-fourth anniversary of Sedan, when German aëroplanes were
flying over Paris, and the distant thunder of cannon near Meaux could
be heard, this book was begun in the Bibliothèque Nationale by one of
the students, while the other yielded to the more pressing call of Red
Cross work. It is hoped that there is nothing that will offend in what
is written here. At this time of tension, of racial rivalry, of mutual
recrimination, the writer does not expect that his judgments will pass
without protest and criticism. But he claims for them the lack of bias
which, under the circumstances, only an American--of this generation at
least--dare impute to himself.

The changes that are bringing about a new map of Europe have come
within the intimate personal experience of the writer.

If foot-notes are rare, it is because sources are so numerous and so
accessible. Much is what the writer saw himself, or heard from actors
in the great tragedy, when events were fresh in their memory. The books
of the colours, published by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the
countries interested, have been consulted for the negotiations of
diplomats. From day to day through these years, material has been
gathered from newspapers, especially the Paris _Temps_, the London
_Times_, the Vienna _Freie Press_, the Constantinople _Orient_, and
other journals of the Ottoman capital.  {xi} The writer has used his
own correspondence to the New York _Herald_, the New York
_Independent_, and the Philadelphia _Telegraph_.  For accuracy of
dates, indebtedness is acknowledged to the admirable British _Annual
Register_.

I am indebted to my friends, Alexander Souter, Litt.D., Professor of
Humanity in Aberdeen University, and Mrs. Souter, for reading the
proofs of this book and seeing it through the press in England.  In the
United States, the same kind office has been performed by my brother,
Henry Johns Gibbons, Esq., of Philadelphia.

As this book goes to press for the third American edition, I wish to
express my thanks to readers in Great Britain, America, France,
Germany, and Australia for suggestions and corrections, and in
particular to Baron Shaw of Dunfermline, to whom I owe the idea of the
map that has been added to face the title-page.

PARIS, July, 1915.




  THE
  NEW MAP OF EUROPE




{1}

The New Map of Europe



CHAPTER I

GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE

The war of 1870 added to the German Confederation Alsace and a large
portion of Lorraine, both of which the Germans had always considered
theirs historically and by the blood of the inhabitants.  In annexing
Alsace and Lorraine, the thought of Bismarck and von Moltke was not
only to bring back into the German Confederation territories which had
formerly been a part of it, but also to secure the newly formed Germany
against the possibility of French invasion in the future.  For this it
was necessary to have undisputed possession of the valley of the Rhine
and the crests of the Vosges.

From the academic and military point of view, the German thesis was not
indefensible.  But those who imposed upon a conquered people the Treaty
of Frankfort forgot to take into account the sentiments of the
population of the annexed territory.  Germany annexed land.  That was
possible by the {2} right of the strongest.  She tried for over forty
years to annex the population, but never succeeded.  The makers of
modern Germany were not alarmed at the persistent refusal of the
Alsatians to become loyal German subjects.  They knew that this would
take time.  They looked forward to the dying out of the party of
protest when the next generation grew up,--a generation educated in
German schools and formed in the German mould by the discipline of
military service.

That there was still an Alsace-Lorraine "question" after forty years is
a sad commentary either on the justice of the annexation of
Alsace-Lorraine by Germany or on the ability of Germany to assimilate
that territory which she felt was historically, geographically, and
racially a part of the Teutonic Empire.  In 1887, when "protesting
deputies" were returned to the _Reichstag_ in overwhelming numbers,
despite the governmental weapons of intimidation, disenfranchisement,
and North German immigration, Bismarck was face to face with the one
great failure of his career.  He consoled himself with the firm belief
that all would be changed when the second generation, which knew
nothing of France and to which the war was only a memory, peopled the
unhappy provinces.

But that second generation came.  Those who participated in the war of
1870, or who suffered by it, were few and far between.  The hotheads
and extreme francophiles left the country long ago, and their place was
taken by immigrants who were supposed to be loyal sons of the
Vaterland.  Those of {3} the younger indigenous brood, whose parents
had brought them up as irreconcilables, ran away to serve in the French
foreign legion, or went into exile, and became naturalized Frenchmen
before their time of military service arrived.  And yet the unrest
continued.  Strasbourg, Metz, Mulhouse, and Colmar were centres of
political agitation, which an autocratic government and Berlin police
methods were powerless to suppress.

The year 1910 marked the beginning of a new period of violent protest
against Prussian rule.  Not since 1888 was there such a continuous
agitation and such a continuous persecution.  The days when the
Prussian police forbade the use of the French language on tombstones
were revived, and the number of petty police persecutions recorded in
the local press was equalled only by the number of public
demonstrations on the part of the people, whose hatred of everything
Prussian once more came to a fever-heat.

Let me cite a few incidents which I have taken haphazard from the
journals of Strasbourg and Metz during the first seven months of 1910.
The _Turnverein_ of Robertsau held a gymnastic exhibition in which two
French societies, those of Belfort and Giromagny, were invited to
participate.  The police refused to allow the French societies to march
to the hall in procession, as was their custom, or to display their
flags.  Their two presidents were threatened with arrest.  A similar
incident was reported from Colmar.  At Noisseville and Wissembourg the
fortieth annual commemoration services held by the {4} French veterans
were considered treasonable, and they were informed that they would
never again be allowed to hold services in the cemetery.  At Mulhouse
the French veterans were insulted by the police and not allowed to
display their flags even in the room where they held their banquet.  At
the college of Thann a young boy of twelve, who curiously enough was
the son of a notorious German immigrant, whistled the _Marseillaise_
and was locked up in a cell for this offence.  The conferring of the
cross of the Legion of Honour on Abbé Faller, at Mars-la-Tour, created
such an outburst of feeling that the German ambassador at Paris was
instructed to request the French Government to refrain from decorating
Alsatians.  A volunteer of Mulhouse was reprimanded and refused
advancement in the army because he used his mother-tongue in a private
conversation.  On July 1st, twenty-one border communes of Lorraine were
added to those in which German had been made the official language.  On
July 25th, for the first time in the history of the University of
Strasbourg, a professor was hissed out of his lecture room.  He had
said that the Prussians could speak better French than the Alsatians.
The most serious demonstration which has occurred in Metz since the
annexation, took place on Sunday evening, January 8, 1910, when the
police broke up forcibly a concert given by a local society.  The
newspapers of Metz claimed that this was a private gathering, to which
individual invitations had been sent, and was neither public nor
political.  The police invaded the hall, and requested the audience {5}
to disband.  When the presiding officer refused, he and the leader of
the orchestra were arrested.  The audience, after a lively tussle, was
expelled from the hall.  Immediately a demonstration was planned to be
held around the statue of General Ney.  A large crowd paraded the city,
singing the _Sambre-et-Meuse_ and the _Marseillaise_.  When the police
found themselves powerless to stop the procession without bloodshed,
they were compelled to call out the troops to clear the streets with
fixed bayonets.

These incidents demonstrated the fact that French ideals, French
culture, and the French language had been kept alive, and were still
the inspiration of the unceasing--and successful--protest of nearly two
million people against the Prussian domination.  The effervescence was
undoubtedly as strong in Alsace-Lorraine "forty years after" as it had
been on the morrow of the annexation.  But its francophile character
was not necessarily the expression of desire for reunion with France.
The inhabitants of the "lost provinces" had always been, racially and
linguistically, as much German as French.  Now that the unexpected has
happened, and reunion with France seems probable, many Alsatians are
claiming that this has been the unfailing goal of their agitation.  But
it is not true.  It would be a lamentable distortion of fact if any
such record were to get into a serious history of the period in which
we live.

The political ideal of the Alsatians has been self-government.  Their
agitation has not been for separation _from_ the German Confederation,
but {6} for a place _in_ the German Confederation.  A great number of
the immigrants who were sent to "germanize" Alsace and Lorraine came to
side with the indigenous element in their political demands.  If the
question of France and things French entered into the struggle, and
became the heart of it, two reasons for this can be pointed out: France
stood for the realization of the ideals of democracy to the descendants
of the Strasbourg heroes of 1793; and the endeavour to stamp out the
traces of the former nationality of the inhabitants of the provinces
was carried on in a manner so typically and so foolishly Prussian that
it kept alive the fire instead of extinguishing it.  Persecution never
fails to defeat its own ends.  For human nature is keen to cherish that
which is difficult or dangerous to enjoy.

To understand the Alsace-Lorraine question, from the internal German
point of view, it is necessary to explain the political status of these
provinces after the conquest, and their relationship to the Empire, in
order to show that their continued unrest and unhappiness were not due
to a ceaseless and stubborn protest against the Treaty of Frankfort.

When the German Empire was constituted, in 1872, it comprehended
twenty-five distinct sovereign kingdoms, duchies, principalities, and
free cities, and in a subordinate position, the territory ceded by
France, which was made a _Reichsland_, owned in common by the
twenty-five confederated sovereignties.  The King of Prussia was made
Emperor of the Confederation, and given extensive executive powers.
Two assemblies were created to legislate {7} for matters affecting the
country as a whole.  The _Bundesrath_ is an advisory executive body as
well as an upper legislative assembly.  _It is composed of delegates of
the sovereigns of the confederated states_.  The lower imperial house,
or _Reichstag_, is a popular assembly, whose members are returned by
general elections throughout the Empire.  In their internal affairs the
confederated states are autonomous, and have their own local
Parliaments.  This scheme, fraught with dangers and seemingly
unsurmountable difficulties, has survived; and, thanks to the
predominance of Prussia and the genius of two great emperors, the
seemingly heterogeneous mass has been moulded into a strong and
powerful Empire.

In such an Empire, however, there never has been any place for
Alsace-Lorraine.  The conquered territory was not a national entity.
It had no sovereign, and could not enter into the confederacy on an
equal footing with the other twenty-five states.  The Germans did not
dare, at the time, to give the new member a sovereign, nor could they
conjointly undertake its assimilation.  Prussia, not willing to risk
the strengthening of a south German state by the addition of a million
and a half to its population, took upon herself what was the logical
task of Baden or Wurtemberg or Bavaria.

So Alsace-Lorraine was an anomaly under the scheme of the organization
of the German Empire.  During forty years the _Reichsland_ was without
representation in the _Bundesrath_, and had thus had no real voice in
the management of imperial affairs.  By excluding the "reconquered
brethren" from {8} representation in the _Bundesrath_, Germany failed
to win the loyalty of her new subjects.  Where petty states with a
tithe of her population and wealth have helped in shaping the destinies
of the nation, the _Reichsland_ had to feel the humiliation of
"taxation without representation."  It was useless to point out to the
Alsatians that they had their vote in the _Reichstag_.  For the
_Bundesrath_ is the power in Germany.

Nor did Alsace-Lorraine have real autonomy in internal affairs.  The
executive power was vested in a _Statthalter_, appointed by the
Emperor, and supported by a foreign bureaucracy and a foreign police
force.  Before the Constitution of 1911, there was a local Parliament,
called the _Landesausschuss_, which amounted to nothing, as the
imperial Parliament had the privilege of initiating and enacting for
the _Reichsland_ any law it saw fit.  Then, too, the delegates to the
_Landesausschuss_ were chosen by such a complicated form of suffrage
that they represented the _Statthalter_ rather than the people.  And
the _Statthalter_ represented the Emperor!

In the first decade after the annexation, Prussian brutality and an
unseemly haste to impose military service upon the conquered people led
to an emigration of all who could afford to go, or who, even at the
expense of material interest, were too high-spirited to allow their
children to grow up as Germans.  This emigration was welcomed and made
easy, just as Austria-Hungary encouraged the emigration of Moslems from
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  For it enabled Bismarck to introduce a strong
Prussian {9} and Westphalian element into the _Reichsland_ by settling
immigrants on the vacant properties.  But most of these immigrants,
instead of prussianizing Alsace, have become Alsatians themselves.
Some of the most insistent opponents of the Government, some of the
most intractable among the agitators, have been those early immigrants
or their children.  This is quite natural, when we consider that they
have cast their lot definitely with the country, and are just as much
interested in its welfare as the indigenous element.

The revival of the agitation against Prussian Government in 1910 was a
movement for autonomy on internal affairs, and for representation in
the _Bundesrath_.  The Alsatians wanted to be on a footing of
constitutional equality with the other German States.  One marvels at
the Prussian mentality which could not see--either with the Poles or
with the Alsatians--that fair play and justice would have solved the
problems and put an end to the agitation which has been, during these
past few years especially, a menace on the east and west to the
existence of the Empire.

Something had to be done in the _Reichsland_.  The anomalous position
of almost two million German subjects, fighting for their political
rights, and forming a compact mass upon the borders of France, was a
question which compelled the interest of German statesmen, not only on
account of its international aspect, but also because of the growing
German public sentiment for social and political justice.  The
_Reichstag_ was full of champions of the {10} claims of the
Alsatians,--champions who were not personally interested either in
Alsace-Lorraine or in the influence of the agitation in the
_Reichsland_ upon France, but who looked upon the Alsace-Lorraine
question as a wrong to twentieth-century civilization.

On March 14, 1910, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg announced to the
_Reichstag_ that the Government was preparing a constitution for
Alsace-Lorraine which would give the autonomy so long and so vigorously
demanded.  But he had in his mind, not a real solution of the question,
but some sort of a compromise, which would satisfy the confederated
states, and mollify the agitators of the _Reichsland, but at the same
time preserve the Prussian domination in Alsace-Lorraine_.  In June,
Herr Delbrück, Secretary of State for the Interior, was sent to
Strasbourg to confer with the local authorities and representatives of
the people concerning the projected constitution.  It was during this
visit that the Alsatians were disillusioned.  A dinner, now famous or
notorious, whichever you like, was given by the _Statthalter_, to which
representative (!) members of the _Landesausschuss_ were invited.  At
this dinner the real leaders of the country, such as Wetterlé, Preiss,
Blumenthal, Weber, Bucher, and Theodor,--the very men who had made the
demand for autonomy so insistent that the Government could no longer
refuse to entertain it--were conspicuous by their absence.  Those
bidden to confer with Herr Delbrück in no way represented, but were on
the other hand hostile to, the wishes of the people.

We cannot go into the involved story of the fight {11} in the
_Reichstag_ over the new Constitution.  The Delbrück project was
approved by the _Bundesrath_ on December 16, 1910, and debated in the
following spring session of the _Reichstag_.  Despite the warnings of
the deputies from the _Reichsland_, and the brilliant opposition of the
Socialists, the Constitution given to Alsace-Lorraine, on May 31st, was
a pure farce.  In no sense was it what the people of the _Reichsland_
had wanted, although representation in the _Bundesrath_ was seemingly
given to them.  The new Constitution preserved the united sovereignty
of the confederated states, and its delegation to the Emperor, who
still had the power to appoint and recall at will the _Statthalter_,
and to initiate legislation in local matters.  A _Landtag_ took the
place of the _Landesausschuss_.  The Upper Chamber of the _Landtag_
consists of thirty-six members, representing the religious confessions,
the University and other bodies, the supreme court of Colmar, and the
municipalities and chambers of commerce of Strasbourg, Mulhouse, Metz,
and Colmar, to the number of eighteen; _and the other eighteen chosen
by the Emperor_.  The Lower Chamber has sixty members, elected by
direct universal suffrage, with secret ballot.  Electors over
thirty-five possess two votes, and over forty-five three votes.

By forcing this Constitution upon Alsace-Lorraine, the interests of
Prussia and of the House of Hohenzollern were considered to the
detriment of the interests of the German Empire.  A glorious
opportunity for reconciliation and assimilation was lost.  The Emperor
would not listen to the admission of {12} Alsace-Lorraine to the
_Bundesrath_ in the only logical way, by the creation of a new dynasty
or a republican form of government, so that the Alsatian votes would
represent a _sovereign_ state.  Prussia in her dealings with
Alsace-Lorraine, has always been afraid, on the one hand, of the
addition of _Bundesrath_ votes to the seventeen of Bavaria, Saxony,
Baden, and Wurtemberg, and on the other hand, of the repercussion upon
her internal suffrage and other problems with the Socialists.

Since 1911, the eyes of many Alsatians have been directed once more
towards France as the only--if forlorn--hope of justice and peace.
What words could be found strong enough to condemn the suicidal folly
of the German statesmen who allowed the disappointment over the
Constitution to be followed by a series of incidents which have been
like rubbing salt into a raw wound?

The first _Landtag_, in conformity to the Constitution of 1911, was
elected in October.  It brought into life a new political party, called
"The National Union," led by Blumenthal, Wetterlé, and Preiss, who
united for the purpose of demanding what the Constitution had not given
them--the autonomy of Alsace and Lorraine.  This party was badly beaten
in this first election.  But its defeat was not really a defeat for the
principles of autonomy, as the German press stated at the time.  The
membership of the new _Landtag_ was composed, in majority, of men who
had been supporters of the demand for autonomy, but who had not joined
the new party for reasons of local politics.  Herr Delbrück had given
{13} universal suffrage (a privilege the Prussian electorate had never
been able to gain in spite of its reiterated demands) to the
_Reichsland_ in the hope that the Socialists would prevent the
Nationalists from controlling the Alsatian _Landtag_.  Many Socialists,
however, during the elections at Colmar and elsewhere, did not hesitate
to cry in French, "_Vive la France!  A bas la Prusse!_"

The Prussian expectations were bitterly deceived.  The Landtag promptly
showed that it was merely the Landesausschuss under another name.  The
nationalist struggle was revived; the same old questions came up again.
The Government's appropriation "for purposes of state" was reduced
one-third, and it was provided that the _Landtag_ receive communication
of the purposes for which the money was spent.  The _Statthalter's_
expenses were cut in half, and a bill, which had always been approved
in previous years, providing for the payment of the expense of the
Emperor's hunting trips in the _Reichsland_, failed to pass.

In the spring of 1912, the Prussians showed their disapproval of the
actions of the new _Landtag_ by withdrawing the orders for locomotives
for the Prussian railways from the old Alsatian factory of Grafenstaden
near Strasbourg.  This was done absolutely without any provocation, and
aroused a violent denunciation, not only among the purely German
employés of the factory and in the newspapers, but also in the
_Landtag_, which adopted an order of the day condemning most severely
the attitude of the Imperial Government towards {14} Alsace-Lorraine,
of which this boycott measure was a petty and mean illustration.

The indignation was at its height when Emperor Wilhelm arrived in
Strasbourg on May 13th.  Instead of acting in a tactful manner and
promising to set right this wrong done to the industrial life of
Strasbourg, the Emperor addressed the following words to the Mayor:


"Listen.  Up to here you have known only the good side of me; it is
possible that you will learn the other side of me.  Things cannot
continue as they are: if this situation lasts, we shall suppress your
Constitution and annex you to Prussia."


This typically Prussian speech, which in a few lines reveals the
hopelessly unsuccessful tactics of the German Government towards the
peoples whom it has tried to assimilate the world over, only served to
increase the indignation of the inhabitants of the _Reichsland_; in
fact, the repercussion throughout all Germany was very serious.

The arbitrary threat of the Emperor was badly received in the other
federated states, whose newspapers pointed out that he had exceeded his
authority.  It gave the Socialists an opportunity to attack Emperor
Wilhelm on the floor of the _Reichstag_.  Four days after this threat
was made, an orator of the Socialist party declared


"We salute the imperial words as the confession, full of weight and
coming from a competent source, that annexation to Prussia is the
heaviest punishment that one can threaten to impose upon a {15} people
for its resistance against Germany.  It is a punishment like hard
labour in the penitentiary with loss of civil rights."


This speech caused the Chancellor to leave the room with all the
Ministry.  On May 22d, the attack upon Emperor Wilhelm for his words at
Strasbourg was renewed by another deputy, who declared that if such a
thing had happened in England, "the English would shut up such a King
at Balmoral or find for him some peaceful castle, such as that of
Stemberg or the Villa Allatini at Salonika."

The answer of the _Landtag_ to Emperor Wilhelm's threat was the passing
of two unanimous votes: one demanding that hereafter the Constitution
could not be modified except by the law of the country and not by the
law of the Empire, and the other demanding for Alsace-Lorraine a
national flag.

One could easily fill many pages with illustrations of senseless
persecutions, most of them of the pettiest character, but some more
serious in nature, which Alsace and Lorraine have had to endure since
the granting of the Constitution.  Newspapers, illustrated journals,
clubs and organizations of all kinds have been annoyed constantly by
police interference.  Their editors, artists, and managers have been
brought frequently into court.  Zislin and Hansi, celebrated
caricaturists, have found themselves provoked to bolder and bolder
defiances by successive condemnations, and have endured imprisonment as
well as fines.  Hansi was sentenced to a year's imprisonment by the
High Court of Leipsic only a month {16} before the present war broke
out, and chose exile rather than a Prussian fortress.

The greatest effort during the past few years has been made in the
schools to influence the minds of the growing generation against the
"_souvenir de France_" and to impress upon the Alsatians what good
fortune had come to them to be born German citizens.

Among the boys, the influence of this teaching has been such that over
twenty-two thousand fled from home during the period of 1900-1913 to
enlist in the Foreign Legion of the French Army.  The campaign of the
German newspapers in Alsace-Lorraine, and, in fact, throughout Germany,
was redoubled in 1911.  Parents were warned of the horrible treatment
accorded to the poor boys who were misguided enough to throw away their
citizenship, and go to be killed in Africa under the French flag.  The
result of this campaign was that the Foreign Legion received a larger
number of Alsatians in 1912 than had enlisted during a single year
since 1871!

Among the girls, the German educational system flattered itself that it
could completely change the sentiments of a child, especially in the
boarding-schools.  Last year the Empress of Germany visited a girls'
school near Metz, which is one of the best German schools in the
_Reichsland_.  As she was leaving, she told the children that she
wanted to give them something.  What did they want?  The answer was not
sweets or cake, but that they might be taught a little French!

{17}

Since 1910, the German war budget has carried successively larger items
for the strengthening of forts and the building of barracks in Metz,
Colmar, Mulhouse, Strasbourg, Neuf-Brisach, Bischwiller, Wissembourg,
Mohrange, Sarrebourg, Sarreguemines, Saarbruck, Thionville, Molsheim,
and Saverne.  The former French provinces have been flooded with
garrisons, and have been treated just as they were treated forty years
ago.  The insufferable spirit of militarism, and the arrogance of the
Prussian officers in Alsatian towns, have served to turn against the
Empire many thousands whom another policy might have won.  For it must
be remembered that by no means all the inhabitants of the _Reichsland_
have been by birth and by home training French sympathizers.  Instead
of crushing out the "_souvenir de France_," the Prussian civil and
military officials have caused it to be born in many a soul which was
by nature German.

The most notorious instance of military arrogance occurred in the
autumn of 1913 in Saverne.  Lieutenant von Forstner, who was passing in
review cases of discipline, had before him a soldier who had stabbed an
Alsatian, and had been sentenced to two months' imprisonment.  "Two
months on account of an Alsatian blackguard!" he cried.  "I would have
given you ten marks for your trouble."  The story spread, and the town,
tired of the attitude of its garrison, began in turn to show its
contempt for the Kaiser's soldiers.  Windows in von Forstner's house
were broken.  Every time officers or soldiers appeared on the streets
they were hooted.  Saverne {18} was put under martial law.  Threats
were made to fire upon the citizens.  One day Lieutenant von Forstner
struck a lame shoemaker across the forehead with his sword.  The affair
had gone so far that public sentiment in Germany demanded some action.
Instead of adequately punishing von Forstner and other officers, who
had so maddened the civil population against them, the German military
authorities gave the guilty officers nominal sentences, and withdrew
the garrison.

All these events had a tremendous repercussion in France.  It is
impossible to exaggerate the ill-feeling aroused on both sides of the
Rhine, in Germany, in Alsace-Lorraine, and in France by the
persecutions in the _Reichsland_.  Only one who knows intimately the
French can appreciate their feeling--or share it--over the Zislin and
Hansi trials, the Saverne affair, the suppression of the _Souvenir
Français_, the _Lorraine Sportive_ and other organizations, and the
campaign against the Foreign Legion.  It has given the French soldiers
in the present war something to fight for which is as sacred to them as
the defence of French soil.  The power of this sentiment is indicated
by the invasion of Alsace, the battle of Altkirk, and the occupation of
Mulhouse at the beginning of August.  The French could not be held back
from this wild dash.  Strategy was powerless in the face of the
sentiment of a _national_ army.

The Alsatian leaders themselves have seen the peril to the peace of
Europe of the German attitude towards their country.  They did not want
France drawn into a war for their liberation.  They were {19} alarmed
over the possibility of this, and desired it to be understood that
their agitation had nothing international in it.  The attitude of all
the anti-Prussian parties may be summed up in the words of Herr Wolff,
leader of the Government Liberal party, who declared that "all the
inhabitants of the _Reichsland_ had as their political ambition was
only the elevation of Alsace-Lorraine to the rank of an independent and
federated state, like the other twenty-five component parts of the
German Empire."  Their sincerity and their desire to preserve peace is
proved by the motion presented by the leaders of four of the political
groups in the _Reichsland_, which was voted on May 6, 1912, without
discussion, by the _Landtag_:


"The Chamber invites the _Statthalter_ to instruct the representatives
of Alsace-Lorraine in the _Bundesrath_ to use all the force they
possess against the idea of a war between Germany and France, and to
influence the _Bundesrath_ to examine the ways which might possibly
lead to a _rapprochement_ between France and Germany, which
_rapprochement_ will furnish the means of putting an end to the race of
armaments."


The mismanagement of the _Reichsland_ has done more than prevent the
harmonious union of the former French provinces with Germany.  It has
had an effect, the influence of which cannot be exaggerated, upon
nourishing the hopes of revenge of France, and the resentment against
the amputation of 1870.  On neither side of the Vosges has the wound
healed.  The same folly which has kept alive a Polish question in
eastern Prussia for one hundred {20} and twenty-five years, has not
failed to make impossible the prussianizing of Alsace and Lorraine.
The Prussian has never understood how to win the confidence of others.
There has been no Rome in his political vision.  As for conceptions of
toleration, of kindness, and of love, they are non-existent in Prussian
officialdom.  Nietzsche revealed the character of the Prussian in his
development of the idea of the _übermensch_.  The ideal of perfect
manhood is the imposition of one will on another will by force.  Mercy
and pity, according to Nietzsche, were signs of weakness, the symbols
of the slave.

Under the circumstances, then, we are compelled after forty-five years
to revise our estimate of Bismarck's sagacity.  His genius was limited
by the narrow horizon of his own age.  He did not see that the future
Germany needed other things that France could give far more than she
needed Alsace and Lorraine.  In posterity, Bismarck would have had a
greater place had he, in the last minutes of the transactions at
Versailles, given back Alsace and Lorraine to France, waived the war
indemnity, and asked in return Algeria or other French colonies.

But would it have been different under Germany in the French colonies?
A Herrero, employed in the Johannesburg mines, wrote his brother in
German South-West Africa: "The country of the English is truly a good
country.  Even if your superior is present, he doesn't strike you, and
if he strikes you and goes thus beyond legal limits, he is punished
like anyone else."




{21}

CHAPTER II

THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY

When the transrhenane provinces of the old German Empire were added to
France in the eighteenth century, the assimilation of these territories
was a far different proposition from their refusion into the mould of a
new German Empire in 1871.  In the first place, the old German Empire
was a mediæval institution which, in the evolution of modern Europe,
was decaying.  Alsace and Lorraine were not taken away from a political
organism of which they were a vital part.  The ties severed were purely
dynastic.  In the second place, the consciousness of national life was
awakened in Alsace and Lorraine during the time that they were under
French rule, and because they shared in the great movement of the birth
of democracy following the French Revolution.

France, then, by the Treaty of Frankfort, believed that she had been
robbed of a portion of her national territory.  The people of the
annexed provinces, as was clearly shown by the statement of their
representatives at Bordeaux, did not desire to enter the German
Confederation.

{22}

Germany failed to do the only thing that could possibly have made her
new territories an integral part of the new Empire, _i.e._ to place
Alsace-Lorraine upon a footing of equality with the other states of the
Confederation, and make their entry that of an autonomous sovereign
state.  Consequently, neither in France nor in the _Reichsland_ was the
Treaty of Frankfort accepted as a permanent change in the map of
Europe.  Germany has always been compelled, in her international
politics, to count upon the possibility of France making an attempt to
win back the lost provinces.  She has sought to form alliances to
strengthen her own position in Europe, and to keep France weak.
France, the continued object of German hostility, has found herself
compelled to ally herself with Russia, with whom she has never had
anything in common, and to compound her colonial rivalries in Africa
with her hereditary enemy, Great Britain.  This is the first cause of
the unrest in Europe that has culminated in a general European war.

The second cause is the _Weltpolitik_ of Germany which has brought the
German Empire into conflict with Great Britain and France outside of
Europe, and with Russia in Europe.

On the map of Europe, Russia, Great Britain, and France are, in 1914,
practically what they were in 1815.  The changes, logical and in
accordance with the spirit of centralization of the nineteenth century,
have transformed middle and south-eastern Europe.  The changes in
south-eastern Europe have been effected at the expense of the Ottoman
Empire, and {23} have been a gradual development throughout the
century, from the outbreak of the Greek revolution in 1822 to the
Treaty of London in 1913.  In middle Europe, during the twelve years
between 1859 and 1871, the three Powers whose national unity, racially
as well as politically, was already achieved at the time of the
Congress of Vienna, were brought face to face with three new Powers,
united Germany, united Italy, and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.

The nineteenth century has been called the age of European
colonization.  Europe began to follow its commerce with other
continents by the imposition of its civilization and its political
system upon weaker races.  Checked by the rising republic of the United
States from encroaching upon the liberties of the peoples of North and
South America, there have been no acquisitions of territory by European
nations in the western continents since the Congress of Vienna.
European expansion directed itself towards Africa, Asia, and the
islands of the oceans.  There was no Oriental nation strong enough to
promulgate a Monroe Doctrine.

In extra-European activities, Great Britain, France, and Russia were
the pioneers.  That they succeeded during the nineteenth century in
placing under their flag the choicest portions of Africa and the
backward nations of Asia, was due neither to the superior enterprise
and energy, nor to the greater foresight, of the Anglo-Saxon, French,
and Russian nations.  They had achieved their national unity, and they
were geographically in a position to take advantage of the great
opportunities which were opening to the world {24} for colonization
since the development of the steamship and the telegraph.

But the other three Powers of Europe came late upon the scene.  It has
only been within the last quarter of a century that Germany and Italy
have been in the position to look for overseas possessions.  It has
only been within the last quarter of a century that Austria, finding
her union with Hungary a durable one, has been able to think of looking
beyond her limits to play a part, as other nations had long been doing,
in the history of the outside world.

By every force of circumstances, the three new States--threatened by
their neighbours, who had looked with jealous, though powerless, eyes
upon their consolidation--were brought together into a defensive
alliance.  The Powers of the Triple Alliance drifted into a union of
common general aims and ambitions, if not of particular interests,
against their three more fortunate rivals, who had been annexing the
best portions of the Asiatic and African continents while they were
struggling with internal problems.

Oceans of ink have been wasted upon polemics against the
peace-disturbing character of the Triple Alliance.  Especially has
Germany and her growing _Weltpolitik_ been subject to criticism,
continuous and untiring, on the part of the British and French press.
But the question after all is a very simple one: the three newer Powers
of Europe have not been willing to be content with an application in
practical world politics of the principle that "to him that hath shall
be given."  Germany and Italy, transformed under {25} modern economic
conditions into industrial states, have been looking for outside
markets, and they have wanted to enjoy those markets in regions of the
globe either actually under their flag or subjected to their political
influence.  In other words, they have wanted their share in the
division of Africa and Asia into spheres under the control of European
nations.

Is a logical and legitimate ambition to play a part in the world's
politics in proportion to one's population, one's wealth, one's
industrial and maritime activity, necessarily a menace to the world's
peace?  It has always been, and I suppose always will be, in the nature
of those who have, to look with alarm upon the efforts of those who
have not, to possess something.  Thus capital, irrespective of epoch or
nationality or of religion, has raised the cry of alarm when it has
seen the tendency for betterment, for education, for the development of
ideals and a sense of justice on the part of labour.  In just the same
way, Russia with her great path across the northern half of Asia and
her new and steadily growing empire in the Caucasus and central Asia;
France with the greater part of northern and central Africa, and an
important corner of Asia under her flag; and Great Britain with her
vast territories in every portion of the globe, raised the cry of
"Wolf, Wolf!" when the Powers of the Triple Alliance began to look with
envious eye upon the rich colonies of their neighbours, and to pick up
by clever diplomacy--and brutal force, if you wish--a few crumbs of
what was still left for themselves.

The result of these alarming ambitions of the {26} Triple Alliance has
been the coming together of Russia, France, and England, hereditary
enemies in former days but now friends and allies, in the maintenance
of the colonial "trust."

The great cry of the Triple Entente is the maintenance of the European
equilibrium.  For this they have reason.  Europe could know no lasting
peace under Teutonic aggression.  But is there not also to the account
of the Triple Entente some blame for the unrest in Europe and for the
great catastrophe which has come upon the world?  For while their
policy has been the maintenance of the European equilibrium, it has
been coupled with the maintenance of an extra-European balance of power
wholly in their favour.

The sense of justice, of historical proportion, and the logic of
economic evolution make one sympathize, in abstract principle, not only
with the _Weltpolitik_ of Germany, but also with Austria-Hungary's
desire for an outlet to the sea, and with Italy's longing to have in
the Mediterranean the position which history and geography indicated
ought to be, and might again be, hers.

But sympathy in abstract principle is quite another thing from sympathy
in fact.  In order to appreciate the _Weltpolitik_ of Germany, and be
able to form an intelligent opinion in regard to it--_for it is the
most vital and burning problem in the world to-day_--we must consider
it from the point of view of its _full significance in practice_ in the
history of the world.

Bismarck posed as the disinterested "honest courtier" of Europe in the
Congress of Berlin.  The declaration he had made, that the whole
question {27} of the Orient "was not worth the finger bone of a
Pomeranian grenadier," was corroborated by his actions during the
sessions of the Congress.  We have striking illustrations of this in
the memoirs of Karatheodory pasha, who recorded from day to day, during
the memorable sessions of the Congress, his astonishment at the
indifference which Bismarck displayed to the nationalities of the
Balkans, and to the complications which might arise in Europe from
their rivalries.

Bismarck did not see how vital was to be the Balkan question with the
future of the nation he had built.  Nor did he see the intimate
relationship between the economic progress of united Germany and the
question of colonies.  One searches in vain the speeches and writings
of the Iron Chancellor for any reference to the importance of the two
problems, in seeking the solution of which the fabric of his building
is threatened with destruction.

Perhaps it is easy for us, in looking backwards, to point out the lack
of foresight which was shown by Bismarck in regard to the future of
Germany.  Forty-five years later, we are able to pass in review the
unforeseen developments of international politics and the amazing
economic evolution of contemporary Europe.  Perhaps it is unreasonable
to expect that much attention and thought should have been given by the
maker of modern Germany to the possible sphere that Germany might be
called upon to play in the world outside of Europe.

For we must remember that the new Germany, after the Franco-Prussian
War, was wholly in an {28} experimental stage, and that the duty at
hand was the immediate consolidation of the various states into a
political and economic fabric.  There was enough to demand all the
attention and all the genius of Bismarck and his co-workers in solving
these problems.  Cordial relationship with Austria had to be
reëstablished.  The dynasties of the south German kingdoms and of the
lesser potentates, whose names still remained legion in spite of the
_Reichsdeputationshauptschluss_ of 1803, had to be carefully handled.
There were four definite internal problems which confronted Bismarck:
the relationship of the empire to the Catholic Church; the
reconciliation of the different peoples into a harmonious whole; the
establishment of representative government without giving the strong
socialistic elements the upper hand; and the development of the
economic wealth of Germany.

There was little time to think of Germany's place in the world's
politics.  In foreign affairs, it was considered that the exigencies of
the moment could be met by adopting a policy of conciliation towards
both Russia and Austria, and the winning of the friendship of Italy.
The _Kulturkampf_, the creation of the _Bundesrath_ under Prussian
hegemony, and the formation of the Triple Alliance and the events
connected with them, are important in an analysis of Germany's
international politics.  Unfortunately we cannot bring them into the
scope of this book.  We can mention only the various factors that have
been directly responsible for giving birth to what is called the
_Weltpolitik_.

{29}

These factors are the belief of the German people in the superiority of
their race and its world-civilizing mission; their connotation of the
word "German"; the consciousness of their military strength being
disproportionate to their political influence; the rapid increase of
the population and the development of the industrial and commercial
prosperity of the empire; and the realization of the necessity of a
strong navy, with naval bases and coaling-stations in all parts of the
world, for the adequate protection of commerce.

_The belief of the German people in the superiority of their race and
its world-civilizing mission is a sober fact_.  It pervades every class
of society from the Kaiser down to the workingman.  It is heralded from
the pulpit, taught in the schools, and is a scientific statement in the
work of many of Germany's leading scholars.  The anthropologist
Woltmann said that "the German is the superior type of the species
_homo sapiens_, from the physical as well as the intellectual point of
view."  Wirth declared that "the world owes its civilization to Germany
alone" and that "the time is near when the earth must inevitably be
conquered by the Germans."  The scientific book--a serious one--in
which these statements occur was so popular that it sold five editions
in three years!  Paulsen remarked that "humanity is aware of, and
admires, the German omnipresence."  Hartmann taught that the European
family is divided into two races, male and female, of which the first,
of course, was exclusively German, while the second included Latins,
Celts, and Slavs.  "Marriage is inevitable." Goethe expressed in
_Faust_ the opinion that the work {30} of the Germans was to make the
habitable world worth living in, while Schiller boasted, "Our language
shall reign over the whole world," and that "the German day lasts until
the end of time."  Schiller also prophesied that "two empires shall
perish in east and west, I tell you, and it is only the Lutheran faith
which shall remain."  Fichte, one hundred years ago, exhorted the
Germans to be "German patriots, and we shall not cease to be
cosmopolitan."  Heine believed that "not only Alsace and Lorraine, but
all France shall be ours."

To show the German state of mind towards those whom they have not
hesitated to provoke to arms, the remarkable teaching of Hummel's book,
which is used in the German primary schools, is a convincing
illustration.  Frenchmen are monkeys, and the best and strongest
elements in the French race asserted to be German by blood.  The
Russians are slaves, as their name implies.  Treitschke's opinion of
the British is that "among them love of money has killed all sentiment
of honour and all distinction of just and unjust.  Their setting sun is
our aurora."  One of the leading newspapers of Germany recently said:
"The army of the first line of which Germany will dispose from the
first day of the mobilization will be sufficient to crush France, even
if we must detach a part of it against England.  If England enters the
war, it will be the end of the British Empire, for England is a
colossus with feet of clay."

The Kaiser has been the spokesman of the nation in heralding publicly
the belief in the superiority of the German people, and its world
mission.  It was {31} at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding
of the Empire that the scope of the _Weltpolitik_ was announced by
Wilhelm II.  He said:


"The German Empire has become a world empire (_ein Weltreich_).
Everywhere, in the most distant lands, are established thousands and
thousands of our compatriots.  German science, German activity, the
defenders of the German ideal pass the ocean.  By thousands of millions
we count the wealth that Germany transports across the seas.  It is
your duty, gentlemen, to aid me to establish strong bonds between our
Empire of Europe and this greater German Empire (_dieses grëssere
Deutsche Reich_) ... May our German Fatherland become one day so
powerful that, as one formerly used to say, _Civis romanus sum_, one
may in the future need only to say, _Ich bin ein deutscher Burger_."


At Aix-la-Chapelle, on June 20, 1902, he revealed his ambition in one
sentence, "_It is to the empire of the world that the German genius
aspires_."  Just before leaving for the visit to Tangier in 1905--the
visit which was really the beginning of one of the great issues of the
present war--he said at Bremen: "If later one must speak in history of
a universal domination by the Hohenzollern, of a universal German
empire, this domination must not be established by military
conquest....  _God has called us to civilize the world: we are the
missionaries of human progress_." This idea was developed further at
Münster, on September 1, 1907, when the Kaiser proclaimed: "The German
people will be the block of granite on which our Lord will be able to
elevate and achieve the civilization of the world!"

{32}

This attitude of mind is as common among the disciples of those
wonderful leaders who founded the international movement for the
solidarity of interests of labour, as it is among the aristocratic and
intellectual elements of the nation.  The German Socialist has
proclaimed the brotherhood of man, and the common antagonism of the
wage-earners of the world against their capitalistic oppressors.  But,
for all his preaching, the German Socialist is first of all a German.
He has come to believe that the mission of Socialism will be best
fulfilled through the triumph of Germanism.  This belief is sincere.
It is a far cry from Karl Marx to the militant--or rather
militarist--German Socialist, bearing arms gladly upon the battlefields
of Europe to-day, because he is inspired by the thought that the
triumph of the army in which he fights will aid the cause of
Socialism.[1]


[1] While the _Landtage_ of the German states are mostly controlled by
Conservative elements, owing to restricted suffrage, the _Reichstag_ is
one of the most intelligently democratic legislative bodies in the
world.  Its social legislation is surpassed by that of no other
country.  During thirty years the Socialist vote in Germany has
increased one thousand per cent.  It now represents one-third of the
total electorate.  But the Socialists are to a man behind the war.


There is a striking analogy between the German Socialist of the present
generation and the Jacobins of 1793.  The heralders of _Liberté,
Egalité et Fraternité_ fought for the spread of the principles of the
Revolution through God's chosen instruments, the armies of France, and
were carried away by their enthusiasm until they became the facile
agents for saddling Europe with the tyranny of Napoleon.  Love for {33}
humanity was turned into blood-lust, and fighting for freedom into
seeking for booty and glory.  Are the profound thinkers of the German
universities, and the visionaries of the workingmen's forums following
to-day the same path?  Does the propagation of an ideal lead inevitably
to a blind fanaticism, where the dreamer becomes in his own imagination
a chosen instrument of God to shed blood?

There is undoubtedly an intellectual and idealistic basis to German
militarism and to German arrogance.

_Their connotation of the word_ "_German_" has led the Germans to look
upon territories outside of their political confines as historically
and racially, hence rightfully, virtually, and eventually theirs.  A
geography now in its two hundred and forty-fifth edition in the public
schools (Daniel's _Leitfaden der Geographie_) states that "Germany is
the heart of Europe.  Around it extend Austria, Switzerland, Belgium,
Luxemburg, and Holland, which were all formerly part of the same state,
and are peopled entirely or in the majority by Germans."

When German children have been for the past generation deliberately
taught as a matter of fact--not as an academic or debatable
question--that _Deutschland_ ought to be more than it is, we can
understand how the neutrality of their smaller neighbours seems to the
Germans a negligible consideration.  No wonder the soldiers who ran up
against an implacable enemy at Liège, Namur, and Charleroi thought
there must be a mistake somewhere, and were more angered against the
opposition of those whom they regarded as their brothers of {34} blood
than they later showed themselves against the French.  No wonder that
the sentiment of the whole German nation is for the retention of
Belgium, their path to the sea.  It was formerly German.  Its
inhabitants are German.  Let it become German once more!

But to the Germans there are other and equally important elements
belonging to their nation outside of the states upon the confines of
the empire.  These are the German emigrants and German colonists in all
portions of the world.  In recent years there has come to the front
more than ever the theory that _German nationality cannot be lost by
foreign residence or by transference of allegiance to another State:
once a German, always a German_.

Convincing proof of this is found in the new citizenship law,
sanctioned with practical unanimity by the _Reichstag_ and
_Bundesrath_, which went into effect on January 1, 1914.  According to
Article XIII of this law, "a former German who has not taken up his
residence in Germany may on application be naturalized."  This applies
also _to one who is descended from a former German, or who has been
adopted as the child of such_!  According to Article XIV, any former
German who holds a position in the German Empire in any part of the
world, in the service of a German religious society or of a German
school, is looked upon as a German citizen "by assumption."  Any
foreigner holding such a position may be naturalized without having a
legal residence in Germany.  The most interesting provision of all is
in Article XXV, section 2 of which says: "Citizenship is not lost by
{35} one who before acquiring foreign citizenship has secured on
application the written consent of the competent authorities of his
home state to retain his citizenship."

Germany allows anyone of German blood to become a German citizen, even
if he has never seen Germany and has no intention of taking up his
residence there; and Germans, who have emigrated to other countries,
secure the amazing opportunity to acquire foreign citizenship without
losing their German citizenship.

The result of this law, since the war broke out, has been to place a
natural and justifiable suspicion upon all Germans living in the
countries of the enemies of Germany.  It is impossible to overestimate
the peril from the secret ill-will and espionage of Germans residing in
the countries that are at war with Germany.  There are undoubtedly many
thousands of cases where Germans have been honest and sincere in their
change of allegiance, but how are the nations where they have become
naturalized to be sure of this?  A legal means has been given to these
naturalized Germans to retain, _without the knowledge of the nation
where their oath of allegiance has been received in good faith_,
citizenship in Germany.

German emigration and colonization societies, and many seemingly purely
religious organizations for "the propagation of the faith in foreign
lands," have been untiring in their efforts to preserve in the minds of
Germans who have left the Fatherland the principle, "once a German
always a German."  The Catholic as well as the Lutheran Church has lent
{36} itself to this effort.  Wherever there are Germans, one finds the
German church, the German school, the _Zeitung_, the _Bierhalle_, and
the _Turnverein_.  The Deutschtum is sacred to the Germans.  One cannot
but have the deepest respect for the pride of Germans in their
ancestry, in their language, in their church, and in the preservation
of traditional customs.  There is no better blood in the world than
German blood, and one who has it in his veins may well be proud of it:
for it is an inheritance which is distinctly to a man's intellectual
and physical advantage.  But, in recent years, the effort has been made
to confuse _Deutschtum_ with _Deutschland_.  Here lies a great danger.
We may admire and reverence all that has come to us from Germany.  But
the world cannot look on impassively at a propaganda which is leading
to _Deutschland über alles!_

When we take the megalomania of the Germans, their ambition to fulfil
their world mission, their belief in their peculiar fitness to fulfil
that mission, and their idea of the German character of the
neighbouring states, and contrast the dream with the reality, we see
how they must feel, _especially as they are conscious of the fact that
they dispose of a military strength disproportionate to their position
in mondial politics_.  Great Britain, with one-third less population,
"the colossus with the feet of clay," owns a good fourth of the whole
world; France, the nation of "monkeys," which was easily crushed in
1870, holds sway over untold millions of acres and natives in Africa
and Asia; while Russia, the nation of "slaves," has a half of Europe
and Asia.

{37}

The most civilized people in the world, with a world mission to fulfil,
is dispossessed by its rivals of inferior races _and of inferior
military strength_!  The thinking German is by the very nature of
things a militarist.

But even if the _logic_ of the _Weltpolitik_, under the force of
circumstances, did not push the German of every class and category to
the belief that Germany must solve her great problems of the present
day by force of arms, especially since her military strength is so much
greater than that of her rivals, the nature of the German would make
him lean towards force as the decisive argument in the question of
extending his influence.  For from the beginning of history the
_German_ has been a _war man_.  He has asserted himself by force.  He
has proved less amenable to the refining and softening influences of
Christianity and civilization than any other European race.  He has
worshipped force, and relied wholly upon force to dominate those with
whom he has come into contact.  The leopard cannot change his spots.
So it is as natural for the German of the twentieth century to use the
sword as an argument as it was for the German of the tenth century, or,
indeed, of the first century.  We cannot too strongly insist upon this
fatal tendency of the German to subordinate natural, moral, legal, and
technical rights to the supremacy of brute force.  There is no
conception of what is called "moral suasion" in the German mind.
Although some of the greatest thinkers of the world have been and are
to-day Germans, yet the German nation has never come to the realization
that the pen {38} may be mightier than the sword.  Give the German a
pen, and he will hold the world in admiration of his intellect.  Give
him a piano or a violin, and he will hold the world in adoration of his
soul.  But give him a sword, and he will hold the world in abhorrence
of his force.  For there never was an _übermensch_ who was not a devil.
Else he would be God.

But the _Weltpolitik_ has had other and more tangible and substantial
causes than the three we have been considering.  It is not wholly the
result of the German idea that Germany can impose her will upon the
world and has the right to do so.  The power of Germany comes from the
fact that her people have been workers as well as dreamers.  _The rapid
increase of the population and development of the industrial and
commercial prosperity of the empire_ have given the Germans a wholly
justifiable economic foundation for their _Weltpolitik_.

United Germany, after the successful war of 1870, began the greatest
era of industrial growth and prosperity that has ever been known in the
history of the world.  Not even the United States, with all its annual
immigration and opening up of new fields and territories, has been able
to show an industrial growth comparable to that of Germany during the
past forty years.  In this old central Europe cities have grown almost
over night.  Railways have been laid down, one after the other, until
the whole empire is a network of steel.  Mines and factories have
sprung into being as miraculously as if it had been by the rubbing of
Aladdin's lamp.  The population has increased more than half in forty
years.

{39}

It was as her population and her productive power increased far more
quickly and far beyond that of her neighbours, that Germany began to
look out into the extra-European world for markets.  She had reached
the point when her productivity, in manufacturing lines, had exceeded
her power of consumption.  Where find markets for the goods?  German
merchants, and not Prussian militarists, began to spread abroad in
Germany the idea that there was a world equilibrium, as important to
the future of the nations of Europe as was the European equilibrium.
Germany, looking out over the world, saw that the prosperity of Great
Britain was due to her trade, and that the security and volume of this
trade were due to her colonies.

Who does not remember the remarkable stamp issued by the Dominion of
Canada to celebrate the Jubilee of Queen Victoria?  On the mercatorial
projection of the world, the British possessions were given in red.
One could not find any corner of the globe where there were not ports
to which British ships in transit could go, and friendly markets for
British commerce.  The Germans began to compare their industries with
those of Great Britain.  Their population was larger than that of the
great colonial power, and was increasing more rapidly.  Their
industries were growing apace.  For their excess population, emigration
to a foreign country meant annual loss of energetic and capable
compatriots.  Commerce had to meet unfair competition in every part of
the world.  Outside of the Baltic and North Seas, there was no place
that a {40} German ship could touch over which the German flag waved.

It was not militarism or chauvinism or megalomania, but the natural
desire of a people who found themselves becoming prosperous to put
secure and solid foundations under that prosperity, that made the
Germans seek for colonies and launch forth upon the _Weltpolitik_.

The first instance of the awakening on the part of the German people to
a sense that there was something which interested them outside of
Europe, was the annexation by Great Britain in 1874 of the Fiji
Islands, with which German traders had just begun, at great risk and
painstaking efforts, to build up a business.  This was the time when
the Government was engaged in its struggles with the Church and
socialism, and when the working of the _Reichstag_ and the _Bundesrath_
was still in an experimental stage.  Nothing could be done.  _But there
began to be a feeling among Germans that in the future Germany ought to
be consulted concerning the further extension of the sovereignty of a
European nation over any part of the world then unoccupied or still
independent_.  But Germany was not in a position either to translate
this sentiment into a vigorous foreign policy, or to begin to seize her
share of the world by taking the portions which Great Britain and
Russia and France had still left vacant.

German trade, still in its infancy, received cruel setbacks by the
British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and of Egypt in 1883, the French
occupation of Tunis in 1881, and the Russian and British dealings {41}
with central Asia and Afghanistan.  The sentiment of the educated and
moneyed classes in Germany began to impose upon the Government the
necessity of entering the colonial field.  The action in Egypt and in
Tunis brought about the beginning of German colonization.  Bismarck had
just finished successfully his critical struggle with the socialists.
The decks were cleared for action.  In 1882, a Bremen trader, Herr
Lüdritz, by treaties with the native chiefs, gained the Bay of
Angra-Pequena on the west coast of Africa.  For two years no attention
was paid to this treaty, which was a purely private commercial affair.
In 1884, shortly after the occupation of Egypt, a dispute arose between
the British authorities at Cape Town and Herr Lüdritz.  Bismarck saw
that he must act, or the old story of extension of British sovereignty
would be repeated.  He telegraphed to the German Consul at Cape Town
that the Imperial Government had annexed the coast and _hinterland_
from the Orange River to Cape Frio.

Other annexations in Africa and the Pacific followed in the years
1884-1886.  In Africa, the German flag was hoisted over the east coast
of the continent, north of Cape Delgado and the river Rovuma, and in
Kamerun and Togo on the Gulf of Guinea.  In the Pacific, Kaiser
Wilhelm's Land was formed of a portion of New Guinea, with some
adjacent islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands,
and the Marshall Islands were gathered in.  Since those early years of
feverish activity, there have been no new acquisitions in Africa, other
than the portion of French Congo ceded {42} in 1912 as "compensation"
for the French protectorate of Morocco.  In the Pacific, in 1899, after
the American conquest of the Philippines, the Caroline, Pelew, and
Marianne groups and two of the Samoan Islands were added.

In China, Germany believed that she had the right to expect to gain a
position equal to that of Great Britain at Hongkong and Shanghai, of
France at Tonkin, and Russia in Manchuria.  She believed that it was
just as necessary for her to have a fortified port to serve as a naval
base for her fleet as it was for the other Powers, and that by a
possession of territory which could be called her own she would be best
able to get her share of the commerce of the Far East.  From 1895 to
1897, Germany examined carefully all the possible places which would
serve best for the establishment of a naval and commercial base.  At
the beginning of 1897, after naval and commercial missions had made
their reports, a technical mission was sent out whose membership
included the famous Franzius, the creator of Kiel.  This mission
reported in favour of Kiau-Chau on the peninsula of Shantung in north
China.

When negotiations were opened with the Chinese, the answer of the
Chinese Government was to send soldiers to guard the bay!  The Kaiser,
in a visit to the Czar at Peterhof in the summer of 1897, secured
Russian "benevolent neutrality."  The murder of two missionaries in the
interior of the province, on November 1st of the same year, gave
Germany her chance.  Three German war vessels landed troops on the
peninsula, and seized Kiau-Chau and Tsing-Tau.  {43} After five months
of tortuous negotiations, a treaty was concluded between Germany and
China on March 6, 1899.  Kiau-Chau with adjacent territory was leased
to Germany for ninety-nine years.  To German capital and German
commerce were given the right of preference for every industrial
enterprise on the peninsula, the concession for the immediate
construction of a railway, and the exclusive right to mining along the
line of the railway.  Thus the greater part of the province of Shantung
passed under the economic influence of Germany.

The entry of Japan into the war of 1914 is due to her desire to remedy
a great injustice which has been done to Japanese commerce in the
province of Shantung by the German occupation, to her fear of this
naval base opposite her coast (just as she feared Port Arthur), and
probably to the intention of occupying the Marianne Islands, the
Marshall Islands, and the Eastern and Western Carolines, in order that
the Japanese navy may have important bases in a possible future
conflict with the United States.

When Germany leased Kiau-Chau, she declared solemnly that the port of
Tsing-Tau would be an open port, _ein frei Hafen für allen Nationen_.
But Japanese trade competition soon caused her to go back on her word.
She conceived a clever scheme in 1906, by which the Chinese customs
duties were allowed to be collected within the Protectorate in return
for an annual sum of twenty per cent. upon the entire customs receipts
of the Tsing-Tau district.  In this way, she is more than recompensed
for the generosity displayed in allowing German goods to {44} be
subject to the Chinese customs.  She reimburses herself at the expense
of the Japanese!  Berlin could not have been astonished at the
ultimatum of August 15th from Tokio.

There has always been much opposition in Germany to the colonization
policy of the Government, the dissatisfaction over the poor success of
the attempts at African colonization led Chancellor Caprivi to state
that the worst blow an enemy could give him was to force upon him more
territories in Africa!  The Germans never got on well with the negroes.
Their colonists, for the most part too poor to finance properly
agricultural schemes, lived by trading.  Like all whites, they cheated
the natives and bullied them into giving up their lands.  In South-West
Africa, a formidable uprising of the Herreros resulted in the massacre
of all the Germans except the missionaries and the colonists who had
established themselves there before the German occupation.  The
suppression of this rebellion took more than a year, and cost Germany
an appalling sum in money and many lives.  But it cost the natives
more.  Two thirds of the nation of the Herreros were massacred: while
only six or seven thousand were in arms, the German official report
stated that forty thousand were killed.  The Germans confiscated all
the lands of the natives.

In 1906, after twenty-one years of German rule, there were in
South-West Africa sixteen thousand prisoners of war out of a total
native population of thirty-one thousand.  All the natives lived in
concentration camps, and were forced to work for the {45} Government.
In commenting upon the Herrero campaign, Pastor Frenssen, one of the
most brilliant writers of modern Germany, put in the mouth of the hero
of his colonial novel the following words: "God has given us the
victory because we were the most noble race, and the most filled with
initiative.  That is not saying much, when we compare ourselves with
this race of negroes; but we must act in such a way as to become better
and more active than all the other people of the world.  It is to the
most noble, to the most firm that the world belongs.  Such is the
justice of God."

German opposition has been bitter also against the occupation of
Kiau-Chau.  For traders have claimed that the _political_ presence of
Germany on the Shantung peninsula and the dealings of the German
diplomats with the Pekin court had so prejudiced the Chinese against
everything German that it was harder to do business with them than
before the leasehold was granted.  They actually advocated the
withdrawal of the protectorate for the good of German commerce!

But German pride was at stake in Africa after the Herrero rebellion.
And in China, Kiau-Chau was too valuable a naval base to give up.  In
1907, a ministry of colonies was added to the Imperial Cabinet.  Since
then the colonial realm has been considered an integral part of the
Empire.

At every point of this colonial development, Germany found herself
confronted with open opposition and secret intrigue.  The principal
strategic value of south-west Africa was taken away by the {46} British
possession of Walfisch Bay, and of east Africa by the protectorate
consented to by the Sultan of Zanzibar to the British Crown.  Togoland
and Kamerun are hemmed in by French and British possession of the
_hinterland_.  The Pacific islands are mostly "left-overs," or of minor
importance.  In spite of the unpromising character of these colonies,
the commerce of Germany with them increased from 1908 to 1912 five
hundred per cent., and the commerce with China through Kiau-Chau from
1902 to 1912 nearly a thousand per cent.

And yet, in comparison to her energies and her willingness--let us
leave till later the question of ability and fitness--Germany has had
little opportunity to exercise a colonial administration on a large
scale.  She must seek to extend her political influence over new
territories.  Where and how?  That has been the question.  Most
promising of all appeared the succession to the Portuguese colonies,
for the sharing of which Great Britain declared her willingness to meet
Germany halfway.  An accord was made in 1898, against the eventuality
of Portugal selling her colonies.  But since the Republic was
proclaimed in Portugal, there has been little hope that her new
Government would consider itself strong enough to part with the
heritage of several centuries.

For the increase of her colonial empire, Germany has felt little hope.
So she has tried to secure commercial privileges in various parts of
the world, through which political control might eventually come.  We
have already spoken of her effort in {47} China.  Separate chapters
treat of her efforts in the three Moslem countries, Morocco, Persia,
and Turkey, and show how in each case she has found herself checkmated
by the intrigues and accords of the three rich colonial Powers.

Long before the political union of the German States in Europe was
accomplished, there were German aspirations in regard to the New World,
when Pan-Germanists dreamed of forming states in North and South
America.

These enthusiasts did not see that the Civil War had so brought
together the various elements of the United States, the most prominent
and most loyal of which was the German element, that any hope of a
separatist movement in the United States was chimerical.  As late as
1885, however, the third edition of Roscher's _Kolonien,
Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung_ stated that "it would be a great step
forward, if the German immigrants to North America would be willing to
concentrate themselves in one of the states, and transform it into a
German state."  For different reasons Wisconsin would appear to be most
particularly indicated.

As early as 1849, the Germans commenced to organize emigration to
Brazil through a private society of Hamburg (_Hamburger
Kolonisationverein_), which bought from the Prince de Joinville,
brother-in-law of Dom Pedro, vast territories in the state of Santa
Catharina.  There the German colonization in Brazil began.  It soon
extended to the neighbouring states of Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul.
There are now about three hundred and fifty thousand {48} Germans,
forming two per cent. of the population.  In no district are they more
than fifteen per cent.  However, in Rio Grande, there is a territory of
two hundred kilometres in which the German language is almost wholly
spoken; and a chain of German colonies binds Sao Leopoldo to Santa Cruz.

Among the Pan-Germanists, the three states of southern Brazil have been
regarded as a zone particularly reserved for German expansion.  The
colonial congress of 1902 at Berlin expressed a formal desire that
hereafter German emigration be directed towards the south of Brazil.
An amendment to include Argentina was rejected.  The decree of Prussia,
forbidding emigration to Brazil, was revoked in 1896 in so far as it
was a question of the three states of Paraná, Santa Catharina, and Rio
Grande do Sul.

It has not been very many years since diplomatic incidents arose
between Brazil and Germany over fancied German violation of Brazilian
territory by the arrest of sailors on shore.  But Germany has not
entertained serious hope of getting a foothold in South America.
Brazil has increased greatly in strength, and there is to-day in South
America a tacit alliance between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to
support the American Monroe Doctrine.  Germany found, when she was
trying to buy a West India island from Denmark, that she had to reckon
not only with Washington, but also with Buenos Ayres, Rio, and Santiago.

Finding herself so thoroughly hemmed in on all sides, in the New World
and in the Old World, by alliances and accords directed against her
overseas {49} political expansion, modern Germany has repeated the
history of the Jews.  Deprived of some senses, one develops
extraordinarily others.  Deprived of civil and social rights for
centuries, the Jews developed the business sense until to-day their
wealth and influence in the business world are far beyond the
proportionate numbers of their race.  Deprived of the opportunity to
administer and develop vast overseas territories, the Germans have
turned to intensive military development at home and extensive
commercial development abroad, until to-day they are the foremost
military Power in Europe, and are threatening British commercial
supremacy in every part of the globe.

The German counterpart of the British and French and Russian elements
that are directing the destinies of vast colonies and protectorates is
investing its energy in business.  During the past generation, the
German campaign for the markets of the world has been carried on by the
brightest and best minds in Germany.  There have been three phases to
this campaign: manufacturing the goods, selling the goods, and carrying
the goods.  German manufactures have increased so greatly in volume and
scope since the accession of the present Emperor that there is hardly a
line of merchandise which is not offered in the markets of the world by
German firms.

Articles "made in Germany" may not be as well made as those of other
countries.  But their price is more attractive, and they have driven
other goods from many fields.  One sees this right in Europe in the
markets of Germany's competitors and enemies.  {50} Since the present
war began, French and British patriots are hard put to it sometimes
when they find that article after article which they have been
accustomed to buy is German.  In my home in Paris, the elevator is
German, electrical fixtures are German, the range in my kitchen is
German, the best lamps for lighting are German.  I have discovered
these things in the past month through endeavouring to have them
repaired.  Interest led me to investigate other articles in daily use.
My cutlery is German, my silverware is German, the chairs in my
dining-room are German, the mirror in my bathroom is German, some of my
food products are German, and practically all the patented drugs and
some of the toilet preparations are German.

All these things have been purchased in the Paris markets, without the
slightest leaning towards, or preference for, articles coming from the
Fatherland.  I was not aware of the fact that I was buying German
things.  They sold themselves,--the old combination of appearance,
convenience, and price, which will sell anything.

That I am unconsciously using German manufactured articles is largely
due to the genius of the salesman.  It is a great mistake to believe
that salesmanship is primarily the art of selling the goods of the
house you represent.  That has been the British idea.  It is today
exploded.  Is it because the same type as the Britisher who is devoting
his brains and energy to solving the problems of inferior people in
different parts of the world is among the Germans devoting his energies
to German commerce in those {51} same places, that the Germans have
found the fine art of salesmanship to be quite a different thing?  It
is studying the desires of the people to whom you intend to sell,
finding out what they want to buy, and persuading your house at home to
make and export those articles.  From the Parisian and the Londoner,
and the New Yorker down to the naked savage, the Germans know what is
wanted, and they supply it.  If the British university man is enjoying
a position of authority and of fascinating perplexity in some colony,
and feels that he has a share in shaping the destinies of the world,
the German university man is not without his revenge.  Deprived of one
sense, has he not developed another--and a more practical one?

The young German, brought up in an overpopulated country, unable to
enter a civil service which will keep him under his own flag--and
remember how intensely patriotic he is, this young German, just as
patriotic as the young Frenchman or the young Britisher,--must leave
home.  He is not of the class from which come the voluntary emigrants.
His ties are all in Germany: his love--and his move--all for Germany.
So he becomes a German resident abroad, in close connection with the
Fatherland, and always working for the interests of the Fatherland.  He
goes to England or to France, where he studies carefully and
methodically, as if he were to write a thesis on it (and he often
does), the business methods of and the business opportunities among the
people where he is dwelling.  He is giving his life to put _Deutschland
über alles_ in business right in the {52} heart of the rival nation,
_and he is succeeding_.  During October, 1914, when they tried to
arrest in the larger cities of England the German and Austrian subjects
they had to stop--there was not room in the jails for all of them!  And
in many places business was paralyzed.

In carrying the products of steadily increasing volume to steadily
growing markets, Germany has been sensible enough to make those markets
pay for the cost of transport.  Up to the very selling price, all the
money goes to Germany.  The process is simple: from German factories,
by German ships, through German salesmen, to German firms, in every
part of the world--beginning with London and Paris.

Germany's merchant marine has kept pace with the development of her
industry.  Essen may be the expression of one side of modern Germany,
which is said to have caused the European war.  But one is more logical
in believing that Hamburg and Bremen and the Kiel Canal have done more
to bring on this war than the products of Krupp.  During the last
twenty-five years the tonnage of Germany's merchant marine has
increased two hundred and fifty per cent., a quarter of which _has been
in the last five years, from 1908-1913_.  There are six times as many
steamships flying the German flag as when Wilhelm II mounted the
throne.  In merchant ships, Germany stands today second only to Great
Britain.  The larger portion of her merchant marine is directed by
great corporations.  The struggle against Great Britain and France for
the freight carrying of outside nations has been most bitter--and most
successful.  _Before {53} the present war, there was no part of the
world in which the German flag was not carried by ships less than ten
years old_.

With the exception of Kiau-Chau, the colonies of Germany have never
been of much practical value, except as possible coaling and wireless
stations for the German fleet.  But here also the opposition of her
rivals has minimized their value.  Walfisch Bay and Zanzibar have, as
we have already said, lessened the strategical value of the two large
colonies on either side of the African continent.  In the division of
the Portuguese colonies agreed to by Great Britain, it was "the
mistress of the seas" who was to have the strategic places--not part of
them, but all of them, the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira, and the Azores.

As Germany's commerce and shipping have so rapidly developed, the
seeking for opportunities to extend her political sovereignty outside
of Europe has not been so much an outlook for industrial enterprise as
the imperative necessity of finding naval bases and coaling stations in
different parts of the world for the adequate protection of commerce.
The development of the German navy has been the logical complement of
the development of the German merchant marine.  Germany's astonishing
naval program has kept pace with the astonishing growth of the great
Hamburg and Bremen lines.  Germany has had exactly the same argument
for the increase of her navy as has had Great Britain.  Justification
for the money expended on the British navy is that Great Britain needs
the navy to protect her commerce, upon which the life of the nation is
dependent, {54} and to guarantee her food-supplies.  The industrial
evolution of Germany has brought about for her practically the same
economic conditions as in Great Britain.  In addition to the dependence
of her prosperity upon the power of her navy to protect her commerce,
Germany has felt that she must keep the sea open for the sake of
guaranteeing uninterrupted food-supplies for her industrial population.
It must not be forgotten that Germany is flanked on east and west by
hereditary enemies, and has come to look to the sea as the direction
from which her food supplies would come in case of war.

This last factor of the _Weltpolitik_, the creation of a strong navy,
must not be looked upon either as a provocation to Great Britain or as
a menace to the equilibrium of the world.  If it has brought Germany
inevitably into conflict with Great Britain, it is because the navy is
the safeguard of commerce.  The _Weltpolitik_ is essentially a
_Handelspolitik_.  The present tremendous conflict between Great
Britain and Germany is the result of commercial rivalry.  It is more a
question of the pocket-book than of the sacredness of treaties, if we
are looking for the cause rather than the occasion of the war.  It has
come in spite of honest efforts to bring Great Britain and Germany
together.

Lord Haldane, in February, 1912, made a trip to Berlin to bring about a
general understanding between the two nations.  But while there was
much discussion of the question of the Bagdad Railway, Persian and
Chinese affairs, Walfisch Bay, and the division of Africa, nothing came
of it.  On March {55} 18th, Mr. Churchill said to the House of Commons:
"If Germany adds two ships in the next six years, we shall have to add
four; if Germany adds three, we shall have to add six.  Whatever
reduction is made in the German naval program will probably be followed
here by a corresponding naval reduction.  The Germans will not get
ahead of us, no matter what increase they make; they will not lose, no
matter what decrease they make."  This was as far as Great Britain
could go.

In the spring of 1912, the British fleet was concentrated in the North
Sea, and an accord was made with France for common defensive action in
the North Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.  At the same time, during M.
Poincaré's trip to Petrograd, an accord was signed between France and
Russia for common naval action in time of war.

The Pan-Germanic movement in recent years has not been a tool of the
Government, but rather a party, including other parties, banded
together more than once to oppose the German Government in an
honourable attempt to preserve peace with the neighbours in the west.

It is a tremendous mistake--and a mistake which has been continuously
made in the French, British, and American press since the beginning of
the war--to consider the _Weltpolitik_ as an expression of the
sentiments of the German Emperor and his officials.  Since it was
forced upon Bismarck against his will, Pan-Germanism has been a power
against which the Emperor William II has had to strive frequently
throughout his reign.  For it has never hesitated to {56} force him
into paths and into positions which were perilous to the theory of
monarchical authority.  The Kaiser has resented the pressure of public
opinion in directing the affairs of the Empire.  Pan-Germanism has been
a striking example of democracy, endeavouring to have a say in
governmental policies.  The Naval and Army Leagues, the German Colonial
Society, and the Pan-Germanic Society are private groups, irresponsible
from the standpoint of the Government.  They have declared the
governmental programs for an increase in armaments insufficient, and
have bitterly denounced and attacked them from the point of view
exactly opposite to that of the Socialists.  The Pan-Germanic Society
refused to recognize the treaty concluded between Germany and France
after the Agadir incident.  Said Herr Klaas at the Hanover Conference
on April 15, 1912: "We persist in considering Morocco as the country
which will become in the future, let us hope the near future, the
colony for German emigration." The same intractable spirit was shown in
Dr. Pohl's address at the Erfurt Congress in September, 1912.

We hear much about the Kaiser and the military party precipitating war.
A review of the German newspapers during the past few years will
convince any fair-minded reader that German public opinion, standing
constantly behind the Pan-Germanists, has frequently made the German
Foreign Office act with a much higher hand in international questions
than it would have acted if left to itself, and that German public
opinion, from highest classes to lowest, is for this war to the bitter
finish.  _It is the war of the {57} people, intelligently and
deliberately willed by them_.  The statement that a revolution in
Germany, led by the democracy to dethrone the Kaiser or to get him out
of the clutches of the military party, would put an end to the war, is
foolish and pernicious.  For it leads us to false hopes.  It would be
much nearer the truth to say that if the Kaiser had not consented to
this war, he would have endangered his throne.

The principle of the _Weltpolitik_, imposed upon European diplomacy by
the German nation in the assembling of the Conference of Algeciras, was
that no State should be allowed to disturb the existing political and
territorial _status quo_ of any country still free, in any part of the
world, without the consent of the other Powers.  This _Weltpolitik_
would have the natural effect, according to Karl Lamprecht, in his _Zur
Jüngsten Deutschen Vergangenheit_, of endangering a universal and
pitiless competition among the seven Great Powers in which the weakest
would eventually be eliminated.




{58}

CHAPTER III

THE "BAGDADBAHN"

In the development of her _Weltpolitik_, the most formidable, the most
feasible, and the most successful conception of modern Germany has been
the economic penetration of Asiatic Turkey.  She may have failed in
Africa and in China.  But there can be no doubt about the successful
beginning, and the rich promise for the future, of German enterprises
in the Ottoman Empire.

The countries of sunshine have always exercised a peculiar fascination
over the German.  His literature is filled with the Mediterranean and
with Islam.  From his northern climate he has looked southward and
eastward back towards the cradle of his race, and in imagination has
lived over again the Crusades.  As long as Italy was under Teutonic
political influence, the path to the Mediterranean was easy.  United
Italy and United Germany were born at the same time.  But while the
birth of Italy threatened to close eventually the trade route to the
Mediterranean to Germany, the necessity of a trade route to the south
became more vital than ever to the new German Confederation from the
sequences of the union.

{59}

When her political consolidation was completed and her industrial era
commenced, Germany began to look around the world for a place to
expand.  There were still three independent Mohammedan
nations--Morocco, Persia, and Turkey.  In Morocco she found another
cause for conflict with France than Alsace-Lorraine.  In Persia and
Turkey, she faced the bitter rivalry of Russia and Great Britain.

The rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire, and the fact that its
sovereign was Khalif of the Moslem world, led German statesmen to
believe that Constantinople was the best place in the world to centre
the efforts of their diplomacy in the development of the _Weltpolitik_.
Through allying herself with the Khalif, _Germany would find herself
able to strike eventually at the British occupation of India and Egypt,
and the French occupation of Algeria and Tunis, not only by joining the
interests of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Germanism, but also by winning a
place in Morocco opposite Gibraltar, a place in Asia Minor opposite
Egypt, and a place in Mesopotamia opposite India_.

The certainty of economic success helped to make the political effort
worth while, even if it came to nothing.  For Asia Minor and
Mesopotamia are countries that have been among the most fertile and
prosperous in the whole world.  They could be so again.  The present
backward condition of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia is due to the fact
that these countries have had no chance to live since they came under
Ottoman control, much less to develop their resources proportionately
to other nations.  The {60} natives have been exploited by the Turkish
officials and by foreign holders of concessions.  Frequently
concessions have been sought to stop, not to further, development.  If
there have been climatic changes to account for lack of fertility in
Asia Minor, this is largely due to deforestation.  Ibn Batutah, the
famous Moorish traveller of the first half of the fourteenth century,
and Shehabeddin of Damascus, his contemporary, have left glowing
accounts of the fertility and prosperity of regions of Asia Minor, now
hopelessly arid, as they existed on the eve of the foundation of the
Ottoman Empire.  Not only have all the trees been cut down, but the
roots have been torn up for fuel!  One frequently sees in the markets
of Anatolian towns the roots of trees for sale.  The treatment of trees
is typical of everything else.  The country has had no chance.  In
Mesopotamia, the new irrigation schemes are not innovations of the
twentieth century, but the revival of methods of culture in vogue
thousands of years before Christ.

The Romans and Byzantines improved their inheritance.  The Osmanlis
ruined it.

In addition to sunshine and romance, political advantages, and
prospects of making money, another influence has attracted the Germans
to the Ottoman Empire.  There is a certain affinity between German and
Osmanli.  The Germans have sympathy with the spirit of Islam, _as they
conceive it to be interpreted_ in the Turk.  They admire the _yassak_
of the Turk, which is the counterpart of their _verboten_.  The von
Moltke who later led Prussia to her great victories had at the
beginning of his career an intimate knowledge {61} of the Turkish army.
He admired intensely the blind and passive obedience of the Turk to
authority, his imperturbability under misfortune and his fortitude in
facing hardship and danger.  "Theirs not to reason why: theirs but to
do and die" is a spirit which German and Turk understand, and show, far
better than Briton, with all due respect to Tennyson.  A Briton may
obey, but he questions all the same, and after the crisis is over he
demands a reckoning.  Authority, to the Anglo-Saxon, rests in the body
politic, of which each individual is an integral--and
ineffaceable--part.

The Turkish military and official cast is like that of the Germans in
three things: authority rests in superiors unaccountable to those whom
they command; the origin of authority is force upholding tradition; and
the sparing of human life and human suffering is a consideration that
must not be entertained when it is a question of advancing a political
or military end.  I have seen both at work, and have seen the work of
both; so I have the right to make this statement.  For all that, I have
German and Turkish friends, and deep affection for them, and deep
admiration for many traits of character of both nations.  The trouble
is that the people of Germany and the people of Turkey allow their
official and military castes to do what their own instincts would not
permit them to do.  The passivity of the Turk is natural: it is his
religion, his background, and his climate.  The passivity of the German
is inexcusable.  He will not exorcise the devil out of his own race.
It must be done for him.

{62}

In 1888, a group of German financiers, backed by the Deutsche Bank,
which was to have so powerful a future in Turkey, asked for the
concession of a railway line from Ismidt to Angora.  The construction
of this line was followed by concessions for extension from Angora to
Cæsarea and for a _branch_ from the Ismidt-Angora line going south-west
from Eski Sheir to Konia.  The extension to Cæsarea was never made.
That was not the direction in which the Germans wanted to go.  The Eski
Sheir-Konia spur became the main line.  The Berlin-Bagdad-Bassorah "all
rail route" was born.  The Germans began to dream of connecting the
Baltic with the Persian Gulf.  The Balkan Peninsula was to revert to
Austria-Hungary, and Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to Germany.  The south
Slavs and the populations of the Ottoman Empire would be dispossessed
(the philosopher Haeckel actually prophesied this in a speech in 1905
before the Geographical Society of Jena).  Russia would be cut off from
the Mediterranean.  This was the Pan-Germanist conception of the
_Bagdadbahn_.

From the moment the first railway concession was granted to Germans in
Asia Minor, which coincided with the year of his accession, Wilhelm II
has been heart and soul with the development of German interests in the
Ottoman Empire.  His first move in foreign politics was to visit Sultan
Abdul Hamid in 1889, when he was throwing off the yoke of Bismarck.
This visit was the beginning of an intimate connection between
Wilhelmstrasse and the Sublime Porte which has never been
interrupted--excepting {63} for a very brief period at the beginning of
the First Balkan War.  The friendship between the Sultan and the Kaiser
was not in the least disturbed by the Armenian massacres.  The
hecatombs of Asia Minor passed without a protest.  In fact, five days
after the great massacre of August, 1896, in Constantinople, where
Turkish soldiers shot down their fellow-citizens under the eyes of the
Sultan and of the foreign ambassadors, Wilhelm II sent to Abdul Hamid
for his birthday a family photograph of himself with the Empress and
his children.

In 1898, the Kaiser made his second voyage to Constantinople.  This
voyage was followed by the concession extending the railway from Konia
to the Persian Gulf.  It was the beginning of the _Bagdadbahn_ in the
official and narrower sense.  After this visit of the Kaiser to Abdul
Hamid, the pilgrimage was continued to the Holy Land.  At Baalbek,
there is a stone of typically German taste, set in the wall of the
great temple, to commemorate the visit of the man who dreamed he would
one day be master of the modern world.  If this inscription seems a
sacrilege, what name have we for the large gap in the walls of
Jerusalem made for his triumphal entry to the Holy City?  The great
Protestant German Church, whose corner-stone was laid by his father in
1869, was solemnly inaugurated by the Kaiser.  As solemnly, he handed
over to Catholic Germans the title to land for a hospital and religious
establishment on the road to Bethlehem.  Still solemnly, at a banquet
in his honour in Damascus, he turned to the Turkish Vali, and declared:
"Say to the three hundred million {64} Moslems of the world that I am
their friend."  To prove his sincerity he went out to put a wreath upon
the tomb of Saladin.

Wilhelm II at Damascus is reminiscent of Napoleon at Cairo.  Egypt and
Syria and Mesopotamia have always cast a spell over men who have
dreamed of world empires; and Islam, as a unifying force for conquest,
has appealed to the imagination of others before the present German
Kaiser.  I have used the word "imagination" intentionally.  There never
has been any solidarity in the religion of Mohammed; there is none now;
there never will be.  The idea of community of aims and community of
interests is totally lacking in the Mohammedan mind.  Solidarity is
built upon the foundation of sacrifice of self for others.  It is a
virtue not taught in the Koran, nor ever developed by any Mohammedan
civilizations.  The failure of all political organisms of Mohammedan
origin to endure and to become strong has been due to the fact that
Mohammedans have never felt the necessity of giving themselves for the
common weal.  The virility of a nation is in the virile service of
those who love it.  If there is no willingness to serve, no incentive
to love, how can a nation live and be strong?

The revelation of Germany's ambition by the granting of the concession
from Konia to the Persian Gulf, and the application of the German
financiers for a _firman_ constituting the Bagdad Railway Company, led
to international intrigues and negotiations for a share in the
construction of the line through Mesopotamia.  It would be wearisome
and profitless {65} to follow the various phases of the Bagdad
question.  Germany did not oppose international participation in the
concession.  The expense of crossing the Taurus and the dubious
financial returns from the desert sections influenced the Germans to
welcome the financial support of others in an undertaking that they
would have found great difficulty in financing entirely by their own
capital.  The _Bagdadbahn_ concession was granted in 1899: the _firman_
constituting the company followed in 1903.

Russia did not realize the danger of German influence at
Constantinople, and of the eventualities of the German "pacific
penetration" in Asia Minor.  She adjusted the Macedonian question with
Emperor Franz Josef in order to have a free hand in Manchuria, and she
made no opposition to the German ambitions.  She needed the friendly
neutrality of Germany in her approaching struggle with Japan.  Once the
struggle was begun, Russia found herself actually dependent upon the
goodwill of Germany.  It was not the time for Petrograd to fish in the
troubled waters of the Golden Horn.

The situation was different with Great Britain.  The menace of the
German approach to the Persian Gulf was brought to the British Foreign
Office just long enough before the Boer crisis became acute for a
decision to be made.  Germany had sent engineers along the proposed
route of her railway.  She had neglected to send diplomatic agents!

The proposed--in fact the only feasible--terminus on the Persian Gulf
was at Koweit.  Like the Sultan of Muscat, the Sheik of Koweit was
practically {66} independent of Turkey.  While showing deference to the
Sultan as Khalif, Sheik Mobarek resisted every effort of the Vali of
Bassorah to exercise even the semblance of authority over his small
domain.  In 1899, Colonel Meade, the British resident of the Persian
Gulf, signed with Mobarek a secret convention which assured to him
"special protection," _if he would make no cession of territory without
the knowledge and consent of the British Government_.  The following
year, a German mission, headed by the Kaiser's Consul General at
Constantinople, arrived in Koweit to arrange the concession for the
terminus of the _Bagdadbahn_.  They were too late.  The door to the
Persian Gulf was shut in the face of Germany.

Wilhelm II set into motion the Sultan.  The Sublime Porte suddenly
remembered that Koweit was Ottoman territory, and began to display
great interest in forcing the Sheik to recognize the fact.  A Turkish
vessel appeared at Koweit in 1901.  But British warships and British
bluejackets upheld the _independence_ of Koweit!  Since the
Constitution of 1908, all the efforts of the Young Turks at Koweit have
been fruitless.  Germany remains blocked.

British opposition to the German schemes was not limited to the
prevention of an outlet of the _Bagdadbahn_ at Koweit.  In 1798, the
East India Company established a resident at Bagdad to spy upon and
endeavour to frustrate the influence of the French, just beginning to
penetrate towards India through the ambition of Napoleon to inherit the
empire of Alexander.  Since that time, British interests have not
failed to be well looked after in Lower Mesopotamia.  {67} After the
Lynch Brothers, in 1860, obtained the right of navigating on the
Euphrates, the development of their steamship lines gradually gave
Great Britain the bulk of the commerce of the whole region, in the
Persian as well as the Ottoman _hinterland_ of the Gulf.  In 1895,
German commerce in the port of Bushir was non-existent, while British
commerce surpassed twelve million francs yearly.  In 1905, the market
was shared about equally between Great Britain and Germany.  In 1906,
the Hamburg-American Line established a service to Bassorah.  British
merchants began to raise the cry that if the _Bagdadbahn_ appeared the
Germans would soon have not only the markets of Mesopotamia but also
that of Kermanshah.  The Lynch Company declared that the _Bagdadbahn_
would ruin their river service, and their representations were listened
to at London, despite the absurdity of their contention.  The Lynches
were negotiating with Berlin also.  This mixture of politics and
commerce in Mesopotamia is a sordid story, which does not improve in
the telling.

The revolution of 1908 did not injure the German influence at
Constantinople as much as has been popularly supposed.  The Germans
succeeded during the first troubled year in keeping in with both sides
through the genius of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, in spite of the
Bosnia-Herzegovina affair.  Germany was fortunately out of the Cretan
and Macedonian muddles, in which her rivals were hopelessly entangled.
Mahmud Shevket pasha was always under German influence, and the Germans
had Enver bey, "hero of liberty," in training at Berlin.  {68} German
influence at Constantinople succeeded also in withstanding the strain
of the Tripolitan War, although it grew increasingly embarrassing as
the months passed to be Turkey's best friend and at the same time the
ally of Italy!  During the first disastrous period of the war of the
Balkan Allies against Turkey, it seemed for the time that the enemies
of Germany controlled the Sublime Porte.  But the revolver of Enver bey
in the _coup d'état_ of January, 1913, brought once more the control of
Turkish affairs into hands friendly to Germany.  They have remained
there ever since.

Germany strengthened her railway scheme, and her hold on the
territories through which it was to pass, by the accord with Russia at
Potsdam in 1910.

The last clever attack of British diplomacy on the _Bagdadbahn_ was
successfully met.  In tracing the extension of the railway beyond
Adana, it was suggested to the Department of Public Works that the cost
of construction would be greatly reduced and the usefulness of the line
increased, if it passed by the Mediterranean littoral around the head
of the Gulf of Alexandretta.  Then the control of the railway would
have been at the mercy of the British fleet.  When the "revised" plans
went from the Ministry of Public Works to the Ministry of War, it was
not hard for the German agents to persuade the General Staff to restore
the original route inland across the Amanus, following the old plan
agreed upon in the time of Abdul Hamid.  More than that, the Germans
secured concessions for a branch line from Aleppo to the Mediterranean
at Alexandretta, {69} and for the construction of a port at
Alexandretta.  The _Bagdadbahn_ was to have a Mediterranean terminus at
a fortified port, and Germany was to have her naval base in the
north-east corner of the Mediterranean, eight hours from Cyprus and
thirty-six hours from the Suez Canal!  This was the revenge for Koweit.

A month before the Servian ultimatum, Germany had contracted to grant a
loan to Bulgaria, one of the conditions of which was that Germany be
allowed to build a railway to the Ægean across the Rhodope Mountains to
Porto Laghos, and to construct a port there, six hours from the mouth
of the Dardanelles.  There was a panic in Petrograd.

The events in Turkey since the opening of the war are too recent
history and as yet too little understood to dwell upon.  But the
reception accorded to the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ at the Dardanelles,
their present[1] anomalous position in "closed waters" in defiance of
all treaties, the abolition of the foreign post-offices, the unilateral
decision to abrogate the capitulations--all these straws show in which
direction the wind is blowing on the Bosphorus.  A successful
termination of the German campaign in France, which at this writing
seems most improbable (in spite of the fact that the Germans are at
Compiègne and their aëroplanes pay us daily visits), would certainly
draw Turkey into the war--and to her ruin.[2]


[1] October, 1914.

[2] This chapter was written before the sudden and astonishing acts of
war by Turkey in sinking a Russian ship and bombarding Russian Black
Sea ports on October 29, 1914.


{70}

On the other hand, the German reliance upon embarrassing the French and
British in their Moslem colonies through posing as the defenders of
Islam and Islam's Khalif has not been well-founded.  On the battlefield
of France, thousands of followers of Mohammed from Africa and Asia are
fighting loyally under the flags of the Allies.  The Kaiser, for all
his dreams and hopes, has not succeeded in getting a single Mohammedan
to draw his sword for the combined causes of Pan-Germanism and
Pan-Islamism.  Have the three hundred million Moslems forgotten the
declaration of Damascus?

In seeking for the causes of the present conflict, it is impossible to
neglect Germany in the Ottoman Empire.  As one looks up at Pera from
the Bosphorus, the most imposing building on the hill is the German
Embassy.  It dominates Constantinople.  There has been woven the web
that has resulted in putting Germany in the place of Great Britain to
prevent the Russian advance to the Dardanelles, in putting Germany in
the place of Russia to threaten the British occupation of India and the
trade route to India, and in putting Germany in the place of Great
Britain as the stubborn opponent of the completion of the African
Empire of France.  The most conspicuous thread of the web is the
_Bagdadbahn_.  In the intrigues of Constantinople, we see develop the
political evolution of the past generation, and the series of events
that made inevitable the European war of 1914.




{71}

CHAPTER IV

ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR

In 1904, an accord was made between Great Britain and France in regard
to colonial policy in northern Africa.  Great Britain recognized the
"special" interests of France in Morocco in exchange for French
recognition of Great Britain's "special" interests in Egypt.  There was
a promise to defend each other in the protection of these interests,
but no actual agreement to carry this defence beyond the exercise of
diplomatic pressure.  The accord was a secret one.  Its exact terms
were not known until the incident of Agadir made necessary its
publication in November, 1911.

But that there was an accord was known to all the world.  Germany, who
had long been looking with alarm upon the extension of French influence
in Morocco, found in 1905 a favourable moment for protest.  Russia had
suffered humiliation and defeat in her war with Japan.  Neither in a
military nor a financial way was she at that moment a factor to be
reckoned with in support of France.  Great Britain had not recovered
from the disasters to her military organization of the South African
campaign.  Her domestic politics were in a chaotic state.  The {72}
Conservative Ministry was losing ground daily in bye elections; the
Irish question was coming to the front again.

German intervention in Morocco was sudden and theatrical.  On March 31,
1905, a date of far-reaching importance in history, Emperor William
entered the harbour of Tangier upon his yacht, the _Hohenzollern_.
When he disembarked, he gave the cue to German policy by saluting the
representative of the Sultan, with peculiar emphasis, as the
representative of an independent sovereign.  Then, turning to the
German residents in Morocco who had gathered to meet him, he said: "I
am happy to greet in you the devoted pioneers of German industry and
commerce, who are aiding in the task of keeping always in a high
position, in a _free land_, the interests of the mother country."

The repercussion of this visit to Tangier in France and in Great
Britain was electrical.  It seemed to be, and was, a direct challenge
on the part of Germany for a share in shaping the destinies of Morocco.
It was an answer to the Anglo-French accord, in which Germany had been
ignored.  Great Britain was in no position to go beyond mere words in
the standing behind France.  France knew this.  So did Germany.  After
several months of fruitless negotiations between Berlin and Paris, on
June 6th, it was made plain to France that there must be a conference
on the Moroccan question.

M. Delcassé, at that time directing with consummate skill and courage
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, urged upon the Cabinet the necessity
for accepting {73} Germany's challenge.  But the Cabinet, after hearing
the sorrowful confessions of the Ministers of War and Navy, and
learning that France was not ready to fight, refused to accept the
advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  M. Delcassé resigned.  A
blow had been struck at French prestige.

For six months the crisis continued in an acute stage.  The
chauvinistic--or shall we say, patriotic?--elements were determined to
withstand what they called the Kaiser's interference in the _domestic_
affairs of France.  But France seemed isolated at that moment, and
prudence was the part of wisdom.  M. Rouvier declared to the Chamber of
Deputies on December 16th: "France cannot be without a Moroccan policy,
for the form and direction which the evolution of Morocco will take in
the future will influence in a decisive manner the destinies of our
North African possessions."  France agreed to a conference, but won
from Germany the concession that France's special interests and rights
in Morocco would be admitted as the basis of the work of the conference.

On January 17, 1906, a conference of European States, to which the
United States of America was admitted, met to decide the international
status of Morocco.  For some time the attitude of the German delegates
was uncompromising.  They maintained the Kaiser's thesis as set forth
at Algiers: the _complete_ independence of Morocco, and sovereignty of
her Sultan.  But they finally yielded, and acknowledged the right of
France and Spain to organize in Morocco an international police.

The Convention was signed on April 7th.  It {74} provided for: (1)
police under the sovereign authority of the Sultan, recruited from
Moorish Moslems, and distributed in the eight open ports; (2) Spanish
and French officers, placed at his disposal by their governments, to
assist the Sultan; (3) limitation of the total effective of this police
force from two thousand to two thousand five hundred, of French and
Spanish officers, commissioned sixteen to twenty, and non-commissioned
thirty to forty, appointed for five years; (4) an Inspector General, a
high officer of the Swiss army, chosen subject to the approval of the
Sultan, with residence at Tangier; (5) a State Bank of Morocco, in
which each of the signatory Powers had the right to subscribe capital;
(6) the right of foreigners to acquire property, and to build upon it,
in any part of Morocco; (7) France's exclusive right to enforce
regulations in the frontier region of Algeria and a similar right to
Spain in the frontier region of Spain; (8) the preservation of the
public services of the Empire from alienation for private interests.

Chancellor von Bülow's speech in the _Reichstag_ on April 5, 1906, was
a justification of Germany's attitude.  It showed that the policy of
Wilhelmstrasse had been far from bellicose, and that Germany's demands
were altogether reasonable.  The time had come, declared the
Chancellor, when German interests in the remaining independent portions
of Africa and Asia must be considered by Europe.  In going to Tangier
and in forcing the conference of Algeciras, Germany had laid down the
principle that there must be equal opportunities for {75} Germans in
independent countries, and had demonstrated that she was prepared to
enforce this principle.

When one considers the remarkable growth in population, and the
industrial and maritime evolution of Germany, this attitude cannot be
wondered at, much less condemned.  Germany, deprived by her late
entrance among nations of fruitful colonies, was finding it necessary
to adopt and uphold the policy of trying to prevent the pre-emption,
for the benefit of her rivals, of those portions of the world which
were still free.

Neither France nor Spain had any feeling of loyalty toward the
Convention of Algeciras.  However much may have been written to prove
this loyalty, the facts of the few years following Algeciras are
convincing.  After 1908, Spain provoked and led on by the tremendous
expenditures entailed upon her by the Riff campaigns began to consider
the region of Morocco in which she was installed as exclusively Spanish
territory.  French writers have expended much energy and ingenuity in
proving the disinterestedness of French efforts to enforce loyally the
decisions of Algeciras.  But they have explained, they have protested,
too much.  There has never been a moment that France has not dreamt of
the completion of the vast colonial empire in North Africa by the
inclusion of Morocco.  It has been the goal for which all her military
and civil administrations in Algeria and the Sahara have been working.
To bring about the downfall of the Sultan's authority, not only press
campaigns were undertaken, but anarchy on the Algerian frontier {76}
was allowed to go on unchecked, until military measures seemed
justifiable.

In a similar way, the German colonists of Morocco did their best to
bring about another intervention by Germany.  Their methods were so
despicable and outrageous that they had frequently to be disavowed
officially.  In 1910, the German Foreign Office found the claims of
Mannesmann Brothers to certain mining privileges invalid, because they
did not fulfil the requirements of the Act of Algeciras.  But the
Mannesmann mining group, as well as other German enterprises in
Morocco, were secretly encouraged to make all the trouble they could
for the French, while defending the authority of the Sultan.  The
Casablanca incident is only one of numerous affronts which the French
were asked to swallow.

Great Britain had her part, though not through official agents, in the
intrigues.  There is much food for thought in the motives that may, not
without reason, be imputed to the publication in the _Times_ of a
series of stories of Moroccan anarchy, and of Muley Hafid's cruelties.

In the spring of 1911, it was realized everywhere in Europe that the
Sultan's authority was even less than it had been in 1905.  The Berber
tribes were in arms on all sides.  In March, accounts began to appear
of danger at Fez, not only to European residents, but also to the
Sultan.  The reports of the French Consul, and the telegrams of
correspondents of two Paris newspapers, were most alarming.  On April
2d, it was announced that the Berber tribes {77} had actually attacked
the city and were besieging it.  Everything was prepared for the final
act of the drama.

A relief column of native troops under Major Bremond arrived in Fez on
April 26th.  The very next day, an urgent message for relief having
been received from Colonel Mangin in Fez, Colonel Brulard started for
the capital with another column.  Without waiting for further word, a
French army which had been carefully prepared for the purpose, entered
Morocco under General Moinier.  On May 21st, Fez was occupied by the
French.  They found that all was well there with the Europeans and with
the natives.  But, fortunately for the French plans, Muley Hafid's
brother had set himself up at Mequinez as pretender to the throne.  The
Sultan could now retain his sovereignty only by putting himself under
the protection of the French army.  Morocco had lost her independence!

Germany made no objection to the French expeditionary corps in April.
She certainly did not expect the quick succession of events in May
which brought her face to face with the _fait accompli_ of a strong
French army in Fez.  As soon as it was realized at Berlin that the
fiction of Moroccan independence had been so skilfully terminated,
France was asked "what compensation she would give to Germany in return
for a free hand in Morocco."  The _pourparlers_ dragged on through
several weeks in June.  France refused to acknowledge any ground for
compensation to Germany.  She maintained that the recent action in
Morocco had been at the request {78} of the Sultan, and that it was a
matter entirely between him and France.

Germany saw that a bold stroke was necessary.  On July 1st, the gunboat
_Panther_ went to Agadir, a port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.  To
Great Britain and to France, the dispatch of the _Panther_ was
represented as due to the necessity of protecting German interests,
seeing that there was anarchy in that part of Morocco.  But the German
newspapers, even those which were supposed to have official relations
with Wilhelmstrasse, spoke as if a demand for the cession of Mogador or
some other portion of Morocco was contemplated.  The Chancellor
explained to the Reichstag that the sending of the _Panther_ was "to
show the world that Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed to one
side."

But in the negotiations through the German Ambassador in Paris, it was
clear that Germany was playing a game of political blackmail.  The
German Foreign Office shifted its claims from Morocco to concessions in
Central Africa.  On July 15th, Germany asked for the whole of the
French Congo from the sea to the River Sanga, and a renunciation in her
favour of France's contingent claims to the succession of the Belgian
Congo.  The reason given to this demand was, that if Morocco were to
pass under a French protectorate, it was only just that compensation
should be given to Germany elsewhere.  France, for the moment,
hesitated.  She definitely refused to entertain the idea of
compensation as soon as she had received the assurance of the {79} aid
of Great Britain in supporting her against the German claims.

On July 1st, the German Ambassador had notified Sir Edward Grey of the
dispatch of the _Panther_ to Agadir "in response to the demand for
protection from German firms there," and explained that Germany
considered the question of Morocco reopened by the French occupation of
Fez, and thought that it would be possible to make an agreement with
Spain and France for the partition of Morocco.  On July 4th, Sir Edward
Grey, after a consultation with the Cabinet, answered that Great
Britain could recognize no change in Morocco without consulting France,
to whom she was bound by treaty.  The Ambassador then explained that
his Government would not consider the reopening of the question in a
European conference, that it was a matter directly between Germany and
France, and that his overture to Sir Edward Grey had been merely in the
nature of a friendly explanation.

Germany believed that the constitutional crisis in Great Britain was so
serious that the hands of the Liberal Cabinet would be tied, and that
they would not be so foolhardy as to back up France at the moment when
they themselves were being so bitterly assailed by the most influential
elements of the British electorate on the question of limiting the veto
power of the House of Lords.  It was in this belief that Germany on
July 15th asked for territorial cessions from France in Central Africa.
Wilhelmstrasse thought the moment well chosen, and that there was every
hope of success.

{80}

But the German mentality has never seemed to appreciate the frequent
lesson of history, that the British people are able to distinguish
clearly between matters of internal and external policy.  Bitterly
assailed as a traitor to his country because he advocates certain
changes of laws, a British Cabinet Minister can still be conscious of
the fact that his bitterest opponents will rally around him when he
takes a stand on a matter of foreign policy.  This knowledge of
admirable national solidarity enabled Mr. Lloyd George on July 21st,
the very day on which the King gave his consent to the creation of new
peers to bring the House of Lords to reason, at a Mansion House
banquet, to warn Germany against the danger of pressing her demands
upon France.  The effect, both in London and Paris, was to unify and
strengthen resistance.  It seemed as if the _Panther's_ visit to Agadir
had put Germany in the unenviable position of having made a threat
which she could not enforce.

But the ways of diplomacy are tortuous.  Throughout August and
September, Germany blustered and threatened.  In September, several
events happened which seemed to embarrass Russia and tie her hands, as
in the first Moroccan imbroglio of 1905.  For Premier Stolypin was
assassinated at Kiev on September 14th; the United States denounced its
commercial treaty with Russia on account of the question of Jewish
passports; and the Shuster affair in Persia occupied the serious
attention of Russian diplomacy.  Had it not been for the splendidly
loyal and scrupulous attitude of the {81} British Foreign Office
towards Russia in the Persian question, Germany might have been tempted
to force the issue with France.

German demands grew more moderate, but were not abandoned.  For members
of the House of Commons, of the extreme Radical wing in the Liberal
party, began to put the British Government in an uncomfortable
position.  Militarism, entangling alliances with a continental Power,
the necessity for agreement with Germany,--these were the subjects
which found their way from the floor of the House of Commons to the
public press.  A portion of the Liberal party which had to be reckoned
with believed that Germany ought not to have been left out of the
Anglo-French agreement.  So serious was the dissatisfaction, that the
Government deemed it necessary to make an explanation to the House.
Sir Edward Grey explained and defended the action of the Cabinet in
supporting the resistance of France to Germany's claims.  The whole
history of the negotiation was revealed.  The Anglo-French agreement of
1904 was published for the first time, and it was seen that this
agreement did not commit Great Britain to backing France by force of
arms.

Uncertainty of British support had the influence of bringing France to
consent to treat with Germany on the Moroccan question.  Two agreements
were signed.  By the first, Germany recognized the French protectorate
in Morocco, subject to the adhesion of the signers of the Convention of
Algeciras, and waived her right to take part in the negotiations
concerning Moroccan spheres of influence {82} between Spain and France.
On her side, France agreed to maintain the open door in Morocco, and to
refrain from any measures which would hinder the legitimate extension
of German commercial and mining interests.  By the second agreement,
France ceded to Germany, in return for German cessions, certain
territories in southern and eastern Kamerun.

There was a stormy Parliamentary and newspaper discussion, both in
France and Germany, over these two treaties.  No one was satisfied.
The treaties were finally ratified, but under protest.

In France, the Ministry was subject to severe criticism.  There was
also some feeling of bitterness--perhaps a reaction from the
satisfaction over Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech--in the
uncertainty of Great Britain's support, as revealed by the November
discussions in the House of Commons.  This uncertainty remained, as far
as French public opinion went, until Great Britain actually declared
war upon Germany in August, 1914.

In Germany, the _Reichstag_ debates revealed the belief that the Agadir
expedition had, on final analysis, resulted in a _fiasco_.  An
astonishing amount of enmity against Great Britain was displayed.  It
was when Herr Heydebrand made a bitter speech against Great Britain,
and denounced the pacific attitude of the German Government, in the
Reichstag session of November 10th, that the Crown Prince made public
his position in German foreign policy by applauding loudly.

The aftermath of Agadir, as far as it affected Morocco, resulted in the
establishment of the French {83} Protectorate, on March 30, 1912.  The
Sultan signed away his independence by the Treaty of Fez.  Foreign
legations at Fez ceased to exist, although diplomatic officials were
retained at Tangier.  France voted the maintenance of forty thousand
troops in Morocco "for the purposes of pacification."  The last
complications disappeared when, on November 27th, a Franco-Spanish
Treaty was signed at Madrid, in which the Spanish zones in Morocco were
defined, and both states promised not to erect fortifications or
strategic works on the Moroccan coast.

But the aftermath of Agadir in France and Germany has been an increase
in naval and military armaments, and the creation of a spirit of
tension which needed only the three years of war in the Ottoman Empire
to bring about the inevitable clash between Teuton and Gaul.  Taken in
connection with the recent events in Alsace and Lorraine, and the
voting of the law increasing military service in France to three years,
the logical sequence of events is clear.




{84}

CHAPTER V

THE PASSING OF PERSIA

The weakness of the Ottoman Empire and of Morocco served to bring the
colonial and commercial aspiration of Germany into conflict with other
nations of Europe.  The recent fortunes of Persia, the third--and only
other--independent Mohammedan state, have also helped to make possible
the general European war.

The first decade of the twentieth century brought about in Persia, as
in Turkey, the rise of a constitutional party, which was able to force
a despotic sovereign to grant a constitution.  The Young Persians had
in many respects a history similar to that of the Young Turks.  They
were for the most part members of influential families, who had been
educated in Europe, or had been sent into exile.  They had imbibed
deeply the spirit of the French Revolution from their reading, and had
at the same time developed a narrow and intense nationalism.  But to
support their revolutionary propaganda, they had allied themselves
during the period of darkness with the Armenians and other non-Moslems.
As Salonika, a city by no means Turkish, was the _foyer_ of the young
Turk movement, so Tabriz, {85} capital of the Azerbaidjan, a city by no
means Persian, was the centre of the opposition to Persian despotism.

Young Turks, Young Persians, Young Egyptians, Young Indians, and Young
Chinese have shown to Europe and America the peril--and the pity--of
our western and Christian education, when it is given to eastern and
non-Christian students.  They are born into the intellectual life with
our ideas and are inspired by our ideals, but have none of the
background, none of the inheritance of our national atmosphere and our
family training to enable them to live up to the standards we have put
before them.  Their disillusionment is bitter.  They resent our
attitude of superiority.  They hate us, even though they feign to
admire us.  Their jealousy of our institutions leads them to console
themselves by singling out and forcing themselves to see only the weak
and vulnerable points in our civilization.  Educated in our
universities, they return to their countries to conspire against us.
The illiterate and simple Oriental, who has never travelled, is
frequently the model of fidelity and loyalty and affection to his
Occidental master or friend.  But no educated non-Christian Oriental,
who has travelled and studied and lived on terms of equality with
Europeans or Americans in Europe or America, can ever be a sincere
friend.  The common result of social contact and intellectual
companionship is that he becomes a foe,--and conceals the fact.
Familiarity has bred more than contempt.

The Young Persians would have no European {86} aid.  They waited, and
suffered.  Finally, after a particularly bad year from the standpoint
of financial exactions, the Moslem clergy of the North were drawn into
the Young Persia movement.  A revolution, in which the Mohammedan
_mullahs_ took part, compelled the dying Shah, Muzaffereddin, to issue
a decree ordering the convocation of a _medjliss_ (committee of
notables) on August 5, 1906.  This improvised Parliament, composed only
of delegates of the provinces nearest the capital, drafted a
constitution which was promulgated on New Year's Day, 1907.  The
following week, Muzaffereddin died and was succeeded by his son,
Mohammed Ali Mirza, a reactionary of the worst type.

Mohammed Ali had no intention of putting the Constitution into force.
A serious revolution broke out in Tabriz a few weeks after his
accession.  He was compelled to acknowledge the Constitution granted by
his father.  In order to nullify its effect, however, the new Shah
called to the Grand Vizierate the exiled Ali Asgar Khan, whom he
believed to be strong enough to overrule the wishes of the Parliament.
The Constitutionalists formed a society of _fedavis_ to prevent the
return to absolutism.  At their instigation, Ali Asgar Khan was
assassinated.  The country fell into an anarchic state.

Constitutional Persia, as much because of the inexperience of the
Constitutionalists as of the ill-will of the Shah, was worse off than
under the despotism of Muzaffereddin.  There was no money in the
treasury.  The peasants would not pay their taxes.  One can hardly
blame them, for not a cent of the {87} money ever went for local
improvements or local government.  Throughout Persia, even in the
cities, life was unsafe.  The Persians, no more than the Turks, could
call forth from the ranks of their enthusiasts a progressive and
fearless statesman of the type of Stambuloff or Venizelos.  In their
Parliament they all talked at once.  None was willing to listen to his
neighbour.  It may have been because there was no Mirabeau.  But could
a Mirabeau have overcome the fatal defects of the Mohammedan training
and character that made the Young Persians incapable of realizing the
constitutionalism of their dreams?  Every man was suspicious and
jealous of his neighbour.  Every man wanted to lead, and none to be
led.  Every man wanted power without responsibility, prestige without
work, success without sacrifice.

It was at this moment that one of the most significant events of
contemporary times was helped to fruition by the state of affairs in
Persia.  Great Britain and Russia, rivals--even enemies--in western and
central Asia, signed a convention.  Their conflicting ambitions were
amicably compromised.  Along with the questions of Afghanistan and
Thibet, this accord settled the rivalry that had done much to keep
Persia a hotbed of diplomatic intrigue like Macedonia ever since the
Crimean War.

In regard to Persia, the two Powers solemnly swore to respect its
integrity and its independence, and then went on to sign its death
warrant, by agreeing upon the question of "the spheres of influence."
In spite of all sophisms, this convention marked the {88} passing of
Persia as an independent state.  Persia is worse off than Morocco and
Egypt.  For one master is better than two!

Here enters Germany.  For many years German merchants had looked upon
Persia as they looked upon Morocco and Turkey.  Here were the
legitimate fields for commercial expansion.  Probably there were also
dreams of political advantages to be gained later.  In their dealings
with the three Moslem countries that were still "unprotected" when they
inaugurated their _Weltpolitik_, the Germans had been attentive
students of British policy in the days of her first entry into India
and to Egypt.  There were many Germans who honestly believed that their
activities in these independent Moslem countries would only give them
"their place under the sun," and a legitimate field for the overflow of
their population and national energy, but that it would also be a
distinct advantage to the peace of the world.  Great Britain and Russia
and France had already divided up between them the larger part of Asia
and Africa.  In the process, Great Britain had _recently_ come almost
to blows with both her rivals.  If Germany stepped in between them,
would this not prevent a future conflict?  But the rivals "divided up."
Germany was left out in the cold.  It is not a very far cry from
Teheran and Koweit and Fez to Liège and Brussels and Antwerp.  Belgium
is paying the bill.

The Anglo-Russian convention of August 31, 1907, was the first of three
doors slammed in Germany's face.  The Anglo-French convention of April
{89} 8, 1904, had been an attempt to do this.  But by Emperor William's
visit to Tangiers in 1905, Germany got in her foot before the door was
closed!  In Persia there was no way that she could intervene directly
to demand that Great Britain and Russia bring their accord before an
international congress.

Germany began to work in Persia through two agencies.  She incited
Turkey to cross the frontier of the Azerbaidjan, and to make the
perfectly reasonable request that the third limitrophe state should be
taken into the _pourparlers_ which were deciding the future of Persia.
Then she sent her agents among the Nationalists, and showed them how
terrible a blow this convention was to their new constitutionalism.
Just at the moment when they had entered upon a constitutional life,
Great Britain and Russia had conspired against their independence, went
the German thesis.

If only there had been a sincerity for the Constitution in the heart of
the Shah, and an ability to establish a really constitutional _régime_
in the leaders of Young Persia, the Anglo-Russian accord might have
proved of no value.  But--unfortunately for Persia and for Germany--the
Shah, worked upon skilfully by Russian emissaries and by members of his
_entourage_, who were paid by Russian gold, attempted a _coup d'état_
against the Parliament in December, 1907.  He failed to carry it
through.  With a smile on his lips and rage in his heart, he once more
went through the farce of swearing to be a good constitutional ruler.
But in June, 1908, he succeeded {90} in dispersing the Parliament by
bombarding the palace in which it sat.

It would be wearisome to go into the story of the revolts and anarchy
in all parts of Persia in 1908 and 1909.  After a year of fighting and
Oriental promises, of solemn oaths and the breaking of them, the
constitutionalists finally drove Mohammed Ali from Teheran in July,
1909.  The Shah saved his life by taking refuge in the Russian
legation.  A few days later, he took the road to exile.  He has since
reappeared in Persia twice to stir up trouble in the north.  On both
occasions, it was when the Russians were finding it hard to justify
their continued occupation of the northern provinces.

Mohammed Ali was succeeded by his son Ali Mirza, a boy of eleven years,
who was still too young to be anything more than a mere plaything in
the hands of successive regents.

The civil strife in Persia gave Great Britain and Russia the excuse for
entering the country.  In accord with Great Britain, Russia sent an
expedition to occupy Tabriz on April 29, 1909.  Later, Russian troops
occupied Ardebil, Recht, Kazvin, and other cities in the Russian sphere
of influence.  Owing to the anarchy in the south during 1910, Great
Britain prepared to send troops "to protect the safety of the roads for
merchants."  This was not actually done, for conditions of travel
slightly ameliorated.  But Persia has rested since under the menace of
a British occupation.

Every effort made to bring order out of chaos in Persia has failed.
Serious attempts at financial {91} reform were undertaken by an
American mission, under the direction of a former American official in
the Philippine Islands.

The new American Treasurer-General would not admit that the
Anglo-Russian accord of 1907 was operative in Persia.  One day in the
summer of 1911, I was walking along the Galata Quay in Constantinople.
I heard my name called from the deck of a vessel just about to leave
for Batum.  Perched on top of two boxes containing typewriters, was a
young American from Boston, who was going out to help reform the
finances of Persia.  I had talked to him the day before concerning the
extreme delicacy and difficulty of the task of the mission whose
secretary he was.  But his refusal to admit the political limitations
of Oriental peoples made it impossible for him to see that
constitutional Persia was any different, or should be treated any
differently, from constitutional Massachusetts.

From the sequel of the story, it would seem that Mr. Shuster had the
same attitude of mind as his secretary.  He refused to appoint fiscal
agents in the Russian "sphere" on any other ground than personal
fitness and ability.  Russia protested.  Mr. Shuster persisted.  A
march on Teheran to expel the Americans was threatened.  Persia yielded
and gave up the American mission--and her independence.

When Germany saw that the Russian troops had entered northern Persia
with the consent of Great Britain, and had come to stay, there was
nothing for her to do but to treat with Russia.

In November, 1910, when the Czar was visiting {92} the Kaiser, Russian
and German ministers exchanged views concerning the ground upon which
Germany would agree to the _fait accompli_ of Russia's exclusive
political interests in Northern Persia, and the Russian military
occupation.  Satisfactory bases were found for an agreement between
Russia and Germany concerning their respective interests in Persia and
Asiatic Turkey.  The Accord of Potsdam, as it is called, was made in
the form of a note presented by the Russian Government to Germany, and
accepted by her.  Russia declared that she would in no way oppose the
realization of the project of the Bagdad railway up to the Persian
Gulf, and that she would construct to the border of Persia a railway to
join a spur of the Bagdad railway from Sadije to Khanikin.  In return
for this, Germany was to promise not to construct railway lines outside
of the Bagdad railway zone, to declare that she had no political
interest in Persia, and to recognize that "Russia has special interests
in Northern Persia from the political, strategic, and economic points
of view."  The German Government was to abandon any intention of
securing a concession for a trans-Persian railway.  On the other hand,
Russia promised to maintain in Northern Persia the "open door," so that
German commercial interests should not be injured.

The accord between Russia and Germany was badly received everywhere.
France feared that Germany was trying to weaken the Franco-Russian
alliance.  Great Britain did not look with favour upon a recognition by
Russia of German interests in Asiatic Turkey.  The Sublime Porte felt
that {93} Russia and Germany had shown a disregard for the elementary
principles of courtesy in discussing and deciding questions that were
of tremendous importance to the future of Turkey without inviting the
Sublime Porte to take part in the negotiations.  Turkey in the Potsdam
accord was ignored as completely as Morocco had been in the Algeciras
Convention and Persia in the Russo-British accord.

The Potsdam stipulations brought prominently before Europe the possible
significance of Germany's free hand in Anatolian and Mesopotamian
railway constructions.  It also aroused interest in the possibility of
an all-rail route from Calais to Calcutta, in which all the Great
Powers except Italy would participate.

The trans-Persian and all other railway schemes in Persia came to
nothing.  Between 1872 and 1890 twelve district railway projects had
received concessions from the Persian Government.  One of these, the
Reuter group, actually started the construction of a line from the
Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf.  A French project for a railway from
Trebizond to Tabriz had gained powerful financial support.  All these
schemes were frustrated by Russian diplomacy.  In 1890, Russia secured
from the Persian Government the exclusive right for twenty-one years to
construct railways in Northern Persia.  Needless to say, no lines were
built.  Russia had all she could do with her trans-Siberian and
trans-Caucasian schemes.  But she deliberately acted the dog in the
manger.  By preventing private groups from building railways in Persia
which she would not {94} build herself, Russia has retarded the
economic progress, and is largely responsible for the financial,
military, and administrative weakness, of contemporary Persia.  By the
accords of 1907 with Great Britain and 1911 with Germany, Russia
secured their connivance in still longer continuing this shameful
stagnation.  To this day no railroad has been built in the Shah's
dominions.

Just a month before the outbreak of the European war, the boy Shah of
Persia was solemnly crowned at Teheran.  It was an imposing and
pathetic ceremony.  The Russians and British saw to it that full honour
should be given to the sovereign of Persia.  The pathos of the event
was in the fact that the Russian and British legations at Teheran paid
the expenses of the coronation.  The Shah received his crown from the
hands of his despoilers.  A similar farce was enacted a little while
before in Morocco.  Turkey alone of Moslem nations remains.

The last effort of Persia to shake off the Russian octopus was made on
October 8, 1914, when Russia was requested once more to withdraw her
troops from the Azerbaijan.  The Russian Minister at Teheran, without
going through the form of referring the request to Petrograd, answered
that the interests of Russia and other foreign countries could be
safeguarded only by the continued occupation.  To this response his
British colleague gave hearty assent.

The importance of the passing of Persia is two-fold.  It shows how in
one more direction Germany found herself shut out from a possible field
of expansion.  Through the weakness of Persia, Great Britain {95} and
Russia, after fifty years of bitter struggle, were able to come to a
satisfactory compromise.  It was in Persia that their animosity was
buried, and that co-operation of British democracy and Russian
autocracy in a war against Germany was first envisaged.  The failure of
the Persian constitutional Government was a tremendous blow to Germany.
It strengthened the bases of the Triple Entente.  For the events of
1908 and 1909 put the accord to severe test, and proved that it was
built upon a solid foundation.  The agony of one people is often the
joy of another.  Has Persia suffered vicariously that France may be
saved?




{96}

CHAPTER VI

THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES[*]


[*] This chapter has not been written without giving consideration to
the Russian point of view.  There is an excellent book on Russia since
the Japanese War (from 1906 to 1912) by Peter Polejaïeff.


When Russia, Austria, and Prussia partitioned Poland at the end of the
eighteenth century, there were at the most six million Poles in the
vast territory stretching from the Baltic nearly to the Black Sea.  Of
these a large number, especially in Eastern Prussia and in Silesia, had
already lost their sense of nationality.  Poland was a country of
feudal nobles, whose inability to group under a dynasty for the
formation of a modern state, made the disappearance of the kingdom an
inexorable necessity in the economic evolution of Europe, and of
ignorant peasants, who were indifferent concerning the political status
of the land in which they lived.

To-day there are twenty million Poles.  Although they owe allegiance to
three different sovereigns, they are more united than ever in their
history.  For their national feeling has developed in just the same way
that the national feeling of Germans and Russians has developed, by
education primarily, and by that remarkable tendency of industrialism,
{97} which has grouped people in cities, and brought them into closer
association.  This influence of city life upon the destinies of Poland
comes to us with peculiar force when we realize that since the last map
of Europe was made Warsaw has grown from forty thousand to eight
hundred thousand, Lodz from one thousand to four hundred thousand,
Posen from a few hundreds to one hundred and fifty thousand, Lemberg
and Cracow from less than ten thousand to two hundred thousand and one
hundred and fifty thousand respectively.  These great cities (except
Lodz, which Russia foolishly allowed to become an outpost of
Pan-Germanism in the heart of a Slavic population) are the _foyers_ of
Polish nationalism.

The second and third dismemberments of Poland (1793 and 1795) were soon
annulled by the Napoleonic upheaval.  The larger portion of Poland was
revived in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.  The Congress of Vienna, just one
hundred years ago, made what the representatives of the partitioning
Powers hoped would be a definite redistribution of the unwelcome ghost
stirred up by Napoleon.  Poznania was returned to Prussia, and in the
western end of Galicia a Republic of Cracow was created.  The greater
portion of Poland reverted to Russia, _not as conquered territory, but
as a separate state, of which the Czar assumed the kingship and swore
to preserve the liberties_.  The unhappiness, the unrest, the
agitation, among the Poles of the Muscovite Empire, just as among the
Finns, came from the breaking of the promises by Russia to Europe when
these subjects of alien races were allotted to her.

{98}

The story of modern Poland is not different from that of any other
nationalistic movement.  A sense of nationality and a desire for racial
political unity are not the phenomena which have been the underlying
causes of the evolution of Europe since the Congress of Vienna.  In
Italy, in Germany, in Poland, in Alsace-Lorraine, in Finland, among the
various races of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Balkan Peninsula,
as well as in Turkey and Persia, the underlying cause of political
agitation, of rebellions and of revolutions has been the desire to
secure freedom from absolutism.  Nationalism is simply the tangible
outward manifestation of the growth of democracy.  There are few
national movements where separatism could not have been avoided by
granting local self-government.  Mixed populations can live together
under the same government without friction, if the lesser races are
granted social, economic, and political equality.  But nations that
have achieved their own unity and independence through devotion to a
nationalistic movement have shown no mercy or wisdom with smaller and
less fortunate races under their domination.  The very methods that
European statesmen have fondly believed were necessary for assimilation
have proved fatal to it.

The Polish question, as we understand it to-day, has little connection
with the Polish revolutions of 1830 and of 1863.  These movements
against the Russian Government were conducted by the same elements of
protest against autocracy that were at work in the larger cities and
universities throughout Europe during the middle of the nineteenth
century.  {99} Nationalism was the reason given rather than the cause
that prompted.  The revolutions were unsuccessful because they were not
supported by the nation.  The mass of the people were indifferent to
the cause, just as in other countries similar revolutions against
despotism failed for lack of real support.  The apathy of the masses
has always been the bulwark of defence for autocracy and reactionary
policies.  Popular rights do not come to people until the masses demand
them.  Education alone brings self-government.  This is the history of
the evolution of modern Europe.

The Poles _as a nation_ began to worry their partitioners in the decade
following the last unsuccessful revolution against Russia.  To
understand the contemporary phases of the Polish question, it is
necessary for us to follow first its three-fold development, as a
question of internal policy in Russia, Germany, and Austria.  Only then
is its significance as an international question clear.



THE POLES SINCE 1864 IN RUSSIA

The troubles of Russia in her relationship to the Poles have come
largely from the fact that the distinction between Poland proper,
inhabited by Poles, and the provinces which the Jagellons conquered but
never assimilated, was not grasped by the statesmen who had to deal
with the aftermath of the revolution.  What was possible in one was
thought to be possible in the other.  What was vital in one was
believed to be vital in the other.  In the kingdom {100} of Poland, as
it was bestowed upon the Russian Czar by the Congress of Vienna, there
were massed ten million Poles who could be neither exterminated nor
exiled.  Nor was there a sound motive for attempting to destroy their
national life.  The kingdom of Poland was not an essential portion of
the Russian Empire, and was not vitally bound to the fortunes of the
Empire.  So unessential has the kingdom of Poland been to Russia, and
so fraught with the possibilities of weakness to its owner, that
patriotic and far-sighted Russian publicists have advocated its
complete autonomy, its independence or its cession to Germany.  Because
it was limitrophe to the territories occupied by the Poles of the other
partitioners, there was constantly danger of weakening the defences of
the empire and of international complications.  Through failing to
treat these Poles in such a way that they would be a loyal bulwark
against her enemies, Russia has done irreparable harm to herself as
well as to them.

The Polish question in Lithuania, Podolia, and the Ukraine was a
totally different matter.  These provinces had been added to Russia in
her logical development towards the west and the south-west.  Their
possession was absolutely essential to the existence of the Empire.
Their population was not Polish, but Lithuanian, Ruthenian, and
Russian.  From the Baltic to the Black Sea, the acquisition of these
territories made possible the entrance of Russia into the concert of
European nations.  They had been conquered by Poland during the period
of her greatness, and had naturally been lost by her {101} when she
became weak.  In these portions of Greater Poland, the Poles were
limited to the landowning class, and to the more prosperous artisans in
the cities and villages.  They were the residue of an earlier
conquering race that had never assimilated the country.  They had
abused their power, and were heartily disliked.  These provinces were
vital to Russia, and she was able to carry out the policy of uprooting
the Poles.  Their villages were burned, their fortunes and their lands
confiscated, the landed proprietors deported to Siberia, and others so
cruelly persecuted that, when their churches and schools were closed
and they found themselves forbidden to speak their language outside of
their own homes, they emigrated.  In Lithuania, the Lithuanian language
was also proscribed.  The Russians had no intention of blotting out a
Polish question in order to make place for a Lithuanian one.

Where the Poles were few in number, these measures, which were exactly
the same as the Poles had employed themselves in the same territories
several centuries before, were successful.  The peasants were glad to
see their traditional persecutors get a taste of their own medicine.
It was not difficult to make these provinces Russian.  They have
gradually been assimilated into the Empire.  In all fairness, one can
hardly condemn the Russian point of view, as regards the Poles in
Lithuania, Podolia, and the Ukraine.  Only youthful Polish irredentists
still dream of the restoration of the Empire of the Jagellons.

In the kingdom of Poland, the situation was {102} entirely different.
This huge territory had been given to Russia by the Congress of Vienna
upon the solemn assurance that it was to be governed as a separate
kingdom by the Romanoffs.  There was no thought in the Congress of
Vienna of the disappearance of the Poles as a separate nationality from
the map of Europe.  But the autonomy of Poland was suppressed after the
rebellion of 1830.

After the rebellion of 1863, Russia tried to assimilate the kingdom of
Poland as well as the Polish marches.  The repression was so severe
that Polish nationalism was considered dead.  The peasants had been
indifferent to the movement.  Not only had they failed to support it,
but they had frequently shown themselves actually hostile to it.

It was because the nobles and priests were believed to be leaders of
nationalistic and separatist movements, not only in Poland but in other
allogeneous portions of the composite Empire, that Czar Alexander II
emancipated the serfs.  The policy of every autocratic government, when
it meets the first symptoms of unrest in a subject race, is to strike
at their church and their aristocracy.  The most efficient way to
weaken the power of the nobles is to strengthen the peasants.
Alexander himself may have been actuated by motives of pure humanity,
but his ministers would never have allowed the _ukase_ to be
promulgated, had they not seen in it the means of conquering the
approaching revolution in Poland.  For the moment it was an excellent
move, and accomplished its purpose.  The Polish {103} peasants were led
to believe that the Czar was their father and friend and champion
against the exactions of the church and landowner.  Was not their
emancipation proof of this?

But in the long run the emancipation of the serfs proved fatal to
Russian domination in Poland.  For the advisers of Alexander had not
realized that freemen would demand and attend schools, and that
schools, no matter how careful the surveillance and restrictions might
be, created democrats.  Democrats would seize upon nationalism to
express their aspiration for self-government.  The emancipation of the
serfs, launched as a measure to destroy Poland, has ended in making it.
Emancipation created Polish patriots.  It was a natural and inevitable
result.  The artificial aid of a governmental persecution helped and
hastened this result.  The Irishman expressed a great truth when he
said that there are things that are not what they are.

A flock of hungry Russian functionaries descended upon Poland in 1864.
They took possession of all departments of administration.  The Polish
language was used in courts only through an interpreter, and was
forbidden as the medium of instruction in schools.  No Polish signs
were tolerated in the railways or post-offices.  In the parts of the
kingdom where there were bodies of the Lithuanians, their nationalism
was encouraged, and they were shown many favours, in contradiction to
the policy adopted towards the Lithuanians of Lithuania.  Catholics who
followed the Western Rite were forced to join the national church.
There was a clear intention {104} to assimilate as much as possible the
populations of the border districts of Poland.

After thirty years of repression, Russia had made no progress in
Poland.  In 1897, Prince Imeretinsky wrote to the Czar that the policy
of the Government had failed.  Polish national spirit, instead of
disappearing, had spread remarkably among the peasant classes.  The
secret publication and importation of unauthorized journals and
pamphlets had multiplied.  The number of cases brought before the
courts for infraction of the "law of association," which forbade
unlicensed public gatherings and clubs, had so increased that they
could not be heard.  Heavy fines and imprisonment seem to have had no
deterring effect.

[Illustration: Map--Partitions of Poland]

Could Russia hope to struggle against the tendencies of modern life?
Free press and free speech are the complement of education.  When men
learn to read, they learn to think, and can be reached by propaganda.
When men increase in prosperity, they begin to want a voice in the
expenditure of the money they have to pay for taxes.  When men come
together in the industrial life of large cities, they form
associations.  No government, no system of spies or terrorism, no laws
can prevent propaganda in cities.  From 1864 to 1914, the kingdom of
Poland has become more Polish than ever before in her history.  Instead
of a few students and dreamers, fascinated by the past glories of their
race, instead of a group of landowners and priests, thinking of their
private interests and of the Church, there is awakened a spirit of
protest against Russian {105} despotism in the soul of a race become
intelligently nationalistic.

The issue between Russia and her Poles has become clearer, and for that
reason decidedly worse, since the disastrous war with Japan.  The Poles
have demanded autonomy in the fullest sense of the word.  The Russians
have responded by showing that it is their intention to destroy Poland,
just as they intend to destroy Finland.  There is an analogy between
the so-called constitutional _régimes_ in Russia and Turkey.  In each
Empire, the granting of a constitution was hailed with joy by the
various races.  These races, who had been centres of agitation,
disloyalty, and weakness, were ready to co-operate with their
governments in building up a large, broad, comprehensive, national life
upon the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity.  But in both
Empires, the dominant race let it soon be understood that the
Constitution was to be used for a destructive policy of assimilation.
In the Ottoman Empire, the Constitution was a weapon for destroying the
national aspirations of subject races.  In Russia it has been the same.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Czar Nicholas and his ministers had their
great opportunity to profit by the lessons of Manchuria.  But the
granting of a constitution was a pure farce.  Blind to the fact that
the enlightened Poles were interested primarily in political reforms,
and in securing equity and justice for the kingdom of Poland, instead
of for the advancement of a narrow and theoretical nationalistic ideal,
the Russians repulsed the proffered {106} loyalty of the Poles to a
free and constitutional Russian Empire.  In the second Duma, Dmowski
and other Polish deputies unanimously voted the supplies for
strengthening the Russian army.  They stated that the Poles were
willing to cast their lot loyally and indissolubly with constitutional
Russia.  Were they not brethren, and imbued with the same Pan-Slavic
idea?  Was it not logical to look to Russia as the defender of all the
Slavs from Teutonic oppression?

But Poland, like Finland, was to continue to be the victim of Russian
bureaucracy and of an intolerant nationalism which the Russians were
beginning to feel as keenly and as arrogantly as the Prussians.  Is the
Kaiser, embodying the evils of militarism, more obnoxious and more
dangerous to civilization than the Czar, standing for the horrors of
bureaucratic despotism and absolutism?  Have not the Armenian
massacres, ordered from Constantinople, and the Jewish pogroms, ordered
from Petrograd, associated Christian Czar with Mohammedan Sultan at the
beginning of the twentieth century?

The first deliberate violation of the integrity of the kingdom of
Poland was sanctioned by the Russian Duma in the same session in which
it approved violation of Russian obligations to Finland.  A law
separating Kholm from the kingdom of Poland was voted on July 6, 1912.
The test of the law declared that Kholm was still to be regarded as a
portion of the kingdom of Poland, but to be directly attached to the
Ministry of the Interior without passing by the intermediary of the
Governor-General of Warsaw; {107} and to preserve the Polish adaptation
of the Code Napoléon for its legal administration, but to have its
court of appeal at Kief.

The elections of 1913 from the kingdom of Poland to the Duma gave a
decided setback to the party of Dmowski, who had so long and so ably
pled for a policy of Pan-Slavism through accommodation with Russia.
The law concerning Kholm had been the response of the Duma to Dmowski's
olive branch.  The moderates were discredited.  But the failure of the
radical nationalists to conciliate the Jewish element caused their
candidates to lose both at Warsaw and Lodz.

The birth of an anti-Semitic movement has been disastrous to Polish
solidarity during recent years.  The Polish nationalists suspected the
Jews of working either for German or Russian interests.  They were
expecially bitter against the _Litvak_, or Lithuanian and south Russian
Jews, who had been forced by Russia to establish themselves in the
cities of Poland.  Poland is one of the most important pales in the
Empire.  The Jewish population is one-fifth of the total, and enjoys
both wealth and education in the cities.  Their educated youth had been
courageous and forceful supporters of Polish nationalism.  Before the
Russian intrigues of the last decade and the introduction of these
non-Polish Jews, there had never been a strong anti-Semitic feeling in
Poland.  The Polish protests against the encroachment of the Russians
upon their national liberties have been greatly weakened by their
antagonism to the Jews.  The anti-Semitic movement, which has carried
away {108} both the moderate party of Dmowski and the radical
nationalists, as was expected, has played into the hand of Russia.

The Muscovite statesmen, while endeavouring to use the Balkan Wars for
the amalgamation of south Slavic races under the wing of Russia against
Austria have treated the Poles as if they were not Slavs.  During 1913
and the first part of 1914, the policy of attempting to russianize the
Poles has proved disastrous to their feeling of loyalty to the Empire.
The government announced definitely that the kingdom of Poland would be
"compensated" for the loss of Kholm by a law granting self-government
to Polish cities.  This promise has not been kept.  The municipal
self-government project presented to the Duma was as farcical in
practical results as all democratic and liberal legislation which that
impotent body has been asked to pass upon.



THE POLES SINCE 1867 IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The disappearance of Austria from Germany after the battle of Sadowa
led to the organization of a new state, the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
We must divorce in our mind the Austria before 1867 from the
Austria-Hungary of the Dual Monarchy.  The political situation changed
entirely when Austrians and Hungarians agreed to live together and
share the Slavic territories of the Hapsburg Crown.  Austria no longer
had need of her Galicians to keep the Hungarians in check.  But there
was equally important work for them to do.

{109}

The Austrians have always treated the Poles very well.  Galicia, which
had been Austria's share in the partition of Poland, was given local
self-government, with its own Diet, and proper representation in the
Austrian _Reichsrath_.  Poles were admitted in generous numbers to the
functions of the Empire.

The Polish nationalists of Russia and Prussia feel very bitter about
the indifference of the Galicians to the nation at large--or rather in
captivity.  They claim that the lack of national feeling among the
Austrian Poles is due to the fact that they have been bribed by the
Austrians to desert not only their brethren of Russia and of Prussia,
but also their fellow-Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  I have
heard this criticism ably and feelingly presented, but I do not think
it just.  Since national aspirations are awakened and sustained by the
effort to secure political equality and justice, the enjoyment of these
takes away need or desire to plot against the Government.  The Poles of
Austria are like the French of Canada.  Their nationalism is literary
and religious in character.  There is no reason for its being
anti-governmental.

Of late years, however, there has been a national Polish agitation in
Galicia.  It is directed not against the Government, but against the
Ruthenians, who, to the number of three millions--nearly forty per
cent. of the total population--inhabit the eastern section of Galicia.
This local racial conflict, which has strengthened rather than weakened
the attachment of the Poles to the Vienna Government, arose after the
introduction of universal suffrage, when {110} eastern Galicia began to
send in large numbers Ruthenian deputies to the Galician Diet and to
the Austrian Parliament.

On April 12, 1908, Count Potocki was assassinated by a Ruthenian
student, whose death sentence was commuted to twenty years'
imprisonment.  With the complicity of wardens, the assassin escaped
from jail after three years.  There has never been peace between the
Poles and the Ruthenians since that time.  After serious disorders at
the University of Lemberg, where the Ruthenian students were treated
disgracefully, Polish and Ruthenian leaders tried to find common ground
for reconciliation in December, 1911.  The Ruthenians demanded
electoral reform with greater representation, and the creation of a
Ruthenian university.  The imperial government communicated to the
representatives of the two nationalities the project of a decree of
public instruction in Galicia in January, 1913.  The project was a
marvel of ingenuity.  A Ruthenian university was to be established
after four years, but if by October 1, 1916, the law voting credits for
it was not yet passed, a special school for Ruthenians would be
attached to the University of Lemberg, until their own university was a
reality.  The teaching of the Ruthenian language would cease in the
University of Lemberg when this "special school" was inaugurated.  The
Ruthenians were suspicious of a trick in the project.  They could not
understand its vagueness.  It looked as if they would be giving up
their present rights in the University of Lemberg, limited as they
were, for an uncertainty.  Why was {111} no definite date for opening
specified, or indication given of the new university's location?  Would
it be maintained by Galicia with a budget appropriation in proportion
to the taxes paid by Ruthenians?

The Ruthenian question in Galicia has been cited here to show how there
are wheels within wheels in the complex questions of nationalities.
European racial questions seem to follow the law of the animal world.
The littlest animals are eaten by little animals, who in turn serve as
food for larger animals.  Nations which have suffered most cruelly from
race persecution are generally themselves relentless and fanatical when
the power to persecute is in their hands.

The Ruthenian question shows also how Poles and Austrians work
together, and are content with the mutual advantages of their union.  I
have never met an Austrian Pole, who lived in Galicia and had a settled
profession or business there, who was not a loyal--even
ardent--supporter of the Hapsburg Monarchy.  Austrian Poles are
dismayed as they face the terrible dilemma of union with Russia or
Germany.



THE POLES SINCE 1870 IN GERMANY

Germany, like Russia, has had a twofold Polish question: The
acquisition of Polish territory on either side of the Vistula to the
Baltic Sea was as essential to the creation of a strong Prussian
kingdom as was the acquisition of Pomerania.  The portion of Poland
which, before the partition, cut off eastern {112} from western Prussia
was fully as much German as Polish,--in fact more so.  It became German
by logical and natural conquest in the course of Prussia's evolution.

The situation was different in Poznania.  This territory of the later
partition reverted to Prussia at the Congress of Vienna.  In 1815, its
population was only twenty per cent. German.  For fifty years the
process of Germanization went on naturally--in no way forced.  When the
German Empire was formed, nearly half of Poznania was German.  Many of
the leading Poles had lost their sense of Polish nationality.  They had
become German in language and in culture.  How many families there are
in Prussia whose Polish origin is betrayed only by their names!

But the Germanized Poles, for the most part, retained their religion.
The notorious _Kulturkampf_ of Bismarck aroused again the sense of
nationality which had been lost, not only among the prosperous Poles of
Poznania, but even of Silesia.  Only the bureaucratic classes were
unaffected by this renaissance of nationalism awakened by revolt
against religious persecution.

Just after the formation of the Empire, when Prussia needed all her
strength and force to preserve her hegemony in the new confederation
and to lead modern Germany in the path of progress and civilization, on
either side of her kingdom she had to cope with nationalist movements
of Danes and of Poles.  But she did not fear to undertake also the
assimilation of Alsace and Lorraine!

{113}

Since the _Kulturkampf_, the Polish renaissance in Prussia has thrived
in spite of persecution.  As in Russia, the Polish language was
banished, Polish teachers were transferred to schools in other parts of
the Empire, and about forty thousand Poles of Russian and Austrian
nationality were expelled from the country.  The persecution has been
carried on in the schools, in the army, and in the church.  School
children have been forbidden to pray in the Polish language.  Two
unconstitutional laws have been passed by the Prussian Diet.  The first
of these forbade the Poles to speak Polish in public gatherings.  The
second, sanctioned by the _Landtag_ on March 8, 1908, authorized the
Government to expropriate land owned by Poles _for the purpose of
selling it to Germans_.

The Prussian scheme for getting rid of the Poles was to drive them from
their lands and instal German colonists.  Private enterprise was first
tried.  A "colonization society" was formed, with a large capital, and
given every encouragement by Prussian officialdom.  But economic laws
are not controlled by politics.  The colonists were boycotted.
Enormous sums of money were lost in wasted crops.  The farms of the
colonists had to be resold by the sheriff, and were bought in by Poles.
To discourage the buying back of the German farms, a law was passed
forbidding Poles to build upon land acquired by them after the date of
the colonization society's failure.  The Poles got around this law most
cleverly.  If one goes into Poznania to-day, he will see farmhouses,
barns, dairies, stables--even chicken-coops--on {114} wheels.  The
people live in glorified wagons.  They do not build.  Will there be a
law now against owning wagons?

When the failure of private enterprise was demonstrated, the Prussian
Government announced its intention of applying the law of expropriation
"for the use of the commission of colonization."  This was in October,
1912.  At the beginning of 1913, the Polish deputies to the _Reichstag_
brought before their colleagues of all Germany the question of the
expropriation of Polish lands in Prussia.  They asked the
representatives of a supposedly advanced and constitutional nation what
they thought of this injustice.  Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg tried
to keep the question from being debated.  He argued with perfect reason
that it was a purely internal Prussian matter, which the Imperial
Parliament was incompetent to discuss.  But the Catholic centre and the
Socialist left combined to vote an order of the day allowing the
discussion of the Polish lands question.

In the history of the German confederation, it was the first time that
an imperial chancellor had received a direct defiance.  This vote is
mentioned here to show how Prussian dealings with the Poles, just as
with Alsace-Lorraine, have tended to weaken the purely Prussian
substructure of the German confederation, and to arouse a dangerous
protest against Prussian hegemony.  Contempt for the elementary
principles of justice has been the key-note of Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg's career.  His mentality is typical of that of German
bureaucracy--no, more than that, of German statesmanship.  It is {115}
possible to have sympathy with German national aspirations, but not
with the methods by which those aspirations are being interpreted to
the world.  To show how little regard he had for parliamentary opinion
in the German confederation, the Chancellor forced through the Prussian
_Landtag_, on April 22, 1913, only three months after his rebuke from
the _Reichstag_, an infamous law, voting one hundred and twenty-five
million marks for German colonization in Prussian Poland.  Shortly
before the European war broke out, another unconstitutional law was
passed, which makes possible the arbitrary division of large landed
properties owned by Poles.



THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF THE POLISH QUESTION

During the war with Japan, the Czar and the Kaiser understood each
other perfectly on the Polish question.  The neutrality of Germany was
essential to Russia at that time.  The Russians owe much to Germany for
her benevolent attitude of those trying days.  The Poles have since
paid the bill.

As in Prussia, the Poles of Russia have seen their liberties menaced
more than ever before during the past decade, and have had to struggle
hopelessly against a policy of ruthless extermination.  If on the one
hand the Prussian persecution is more to be condemned because Germany
asks the world to believe that she is an enlightened, constitutional
nation, and "the torch-bearer of civilization," while Russia is
admittedly reactionary and still half-barbarous, on the other hand
there is less excuse for {116} the Russian persecution of the Poles.
For in Russia it is not Teuton against Slav, but Slav against Slav.

Germany and Russia have had the common interest of fellow-criminals in
their relation to the Polish nation.  Russia has not hesitated to
co-operate with Germany through diplomatic and police channels in
riveting more securely the fetters of the Poles.  Her championship of
the south Slavs against Teutonic aggression has been supposedly on the
grounds of "burning love for our brothers in slavery, in whose veins
runs the same blood as ours."  The sham and hypocrisy of this attitude
is revealed when we consider the fact that Russia has never protested
to Germany against the treatment of the Poles of Poznania, nor shown
any inclination to treat with equity her own Poles.  Here are "brothers
in slavery" nearer home.  There is ground for suspicion that her
interest in the south Slavs has been purely because they are on the way
to Constantinople and the Mediterranean.  One who reads the recent
history of Russia stultifies himself if he allows himself to believe
that Russia has entered into the present war to defend Servia from
Austrian aggression _through any love for or humanitarian interest in
the Servians_.  If Russia gets the opportunity, will her treatment of
Servian national aspirations be any different from that of
Austria-Hungary?  When we try to answer this question, let us think of
Bulgaria after 1878 (the last "war of liberation") and of Poland _in
1914_.

On August 16, 1914, when I read the proclamation of Czar Nicholas to
the partitioned Poles, promising {117} to restore administrative
autonomy to the kingdom of Poland, and posing as the liberator of Poles
now under the yoke of Austria and of Prussia, it was hard to be
enthusiastic.  For the Jews of Odessa and Kief, and the Finns of
Helsingfors, rise up to add their cry of warning to the bitter comments
of Polish friends.  Only two years ago I saw in those cities subjects
of the Czar suffering cruelly from fanaticism and broken promises, and
deprived of that which is now being held out as bait to the Poles, and
as a sop to Russia's Allies.

Austria-Hungary has been able to use the Russian treatment of Poland as
a means of strengthening her own hold on the border regions of the
Empire.  It was at the instigation of Ballplatz that the Galician
deputies, on December 16, 1911, made a motion in the Reichsrath,
inviting the Minister of Foreign Affairs "to undertake steps among the
Powers who signed the conventions at Vienna in 1815 to assure the
maintenance of the frontiers of the kingdom of Poland, of which Russia,
in violation of her international obligations, was threatening the
integrity.  For the separation of Kholm from Poland is an attack upon
Polish historic and national consciousness."  It was tit for tat with
the two Eastern Powers.  Russia burned with indignation for the
feelings of Servia when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Austria-Hungary burned with indignation for the feelings of her own
loyal Polish subjects, when Russia separated Kholm from Poland.  Both
had violated international treaties.  Russia had no genuine interest in
the Servians, and Austria {118} none in the Poles.  They merely seized
upon weapons with which to attack each other.

It is a mystery how French and British public opinion, always so
traditionally favourable to downtrodden races, and especially to the
Poles, can hail the Russian entry into Lemberg as a "victory for
civilization."  To the Austrian Poles, the coming of the Cossacks is as
the coming of the Uhlans to the Belgians.  They look upon the Russian
invasion of Galicia as a calamity to their national life.  Fighting
with the Austrians are thirty thousand young Poles who call themselves
Sokols (falcons).  Their organization is something like the German
_Turnverein_, but more purely military.  The Poles of Austria-Hungary
are a unit against Russia.

One can make no such positive statement about the attitude of the Poles
of the other two partitioners.  They have little hope of any
amelioration of their lot from a change of masters through the present
war.  As I write, the thunder of German cannon is heard at Warsaw, and
the unhappy kingdom of Poland is the centre of conflict between Russia
and Germany.  The Poles are fighting on both sides, and Polish
non-combatants are suffering from the brutality of both "liberating"
armies.  The situation is exactly expressed by a Polish proverb which
is the fruit of centuries of bitter experience: _Gdzie dwóch panów sie,
bije, ch[l-tilde]op w skur[e-cedille], dostaje_--"When two masters
fight, the peasant receives the blows."




{119}

CHAPTER VII

ITALIA IRREDENTA

Irredentism grew inevitably out of the decisions of the Congress of
Vienna, whose members were subjected to two influences in making a new
map of Europe.  The first consideration, so common and so necessary in
all diplomatic arrangements, was that of expediency.  The second
consideration was to prevent the rise of liberalism and democracy.  The
decisions on the ground of the first consideration were made under the
pressure and the play and the skill of give and take by the
representatives of the nations who fondly believed that they were
making a lasting peace for Europe.  The decisions on the ground of the
second consideration were guided by the idea that the checking of
national aspirations was the best means of preventing the growth of
democracy.

The decisions of Vienna, like the later modifications of Paris and
Berlin, could not prevent the development of the national movements
which have changed the map as it was rearranged after the collapse of
the Napoleonic _régime_.

During the past hundred years, ten new states have appeared on the map
of Europe: Greece, {120} Belgium, Servia, Italy, the German
Confederation, Rumania, Montenegro, Norway, Bulgaria,
and--possibly--Albania.  With the exception of Albania (and is this the
reason why we have to qualify its viability by the word _possibly?_),
_all of these states have appeared upon the map against the will of,
and in defiance of, the concert of the European Powers_.  They have
all, again with the exception of Albania, been born through a rise of
national consciousness preceded and inspired by a literary and
educational revival.  The goal has been democracy.  None of them, in
achieving independence, has succeeded in including within its frontiers
all the territory occupied by people of the same race and the same
language.  _Irredentism is the movement to secure the union with a
nation of contiguous territories inhabited by the same race and
speaking the same language_.  It is the call of the redeemed to the
unredeemed, and of the unredeemed to the redeemed.

If we were to regard the present unrest in Europe and the antagonism of
nations from the standpoint of nationalism, we could attribute the
breaking out of contemporary wars to five causes: the desire of nations
to get back what they have lost, illustrated by France in relationship
to Alsace-Lorraine; the desire of nations to expand according to their
legitimate racial aspirations, illustrated by the Balkan States in
relationship to Turkey and Austria-Hungary, and Italy in relationship
to Austria-Hungary; the desire of nations to expand commercially and
politically because of possession of surplus population and energy,
illustrated by Germany in her {121} _Weltpolitik_; the desire of
nations to prevent the commercial and political expansion of their
rivals, illustrated by Great Britain and Russia; and the desire of
nations to stamp out the rise of national movements which threaten
their territorial integrity, illustrated by Austria-Hungary and Turkey.

The irredentism of the Balkan States led, first, to their war with
Turkey; second, to their war with each other; and third, to Servia
becoming the direct cause of the European war.  The aspirations of none
have been satisfied.  Rumanian irredentism has stood between Rumania
and the Triple Alliance.  The irredentism of Italy has not yet led to
anything, but it is so full of significance as a possible factor in
bearing upon and changing the whole destinies of Europe during the
winter of 1914-1915, that it cannot be overlooked in a study of
contemporary national movements and wars.

The entrance of Italy into an alliance with the Teutonic Powers of
Central Europe was believed by her statesmen to be an act of
self-preservation.

The opposition of the French clerical party to the completion of the
unification of Italy during the last decade of the Third Empire
destroyed whatever gratitude the Italian people may have felt for the
decisive aid rendered to the cause of Italian unity at Solferino.  On
the part of the moving spirits of Young Italy, indeed, this gratitude
was not very great.  For the first great step in the unification of
Italy had been accompanied by a dismemberment of the territories from
which the royal house of Piedmont took its name.  Young Italy felt that
the French {122} had been paid for their help against Austria, and paid
dearly.  The cession of his birthplace, at the moment when the nation
for which he had suffered so terribly and struggled so successfully
came into being, hurt Garibaldi more than the French bullets lodged in
his body eight years later at Mentana.  When the French look to-day
with joy upon Italian irredentism as the hopeless barrier between Italy
and Austria-Hungary, they should not forget that, even though fifty
years have passed, Italian irredentism includes also Savoy and Nice.

After the Franco-German War, there were two tendencies in the policy of
the Third Republic to prevent an understanding between France and
Italy.  The first of these was the recurrence in France of the old
bitter clericalism of the Empire.  Italy feared that French soldiers
might again come to Rome.  The second was the antagonism of France to
the budding colonial aspirations of Italy.  When France occupied Tunis,
Italy felt that she had been robbed of the realization of a dream,
which was hers by right of history, geography, and necessity.

So Italy joined the Triple Alliance.  It is argued with reason in
France that the alliance of Teuton and Latin was unnatural.  Since
Italy had become wholly Guelph to realize its unity, why this sudden
return to Ghibellinism?  The alliance of Italy with Germany and
Austria-Hungary, however, was not more paradoxical than the alliance of
increasingly democratic and socialistic and anti-clerical France with
mediæval Russia.  The reasons dictating the alliance were practically
the same.

{123}

But there was this difference.  Italy entered into an alliance with a
former enemy and oppressor, who was still holding certain unredeemed
territories of the united Italy as it had existed in the minds of the
enthusiasts of the middle of the nineteenth century.

Too many books have been written about the distribution of populations
in the Austro-Hungarian Empire to make necessary going into the details
here of the Italian populations of the Austrian Tyrol and of the
Austrian provinces at the north of the Adriatic Sea.  The Tyrolese
Italians are undoubtedly Italian in sympathies and characteristics.
But is their union with Italy demanded by either internal Italian or
external European political and economic considerations more than would
be the union with Italy of the Italian cantons of the Swiss
confederation?

Italian irredentism in regard to the Adriatic littoral is a far more
serious and complicated problem.  One is struck everywhere in the
Adriatic, even as far south as Corfu, by the Italian character of the
cities.  Cattaro, Ragusa, Spalato, Zara, Fiume, Pola, and Trieste, all
have an indefinable Italian atmosphere.  It has never left them since
the Middle Ages.  It is in the buildings, however, rather than in the
people.  One hesitates to attribute even to the people of Fiume and
Trieste Italian characteristics in the narrower sense of the word.  On
the Dalmatian coast, the Slavic element has won all the cities.  In
Fiume and Trieste, it is strong enough to rob these two cities of their
distinctive Italian character.  One's misgivings concerning the claims
of Italian irredentists grow when he leaves the cities.  {124} There
are undoubtedly several hundred thousands of Italians in this region.
Italian is the language of commerce, and on the Austrian-Lloyd and
Hungaro-Croatian steamship lines, Italian is the language of the crews.
But the people who speak Italian are not Italians, in every other case
you meet, nor do they resemble Italians.  Why is this?

Nationality, in the twentieth century, has a mental and civic, rather
than a physical and hereditary basis.  _We are the product of our
education and of the political atmosphere in which we live_.  This is
why assimilation is so strikingly easy in America, where we place the
immigrant in touch with the public school, the newspaper, and the
ballot.  Just as the Italians and Germans and French of Switzerland are
Swiss, despite their differences of language, so the Italians of the
Adriatic littoral are the product of the dispensation under which they
have lived.  Unlike the Alsatians, they have never known political
freedom and cultural advantages in common with their kin across a
frontier forcibly raised to cut them off; unlike the Poles, they have
not been compelled to revive the nationalism of an historic past as a
means of getting rid of oppression; unlike the Slavs of the Balkans,
their national spirit has not been called into being by the tyranny of
a race alien in civilization and ideals, because alien in religion.

I have among my clippings from French newspapers during the past five
years a legion of quotations from Vienna and Rome correspondents,
concerning the friction between Austria-Hungary and Italy, and between
the Italian-speaking population {125} of Austria and the Viennese
Government, over the question of distinct Italian nationality of
Austro-Hungarian subjects.  There have been frontier incidents; there
have been demonstrations of Austrian societies visiting Italian cities
and Italian societies visiting Trieste; there has been much discussion
over the creation of an Italian Faculty of Law at the University of
Vienna, and the establishment of an Italian University at Trieste or
Vienna; and there have been occasional causes of friction between the
Austrian Governor of Istria and the Italian residents of the province.
But the general impression gained from a study of the incidents in
question, and the effort to trace out their aftermath, leads to the
conclusion that these irredentist incidents have been magnified in
importance.  A clever campaign of the French press has endeavoured to
detach Italian public opinion from the Triple Alliance by publishing in
detail, on every possible occasion, any incident that might show
Austrian hostility to the Italian "nation."

In 1844, Cesare Balbo, in his _Speranze d'Italia_, a book that is as
important to students of contemporary politics as to those of the
Risorgimento, set forth clearly that the hope of Italy to the exclusion
of Austria from Lombardy and Venetia was most reasonably based _upon
the extension of the Austrian Empire eastward through the approaching
fall of the Ottoman Empire_.  Balbo was a man of great vision.  He
looked beyond the accidental factors in the making of a nation to the
great and durable considerations of national existence.  He grasped the
fact {126} that the insistence of the Teutonic race upon holding in
subjection purely Italian territories, and its hostility to the
unification of the Italian people, was based upon economic
considerations.  Lombardy and Venetia had been for a thousand years the
pathway of German commerce to the Mediterranean.  If Austria, Balbo
argued, should fall heir to a portion of the European territories of
the Ottoman Empire, she would have her outlet to the Mediterranean more
advantageously than through the possession of Lombardy and Venetia.
Once these Ottoman territories were secured, Austria would be ready to
cede Lombardy and Venetia to a future united Italy.

After the unity of Italy had been achieved, and Austria had been driven
out of Lombardy and Venetia, she did receive compensation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and, just as Balbo predicted, there was born the Austrian
ambition to the succession of Macedonia.  _That this ambition has not
been realized, and that Russia was determined to prevent the attempt to
revive it, explains the Austro-Hungarian willingness to fight Russia in
the summer of 1914_.

Austria and Hungary, from the very beginning of existence as a Dual
Monarchy, have been caught in the vise between Italian irredentism and
Servian irredentism.  They have not been able to secure their outlet
through Macedonia to the Ægean Sea.  They have been constantly
threatened by their neighbours on the south-east and south-west with
exclusion altogether from the Adriatic, their only outlet to the
Mediterranean.

From the economic point of view, one cannot {127} but have sympathy
with the determination of the Austrians and Hungarians to prevent the
disaster which would certainly come to them, if the aspirations of
Italian and Servian irredentism were realized.  The severity of Hungary
against Croatia and the oppression of the Servians in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia by Austria have been dictated by the
same reasons which led England and Scotland to attempt to destroy the
national spirit of Ireland for so many centuries after they had robbed
her of her independence.  They could not afford to have their
communications by sea threatened by the presence and growth of an
independent nation, especially since this nation was believed to be
susceptible to the influence of hereditary enemies.

It has been fortunate for Austria-Hungary that the claims of the
irredentists at the head of the Adriatic have overlapped and come into
conflict in almost the same way that the claims of Greece and Bulgaria
have come into conflict in Macedonia.  From time immemorial, the
Italian and Greek peoples, owing to their position on peninsulas, have
been seafaring.  Consequently, it is they who have developed the
commercial life of ports in the eastern Mediterranean.  Everywhere
along the littoral of the Ægean and the Adriatic, Greeks and Italians
have founded and inhabited, up to the present day, the chief ports.
But, by the same token, those engaged in commercial and maritime
occupations have never been excellent farmers, shepherds, or woodsmen.
So, while the Italians and Greeks have held the predominance in the
cities of the littoral, the {128} _hinterland_ has been occupied by
other races.  Just as the _hinterland_ of Macedonia is very largely
Bulgarian, the _hinterland_ of the upper end of the Adriatic is very
largely Slavic.  Just as the realization of the dreams of Hellenic
irredentists would give Greece a narrow strip of coast line along
European Turkey to Constantinople, with one or two of the larger inland
commercial cities, while the Slavs would be cut off entirely from the
sea, the realization of the dreams of Italian irredentists would give
to Italy the ports and coast line of the northern end of the Adriatic,
with no _hinterland_, and the Slavs, Hungarians, and Germans an
enormous _hinterland_ with no ports.

Italian irredentism, in so far as the Tyrol goes, is not unreasonable.
But its realization in Istria and the Adriatic littoral is
impracticable.  Our modern idea of a state is of people living together
in a political union that is to their economic advantage.  Only the
thoughtless enthusiasts could advocate a change in the map of Europe by
which fifty million people would be cut off from the sea to satisfy the
national aspirations of a few hundred thousand Italians.

The Italian Society _Dante Alighieri_ has gotten into the hands of the
irredentists, and, before the Tripolitan conquest, was successful in
influencing members of Parliament to embarrass the Government by
interpellations concerning the troubles of Italians who are Austrian
subjects.  This society has advocated for Italy the adoption of a law
so modifying the legislation on naturalization that Italians who
emigrate can preserve their nationality even if they acquire that of
the countries to which they have gone.  {129} It was a curious
anticipation of the famous Article XXV, of the German Citizenship Law
of 1914.  In 1911, a Lombard deputy tried to raise the old cry of alarm
concerning German penetration into Italy, and emphasized the necessity
of the return to the policy of the Ghibelline motto, "_Fuori i
Tedeschi_"--"Expel the Germans."

Italian statesmen, however, have never given serious attention to the
claims of the irredentists.  The late Marquis di San Giuliano deplored
their senseless and harmful manifestations.  In trying for the
impossible, and keeping up an agitation that tended to make friction
between Italy and Austria-Hungary, he pointed out that they harmed what
were the real and _attainable_ Italian interests.

The antagonism between Italy and Austria-Hungary has had deeper and
more logical and justifiable foundation than irredentism.  The two
nations have been apprehensive each about allowing the other to gain
control of the Adriatic.  Up to 1903, Spezzia was the naval base for
the whole of Italy.  Since that time, Tarento has become one of the
first military ports, important fortifications have been placed at
Brindisi, Bari, and Ancona, and an elaborate scheme has been drawn up
for the defence of Venice.  The Venetians have been demanding that
Venice become a naval base.

Italian naval and maritime activity having increased in the Adriatic,
there has naturally been more intense opposition and rivalry between
the two Adriatic Powers over Albania.  The spread of Austro-Hungarian
influence has been bitterly fought {130} by the Italian propaganda.
This problem was becoming a serious one for the statesmen of the two
nations while Albania was still under Turkish rule.  Since, at the
joint wish of Italy and Austria-Hungary, Albania has been brought into
the family of European nations, the question of the equilibrium of the
Adriatic has only become more unsettled.  For free Albania turned out
to be a fiasco.

If the relations between Austria-Hungary, fighting for life, and her
passive ally of the Triple Alliance have become more strained since the
European war began, let it be hoped for the future stability of Europe
that it has not been because Italian irredentism has gained the upper
hand at Rome.  For if Italy were to intervene in the war for the
purpose of taking away from Austria-Hungary the Adriatic littoral
inhabited by Italians, she would be menacing her own future, and that
of Switzerland as well.  To entertain the hope of taking and keeping
Trieste would be folly.




{131}

CHAPTER VIII

THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES

The River Danube and the Straits leading from the Black Sea to the
Ægean Sea have been the waterways of Europe whose fortunes have had the
greatest influence upon the evolution of international relations during
the last half century.  The control of these two waterways, as long as
the Ottoman Empire remained strong, was not a question of compelling
interest to Europe.  It was only when the decline of the Ottoman power
began to foreshadow the eventual disappearance of the empire from
Europe that nations began to think of the vital importance of the
control of these waterways to the economic life of Europe.

There is an extensive and interesting literature on the history of the
evolution of international law in its relationship to the various
questions raised by the necessarily international control of the Danube
and the Dardanelles.  In a book like this, an adequate statement of the
history and work of the Danube Commission, and of the various
diplomatic negotiations affecting the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles,
their freedom of passage, their fortifications, their {132}
lighthouses, and their life-saving stations, cannot be attempted.  It
is my intention, therefore, to treat these great waterways only in the
broader aspect of the important part that the questions raised by them
have played in leading up to the gigantic struggle which foreshadows a
new political reconstruction of the world.

The Danube is navigable from Germany all the way to the Black Sea.  On
its banks are the capitals of Austria, Hungary, and Servia.  It
traverses the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire, forms a natural boundary
between Austria and Servia, Rumania and Bulgaria, and then turns north
across Rumania to separate for a short distance Rumania and Russia
before finally reaching the Black Sea.

The volume of traffic on the Danube has increased steadily since the
Crimean War.  It has become the great path of export for Austrian and
Hungarian merchandise to the Balkan States, Russia, Turkey, and Persia,
and for Servian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian products to Russia and Turkey.
The passenger service on the Danube has kept pace with the competition
of the railways.  Eastward, it is frequently quicker, cheaper, and more
convenient than the railway service.  You can leave Vienna or
Buda-Pesth in the evening, and reach Buda-Pesth or Belgrade in the
morning.  From Belgrade to the Hungarian and Rumanian frontier towns,
the Danube furnishes the shortest route.  From Bulgaria to Russia, the
Danube route, via Somovit and Galatz to Odessa, is in many ways
preferable to the through train service.  It is by spending days on the
Danube that I have come to {133} realize how vital the river is to
freight and passenger communications between Austria-Hungary, the
Balkan states, and Russia.  Travel gives life and meaning to
statistics.  The Danube interprets itself.

The Congresses of Paris and Berlin considered carefully the entrance of
the Danube question into international life through the enfranchisement
of the Balkan States.  International laws, administered by an
international commission, govern the Danube.  It is a neutral waterway.
Problems, similar to those of the Scheldt, have arisen, however, in the
present war between Austria-Hungary and Servia.  If Rumania and
Bulgaria should join in the European war, no matter on which side they
should fight, the whole Danube question would become further
complicated.  When war actually breaks out, the rulings of
international law concerning neutrality are invariably violated.
States act according to their own interests.

In its larger European aspect, the Danube, as an international
waterway, is dependent upon the Dardanelles.  Were Rumania to close the
navigation of the Danube, or were she to preserve its neutrality, she
would only be preventing or assisting the commerce of the riverain
states with the Black Sea.  Unobstructed passage to the outside world
for Danube commerce depends upon the control of the outlet from the
Black Sea to the Ægean Sea.  The Hungarian and Servian peasant looks
beyond his own great river to the narrow passage from the Sea of
Marmora.  The question of the Danube is subordinated to the question of
the Dardanelles.

That the passage from the Black Sea to the outside {134} world remain
open and secure from sudden stoppage or constant menace is of vital
importance to the riverain Danube states, Austria-Hungary and Servia,
to the states bordering the Black Sea, Russia, Rumania, and Turkey, and
to Persia, whose nearest communications with Europe are by way of the
Black Sea.  Austria-Hungary, however, has another outlet through the
Adriatic, Servia is pressing towards the Adriatic and the Ægean,
Bulgaria has recently secured an Ægean littoral, Persia is dependent
upon Russia, and Turkey holds the straits.  There remain Russia and
Rumania, to whom the question of the Dardanelles is a matter of life
and death.

The international position of Rumania is most unfortunate.  She must
make common cause with Germanic Europe or with Turkey to prevent her
only waterway to the outside world from falling into the hands of
Russia, or she must ally herself with Russia, and, by adding Bukovina
and Transylvania, increase her numbers to the point where she can hope
to resist the tide of Slavs around her.  In discussing the neutrality
of Rumania, the French and British press have given too much emphasis
to the loyalty of King Carol for the Hohenzollern family, of which he
was a member, as the cause of the failure of Rumania to join the
enemies of the Germanic Powers, and to the hope that the death of the
sovereign who made Rumania may result in a favourable change in the
policy of the Bukarest Cabinet.  The new sovereign, King Ferdinand, is
also a Hohenzollern.  The hesitation of Rumania has not been, and is
not, primarily because of the family ties of her rulers.  {135} The
Rumanians in Hungary may call for union with their enfranchised
brethren, just as the Italians in Austria may call for union with the
Italians who were liberated in 1859 and 1866.  But is irredentism the
only factor in influencing the policy of Italy and Rumania?  For
Rumania, at least, the hope of acquiring Transylvania and Bukovina in
the international settlement following the war is offset by the
apprehension of seeing Russia at the Dardanelles.

The Dardanelles has been the scene of struggles for commercial
supremacy since the days of the Peloponnesian wars.  It was in the
Dardanelles that the great battle was fought which brought about the
downfall of Athenian hegemony.  It was over the question of fortifying
the island of Tenedos that Venice and Genoa in the latter half of the
fourteenth century fought the war during which the Genoese occupation
of Chioggia nearly caused the destruction of Venice.  Then came the
Ottoman occupation to put a stop to international jealousies until
modern times.

The political development of Russia from Moscow has been a consistent
forward march towards ocean waterways.  There have been six possible
outlets for Russia, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the White Sea, the
Yellow Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Adriatic.  At different periods
of her history, Russia has expended her efforts continuously in these
various directions.  To reach the Baltic, Peter the Great built
Petrograd.  One has to stand on the Kremlin on a beautiful summer day
and look out over the sacred city of the Russians to grasp the fulness
of {136} the sacrifice and the marvellous daring of the man who
abandoned Moscow to build another capital on piles driven into dreary
salt marshes.  It was for the sea and contact with the outside world!
To reach the Pacific Ocean, Russia patiently conquered the former
empire of the Mongols, steppe by steppe, and when she thought the
moment of realization had arrived, did not hesitate to throw a band of
steel across the continent of Asia.  To reach the Persian Gulf, she
crossed the Caucasus and launched her ships upon the Caspian Sea.  To
reach the Black Sea, she broke the military power of the houses of
Jagello and Osman, building laboriously upon the ruins of Poland and
the Ottoman Empire.  Is it to reach the Adriatic that her forces are
now before Przemysl?

In spite of her struggles through three centuries, Russia is still
landlocked.  The ice is an insurmountable barrier to freedom of exit
from the White Sea, her only undisputed outlet.  Japan has arisen to
shatter the dreams of the future of Port Dalny, and make useless the
sacrifices to gain the Pacific.  The control by Germany of the exit
from the Baltic Sea has been strengthened in recent years by the
construction and fortification of the Kiel Canal.  The Persian Gulf has
been given up by the accord of 1907 with Great Britain.  There has
remained what has always been the strongest hope, and the one for the
realization of which Russia has made consistent and stupendous efforts.

Radetsky, in his memoirs, has summed up the attitude of Russia towards
the Ottoman Empire in {137} words that give the key to the whole
Eastern Question during the past century:


"Owing to her geographical position, Russia is the national and eternal
enemy of Turkey....  Russia must therefore do all she can to take
possession of Constantinople, for its possession alone will grant to
her the security and territorial completeness necessary for her future."


Three times during the nineteenth century Russia endeavoured to destroy
the Ottoman Empire in Europe so that she might gain control of the exit
to the Ægean Sea.  In 1828, her armies reached Adrianople, and half a
century later the suburbs of Constantinople.  In both instances,
especially the second, it was the opposition of Great Britain that
forced Russia to make peace without having attained her end.  In 1854,
France and Italy joined Great Britain in the invasion of the Crimea to
preserve "the integrity of the Ottoman Empire."  In 1856, at the
Congress of Paris, Russia saw the western Powers uphold the principle
that the Czar had no right to sovereignty even on the Black Sea, a half
of which his ancestors had wrested from the Turks.  It was no use for
Russia to plead that she had "special interests" in her own territorial
waters.  The Black Sea was neutralized.  The expression "_selon nos
convenances et intérêts_" was understood by Great Britain to refer only
to British interests!  It was by right of might that Russia was held in
check.  In 1870, Bismarck purchased the neutrality of Russia in his war
against France by agreeing to Russia's {138} denunciation of the Paris
treaty clauses which held her impotent in the Black Sea.  But again, in
1878, Great Britain interfered to bottle up Russia.  Since then the
Russian navy has been a prisoner in the Black Sea.  Will it continue to
be so after the war of 1914?

Just when Ottoman power was receding, the rapid development of steam
power began to make southern Russia the bread basket of Europe.  Steam
machinery increased the yield of these vast and rich lands, steam
railways enabled the farmers to send their harvests to Black Sea ports,
and steamships made possible the distribution of the harvests
throughout Europe.  I used to live on the Bosphorus, and from my study
window I could see every day the never-ceasing procession of grain
ships of all nations going to and coming from the Black Sea.  In May,
1912, when the Dardanelles was closed for a month during the Italian
war, two hundred steamships lay at anchor in the harbour of
Constantinople.

Another influence whose importance cannot be overestimated has
constantly turned the eyes of Russians towards Constantinople.  Slavs
are idealists.  For an ideal, one makes sacrifices that material
considerations do not call forth.  To the Russians, Constantinople is
Tsarigrad, the city of the Emperor.  It is from Constantinople that the
Russians received their religion.  Their civilization is imbued with
the spirit of Byzantium.  Just as one sees in the Polish language the
influence of Latin in the construction of the sentence, one sees in the
kindred Russian tongue the influence of Greek.  I have frequently been
struck {139} with the close and vital relationship between
Constantinople and Russia during the period of the development of the
Russian nation.  _Now that Russia seems to be entering upon a period of
national awakening, the sentiment is bound to be irresistible among the
Russians that they are the rightful inheritors of the Eastern Empire,
eclipsed for so many centuries by the shadow of Islam and now about to
be born again_.

On a July evening in 1908, when the constitutional revolution in Turkey
was beginning to occupy the attention of Europe, I sat with my wife in
the winter garden of the Grand Hotel in Paris.  We were listening to a
charming and intelligent Russian gentleman explain to us the aims of
the political parties in the Duma of 1907.  A waiter came to tell us
that our baggage was ready.  "Where are you going?" asked the Russian.
"To Constantinople," we answered.  An expression of wistful sadness or
joy--you can never tell which it is meant to be with a Russian--came
across his face.  "Constantinople!" he murmured, more to himself than
to us: "This revolution will fail.  You will see.  For we must come
into our own."

The political aspect of the question of the Dardanelles has changed
greatly since Great Britain and France fought one war with Russia, and
Great Britain stood ready to fight a second, in order to prevent this
passage from falling into Russian hands.

Almost immediately after the crisis of San Stefano and the resulting
revision of the Russo-Turkish treaty at Berlin, the interests of Great
Britain were diverted from the north-east to the south-east {140}
Mediterranean.  She decided that her permanent route to India was
through the Suez Canal, and made it secure by getting possession of the
majority of the shares of the Canal and by seizing Egypt.  The
Bulgarians began to show themselves lacking in the expected docility
towards their liberator.  British diplomats realized that they had been
fearing what did not happen.  They began to lose interest in the
Dardanelles.  This loss of interest in the question of the straits as a
vital factor in their world interests has grown so complete in recent
years that Russia has no reason to anticipate another visit of the
British fleet to Besika Bay if--I refrain from prophesying.  It is safe
to say, however, that London has forgotten Mohammed Ali, the Crimea,
and the Princes' Islands, while the traditions of Unkiar Skelessi are
still dominating the foreign policy of Petrograd.

For, while the future of the Dardanelles has come to mean less to Great
Britain, it means more than ever before to Russia.  Russia has been
turned back from the Pacific.  The loss of Manchuria in the war with
Japan caused her once again to cast her eyes upon the outlet to the
Mediterranean.  To the increase in her wheat trade has been added also
the development of the petroleum trade from the Caucasus wells.  Since
the agreement for the partition of Persia with Great Britain in 1907,
and the mutual "hands off" accord with Germany at Potsdam in 1910, the
expectations of a brilliant Russian future for northern Persia and the
Armenian and Kurdish corner of Asiatic Turkey have been great.

{141}

Since the Congress of Berlin, Germany has come into the place of Great
Britain as the enemy who would keep Russia from finding the Ægean Sea.
The growth of German interests at Constantinople and in Asia Minor has
become the India--in anticipation--of Germany.  When Russia, after her
ill-fated venture in the Far East, turned her efforts once more towards
the Balkan peninsula, it began to dawn upon her that the _Drang nach
Oesten_ might prove a menace to her control of the Dardanelles, fully
as great as was formerly the British fetish of the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire to keep open the route to India.  Diplomacy endeavoured
to ward off the inevitable struggle.  But the Balkan wars created a new
situation that broke rudely the accords of Skierniewice and Potsdam.
Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and Germany in Asia Minor became the
nightmare of Russia.




{142}

CHAPTER IX

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SOUTH SLAVS

It has often been predicted in recent years that the union between
Austria and Hungary would be broken by internal troubles.  Hungary has
been credited with desiring to cut loose from Austria.  The frequent
and serious quarrels between the members of the Dual Monarchy have
caused many a wiseacre to shake his head and say, "The union will not
outlive Franz Josef!"  But the Austro-Hungarian Empire has been founded
upon sound political and economic principles, which far transcend a
single life or a dynasty.  Austrians and Hungarians may be unwilling
yoke-fellows.  But they know that if they do not pull together, they
cannot pull at all.  They have too many Slavs around them.

The principle upon which Austrians and Hungarians have founded a Dual
Monarchy is the old Latin proverb, _divide et impera_.  In the Empire,
Austrians and Hungarians are in the minority.  In each kingdom, by
dividing the Slavs cleverly between them, they hold the upper hand.
The German race is, {143} therefore, the dominant race in Austria, and
the Hungarian race is the dominant race in Hungary.

If one looks at the map, and studies the division of the Empire, he
will readily see that it is much more durably constructed than he would
have reason to believe from statistics of the population.  _The Slavic
question in the Dual Monarchy is not how many Slavs of kindred races
are to be found in Austria-Hungary, but how they are placed in
relationship to each other and to neighbouring states_.  It is a
question of geography rather than of census.  The student needs a map
instead of columns of figures.

In only one place is the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy very weak, and that
is in the south.  The sole port for the thirty millions of Austria is
Trieste.  To reach Trieste one passes through a belt of Slavic
territory, and Trieste itself is more Italian than German.  The sole
port of Hungary is Fiume.  To reach Fiume one passes through a belt of
Slavic territory, and there are hardly any Hungarians in Fiume itself.
The Slavs which cut off Fiume from Hungary and the Slavs of the
Dalmatian coast and of all Bosnia and Herzegovina belong to the same
family.  They speak practically the same language as the Servians and
Montenegrins.

The Hungarians, then, have exactly the same interest as the Austrians
in every move that has been made since the proclamation of the
constitution of Turkey to prevent the foundation of a strong
independent Servian State on the confines of the {144} Austro-Hungarian
Empire, and to prevent the Slavs from reaching the Adriatic Sea.

Austria has not been necessarily influenced in her attitude towards the
Balkan problem by Germany.  Although her _Drang nach Osten_ is
frequently interpreted as a part of the Pan-Germanic movement, the
Germans of Austria have needed no German sentiment and no German
prompting to arrive at their point of view in regard to the Balkan
nationalities.  It must be clearly kept in mind that the Convention of
Reichstadt in 1876, which was the beginning of Austria's consistent
policy towards the Balkan peninsula, was signed before the alliance
with Germany; that it was the conception of a _Hungarian_ statesman,
and that _the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had nothing whatever
to do with Pan-Germanism_.  It was a measure of self-protection to
prevent these remote provinces of Turkey from forming a political union
with Servia, should the Russian arms, intervening on behalf of the
south Slavs against Turkey, prove successful.  The extension of
sovereignty over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 was to prevent the
constitutional _régime_ from trying to weaken the hold of
Austria-Hungary upon these provinces.  Austria-Hungary certainly would
have preferred the more comfortable status of an occupation to the
legal adoption of a _Reichsland_.  But she could take no chances with
the Young Turks.  Her military occupation of the _Sandjak_ of Novi
Bazar was inspired as much by the necessity of preventing the union of
Montenegro and Servia as by the desire to provide for a future railway
extension to Salonika.

{145}

Hungary has had to grapple with two Balkan problems, the rise of
Rumania and the rise of Servia.  She has had within her kingdom several
million Rumanian subjects and several million South Slavic subjects.
Most of her Rumanians, however, have been separated from Rumania from
the natural barrier of the Carpathian mountains, and have not found
their union with Hungary to their disadvantage.  For the Rumanians of
Hungary enjoy through Buda-Pesth and Fiume a better outlet to the
markets of the world, and a cheaper haul, than they would find through
Rumania.  They have benefited greatly by their economic union with
Hungary.  It is not the same with the Croatians.  They are situated
between Buda-Pesth and the Adriatic.  They have a natural river outlet
to the Danube.  They are not separated by physical barriers from their
brothers of race and language in Servia, Bosnia, and Dalmatia.  Were
they to separate from Hungary, they would not find their economic
position in any way jeopardized.

Many South Slavs have advocated a trialism to replace the present
dualism.  They have claimed that the most critical problems of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire could be solved in this way.  Added to Hungary
and Austria, there could be a Servian kingdom, perhaps enlarged by the
inclusion of independent Servia and Montenegro, whose crown could be
worn by the Hapsburg ruler.

But this solution has never found favour, simple and attractive though
it sounds on first sight, with {146} either Hungarians or Austrians.
For it would mean the cutting off of both kingdoms from the sea.  The
Hungarians would be altogether land-locked, and surrounded on all sides
by alien races.  Austria would be forced into hopeless economic
dependence upon Germany.  The Germans of Austria and the Hungarians of
Hungary have felt that their national existence depended upon keeping
in political subjection the South Slavs, and upon repressing
mercilessly any evidences of Italian irredentism upon the littoral of
the Adriatic.  Italian irredentism is treated in another place.  The
repression of national aspirations among the South Slavs, which
interests us here, has been the corner-stone of Austro-Hungarian policy
in the Balkans.  For Hungary it has also been an internal question in
her relationship with Croatia.

The Serbo-Croatian movement in southern Hungary has been repressed by
Hungary with the same bitterness and lack of success that have attended
the attempts to stifle national aspirations elsewhere in Europe.  No
weapon has been left unused in fighting nationalism in Croatia.
Official corruption, bribery, manipulation of judges, imprisonment
without trial, military despotism, gerrymandering, electoral
intimidation,--this has been for years and is still, the daily record
in Croatia.  If there were a Slavic Silvio Pellico, the world would
know that the ministers of the aged Franz Josef are not very different
from the ministers of the young Franz Josef, who crushed the Milanese
and tracked Garibaldi like a beast.  Radetzkys and Gorzkowskis are
still wearing {147} Austrian livery.  To Austria and Hungary, Salonika
and Macedonia may have been the dream.  But Trieste, Fiume, and
Dalmatia have always been the realities.  If Hungary took her heel off
the neck of the Croatians, Buda-Pesth might become another Belgrade and
Hungary another Servia, land-locked with no other outlet than the
Danube.  This does not excuse, but it explains.  In this world the
battle is to the strong.  The survival of the fittest is a historical
as well as a biological fact.

In spite of their juxtaposition, the Serbo-Croats have never been able
to unite.  There have been more reasons for this than their political
separation.  They are divided in religion.  The Servians are Orthodox,
and the Croatians and Dalmatians Catholic.  In Bosnia and Macedonia,
the race adhered to both confessions, though in majority Orthodox, and
has also a strong Mohammedan element.  The Orthodox Servians of Servia
use the Cyrillic alphabet, and the Catholic Croatians and Dalmatians of
Austria-Hungary the Latin alphabet.

Until the recent Balkan Wars, the Croatians and Dalmatians considered
themselves a much superior branch of the race to the Servians.  They
have certainly enjoyed a superior education and demonstrated a superior
civilization.  The probable reason for this is that they did not have
the misfortune to be for centuries under the Ottoman yoke.  The
Croatians have never been willing to play the understudy to the
Servians.  Agram has considered itself the centre of the Serbo-Croat
movement rather than Belgrade.  {148} It is a far more beautiful and
modern city than Belgrade.  Few cities of all Europe of its size can
equal Agram for architecture, for municipal works, and for keen,
stimulating intellectual life.  Its university is the _foyer_ of
Serbo-Croat nationalism and of _risorgimento_ literature.  It was here
that the one Roman bishop of the world, who dared to speak openly in
the Vatican Council of 1870 against the doctrine of papal infallibility
and remain within the Church, gave to his people the prophetic message
that nationality transcended creeds.  Here also another Catholic priest
taught the oneness of Servians and Croatians in language and history,
and proved by scholarly research which is universally admired, that
Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia formed a triune kingdom, whose juridic
union with the Austro-Hungarian Empire was wholly personal connection
with the Hapsburg Crown, and had never been subjection to the Magyar.
The Hungarians, during the past few years of bitterest persecution at
Agram, have not been able to drive away the ghosts of Strossmayer and
Racki.  In Croatia, the pen has proved mightier than the sword.

Until recently, Austria-Hungary has not felt uneasy about the
relationship between the Croatians and the Servians of the independent
kingdom.  But there has never been a minute since the annexation of
1908 that the statesmen of the Ballplatz have not been nervous about
the Servian propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  To keep Catholic
Croatians and Orthodox Servians in {149} antagonism with each other and
with the Moslems, to prevent the education and economic emancipation of
the Orthodox peasants, and to introduce German colonists and German
industrial enterprises everywhere, has been the Austro-Hungarian
program.

Vienna has used the Catholic Church and the propaganda of Catholic
missions for dividing the Orthodox Servians in Bosnia from their
Croatian brothers of the Catholic rite.  Missionaries give every
encouragement to Servians to desert the Orthodox Church.  In the
greater part of Bosnia, the Government has made it absolutely
impossible for a child to receive an education elsewhere than in the
Catholic schools.  There are only two hundred and sixty-eight schools
supported by the Government, of which one-tenth are placed in such a
way that they serve exclusively other populations.  The Bosnian budget
provides four times as much money for the maintenance of the
_gendarmerie_ as for public schools.

Moslem law provides that all conquered land belongs to the Khalif.  He
farms it out in annual, life, or hereditary grants.  In the Ottoman
conquest of the Balkan Peninsula, the territories acquired were granted
to successful soldiers on a basis which provided for a feudal army.
The feudal proprietors, or _beys_, left the land to the peasants who
occupied it, in consideration of an annual rental of a third of the
yield of the land.  The peasants had in addition to pay their tenth to
the tax collectors of the Sultan.  In territories that were on the
borders of the Ottoman {150} Empire, like Bosnia and Albania, the lands
were largely retained by their former proprietors, who became Moslems.
So the landed aristocracy remained indigenous.

The lot of the peasants in Bosnia, who were largely Orthodox Servians
was not intolerable under Turkish rule, except when Moslem fanaticism
was aroused by Christian separatist propaganda.  Austria-Hungary
claimed, however, that her occupation of the province was a measure
dictated by humanity to ameliorate the lot of the enslaved Christians.
But the Austrian administration has accomplished just the opposite.
The new government from the beginning supported its authority upon the
Moslem landowners, upon whose good-will they were dependent to prevent
the awakening of national feeling among the peasants.  Vienna was more
complacent in overlooking abuses of the _beys_ than had been
Constantinople.  For the Turks held their _beys_ in check when
exactions grew too bad.  The Sublime Porte was afraid of giving an
excuse for Christian intervention.  But the Austrians encouraged the
exactions of the _beys_ in order to keep in abject subjection the
Servian peasant population.

From the first moment of the Austro-Hungarian occupation, the peasants
found that they would no longer enjoy undisturbed possession of their
lands.  The exodus of Mohammedan Bosnians, who, as we have seen
elsewhere, were urged to follow the Ottoman flag, gave the Germans the
opportunity of settling colonists on the vacated lands.  This process
{151} of colonization was afterwards pursued to the detriment of the
indigenous Christian population.  Ernest Haeckel, the great
philosopher, once said in a lecture at Jena that "the work of the
German people to assure and develop civilization gives it the right to
occupy the Balkans, Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia, and to exclude
from these countries the races actually occupying them which are
powerless and incapable."  This statement, publicly made before a body
of distinguished German thinkers, reveals the real ulterior ideal of
the _Drang nach Osten_.  Professor Wirth, dealing specifically with
present possibilities, stated that the policy of Austria-Hungary in
Bosnia must be to keep the peasantry in slavery and, as much as
possible, to encourage them by oppression to emigrate.  The reason
given for this was: "_To render powerful the Bosnian peasant is to
render powerful the Servian people, which would be the suicide of
Germany._"  Can we not see from this how public sentiment in Germany
has stood behind the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia?

From 1890 to 1914, the theory of Haeckel and the advice of Wirth have
been followed by the Austrian functionaries in Bosnia.  No stone has
been left unturned to drive the peasants from their lands.  Right of
inheritance has been suppressed, a tax collector has been introduced
between the bey and his peasants, the taxes have been raised in many
cases arbitrarily to the point where the peasants have been compelled
to abandon their land.  To German immigrants have been given {152}
communal lands which were necessary to the peasants for pasturage and
the forests where their swine fed on acorns.

The population of Bosnia hardly surpasses thirty-five inhabitants to
the kilometre.  The total population is about two millions, of whom
eight hundred thousand are Orthodox, six hundred thousand Moslem, and
five hundred thousand Catholic.  But practically all of this
population--except one hundred thousand who are Jews, Protestants, and
other German immigrants--is Servian or Servian-speaking.  There are
thirty-five thousand Germans, as opposed to one million eight hundred
thousand Slavs.  And yet German is the language of the administration,
and the only language of the railways and posts and telegraphs, which
in Bosnia have not ceased to be under the control of the military
government.  Many functionaries after thirty years of service in Bosnia
do not know the language of the country.  Two German newspapers are
supported at the expense of the public budget to attack indigenous
elements.  In German schools, pupils are taught the history of Germany,
but in Slavic schools the history of the south Slavs is excluded from
the curriculum.  There are fourteen schools for ten thousand Germans,
and one school for every six thousand Slavs.

In the administration of Bosnia, only thirty-one out of three hundred
and twenty-two functionaries are Servians, only twelve out of one
hundred and twenty-five professors of lyceums, only thirty-one out of
two hundred and thirty-seven judges and {153} magistrates.  And yet the
Orthodox Servians form forty-four per cent. of the population.  The
young Bosnians who have graduated from the Austro-Hungarian
universities find themselves excluded from public life.  Turning to
commercial life, they find eighty per cent. of the large industries
controlled by German capital and managed exclusively by Germans.
Turning to agriculture, they find economic misery and hopeless
ignorance among the peasants of their race, and every effort made by
the Government to prevent the bettering of their lot.  Turning to
journalism and public speaking to work for their race, they find an
unreasoning censorship and a law against assemblies.  As one of them
expressed it to me, "We must either cease to be Slavs or become
revolutionaries."

Did Austria-Hungary need to look to Servian propaganda, to influences
_from the outside_, to find the cause of the assassination of Franz
Ferdinand?  Political assassinations were not new in the south Slavic
provinces of the monarchy.  A young Bosnian student attempted to
assassinate the Governor of Bosnia at Sarajevo on June 6, 1910, at the
time of the inauguration of the Bosnian _Sabor_ (Diet).  Two years
later the royal commissioner in Croatia was the object of an attempt at
assassination by a Bosnian at Agram.  In September of the same year, a
Croatian student shot at the Ban of Croatia.  The same Ban, Skerletz,
was attacked again at Agram by another young Croatian on August 18,
1913.  These assassinations preceded those of the Archduke and his
wife.  They {154} were all committed by students of Austro-Hungarian
nationality.  Only the last one had ever been in Servia.

In theory, Bosnia has had since February 20, 1910, a constitution with
a deliberative assembly.  But the _Sabor_ can discuss no projects of
law that have not been proposed by the two masters.  Once voted, a law
has to pass the double veto of Vienna and Buda-Pesth.  As if this were
not enough, the Viennese bureaucracy has so arranged the qualification
of the electorate and the electoral laws that the suffrage does not
represent the country.  Then, too, the constitution decides arbitrarily
that the membership of the _Sabor_ must be divided according to
religions, one Jew, sixteen Catholics, twenty-four Moslems, and
thirty-one Orthodox.  The Government has reserved for itself the right
of naming twenty members!  The constitution provides for individual
liberty, the inviolability of one's home, liberty of the press and
speech, and secrecy of letters and telegrams.  This enlightened measure
of the Emperor was heralded to the world.  But of course there was the
joker, Article 20.  Vienna held the highest card!  In case of menace to
the public safety, all public and private rights may be suspended by a
word from Vienna.  Public safety always being menaced in Bosnia, the
constitution is perpetually suspended.  The Government even goes as far
as to prosecute deputies for their speeches in Parliament.  Newspapers
are continually censored.  Their telegraphic news from Vienna and
Buda-Pesth is suppressed without reason.  Particularly severe {155}
fines--sometimes jail sentences--are passed upon offending journalists.

Is it necessarily because of instigation and propaganda from Belgrade
that of the three Servian political parties in Bosnia two (the _Narod_
and the _Otachbina_) are closely allied to the Pan-Servian Society
_Narodna Obrana_, and that these two parties openly support the
separatist movement?

In Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Croatia in 1914 the bureaucracy of Vienna has
been engaged in the same process of repression and police persecution
as in Italy during the half century from 1815 to the liberation of
Italy.  The local constitutions have been suspended everywhere.  Why
have the Austrians, in spite of the lessons of the beginning of the
present reign, dared to tempt providence in exactly the same way after
the Golden Jubilee?

The victories of the Allies in the Balkans were a terrible blow to
Austria-Hungary.  Not only was her dream of reaching the Ægean Sea
through the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar and Macedonia shattered by the
Greek occupation of Salonika, but the aggrandizement of Servia, caused
by a successful war, threatened to have a serious effect upon the
fortunes of the Empire.  The appearance of the Servians on the Adriatic
would mean really the extension of Russian influence through Bulgaria
and Servia to the Austrian and Italian private lake, and would cut off
Austria for ever from her economic outlet to the Ægean.  But there
{156} was more than this to cause alarm both in Austria and in Hungary.
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Dalmatia--would they remain loyal to
the Empire, if once they came under the spell of the idea of Greater
Servia?  Leaving Russia entirely out of the calculation, an
independent, self-reliant, and enlarged Servia, extending towards the
Adriatic and Ægean Seas, if not actually reaching it,--would it not be,
as Professor Wirth declared, "the suicide of Germany"?  The statesmen
of the Hohenzollern and Hapsburg Empires determined that it should not
occur.

From the very moment that the Servian armies drove the Turks before
them, Austria-Hungary began to act the bully against Servia.  The
Austrian consuls at Prisrend and Mitrovitza were made the first cause
of Austrian interference.  It was pretended that Herr Prochaska had
been massacred and mutilated at Prisrend, and that the life of Herr
Táhy had been threatened so that he was forced to flee for safety from
Mitrovitza.  A formal inquest showed that the first of these consuls
was safe, and that the trouble had been merely a discussion between
Servian officers and Herr Prochaska over some fleeing Albanians who had
taken refuge in the consulate, in the other case, there seemed to be no
ground at all for complaint.  But on January 15, 1913, the Servians
acceded to the demand of Austria that the reparation be granted for the
Prisrend incident.  A company of Servian soldiers saluted the
Austro-Hungarian flag as Consul Prochaska {157} solemnly raised it.
This incident seems too petty to mention, but in that part of the world
and at that moment we thought it very serious.  For it showed how
anxious Austria-Hungary was to pick a quarrel with Servia in the midst
of the Balkan War.

Two other incidents of an even more serious character immediately
followed.  Servia refused the Austrian demand that Durazzo be
evacuated, supporting herself upon the hope that Russia would
intervene.  During December and January, deluded by unofficial
representatives of Russian public sentiment and by demonstrations
against Austria-Hungary in Moscow and Petrograd, Servia held out.  It
was only when she saw that Russian support was not forthcoming that she
withdrew from Durazzo.  The international situation during January,
1913, was similar to that during July, 1914, and the cause of the
crisis was practically the same.  In both cases Servia backed down, but
the second time Austria-Hungary and Germany determined to provoke the
war which they believed would be the end of Servia and the destruction
of Russia's power to influence the political evolution of Balkan
Peninsula.

After Durazzo, it was Scutari.  Servia for the third time bowed before
the will of Austria.

The next move against Servia was the annexation on May 12, 1913, of the
little island of Ada-Kaleh on the Danube, which had curiously enough
remained Turkish property after the Treaty of Berlin.  It had actually
been forgotten at that time.  {158} This island, situated in front of
Orsova, would have given Servia a splendid strategic position at the
mouth of the river.  Austria-Hungary anticipated the Treaty of London.

It was to reduce Servia that secret encouragement was given to Bulgaria
to provoke the second Balkan war.  There is no doubt now as to the rôle
of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Sofia in allowing this crisis to be
precipitated.

Had Germany been willing to stand behind her at Bukarest,
Austria-Hungary would have prevented the signing of the treaty between
the Balkan States by presenting an ultimatum to Servia.  But Germany
did not seem to be ready.  The reason commonly given that Emperor
William did not want to embarrass King Carol of Rumania, a prince of
his own house, and his brother-in-law, the King of Greece, does not
seem credible.  In view of the events that have happened since, the
signing of the Treaty of Bukarest is a mystery not yet cleared up.

The second Balkan war acted as a boomerang to Austria-Hungary.  It
increased tremendously the prestige of Servia abroad, and the
confidence of the Servians in themselves.  The weakness of the Turkish
armies in the first Balkan war had been so great that Servia herself
hardly considered it a fair test of her military strength.  To have
measured arms successfully with Bulgaria was worth as much to Servia as
the territory that she gained.

We have seen how strained were the relationships of Austria-Hungary as
separate kingdoms and {159} together as an empire in their relationship
with their south Slavic subjects.  The Croatians, the Dalmatians, and a
major portion of the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina were Servian in
language and sympathies.  They had never thought of political union
with Servia, the petty kingdom which had allowed its rulers to be
assassinated, and which seemed to be insignificant in comparison with
the powerful and brilliant country of which they would not have been
unwilling, if allowed real self-government, to remain a part.  But a
large and glorified Servia, with an increased territory and a
well-earned and brilliant military reputation--would this prove an
attraction to win away the dissatisfied subjects of the Dual Monarchy?

Austria-Hungary by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had taken to
herself more Servians in a compact mass than she could well assimilate.
They were not scattered and separated geographically like her other
Slavic subjects.  It was a danger from the beginning.  After the Balkan
wars, it became an imminent peril.

The death sentence of Servia was decided by the statesmen of
Austria-Hungary and Germany the moment their newspapers brought to them
the story of the battle of Kumonova.

I shall never forget my presentiment when I heard on June 29, 1914,
down in a little Breton village, that a Bosnian student had celebrated
the anniversary of the battle of Kossova by assassinating the Archduke
Franz Ferdinand.  The incident for which Austria was waiting had
happened.  There {160} came back to me the words of Hakki Pasha, "If
Italy declares war on Turkey, the cannon will not cease to speak until
all Europe is in conflagration."


NOTE.--As a commentary on Austrian rule in Bosnia, particularly in
connection with the statistics on pages 152-153 of this chapter,
consider von Kállay who, as Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, fought so
bitterly the rise of national feeling among the Servians through the
teaching in their schools.  This same von Kállay, in his earlier days,
wrote a scholarly history of Servia, which I have had occasion to use.
It is admirably written and accurate in detail.  As a research scholar,
von Kállay believed that Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats were _the same
race_, and supported this thesis; but, as an Austrian official, he
disclaimed such dangerous teaching by placing the ban upon his own
book, which he forbade to be introduced into the provinces of which he
was governor!




{161}

CHAPTER X

RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the peace of Europe was
twice disturbed, and terrible wars occurred, over the question of the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire.  Since it is still the same question
which has had most to do--directly at least--with bringing on the
general European war of 1914, it is important to consider what has
been, since the Treaty of Berlin, the very heart of the Eastern
question in relation to Europe, the rivalry of races in Macedonia.

When the European Powers, following the lead of Great Britain,
intervened after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 to annul the Treaty
of San Stefano, they frustrated the emancipation from Moslem rule of
the Christian populations in Macedonia.  A Balkan territorial and
political _status quo_ was decided upon by a Congress of the Powers at
Berlin in 1878.  In receiving back Macedonia, Turkey solemnly promised
to give equal rights to her Christian subjects.  In taking upon
themselves the terrible responsibility of restoring Christians to
Turkish rule, the Powers assumed at the same time the obligation to
watch Turkey and _compel her to keep her promises_.

{162}

The delegates of the Powers brought to the Congress of Berlin a
determination to solve the problems of South-eastern Europe, according
to what they believed to be the personal selfish interests of the
nations they represented.  From the beginning of the Congress to the
end, there was never a single thought of serving the interests of the
people whose destinies they were presuming to decide.  They compromised
with each other "to preserve the peace of Europe."  This formula has
always been interpreted in diplomacy as the getting of all you can for
your country without having to fight for it!

Practically every provision of the Treaty of Berlin has been
disregarded by the contracting parties and by the Balkan States.  The
policy of Turkey in this respect has not been different from that of
the Christian Powers.  Great Britain and France, as their colonial
empires increased, ignored the obligations of the treaty which they had
signed, because they feared the effect upon their commercial and
colonial interests overseas, were they to press the Khalif.  The only
effective pressure would have been force of arms.  When popular
sympathy was stirred to the depths by the cruelty of Abdul Hamid's
oppression and massacres, successive British and French Cabinets washed
their hands of any responsibility towards the Christians in Turkey.
Pan-Islamism was their nightmare.  They had an overwhelming fear of
arousing Mohammedan sentiment against them in their colonies.  Germany
refused to hold Abdul Hamid to his promises, because she wanted to
curry favour with him to get a foothold in Asiatic Turkey.  {163}
Russia and Austria, the Powers most vitally interested in the Ottoman
Empire, because they were its neighbours, were agreed upon preserving
the Sultan's domination in the Balkan Peninsula, no matter how great
the oppression of Christians became.  Neither Power wanted to see the
other increase in influence among the Balkan nationalities.

The centres of intrigue were Bulgaria, Albania, Thrace, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Macedonia, the portions of the Peninsula which had
been refused emancipation by the Congress of Berlin.  Bulgaria worked
out her own emancipation.  She refused the tutelage of Russia, annexed
Eastern Rumelia in defiance of the Powers in 1885, and proclaimed her
independence in 1908.  The fortunes of Albania have been followed in
another chapter.  Thrace was too near Constantinople, the forbidden
city, too unimportant economically, and too largely Moslem in
population to be coveted by the Balkan States.  Bosnia and Herzegovina,
administered by Austria-Hungary since 1878, were annexed in defiance of
treaty obligations in 1908.  The principal victim of the mischief done
by the Congress of Berlin was Macedonia.

The future of Macedonia has been the great source of conflict between
Austria-Hungary and Russia, and between the Balkan States.  At Athens,
Sofia, Belgrade, Bukarest, and Cettinje, the diplomats of Russia,
Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, from the morrow of the Berlin Congress to
the eve of the recent Balkan Wars, played a game against each other,
endeavouring always to use the Balkan States {164} as pawns in their
sordid strife.  Turkey was backed by France and England, whenever it
suited opportune diplomacy to do so.  Austria-Hungary was backed by
Germany, who at the same time did not hesitate to play a hand with the
Turks.  Russia has always stood more or less alone in the Balkan
question, even after the conclusion of the alliance with France.
Except at Cettinje, Italian activity in this diplomatic game has never
been particularly marked.

What has been the object of the game?  This is difficult to state
categorically.  Aims have changed with changing conditions.  For
example, during the five years immediately following the Congress of
Berlin, British diplomacy was directed strenuously towards keeping down
emancipated Bulgaria, and towards preventing the encroachment of Servia
in the direction of the Adriatic and the Ægean.  But when she saw that
Bulgaria had refused to be the tool of Russia, and when her problem of
the trade route of India had been solved by the buying up of the
majority of shares in the Suez Canal and the occupation of Egypt, Great
Britain championed Bulgaria and sustained her in the annexation of
Eastern Rumelia.  British policy remained anti-Servian for thirty
years.  There was more in the withdrawal of the British Legation from
Belgrade than disapproval of a dastardly regicide.  But the moment
British commerce began to fear German competition, and an accord had
been made with Russia to remove causes of conflict, the British press
began to change its tone towards Servia.  What a miracle has been
wrought in the decade since "an {165} immoral race of blackguards, with
no sense of national honour" has become "that brave and noble little
race, spirited defenders of the liberties of Europe!"  I quote these
two sentiments from the same newspapers.  If Premier Asquith is sincere
in his belief that this present war is to defend the principle of the
sanctity of treaties, will he insist, when peace is concluded, that
Servia make good her oath to Bulgaria, and Russia her international
treaty obligations in regard to the kingdom of Poland?  Great Britain
is the least of the offenders when it comes to diplomatic cant and
hypocrisy.  For the British electorate has a keen sense of justice, and
an intelligent determination that British influence shall be exerted
for the betterment of humanity.  Cabinets must reckon with this
electorate when they decide questions of foreign policy.

But we do not want to lose ourselves in a maze of diplomatic intrigue,
which it is fruitless to follow, even if we could.  We must limit
ourselves to an exposition of the ambitions of Austria-Hungary and of
the Balkan States to the possession of this coveted province.

Since the creation of modern Italy, the great German trade route to the
Mediterranean has been changed.  The influence in Teutonic commercial
evolution of the passing of Lombardy and Venetia from the political
tutelage of a thousand years has been of tremendous importance, for the
connection between Germany and Italy had always been vital.  It was the
first Napoleon who broke this connection.  It was the third Napoleon
who nullified the effort {166} of the Congress of Vienna to
re-establish it.  United Italy gave a new direction to Teutonic
expansion.  United Germany gave to it a new impulsion.  The _Drang nach
Osten_ was born.

By the Convention of Reichstadt in 1876, Austria-Hungary secured from
Russia the promise of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in return for her neutrality in the "approaching war of liberation" of
Russia against Turkey.  In order to liberate some Slavs, Russia changed
the subjection of others.  The Convention of Reichstadt is really the
starting-point of the quarrel which has grown so bitterly during the
last generation between Austria and Russia over the Slavs of the Balkan
Peninsula.  Russia paid dearly for a "free hand" with Turkey in 1877.
She is paying still.

In her attitude towards the Balkans, Austria has had three distinct
aims: the prevention of a Slavic outlet to the Adriatic, the
realization of a German outlet to the Ægean, and the effectual
hindrance of the growth in the Balkans of a strong independent south
Slavic state, which might prove a fatal attraction to her own provinces
of Croatia and Dalmatia.  It was this triple consideration that led her
to the occupation and annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the
policy of hostility to Servia, which is developed in another chapter.
Desiring to possess for herself the wonderful port of Salonika on the
Ægean bea, to reach which her railroads would have to cross Macedonia,
the policy of Austria-Hungary towards Macedonia has been consistently
to endeavour to uphold the semblance of Turkish {167} authority, and at
the same time to make that authority difficult to uphold through the
exciting of racial rivalry among Greece, Servia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and
Albania, in this turbulent country.  Turkey and Austria met on the
common ground of "keeping the pot boiling," although with a different
aim.  By keeping the pot boiling, Turkey thought that her sovereignty
was safe, while Austria hoped that when Turkey and the Balkan States
had worn themselves out, each opposing the other, she could step in and
capture the prize.

Turkey and Austria-Hungary, then, conspired together to create as many
points of conflict as possible among the Macedonians of different
races.  The most devilish ingenuity was constantly exercised in
stirring up and keeping alive the hatred of each race over the other.
While frequently aroused to the point of making perfunctory protests,
the other nations of Europe, with the exception of Russia, let Austria
and Turkey do as they pleased, just as Turkey was allowed a free hand
in massacring the Armenians.  The _laissez faire_ policy of the Powers
was a denial of their treaty obligations.

It was only when the Balkan States awoke to the realization of the fact
that they were regarded as mere pawns upon the chessboard of world
politics, to be sacrificed without compunction by the European Powers
whenever it was to their interest, that they buried differences for a
moment, and worked out their own salvation.  If the Balkan Wars have
brought the present terrible disaster upon Europe, it is no more than
the contemptible {168} diplomacy of self interest and mutual jealousy
could expect.

Why was the Austro-Turkish policy possible, and why did it succeed for
a whole generation?

The Ottoman Empire was founded in the Balkan peninsula by rulers whose
military genius was coupled with their ability to use one Christian
population against the other.  The Osmanlis never fought a battle in
which the Balkan Christians did not give valuable assistance in forging
the chains of their slavery.  The Osmanlis conquered the Balkan peoples
by means of the Balkan peoples.  They kept possession of the country
just as long as they could pit one chief against another, and then,
when national feeling arose, one race against another.

Gradually, in the portion of the Balkans where one race was
predominant, nationalities began to form states, which secured
independence as soon as they demonstrated the possibility of harmony.
Greece was the first, and was followed by Servia.  Moldavia and
Wallachia united into the principality of Rumania.  Last of all came
Bulgaria.  After having gained autonomy, independence was only a matter
of form.  But in the central portion of the Balkan Peninsula, from the
Black Sea to the Ægean, through Thrace, Macedonia, and Albania, the
sovereignty of Turkey, restored by the Treaty of Berlin, was able to
endure.  For the people were mixed up, race living with race, and in no
place could the Christians of any one race claim that the country was
wholly theirs.

As emancipated Greeks, Servians and Bulgarians {169} formed independent
states, they looked towards Macedonia as the legitimate territory for
expansion.  But here their claims, both historically and racially,
overlapped.  Greece regarded Macedonia as entirely Hellenic.  Had it
not always been Greek before the Osmanlis came, from the days of Philip
of Macedon to the Paleologi of the Byzantine Empire?  The Servians, on
the other hand, invoked the memory of the Servian Empire of Stephen
Dushan, who in the fourteenth century, on the eve of the Ottoman
conquest, was crowned "King of Romania" at Serres.  It was from the
Servians and not from the Greeks, that the Osmanlis conquered Macedonia
in the three battles of the Maritza, Tchernomen, and Kossova.  The
Bulgarians invoked the memory of their mediæval domination of Macedonia
and Thrace.  It was by the Bulgarians that northern Thrace was defended
against the Ottoman invasion; a Bulgarian prince was the last
independent ruler of central Macedonia; and long before the ephemeral
Servian Empire of Stephen Dushan, the Bulgarian Czars were recognized
from Tirnova to Okrida.  This latter city, in fact, was the seat of the
autonomous Bulgarian patriarchate in the Middle Ages.

These historical claims, to us of western Europe, would have only a
sentimental value.  They had been forgotten by the subject populations
of European Turkey for many centuries.  The first revival of political
ambitions was that of Hellenism.  Modern Greece, divorcing itself from
the impossible and pagan dream of a restoration of classic Greece, with
Athens as its capital, which had been woven for it {170} by western
European admirers during the first half century of its liberation,
began to take stock of its Byzantine and Christian heritage during the
latter part of the reign of Abdul Aziz.  The new Hellenism, as the
prestige of the Ottoman Empire decreased, took the definite form of a
determination to succeed the Ottoman Empire, as it had preceded it,
with Constantinople as capital.

The Greeks believed themselves to be the unifying Christian race of the
Balkan Peninsula.  They had a tremendous advantage over the Slavs,
because the ecclesiastical organization, to which all the Christians of
the Balkan Peninsula owed allegiance, was in their hands.  When
Mohammed the Conqueror entered Constantinople, he gave to the Patriarch
of the Eastern Church the headship of the Balkan Christians.  The
spirit of Moslem institutions provides for no other form of government
than a theocracy.  Religion has always been to the Osmanli the test of
nationality.  The Christians formed one _millet_, or nation.  This
_millet_ was Greek.  During all the centuries of Ottoman subjection,
the Balkan Christians owed allegiance to the Greek Patriarchate.
Whatever their native tongue, the language of the Church and _of the
schools_ was Greek.

Unfortunately for Hellenism, the new Greek aspirations came into
immediate conflict with the renaissance of the Bulgarian nation.
Russia had long been encouraging, for the purposes of Pan-Slavism, the
awakening of a sense of nationality in the south Slavs.  Her agents had
been long and patiently working among the Bulgarians.  But they {171}
overshot their mark.  When Bulgarian priests and the few educated men
of the peasant nation turned their attention to their past and their
language, it was not the idea of their kinship with the great Slavic
Power of eastern Europe that was aroused, _but the consciousness of
their own particular race_.  Bulgaria had been great when Russia was
practically unknown.  Bulgaria could be great once more, when, by the
disappearance of Ottoman rule, the Bulgarian Empire of the Middle Ages
would be born again in the Balkans.

One can readily appreciate that _the first necessity of Bulgarian
renaissance was liberation from the Greek Church_.  Russia strenuously
opposed this separatist agitation.  What she wanted was a Slavic
movement within the bosom of the Greek Orthodox Church, which, if
bitterly persecuted by the Patriarchate, would throw the south Slavs
upon the Russian Synod for protection, or, if tolerated, would give
Russia a powerful voice in the councils of the Orthodox Church in the
Ottoman Empire.  But the Bulgarians had progressed too far on the road
of religious separation from the Greeks to be arrested by their Russian
godfather.  It was a prophecy of the future independent spirit of the
Bulgarian people, which Beaconsfield and Salisbury unfortunately failed
to note, that the Bulgarians determined to go the length of uniting
with Rome in order to get free from Phanar.  Another Uniate sect would
have been born had Russia not yielded.  With bad grace, her Ambassador
obtained from Sultan Abdul Aziz the _firman_ of March 11, 1870,
creating the Bulgarian Exarchate.

{172}

The cleverness of the Bulgarians outwitted the manoeuvre made to have
the seat of the Exarchate at Sofia.  The Greeks realized that a
formidable competitor had entered into the struggle for Macedonia.
From that moment there has been hatred between Greek and Bulgarian.  In
spite of the treaty of Bukarest, the end of the struggle is not yet.
The policy and ambition of the modern state are dictated by strong
economic reasons, of which sentimental aspirations are only the outward
expression.  If wars and the treaties that follow them were guided by
honest confession of the real issues at stake, how much easier the
solution of problems, and how much greater the chances of finding
durable bases for treaties!  The whole effort of Bulgaria in Macedonia
may be explained by the simple statement that the Bulgarian race has
been seeking its natural, logical, and inevitable outlet to the Ægean
Sea.

During the middle of the nineteenth century, Servian national
aspirations were directed toward Croatia, Dalmatia, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Servians thought only in terms of the west.
It was the foundation of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy in 1867,
followed by the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the
_sandjak_ of Novi Bazar, that let Servia to enter into the struggle for
Macedonia.

As soon as Russia saw that she could not control Bulgaria, she began to
favour a Servian propaganda in the valley of the Vardar.  Russian
intrigues at Constantinople led to the suppression of the Bulgarian
bishoprics of Okrida, Uskub, Küprülü (Veles) {173} and Nevrokop.
Bulgaria secured the restoration of these bishoprics through the
efforts of Austria-Hungary and Great Britain.  The story of Macedonia
is full of instances like this of intrigue and counter intrigue by
European Powers at the Sublime Porte.  Combinations of interests
changed sometimes over night.  Is it any wonder that the Turks grew to
despise the European alliances, and to laugh at every "joint note" of
the Powers in relation to Macedonia?

Austria-Hungary opposed the Russian aid given to Servia by introducing
a new racial propaganda.  Ever since the Roman occupation there had
been a small, but widely diffused, element in the population of
Macedonia, which retained the Roman language, just as the Wallachians
and Moldavians north of the Danube had done.  Diplomatic suggestion at
Bukarest succeeded in interesting Rumania in these Kutzo-Wallachians,
as they came to be called.  Rumania did not have a common boundary with
European Turkey.  But her statesmen were quick to see the advantage of
having "a finger in the pie" when the Ottoman Empire disappeared from
Europe.  So Rumania became protector of the Kutzo-Wallachian.  The
Sublime Porte gladly agreed to recognize this protectorate.  The
development of a strong Rumanian element in Macedonia would help
greatly to preserve Turkish sovereignty.  For Rumania could have no
territorial aspirations there, and would look with disfavour upon
Rumania being swallowed up by Greece, Servia, or Bulgaria.  Another
propaganda, well financed, and encouraged {174} by the Austro-Hungarian
and Turkish Governments was added to the rivalry of races in Macedonia.

We cannot do more than suggest these intrigues.  After 1885, the
Macedonian question became gradually the peculiar care of the two "most
interested" Powers.  There was little to attract again international
attention until the question of Turkey's existence as a state was
brought forward in a most startling way by the repercussion throughout
the Empire of the Armenian massacres of 1893-96.  _By refusing to
intervene at that time, the Powers, who fondly thought that they were
acting in the interest of the integrity of the Empire, were really
contributing to its further decline_.

Elsewhere we have spoken of the Cretan insurrection of 1896 and the
train of events that followed it, ending in the formation of the Balkan
alliance to drive Turkey out of Europe.  Here we take up the other
thread which leads us to the Balkan Wars.  Bulgaria, remembering the
happy result of her own sufferings from the massacres of twenty years
before, was keen enough to see in the Asiatic holocausts of the "Red
Sultan" a sign of weakness instead of a show of strength.  The
statesmen of the European Powers had not acted to stop the massacres of
the Armenians.  But their indecision and impolitic irresolution was not
an expression of the sentiments of the civilized races whom they
represented.  The time was ripe for an insurrection in Macedonia.
Public opinion in Europe would sustain it.  The movement was launched
from Sofia.

From that moment, Turkish sovereignty was {175} doomed.  Turkey did not
realize this, however.  Instead of adopting the policy of treating with
Bulgaria, and giving her an economic outlet to the Ægean Sea, the
Sublime Porte was delighted with the anticipation of a new era of
racial rivalry in Macedonia.  For it knew that Bulgaria's efforts to
secure Macedonian autonomy would be opposed by Servia and Greece.  In
fact, the Greeks were so alarmed by the Bulgarian activity that
immediately after their unhappy war with Turkey they gave active
support to the Turks in putting down the Bulgarian rebels.  The
services of the Greek Patriarchate were particularly valuable to Turkey
at this time.

Nor did Austria-Hungary and Russia appreciate the significance of the
Bulgarian movement.  In 1897, they signed an accord, solemnly agreeing
that the _status quo_ be preserved in the Balkan peninsula.  Russia was
anxious for this convention with Austria.  For the moment all her
energies were devoted to developing the policy in the Far East that was
to end so abruptly eight years later on the battlefield of Mukden.
Austria-Hungary was delighted to have the solution of the Macedonian
problem delayed.  _She felt that every year of anarchy in European
Turkey would bring her nearer to Salonika_.  The _Drang nach Osten_ was
to be made possible through the strife of Servian, Bulgarian, and Greek.

The moment was favourable for the Bulgarian propaganda.  Russia was too
much involved in Manchuria to help the Servians.  The Greeks had lost
prestige with the Macedonians by their easy {176} and humiliating
defeat at the hands of Turkey.  Gathering force with successive years,
and supported by the admirably laid foundation of the Bulgarian
ecclesiastic and scholastic organizations throughout Macedonia, the
Bulgarian bands gradually brought the _vilayets_ of Monastir, Uskub,
and Salonika into a state of civil war.  In 1901 and 1902, conditions
in Macedonia were beyond description.  But the Powers waited for some
new initiative on the part of Austria-Hungary and Russia.

Emperor Franz Josef and Czar Nicholas met at Mürszteg in the autumn of
1903.  Russia, more and more involved in Manchuria, and on the eve of
her conflict with Japan, found no difficulty in falling in with the
suggestion of the Austrian Foreign Secretary that the two Powers
present to the signers of the Treaty of Berlin a program of "reforms"
for Macedonia.  Europe received with delight this new manifestation of
harmony between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

In 1904 the "Program of Mürszteg" was imposed upon Turkey by a
comic-opera show of force on the part of the Powers.  An international
_gendarmerie_ was their solution of the Macedonian problem.  Different
spheres were mapped out, and allotted to officers of the different
Powers.  Germany refused to participate in this farce, just as she had
refused to participate in "protecting" Crete.

The international "pacification" failed in Macedonia for the same
reasons that it had failed in Crete, and was to fail a third time ten
years later in Albania.  _It was a compromise between the Powers, {177}
dictated by considerations which had nothing whatever to do with the
problem of which it was supposed to be the solution_.  This is the
story of European diplomacy in the Near East.

From the very moment that Turkey found herself compelled to accept the
policing of Macedonia by European officers, she set to work to make
their task impossible.  Hussein Hilmi pasha was sent to Salonika as
Governor.  An accord was quickly established between him and the
Austro-Hungarian agents in Macedonia.  Where the Bulgarians were weak,
the Turks and the Austrian emissaries encouraged the Bulgarian
propaganda.  Where the Greeks were weak, Hellenic bands were allowed
immunity.  Where the Servians were weak, the connivance of the
Government.  The European _gendarmerie_ was powerless to struggle
against Turkish, Austro-Hungarian, and Balkan intrigues.  The
correspondence of the European officers and consuls, and of journalists
who visited Macedonia during this period, makes interesting reading.
Their point of view is almost invariably that of their surroundings.
It depended upon just what part of Macedonia one happened to be in, or
the company in which one travelled, whether a certain nationality were
"noble heroes suffering for an ideal" or "blood-thirsty ruffians."  Why
are so many writers who pretend to be impartial observers like
chameleons?

Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria were alike guilty of subsidizing bands of
armed men, who imagined that they were fulfilling a patriotic duty in
brutally {178} forcing their particular nationality upon ignorant
peasants, most of whom did not know--or care--to what nation they
belonged.  There was little to choose between the methods and the
actions of the different bands.  Everywhere pillage, incendiarism, and
assassination were the order of the day.  When Christian propagandists
let them alone, the poor villagers had to endure the same treatment
from Moslem Albanians and from the Turkish soldiery.

In order to give the "reforms" of the Program of Mürszteg a chance,
Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade ostensibly withdrew their active support of
the bands.  But the efforts of the Powers had still not only the secret
bad faith of Austria-Hungary and Turkey to contend with, but also the
determination of the Macedonians themselves not to be "reformed" _à
l'européenne_, that is to say, _à la turque_.  The powerful Bulgarian
"interior organization" in Macedonia kept up the struggle in the hope
that the continuation of anarchy would bring the Powers to see that
there was no other solution possible of the Macedonian question _than
the autonomy of Macedonia under a Christian governor_.  Greeks and
Servians opposed the project of autonomy, however, because they knew
that it would result eventually in the reversion of Macedonia to
Bulgaria.  The history of Eastern Rumelia would be repeated.  In
considering the Macedonian problem, it must never be forgotten that the
great bulk of the population of Macedonia is Bulgarian, in spite of all
the learned dissertations and imposing statistics of Greek and Servian
writers.  But the difficulty is that this {179} Bulgarian population is
agricultural.  In the cities _near the sea_ and all along the seacoast
from Salonika to Dedeagatch the Greek element is predominant.  No
geographical division of Macedonia can be made, viable from the
economic point of view, which satisfies racial claims by following the
principle of preponderant nationality.

After her disasters in the Far East, Russia began to turn her attention
once more to the Near East.  A reopening of the Macedonian question
between Austria-Hungary and Russia was imminent when the Young Turk
revolution of July, 1908, upset all calculations, and brought a new
factor into the problem of the future of European Turkey.
Austria-Hungary boldly challenged--more than that, defied--Russia by
annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In this action she was backed by Germany.
Russia and France were not ready for war.  Great Britain and Italy,
each involved in an internal social revolution of tremendous
importance, could not afford to risk the programs of their respective
cabinets by embarking upon uncertain foreign adventures.

The Balkan States were left to solve the Macedonian problem by
themselves.  Their solution was the Treaty of Bukarest.  The success of
Servia in planting herself in the valley of the Vardar, and in
occupying Monastir, is the result of the struggle of races in
Macedonia.  It is the direct, immediate cause of the European War of
1914.




{180}

CHAPTER XI

THE YOUNG TURK _RÉGIME_ IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

No event during the first decade of the twentieth century was heralded
throughout Europe with so great and so sincere interest and sympathy as
the bloodless revolution of July 24, 1908, by which the _régime_ of
Abdul Hamid was overthrown and the constitution of 1876 resuscitated.

Although the world was unprepared for this event, it was not due to any
sudden cause.  For twenty years the leaven of liberalism had been
working in the minds of the educated classes in the Ottoman Empire.
Moslems, as well as Christians, had been in attendance in large numbers
at the American, French, Italian, and German schools in Turkey, and had
gone abroad to complete their education.  Just as in Italy and in
Germany, Young Turkey had come into existence through contact with
those free institutions in the outside world which other races enjoyed,
had been emancipated from superstition and from the stultifying
influences of religious formalism, and had grown, in the army, to
numbers sufficient to dictate the policy of the Government.

From the beginning of his reign, Abdul Hamid had {181} done all in his
power to prevent the growth of the liberal spirit.  The result of
thirty years, in so far as civil officials of the Government were
concerned, had been the stamping out of every man who combined ability
with patriotism and devotion to an ideal.  The best elements had taken
the road to death, to imprisonment, or to exile, so that from the
palace down to the humblest village, the Turkish civil service was
composed of a set of men absolutely lacking in independence and in
honour, and devoted to the master who ruled from Yildiz.  But in the
army, this same policy, though attempted, had not wholly succeeded.  A
portion at least of the officers received an education; many of them,
indeed, had been sent abroad to Germany and to France in order to keep
abreast with the development of military science, so essential to the
very existence of Turkey.  In the army, then, hundreds of officers of
high character and high ideals were able to avoid the fate which had
come to other educated Moslems in Turkey.  They learned to love their
country, and with that love came a sense of shame for the results of
the despotism under which they existed.  To have lived in Paris or in
Berlin was enough to make them dissatisfied; to have visited Cairo or
Alexandria, Sofia or Bukarest or Athens, and to have contrasted the
conditions of life in these cities, recently their own, with
Constantinople, Salonika, and Smyrna, was sufficient.

It is impossible in the limits of this book to tell how this bloodless
revolution was planned by exiles abroad and officers at home.  It was
successful, as {182} well as bloodless, because the army refused to
obey the orders of the Sultan.  To save his life and his throne, Abdul
Hamid was compelled to resuscitate the constitution which he had
granted, and then suppressed, at the beginning of his reign.

We who lived through those dream days of the beginning of the new
_régime_ will never forget the sense of joy of an emancipated people.
The spy system was abolished, newspapers were allowed to tell the truth
and express their own opinions, passports and _teskeres_ (permissions
to travel from one point to another within the Empire) were declared
unnecessary, _bakshish_ was refused at the custom house and police
station.  Moslem _ulema_ and Christian clergy embraced each other in
public, rode through the streets in triumph in the same carriages, and
harangued the multitudes from the same platform in mosque and church.
A new era of Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality, they said, had dawned
for all the races in Turkey.  The Sultan was the father, Turkey the
fatherland, barriers and disabilities of creed and race had ceased to
exist.  It seemed incredible, but these scenes were really happening
from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf.

Optimism, hope for the future, was so strong that one had not the heart
to express very loudly his belief that no real revolution was ever
bloodless, that no real change in political and social life of the
people could come in a single day or as a result of an official
document.  No one could think of anything else but the constitution,
which had broken the chains for Moslem and Christian alike, the
constitution which {183} was going to restore Turkey to its lawful
place among the nations of Europe, the constitution which was to heal
the sick man and solve the question of the Orient.  In Smyrna, in
Constantinople, in Beirut, and in Asia Minor, I heard the same story
over and over again.  But there was always the misgiving, the
apprehension for the future, from which the foreigner in Turkey is
never free.  It seemed too good to be true; it _was_ too good to be
true.  It was against the logic of history.  The most wonderful
constitution that the world has ever known is that of England.  It does
not exist on paper; there is no need for a document.  It is good, and
it has endured, because it has been written in blood, in suffering, and
in the agony of generations, on the pages of eight centuries of
history.  Could Turkey hope to be free in a day?

The first test of the constitution came, of course, with the election
and composition of the Parliament.  The election was held quietly, in
some parts of the Empire secretly even, and when the Parliament
assembled at Constantinople, one began to see already the handwriting
on the wall.  For its composition was in no way in accordance with the
distribution of population in the Empire.  The Turk--and by the Turk I
mean the composite Moslem race which has grown up through centuries of
inter-marriage and forcible conversion--had always been the ruling
race.  With the establishment of a constitutional _régime_, the Young
Turks did not mean to abdicate in favour of Moslem Arabs or Christian
Greeks and Armenians.  They had "arranged" the elections in such a way
that they would have in the {184} Parliament a substantial majority
over any possible combination of other racial elements.

One cannot but have sympathy with the natural feeling of racial pride
which is inborn in the Turks.  A race of masters,--who could expect
that they would be willing to surrender the privileges of centuries?
But they forgot that a constitutional _régime_ and the principles of
Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity must necessarily imply the yielding
of their unique position in the Empire.  The Turk, as a race, is
composed of two elements, a ruling class of land-owners and military
and civil officials, arrogant though courteous, corrupt though honest
in private life, parasitical though self-respecting, and a peasant
class, hopelessly ignorant, lacking in energy, initiative, ambition,
aspirations, and ideals.  The great bulk of the Turkish element in the
Empire looked with the indifference of ignorance and the hostility of
jealous regard for their unique position in the community upon the
granting of a constitution.  I doubt if five per cent. of the Turkish
population of the Empire has ever known what a constitutional _régime_
means, or cared whether it exists or not.

There remains the five per cent.  Of these the great bulk belong either
to the corrupt official class, whose subjection to the tyranny of
Yildiz Kiosk had totally unfitted them for service under the new
_régime_ on which they were entering, and the land-owners, whose wealth
was dependent upon the unequal privileges that the law allowed to them
as Moslems, and whose interests were totally at variance with the
spirit of the constitution.  There are {185} left small groups of
younger army officers and of professional men, who had been educated in
foreign schools or by foreign teachers in Turkey and abroad.  They
were, for the most part, either without the knowledge of any other
_métier_ than the army, or, if civilian, unfitted by training and
experience for governmental executive and administrative work.
Consequently from the very beginning, the genuine Young Turks who were
honest in their idealism had to make a compact with the higher army
officers and with corrupt civil officials of Abdul Hamid.  When the
real Young Turks controlled the Cabinet, their disasters were those of
theorists and visionaries.  When they yielded the control of affairs to
men more experienced than they, it was simply the renewal of the
tyranny of Abdul Hamid.  It was because these two elements were united
in the firm resolution to keep the control in the hands of Moslem
Turks, that the constitutional _régime_ in Turkey has gone from Scylla
to Charybdis without ever entering port.

From the very beginning, thoughtful men pointed out that there was only
one way of salvation and of liberal evolution for the Ottoman Empire.
That was an honest and sincere co-operation with the Christian elements
of the Empire, and with the Arabic and Albanian Moslem elements.
Fanaticism and racial pride prevented the Young Turks from adopting the
sole possible way of establishing the constitutional _régime_.  From
the very beginning, then, they failed, and it is their failure which
has plunged Europe into the series of wars that has ended in the
devastation of unhappy Belgium, so far remote from the cause and {186}
so innocent of any part in the events which brought upon her such
terrible misfortunes.  One could write a whole book upon the events of
the first five years of constitutional government in Turkey and could
show, beyond a shadow of a doubt, how from the very beginning there was
no honest and loyal effort made to apply even the most rudimentary
principles of constitutional government.  Despotism means the
subjection of a country to the will of its rulers.  Constitutionalism
means the subjection of the rulers to the will of the country.  The
Young Turks, embodied in the "Committee of Union and Progress," merely
continued the despotism of Abdul Hamid.  They were far worse than Abdul
Hamid, however, for they were irresponsible and unskilled.  One
handling the helm, knowing how to steer, might have kept the ship of
state afloat, all the more easily, perhaps, because the waters were so
troubled.  Many hands, none knowing where or how to go, steered the
Ottoman Empire to inevitable shipwreck.

Although the vicissitudes of various Cabinets and Parliaments can have
place in our work only so far as they have a direct bearing on foreign
relations, there are six matters of internal policy which must be
mentioned in order to explain how rapidly and surely the Ottoman Empire
went to its destruction; the treatment of Armenians before and after
the Adana massacres; the attempt to suppress the liberties of the
Orthodox Church; the Cretan question, ending in the Greek boycott; the
Macedonian policy; the Albanian uprisings; and the lack of co-operation
and sympathy with the Arabs.



{187}

THE ARMENIANS AND THE ADANA MASSACRES

Among the various races of the Ottoman Empire, none was more overcome
with joy at the proclamation of the constitutional _régime_ than the
Armenian.  Scattered everywhere throughout the Empire, and in no region
an element of preponderance, the Armenians had always made themselves
felt in the commercial and intellectual life of Turkey far out of
proportion to their numerical strength.  They appreciated and
understood, best of all the Christian populations, the significance of
constitutional government.  Honestly applied, it meant more to them
than to any other element of the Empire.

In the first place, the burden of Turkish and Moslem oppression had
fallen most heavily on them.  It was not only the massacres of 1894 to
1896, horrible as they were, which had put the Armenians in continual
fear for their lives; it was the centuries-old petty persecution, from
which they believed they were now to be freed.  Turkish officialdom had
grown rich in extorting the last farthing from the Armenians.  Only
those who had seen this persecution and extortion can realize how large
a part it played in the daily life of the Armenians, and how continuous
and rich a source of revenue it was to the official Turk.  For every
little service the official expected his fat fee, always charging up to
the limit his victim was able to pay.  You could not carry on your
business, you could not build a house, you could not enlarge or alter
or repair your shop, you could not get a tax on your harvest estimated,
you could {188} not travel even from one village to another for the
purpose of business or pleasure or study, without paying the officials.
Very frequently between the local Turkish official and the Armenian
stood a middle man who must also be paid for the purpose of carrying
the fee or bribe to the official in charge.  How people could have
lived under such a _régime_ and have prospered, is beyond the
comprehension of the Occidental.  Nothing speaks so eloquently for the
business acumen of the Armenian race, as well as for devotion to the
religion of its fathers.

Naturally, the Armenians expected that the constitution would bring to
them a complete relief from economic repression, as well as from the
terrors of massacre.  They were led to believe this by the Young Turks
who had so long plotted the overthrow of Abdul Hamid's despotism.
During the campaign from 1890-1908, the Young Turks needed the money
and the brains of Armenians in the larger centres of population where
they had their _foyers_, and in the cities abroad where they lived in
exile.  It cannot be doubted that there were among the Young Turks
during the period when they had to keep alive their ideals in the fire
of hope, an honest intention to give the Armenians a share in the
regeneration of the Ottoman Empire.  But, as soon as they realized
their ambitions, racial and religious fanaticism came to them with such
force that they forgot the brilliant promises as well as the
affectionate intercourse of the days of suffering and struggle.

In the second place, Armenians, unlike the Greeks, the Macedonians, and
the Arabs, had, as a race, no {189} separatist tendencies.  They were
not looking towards another state to come and redeem them.  They feared
Russia.  They were too scattered to hope to form, by the break-up of
the Ottoman Empire, a state of their own.  They loved the land in which
they lived with all the passion of their nature.  In many regions,
Turkish was their native tongue.  They were industrious tillers of the
soil, as well as merchants.  The Sultan could have had no more loyal
subjects than these, had he so desired.

Although the composition of the new Parliament chosen in October, 1908,
and of the first constitutional Cabinet, was a prophecy of how they
were to be left out in the cold, the Armenians were throughout that
winter, when the constitution was new, firm and loyal, as well as
intelligent, supporters of regenerated Turkey.  The wish was father to
the thought.  For them there was no longer the barrier of race and
creed.  All were Osmanlis, and willing to lose their identity in the
politically amalgamated race.  The reign of Abdul Hamid was a
nightmare, quickly forgotten.  The future was full of hope.  If only
the Young Turks had realized what a tremendous influence the Armenians
could have played in the creation of New Turkey, if only they had been
willing to use these allies, we might have been able to write a
different history of the past few years in Europe.

But the awakening was to be cruel.  It came in a region of the Empire
that never before experienced the horrors of a general massacre, where
Christians felt not only at ease, but on friendly terms with their
Moslem neighbours.

{190}

On April 14, 1909, on a morning when the sun had risen upon the
peaceful and happy city of Adana, out of a clear sky came the tragedy
which was the beginning of the end of the Ottoman Empire.  Without
provocation, the Moslem population began to attack and kill the
Christians.  The Governor of the province and his military officials
not only did nothing whatever to stop the bloodshed, but they actually
handed out arms and munitions to the blood-frenzied mob of peasants,
who were pouring into the city.  For three days, killing, looting, and
burning of houses were aided by the authorities.  The massacres spread
west through the great Cilician plain to Tarsus, and east over the
Amanus Range into northern Syria, as far as Antioch, where the
followers of Jesus were first called Christians.  The world, horrified
by the stories which soon made their way to the newspapers, realized
that the "bloodless revolution" had not regenerated Turkey.  The blood
had come at last, and without the regeneration!  The Great Powers sent
their warships to Mersina, the port of Tarsus and Adana.  Even from the
distant United States came two cruisers, under pressure, over six
thousand miles.

In the meantime, events of great importance, but not of equal
significance in the future of Turkey, were taking place at
Constantinople.  On the eve of the first Adana massacre, Abdul Hamid,
having corrupted the soldiers of the Constantinople garrison, set in
motion a demonstration against the constitution.  The soldiers shot
down their officers in cold blood, marched to Yildiz Kiosk, and
demanded of the {191} Sultan the abolition of the constitution, which
they declared was at variance with the _Sheriat_, the sacred law of
Islam.  Abdul Hamid gladly consented.  Popular sympathy in
Constantinople and throughout the Empire was with the Sultan, as far as
the object of the revolution went.  But the way in which it was brought
about made it impossible for the Sultan to remain within the pale of
civilization.  Of all nations, none relied on its army more than
Turkey.  Were the assassination of the officers to go unpunished, the
disintegration of the Empire necessarily followed.  So the military
hierarchy, "Old" Turks as well as "Young," rose against the Sultan.
The army corps in Salonika under the command of Mahmud Shevket pasha,
marched against the capital and with very little resistance mastered
the mutiny of the Constantinople garrison.  Abdul Hamid was deposed,
and sent into exile at the Villa Alatini at Salonika.  His brother,
Reshid Mohammed, came to the throne, under the title of Mohammed V.

As soon as the Young Turks found themselves again in control of the
situation, even before the proclamation of the new Sultan, they sent
from Beirut to Adana a division of infantry to "re-establish order."
These regiments disembarked at Mersina on the day Mohammed V ascended
the throne, April 25th.  Immediately upon their arrival in Adana they
began a second massacre which was more horrible than the first.
Thousands were shot and burned, and more than half the city was in
ruins.  This second massacre occurred in spite of the fact {192} that a
dozen foreign warships were by this time anchored in the harbour of
Mersina.

It is impossible to estimate the losses of life and property in the
_vilayets_ of Cilicia and northern Syria during the last two weeks of
April, 1908.  Not less than thirty thousand Armenians were massacred.
The losses of property in Adana alone were serious enough to cause the
foremost fire insurance company in France to fight in the courts for
two years the payments of its claims.  But it is not in the realm of
our work to follow out the local aftermath of this terrible story.  We
are interested here only in its bearing on the fortunes of the Empire
and of Europe.

From the very beginning, the Young Turks, now re-established in
Constantinople with a Sultan of their own creation, and having nothing
more to fear from the genius and bad will of Abdul Hamid, protested
before Europe that the massacres were due to the old _régime_ and that
they had been arranged by Abdul Hamid, whose deposition cleared them of
responsibility.  But the revelations of the _New York Herald_, the
_Tribuna_ of Rome, and the _Berliner Tageblatt_, translated and
reprinted in the British, French, and Russian press, were so moving
that it was necessary for the Young Turks to send special commissions
to the capitals of Europe to counteract the impression of these
articles.

Europe was willing to accept the explanation of the Constantinople
Cabinet, and to continue its faith, though shaken, in the intentions of
the Young Turks to grant to the Christians of Turkey the _régime_ of
equality and security of life and property {193} which the constitution
guaranteed.  Even the Armenians, terrible as this blow had been, were
also willing to forgive and forget.  But the condition of forgiveness,
and the proof of sincerity of the declarations of the Young Turks, both
to the outside world and to the Armenians, would be the punishment of
those who had been guilty of this most horrible blot upon the
civilization of the twentieth century.  This was to be the test.

The Court-Martial, sent to Adana from Constantinople after the new
Sultan was established upon the throne and the Young Turks were certain
of their position, had every guarantee to enable it to do its work
thoroughly and justly.  It was not influenced or threatened.  There
was, however, no honest intention to give decisions impartially and in
accordance with the facts that the investigation would bring forth.
The methods and findings of the Court-Martial were a travesty of
justice.  Its members refused absolutely to go to the bottom of the
massacre, and to punish those who had been guilty.  I happen to be the
only foreign witness whose deposition they took.  They refused to allow
me to testify against the Vali and his fellow-conspirators.  The line
of conduct had been decided before their arrival.  The idea was to
condemn to death a few Moslems of the dregs of the population, who
would probably have found their way to the gallows sooner or later any
way.  With them were to be hanged a number of Armenians, whose only
crime was that they had defended the lives and honour of their women
and children.  The Vali of Adana, who had planned the {194} massacre
and had carried it out, and two or three Moslem leaders of the city who
had co-operated with him and with the military authorities in the
effort to exterminate the Armenians, were not even sent to prison.  No
testimony against them was allowed to be brought before the
Court-Martial.  They went into exile "until the affair blew over."

When a future generation has the prospective to make researches into
the downfall of the Young Turk constitutional _régime_ in Turkey, they
will probably find the beginning of the end in the failure to punish
the perpetrators of the Adana massacres.  For this was a formal
notification to the Christians of Turkey that the constitutional
_régime_ brought to them no guarantees of security, or justice, but, on
the other hand, made their position in the Empire even more precarious
than it had been under the despotism of Abdul Hamid.  After Adana, the
Armenian population became definitely alienated from the constitutional
movement, and was convinced that its only hope lay in the absolute
disappearance of Turkish rule.



  THE ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS THE LIBERTIES OF
  THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

When Mohammed the Conqueror entered Constantinople in 1453, he showed a
wise determination to continue the policy of his predecessors by
preserving the independence of the Orthodox Church.  For he knew well
that the success of the Osmanlis had been due to religious toleration,
and that no durable empire could be built in Asia Minor and the Balkan
{195} Peninsula by a Moslem government, unless the liberties of the
Christian inhabitants were assured through the recognition of the Greek
patriarchate.  The first thing that Mohammed did was to seek out the
Greek patriarch, and confirm him in his position as the political, as
well as the religious, head of Christian Ottoman subjects.

Islam is a theocracy.  The spirit of its government is inspired by the
sacred law, the _Sheriat_, based upon the Koran and the writings of the
earliest fathers of Islam.  Down to the smallest details, the
organization of the state, of the courts of justice, and of the social
life of Mohammedan peoples, is influenced by ecclesiastical law, and by
the power of the Church.  As this law does not provide for the
inclusion of non-Moslem elements either in the political or social life
of the nation, it has always been evident that people of another
religion, within the limits of a Moslem state, can exist only if they
have an ecclesiastical organization of their own, with well-defined
liberties, privileges, and safeguards.

This principle was recognized by the Osmanlis for over five hundred
years; even the most despotic of sultans never dreamed of abandoning
it.  There might be persecutions, there might be massacres, there might
be even assassination of patriarchs, but, until the Young Turk
_régime_, no Ottoman ministry ever dreamed of destroying the organism
which had made possible the life of Moslem and Christian under the same
rule.

The thesis of the Young Turks was, from a theoretical standpoint,
perfectly sound and just.  They {196} said that ecclesiastical autonomy
was necessary under a despotism, but that it had ceased to have a
_raison d'être_ under a constitutional government.  The constitution
guaranteed equal rights, irrespective of religion, to all the races of
the Empire.  Therefore the Greek Church must resign its prerogatives of
a political nature, for they were wholly incompatible with the idea of
constitutional government.

Many foreigners, carried away by the reasonableness of this argument,
severely condemned the Orthodox Church for continuing to resist the
encroachments of the new Government upon its secular
privileges--secular in both senses of the word.  They attributed the
attitude of the Greek ecclesiastics to hostility to the constitution,
to the reactionary tendency of every ecclesiastic organization, and to
selfish desire to hold firmly the privileges which enabled them to keep
in their clutches the Greek population of Turkey, and continue to enjoy
the prestige and wealth accruing to them from these privileges.  Such
criticism only revealed ignorance of history and a lack of appreciation
of the real issue at stake.

No ecclesiastical organization can, under a constitutional government,
continue indefinitely to be a state within a state, and to enjoy
peculiar privileges and immunities.  But the application of the
constitution must come first.  It must enter into the life of the
people.  It must become the vital expression of their national
existence, evolved through generations of testing and experimenting.
The constitution is finally accepted and supported by a nation {197}
when, and because, it has been found good and has come to reflect the
needs and wishes of the people.  Then, without any great trouble, the
ecclesiastical organization will find itself gradually deprived of
every special privilege.  For the privileges will have become an
anachronism.

But, just as in the establishment of the constitution, in their
attitude toward the Greek Church the Young Turks acted as if the work
of generations in other countries could be for them, in spite of their
peculiarly delicate problems and the differences in creed involved, the
act of a single moment.  This mentality of the half-educated, immature
visionary has been shown in every one of the numerous senseless and
disastrous decisions which have brought the Ottoman Empire so speedily
to its ruin.

The Greek Church resisted bitterly every move of the Young Turks to
bring about the immediate millennium.  The patriarch was a man of wide
experience, of sound common sense, and of undaunted courage.  Backed by
the Lay Assembly, which has always been an admirable democratic
institution of the Orthodox Church, he refused to give up realities for
chimeras.  With all its privileges and all its power, it had been hard
enough for the Orthodox Church to protect the Greek subjects of Turkey.
The patriarch did not intend to surrender the safeguards by which he
was enabled to make tolerable the life of his flock for illusory and
untested guarantees.  Let the constitution become really the expression
of the will of the people of Turkey, let it demonstrate the uselessness
of any safeguards for {198} protecting the Christians from Moslem
oppression, let the era of liberty and equality and fraternity actually
be realized in the Ottoman Empire, and then the Church would resign its
privileges.  For they would be antiquated, and fall naturally into
desuetude.  But in constitutions, as in other things, the proof of the
pudding is in the eating.

What the Young Turks attempted to do was to destroy the privileges of
the Orthodox Church, on the ground that these privileges were a barrier
to the assimilation of the races in the Empire.  Americans, above all
nations, have deep sympathies for, and well justified reasons for
having faith in, the policy of assimilation.  Have not the various
races of Europe, different in religion and in political and social
customs, passed wonderfully through the crucible of assimilation on
American soil?  But by assimilation the Young Turks meant, not the
amalgamation of races, each co-operating and sharing in the building up
of the fatherland, as in America, but the complete subjection and
ultimate disappearance of all other elements in the Empire than their
own.  They intended, from the very first days of the constitutional
_régime_, to make Turkey a nation of Turks.  Theirs was the strong,
virile race, into which the other races would be fused.  Turkey was
weak, they declared, because it was the home of a conglomeration of
peoples.  If Turkey was to become like the nations of Europe, these
different nationalities must be destroyed.  To destroy them, the
Government had first to aim at the _foyer_ of national life, the
ecclesiastical hierarchies.

{199}

I have talked with many a zealous Young Turk.  What I have written here
is not only the logical interpretation of the facts; it is also the
faithful expression of the ideas of the most earnest and intelligent
Turkish partisans of the new _régime_.  They pointed out, with perfect
logic, that this process had gone on in every European country, and
that it was the only way in which a strong nation could be built.  So
far they were right.  But, aside from the fact that in Europe this
political and social evolution had taken centuries, there was also the
working of the law of the survival of the fittest.  In European nations
it had been the element, always composite, which deserved to live, that
formed the nucleus of a nationality.  The whole root of the question in
Turkey was, were the Young Turks justified in believing that the Turk
was this element?

There is not space to discuss the reasons for the supremacy of the
Osmanli in the Ottoman Empire.  Up to the eighteenth century, the
Osmanli was undoubtedly the "fittest" element.  For the past two
hundred years, the continued domination of Turk and the continued
subjection of Christian populations, in Turkey, has been due to causes
outside of the Empire.  The Turk has remained the ruling race.  But is
he still the fittest?  One may examine the different elements of the
Ottoman Empire, and measure them by the tests of civilization.  From
the intellectual standpoint, from the business standpoint, from the
administrative standpoint, the Turk is hardly able to sustain his claim
to continue to be, in a twentieth-century empire, the element which can
{200} hope to assimilate Greek, Armenian, Albanian, Slav, and Arab.  He
is less fit than any of the others, especially than the Greek and
Armenian in intellectual and business faculties, and than the Albanian
in administrative faculties.  There remains, then, as his sole claim to
dominate the other races, his physical superiority.  By history and by
legend, he is the fighting man and rules by right of conquest and force.

It was always the sane--and only safe--policy of the Turks to keep
Christians out of the army.  They saw to it that the _métier_ of arms
remained wholly to the Moslems.  In spite of the increasing wealth and
education of the Christian elements of the Empire, the ascendancy was
preserved to the Turk through the army.  But at what a sacrifice!  By
reason of military service, the Turkish peasant has been kept in
economic and intellectual serfdom, while his Christian neighbour
progressed.  The Turkish population has actually decreased, and the
ravages of garrison life, due to dyspepsia and syphilis, have
diminished fearfully the physical vigour of the race.  By the same
token, the upper classes, knowing only the life of army officers, have
been removed from the necessity of competing in the world for position
and success.  Can manhood be formed in any other mould than that of
competition, where the goal is achievement, and is reached only by
continued effort of will and brain?  The upper class Turk is a
parasite, and, like all parasites, helpless when that upon which he
feeds is taken from him.

[Illustration: Map--Europe in 1911]

{201}

The attack of the Young Turk party upon the Greek Church failed.  The
patriarch refused to surrender his privileges.  The Greek clergy and
the Lay Council held out under persecution and threats.  In October,
1910, when the Lay Council met in Constantinople, its members were
arrested, and thrown into jail.  In Macedonia and Thrace, in the Ægean
Islands, along the coast of Asia Minor, the bishops and clergy suffered
untold persecutions.  Some were even assassinated.  I shall never
forget a memorable interview I had with Joachim III, during that
crisis.  His Holiness untied with trembling fingers the _dossier_ of
persecutions, which contained letters and sworn statements from a dozen
dioceses.  "They treat us like dogs!" he cried.  "Never under Abdul
Hamid or any Sultan have my people suffered as they are suffering now.
But we are too strong for them.  We refuse to be exterminated.  I see
all Europe stained with blood because of these crimes."  How prophetic
these words as I record them now!

The Turk could not hope to assimilate the Greek by peaceful methods,
because he was his intellectual inferior.  When he planned to use
force, the Balkan Alliance was formed.  The battle of Lulé Burgas took
away from the Turk his last claim to fitness as dominant race.  He
could no longer fight better than Christians.  The first Balkan War
gave the _coup de grâce_ to the final--and has it not been all along
the only?--argument for Turkish racial supremacy.



THE CRETAN QUESTION AND THE GREEK BOYCOTT

The island of Crete had long been to Turkey, in relation to Greece,
what Cuba had been to Spain, in {202} relation to the United States.
In both cases, and about the same time, wars of liberation broke out.
But Greece was not as fortunate in her efforts for the emancipation of
an enslaved and continually rebellious population as was the United
States.  Powerless and humiliated, after the war of 1897, Greece could
no longer hope to have a voice, by reason of her own force, in the
direction of Cretan affairs.  Crete became the foundling of European
diplomacy.

Together with the declaration of Bulgarian independence, and the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, the Young
Turks had to face a decree of the Cretan assembly to the effect that
Crete was indissolubly united to the kingdom of Greece.  The Young
Turks could do nothing against Bulgaria.  For the ceremony of Tirnovo
had been no more than the _de jure_ sanction of a _de facto_ condition.
The only cause for conflict, the question of the railroads in eastern
Rumelia, was solved by Russian diplomacy.  Against Austria-Hungary a
boycott was declared.  It resulted in a few successful attempts to
prevent the landing of mails and freights from Austrian steamers, and
in the tearing up of several million fezes which were of Austrian
manufacture.  These, by the way, were soon replaced by new fezes from
the same factories.  The Sublime Porte settled the Bosnia-Herzegovina
question by accepting a money payment from Austria-Hungary.

All the rancour resulting from these losses and humiliation, all the
vials of wrath, were poured upon the head of Greece.  The Cretan
question became {203} the foremost problem in European diplomacy.  The
Cretans stubbornly refused to listen to the Powers, and decided to
maintain their decision to belong to Greece.  But Greece was threatened
with war by Turkey, if she did not refuse to accept the annexation
decree voted by the Cretans themselves.  In order to prevent Turkey
from attacking Greece, the Powers decided to use force against the
Cretans.  Turkey, not satisfied with the efforts of the Powers to
preserve the Ottoman sovereignty and Ottoman pride in Crete, demanded
still more of Greece.  She asked that the Greek Parliament should not
only declare its disinterestedness in Crete, but should take upon
itself the obligation to maintain that disinterestedness in the future.

To go into all the tortuous phases of the Cretan question up to the
time of the Balkan War would make this chapter out of proportion; and
yet Crete, like Alsace-Lorraine, has had a most vital influence upon
the present European war.  The one point to be emphasized here is, that
to bring pressure to bear upon Greece in defining her attitude toward
Crete, the Young Turks decided to revive the commercial boycott which
they had used against Austria.  I have seen from close range the
notorious Greek boycott of 1910 to 1912.  It was far more disastrous to
the Turks than to the Greeks of Turkey.  It threatened so completely,
however, the economic prosperity of Greece, which is a commercial
rather than an agricultural country, that it forced Greece into the
Balkan Alliance much against her will, for the sake of
self-preservation.

{204}

If this boycott had been carried on against the Greeks of Greece alone,
it would not have affected vitally the prosperity of the Greeks in the
Ottoman Empire.  Their imports come from every country, and for their
exports the freight steamers of all the European nations competed.  But
it was directed also against the Greeks who were Ottoman subjects.  In
Salonika, Constantinople, Trebizond, Smyrna, and other ports, commerce
was entirely in the hands of Greeks.  They owned almost every steamer
bearing the Ottoman flag.  They owned the cargoes.  They bought and
sold the merchandise.  The Young Turks, working through the _hamals_ or
longshoremen and the boatmen who manned the lighters,--all Turks and
Kurds,--succeeded in tying up absolutely the commerce of Ottoman
Greeks.  The Greek merchants and shippers were ruined.  It was urged
cleverly that this was the chance for Moslems to get the trade of the
great ports of Turkey into their own hands.  The Government encouraged
them by buying and maintaining steamship lines.  But the Turks had no
knowledge of commerce, no money to buy goods, and no inclination to do
the work and accept the responsibilities necessary for successful
commercial undertakings.  The result was that imports were stopped,
prices went up, and the Moslems were hurt as much as, if not more than,
the Christians.  After several voyages, the new government passenger
vessels were practically _hors de combat_.  There was no longer first,
second, and third class.  Peasants squatted on the decks and in the
saloons.  Filth reigned supreme, and hopeless confusion.  No {205}
European could endure a voyage on one of these steamers, and no
merchant cared to entrust his shipments to them.

The boycott died because it was a hopeless undertaking.  For many
months, the Government lost heavily through the falling off in the
custom house receipts.  The labouring class (almost wholly Moslems) of
the seaports suffered terribly, as our labouring class suffers during a
prolonged strike.  The boycott was removed, Greeks were allowed to
resume their business, so essential for the prosperity of the
community, and, as is always the case in Turkey, everything worked
again in the same old way.

But, just as the failure to punish the perpetrators of the Adana
massacre alienated definitely and irrevocably the sympathy and loyal
support of the Armenian element from the constitutional _régime_, so
the boycott, iniquitous and futile, lost to the Young Turks the
allegiance of the Greeks of the Empire.  Already alarmed by the attack
upon the liberties of the patriarchate, the Greeks began to look to
Greece for help; and, in the islands of the Ægean and in Macedonia, the
hope was strong that a successful war might put an end to what they
were suffering.

The Greeks of Turkey are not free from the universal characteristic of
human nature.  You can persecute and browbeat a man, you can bully him
and do him physical injury, you can refuse him a share in the
government and put him in an inferior social position, and he will
continue to endure it.  But, {206} rob him of the chance of making a
livelihood, and he will commence to conspire against the government.  A
man's vital point is his pocket-book.  That vital point the Young Turks
threatened by their boycott.



THE YOUNG TURKS AND THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM

It was at Salonika that the Young Turk movement first gained its
footing in the Ottoman Empire, and until the loss of European Turkey,
after the disastrous war with the Balkan States, Salonika continued to
be the centre of the "Committee of Union and Progress."  Its congresses
were always held there.  From Salonika the third army corps went forth
to suppress, in April, 1909, the counter-revolution in Constantinople.
To the Young Turks, Salonika seemed the safest place in all the Ottoman
dominions for the imprisonment of Abdul Hamid.  Many of the leading
members of the party were natives of Macedonia.  In fact, it was
because the Young Turks saw clearly that European Turkey would soon be
lost to the Empire, unless there was a regeneration, that they
precipitated in 1908 the revolution which had so long been brewing.

It is natural, then, that the Macedonian problem should be the first
and uppermost of all the many problems that had to be solved in the
regeneration of Turkey.  The "Committee of Union and Progress" saw that
immediate action must be taken to strengthen Ottoman authority, so
severely shaken since the war with Russia, in the European _vilayets_.

We have already shown in a previous chapter how {207} the struggle of
races in European Turkey had made Macedonia the bloody centre of Balkan
rivalry, and had reduced the _vilayets_ of Uskub and Salonika to
anarchy.

Up to the coming of the constitutional _régime_, there had been a very
strong element in Macedonia, principally Bulgarian, which saw--oh, how
prophetically!--that the liberation of Macedonia from Turkish rule
would endanger, rather than aid, the propaganda for eventual Bulgarian
hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula.  These Bulgarians, wise in their day
and generation beyond their emancipated brethren, advocated the
intervention of Bulgarian arms, not to secure independence, but
autonomy.  They felt that by the creation, for a period of years, of an
autonomous province of Macedonia under the suzerainty of the Sultan,
the felicitous history of Eastern Rumelia would repeat itself.

The Young Turks decided to solve the Macedonian problem by
strengthening the Moslem element in every corner of the _vilayets_ of
Salonika and Uskub.  The means of doing this were at hand.  After the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkish agents began to work
among the Moslem population in these countries to induce them to
emigrate and come under the dominion of the "Padishah," as the Sultan
is called by his faithful subjects.  They were brought in and settled,
with the help of the Government, in those districts of Macedonia where
the Moslem element was weak.  This was a repetition of the policy of
Abdul Hamid after the Congress of Berlin, when, in Eastern Rumelia and
Thrace, {208} to oppose the Bulgarians Circassians from the lost
Caucasus were settled, and to oppose the Servians Albanian emigration
into old Servia and the Sandjak of Novi Bazar was encouraged.

In addition to this, the Young Turks decided to secure the loyalty of
their Christian subjects in European Turkey by abolishing the _karadj_
(head tax) which exempted Christians from military service.
Bulgarians, Greeks, and Servians were summoned to serve in the Ottoman
army.

The first of these measures should never have been adopted.  The bitter
experience of former years should have taught the Young Turks the
lesson that emigration of this nature not only tended to arouse
religious fanaticism, but also introduced an element, ignorant and
unruly, and wholly worthless from the economic point of view.  It has
often been recorded that Moslems, prompted to the sacrifice of
abandoning everything for their love of remaining Turkish subjects,
have made these "treks" after the unsuccessful wars of Turkey _of their
own initiative_.  Nothing is farther from the truth.  There has never
been an exodus of this sort which has not been due to the instigation
of political agents.  From the very fact that large industrious and
influential Moslem elements have remained and prospered under Russian,
Bulgarian, and Austrian rule, it can be inferred that those who yielded
to the solicitation of Turkish agents were the undesirable Moslem
element, who, never having acquired anything where they were, had
nothing to lose by making a change.  If one excepts a certain portion
of the Circassians, the {209} statement may well be made that these
emigrants--_muhadjirs_ they are called in Turkish--are an element
forming the lowest dregs of the population, as worthless and shiftless
as the great majority of the Jews whom the Zionist movement has
attracted to Palestine.  More than this, the _muhadjirs_ have been
fanatical and lawless, and it is they whose massacres of Christians
have invariably ended in irretrievable disaster for Turkey.

In Macedonia, the muhadjirs, in conjunction with the Albanian Moslem
immigrants, were responsible for the succession of massacres in 1912,
such as those of Ishtip and Kotchana, which helped to bring about the
Balkan alliance.  The same thing is happening to-day in the coast towns
of Asia Minor and Thrace, where the brutality and blood lust of the
_muhadjirs_ since 1913 will eventually cause another attack of Greece
upon Turkey.

The second policy--that of enrolling Christians in the army--was
recorded, back in the days of the first attempt at the emancipation of
Christians, the _Tanzimat_ of 1839, as a measure which would ameliorate
their lot and bring about equality.  The idea was splendid, but its
application was impracticable.  Ottoman Christians are so wholly
incompatible, from their social and educational background, with
Ottoman Moslems, that they cannot be placed in the army, in mixed
regiments, without incurring humiliation, degradation, and persecution
of the most cruel sort.

The only way in which Christians could be called to serve in the
Ottoman army would have been the formation, at first, of separate
regiments, where the {210} soldiers would enjoy immunity from
persecution.  When this reform was made, there should have been also a
provision from the very first, that the ranks of officers be recruited
from the Christian elements in the Empire, in proportion to their
numerical strength.  But with both Christians and Jews, obligatory army
service was used from the beginning--it is still used today--as a means
of extorting money from those who could pay, and terrorizing and
reducing to slavery those who could not raise the forty pounds required
for exemption.  Even if there were no religious fanaticism, even if it
were not necessary for Christians of intelligence to serve in an army
wholly officered by Moslems, the terrible and criminal conditions of
service which they were called upon to suffer would have justified the
Christians in adopting every possible measure to avoid military service.

Throughout the Empire, intelligent Christians who could not purchase
their freedom from this obligation preferred exile to military service.
From 1909 to 1914, Turkey has lost hundreds of thousands of its best
young blood.

The result in Macedonia of the coming of the _muhadjirs_ and the taking
of Christians for the army, was that the Macedonians abandoned their
advocacy of autonomy, under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and looked to
the Balkan States for freedom from Turkish rule.



THE ALBANIAN UPRISINGS

Albania was never fully conquered by the Osmanlis.  Like the
Montenegrins, the Albanians were always {211} able to resist the
extension of Turkish authority in their mountains.  Not only did the
nature of the country favour them, but their proximity to the Adriatic,
and their ability to call at will for Italian and Austrian help, made
it advisable for the Supreme Porte to compromise with them.  Many
Albanians, including principally, as in Bosnia, the landowning
families, were converted to Mohammedanism, and attached themselves to
the fortunes of Turkey.  Without ever giving up their local
independence, these renegade Albanians became the most loyal and
efficient supporters of Ottoman authority _outside of Albania_.

Turkey has gained much from the Albanians.  Her higher classes, endowed
with extreme intelligence and physical activity, have been the most
valuable civil and military officials that the Government has ever
enjoyed.  Because they were Moslems, they were able to take high
positions in the army and government service.  It is one of the most
remarkable facts of Ottoman history that the great majority of the
really great statesmen and soldiers of the Empire, if not of Christian
ancestry, have been, and still are, Albanians.  In strengthening the
Turkish domination in the European provinces, after the period of
decline set in, the Albanians have been indispensable.  Their
emigration from their mountains into Epirus, Old Servia, the valley of
the Vardar, and the coast towns of Macedonia checked for a long time
the conspiracies and rebellions of the Christian elements.

The Sultans of Turkey and their counsellors have always recognized the
value of the Albanians.  In {212} return for their great services to
the Empire, they were allowed to retain their local privileges.  This
meant independence, in reality, rather than autonomy.  They gave what
taxes they pleased, or none.  Military service was rendered upon their
own terms.  Christian Albanians, as well as Moslem, have preferred
Ottoman sovereignty to any other.  They have never thought of
independence, because this would have brought them responsibilities and
dangers from which, under the fetish of "the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire," they were free.  So they resisted every effort of Italian,
Austrian, Slav, and Greek to weaken their allegiance to the Sultan.
Turkey also allowed them to remain under the mediæval conditions in
which they lived back in the fourteenth century.  They wanted neither
railways, roads, nor ports.  Among all the subjects of the Sultan, the
Albanians were best satisfied with the absolute lack of progress under
Moslem rule.  These are the reasons why the majority of Albanians want
to return once more to the fold of Turkey.

The Young Turks were no more felicitous in their treatment of the
Albanians than of the Greeks and Armenians.  Without any consideration
of the peculiar problems involved, they decided immediately, tackling
every problem at once, that Albania must be civilized and that Ottoman
sovereignty must work there in exactly the same way as in any other
part of the Empire.  Albanians must render military service, and submit
to being sent wherever the authorities at Constantinople decided.
Local independence must cease.  Taxes must be paid regularly.  When the
{213} Albanians resisted, as they did immediately, an army was sent to
pacify the country.

One cannot but sympathize with the principle laid down by the Minister
of the Interior at Constantinople, that the central authority must be
recognized and that the only way to stamp out the Albanian anarchy was
to disarm the population.  But the Young Turks knew no other way of
doing this than by force.  They did not realize that anarchy and
lawlessness disappear only with education and economic progress.
Instead of starting to "civilize" the Albanians by establishing schools
and opening up the country with railways, they sent rapid-firing guns.
In the summer of 1909, the rebellion was stamped out with ruthless
cruelty by the burning of villages, the destruction of crops, and the
seizing of cattle.  Such measures were a very poor argument for the
Albanian to induce him to comply with the disarmament decree.  Under
ordinary circumstances an Albanian would rather lose his leg than his
gun.  Under these circumstances, he preferred risking his life to
giving up what he considered his only means of defence.

Every year the Albanian rebellion broke out afresh.  Every year the
Young Turks exhausted the strength and spent the resources of their
armies in European Turkey against the invulnerable mountains of
Albania.  After every "pacification," Albania in arms was just as
certain each May as the coming again of summer.

In 1912, when affairs were in a critical state as regards the Christian
neighbours, the Cabinet in {214} Constantinople was once more engaged
in the hopeless task of subduing Albanian opposition.  The Albanians,
however, seemed to gain strength rather than lose it.  In September,
1912, I was in Uskub just four weeks before the Balkan War broke out.
The Albanian chieftains were there, having made a truce for Ramazan
(the sacred month of the Moslem fasting).  They said to me that the
next year, if the Turks did not stop persecuting them, they would take
their army to Constantinople.  Others were to get ahead of them, and
they were to win their independence without having to fight the Turks
again.  The poor showing of the Turkish arms against the Greeks and
Servians is very largely due to the exhaustion which had come to them
through continuous and unsuccessful attempts to get the better of the
Albanian uprisings.  The Balkan States knew how severely the western
Macedonian army had suffered in July and August, 1912.  It was one of
the considerations which decided them to strike at that moment.



THE TREATMENT OF THE ARABIC ELEMENT

In Asiatic Turkey there are supposed to be about eight million
Arabic-speaking inhabitants.  These figures may be an exaggeration, for
no census has ever been taken.  But the _vilayets_ are occupied almost
exclusively by Arabs and races speaking Arabic.  They form a half of
the Empire's dominions in Asia, starting with the Taurus and Amanus
ranges, south through Syria to Arabia and east and south-east through
Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf.

{215}

These large stretches of territory were never thoroughly conquered by
the Turks.  They did not settle there in the way they had done in the
Balkan Peninsula, outside of Albania and Montenegro, and in Asia Minor.
The race from whom they had taken their religion and from whom they
soon absorbed whatever culture and art they can be said to possess, was
never assimilated by the Turks.  Their simple warrior and herdsman
language was enriched by Arabic substantives, as Anglo-Saxon was
enriched by the Latin gotten through the Normans and through the
Church.  But there was no racial fusion.

Only in appearance did Turkish officialdom and the authority of the
Sultan ever get a real hold over the Arabs.  By habit they came to
respect the Sultan as Khalif.  The allegiance which they gave him as
ruler was altogether without value--a pure matter of form.  An
aggressive pasha found it easy to detach Egypt from Turkish rule.  It
was conglomerate populations and a lack of natural boundaries for
forming states that prevented the other Arabic portions of the Ottoman
Empire from following Egypt.  In Arabia proper, and in the larger
portion of Mesopotamia, up to the present day, the Arabs have been as
independent of the Sublime Porte as have been the Albanians.

In the reign of Abdul Hamid, when the idea of the Pan-Islamic movement
was conceived, the importance of joining the sacred cities of Medina
and Mecca more closely with the Turkish Empire was recognized.  French
interests were building a railway across the Lebanon Mountains to
Aleppo and Damascus.  The {216} Germans had launched their project for
the _Bagdadbahn_.  Abdul Hamid decided to create a railway directly
under government control, from Damascus to Medina and Mecca.  For the
first time since they were joined to the Ottoman Empire, the Arabic
provinces saw themselves in prospective connection with the capital.
It had been for a long time easier and quicker to go from
Constantinople to the United States or to China than to Bagdad or to
Mecca.  The railways would have one of two results: either the Arabs
would be brought more closely into connection with the Empire, or they
would be definitely alienated from it.

The Arabic question stood thus when the constitution was re-established
in 1908.  There are many Arabs among the Young Turks, but these, like
the Slavs in the military and official service of Austria-Hungary, have
been definitely alienated from their own nationality.  Here was the
opportunity to bring into sympathy with the constitutional movement the
millions of Arabic-speaking subjects of the Sultan, who formed the most
numerous Moslem element in the Empire.  But the Young Turks were no
more tactful in the treatment of the Arabs, who were mostly of their
own religion, than of the Greeks and Armenians.  In the first
Parliament, they were almost as unfair to Moslem Arabs as to
Christians.  In the apportionment of places in the Cabinet, the Arabs
were ignored.  It is true that some Cabinet members, some high
officials both in the military and civil administration, and some
members of the inner council of the Committee of Union and Progress
{217} were of Arabic origin.  But they must be counted practically as
Turks, for they had lived so long away from their own country and their
people that they had lost all Arabic sympathies.  Some who were called
Arabs were in reality members of the old Turkish families, who in
Mesopotamia, as in Syria and Egypt, had received large tracts of land
at the time of the conquest, and had always been Turks by interests and
by atmosphere.  The younger nationalistic Arabic element, educated, and
living by professional or business interests in cities of the Arabic
portion of the Empire, were from the very beginning ignored.

Two things soon became evident.  In the first place, the Young Turks
tried to impose their language in local administration as the sole
official language of the Empire.  In many places in Syria and
Mesopotamia, civil officials, even in the courts of justice, were
appointed without a knowledge of the language of the people among whom
they had to serve.  In the Balkans and in Asia Minor, where there were
so many races and so many tongues, the Turks were acting reasonably and
sensibly in imposing their own language as a medium for the transaction
of government business, but in _vilayets_ which were _wholly_ Arabic
speaking, the foisting of the Turkish language upon the people could be
likened to a bastard child endeavouring to rule the branch of his
family from which he had received his best and purest blood.  Before a
year had passed, the educated, intellectual Arabs were wholly out of
sympathy with the new _régime_.  Many of them began to dream of the
revival of {218} the Arabian khalifate, and looked to the nationalistic
movement in Egypt as the seed from which their Pan-Arabic tree would
some day grow.  Others, older and less sentimental, did not hesitate to
express a desire to see British or French sovereignty extended over
Syria and Mesopotamia.

In the second place, among the quasi-independent tribes of the Syrian
_hinterland_, and of the Arabian peninsula, the attempt of the Turks to
destroy their privileges ended in the same way as it had done in
Albania.  From 1908 up to the outbreak of the Balkan War, millions of
treasure and thousands of the best soldiers of the Empire were lost in
fruitless efforts to realize the aspirations of the Young Turks.  We
cannot even enumerate these rebellions.  They were as perennial as the
Albanian uprisings, and as disastrous to the Turkish army.  In Arabia,
rebellious Arabs treated with the Italians.  In Syria, beyond the
Jordan, they made a practice of tearing up the tracks and burning the
stations of the Hedjaz railway.  In Mesopotamia, they refused to
respond to the obligation of military service.


This incomplete summary of the Young Turk _régime_ in the Ottoman
Empire has been given to throw light upon the collapse of the
constitutional _régime_ and of the military reputation of Turkey.  I
have refrained from going into a discussion of party politics, of
intrigues, and of the bickerings of Parliament.  Enough has been told
to show that the constitutional _régime_ was marked for failure from
the beginning for three reasons: There was no honest {219} attempt to
bring together the various races of the Empire in a common effort for
regeneration.  The Young Turks, having no statesmen among their
leaders, depended upon untrained men and upon those Abdul Hamid had
trained in sycophancy and despotism.  In spite of the heroic and able
efforts of the German military mission and the British naval mission,
no progress was made in reforming the only force by which the Young
Turks could have held in respect and obedience the Sultan's own
subjects, as well as those foreign nations who were looking for the
opportunity to dismember the Empire.

If the hopes of the true friends of Turkey had been realized, if only
the constitution had been applied, if only there had been the _will_ to
regenerate Turkey, all the wars of the past few years, including the
one which is now shaking Europe to its foundations, would have been
avoided.




{220}

CHAPTER XII

CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

On November 19, 1910, the Cretan General Assembly made a stirring
appeal "to the four Great Powers who are protectors of the island, to
the two great Powers of Central Europe, to the great Republic of the
New World, to the liberal and enlightened press of two Continents, and
in general to all Christians, in favour of the rights of the Cretan
people which it represents,--rights acquired and made legal by so many
sacrifices and sufferings."  The Cretans definitely included the United
States and the American press in this manifesto.  They wanted the
American people to become acquainted with what was known to the
chancelleries of Europe as "the Cretan question."  For one fifth of the
Cretans have members of their families in America.  There are few
hamlets in the island into which the spirit and influence of "the great
Republic of the New World" has not penetrated.

A review of the relationship between Crete and the European Powers is
as necessary in trying to throw light upon the events which led up to
the war of 1914 as is the exposition of the later phases of the
Albanian question.  It helps us to grasp the attitude {221} of the
Powers towards Turkey in the years immediately after the proclamation
of the constitution, the tremendous power of Hellenism under the wise
and skilful guidance of a statesman such as M. Venizelos has proved
himself to be, the importance of the Cretan question in precipitating
the Balkan Wars, and the impotence of European diplomacy to preserve
the _status quo_, and decide _ex cathedra_ the destinies of countries
like Crete and Macedonia, whose emancipated kinsfolk had acquired the
spirit of the soldiers who sang:


    "As Christ died to make men holy, let us die to make men free."


A century ago, Crete was cut off from the outside world.  It had been
for two hundred and fifty years under the Turks, who took a peculiar
pride in the island from the fact that it was their last great
conquest.  Its Christian inhabitants, although forming the majority of
the population, lived, or rather existed, under the same hopeless
conditions as prevailed throughout Turkey.  In the sea-coast towns the
Christians prospered better than the Moslems, owing to their aptitude
for commerce; but the bulk of the Christian population was in abject
slavery to the Turkish _beys_, who were the great landowners.

The Greek war of liberation was shared in by the Cretans, who lent
valuable aid to their brethren of the mainland.  They endured all the
sufferings of the war, but reaped none of its rewards.  It is quite
possible that they might have thrown off the Turkish yoke at that
favourable moment had it not been for {222} the astute policy of the
Turks, who, seeing the danger of losing Crete, handed it over to
Mehemet Ali in 1830 as a reward for Egyptian aid in the Greek war and
compensation for the ships destroyed at Navarino.  With the downfall of
Mehemet Ali's schemes of conquest in 1840, the island reverted to
Turkey.  At this time the Powers could easily have united Crete with
Greece, but deliberately sacrificed the Cretans to their commercial
rivalries.

Turkey never succeeded in gaining her former ascendancy in Crete.
Insurrection after insurrection was drowned in blood.  During two
generations the Turks sent into the unhappy island successive armies,
whose orgies of cruelty and lust are better left undescribed.  But the
tortures of hell could not extinguish the flames of liberty.  Every few
years the Cretans would rise again and repay blood with blood until
they were overwhelmed by Anatolian soldiers, of whom Turkey possesses
an unlimited supply.

At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the Greeks pled, with much force, for
the privilege of annexing Crete.  As we read them to-day, the arguments
of M. Delyannis are a prophecy.  The Powers put Crete back under
Ottoman control, subject to a reformed constitution called the Pact of
Holepa, which provided a fairly good administration, if a capable and
sincere governor were chosen.  Everything went well until Sultan Abdul
Hamid in 1889 practically annulled the solemn agreement he had made by
appointing a Moslem Governor-General, and reducing the representation
in the General Assembly in such a way that the Moslem minority in the
island came into {223} power again.  It would be fruitless to go into
the complex history of the next seven years during which the
lawlessness of former times was revived.

Christian refugees fled to Greece and carried the tale of their
sufferings.  A massacre in Canea in February, 1897, engineered by
Turkish officers fresh from similar work in Armenia, had such a
repercussion in Greece that King George would have lost his throne had
he remained deaf to the popular demand that aid be sent to the Cretans.
Greek soldiers crossed to the stricken island.  This meant war with
Turkey.  In a few weeks Greece was overwhelmed in Thessaly, and the
Powers were compelled to intervene.  Much ridicule has been cast upon
Greece for her impotence in the war of 1897.  Her defeat was a foregone
conclusion, and she was severely blamed for having jeopardized the
peace of Europe just as the Balkan States are being blamed to-day.

But there are times when a nation simply has to fight.  So it was with
Greece in 1897.  In exactly similar circumstances, but with conditions
less serious and an issue not so long outstanding or so vital to
national well-being, the United States a year later declared war on
Spain.  There was great similarity between the Cretan situation in 1897
and that of 1912 in Crete and Macedonia.  Refugees, crossing the
borders and telling unspeakable tales to their brothers of blood and
religion, were continually before the eyes of the Bulgarians and
Servians and Montenegrins and Greeks since the proclamation of the
constitution in 1908.  Each nationality suffered {224} by massacres in
Macedonia which were followed by no serious punishment.

Even though defeated in 1897, Greece forced the hand of the Powers and
of Turkey.  Crete was given autonomy, and placed under the protection
of Italy, Great Britain, France, and Russia, who occupied the principal
ports of the island.  For a year and a half they searched for a
"neutral" governor for the Cretans.  The Turkish troops, however,
remained at Candia, leaving the rest of the island to the
revolutionaries.  It was not until the British were attacked in the
harbour of Candia, and their Vice-Consul murdered, that the Powers
moved.  But, as at Alexandria in 1882, it was a bluff admiral and not
the diplomats who settled the status of the island.  The Turkish troops
were compelled to withdraw, and the Powers were told that they would
either have to appease the Cretans by some encouragement of their
aspirations or conquer the island by force.  A way out of the dilemma
was found in the appointment of Prince George of Greece as High
Commissioner of the protecting Powers in Crete.

Here is where the Powers, if they had at that time any intention of
"preserving the rights of Turkey" in Crete, made the first of their
blunders.  To call the son of the King of Greece to the chief
magistracy of an island which had so long aspired to political union
with Greece was, in the eyes of the people, a direct encouragement to
their aspirations.  How could they think otherwise?  The Turkish
Cretans, too, regarded this step as the end of Ottoman sovereignty, for
they emigrated in so great a number that soon the {225} Moslem
population was reduced to ten per cent.  Prince George's appointment,
made in December, 1898, was for three years, but really lasted eight.
In 1906 he withdrew because he had become hopelessly involved in party
politics, and had "backed the wrong horses."

Now comes the second blunder, _unless the Powers were preparing Crete
for union with Greece_.  They sent a letter to the King of Greece,
asking him to appoint a successor to his son!  Let me quote from the
exact wording of this letter:


"The protecting Powers, in order to manifest their desire to take into
account as far as possible the aspirations of the Cretan people, and to
recognize in a practical manner the interest which His Hellenic Majesty
must always take in the prosperity of Crete, are in accord to propose
to His Majesty that hereafter, whenever the post of High Commissioner
of Crete shall become vacant, His Majesty, after confidential
consultations with the representatives of the Powers at Athens, will
designate a candidate capable of exercising the mandate of the Powers
in this island...."


Turkey naturally protested against the change in the _status quo_ which
such a step implied, and pointed out that it was a virtual destruction
even of the _suzerainty_ of the Sultan.  The Powers, however, did not
object to the publication of their note to the King of Greece in the
newspapers of Crete.  M. Zaimis, a former prime minister of Greece, was
appointed High Commissioner.  The island had its own flag and postage
stamps, and laws identical with those of {226} Greece.  Cretan officers
in Greek uniform commanded the militia and constabulary of the island.
Turkey treated Crete as a foreign country.  For this statement there is
no more conclusive proof than the records of the custom-houses at
Smyrna and Salonika which show that Cretan products were subjected to
the same duties as were applied to all foreign imports.

It would seem, then, that Crete was in practically the same position as
Eastern Roumelia in 1885, or, in fact, as Bulgaria herself.  Nothing
was more natural than that the establishment of a constitutional
_régime_ in Turkey should lead to a proclamation of union with Greece.
The motives which led to this action were identical with those which
Austria-Hungary put forth as an explanation of her annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.  The Cretans quite justly feared that the Young Turks
would repudiate the obligations assumed by Abdul Hamid, and endeavour
to bring Crete back into the Turkish fold.  At the moment Turkey was so
engrossed in the question of the Austrian annexation and the Bulgarian
declaration of independence and seizure of the railways in Eastern
Roumelia that she contented herself with a formal protest against the
action of the Cretan Assembly.

What did the Powers do?  Turkey, at the moment, could have done nothing
had they recognized the union with Greece.  But they did not want to go
that far.  On the other hand, they did not want to offend Greece and
the Cretans.  They made no threats, and took no action, although their
troops were in the island.  Inaction and indecision were made worse by
{227} the following note, which was sent by the four Consuls at Candia
to the self-appointed provisional government:


"The undersigned, agents of France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia,
by order of their respective governments, have the honour of bringing
to the knowledge of the Cretan government (_sic_) that the protecting
Powers consider the union of Crete to Greece as depending upon the
assent of the Powers who have contracted obligations with Turkey.
Nevertheless they would not refuse to envisage with kindly and
sympathetic interest the discussion of this question with Turkey, if
order is maintained in the island and if the safety of the Moslem
population is secured."


That diplomatic sanction would sooner or later be given to the action
of the Cretans, if they showed their ability to preserve order in the
island and treat the Moslems well, is an altogether justifiable
interpretation of this note of the Powers.  Otherwise would they not
have protested against the illegality of the provisional government,
and have forbidden the Cretan authorities to promulgate their decrees
in the name of King George?  Although the High Commissioner had
disappeared, and the Cretans were running the island just as if the
annexation were an assured fact, the Powers, far from protesting,
announced their intention of withdrawing their troops of occupation!

What were their intentions concerning Crete, and what was their
understanding of the _status quo_ at the moment of withdrawal?  This
question they did not {228} answer then, nor did they answer it
afterwards.  They simply withdrew from the island without stating what
legal power was to succeed them.  This was in the summer of 1909.  M.
Venizelos, then Prime Minister of Crete, asked the Powers to state
definitely their intentions.  He said that he did not wish to run
counter to the orders of the Powers, but that he would have to raise
the flag of Greece over the island when their troops left, unless they
_formally_ forbade him to do so.  With admirable clearness and
irrefutable logic he pointed out to the Powers that the only other
alternative would be anarchy.  But the Powers, pressed by their
ambassadors at Constantinople, were afraid to assent to annexation.
They were equally averse to taking the opposite course.  So they
contented themselves with giving M. Venizelos "friendly counsels" not
to hoist the Greek flag.  The result was the ludicrous spectacle of the
cutting down of the Greek flag by marines landed from eight warships.
It was like a scene from a comic opera, and M. Venizelos must have
formed then the opinion which every succeeding action of the Powers
strengthened and to which he gave expression after the Balkan War was
declared--that the Powers were "venerable old women."

Crete now began to be menaced by the insensate chauvinism of the Young
Turks, who thought they could avenge the loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
the Bulgarian declaration of independence by destroying the autonomy of
Crete and re-establishing the authority of the Sultan in this island
which had been repudiating the Ottoman government for eighty {229}
years.  In the spring of 1910, the _Tanine_, at that time official
organ of the Committee of Union and Progress, laid down five points as
the _minimum_ which the Porte would accept in the definite and
permanent solution of the status of Crete:


"1. Formal recognition of the rights of the Sultan.

"2. The right of the Sultan to name the Governor-General of the island
among three Cretan candidates elected by the General Assembly.

"3. The right of the _sheik-ul-islam_ to name the religious chiefs of
the Cretan Moslems.

"4. Establishment in the Bay of Suda of a coaling-station for the
Ottoman fleet, and the maintenance there of a permanent _stationnaire_
like the _stationnaires_ of the embassies at Constantinople.

"5. Restriction of the rights of the Cretan government in the matter of
conclusion of treaties of commerce and agreements with foreign powers."


What the "rights of the Sultan" might be were not specified then, nor
have they been since: but articles four and five were enough to throw
the whole of Crete into a state of wildest excitement.  The Turks,
after having lost the island, were trying to win it back.

Left to themselves (as they had every reason to believe) the Cretans
convoked the National Assembly for April 26, 1910.  The Assembly was
opened in the name of George I., King of the Hellenes.  The Moslem
deputies immediately presented a protest in which they rejected the
sovereignty of Greece over Crete.  The deputies were then asked to take
the oath of allegiance in the name of King George.  A second petition
was presented by the {230} Moslem deputies, declaring that, as the
Sultan of Turkey held "sovereign rights" in the island, they, in the
name of their Moslem constituents, protested against such an action.
They refused to take the oath.  Should they be excluded from the
Assembly, or be allowed to sit without taking the oath?

Instead of insisting on the admission of the Moslem deputies, the
Powers again gave "friendly counsels."  Once more M. Venizelos pleaded
that they speak out their mind in the matter of the legal status of the
island.  The diplomats "temporized" again, and the warships reappeared
to assure to the Moslem deputies "their lawful rights."  When M.
Venizelos could get no statement from the Powers as to the grounds upon
which these "lawful rights" rested, he saw that all hope of help from
the Powers was over, and that he was only wasting his time.  Like
Cavour, when he turned with disgust from his efforts to interest the
Powers and had the inspiration, _Italia fara da se_, the Cretan leader
abandoned the antechamber of the chancelleries.  While the Powers still
sought a _modus vivendi_ for Crete, M. Venizelos made one.  From that
moment the Balkan War was a certainty.

The Young Turk Cabinet, arrogant and drunk with the success of their
boycott against Austria-Hungary, and at the same time knowing that they
must turn public attention away from the loss of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, began to press the Powers for the restoration in Crete of
the _status quo_ as it had existed before the diplomatic blunders I
have outlined above, and, in addition, for the coaling station and for
control over Crete's foreign relations.  At {231} the same time, they
demanded of the Athens Cabinet that Greece renounce formally, not only
for the present _but also for the future_, any intention of annexing
Crete.  The Young Turks represented that public opinion in Turkey was
so wrought up over the Cretan question that war with Greece would
certainly follow.  To illustrate to the Powers and to Greece the force
of this public opinion, a widespread boycott against everything Greek
in Turkey was started.  This economic warfare is described in another
chapter.  In some parts of Turkey the boycott has never ceased.  There
is no doubt that this boycott was one of the very most important
factors in bringing on the Balkan War.  For it taught the Greeks, who
were continually being bullied and threatened with an invasion in
Thessaly, the imperative necessity of reconciliation with Bulgaria by a
compromise of rival claims in Macedonia.

Thinking that he could serve his country better in Greece than in
Crete, M. Venizelos posed his candidacy to the Greek Chamber in the
summer of 1910.  Seemingly he was abandoning Crete to its fate, and he
had to bear many unjust reproaches from his fellow-countrymen.  His
wonderful personality and extraordinary political genius soon brought
him to the front in Greece.  The Cretan revolutionary became Prime
Minister of Greece.  Steadfast in his purpose he began to negotiate
with the other Balkan States and with Russia.  He was able to
accomplish the impossible.  The war with Turkey is largely his personal
success.  No statesman since Bismarck has had so brilliant a triumph.

{232}

In 1910, M. Venizelos took the step which was the turning point in his
career and in the history of Greece.  Firmly persuaded that Crete could
be annexed to Greece only by Greece proving herself stronger than
Turkey, and not by diplomatic manoeuvres, he decided to desert Cretan
politics, and enter the larger sphere open to him at Athens.  It was
easy to secure a seat in the Greek Parliament, but that was the only
easy part about it.  When one considered the fickle character of the
Greek people in their politics, the selfish narrowness and bitter
prejudices of their leaders, the inefficiency of the army and navy,
whose officers had been ruined by political activity, the emptiness of
the treasury, the unpopularity of the royal family, and the general
disorder throughout the country, it seems incredible that M. Venizelos
should have been willing to assume the responsibility of government,
let alone succeed in his self-imposed task.  Had you asked the leading
statesmen of Europe five years ago what country presented the most
formidable and at the same time most hopeless task tor a Premier, there
would have been unanimity in selecting Greece.

But for Eleutherios Venizelos there was no difficulty which could not
be overcome.  It is the nature of the man to refuse to see failure
ahead.  "If one loves to work, and works for love," he has declared,
"failure does not exist."

Called to be Prime Minister in August, 1910, M. Venezelos began to
reform everything in sight.  His first step was to endow Greece with a
new constitution, whose most important changes were a Council of {233}
State, chosen for life and irremovable, to act as a Senate (Greece has
single-chamber government), legalizing the state of siege, sanctioning
the employment of foreigners in the service of the Government, fixing
twenty-four hours as the maximum delay for bringing one who had been
arrested before a magistrate, forbidding the publication of uncensored
news relative to military and naval operations in time of war,
establishing free, obligatory primary instruction, excluding from
Parliament directors in corporations, and facilitating the
expropriation of property for public purposes.  I have given enough to
show the practical character of the new constitution.

Although strongly urged to do so, both by the King and by the political
leaders, M. Venizelos refused to turn his Constituent Assembly into an
ordinary Parliament, and proceed to the legislation made possible by
the new constitution.  Seeing clearly that durable and effective
ministerial power could be derived only from the people and supported
only by their intelligent good-will, he balked the intrigues of the
politicians, and overcame the dynastic fears of the King.  The
Constituent Assembly was dissolved.  M. Venizelos went before the
people, travelling everywhere and explaining his program for the
reformation of the country.  The result was a triumph such as no man
has ever received in modern Greece.  In November, 1910, followers of M.
Venizelos were returned in so overwhelming a majority that he could
afford to ignore the Athenian politicians who saw in him a menace to
their personal rule, their sloth, and their "graft."

{234}

Since that day M. Venizelos has been the idol of Greece.  Never has
trust in public man been more amply justified.  Every administration of
the State was completely transformed within eighteen months.  Even to
outline what M. Venizelos has accomplished reads like a fairy tale.
Only those who knew the Greece before his arrival and are able to
contrast it with the Greece of today can appreciate the immensity of
his labours and the radical character of the changes he has made.  I
cannot dwell on the talent shown by this Cretan in matters of financial
reform.  But his military and naval reforms, and his foreign policy,
have been so important in making possible the Balkan alliance and its
successes that they cannot be passed over.

M. Venizelos, when he first came to Athens, saw what was the matter
with the Greek military and naval establishments.  Like Peter the Great
and the Japanese, he realized that the Greeks must learn from Europe by
submitting to European teachers.  To persuade his fellow-countrymen,
who have a very exalted opinion of their own ability (the Greeks are
always sure they were born to command, without first having learned to
obey!), that they must not only call in foreign advisers, but must
submit to their authority, has been the most Herculean of the tasks
this great man set before him.  Article three of the new constitution
had authorized the appointment of foreigners as officers of the
Government and given them temporarily Hellenic citizenship.  From
England was asked a naval mission, from France a military mission, and
from {235} Italy officers to reorganize the _gendarmerie_.  In Greece
the foreign officers were able to accomplish more in eighteen months
than the foreign "advisers" of Turkey had accomplished in many long
years.  This is no assertion of personal opinion.  The facts of the
Balkan War speak for themselves.  Why is this?  In Turkey, the foreign
teachers have never been given any real authority, and have seen every
effort they put forth nullified by the insouciance, self-sufficiency,
and cursed apathy of the Turk.  The Greeks, on the contrary, "became as
little children," and lo! a miracle was wrought!

When foreigners who visited Greece within recent years read about the
successes of the Crown Prince at Salonika and Janina, the assassination
of King George, the mourning of the Greek people, and the hearty
acclamation of King Constantine, the national hero, they could think
back to less than four years ago when the Crown Prince was practically
banished from Greece, after having been dismissed from his command in
the army by a popular uprising, and when the portrait of the King was
removed from every coffee-house in Athens.  What is the cause of the
complete revulsion in public feeling towards the dynasty?  It is due to
the common sense of M. Venizelos.  He saw that the present dynasty was
necessary for Greece, and that the Crown Prince must come back and take
command of the army.  In defiance of public opinion, he insisted on
this point.  This attitude was a bitter disappointment to many who
imagined that M. Venizelos would be anti-dynastic in his policy.  As a
result of his {236} success in reconciling the Greeks with their
sovereign and his family, the sympathies of Russia and Germany and
Great Britain were not alienated from the Greek people, as was rapidly
becoming the case.  Emperor William especially, whose sister is wife of
the new Greek King, was so delighted with the success of M. Venizelos
in rehabilitating his brother-in-law that he asked the Greek Premier to
visit him at Corfu.

This visit of the former Cretan revolutionary to the German Emperor in
April, 1912, was hardly commented upon by the European press.  But
epoch-making words must have been spoken in the villa Achilleion, for
immediately after that visit the semi-official German press began to
prepare the public for the events which were to take place in the
Balkans.  The eloquence and remorseless logic which had carried the day
among Cretan insurgents and Greek electors was not lost on the
"war-lord of Europe."  Emperor William carried back to Berlin the
conviction that no diplomacy could outwit the Greek Premier's
determination that Turkey should disappear from Crete and Macedonia.

I do not think I am exaggerating in saying that when the Young Turks,
by their insensate chauvinism, caused M. Venizelos to despair of saving
Crete through Crete itself, they signed their own death-warrant.  If
they had refrained from their boycott and let Crete alone, would M.
Venizelos have gone to Greece?  I think not.  It is one of those
strange coincidences of history that on the very day when Mahmud
Shevket pasha, in the Ottoman Parliament, {237} declared that if Greece
did not make a public statement to the effect that she had no intention
at any time to extend her sovereignty over Crete, a million Turkish
bayonets would gleam upon the plains of Thessaly, Eleutherios Venizelos
was quietly leaving Crete for Athens.

To bring together Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro into an
alliance which would drive the Turk out of Europe was in the mind of M.
Venizelos as far back as the summer of 1909, when he saw the
international fleet at Canea land marines to cut down the Greek flag
which he had raised.  It became an obsession with him.  It was
possible, because he believed it was possible.  But no one else
regarded it as more than an idle dream.  The rare friends to whom M.
Venizelos vaguely hinted that such an alliance was the only way of
solving the Balkan question called it the "acme of absurdity."  I quote
the words of an eminent diplomat to whom this solution was mentioned.
At the opening of the Italian War, when I suggested to the Turkish
Grand Vizier that such an alliance was possible, he looked at me
pityingly, and said, "The questions you ask display your ignorance of
conditions in this part of the world.  My time is too valuable to
discuss such an impossible hypothesis.  Go to Hussein Hilmi pasha, and
ask him if he thinks the Greeks and Bulgarians could ever unite."
Hussein Hilmi pasha referred me to every single book that has ever been
written about the Macedonian question.  "I do not care which you read,"
said the ex-Governor-General of Macedonia, "they all tell the same
story."

{238}

But M. Venizelos was not asking himself, "Can I do it?" but, "How shall
I do it?"  Once more he saw clearly.  The pan-Hellenic national ideal
must be given up.  Greece must content herself with Epiros, the Ægean
Islands, Crete, and a slice of Macedonia west of the Vardar--possibly
including Salonika, if the army proved as victory-winning as those of
Bulgaria and Servia.  Everything else must be left to Bulgaria and
Servia.  When first proposed to the leaders of Greece, this proposition
seemed so preposterous that M. Venizelos was accused of being a traitor
to Hellenism.  He is still denounced by the fanatics, after all that he
has accomplished.  But patiently he built up his argument, using all
his magnetism and his eloquence to convince his colleagues.  He showed
how Greece was being constantly humiliated and menaced by the
chauvinism of the Young Turks, how the boycott was ruining Greek
shipping, how Crete itself would gradually get to like independence
better than union with Greece, and how inevitable it was that the Slavs
should in the course of time come to possess Thrace and Macedonia.
Instead of sacrificing everything to Bulgaria, he maintained, "this is
our only chance to get any part of European Turkey.  We must give up
our ideal, because it is impracticable.  With Bulgaria, we can crush
Turkey.  Without Bulgaria, Turkey will crush us.  And if Bulgaria
helps, we must pay the price."  It may be years--not until archives are
open to historians and memoirs of present actors are published--before
everything is clear concerning the formation of an alliance which was
as great a surprise {239} to Europe as it was to Turkey.  But the
famous telegram which M. Gueshoff, Prime Minister of Bulgaria,
addressed to his colleagues at Athens after the first successes of the
war were won, is sufficient testimony to the essential part played by
M. Venizelos in forming the coalition.

After M. Venizelos left Crete, a last blunder made the protecting
Powers the laughing-stock of Europe.  The Cretans elected deputies to
the Greek Chamber, and the warships of the Powers played hide-and-seek
with small Cretan craft in a fruitless endeavour to prevent the chosen
deputies from proceeding to Athens.  This move was altogether
unnecessary, for they had not yet learned the matchless worth of their
opponent.  M. Venizelos, knowing that Greece and her new allies were
not yet ready for war with Turkey, "tipped off" both the Cretans and
the leaders in the Greek Parliament that they would have to wait one or
two years longer.  But, to satisfy the _hoi polloi_ on the one hand and
the diplomats on the other, a little comedy was enacted before the
Parliament House in Athens which threw wool over everybody's eyes.

As soon as he saw that war was inevitable and that his allies were
ready, M. Venizelos admitted the Cretan deputies.  Europe was face to
face with a _fait accompli_.  The Cretan and Macedonian questions were
settled by war.  The hand of Turkey and the diplomats was forced.

Now we see the importance of the Cretan question.  The Balkan War could
have been avoided by a courageous and straightforward policy of
efficient {240} protection of Christians who lived under the Ottoman
flag.  It is because the Powers did not fulfil the obligations of the
Treaty of Berlin, and sacrificed Cretans and Bulgarians and Servians
and Greeks to the furthering of their commercial interests at
Constantinople, that all Europe is now stained with blood.  By
flattering the Turk and condoning his crimes, the Powers succeeded in
destroying the "integrity of the Ottoman Empire," which they professed
to uphold.  In trying to be the friends of the Turk they proved his
worst enemies.

The Cretan question is a commentary upon the utter futility of
insincere and procrastinating diplomacy.




{241}

CHAPTER XIII

THE WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY

Since the days when Mazzini, looking beyond the almost irrealizable
dream of Italian unity, said in his Paris exile, "North Africa will
belong to Italy," a new Punic conquest has been the steadfast hope of
the Italians.  France had already started her conquest of Algeria when
Mazzini spoke, and was mistress of the richest portion of the southern
Mediterranean littoral before the Italian unification was completed.
Late though they were in the race, the Italians began to try to realize
their dream by sending thousands of colonists to Egypt and to Tunis.
But the events of the years 1881-1883 in these two countries,
consummated by the Convention of London in 1885, gave Egypt to England
and Tunis to France.  Italy was too weak at the time to protest, and
Germany had not yet begun to develop her _Weltpolitik_.

For some years Italian colonial aspirations were directed towards
Somaliland and Abyssinia.  The battle of Adowa in 1896 was a death-blow
to the hopes of founding an Italian empire of Erythrea.  Ten years ago
Giolitti received a portfolio in the Zanardelli ministry, and ever
since then there has {242} been a new Cato at Rome, crying "Tripoli
must be taken."  By the Franco-Italian protocol of 1901, it was agreed
that if France should ever extend her protectorate over Morocco, Italy
should have the Tripolitaine and Barca, with the Fezzan as a
_hinterland_.  This "right" of Italy was recognized at the
international conference of Algeciras in 1906, and has since been
accepted in principle by the European cabinets.

During the past decade Italy quietly prepared to seize
Tripoli,--peacefully, if possible, and if not, by force.  Had Italy
been ready, Turkey would have lost Tripoli in the autumn of 1908, when
Bulgaria declared her independence and Austria annexed Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  Internal politics made a bold stroke impossible at that
favourable moment.

To accomplish her purpose, Italy worked along two lines.  She tried to
make her economic position so strong in Tripoli that the country would
virtually belong to her and be exploited by her without any necessity
for a change in its political status, until Arabs and Berbers, choosing
between prosperity under Italy and poverty under Turkey, would of their
own accord expel the Turks.  Foreseeing a possibility of failure in
this plan, she at the same time prepared for a forcible occupation of
the country.

Immediately after the Anglo-Boer War, the Italian Ministries of War and
Marine began to make a study of the question of transporting troops and
landing them under the cover of a fleet.  Tourists who were in Italy
during the summer of 1904 will remember the famous dress rehearsal of
the Tenth Army Corps.

{243}

Some six thousand men, completely provided with horses, ammunition,
artillery, and provisions, were embarked in eleven hours.  The convoy
put to sea, escorted by a squadron of battleships and torpedo-boats, in
two columns of five transports each.  Despite a heavy swell, these
troops and all their stores were landed in the Bay of Naples in sixteen
hours.  I wonder if many who were watching and applauding on that
memorable day understood why Italy was practising so assiduously
landing from transports,--and under the protection of the fleet.  For
what war was she preparing in time of peace?  In 1907, the Minister of
Marine announced in the _Italia Militare_ that Italy could send seventy
thousand troops upon a distant expedition oversea and one hundred and
fourteen thousand _for a short journey not exceeding two nights at sea_!

The peaceable conquest of Tripoli was cleverly conceived, and has been
faithfully tried.  Branches of the Banco di Roma were established at
Tripoli and Benghazi, and, for the first time since the days of
Imperial Rome, a serious attempt was made to develop the agricultural
and commercial resources of the country.  The natives were encouraged
in every enterprise, and managed in such a way that they became--in the
vicinity of the seaports and trading-posts, at least--dependent for
their livelihood upon the Banco di Roma.  Italian steamship lines,
heavily subsidized, maintained regular and frequent services between
Tunis and Tripoli and Benghazi and Derna and Alexandria.  The more
enterprising natives travelled for a few piastres to {244} Alexandria,
and the object-lesson of contrast was left without words to work its
effect upon them.  The admirable Italian parcel post system--one of the
most successful in Europe--extended its operations into the
_hinterland_ and captured the ostrich feather trade.  The Italians
began to talk of making secure the routes to Ghadames and Ghat and
Murzuk, and of establishing for the interior postal and banking
facilities that these regions could never hope to have under Turkish
administration.  Railways were contemplated as soon as they could be
financed entirely by Italian capital.

The Italian schemes were working beautifully when the birth of New
Turkey in the revolution of July, 1908, changed the whole situation.
The indolent and corrupt officials of the _vilayet_ of Tripoli and
_sandjak_ of Benghazi, whose attention had been turned from Italian
activities by Italian gold pieces, were replaced by members of the
Union and Progress party.  These new officials, owing to their utter
inexperience and their sense of self-esteem, may have been no better
than the old ones; probably they proved as inefficient, for executive
power is not inherent in the Turkish character.  But they were men who
had passed through the fire of persecution and suffering for love of
their fatherland, and the renaissance of Turkey was the supreme thing
in their lives.  Their patriotism and enthusiasm knew no bounds.  Their
ambitions for Turkey may have been far in advance of their ability to
serve her.  But criticism is silent before patriotism which has proved
its willingness to sacrifice Life for country.

{245}

One can imagine the feelings of the Young Turks when they saw what
Italy was doing.  It is easy enough to say that they should have
immediately reformed the administration of the country and given to the
Tripolitans an efficient government.  Reform does not come in a
twelvemonth, and the Young Turks had to act quickly to prevent the loss
of Tripoli.  They took the only means they had.  They began to thwart
and obstruct every Italian enterprise, to extend the military frontiers
of Tripoli into the Soudan, to bring all the Moslem tribes of Africa
into touch with the Constantinople khalifate.

Italy saw her hopes being destroyed as other colonial hopes had been
destroyed one after the other.  Representations at Constantinople were
without effect.  The more her ambassador tried, the more he realized
the hopelessness of his case.  Surely it was a fruitless diplomatic
task to persuade Young Turkey that her officials in Tripoli and
Benghazi should be forbidden to hinder the onward march of Italian
"peaceable conquest."  The Italian economic fabric in Tripoli, so
carefully and so patiently built, seemed to be for nothing.
Austria-Hungary had begun the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908.  No Power had
successfully protested, much less the helpless Turks.  So Italy began
to prepare her coup.

The crisis could not be precipitated.  Italian public opinion, wary of
colonial enterprises since the terrible Abyssinian disaster, and
opposed to the imposition of fresh taxes, had to be carefully prepared
to sustain the Ministry in a hostile action against Turkey.

{246}

In January, 1911, the Italian press began to publish articles on
Tripoli, dilating upon its economic value and its vital importance to
Italy, if she were to hold her place among the great Powers of Europe.
Every little Turkish persecution--and there were many of them--was made
the subject of a first-page bit of telegraphic news.  The Italian
people were worked up to believe that not only in Tripoli, but
elsewhere, the Young Turks were showing their contempt for Italian
officials and for the Italian flag.  An Italian sailing vessel was
seized at Hodeidah in the Red Sea; the incident was magnified.  An
American archæological expedition was granted a concession in Tripoli;
a similar concession had been refused to Italian applicants.  The
newspapers pretended that the Americans were really prospecting for
sulphur mines, whose development would mean disaster to the great mines
in Sicily!  French troops reached the Oasis of Ghadames; the
_hinterland_ of Tripoli was threatened by the extension of French
sovereignty into the Sahara.  At this moment the reopening of the
Morocco question by the Agadir incident gave Italy the incentive and
the encouragement to show her hand.

In September, the press campaign against the Turkish treatment of
Italians in Tripoli became daily and violent.  Signor Giolitti
succeeded in getting all parties, except the extreme Socialists, to
promise their support.

It was not until the last moment that the Sublime Porte realized the
danger.  On September 26th, the _Derna_, a transport, arrived at
Tripoli, with {247} much-needed munitions of war.  There had been a
shameful neglect to keep up the garrisons in the African provinces, and
when it was too late--as is so often the case at Constantinople--there
dawned the realization that the provinces were practically without
defence.

On September 27th, the first of the series of ultimatums which have
brought all Europe into war was delivered to the Sublime Porte.  Italy
gave Turkey forty-eight hours to consent to the occupation of Tripoli,
with the proviso of the Sultan's sovereignty under the Italian
protectorate, and the payment of an annual subsidy into the Ottoman
Treasury.  In Italy, two classes were mobilized, General Caneva
embarked his troops upon transports that had already been prepared, and
the Italian fleet proceeded to Tripoli.

The Turks did not believe that there would be war.  On the afternoon of
September 29th, the Grand Vizier, as far-seeing in his understanding of
international affairs as he was blind in grasping what was best for
Turkey's interests, told me that he was sure Italy would hesitate
before entering upon a war that would be the prelude to the greatest
catastrophe that the world has ever known.  "Italy will not draw the
sword," he declared, "because she knows that if she does attack us, all
Europe will be eventually drawn into the bloodiest struggle of
history,--a struggle that has always been certain to follow the
destruction of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire."  Hakki pasha was
right, except in one important particular.  Perhaps Italy did know what
an attack upon Turkey {248} would eventually lead to.  But two hours
after my conversation with the Grand Vizier, he received a declaration
of war.

Simultaneously with the news of the declaration of war, Constantinople
learned that the first shots had already been fired.  Without waiting
for any formalities, the Italian fleet had attacked and sunk Turkish
torpedo-boats off Preveza at the mouth of the Adriatic.  The Turkish
fleet had just left Beirut to return to Constantinople, and for three
days it was feared that the Italians would follow up their offensive by
destroying the naval power of Turkey.  They did not do so, although it
would have been an easy victory.  For it was the hope of the Giolitti
Cabinet that there would be no real war.

The attack at Preveza had a double purpose of preventing the
torpedo-boats from interfering with the Italian commerce, and of
striking terror into the hearts of the Turks.  The Italians did not
want to widen the breach and draw upon themselves the hatred and enmity
of Turkey by sinking her navy.  Such an action would make difficult the
negotiations which they still hoped to pursue.  It was not war against
the people of Turkey that they had declared; that was a mere form.
What they wanted was a pretext for seizing Tripoli.  So naval and
military operations were directed not against Turkey, but against the
coveted African provinces.  Considerations of international diplomacy,
also, dictated this policy.

The Italian warships opened fire upon Tripoli on September 30th.  On
October 2d and 3d, the forts {249} were dismantled and the garrison
driven out of the city by the bombardment.  On October 5th, Tripoli
surrendered.  The expeditionary corps disembarked on the 11th.  The
next transports from Italy went farther east.  Derna capitulated on the
8th, but a heavy sea prevented the troops from landing until the 18th.
General Ameglio took Benghazi at the point of the bayonet on October
19th.  Homs was occupied on the 21st.

The Turks and Arabs attempted to retake Tripoli on October 23d.  While
the Italian soldiers were in the trenches they were fired upon from
behind by Arabs who were supposed to be non-combatants.  Discovery of
the assailants was practically impossible, because many clothed
themselves like women and hid their faces by veils.  The Italians had
to repress this move from the rear with ruthless severity.  They did
what any other army would have done under the circumstances, for their
safety depended upon putting down the enemy that had arisen in their
rear.  Failure to act quickly and severely would have encouraged a
revolution in the city and its suburbs.  Horror was excited throughout
the world by the highly coloured stories of this repression.  Details
of Italian cruelty were emphasized.  No effort was made to explain
impartially the provocation which had led to this killing.  There was
an unconscious motive in these stories to embarrass Italy in her
attempt to build a colonial empire, just exactly as there had been in
the time of the Abyssinian War in 1896.  The American Consul at Tripoli
has assured me that the correspondents who were {250} guests at the
time of the Italian army did not give the facts as they were.

The French and English newspaper campaign against Italy was as violent
as it had been against Austria in 1908, at the time of the first
violation of Ottoman territorial integrity.  Attempts were made to
denounce the high-handed act of piracy of which Italy had been guilty,
and to poison the public mind against the Italian army.  It is
significant to note this attitude of the press of the two countries,
which are now so persuasively extending the olive branch to Italy.
Great Britain and France were alarmed over the menace to the
"equilibrium" of the Mediterranean.  This is why they did not hesitate
to denounce unsparingly the successful effort of Italy to follow in
their own footsteps!  The tension between France and Italy was
illustrated by the vehement newspaper protests against the Italian use
of the right of search for contraband on French ships.  Italy was taken
to task for acting in exactly the same way that France has since acted
in arresting Dutch ships in August and September, 1914.

The attempt of October 23d failed, in spite of the conspiracy behind
the lines.  A second attempt on the 26th was equally unsuccessful.  On
November 6th, the garrison of Tripoli started to take the offensive.
But progress beyond the suburbs of the city was found to be impossible.

A decree annexing the African provinces of Turkey was approved by the
Italian Parliament on November 5th.  The Italian "adventure," as those
who looked upon Italy's aggression with unfriendly eyes {251} persisted
in calling it, was now shown to be irrevocable.  Turkey's opportunity
to compromise had passed.

In Tripoli, as well as in the other cities, it took the whole winter to
make the foothold on the coast secure.  From November 27th to March 3d,
Enver bey made three attempts to retake Derna.  From November 28th to
March 12th, six assaults of Turks and Arabs were made upon Benghazi.
The Italian positions at Homs were not secure until February 27th.
Italy was practically on the defensive everywhere.

Hakki pasha found himself compelled to resign when the war was
declared.  In fact, he considered himself fortunate not to be
assassinated by army officers, who declared that he had been negligent
to the point of treason in laying Turkey open to the possibility of
being attacked where and when she was weakest.  Saïd pasha became Grand
Vizier--he had held the post six times under Abdul Hamid.  Five members
of the former Cabinet, including Mahmud Shevket pasha, remained in
office.

The first appearance of Saïd pasha's Cabinet before Parliament is a
scene that I shall never forget.  No pains had been spared to make it a
brilliant spectacle.  The Sultan was present during the reading of his
speech from the throne.  Everyone expected an important pronouncement.
The speech of Saïd pasha was typically Turkish.  Instead of announcing
how Turkey was to resist Italy, he gave it to be understood in vague
language that diplomacy was going to save the day once more, and that
Turkey was secure because the preservation of her territorial integrity
was necessary for Europe.

{252}

The action of Italy, however, had upset the calculations of the Young
Turks in the game they were trying to play in European diplomacy.  It
was their dream--more than that, their belief--that Turkey held the
balance of power between the two great groups of European Powers.  They
thought that the destinies of Europe were in their hands.  I heard
Mahmud Shevket pasha say once that "the million bayonets of Turkey
would decide the fortunes of Europe."  Turkey was essentially mixed up
in the European imbroglio.  But it was the absence of those million
bayonets, of which Mahmud Shevket pasha boasted, that changed the
fortunes of Europe.  The military weakness of the Ottoman Empire has
brought us to the present catastrophe.

The embarrassment of the Young Turks was that Italy belonged to the
Triple Alliance, and that Germany, while professing deep and loyal
friendship, stood by and saw Turkey attacked by her ally, Italy, just
as she had stood by in 1908, when the other partner of the Triple
Alliance had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Those who had based their
hopes of Turkey's future upon the pan-Germanic movement had a bitter
awakening.  In what sense could Wilhelm II be called "the defender of
Islam"?

I attended sessions of Parliament frequently during the five weeks
between the outbreak of the war and the passing of the decree by which
the African possessions of Turkey were annexed to the kingdom of Italy.
Before this step had been taken by Italy, there was a possibility of
saving the situation.  But the Turks, instead of presenting a united
front to the {253} world, and finding ways and means of making a
successful resistance against Italy, wasted not only the precious month
of October, when there was still a way out, but also the whole winter
that followed.  In November, the opposition in the House and Senate
formed a new party which they called the "Entente Liberale."  The
principal discussions in Parliament were about whether the Hakki pasha
Cabinet should be tried for high treason, and whether the Chamber of
Deputies could be prorogued by the Sultan without the consent of the
Senate.  The opposition grew so rapidly that the Committee of Union and
Progress induced the Sultan to dissolve Parliament on January 18, 1913.

The new elections were held at the end of March.  Throughout the Empire
they were a pure farce.  The functionaries of the Government saw to it
that only members of the Committee of Union and Progress were returned.
While the Young Turks were playing their game of parties, anarchy was
rife in different parts of the Empire.  The "Interior Organization" had
been revived in Macedonia.  The Albanians, who had been left entirely
out of the fold in the new elections, were determined to get redress.
In Arabia, the neutrality of Iman Yahia in the war with Italy was
purchased only by the granting of complete autonomy.  It was the
surrender of the last vestige of Turkish authority in an important part
of Arabia.  Saïd Idris, the other powerful chief in the Yemen, refused
to accept autonomy, and continued to harass the Turkish army.

The Committee of Union and Progress was not {254} allowed to enjoy long
its fraudulent victory.  In the army an organization which called
itself "The Military League for the Defence of the Country" was formed,
and received so many adhesions that Mahmud Shevket pasha was compelled
to leave the Ministry of War on July 10th, and Saïd pasha the Grand
Vizirate eight days later.  Ghazi Mukhtar pasha accepted the task of
forming a new Cabinet.  The Unionist Parliament refused to listen to
his program.  So he secured from the Sultan a second prorogation of
Parliament on August 5th.  The weapon the Unionists had used was turned
against them.

While Turkey showed herself absolutely incapable of making any military
move to recover the invaded provinces or to punish the invader, Italy
had none the less a difficult problem to face.  A few Turkish officers
had succeeded in organizing among the Arabs of Tripoli and Benghazi a
troublesome resistance.  General Caneva went to Rome at the beginning
of February, and told the Cabinet very plainly that it would take
months to get a start in Africa, and years to complete the pacification
of the new colonies, unless the Turks consented to withdraw the support
of their military leadership and to cease their religious agitation.

The question was, how could Turkey be forced to recognize the
annexation decree of November 5th?  The Italian fleet could not be kept
indefinitely, at tremendous expense and monthly depreciation of the
value of the ships, under steam.  The Turkish fleet did not come out to
give battle, so the Italians were immobilized at the mouth of the
Dardanelles.  Italian {255} commerce in the Black Sea and eastern
Mediterranean was at a standstill.  Upon Italian imports into Turkey
had been placed a duty of one hundred per cent.  Where, outside of
Tripoli, was the pressure to be exercised?

Premier San Giuliano had promised before the war started that he would
not disturb political conditions in the Balkan peninsula.  The alliance
with Austria-Hungary made impossible operations in the Adriatic.  But
it was clear that something must be done.  Public opinion in Italy had
been getting very restless.  It did not seem to the Italians that the
considerations of international diplomacy should stand in the way of
finishing the war.  Were they to burden themselves with heavy taxes in
order to spare the feelings of the Great Powers?  Had Russia hesitated
in the Caucasus?  Had Great Britain hesitated in Egypt?  Had Austria
hesitated in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

As a sop to public opinion, and also as a feeler to see how the move
would be taken by the other Powers, the Cabinet decided upon direct
action against Turkey.  The fleet appeared before Beirut on February
24th, and sank two Turkish warships in the harbour.  It was not exactly
a bombardment of the city, but many shells did fall on the buildings
and on the streets near the quay.  Neither Turkey nor Europe paid much
attention to this demonstration.  In April, Italy had come to the point
where she felt that she must cast all scruples to the winds.  A direct
attack upon Turkey was decided.  Italy, at this writing the only
neutral among the Great Powers of Europe, took the action {256} which
brought Balkan ambitions to a ferment, and caused the kindling of the
European conflagration.  Her declaration of war on Turkey and the
annexation of Tripoli inevitably led to this.  On April 18th Admiral
Viala bombarded the forts of Kum Kale at the Dardanelles, and on the
same day the port of Vathy in Samos.  Four days later Italian marines
disembarked on the island of Stampali.  On May 4th, Rhodes was invaded,
a battle occurred in the streets of the town, and the Turks withdrew to
the interior of the island.  They were pursued, and surrendered on the
17th.  Ten other islands at the mouth of the Ægean Sea were occupied.

A demonstration at Patmos for union with Greece was vigorously
repressed.  Italy protested her good faith in regard to the islands.
But the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, arrested at San Stefano in
1878, had begun again.

Turkey responded to the bombardment of Kum Kale by closing the
Dardanelles, and to the occupation of Rhodes by attempting to expel
from Turkey all Italian residents.  The expulsion decree, however, was
carried out with great humanity and consideration by the Turks.  During
the Italian War and also the Balkan War, Turkish treatment of subjects
of hostile states living in Ottoman territory was highly praiseworthy.
The Christian nations of Europe would today do well to follow their
example!

The closing of the straits lasted for a month.  It disturbed all
Europe.  Never before has the question of the straits been shown to be
so vital to the world.  From April 18th to May 18th, over two hundred
{257} merchant vessels of all nations were immobilized in
Constantinople.  It was a sight to be witness of once in a lifetime.
For these ships were not lost in a maze of basins, docks, and piers.
They lay in the stream of the Bosphorus and at the entrance to the Sea
of Marmora.  You could count them all from the Galata Tower.  The loss
to shipping was tremendous.  Southern Russia is the bread basket of
Europe.  No European resident could remain unaffected by a closing of
the only means of egress for these billions of bushels of wheat.  Angry
protests were in vain.  Turkey reopened the straits only when assurance
had been given to her that the attack of the Italian fleet would not be
repeated.

Little had been gained by Italy as far as hastening peace was
concerned.  She had done all that she could.  Turkey still remained
passive and unresisting, because she knew well that any vital action,
such as the bombardment of Salonika or Smyrna, or the invasion of
European Turkey by way of Albania or Macedonia, would bring on a
general European war.  Italy could not take this responsibility before
history.  So for months longer it remained a war without battles.  Many
Italian warships had not fired a single shot.

During May, June, and July, the Italians pushed on painfully to the
interior of Tripoli.  There was no other way.  In August, the Turkish
resistance on the side of Tunis was finished.  In September, a
desperate attack of Enver bey against Derna was repulsed.  The Italian
forces were in a much better position than before.  But the attacks of
the Arabs {258} were of such a character that they could not be
suppressed by overwhelming numbers of trained men that the Italians
could muster.  It was a guerilla warfare with the oases of the desert
as the background.  The Italians felt that the Arabs, if left to
themselves, would soon tire of the conflict.  For they were, after all,
traders, and were dependent upon the outlets for their caravan trade
which was now completely in the hands of Italians.  It was the mere
handful of Turkish troops and Turkish officers who kept the Arabs
stirred up to fight.

As early as June, Italian and Turkish representatives met informally at
Ouchy on Lac Leman to discuss bases for a solution of the conflict
which had degenerated into an odd _impasse_.  Italy was anxious to
conclude peace for several reasons.  Her commerce was suffering.  Her
warships needed the drydock badly.  While Turkey could no longer
prevent the conquest of Tripoli and Benghazi, the absence of Turkish
direction in keeping the tribesmen of the interior stirred up, and the
cessation of the propaganda against the Italian occupation on the
ground of religion, would help greatly in the pacification of the
provinces.  Since the Albanian revolution had assumed alarming
proportions, Turkey also became anxious for peace.  She was uncertain
of Italy's attitude in case of an outbreak in the Balkans.
Unofficially, Italy had let it be known that there was a limit to
patience, and that the development of a hostile attitude by the Balkan
States against Turkey would find her, in spite of Europe, in alliance
with them against her.  In reality, however, the Italian {259}
ministers at the Balkan courts had all along done their best to keep
Greece and Bulgaria from being carried away by the temptation to take
advantage of the situation.  This had been especially true in April and
May, during the period of Italian activity in the Ægean.

Turkey knew perfectly well, before the _pourparlers_ at Ouchy, what
were the Italian terms.  In March, when the five other Powers had
offered to mediate, Italy had laid down the following points: tacit
recognition of the Italian conquest and withdrawal of the Turkish army
from Africa; recognition by the Powers, if not by Turkey, of the decree
of annexation.  Italy promised, if this were done, to recognize the
Sultan as Khalif in the African provinces (this meant purely religious
sovereignty); to respect the religious liberty and customs of the
Moslem populations; to accord an amnesty to the Arabs; to guarantee to
the Ottoman Public Debt the obligations for which the customs-duties of
Tripoli had been mortgaged; to buy the properties owned by the Ottoman
Government; to guarantee, in accord with the other Powers, the
(future!) "integrity of the Ottoman Empire."  Turkey had refused these
terms, in spite of the pressure of the Powers at the Sublime Porte.
Then followed the loss of Rhodes and the other islands.

The first _pourparlers_ at Ouchy had been interrupted by the fall of
Saïd pasha.  They were resumed on August 12th by duly accredited
delegates.  After six weeks an accord was prepared, and sent to
Constantinople.  The ministry, although facing a war with the Balkan
States, tried to prolong the {260} negotiations.  Italy then addressed
an ultimatum on October 12th.  The Sublime Porte was doing its best to
prevent war with the Balkan States.  Italy was determined now to go to
any length to wring peace from her stubborn opponent.  For the Balkan
storm was breaking, and she wanted to get her ambassador back to
Constantinople to take part in the councils of the Great Powers.  The
continuance of a state of war with Turkey was never more clearly
against her interests.  When the ultimatum arrived, Turkey yielded.
The preliminaries of Ouchy were signed on October 15th.

There were two distinct parts to the Treaty of Lausanne, as it is
generally called.  In order to save the pride of Turkey, nothing was
said in the text of the treaty about a cession of territory.  Turkey
was not asked to recognize the Italian conquest.  The unofficial
portion of the treaty consisted of a _firman_, granting complete
autonomy to the African _vilayet_, and appointing a personal religious
representative of the Khalif, with functions purely nominal; and the
promise of amnesty and good administration to the Ægean Islands.

The text of the treaty provided for the cessation of hostilities; the
withdrawal of the Turkish army from Tripoli and Benghazi and the
withdrawal of the Italian army from the islands of the Ægean; the
resumption of commercial and diplomatic relations; and the assumption
by Italy of Tripoli's share of the Ottoman Public Debt.

Italy had no intention of fulfilling the spirit of the second clause of
this treaty, which was that the {261} islands occupied by her be
restored to Turkey.  The text of the treaty provided that the recall of
the Italian troops be subordinated to the recall of the Turkish troops
from Tripoli.  It was easy enough to quibble at a later time about the
meaning of "Turkish."  As long as there was opposition to the Italian
pacification, the opponents could be called Turkish.  Italy said that
the holding of the Dodecanese was a guarantee of Turkish good faith in
preventing the continuance secretly of armed opposition to her
subjugation of the new African colonies.  As long as an Arab held the
field against the Italian army, it could still be claimed that Turkey
had not fulfilled her side of the promise in Article 2.  At the moment,
Turkey was quite willing to see the Italians stay in the southern
islands of the Ægean.  For otherwise they would have inevitably fallen
into the hands of the Greeks when the Balkan War broke out.

Since the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the Italians have remained in
the Dodecanese.  Not only that, but they have used their position in
Rhodes to begin a propaganda of Italian economic influence in
south-western Asia Minor.  Before the present European war, Italy might
have found herself compelled to relinquish her hold on these islands.
But now her advantageous neutrality has put into her hands the cards by
which she can secure the acquiescence of Europe to the annexation of
Rhodes.

The outbreak of indignation in Turkey against Italy at the beginning of
the war was even more vehement than that against Austria-Hungary when
she had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908.  {262} Hussein Djahid bey,
in the _Tanine_, wrote an editorial, in which he said: "Never shall we
have any dealings with the Italians in the future.  Never shall a ship
bearing their flag find trade at an Ottoman port.  And we shall teach
our children, and tell them to teach their children, the reasons for
the undying hatred between Osmanli and Italian as long as history
lasts."  Having read the same sort of a thing in 1908, I was interested
in seeing just how long the hatred would last.  Just a year from the
day war was declared, and this editorial appeared, the Italian
ambassador returned on a warship to Constantinople, the Italian post
offices opened, and all my Italian friends began to reappear.  This is
told here to illustrate the fact that cannot be too strongly
emphasized: _there is no public opinion in Turkey_.

The chief importance of the year of "the war that was no war" is not in
the loss of Tripoli.  It is in the fact that the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire, secure since 1878, had been attacked _by violence_.
The example given by Italy was to be followed by the Balkan States.
What Europe had feared had come.  This war was the prelude to Europe in
arms.




{263}

CHAPTER XIV

THE WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY

During the year 1911 there had been a perceptible drawing together of
the Balkan States in the effort to find a common ground for an
offensive alliance against Turkey.  The path of union was very
difficult for the diplomats of the Balkan States to follow.  It was
clear to them in principle that they would never be able to oppose the
policy of the Young Turks separately.  They were not even sure whether
their united armies could triumph over the large forces which the
Ottoman Empire was able to put in the field, and which were reputed to
be well trained and disciplined.  This reputation was sustained by the
unanimous opinion of the military _attachés_ of the Great Powers at
Constantinople.  And then, there were the mutual antipathies to be
healed, and the problem of the terrible rivalry in Macedonia, of which
we have spoken before, to be solved.  Most formidable of all, was the
uncertainty as to the benefit to the different Balkan nations of a
successful war against Turkey.

It is impossible to explain here all the diplomatic {264} steps leading
up to the Balkan alliance against Turkey.  They have been set forth,
with much divergency of opinion, by a number of writers who were in
intimate touch with the diplomatic circles of the Balkan capitals
during the years immediately preceding the formation of the alliance.
We must confine ourselves to a statement of the general causes which
induced the Balkan States, against the better judgment of many of their
wisest leaders, to form the alliance, and to declare war upon Turkey.
Both Bulgaria and Greece had sentimental reasons; the terrible
persecution of the Christians of their own race in Macedonia seemed
cause enough for war.  But while Bulgaria had long held the thesis of
Macedonian autonomy, which was sustained by the Bulgarian Macedonians
themselves, Greece was afraid that the creation of such a _régime_
would in the end prove an irrevocable blow to Hellenistic aspirations.
It was well known to the Greeks that the population of Macedonia was
not only largely Bulgarian, but aggressively so, and that its sense of
nationality had been intelligently and skilfully awakened and fostered
by the educational propaganda.  Above all things Hellenism feared the
Bulgarian schools.  Under an autonomous _régime_ their influence could
not be combated.

The possibility of the Balkan alliance was really in the hands of
Greece.  For it was recognized that no matter how large and powerful an
army Bulgaria and Servia could raise, the co-operation of the Greek
navy, which would prevent the use of the Ægean ports of the Macedonian
littoral for disembarking {265} troops from Asia, was absolutely
essential to success.  In spite of their fears for the future of
Macedonia, the Greeks were converted to the idea of an alliance with
the Slavic Balkan States to destroy the power of Turkey by the
continual bullying of the Young Turks over Crete, and by the economic
disasters from the boycott.  It is not too much to say that the
attitude of the Young Turks towards the Cretan questions, and their
institution of the boycott, were two factors directly responsible for
the downfall of the Empire.

The visit of three hundred Bulgarian students to Athens in Easter week,
1911, should have been a warning to Turkey of the danger which attended
her policy of goading the Greeks to desperation.  I was present on the
Acropolis at the memorable reception given by the students of Athens to
their guests from the University of Sofia, and remember well the
peculiar political significance of the speeches of welcome addressed to
them there.  Later in the same year, Greece followed the example of the
other Balkan States in sending her Crown Prince to Sofia to join in the
festivities attendant upon the coming of age of Crown Prince Boris.

Bulgaria was drawn into the Balkan alliance, and reluctantly compelled
to abandon the policy of Macedonian autonomy, by the attitude of the
Young Turks toward Macedonians.  The settlement of immigrants from
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the conscription for the Turkish army, led
to reprisals on the part of Bulgarian bands.  These were followed by
massacres at Ishtib and elsewhere.  In the {266} first week of August,
1912, the massacre of Kotchana was for Bulgaria the last straw on the
camel's back.  I was in Sofia at the end of August when the national
congress, called together wholly without the Government's co-operation,
declared that war was a necessity.  Seated one evening in the public
garden at a café--if I remember rightly it was the 1st of September--I
heard from the lips of one of the influential delegates at this
congress that public opinion in Bulgaria was so wholly determined to
force war, that the King and the Cabinet would have to yield.

In Servia and Montenegro, it had long been recognized that any
opportunity to unite with Bulgaria and Greece to bring pressure to bear
upon Turkey could not but be beneficial to these two kingdoms.  There
was the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar to be divided between Montenegro and
Servia.  There was the possibility of an outlet to the Adriatic.  So
far as Macedonia was concerned, if we believe that she was honest and
sincere in the treaty of partition with Bulgaria, Servia was quite
content with the idea of a possible annexation of Old Servia, and the
opportunity to drive back the Moslem Albanians, who had been
established on her frontiers under the Young Turk _régime_, and were
ruthlessly destroying Slavs wherever they got the opportunity.

One does not have any hesitation in declaring that the political
leaders in power in the Balkan States at first hoped to avoid a war
with Turkey.  That they did not succeed in doing so was due to the
pressure of public sentiment upon them.  This public sentiment forced
them to action.  Every Balkan {267} Cabinet would have fallen had the
ministries remained advocates of peace.  Over against the fear of the
Turkish army, which (let me say it emphatically) was very strong among
the military authorities in each of the Balkan States, was the feeling
that the time was very favourable to act, and that chances of success
in a common war against Turkey were greater in the autumn of 1912 than
they would be later; for the Young Turks were spending tremendous sums
of money on army reorganization.  At that moment, they were coming to
the end of a demoralizing war with Italy, and the Macedonian army had
suffered greatly during the summer by the Albanian uprising.

Early in September, Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro decided
that peace could be preserved only by the actual application, under
sufficient guarantees, of sweeping reforms in Macedonia.  They appealed
to the Powers to sustain them in demanding for Macedonia a provincial
assembly, a militia recruited within the limits of the province, and a
Christian Governor.  The Great Powers, as usual, tried to carry water
on both shoulders.  Blind to the fact that inaction and vague promises
would no longer keep in check the neighbours of Turkey, they urged the
Balkan States to refrain from "being insistent," and pointed out to
Turkey the "advisability" of making concessions.  The Turks did not
believe in the reality of the union of the Balkan States.  They could
not conceive upon what grounds their neighbours had succeeded in
forming an alliance.  Neither the Balkan States nor Turkey had {268}
any respect for the threats or promises or offers of assistance of the
Powers.

In order to convince the Balkan States that they had better think twice
before making a direct ultimatum, the Turks organized autumn manoeuvres
north of Adrianople, in which fifty thousand of the _élite_ army corps
were to take part.  The answer of the Balkan States was an order for
general mobilization issued simultaneously in the four capitals.  This
was on September 30th.  The next day Turkey began to mobilize.  All the
Greek ships in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were seized.
Munitions of war, disembarked at Salonika for Servia, were confiscated.
It was not until then that it began to dawn upon Turkey and her
sponsors, the Great Powers, that the Balkan States meant business.  The
questions of reforms in Macedonia had been so long the prerogative of
the Powers that they did not realize that the moment had come when the
little Balkan States, whom they called "troublesome," were no longer
going to be put off with promises.  The absolute failure of concerted
European diplomacy to accomplish anything in the Ottoman Empire was
demonstrated from the results in Macedonia, and also in Crete.

So the Balkan States were not in the proper frame of mind to receive
the joint note on the _status quo_, which will remain famous in the
annals of European diplomacy as a demonstration of the futility of
concerted diplomatic action, when there is no genuine unity behind it.
On the morning of October 8th, the ministers of Russia and Austria,
acting in the {269} name of the six "Great Powers," handed in at Sofia,
Athens, Belgrade, and Cettinje, the following note:


"The Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments declare to the Balkan
States:

"1. That the Powers condemn energetically every measure capable of
leading to a rupture of peace;

"2. That, supporting themselves on Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin,
they will take in hand, in the interest of the populations, the
realization of the reforms in the administration of European Turkey, on
the understanding that these reforms will not diminish the sovereignty
of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the territorial integrity of the
Ottoman Empire; this declaration reserves, also, the liberty of the
Powers for the collective and ulterior study of the reforms;

"3. That if, in spite of this note, war does break out between the
Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire, they will not admit, at the end
of the conflict, any modification in the territorial _status quo_ in
European Turkey.

"The Powers will make collectively to the Sublime Porte the steps which
the preceding declaration makes necessary."


The shades of San Stefano, Berlin, Cyprus, and Egypt, Armenian
massacres, Mitylene and Mürszteg, Bagdad railway, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Tripoli, and Rhodes, haunted this declaration, and made it impotent,
honest effort though it was to preserve the peace of Europe.  It was
thirty-six years too late.

For, one hour after it was delivered, the _chargé {270} d'affaires_ of
the Montenegrin legation at Constantinople, evidently as a result of an
anticipation of a joint note from the Powers, left at the Sublime Porte
the following memorable declaration of war:


"In conformity with the authorization of King Nicholas, I have the
honour of informing you that I shall leave Constantinople to-day.  The
Government of Montenegro breaks off all relations with the Ottoman
Empire, leaving to the fortunes of arms of the Montenegrins the
recognition of their rights and of the rights scorned through centuries
of their brothers of the Ottoman Empire.

"I leave Constantinople.

"The royal government will give to the Ottoman representative at
Cettinje his passports.

"October 8, 1912.  PLAMENATZ."


There could no longer be any doubt of the trend of things.  Inevitable
result, this declaration of war, of the action of Italy one year
before, just as the action of Italy harked back to Russian action in
the Caucasus, British action in Egypt, Austrian action in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and French action in Morocco.  Inevitable
precursor, this declaration of war, of the European catastrophe of
1914.  Who, then, is presumptuous enough to maintain that the cause is
simple, and the blame all at one door?  Europe is reaping in blood-lust
what _all_ the "Great Powers" have sown in land-lust.

The chancelleries made strenuous efforts to nullify what their inspired
organs called the "blunder," or the "hasty and inconsiderate action,"
of King Nicholas.  There was feverish activity in Constantinople, {271}
and a continual exchange of conferences between the embassies and the
Sublime Porte.  The ambassadors gravely handed in a common note, in
which they offered to avert war by taking in hand themselves the
long-delayed reforms.  Had they forgotten the institution of the
_gendarmerie_ in 1903, and Hussein Hilmi pasha at Salonika?

On this same day, the Montenegrin ex-minister at Constantinople, whose
declaration of war had been so theatrical, was reported as having said
at Bukarest on his way home, "Montenegro wants territorial
aggrandizements, and will not give back whatever conquests she makes.
We do not fear to cross the will of the Great Powers, for they do not
worry us."  These words express exactly the sentiments of the other
allies, both as regards their possible conquests and their attitude
towards the _dictum_ of the Powers.

Events moved rapidly during the next ten days.  On October 13th, the
Balkan States responded to the Russo-Austrian note, thanking the Powers
for their generous offices, but declaring that they had come to the end
of their patience in the matter of Turkish promises for Macedonian
reform, and were going to request of the Ottoman Government that it
accord "without delay the reforms that have been demanded, and that it
promise to apply them in six months, with the help of the Great Powers,
and of the Balkan States whose interests are involved."  This response
was not only a refusal of mediation.  It was an assertion, as the last
words show, that the time had come when the Balkan States felt strong
{272} enough to claim a part in the management of their own affairs.

Acting in accordance with this notification to the Powers, on October
14th, Servia, Greece, and Bulgaria demanded of Turkey the autonomy of
the European provinces, under Christian governors; the occupation of
the provinces by the allied armies while the reforms were being
applied; the payment of an indemnity for the expenses of mobilization;
the immediate demobilization of Turkey; and the promise that the
reforms would be effected within six months.  The demand was in the
character of an ultimatum, and forty-eight hours were given for a
response.

It was now evident that unless the Powers could compel the Balkan
States to withdraw this sweeping claim, war would be inevitable.  For
no independent state could accept such a demand, and retain its
self-respect.  The representatives of Turkey at Belgrade and Athens
were quite right in refusing to receive the note and transmit it to
Constantinople.

The Sublime porte did not answer directly the ultimatum of the allies.
An effort was made to anticipate the Balkan claims, and get the Powers
to intervene, by reviving the law of reform for the _vilayets_, which
provided for the organization of communes and schools, the building of
roads, and the limitation of military service to the _vilayet_ or
recruitment.  But the fact that this law had been on the statute books
since 1880, and had remained throughout the Empire a dead letter, gave
little hope that it would be seriously applied now.

{273}

On October 15th, fighting began on the Serbo-Turkish frontier.  The war
had already brought about Turkish reverses at the hands of the
Montenegrins.  Greece threw an additional defiance in the face of
Turkey by admitting the Cretan deputies to the Greek legislative
chamber.

To gain time, for she was unprepared, and her mobilization progressing
very slowly, Turkey made desperate efforts to delay the declaration of
war by offering to treat at Sofia, on the basis of a cessation of
Moslem immigration into Macedonia, and the suspension of enrolment of
Christians in Moslem regiments.  These points, as we have already
shown, were the two principal reasons why the Bulgarians of Macedonia
had changed their policy from autonomy to independence.  But Bulgaria,
feeling that cause for hesitation over a war of liberation had been
removed by her secret partition treaty with Servia, remained obdurate.

Then the Turkish diplomats turned their attention to Athens, and tried
to detach the Greeks from the alliance by agreeing to recognize the
annexation of Crete to Greece, and promising an autonomous government
for some of the Ægean Islands.  This failed.  But, to the very last,
the Turks believed that Greece might stay out of the war.  For this
reason her representative at Athens was instructed to do all in his
power to remain at his post, even if war were declared by the Sublime
Porte on Bulgaria and Servia.

Peace was hurriedly concluded with Italy at Ouchy on October 15th.  On
the 16th, when the {274} forty-eight hours of the ultimatum had
expired, and there was no answer from Turkey, every one expected a
declaration of war from the allies.  None came.  On the 18th, to
preserve her dignity, Turkey saw that she must be the one to act.  It
was no longer possible to wait until the allies were "good and ready"!
She declared war on Bulgaria and Servia.  Greece waited till afternoon
to receive a similar declaration.  None came.  So Greece declared war
on Turkey.



THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR

While the diplomats were still agitating and blustering, while Turkey
was procrastinating and trying to put off the evil day, and while the
larger Balkan States were quietly completing their mobilization,
Montenegro entered into action.  On October 9th, the day following her
declaration of war, the Montenegrins entered the _sandjak_ of Novi
Bazar, and surrounded the frontier fortress of Berana.  This was
captured after six days of fighting.  On the same day, Biepolje fell.
Nearly one thousand prisoners, fourteen cannon, and a large number of
rifles and stores were captured by the Montenegrins.  In the meantime,
two other Montenegrin columns had marched southward, reached San
Giovanni di Medua, at the mouth of the Boyana, and cut Scutari off from
the sea.  Scutari was invested, but the Montenegrins, who had been able
to put into the field scarcely more than thirty thousand men, found
themselves mobilized for the entire winter.  The {275} great fortress
of Tarabosh, a high mountain, towering over the town of Scutari and the
lower end of the lake, was too strong for their forces and for their
artillery.  Inside the city of Scutari, it was the Albanians fighting
for their national life, and not the Turks, who organized and
maintained the splendid and protracted resistance.

The mobilization in the other Balkan States was not completed until the
18th, when the declaration of war was made on both sides.

Most important of the foes of Turkey were the Bulgarians, whose
military organization had for some years been attracting the admiration
of all who had been privileged to see their manoeuvres and to visit
their casernes.  Bulgaria had been carefully and secretly preparing her
mobilization long before the crisis became acute.  I had the privilege
of travelling in Bulgaria during the last two weeks of July, and of
spending the month of August along the frontier between Thrace and
Bulgaria.  Everywhere one could see the accumulation of the soldiers of
the standing army already on war footing, and of military stores, at a
number of different places.  During August and September, every detail
of the mobilization had been carefully arranged.  When war was
declared, Bulgaria had four armies with a total effective of over three
hundred thousand.  Three of them were quickly massed on the frontier,
fully equipped.  No army has ever entered the field under better
auspices.

On the day of the declaration of war, the Czar Ferdinand issued a
proclamation to his troops which {276} clearly defined the issue.  It
was to be a war of liberation, a crusade, undertaken to free the
brothers of blood and faith from the yoke of Moslem oppression.  In
summing up, the Czar said: "In this struggle of the Cross against the
Crescent, of liberty against tyranny, we shall have the sympathy of all
those who love justice and progress."  At the time, bitter criticism
was directed against the Czar for having used words which brought out
so sharply the religious issue.  The proclamation of a _crusade_ could
bring forth on the other side the response of a _djehad_ (holy war).
This, above all things, was what the European Powers wished to avoid;
for they feared not only that it would make the war more bitter and
more cruel between the opponents in the field, but that it would awaken
a wave of fanaticism among the Moslems living under European control in
Asia and in Africa.  How many lessons will it need to teach Europe that
the political menace of Pan-Islamism is a phantom, a myth!

According to the plan adopted by the allied States, the offensive
movement in Thrace, in which the bulk of the Turkish army would be met,
was to be undertaken solely by Bulgaria.  Only a Bulgarian army of
secondary importance was to enter eastern Macedonia, to protect the
flank of the main Bulgarian army from a sudden eastward march of the
Turkish Macedonian army.  Its objective point, though not actually
agreed upon, was to be Serres.

The rôle of Servia and Greece, who in the general mobilization were
expected to put about one hundred and fifty thousand troops each into
the field, was {277} to keep in check the Turkish army in Macedonia,
and to prevent Albanian reinforcements from reaching the Turkish army
in Thrace.  In addition to this, Servia and Montenegro were expected to
prevent the possible surprise of Austrian interference, while the fleet
of Greece would perform the absolutely necessary service of preventing
the passage of Turkish forces from Asia Minor to a Macedonian port.

The allies expected a bitter struggle and, in Macedonia and Thrace at
least, the successful opposition of a Turkish offensive, rather than
the destruction of the Turkish armies.

The mobilization in Turkey was described by many newspaper men who had
come to Constantinople for the war in the most glowing terms.  The
efforts of Mahmud Shevket pasha to prepare the Turkish army for war
were declared to be bearing splendid fruits in the first days of the
mobilization.  Wholly inaccurate accounts were written of the wonderful
enthusiasm of the Turkish people for the war.  Naturally, what even the
residents of Constantinople saw at the beginning was the best foot
front.  We knew that tremendous sums had been expended for four years
in bringing the army up to a footing of efficiency.  We had seen with
our own eyes the brilliant manoeuvres on the anniversary of the
Sultan's accession in May, and on the anniversary of the Constitution
in July.  The work accomplished by the German mission had cast its
spell over us.  We saw what we were expecting to see during the first
days of the mobilization.  The "snap {278} judgments" of special
correspondents have little value, other than freshness and _naïveté_,
except to readers even less informed than they are.  But the East is a
sphinx even to those who live there.  After you have figured out, from
what you call your "experience," what _ought_ to happen, the chances
are even that just the opposite comes true.  In spite of the misgivings
which had been awakened by a trip into the interior of Asia Minor, as
far as Konia, during the third week of September, I believed that the
Turkish army was going to give a good account of itself against the
Bulgarians, whose spirit and whose organization I had had opportunity
to see and admire during that very summer.

Every one was mistaken.  There were large bodies of splendidly trained
and well-equipped troops in Thrace.  Spick and span regiments did come
over from garrison towns in Asia.  We saw them fill the trains at
Stambul and at San Stefano.  But we over-estimated their number.  The
truth of the matter is that the _trained_ and _well-equipped_ forces of
the Thracian army, officered by capable men, did not amount to more
than eighty thousand.  In retrospect, after going over carefully the
position of the forces which met the Bulgarians, I feel that these
figures can be pretty accurately established.  But even these eighty
thousand soldiers of the _nizam_ (active army) could have done wonders
in the Thracian campaign, if they had been allowed to go ahead to meet
the Bulgarians, and to form the first line of battle.  But this was not
done.

There are three time-honoured principles that {279} cannot afford to be
neglected at the beginning of a campaign.  The army used for _initial_
offensive action against the enemy should be composed _wholly_ of
soldiers in active service.  The army should be concentrated to meet
the attack, or to attack one opposing army first, leaving the others
until later.  Armies must be kept mobile, and not allow themselves to
be trapped in fortresses.  The fortresses in the portions of territory
which may have to be abandoned temporarily to the invasion of the enemy
may easily be overstocked with defenders, but never with provisions and
munitions of war.  In spite of the instructions of von der Goltz pasha,
the Turks showed no regard for the first two, at least, of these
elementary principles.  The mobile army in Macedonia, outside of the
fortresses, was not recalled to Thrace, and _redifs_ (reservists) were
mixed with _nizams_ (actives) in the first line of battle.  The neglect
of these principles was the direct cause of the Turkish disasters.

After the _nizams_, most of whom were already in Thrace, came the
_redifs_ from Asia Minor.  They arrived at Constantinople and at San
Stefano in huge numbers, and without equipment.  I saw many of them
with their feet bound in rags.  There were no tents over them or other
shelter; there was no proper field equipment for them, and, even while
they were patiently waiting for days to be forwarded to the front, they
lacked (within sight of the minarets of Stambul!) bread to eat, shoes
for their feet, and blankets to cover them at night.  More than that,
among them were many thousands who did {280} not know how to use the
rifles that were given to them, and who had not even a rudimentary
military education.  In defensive warfare, as they proved at Adrianople
and at Tchatalja, they could fight like lions.  But for an offensive
movement in the field the great majority of the _redifs_ were worse
than useless.

The Turks were absolutely sure of victory.  The press of the capital,
on the day that war was declared, stated that the army of Thrace was
composed of four hundred thousand soldiers, and that it was the
intention to march direct to Sofia.  Turkish officers of my
acquaintance told me that they were all taking their dress uniforms in
their baggage for this triumphal entry into Sofia, and that the
invasion of Bulgaria would commence immediately.

On the 19th of October, the Bulgarian army appeared in force at Mustafa
Pasha, the first railway station after passing the Turkish frontier on
the line from Sofia to Constantinople, and about eighteen miles
north-west of Adrianople.  It was the announced intention of the
Bulgarians to attack immediately the fortress of Adrianople, whose
cannon commanded the sole railway line from Bulgaria into Thrace.  Two
of the Bulgarian armies were directed upon Adrianople, and the third
army under General Dimitrieff received similar orders.  In Bulgaria, as
well as in Turkey, every one expected to see an attack upon Adrianople.
Had not General Savoff declared openly that he would sacrifice fifty
thousand men, if necessary, as the Japanese had done at Fort Arthur, in
order to capture Adrianople?

{281}

A strict censorship was established in Bulgaria.  No one, native or
foreigner, who by chance saw just what the armies were doing, could
have any hope of sending out the information.  Postal and telegraphic
communications were in the hands of the military authorities.  No one,
who happened to be in the region in which the troops were moving
forward, was allowed to leave by train, automobile, bicycle, or even on
foot.  Never in history has the world been so completely in the dark as
to the operations of the army.  But the attacks of the outposts of
Adrianople, and the commencement of the bombardment of the forts,
seemed to indicate the common objective of the three Bulgarian armies.
Adrianople had the reputation of being one of the strongest fortresses
in the world.  This reputation was well justified.

Some miles to the east of Adrianople, guarding the mountains of the
south-eastern frontier of Bulgaria, was Kirk Kilissé, which was also
supposed to be an impregnable position.  Here the Ottoman military
authorities had placed stores to form the base of supplies for the
offensive military operation against Bulgaria.  Shortly before the war,
a branch railway from the sole line between Constantinople and
Adrianople, going north from Lulé Burgas, was completed.  It furnished
direct means of communication between the capital and Kirk Kilissé.

The General Staff at Constantinople wisely decided to leave in
Adrianople only a sufficient garrison to defend the forts and the city.
It was their intention to send the bulk of their Thracian army {282}
north-west from Kirk Kilissé, using that fortress as a base, in order
to cut off the Bulgarians from their supplies, and throw them back
against the forts of Adrianople.  In this way they intended to put the
Bulgarians between two fires and crush them.  Then they would commence
the invasion of Bulgaria.  The plan was excellent.  If Turkey had
actually had in the field a half million men well trained and well
equipped, well officered and with a spirit of enthusiasm, and--most
important of all--properly fed, it is probable that the Bulgarians
could have been held in check.  But this army did not exist.  The
millions spent for equipment had disappeared--who knows where?  There
were not enough horses, even with the requisitions in Constantinople,
for the artillery, and for the cavalry reserves.  That meant that there
were no horses at all for the commissary department.  The only means of
communication with the front was a single railway track.  Roads had
never been made in Thrace since the conquest.  The artillery and the
waggons had to be drawn through deep mud.

Beyond the needs of the _nizam_ (active) regiments, there were hardly
any officers.  The wretched masses of _redifs_ (reservists) were
without proper leadership.  Not only was this all important factor for
keeping up the _morale_ of the soldiers lacking, but, from the moment
they left Constantinople--even before that--there was insufficient
food.  Nor did the soldiers know why they were fighting.  There was no
enthusiasm for a cause.  The great mass of the civil population, if
not, like the Christians, hostile to the army, {283} was wholly
indifferent.  I do not believe there were ten thousand people in the
city of Constantinople, who really cared what happened in Thrace.
Since I have been in the midst of a mobilization in France, and have
seen how the French soldiers are equipped for war and fed, and how they
have been made to feel that every man, woman, and child in the nation
was ready to make any sacrifice--no matter how great--for "the little
soldiers of France," I feel more deeply the tragedy of the Turkish
_redifs_.  My wonder is that they were able to fight as bravely as they
did.  The world has no use for the government--for the "system"--which
caused them to suffer as they did, and to give their lives in a wholly
useless sacrifice.

The story of the Thracian campaign I heard from the lips of many of
those who had taken part in it, when the events were still fresh in
their memory.  It is fruitless to go into all the details, to discuss
the strategy of the generals in command, and to give a technical
description of the battles, and of the retreat.  Turkish and Bulgarian
officers, as well as a host of foreign correspondents, have published
books on this campaign.  Most of them hide the real causes of the
defeat under a mass of unimportant detail, and seem to be written
either to emphasize the writer's claim as a "first-hand" witness, to
take to task certain generals, or to prove the superiority of French
artillery, and the faultiness of German military instruction.  When all
these issues are cast to one side, the campaign can be briefly
described.

We have already anticipated the _débâcle_ of the military power of
Turkey by giving the causes.  {284} This is not illogical.  For these
causes existed, and led to the inevitable result, before the first gun
was fired.

On October 19th, the Bulgarians began the investment of Adrianople from
the north and west.  There was no serious opposition.  The Turkish
garrison naturally fell back to the protection of the forts, for the
Turks had not planned to oppose, beyond Adrianople, the Bulgarian
approach.  The Ottoman advance-guard, composed of the corps of
Constantinople and Rodosto, under the command of Abdullah and Mahmud
Mukhtar pashas, was ordered to take the offensive north of Kirk
Kilissé.  They were to be followed by another army.  This movement was
intended to cut off the Bulgarians from their base of supplies, and
throw them back on Adrianople.  The remainder of the Turkish forces in
Thrace were to wait the result of this movement.  If the Bulgarians
moved down the valley of the Maritza, leaving Adrianople, they would
meet these imposing forces which covered Constantinople, and would have
behind them the garrison of Adrianople, and the army of Abdullah and
Mahmud Mukhtar threatening their communications.  If they besieged
Adrianople, the second army would take the offensive and the Bulgarians
would be encircled.

The outposts of the Turkish army came into contact with the Bulgarians
on October 20th.  Believing that they had to do with the left of the
army investing Adrianople, Mahmud and Abdullah decided to begin
immediately their encircling movement.  On the 21st and 22d, the two
columns of the Turkish {285} army were in fact engaged with the
advance-guards of the first and second Bulgarian armies.  But, in the
meantime, General Dimitrieff and the third army (which they believed
was on the extreme Bulgarian right, pressing down the Maritza to invest
the southern forts of Adrianople) had quietly crossed the frontier
almost directly north of Kirk Kilissé, and fell like a cyclone upon the
Turks.  The Turkish positions were excellent, and had to be taken at
the point of the bayonet.  From morning till night on October 23d, the
Bulgarian third army captured position after position, without the help
of their artillery, which was stuck in the mud some miles in the rear.
In the evening, during a terrible storm, two fresh Bulgarian columns
made an assault upon the Turkish positions.  It was not until then that
the Turks realized that they were fighting another army than that
charged with the investment of Adrianople.  A wild panic broke out
among the _redifs_, who were mostly without officers.  They started to
retreat, and were soon followed by the remainder of the army.  At
Uskubdere, they met during the night reinforcements coming to their
aid.  Two regiments fired on each other, mutually mistaking the other
for Bulgarians.  The reinforcements joined in the disorderly retreat,
which did not end until morning, when, exhausted and still crazed by
fear, what remained of the Turkish army had reached Eski Baba and Bunar
Hissar.

The army was saved from annihilation by the darkness and the storm.
For not only were the Bulgarians ignorant of the abandonment of Kirk
{286} Kilissé, but, along the line where they knew the enemy were
retreating, their cavalry could not advance in the darkness and mud,
nor could their artillery shell the retreating columns.  On the morning
of the 24th, when General Dimitrieff was preparing to make the assault
upon Kirk Kilissé, he learned that the Turkish army had fled, and that
the fortress was undefended.

By the capture of Kirk Kilissé the Bulgarians gained enormous stores.
They had a railway line open to them towards Constantinople.  The only
menace to a successful investment of Adrianople was removed.  The
victory, so easily purchased, was far beyond their dreams.  But it
would not have been possible had it not been for the willingness of the
Bulgarian soldiers to charge without tiring or faltering at the point
of the bayonet.  The victory was earned, in spite of the Turkish panic.
For the Bulgarian steel had much to do with that panic.

As soon as he realized the extent of the victory of Kirk Kilissé,
General Savoff ordered a general advance of the three Bulgarian armies.
Only enough troops were left around Adrianople to prevent a sortie of
the garrison.  Notwithstanding the unfavourable condition of the roads,
the Bulgarian armies moved with great rapidity.  The cavalry in two
days made reconnaissances on the east as far as Midia, and on the south
as far as Rodosto.  The main--and sole--armies of the Turks were thus
ascertained to be along the Ergene, and beyond in the direction of the
capital.  On the left, the third army of General Dimitrieff, not
delaying at Kirk Kilissé, was in contact with the {287} Turks at Eski
Baba on the 28th.  On the afternoon of the same day the Bulgarians
drove the Turks out of the village of Lulé Burgas, on the railway to
Constantinople, east of the point where the Dedeagatch-Salonika line
branches off.

For three days, October 29-31, the Turkish armies made a stand along
the Ergene from Bunar Hissar to Lulé Burgas.  Since Gettysburg, Sadowa,
and Sedan, no battle except that of Mukden has approached the battle of
Lulé Burgas in importance, not only because of the numbers engaged, but
also of the issue at stake.  Three hundred and fifty thousand soldiers
were in action, the forces being about evenly divided.  For two days,
in spite of the demonstration of Kirk Kilissé, the Turks fought with
splendid courage and tenacity.  Time and again the desperate charges of
the Bulgarian infantry were hurled back with heavy loss.  Not until the
third day did the fighting seem to lean decisively to the advantage of
the Bulgarians.  Their artillery began to show marked superiority.
From many points shells began to fall with deadly effect into the
Turkish entrenchments.  The Turks were unable to silence the murderous
fire of the Bulgarian batteries.  The soldiers, _because they were
starving_, did not have it in them to attempt to take the most
troublesome Bulgarian positions by assault.

The retreat began on the afternoon of the 31st.  On November 1st, owing
to lack of officers and of central direction, it became a disorderly
flight, a _sauve qui peut_.  Camp equipment was abandoned.  The
soldiers threw away their knapsacks and rifles, {288} so that they
could run more quickly.  The artillery-men cut the traces of their
gun-wagons and ammunition-wagons, and made off on horseback.
Everything was abandoned to the enemy.  Nazim pasha, generalissimo, and
the general staff, who had been in headquarters at Tchorlu, without
proper telegraphic or telephonic communication with the battle front,
were drawn into the flight.  The Turkish army did not stop until it had
placed itself behind the Tchatalja line of forts, which protected the
city of Constantinople.

The battle of Lulé Burgas marked more than the destruction of the
Turkish military power and the loss of European Turkey to the Empire.
It revealed the inefficiency of Turkish organization and administration
to cope with modern conditions, even when in possession of modern
instruction and modern tools.  With the Turks, it is not a question of
an ignorance or a backwardness which can be remedied.  Total lack of
organizing and administrative ability is a fault of their nature.
Courage alone does not win battles in the twentieth century.

The Bulgarians were without sufficient cavalry and mounted machine-guns
to follow up their victory.  The defeat of the Turks, too, had not been
gained without the expenditure of every ounce of energy in the army
that had in those three days won undying fame.  The problem of pursuit
was difficult.  There was only a single railway track.  Food and
munitions for the large army had to be brought up.  The artillery
advanced painfully through roads hub-deep in mud.  It took two weeks
for the Bulgarian {289} army to move from the Ergene to Tchatalja, and
prepare for the assault of the last line of Turkish defence.

An immediate offensive after Lulé Burgas would have found
Constantinople at the mercy of the victorious army.  The two weeks of
respite changed the aspect of things.  For in this time the forts
across the peninsula from the Sea of Marmora to the Black Sea were
hastily repaired.  They were mounted with guns from the Bosphorus
defences, the Servian Creusots detained at Salonika at the beginning of
the war, and whatever artillery could be brought from Asia Minor.  The
army had been reformed, the worthless, untrained elements ruthlessly
weeded out, and a hundred thousand of the best soldiers, among whom the
only _redifs_ were those who had come fresh from Asia Minor, and had
not been contaminated by the demoralization of Kirk Kilissé and Lulé
Burgas, were placed behind the forts.  The Turkish cruisers whose guns
were able to be fired were recalled from the Dardanelles, and anchored
off the end of the line on either side.

On November 15th, the Bulgarians began to put their artillery in
position all along the Tchatalja line from Buyuk-Tchekmedje on the Sea
of Marmora to Derkos Lake, near the Black Sea.  At the same time, they
entrenched the artillery positions by earthworks and ditches, working
with incredible rapidity.  For they had to take every precaution
against a sudden sortie of the enemy.  In forty-eight hours they were
ready.

The attack on the Tchatalja lines commenced {290} at six o'clock on
Sunday morning, November 17th, by machine-gun and rifle fire as well as
by artillery.  The forts and the Turkish cruisers responded.  In the
city and in the villages along the Bosphorus we could hear the firing
distinctly.  On the 17th and 18th, the Bulgarians delivered assaults in
several places.  Near Derkos they even got through the lines for a
short while.  These were merely for the purpose of testing the Turkish
positions, however.  Several of the assaults were repulsed.  The
Bulgarians suffered heavily on the 18th, when the first and only
prisoners of the war were made.  On the 19th, the artillery fire grew
less and less, and there were no further attacks.  Towards evening it
was evident that the Bulgarians had abandoned their advanced lines, and
did not intend to continue the attack.  No general assault had been
delivered.

It seems certain that General Savoff had in mind the capture of
Constantinople on November 17th.  Turkish overtures for peace, opened
on the 15th, had been repulsed.  Every preparation was made for the
attempt to pierce Tchatalja.  Why was the plan abandoned before it was
actually proven impossible?  Did General Savoff fear the risk of a
reverse?  Was he short of ammunition?  Had the Turkish defence of the
17th and 18th been more determined than he had expected?  Was it fear
of a cholera epidemic among his soldiers?  Or was the abandonment of
the attempt to capture Constantinople for that is what a triumph at
Tchatalja would have meant, dictated by political reasons?

Perhaps there was a shortage of ammunition.  {291} But it is impossible
to believe that General Savoff ceased the attack because he feared a
failure, or because he paused before the heavy sacrifice of life it
would involve.  The Bulgarians were too fresh from their sudden and
overwhelming victories to be halted by the unimportant fighting of the
17th and 18th.  They were not yet aware of the terrible danger from
cholera.

At the time it was the common belief in Constantinople--I heard it
expressed in a number of intelligent circles--that the Great Powers--in
particular Russia--had informed Bulgaria that she should halt where she
was.  A second San Stefano!  This seems improbable.  Even in the moment
of delirium over Lulé Burgas, the Bulgarians had no thought of
occupying permanently Constantinople.  They knew that this would be a
task beyond their ability as a nation to undertake.  If there was a
thought of entering Constantinople, it was to satisfy military pride,
and to be able to dictate more expeditiously and satisfactorily terms
of peace.

The real reason for the halt of Tchatalja, and the willingness to
conclude an armistice, must be found in the alarm awakened in Bulgaria
by the Servian and Greek successes.  Greece had settled herself in
Salonika, and the King and royal family had come there to live.  Is it
merely a coincidence that _on November 18th_ the Servians captured
Monastir, _foyer_ of Bulgarianism in western Macedonia, and _on the
following day_, a telegram from Sofia caused the cessation of the
Bulgarian attack upon Tchatalja?

{292}

At Adrianople, a combined Bulgarian and Servian army, under the command
of General Ivanoff, which had been hampered during the first month of
operations by the floods of the Maritza, and by daring sorties of the
garrison, after receiving experienced reinforcements on November 22d,
began a determined bombardment and narrow investment of the forts.  Ten
days later, a general attack was ordered, probably to hurry the Turks
in the armistice negotiations.  The investing army had made very little
progress on December 2d and 3d, when the signing of the armistice
caused a cessation of hostilities.

But while the Bulgarians were vigorously pressing the attack upon
Adrianople, they were inactive at Tchatalja.

At the beginning of the Thracian campaign, a portion of the Turkish
fleet started to attack the Bulgarian coast.  The Bulgarians had only
one small cruiser and six torpedo-boats of doubtful value.  But their
two ports, termini of railway lines, were well protected by forts.  On
October 19th, two Turkish battleships and four torpedo-boats appeared
before Varna, and fired without effect upon the forts.  Then they
bombarded the small open port of Kavarna, near the Rumanian frontier.
On the 21st, they succeeded in throwing a few shells into Varna, but
did not risk approaching near enough to do serious damage.  This was
the extent of the offensive naval action against Bulgaria.  A short
time later, the _Hamidieh_, which was stationed on the Thracian coast
of the Black Sea to protect the landing of _redifs_ from Samsun, was
surprised in the night by {293} Bulgarian torpedo-boats.  Two torpedoes
tore holes in her bow.  She was able to return to Constantinople under
her own steam, but had to spend ten weeks in dry-dock.  The only
service rendered by the Turkish fleet against the Bulgarians was the
safeguarding of the transport of troops from Black Sea ports of Asiatic
Turkey, and the co-operation at the ends of the Tchatalja lines during
the Bulgarian assaults of November 17th and 18th.

The Servian campaign was a good second to the astounding successes of
the Bulgarians in Thrace.  The third army entered the _sandjak_ of Novi
Bazar, so long coveted by Servia, and expelled the Turks in five days.
A portion of this army next occupied Prisrend and Diakova, descended
the valley of the Drin through the heart of northern Albania to
Alessio, where it joined on November 19th the Montenegrins, who were
already at San Giovanni di Medua.  On the 28th, they occupied Durazzo.
The Servians had reached the Adriatic!

While the third army was in the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar, the second
Servian army crossed into Old Servia, passed through the plain of
Kossova, where the Turks had destroyed the independence of Servia in
1389, and occupied Pristina on October 23d.  This gave them control of
the branch railway from Uskub to the confines of the _sandjak_.

The flower of the Servian fighting strength was reserved for the first
army under the command of Crown Prince Alexander.  This force,
considerably larger than the two other armies combined, mustered over
seventy thousand.  Its objective point was {294} Uskub, covering which
was the strong Turkish army of Zekki pasha.  Battle was joined outside
of Kumanova on October 22d.  After three days of fighting, during which
the Turkish cavalry was annihilated by the Servian artillery and the
Servian infantry took the Turkish artillery positions at the point of
the bayonet, the army of Zekki Pasha evacuated Kumanova.  No attempt
was made to defend Uskub, which the Servians entered on October 26th.
The Turkish army retreated to Küprülü on the Vardar, towards Salonika.
When the Servians continued their march, Zekki pasha retreated to
Prilip, where he occupied positions that could not well be shelled by
artillery.  After two days of continuous fighting, the Servians'
bayonets dislodged the Turks.  They withdrew to Monastir with the
Servians hot upon their heels.

Together with Kumanova, in which the bulk of Prince Alexander's forces
did not find it necessary to engage, the capture of Monastir is the
most brilliant feat of an army whose intrepidity, agility, and
intelligence deserve highest praise.  Into Monastir had been thrown the
army of Tahsin pasha, pushed northward by the Greeks, as well as that
of Zekki pasha, harried southward by the Servians.  The Servians did
not hesitate to approach the defences of the city on one side up to
their arm-pits in water, while on the other side they scaled the
heights dominating Monastir--heights which ought to have been defended
for weeks without great difficulty.  The Turks were compelled to
withdraw, for they were at the mercy of the Servian artillery.  They
tried to {295} retreat to Okrida, but the Servian left wing anticipated
this movement.  Only ten thousand escaped into Epirus.  Nearly forty
thousand Turks surrendered to the Servians on November 18th.  Monastir
and Okrida were captured.  The Turkish armies of Macedonia had ceased
to exist.

The Greeks were eager to wipe out the shame of the war of 1897.
Fifteen years had wrought a great difference in the _morale_ of the
Greek army.  A new body of officers, who spent their time in learning
their profession instead of in discussing politics at _café terrasses_,
had been created.  The French military mission, under General Eydoux,
had been working for several years in the complete reorganization of
the Greek army.  I had the privilege at Athens of enjoying the
hospitality of Greek officers in their casernes at several successive
Easter festivals.  Each year one could notice the progress.  They were
always ready to show you how the transformation of their artillery, and
its equipment for mountain service as well as for field work, would
make all the difference in the world in the "approaching" war with the
Turks.  The results were beyond expectations.  What the Greeks had been
working for was mobility.  This they demonstrated that they had
learned.  They had also an _esprit de corps_ which, in fighting, made
up for what they lacked of Slavic dogged perseverance.  Neither in
actual combat, nor in strategy, with the exception of Janina, were the
Greeks put to the test, or called upon to bear the burden, of the
Bulgarians and Servians.  But, especially when we take into
consideration the {296} invaluable service of their fleet, there is no
reason to belittle their part in the downfall of Turkey.  If the effort
had been necessary, they probably would have been equal to it.

The Greeks sent a small army into Epirus.  The bulk of their forces,
following a sound military principle, were led into Thessaly by the
Crown Prince Constantine.  They crossed the frontier without
resistance, fought a sharp combat at Elassona on the 19th, in which
they stood admirably under fire, and broke down the last Turkish
resistance at Servia.  The army of Tahsin pasha was thrown back upon
Monastir.  The battles of the next ten days were hardly more than
skirmishes, for the Turkish stand was never formidable.  At Yanitza,
the only real battle of the Greek campaign was fought.  The Turks fled.
The way to Salonika was open.

The battle of Yanitza (Yenidje-Vardar) was fought on November 3d.  On
October 30th, a Greek torpedo-boat had succeeded, in spite of the
strong harbour fortifications, equipped with electric searchlights, and
the mined channel, in coming right up to the jetty at Salonika during
the night, and launching three torpedoes at an old Turkish cruiser
which lay at anchor there.  The cruiser sank.  On his way out to open
sea, the commander of the torpedo-boat did not hesitate to fire upon
the forts!

[Illustration: Map--Africa in 1914]

This daring feat, and the approach of the Greek army, threw the city
into a turmoil of excitement.  The people had been fed for two weeks on
false news, and telegrams had been printed from day to day, relating
wonderful victories over the Servians, {297} Bulgarians, and Greeks.
But the coming of the refugees, fresh thousands from nearer places
every day, and the presence in the streets of the city of deserters in
uniform, gave the lie to the "official" news.  When the German
_stationnaire_ arrived from Constantinople, and embarked the prisoner
of the Villa Allatini, ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, the most pessimistic
suspicions were confirmed.

Although he had thirty thousand soldiers, and plenty of munitions,
Tahsin pasha, commandant of Salonika, did not even attempt to defend
the city.  He began immediately to negotiate with the advancing Greek
army.  When the Crown Prince refused to accept any other than
unconditional surrender, and moved upon the city, Tahsin pasha yielded.
Not a shot was fired.  On November 9th, without any opposition, the
Greek army marched into Salonika.

In other places the Turks at least fought, even if they did not fight
well.  At Salonika their surrender demonstrated to what humiliation and
degradation the arrogance of the Young Turks had brought a nation whose
past was filled with glorious deeds of arms.

The Bulgarian expeditionary corps for Macedonia, under General
Theodoroff, had crossed the frontier on October 18th.  Joined to it
were the notorious bands of _comitadjis_ under the command of
Sandansky, who afterwards related to me the story of this march.
General Theodoroff's mission was to engage the portion of the Turkish
Fifth Army Corps, which was stationed in the valleys of the Mesta and
Struma, {298} east of the Vardar, thus preventing it from assembling
and making a flank movement against the main Servian or Bulgarian
armies.  The Bulgarians were greeted everywhere as liberators, and,
although they were not in great numbers, the Turks did not try to
oppose them.  Soldiers and Moslem Macedonians together fled before them
towards Salonika.

When General Theodoroff realized the demoralization of the Turks, and
heard how the Greeks were approaching Salonika without any more serious
opposition than that which confronted him, he hurried his column
towards Salonika.  The Bulgarian Princes Boris and Cyril joined him.
They were not in time to take part in the negotiations for the
surrender of the city.  The cowardice of Tahsin pasha had brought
matters to a climax on November 9th.  But they were able to enter
Salonika on the 10th, at the same time that Crown Prince Constantine
was making his triumphal entry.  Sandansky and his _comitadjis_ hurried
to the principal ancient church of the city, for over four hundred
years the Saint Sophia of Salonika, and placed the Bulgarian flag in
the minarets before the Greeks knew they had been outwitted.  On the
12th, King George of Greece arrived to make his residence in the city
that was to be his tomb.

After the capture of Monastir, the Servians pressed on to Okrida, on
November 23d, and from there into Albania to Elbassan, which they
reached five days later.  It was their intention to join at Durazzo the
other column of the third Servian army, of whose march down the Drin we
have already spoken.  But {299} the threatening attitude of
Austria-Hungary necessitated the recall of the bulk of the Servian
forces to Nish.  This is the reason they were not able, at that stage
of the war, to give the Montenegrins effective assistance against
Scutari.

The left wing of the Thessalian Greek army, after the capture of
Monastir by the Servians, pursued towards Albania, the Turks who had
escaped from Monastir.  With great skill, they managed to prevent the
Turks from turning north-west into the interior of Albania.  After the
brilliant and daring storming of the heights of Tchangan, what remained
of the Turkish army was compelled to retreat into Epirus towards Janina.

On October 20th, the Greek fleet under Admiral Koundouriotis appeared
at the Dardanelles to offer battle to the Turks.  Under the cover of
the protection of their fleet, the Greeks occupied Lemnos, Thasos,
Imbros, Samothrace, Nikaria, and the smaller islands.  The inhabitants
of Samos had expelled the Turkish garrisons on their own initiative at
the outbreak of the war.  Mitylene was captured without great
difficulty on November 2lst.  The Greeks landed at Chios on the 24th.
Here the Turkish garrison of two thousand retired to the mountainous
centre of the island, and succeeded in prolonging their resistance
until January.  When he saw that no help was coming from Asia Minor,
whose shores had been in sight during all the weeks of combat and
suffering, the heroic Turkish commander surrendered with one thousand
eight hundred starving men on January 3d.  It was only because Italy,
{300} by a clause of the Treaty of Ouchy, still held the Dodecanese,
that all of the Ægean Islands were not "gathered into the fold" by
Greece.

There had been less than six weeks of fighting.  The Balkan allies had
swept from the field all the Turkish forces in Europe.  The Turkish
armies were bottled up in Constantinople, Adrianople, Janma, and
Scutari, with absolutely no hope of making successful sorties.  Except
at Constantinople, they were besieged, and could expect neither
reinforcements nor food supplies.  The Greek fleet was master of the
Ægean Sea, and held the Turkish navy blocked in the Dardanelles.  No
new armies could come from Asiatic Turkey.  This was the situation when
the armistice was signed.  The Ottoman Empire in Europe had ceased to
exist.  The military prestige of Turkey had received a mortal blow.



THE ARMISTICE AND THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF LONDON

The hopelessness of the outcome of the war with Italy, the
dissatisfaction over the foolish and arbitrary rule of its secret
committees had weakened the hold of the "Committee of Union and
Progress" over the army.  Despite its success in the spring elections
of 1912, its position was precarious.  In July, Mahmud Shevket pasha,
who was suspected of planning a military _pronunciamento_, resigned the
Ministry of War.  The Grand Vizier, Saïd pasha, soon followed him into
retirement.  The Sultan declared that a {301} ministry not under the
control of a political party was a necessity.

Ghazi Mukhtar pasha, after much difficulty, succeeded in forming a
ministry, in which a distinguished Armenian, Noradounghian effendi, was
given the portfolio of Foreign Affairs.  The Unionist majority in the
lower house of Parliament proved intractable.  Its obstructionist
tactics won for the Chamber of Deputies the name of the "comic
operahouse of Fundukli."  (Fundukli was the Bosphorus quarter in which
the House of Parliament was located.)  With the help of the Senate, and
the moral support of the army, the Sultan dissolved Parliament on
August 5th.  Only the menace of the Albanian revolution prevented the
Committee from attempting to set up a rival Parliament at Salonika.
This was the unenviable internal situation of Turkey at the opening of
the Balkan War.

The disasters of the Thracian campaign led to the resignation of the
Ghazi Mukhtar pasha Cabinet.  The aged statesman of the old _régime_,
Kiamil pasha, was called for the eighth time to the Grand Vizirate.  He
retained Nazim pasha, generalissimo of the Turkish army, and
Noradounghian effendi, in the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs.
The most influential of the Young Turks, who had opposed bitterly the
peace with Italy and were equally determined that no negotiations
should be undertaken with the Balkan States, were exiled.  Kiamil pasha
saw clearly that peace was absolutely necessary.  His long experience
allowed him to have no illusions as to the possibility of continuing
the struggle.  Before {302} the Bulgarian attack upon Tchatalja, he
began _pourparlers_ with General Savoff.  After the repulse of November
17th and 18th, he was just as firm in his decision that the
negotiations must be continued.  He won over to his point of view the
members of the Cabinet, and notably Nazim pasha.

The conditions of the armistice, signed on December 3d, were an
acknowledgment of the complete _débâcle_ of the Turkish army.  Bulgaria
forced the stipulation that her army in front of Tchatalja should be
revictualled by the railway which passed under the guns of Adrianople,
while that fortress remained without food!  Greece, by an agreement
with her allies, refused to sign the armistice, but was allowed to be
represented in the peace conference.  The allies felt that the state of
war on sea must continue, in order that Turkey should be prevented
during the armistice from bringing to the front her army corps from
Syria and Mesopotamia and Arabia; while Greece, in particular, was
determined to run no risk in connection with the Ægean Islands.  The
peace delegates were to meet in London.

Orientals, Christian as well as Moslem, are famous for bargaining.
Nothing can be accomplished without an exchange of proposals and
counter-proposals _ad infinitum_.  In the Conference of London, the
demands of the allies were the cession of all European Turkey, except
Albania, whose boundaries were not defined, of Crete, and of the
islands in the Ægean Sea.  A war indemnity was also demanded.  Turkey
was to be allowed to retain Constantinople, and a strip of territory
from Midia on the Black Sea to {303} Rodosto on the Sea of Marmora, and
the peninsula of the Thracian Chersonese, which formed the European
shore of the Dardanelles.  The boundaries of Albania, and its future
status, were to be decided by the Powers.

I had a long conversation with the Grand Vizier, Kiamil pasha, on the
day the peace delegates left for London.  He was frank and unhesitating
in the statement of his belief that Turkey could not continue the war.
He denounced unsparingly the visionaries who were clamouring for a
continuance of the struggle.  "It is because of them that we are in our
present humiliating position," he said.  "They cry out now that we must
not accept peace, but they know well that we cannot hope to win back
any portion of what we have lost."

There were a number of reasons why the position of Kiamil pasha was
sound.  First of all, the army organization was in hopeless confusion.
Although the Bulgarians were checked at Tchatalja, the conditions on
the Constantinople side of the forts was terrible.  The general
headquarters at Hademkeuy were buried in filth and mud.  Although the
army was but twenty-five miles from the city, there were days on end
when not even bread arrived.  Cholera was making great ravages.
Soldiers, crazed from hunger, were shot dead for disobeying the order
which forbade their eating raw vegetables.  There were neither fuel,
shelter, nor blankets.  Winter was at hand.  At San Stefano, one of the
most beautiful suburbs of Stambul, in a concentration camp the soldiers
died by the thousands of starvation fever.  {304} It was one of the
most heart-rending tragedies of history.

All the while, in the cafés of Péra, Galata, and Stambul, Turkish
officers sat the day long, sipping their coffee, and deciding that
Adrianople must not be given up.  Even while the fighting was going on,
when the fate of the city hung in the balance, I saw these degenerate
officers _by the hundreds_, feasting at Péra, while their soldiers were
dying like dogs at Tchatalja and San Stefano.  This is an awful
statement to make, but it is the record of fact.  Notices in the
newspapers, declaring that officers found in Constantinople without
permission would be immediately taken before the Court-Martial, had
absolutely no effect.

The navy failed to give any account of itself to the Greeks, who were
waiting outside of the Dardanelles.  Finally, on December 16th, after
the people of the vicinity had openly cursed and taunted them, the
fleet sailed out to fight.  An action at long range did little damage
to either side.  The Turkish vessels refused to go beyond the
protection of their forts.  They returned in the evening to anchor.
The mastery of the sea remained to the Greeks.[1]


[1] In this connection, it would be forgetting to pay tribute to a
remarkable exploit to omit mention of the raid of the _Hamidieh_ during
the late winter.  One Ottoman officer at least chafed under the
disgrace of the inaction of the Ottoman navy.  With daring and skill,
Captain Reouf bey slipped out into the Ægean Sea on the American-built
cruiser, the _Hamidieh_.  He evaded the Greek blockaders, bombarded
some outposts on one of the islands, and sank the auxiliary cruiser,
the _Makedonia_, in a Greek port.  The _Hamidieh_ next appeared in the
Adriatic, where she sank several transports, and bombarded Greek
positions on the coast of Albania.  The cruiser was next heard of at
Port Said.  She passed through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea for a
couple of weeks, and then returned boldly into the Mediterranean,
although Greek torpedo-boats were lying in wait.  Captain Reouf bey ran
again the gauntlet of the Greek fleet, and got back to the Dardanelles
without mishap.  This venture, undertaken without permission from the
Turkish admiral, had no effect upon the war.  For it came too late.
But it showed what a little enterprise and courage might have done to
prevent the Turkish débâcle, if undertaken at the beginning of the war.


{305}

If the army and the navy were powerless, how about the people of the
capital?  From the very beginning of the war, the inhabitants of
Constantinople, Moslem as well as Christian, displayed the most
complete indifference concerning the fortunes of the battles.  Even
when the Bulgarians were attacking Tchatalja, the city took little
interest.  Buying and selling went on as usual.  There were few
volunteers for national defence, but the cafés were crowded and the
theatres and dance-halls of Péra were going at full swing.  The
refugees came and camped in our streets and in the cemeteries outside
of the walls.  Those who did not die passed on to Asia.  The wounded
arrived, and crowded our hospitals and barracks.  The cholera came.
The soldiers starved to death at San Stefano.  The spirit of Byzantium
was over the city still.  The year 1913 began as 1453 had begun.

The Government tried to raise money by a national loan.  It could get
none from Europe, unless it agreed to surrender Adrianople and make
peace practically on the terms of the allies.  An appeal must be made
to the Osmanlis.  For how could the war be resumed without money?
There are many wealthy pashas at Constantinople.  Their palaces line
both shores of the Bosphorus.  They spend money at Monte Carlo {306}
like water.  They live at Nice, as they live at Constantinople, like
princes--or like American millionaires!  One of the sanest and wisest
of Turkish patriots, a man whom I have known and admired, was appointed
to head a committee to wait upon these pashas, many of them married to
princesses of the imperial family, and solicit their contributions.
The scheme was that the subscribers should advance five years of taxes
on their properties for the purposes of national defence.  The
committee hired a small launch, and spent a day visiting the homes of
the pashas.  On their return, after paying the rental of the launch,
they had about forty pounds sterling!  Was it not two million pounds
that was raised for the Prince of Wales Fund recently in London?  Was
not the French loan "for national defence," issued just before the
present war, subscribed in a few hours _forty-three times _over the
large amount of thirty-two million pounds asked for?

In the face of these facts, the Young Turks were vociferous in their
demand that the war be continued.  Adrianople must not be surrendered!
Kiamil pasha decided to call a "Divan," or National Assembly, of the
most important men in Turkey.  They were summoned by the Sultan to meet
at the palace of Dolma-Baghtche on January 22, 1913.  I went to see
what would happen there.  One would expect that the whole of
Constantinople would be hanging on the words of this council, whose
decision the Cabinet had agreed to accept.  A half-dozen policemen at
the palace gate, a vendor of lemonade, two street-sweepers, an Italian
cinematograph photographer, {307} and a dozen foreign newspaper
men--that was the extent of the crowd.

The Divan, after hearing the _exposés_ of the Ministers of War,
Finance, and Foreign Affairs, decided that there was nothing to
discuss.  The decision was inevitable.  Peace must be signed.  That
night Kiamil pasha telegraphed to London to the Turkish commissioners,
directing them to consent to the reddition of Adrianople; and, the
other fortresses which were still holding out, and to make peace at the
price of ceding all the Ottoman territories in Europe beyond a line
running from Enos on the Ægean Sea, at the mouth of the Maritza River,
to Midia on the Black Sea.

On the following day, January 23d, a _coup d'état_ was successfully
carried out.

Enver bey, the former "hero of liberty," who had taken a daring and
praiseworthy part in the revolution of 1908, had been ruined afterwards
by being appointed military _attaché_ of the Ottoman Embassy at Berlin.
There was much that was admirable and winning in Enver bey, much that
was what the French call "elevation of soul."  He was a sincere
patriot.  But the years at Berlin, and the deadening influence of
militarism and party politics mixed together, had changed him from a
patriot to a politician.  He went to Tripoli during the Italian War,
and organized a resistance in Benghazi, which he announced would be "as
long as he lived."  But it was a decision _à la Turque_.  The Balkan
War found him again at Constantinople--not at the front leading a
company against the enemy--but at {308} Constantinople, plotting with
the other Young Turks how they could once more get the reins of
government in their hands.  The decision of the Divan was the
opportunity.  Enver bey led a small band of followers into the Sublime
Porte, and shot Nazim pasha and his _aide-de-camp_ dead.  The other
members of the Cabinet were imprisoned, and the telephone to the palace
cut.  Enver bey was driven at full speed in an automobile to the
palace.  He secured from the Sultan a _firman_ calling on Mahmud
Shevket pasha to form a new Cabinet.  The Young Turks were again in
power.

The bodies of Nazim pasha and the _aide-de-camp_ were buried quickly
and secretly.  For one of Enver's companions, a man of absolutely no
importance, who had been killed by defenders of Nazim, a great military
funeral was held.

Mahmud Shevket pasha, who had been living in retirement at Scutari
since the war began, accepted the position of Grand Vizier.  I heard
him, on the steps of the Sublime Porte, justify the murder of Nazim
pasha, on the ground that there had been the intention to give up
Adrianople.  The new Cabinet was going to redeem the country, and save
it from a shameful peace.

When the news of the _coup d'état_ reached London, it was recognized
that further negotiations were useless.  The peace conference had
failed.



THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR

It is very doubtful if Mahmud Shevket, Enver, and their accomplices had
any hope whatever of {309} retrieving the fortunes of Turkish arms.
They had prepared the _coup d'état_ to get back again into office.
This could not be done without the tacit consent of the army.  At the
moment of the Divan the army was stirred up over the surrender of
Adrianople.  It was the moment to act.  At any other time the army
would not have acquiesced in the murder of its generalissimo.  The
Sultan's part in the plot was not clear.  His assent was, however,
immediately given.  Living in seclusion, and knowing practically
nothing of what was going on, he signed the _firmans_, accepting the
resignation of the Kiamil pasha Cabinet and charging Mahmud Shevket
with the formation of a new Cabinet, either by force or by playing upon
his fears of what might be his own fate, should the agreement to
surrender Adrianople lead to a revolution.

On January 29th, the allies denounced the armistice, and hostilities
reopened.  The Bulgarians at Tchatalja had strongly entrenched
themselves, and were content to rest on the defensive.  They did not
desire to capture Constantinople.  But the Turks wanted to relieve
Adrianople.  The offensive movement must come from them.  The Young
Turks had killed Nazim pasha, they said, because they believed
Adrianople could be saved.  The word was now to Mahmud Shevket and
Enver.  Let them justify their action.

Enthusiastic speeches were made at Constantinople.  We were told that
the army at Tchatalja had moved forward, and was going to drive the
Bulgarians out of Thrace.  The Turks did advance some kilometres, but,
like their fleet at the Dardanelles, {310} not beyond the protection of
the forts!  They did not dare to make a general assault upon the
Bulgarian positions.  The renewal of the war, as far as Tchatalja was
concerned, was a perfect farce.  Every one in Constantinople knew that
the army was not even trying to relieve Adrianople by a forward march
from Constantinople.

Enver bey, who realized that he must make some move to justify the
_coup d'état_ of January 23d, gathered two army corps on the small
boats which serve the Bosphorus villages and the Isles of Princes.  It
was his intention to land on the European shore of the Dardanelles, and
take the Bulgarians in the rear.  A few of his troops--the first that
were sent--disembarked at Gallipoli, and, co-operating with the
Dardanelles garrison, attempted an offensive movement against the
Bulgarian positions at Bulair, which were bottling the peninsula.  The
attack failed ignominiously.  For the Bulgarians, after dispersing the
first bayonet charge by their machine-guns, were not content to wait
for another attack.  They scrambled over their trenches, and attacked
the Turks at the point of the bayonet.  The army broke, and fled.  Some
six thousand Turks were left on the field.  The Bulgarian losses were
trifling.  On the same day, February 8th, and the following day, the
rest of Enver bey's forces tried to land at several places on the
European shore of the Sea of Marmora.  For some reason that has never
been explained, the Turkish fleet did not co-operate with Enver bey's
attempted landings.  Naturally the Turks were mowed down.  At Sharkeuy
it was simply slaughter.  {311} Three divisions were butchered.  Those
few who succeeded in getting foot on shore were driven into the sea and
bayoneted.  The two corps were practically annihilated.

After this exploit, Enver bey returned to Constantinople, and received
the congratulations of the Grand Vizier whom he had created, by a
murder, _to redeem Turkey and recover Adrianople_.

The inability to advance at Tchatalja and at Bulair, and the failure to
land troops on the coasts of Thrace, entirely immobilized the Turkish
armies during the second period of the war.  They were content to sit
and watch the fall of the three fortresses of Janina, Adrianople, and
Scutari.  At the moment of the _coup d'état_, I telegraphed that the
whole miserable affair was nothing more than a party move of the "outs"
to oust the "ins."  The events confirmed this judgment.  Mahmud Shevket
pasha had no other policy than that of Kiamil pasha and Nazim pasha.
He, and the Young Turk party, did absolutely nothing to relieve the
situation.  As soon as they thought they were safe from those who swore
to avenge Nazim's death, they began again negotiations for peace, and
on exactly the same terms.

In the meantime, the Greeks, who had not signed the armistice, decided
that they must take Janina by assault.  The worst of the winter was not
yet over, but plans were made to increase the small Greek forces which
had been practically inactive since the siege began.  Janina had never
been completely invested.  When the Crown Prince arrived, he planned to
capture the most troublesome forts, and {312} from them to make
untenable the formidable hills which commanded the city.  The Greeks
followed the plan with great skill and courage.  Position after
position was taken until the city was at the mercy of their artillery.
During the night of March 5th, Essad pasha sent to Prince Constantino
emissaries to surrender the city, garrison, and munitions of war
without conditions.

The Crown Prince returned to Salonika in triumph.  A few days later,
the assassination of King George made him King.  From this time on, the
diplomatic position of Premier Venizelos, in his endeavour to keep
within bounds the military party which had the ear of the new King,
became most difficult.  Even his great genius could not prevent the
rupture with Bulgaria.

After the fall of Janina, the Bulgarian general staff realized that it
was essential for them to force the capitulation of Adrianople, or to
take the city by assault.  As they had to keep a large portion of their
army before Tchatalja and Bulair, it was decided that forty-five
thousand Servians, with their siege cannon, should co-operate in the
attack upon Adrianople.  It was afterwards given by the Servians as an
excuse for breaking their treaty with Bulgaria, that they had helped in
the fall of Adrianople.  But it must be remembered that the Bulgarian
army, by its maintenance of the positions at Tchatalja and Bulair, was
rendering service not to herself alone but to the common cause of the
allies.  Greece and Servia will never be able to get away from the fact
that Bulgaria bore the brunt of the burden in the first {313} Balkan
War, and that her services in the common cause were far greater than
those of either of her allies.  One cannot too strongly emphasize the
point, also, that the capture and possession of Adrianople did not mean
to Bulgaria either from the practical or from the sentimental
standpoint what Salonika meant to the Greeks and Uskub to the Servians.
The Servian contingent before Adrianople was not helping Bulgaria to do
what was to be wholly to the benefit of Bulgaria.  The Servians were
co-operating in an enterprise that was to contribute to the success of
their common cause.

Adrianople had been closely invested ever since the battle of Kirk
Kilissé.  No army came to the relief of the garrison after the fatal
retreat of October 24th.  The Bulgarians had not made a serious effort
to capture the city during the first period of the war.  The armistice
served their ends well, because each day lessened the provisions of the
besieged.  Inside the city Shukri pasha had done all he could to keep
up the courage of the inhabitants.  He himself was ignorant of the real
situation at Constantinople.  Perhaps it was in good faith that he
assured the garrison continually that the hour of deliverance was at
hand.  By wireless, the authorities at Constantinople, after the _coup
d'état_ especially, kept assuring him that the army was advancing, and
that it was a question only of days.  So, in spite of starvation and of
the continual rain of shells upon the city, he managed to maintain the
_morale_ of his garrison.  The allies finally decided upon a systematic
assault of the forts on all sides of the city at once.  In this way,
{314} the Turks were not able to use their heavy artillery to best
advantage.  Advancing with scissors, the Bulgarians and Servians cut
their way through the tangle of barbed wire.  On the 24th and 25th, the
forts fell one after the other.  Czar Ferdinand entered the city with
his troops on March 26th.

It was at the moment of this heroic capture, in which there was glory
enough for all, that the clouds of trouble between Bulgaria and Servia
began to appear on the horizon.  Shukri pasha, following the old policy
of the Turks, which had been so successful for centuries in the Balkan
Peninsula, tried to surrender to the Servian general, who was too loyal
to discipline to fall into this trap.  But the Servian newspapers began
to say that it was really the Servian army who had captured the city,
and that Shukri pasha recognized this fact when he sent to find the
Servian commander.  There was an unedifying duel of newspapers between
Belgrade and Sofia, which showed that the material for conflagration
was ready.

In the second period of the war, the Servians gave substantial aid,
especially in artillery, to the Montenegrins, who had been besieging
Scutari ever since October 15th.  I went over the mountain of Tarabosh
on horse with an Albanian who had been one of its defenders.  He
related graphically the story of the repeated assaults of the
Montenegrins and Servians.  Each time they were driven back before they
reached those batteries that dominated Scutari and made impossible the
entry to the city without their capture.  The loss of life was
tremendous.  The bravery of the {315} assailants could do nothing
against the miles and miles of barbed wire.  No means of stopping
assault has ever proved more efficacious.  The besiegers were unable to
capture Tarabosh.  So they could not enter the city.

At the beginning of the war, Scutari was under the command of Hassan
Riza pasha.  In February, he was assassinated by his subordinate, Essad
pasha, an Albanian of the Toptani family, who had been a favourite of
Abdul Hamid, and had had a rather questionable career in the
_gendarmerie_ during the days of despotism.  After the assassination of
the Turkish commandant, it was for Albania and not for Turkey that
Essad pasha continued the resistance.  In March, Austria began to
threaten the Montenegrins, and assure them that they could not keep the
city.  The story of how she secured the agreement of the Great Powers
in coercing Montenegro is told in another chapter.  Montenegro was
defiant, and paid no attention to an international blockade.  But on
April 13th, the Servians, fearing international complications, withdrew
from the siege.  It was astonishing news to the world that after this,
on April 22d, Essad pasha surrendered Scutari to the King of
Montenegro, with the stipulation that he could withdraw with his
garrison, his light artillery, and whatever munitions he might be able
to take with him.

The Ottoman flag had ceased to wave in any part of Europe except
Constantinople and the Dardanelles.  The war was over, whether the
Young Turks would have it so or not.  Facts are facts.



{316}

THE TREATY OF LONDON

Nazim pasha was assassinated on January 23d.  The armistice was
denounced on the 29th.  On February 10th, Mahmud Shevket pasha began to
sound the Great Powers for their intervention in securing peace.  It
was necessary, however, now that the war had been resumed, that the
impossibility of relieving Adrianople be demonstrated, so that it might
not continue to be a stumbling-block in reopening the negotiations.
The Great Powers were willing to act as mediators, but could not make
any acceptable overture until after the fall of Janina and Adrianople.

On March 23d, they proposed the following as basis for the renewal of
the negotiations at London:


"1. A frontier line from Enos to Midia, which would follow the course
of the Maritza, and the cession to the Allies of all the territories
west of that line, with the exception of Albania, whose status and
frontiers would be decided upon by the Powers.

"2. Decision by the Powers of the question of the Ægean Islands.

"3. Abandonment of Crete by Turkey.

"4. Arrangement of all financial questions at Paris, by an
international commission, in which the representatives of Turkey and
the allies would be allowed to sit.  Participation of the allies in the
Ottoman Debt, and in the financial obligations of the territories newly
acquired.  No indemnity of war, in principle.

"5. End of hostilities immediately after the acceptance of this basis
of negotiations."


{317}

Turkey agreed to these stipulations.  The Balkan States, however, did
not want to commit themselves to the Enos-Midia line "as definitely
agreed upon," but only as a base of _pourparlers_.  They insisted that
the Ægean Islands must be ceded directly to them.  They wanted to know
what the Powers had in mind in regard to the frontiers of Albania.  In
the last place, they refused to relinquish the possibility of an
indemnity of war.

Notes were exchanged back and forth among the chancelleries until April
20th, when the Balkan States finally agreed to accept the mediation of
the Powers.  They had practically carried all their points, however,
except that of the communication of the Albanian frontier.  Hostilities
ceased.  There really was not much more to fight about, at least as far
as Turkey was concerned.

It was a whole month before the second conference at London opened.
The only gleam of hope that the Turks were justified in entertaining,
when they decided to renew the war, had been the possible outbreak of a
war between the Allies.  If only the quarrel over Macedonia had come,
for which they looked from week to week, they might have been able to
put pressure on Bulgaria for the return of Adrianople, and on Greece
for the return of the Ægean Islands.  But the rupture between the
Allies did not take place until after they had settled with Turkey.
Why fight over the bear's skin until it was actually in their hands?

The negotiations were reopened in London on May 20th.  On May 30th, the
peace preliminaries {318} were signed.  The Sultan of Turkey ceded to
the Kings of the allied states his dominions in Europe beyond the
Enos-Midia line.  Albania, its status and frontiers, were intrusted by
the Sultan to the sovereigns of the Great Powers.  He ceded Crete to
the allied sovereigns, but left the decision as to the islands in the
Ægean Sea, and the status of Mount Athos, to the Great Powers.

The war between the allies enabled Turkey to violate this treaty.  They
won back from Bulgaria, without opposition, most of Thrace, including
Adrianople and Kirk Kilissé.  Later, treaties were made separately with
each of the Balkan States.  But, as it seems to be a principle of
history that no territories that have once passed from the shadow of
the Crescent return, it is probable that the Treaty of London will, in
the end, represent the _minimum_ of what Turkey's former subjects have
wrested from her.




{319}

CHAPTER XV

THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES

To those who knew the centuries-old hatred and race rivalry between
Greece and Servia and Bulgaria in the Balkan Peninsula, an alliance for
the purpose of liberating Macedonia seemed impossible.  The Ottoman
Government had a sense of security which seemed to be justifiable.
They had known how to keep alive and intensify racial hatred in
European Turkey, and believed that they were immune from concerted
attack because the Balkan States would never be able to agree as to the
division of spoils after a successful war.

The history of the ten years of rivalry between bands, which had
nullified the efforts of the Powers to "reform" Macedonia by installing
a _gendarmerie_ under European control, had taught the diplomats that
they had working against the pacification of Macedonia not only the
Ottoman authorities, but also the native Christian population and the
neighbouring emancipated countries.  They were ready to believe the
astute Hussein Hilmy pasha, Vali of Macedonia, when he said: "I am
ruling over an insane asylum.  Were the Turkish flag withdrawn, {320}
they would fly at each other's throats, and instead of reform, you
would have anarchy."

If the Balkan States had realized how completely and how easily they
were going to overthrow the military power of Turkey, they probably
would not have attempted it.  This seems paradoxical, but it is true
all the same.

The Allies did not anticipate more than the holding of the Ottoman
forces in check and the occupation of the frontiers and of the upper
valleys of the Vardar and Struma.  Greece felt that she would be
rewarded by a slight rectification of boundary in Thessaly and Epirus,
if only the war would settle the status of Crete and result in an
autonomous _régime_ for the Ægean Islands.  At the most, the Balkan
States hoped to force upon Turkey the autonomy of Macedonia under a
Christian governor.  So jealous was each of the possibility of
another's gaining control of Macedonia that this solution would have
satisfied them more than the complete disappearance of Turkish rule.
Both hopes and fears as to Macedonia were envisaged rather in
connection with each other than in connection with the Turks.

Between Servia and Bulgaria there was a definite treaty, signed on
March 13, 1912, which defined future spheres of influence in upper
Macedonia.  But Greece had no agreement either with Bulgaria or Servia.

The events of October, 1912, astonished the whole world.  No such
sudden and complete collapse of the Ottoman power in Europe was dreamed
of.  I {321} have already spoken of how fearful the European
Chancelleries were of an Ottoman victory.  Had they not been so morally
certain of Turkey's triumph they would never have sent to the
belligerents their famous--and in the light of subsequent events
ridiculous--joint note concerning the _status quo_.

But if the Great Powers were unprepared for the succession of Balkan
triumphs, the allies were much more astonished at what they were able
to accomplish.  Kirk Kilissé and Lulé Burgas gave Thrace to Bulgaria.
Kumanovo opened up the valley of the Vardar to the Servians, while the
Greeks marched straight to Salonika without serious opposition.

The victories of the Servians and Greeks, so easily won, were to the
Bulgarians a calamity which overshadowed their own striking military
successes.  They had spilled much blood and wasted their strength in
the conquest of Thrace which they did not want, while their allies--but
rivals for all that--were in possession of Macedonia, the _Bulgaria
irredenta_.  To be encircling Adrianople and besieging Constantinople,
cities in which they had only secondary interest, while the Servians
attacked Monastir and the Greeks were settling themselves comfortably
in Salonika, was the irony of fate for those who felt that others were
reaping the fruits for which they had made so great and so admirable a
sacrifice.

When we come to judge dispassionately the folly of Bulgaria in
provoking a war with her comrades in arms, and the seemingly amazing
greed for land which it revealed, we must remember that the Bulgarians
felt that they had accomplished everything {322} to receive nothing.
Salonika and not Adrianople was the city of their dreams.  Macedonia
and not Thrace was the country which they had taken arms to liberate.
The Ægean Sea and not the extension of their Black Sea littoral formed
the substantial and logical economic background to the appeal of race
which led them to insist so strongly in gathering under their
sovereignty all the elements of the Bulgarian people.  European writers
have not been able to understand how little importance the Bulgarians
attached to their territorial acquisitions in Thrace, and of how little
interest it was for them to acquire new possessions in which there were
so few Bulgarians.

Then, too, the powerful elements which had pushed Bulgaria into the war
with Turkey, and had contributed so greatly to her successes, were of
Macedonian origin.  In Sofia, the Macedonians are numerically, as well
as financially and politically, very strong.  I had a revelation of
this, such as the compilation of statistics cannot give, on the day
after the massacre of Kotchana.  The newspapers called upon all the
Macedonians in Sofia to put out flags tied with crêpe.  In the main
streets of the city, it seemed as if every second house was that of a
Macedonian.  To these people, ardent and powerful patriots, Macedonia
was home.  It had been the dream of their lives to unite the regions
from which they had come--once emancipated from the Turks--to the
mother country.  From childhood, they had been taught to look towards
the Rhodope Mountains as the hills from which should come their help.
Is it any wonder then, that, after the striking victories {323} of
their arms, there should be a feeling of insanity--for it was
that--when they saw the dreams of a lifetime about to vanish?

But the mischief of the matter, as a Scotchman would say, was that
Greeks and Servians felt the same way about the same places.
Populations had been mixed for centuries.  At some time or other in
past history each of the three peoples had had successful dynasties to
spread their sovereignty over exactly the same territories.  Each then
could evoke the same historical memories, each the same past of
suffering, each the same present of hopes, and the same prayers of the
emancipated towards Sofia and Athens and Belgrade.

After the occupation of Salonika by the Greeks, the Bulgarian ambitions
to break the power of Turkey were not the same as they had been before.
Had Salonika been occupied two weeks earlier, there might not have been
a Lulé Burgas.  An armistice was hurriedly concluded.  During the
trying period of negotiations in London, and during the whole of the
second part of the war, the jealousies of the allies had been awakened
one against the other.  Between Greeks and Bulgarians, it had been keen
since the very first moment that the Greek army entered Macedonia.  The
crisis between Servia and Bulgaria did not become acute until Servia
saw her way blocked to the Adriatic by the absurd attempt to create a
free Albania.  Then she naturally began to insist that the treaty of
partition which she had signed with Bulgaria could not be carried out
by her.  In vain she appealed to the sense of justice of the
Bulgarians.  {324} The treaty had been signed on the understanding that
Albania would fall under the sphere of Servian aggrandizement.  Nor, on
the other hand, had it been contested that Thrace would belong to
Bulgaria.  If the treaty were carried out, Bulgaria would get
everything and Servia nothing.  Servia also reminded the Bulgarians of
the loyal aid that had been given them in the reduction of Adrianople.
But Bulgaria held to her pound of flesh.

Under the circumstances of the division of territory, Bulgaria's claim
to cross the Vardar and go as far as Monastir and Okrida, would not
only have given her possession of a fortress from which she could
dominate both Servia and Greece, but would have put another state
between Servia and Salonika.  Bulgaria was, in fact, demanding
everything as far as Servia was concerned.  Servia cannot be blamed
then for coming to an understanding with Greece, even if it were for
support in the violation of a treaty.  For where does history give us
the example of a nation holding to a treaty when it was against her
interest to do so?

After their return from London, the Premiers Venizelos and Pasitch made
an offensive and defensive alliance for ten years against the Bulgarian
aspirations.  In this alliance, concluded at Athens shortly after King
George's death, the frontiers were definitely settled.  In the
negotiations, Greece showed the same desire to have everything for
herself which Bulgaria was displaying.  Finally she agreed to allow
Servia to keep Monastir.  Without this concession, Servia would have
fared as badly {325} at the hands of Greece as at the hands of
Bulgaria.  It is only because Greece feared that Servia might be driven
to combine with Bulgaria against her, that the frontier in this
agreement was drawn south of Monastir.  The Greek army officers opposed
strongly this concession, but Venizelos was wise enough to see that the
maintenance of Greek claims to Monastir might result in the loss of
Salonika.  The Serbo-Greek alliance was not made public until the
middle of June.  Bulgaria had also been making overtures to Greece, and
at the end of May had expressed her willingness to waive her claim to
Salonika in return for Greek support against Servia.  Venizelos,
already bound to Servia, was honourable enough to refuse this
proposition.

But the military reputation of Bulgaria was still so strong in
Bulgarian diplomacy that Servia and Greece were anxious to arrive, if
possible, at an arrangement without war.  Venizelos proposed a meeting
at Salonika.  Bulgaria declined.  Then Venizelos and Pasitch together
proposed the arbitration of the Czar.  Bulgaria at the first seemed to
receive this proposition favourably, but stipulated that it would be
only for the disputed matter in her treaty with Servia.  At this
moment, the Russian Czar sent a moving appeal to the Balkan States to
avoid the horrors of a fratricidal war.  Bulgaria then agreed to send,
together with her Allies, delegates to a conference at Petrograd.

All the while, Premier Gueshoff of Bulgaria had been struggling for
peace against the pressure and the intrigues of the Macedonian party at
Sofia.  {326} They looked upon the idea of a Petrograd conference as
the betrayal of Macedonians and Bulgarians by the mother country.
Unable to maintain his position, Gueshoff resigned.  His withdrawal
ruined Bulgaria, for he was replaced by M. Daneff, who was heart and
soul with the Macedonian party.  A period of waiting followed.  But
from this moment war seemed inevitable to those who knew the feeling on
both sides.  Daneff and his friends did not hesitate.  They would not
listen to reason.  They believed that they had the power to force
Greece and Servia to a peace very nearly on their own terms.  Public
opinion was behind them, for news was continually coming to Sofia of
Greek and Servian oppression of Bulgarians in the region between
Monastir and Salonika.  These stories of unspeakable cruelty, which
were afterwards established to be true by the Carnegie Commission, had
much to do with making possible the second war.

It was not difficult for the Macedonian party at Sofia to precipitate
hostilities.  The Bulgarian general staff, in spite of the caution that
should have imposed itself upon them by the consideration of the
exhausting campaign in the winter, felt certain of their ability to
defeat the Servians and Greeks combined.  Then, too, the army on the
frontiers, in which there was a large element--perhaps twenty per
cent.--of Macedonians, had already engaged in serious conflicts with
the Greeks.

In fact, frontier skirmishes had begun in April.  The affair of Nigrita
was really a battle.  After these outbreaks, Bulgarian and Greek
officers had {327} been compelled to establish a neutral zone in order
to prevent the new war from beginning of itself.  At the end of May,
there had been fighting in the Panghaeon district, east of the river
Strymon.  The Bulgarian staff had wanted to prevent the Greeks from
being in a position to cut the railway from Serres to Drama.  In the
beginning of June, Bulgarian coast patrols had fired on the _Averoff_.
By the end of June, the Bulgarian outposts were not far from Salonika.

The first Bulgarian plan was to seize suddenly Salonika, which would
thus cut off the Greek army from its base of supplies and its
advantageous communication by sea with Greece.  There were nearly one
thousand five hundred Bulgarian soldiers in Salonika under the command
of General Hassapsieff.  How many _comitadjis_ had been introduced into
the city no one knows.  I was there during the last week of June, and
saw many Bulgarian peasants, big strapping fellows, who seemed to have
no occupation.  When I visited the Bulgarian company, which was
quartered in the historic mosque of St. Sophia, two days before their
destruction, they seemed to me to be absolutely sure of their position.
At this moment, the atmosphere among the few Bulgarians in Salonika was
that of complete confidence.

Among the Greeks, a spirit of excitement and of apprehension made them
realize the gravity and the dangers of the events which were so soon to
follow.  Perfect confidence, while highly recommended by the theorists,
does not seem to win wars.  Nervousness, {328} on the other hand, makes
an army alert, and ready to exert all the greater effort, from the fact
that it feels it needs that effort.  In all the wars with which this
book deals this has been true,--Italian confidence in 1911, Turkish
confidence in 1912, Bulgarian confidence in 1913, and German confidence
in 1914.

On the 29th of June, when I left Salonika to go to Albania, it was the
opinion of the Greek officers in Salonika that the war--which they
viewed with apprehension--would be averted by the conference at
Petrograd.  When I got on my steamship, the first man I met was
Sandansky, who had become famous a decade before by the capture of Miss
Stone, an American missionary.  He had embarked on this Austrian Lloyd
steamer at Kavalla, with the expectation of slipping ashore at
Salonika, if possible, to prepare the way for the triumphal entry of
the Bulgarian army.  But he was only able to look sorrowfully out on
the city, for the police were waiting to arrest him.  What bitter
thoughts he must have had when he saw the Bulgarian flag, which he had
planted there with his own hands, waving from the minaret of St.
Sophia, and he unable to organize its defence!  A week later I saw
Sandansky at a café in Valona.  The war had then started, and he was
probably trying to persuade the Albanians to enter the struggle and to
take the Servians in the rear.

{330}

CHAPTER XVI

THE WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES

On Sunday night, June 29th, without any declaration of war or even
warning, General Savoff ordered a general attack all along the Greek
and Servian lines.  There was no direct provocation on the part of
Bulgaria's allies.

The responsibility for precipitating the war which brought about the
humiliation of Bulgaria can be directly fixed.  Two general orders,
dated from the military headquarters at Sofia on June 29th, have been
published.  They set forth an amazing and devilish scheme, which stands
out as a most cold and bloody calculation, even among all the horrors
of Balkan history.  General Savoff stated positively that this
energetic action was not the commencement of a war.  It was merely for
the purpose of occupying as much territory as possible in the contested
regions before the intervention of the Powers.  It had a two-fold
object: to cut the communications between the Greeks and Servians at
Veles (Küprülü) on the Vardar, and to throw an army suddenly into
Salonika.  The fighting began in the night-time.  The Bulgarians
naturally were able to advance into a number of important positions.

{331}

When the news became known at Salonika on the morning of the 30th,
General Hassapsieff, on the ground that he was a diplomatic agent, was
allowed to leave.  Before his departure he gave an order to his forces
to resist, if they were attacked, as he would return with the Bulgarian
army in twenty-four hours.

Early in the afternoon the Greeks sent an ultimatum ordering the
Bulgarians in Salonika to surrender by six o'clock.  Their refusal led
to all-night street fighting.  Barricaded in St. Sophia and several
other buildings, they were able to defend themselves until the Greeks
turned artillery upon their places of refuge.  Not many were killed on
either side.  Salonika was calm again the next day.  One thousand three
hundred Bulgarian soldiers and a number of prominent Bulgarian
residents of Salonika, under conditions of exceptional cruelty and
barbarism, were sent to Crete.  The Greek forces in Salonika, among
whom were some twenty thousand from America, were hurried to the
outposts for the defence of the city.

There was no diplomatic action following the treachery of the
Bulgarians towards their allies.  The Greek Foreign Minister stated
that Greece considered the Bulgarian attack an act of war, and that the
Greek army had been ordered to advance immediately to retake the
positions which the Bulgarians had captured.  Nor did Servia show any
disposition to treat with Bulgaria.  No official communications reached
Sofia from a Great Power.  There had been a miscalculation.  Bulgaria
was {332} compelled, as a consequence of her ill-considered act, to
face a new war.  There was no withdrawal possible.

From a purely military point of view, it seems hard to believe that the
Bulgarians really thought that their night attack would bring about
war.  Their army had borne the brunt of the campaign against the Turks,
and had suffered terribly during the winter spent in the trenches
before Tchatalja.  They were not in a good strategic position, for the
army was spread out over a long line, and the character of the country
made concentration difficult.  Adequate railway communication with the
bases of supplies was lacking.  The Greeks and Servians, on the other
hand, held not only the railway from Salonika to Nish through the
valley of the Vardar, but even were it successfully cut, had
communication by railway with their bases at Salonika, Monastir,
Mitrovitza, Uskub, and Nish.

General Ivanoff, in command of the second Bulgarian army, was charged
with confronting the whole of the Greek forces, in a line passing from
the Ægean Sea to Demir-Hissar on the Vardar, between Serres and
Salonika.  When we realize that General Ivanoff had less than fifty
thousand men, a portion of whom were recruits from the region of
Serres, and that he had to guard against an attack on his right flank
from the Servians, we cannot help wondering what the Bulgarian general
staff had counted upon in provoking their allies to battle.  Did they
expect that the Greeks and Servians would be intimidated by the night
attack of June 29th, and would {333} agree to continue the project of a
conference at Petrograd?  Or did they think that the Greek army was of
so little value that they could brush it aside, and enter Salonika,
just as the Greeks had been able to enter in November?  Whatever
hypothesis we adopt, it shows contempt for their opponents and belief
in their own star.  The proof of the fact that the Bulgarians never
dreamed of anything but the success of their "bluff," or, if there was
resistance, of an easy victory, is found in the few troops at the
disposal of General Ivanoff, and in the choice of Doiran, so near the
front of battle, as the base of supplies.  At Doiran everything that
the second army needed in provisions and munitions of war was stored.
From the financial standpoint alone, Bulgaria could not afford to risk
the loss of these supplies.

On July 2d, the Greek army, under the command of Crown Prince
Constantine, took the offensive against the Bulgarians, who had
occupied on the previous day the crest of Beshikdag, from the mouth of
the Struma to the plateau of Lahana, across the road from Salonika to
Serres, and the heights north of Lake Ardzan, commanding the left bank
of the Vardar.  The positions were strong.  If the Greek army had been
of the calibre that the Bulgarians evidently expected, or if General
Ivanoff had had sufficient forces to hold the positions against the
Greek attack, there would undoubtedly have been _pourparlers_, and a
probable cessation of hostilities just as the Bulgarians counted upon.

But the Greeks soon proved that they were as brave and as determined as
their opponents.  Their {334} artillery fire was excellent.  There was
no wavering before the deadly resistance of the entrenched Bulgarians.
After five days of struggle, in which both sides showed equal courage,
the forces of General Ivanoff yielded to superior numbers.  The
Bulgarians were compelled to retreat, on July 6th, in two columns,
towards Demir-Hissar and Strumitza.  The retreat was effected in good
order, and the Greeks, though in possession of mobile artillery, could
not surround either column.  Victory had been purchased at a terrible
price.  The Greek losses in five days were greater than during the
whole war with Turkey.  They admitted ten thousand _hors du combat_.
The Greeks had received their first serious baptism of fire, and had
demonstrated that they could fight.  The Turks had never given them the
opportunity to wipe out the disgrace of 1897.

It is a tribute to the quickness of decision of the Crown Prince
Constantine and his general staff, and to the spirit of his soldiers,
that this severe trial of five days of continuous fighting and fearful
loss of life was not followed by a respite.  The Greek headquarters
were moved to Doiran on the 7th.  It was decided to maintain the
offensive as long as the army had strength to march and men to fill the
gaps made by the fall of thousands every day.  The Bulgarians, although
they contested desperately every step, were kept on the move.  On the
right, the Greeks pushed through to Serres, joining there, on July
11th, the advance-guard of the detachments which the Greek fleet had
landed at Kavalla on the 9th.

{335}

The advance of the Greek armies was along the Vardar, the Struma, and
the Mesta.  On the Vardar, the Bulgarian abandonment of Demir-Hissar,
on the 10th, enabled the Greeks to repair the railway, and establish
communication with the Servian army.  The right wing, advancing by the
Mesta, occupied Drama.  On July 19th, the Bulgarian resistance was
concentrated at Nevrokop.  When it broke here, the Greek right wing was
able to send its outposts to the foothills of the Rhodope Mountains, on
the Bulgarian frontier.

The Greeks began to speak of the invasion of Bulgaria, and of making
peace at Sofia.  But the bulk of their forces met an invincible
resistance at Simitli.  From the 23d to the 26th, they attacked the
Bulgarian positions, and believed that the advantage was theirs.  But
on the 27th the Bulgarians began a counter-attack against both wings of
the Greek army at once.  On the 29th, the Greeks began to plan their
retreat.  On the 30th, they realized that the retreat was no longer
possible.  The Bulgarians were on both their flanks.  It was then that
the armistice saved them.

While the Greek army was gaining its victories in the _hinterland_ of
Macedonia, the ports of the Ægean coast, Kavalla, Makri, Porto-Lagos,
and Dedeagatch were occupied without resistance by the Greek fleet.
Detachments withdrawn from Epirus were brought to these ports.  Some
went to Serres and Drama.  Others garrisoned the ports, and occupied
Xanthi and other nearby inland towns.

The Bulgarians may have had some reason to {336} discount the value of
the Greek army.  For it had not yet been tried.  But the Servians had
shown from the very first day of the war with Turkey that they
possessed high military qualities.  The courage of their troops was
coupled with agility.  They had had more experience than the Bulgarians
and Greeks in quick marches, and in breaking up their forces into
numerous columns.  There is probably no army in Europe to-day which can
equal the Servians in mobility.  It is incredible that the Bulgarians
could have hoped to surprise the Servians, and find a weak place
anywhere along their lines.  On the defensive, in localities which they
had come to know intimately by nine months in the field, it would have
taken a larger force than the Bulgarians could muster to get the better
of soldiers such as the Servians had proved themselves to be.

Whether it was by scorn for the Greeks, or by appreciation of the
Servian concentration, the Bulgarians had planned to confront the
Servians with four of their five armies.  We have already seen that
General Ivanoff had the second army alone to oppose to the Greeks, and
that even a few battalions of his troops were needed on the Servian
flank.

The engagements between the Bulgarians and the Servians had two
distinct fields of action, one in Macedonia, and the other on the
Bulgaro-Servian frontier.

In Macedonia, the Bulgarians experienced the same surprise in regard to
the Servians as in regard to the Greeks.  Their sudden attack of June
30th did not strike terror to the hearts of their opponents.  {337}
Instead of gaining for them a favourable diplomatic position, they
found that the Servians did not even suggest a parley.  On July 1st,
the Servians started a counter-attack, and kept a steady offensive
against their former allies for eight days.  Gradually the Bulgarians,
along the Bregalnitza, gave ground, retreating from position to
position, always with their face towards the enemy.  The battle, after
the first day, was for the Bulgarians a defensive action all along the
line.

On July 4th, General Dimitrieff assumed the functions of generalissimo
of the Bulgarian forces.  He tried his best to check the Servian
offensive.  But the aggressive spirit had gone out of the Bulgarian
army.  Lulé Burgas could not be repeated.  It was incapable of more
than a stubborn resistance to the Servian advance.  By July 8th, the
Servians were masters of the approaches to Istip, and had cleared the
Bulgarians out of the territory which led down into the valley of the
Vardar.  Then they stopped.  From this time on to the signing of the
armistice, the Macedonian Servian army was content with the victories
of the first week.

Along the Servian-Bulgarian frontier, the Bulgarian army had some
initial success.  But General Kutincheff did not dispose of enough men
to make possible a successful aggressive movement towards Nish.  From
the very first, when the Macedonian army failed to advance, the
Bulgarian plans for an invasion of Servia fell to the ground.  They had
based everything upon an advance in Macedonia to the Vardar.  So the
forward movement wavered.  {338} The Servians, now sure of Rumanian
co-operation, advanced in turn towards Widin.  General Kutincheff was
compelled to fall back on Sofia by the Rumanian invasion.  Widin was
invested by the Servians on July 23d.

Rumania had watched with alarm the rise of the military power of
Bulgaria.  She could not intervene in the first Balkan war on the side
of the Turks.  The civilized world would not have countenanced such a
move, nor would it have had the support of Rumanian public opinion.
Whatever the menace of Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula,
Rumania had to wait until peace had been signed between the allies and
the Turks.  But, as we have already seen, during the first negotiations
at London, her Minister to Great Britain had been instructed to treat
with Bulgaria for a cession of territory from the Danube at Silistria
to the Black Sea, in order that Rumania might have the strategic
frontier which the Congress of Berlin ought to have given her, when the
Dobrudja was awarded to her, without her consent, in exchange for
Bessarabia.  As Rumania had helped to free Bulgaria in 1877-78, and had
never received any reward for her great sacrifices, while the
Bulgarians had done little to win their own independence, the demand of
a rectification of frontier was historically reasonable.  Since Rumania
had so admirably developed the Dobrudja, and had constructed the port
of Constanza, it was justified from the economic standpoint.  For the
possession of Silivria, and a change of frontier on the Dobrudja, was
the only means by which Rumania {339} could hope to defend her southern
frontier from attack.

At first, the Bulgarians bitterly opposed any compensation to Rumania.
They discounted the importance of her neutrality, for they knew that
she could not act against them as long as they were at war with Turkey.
They denounced the demands of Rumania, perfectly reasonable as they
were, as "blackmail."  They were too blinded with the dazzling glory of
their unexpected victories against the Turks to realize how essential
the friendship of Rumania--at least, the neutrality of Rumania--was to
their schemes for taking all Macedonia to themselves.  When, in April,
they signed with very ill grace the cession of Silivria, as a
compromise, and refused to yield the small strip of territory from
Silivria to Kavarna on the Black Sea, the Bulgarians made a fatal
political mistake.  It was madness enough to go into the second Balkan
war in the belief that they could frighten, or, if that failed,
overwhelm the Servians and Greeks.  What shall we call the failure to
take into their political calculations the possibility of a Rumanian
intervention?  Even if there were not the question of the frontier in
the Dobrudja, would not Rumanian intervention still be justified by the
consideration of preserving the balance of power in the Balkans?  By
intervening, Rumania would be acting, in her small corner of the world,
just as the larger nations of Europe had acted time and again since the
sixteenth century.

The Rumanian mobilization commenced on July {340} 3d.  On July 10th,
Rumania declared war, and crossed the Danube.  The Bulgarians decided
that they would not oppose the Rumanian invasion.  How could they?
Already their armies were on the defensive, and hard pressed, by Greeks
and Servians.  There is a limit to what a few hundred thousand men
could do.  It is possible, though not probable, that the Bulgarian
armies might have gained the upper hand in the end against their former
allies in Macedonia.  But with Rumania bringing into the field a fresh
army, larger than that of any other Balkan States, Bulgaria's case was
hopeless.  The Rumanians advanced without opposition, and began to
march upon Sofia.  They occupied, on July 15th, the seaport of Varna,
from which the Bulgarian fleet had withdrawn to Sebastopol.

It would have been easy for the Rumanians to have occupied Sofia, and
waited there for the Servian and Greek armies to arrive.  The
humiliation of Bulgaria could have been made complete.  Why, then, the
armistice of July 30th?  Why the assembling hastily of a peace
conference at Bukarest?  Political and financial, as well as military,
considerations dictated the wisdom of granting to Bulgaria an armistice.

Greece and Servia were exhausted financially, and their armies could
gain little more than glory by continuing the war.  The Greek army, in
fact, was in a critical position, and ran the risk of being surrounded
and crushed by the Bulgarians.  The Servians had not shown much hurry
to come to the aid of the Greeks.  The truth of the matter is that,
{341} after the battle of the Bregalnitza, which ended on July 10th,
the Servians began to get very nervous about the successes of their
Greek allies.  They knew well the Greek character, and feared that too
easy victories over the Bulgarians might necessitate a third war with
Greece over Monastir.  So, on July 11th, with the ostensible reason
that such a measure was necessary to protect their rear against the
Albanians, the Servian general staff withdrew from the front a number
of the best regiments, and placed them in a position where they could
act, if the Greeks tried to seize Monastir.  On the other hand, Rumania
gave both Greece and Servia to understand that she had entered the war,
not from any altruistic desire to help them, but for her own interests.
To see Bulgaria too greatly humiliated and weakened was decidedly no
more to the interest of Rumania than to see her triumphant.

As for Montenegro, she had entered the second Balkan war to give loyal
support to Servia, from whom she expected in return a generous spirit
in dividing the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar.  Her co-operation, however, as
I am able to state from having been in Cettinje when the decision was
taken to send ten thousand men against Bulgaria, was not made the
subject of any bargain.  So, when Servia thought best to sign the
armistice, Montenegro was in thorough accord.

After a month of fighting, in which the losses had been far greater
than during the war with Turkey, and the treatment of non-combatants by
all the armies horrible beyond description, the scene of {342} battle
shifted from the blood-stained mountains and valleys of Macedonia to
the council chamber at Bukarest.  Rumania was to preside over a Balkan
Congress of Berlin!




{343}

CHAPTER XVII

THE TREATY OF BUKAREST

When the delegates from the various important capitals reached Bukarest
on July 30th, the armies were still fighting.  Everyone, however,
seemed anxious to come to an understanding as soon as possible.  The
first session of the delegates was held on the afternoon of July 30th.
Premier Pasitch for Servia and Premier Venizelos for Greece were
present.  But Premier Daneff, who had so wanted the war, did not have
the manhood to face its consequences.  The Bulgarians were represented
in Bukarest by no outstanding leader, either political or military.
Premier Majoresco of Rumania presided over the conference.  The first
necessity was the decision for an armistice.  A suspension of arms was
agreed upon to begin upon August 1st at noon.  On August 4th the
armistice was extended for three days to August 8th.

In the conference of Bukarest, Bulgaria, naturally, stood by herself.
It was necessary, if there was to be peace, that her delegates should
come to an understanding as to the sacrifices she was willing to make
with each of her neighbours separately.  {344} Consequently the
important decisions were made in committee meetings.  The general
assembly of delegates had little else to do than to ratify the
concessions wrung from Bulgaria in turn by each of the opponents.

Rarely have peace delegates been put in a more painful position than
the men whom Bulgaria sent to Bukarest.  It will always be an open
question as to whether the military situation of Bulgaria on the 31st
of July, as regards Servia and Greece, was retrievable.  But the
presence of a Rumanian army in Bulgaria made absolutely impossible the
continuance of the war.  Consequently there was nothing for Bulgaria to
do but to yield to the demands of Greece and Servia.  The only check
upon the Servian and Greek delegates was the determination of Rumania
not to see Bulgaria too greatly weakened.  She had entered into line to
gain her bit of territory in the south of the Dobrudja.  But she had
also in mind the prevention of Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkan
Peninsula, and she did not propose to see this hegemony go elsewhere.
This explains the favourable terms which Bulgaria received.

The Bulgarian and Rumanian delegates quickly agreed upon a frontier to
present to the meeting of August 4th.  By this, the first of the
protocols, Bulgaria ceded to Rumania all her territory north of a line
from the Danube, above Turtukaia, to the end of the Black Sea, south of
Ekrene.  In addition, she bound herself to dismantle the present
fortresses and promised not to construct forts at Rustchuk, Schumla,
and the country between and for twenty kilometres around Baltchik.

{345}

On August 6th, the protocol with Servia was presented.  The Servian
frontier was to start at a line drawn from the summit of Patarika on
the old frontier, and to follow the watershed between the Vardar and
the Struma to the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, with the exception of the
upper valley of the Strumnitza which remained Servian territory.

The following day the protocol with Greece was presented.  The
Greek-Bulgarian frontier was to run from the crest of Belashitcha to
the mouth of the River Mesta on the Ægean Sea.  Bulgaria formally
agreed to waive all pretensions to Crete.  The protocol with the Greeks
was the only one over which the Bulgarians made a resolute stand.  When
they signed this protocol, they stated that the accord was only because
they had taken notice of the notes which Austria-Hungary and Russia
presented to the conference, to the effect that in their ratification
they would reserve for future discussion the inclusion of Kavalla in
Greek territory.

The Bulgarians insisted on a clause guaranteeing autonomy for churches
and schools in the condominium of liberated territories.  Servia
opposed this demand mildly, and Greece strongly.  They were right.  The
question of national propaganda through churches and schools had done
more to arouse and keep alive racial hatred in Macedonia than any other
cause.  If there were to be a lasting peace, nothing could be more
unwise than the continuance of the propaganda which had plunged
Macedonia into such terrible confusion.

Rumania, however, secured in the Treaty of {346} Bukarest from each of
the States what they had been unwilling to grant each other.  Rumania
imposed upon Bulgaria, Greece, and Servia, the obligation of granting
autonomy to the Kutzo-Wallachian churches, and assent to the creation
of bishoprics subsidized by the Rumanian Government.

A rather amusing incident occurred on August 5th by the proposition of
the United States Government through its Minister at Bukarest, that a
provision be embodied in the treaty according full religious liberties
in transferred territories.  The ignorance of American diplomacy, so
frequently to be deplored, never made a greater blunder than this.  It
showed how completely the American State Department and its advisors on
Near Eastern affairs had misunderstood the Macedonian question.  Quite
rightly, the consideration even of this request was rejected as
superfluous.  Mr. Venizelos administered a well-deserved rebuke when he
said that religious liberty, in the right sense of the word, was
understood through the extension of each country's constitution over
the territories acquired.

Much has been written concerning the intrigues of European Powers at
Bukarest during the ten days of the conference which made a new map for
the Balkan Peninsula.  It will be many years, if ever, before these
intrigues are brought to light.  Therefore we cannot discuss the
question of the pressure which was brought to bear upon Rumania, upon
Bulgaria, and upon Servia and Greece to determine the partition of
territories.  Germany looked with alarm upon the possibility of a
durable {347} settlement.  Austria was determined that Bulgaria and
Servia should not become reconciled.

Austria-Hungary and Russia, though for different reasons, were right in
their attitude toward the matter of Greece's claim upon Kavalla.
Greece would have done well had she been content to leave to Bulgaria a
larger littoral on the Ægean Sea, and the port which is absolutely
essential for the proper economic development of the _hinterland_
attributed to her.  By taking her pound of flesh, the Greeks only
exposed themselves to future dangers.  The laws of economics are
inexorable.  Bulgaria cannot allow herself to think sincerely about
peace until her portion of Macedonia, by the inclusion of Kavalla, is
logically complete.  It would have been better politics for Greece to
have shown herself magnanimous on this point.  As George Sand has so
aptly said: "It is not philanthropy, but our own interest, which leads
us sometimes to do good to men in order that they may be prevented in
the future from doing harm to us."

When we come to look back upon the second Balkan war, and have traced
out the sad consequences and the continued unrest which followed the
Treaty of Bukarest, it is possible that Servia's responsibility may be
considered as great, if not greater, than that of Bulgaria in bringing
about the strife between the allies.  In our sympathy with the inherent
justice of Servia's claim for adequate territorial compensation for
what she had suffered for, and what she had contributed to, the Turkish
_débâcle_ in Europe, we are apt to overlook three {348} indisputable
facts: that Servia repudiated a solemn treaty with Bulgaria, on the
basis of which Bulgaria had agreed to the alliance against Turkey; that
the territories granted to Servia, _south of the line which she had
sworn not to pass in her territorial claims_, and a portion of those in
the "contested zone" of her treaty with Bulgaria, were beyond any
shadow of doubt inhabited by Bulgarians; and that since these
territories were ceded to her she has not, as was tacitly understood at
Bukarest, extended to them the guarantees and privileges of the Servian
constitution.

The Treaty of Bukarest, so far as the disputed territories allotted to
Servia are concerned, has created a situation analogous to that of
Alsace and Lorraine after the Treaty of Frankfort.  And Servia started
in to cope with it by following Prussian methods.  What Servians of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dalmatia have suffered from Austrian rule,
free Servia is inflicting upon the Bulgarians who became her subjects
after the second Balkan war.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the population of
Macedonia, as a whole, of whatever race or creed, would welcome to-day
a return to the Ottoman rule of Abdul Hamid.  The Turkish
"constitutional _régime_" was worse than Abdul Hamid, the war of
"liberation" worse than the Young Turks, and the present disposition of
territories satisfies none.  Poor Macedonia!

After the disastrous and humiliating losses at Bukarest, Bulgaria still
had her former vanquished foe to reckon with.  The Turks were again at
Adrianople {349} and Kirk Kilissé.  Thrace was once more in her power.
The Treaty of Bukarest, while attributing Thrace to Bulgaria on the
basis of the Treaty of London, actually said nothing whatever about it.
Nor were there any promises of aid in helping Bulgaria to get back
again what she had lost, without a struggle, by her folly and treachery.

A new war by Bulgaria alone in her weakened military condition and with
her empty treasury, to drive once more the Turks back south of the
Enos-Midia line, was impossible.  Bulgaria appealed to the
chancelleries of Europe to help her in taking possession of the
Thracian territory ceded to her at London.  The Powers made one of
their futile overtures to Turkey, requesting that she accept the treaty
which she had signed a few months before.

But no one could blame the Turks for having taken advantage of
Bulgarian folly.  Who could expect them to meekly withdraw behind the
Enos-Midia line?  Bulgaria could get no support in applying the
argument of force.

In the end, the victors of Lulé Burgas had to go to Constantinople and
make overtures directly to the Sublime Porte.  They fared very badly.
The Enos-Midia line was drawn, but it took a curve northward from the
Black Sea and westward across the Maritza in such a way that the Turks
obtained not only Adrianople, but also Kirk Kilissé and Demotica.  The
Bulgarians were not even masters of the one railway leading to
Dedeagatch, their sole port on the Ægean Sea.

The year 1913 for Bulgaria will remain the most {350} bitter one of her
history.  She had to learn the lesson that the life of nations, as well
as of individuals, is one of give as well as take, and that compromise
is the basis of sound statesmanship.  Who wants all, generally gets
nothing.




{351}

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ALBANIAN FIASCO

The world has not known just what to do with the mountainous country
which comes out in a bend on the upper western side of the Balkan
Peninsula directly opposite the heel of Italy.  It caused trouble to
the Romans from the very moment that they became an extra-Italian
power.  Inherited from them by the Byzantines, fought for with the
varying fortunes by the Frankish princes, the Venetians, and the Turks,
Albania has remained a country which cannot be said to have ever been
wholly subjected.  Nor can it be said to have ever had a national
entity.  Its present mediæval condition is due to the fact that, owing
to its high mountains and its being on the road to nowhere, it has not,
since the Roman days at least, undergone the influences of a
contemporary civilization.

Venice recognized the importance of Albania during the days of her
commercial prosperity.  For the Albanian coast, with its two splendid
harbours, of Valona and Durazzo, effectively guards the entrance of the
Adriatic into the Mediterranean Sea.

But Albania did not demand attention a hundred years ago when the last
map of Europe was being {352} made by the Congress of Vienna.  The
reason for this is simple.  Italy was not a political whole.  The head
of the Adriatic was entirely in the hands of Austria.  There was no
thought at that time of our modern navies, and of the importance of
keeping open the Straits of Otranto.  It was the Dalmatian coast, north
of Albania, which Austria considered essential to her commercial
supremacy.  Then, too, Greece had not yet received her freedom, and the
Servians had not risen in rebellion against the Ottoman Empire.  There
were no Slavic, Hellenic, and Italian questions to disturb Austria in
her peaceful possession of the Adriatic Sea.

It was not until the union of Italy had been accomplished, and the
south Slavic nationalities had formed themselves into political units,
that Albania became a "question" in the chancelleries of Europe.

Austria-Hungary determined that Italy should not get a foothold in
Albania.  Italy had the same determination in regard to
Austria-Hungary.  Since the last Russo-Turkish War, Austria-Hungary and
Italy have had the united determination to keep the Slavs from reaching
the Adriatic.  For the past generation, feeling certain that the end of
the Ottoman Empire was at hand, Austria and Italy through their
missionaries, their schools, and their consular and commercial agents,
have struggled hard against each other to secure the ascendancy in
Albania.  Their intrigues have not ceased up to this day.

When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Young Turk
oppression of the Albanians aroused the first expression of what might
possibly {353} be called national feeling since the time of Skander
bey's resistance to the Ottoman conquest, the rival Powers, instead of
following in the line of Russia and Great Britain in Persia, and
establishing spheres of interest, agreed to support the Albanian
national movement as the best possible check upon Servian and Greek
national aspirations.  This was the status of Albania in her
relationship to the Adriatic Powers, when the war of the Balkan States
against Turkey broke out.  The accord between Austria and Italy had
stood the strain of Italy's war with Turkey.  Largely owing to their
fear of Russia and to the pressure of Germany, it stood the strain of
the Balkan War.  But both Italy and Austria let it be known to the
other Powers that if the Turkish Empire in Europe disappeared, there
must be an independent Albania.

This dictum was accepted in principle by the other four Powers, who saw
in it the only possible chance of preventing the outbreak of a conflict
between Austria and Russia which would be bound to involve all Europe
in war.  No nation wanted to fight over the question of Albania.
Russia could not hope to have support from Great Britain and France to
impose upon the Triple Alliance her desire for a Slavic outlet to the
Adriatic.  For neither France nor Great Britain was anxious for the
Russian to get to the Mediterranean.  The accord between the Powers was
shown in the warning given to Greece and Servia that the solution of
the Albanian question must be reserved for the Powers when a treaty of
peace was signed with Turkey.  The accord weathered {354} the severe
test put upon it by the bold defiance of the Montenegrin occupation of
Scutari.

We have spoken elsewhere of the policy of the Young Turks towards
Albania.  This most useful and loyal corner of the Sultan's dominions
was turned into a country of perennial revolutions, which started soon
after the inauguration of the constitutional _régime_.  In the winter
of 1911-1912, when the group of Albanian deputies in the Ottoman
Parliament saw their demands for reforms rejected by the Cabinet, and
even the right of discussion of their complaints refused on the floor
of Parliament, the Albanians north and south, Catholic and Moslem,
united in a resistance to the Turkish authorities that extended to
Uskub and Monastir.  After the spring elections of 1912, the resistance
became a formidable revolt.  For the Young Turks had rashly manoeuvred
the balloting with more than Tammany skill.  The Albanians were left
without representatives in Parliament!  Former deputies, such as Ismail
Kemal bey, Hassan bey, and chiefs such as Isa Boletinatz, Idris Sefer,
and Ali Riza joined in a determination to demand autonomy by force of
arms.

When, in July, the Cabinet decided to move an army against the
Albanians, there were wholesale desertions from the garrison of
Monastir, and of Albanian officers from all parts of European Turkey.
Mahmoud Shevket pasha was compelled to resign the Ministry of War, and
was followed by Saïd pasha and the whole Cabinet.  The Albanians
demanded as a _sine qua non_ the dissolution of Parliament.  The {355}
Mukhtar Cabinet agreed to the dissolution, and accepted almost all the
demands of the rebels in a conference at Pristina.

For the tables had now been turned.  Instead of a Turkish invasion of
Albania for "pacification," as in previous summers, it was a question
now of an Albanian invasion of Turkey.  In spite of the conciliatory
spirit of the new Cabinet, the agitation persisted.  It was rumoured
that the Malissores and the Mirdites were planning a campaign against
Scutari and Durazzo.  I was in Uskub in the early part of September.
Isa Boletinatz and his band were practically in possession of the city.
A truce for Ramazan, the Moslem fast month, had been arranged between
Turks and Albanians.  But the Albanians said they would not lay down
their arms until a new and honestly constitutional election was held.

Immediately after Ramazan came the Balkan War.  Albania found herself
separated from Turkey, and in a position to have more than autonomy
without having to deal further with the Turks.

During the Balkan War, the attitude of the Albanians was a tremendous
disappointment to the Turks.  One marvels that loyalty to the Empire
could have been expected, even from the Moslem element, in Albania.
And yet the Turks did expect that a Pan-Islamic feeling would draw the
Albanian _beys_ to fight for the Sultan, just as they had expected a
similar phenomenon on the part of the rebellious Arabs of the Arabic
peninsula during the war with Italy.

{356}

From the very beginning the Albanians adopted an attitude of
opportunism.  They did not lift a hand directly to help the Turks.  Had
they so desired, they might have made impossible the investment of
Janina by the Greeks.  But nowhere, save in Scutari, did the Albanians
make a stubborn stand against the military operations of the Balkan
allies.  Almost from the beginning, they had understood that the Powers
would not allow the partition of Albania.  They knew that the retention
of Janina was hopeless after the successes of the allies during
October.  But they received encouragement from both Austria-Hungary and
Italy to fight for Scutari.

The heroic defence of Scutari, which lasted longer than that of any of
the other fortified towns in the Balkan Peninsula, cannot be regarded
as a feat of the Turkish army.  During the siege, the general
commanding Scutari had been assassinated by order of Essad pasha, who
was his second in command.  Essad then assumed charge of the defence as
purely Albanian in character.  He refused to accept the armistice, and
continued the struggle throughout the debates in London.  Scutari is at
the south end of a lake which is shared between Albania and Montenegro.
Commanding the city is a steep barren hill called Tarabosh.  With their
heavy artillery on this hill, the Albanians were able to prevent
indefinitely the capture of their city.  Servians and Montenegrins
found themselves confronted with the task of taking Tarabosh by
assault, if they hoped to occupy Scutari.  This was a feat beyond the
strength of a Balkan army.  On the {357} steep slopes of this hill were
placed miles of barbed wire.  The assailants were mowed down each time
they tried to reach the batteries at the top.  As Tarabosh commanded
the four corners of the horizon, its cannon could prevent an assault or
bombardment of the city from the plain.  The allies were unable to
silence the batteries on the crest of this hill.

During the winter, the principal question before the concert of
European Powers was that of Scutari.  Austria-Hungary was so determined
that Scutari should not fall into the hands of the Montenegrins and
Servians that she mobilized several army corps in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and on the Russian frontier of Galicia, at Christmas time, 1912.  The
New Year brought with it ominous forebodings for the peace of Europe.
Diplomacy worked busily to bring about an accord between the Powers,
and pressure upon the besiegers of Scutari.  In the middle of March, it
was unanimously agreed that Scutari should remain to Albania, and that
Servia should receive Prizrend, Ipek, Dibra, and Diakova as
compensation for not reaching the Adriatic, and the assurance of an
economic outlet for a railroad at some Albanian port.  The European
concert then decided to demand at Belgrade and Cettinje the lifting of
the siege of Scutari.

Servia, yielding to the warning of Russia that nothing further could be
done for her, consented to withdraw her troops from before Scutari, and
to abandon the points in Albanian territory which had been allotted by
the Powers to the independent Albanian State which they intended to
create.  {358} Servia had another reason for doing this.  Seeing the
hopelessness of territorial aggrandizement in Albania, she decided to
denounce her treaty of partition, concluded before the war, with
Bulgaria.  To realize this act of faithlessness and treachery, she had
need of the sympathetic support of the Powers in the quarrel which was
bound to ensue.  We see here how the blocking of Servia's outlet to the
Adriatic led inevitably to a war between the Balkan Allies.

But with Montenegro the situation was entirely different.  She had
sacrificed one-fifth of her army in the attacks upon Tarabosh, and
Scutari seemed to her the only thing that she was to get out of the war
with Turkey.  Perched up in her mountains, there was little harm that
the Powers could do to her.  Just as King Nicholas had precipitated the
Balkan War against the advice of the Powers the previous October, he
decided on April 1st to refuse to obey the command of the Powers to
lift the siege of Scutari.  From what I have gathered myself from
conversations in the Montenegrin capital two months later, I feel that
the King of Montenegro can hardly be condemned for what the newspapers
of Europe called his "audacious folly" in refusing to give a favourable
response to the joint note presented to him by the European Ministers
at Cettinje.  The Montenegrins are illiterate mountaineers, who know
nothing whatever about considerations of international diplomacy.  If
their King had listened to words written on a piece of paper, and had
ordered the Montenegrin troops to withdraw from {359} before Scutari,
he would probably have lost his throne.

So the Powers were compelled to make a show of force.  Little
Montenegro, with its one port, and its total population not equal to a
single _arrondissement_ of the city of Paris, received the signal
honour of an international blockade.  On April 7th, an international
fleet, under the command of the British Admiral Burney, blockaded the
coast from Antivari to Durazzo.  While all Europe was showing its
displeasure in the Adriatic, the Montenegrins kept on, although
deserted by the Servians, sitting in a circle around Scutari, only
twenty-five miles inland from the blockading fleet.  On April 23d,
after the Balkan War was all finished, Europe was electrified by the
news that the Albanians had surrendered Scutari to Montenegro.  The
worst was to be feared, for Austria announced her determination to send
her troops across the border from Bosnia into Montenegro.  Such an
action would certainly have brought on a great European war.  For
neither at Rome nor at Petrograd could Austrian intervention have been
tolerated.

No Power in Europe was at that moment ready for war.  Largely through
pressure brought to bear at Cettinje by his son-in-law, the King of
Italy, King Nicholas decided on May 5th to deliver Scutari to the
Powers.  The Montenegrins withdrew, and ten days later Scutari was
occupied by detachments of marines from the international squadron.
The blockade was lifted.  The peace of Europe was saved.

{360}

The Treaty of London, signed on May 30, 1913, put Albania into the
hands of the Powers.  The northern and eastern frontiers had been
arranged by the promise made to Servia in return for her withdrawal
from the siege of Scutari.  But the southern frontier was still an open
question.  Here Italy was as much interested as was Austria in the
north.  With Corfu in the possession of Greece, Italy would not agree
that the coast of the mainland opposite should also be Hellenic.  The
Greeks, on the contrary, declared that the littoral and _hinterland_,
up beyond Santi Quaranta, was part of ancient Epirus, and inhabited
principally by Greeks.  It should therefore revert logically to greater
Greece.  Athens lifted again the old cry, "Where there are Hellenes,
there is Hellas."  The Greeks were occupying Santi Quaranta.  They
claimed as far north as Argyrokastron.  But they consented to withdraw
from the Adriatic, north of and opposite Corfu, if interior points
equally far to the north were left to them.  An international
commission was formed to make a southern boundary for Albania.  Its
task has is still open.

What was to be done with this new state, foster child of all Europe,
with indefinite boundaries, with guardians each jealous of the other,
and neighbours waiting only for a favourable moment to throw themselves
upon her and extinguish her life?

I visited Albania in July, 1913, during the second Balkan War.  At
Valona, in the south, I found a provisional government,
self-constituted during the {361} previous winter, whose authority was
problematical outside of Valona itself.  At the head of the government
was Ismail Kemal, whom I had known as the champion of Albanian autonomy
in the Ottoman Parliament at Constantinople.  He talked passionately of
Albania, the new State in Europe, with its _united_ population and its
_national_ aspirations.  He was eager to have the claims of Albania to
a generous southern frontier presented at London.  He assured me that I
could write with perfect confidence in glowing terms concerning the
future of Albania, that a spirit of harmony reigned throughout the
country, and that the Albanians of all creeds, freed from Turkish
oppression, were looking eagerly to their new life as an independent
nation.  When I expressed misgivings as to the rôle of Essad pasha, the
provisional president asserted that the former commander of Scutari was
wholly in accord with him, and cited as proof the fact that he had that
very day received from Essad pasha his acceptance of the portfolio of
Minister of the Interior.

But that indefinable feeling of misgiving, which one always has over
the enthusiasm of Orientals, caused me to withhold judgment as to the
liability of Albania until I had seen how things were going in other
portions of the new kingdom.

At Durazzo, the northern port of Albania, the friends of Essad pasha
were in control of the government.  Things were still being done _à la
turque_, and there was a feeling of great uncertainty concerning the
future.  Few had any faith whatever in the provisional government at
Valona, and it was declared {362} that the influence of Essad pasha
would decide the attitude of the Albanians in Durazzo, Tirana, and
Elbassan.  Essad was chief of the Toptanis, the most influential family
in the neighbourhood of Durazzo.  He had "made his career" in the
_gendarmerie_, and had risen rapidly through the approval and
admiration of Abdul Hamid.  This is an indication of his character.  He
was credited with the ambition of ruling Albania.  To withdraw his
forces and his munitions of war intact, so that he could press these
claims, is the only explanation of his "deal" with King Nicholas of
Montenegro to surrender Scutari.  Essad had sacrificed the pride and
honour of Albania to his personal ambition.

From Durazzo, I went to San Giovanni di Medua, which was occupied by
the Montenegrins, just as I had found Santi Quaranta in the south
occupied by the Greeks.  Going inland from this port (one must use his
imagination in calling San Giovanni di Medua a port) by way of Alessio,
I reached Scutari, from whose citadel flew the flags of the Powers.  In
every quarter of this typically and hopelessly Turkish town, one ran
across sailors from various nations.  Each Power had its quarter, and
had named the streets with some curious results.  The Via Garibaldi ran
into the Platz Radetzky.  On the Catholic cathedral was a sign
informing you that you were in the Rue Ernest Renan.

This accidental naming of streets was a prophecy of the hopelessness of
trying to reconcile the conflicting aims and ideals of the Powers whose
bands were playing side by side in the public garden.  In {363} the
dining-room of the hotel, when I saw Austrians, Italians, Germans,
British, and French officers eating together at the long tables,
instead of rejoicing at this seeming spirit of European harmony, I had
the presentiment of the inevitable result of the struggle between Slav
and Teuton, to prevent which these men were there.  Just a year later,
I stood in front of the Gare du Montparnasse in Paris reading the order
for General Mobilization.  There came back to me as in a dream the
public garden at Scutari, and the mingled strains of national anthems,
with officers standing rigidly in salute beside their half-filled
glasses.

In the palatial home of a British nobleman who had loved the Albanians
and had lived long in Scutari, Admiral Burney established his
headquarters.  I talked with him there one afternoon concerning the
present and the future of Albania, and the relationship of the problem
which he had before him with the peace of Europe.  Never have I found a
man more intelligently apprehensive of the possible outcome of the
drama in which he was playing a part, and at the same time more
determinedly hopeful to use all his ability and power to save the peace
of Europe by welding together the Albanians into a nation worthy of the
independence that has been given to them by the European concert.  Such
men as Admiral Burney are more than the glory of a nation: they are the
making of a nation.  The greatness of Britain is due to the men who
serve her.  High ideals, self-sacrifice, ability, and energy are the
corner-stones of the British overseas Empire.

{364}

There was little, however, that Admiral Burney, or anyone in fact,
could do for Albania.  No nation can exist in modern times, when
national life is in the will of the people rather than in the unifying
qualities of a ruler, if there are no common ideals and the
determination to attain them.  Albania is without a national spirit and
a national past.  It is, therefore, no unit, capable of being welded
into a state.  The creation by the Ambassadors of the Powers in London
may have been thought by them to be a necessity.  But it was really a
makeshift.  If the Albanians had done their part, and had shown the
possibility of union, the makeshift might have developed into a new
European state.  As things have turned out, it has stayed what it was
in the beginning,--a fiasco.

Among the many candidates put forward for the new throne, Prince
William of Wied was finally decided upon.  He was a Protestant, and
could occupy a position of neutrality among his Moslem, Orthodox, and
Catholic subjects.  He was a German, and could not be suspected of
Slavic sympathies.  He was a relative of the King of Rumania, and could
expect powerful support in the councils of the Balkan Powers.

It would be wearisome to go into the story of Prince William's short
and unhappy reign.  At Durazzo, which was chosen for the capital, he
quickly showed himself incapable of the rôle which a genius among
rulers might have failed to play successfully.  Lost in a maze of
bewildering intrigues, foreign and domestic, the ruler of Albania saw
his prestige, and {365} then his dignity, disappear.  He never had any
real authority.  He had been forced upon the Albanians.  They did not
want him.  The Powers who had placed him upon the throne did not
support him.  In the spring, the usual April heading, "Albania in
Arms," appeared once more in the newspapers of the world.  Up to the
outbreak of the European war, when Albania was "lost in the shuffle,"
almost daily telegrams detailed the march of the insurgents upon
Durazzo, the useless and fatal heroism of the Dutch officers of the
_gendarmerie_, the incursions of the Epirote bands in the south, and
the embarrassing position of the international forces still occupying
Scutari.  What the Albanians really wanted, none could guess, much less
they themselves!

The European war, in August, 1914, enabled the Powers to withdraw
gracefully from the Albanian fiasco.  Their contingents hurriedly
abandoned Scutari, and sailed for home.  The French did not have time
to do this, so they went to Montenegro.  Since the catastrophe, to
prevent which they had created Albania, had fallen upon Europe, what
further need was there for the Powers to bother about the fortunes of
Prince William and his subjects?  Italy alone was left with hands free,
and her interests were not at stake, so long as Greece kept out of the
fray.  For Prince William of Wied, Italy felt no obligation whatever.

Without support and without money, there was nothing left to Prince
William but to get out.  He did not have the good sense to make his
withdrawal from Albania a dignified proceeding.  The palace {366} was
left under seals.  The Prince issued a proclamation which would lead
the Albanians to believe that it was his intention to return.  It may
be that he thought the triumph of the German and Austrian armies in the
European war would mean his re-establishment to Durazzo.  But after he
was once again safely home at Neu-Wied, he did what he ought to have
done many months before.  A high-sounding manifesto announced his
abdication, and wished the Albanians Godspeed in the future.  After
this formality had been accomplished, the former Mpret of Albania
rejoined his regiment in the German army, and went out to fight against
the French.

With Prince William of Wied and the international corps of occupation
gone, the Albanians were left to themselves.  At Durazzo, a body of
notables, calling themselves the Senate, adopted resolutions restoring
the Ottoman flag and the suzerainty of the Sultan, invited Prince
Burhaneddin effendi, a son of Abdul Hamid, to become their ruler, and
solemnly decreed that hereafter the Turkish language should be restored
to its former position as the official language of the country.

But Essad pasha thought otherwise.  The psychological moment, for which
he had been waiting ever since his surrender of Scutari to the
Montenegrins, had come.  In the first week of October, he hurried to
Durazzo with his followers, had himself elected head of a new
provisional government by the Albanian Senate, and announced openly
that his policy would be to look to Italy instead of to Austria for
support.  After rendering homage to the Sultan as Khalif, {367} asking
the people to celebrate the happy spirit of harmony which now reigned
throughout Albania, and prophesying a new era of peace and prosperity
for Europe's latest-born independent state, the former _gendarme_ of
Abdul Hamid entered the palace, broke the seals of the international
commission, and went to sleep in the bed of Prince William of Wied.

One wonders whether the new ruler of Albania will have more restful
slumbers than his predecessor.  In spite of all protests, Greece is
still secretly encouraging the Epirotes in their endeavour to push
northward the frontier of the Hellenic kingdom.  Italy has two army
corps at Brindisi waiting for a favourable moment to occupy Valona.
The Montenegrins and Servians are planning once more to reach the
Adriatic through the valleys of the Boyana and Drin, after they have
driven the Austro-Hungarian armies from Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Only
an Austrian triumph could now save Albania from her outside enemies.
But could anything save her from her inside enemies?  When I read of
Essad Pasha in Durazzo, self-chosen Moses of his people, there comes
back to me a conversation with the leading Moslem chieftain of Scutari,
whose guest I had the privilege of being, in his home in the summer of
1913.  When I mentioned Essad pasha, he rose to his feet before the
fire, waved his arms, and cried out: "When I see Essad, I shall shoot
him like a dog!"




{368}

CHAPTER XIX

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA

In discussing the relations of the Austrians and Hungarians with their
south Slavic subjects, and the rivalries of races in Macedonia the
general causes behind the hostile attitude of Austria-Hungary to the
development of Servia have been explained.  Specific treatment of the
Servian attitude towards the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
reserved for this chapter, because the events of the summer of 1914 are
the direct sequence of the events of the winter of 1908-1909.

On October 3, 1908, Marquis Pallavicini, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at
Constantinople, notified verbally the Sublime Porte that
Austria-Hungary had annexed the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, whose administration was entrusted to her by the Treaty of
Berlin just thirty years before.  Austria-Hungary was willing to
renounce the right given her by the Treaty of Berlin to the military
occupation of the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar (a strip of Turkish territory
between Servia and Montenegro), if Turkey would renounce her
sovereignty of the annexed provinces.

{369}

This violation of the Treaty of Berlin by Austria-Hungary aroused a
strong protest not only in Servia and in Turkey, but also among the
other Powers who had signed at Berlin the conditions of the maintenance
of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.  The protest was especially
strong in London and Petrograd.  But Austria-Hungary had the backing of
Germany, whose Ambassador at Petrograd, Count de Pourtales, did not
hesitate several times during the winter to exercise pressure _that
went almost to the point of being a threat_ upon the Russian Foreign
Office to refrain from encouraging the intractable attitude of Servia
towards the annexation.

With Germany's support, Austria-Hungary did not have much difficulty in
silencing the protests of all the Great Powers.  She had a free hand,
thanks to Germany, in forcing Turkey and Servia to accept the _fait
accompli_ of the annexation.

Turkish protests took the form of the boycott of which we have spoken
elsewhere.  On November 22d, Austria-Hungary threatened to put the
whole status of European Turkey into question by convoking the European
congress to revise the Treaty of Berlin.  This is exactly what
Austria-Hungary herself did not want.  But neither did Turkey.  Both
governments had a common interest in preventing outside intervention in
the Balkan Peninsula.  The boycott, as evidencing anti-Austrian
feeling, was rather a sop to public opinion of Young Turkey, and a
blind to the Powers to hide the perfect accord that existed between
Germany and Turkey at the moment, than the expression of hostility to
Austria-Hungary.  {370} After several months of _pourparlers_ an
agreement was made between Constantinople and Vienna on February 26,
1909.  Turkey agreed to recognize the annexation in return for
financial compensation.  The negotiations at Constantinople concerning
Bosnia and Herzegovina are a monument to the diplomatic finesse and
skill of the late Baron Marschall von Bieberstein and of Marquis
Pallavicini.

To lose something that you know you can no longer keep is far different
from losing the hope of possession.  It is always more cruel to be
deprived of an anticipation than of a reality.  Turkey gave up Bosnia
and Herzegovina with her usual fatalistic indifference.  Her
sovereignty had been only a fiction after all.  But Servia saw in the
action of Austria-Hungary a fatal blow to her national aspirations.
The inhabitants of the two Turkish provinces on her west were Servian:
Bosnia-Herzegovina formed the centre of the Servian race.  Montenegro
on the south was Servian.  Dalmatia on the west was Servian.  Croatia
on the north was Servian.  Everything was Servian to the Adriatic Sea.
And yet Servia was land-locked.  The Servians determined they would not
accept this annexation.  They appealed to the signatory Powers of
Berlin, and succeeded in arousing a sentiment in Europe favourable to a
European conference.  They threatened to make Austrian and Hungarian
sovereignty intolerable, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also
in Croatia and Dalmatia.

Austria-Hungary was more than irritated; she was alarmed.  She appealed
to her ally, and pictured {371} the danger to the _Drang nach Osten_.
The powerful intervention of the German ambassadors in the various
European capitals succeeded in isolating Belgrade.  Russian support of
Servia would have meant a European war.  Rather than risk this, France
begged Russia to yield.  Russia, not yet recovered from the Manchurian
disaster, ordered Servia to yield.  Austria-Hungary was allowed to
force Servia into submission.

Friendless in the face of her too powerful adversary, Servia directed
her Minister at Vienna on March 31, 1909, to make the following formal
declaration to the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:


"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the
situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt
herself to the decisions at which the Powers are going to arrive in
reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty.  By following the councils
of the Powers, Servia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest
and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to
the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction
of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to
live with the latter in friendly and neighbourly relations."


The crisis passed.  Servia's humiliation was the price of European
peace.  Germany had shown her determination to stand squarely behind
Austria-Hungary in her dealings with Servia.  It was a lesson for the
future.  Five years later history repeated itself--except that Russia
did not back down!

{372}

We have already told the story of Austria-Hungary's dealings with
Servia after the first victorious month of the Balkan War with Turkey:
how Servia was compelled, owing to lack of support from Russia, to give
satisfaction to Austria-Hungary in the Prochaska incident, to withdraw
her troops from Durazzo and from before Scutari; and how the Powers
saved the peace of Europe in May, 1913, by compelling Montenegro to
abandon Scutari.

Ever since the Treaty of Bukarest, Austria-Hungary watched Servia
keenly for an opportunity to pick a quarrel with her.  It is marvellous
how the Servians, elated as they naturally were by their military
successes against Turkey and Bulgaria, avoided knocking the chip off
the shoulder of their jealous and purposely sensitive neighbour.

It was one thing to be able to keep a perfectly correct official
attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian Government.  This the Servian
Government had promised to do in the note wrung from it on March 31,
1909.  This it _did_ do.  But it was a totally different thing to
expect the authorities at Belgrade to stifle the national aspirations
of twelve million Servians, the majority of whom were outside of her
jurisdiction.  Even if it had been the wiser course for her to
pursue--and this is doubtful,--could Servia have been able to repress
the thoroughly awakened and triumphant nationalism of her own subjects
who had borne so successfully and so heroically the sufferings and
sacrifices of two wars within one year?

Individual Servians, living within the kingdom of {373} Servia, were
irredentists, but without official sanction.  They were undoubtedly in
connection with the revolutionaries created by Austrian and Hungarian
methods in the Servian provinces of the Dual Monarchy.  There was
undoubtedly a dream of Greater Servia, and a strong hope in the hearts
of nationalists on both sides of the frontiers that the day would dawn
_by their efforts_ when Greater Servia would be a reality.  No
government could have continued to exist in Servia which tried to
suppress the _Narodna Obrana_.  I make this statement without
hesitation.  King Peter did not intend to become another Charles Albert.

Ought the Vienna and Berlin statesmen to have expected Servia to do so?
What answer would Switzerland or Holland or Belgium or Brazil receive,
were their ministers to present a note at Wilhelmstrasse or Ballplatz,
calling attention to the menace to their independence of the
Pan-Germanic movement, citing speeches delivered by eminent professors
in universities, books written by officials of the imperial
Governments, and asking that certain societies be suppressed and
certain geographies be removed from use in German schools?  Their cause
would have been as just, and their right as clear, _for exactly the
same reasons_, as that of the Austrian Government in its attitude
towards Servia.  The only difference between Pan-Servianism and
Pan-Germanism--and you must remember that the latter is not only
encouraged, but also subsidized, by the Berlin and Vienna
governments--is that the former is the aspiration of twelve millions
while the latter {374} is the aspiration of ninety millions.  Is not
the answer the old Bismarckian formula that might makes right?

During the winter following the Treaty of Bukarest the Austro-Hungarian
agents and police continued their careful surveillance of the _Narodna
Obrana_, and followed all its dealings with Servians of
Austro-Hungarian nationality.  But it could find no _casus belli_.  The
attitude of the Servian Government was perfectly correct at all times.
Traps were laid, but Servian officials did not fall into them.  The
occasion for striking Servia came in a most tragic way.

It seems like tempting Providence to have sent the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand and his wife to Sarajevo on the anniversary of the battle of
Kossova.  Things had been going from bad to worse in Bosnia.  Flags of
the Dual Monarchy had been burned in Sarajevo and Mostar, and the
garrisons called upon to intervene to restore order.  The Constitution
of 1910 had been modified in 1912, so that the military Governor was
invested with civil power.  The local Bosnian Diet had been twice
prorogued.  In May, 1913, the constitution was suspended, and a state
of siege declared in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Throughout the winter of
1913-1914, incipient rebellions had to be checked by force in many
places.  It was known to the police that Servian secret societies were
active, and that the provinces were in a state of danger and
insecurity.  The Servian Government was apprehensive concerning the
announced visit of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne.  In fact,
so greatly was it feared that some attempt {375} might be made against
the life of Franz Ferdinand, and that this would be used as an excuse
for an attack upon Servia, that the Servian Minister at Vienna, a week
before the date announced for the visit, informed the Government that
there was reason to fear a plot to assassinate the Archduke.

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, the
Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated in the streets of Sarajevo.
Austria-Hungary realized that her moment had come.  Germany was
sounded, and found to be ready to prevent outside interference in
whatever measures Vienna might see fit to take with Belgrade.

In the spring of 1914, the Pasitch Cabinet had almost succumbed in the
struggle between civil and military elements.  Premier Pasitch retained
his power by agreeing to a dissolution of Parliament, and binding
himself to the necessity of following the leadership of the military
part.  So far were the chiefs of the military party from being in a
mood to consider the susceptibilities of Austria-Hungary that they were
actually, according to a telegram from a well-informed source in Agram
on June 26, 1914, debating the means of uniting Servia and Montenegro.
The difficult question of dynasties was in the way of being solved,
and, despite Premier Pasitch's misgivings, the _ballon d'essai_ of the
project of union had been launched in Europe.  It was at this critical
and delicate moment for the Belgrade Cabinet that the storm broke.

I was surprised by the spirit of optimism which seemed to pervade the
French press during the {376} period immediately following the
assassination of Franz Ferdinand.  For three weeks the telegrams from
Vienna repeated over and over again the statement that the ultimatum
which Austria-Hungary intended to present at Belgrade as a result of
the Sarajevo assassination would be so worded that Russia could not
take offence.  This optimistic opinion, which seems to have been given
almost official sanction by the Ballplatz, was shared by the French
Government.  France is a country in which the inmost thoughts of her
statesmen are voiced freely in the daily newspapers of Paris.  If there
had been any serious misgivings, the protocol for the visit of
President Poincaré to Petrograd and to the Scandinavian capitals would
certainly have been modified.

The President of France sailed for the Baltic on July 15th.  At six
o'clock in the evening of the 23d, the note of the Austro-Hungarian
Government concerning the events of the assassination of Sarajevo was
given to the Servian Government.  It commenced by reproducing the text
of the Servian declaration of March 31, 1909, which we have quoted
above.  Servia was accused of not having fulfilled the promise made in
this declaration, and of permitting the Pan-Servian propaganda in the
newspapers and public schools of the kingdom.  The assassination of the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was stated to be the direct result of Servian
failure to live up to her declaration of March 31, 1909.
Austria-Hungary claimed that the assassination of the heir to her
throne had been investigated, and that ample proof had been found of
the connivance of two Servians, {377} one an army officer and the other
a functionary who belonged to the _Narodna Obrana_; that the assassins
had received their arms and their bombs from these two men, and had
been knowingly allowed to pass into Bosnia by the Servian authorities
on the Serbo-Bosnian frontier.  Being unable to endure longer the
Pan-Servian agitation, of which Belgrade was the _foyer_ and the crime
of Sarajevo a direct result, the Austro-Hungarian Government found
itself compelled to demand of the Servian Government the formal
assurance that it condemned this propaganda, which was dangerous to the
existence of the Dual Monarchy, because its final end was to detach
from Austria-Hungary large portions of her territory and attach them to
Servia.

After this preamble, the note went on to demand that on the first page
of the _Journal Officiel_ of July 26th the Servian Government publish a
new declaration, the text of which is so important that we quote it in
full.


"The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against
Austria-Hungary, _i.e._, the entirety of those machinations whose aim
it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories
belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences
of these criminal actions.

"The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and
officials have participated in the propaganda cited above, and have
thus threatened the friendly and neighbourly relations which the Royal
Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March
31, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and {378} rejects every
thought or every attempt at influencing the destinies of the
inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to
call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and officials,
and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it will hereafter
proceed with the utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar
actions, to prevent and suppress which it will make every effort."


Simultaneously with the publication in the_ Journal Officiel_,
Austria-Hungary demanded that the declaration be brought to the
knowledge of the Servian army by an order of the day of King Peter, and
be published in the official organ of the army.  The Servian Government
was also asked to make ten promises:


1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt
for, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and whose general tendency is
directed against the latter's territorial integrity;

2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society _Narodna
Obrana_, to confiscate its entire means of propaganda, and to proceed
in the same manner against the other societies and associations in
Servia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against
Austria-Hungary, and to take the necessary measures that the dissolved
societies may not continue their activities under another name or in
another form;

3. To eliminate without delay from the public instruction in Servia, so
far as the teaching staff as well as the curriculum is concerned,
whatever serves or may serve to foster the propaganda against
Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from military service and public {379} office in general
all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against
Austria-Hungary and whose names, with a communication of the evidence
which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the
Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the
Royal Government;

5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of members of the official
machinery (_organes_) of the Imperial and Royal Government in the
suppression of the movement directed against Austro-Hungarian
territorial integrity;

6. To commence a judicial investigation (_enquête judiciaire_) against
the participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian
territory--members of the official machinery (_organes_) delegated by
the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the researches
(_recherches_) relative thereto;

7. To proceed immediately to arrest Major Vorja Tankositch and a
certain Milan Ciganovitch, a functionary of the Servian State, who have
been compromised by the result of the preliminary investigation at
Sarajevo;

8. To prevent, by effective measures, the participation of the Servian
authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the
frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the functionaries at the
frontier at Shabatz and at Loznica, guilty of having aided the authors
of the crime of Sarajevo by facilitating their crossing of the frontier;

9. To give to the Austro-Hungarian Government explanations concerning
the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries, in Servia and
abroad, who, in spite of their official position have not hesitated,
after the crime of June 28th, to express themselves in interviews in a
hostile manner against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy;

{380}

10. To notify without delay to the Austro-Hungarian Government the
execution of the measures included in the preceding points.


Annexed to the note was a memorandum which declared that the
investigation of the police, after the assassination of the Archduke
and his wife, had established that the plot had been formed at Belgrade
by the assassins with the help of a commandant in the Servian army,
that the six bombs and four Browning pistols with their ammunition had
been given at Belgrade to the assassins by the Servian functionary and
the Servian army officer whose names were cited in the note, that the
bombs were hand grenades which came from the Servian army headquarters
at Kragujevac, that the assassins were given instruction in the use of
the arms by Servian officers, and that the introduction into Bosnia and
Herzegovina of the assassins and their arms was facilitated by the
connivance of three frontier captains and a customs official.

The wording of this note seemed to have been entirely unexpected.  The
intention of the ultimatum was clear.  It was understood that Russia
would not accept an attack upon the integrity of Servia.  Six years had
passed since 1908, and two since 1912.  Russia had recuperated from the
Japanese War, and her Persian accord with Great Britain had borne much
fruit.  She was sure of France.  Was this not a deliberate provocation
to Russia?

Forty-eight hours had been given to Servia to respond.  Russia and
France had both counselled {381} Servia to give an answer that would be
a _general_ acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum.  Neither
France nor Russia wanted war.  So anxious were they to avoid giving
Austria-Hungary the opportunity to precipitate the crisis before they
were ready for it that _for the third time in six years_ Servia was
asked to swallow her pride and submit.  On the night of July 24th, a
memorable council was held in Belgrade.  The Premier and the leaders of
the opposition, together with some members of the _Narodna Obrana_ were
shown clearly what course they must follow, if they expected the loyal
support of Russia.  The answer to the ultimatum must be worded in such
a way that Austria-Hungary would have no ground upon which to stand in
forcing immediately the war.  Servia must once more "eat humble pie."
But this time the promise of Russian support was given _to defend the
territorial integrity and the independence of Servia_.

The Servian answer was far more conciliatory than was expected.  The
allegations of the Austro-Hungarian preamble were denied, but the
publication of the declaration in the _Journal Officiel_ and in the
army bulletin, and its incorporation in an order of the day to the
army, were promised.  But there were to be two changes in the text of
the declaration.  Instead of "the Royal Servian Government condemns
_the propaganda against_ Austria-Hungary," the Servians agreed to
declare that "the Royal Servian Government condemns _every propaganda
which should be directed against_ Austria-Hungary," and instead of "the
Royal Government regrets _that Servian officers {382} and officials_
... have participated in the propaganda cited above," the Servian King
could say no more than "the Royal Government regrets _that according to
a communication of the Imperial and Royal Government certain officers
and functionaries ... etc._"

The German _White Book_ makes a special point of the bad faith of
Servia in altering the text of the declaration in this way.  But what
government could be expected to admit what was only a supposition, and
what king worthy of the name would denounce as a regicide openly before
his army one of his officers upon the unsupported statement of a
political document?  The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had given no proof
of its charges against the man named in its note, and forty-eight hours
was too short a time for the Servian Government to investigate the
charges to its own satisfaction.

In order to make clear just what was the nature of the demands which
Austria-Hungary made upon Servia, I have cited the ten articles in full.

One can readily see that the demands of Articles 1, 2, and 3, in their
entirety, meant the extinction of the Pan-Servian movement and Servian
nationalism.  Austria-Hungary was asking of Servia something that
neither member of the Dual Monarchy had succeeded in accomplishing in
its own territories!  The German _White Book_ attempts to sustain the
justice of the demands of its ally in striking at the press, the
nationalist societies, and the schools.  The methods of arousing a
nationalistic spirit in the Servian people through the press, through
the formation of societies, {383} and through the teaching of
irredentism by school-books, were borrowed from Germany.  But Servia
agreed to make her press laws more severe, to dissolve the _Narodna
Obrana_ and other societies; and "to eliminate from the public
instruction in Servia anything which might further the propaganda
directed against Austria-Hungary, provided the Imperial and Royal
Government furnishes actual proofs."

Article 4 was agreed to only so far as it could be actually proved that
the officers and officials in question had been "guilty of actions
against the territorial integrity of the monarchy."  To promise to
remove all who were "guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary"
would have meant the disbanding of the Servian army and the Servian
Government!  Is there any man with red blood in his veins who can be
prevented from having hopes and dislikes, and expressing them?  Could
Servia prevent Servians from stating how they felt about the political
_status_ of their race in Croatia and in Bosnia?  Did Austria-Hungary
ever make a similar request to her ally, Italy, about irredentist
literature and speeches?

Articles 5 and 6 are open to discussion.  There is no doubt that the
newspapers of nations hostile to Austria-Hungary and Germany have been
unfair in their interpretation and in their translation of these two
articles.  The Servian answer deliberately gives a false meaning to the
Austrian request here, and represents it as an attack upon the
independence of her courts.  Servia had enough good grounds for
resistance to the ultimatum without equivocating {384} on this point.
In her answer she refused what had not been actually demanded, a
co-operation in the _enquête judiciaire_ of Austro-Hungarian _organes_.
What Austria-Hungary demanded was the co-operation of her police
officials in the _recherches_.

Articles 7 to 10 were accepted by Servia _in toto_.  As a proof of her
good faith, the Servian answer declared that Major Tankositch had been
arrested on the evening of the day on which the ultimatum was received.

In conclusion, Servia offered, if her response to the ultimatum were
found insufficient, to place her case in the hands of the Hague
Tribunal and of the different Powers at whose suggestion she had signed
the declaration of March 31, 1909, after the excitement over the
Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The answer to the ultimatum was taken by Premier Pasitch in person to
the Minister of Austria-Hungary at Belgrade before six o'clock on the
evening of July 25th.  Without referring the response to his
Government, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, acting on previous
instructions that _no answer other than an acceptance in every
particular of the ultimatum would be admissible_, replied that the
response was not satisfactory.  At half-past six, he left Belgrade with
all members of the legation.

While the European chancelleries were trying to find some means to heal
the breach, Austria-Hungary formally declared war on Servia on the
morning of July 28th.  The same evening, the bombardment of Belgrade
from Semlin and from the Danube {385} was begun.  The Servian
Government retired to Nish.

Only the intervention of Germany could now prevent the European
cataclysm.




{386}

CHAPTER XX

GERMANY FORCES WAR UPON RUSSIA AND FRANCE

The title of this chapter seems to indicate that I have the intention
of taking sides in what many people believe to be an open question.
But this is not the case.  The German contention, that Russia caused
the war, must be clearly distinguished from the contention, that Russia
forced the war.  There is a great deal of reason in the first
contention.  No impartial student, who has written with sympathy
concerning Great Britain's attitude in the Crimean War, can fail to
give Germany just as strong justification for declaring war on Russia
in 1914 as Great Britain had in 1854.  But, when we come down to the
narrower question of responsibility for launching the war in which
almost all of Europe is now engaged, there can be no doubt that it was
deliberately willed by the German Government, and that the chain of
circumstances which brought it about was carefully woven by the
officials of Wilhelmstrasse and Ballplatz.  There may be honest
difference of opinion as to whether Germany was justified in forcing
the war.  But the facts allow no difference of opinion as to whether
Germany _did_ force the war.

{387}

A war to crush France and Russia has for many years been accepted as a
necessary eventuality in the evolution of Germany's foreign policy.
That when this war came, Great Britain would take the opportunity of
joining in order to strike at German commerce, which had begun to be
looked upon by British merchants as a formidable rival in the markets
of the world, was thought probable.  The leading men of Germany,
especially since the passing of Morocco and Persia, have felt that this
war was vital to the existence of the German Empire.  During recent
years the questions, "Ought there to be a war?" and "Will there be a
war?" ceased to be debated in Germany.  One heard only, "Under what
circumstances could _the_ war be most favourably declared?" and "How
soon will _the_ war come?"

Germany has believed that the events of the past decade have shown the
unalterable determination of Great Britain and France to make
impossible the political development of the _Weltpolitik_, without
which her commercial development would always be insecure.  This
determination has been consistently revealed in the hostility of her
western rivals to her colonial expansion in Africa and Asia.  The world
equilibrium, already decidedly disadvantageous to the overseas future
of Germans at the time they began their career as a united people, has
been disturbed more and more during the past forty years.

The Balkan wars, resulting as they did in the aggrandizement of Servia,
threatened the equilibrium of the Near East, where lay Germany's most
vital {388} and most promising external activities.  We must remember,
when we are considering the reasons for the consistent backing given to
Austria-Hungary by Germany in her treatment of Servian aspirations, the
words of Wirth: "_To render powerful the Servian people would be the
suicide of Germany._"

Germany has had as much reason, in the development of the present
crisis, for regarding Servia as the outpost of Russia as had Great
Britain for awarding this rôle to Bulgaria in 1876.  Germany has had as
much reason for declaring war on Russia to prevent the Russians from
securing the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire as had Great Britain and
France to take exactly the same step in 1854.  The extension, in 1914,
of Russian influence in what was until recently European Turkey would
be just as disastrous to the interests of Germany and
Austria-Hungary--far more so--than it would have been to Great Britain
and France sixty years ago.  What she has in Asia-Minor to-day is as
great a stake for Germany to fight for as what Great Britain had in
India in the middle of the nineteenth century.

There is, however, this important difference.  Germany, in supporting
the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, was not responding to the overt act of
an enemy.  She calculated carefully the cost, waited for a favourable
moment, and, when she decided that the favourable moment had come,
deliberately provoked the war.

Germany, looking for the opportunity to strike her two powerful
neighbours on the east and west, believed that the propitious moment
had come in the {389} summer of 1914.  Her rivals were facing serious
internal crises.  Russia was embarrassed by the menace of a
widely-spread industrial strike.  But Russia did not count for much in
the German calculations.  _It was the situation in France that induced
the German statesmen to take advantage of the assassination of Franz
Ferdinand_.  The spring elections had revealed a tremendous sentiment
against the law recently voted extending military service for three
years.  The French Parliament had just overthrown the admirable Ribot
Cabinet for no other reason than purely personal considerations of a
bitter party strife.  An eminent Parliamentarian had exposed publicly
from the tribune the alarming unpreparedness of France for war.  The
trial for murder of the wife of the former Premier Caillaux bade fair
to complicate further internal Parliamentary strife.

These were the favourable circumstances of the end of June and the
beginning of July.

But the decision had wider grounds than the advantages of the moment.
The German Government was finding it more and more difficult every year
to secure the credits necessary for the maintenance and increase of her
naval and military establishments.  Socialism and anti-militarism were
making alarming progress in the German _Reichstag_.  On the other hand,
the Russian military reorganization, commenced after the Japanese War,
was beginning to show surprising fruits.  And was France to be allowed
time for the spending of the eight hundred and five million francs just
borrowed by her in June {390} to correct the weak spots in her
fortifications and war material, and for the application of the _loi
des trois ans_ to increase her standing army?

Furthermore, would Great Britain be able to intervene on behalf of
France and Russia?  The crisis over the Home Rule Bill seemed to have
developed so seriously that civil war was feared.  Sir Edward Carson,
leader of the Protestant irreconcilables in the north of Ireland, had
formed an army that was being drilled in open defiance of the
Government.

The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess of
Hohenberg came at this advantageous moment.  A _casus belli_ against
Servia, so provokingly lacking, had at last been given.
Austria-Hungary was only too ready for the chance to crush Servia.  If
there were any misgivings about the risk of doing this, they were
immediately allayed by Germany, who assured Austria-Hungary that she
would not allow Russia even to mobilize.  Austria-Hungary was given by
Germany _carte blanche_ in the matter of her dealings with Servia.  It
is possible, as the German Ambassador at Petrograd declared to M.
Sasonow, that the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had not been
submitted beforehand for the approval of Wilhelmstrasse.  But the
general tenor of the ultimatum had certainly been agreed upon.  Germany
knew well that the ultimatum would be so worded as to be a challenge to
Russia.  Either Russia would accept once more the humiliation of a
diplomatic defeat and see Servia crushed, or she would intervene to
save Servia.  In the latter {391} contingency, Germany could declare
war upon Russia on the ground that her ally, Austria-Hungary, had been
attacked.  The Franco-Russian Alliance would then be put to the test,
as well as whatever understanding there might be between Great Britain
and France.

Subsequent events proved that Germany left no means, other than
complete submission to her will, to France and Russia for avoiding war.
Negotiations were so carried on that there would be no loop-hole for
escape either to Servia, or to the Great Powers that were her
champions.  She did not even wait for Russia to attack Austria-Hungary,
or for France to aid Russia.  As for Great Britain, it is not yet clear
whether Germany really thought that she was making an honest effort to
keep her out of the war.

From the very beginning of the Servian crisis, Germany associated
herself "for better or for worse with Austria-Hungary."  On the day
that the ultimatum to Servia was delivered, Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg wrote to the German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and
Petrograd, requesting them to call upon the Foreign Ministers of the
governments to which they were accredited and point out that the
ultimatum was necessary for the "safety and integrity" of
Austria-Hungary, and to state with special "emphasis" that "_in this
question there is concerned an affair which should be settled
absolutely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to which
it must be the earnest endeavour of the Powers to ensure_.  We
anxiously desire _the localization of the conflict_, {392} because any
intercession by another Power would precipitate, on account of the
various alliances, inconceivable consequences."

The position of Germany is admirably stated in these instructions,
which I quote from Exhibit I of the German official _White Book_.  To
this position, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg consistently held
throughout the last week of July.  In the four words "_localization of
the conflict_" the intention of Germany was summed up.  There was to be
a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.  That could not be
avoided.  The only thing that could be avoided was the intervention of
Russia to prevent the approaching attack of Austria-Hungary upon
Servia.  If the Powers friendly to Russia did not prevail upon the Czar
to refrain from interfering, there would be, "_on account of the
various alliances, inconceivable consequences_."

The next day, July 24th, a telegram from the German Ambassador at
Petrograd to the Chancellor stated that M. Sasonow was very much
agitated, and had "declared most positively that Russia could not
permit under any circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be
settled alone between the parties concerned."

[Illustration: Map--Belgium and the Franco-German Frontier]

There was still time for Germany, warned by the attitude taken by
Russia, to counsel her ally to accept whatever conciliatory response
Servia might give.  But this was not done.  As we have already seen in
the previous chapter, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade,
without communicating with his Government, declared the Servian
response unsatisfactory, {393} even though it gave an opening for
further negotiations, and withdrew from Belgrade with all the members
of the legation staff.

This precipitate, and, in view of the gravity of the international
situation, unreasonable action could have been avoided, had Chancellor
von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed the word to Vienna.

Not only was the Austro-Hungarian Minister allowed to leave Belgrade in
this way, but, _after three days had elapsed_, Austria-Hungary took the
irrevocable step of declaring war on Servia.

During these three days, Sir Edward Grey requested the British
Ambassadors at Rome and Vienna and Berlin to make every possible effort
to find ground for negotiation.  On the morning of July 27th, Sir
Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, submitted to Count
Berchtold the proposition of Sir Edward Grey, which was made
simultaneously at Petrograd, that the question at issue be adjusted in
a conference held at London.  In the meantime, after a conversation
with Sir Rennell Rodd, the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Berlin, suggesting that
Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy mediate between
Austria-Hungary and Russia.  In sharp contrast to the efforts being
made by the British Ambassadors, the German Ambassador at Paris, in an
interview with Premier Viviani, insisted upon the impossibility of a
conference of mediation, and announced categorically that _the only
possible solution of the difficulty was a common French and German
intervention at Petrograd_.  In {394} other words, France could avoid
war by assisting her enemy in humiliating her ally!

On July 28th, the German position was: "That Austria-Hungary must be
left a free hand in her dealings with Servia, and that it must be
pointed out to Russia, if France and Great Britain really wanted to
save the peace of Europe, that she should not mobilize against
Austria-Hungary."  Diplomatic intervention, then, could do nothing
except attempt to force Russia to refrain from interfering between
Austria-Hungary and Servia.  Germany would aid the other Powers in
coercing Russia, but she would not urge herself, or aid them in urging,
upon Austria-Hungary, _who had started the trouble_, the advisability
of modifying her attitude towards Servia, and postponing hostilities
that were bound to lead to a European war.

Germany had refused all intervention at Vienna.  She agreed, however,
to prove her good-will by letting it be known that Austria-Hungary was
willing to make the promise to seek no territorial aggrandizement in
her war with Servia, but to limit herself to a "punitive expedition."
_But this suggestion did not come until Russia had already committed
herself to defend Servia against invasion_.

There was another way in which the peace of Europe could have been
saved, and that was by a declaration on the part of Germany that she
would allow Russia and Austria-Hungary to fight out the question of
hegemony in south-eastern Europe.  But there was no proposition from
Germany to France suggesting a mutual neutrality.  On the other hand,
{395} Germany let it be known that she would stand by Austria-Hungary
if Russia attacked her, and, in the same breath, warned France against
the danger of being loyal to the Russian alliance!

On July 29th, it was announced from Petrograd that a partial
mobilization had been ordered in the south and south-east.  The German
Ambassador in Petrograd, in an interview with M. Sasonow, pointed out
"very solemnly that the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by
the danger of a general European conflagration, and endeavoured to
present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.  It was
impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia could now be
deserted by Russia."  On the same day, Ambassador von Schoen at Paris
was directed by the German Chancellor to "call the attention of the
French Government to the fact that preparation for war in France would
call forth counter-measures in Germany."  An exchange of telegrams on
the 29th and 30th between the Kaiser and the Czar showed the
irreconcilability between the Russian and German points of view.  The
idea of the Kaiser was that the Czar should give Austria-Hungary a free
hand.  The idea of the Czar was that the attack by Austria-Hungary upon
Servia absolutely demanded a Russian mobilization "directed solely
against Austria-Hungary."

On July 31st, the German Ambassador at Petrograd was ordered to notify
Russia that mobilization against Austria-Hungary must be stopped within
twelve hours, or Germany would mobilize against Russia.  At the same
time a telegram was sent to {396} the German Ambassador at Paris,
ordering him to "ask the French Government whether it intends to remain
neutral in a Russo-German war."

On August 1st, at 7.30 P.M., the German Ambassador at Petrograd handed
the following declaration of war to Russia:


"The Imperial Government has tried its best from the beginning of the
crisis to bring it to a peaceful solution.  Yielding to a desire which
had been expressed to Him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His
Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in accord with England, was engaged in
accomplishing the rôle of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and
of Petrograd, when Russia, without awaiting the result of this
mediation, proceeded to the mobilization of its forces by land and sea.

"As a result of this threatening measure, which was actuated by no
military preparation on the part of Germany, the German Empire found
itself facing a grave and imminent danger.  If the Imperial Government
had failed to ward off this danger, it would compromise the security
and very existence of Germany.  Consequently the German Government saw
itself forced to address itself to the Government of His Majesty, the
Emperor of all the Russias, insisting upon the cessation of the said
military acts.  Russia having refused to accede, and having manifested
by this refusal that this action was directed against Germany, I have
the honour of making known to Your Excellency the following order from
my Government:

"His Majesty, the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the
Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself in the state of
war with Russia."


{397}

The same afternoon, President Poincaré ordered a general mobilization
in France.  What Ambassador von Schoen tried to get from Premier
Viviani, and what he _did_ get was expressed in his telegram sent from
Paris three hours before the call to mobilization was issued:

"Upon the repeated definite enquiry whether France would remain neutral
in the case of a Russo-German War, the Premier declared that France
would do that which her interests dictated."

Germany violated the neutrality of Luxemburg on August 2d, and of
Belgium on August 3d, after vainly endeavouring to secure permission
from Belgium for the free passage of her troops to the French frontier.
On Sunday morning, August 2d, French soil was invaded.  But Ambassador
von Schoen stayed in Paris until Monday evening "waiting for
instructions."  Then he called at the Quai d'Orsay, and handed the
following note to Premier Viviani, who was acting also as Minister of
Foreign Affairs:


"The German civil and military authorities have reported a certain
number of definite acts of hostility committed on German territory by
French military aviators.  Several of these have clearly violated the
neutrality of Belgium in flying over the territory of this country.
One of them tried to destroy structures near Wesel; others have been
seen in the region of Eiffel, another has thrown bombs on the railway
near Karlsruhe and Nürnberg.

"I am charged, and I have the honour to make known to Your Excellency
that, in the presence of these aggressions, the German Empire considers
{398} itself in state of war with France by the act of this latter
Power.

"I have at the same time the honour to bring to the knowledge of Your
Excellency that the German authorities will detain the French merchant
ships in German ports, but that they will release them if in
forty-eight hours complete reciprocity is assured.

"My diplomatic mission having come to an end, there remains to me no
more than to beg Your Excellency to be willing to give me my passports
and to take what measures you may judge necessary to assure my return
to Germany with the staff of the embassy, as well as with the staff of
the legation of Bavaria and of the German Consulate-General at Paris."


In communicating this declaration of war to the Chamber of Deputies on
the following morning, August 4th, Premier Viviani declared formally
that "at no moment has a French aviator penetrated into Belgium; no
French aviator has committed either in Bavaria or in any part of the
German Empire any act of hostility."




{399}

CHAPTER XXI

GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR

The balance of power in European diplomacy led inevitably to a
_rapprochement_ between France and Russia and Great Britain to offset
the Triple Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary and Italy.

The Triple Alliance, however, while purely _defensive_, was still an
alliance.  It had endured or over thirty years, and the three Powers
generally sustained each other in diplomatic moves.  Their military and
naval strategists were in constant communication, and ready at any time
to bring all their forces into play in a European war.

France and Russia had also entered into a defensive alliance.  This had
not been accomplished without great difficulty.  Were it not for the
constant menace to France from Germany, the French Parliament would not
have ratified the alliance in the first place, nor would it have stood
the strain of increasing Radicalism in French sentiment during the last
decade.  While there is much intellectual and temperamental affinity
between Gaul and Slav, there is no political affinity between
democratic France and autocratic Russia.

The commercial rivalry of Great Britain and {400} Germany led to a
rivalry of armaments.  The struggle of German industry for the control
of the world markets is the real cause of the creation and rapid
development of the German navy to threaten the British mastery of the
seas.  It is possible that the statesmen of Great Britain, by a liberal
policy in regard to German colonial expansion in Africa and Asia and in
regard to German ambitions in Asiatic Turkey, might have diverted
German energy from bending all its efforts to destroy British commerce.
It is possible that such a policy might have enabled the German
democracy to gain the power to prevent Prussian militarism from
dominating the Confederation.  But that would have been expecting too
much of human nature.  Nations are like individuals.  There never has
been any exception to this rule.  What we have we want to keep.  We
want more than we have, and we try to get it by taking it away from our
neighbour.  Thus the world is in constant struggle.  Until we have the
millennium, and by the millennium I mean the change of human nature
from selfishness to altruism, we shall have war.  Then, too, the
British have seen in themselves so striking an illustration of the
proverb that the appetite grows with eating that they could hardly
expect anything else of the Germans, were they to allow them
voluntarily "a place in the sun."

The rapid growth of Germany along the lines similar to the development
of Great Britain has made the two nations rivals.  As a result of this
rivalry, Great Britain has been forced to prepare for the eventuality
of a conflict between herself and {401} Germany by giving up the policy
of "splendid isolation," and seeking to enter into friendly
relationship with those European Powers that were the enemies of her
rival.  The first decade of the twentieth century saw British diplomacy
compounding colonial rivalry with France in Africa and with Russia in
Asia.  The African accord of 1904 and the Asiatic accord of 1907 marked
a new era in British foreign relations.  Since their conclusion, Great
Britain has drawn gradually nearer to France and Russia.

But British statesmen have had to reckon with the development of
Radical tendencies in the British electorate.  These tendencies have
become more and more marked during the very period in which British
foreign policy found that its interests coincided with those of Russia
and France.  British democracy had the same antipathy to a Russian
alliance as had French democracy.  But the menace of Germany, which
threw France into the arms of Russia, has not seemed as real to the
British electorate.  There was also the sentiment against militarism,
which has made it difficult for the Liberal Cabinet to secure from
Parliament sufficient sums for the maintenance of an adequate naval
establishment, and has blocked every effort to provide even a modified
form of compulsory military service and military training in Great
Britain and Ireland.

When one considers all that Sir Edward Grey has had to contend with
during the years that he has held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in
the British Cabinet admiration for his achievements knows no limits.
It is never safe to make comparisons or form judgments {402} in the
appreciation of contemporary figures in history.  But I cannot refrain
from stating my belief that British foreign policy has never passed
through a more trying and critical period, and British interests have
never been more ably served, than during the years since the conference
of Algeciras.

The menace of a war between Great Britain and Germany has disturbed
Europe several times during the past decade.  There has not been,
however, a direct crisis, involving the interests of the two rival
nations, to make an appeal to arms inevitable, or even probable.  But,
although British public sentiment might have been slow in supporting
the intervention of the Cabinet in favour of France, had Germany
attacked France in 1905, in 1908, or in 1911, to have stayed out of the
war would have been suicidal folly, and Great Britain would soon have
awakened to this fact.

The crisis over the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary to Servia became acute
after the terms of the ultimatum were known.  Sir Edward Grey, seconded
by as skilful and forceful ambassadors as have ever represented British
interests on the continent of Europe, honestly tried to prevent the
outbreak of war.  It was not to the interests of Great Britain that
this war should be fought.  All sentimental considerations to one side,
the moment was peculiarly unfavourable on purely material grounds.  The
British Parliament was facing one of the most serious problems of its
history.  The confidence of the country in the wisdom of the measures
in Ireland {403} that the Government seemed determined to carry out was
severely shaken.  The interest of the British public in the troubles
between Austria-Hungary and Servia was not great enough to make the war
popular.  The efforts of Lord Haldane had done much to improve the
relationship between Great Britain and Germany.  Sympathy with Russia
had been alienated by the increasingly reactionary policy of the Czar's
government towards the Poles, the Finns, and the Jews.  The British
press was disgusted by the overthrow of the Ribot Ministry and by the
revelations of the Caillaux trial.

As there was no actual alliance between Great Britain and France, and
no understanding of any nature whatever with Russia, French public
opinion was far from being certain that British aid would be given in
the approaching war, _and British public opinion was far from being
certain as to whether it would be necessary to give this aid, or
whether it wanted to do so_.  I am speaking here of the feeling among
the electorate, which, accurately represented by Parliament, is the
final court of appeal in Great Britain.  There was no doubt about the
opinion of Sir Edward Grey and the majority of his colleagues in the
Cabinet, as well as of the leaders of the Opposition.  There was,
however, very serious doubt as to the attitude of Parliament.  Would it
sustain France and Russia over the question of Servia, at a time when
there was so serious a division in the nation concerning the Home Rule
Bill--even the open menace of civil war?

When Germany decided to declare war on Russia, {404} and it was seen
that France would be drawn into the struggle, Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg declared to Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador to
Germany, that "the neutrality of Great Britain once guaranteed, every
assurance would be given to the Cabinet at London that the Imperial
Government did not have in view territorial acquisitions at the expense
of France."  Sir Edward questioned the Chancellor about the French
colonies, "the portions of territories and possessions of France
situated outside of the continent of Europe."  Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg answered that it was not within his power to make any
promise on that subject.

There was no hesitation or equivocation in the response of the British
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to this proposition.  He said
that neutrality under such conditions was impossible, and that Great
Britain could not stand by and see France crushed, even if she were
left her European territory intact, for she would be reduced to the
position of a satellite of Germany.  To make a bargain with Germany at
the expense of France would be a disgrace from which Great Britain
would never recover.  It was pointed out to the Chancellor that the
only means of maintaining good relations between Great Britain and
Germany would be for the two Powers to continue to work together to
safeguard the peace of Europe.  Sir Edward Grey promised that all his
personal efforts would be directed towards guaranteeing Germany and her
Allies against any aggression on the part of Russia and France, and
hoped that, if Germany showed her good faith in the present crisis,
{405} more friendly relations between Great Britain and Germany would
ensue than had been the case up to that moment.

This dignified and manly response could have left no doubt in the minds
of German statesmen as to the stand which the British Cabinet intended
to take.  Did they believe that Parliament and the people would not
support Sir Edward Grey?

The position of Great Britain was explicitly put before the House of
Commons on the evening of August 3d.  Because of her naval agreement
with France, by which the French navy was concentrated in the
Mediterranean in order that the British Admiralty might keep its full
forces in home waters, Great Britain was bound in honour to prevent an
attack of a hostile fleet upon the Atlantic seacoast of France.  If
Germany were to make such an attack, Great Britain would be drawn into
the war without any further question.  There had also been since
November, 1912, an understanding between the British and French
military and naval authorities concerning common action on land and sea
"against an enemy."  But, at the time this understanding was made, it
was put in writing that it was merely a measure of prudence, and did
not bind Great Britain in any way whatever to act with France either in
a defensive or offensive war.

Great Britain was drawn into the war by the German violation of the
neutrality of Belgium.

On Sunday evening, August 2d, at seven o'clock, Germany gave the
following ultimatum to Belgium:

"The German Government has received sure news, {406} according to which
the French forces have the intention of marching on the Meuse by way of
Givet and Namur; this news leaves no doubt of the intention of France
to march against Germany by way of Belgian territory.  The Imperial
German Government cannot help fearing that Belgium, in spite of its
very good will, will not be able to repulse, without help, a forward
march of French troops which promises so large a development.

"In this fact we find sufficient certitude of a threat directed against
Germany; it is an imperious duty for self-preservation for Germany to
forestall this attack of the enemy.

"The German Government would regret exceedingly should Belgium regard
as an act of hostility against it the fact that the enemies of Germany
oblige her to violate, on her side, the territory of Belgium.  In order
to dissipate every misunderstanding, the German Government declares as
follows:

"1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium, if Belgium
consents, in the war which is going to commence, to adopt an attitude
of benevolent neutrality in regard to Germany.  The German Government,
on its side, promises, at the moment of peace, to guarantee the kingdom
and its possessions in their entire extent.  2. Germany promises to
evacuate Belgian territory, under the condition above pronounced,
immediately peace is concluded.  3. If Belgium observes a friendly
attitude, Germany is ready, in accord with the authorities of the
Belgian Government, to buy, paying cash, all that would be necessary
for her troops, and to indemnify the losses caused to Belgium.  4. If
Belgium conducts herself in a hostile manner against the German troops
and makes in particular difficulties for their forward march by an
opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse or by the destruction of
{407} roads, railways, tunnels, or other constructions, Germany will be
obliged to consider Belgium as an enemy.

"In this case, Germany will make no promise in regard to the kingdom,
but will leave the subsequent adjustment of the relations of the two
states one toward the other to the decision of arms.

"The German Government has the hope with reason that this eventuality
will not take place, and that the Belgian Government will know how to
take the necessary measures suitable for preventing it from taking
place.

"In this case, the relations of friendship which unite the two
neighbouring states will become narrower and more lasting."


Belgium did not hesitate to respond promptly as follows:


"By its note of August 2, 1914, the German Government has made known
that according to sure news the French forces have the intention of
marching on the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in
spite of her very good will, would not be able to repulse without help
the forward march of the French troops.

"The German Government would believe itself under the obligation of
forestalling this attack and of violating the Belgian territory.  In
these conditions, Germany proposes to the Government of the King to
adopt in regard to her a friendly attitude, and she promises at the
moment of the peace to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and of
its possessions in their entire extent.

"The note adds that if Belgium makes difficulty for the forward march
of the German troops, Germany will be obliged to consider her as an
enemy but will leave the subsequent adjustment of the {408} relations
of the two states one towards the other by the decision of arms.

"This note has aroused in the Government of the King a deep and
grievous astonishment.  The intentions that it attributes to France are
in contradiction with the formal declarations which have been made to
us on August 1st, in the name of the Government of the Republic.

"However, if in opposition to our expectation a violation of the
Belgian neutrality is going to be committed by France, Belgium would
fulfil all her international duties, and her army would oppose itself
to the invader with the most vigorous resistance.  The treaties of
1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, make sacred the independence
and the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers and
notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

"Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she
has accomplished her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has
neglected no effort to maintain and to make respected her neutrality.
The attack upon her independence with which the German Government
menaces her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law.

"No strategic interest justifies the violation of international law.
The Belgian Government in accepting the propositions of which it has
received notice would sacrifice the honour of the nation at the same
time as it would betray its duties toward Europe.  Conscious of the
rôle that Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the
civilization of the world, it does not allow itself to believe that the
independence of Belgium can be preserved only at the price of the
violation of her neutrality.  If this hope is deceived, the Belgian
Government is firmly decided to repulse by every means in its power
every attack upon its rights."

[Illustration: Map--Europe in 1914]

{409}

As I record these two statements, there is before me a cartoon from a
recent issue of _Punch_.  The Kaiser, with a leer on his face, is
leaning over the shoulder of King Albert, who is looking out with
folded arms upon the smoking ruins of his country, and the long defile
of refugees.  The Kaiser says, "See, you have lost all."  King Albert
answers, "Not my soul."

To be just to Germany, is necessary for us to quote the explanation of
this action made by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg to the _Reichstag_,
on August 4th, when Germany had commenced to carry into execution her
threat:


"Here is the truth.  We are in necessity, and necessity knows no law.

"Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and have perhaps already put their
foot upon Belgium territory.

"It is against the law of nations.  The French Government has, it is
true, declared at Brussels that it would respect the neutrality of
Belgium, so long as the enemy respected it.  We knew, however, that
France was ready for the aggression.  France could wait; we, no.  A
French attack upon our flank in the Lower Rhine might have been fatal
to us.  So we have been forced to pass beyond the well-founded
protestations of Luxemburg and the Belgian Government.  We shall
recompense them for the wrong that we have thus caused them as soon as
we shall have attained our military end.

"When one is as threatened as we are and when one fights for that which
is most sacred to him, one can think only of one thing, that is, to
attain his end, cost what it may."


{410}

"I repeat the words of the Emperor; 'It is with pure conscience that
Germany goes to the combat.'"


On the afternoon of August 3d, as Sir Edward Grey was leaving for
Parliament to make his _exposé_ of Great Britain's position in the
European crisis, he received from the King a telegram that had just
arrived from King Albert of Belgium:


"Remembering the numerous proofs of friendship of Your Majesty and of
Your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of Great Britain in 1870,
as well as of the new gage of friendship that she has just given me, I
address a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty
to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."


Sir Edward Grey read this telegram to Parliament, and explained that
the diplomatic intervention asked for had already been made both at
Paris and Berlin, for this eventuality had been foreseen.  To the
questions of the British Ambassadors concerning their intentions
towards Belgium, _to respect and maintain the neutrality of which each
of these Powers was equally bound with Great Britain by the treaty of
1839_, France responded by telegraph received August 1st:


"French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium,
and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that
neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order
to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise."


Germany answered the same day through Sir E. Goschen;

{411}

"I have seen the Secretary of State, who informs me that he must
consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer."


When Sir Edward Goschen expressed the hope that the answer would not be
delayed, Herr von Jagow gave him clearly to understand that he doubted
whether he could respond, "for any response on his part would not fail,
in case of war, to have the regrettable effect of divulging a part of
the German plan of campaign!"

There was no doubt about the sentiment of Parliament.  The Cabinet saw
that party lines had been obliterated, and that the country was behind
them.  The following day, August 4th, Great Britain presented an
ultimatum to Germany, demanding an assurance that the neutrality of
Belgium should be respected.  Germany gave no answer.  Her army had
already invaded Belgium.  A few hours after the reception of the
British ultimatum, the advance on Liège was ordered.  After waiting
until evening, Great Britain declared war on Germany.

It is probable that Germany counted the cost before she invaded
Belgium.  Whatever may have been said at Berlin, the intervention of
Great Britain was not the surprise that it has been represented to be.
In deciding to violate Belgian neutrality, in spite of the British
ultimatum, the German argument was: It is morally certain that Great
Britain will intervene if we enter Belgium.  But what will this
intervention mean?  She has no army worth the name.  Her navy can do
practically nothing to harm {412} us while we are crushing France and
Russia.  The participation of Great Britain in the war is a certainty a
few weeks later.  By precipitating her intervention, we are less harmed
than we would be by refusing to avail ourselves of the advantage of
attacking France through Belgium.

In believing that the eventual participation of Great Britain was
certain, even if there were no Belgian question, Germany was right.
The violation of the neutrality of Belgium was not the cause, but the
occasion, of Great Britain's entry into the war.  It was, however, a
most fortunate opportunity for the British Cabinet to secure popular
sympathy and support in declaring war upon Germany.  For it is certain
that Great Britain ought not to have delayed entering the war.  The
nation might have awakened too late to the fact that the triumph of
Germany in Europe would menace her national existence.  There is no
room in the world for the amicable dwelling side by side of Anglo-Saxon
idealism and German militarism.  One or the other must perish.

In August, 1914, the only way to have avoided the catastrophe of a
general European war would have been to allow Germany to make,
according to her own desires and ambitions, the new map of Europe.




{413}

INDEX


Abdul-Hamid deposed as Sultan, 185

Adana massacres, 190

Adrianople, invested by Bulgarians in Balkan War, 292; captured by
combined Servian and Bulgarian armies, 313; Turks reoccupy, 349

Agadir expedition reopens the Moroccan question in 1911, 78; terms of
the two treaties signed by France and Germany, 81

Agram and the Serbo-Croat movement, 147-8

Albania: hotbed of rebellions, but partial to Moslem rule, 210; a thorn
in the flesh to the chancelleries of Europe, 351; her political status
before and during the Balkan War, 353; put in the hands of the Powers
by the Treaty of London, 1913, 360; Prince William of Wied made ruler
of new kingdom, 364; his abdication, 366; now under the provisional
government of Essad pasha, 366

Algeciras, Conference of European Powers on the Moroccan question at,
73; provisions of the Convention, signed April 7, 1906, 74

Alsace-Lorraine, annexed to Germany in 1871, 1; political status in the
Empire, 6; new Constitution granted in 1911, 11; autonomy demanded, 12;
persecutions suffered from Prussian military arrogance, 15-20

Analogy between German Socialists of to-day and the Jacobins of 1793, 32

Anglo-French agreement of 1904 published, 81

Arabs in Ottoman Empire oppose Young Turk hegemony, 214-218

Armenia, Turkish and Moslem oppression in, 187; horrors of the Adana
massacres, 190

Austria-Hungary, and her south Slavs, 142-160; the Dual Monarchy's
Balkan policy and problems, 144-160; acts the bully against Servia, 156

Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia, 368-385; the direct sequence of
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908-1909, 368-371;
exciting cause: the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife at
Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, 374; Austria's note to Servia and demands
for reparation, 376; the Servian reply, 381; declared not satisfactory
by Austro-Hungarian Minister, 384; war declared on Servia, July 28,
1914, 384


_Bagdadbahn_, The, 58-70, 216; the Pan-Germanist conception of it, 62;
concession granted in 1899, and company constituted in 1903, 65;
British oppose successfully German schemes in Asiatic Turkey, 66

Balbo, Cesare, on the "Hope of Italy," 125

Balkan States: Alliance of Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro
against Turkey, 263; Russian and Austro-Hungarian joint note to the
States, 268; war declared by Montenegro, October 8, 1912, 270; causes
of Turkish disasters, 279; story of the Thracian campaign, 283-293;
capture of Kirk Kilissé and battle of Lulé Burgas, 285-289; Bulgarians
halt at Tchatalja, 290; Servian and Greek successes, 293-300;
conditions of armistice, signed December 3d, 302; failure of first
peace conference, 308; mediation of the Great Powers accepted, 316;
terms of the Treaty of London, which ended war, 316; rupture between
the Balkan allies, 319-329; disputes over division of the spoil bring
on second Balkan War, 321-327; treachery of the Bulgarians at Salonika,
330-334; Servian and Greek successes, 333-337; Rumania intervenes
against Bulgaria, 338; Montenegro supports Servia, 341; Bulgaria
humiliated, and new map for the Balkan peninsula made by the Treaty of
Bukarest, 343-350

Banca di Roma in Tripoli, 243

Belgian neutrality violated by Germany, August 3, 1914, 397

Belgium, Germany's ultimatum to, 405; the reply, 407

Bethmann-Hollweg, von, German Chancellor, 10; his arbitrary ruling
forbidding discussion of the Polish lands question in the _Reichstag_,
rebuked, 114; his disregard for parliamentary opinion in the German
Confederation, 115; his notes to London, Paris, and Petrograd on the
Servian ultimatum, 391; tries to bargain for Great Britain's neutrality
at the expense of France, but fails, 404; his explanation in the
_Reichstag_ for Germany's violation of neutrality, 409

Bismarck, in the Congress of Berlin, 26; indifferent to the Eastern
Question, 27; concerned chiefly with internal problems, 28; inaugurates
new German colonial policy by annexations in Africa, 41; purchases
Russian neutrality in 1870, 137-8

Bosnia-Herzegovina, under the rule of Austria-Hungary, 148-155; how
their annexation was effected despite the protests of England, Russia,
Turkey, and Servia, 368-371

Bülow, von, German Chancellor, on the Moroccan situation in 1906, 74

Bulgaria, aspirations in Macedonia, 168-173, 176-8, 207; alliance with
Greece, 231, 237-8, 265; in the Balkan War, 275-293; attitude towards
Servia and Greece after the Treaty of London, 321-7; fights her former
allies, 328-40; loses Adrianople again to Turks, 349

_Bundesrath_, composition of, 7, 11

Burney, British Admiral, on the future of Albania, 363


Carol, King of Rumania, loyalty to Hohenzollerns, 134

Colonization policy of the German Government, 44; opposition against it
in Germany, 44-45

Congress of Berlin, 161; its provisions disregarded by the contracting
Powers and the Balkan States, 162, 240; its action on the Cretan
question, 222

Congress of Vienna, 97, 119

Convention of Reichstadt in 1876, 144, 166

_Coup d'état_ of January 23, 1913, in Turkey, 307

Crete: Assembly decrees the island indissolubly united to Greece, 202;
Turkey enforces the Greek commercial boycott, 203; put back under
Ottoman rule by Congress of Berlin, 222; granted autonomy by the Powers
in 1898, 224; Young Turks attempt to re-establish their authority, 228;
rise of M. Venizelos from a Cretan revolutionary to become Prime
Minister of Greece, 231; insincere and procrastinating diplomacy of the
Powers on the Cretan question leads to the first Balkan War, 230-240,
264


Danube and the Dardanelles, 131-141; how the former is subordinated to
the latter, 133; Russia's struggles for ocean waterways, 135-141

Dellbrück, Herr, Secretary of State for the Interior, sent to confer
with Alsatians concerning the new Constitution, 10

_Deutschland über Alles!_ 36

Duma, Poles in, 105-8

Durazzo, Servia forced to evacuate, 157

_Drang nach Osten_, according to Professors Haeckel and Wirth, 151;
Austro-Hungarian attitude towards, 144; birth of, 165-6


Enver bey, in training at Berlin, 67; and the _coup d'état_ of January
23, 1913, 307; attempts an offensive movement on the Gallipoli
peninsula, 310

Essad pasha, in control of northern Albania, 361; put at head of new
provisional government by Albanian Senate, 366


France: opposes German intervention in Morocco, 72; sends expeditionary
force and captures Fez, 77; patches peace with Germany by mutual
concessions, 81

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, assassinated, with his wife, at
Sarajevo, on June 28, 1914, 374; assassinations preceding this, 153


German, connotation of word, 33

German citizenship law of 1914, 34-6

German Empire, how constituted in 1872, 6

German _White Book_, 382, 392

Germans quoted on the superiority of their race, 29-31

Germany: in Alsace and Lorraine, 1-20; annexed the land but not the
people, 2; her industrial prosperity since 1870 necessitated entering
the colonial field, 40; annexations in Africa, China, and the Pacific,
41; how her campaign for the markets of the world has been carried on,
49; historical _résumé_ of the attempts to obtain concessions in Asia
Minor and Mesopotamia, 62-70; intervenes in Morocco in 1905 and 1910,
72-83; fails to obtain a foothold in Persia, 89-95: her treatment of
the Poles, 111; forces war upon Russia and France, 386-398; backs
Austria-Hungary in her demands upon Servia, 388; diplomatic exchanges
day by day preceding the declaration of war, 392-398; violates the
neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, 397; sends ultimatum to Belgium,
405

Great Britain enters the war, 399-412; commercial rivalry with Germany
one of the causes, 399; Sir Edward Grey's efforts to prevent the
outbreak, 402; refuses to make a bargain with Germany at the expense of
France, 404; violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany the occasion
for declaring war, 405, 411

Greece: her impotence in the war of 1897, 223; drawn into the Balkan
alliance, 264; her rôle in the Balkan War, 276, 295, 299, 331, 333, 336

Greek Church, 170, 171, 196, 197

Grey, Sir Edward, supports France in resisting German claims in
Morocco, 81; makes strenuous efforts to prevent war, 393, 402, 404


Hakki pasha predicts European War, 247

Haldane, Lord, his mission to Germany in 1912, 54

_Hamidieh_, Turkish cruiser, raids the Ægean, 304 note

Herreros against Germany, 20, 44

Holepa, Pact of, 222

Hussein Hilmi pasha, characterization of Macedonians, 237


Italia Irredenta, 119-130; meaning of the term "Irredentism," 120;
Cesare Balbo on the "Hope of Italy," 125; the struggle to gain control
of the Adriatic, 128

Italy: sends ultimatum to Turkey to consent to the occupation of
Tripoli, 247; war begins September 30, 1911, 248; decree annexing the
African provinces of Turkey approved by Italian Parliament, November
5th, 250; peace secured by Treaty of Lausanne, October 15, 1912, 260,
273


Janina, surrendered to the Greeks, 311

Jews, development of business sense, 49; oppressed in Poland and
Russia, 107, 117


Kholm separated from the Kingdom of Poland in 1912, 106

Kiau-Chau, China, leased to Germany for ninety-nine years, 43; increase
of commerce of, 46

Kirk-Kilissé captured by the Bulgarians, 286

Koweit, British seize, 66


Lausanne, Treaty of, 260

Lodz, a German outpost in Poland, 97

London, Treaty of, 316

Lulé Burgas, battle of, 287

Luxemburg neutrality violated by Germany, August 2, 1914, 397


Macedonia, racial rivalries in, 161-179; fomented by Austro-Turkish
policy, 167; complicated by Russian intrigues in the Balkan States,
171; Armenian massacres of 1893-96, 174; failure of the international
"pacification" policy, 176; how the Young Turks decided to solve the
Macedonian problem, 207

Mesopotamia, British and German rivalry in, 67

Montenegro, opens first Balkan War by a memorable declaration, 270;
enters war against Bulgaria, 341

Morocco, German intervention in 1905 in, 72; Convention of Algeciras in
1906 decides the international status of, 73; question reopened by the
Agadir incident in 1911, 78; French protectorate over, agreed to by
Germany, 81-82

Mürszteg, Program of, 176


_Narodna Obrana_, Servian patriotic society organized in support of the
national aspirations for a "Greater Servia," 155, 373; its dissolution
demanded by Austria-Hungary, 378; and agreed to by Servia, 383

Nazim pasha assassinated, 308

New citizenship law enacted in Germany, January 1, 1914, 34

Nicholas, Czar, proclamation to Poles, Aug. 16, 1914, 116

Novi Bazar, Sandjak of, 144, 368, 341


Osmanlis, contrast of civilization to Roman and Byzantine, 60


Pan-Germanic movement in Germany, 55

Pan-Islamic movement, failure of, 64, 70

Paris, Congress of (1856), forbids the Black Sea to Russia, 137

Persia, Passing of, 84-95; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, 87; terms
of the Russo-German Accord of 1911, 92

Persian Constitutionalists, weakness of, 87

Poland, and its partitioners, 96-118; its redistribution by the
Congress of Vienna, 97; the Polish revolutions of 1830 and 1863, 98;
harsh treatment of the Poles since 1864 in Russia, 99; separation of
Kholm in 1912, 106; condition of the Poles in Austria-Hungary since
1867, 108; how the Poles have fared in Germany since 1870, 111;
international aspect of the Polish question, 115-118

"Program of Mürszteg," proposed as a solution of the Macedonian
problem, 176


Radetzky, on the attitude of Russia to the Ottoman Empire, 136

_Reichsland_, Alsace-Lorraine constituted a, 6

Reichstadt, Convention of, 144

Ribot Ministry, fall of, 389, 403

Rumania: her neutrality discussed, 134; her rôle in the second Balkan
War, 338-340; and the Treaty of Bukarest, 346

Ruthenians in Galicia, 109-111

Russia: ends Asiatic rivalry with Great Britain by convention of August
31, 1907, 87; sends troops to northern Persia in 1909, 90; comes to
accord with Germany in Persia, 92; her despotic rule in Poland, 99; her
strivings after ocean waterways, 135; promises to support Servia
against Austrian aggression, 381, 394


Salonika, Austro-Hungarian dream of possessing, 144, 166; surrendered
to the Greeks, 297, 321

Sandansky, the capturer of Miss Stone, an American missionary, 328

Sarajevo, Archduke Ferdinand and his wife assassinated at, 374

Saverne, affair of, 17-18

Scutari surrendered to the Montenegrins, 315

Serbo-Croatian national aspirations repressed in southern Hungary, 146

Servia: her national aspirations for a strong independent state held in
check by Austria-Hungary, 143-149, 155-158; her rôle in the Balkan
alliance, against Turkey, 276, 293; capture of Monastir, 294; her
rupture with Bulgaria precipitates second Balkan War, 323; protests
against annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, 368;
forced into submission, 371; receives ultimatum from Austria for the
Sarajevo assassination, 376; her answer conciliatory but not
satisfactory, 381-384; war declared against her, 384

Shuster mission in Persia a failure, 91


Tchatalja, Bulgarian attack halted at, 291

Thracian campaign in the Balkan War, 276-292

Treaty of Bukarest, 343-350: terms of the protocols signed by the
allies and new map of the Balkan peninsula, 345-350

Treaty of Frankfort, 6, 21, 22

Treaty of Lausanne ends war between Italy and Turkey, 260

Treaty of London, signed May 30, 1913, 316; its terms, 318, 360

Treitschke's opinion of the British, 30

Triple Alliance, 24, 28, 122

Triple Entente, 26

Tripoli annexed by Italy, 250

Turkey, the bloodless revolution of 1908, 180; Young Turks'
constitutional _régime_, 182-219; why it failed, 185, 218; treatment of
Armenians before and after the Adana massacres, 186; the attempt to
suppress the liberties of the Orthodox Church, 194; the Cretan question
and the Greek boycott, 201; the Young Turks and the Macedonian problem,
206, the Albanian uprisings, 210; treatment of the Arabs in Asiatic
Turkey, 214; war with Italy over the occupation of Tripoli, 247, 262;
war with the Balkan States, 263-300


Venizelos, Eleutherios, Prime Minister of Crete, urges Powers to place
the island under Greek protection, 228; the diplomats temporize, 230;
becomes Prime Minister of Greece and inaugurates constitutional
reforms, 232


_Weltpolitik_ of Germany, 22-57; the factors which have given birth to
it, 29; its scope as announced by the Kaiser, 31; supported by new
citizenship law, 34; "once a German always a German," 35; led to
colonial annexations in Africa, China, and the Pacific, 41; its
development creates a strong navy and merchant marine, 52; leads to
railway concessions in Asia Minor and formation of the Bagdad Railway
Company, 64; German intrigues in the Ottoman Empire, 66

Wilhelm, Emperor, makes tactless speech at Strasbourg, 14; attacked by
Socialists in the _Reichstag_, 14-15; announces scope of the
_Weltpolitik_, 31; historic speech in Tangier, March 31, 1905, 72;
Venizelos interviews, 236

William of Wied, Prince, made Mpret of Albania, 364; abdicates after a
short reign, 366

Wolff, Herr, leader of the German Liberal party, on the attitude of the
anti-Prussian parties in the _Reichsland_, 19


Young Turks, _see under_ Albania, Crete, Italy, Macedonia, and Turkey