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                       The University of Chicago
                    FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER

                     THE NOOTKA SOUND CONTROVERSY

                            A DISSERTATION

        SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS
              AND LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
                        OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

                        (DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY)

                                  BY
                          WILLIAM RAY MANNING

         INSTRUCTOR IN HISTORY AT PURDUE UNIVERSITY; FELLOW OF
                THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 1902 TO 1904

                              WASHINGTON
                      GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
                                 1905




XVI.--THE NOOTKA SOUND CONTROVERSY.

By WILLIAM RAY MANNING, Ph. D.

_Instructor in History at Purdue University; Fellow of the University
of Chicago, 1902 to 1904._

[The Justin Winsor prize of the American Historical Association was
awarded to the author of this monograph.]




THE NOOTKA SOUND CONTROVERSY.

By WILLIAM RAY MANNING, Ph. D.




CONTENTS.


                                                                      Page.

    CHAPTER I. Introduction                                             283

           II. The English plans for occupying Nootka Sound             286

          III. The Spanish plans for occupying Nootka Sound--The
                 conflicting claims before 1789                         300

           IV. Martinez’s operations at Nootka before Colnett’s
                 arrival                                                312

            V. The quarrel and the seizure                              331

           VI. The English prisoners in Mexico                          344

          VII. Attempts at peaceable settlement                         362

         VIII. Europe prepares for war                                  380

           IX. England’s first demand granted                           395

            X. America’s relations to the controversy                   412

           XI. The national assembly and the family compact--Effect
                 on the negotiation                                     424

          XII. English ultimatum--Spanish defiance                      439

         XIII. The Nootka Sound convention--Its reception and results   450

          XIV. Subsequent negotiations and final settlement of the
                 Nootka Sound dispute                                   463

    Bibliography                                                        472




PREFACE.


The French revolutionary period contains so much of greater importance
that historians have neglected the Nootka Sound incident. Of the
few writers who have discussed it, the majority have written from a
partisan standpoint, or, if impartial themselves, have drawn their
information from partisan pamphlets. The consequence is that many
errors regarding it have crept into the work of the best writers. The
purpose of this monograph is to give a more extended account, drawn
largely from unpublished sources, and to correct as many of the errors
as possible.

Besides working over the documents that have been published and the
accounts that have been written, a thorough search has been made in
the archives of the Indies at Seville, in the national historical
archives at Madrid, and in the British Museum and the public record
office at London. A less thorough search has been made in the archives
of foreign affairs at Paris and the archives of the Department of State
at Washington. More than 500 pages of unpublished documents relating to
the dispute have been transcribed and used. The classified bibliography
at the close will make clear the sources of information and their
relative value.

My acknowledgments are due to the following persons for valuable
assistance: To my wife, who worked with me continually for two and
a half months in the Spanish archives and the British Museum, and
who has criticised my manuscript and read the proof sheets; to Prof.
J. F. Jameson, whose untiring interest has been a constant source
of inspiration, and to whose aid and painstaking suggestions are
largely due any merits that the monograph may possess; to Prof. A. C.
McLaughlin, for research in the archives at Washington; to Prof. F. J.
Turner, for manuscripts and other material from his own collection.
Besides these, I wish to make special mention of the kindness and
assistance of Señor Pedro Torres-Lanzas, director of the archives
of the Indies at Seville, and of Señor Vicente Vignau y Ballester,
director of the national historical archives at Madrid.

CHICAGO, _July, 1904_.




CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.


Nootka Sound is a small inlet on the western shore of Vancouver Island.
It was christened and made known to the world by Captain Cook in 1778.
A few years afterwards a flourishing fur trade sprang up between the
Northwest Coast and China. Nootka became the center of this trade,
though it remained for several years without any settlement except an
Indian village. On account of its sudden and growing importance, the
Russians, English, and Spaniards all laid plans for occupying the port.
It happened that all planned to carry out the project in the year 1789,
a year that meant so much for the subsequent history of the world.
Though the Nootka incident can make no claim to rank in importance with
the great events of that year, yet it was destined to have an influence
on the movements then started and to be influenced in turn by them.

The Russian plans were not acted upon, but the plans of the other two
were. An English expedition from India and a Spanish from Mexico each
sailed in the spring of 1789 to establish a colony at Nootka. The
promoters of neither knew anything of the other. The Spanish commander
arrived first and took possession. Nearly two months later the
Englishman came. A quarrel ensued. The Spaniard seized the Englishman,
imprisoned him, his officers and crew, and sent them to Mexico as a
prize. A consort vessel arrived a few days later and met the same
fate. Two other English vessels had been seized earlier. One of them
had been released on bond and the other had been confiscated without
adjudication.

The Viceroy of Mexico, instead of acting on his own responsibility,
reported the matter to the Government at Madrid. The Spanish Court
complained to the British that subjects of the latter had violated the
territorial sovereignty of the former, and demanded that the offenders
be punished to prevent such enterprises in the future. The British
Cabinet rejected the Spanish claim to exclusive sovereignty over the
territory in question, and suspended all diplomatic relations until
Spain should have offered a satisfactory reparation for the insult
which His Britannic Majesty felt that his flag had suffered. Each Court
refused to grant the demand of the other and stood firmly on the ground
originally taken. To support their respective claims, both Governments
made the most extensive armaments. Each nation also called upon its
allies for assurances of support and entered negotiations for forming
new alliances. For a time it seemed that all Europe would be drawn
into war over what, on the face of it, appeared to be an insignificant
quarrel between two obscure sea captains.

Speaking of the controversy Schoell says that a few huts built on an
inhospitable coast and a miserable fortification defended by rocks were
sufficient to excite a bloody war between two great European powers
and gave birth to a negotiation which for several months absorbed
the attention of all of the maritime powers of Europe.[1] Similar
statements were made by other writers within a few years after the
incident.[2] Most historians who have touched upon it have either
treated it from a partisan standpoint or have considered it of too
little importance to merit careful inquiry into the facts.[3]

But far from being merely a dispute over a few captured vessels and a
comparatively unimportant trading post, it was the decisive conflict
between two great colonial principles, of which England and Spain
were, respectively, the exponents. Spain still clung to the antiquated
notion that the fact of the Pacific Ocean’s having been first seen by
a Spaniard gave his Government a right to all of the lands of the
continent which were washed by it. This fact, added to the gift of
the Pope, was sufficient to convince the Spanish mind that Spain had
a valid title to the whole of the western coast of both Americas. On
the other hand, England had long been acting on the now universally
accepted principle that mere discovery is an insufficient title, and
that land anywhere on the globe not controlled by any civilized nation
belongs to that nation which first occupies and develops it.

The controversy is of further importance because of the fact that
it tested the triple alliance of 1788 between England, Prussia, and
the Netherlands. It also afforded the occasion for overthrowing the
Bourbon family compact of 1761. It marked the end of Spain’s new brief
period of national greatness, which had resulted from the wise reign
of Charles III. It was also the beginning of the collapse of Spain’s
colonial empire. Duro, one of the leading Spanish historians of the
present, says that it inaugurated a period of degradation disgraceful
to Spanish history, and began a series of pictures which cause anyone
to blush who contemplates them with love for the fatherland.[4]

The settlement of the controversy determined the subsequent position
of England and Spain on the Northwest Coast. Later, after the United
States had bought the Spanish claim, the Nootka Sound affair became
a part of the Oregon controversy. For a time the dispute threatened
to change the course of the French Revolution.[5] It menaced the
existence, or at least the expansion, of the United States. It promised
to substitute English for Spanish influence in Latin America.




CHAPTER II.

THE ENGLISH PLANS FOR OCCUPYING NOOTKA SOUND.


As early as 1785 instructions were given looking toward the
establishment of an English trading post on Nootka Sound. In this
year an English commercial company instructed the commander of one
of its vessels to establish a post on the northwest coast of America
for “securing the trade of the continent and islands adjacent.” King
Georges [Nootka] Sound was suggested as being “in every respect
consistent with the intent of forming such establishment.”[6]

The fur trade between the western coast of America and China was at the
time in its infancy, but the profits accruing from it soon made it of
great importance. Captain Cook, in his voyage of 1778, had brought the
possibility of the industry to the attention of English shipowners.
“By the accidental carrying away of a small collection of furs, whose
great value was learned in Siberia and China, he originated the great
fur trade which became the chief incentive of all later English
and American expeditions to these regions.”[7] He remained a month
in Nootka Sound. A number of English expeditions visited the place
between this date and 1789, as did also several Spanish, French, and
American. Only such of them will be discussed as have a direct bearing
on the Nootka Sound controversy, and these only at such places in the
narrative as their bearing becomes important. A sufficiently full
account of the others may be found in the first volume of Bancroft’s
“History of the Northwest Coast.”

The first English expedition to claim serious attention is that of
1788. It was commanded by John Meares,[8] a retired lieutenant of the
royal navy. Two years before this he had been placed in charge of an
expedition to the same coast by some merchants under the protection of
the East India Company.[9] He had two vessels, the _Nootka_, commanded
by himself, and the _Sea Otter_, commanded by a subordinate. The latter
was lost at sea. The former spent the winter of 1786-87 in Prince
William Sound, on the Alaskan coast, where, according to Meares’s
account, the most terrible hardships were suffered, and so many of the
crew were lost that not enough remained to man the ship.[10] After
disposing of his cargo of furs in China[11] he made preparations for
the expedition of the following year, during which he set up the first
English establishment on the coast. It was this post which, rightly
or wrongly, furnished the chief basis for the stubborn persistence of
the English ministry in its demands on Spain in the controversy two
years later. The purpose of discussing this expedition is to study what
Meares did at Nootka and find just what rights, if any, were thereby
acquired for England.

It was intended that this expedition should be preliminary to the
planting of an English commercial colony. In mentioning the fact that
one vessel was destined to remain out much longer than the other,
Meares says that she was to leave the coast of America at the close
of the year and go to the Sandwich Islands for the winter. The next
year she was “to return to America, in order to meet her consort from
China with a supply of necessary stores and refreshments sufficient for
establishing factories and extending the plan of commerce in which we
were engaged.”[12] Probably to prove the feasibility of constructing
such factories, Meares took with him on this preliminary trip the
material and workmen for building a small trading vessel, which would
necessitate the erection of some sort of establishment to protect
the workmen and tools during the process of construction. In the
instructions for the voyage no mention is made of the vessel to be
constructed or of any establishment, either temporary or permanent,
but plans were laid for a second expedition. Speaking of the proposed
meeting of the two vessels constituting the expedition, which meeting
was to be at Nootka at the close of the summer trading season of 1788
previous to the sailing of one vessel to China with the furs collected,
the proprietors instructed Meares to appoint “a time and place of
rendezvous, that you may receive the instructions and refreshments we
may send you next season.”[13]

The larger vessel, the _Felice_, was commanded by Meares and was to
proceed directly to Nootka, arriving as early as possible and remaining
the entire season at Nootka and in the neighborhood. During the summer
of 1788 it is this vessel and the operations of its commander that
furnish the center of interest. The second vessel, the _Iphigenia_,
commanded by Captain Douglas, subject to Meares’s orders, was to spend
most of the trading season on the coast of Alaska in Cooks River
and Prince William Sound. When trade should slacken she was to move
southward, endeavoring to reach Nootka Sound by September 1, where the
two vessels were to meet.[14] During the first season the voyage of
the _Iphigenia_ is unimportant, but on its return to Nootka from the
Sandwich Islands in 1789 it furnishes for a time the chief interest.

It is well to notice at the outset the double instructions and the
double national character of the expedition, though the importance of
the fact will become more evident later. As far as the instructions to
Meares are concerned, or his repetition of them to Douglas, the ships
were purely English in character, Daniel Beale, of Canton, China, being
the ostensible agent. But later, when one of them came into conflict
with the Spaniards, it was just as purely Portuguese to all external
appearances. It was flying Portuguese colors and was commanded by a
Portuguese captain, with instructions in his own language, given by a
merchant of the same nationality living at Macao, China.[15] In these
papers the real commanders appeared as supercargoes.

In Meares’s narrative of the voyage no mention is made of the
deception, but later, in his memorial to the British Government,
he said that it was “to evade the excessive high port charges
demanded by the Chinese from all other European nations excepting
the Portuguese.”[16] Dixon, in one of his pamphlets, says that the
principal motive in using the Portuguese colors was to evade the South
Sea Company’s license.[17] Bancroft mentions both of these motives and
suggests that the trick is not permissible unless directed against a
hostile nation in time of war.[18] It seems to have been expected that
it would enable them to avoid some anticipated danger or difficulty.
However, as will be seen, this very double nationality was the first
thing to arouse suspicion and get the _Iphigenia_ into trouble.

The vessels sailed from China in the latter part of 1788. Besides the
regular crew, each carried a number of European artisans and Chinese
smiths and carpenters. The latter, Meares says, were shipped on this
occasion as an experiment because of their reputed hardiness, industry,
and ingenuity, and also because of their simple manner of life and the
low wages demanded. He observes that “during the whole of the voyage
there was every reason to be satisfied with their services,” and adds:
“If hereafter trading posts should be established on the American
coast, a colony of these men would be a very important acquisition.” Of
the 90 men on the two ships 50 were Chinese. In view of the importance
of the Chinese element in the population of the Western States, it is
a significant circumstance that they figured so largely in this very
first venture. And, considering the subsequent rush of these people
to the New World, it is worthy of notice that on this occasion “a
much greater number of Chinese solicited to enter into this service
than could be received,” and those who were refused “gave the most
unequivocal marks of mortification and disappointment.”[19] “On the
voyage the artisans were employed in preparing articles of trade for
the American market. … The carpenters were also at work in preparing
the molds and the models for a sloop of 50 tons that was designed to
be built immediately on our arrival in King Georges Sound, as such a
vessel would be of the utmost utility not only in collecting furs,
but in exploring the coast.” In speaking of the work necessary for
the enterprise, Meares says: “Our timber was standing in the forests
of America, the ironwork was as yet in rough bars on board, and the
cordage which was to be formed into ropes was yet a cable.”[20] On May
13, after a passage of three months and twenty-three days from China,
they “anchored in Friendly Cove, in King Georges Sound, abreast of the
village of Nootka.”[21]

The natives received them in a friendly manner, and operations were
soon begun to carry out their shipbuilding enterprise. Meares says:

    Maquilla [the Indian chief, sometimes called “Maquinna”] had not
    only most readily consented to grant us a spot of ground in his
    territory whereon a house might be built for the accommodation of
    the people we intended to leave there, but had promised us also his
    assistance in forwarding our works and his protection of the party
    who were destined to remain at Nootka during our absence. In return
    for this kindness, and to insure a continuance of it, the chief was
    presented with a pair of pistols, which he had regarded with an eye
    of solicitation ever since our arrival.[22]

This is Meares’s account of the transaction to which he referred in
his memorial two years later as a purchase of land. It was by this
transaction that the English Government claimed to have acquired a
title not only to this spot, but to the whole of Nootka Sound.[23]
There is nothing in his narrative which indicates that at the time
Meares had any thought of acquiring a permanent title, either for
himself or for his Government. Neither is there any unmistakable
indication to the contrary. Under these circumstances any title to
sovereignty thus acquired would have to depend on subsequent operations.

With the assistance of the natives, work on the house advanced
rapidly, and on May 28, fifteen days after their arrival, it was
completed. It had two stories. On the ground floor were a workshop
and storeroom and in the upper story were a dining room and chambers
for the party. “A strong breastwork was thrown up around the house,
enclosing a considerable area of ground, which, with one piece of
cannon, placed in such a manner as to command the cove and the village
of Nootka, formed a fortification sufficient to secure the party
from any intrusion. Without this breastwork was laid the keel of a
vessel of 40 or 50 tons, which was now to be built agreeable to our
former determination.”[24] While this was being done the ship had been
repaired and refitted for a trading cruise to the southward. All was
in readiness for departure on June 11. On the day previous the party
to be left at Nootka was landed with articles to continue the brisk
trade which had sprung up, and also supplies for the completion of
the new vessel and enough provisions to fit it for a voyage to China
should misfortune prevent the return of the _Felice_ or the arrival of
her consort, the _Iphigenia_. A formal visit was paid to the chief,
Maquilla, to acquaint him with the intended departure and to secure
his attention and friendship to the party to be left on shore. Meares
adds: “As a bribe to secure his attachment he was promised that when
we finally left the coast he should enter into full possession of the
house and all the goods and chattles thereunto belonging.”[25] This
statement is quoted by Greenhow as conclusive proof of the merely
temporary character of the establishment.[26] If the promise was made
in good faith, it would seem that the position was well taken, did not
the subsequent conduct of Meares indicate the contrary! On the occasion
of this visit other presents were made to the chief and members of his
family. The narrator continues: “Maquilla, who was glowing with delight
at the attentions we had paid him, readily granted every request that
we thought proper to make, and confirmed with the strongest assurances
of good faith the treaty of friendship which had already been entered
into between us.”[27] Nothing further is said of this treaty or of its
terms. If some more tangible evidence of it appeared, it might be a
valuable link. The mere statement that such was made is of interest as
indicating the policy of Meares, which, however, would have been the
same whether he expected to retain an establishment at Nootka or simply
to make subsequent visits for trading. It is possible, too, that the
treaty was only a temporary arrangement to last during the one visit.

The _Felice_, with Meares and most of the crew, spent the next two
and a half months in a combined trading and exploring cruise to the
southward, returning to Nootka once during the time and remaining two
weeks. This trip has no direct bearing on the Nootka incident, but
throws some side lights on Meares’s policy and the national character
of the expedition. He tells of a treaty made at Port Cox and gives
something of its terms. It established trade relations with three
chiefs. Apparently it excluded all competitors, though this is not so
stated;[28] but on seeing a vessel pass Nootka, some two months later,
he at once set out for Port Cox lest the chief should be tempted “to
intrude upon the treaty he had made with us.”[29] On reaching the place
he found large quantities of furs, indicating that the treaty had been
kept. It may be, however, that no opportunity had been presented for
breaking it. The chief inquired earnestly concerning Meares’s return
next season.[30]

In another place Meares says: “We took possession of the Straits of
Juan de Fuca in the name of the King of Britain, with the forms that
had been adopted by preceding navigators on similar occasions.”[31]
In mentioning this ceremony in his memorial he makes the additional
statement that he purchased a tract of land within the said straits.
A party sent to examine the straits was attacked by the natives
after a few days and abandoned the enterprise.[32] This subsidiary
expedition plays an important part in the controversial writings on the
conflicting claims to the Oregon country. On August 24 the _Felice_
returned to Nootka. Three days later her consort, the _Iphigenia_,
arrived.

In less than a month more the new vessel was completed. On September 20
it was launched with what Meares considered very impressive ceremonies.
It was christened “the _North-West America_, as being the first
bottom ever built and launched in this part of the globe.” He says
that the British flag was displayed on the house and on board the new
vessel.[33] This statement regarding the use of the British flag should
be noticed, since Greenhow states, and Bancroft gives it a qualified
indorsement, that “there is no sufficient proof that any other [than
the Portuguese flag] was displayed by them during the expedition.”[34]
Statements are made by other men that the Portuguese flag was used at
Nootka during the summer.[35] In the engraving in Meares’s narrative
illustrating the launching, three British flags are represented.[36]
There is at least one other very plain indication of the use of the
British flag by the expedition. It is found in the instructions of
Meares to Funter, who was to command the _North-West America_. They are
dated Friendly Cove, Nootka Sound, September 10, 1788, and say: “You
are on no account to hoist any colors until such time as your employers
give you orders for this purpose, except on taking possession of any
newly discovered land; you will then do it, with the usual formality,
for the Crown of Great Britain.”[37] If these instructions were really
given, and the statement is true which is quoted above regarding taking
possession of the Straits of Juan de Fuca, it must be admitted that
Meares considered at the time that his expedition was English and that
whatever rights might be acquired by it for any nation were acquired
for England.

Four days after the new vessel had been completed Meares departed
for China in the _Felice_, carrying with him the furs collected by
both vessels. The _North-West America_ was placed under the orders of
Douglas, the commander of the _Iphigenia_. Before departing, Meares had
given him extended orders regarding wintering at the Sandwich Islands,
and his conduct on the coast during the next season.[38] On October 27
the two remaining vessels left Nootka for the winter.[39]

In the instructions just mentioned nothing is said regarding any
settlement to be made at Nootka the succeeding year. There is a
statement, however, in the narrative that indicates unmistakably the
intention of planting a colony of some considerable extent. The writer
says that early in September, when the natives were leaving for the
winter settlement up the sound, “we made these chiefs sensible in
how many moons we should return to them, and that we should then be
accompanied by others of our countrymen, and build more houses and
endeavor to introduce our manners and mode of living to the practice
of our Nootka friends.” He speaks of their pleasure at hearing this
and of their promise of large quantities of furs; then narrates an
elaborate ceremony of coronation performed by the chief, Maquilla, and
his companions, which, he says, was intended as a recognition of his
superiority and sovereign power over them.[40] If Meares understood
that by this childish act of crowning he acquired for Great Britain
sovereign rights over the district, he makes no effort to emphasize
the fact. The statement, if true, is of more value as showing a
definite intention to establish a colony the following year. It is
not impossible, however, that both of these are cunningly contrived
and rather overdrawn fabrications of a later date to strengthen his
case before the Government or in the eyes of the public. Greenhow and
Bancroft both seem to draw a line between Meares’s narrative and his
memorial, considering the former more trustworthy since the latter
was written for the express purpose of convincing the cabinet of the
justice of his cause. If the narrative were the original log of the
vessel instead of a subsequent account simply using that log as its
basis, the reason for the distinction would be clear. But besides the
indications in the preface and the date, November 16, 1790, attached to
the preface, there are internal evidences that the narrative was not
written, at least not completed, until Meares knew of the operations of
the Spaniards at Nootka in 1789. Hence there is no reason why it should
not be influenced by the same partisanship and selfish interest.[41]

But whether he really did or did not make the statement to the chiefs
in September, 1788, concerning planting a colony the next year, he
proceeded exactly as he would be expected to have proceeded had he made
it. The question as to what became of the house built in 1788, whether
it was given to the chief as promised, or whether it was torn down
by Douglas before leaving for the Sandwich Islands, according to the
testimony of the American captains, Gray and Ingraham,[42] does not
greatly affect the case, if the Englishmen really intended to continue
the occupation in 1789, as they unquestionably did. If there were
nothing else to consider, and if the title to sovereignty rested wholly
on actual occupation, whether that occupation be by persons of a public
or private character, then England had a better claim than Spain to
the sovereignty of Nootka Sound at the beginning of the year 1789. But
there are other things to consider. It remains to be seen whether or
not they outweigh this English advantage.

       *       *       *       *       *

The next man to demand careful attention in studying the English
preparations for occupying Nootka is Capt. James Colnett, also a
lieutenant in the royal navy. He had been a midshipman with Captain
Cook and had served for several years on a man-of-war.[43] In the
autumn of 1786 he left England, in command of the ship _Prince of
Wales_, owned by Etches & Co., of London. This company held a license
from the South Sea Company good for five years after September 1, 1786,
for trading in the South Sea and other parts of America.[44] Colnett
went to the South Sea by way of Cape Horn. He reached the northwest
coast in 1787, collected a cargo, and continued his voyage to China,
where he disposed of it.[45] While in China he became identified with
Meares’s project for planting a colony at Nootka. The latter, after his
arrival in China in the autumn of 1788, had set about preparations for
the expedition of the succeeding year. While he was engaged in this,
Colnett reached Canton. Since the latter carried a license from the
South Sea Company, Meares saw an advantage to be gained by enlisting
his services, as this would give governmental sanction and protection
to the proposed establishment. Meares and his associates formed a
joint stock concern with Etches & Co., through the agency of John
Etches, who accompanied Colnett’s expedition as supercargo. As the
_Prince of Wales_ was to return to England, a new ship was purchased
and named the _Argonaut_, and Colnett was transferred to it. The small
ship, the _Princess Royal_, which had accompanied him on the former
voyage, continued with him on this. Besides having command of the
vessels, all of the concerns of the company on the American coast were
committed to his charge, including the proposed colony.[46]

A clear notion of the character of the expedition thus placed under the
command of Colnett may best be obtained by a careful examination of the
instructions given to him before his departure from China. The copy of
these that was submitted with Meares’s Memorial is dated Macao, April
17, 1789, and signed “J. Meares, for Messrs. Etches, Cox & Co.”[47]
A Spanish translation of the same, copied from the papers that fell
into the hands of the Spaniards, is signed “Daniel Beale, for himself
and for Messrs. Etches, Cox & Co.”[48] While this discrepancy has no
importance in discovering the intent of the expedition, it casts a side
light on the veracity of Meares. The Spanish copy is preferably to be
trusted, since no motive is apparent for their changing the signature.
In these instructions strictly honorable dealings and careful attention
to their needs is enjoined in all his intercourse with other vessels,
whether English or foreign. Cruelty to the natives is to be prevented
under penalty of condign punishment for offenders. He was to form a
treaty, if possible, with the various chiefs, especially those near
Nootka. The purpose was to monopolize the trade of the district and
so conquer competitors honorably and creditably. They were so anxious
to form such treaties that he was authorized to protect allies from
insult from all persons.[49] The factory planned was to be a “solid
establishment, and not one that is to be abandoned at pleasure.”
Colnett was authorized to fix it at the most convenient place, so that
the colony would be protected from the least sinister accident.[50] It
was to receive the name “Fort Pitt.” R. Duffin was to be invested with
the superintendence of it.

The object of the post was to attract the Indians for commercial
purposes and to furnish a place to build small vessels and to lay them
up for the winter season. During each winter some vessels were to be
sent to the Sandwich Islands for provisions, and natives of those
islands, both men and women, were to be encouraged to embark for the
American colony. When this settlement should have been effected trading
houses were to be established at other places along the coast where
they would be the most advantageous. Preparatory to this rewards were
to be offered the first season to men who would reside with different
Indian chiefs for the purpose of collecting furs and assuring the
natives of the return of the vessels, thus encouraging them to keep
back their furs from competitors. The _Iphigenia_, which went out
the preceding year under Meares’s command, and also the _North-West
America_, which he had built on the coast, were to be under the command
of Colnett. The rest of the instructions are of no interest to the
Nootka Sound Affair.[51]

With these instructions and with provisions for three years the two
vessels sailed from China, the _Princess Royal_ in February and
the _Argonaut_ in April, 1789.[52] They carried, “in addition to
their crews, several artificers of different professions and near 70
Chinese, who intended to become settlers on the American coast.”[53]
The plans are seen to have been large with hope for the future, and
there seems to have been every reasonable prospect for success. Should
they be successful it would mean not only a fortune for the merchant
adventurers and a worthy monument to the wisdom of the projectors, but
it would mean also the definite planting of the British flag on an
unoccupied coast and the extension to that coast of the sovereignty
of Great Britain. But while these plans were taking shape other plans
were being laid elsewhere, which, before the arrival of Colnett’s
expedition, had totally changed the appearance of things at Nootka. A
discussion of these will occupy the next two chapters.




CHAPTER III.

THE SPANISH PLANS FOR OCCUPYING NOOTKA SOUND--THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS
BEFORE 1789.


The Spanish name of most importance in connection with affairs at
Nootka is that of Estevan José Martinez. Besides playing the chief rôle
in the drama enacted there in 1789, which proved to be but the prelude
to a greater drama played in Europe the following year, it was he who
first suggested the planting of a Spanish colony at this point. This
is contrary to the notion prevalent in the minds of the diplomats when
the controversy was at its height, a notion which has been more or less
accepted ever since, viz, that one or more of the Governments concerned
had engaged in the enterprise with malice aforethought, having some
ulterior end in view. These suspicions will be discussed in their
proper place. At present it suffices to show, from documentary sources,
the actual genesis of the original Spanish expedition.

On the return of Martinez, late in 1788, from a voyage to Alaska,
where he had gone under a royal commission to investigate the Russian
settlements on the coast, he reported to Florez, the Viceroy of Mexico,
as follows:

    Cusmich also told me that, as a result of his having informed
    his Sovereign of the commerce which the English from Canton are
    carrying on at Nootka, he was expecting four frigates from Siberia
    to sail next year for the purpose of making an establishment at
    Nootka, situated in latitude 49° 36´ north and in longitude 20° 15´
    west from San Blas. He assured me that his Sovereign has a better
    right to that coast than any other power on account of its having
    been discovered by the Russian commanders, Behring and Estericol
    [Chirikov], under orders from the Russian Court in the year 1741.
    For this reason it seems to me advisable that an attempt should be
    made next year, 1789, with such forces as you may have at hand, to
    occupy the said port and establish a garrison in it. According to
    what is learned from the work of Cook and from what I saw on my
    first expedition to that place (which I made in 1774), it possesses
    qualifications which adapt it to this purpose. By accomplishing
    this we shall gain possession of the coast from Nootka to the port
    of San Francisco, a distance of 317 leagues, and authority over a
    multitude of native tribes. [I say this, at the same time] offering
    myself to carry out the project, and to prove the feasibility of it
    I will sacrifice my last breath in the service of God and the King,
    if you approve it.[54]

This letter was written from the port of San Blas on December 5, 1788.
Only eighteen days later the Viceroy wrote from the City of Mexico to
the home Government that he had determined to occupy Nootka at once,
although the royal orders did not warrant him in so doing.[55] On
the same day Martinez was commissioned to carry out the enterprise,
and his instructions were sent to him.[56] In his letter to Madrid,
the Viceroy says “the essential object of this new expedition is no
other, as I have indicated, than the anticipation of the Russians in
taking possession of the port of San Lorenzo or Nootka.” Ten days
later, in justification of his action, he wrote that it was true he
was forbidden to incur expenses without special royal order, but since
this was an extraordinary case, demanding prompt action, he begged for
the royal approval.[57] This approval was granted, but not until April
14, 1789,[58] when Martinez was already well on his way to Nootka. It
could not have been known in America in time to affect the events at
Nootka. Far, then, from there being any ground for the suspicion that
the Spanish Government had ordered the seizure of English vessels,
which resulted from this undertaking, the Madrid Government did not
so much as know that the expedition was to be sent until long after
it had sailed. Further, even in the mind of the Viceroy, there was
not the slightest thought of any interference with the English, the
expedition being directed solely against the Russians. It is also seen
that whatever glory it promised for Spain, or whatever opprobrium
attached to Spain because of the unfortunate events connected with it,
must be placed largely to the credit of Martinez. But he was not wholly
responsible, since his plan was authorized by the Viceroy and later
approved by the home Government.

It is a fact of some significance, as an indication of the political
sagacity of the Viceroy, that he apprehended much more danger to
Spanish dominion on this coast from the new United States than from
England or even Russia. While the English were only mentioned in
connection with the known plans of Russia, considerable space was
devoted to discussing a probable attempt of the American colonies to
obtain a foothold on the western coast. As proof he mentioned the
fact that an American ship, which had touched at the islands of Juan
Fernandez in the same year, had continued its voyage to the coast. He
expressed a suspicion that it had this end in view.[59] He told also
of an overland trip made in 1766-67 from the English colonies,[60] and
closed his observations on this point with the prophetic statement: “We
ought not to be surprised that the English colonies of America, being
now an independent Republic, should carry out the design of finding a
safe port on the Pacific and of attempting to sustain it by crossing
the immense country of the continent above our possessions of Texas,
New Mexico, and California.” He added: “Much more might be said of
an active nation which founds all of its hopes and its resources on
navigation and commerce,” and mentioned the immense value to them of
a colony on the west coast of America. He continued: “It is indeed an
enterprise for many years, but I firmly believe that from now on we
ought to employ tactics to forestall its results; and the more since
we see that the Russian projects and those which the English may make
from Botany Bay, which they have colonized, already menace us.” It was,
then, he said, to dissipate for the future the dormant possibilities
of the present that he was taking the extraordinary step of formally
occupying the port of Nootka without royal authorization.[61]

After thus setting forth to the Government at Madrid the reasons for
his action, the Viceroy outlined the plans for the expedition. It was
to consist of the two vessels, the _Princesa_ and the _San Carlos_,[62]
which had constituted the expedition of 1788. They were also to retain
the same officers--Martinez as commander, and Haro subject to his
orders. They were to sail from San Blas early in February. A packet
boat would follow in March with supplies and reënforcements, and would
bring back an account of the occupation. Later, according to events,
explorations of the coast to the northward and southward would be made.
A land expedition was to follow, including a chief, a detachment of
troops, missionaries, colonists, and live stock.[63]

Since the whole of the Nootka affair grew out of measures taken by
Martinez while on this trip, it is worth while to examine in detail
the instructions under which he was operating. After alluding to the
happy termination of Martinez’s voyage just ended, the Viceroy referred
to the Russian plans for occupying Nootka to anticipate the English,
and said “these designs of either nation are as pernicious to our
country as their claims are unfounded.” The Russian commanders failed
to explore the ports, Florez continued, and the English captain, Cook,
did not see Nootka until 1778, four years after the expedition of
Perez “on which you yourself went as second pilot. For these and many
other weighty reasons our just and superior right to occupy the coasts
discovered to the northward of California and to forbid colonies of
other nations is clear. These important objects, indeed, are embraced
in the delicate expedition which I now place in your charge.”

The following are his instructions:

    1. The two vessels and their commanders were named.

    2. They were to have the same officers and sailors as on the last
    voyage, with some increase of troops, and an armament corresponding
    to the crew, and the crew were to be drilled in the use of that
    armament.

    3. The expedition should sail not later than February 15.

    4. In March the _Aranzazu_ should follow with reënforcements and
    supplies for Nootka, as well as other settlements of New California.

    5. This vessel should bring back an account of what should
    have happened and an estimate of the necessary supplies and
    reënforcements which would be returned by it or by the _Concepcion_,
    or both.

    6. A plan of the port of Nootka, copied from Cook’s work, was to
    serve as a guide.

    7. Kindness, voluntary trade, and opportune gifts were to capture
    the good will of the natives: in this endeavor the discretion of the
    four missionaries was to be used. These were to begin at once to
    propagate the gospel.

    8. A formal establishment was to be set up for a meeting place to
    treat with the Indians and for protection from the weather and from
    enemies.

    9. This would be a manifestation of Spanish sovereignty. Part of the
    people were to be kept in this during the day, but returned to the
    ship at night for greater security.

    10. “If Russian or English vessels should arrive, you will receive
    their commanders with the politeness and kind treatment which the
    existing peace demands; but you will show the just ground for our
    establishment at Nootka, the superior right which we have for
    continuing such establishments on the whole coast, and the measures
    which our superior Government is taking to carry this out, such as
    sending by land expeditions of troops, colonists, and missionaries,
    to attract and convert the Indians to the religion and the mild
    dominion of our august Sovereign.”

    11. “All this you ought to explain with prudent firmness, but
    without being led into harsh expressions which may give serious
    offense and cause a rupture; but if, in spite of the greatest
    efforts, the foreigners should attempt to use force, you will repel
    it to the extent that they employ it, endeavoring to prevent as far
    as possible their intercourse and commerce with the natives.”

    12. “For use with the Russians, you will keep in mind and avail
    yourself of the well-founded political reasons for Spain’s being
    in intimate friendship with their sovereign Empress, viz, that the
    ships of that nation, both naval and merchant, are admitted to the
    Spanish ports of the Mediterranean and given such assistance as
    they may need, without which they could not subsist in those seas;
    that consequently it would be a grave offense for the vessels of
    His Catholic Majesty to suffer hostilities in America at the hands
    of the Russians, furnishing just cause for a breach between two
    friendly powers; and that in this case Spain would count on the
    powerful support of her French ally, besides withdrawing from Russia
    the privilege of obtaining supplies in the Mediterranean at a time
    when she finds herself engaged in war with the Turks, with Sweden,
    and possibly with Denmark.”

    13. “To the English you will demonstrate clearly and with
    established proofs that our discoveries anticipated those of Captain
    Cook, since he reached Nootka, according to his own statement, in
    March of the year 1778, where he purchased (as he relates in Chapter
    I, book 4, page 45, of his work)[64] the two silver spoons which the
    Indians stole from yourself in 1774.”

    14. “You will have more weighty arguments to offer to vessels of
    the Independent American Colonies, should they appear on the coasts
    of northern California, which hitherto has not known their ships.
    However, by a letter of the most excellent Señor Viceroy of Peru,
    it is known that a frigate, which is said to belong to General
    Washington,[65] sailed from Boston, in September of 1787, with the
    intention of approaching the said coasts, that a storm obliged her
    to stop in distress at the islands of Juan Fernandez, and that she
    continued her course after being relieved.”

    15. “In case you are able to encounter this Bostonian frigate or the
    small boat which accompanied her, but was separated in the storm,
    this will give you governmental authority to take such measures
    as you may be able and such as appear proper, giving them to
    understand, as all other foreigners, that our settlements are being
    extended to beyond Prince Williams Sound, of which we have already
    taken formal possession, as well as of the adjacent islands, viz. in
    1779.”

    16. A plan of Prince Williams Sound was inclosed, for it was
    intended that a careful survey of the entire coast should be made
    between it and Nootka.

    17. The _San Carlos_ was to make this expedition after the
    establishment at Nootka should be completed.

    18, 19. Instructions for the exploration.

    20. The coast from San Francisco to Nootka was to be explored in
    like manner, the latter port being the rendezvous. The Viceroy would
    do all he could to contribute to the welfare of the enterprise thus
    placed under Martinez’s charge.

    21. Great care was enjoined in the treatment of the Indians and
    of any establishments or vessels of foreign nations that might be
    encountered.

    22. The means to be employed to preserve health.

    23. Good wishes for Divine favor and for the success of the voyage.

As an argument for use with the English, in addition to what he had
given in section 13, the Viceroy added, in a postscript, reference to
the instructions given by the English Admiralty to Captain Cook, July
6, 1776. Cook, he said, was not to touch at any port in the Spanish
dominions on the west coast of America unless forced by unavoidable
accident, in which case he was not to remain longer than absolutely
necessary, and was to avoid giving the least cause for complaint to
any of the inhabitants of the country or to vessels of His Catholic
Majesty.[66]

The vessels sailed from San Blas February 17, 1789.[67] These
instructions, as well as those given to the English expedition of the
same year, look toward a permanent establishment at Nootka, which
was to be used as a basis for future operations on the coast. Each
expedition was sent without any knowledge that the other was even
thought of. The instructions given to the commander of each were such
as to leave no doubt in his mind as to his perfect right to carry them
out. It was impossible for both to obey; hence a clash was inevitable.
Before studying the occurrences at Nootka a brief examination should
be made of the conflicting claims, with an attempt to discover the
respective rights in the spring of 1789 before either expedition
reached the common destination.

       *       *       *       *       *

The first Englishman known to have visited Nootka Sound is Capt. James
Cook. In the spring of 1778 he spent the month of April in the sound,
which he explored and mapped carefully; and, being unable to learn that
any European had before visited this particular part of the coast,
he gave it the name of King Georges Sound, but later concluded that
it would be better to call it by the native name Nootka. He obtained
supplies of water, wood, fish, etc. The natives were friendly to him,
and he found among them several articles, including the two silver
spoons mentioned in the above instructions, which, together with the
conduct of the natives, indicated that Europeans had previously been
somewhere in the neighborhood, at least. No mention is made of his
having taken possession of the place for England.[68] It seems that
the Englishmen who were interested in the expedition of 1789 had
no knowledge that any European had visited the place earlier than
this visit of Captain Cook.[69] If they had such knowledge, they
intentionally ignored it. This was looked upon as a real discovery and
it was assumed that thereby England acquired such rights as discovery
can give. Although Sir Francis Drake’s landing on the California coast
in 1579 was mentioned,[70] yet it seems not to have been looked upon
as of very much value in establishing a claim, and, of course, was
not so far north. During the years subsequent to 1785 English trading
ships frequently visited Nootka. Although they were purely private
undertakings, this fact had considerable value in strengthening the
English claim, since they tended to develop the resources of the
country. The details of these voyages are not in place here.[71] These,
then, constitute the ground for the English claim up to the visit of
Meares in 1788 and his erection of a house and building of a ship,
which were treated in the last chapter.

It was clearly brought out in the diplomatic contest of 1790 that a
Spanish expedition had examined with some care the whole coast up to
about 55°, and had spent some time in this very port of Nootka or its
immediate neighborhood four years before Captain Cook’s visit. After
the Spanish explorations of the sixteenth century, which had extended
some distance up the California coast, there was a long period of
inactivity in this part of the world due to the decay of the Government
at home. When the temporary revival of national life came under Charles
III there was also a revival of exploring enterprises on the western
coast of America. Word reached Madrid through the Spanish ambassador
at St. Petersburg that the Russians were making settlements on the
American coast north of California. In consequence of royal orders
issued the previous year, an expedition, under the command of Juan
Perez, was sent from Mexico in 1774 to investigate. He had orders to
examine the coast as high as 60°, but did not get beyond 55°. As he
was returning he anchored early in August in a port which he called
San Lorenzo, and which was later identified with Nootka Sound. Some
question was raised as to its identity, but there seems to be little
doubt. The latitude agrees very closely--too closely, Bancroft says.
The anchorage must have been in the immediate neighborhood.[72]
Revilla-Gigedo says it is believed that the commander took possession
of Nootka, but Bancroft, who examined the diaries, asserts that he did
not land anywhere to take possession for Spain. Martinez, who became
so important in the expedition of 1789, was second pilot on this
expedition of Perez. It was while at San Lorenzo in 1774 that the two
silver spoons were stolen from him by the Indians. They are frequently
mentioned in the Spanish manuscripts, and are accepted as proof
positive that this expedition was at Nootka, and as thereby proving the
superiority of the Spanish claim.[73]

In 1775, the next year after Perez’s voyage, another was made by
Heceta [Ezeta] with Quadra accompanying in a small vessel. The former
approached the coast in the region of Nootka, but did not enter,
thereupon turning his course southward. Quadra, in the little vessel,
pressed onward to about the fifty-eighth degree. This expedition made
landings and took formal possession for Spain of at least three points
between 47° and 58°.[74] In 1779 a third expedition sailed from Mexico
to explore the coast still farther north. It reached the sixty-first
degree, Prince William Sound.[75] By these three expeditions the
Spanish Government considered that this entire coast from California
northward had been sufficiently explored and that formal possession had
been taken at enough places to establish thoroughly the Spanish claim.
So a royal order was given in 1780 that voyages for this purpose should
cease.[76]

The first two of these Spanish voyages were earlier than that of
Captain Cook and included practically all that he explored, though they
did not examine it so thoroughly. Hence, as far as discovery alone is
concerned, these should have given Spain rights superior to any that
England could have acquired by Cook’s enterprise, not only to Nootka
Sound, but to the whole of the Northwest Coast. But, unfortunately
for the Spanish claim, there is a serious flaw in the title at this
point, arising from the fact-that the results of these voyages were
not published, except in brief accounts.[77] It is a serious question
whether a discovery which was not made known to the world could give a
claim superior to one gained by a subsequent voyage whose results were
made known. Reason and justice would seem to say it could not. But,
besides these explorations, Spain still clung in theory at least to her
ancient claim to sovereignty over the entire American continent west
of the line drawn by the treaty of Tordesillas (1494), and sanctioned
by Pope Alexander VI, who had drawn the arbitrary line the previous
year, dividing the world between Spain and Portugal. Only as a matter
of necessity had she gradually conceded the right of other nations to
occupy the eastern coast of North America, and for the same reason had
recently conceded the Russian control of the western coast down to
Prince William Sound. This is illustrated by the facts arising out of
the forced entrance of the American ship, _Columbia_, into a port of
the islands of Juan Fernandez in 1788, referred to in the instructions
of the Viceroy to Martinez above.

The Spanish governor of the islands, Blas Gonzales, after relieving the
vessel’s distress, had allowed it to go on its way to the Northwest
Coast, knowing its destination.[78] For this act he had been summoned
before the captain-general of Chile and cashiered. The captain-general
was supported by the Viceroy of Peru and apparently by the home
Government.[79] This harsh treatment was based on a royal decree of
1692, ordering all viceroys, governors, etc., to prevent foreign ships
from navigating the south sea without permission from Spain,[80] since
no other nation had, or ought to have, any territories which it was
necessary for them to pass around Cape Horn to reach. It is needless
to say that this claim was not respected by other governments. The
Viceroy’s assertion of the right of Spain to occupy the coasts and
exclude colonies of other nations, quoted above from his instructions
to Martinez, is another evidence. It had long been conceded by other
nations that discovery alone, or even discovery with formal acts of
taking possession, can not give a valid title. It is essential that
some effort be made to use the land discovered and to develop its
resources; and, before the claim is fully established, actual and
continued possession must be taken.

With discovery, exploration, and formal acts of possession Spanish
activity ceased, there being no serious effort to make any use of the
territory in the way of trade, and no steps being taken to occupy the
country until they were aroused to do so by reports coming from the
north in 1788 that the Russians were intending to occupy. In other
words, either from lack of enterprise or from policy, the Spanish
did not seem to care to develop the country or make any use of it
themselves, but did wish to prevent any other people from doing so.
Their reason for this policy of obstruction was probably an idle pride
in retaining a shadowy sovereignty over this vast territory; or,
possibly, a wish to retain it as a field for future enterprise; or,
more likely, the hope of being able to control the Pacific outlet of
any water passage to the Atlantic that might later be discovered along
this coast. In the face of modern national enterprise, something more
tangible was necessary in order to retain control.

The English people, not from any fixed national policy, but from
individual initiative, were taking these necessary steps and the
Government was practically compelled to follow them up. As soon as
Captain Cook’s voyage of 1778 had made known to the English people the
possibilities of the fur trade in this region, shipowners immediately
turned their attention thither. Between 1785 and 1790 no fewer than
12 or 15 British vessels visited the coast to trade with the natives,
several of them making return voyages, and most of them making shorter
or longer stops at Nootka.[81] As has been stated, steps were taken
from the very first to establish a post at Nootka as a center for these
trading operations. A temporary one was actually set up by Meares
in 1788, and an expedition was sent out for the purpose of making
this permanent the following year. Thus, up to 1789, the English
were exercising more control over the region than the Spanish. Had
the English plans of this year not miscarried, and had the Spanish
expedition of the same year not been sent, the question as to the
respective rights, at least to Nootka and the immediate neighborhood,
would probably never seriously have been raised.




CHAPTER IV.

MARTINEZ’S OPERATIONS AT NOOTKA BEFORE COLNETT’S ARRIVAL.


It was on the 5th[82] of May, 1789, that the Spanish ship anchored in
Friendly Cove of Nootka Sound bearing Martinez with his instructions
for occupying the port and planting a permanent colony that should be
a substantial proof of the Spanish claim and serve as a center for
spreading Spanish sovereignty over all the coast. Just ten days before
this[83] Colnett had sailed from China with instructions and equipment
to make it, an English port.[84] During the next two months, while
the Englishman was crossing the Pacific, the Spaniard was making good
use of the time. When the latter reached Nootka there seems to have
been no visible sign that the English had ever occupied the place or
even intended to occupy it. The only evidence of civilization was one
vessel under a Portuguese captain with Portuguese instructions and a
Portuguese flag. It soon became known that there was also an American
ship a few miles away up the sound.

It has never been conclusively proved that the house which Meares
built the summer before had entirely disappeared. In a letter written
three years later to the Spanish commandant at that time the American
captains, who had spent the winter of 1788-89 at Nootka, declared that
when Martinez arrived there was no trace of Meares’s house in the cove;
that there had been a house, or rather a hut, when they arrived in the
fall, but that, prior to his sailing for the Sandwich Islands, Captain
Douglas had pulled it to pieces, had taken the boards on board the
_Iphigenia_, and had given the roof to Captain Kendrick, who had used
it as firewood.[85]

While there is no proof that the statement of these gentlemen is not
true, yet they were too plainly prejudiced in favor of the Spanish
to permit their testimony to be taken for its full face value in the
absence of any corroborating evidence. There is, however, some indirect
evidence to support their statement, and its value is the greater
because of its being indirect, and still greater because it comes
from the side of the English to whose interest it would have been to
maintain the contrary. This appears in the extract which Meares quotes
from the journal of the _Iphigenia_. In the entry made two days after
his return from the Sandwich Islands and two weeks before the arrival
of Martinez the writer says: “[We] sent some sails on shore and erected
a tent to put our empty casks in.”[86]

If their house had still been standing they would doubtless have
used it for this purpose instead of erecting the tent. Further, the
fact that no mention is made of the house in this journal is pretty
conclusive proof that it was not in existence on their arrival.
Meares’s narrative of the departure of the _Iphigenia_ in the preceding
autumn is silent on the subject. In fact, there is no statement made
even in Meares’s memorial that his house was still standing; but the
memorial is so written, doubtless intentionally, that the casual
reader would infer that the house was still there and that evidences
of English occupation were unquestionable. This is doubtless what has
led most historians who have touched upon the subject, among whom are
some of the best, into the error of implying or openly declaring that
there was a substantial English colony when the Spanish expedition
arrived.[87]

It was also this failure of Meares to tell the whole truth that led
the British Parliament and ministry into the error of believing that
their rights to the place were unquestionable and that the conduct of
the Spanish commandant was little better than high-handed robbery.[88]
It is, then, pretty safe to assert that there was no indication
whatever of English occupation when Martinez arrived, and that he was
consequently perfectly justified in taking possession for Spain and in
maintaining his position by force if it should become necessary. The
question, therefore, is not, Was he justified in his first act? but,
Were his subsequent acts of violence necessary to maintain his position?

Captain Kendrick, of the American ship _Columbia_, which Martinez found
at Nootka, and Captain Gray, of her consort, the _Lady Washington_,
which was out on a trading cruise at the time, were slightly involved
in the relations between the Spanish and English commanders. But the
vessel under Portuguese colors furnishes the center of interest for the
first month of Spanish occupation.

This vessel was the _Iphigenia_, which had sailed from China in company
with the _Felice_, under Captain Meares, in the spring of 1788, but
which had separated from the latter vessel, had spent the summer in
trading on the coast of Alaska and had rejoined her consort in the
autumn at Nootka, where they again separated, the _Felice_, under
Meares, sailing for China with the furs collected by both vessels, and
the _Iphigenia_, under Douglas, accompanied by the small vessel, the
_Northwest America_, built at Nootka during the summer, going for the
winter to the Sandwich Islands.[89] Returning to the American coast in
the spring of 1789, the _Iphigenia_ had reached Nootka sixteen days
before the arrival of Martinez. Four days after her the little vessel,
her consort, arrived, and preparations were immediately made to send
the latter out on a trading cruise, that they might not be worsted
in competition by the American sloop, the _Lady Washington_, which
had just returned from a six weeks’ cruise to the southward and would
soon set out on a similar trip to the northward. In four days more the
necessary repairs were made, and on April 27 the _Northwest America_
set out to trade with the natives to the northward,[90] not returning,
and consequently not being of any further interest for six weeks, at
the end of which time she assumes considerable importance.

The double national character of the expedition to which the
_Iphigenia_ belonged has already been discussed.[91] When, on May 5,
the Spanish ship appeared, it was evidently thought better--for reasons
which are not disclosed--to present the appearance of a Portuguese
rather than an English ship. During the first few days all of the
commanders seem to have been on the best of terms. According to the
journal of the _Iphigenia_, Douglas was invited to dine on board the
Spanish ship on the day of Martinez’s arrival. Three days later the
officers of the _Iphigenia_ and of the Spanish vessel all went to
dine with Kendrick, the captain of the American ship, and the next
day the officers of the American and Spanish ships dined on board the
_Iphigenia_.

Thus, up to the 9th of May the utmost harmony prevailed. Douglas had
acquainted Martinez with the distressed condition of his ship and the
latter had promised to relieve him as far as lay in his power. On the
8th the Portuguese instructions and passport of the _Iphigenia_ had
been presented to Martinez.[92] These seem to be what started the
difficulty. In his account to the Viceroy, Martinez says:

    On my arrival in it [the port of San Lorenzo de Nootka] I found a
    packet boat, with its captain (flag) and passport of the Portuguese
    nation, but its supercargo (who was really the captain), its pilot,
    and the greater part of its crew English.[93]

The passport was signed by the governor and captain-general of the port
of Macao, in China, and began:

    Be it known that from the port of this city is sailing for the
    coasts of North America the sloop named the _Iphigenia Nubiana_. It
    belongs to Juan Carvalho,[94] a subject of the same master of this
    port, and is of 200 tons burden having artillery, powder, balls,
    arms, and munitions necessary for its defense, and carrying as its
    captain Francisco Josef Viana, also a subject of the same Crown, and
    of competent ability.[95]

The instructions were addressed to Viana, captain of the sloop
_Iphigenia Nubiana_, and signed by Juan Carvalho. Besides the
perplexity of the double nationality of the vessel, Martinez’s
suspicions were aroused by what he considered an obnoxious clause in
the instructions. It read:

    In case of your meeting on your voyage with any Russian, Spanish,
    or English vessels, you will treat them with the greatest possible
    friendship and permit them (if they demand it) to examine your
    papers that they may see the object of your voyage, taking care at
    the same time to avoid surprise, if they should attempt to divert
    you from your voyage. In such case you will resist force by force
    and protest against such violent and illegal proceedings before
    a tribunal at the first port in which you arrive, giving also an
    estimate of the value of the ships and cargoes. You will send to us
    at Macao a copy of said protest, with a narrative of all that shall
    have occurred, and another such to Francisco Josef Bandieras and
    Geronimo Ribeiro Nores, our correspondents at Lisbon, and likewise
    to the Portuguese ambassador, at the Court of the nation of the
    aggressor, in order that our Sovereign may demand satisfaction. If,
    perchance, in such conflict you should have the superiority, you
    will take possession of the vessel and its cargo, conducting them,
    with the officers, to Macao, in order that they may be condemned as
    legal prize and the officers and crew punished as pirates.[96]

Rightly or wrongly, Martinez thought that these instructions justified
him in demanding an explanation. Since this is the first of the vessels
seized, and in order to show that the Spanish commander considered that
he was acting under instructions and with full authority, the whole of
the first of a series of affidavits regarding the affair is here quoted:

    On board the frigate of His Majesty named _Our Lady of the Rosary_,
    alias the _Princesa_, on the 13th[97] day of the month of May,
    1789, I, an ensign of the royal navy, Don Esteban José Martinez,
    appointed commander in chief of this expedition by the most
    excellent Señor Viceroy Don Manuel Antonio Florez for occupying and
    taking possession of this port of San Lorenzo de Nootka, where I am
    anchored, declare: That, in virtue of the Instructions and other
    superior orders, dated the 23d of December of the year last passed,
    1788, and according to an order of His Majesty in Arto. 17, Tito.
    5, Trato. 6, of the royal orders for the navy, I ought to order
    and leave ordered to appear before me Don Francisco Josef Viana,
    an inhabitant of Lisbon and captain of the packet boat named the
    _Iphigenia Nubiana_ coming from Macao, which I found on the 5th of
    the present month anchored in this aforesaid port, and likewise that
    he should be accompanied by the so-called supercargo, M. William
    Douglas, in order that each one, in so far as he is involved, may
    vindicate himself, in view of the charges which I have to make
    against them, according to the cited article of the royal orders,
    on account of sections 18 and 19 of the instructions which the said
    captain presented to me on the 8th of the present month.

This affidavit was signed by Martinez before the notary, Canizares.
Following it is one by the interpreter of the expedition saying that he
delivered the above order, and then comes a long one giving an account
of the interview that followed.

Viana, the captain, Douglas, the supercargo, and Adamson, the first
pilot, immediately answered the summons, and repaired on board the
_Princesa_. Martinez began by demanding an explanation for their
having anchored in a port of the Spanish dominions without a license
from that Monarch. They replied that they were there in virtue of their
passport from the governor of Macao; that, as to this port’s belonging
to the Spanish dominions, they were ignorant of it, since the fact
had not been published at the European Courts; and that they were
informed by the first article of their instructions that this coast
had been discovered by the Portuguese Admiral Fonte in 1640.[98] To
this last Martinez responded that Portugal was at that time under the
dominion of Spain. He likewise charged them to tell who this Carvalho
was that had given such despotic instructions as the minister of a
sovereign would hardly have given; to which they answered that he was
the owner of the vessel. He then charged them with articles 18 and 19
of their instructions (the objectionable clauses quoted above). They
replied that the articles in question had been misinterpreted; that
they ordered Viana, in case his crew mutinied and he met with the
vessel of a foreign nation, to appeal to that vessel for assistance
in imprisoning his own crew and conducting them to Macao, and that
the mutinous crew were the ones to be punished as pirates. Martinez
insisted that this was not the true import of the articles, but a
clumsy pretext. Considering their defense unsatisfactory, according to
the cited article of the orders for the royal navy, Martinez demanded
in the name of the King that they should surrender themselves as
prisoners of war. The affidavit giving account of this was signed by
Viana, Douglas, and Martinez before Canizares.[99]

This is Martinez’s account of the arrest, written at the time or very
soon thereafter, since it bears the signature of Viana and Douglas,
and they would have been most unlikely to sign it if they had not been
compelled to do so while in captivity. It is very doubtful whether
Martinez was truthful in his report of the clumsy fabrication offered
by Viana and Douglas in defense of the objectionable clause. To have
offered such, expecting it to be believed, they would have had to be
either very stupid or absolutely certain that Martinez and all his
associates were entirely ignorant of the Portuguese language--a very
unlikely circumstance. This false defense may have been invented by
the Spanish commander to give more color to the justice of the arrest.
It would be more charitable and possibly more just to suppose that
owing to his imperfect understanding of the language that they used,
or its imperfect translation by his interpreter, he understood them
to say this when they really said something very different. It is
quite evident that his first translation of what he considered the
objectionable clause in their instructions was incorrect. For in his
rendering of it in the above account of the investigation he makes the
clause read that Viana was to treat with respect all English, Russian,
and Spanish vessels whose force was superior to his own, but, if he
had the superior force, he was to seize them and carry them to Macao,
where their crews should be tried as pirates. This is what he referred
to when he spoke of their being so despotic. It is impossible to
understand how, in a correct translation, he could have seen anything
so obnoxious as he claimed to see. If, however, this rendering had been
the correct one, it would have made the _Iphigenia_ virtually a pirate
ship, and Martinez would have been fully justified. But if his first
translation was faulty, his later one was correct, as will be seen
by comparing the quotation from it given above with the instructions
of the Merchant Proprietors to Meares, the English commander of the
expedition. They correspond almost word for word, differing only in the
details necessary to give the appearance of a Portuguese instead of an
English expedition.[100]

This error of Martinez is brought out in Douglas’s account of the
investigation. He says:

    [Martinez] told me my papers were bad; that they mentioned I was to
    take all English, Russian, and Spanish vessels that were of inferior
    force to the _Iphigenia_, and send or carry their crews to Macao,
    there to be tried for their lives as pirates. I told him they had
    not interpreted the papers right; that though I did not understand
    Portuguese I had seen a copy of them in English at Macao,[101]
    which mentioned, if I was attacked by any of those three nations,
    to defend myself, and, if I had the superiority, to send the
    captain and crews to Macao to answer for the insult they offered.
    The padries and the clerk read the papers over, and said they had
    interpreted the papers right.[102]

The American commanders say that the capture was due to a
misinterpretation.[103] If Martinez did make this mistake and later was
led to restore the vessel by the discovery of it, he remains entirely
silent regarding it, giving other reasons for the release, as will be
seen.

Between May 13, when the _Iphigenia_ was seized, and May 25, when she
was released, part of her officers and crew were detained on board
Martinez’s ship, the _Princesa_, and part on the _San Carlos_, the
other Spanish ship, which had reached Nootka a week later than the
commander’s. Of the conduct of the Spanish during these twelve days
while they held the _Iphigenia_ prisoner there are the most divergent
accounts in the different sources.

According to the account of Douglas, a deaf ear was turned to his plea
that he had been forced to enter the port because of the distress of
his vessel, which was such that, had he entered a port of the Spanish
dominions of South America he would have been allowed to repair his
damages and depart in peace, and that consequently to take him
prisoner in a port to which the King of Spain had never laid claim
was a piece of injustice that no nation had ever attempted before.
His offer to leave the port immediately in spite of his distress, if
permission should be granted, was refused; he and his crew were most
inhumanely treated, and their valuable personal effects and even their
very clothes were stolen; Spanish colors were hoisted on their vessel
and it was looted of its provisions and articles for trading with the
natives and anything else that the Spaniards fancied. When his vessel
was restored a very meager supply of provisions was sent on board, and
an account presented which listed five times the quantity actually
sent and charged five times their cost; he was compelled to sign a
paper saying that Martinez had found him in distress and in want of
everything, had supplied him with all necessary to take him to the
Sandwich Islands, and had not interfered with his navigation; another
paper was forced upon him by which he agreed that, if his papers should
be found to be bad, the vessel was to be delivered up at Macao, and
before he was allowed to sail a letter was demanded from him to Captain
Funter, of the _North-West America_, ordering the latter to sell the
schooner to Martinez; but, not having authority either to sell or to
order another to sell, he said nothing in the letter that he left
about selling the vessel, but advised Funter to act to the best of his
judgment for the benefit of his employers.[104]

According to the account of the American captains, on the other hand,
the officers of the _Iphigenia_ “were treated with all imaginable
kindness, and every attention paid them.”

    The vessel while in the possession of the Spaniards, from being a
    wreck was put in complete order for the sea, being calked, rigging
    and sails repaired, anchors and cables sent from the _Princesa_,
    etc. On the 20th Don Martinez supplied them with every kind of
    provisions they were in need of, for which Captain Douglas gave him
    bills on Cravalia, the before-mentioned merchant of Macao. On the
    31st the _Iphigenia_ sailed and was saluted by the Spanish fort,
    and the commodore accompanied them out of the harbor, giving every
    assistance with boats, etc. When Captain Douglas took his leave of
    the commodore he declared he should ever entertain a sense of Don
    Martinez’s kindness, deeming his conduct relative to the vessel
    no more than his duty as a King’s officer. Upon the whole, we both
    believe the _Iphigenia’s_ being detained was of infinite service to
    those who were concerned in her.[105]

Vancouver, in giving the substance of a letter written later by Viana
to Quadra, represents Viana as saying that he was imprisoned, was well
treated, and on being liberated his vessel and cargo were completely
restored and he was furnished what he needed.[106]

It is plain that neither the account of Douglas nor that of the
American commanders can be accepted for its full value, but that the
truth lies between them. The fact that the former on his release turned
northward and spent a month trading, and later made a successful trip
to the Sandwich Islands and China, shows that his ship was not so
destitute of provisions as his journal would make it seem; and the
fact that he purchased a cargo of furs from the natives shows that he
had not been so nearly robbed of his articles of trade as he declared.
Further, knowing that this journal passed through Meares’s hands before
it was published, and knowing this gentleman’s tendency to distort the
truth, when there was a possibility of thereby strengthening his case,
one can not help suspecting that the journal was tampered with so that
it would exhibit Martinez’s treatment of the vessel in as unfavorable
a light as possible. But the testimony of the American commanders must
be discounted also, since their prejudice in favor of the Spaniards is
very conspicuous. This would be suspected because of their intimacy
with Martinez; but the extravagant statements of the letter itself show
a decided prejudice. It was written three years after the events which
it discusses, and errors in date indicate that it was produced merely
from memory. The statements from Viana’s letter are too indirect to be
of much value.

In the series of affidavits which Martinez submitted to the Viceroy
concerning the arrest and detention of the vessel, there is what
appears to be a wholly unimpassioned account. These affidavits seem
to have been written and sworn to before the notary, each on the
day on which the event that it records occurred. The first one, in
which Martinez gives his reasons for calling to account the officers
of the _Iphigenia_, is quoted in full above. The second, in which
the interpreter says that he delivered Martinez’s orders, has been
referred to, and the substance has been given of the third which
recounts the investigation of Douglas and Viana and their arrest. The
fourth tells of the formal act of seizing the vessel, the replacing
of the Portuguese colors by the Spanish, and the imprisonment of the
crew. These four are dated May 13. A letter to Martinez, dated May 15,
written by Tovar, who had been placed in command of the captured ship,
tells of a bundle of papers which he had found belonging to Douglas.
In the fifth affidavit, dated May 16, Martinez says that in view of
this letter of Tovar he had ordered the papers of Douglas to be taken
in charge, and the sixth affidavit, of the same date, is signed by the
English interpreter and says that no suspicion attached to Douglas’s
papers.[107]

On May 17, in the seventh affidavit, Martinez says that on account of
the difficulty of sending the captured vessel to San Blas, owing to the
scarcity of men to man her, he has concluded to release her, but has
ordered an inventory to be made, that he may bind the owner to pay the
value of the ship and cargo in case the Viceroy shall declare her to
have been good prize. The inventory was completed May 22, and signed on
board the _Iphigenia_ the same day by Tovar, the temporary commander,
and by Viana, the Portuguese captain, in whose presence it had been
made. The eighth affidavit, signed on May 25, declares that the
inventory should be embodied in the account. An itemized list follows,
covering five pages of manuscript and indicating that the _Iphigenia_
was by no means destitute of general supplies, though there might have
been a lack of those necessary to man the ship. Immediately following
the inventory is the bond signed by Viana and Douglas, captain and
supercargo of the _Iphigenia_, for Juan Carvalho, the owner, and by
Kendrick and Ingraham, of the American ship, as witnesses, and finally
by Martinez, all in the presence of Canizares, the notary. This
obliges the owner to pay the value of the ship and cargo, as shown by
the attached inventory, in case the Viceroy should decide that the
vessel was good prize on account of having been found anchored in the
port of Nootka without having a passport, permission, or license from
His Catholic Majesty for navigating or anchoring in seas or ports
belonging to his dominion.[108] The ninth affidavit, signed May 26,
formally submits to the Viceroy the preceding account of the measures
taken in view of the instructions submitted by the captain of the
_Iphigenia_.[109]

On May 31, after a dinner on board the Spanish commander’s ship,
at which the _Iphigenia’s_ officers and those of the American ship
were present, the _Iphigenia_ was accompanied out of the harbor by
the officers of the other two, and, after a farewell salute from the
Spanish guns, sailed away, ostensibly for Macao, by way of the Sandwich
Islands. At midnight Douglas gave orders to turn north for a trading
cruise, having, as he says, “no idea of running for Macao with only
between 60 and 70 sea-otter skins which I had on board.”[110]

       *       *       *       *       *

The next occurrence of interest at Nootka was in connection with the
_North-West America_. Mention has been made of Martinez’s futile
attempt to get a letter from Douglas ordering Captain Funter to sell
the schooner to Martinez. It will be recalled that this vessel, on
returning from the Sandwich Islands, had reached Nootka four days
later than her consort, the _Iphigenia_, had been repaired as soon as
possible, and had set out on a trading trip before the arrival of the
Spanish commander. Having carried on a profitable trade for six weeks,
and being seriously in need of provisions, she returned to Nootka June
8 in hope of meeting there the vessel that was expected from Macao
with stores. For some reason not wholly plain Martinez took possession
of the schooner as soon as she arrived. Meares says that the Spanish
commander was angered when he learned that the letter which Douglas
had left for Funter was not the desired order for the latter to sell
his schooner, and gave vent to his anger by seizing the vessel.[111]
The American captains say that when Martinez learned later of the
bankruptcy of Carvalho, on whom he had accepted bills in payment for
supplies furnished to Douglas, he justified himself as holding the
schooner in security for the debt.[112] Martinez gives a partial
explanation in an affidavit of June 12. Learning, he said, that the
schooner belonged to Carvalho and was connected with the _Iphigenia_,
which he had seized on account of her instructions, he therefore took
possession of this vessel also, and submitted an inventory to the
Viceroy, together with that of the larger ship. He fails to explain
why he did not release her; but he doubtless considered explanation
unnecessary, since he had given as his only reason for not detaining
the larger vessel his inability to man her.[113] He would not have been
consistent in not detaining her unless he had released her also on
bond; and there was no need for doing that, since she required so few
men. Doubtless the other two motives suggested had their influence also.

The English commanders give the same extravagant account of robbery
and barbaric treatment at the hands of the Spaniards that were given
in the case of the other vessel--the Spanish flag was hoisted; the
officers and men were imprisoned; the vessel was repaired, refitted,
rechristened the _Gertrudis_ and sent on a trading trip for the benefit
of the Spaniards, in which they bartered away the articles of trade
that they found on board; every possible effort was made by bribery and
intimidation to induce Funter and some of his men to man the vessel for
the Spaniards and show them where trade was good, but without avail;
the men were kept in confinement for a month and then shipped for
China on board one of the American vessels, which they were compelled
to assist in manning to keep from being wrecked.[114] It must be
admitted that at the best the provocation was sufficient to excuse some
exaggeration, which is the more to be expected when it is noticed that
the account was not written until several months after the occurrence
of the events recorded. But that the Spanish commander meant to show
a certain amount of justice and even generosity is evident from the
fact that he later transferred to another English vessel all of the
furs collected by the schooner except twelve, which were either lost
or detained by the Spaniard.[115] And still later, when Funter and
his men were sent to China on the American vessel, Martinez shipped
to their credit 96 skins to pay their wages besides the cost of their
passage.[116] He also transferred provisions from an English ship to
the American captain for the maintenance of Funter and his men.[117]
The purpose seems to have been to punish the owners, but to avoid
working immediate hardship to the officers and crew.

       *       *       *       *       *

Another event of the Spanish operations is the taking formal possession
of the port, which occurred June 24.[118] In the seven weeks that had
intervened since the arrival of the Spanish expedition, besides the
seizure and disposition of the two vessels just discussed, a fort had
been constructed on the top of a high hill which commanded the entrance
to the port, and had been occupied by a garrison and a battery of ten
cannon. Three houses had also been built--a workshop, a bakery, and a
lodging house.[119] The ceremony had not been performed earlier because
they were awaiting the arrival of the _Aranzazu_, that it might be
given greater solemnity; but that ship not coming, it was decided to
delay no longer.[120] The instrument of possession is a long, very
formal, and high-sounding document. The right of Spain is based on the
discovery of Nootka in 1774 and the bull of Pope Alexander VI of May
4, 1493. The instrument bears the signatures of Martinez and Haro,
commanders of the two vessels; of Tovar, the first pilot; of the two
chaplains, and of the four missionaries, and is attested by Canizares,
the notary.[121] From the fort and the vessels a salute of 21 cannon
was fired in honor of the King, and at a splendid banquet on board the
commander’s ship all of the officers of the Spanish ships, and several
foreigners, drank to that sovereign’s health.

These foreigners, Martinez says, were of the English nation and the
American Congress [Colonies], and the ceremony was performed without
any contradiction by them.[122] Through Kendrick and Ingraham, officers
of the American ship, he had made the Englishmen understand that the
Spaniards had been the first discoverers of the port. He had proved
this by having the Americans--since they also understood the Indian
dialect--talk with the natives, who had described the clothes of the
first comers. And as a further and more conclusive proof he laid before
the Indians the flags of various nations, including the old Spanish
flag,[123] and the last was recognized by the old chief as the one
borne by the first vessel.[124]

One more occurrence should be noted before the arrival of the English
expedition under Colnett that gave rise to the most important event
of the summer. This occurrence is the coming of the _Princess Royal_,
commanded by Hudson, subject to the orders of Colnett. This vessel
left China earlier than her consort and reached Nootka on June 15[125],
where she remained a little more than two weeks. A letter written by
Hudson, a copy of which is in the Spanish archives, gives a detailed
account of his stay at Nootka on this occasion. On his approach in
the evening he was met by two launches. Being alarmed, he demanded
to know whether they were armed and received answer in English that
they were, but only with a bottle of brandy. Martinez, of the Spanish
ship, Kendrick, of the American, and Funter, of the captured English
schooner, came on board and remained all night. The next morning,
the 16th, they were towed into the harbor, and saluted by the guns
of the two Spanish ships and the fort. In the afternoon Hudson and
Martinez accompanied Kendrick up the sound 6 miles to his vessel, the
_Columbia_, where they remained that night. On the 11th Hudson returned
to his vessel, where he received a note from the Spanish commander
demanding his motive for anchoring in the sound, and informing him that
the port belonged to the King of Spain. On the 18th Hudson replied
that during his voyage of sixteen weeks and three days from Macao
in continual storms his ship had been badly damaged; this, with the
failure of wood and water, had caused him to anchor where he was, and
he hoped that Martinez would permit him to supply his losses, upon
which, with permission, he would depart. In a note of the same day
Martinez replied that Hudson’s explanation was perfectly satisfactory
and that he might supply his needs and depart when he wished.

This shows that the utmost harmony and good will prevailed. Hudson’s
vessel was present when the Spaniards took formal possession of
the port, and he was doubtless one of the Englishmen who were at
Martinez’s sumptuous banquet and are mentioned as not disputing the
act of possession. This is the English vessel, also, to which Martinez
transferred the furs taken from the _North-West America_, as mentioned
above.

On July 1, his ship being ready to leave, Hudson notified Martinez
that he intended to sail the next morning. The latter, after a little
hesitation, gave his consent, and also furnished Hudson with a circular
letter to all commanders of Spanish ships which he might encounter
ordering them to let him pass. The next morning, July 2, the launches
from the American ships towed the _Princess Royal_ out of the harbor;
and having had to wait all day for a breeze she sailed away at 10
o’clock in the evening, returning eleven days later, at the close of
the important events to be discussed in the next chapter.[126]

Comparing the actions of Martinez, which have been discussed in this
chapter, with his instructions given in the foregoing chapter, it is
seen that it would not be difficult for him to justify his seizure of
the _Iphigenia_ and the _North-West America_. The last clause of the
eleventh article orders him to endeavor, as far as possible, to prevent
intercourse and commerce with the natives. It is difficult to see how
he could have carried this out in any other way. Knowing the general
policy of Spain, which was to prevent all foreigners from trading with
the Spanish dominions, and feeling himself responsible for maintaining
that policy along this whole coast, he might easily have felt it his
duty to employ harsh means, being satisfied that nothing less would be
effectual. Having in mind the recent treatment accorded to the governor
of the islands of Juan Fernandez because he allowed a vessel that had
been in his power to continue its voyage to these very coasts, it is
not strange that he should be unwilling to incur similar disgrace
because of too great leniency.[127] It would seem, however, that he
was inconsistent in not seizing also the _Princess Royal_, unless,
indeed, he believed what he embodied in the circular letter which he
gave to Hudson for other Spanish commanders. In this he declared that
the purpose of the voyage was discovery; that he had seen Hudson’s
commission to that effect. Martinez may have known nothing to the
contrary at the time, and what he said was doubtless true; but it was
not the whole truth. But if he was too lenient this time, he did not
err in that direction on Hudson’s return, as will appear.

If Martinez felt it necessary to treat the English ships with such
harshness, can his mild treatment of the American ships be justified?
These are the very ships that are referred to in articles 14 and 15
of the above-mentioned instructions. It will be recalled that he was
there given authority, in case of his meeting with them, to deal
with them as appeared proper. The suspicion was mentioned in another
place that the purpose of these ships was to find a port in which to
establish a colony. On encountering them at Nootka, Martinez inspected
their papers and found that this was not their purpose. He says that
his interpreter found nothing in their papers derogatory to the rights
of Spain; that their purpose was to circumnavigate the globe; that
there seemed no reason for interfering with their course nor placing
them under bond, as he had done the packet boat from Macao; but that,
nevertheless, he had required them, in the name of his Sovereign, not
to return to these seas or coasts without bringing a passport and
special permit, since that Monarch had prohibited every foreign nation
from navigating the coasts of America.[128] His allowing the American
ships to trade unmolested for the two months hardly seems consistent,
unless his reason was what might be implied from the latter part of
the letter just referred to. He tells of the assistance afforded him
by the American commanders in his dealings with the English and the
Indians, since they conversed in both of those languages. He might
have considered it better to allow them for a time to violate the
letter of the strict Spanish regulations than to lose their services in
establishing himself in a position to prevent all such violations in
the future. His intimacy with the Americans was so noticeable that the
Englishmen frequently accused the latter of collusion with the schemes
of the Spaniard.[129]




CHAPTER V.

THE QUARREL AND SEIZURE.


The English ship from China, the _Argonaut_, Captain Colnett, whose
equipment and instructions have already been discussed, arrived at
Nootka late in the evening of July 2, 1789. She had neared the coast
some distance north the previous evening. Sailing southward, she was
visited in the morning by some Indians, who told of five vessels in
Friendly Cove, but could not identify them. The officers conjectured
that the ships belonged to Mr. Etches, one of the merchants interested
in their proposed colony. They hastened to join them. As their vessel
approached the entrance they saw the sloop _Princess Royal_ pass out
and sail away. This increased their confidence, since she was their
consort. Shortly after they passed the sloop they saw two launches
approach in the growing darkness. A voice in Spanish asked permission
to come on board and was answered in the affirmative. The leader of the
party was the Spanish commander, Martinez. Two hours earlier he had
been notified from the port of the approach of a ship. Thinking it to
be the _Aranzazu_, which he had been anxiously expecting for some weeks
from San Blas with provisions, he had hastened to welcome her in.

The events that follow this meeting of Martinez with Colnett, the
commander of the English expedition, are the real genesis of the Nootka
controversy. Had the vigorous measures of the Spanish commander stopped
with the seizure of the two vessels already discussed, the matter
would probably never have reached the cabinets of London and Madrid.
Since these events are so important, a detailed account is given. This
is drawn from five separate narratives, all written by men who were
present and took part in them. One is the letter of Martinez, written
at the close of the events, giving his official account to the Viceroy.
Another is a letter from Colnett to the same official, written some
three months later. These two are unpublished. The third is a second
account by Colnett, written nine years later, appearing as a footnote
to his published narrative of a subsequent voyage. The fourth is a
series of letters, written while the events were in progress, by
Duffin, second in command to Colnett, but really in control during most
of the time. The fifth is the letter, written three years later, by the
American captains, who were eyewitnesses of most of the events.[130]

At the first meeting each commander was disappointed at finding the
other very different from the person whom he expected. Martinez
at once presented to Colnett a letter from Captain Hudson, of the
_Princess Royal_, saying that the bearer was commander of two ships of
His Catholic Majesty anchored in Friendly Cove; that the writer had
received all possible aid from him and had departed. The letter had
been written that very morning, and put Colnett somewhat at his ease.
He invited Martinez and his party, among whom were the officers of the
American ships, down into the cabin, where they drank freely together.
The Spaniard was very courteous, declared that the vessels under his
command were in great distress from the want of provisions and other
necessaries, and urged the English commander to go into port in order
to supply their needs, inviting him to stay for some time. Colnett, in
his letter to the Viceroy, says that he consented to stay, provided he
should be permitted to build a sloop, for which he had the materials on
board; but this being refused, he said that he could not stay longer
than the next day.

On the other hand, Martinez says that Colnett claimed to have come
under authority from the King of England, with orders to take
possession of Nootka, construct a fort, establish a factory, and
plant a colony, for which he had brought 29 Chinese laborers; that
having learned this his interpreter made the Englishman understand
that Martinez had already taken possession of the port in the name and
under an order of the King of Spain; that thereupon the English captain
claimed the land for His Britannic Majesty on the ground of Cook’s
discovery, adding that his company had purchased the rights to the
place which were acquired the previous year by the Portuguese company,
their vessels, the _Iphigenia_ and the _North-West America_, being also
included in the purchase. To refute the Englishman’s arguments, the
Spaniard declared that a Spanish expedition had discovered the port
four years earlier than Cook;[131] that he himself had accompanied the
expedition, and from him the spoons had been stolen which Cook tells
of purchasing; that the Portuguese company had done wrong in selling
land which was not theirs but belonged to the King of Spain, not only
this port being the property of that Crown, but all the coast as far as
Prince Williams Sound. Colnett, the Spaniard continues, was unable to
reply to these well-founded arguments. The American captains say:

    Colnett asked if he would be prevented from building a house in the
    port. The commodore, mistaking his meaning, answered him he was at
    liberty to erect a tent, get wood and water, etc., after which he
    was at liberty to depart when he pleased; but Captain Colnett said
    that was not what he wanted, but to build a blockhouse, erect a
    fort, and settle a colony for the Crown of Great Britain. This was
    refused.

Colnett, in his published account, says that he hesitated, being
uncertain whether to enter the port, but--

    The Spaniard, observing my unwillingness to comply with his request,
    assured me on his word and honor, in the name of the King of Spain,
    whose servant he was, and of the Viceroy of Mexico, whose nephew he
    declared himself to be, that if I would go into port and relieve his
    wants I should be at liberty to sail whenever I pleased.

Martinez’s plea of distress and his solemn promise, with Hudson’s
letter, the Englishman says, influenced him to enter the harbor,
and, as there was a calm, he allowed the Spanish boats to assist in
towing his vessel into the cove. Among the party that had come out in
the launches was the pilot of the captured English schooner. He told
Colnett of the situation in the cove--the Spanish war ships, the fort,
the formal possession, the seizure of the _Iphigenia_ and _North-West
America_, and the arrival and departure of Captain Hudson. He advised
Colnett to anchor outside the cove until morning, but the latter,
depending on the Spaniard’s honor, entered and brought up between the
Spanish ships at about midnight.

The next morning, July 3, everything seems to have been harmonious.
Colnett visited the fort and other Spanish establishments, and on
invitation of Martinez took breakfast on board the Spanish vessel,
the Spanish commander returning the compliment by dining on board the
Englishman’s ship. The latter was urged to delay his departure for a
day, but being unwilling to do so it was arranged that the Spaniard
should send a launch in the afternoon to tow the English vessel out,
and on the return of the boat Colnett should send the supplies, a list
of which had already been agreed upon. The launch not coming as soon
as expected, a request was made that it be sent at once. Martinez
asked to see Colnett’s papers before the latter should depart. After
some hesitation the Englishman took them on board the Spanish ship.
The Spaniard was still in doubt whether he should allow the _Argonaut_
to depart, sometimes saying that she could, at other times that she
could not. Finally he declared that she could not go that day. He
produced a book in which he showed what he said was an order from the
King of Spain to seize all English vessels found on the coast. Colnett
declared that he would sail at once, with or without permission,
unless the Spaniard fired on him, in which case he would haul down
his colors and surrender. Thinking it presumption for Colnett to talk
as if he were an agent of the English King, though he was really sent
only by a commercial company, Martinez declared himself the personal
representative of the King of Spain and commander in chief of the port.
Colnett replied that he had been in His Britannic Majesty’s service for
twenty years, and that he then carried a governmental license, which
he produced. He endeavoured to show the injustice of the Spaniard’s
conduct, reminding him of his promise on his word and honor, made
the evening before. Warm words followed, and each commander seems
completely to have lost his temper. Each tells of violence, either
threatened or inflicted, by the other. At Martinez’s order Colnett was
seized and made a prisoner.

From the accounts it is impossible to decide which officer was the
more at fault in the quarrel. It was the unfortunate outcome of anger
on both sides, and doubtless was not premeditated by either. The real
explanation appears to be that given in the letter of Duffin. Eight
days after the quarrel he wrote: “I have every reason to suspect there
was a misunderstanding between the two parties, for the linguist
spoke English very imperfectly, and in all likelihood interpreted as
many words wrong as right.” It seems, then, to have been a faulty
translation that caused the quarrel which later threw two continents
into a feverish excitement in anticipation of war.

After the seizure had been made, however, a plausible excuse was not
wanting to the Spaniard. He says that he imprisoned Colnett because the
latter would likely have gone elsewhere on the coast and established a
post from which it would have been impossible to dislodge the English
without the force of arms. This is doubtless exactly what would have
happened, and in view of Martinez’s instructions and of what he knew to
be the policy of his country with regard to the coast, he was entirely
justified, from the Spanish standpoint, in preventing by force what
he could not have prevented otherwise. Indeed, had he allowed the
English expedition to depart unmolested, and had the English colony
been established elsewhere, he probably would have been seriously
taken to task for not attempting to prevent it. Martinez’s account
to the Viceroy was such as to make it seem that he at no time had
any intention whatever of allowing Colnett to leave. He says nothing
of his promise and pledge to that effect which the English commander
says that he made. But though the Spaniard concealed the fact from his
superiors, the other accounts indicate unmistakably that he really
intended, at first, to allow the _Argonaut_ to depart, and that his
promise to her commander was made in good faith. Possibly he had begun
to doubt whether the Viceroy would approve his proceedings respecting
the two vessels already seized, and did not wish to involve himself
further until he had that official’s decision. In view of this he may
have concluded to let all other vessels pass without scrutinizing them
too closely. His treatment of the _Princess Royal_ indicates such
intent, and his promise to Colnett was consistent with it. After a
day’s consideration, he may have concluded to go through the form of an
investigation, at least, that he might make a plausible report of it,
but with the deliberate intention of closing his eyes to anything that
might prove derogatory to Spain. However the fact may be accounted for,
it is clear that Martinez was wavering between two opinions and that
the quarrel forced his decision. Duffin, in his letter of July 12 [11],
which seems to be the fairest of all the accounts, speaking of events
after the seizure, says:

    The commodore’s passion now began to abate a little, and he sent
    for me from the _San Carlos_, where I was imprisoned. When I came
    to him, he seemed to profess a very great friendship for me, and
    appeared to be exceedingly sorry for what, he said, his officers
    compelled him to do. He declared to me that he had given Colnett
    permission to depart, and would have assisted him all in his power
    but that Captain Colnett insisted on erecting a fort opposite his.

A little further on, after telling of Colnett’s turning over to him all
control of affairs, the same writer continues:

    I have endeavored to convince the Spaniards, had we known this place
    had been taken possession by the King of Spain, we would not, on any
    consideration, have come near it; I have likewise wished to persuade
    him to peruse the South Sea Company’s grant and our instructions,
    which he refuses, and tells me it would avail nothing now to do it,
    as his officers insist on his going on with what he acknowledges he
    too rashly and hastily began, and without deliberating what might
    hereafter be the consequence.

That the English captain was somewhat to blame for what had occurred is
clear from his own behavior, as related in Duffin’s letter of July 14
[13]. The writer, speaking of Colnett, says:

    I have endeavored to persuade him to draw out every particular
    concerning our being captured, to send to his employers, which he
    refuses. His objection is that he has involved himself and everyone
    else in difficulties that he is not able to extricate himself from,
    and therefore declares to me that he will have no more concern with
    the charge of the vessel.

This refusal to give the particulars of his arrest occurred after his
recovery from what Duffin spoke of at the time as insanity, but what
Colnett himself refers to as delirium. Meares’s publication of Duffin’s
statement concerning the commander’s insanity caused some hard feeling
when Colnett learned of it; and the statement was publicly denied later
by Meares.[132] Whatever it may be called, the immediate cause was his
capture. The malady lasted for ten days. As a result of it, the whole
control was left in the hands of Duffin, the second in command. The
latter’s statement concerning the captain is as follows:

    Captain Colnett has been in such a state of insanity ever since the
    vessel has been captured by the Spaniards that we are obliged to
    confine him to his cabin. Yesterday morning he jumped out of the
    cabin window, and it was with great difficulty his life was saved.
    His constant cry is that he is condemned to be hanged. I sincerely
    hope for his speedy recovery, but am apprehensive he never will
    recover his former senses again. I understand from the boy, Russell,
    that it is a family disorder and that they all have symptoms of
    madness more or less.

The next day he wrote: “Captain Colnett is much better to-day, and, in
general, discourses very rationally.” It was at this time that Duffin
made his vain attempt to draw out the particulars of the capture.
Duffin seems to blame Colnett.

On the afternoon of July 3, immediately after seizing Colnett, Martinez
had taken possession of the _Argonaut_, had run up the Spanish flag,
and had imprisoned all of the officers and crew, removed them from
their own ship, and confined them on board the two Spanish vessels. Of
the events that followed during the next ten days, while preparations
were being made to send the vessel to San Blas for the Viceroy to
decide whether she was good prize, there are greatly divergent
accounts, as in the case of the other captured ships. It is significant
that the further the writing was removed from the event the blacker is
the picture drawn in the English accounts of the Spaniard’s cruelty.
Doubtless the most authentic is the one first written--the letters of
Duffin, already referred to.

After a little time Colnett and Duffin, with two other officers,
were allowed to return to their own ship. On the 11th Duffin wrote:
“I am at present in possession of my cabin, as are also the rest of
us, and the commodore behaves with great civility, by obliging us
in every liberty that can be expected as prisoners.” This is pretty
strong evidence that there was nothing very barbaric about Martinez’s
treatment, since Duffin had no motive for concealing the truth. What he
wrote had to be by stealth, he says, and was taken by Mr. Barnett, an
Englishman of the crew of the _North-West America_, who was going to
China on board the American ship. Under these circumstances he would
probably not have represented the Spaniard’s conduct more favorably
than it deserved. Many of the supplies and stores on board the English
ship were appropriated by the Spaniards; but not without arrangement
for compensation, as would be inferred from later English accounts.
Speaking of their appropriation, Duffin says:

    They have taken of our stores to themselves all our pitch, tar,
    canvas, twine, some provisions of all kinds, guns, ammunition,
    the chief of our copper, and many other articles that we were not
    acquainted with, all the officers being prisoners, some on board one
    vessel and some on board the other. We have great expectations that
    the vessel will be delivered up at San Blas. The commodore promises
    me, if she is, everything that he has taken to himself shall be
    replaced at that port; but there has been a number of things taken
    out of the vessel by theft that he knows nothing of. Nevertheless,
    if any, and the vessel is returned, they must undoubtedly make it
    good.

According to the same writer, Martinez tried to buy all of the copper
on board, offering to give bills for the same, but it was refused on
the ground that if his orders allowed him to capture the vessel they
would undoubtedly allow him to capture the cargo also. The Spaniard, he
says, wanted the copper to trade for furs, which he shipped to Macao
by Captain Kendrick [of the American ship _Columbia_], who traded for
him on shares. This is the way in which the man in command at the time
spoke of what later accounts designate as plundering by the Spaniards.

That the promise of compensation was made in good faith is proved by
the documents which Martinez submitted to the Viceroy. One is dated at
San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 5, 1789, and is a “List of the provisions
and other stores which have been taken at the expense of the royal
treasury from the captured English packet boat _Argonaut_, for my
subsistence in this port; all of which are to be restored to Capt.
James Colnett from the royal treasure of the department of San Blas,
in case the Most Excellent Señor Viceroy of New Spain releases the
vessel.” An itemized statement carefully describing each article is
given. Another document dated July 13 is a “List of the artillery,
balls, and other armament found on board the captured English ship
_Argonaut_, belonging to the free commercial company of London, which
remain in my possession at the disposal of his excellency, awaiting his
superior determination.” Inclosed with these is a “List of the names
of the captain, officers, crew, and passengers which the _Argonaut_
carried.” Among the officers there were 12 Englishmen and 1 Spaniard;
of the sailors, 4 were English, 7 Portuguese, and 3 Filipinos; the
passengers were 29 Chinese; to these were added Colnett’s servant, who
was a Sandwich Islander, and Duffin’s, who was a Bengalese. In all,
there were 58 persons. Another list includes only the 16 Englishmen,
and states that they are to be sent to San Blas on board the captured
ship _Argonaut_. Still another list includes the Portuguese, the
Filipinos, the Chinese, and the two servants, who were to be sent on
the _Aranzazu_ and the other vessels that might come from San Blas. The
one Spaniard had entered the service of Martinez.[133]

       *       *       *       *       *

On July 13, after the above documents relating to the capture of the
_Argonaut_ were sealed up and the vessel was ready to be sent as a
prize to San Bias, the _Princess Royal_, which had left ten days
before, returned and was seized by Martinez. He says that his motive
for the seizure was his wish to prevent her from carrying news of the
capture of the other vessel to the company, and thus to forestall their
taking measures against him before he could be reënforced.[134] This
seems a poor excuse since the Englishmen shipped on board the American
vessel could carry the news just as well.

Hudson’s letter to the Viceroy gives his account of the seizure. On
leaving Nootka on July 2 he had intended to sail northward, but a
storm had driven him southward and he had been unable to return for
several days. On July 13 he had succeeded in getting back opposite the
entrance to Nootka Sound, and being anxious to know whether Colnett had
arrived, and, if he had, wishing to get from him some needed supplies
and instructions for his future conduct, he determined to enter in his
launch, leaving his vessel in the open. He had no fears of maltreatment
since Martinez had dealt so liberally with him before. He was met by
a Spanish launch, was told that Colnett was there and was sick and in
trouble, was requested by Martinez to enter the port, and was invited
on board the Spanish launch. He found it completely armed. His own
pistol was taken from him and his launch was taken into possession.
When he reached the _Princesa_ Martinez informed him that he was a
prisoner, as was also Colnett, and that the fault was all the latter’s.
Hudson was urged to give orders for his ship to come in, but refused,
and the Spaniards prepared to take her by force. Seeing the futility of
resisting, he advised his lieutenant to surrender. The vessel was taken
at midnight and brought in the next morning. Captain Hudson does not
mention here his brutal treatment at the hands of the Spaniards, which
is related in other English accounts.[135] He says that he was allowed
to go on board his own ship or anywhere else in the port that he chose.

       *       *       *       *       *

The two English vessels left Nootka for San Blas, where they were to
await the disposition of the Viceroy. The _Argonaut_ sailed July 13, in
charge of Tovar as prize captain. In Colnett’s letter to the Viceroy he
tells of the hardships that he suffered on the voyage. His belongings
had been transferred to the mate’s cabin, a very small room. Each night
at 8 o’clock he was locked in this, and the door was not opened until
morning. He was not allowed to have any intercourse with his officers
except in the daytime. The commandant at Nootka had either asked or
taken all of his chickens and other fresh provisions, so that he had a
slight attack of scurvy. His mouth, he said, ulcerated, and the captain
of the prize refused to allow him to have his bread toasted for fear
of destroying his teeth! Whenever there was a storm the hatchways were
closed, and he almost smothered. The heat increased each day. One night
he asked repeatedly for a glass of water, but it was too great a favor,
and he had to wait until morning. His own condition was bad enough,
but when he got to San Blas he learned that the men of his crew had
suffered much more than he. They had been closely confined in irons for
many days, though there were only 8 of them and four times as many to
guard them.[136] Their chests had been broken into, and most of their
clothes and personal belongings had been taken. Colnett had lost many
articles that he valued very highly. After their arrival at San Blas,
August 15, they received better treatment.[137] The _Princess Royal_
arrived at San Blas on August 27, just a month after she had left
Nootka. She carried 12 English and 2 Portuguese prisoners.[138]

On August 29, Hanson, second pilot of the _Argonaut_, committed
suicide. The only known cause was melancholy, according to the
statement of the Viceroy drawn from a detailed account sent to him by
the commandant of San Blas.[139] In Colnett’s published account he
says that it was because of Hanson’s despair at the treatment which he
had received. The same writer states that several others became sick
and died.[140] Colnett may have exaggerated somewhat the hardships
of the voyage, but the letter seems to be a truthful account. Their
condition, at the best, was a bad one, and they were probably confined
more closely than was necessary and their wants not attended to as they
might have been. It is likely, however, that most of the harsh measures
taken by the prize crew were the result of excessive caution rather
than wanton cruelty.

Martinez’s operations at Nootka after sending his prizes to San
Blas are of minor interest. He carried on some explorations in the
neighborhood, studied the customs of the natives, and made, in his
diary, a full report of the country and its inhabitants. On December 6
he reached San Blas, having returned in consequence of an order from
Florez dated February 25, 1789.[141] This date shows that the events at
Nootka during the summer had nothing to do with his recall, since the
order was given shortly after the expedition had sailed.

When Martinez reached San Blas he had with him an American ship and
schooner which he had captured just as he was leaving Nootka. He had
hesitated for some time, uncertain whether he should set them free,
but had finally decided to take them to San Blas to be acted on by the
Viceroy. Revilla-Gigedo, who had succeeded Florez in the viceroyalty,
set them free, on the ground that the Americans had not molested the
Spanish settlements.[142] The names of the vessels do not appear in
this letter. They were doubtless the _Eleanora_ and the _Fair America_,
under Captain Metcalf.[143]

Martinez also brought with him the 29 Chinese that he had taken from
the _Argonaut_. To save the expense of keeping them the Viceroy said
that he had decided to have them brought to Mexico, liberated, and
given employment; or, if they preferred, they would be sent to the
colonies and mission settlements of California.[144] Meares, in his
memorial, declared that these Chinese laborers were detained at Nootka
by Martinez and put to work in the mines that had been opened on the
land belonging to Meares. Nothing appears in the Spanish documents
concerning any such mines. It has been stated elsewhere that Meares
gave 70 as the number of Chinese taken to Nootka by Colnett. This is
probably an exaggeration, since the number 29 is repeated several times
in the Spanish documents, and in two places a complete list of their
names is given.[145] From what will be stated later, it seems that
the Viceroy’s scheme for liberating them in Mexico was not carried
out.[146]




CHAPTER VI.

THE ENGLISH PRISONERS IN MEXICO.[147]


Florez, the Viceroy, who had sent the Nootka expedition, had no news
from Martinez until late in the summer. Shortly after the arrival
at San Blas of the first prize, the _Argonaut_, the commandant of
that port dispatched a special messenger to Mexico. This messenger
arrived August 26, bearing Martinez’s letters and the papers from the
captured ships. The Viceroy’s anxiety was far from being relieved
when he found himself involved, not with the Russians, but with the
English. The question now was what should be done with the prizes
sent for his adjudication. He was embarrassed by the fact that he
was to retire from the viceroyalty within a few weeks, and whatever
measures he might determine upon would have to be carried out by
his successor. He decided to take no decisive step without the new
Viceroy’s concurrence. Within a day after the messenger’s arrival the
more important documents had been copied and Florez had written his
report. They were hurried off to the Government at Madrid. In this
report he told briefly of Martinez’s voyage to Nootka, of his taking
formal possession of the port and fortifying it, of his finding the
American vessels and allowing them to continue their voyage, and of his
seizing the _Iphigenia_ and the _Argonaut_, releasing the former on
bond and sending the latter as a prize. To this account he added some
reflections concerning the importance of retaining the port of Nootka.
He would send reënforcements and supplies to Martinez at once. The
question as to whether the vessels were good prize he would leave to
his successor.[148]

Two days after sending this account to the home Government, Florez
sent orders to the commandant and commissary at San Blas for the
temporary disposition of the prize. The officers and men were to be
kindly treated and supplied with lodgings and other accommodations
according to their rank. Fresh food was to be furnished at public
expense, an account being kept of the cost. All of their clothing was
to be turned over to them, but no arms. They were to be given complete
liberty within the port, but were to be closely watched to see that no
one abused his privileges. A complete inventory should be made in the
presence and with the help of the English captain. The latter should
sign it and receive a copy for his security and protection, whatever
the fate of his vessel. The perishable part of the cargo was to be
sold and the rest deposited separately in the royal storehouses. The
ship, after being unloaded, was to be examined, cleaned, and repaired
at governmental expense, with the approval of the English commander,
who should have a copy of the account.[149] The fact is not stated in
this order, but in a letter to Madrid it appears that the ship, when
repaired, was to be used in collecting supplies and reënforcements for
Martinez at Nootka.[150] From Colnett’s published account, it seems
that the Englishmen were induced to do the work on the ship in the
false hope of an early release. He says:

    Under a promise that our detention could not be long, they persuaded
    us to heave down and repair the _Argonaut_, new copper her bottom,
    and fit new rigging. The idea of release stimulated us to work on
    the ship with great alacrity. So much so that our exertions threw
    several into fevers; and on the vessel being nearly ready, the
    Government threw off the mask, informing us she was to be employed
    for their use, and laughed again at our credulity.[151]

After receiving news of the arrival at San Blas of the second English
prize, the _Princess Royal_, Viceroy Florez wrote again to the
Madrid Government. This letter was dated September 26, and told of
the steps taken with regard to the captured ships since his account
written a month before. He had considered the matter carefully, and,
although he had decided to leave the disposition of the prizes to his
successor, yet he gave his own conclusions. He knew of no precedent
for the capture except the conduct of the Viceroy of Peru toward the
governor of Juan Fernandez, on account of the latter’s not having
detained the American ship _Columbia_ when he found she was bound
for California.[152] This, he said, was based on the royal order of
1692, a copy of which he inclosed.[153] He added that conditions had
changed in a century. However, he would not disapprove the conduct of
Martinez, since, he said: “Article 11 of my instructions, ‘to repel
force by force and to prevent hostile ships from making establishments
and trading with the Indians of our coasts,’[154] could not have been
enforced without detaining the vessels.” He concluded: “For the sake of
economizing expenses and avoiding hard feelings between our court and
that of London, it seems to me best to allow both vessels to return to
Macao, placing their commanders under bond, as Martinez did the captain
of the _Iphigenia_.” Everything taken from the vessels he would restore
or pay for, deducting the cost of keeping the men and the expense for
repairing the ship. He had not time to attend to this, but would leave
it to his successor, if that official approved.[155]

On August 27, the day that Florez had written his first hurried
account to the home Government, he had also written an account to
Revilla-Gigedo, who was soon to succeed him in the viceroyalty. The
correspondence that followed is valuable as showing the divided
opinion in official circles regarding the justice of the seizures,
and as illustrating the evolution of the new Viceroy’s final decision
regarding the prizes. In the first letter Florez explained briefly
that, as a result of the last expedition ordered by the King, he had,
without loss of time, sent Martinez to take possession of Nootka. He
then recounted the grave consequences, which made it necessary to take
most prudent measures, and added:

    For my part I have not ventured to enter upon them, in view of
    the fact that I am so soon to surrender the government to your
    excellency. I look upon this business as more important than any
    other, and if you rank it the same I hope you will hasten your
    coming.[156]

Three days later the new Viceroy, who was attending to some public
business at Veracruz, replied that he came fully instructed from the
higher authorities of all the steps taken by Florez in the Nootka
matter, of their approval by the junta of state, and the consequent
royal order. In view of the attempt to represent the English expedition
as a governmental enterprise, he especially commended Florez for
having inserted in Martinez’s instructions the order of the English
Admiralty office to Cook telling the latter not to touch at Spanish
ports except in case of necessity and then to leave as soon as
possible. He thought that that wise council would not now have sent an
expedition with such contrary instructions. He believed it had come
simply from Botany Bay or some establishment in India. He said that it
did not appear necessary for Florez to await his coming to take steps
regarding the captured ships, since Florez was so well informed. As to
the possibility of another English expedition being sent to dislodge
Martinez, he thought there was no danger. England was too remote, and
the Spanish could supply reënforcements when necessary. The English
Cabinet would not undertake anything so likely to fail. In the end the
unhappy affair would be settled between the Spanish and English Courts.
However, he would not delay his coming to Mexico a moment longer than
necessary.[157]

On September 2, the same day that Florez received the letter just
reviewed, he answered it. In his answer there is a tone of impatience
which seems to be partly because Revilla-Gigedo had not dropped
everything else to attend to the prizes, and partly because the
latter’s approval was not enthusiastic. The new Viceroy had suggested,
that since the English expedition did not appear to have been sent
by the Government it would have been better if Martinez had told the
captains to return when they chose to the parts from whence they had
come. Florez retorted: “I explained to your excellency that, according
to the documents which Martinez sent to me, these prizes have been
made with good cause, and I think your excellency will indorse my
opinion when you have given careful attention to their contents.”
He inclosed copies of them, and called attention to the positive
representations of the English captain. He continued: “Whether the
English Court had any part in the plan for occupying Nootka, or whether
it did not, we have often seen them lay claim to ports and territories
occupied by the merchants or subjects of their nation; and there is
no doubt but that they have ready naval forces incomparably greater
than those which we can send from San Blas.” He enlarged on the
insufficiency of vessels in that port for present needs, and told of
the preparations that he was making to use the captured ships to convey
reënforcements and supplies to Martinez. In closing he said: “But since
your excellency can not give it the preferential attention asked I have
suspended my orders relative to Nootka affairs until your excellency
gives me your final decision concerning the liberating or retention of
the English ships.”[158]

The loyalty with which Florez supported Martinez, and his resentment
when he found Revilla-Gigedo inclined to disavow the seizures, may have
arisen from a personal relation, since, as stated above, Colnett says
that Martinez represented himself as the nephew of Florez.[159]

After having read the copies of Martinez’s letters and documents,
which Florez had sent, Revilla-Gigedo replied, September 9, that he
was pleased to find that his opinion of the unofficial character of
the English expedition was confirmed; that Colnett had been sent,
not as a governor, but as a merchant; that he was not to establish a
fortification but a factory, which was to be located not necessarily
at Nootka, but wherever it might be with convenience, and that Fort
Pitt was simply the name to be given to the factory. Had the English
expedition taken any sort of possession of Nootka, he said that it
would doubtless have afforded some subsequent claim. But since it had
not succeeded, and since the English captain had asked permission
to sail, all such fears ought to have vanished. There was the more
reason for this, since not only had England been prevented from taking
possession, but Spain actually possessed it. Since Florez had already
referred the matter to the Spanish Court, it seemed to him that they
could take no further step until the decision of His Majesty should
arrive. He agreed that in the meantime the captured ships should be
used to convey supplies to Martinez if no others were available. He had
read with pleasure the timely and prudent orders of Florez for caring
for the captured ships and prisoners. The weakened forces at San Blas
were being strengthened and the necessary ships could be constructed.
A new commandant of that port with reënforcements had set out from
Veracruz the preceding day.[160]

In this Revilla-Gigedo maintained his former position that Martinez
had insufficient ground for making the captures. He seems not to have
considered what would have been the consequences if the English ships
had not been seized and had established a colony elsewhere on the
coast. He gave a qualified approval of the steps taken by Florez while
awaiting an answer from the home Government, but he did not definitely
commit himself on the question to which Florez had tried to elicit an
answer--that is, whether he would declare the ships good prize.

On September 16 Florez replied that he had decided to continue his
preparations for sending supplies and reënforcements to Nootka,
since Revilla-Gigedo had approved using the captured ships for that
purpose.[161]

The new Viceroy took control of the government October 18.[162] A few
days later he wrote to the home Government concerning Nootka affairs:

    When my predecessor, Don Manuel Antonio Florez, surrendered this
    government to me we had many extended conferences, but either
    because of forgetfulness or on account of preference for other
    weighty affairs, he did not mention the matter of the English ships
    captured at Nootka. He ought to have done it, since he left the
    business for me to settle. … My verdict has always been opposed to
    the seizure of the vessels, but since my predecessor has seen fit
    to refer the matter to the home Government, I have concluded that I
    ought to do nothing further until I have received the decision of
    the King. Since there were no others available at San Blas, he had
    made use of the captured ships, he said, to bring arms from Acapulco
    to that port. After their return from this trip he would send them
    in January with supplies and reënforcements for Nootka. By the time
    these operations should be completed the King’s orders for detention
    or release would have come.[163]

About the time that the new Viceroy took possession of the government,
letters arrived from the captains of the captured English vessels.
Mention has been made of the letter which Florez wrote to the
commandant and commissary at San Blas immediately after receiving news
of the arrival of the first prize. Besides this letter giving orders
for the care of the prisoners, the repairing of the vessels, and making
an inventory of the cargo, he seems to have given instructions for
obtaining a full statement of their case from the English commanders.
Their letters were addressed to Florez. These are the accounts
of Colnett and Hudson to which frequent reference has been made
above.[164] In closing, Colnett said:

    Your excellency will pardon me for venturing to write such a long
    letter, in which I have dwelt on affairs of such little importance.
    But if I have done so, it has been at the instance of the commandant
    of this port, who has told me that it was your excellency’s wish.
    As reflecting the treatment received at San Blas [he said], I beg
    permission to add that all of the bad treatment which I received
    at Nootka and the cruelty which was practiced on me in my passage
    from thence hither has been entirely wiped out by the attentions
    and humanity of the official whom I find here in the position of
    commandant, Don José Comancho.[165]

This letter bears no date, but that of Hudson which accompanied it is
dated September 18.[166] Inclosed with these letters was a copy of an
inventory giving the original cost of each article. It was signed by
Colnett and Duffin, and apparently included the cargo of the _Argonaut_
only. On October 1 Colnett wrote another letter, in concluding which he
said:

    The climate of San Blas has proved to be very bad for me and my
    officers and crew. We should consider it a great favor if you would
    permit us to make a journey on horseback some miles inland, or allow
    part of us to pass a few days at some distance from the port.[167]

It fell to the lot of Revilla-Gigedo to answer the letters. On October
21 he wrote to Colnett:

    I have read the representations which you and Captain Hudson made
    to my predecessor, the Most Excellent Señor Don Manuel Antonio
    Florez. He has turned over to me all of your complaints against the
    proceedings of the commandant of Nootka, Don Estevan José Martinez.
    My dealings shall be based on the laws of reason, equity, and
    justice. This is all that I can or should say at present. I assure
    you and Captain Hudson that yourselves and all the people of your
    vessels shall be treated with such attention as is demanded by the
    friendship and harmony existing between our Sovereigns.[168]

Having thus temporarily disposed of the question of the captured ships,
the Viceroy busied himself about carrying out a “royal order of the
14th of last April for sustaining with vigor our new establishment
at Nootka.” He wrote to his superior at Madrid how he had planned to
send, in the following January, a new expedition of three vessels
with complete equipment, supplies, and reënforcements. It was to
be commanded by a military official. He was to succeed Martinez as
commandant of Nootka, and was to receive from Martinez complete
instruction regarding the country and its inhabitants. This would
contribute the greatest possible security to the establishment in that
port. But the plan had been completely overthrown by the return of
Martinez with all of his ships to San Blas December 6.[169] At first
this had caused the Viceroy great inquietude, but soon he had modified
his plan and was again pushing it to completion. The new commandant was
to be Eliza, and Martinez should accompany him in the office of pilot.
The Spanish possession of Nootka was to be vigorously maintained if any
foreign power should attempt to dispute it. One of the three ships was
to be the captured _Princess Royal_. The _Argonaut_ had already gone
to Acapulco and returned to San Blas loaded with artillery to furnish
armament for the expedition.[170] This new enterprise may be dismissed
for the present to follow the fate of the English prisoners.

Before turning to the dealings of the Viceroy with the Englishmen it is
interesting, though not essential to the narrative, to notice the final
exit of Martinez from the stage that his rashness had brought into
prominence. In a letter of February 26, 1790, the Viceroy mentioned a
royal order of October 13, 1789, “informing me that at the instance of
Doña Gertrudis Gonzales, wife of Don Estevan José Martinez, ensign of
the navy, the King had resolved that I should arrange to transfer this
official to those dominions [Spain], or that in case his continuance at
San Blas was necessary to the service that I should withhold a third
part of his salary, to be applied to the support of his wife and of one
daughter 17 years old.”[171] Thus it appears that while Martinez was
getting himself and his Government into trouble in America his family
in Spain was in trouble because he had neglected their support. The
Viceroy gave orders at once for Martinez’s return from Nootka on the
first vessel coming to San Blas, in order that he might go to Spain and
rejoin his family. His services were no longer necessary, it was said,
there being enough officials without him. It should be noticed that
this order was given more than two months before news reached Spain of
Martinez’s operations at Nootka. So that could have had no influence on
his recall.

The request for a change of climate made by Colnett in his second
letter to the Viceroy, mentioned above, was granted. In Colnett’s
published account he says: “We were removed 60 miles up the country;
here we were allowed great liberty and better treatment,”[172] and
permitted to remain “the six latter months of our captivity.”[173] This
was at a place called Tepic. Not only was this favor granted, but the
English commanders were allowed to go in person and plead their case
before the Viceroy. Speaking of Bodega y Quadra, the new commandant of
San Blas, Colnett says:

    To this officer I am greatly indebted for his kind attention and
    obtaining permission for me to go to Mexico to claim redress for our
    past treatment.[174]

In Revilla-Gigedo’s first account of the matter to the home government
he had mentioned the English captain’s complaint of the bad faith and
worse treatment of Martinez. He said he had offered to give them a
hearing in court, but it would be impossible to do this without giving
Martinez a hearing at the same time.[175] When writing this he supposed
that Martinez was at Nootka and would remain until relieved of his
command. But although Martinez returned to Mexico shortly thereafter,
still the trial was not held, since he had to go again to Nootka as
pilot of the expedition under Eliza. The Viceroy, in his published
“Informe,” tells of the promised trial and why it was not held:

    The captain of the _Argonaut_, James Colnett, and that of the
    _Princess Royal_, Thomas Hudson, his subaltern, asked and I gave
    them permission to come to this capital. They produced their
    complaints against Martinez and I ordered the case to be drawn up.
    But it could not be continued, because the defendant and some of the
    witnesses were necessarily employed in the royal service and the
    plaintiffs wished to be set free as soon as possible.[176]

Speaking of his stay at the capital, Colnett says:

    On my arrival at Mexico and during my residence there I was treated
    by the Viceroy, Don Revilla-Gigedo, with greater politeness and
    humanity, and, indeed, by all ranks of people in that city.[174]

The time of the arrival of the English captains at Mexico seems to have
been about the first of the year. They received no definite answer
to the question whether their ships should be condemned or released
until late in April. The Viceroy was waiting for an answer from the
home Government to the first account of the seizures which Florez
had written the previous August. This account had not reached the
Government until December 30.[177] Florez’s second account was received
three days later.[178] Thus by the second day of the new year the
Government had a full account of the seizures and copies of all of the
documents. No reply was made until January 26. When this reply reached
the Viceroy, greatly to his surprise and disappointment, it gave him
no advice, but instead it asked for his determinations concerning the
question whether the ships were good prize.

Revilla-Gigedo resolved to wait no longer for advice, and so took the
responsibility upon himself. In answer to the request from Madrid, he
wrote, on May 1, 1790, his conclusions, as follows:

    They have been to liberate the English prisoners on the conditions
    shown by inclosed letters. Colnett, who came to Mexico with my
    consent to present his complaints, will now return to San Blas,
    where he will receive his ship, the _Argonaut_. Embarking there
    with all of the English and Chinese,[179] he will return to
    Macao or wherever he wishes. At Nootka he will receive from the
    commandant, Don Francisco Eliza, the sloop _Princess Royal_, which
    will be turned over to her master, Thomas Hudson. These foreigners
    are warned not to delay, trade, nor establish themselves on our
    Spanish coasts under threat of punishment for violation. I have
    felt compelled to release them, considering that I ought not to
    hold as good prize a few little vessels found on a distant and
    deserted coast of our colonies of California; and considering the
    uselessness of burdening the royal treasury with some 60 men, whose
    scanty sustenance has to be provided for in the feeble and expensive
    establishment of San Blas in order that the just sentiments of
    humanity might not be violated, and that the plans of my predecessor
    might be carried out.[180]

This action of Revilla-Gigedo and the grounds here given for the
release of the English ships are consistent with the position taken
by him as soon as he heard of the affair, namely, that the vessels
ought never to have been seized. It will be interesting to notice the
subsequent change in his position.

Colnett had been informed of the decision of the Viceroy on April
27.[181] On the same day orders were sent to San Blas for carrying it
out. The commandant, Bodega y Quadra, was to surrender the _Argonaut_
to Colnett in good condition, and was to give orders to Eliza at Nootka
to surrender the _Princess Royal_ to Hudson in the same condition.
The small schooner, since it could not be taken apart to be put on the
larger vessel, was to be paid for. All belongings were to be returned
to the prisoners. The supplies deposited in the royal storehouses were
to be given back, an equivalent was to be given for everything applied
to the royal service, and whatever had been lost was to be paid for.
All this was to be done in such a manner as to avoid complaint.[182]
Besides having all of their belongings restored, the commissary was to
pay wages to all, extending from the day of their capture until they
were released. Colnett was to be paid as a lieutenant of the navy, and
all others according to their rank as regulated by the scale of wages
for the South Sea. A general account was to be made of all expenses
occasioned by the captured ships.[183] The Viceroy argued, in a letter
to the home Government, that the English South Sea Company, under whose
license Colnett was navigating, should repay to the royal treasury of
Spain all expenses occasioned by the captured ships. His reason was
that their agents made the seizure necessary by coming to the coast of
California, where they could neither establish themselves nor enjoy
commercial advantages by right.[184]

In the packet which Revilla-Gigedo sent on May 1 he inclosed a letter
from Colnett to the British ambassador at Madrid, presenting his
complaints against Martinez.[185] The Viceroy added that he hoped these
would be considered when Martinez reached Spain.

The Viceroy considered that he was treating Colnett very liberally,
and it does seem that he had allowed about all that could be expected
if his orders should be faithfully carried out. Colnett, however, was
not fully satisfied and presented a number of formal requests. He
enumerated a list of things which he requested should be sent from
Mexico to fit out his ships. These were granted. He asked that all of
the wages of both crews be paid to him as commander, which was granted
also. He demanded payment for himself as commandant of an expedition,
but he was allowed pay only for a lieutenant, which was less than half
as much. He demanded the return of the schooner which he had brought in
the _Argonaut_, but which Martinez had taken. He was to have pay for
it. He wished the _Princess Royal_ to return to San Blas for her crew,
but he was compelled to wait until he should get to Nootka for her. He
demanded a money payment of not more than £3,000 to reimburse himself
for personal valuables and nautical instruments lost. The Viceroy
refused this, since he had ordered that all of these should be returned
or paid for at San Blas. He asked for a special interpreter to be
appointed for him, but this was refused as unnecessary. His request for
the return of his servant, a Sandwich Islander, was at first refused,
but later granted. The Viceroy was attempting to keep this man, who was
said to be chief of one of the islands, ostensibly that he might be
converted to the Catholic religion; but probably the real reason was to
use him in getting an opening for a Spanish settlement on the Sandwich
Islands. He had flattered the vanity of the savage by promising to send
him to see the King of Spain. Colnett’s persuasion prevailed. The most
important request was that for a passport which should allow greater
privileges than the Viceroy’s order for his release had granted.[186]

The Viceroy had forbidden the Englishmen to make any establishment,
to trade, or even to tarry on the coast; and in his first reply to
Colnett’s demands he repeated the prohibition. Three days later
Colnett wrote again, using very plain language. He called attention
to the instructions under which he had sailed with a license from the
British Government. Those instructions required him to trade with the
Indians and to form an establishment for that purpose. The Viceroy’s
instructions had ordered him to sail directly to Macao, without
stopping on the coast. He pointed out the inconsistent position in
which he was placed. The right of Spain to the coast was a point to be
settled--he hoped, in a friendly manner[187]--between the Cabinets of
Madrid and St. James. It was clear that the right was not recognized
by the English, as was shown by the patent and instructions which he
bore. That same year the privilege granted to his company would expire.
Let Spain see, in a friendly manner, that it should not be renewed, but
the Viceroy should not oppose the pacific execution of a commercial
undertaking attempted in good faith and at so great an expense. He
demanded a passport with only one prohibition, namely, to trade with
Spanish ports.[188]

Colnett’s arguments had the desired effect. On May 11 the Viceroy sent
him a passport with only the one prohibition and expressly stating that
he might carry on his operations in places not actually under Spanish
dominion.[189] In the letter inclosing the passport he trusts that they
will not think of making an establishment on the coast or of trading to
the prejudice of the Spanish nation.[190]

It is noteworthy that in this passport the Viceroy reversed his
decision of ten days before and declared that Martinez’s seizure of
the vessels was well founded. He cited laws and royal orders which he
said not only absolutely forbade the navigation, establishment, and
trade of foreign nations on the American coasts of the South Sea, but
ordered them to be looked upon and treated as enemies. His reason for
freeing the English ships, he now said, was to preserve harmony and a
good understanding between the subjects of His Catholic Majesty and the
King of Great Britain. The change in his mental attitude seems to have
been brought about by the stubborn persistence with which Colnett urged
his demands in the meantime. By the latter part of May, when he wrote
again to the home Government, the Viceroy had formulated his decision.
He declared:

    The coasts north of California are truly and justly the dominions of
    our Sovereign. According to the royal order of November 25, 1692,
    of which my predecessor sent a copy, and according to the treaty,
    to which it refers, of 1670, ratified and confirmed by article 2 of
    that of 1783, all of the vessels which Don Estevan José Martinez,
    ensign of the royal navy, found in Nootka were legitimate prizes.
    The release of the packet boat _Argonaut_ and the sloop _Princess
    Royal_ has been the result of pure generosity.[191]

This is a complete reversal of his decision quoted above from his
letter of twenty-six days earlier. In his “Informe” of three years
later the Viceroy cited in addition as grounds for his decision an
article of the orders of the royal navy, and also a royal order of
October 18, 1776, “to detain, seize, and prosecute any foreign ship
which arrives in our ports of the South Sea.”[192]

A royal order had been finally given, March 23, definitely instructing
the Viceroy to liberate the captured ships. In a letter of June
26 Revilla-Gigedo said that the royal order of March 23 had been
completely satisfied by his accounts of May 1 and 27. He was pleased
that he had conformed so happily to the decisions of the King.[193]

According to Colnett’s published account, he found on his return to
San Blas that the _Argonaut_ was in a bad condition on account of the
treatment she had received. He says that the Viceroy’s liberality in
allowing wages was counterbalanced by the charges for maintenance,
traveling expenses, medical assistance, and an allowance of eight
months’ provisions. He says also that before he was allowed to sail he
was compelled to sign a paper expressing his complete satisfaction with
their usage.[194] That paper was signed July 8, 1790, and is as follows:

    I have the honor of informing your excellency that to-day I have
    been dispatched from San Blas; and I also have the satisfaction of
    adding that I have reason to be content with the treatment of the
    commandant and commissary of this department.

    With all proper submission, I ask permission of your excellency to
    add that the money which I have received here is little more than
    the amount of my individual loss, and is not the fifth part of the
    damages by the most moderate calculation. Since I shall have to
    turn matters over to the company which employs me, I hope that
    your excellency will have consideration in keeping with your known
    generosity, and will not allow them to suffer such losses.[195]

This, if true, indicates that Colnett’s apprehensions of illiberal
treatment at San Blas were well founded. On his arrival at Nootka
the _Princess Royal_ was not there. June 11 of the next year she was
dispatched from San Blas to be surrendered to Colnett or some other
representative of the company in China.[196] Colnett fell in with her
and she was handed over at the Sandwich Islands.[197]

This closes the Nootka affair as far as events on the American
continent are concerned. Before the Viceroy had finally decided to
liberate the prisoners, the matter had been taken up by the home
Governments, and all Europe was ablaze with excitement over an expected
war. The center of interest now shifts to the diplomatic controversy,
which is the most important phase of the Nootka incident.[198]

What has been discussed so far might be briefly summarized as follows:
As far as discoveries and explorations, which could give definite
claims, are concerned, the Spanish were the earlier; but the English
were made in ignorance of the Spanish, and the results of the English
were published first. Spain could claim a prescriptive title from the
fact that she had maintained for so long an undisputed claim, and from
the additional fact that the land was contiguous to her settled Mexican
dominions; but the English were the first to attempt to develop the
country by exploiting the fur trade. The first actual establishment
was made by the English, and, although it was temporarily abandoned in
the autumn, it was with the evident intention of renewing, enlarging,
and making it permanent in the spring; but unfortunately for what
was, in the autumn of 1789, an unquestionably superior claim, it was
counterbalanced by the arrival of a Spanish expedition in the spring
of 1790, a few days before the English returned to resume their
occupation, and when there were no signs of previous or intended
occupation. The fact that the Spanish expedition was public while the
English was private, favored the former. From these recapitulations it
is plain that there was abundant ground for disputing the respective
rights.

As to the justice or injustice of the seizures at Nootka, there is also
room for dispute. The _Iphigenia_, by pretending to be a Portuguese
when she was really an English ship, aroused a just suspicion, and what
was probably a harmless trick, meant solely to deceive the Celestials,
assumed a grave appearance when the added suspicion of piracy was
aroused. But this suspicion of piracy was based on a mistake made by
the Spaniard in translating the ship’s instructions. Having seized her
on the ground of this double suspicion, for the sake of consistency
and to hide his blunder, Martinez justified his rash act on a totally
different ground, but one which was plausible from the Spanish view.
When the _Argonaut_ arrived her captain made the mistake of rashly
declaring his purpose before he knew his opponent’s strength, and
of manifesting too much impatience to get out of the power of a man
who would probably have allowed him to depart in peace had he been
patient. Then a quarrel, caused largely by the mistakes of a blundering
interpreter, ended in the Spaniard’s making another rash seizure, this
one without so much as having had the Englishman’s papers translated.

When the matter was transferred to the officials in Mexico, the
outgoing Viceroy, instead of shouldering the responsibility and acting
at once, attempted to shift it to his successor. The failure of the
two to agree led to an awkward delay of several months. Then after the
new Viceroy finally declared that the vessels were not good prize, a
quarrel with the liberated Englishman led him to reverse his decision,
so far as the principle was concerned, though his change did not affect
the fact of the Englishman’s freedom.

The whole episode to this point seems to have been a series of
blunders, and would not merit careful consideration had not the
consequences been so serious for the home Governments.




CHAPTER VII.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACEABLE SETTLEMENT.


The Spanish name of greatest importance in the diplomatic contest
with England in 1790 is that of Count Floridablanca. He was of humble
origin. His ability as a diplomatist was established while ambassador
to the Papal Court, especially in the suppression of the Jesuit order.
“This result [says Tratchevsky] was due in great measure to the skill
and energy of the Spanish ambassador at Rome, Don José Moñino. As a
recompense, Charles III conferred on him the title Count Floridablanca,
and soon made him prime minister (1777).”[199] He retained this
position fifteen years. “His integrity and love of labor won for him
the entire confidence of Charles III, who found in him the industrious
and respectful servant whom he sought.[200] He was a great worker,
of clean morals, beneficent, but very proud.”[201] He was a devoted
servant of monarchy and an enthusiastic adherent to the principle of
aristocracy. But on account of his recent elevation to the rank of a
noble he did not enjoy the favor of the upper classes. Zinovief, the
Russian ambassador, wrote: “The nobles and the soldiery despise him,
and he, in turn, takes no pains to hide his aversion to them. No one
of the great nobles enjoys any considerable importance at Court or in
the confidence of the King. Floridablanca seems intentionally to push
everyone else aside that he alone may enjoy the Sovereign’s favor. Even
the King’s confessor, who, it seems, should have nothing to fear, has
to yield to him. … Everybody trembles before him.”[202]

This enviable position was enjoyed by the great minister until the
death of Charles III (1788). He was retained by Charles IV, but it was
not long before his position began to be undermined by court intrigues.
Baumgarten says:

    The Queen sought occasions to cast reproaches upon him over a
    multitude of trifles, and, according to the testimony of Sandoz,
    this mighty man was more busily engaged in these bagatelles than
    in the weighty affairs of state.[203] … The Queen found willing
    accomplices among the Count’s associates in the cabinet. By 1790 his
    power was greatly diminished, so that he entered the contest with
    England considerably handicapped.[204]

The controversy between England and Spain did not seem so one-sided at
that time as it does when viewed in the light of the subsequent history
of the two countries. The thirty years’ reign of Charles III, which had
just closed, is the most glorious period of Spanish history, with the
single exception of her period of preeminence in the sixteenth century.
Desdevises du Dezert says: “In Charles III Spain had a real King, the
only one she had had since Philip II.”[205] Speaking of his position in
Europe, the same author says:

    His foreign policy was wise. He rightly considered England as the
    true enemy of Spain. He feared for the Indies; he beheld them
    invaded by English merchants and adventurers, by English merchandise
    and ideas. To protect the colonies he hurled upon them a new current
    of Spanish emigration, and decreed liberty of commerce between the
    Peninsula and America. He allied himself with France in order to
    combat England; and, notwithstanding some reverses, the war was
    closed to the advantage of Spain, which country in 1783 again took
    her place as a great European power.[206]

When the conflict came, in 1790, although nearly two years of the reign
of Charles IV had passed, little was known of the weakness of the
King, the corrupting influence of the Queen, and the intrigues in the
ministry. Europe of the time saw in Spain a country rapidly forging
to the front, with a rejuvenated kingship, and a minister second
only to Pitt.[207] Led by this minister, Spain had less than a decade
before been largely instrumental in humiliating England; and since
then she had persistently refused to make any commercial concessions
to her vanquished antagonist. The same minister now dared to intervene
between the Czar and the Porte. He was also negotiating for an alliance
between Spain, France, Austria, and Russia.[208] If this quadruple
alliance should prove successful the outlook for England would be dark,
notwithstanding her triple alliance with Prussia and Holland.

Such, briefly, was the political condition of Spain, internally and
externally, when news arrived of the occurrences at Nootka Sound which
have been discussed in the foregoing chapters.

As stated above, it was at the very beginning of the year that the
intelligence was received which was soon to throw all Europe into a war
fever. On January 2, 1790, Valdez[209] sent to Floridablanca the second
installment of letters and documents concerning the occurrences at
Nootka. Three days earlier he had sent the first bundle.[210] These two
packages contained a complete account of the affair, with copies of all
the documents. Valdez asked for His Majesty’s pleasure concerning the
matter.

On January 4, Anthony Merry, the English chargé d’affaires at Madrid
wrote to the Duke of Leeds, British secretary for foreign affairs,
giving a very confused account based on rumors. Word had just arrived
from Mexico, he said, that a small Spanish ship of war had captured an
English vessel in the port of Nootka. There were conflicting accounts
of the event. Some said “that the Viceroy of Mexico, having had notice
that the English were forming an establishment at the above-mentioned
place, ordered a ship there to take possession of it.” Others said that
the Spanish ship was there simply to reconnoiter the coast. There were
also conflicting accounts of what was done with Russian, Portuguese,
and American ships found in the same port, some stating that all were
allowed to go free except the English; others, that all were seized and
only the American released, Merry had not yet been able to learn the
name of the English vessel or her master. All accounts agreed that she
had come for the purpose of forming a settlement, that other vessels
were to follow, and that the captured ship had been manned with Spanish
seamen and sent to Mexico.[211]

This was the first account to reach London.[212] It is not strange that
mistaken notions were formed. Fired by hatred for the Spaniards, it was
natural that the English should consider the act much more atrocious
than it was. The indefiniteness and inconsistency of the accounts gave
room for full play of the imagination. The Spanish Court, which had
complete accounts, either did not study them carefully enough to get
at the whole truth, or intentionally kept the British Court in the
dark. No English account arrived for nearly four months. Such a period
of uncertainty and suspense prepared a fertile field in which the
exaggerated accounts then arriving produced a fruitful crop of error.

Three days after sending the above confused account Merry inclosed an
extract from a letter written in Mexico, which he had seen. This letter
seems to have been unofficial. Respecting the genesis and purpose of
the Spanish expedition it is true to the facts. It tells briefly of
the expedition of 1788 to investigate the Russian settlements, of the
discovery that the Russians intended to occupy Nootka, and of the
Viceroy’s prompt action to anticipate them. But respecting the events
at Nootka little is told except the seizure of an English vessel and
its arrival in Mexico as a prize.[213] On January 15 the British
chargé wrote of a conference with Floridablanca on the subject. “The
Count avoided explaining to him the particulars of the transaction,
or avowing clearly the seizure of the vessels; neither did he enter
upon the question of our right to trade or to form an establishment in
that part of the continent of America.” He said that he would direct
the Marquis del Campo, the Spanish ambassador at London, to impart the
circumstances to the Duke of Leeds.[214]

In virtue of this promise Floridablanca instructed Campo, January
20, regarding the communication which he was to make to Leeds. This
communication will be studied presently.[215] A week after sending
his harsh instructions the Count attempted to smooth matters over in
another conference with Merry. He wished to see the present harmony
between the two courts preserved and improved, and “hoped that no
event might happen which might cause Great Britain to deviate from her
present pacific system.”[216]

The first three letters from Merry had reached London before February
2. On that day the Duke of Leeds wrote cautioning him to be extremely
guarded in what he should say, until definite instructions could
be sent after Campo’s communication should have been received. He
declared that England undoubtedly had a complete “right to visit for
the purposes of trade, or to make a settlement in, the district in
question.”[217] When this positive declaration by the British Cabinet
at the very first is compared with the demand of the Spanish Court,
received a few days later, it is seen that a conflict was inevitable
unless one side should yield.

The expected communication from Campo was received by Leeds February
11. Since it was this note that started the diplomatic controversy, and
since it has not before been made public, it is worth while to quote it
in full. It is dated “Manchester Square, February 10, 1790,” and is as
follows:

    MY LORD: Continuing the frequent expeditions which the King, my
    master, has ordered to be made to the northern coasts of California,
    the Viceroy of Mexico sent two ships, under the orders of Don
    Estevan José Martinez, ensign of the navy, to make a permanent
    settlement in the port of San Lorenzo, situated about the fiftieth
    degree of latitude, and named by foreigners “Nootka,” or “Nioka,” of
    which possession had formerly been taken. He arrived there the 24th
    of last June. In giving his account to the Viceroy, M. Martinez said
    that he found there an American frigate and sloop, which had sailed
    from Boston to make a tour of the world. He also found a packet
    boat and another vessel belonging to a Portuguese established at
    Macao, whence they had sailed with a passport from the governor of
    that port. He announced also that on the 2d of July there arrived
    another packet boat from Macao. This was English, and came to take
    possession of Nootka in the name of the British King. She carried a
    sloop in pieces on board.

    This simple recital will have convinced your excellency of the
    necessity in which the Court of Madrid finds itself of asking
    His Britannic Majesty to punish such undertakings in a manner to
    restrain his subjects from continuing them on these lands which
    have been occupied and frequented by the Spaniards for so many
    years. I say this to your excellency as an established fact, and
    as a further argument against those who attribute to Captain Cook
    the discovery of the said port of San Lorenzo, I add that the same
    Martinez in charge of the last expedition was there under commission
    in August of 1774. This was almost four years before the appearance
    of Cook. This same Martinez left in the hands of the Indians two
    silver spoons, some shells, and some other articles which Cook
    found. The Indians still keep them, and these facts, with the
    testimony of the Indians, served M. Martinez to convince the English
    captain.

    The English prisoners have been liberated through the consideration
    which the King has for His Britannic Majesty, and which he has
    carefully enjoined upon his viceroys to govern their actions in
    unforeseen events. His Majesty flatters himself that the Court of
    St. James will certainly not fail to give the strictest orders to
    prevent such attempts in the future, and, in general, everything
    that could trouble the good harmony happily existing between the two
    Crowns. Spain on her side engages to do the same with respect to her
    subjects.

                     I have the honor to be, etc.,

                                                 THE MARQUIS DEL CAMPO.

    His Excellency M. the DUKE OF LEEDS.[218]

One who has read the foregoing chapters will recognize many misleading
statements in this letter. The first sentence falsely gives the
impression, though it does not make the positive statement, that the
King of Spain had ordered the occupation of Nootka. Hence there was
some ground for suspecting that the Spanish Government had ordered
Martinez’s violent proceedings. Martinez arrived at Nootka almost two
months earlier than the date given in the note. June 21 was the date
of the formal act of possession. This error seems to have been due
to carelessness, since no motive is apparent, and the correct date
is given in the documents which Floridablanca had at hand. The note
does not mention the fact, clearly stated in the same documents, that
the first packet boat and the other vessel accompanying it from Macao
were really English, though nominally Portuguese; and the impression
is given that they were allowed to go absolutely free as were the
American vessels. No mention whatever is made of the _Princess Royal_
which was also sent as a prize to Mexico, though this is plainly
stated in the documents. Instead of telling that four English ships
were captured, the impression is given that there was only one. The
gravest misstatement is that the English prisoners had been liberated.
As pointed out above, this was probably inferred from the statement
in the second letter of Florez that he thought that they ought to be
liberated, but would leave his successor to do it--a very insufficient
ground for such a positive assertion. As a matter of fact, they were
not liberated for more than three months after Floridablanca wrote the
instructions which this note embodied.[219]

But the gravity of the note did not lie in its errors or
prevarications. The serious part of it was the demand that the English
King should punish his subjects for doing what Leeds had declared to
Merry only a few days before they had a perfect right to do, namely, to
trade and make settlements on the Northwest Coast. The further request
that the English Government should give strict orders to prevent such
enterprises in the future was virtually demanding that England should
forever refrain from exercising this right. Such demands could only be
acquiesced in when made upon a weak government by a strong one. English
pride could not brook them.

The narrative which was prepared in the foreign office and published by
the Government[220] says:

    His Majesty’s ministers conceiving the circumstance of seizing a
    British ship in time of peace to be an offense against the law of
    nations and an insult to His Majesty, lost no time in taking the
    only step in their powers.[221]

A fortnight after receiving the Spanish note Leeds replied in a tone
equally imperious. After reviewing the facts as given by Campo and
referring to the demands of the Spanish Court, he said:

    As yet no precise information has been received relative to the
    events mentioned in your excellency’s letter, but while awaiting
    such I have His Majesty’s orders to inform your excellency that the
    act of violence spoken of in your letter as having been committed
    by M. Martinez, in seizing a British vessel under the circumstances
    reported, makes it necessary henceforth to suspend all discussion of
    the pretensions set forth in that letter until a just and adequate
    satisfaction shall have been made for a proceeding so injurious to
    Great Britain.

    In the first place it is indispensable that the vessel in question
    shall be restored. To determine the details of the ultimate
    satisfaction which may be found necessary more ample information
    must be awaited concerning all the circumstances of the affair.[222]

This haughty tone surprised the Spanish ambassador. In his note to
Floridablanca inclosing Leeds’s answer, he said:

    The reply which this ministry has finally given to my letter will
    surprise your excellency as it has surprised me. I refrain from
    comments on it. At first I thought of going to the Duke of Leeds to
    express my astonishment, but after considering the matter carefully
    I have concluded that I ought to refrain, fearing lest in the heat
    of conversation something might be said which might exasperate.
    Since it is a formal reply and in writing I could not have obtained
    its withdrawal. Besides, anything which I may say in reply will be
    better if it comes from there (Madrid), which is the source.[223]

This quotation is a postscript to a letter which had been written
after delivering the Spanish note to Leeds, but evidently before
receiving the answer. In the letter he had said that Leeds listened to
him calmly, but avoided any discussion of the matter. He had tarried
a little time and then withdrawn to write his account and urge anew
that orders be sent disavowing the seizure. He was not convinced that,
as might be suspected, the English expedition had been ordered by
the Court. He believed it to have been an enterprise of some remote
officials.[224]

It should be noticed in connection with this reply to the Spanish Court
that Pitt was at this very time listening to the schemes of Colonel
Miranda, the famous South American agitator. It is quite possible that
this had much to do with the imperious tone assumed by the British
Cabinet. As previously stated, the Spanish note was received February
11. On February 14 Miranda met Pitt, on the latter’s invitation. He
had previously proposed his “grand plan” for the advantage of England
in connection with South America, and that plan was considered at
this meeting. Miranda explained the new form of government to be
introduced and discussed the existing situation. The plan was admitted
to be beneficial, but was to be put into execution only in case of a
war with Spain. Pitt asked him to write down the substance of what he
had said, adding a statement of all the products of South America, the
exports and imports, and the population, and the military and naval
forces of both South America and Spain. Miranda did so with as much
accuracy and detail as possible, and submitted his statement to Pitt on
March 5.[225] In the meantime, on February 25, Leeds’s reply had been
delivered to Campo. It will be interesting to watch the progress of
these conferences between Pitt and Miranda and note the coincidence of
some of them with the critical periods of the Spanish negotiation.

       *       *       *       *       *

While awaiting the reply from London, nothing out of the ordinary seems
to have occurred at the Spanish capital. When Leeds cautioned Merry to
be guarded in what he might say, he also asked the chargé for all the
information he could obtain concerning recent Spanish naval movements.
Merry’s replies indicated a pacific attitude, externally at least, on
the part of the Spanish Court. March 1 he wrote:

    Count Floridablanca gave me no hint of his having any intention of
    arming; and, notwithstanding the reports which have continued to
    prevail here with regard to the naval preparations in the Spanish
    ports, I can not, on the most diligent inquiry, find that any are
    yet commenced, except for the equipping of 3 ships of the line, 6
    frigates, and 3 sloops of war for the purpose of forming a fleet of
    exercise. [On March 15 he wrote:] The King of Spain has given orders
    to grant free license to Prince Edward to pass and repass from
    Gibraltar to Spain, and to pay him the same honors as to an Infante
    de Castilla.[226]

After the English reply reached Madrid, Merry’s reports were very
different. March 22 he wrote that Floridablanca was much dissatisfied
with the English reply, but still seemed anxious that peace should
be preserved. Merry thought that the Count’s ill humor was caused by
the fear lest Great Britain should use the matter as a ground for a
quarrel.[227]

On the same day that Merry wrote the last-mentioned letter an important
session of the supreme junta of state was being held. The question
considered was as to the reply that should be made to England. The
matter had been discussed in the preceding junta. At this meeting of
March 22 Valdez, the minister for marine, presented in writing his
version of the proper reply. Though it is not given, its import may
be divined from the report which accompanied it. He told of abundant
military preparations at the principal places in the Indies, of what
was needed to complete their equipment, and the orders that could be
given to insure their security. He also reported on the state of the
Spanish navy, telling of the ships at the three naval stations Cadiz,
Ferrol, and Carthagena. There were 45 ships of the line and 32 frigates
ready to be armed at once; and in addition 24 of the former and 7 of
the latter could be prepared in a short time. The chief of the council
for the Indies, Porlier, also presented his opinion in writing. Others
gave oral advice, and it was left to Floridablanca to formulate the
reply to the English Court. Valdez received royal orders to collect a
squadron at Cadiz to be ready for emergencies, and to take the steps
necessary to put Honduras, Trinidad, and Porto Rico in a state of
defense.[228]

On March 24 an order was sent to the Viceroy of New Spain to liberate
the English ship in case this had not already been done.[229] As stated
in the preceding chapter, the vessels had not been released at this
time, but were liberated before this order reached the Viceroy.

Merry had another conference with Floridablanca on March 27. He
reported to his Government that the Count had concluded from Leeds’s
reply that the British Court intended to use the matter as a ground
for quarreling. The Spanish minister lamented the fact and hoped that
the necessity for Spain’s coming to an understanding with other courts
might be avoided. He said that he would endeavor to soften his reply to
the British Court. Merry thought that in view of the condition of Spain
Floridablanca would not suffer the matter to come to extremities.[230]

At the next junta, which was March 29, the minister for marine
presented another report. This was dated March 28 and was embodied in
the minutes of the session of the following day. In it Valdez says
that in consequence of the reply which the junta of one week before
had agreed should be sent to the Court of London by Floridablanca, and
in compliance with the precautionary measures which the department of
marine was ordered to take in the Indies and in Spain, he had proceeded
promptly, with His Majesty’s approval, to execute the orders which
follow in the report. Vessels were to be armed at once in Ferrol,
Carthagena, and Cadiz, and, the real purpose being kept as secret as
possible, a sufficient number were to be collected at the last-named
port to form a respectable squadron for use in case later occurrences
should make it necessary. The vessels that needed it were to be
cleaned and repaired as rapidly as possible. Those out of port were to
be detained under arms at Cadiz when they returned. Provisions were
being collected. The officials of Havana, Santo Domingo, Porto Rico,
and Trinidad were ordered to strengthen their positions. At the same
session Floridablanca read the reply which Campo, the ambassador at
London, was to present to the English Ministry.[231] The contents of
this reply will be examined presently.

This glimpse into the inner workings of the Spanish Cabinet reveals
a warlike activity. But externally every possible effort was made to
maintain a peaceable demeanor. Floridablanca made especial efforts
to keep the British chargé in the dark and quiet any alarm which
the warlike rumors might arouse. According to the dispatches of the
Prussian ambassador, Sandoz, to his Government at Berlin, the Count--

    confided to Merry in the greatest secrecy the intelligence that
    French emissaries had scattered seditious pamphlets in Mexico and
    Havana, and thereby had stirred up the greatest possible ferment,
    which threatened an outbreak every moment. The King had concluded
    that the most efficacious measures must be taken with the greatest
    haste in order that these first dangerous agitations might be nipped
    in the bud, and consequently he had decided to employ his whole
    force against it if necessary. To make this seem more probable, he
    indulged in a tirade against the French Revolution.[232]

In dispatches of April 5 and 6 Merry told of the alarm in Spain and
of the naval activity, but he still thought Floridablanca desirous of
avoiding war if possible. The fleet of exercise which he had mentioned
before was assembling at Carthagena.[233] April 12 he reported that
the fleet of exercise had been ordered to Cadiz. Other ships were
being armed in that port and the other two naval stations.[234] Three
days later he reported as being fitted for immediate service at Cadiz
14 ships of the line, 10 frigates, and 2 sloops. He told of three
treasure ships that had recently arrived from Spanish America with some
5,000,000 Spanish dollars on board.[235] On April 22 he wrote of still
larger armaments. Twenty ships of the line were reported ready for
service.[236]

Such was the tenor of the dispatches from Madrid arriving at London
when, on April 20, Campo presented the second formal note from the
Spanish Court on the Nootka Sound controversy. This embodied the reply
agreed upon in the sessions of the Spanish junta of March 22 and 29. It
is as follows:[237]

    MY LORD: Having given an account to my Court of the reply which
    your excellency was pleased to make on the 26th of last February
    to my memoir on the detention in the port of Nootka of an English
    packet boat named the _Prince of Wales_,[238] in consequence I have
    received an order to inform the Ministry of His Britannic Majesty as
    follows: In spite of the incontestable rights of Spain to exclusive
    sovereignty, navigation, and commerce, founded on the most solemn
    treaties, on the discovery of the Indies and the islands and the
    continent of the South Sea, on ancient laws, and on immemorial
    possession, which rights this Crown has continually exercised over
    the territories, coasts, and seas above mentioned, including the
    right always exercised of capturing transgressors--[in spite of all
    this] the Viceroy of Mexico, as appears from the latest information,
    has already liberated the above-mentioned English vessel and crew.
    He did this because he was convinced that nothing but ignorance
    of the rights of Spain could have encouraged the individuals of
    any nation to resort to those places with the idea of establishing
    themselves or of carrying on commerce there. The Viceroy also had at
    hand positive orders which had been given to him instructing him to
    have all possible regard for the British nation and to avoid even
    the least act that could disturb the good harmony and friendship
    which happily subsists between the two Courts. For these reasons,
    and in order to give a further proof of the King’s desire to
    preserve and strengthen this friendship, His Majesty understands and
    considers this affair as closed, without entering into disputes or
    discussions over the indubitable rights of his Crown. His Catholic
    Majesty flatters himself that the British King will order all of
    his subjects to respect these rights, as I had the honor of setting
    forth and recommending to your excellency formerly.

    It is with the most respectful sentiments and the most constant
    attachments that I have the honor, etc.,

                                                 THE MARQUIS DEL CAMPO.

    His Excellency M. the DUKE OF LEEDS.[239]

The tone of this letter explains the feverish preparations for war
which the Spanish Court began as soon as the reply was decided upon.
It ignored the demand for satisfaction, the granting of which the
English reply of February 26 had made the indispensable condition
of further negotiation. It assumed that Spain was right and England
wrong. It distinctly avowed the seizure and made the release an act
of pure generosity. As justification, it asserted the most extensive
claims to exclusive dominion. It renewed the former demand that England
prevent her subjects from infringing upon that dominion. To support the
positive position taken, Spain was making extensive preparations for
war. If granting the first Spanish demand would have been incompatible
with British pride, yielding to the second would have been inconsistent
with British honor. Only one answer could have been expected from the
British Court.

Shortly after the presentation of the above Spanish memorial an event
occurred which greatly influenced the British Cabinet and made them
urge their demands more vigorously. This was the arrival of Meares.
He came just at the opportune moment. The blood of the English
ministers was already up. In the absence of any authentic account to
the contrary, they accepted the exaggerated statements of Meares. The
foreign office “Narrative” says:

    From him a more full and probably a more authentic account of this
    transaction was obtained than had already been in possession of
    Government.[240]

    His Majesty’s ministers, who till now had proceeded with that
    caution which the uncertain nature of the intelligence they had
    received rendered essentially necessary, no longer having room to
    doubt of the insult offered to the British flag, and the injury
    sustained by British subjects from the unwarrantable and unprovoked
    hostility of the Spanish commander, lost no time in taking those
    measures which were best calculated to vindicate the honor of His
    Majesty and the British nation.[241]

This event with the arrival of the reports from Merry, mentioned above,
caused the British Government to turn its most serious attention to the
Nootka business.

At a cabinet meeting held in the night of April 30 the following
recommendations to the King were agreed upon, and submitted by
Grenville to George III the next day:

    Upon consideration of the information which has been received from
    Mr. Meares of the detention and capture of several British vessels
    at Nootka Sound, on the coast of America, and of the circumstances
    of that transaction, as also of the papers which here have been
    delivered by Monsieur del Campo relative thereto, Your Majesty’s
    servants have agreed humbly to submit to Your Majesty their opinion
    that Your Majesty’s minister at the Court of Madrid should be
    instructed to present a memorial demanding an immediate and adequate
    satisfaction for the outrages committed by Monsieur de Martinez; and
    that it would be proper, in order to support that demand and to be
    prepared for such events as may arise, that Your Majesty should give
    orders for fitting out a squadron of ships of the line.[242]

In a note of May 1 the King asked whether a press would be necessary
for equipping the proposed squadron. The next day Grenville replied
that the Cabinet thought a press necessary and that it should take
place Tuesday night, May 4, between 12 and 3 o’clock, as that time
would create least observation. The same day that Grenville’s note was
written the King answered it requesting a privy council for the next
day, May 3, to consider the arrangements for the press. The council
was to be composed of the cabinet ministers, as the more secret
the business could be kept the more possibility there would be of
collecting some seamen in the first attempt.[243]

After these days of martial activity in the British Cabinet Leeds
replied to Campo’s letter of April 20. He informed the Marquis, May 5,
that the unsatisfactory answer which the latter had been instructed to
make to the English demand for satisfaction made it necessary for His
Majesty to direct his minister at Madrid to renew the representations.
Owing to this change in the seat of negotiations, Leeds said it was
impossible for him to enter into the particulars of Campo’s letter. He
concluded:

    I can therefore at present only observe in general to your
    excellency that although on cases properly stated it will be His
    Majesty’s desire--which he has manifested in repeated instances--to
    take any measures necessary for preventing his subjects’ interfering
    with the just and acknowledged rights of Spain, he can never in any
    shape accede to those claims of exclusive sovereignty, commerce,
    and navigation to which your excellency’s representations appear
    principally to refer; and particularly that His Majesty will
    consider it his indispensable duty to protect his subjects in the
    enjoyment of the right of carrying on their fisheries in the Pacific
    Ocean.[244]

Each nation stood firmly on the ground originally taken. Each had
made its first demand apparently expecting immediate compliance.
When such was stubbornly refused each suspected that the other had
some ulterior end in view and was using the matter in hand only as
a pretext. The misunderstanding arose over the fact that neither
the Briton nor the Spaniard could understand the mental attitude of
the other regarding the matter in dispute. The Spanish mind had for
centuries been accustomed to think of the American continent as the
exclusive possession of Spain. The accident that had given a portion to
Portugal, when the Pope drew his arbitrary line between the dominions
of the two maritime nations, was accepted without question by the
abnormally religious mind of the Spaniard. That Spain had yielded the
bleak northern shore of the Atlantic was of little consequence, since
she retained the sunny southern portion, where, alone, the Spaniard
could feel at home. With the exception of Portugal’s comparatively
insignificant holding, Spain still possessed practically the whole of
both Americas south of the northern line of Florida and west of the
Mississippi River. That Russia had recently settled on the icebound
coast of the far-away northwest was hardly known and less to be
regretted. Being accustomed to think of America thus, the Spaniard
could not conceive that anyone else would dare to infringe on his
right. Little was known in Spain of the colonial development of England
and the new principles on which it was based, namely, that unoccupied
land anywhere on the globe was the legitimate possession of any nation
that would occupy and develop it, and that no other nation could resist
such occupation by the mere assertion of an ancient shadowy claim that
had never been made good by actual settlement. The Briton was too
accustomed to this view to believe that anyone would still advance in
good faith the antiquated notion that any real right could be conferred
by the gift of a Pope, who, he believed, had no more authority to make
such gifts than any other individual, or that a claim not made good by
occupying and developing would be seriously urged. It was impossible to
reach a harmonious agreement. One party would have to yield.

From this time onward negotiations were conducted at Madrid instead
of at London as hitherto. The British minister to the Court of
Spain, Alleyne Fitzherbert, had not yet gone to take charge of his
post. Affairs were in the hands of the chargé, Merry. Fitzherbert
was now dispatched to Madrid.[245] No communication of importance
passed between the two Courts until his arrival. In the meantime
each Government was putting forth its utmost efforts to raise its
naval force to the highest possible efficiency. During the same
time the diplomacy of each country was directed toward strengthening
its European position by calling on its allies for assurances of
support. The outcome of these efforts influenced, considerably, the
course of the main negotiation. Besides this influence much of the
interest and importance of the controversy lies in the effect of these
by-negotiations on France, the country chiefly involved in them. They
will be studied in the next chapter.




CHAPTER VIII.

EUROPE PREPARES FOR WAR.


Until the first week in May the negotiations regarding the Nootka Sound
dispute were conducted with the greatest secrecy in both countries. The
public, especially in England, did not so much as know that there was
any serious question pending between the two Crowns. There were general
rejoicings over the prospect of a long period of untroubled peace. The
consternation that ensued may be imagined when, on the morning of May
5, England awoke to the fact that in the darkness of the preceding
night sailors had been seized in every port and were being pressed into
the navy for immediate service. The excitement in London is reflected
by the following extracts from a diary. The writer was an ex-governor
of Canada, and was living in retirement at London. According to his
entry for May 5, a note just received informed him that “during last
night all the sailors on the Thames had been pressed, and that war was
on the point of being declared against Spain, which had seized five
of our ships near Cooks River; and the funds had fallen 3 per cent.”
This indicates that the financial pulse was decidedly unsteady. The
depression seems to have continued for at least ten days. At the end
of that time the same writer entered in his diary: “Opinions are still
divided as to whether there will be a war or not. The funds begin to
rise.” On this day he had invested $3,000 in bonds.[246]

On the day following the press a message from the King was read in
both Houses of Parliament. This explained why the Government had taken
such an extraordinary step. The King declared that two vessels whose
nationality had not been fully ascertained and two others known to
be British had been captured at Nootka Sound by an officer commanding
two Spanish ships of war. He told how the cargoes had been seized and
the officers sent as prisoners to a Spanish port. He related briefly
the correspondence with the Spanish Court, then told how that Court
had refused the satisfaction demanded and had asserted a claim “to
the exclusive rights of sovereignty, navigation, and commerce in the
territories, coasts, and seas in that part of the world.” His minister
at Madrid was to renew the demand for satisfaction. Having learned of
considerable armaments in Spain, he had judged it necessary to arm in
turn “in support of the honor of his Crown and the interests of his
people.” He appealed to the Commons for the necessary support. He hoped
that the affair might be terminated peaceably, and in such a manner as
to remove grounds for misunderstandings in the future.[247]

The next day, May 6, the matter was discussed in Parliament. Pitt
opened the debate in the lower House by moving an address of thanks
for the King’s message. He recited the facts briefly, asserted
England’s right to fisheries and commerce in the districts in question,
and showed that Spain’s extravagant claims would entirely exclude
England from that ocean, if they were allowed. The settlement of this
dispute would establish a precedent for all the future. The insult
to the British flag lay in two facts--first, the seizure had been
made in time of profound peace; secondly, goods had been confiscated
without condemnation.[248] Government hoped yet to settle the dispute
peaceably, but it was necessary to increase the armaments in order to
treat with Spain on an equal footing. The opposition led by Fox agreed
that the address should be voted and the armaments approved; but they
criticised the ministry for having so recently held out hopes for
continued peace when a matter of such importance was pending. This
reference was to statements made by Pitt in his budget speech of April
19. The minister answered that the facts were not all known at that
time; and besides, he had made no promise of the continuance of peace,
but had said that the existing prosperity was due to the happy interval
of peace and that if peace should continue prosperity would increase.

From the facts presented in the preceding chapter it is known that
the criticism was unjust. Until April 21 the ministry had had no
communication from Spain except the note of February 10. Only one
ship was known to have been captured, and that only through the
information furnished by the Spanish Court in that note. Merry had
reported rumors of Spanish naval preparations, but had at the same
time given quieting assurances. Shortly after the budget speech came
the Spanish memorial of April 20, distinctly avowing the seizures and
asserting the Spanish pretensions; then came exact information from
Merry of extensive Spanish armaments; and last and most important came
Meares with his exaggerated stories of Spanish cruelty and injustice,
revealing the true number of seizures and overrating the losses. It was
urged more properly that the English Government was unjust in demanding
the restoration of the ships and satisfaction for the insult before
discussing the respective rights. This, it was said, was begging the
question.

Notwithstanding these criticisms the address was carried unanimously.
The measures taken by the Government were confirmed, the armament
was approved, and the support of the Commons was assured. After a
similar debate in the Lords on the same day the ministry was supported
with the same enthusiasm.[249] The entry in the diary of Gouverneur
Morris, who was then in London as the semiofficial agent of the United
States Government, tells of the animated debate in the Commons, of
the enthusiastic support accorded to the ministry, and of the avowed
determination to obtain from the Spanish Court an acknowledgment
that Spain is entitled to no part of America except such as she
occupies.[250] The assurance of the Commons was followed up on June
10 by a vote of credit for £1,000,000 “to enable His Majesty to act
as the exigency of affairs might require.”[251] Orders were at once
given for the equipment of a fleet to consist of 14 ships of the
line, besides smaller vessels. This was soon increased. The press was
prosecuted vigorously and with success in all ports.[252] Vancouver’s
work speaks of “the uncommon celerity and the unparalleled dispatch
which attended the equipment of one of the noblest fleets that Great
Britain ever saw.”[253] Public excitement was wrought to the highest
pitch. Pamphlets were issued in the form of addresses to the King,
setting forth the extravagance of the Spanish claim to exercise
control over the whole Pacific Ocean, and enlarging on the magnitude
and promise of the frustrated English enterprise. All the forces
of national pride, prejudice, and patriotism were united to arouse
hatred for the Spaniard. Indignant orators dwelt on memories of Papal
anathemas, the Holy Inquisition, and the Invincible Armada.[254]

At this juncture it is interesting to note again the relations between
Pitt and the South American agitator, Miranda. Attention was called
above to conferences between them shortly after the Spanish note of
February 10 was delivered to the British Court. Nothing seems to
have passed between them after that time until the second Spanish
note arrived. At 9 o’clock on the evening of May 6, the day of the
debate in Parliament just studied, Miranda again met Pitt on the
latter’s invitation. Grenville was present also. They had a long
conference “upon the subject of a war with Spain, in consequence of the
occurrences at Nootka Sound, the disposition of the people in South
America toward joining the English for their independency against the
Spaniards,” etc. Pitt thanked Miranda for the papers which he had sent,
and showed them to him. The minister was taking them to a meeting of
the Cabinet. New assurances were given of the execution of Miranda’s
plans in case of war. Various interviews took place between them
during the time that the great armament and the Spanish negotiations
were in progress.[255] The fact that Pitt was taking Miranda’s papers
to a cabinet meeting just at this time is unmistakable evidence that
his plans were being seriously considered.

There were attempts on the part of the opposition to censure the
ministry for their conduct of the Spanish business. On May 10, in
debating the motion for the vote of credit, Fox called for the date
of the first communication from Spain on the affair. This was not
revealed.[256] On the next day there was an attempt to learn whether
the proposed settlement at Nootka was “undertaken under the sanction
and authority of Government, or merely as an enterprise of private
persons.” The motion was defeated, but Pitt declared that licenses to
trade at Nootka Sound had been granted; and whether this particular
undertaking was or was not a public enterprise it was incumbent on
the honor of the country to demand satisfaction. He said that the
“Memorial” of Captain Meares would put the House in possession of
all that Government knew on the subject.[257] On May 12 there was
a spirited debate on a motion calling for the papers relative to
the dispute, but the demand was successfully resisted.[258] On the
following day a motion by the opposition, calling for information
regarding the appointment of ambassadors to Spain since the peace
of 1783, was not resisted by the ministry.[259] A week later the
information obtained was discussed. During the seven years there had
been a resident ambassador at Madrid only thirteen months, though there
had been four appointments and upward of £35,000 had been appropriated
for their support. It was explained that these conditions were mostly
due to Spanish delays and etiquette; that although an ambassador had
not been present yet a chargé had been there all the time, and British
interests had not suffered. The motion was for an address asking the
King to provide for the performance in the future of the duties of
ambassadors to foreign courts. It was defeated.[260] There was no
further Parliamentary activity of importance on the matter before the
session closed on June 10.[261]

While England was making these vigorous preparations at home she was
calling for support in every place from which she had a right to
expect aid. At the same time she was taking steps to put every portion
of her wide dominions in a state of defense. Ireland was called upon
to restrain shipments of provisions to Spain, and also to recruit
forces for the West Indies. The lord lieutenant agreed, with some
qualifications, to carry out both measures.[262] The commander at
Gibraltar was warned of his danger. The governor of that port, who was
visiting in England, was ordered to return to his post. A regiment of
foot was to embark immediately to reënforce the garrison.[263] Notices
were sent to the governors of Barbados, St. Vincent, the Leeward and
Bahama Islands, Dominica, Cape Breton, and Nova Scotia. They were
ordered to expedite works of defense, to report on their forces, and to
keep a watch on Spanish and French movements. Four regiments of foot
and two ships of war were ordered to the West Indies.[264] Three ships
of war, with reënforcements and provisions, were sent to India, with
instructions to prepare an expedition to seize Manila or the west coast
of America should orders come to that effect.[265] The governor of
Canada, about to return to England, was ordered to remain and prepare
the forces of Canada for any exigency that might arise. He was to
cultivate the friendship of the United States and to adopt every means
in his power for influencing the Americans in favor of Great Britain
and preventing their union with Spain.[266] These interesting Canadian
overtures will be fully discussed later. It was suggested to the King
that he use his Hanoverian troops to augment the garrison at Gibraltar.
He favored the measure, and took steps for carrying it out.[267]

Besides this aid from her dependencies, England also claimed the
support of her allies under the triple alliance of 1788. Since the war
promised to be almost wholly naval, the friendship of the Netherlands
with her fleet would be of great value. On May 4, the day before the
English preparations were made public, Leeds wrote to Lord Auckland,
the British ambassador at The Hague, asking him to communicate the
matter to the Dutch Government. His Britannic Majesty relied on the
justice of his cause, and had no doubt that the Dutch Republic would
approve, and, if it should become necessary, furnish him support under
the treaty.[268] In a private letter of the same date Leeds asked that
before demanding aid under the treaty Auckland ascertain whether the
Dutch Government would fit out a number of vessels and furnish them
to England at English expense.[269] In less than ten days an answer
had arrived, saying that Holland was ready to support England and that
any or all of the Dutch ships of the line might be put at the disposal
of Great Britain at British expense.[270] On May 15 Auckland sent a
statement of the terms on which these vessels would be furnished.[271]
Three days later Leeds replied that the terms were so favorable that
Auckland was authorized to accept them at once and promote with the
utmost expedition the equipment of 10 sail of the line.[272] Still
further assurances of Dutch friendship and generosity were given. On
May 31 the States General passed resolutions refusing to accept the
English subsidies, and taking upon themselves the entire expense.[273]
Everything being in readiness and the English Government having
requested the movement, the Dutch fleet, under Admiral Kinsbergen, left
the Texel on June 17 and joined the English fleet at Portsmouth three
weeks later.[274]

The third member of the triple alliance, Prussia, was at the same time
called upon for support. On May 20 Hertzberg, the Prussian minister,
handed an answer to Ewart, the British ambassador at Berlin. The
Prussian King approved the measures of England and pledged himself to
fulfill his engagements in case the contest with Spain should render
it necessary. Hertzberg suggested that it was impossible to suppose
that Spain would think of embarking on a war with such disadvantage
without having a motive other than that alleged. He said that there
were positive indications that an alliance was being negotiated between
Spain, Russia, and Austria to which Denmark was to be asked to accede.
These indications made it necessary for the three allies to be in
perfect accord. He referred to Prussia’s very grave discussions with
the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg and claimed English support in
case it should be needed in that business.[275] Thus the Nootka Sound
dispute was drawn into the general current of European politics and
was destined to have an indirect influence on the Polish and Turkish
questions. More will be said later regarding these matters.

       *       *       *       *       *

While England was meeting with such decided success in her demands on
her allies, Spain was also looking for support outside her own borders.
Her chief reliance was on France. For nearly thirty years the two
countries had been intimately united under the family compact. This
was concluded in 1761, during the Seven Years’ war, when France was
fighting a losing battle. The farsighted Charles III, who had then
recently ascended the Spanish Throne, saw in a close union between the
Bourbon Monarchies a prospect for ultimate gain to his Kingdom in spite
of the fact that he could hope for little at the time. He hastened
nobly to the rescue and generously shared the defeats and losses of
France. When Louis XVI entered the contest in behalf of the American
colonies in their struggle against the mother country, Charles III,
true to the family compact, followed his ally into the war which ended
in the glorious peace of 1783. When in 1790 Spain was threatened by
war with England, she naturally turned to France, whom she had twice
assisted against this same foe. But the advances were made with
serious misgivings on account of the turbulence in France, which was
threatening to overturn the monarchy.

For a year the utmost confusion had prevailed in Paris and throughout
the country. The oppressions of the feudal régime, wasteful methods
of taxation, and financial mismanagement had combined to reduce the
Government to a state of bankruptcy. Finally, Louis XVI had yielded to
the universal clamor and called the States-General. In May, 1789, after
a recess of a hundred and seventy-five years, they had assembled at
Versailles. After a deadlock of nearly two months the privileged orders
had been compelled to yield to the demand of the third estate and meet
in a common body--the National Assembly. In the middle of July, the
Parisian mob had razed the Bastille, which they looked upon as the
symbol of arbitrary government. A little more than a fortnight later
the nobles in the National Assembly had bowed before the coming storm
and voluntarily laid down their feudal privileges. Rightly interpreting
these events as an acknowledgment of impotence on the part of the old
régime; the proletariat in the cities and the peasants in the country
had arisen everywhere, murdered the governmental officials, and burned
and pillaged the castles of the nobles. As a result of the frightful
events of the early days of October, the mob had carried the royal
family in triumph to Paris, and the National Assembly had followed
shortly after. Both were thenceforward virtually the prisoners of the
Parisian populace. The power of the Monarchy had ended. Under the spell
of Jacobin orators the Assembly was wasting its time in the fruitless
discussion of constitutional principles, and leaving the country to
ruin and anarchy. This was the condition of France in the summer of
1790.

As early as January 20, the day on which Floridablanca wrote his
instructions to Campo in London--which instructions the latter
embodied in his drastic note of February 10 to the British Court--the
Spanish minister had also written to Montmorin, the French minister
for foreign affairs. In this letter he made no mention of the Nootka
Sound episode nor of the haughty demands which he was making on England
the same day. But he expressed pity for France and her King, and
complained that in the existing circumstances that country was not in
a condition to unite with Spain as she should. He feared that their
enemies would take advantage of the embarrassing position.[276] Though
he said nothing about it, Floridablanca was evidently thinking of the
possible consequences of his harsh demand. After the warlike sessions
of the junta of state, mentioned in the previous chapter, and after
the second note to the British Court had been sent, Floridablanca made
indirect overtures to France for assurances of support. This was in a
letter of April 6 to Fernan Nuñez, the Spanish ambassador in Paris. He
suggested that in the absence of French support it would be necessary
for Spain to look to other powers. Russia he thought most likely to
furnish aid.[277] No formal demand was made in this communication,
but it seems that the Spanish ambassador made some advances to the
French Court. On May 11 Fernan Nuñez wrote of a conference which he had
had with Montmorin. The latter had promised to propose an armament.
Luzerne, the French minister for marine, had told of the number of
vessels available. Montmorin had suggested that in case of war the
allies should disembark 50,000 men in England and should revolutionize
Holland. The French minister had asked for information concerning the
origin and progress of the dispute with England.[278]

In the conversation just referred to Montmorin had told the Spanish
ambassador that the Constitutional party in France suspected Vauguyon,
the French ambassador at Madrid. They thought that he had induced
the Spanish Government to stir up the quarrel with England in order
to involve France as the ally of Spain. They suspected that this was
being done in the hope of strengthening the French royal power, and so
bringing about a counter revolution. This suspicion grew so strong that
Montmorin, as a concession to the radical element, recalled Vauguyon.
The Spanish King refused to grant him a letter of dismissal or to
recognize anyone as his successor.[279]

As Montmorin had promised the Spanish ambassador in the above-mentioned
conversation, the French Government immediately took steps toward an
armament. On May 14 a letter from Montmorin to the president of the
National Assembly informed that body that the King had given orders
for the armament of 14 ships of the line. Assurance was given that
it was only a precautionary measure in view of the English armament.
The King would do all that he could to promote a friendly adjustment
between the Courts of London and Madrid. He hoped that France would not
be involved in war. The English Court had made friendly declarations
and had stated that the only cause for armament was the dispute with
Spain.[280] It was not wise, however, to remain disarmed under such
circumstances. France ought to show to Europe that her constitution was
not an obstacle to the development of her forces.[281]

Montmorin’s message precipitated the famous discussion as to whether
the right to make peace and war should rest with the King or the
people. This discussion is probably better known than the Nootka Sound
dispute which occasioned it. The consideration of the message was made
the order of the day for May 15, the day following its presentation.
Biron, the first speaker, declared that the prosperity of France was
closely bound up with that of Spain. Spain had been a generous ally of
France in the past. The representatives of the people ought to respect
the obligations of the nation. “Let it not be said,” he declared, “that
the efforts of a free people are less than those of a despotism.” After
a brief enthusiastic speech he moved a decree approving the measures
taken by the King. Alexander Lameth declared, amid great applause, that
the first question to be considered was whether the sovereign nation
ought to concede to the King the right to make peace and war. There was
an attempt to postpone this question, but Barnave declared that when
it should be demonstrated that effects ought to precede their causes
then it would be proved that the question proposed by Lameth should be
considered last. Robespierre said that the time to judge of a right was
when they were deliberating on the exercise of it. Baron Menou said
that the right of making peace and war should be determined first,
then they ought to learn which nation was in the wrong. If Spain, she
ought to be persuaded to yield; if England, then France should arm not
merely 14 vessels, but all of the forces on land and sea, and compel
submission.

Mirabeau declared that it was unreasonable and irrelevant thus to elude
the question. The message, he continued, had nothing in common with a
declaration of war. Jurisdiction in times of danger ought always to be
in the King’s hands. The vessels were to be armed only because England
was arming. The armament was not dangerous, and to deny it would cause
commercial discontent. The only question, he said, was whether the
funds asked were necessary. He declared that they were, and called for
the immediate consideration of the message. He proposed to approve the
measures of the King and to order by the same decree that to-morrow
they take up the discussion of the constitutional question, Shall the
nation delegate to the King the exercise of the right of peace and war?
His proposition was adopted almost unanimously.[282]

Thus after some hesitation over the theoretical consequences the
armament was approved as enthusiastically as Spain could expect or
desire. The debate in the Assembly has no further importance for the
Nootka question. It would be of little interest and less value to
follow the metaphysical discussions of the constitutional question.
The final decision is of some interest. The debate occupied nearly
the whole of each morning session for six days. In the end Mirabeau
prevailed again. He had taken a middle ground. It was decreed that
the right of peace and war belonged to the nation; that war could be
declared only by a decree of the legislative body, but that this step
could be taken only on a formal proposal by the King, and must be
sanctioned by the King subsequently.[283]

A few days after the Assembly had approved the armament Montmorin
wrote to Floridablanca. He hoped that the armament would recall
England to a proper tone and that the difficulty might be settled
amicably. Referring to Floridablanca’s letter of January 20, in which
the latter had complained of the inability of France to support Spain
as she should, the French minister said that its statements were as
forceful as they were true. The Spanish Government could count on the
most sincere desire on the part of the French King to fulfill his
engagements with Spain, but the will of the Assembly could not be
depended on. If war should be decided upon, the difficulties would be
incalculable. Peace, then, he concluded, ought to be the end of all
their efforts.[284]

Subsequently, Luzerne, the minister for marine, made two reports on the
extent of the armament and the increased cost. On June 13 the Assembly
appropriated 3,000,000 livres to support it.[285] Up to the present
point the attitude of France appeared to be all that Spain could wish,
as far as could be judged from external appearances. But this armament
was distinctly French. There was no assurance that the fleet or any
part of it would be turned over to Spain if she should call for it
under the treaty. But this seems not yet to have been asked.

On June 4 Spain attempted to set herself right in the eyes of all
Europe by issuing a circular letter and sending it to all the Courts.
This recounted briefly the origin of the dispute and the course of the
negotiations, and attempted to show the unreasonableness of the English
demands and their inconsistency with her treaty obligations. It set
forth the Spanish claim in the most favorable light possible, basing it
on treaties and the consent of nations.[286]

The formal demand from Spain for French assistance was made June 16. On
that date the Spanish ambassador at Paris handed to Montmorin extracts
from all the correspondence between Spain and England up to date. He
inclosed with them an extended argument in support of the Spanish
case. After elaborating the arguments he demanded French assistance
under the family compact, and added that if it were not offered Spain
would have to seek alliances elsewhere in Europe.[287] Ten days later
Montmorin replied that the matter had been laid before the King, but
in view of the decree of the Assembly relative to peace and war the
Spanish demand would have to be submitted to that body. As soon as
it had been acted upon a positive response would be given.[288] This
reply had been delayed so long that the Spanish ambassador had become
impatient. On the preceding day he had written again to the French
minister demanding an early reply. Fitzherbert, the British ambassador,
had already arrived at Madrid, he said, and it was necessary for the
negotiation that Spain be assured of French supported.[289] To this
Montmorin answered that the King had not for a moment lost sight of the
importance of the matter. Louis XVI had written to Charles IV regarding
it.[290]

Notwithstanding the urgency of the Spanish ambassador and the
willingness of the French King and his foreign minister, the Spanish
demand was not laid before the Assembly for more than six weeks after
it was presented. During all this time Spain was kept in uncertainty
as to whether she would receive from France the aid which she had a
right to expect. Before the expiration of this time the diplomacy of
Floridablanca and Fitzherbert had taken an important turn, though the
dispute was still far from settled. The next chapter will follow the
course of the main negotiation through this preliminary settlement.




CHAPTER IX.

ENGLAND’S FIRST DEMAND GRANTED.


While England and Spain were preparing for war at home and calling
on their allies for support, their diplomatic representatives were
endeavoring to reach an understanding. As stated above, the British
Court had concluded to make no further effort to get satisfaction
through the Spanish ambassador at London, but had sent its own
ambassador, Fitzherbert, to treat directly with the Spanish Court. This
step was decided upon during the exciting days immediately following
the 1st of May. It was nearly the middle of June before Fitzherbert
reached Madrid. In the meantime the British chargé, Merry, had been
instructed to open the renewed negotiation by presenting to the Spanish
Court a memorial setting forth at length the English contention. Leeds
sent instructions for this on May 4.[291]

Having received this communication from Leeds, Merry obtained an
interview with Floridablanca May 16. The Spanish minister was milder
than usual, but still suspected that England meant to use the matter
as a ground for quarreling. In an endeavor to remove this suspicion,
Merry, read to the Count his own secret and confidential instructions.
Floridablanca observed that if England was really not attempting to
force a quarrel the business might be amicably settled. In the evening,
after the interview, Merry sent to the Spanish minister a copy of the
memorial.[292] In a brief note accompanying it, he expressed great
anxiety to quiet the alarm, and suggested dispatching to London at once
a courier with pacific assurances from Floridablanca, if the Count felt
like giving such.[293]

The British memorial declared that the last Spanish communication[294]
was unsatisfactory even as the transaction had been stated in the
former Spanish note.[295] No satisfaction had been offered for the
insult to the British flag, and the ground stated for releasing the
vessels was not justice, from the English standpoint, but ignorance
on the part of the English commanders and general regard for England
on the part of the Spanish officials. Neither could Great Britain
admit the Spanish claim to exclusive rights of sovereignty, commerce,
and navigation. Besides these reasons, additional information had
arrived[296] telling of more than one captured vessel. It also appeared
that the soil at Nootka had been purchased by a British subject and the
British flag hoisted thereon. Merry was--

    to represent in the strongest manner to the Court of Spain that
    His Majesty has every reason to expect from the justice and wisdom
    of His Catholic Majesty not only the full and entire restitution
    of all the said vessels, with their property and crews (or of as
    many of them as shall, on fair examination of what can he alleged
    on both sides, be found to have been British vessels, entitled as
    such to His Majesty’s protection), but also an indemnification to
    the individuals concerned in the said vessels for the losses which
    they have sustained by their unjust detention and capture, and,
    above all, an adequate reparation to His Majesty for an injury done
    by an officer commanding His Catholic Majesty’s vessels of war to
    British subjects trading under the protection of the British flag
    in those parts of the world where the subjects of His Majesty have
    an unquestionable right to a free and undisturbed enjoyment of the
    benefits of commerce, navigation, and fishery, and also to the
    possession of such establishments as they may form, with the consent
    of the natives, in places unoccupied by other European nations.

Assurances were given of pacific wishes on the part of England, but a
speedy and explicit answer was demanded.[297]

In this memorial England renewed her demand for satisfaction for the
insult to her flag, and added a demand that Spain indemnify the owners
of the captured vessels. She also rejected absolutely the Spanish claim
to exclusive sovereignty by asserting England’s unquestionable right
to unoccupied portions of the coast in question. Incidentally it is
valuable as a declaration of Great Britain’s position on the question
of the rights of colonization.

Two days after receiving this memorial Floridablanca answered
Merry’s note which accompanied it. He gave the pacific assurances
that the British agent had asked, but in general terms. In keeping
with his peaceful professions he proposed a mutual and proportionate
disarmament. He asserted that His Catholic Majesty knew of the capture
of only one vessel; and it had been trading illicitly, at the time, in
a place occupied by the Spanish.[298]

On the following day Merry replied, expressing his satisfaction with
the pacific intentions of the Spanish Court. He said that he would
gladly dispatch one of the English messengers with the Count’s peaceful
assurances.[299] Fearing lest Floridablanca meant this informal note
as a reply to the British memorial of May 16, he gave the Spanish
minister to understand that he still expected a formal reply.[300]
The British messenger bearing the peaceful assurances left Madrid May
21[301] and arrived in London June 1. Since the reply contained nothing
indicating that Spain would grant the English demands, the armaments
were continued.[302] Another messenger from Merry arrived in London
ten days later with less pacific news. Floridablanca’s language to the
foreign ministers at Aranjuez showed that he still thought that England
was determined to break with Spain. He looked on the English King’s
message to Parliament as almost equivalent to a declaration of war.
England’s advices to all settlements abroad increased his conviction.
Her tone toward Spain he thought insufferable. He still desired peace,
but feared that Spain would be driven to the necessity of defending
herself. Not only had Floridablanca expressed himself thus to the
foreign ministers, but he had made an appeal for money, and the bankers
of Madrid had agreed to furnish some £4,000,000.[303]

Floridablanca’s formal reply to the British memorial reached London
June 15. Merry had received it from the Spanish Court on the 4th of
the same month.[304] It declared that His Catholic Majesty would claim
nothing but what he could base on treaty rights, on the consent of
nations, and on immemorial possession. The discussions with the new
ambassador would turn on these points. If Spanish subjects had gone
beyond these rights they would be punished, and the injured parties
would be indemnified. Spain did not mean to carry her claim to all of
the South Sea, but only to “the Indian continent, islands, and seas,
which by discovery, treaties, or immemorial possession have belonged
and do belong to her by the acknowledgment of all nations.” The Spanish
King denied that Spain’s not having settled any particular spot was
a proof that it did not belong to her. Were this admitted, the Count
argued, any nation might establish herself on the dominions of any
other nation wherever there was not an actual establishment. This, he
said, would be absurd to think of. Satisfaction and indemnification
should rest on the question of right, which was to be settled by the
negotiation.[305]

This review of the essential points of the two memorials shows that the
Courts were as far apart as ever. The conflicting colonial principles
were clearly stated, and each nation stubbornly persisted in its own
view. In his remarks on this communication Merry conceived that there
was little or no room left to expect that any change would occur in
the sentiments of the Spanish Court. He thought that the Spanish delay
had probably been occasioned by the fluctuating advices from France.
He could attribute the conduct of Spain to no other motive than a hope
that her being attacked by England might put France under the necessity
of engaging in the war.[306]

Fitzherbert conducted the English negotiations from this point. His
record as a diplomat was already established. He had negotiated the
treaty of peace with France and Spain in 1783. The next four years he
had been envoy extraordinary to Russia. After that he had been for some
time chief secretary to the lord-lieutenant of Ireland. He had also
been made a member of the privy council. He left London May 9[307] and
went to Paris, where he tarried for some time. His delay at this place
was due partly to sickness, partly to his being engaged in making some
representations to the French Court in connection with Fitzgerald,[308]
and partly to his awaiting written instructions from London to govern
him in his negotiations with Spain.[309] He reached Madrid June 9.[310]
The next day he wrote a note to Floridablanca, who, with the whole
Spanish Court, had gone to Aranjuez. This note announced his presence
and his intention of reaching Aranjuez the same evening. It also
inclosed his credentials signed by the English King.[311]

The following day he had an interview with Floridablanca. Two days
later, June 13, he received his formal introduction to the King and
Queen.[312]

In their interview of June 11 Fitzherbert and Floridablanca exchanged
views on the question in dispute. The former, conceiving that the
memorial given to Merry on June 4 must fall short of His Britannic
Majesty’s just expectations, urged the latter to give him a more
favorable communication. The latter insisted that the paper in question
contained the utmost that Spain ought to grant. He declared that
compliance with the British demand for satisfaction would invalidate
the Spanish claims to sovereignty, rendering further discussion
useless. Therefore the British demand and the Spanish claim, he
maintained, ought to be discussed at the same time. He asked that
Fitzherbert’s statements should be presented in writing. Consequently,
two days later the British ambassador sent a brief memorial presenting
the British demand in language which makes it seem plausible.
Stripped of its verbiage it declares that England desires a peaceable
settlement, but that there can be no further negotiation until Spain
shall have fulfilled three conditions: First, restored the vessels;
secondly, indemnified the injured parties; thirdly, given satisfaction
to the British sovereign for the insult offered to his flag. A
declaration that the Spanish King would grant these demands would be
accepted as ground for the negotiation.[313]

After this first exchange of views with the Spanish minister,
Fitzherbert reported his observations to the British Cabinet. He
thought that Spain was bent on war, and was refusing satisfaction in
hope of inducing England to make reprisals which would serve as a
pretext for demanding French aid. As to her motive, he thought that
she certainly could not hope to regain Gibraltar or her West Indian
possessions; and it could not be to counteract French revolutionary
infection, for everything was quiet in Spain. He believed the real
cause to be Floridablanca’s suspicion that England had designs on
the Spanish colonies. The Spanish minister seemed to count little on
French aid, but to expect substantial help from the United States. Some
advances had been made to that power, and Carmichael, the American
chargé, was much caressed at Court. The American agent thought that his
Government would not be favorable.[314] A few days later, Fitzherbert
expressed his confidence that no encouraging communication had been
received from America. On the contrary, there had recently been marked
symptoms of coldness.[315]

In answer to the British ambassador’s communication of June 13,
Floridablanca replied five days later that he could not consent to
the principles which it laid down. However, for the sake of peace,
he offered to make the declaration proposed, provided one of three
explanations be added: First, the question of insult and satisfaction
should be decided by the arbitration of a king of Europe, to be chosen
by England; or, second, no facts should be admitted in the subsequent
negotiation unless fully established by Great Britain; or, third, the
satisfaction should not prejudice the rights of Spain nor prevent her
from exacting equivalent satisfaction from Great Britain if it should
be found that she had a right to do so.[316] In spite of the evident
fairness of these proposals, they were not accepted. In reporting
them to the British Court, Fitzherbert suggested that he considered
them inadmissible. The English Cabinet seems to have agreed with him.
This makes it appear that England was afraid to submit her case to
the judgment of a third party, even though she had the privilege of
selecting the judge. Further, she seemed unwilling to confine the
negotiation to established facts, or to suffer the consequences in case
the negotiation should show her to have been in the wrong. It appears
that the English Court had decided to force from Spain once and for all
an acknowledgment of the British principle of colonization. Nothing
less would be accepted. It was this, and not simply justice, that she
demanded.

For some time after this the British ambassador received no
communication from the Spanish minister. This was partially accounted
for by accident. On the same day that Floridablanca had written the
document last studied an attempt was made to assassinate him. He was
stabbed by a fanatical Frenchman. The wound was not serious. In letters
of June 24 and 28 Fitzherbert reported that the Count still refused to
see him on the pretense of indisposition, though he was transacting
other business. The Spanish Court had assumed a more pacific attitude
and seemed sincerely desirous of an accommodation. The delay was
continued in hope that a reply would soon be received from London to
the Spanish memorial presented to Merry June 4.[317]

The pacific intentions of the Spanish Court were further shown by the
fact that orders had been given to the commanders of various ports to
treat British war ships, which were hovering in the neighborhood, as
they would be treated in a period of profound peace. Furthermore, in
an informal interview of July 1, Floridablanca said that he had been
busying himself on a plan for an ulterior arrangement which he thought
would entirely fulfill the views and objects of both parties.[318] At
a conference on July 10 the Count presented his plan. The essential
points were: First, Spain should retain exclusive possession of the
Northwest Coast up to and including Nootka; second, from Nootka to
the sixty-first degree the two Crowns should have common rights,
except that south of the fifty-sixth degree British influence should
not extend beyond a certain distance inland; third, Great Britain
should have the right of fishing in the South Sea and of landing and
erecting temporary buildings in unoccupied places, though no English
vessels should approach a Spanish settlement; and fourth, the mutual
rights should not be discussed and the mutual demands for satisfaction
should be waived, in which case Spain would pay the losses on ships
taken at Nootka. Fitzherbert declared the plan inadmissible, but said
that it might possibly be modified to make it acceptable.[319] This is
interesting as foreshadowing in some respects the final settlement.

About the middle of July Fitzherbert received the English reply to the
Spanish memorials of June 4 and June 18. Extended instructions were
given to guide him in his communication to the Spanish Court. These had
been sent from London July 5[320]. In obedience to his instructions,
the British ambassador presented to the Spanish minister on July 17 a
new memorial defining the British views on the point of satisfaction.

With the memorial he inclosed drafts of a proposed Spanish declaration
and a British counter declaration which would be acceptable to
His Britannic Majesty as affording the satisfaction demanded. The
memorial declared that the Spanish communications did not contain
the satisfaction demanded, nor was a plausible ground established
for refusing the demands. To justify these demands it was urged that
there had been no established possession of nor proved sovereignty
over the Nootka region which could have justified the seizure of
British vessels. For such justification there must have been actual
possession and exercise of jurisdiction which had been recognized by
other nations. From the representations of the Spanish Court itself, it
appeared that the Spaniards had undertaken the occupation only a few
days before the seizure of the vessels in question. English subjects
had for many years previously frequented the place and had traded with
the natives without interruption. Hence it was impossible for Spain to
maintain her claim to exclusive jurisdiction. The simple restoration
of the vessels was not sufficient. No reparation had been made for the
insult to the British flag. “In consequence, His majesty finds it
necessary to demand anew in terms most direct and least equivocal the
satisfaction already demanded, and which can not longer be deferred
without consequences which His Majesty desires ardently to avoid.” As
soon as this demand should be met England would be ready to treat with
reference to rights of territorial possessions, commerce, navigation,
and fisheries in that part of the world.[321]

In his private instructions referred to above, Fitzherbert was told
that the giving of satisfaction must amount to an admission that Spain
was not in possession of an actual and known sovereignty at Nootka.
No discussion could take place on this point, it was declared, after
the satisfaction should be given. If Spain could prove her claim to
sovereignty, it must be done before the point of satisfaction should be
reached. If proved, it would remove the ground on which satisfaction
was demanded; but, it was added, no such proof could be adduced. Hence
satisfaction was insisted upon.[322] This was tantamount to saying that
the British Court would not be convinced, no matter what arguments the
Spanish Court might produce. Spain was just as confident that she did
possess sovereignty over Nootka as England was that Spain did not. The
Spanish Court had taken great care to collect evidence on this point.
A commission was sent to examine the archives of the Indies at Seville
for this purpose. Their report covered some 200 pages of manuscript.
It was a compilation of accounts of exploring expeditions, of royal
orders and decisions, of acts of the council of the Indies, and of
laws promulgated, all affecting that part of the world. Its purpose
was to show that Spain had always claimed and exercised the rights of
sovereignty over those regions and the right of excluding other nations
from her possessions in the South Sea.[323] The treaty of Utrecht was
repeatedly cited in the various memorials and letters as guaranteeing
Spain’s rights in the Indies as they had been in the time of Charles
II. The willingness of Spain to submit the matter to arbitration shows
that she had confidence in the justice of her cause. England’s refusal
to arbitrate indicates a lack of confidence.

On July 22 Floridablanca replied to Fitzherbert’s communication of
five days before. He added little to what he had said in documents
already studied. He repeated the grounds on which Spain rested her
claim--grounds that were absolutely good from the Spanish standpoint.
He showed again the unreasonableness and absurdity, from the same
standpoint, of the English demands, and their contravention of
treaties. He assumed, not without cause, a tone of injured innocence,
and concluded that it was not worth while to extend further his
reflections on points so clear nor in demonstration of the rights of
Spain, since enough had been said already. The Spanish King had no
intention, he declared, of being dragged into a war over an academic
dispute. He agreed to give, first, such satisfaction as one of the
Kings of Europe, chosen by England as arbitrator, should think proper;
or, secondly, to give whatever satisfaction should be reciprocally
agreed upon, it being understood that such satisfaction should not
prejudice the rights of Spain to Nootka. He appealed to the honor and
justice of all nations to recognize the generosity of His Catholic
Majesty’s heart, since to avoid dragging Europe into war he would
sacrifice his own well-founded opinion, even though prepared to enforce
it by his superior armament.[324] Having led, or rather forced, the
Spanish minister to yield this much, Fitzherbert continued to press him
until he agreed to the declaration and counter-declaration, almost word
for word, as they had been dictated by the British Cabinet. They were
signed July 24, and are as follows:[325]

                             DECLARATION.

    His Britannic Majesty having complained of the capture of certain
    vessels belonging to his subjects in the port of Nootka, situated
    on the Northwest Coast of America, by an officer in the service
    of His Catholic Majesty, the undersigned counselor and principal
    secretary of state to His Majesty, being thereto duly authorized,
    declares in the name and by the order of His Majesty, that he is
    willing to give satisfaction to His Britannic Majesty for the injury
    of which he has complained, fully persuaded that His said Britannic
    Majesty would act in the same manner toward His Catholic Majesty
    under similar circumstances; and His Majesty further engages to make
    full restitution of all the British vessels which were captured at
    Nootka, and to indemnify the parties interested in those vessels
    for the losses which they may have sustained, as soon as the amount
    thereof shall have been ascertained. It being understood that this
    declaration is not to prejudice the ulterior discussion of any right
    which His Catholic Majesty claims to form an exclusive establishment
    at Nootka.

    In witness whereof I have signed this declaration and sealed it with
    the seal of my arms at Madrid the 24th of July, 1790.

                                                   COUNT FLORIDABLANCA.

                         COUNTER DECLARATION.

    His Catholic Majesty having declared that he was willing to give
    satisfaction for the injury done to the King by the capture of
    certain vessels belonging to his subjects in the Bay of Nootka; and
    Count Floridablanca having signed, in the name and by the order of
    His Catholic Majesty, a declaration to this effect, and by which
    His said Majesty likewise engages to make full restitution of the
    vessels so captured and to indemnify the parties interested in
    those vessels for the losses which they shall have sustained, the
    undersigned ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of His
    Majesty to the Catholic King, being thereto duly and expressly
    authorized, accepts the said declaration in the name of the King;
    and declares that His Majesty will consider this declaration, with
    the performance of the engagements contained therein, as a full
    and entire satisfaction for the injury of which His Majesty has
    complained.

    The undersigned declares at the same time that it is to be
    understood that neither the said declaration signed by Count
    Floridablanca nor the acceptance thereof by the undersigned, in the
    name of the King, is to preclude or prejudice, in any respect, the
    rights which His Majesty may claim to any establishment which his
    subjects may have formed, or may desire to form in the future, at
    the said Bay of Nootka.

    In witness whereof I have signed this counter declaration and sealed
    it with the seal of my arms at Madrid the 24th of July, 1790.

                                                   ALLEYNE FITZHERBERT.

The only difference of any importance between the drafts prepared
by the British Cabinet and the documents as finally signed is the
insertion in the Spanish declaration of the clause “fully persuaded
that His said Britannic Majesty would act in the same manner toward
His Catholic Majesty under similar circumstances.”[326]

Fitzherbert wrote that on the first occasion of his paying his respects
to His Catholic Majesty after the declarations had been signed that
Monarch had deigned to converse freely concerning them, saying that
they had given him the sincerest pleasure, and that he considered
them “a happy earnest of the revival of that perfect harmony and good
understanding which it was his constant wish to maintain with the Crown
of Great Britain.” The ambassador reminded Leeds “that it is extremely
unusual for His Catholic Majesty to converse with foreign ministers
on any political topic, from which circumstance, joined to the known
sincerity of his character and the marked cordiality of air and manner
with which he accompanied this declaration, I can safely convey it to
your grace as the genuine expression of his feelings.”[327]

These declarations settled merely the question of satisfaction which
England had demanded as the indispensable preliminary to a discussion
of the respective rights of the two Crowns on the Northwest Coast,
and particularly at Nootka. This simply repaired the insult which
England felt that she had suffered at the hands of Spain. They were
now ready to begin negotiations on a friendly basis for the settlement
of the present difficulty and the arrangement of a modus vivendi for
the future. News of the declarations reached London August 5, and
Grenville immediately notified the King, congratulating him on the
event, “which, as far as it goes, appears highly satisfactory and seems
to offer the most favorable prospect for such an ultimate termination
of the business as may correspond with Your Majesty’s wishes.”[328] In
a letter of the next day, Leeds praised Fitzherbert for the latter’s
success.[329]

During the months of May, June, and July, while the negotiations that
have been studied in this chapter were in progress, both countries
continued their warlike preparations. Shortly after reaching Madrid
Fitzherbert reported a Spanish fleet of 30 sail of the line, though
poorly manned.[330] Baumgarten tells of the difficulty which the
Spanish Government experienced in getting sailors. He says that
they took refuge in the mountains to escape being pressed into the
navy.[331] On July 5 the British ambassador reported that the Spanish
fleet at Cadiz had been ordered to sea immediately, but he thought it
simply a show of vigor to inspire confidence.[332] Four days later he
received a note from Floridablanca explaining the movement. The King
of Spain, having learned that the English fleet had put to sea, gave
orders to his to move also, but to refrain from hostilities unless
attacked.[333] Two Spanish ships of war, with 1,000 soldiers, had been
sent to Porto Rico, since an attack was apprehended at that point.[334]
By the 20th of the same month Spain had 34 ships of the line and 16
smaller craft at sea.[335] At the end of June an English fleet of 25
vessels of the line had put to sea,[336] and had been joined early in
July by the Dutch fleet under Admiral Kinsbergen.[337]

During all this time the armaments had been carried on in spite
of repeated offers and requests from Spain to disarm mutually.
As early as May 18, on receipt of the British memorial presented
two days before, Floridablanca had proposed to Merry mutual and
proportionate disarmament.[338] This was repeated in the Spanish
memorial of June 4.[339] The British Cabinet rejected the proposition.
In his instructions of July 5 Leeds cautioned Fitzherbert to be
particularly careful not to give the smallest encouragement to this
idea. His Majesty could not consent to discontinue preparations
until he should have secured freedom of commerce, navigation, and
fisheries in the districts in question.[340] After the declaration
and counter declaration had been signed, Floridablanca proposed
limiting the operations of the fleets to prevent the possibility of an
encounter.[341] On August 10 Campo, the Spanish ambassador in London,
repeated the proposals for disarming.[342] In reply, four days later,
Leeds gave assurance of England’s desire for peace, but declared that
Great Britain refused to disarm until the matter in question should
be settled for the future.[343] On the same day that Leeds gave this
decided answer to Campo in London, Floridablanca, in Madrid, had again
proposed to Fitzherbert a mutual disarmament. On September 10, Leeds
sent a formal reply, repeating what he had said to Campo on August
14.[344]

Far from yielding to the Spanish proposals, Great Britain was
continuing her preparations and calling on her allies to do the same.
On the day that Leeds rejected Campo’s proposition to disarm, he
instructed Auckland, the British ambassador at The Hague, to ask that
Dutch preparations should not be relaxed. The national honor had been
satisfied, but the question of peace or war had not been settled. It
was requested that the Dutch fleet be ordered home for supplies and
reënforcements.[345] August 19 this request was granted, and England
was reassured of the support of Holland.[346] Baumgarten says that
early in September the English and Spanish fleets were both hovering
off Cape Finisterre, and were dangerously near to each other.[347]

In his instructions to Auckland of August 14, referred to above, Leeds
had suggested that with a slight additional expense the Dutch and
English fleets could be used to give weight to the representations
already made by England for bringing about a pacification in the north
and east of Europe. The Dutch Government assented that the general
state of Europe, as well as the Spanish negotiations, warranted a
continuance of their armament.

The relation between the Nootka Sound negotiations and the questions
uppermost in eastern and northern Europe is more than incidental. In
a dispatch of June 14 Theremin, the Prussian chargé at Madrid, wrote
his Government that in case of a breach between England and Spain the
latter would certainly join Russia and Austria.[348] The situation of
the powers was such that this would have been perfectly natural. Russia
and Austria were waging a common war against the Porte. The former
was also engaged in war with Sweden, and the latter had just been
deprived of her control in the Netherlands by the Belgian revolution.
England and the Netherlands were trying to quiet the storm and induce
all parties to make peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum.
Prussia, the third member of the triple alliance, was not in harmony
with the other two in this matter. On the contrary, she was attempting
to increase the confusion in the hope of gaining something in the
turmoil. She was attempting to force Galicia from Austria that she
might restore it to Poland and receive as compensation Dantzig and
Thorn. She was fostering the Belgian revolution so that in the end she
might be able to return the Flemish provinces to Austria to compensate
that power for the loss of Galicia. She had actually made a treaty
with the Porte looking to this end, and had won the partial support of
Poland. If Prussia had succeeded in dragging the other two members of
the triple alliance with her into war and Spain had at the same time
broken with England on the Nootka question, it would inevitably have
thrown Spain into the arms of the imperial courts. The opponents, then,
would have been Prussia, England, the Netherlands, and Turkey, with
probably Poland and Sweden, against Russia, Austria, and Spain, with
possibly Denmark. France had for a time been thought of as a fourth
member of the proposed alliance between Spain and the imperial courts,
but the disturbances in that country had, for the present, made her
almost a negligible quantity.

The conference at Reichenbach, which closed in August, affected
materially the state of Europe. The pacific efforts of England and the
Dutch Republic had already succeeded in curbing somewhat the warlike
passions of Prussia, and at this conference won a further triumph for
the peace principle by inducing Leopold of Austria to make peace with
Turkey. But Russia still persisted for a time in her war with the
Porte, and the English-Spanish dispute over Nootka Sound was almost as
far from settlement as ever.[349]




CHAPTER X.

AMERICA’S RELATIONS TO THE CONTROVERSY.


Attention was called above to the repeated conferences between Pitt
and the South American agitator, Miranda. The fact was pointed out
that these conferences occurred at the critical periods of the
English-Spanish negotiations.[350] To repeat briefly: The first was on
February 14, just after the receipt of the first Spanish communication
on the Nootka affair, and before the British Court had formulated
its reply. Miranda had previously proposed his “grand plan” for the
advantage of England united with South America. At this conference
the plan was admitted to be beneficial. It was decided that it should
be put into execution in case of a war with Spain. In consequence of
Pitt’s request, Miranda presented, some three weeks later, a written
statement of the commercial and military resources of South America.
Again, on May 6, when the war excitement in London was at its highest,
the great minister and the South American had a conference on the same
subject. Pitt was on his way to a cabinet council and was taking with
him for consideration at the council the papers which Miranda had
presented. Grenville was present at the interview. The conversation was
on the prospect of war with Spain, and on the disposition of the people
of South America toward joining England in order to gain independence.
Various interviews took place at Pitt’s house while the Spanish
negotiations were in progress.[351]

At some time during the year Miranda’s plan was presented in the form
of a draft of a constitution for the Spanish-American colonies after
they should have gained their independence. The proposed new empire
was to include all of South America, except Brazil and Guiana, and the
portion of North America west of the Mississippi River and south of the
forty-fifth parallel. Cuba was to be included as the key to the Gulf of
Mexico. The government was to be modeled in a general way on that of
Great Britain. The executive power was to be lodged in an inca, under
the title of “emperor,” with hereditary succession. The upper chamber
was to be composed of members nominated for life by the inca. Further
details of the government were worked out.[352] Miranda reminded Pitt
that the latter had seemed pleased with his ideas and had asked him to
leave the draft for further perusal. Plans for carrying on the war were
discussed, and the most favorable point for attack in South America was
considered. Means were devised for enlisting the interest of Jesuits
in Italy who were natives of South America and had been exiled by the
King of Spain. Accounts of recent insurrections in Spanish America were
given to show how ready the people were for emancipation. Later, a
detailed plan of attack was presented, with maps to illustrate it. At
Pitt’s request a plan of the defenses of Havana was left with him.

This shows what extended plans the British Cabinet was considering.
It was to be expected that England would persist in her demands, for
if Spain would not yield there was much to expect from a war. Secret
agents at various places in America were collecting information
looking toward military operations to carry out these schemes. Besides
the overtures to the United States through Canada, to be discussed
presently, there were secret emissaries at Charleston and New York, and
information was being collected concerning New Orleans, the Floridas,
and the Mississippi country. The feasibility of marching troops from
New Orleans to Mexico was considered, and reports were made by men
who were familiar with the country. Some of the secret employees were
enthusiastic over the possibility of making a great English colony
out of the Floridas and the Mississippi Valley. Agents of the Creek
and Cherokee Indians were negotiating for a friendly connection with
England. The plan, as far as it had taken shape, seems to have been for
England to seize the heart of North America for herself and erect the
remainder of Spanish America into a client state.[353]

As mentioned above, the British Cabinet sent instructions on May 6 to
Lord Dorchester, the governor of Canada.[354] He had intended to visit
England during the summer, but was requested to remain and prepare for
the impending struggle. Besides strengthening his own dominions he was
to make friendly overtures to the United States.[355] In consequence
of these orders Lord Dorchester gave instructions on June 27 to Major
Beckwith, whom he had selected as the medium through which these
overtures should be made. Beckwith was given double instructions. The
one set was to guide his conversations in discussing public questions
in a general way. The other was secret and for his private guidance.
In the first he was instructed to say that the appearance of war with
Spain rendered it improbable that Dorchester would obtain his expected
leave of absence that season. He was to return hearty thanks for the
friendly approbation of Dorchester’s proposed trip through the United
States on his way to England. He was to express the hope that the
appearance of a war with Spain, or even its actual occurrence, would
not alter the friendly disposition of the United States toward Great
Britain. He was to mention the pretensions of Spain to absolute control
over navigation, commerce, and fisheries in the Pacific Ocean, and
discuss the evil effect on the United States if such control should
be conceded. These things he might say freely and publicly. But his
secret instructions were to guide him in conversing with those whom he
might select as proper persons in whom to confide. From them he was to
learn the disposition of the Government and the people toward England
if the affair with Spain were not considered. Then he was to discover
what difference a war with that country might make. He was to ascertain
whether in case war should occur they would be likely to join Spain,
and also to find what might induce them to join Great Britain in such
an event. In discussing the Mississippi question he was to be cautious,
but might suggest that England would probably assist in obtaining its
navigation. Naval and military movements should be watched.[356]

Dorchester reported to the home office, on July 7, that Beckwith had
been hastily sent back to New York.[357] The latter did not have
to wait long to find the right man to converse with on the matter
contained in his secret instructions. On July 8, Hamilton, the
Secretary of the Treasury, made a memorandum giving the substance of a
communication from him. The major had spoken of the expected rupture
and had observed that all commercial nations must favor the views of
England.

    It was therefore presumed, should a war take place, that the United
    States would find it to their interest to take part with Great
    Britain rather than with Spain.[358]

It seems that Hamilton communicated the matter to the President at
once, for in a letter reporting a later conversation with Beckwith he
says:

    I have made the proper use of what you said to me at our last
    Interview [July 8].[359]

Under date of July 12, Jefferson, the Secretary of State, prepared a
paper entitled, “Heads of a consideration on the conduct we are to
observe in the war between Spain and Great Britain, and particularly
should the latter attempt the conquest of Louisiana and the Floridas.”
As one would expect, Jefferson inclined toward Spain rather than
England. He brought out the danger to the United States if England
should get control of New Orleans and the neighboring territory. He
suggested the idea of joining Spain in guaranteeing the independence
of these countries instead of allowing Great Britain to take them. The
paper seems to have been prepared to serve as a guide in an approaching
interview with the Canadian agent, for he says, “As to England, say
to Beckwith,” etc.,[360] then gives the substance of what Hamilton
reported as having been said to that gentleman in an interview of July
22, at which Jefferson was present.

In this interview the fact was brought to light that Beckwith was not
an authorized British agent, but that he had been sent by Dorchester
with the knowledge of the British Cabinet. Owing to his unofficial
character nothing of importance passed, but he was told that the United
States was ready to answer when it should be presented in an official
form. Hamilton had said that, at the time, he--

    would not mean either to raise or repress expectations. … Something
    was said respecting the probable course of military operations in
    case of a war between Britain and Spain, which Mr. Beckwith supposed
    would be directed toward South America, alleging, however, that this
    was mere conjecture on his part. I hinted cautiously our dislike of
    any attempt on New Orleans.

Hamilton added in a note:

    The views of the Government were to discard suspicion that any
    engagements with Spain or intentions hostile to Great Britain
    existed; to leave the ground in other respects vague and open, so as
    that in case of a rupture between Great Britain and Spain the United
    States ought to be in the best situation to turn it to account in
    reference to the disputes between them and Great Britain on the one
    hand and Spain on the other.[361]

Beckwith reported to Dorchester that Hamilton had said:

    We are perfectly unconnected with Spain, have even some points
    unadjusted with that Court, and are prepared to go into a
    consideration of the subject.[362]

Scott, a member of the House of Representatives from western
Pennsylvania, told Beckwith that the prospect for a rupture made
most forcible impressions on all classes in the States. There was a
deep interest, he said, in the prospect of England’s possessing New
Orleans. The possible dismemberment of South America and the opening of
commerce with that continent was of interest, as well as the question
of navigation, commerce, and fisheries in the Pacific. He thought that
the moment was very favorable for England; and he saw no reason why the
United States should not assist her.[363] After news of the declaration
and counter declaration, signed at Madrid July 24, reached America,
Beckwith reported general dissatisfaction in the United States at the
prospect of pacification. Agricultural interests had expected that
the war would bring them high prices, and the shipping interests were
expecting a share in the English carrying trade and hoped for free
commerce with the Spanish West Indies. Friends of England thought that
she ought to take the opportunity for ruining the Spanish marine, which
they imagined to be an easy matter. British possession of New Orleans
was expected and desired, except by the Government which hoped to gain
from a neutral position when the settlement should come. At the same
time he reported another conversation with Hamilton. The Secretary had
said:

    We consider ourselves at perfect liberty to act with respect to
    Spain in any way most conducive to our interests, even to the going
    to war with that power, if we shall think it advisable to join
    you.[364]

These reports were doubtless colored by the desire of the Canadian
agent to send as favorable news as possible; but after allowing for
the exaggerations and the distortion of facts that would naturally be
expected, enough remains to show that the prospect of war was common
talk and that it was not altogether undesired. They also point to the
well-known fact that England had many friends in the United States and
some even in the highest official circles.

       *       *       *       *       *

While Beckwith was holding these unofficial conferences with American
statesmen President Washington and his advisers were considering
what measures the Government should take in the event of hostilities
breaking out. Between the time of Beckwith’s first interview with
Hamilton and that of the more formal conference a fortnight later in
Jefferson’s presence the latter had written to Monroe concerning the
matter. He said that a war between England and Spain was probable.
Symptoms indicated a general design on Louisiana and the Floridas.
He spoke of the unpleasant position of the United States if England
should obtain them. Both England and Spain, he said, ought to know that
this country was in a condition for war.[365] Late in August President
Washington wrote concerning the matter to his chief advisers. He
thought that if Great Britain and Spain should come to arms New Orleans
and the Spanish posts on the Mississippi would be the first objective
point of the former. He asked what the answer to Lord Dorchester
should be in case he should request permission to march troops from
Detroit across the territory of the United States against the Spanish
posts, or in case it should be attempted without leave, which was most
probable.[366]

On the day after that on which the President’s letter was written
Jefferson answered it. He thought that the United States should keep
out of the war as long as possible. If Lord Dorchester should make the
expected demand, it should either be silently ignored, or, if granted,
the same privilege ought to be offered to Spain. If the march should
be attempted without permission, the United States should allow it,
but protest against it, holding off from actual hostilities as long as
possible.[367]

On the same day Chief Justice Jay answered the President’s question.
He considered, first, what the United States had a right to do from
the standpoint of international law, and, secondly, what was expedient
under the circumstances. Under the first head he concluded that,
except in cases of absolute necessity, or those in which it could be
shown that passage would be entirely innocent, the right of dominion
involved the right of excluding foreigners. Under the second head
he said that the probability of their being restrained by a refusal
ought to be considered. If they would probably proceed anyway, it
would be most prudent, he concluded, to consent. However, he added,
these remarks retain little force when applied to leading troops from
posts in the actual possession of England through territory under
English jurisdiction, though both the posts and the territory, of
right, belong to the United States. He admitted that it would militate
against the interests of the United States to have England occupy the
Spanish territories in question. The extent to which the principles of
the balance of power were applicable to the case in hand would merit
serious inquiry, he remarked, if the United States had only to consider
what might be right and just. But since the condition of the country
strongly recommended peace, and since it would be more prudent to allow
Great Britain to conquer and hold the Floridas than to engage in war to
prevent it, such inquiries would be premature.[368]

On the second day after the President wrote, Vice-President Adams gave
his opinion. He said that the interests of the United States pointed to
neutrality as long as practicable. To preserve neutrality every wrong
must be avoided. Granting to England the privilege in question would
be an offense against Spain. Therefore, if asked, the answer should
be a refusal. If the measure should be undertaken without leave there
were two methods of procedure--the one was war; the other, negotiation.
Nations, he said, are not obliged to declare war for every injury
or even hostility; but tacit acquiescence would be misinterpreted.
Negotiation, then, was the only alternative. The fact that there had
been no exchange of ministers with England made this difficult. A
remonstrance might be made in either of two ways. It might be handed
by the American representative at Paris, Madrid, or The Hague to the
British ambassador at the same place, or a special messenger might be
sent to London to demand an audience, make remonstrance, and then take
his leave shortly if a minister were not sent to the United States.[369]

Knox, the Secretary of War, sent his advice on the same day as the
Vice-President. He mentioned the danger to the United States if England
should get the Mississippi Valley. The true interests of the country
dictated neutrality. Spain, he said, would not enter the war unless
supported by France, and such support was not unexpected. If it should
be given, France would attempt to associate the United States with her
in the war. One of the parties might offer sufficient inducement to the
United States to enter the war, or they might be obliged to enter the
war on their own account to avert a greater evil.[370]

More than two weeks later Hamilton sent a long discussion of the
question from the standpoint of national right and from the standpoint
of expediency. He concluded that if Great Britain should ask the
privilege, it would be best for the United States to agree to it and
then explain the matter to Spain. If troops should be marched across
without consent having been asked, it would be a cause of war and would
have to be resented or a great national humiliation borne. Hostilities,
he thought, should be delayed as long as possible.[371]

While these precautionary measures were being considered by the
Government at New York, instructions were being sent to the American
diplomatic agents in Europe to guide them in case of a breach between
England and Spain. On August 11 Jefferson wrote instructions for Col.
David Humphreys, whom he was sending to Europe as a secret agent of
the United States. Humphreys was to go first to London, where he
should deliver instructions to Morris, the American informal agent at
that place. After delivering these he was to proceed by way of Lisbon
to Madrid, where he should deliver instructions to Carmichael, the
American chargé at the Spanish Court.[372]

Morris had been watching the progress of the dispute between England
and Spain and had been in close touch and sympathy with French
representatives.[373] The letter which Humphreys carried instructed
Morris to intimate to the British Court in case of war that the United
States could not be indifferent to the prospect of England’s acquiring
territory in the adjoining Spanish possessions. The American Government
would contemplate a change of neighbors with extreme uneasiness. Due
balance on their borders was not less desirable to Americans than the
balance of power in Europe was to Englishmen. Jefferson wrote: “We wish
to be neutral, and we will be so if they will execute the treaty fairly
and attempt no conquests adjoining us.” Other dominions of Spain, he
declared, left them room for conquests. “If war takes place, we would
really wish to be quieted on these two points, offering in return an
honorable neutrality. More than this they are not to expect.”

This was to be communicated only in the event of war having actually
taken place.[374] Without waiting for America to broach the subject,
the Duke of Leeds had sounded Morris on the American attitude toward
the extravagant claims of Spain. The latter answered carelessly without
giving any real information. He said that Spain was apprehensive of the
Americans and would sacrifice for their friendship. He intimated that
the navigation of the Mississippi might be offered.[375] A report was
current in London that Spain had actually made this concession to the
United States.[376]

Jefferson was planning to use French mediation to secure from Spain the
opening of the Mississippi. He instructed Short, the American chargé at
Paris, to make advances for this purpose through Lafayette if war had
begun or whenever it should begin. France, he said, would be drawn into
the war only as an ally, hence she might reasonably insist that Spain
should do all in her power to keep the United States from the ranks of
the enemy.[377]

In his instructions to Carmichael Jefferson suggested that, in case
of war, the people of Louisiana and Florida would favor England. He
also suggested that it would be best for both countries if Spain
would cede the Floridas and New Orleans to the United States in
return for a guaranty of the Spanish possessions on the west bank of
the Mississippi. These matters were being pressed warmly and firmly,
the Secretary said, under the idea that the war between Spain and
Great Britain would be begun before Carmichael could receive these
instructions, and such an opportunity must not be lost.[378] As stated
in the previous chapter, Fitzherbert believed that Spain had made
friendly overtures to the United States, but thought also that they
would not be cordially received. The Spanish representative at New York
presented a letter to President Washington on August 3 which doubtless
contained the overtures to which Fitzherbert referred.[379] Very late
in the negotiations Short thought that the Spanish ambassador at Paris
was about to offer through him a concession of territory to the United
States, but the conversation was interrupted before it reached the
vital point.[380]

Humphreys delivered Jefferson’s instructions to Carmichael late in the
year. Carmichael thought that America might have obtained all of her
wishes if the Secretary’s letters had arrived early in the summer. At
that time--

    The critical state of affairs induced the Comte de Floridablanca
    to throw out those general assertions that we should have no
    reason to complain of the conduct of this Court with respect to
    the Mississippi, which gave rise to the report its navigation
    was opened. That minister had intimations from del Campo of the
    conferences between Mr. Morris and the Duke of Leeds, which
    occasioned him to say with warmth to Mr. Carmichael, “Now is the
    time to make a treaty with England.” Fitzherbert availed himself of
    these conferences to create apprehensions that the Americans would
    aid his nation in case of war.[381]

The circumstances studied in this chapter show that plans were being
formed which, if they had been carried out, would have profoundly
altered the subsequent development of the United States. They show
also that the attitude of the United States was looked upon as of
considerable importance, and influenced to a certain extent the
counsels of both of the contending parties. Incidentally it is seen
that the controversy afforded an opportunity for expressions of the
attitude of the American Government toward encroachment of European
nations on American soil. In the above quotations from Jefferson’s
letters may be found a very good statement of the principles that later
became known as The Monroe Doctrine.




CHAPTER XI.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE FAMILY COMPACT--EFFECT ON THE NEGOTIATION.


The decree of the National Assembly, in May, ordering the armament of
14 vessels of the line has been studied in a former chapter. Attention
was there called to the fact that this step was taken before Spain had
made a formal demand for assistance under the family compact. It was
also noted that the formal demand was made in the middle of June, but
that the King, fearing the consequences, had delayed laying the matter
before the Assembly.[382] On August 2, more than six weeks later, a
letter from Montmorin informed the Assembly that Spain had demanded
in the most positive manner the execution of treaties in case the
negotiation with England did not turn out as desired. The King, hoping,
for a speedy settlement, had thought it wise to defer provoking a
discussion of the matter in the National Assembly; but in view of the
continued preparations of England he could delay no longer. Therefore
he had charged the writer to warn the Assembly and thought that it
would be prudent to increase the French armament. He laid before the
Assembly the letter of the Spanish ambassador of June 16, with copies
of the letters and documents accompanying it, recounting the history
of the dispute and the negotiations to the time when it was written.
The minister asked the Assembly to deliberate on the demand of the
Court of Madrid. All of the documents were referred to the diplomatic
committee.[383]

On the next day, August 3, another letter from Montmorin notified the
Assembly that a courier from Madrid had brought news of the signature
of a declaration and counter declaration that gave hope of an amicable
settlement. Great applause greeted the announcement. The letter and
declarations were referred to the diplomatic committee. Dupont de
Nemours then announced that he had some observations to present on
the treaty with Spain known as the “family compact;” but to save the
valuable time of the Assembly he would bring them to the attention of
the Deputies by having them printed. Another Deputy announced that
he also would present some remarks on the Spanish demand in the same
manner.

Dupont, in his observations on the treaty, first announced the
principles on which he proposed to examine it. It had been made, he
said, thirty years before, when political philosophy had made scarcely
any progress. It was antiquated and inconsistent in some respects, but
these defects did not prevent its being just and salutary in principle.
Some, he said, wished to break the treaty and abandon our allies, but
reason, common sense, and honor point to the contrary--that we should
confirm it. He declared that defensive and commercial arrangements
ought to be kept, but anything involving offensive warfare ought
to be struck out. He thought that it ought to be so modified that
instead of a family it would be a national compact. Wherever the word
“crown” occurred he would substitute the word “nation,” and instead of
“the Kings agree,” etc., he would have it read “the nations (through
their Kings).” He examined the treaty article by article and measured
each by these standards. Most of the stipulations he would preserve,
with slight modifications; a few he would strike out entirely. The
stipulation which provided that the mere requisition should be
sufficient to establish the obligation of the nation called upon to
furnish the aid was wholly untenable, he declared. The need should be
first established, and the nation called upon should have the right of
judging. Instead of limiting the alliance to the House of Bourbon, he
thought that all nations having similar sentiments ought to be admitted.

The other Deputy, who presented the observations on the Spanish demand,
declared that Spain had been a faithful ally. She had taken up a
failing cause in 1761 and shared in the unhappy sacrifices of two years
later. She had aided in the American Revolution and had prepared to
assist in the trouble with the Netherlands in 1787. Gratitude would
command France to reciprocate; but he wished to appeal to reason and
not to sentiment. Spain and France were natural allies because of
common interests. The treaty of 1761, no longer a family but a national
compact, offered many advantages. Spain was still the most important
outlet for French commerce. France had profited more from the alliance
than Spain, hence was indebted to her. The financial embarrassment at
the time was serious, and a war would be dangerous, but even this ought
not to cause France to sacrifice honor. He thought that the armaments
ought to be continued and all the forces of France ought to be offered
to Spain. If this should be done, England would probably give way. The
war, if it should come, ought to have the support of all France and be
waged on new and noble principles.[384]

It was more than three weeks before the diplomatic committee was ready
to report. The principal member of the committee was Mirabeau. He was
spokesman when the report was presented to the Assembly on August 25.
He began by saying that the peace was not likely to be disturbed;
that the territory in dispute between Spain and England belonged to
neither, but to the natives; that it was not worth the loss of blood
and treasure; that France, because of internal conditions, ought to
avoid war; and that there would soon be universal peace and no need of
allies. After giving these pacific assurances, he admitted that France
ought to change her political principles, but declared that this ought
not to be done suddenly. She could not remain isolated from the world.
The suspension of treaties would be perilous. All treaties made by
the King ought to be observed by the nation until they were annulled
or changed. He recited the history of Spain’s faithful observance of
the family compact; then asked whether it would be right for France
to annul such a solemn engagement at a time when Spain was threatened
by the same danger that she had three times warded off from France.
In view of the great English armament, self-interest obliged France
to strengthen her alliance with Spain. That would require a faithful
observance of the treaty. If England did not really desire war, but was
arming simply to conduct the negotiation more favorably, increasing
the French armament would doubtless delay the result. But if the
abandonment of French engagements should force Spain to make peace with
England more promptly, a great wrong would be done to French credit and
French commerce. If England desired war, then France ought to support
Spain with all her resources. For if England should force Spain to
succumb, France would be the next object of her ambition and vengeance.
It was not proposed, he said, to ratify the compact as a whole, but
only the defensive and commercial stipulations. He proposed to notify
the King of Spain that the alliance would be preserved, and at the same
time to refer the treaty to a committee for revision, after which it
should be renewed.

The King of France was to open negotiations with the King of Spain at
once for this purpose. He also proposed that the fleet be raised to
30 ships of the line, with a proportionate number of smaller vessels.
After a few short favorable addresses on the report the discussion was
postponed to the next day.[385]

When the discussion was resumed on August 26 the report met with very
little opposition. There was a futile attempt, led by Pétion, to
postpone the decision until further information might be obtained.
L’Abbé Maury favored confirming the treaty as it stood, declaring,
rightly as events proved, that it would give England a great advantage
to leave the alliance so indefinite. Ricard considered 30 vessels too
small an armament and proposed increasing it to 45. Others favored his
idea and Mirabeau embodied it in his report. With this modification,
the decrees proposed were unanimously adopted by the Assembly. The
essential points were: First, defensive and commercial arrangements
with Spain were to be observed; secondly, negotiations were to be
opened with Spain for the purpose of renewing and perpetuating the
alliance; thirdly, the armament should be raised to 45 ships of the
line, with a proportionate number of smaller vessels.[386]

On August 30 Montmorin informed the Assembly that the King had
sanctioned the decrees and would proceed at once to carry them out.
The minister for marine, he said, had already received orders for the
armament. Only 16 vessels would be fitted out at once, which, added
to the 14 already armed, would make 30. Preparations would be made to
complete the armament to 45 if that should become necessary.[387] On
September 1 Montmorin replied to Fernan Nuñez’s letter of June 16. He
told of the action of the Assembly and inclosed a copy of the decrees.
The King, he said, was taking steps to carry them out. The reason that
only 30 ships instead of 45 would be armed immediately was to avoid
the appearance of hostility to England. The French King hoped for a
peaceful settlement and reciprocal disarmament.[388]

To one who did not scrutinize the decrees closely the action of the
Assembly seemed to be all that Spain could desire. If the support had
been tardy, yet it was enthusiastic. It seems that at heart most of the
Assembly really desired to support Spain and thought that they were
doing all that could be expected; but their irrepressible tendency to
theorize blinded them to the practical. Apparently they did not realize
that their proposal to modify the treaty at such a critical time
nullified it as far as any immediate assistance under it was concerned.
It seems possible that if Mirabeau had stood firmly for ratifying
the treaty as it was he might still have carried the Assembly with
him.[389]

The French Government was anxious regarding the effect that the action
of the Assembly might have on England. The French view of England’s
conduct was well expressed in a letter from Montmorin to Luzerne, the
ambassador from France to the English Court. After remarking that
the British Court would probably be astonished at the decrees, he
explained that the step was necessary to sustain the honor of France.
It had not been taken precipitately, he said, but had been delayed
as long as possible, even provoking complaints from Spain. When it
was learned that Spain had given satisfaction to England, and still
the latter refused to disarm, the French Government was compelled to
suppose that the British Cabinet had some ulterior purpose and was not
certain that it did not concern France. Either England did not wish to
terminate the Nootka affair justly or she had other objects, for which
this was to furnish a stepping-stone. If it was a question of Spain,
France was interested in saving her ally; if the French themselves were
concerned, argument was unnecessary. Luzerne was to use these arguments
with Leeds and Pitt. He was also to use confidentially the fact that
the Assembly had decreed a larger armament than the Government had
asked. This, Montmorin remarked, ought to make an impression. Luzerne
might again suggest French intervention, but with much circumspection,
since it had been refused before.[390] On the day after writing the
above private instructions for the ambassador, Montmorin asked him to
assure the English King that the armaments were purely precautionary
and had no object except those designated by the Assembly. The French
King hoped for a peaceable settlement. He had been pleased with the
declaration and counter-declaration, but would have been more pleased
if a proportionate disarmament had followed, or at least an agreement
not to increase the armaments.[391]

Gower, the British ambassador at Paris, had promptly expressed to
Montmorin his surprise at the action of the Assembly. He reported on
August 27 to his Government that Montmorin was surprised also, and had
told him that orders would be given to commission more ships, “but
that it would be done (this he said in the utmost confidence) avec
le plus grande lenteur.”[392] A dispatch of the next day hinted that
Spanish money might have influenced the Assembly.[393] On September 1
instructions were sent from London telling Gower to renew the English
assurances of friendliness for France, but to observe that it would be
impossible for the harmony to continue if France should support Spain.
He was to represent that any aid or encouragement to Spain would be a
cause of umbrage to England, since it would make a just settlement more
difficult.[394] On September 4 Gower presented a memorial demanding
an explanation of the armament.[395] Montmorin’s letter to Luzerne of
August 28, referred to above, was presented to the English Court on
September 7.[396] On September 10, in reply to Gower’s of the 4th,
Montmorin referred the English Court to a letter written September 9
to Luzerne, which the latter would present. For some reason Luzerne
delayed handing this to the British Court, and on September 21 Gower
was instructed to demand a formal reply to his memorial. When this
demand reached Paris, Montmorin was out of the city. Having returned,
he answered, October 4, that he did not understand Luzerne’s delay. He
declared that France had no wish to influence the negotiations, but in
case the matter could not be amicably settled she might be compelled
to support Spain. Before this reached London Gower had been instructed
to demand that the French fleet make no move to join the Spanish. On
October 14 Montmorin agreed that no movement should be made until
England should have received a reply from Spain to the ultimatum which
the British Court had sent a few days before.[397] Hugh Elliot was sent
secretly as a special English agent to argue with the French Court
against supporting Spain. He met members of the diplomatic committee
and thought, at least, that he had converted them to the English view.
W. A. Miles coöperated with Elliot in this undertaking. Only obscure
and mysterious references to their mission are extant, and many
curious speculations have been made concerning it.[398]

Before news reached Madrid of the action of the National Assembly
negotiations had begun for a final settlement of the Nootka question.

The declaration and counter declaration signed late in July had been
accepted by England as affording the satisfaction demanded. This had
opened the way for a pacific discussion of the respective rights to
Nootka and the neighboring coast.[399] On September 8 Fitzherbert
presented to Floridablanca the first projet of a treaty. It had been
formulated in London three weeks earlier and had been sent with
instructions to the British ambassador. These instructions declared
it to be the purpose of the British Government to avoid requiring
Spain to make any mortifying renunciation of rights, but at the same
time the stipulations were to be so worded that they would not imply
an admission of the Spanish claims by the British Government. It was
impossible for His Majesty to recognize them, either directly or
indirectly. They were merely a matter of pride with Spain, it was said,
and were really a source of weakness rather than of strength.[400]

When Fitzherbert submitted the projet he inclosed with it extended
observations on each article. The preamble, as it had been worded by
the British ambassador, declared a desire to form a convention which
would settle the present differences and avoid such disputes for the
future. On this he observed that the Court of London thought that would
be the best means of settlement which, without formally pronouncing on
the opposing pretensions, should regulate the respective positions of
the two Crowns for the future. If British subjects could be assured
of the free exercise of their rights in the Pacific, the English King
would not be reluctant to establish all possible rules to prevent
illicit commerce with Spanish possessions. The Court of London was
persuaded that a Cabinet so wise as that of Spain could not seriously
have advanced such vast pretensions.

The first article declared that British subjects should be replaced in
possession of the ships and lands of which they had been deprived at
Nootka by a Spanish officer toward the month of April, 1789.[401] The
observations on this gave the English arguments against the claim of
Spain to exclusive dominion over the coasts in question. The English
Court could not admit the justice of an exclusive sovereignty over
so vast a coast, which since its discovery had without interruption
been frequented by British subjects and by those of other nations as
well. Spain claimed only as far as the sixty-first degree, conceding
to Russia the portion beyond. Fitzherbert insisted, with a good deal
of sagacity, that the very principle of this division demonstrated
the inadmissibility of the Spanish pretension. If Russia had acquired
rights to the coast beyond the sixty-first degree in virtue of the
establishments which her subjects had formed there, how, he asked,
could other nations be denied the opportunity of making establishments
in like manner on the parts of the coast situated below this degree and
not already occupied? As to the Spanish claim to priority of discovery,
he implied that it could be disproved, though he did not disprove it.
However, he insisted that discovery alone, without being followed up
by actual occupation, could not be admitted as furnishing a right to
possession which could operate to the exclusion of other nations.
England did not claim exclusive jurisdiction, he said. What she wished
was a reciprocal assurance of free access for both nations to the new
establishments formed or to be formed by the one or the other.

The second article, in keeping with the statement just made, declared
that between certain limits, to be named later, the subjects of
both Crowns should exercise their commerce without hindrance in the
establishments of either.

The third article declared that England would employ efficient means
to prevent such access being made a pretext for illicit commerce with
Spanish colonies. With this in view it was stipulated that between
certain limits, to be named later, British subjects should make no
establishments, and that they should not approach within a certain
distance of the coast between these limits. Fitzherbert observed
that the purpose of this was to assure to Spain the rights of domain
over all places in actual possession of her subjects. It was desired
to make this as favorable to the Spanish pretensions as possible.
He proposed as the northern limit of Spanish exclusive dominion the
thirty-first degree. This would have left to Spain not quite all of
Lower California. He suggested that the boundary should run east on
this degree to the Colorado River, follow that river to its source, and
then run northeast to the nearest point on the Missouri. Spain should
have exclusive dominion of the coast from the above-mentioned parallel
southward to within about 10° of Cape Horn. In his private instructions
Fitzherbert was authorized to yield a little if necessary. He might
accept as the northern limit the fortieth parallel from the Pacific to
the Missouri. He thought that the distance within which British ships
should not approach ought to be 5 leagues. On this point his private
instructions allowed him to yield to 8 or even 10 leagues.

The fourth article provided that everywhere else in the Pacific the
subjects of both Crowns should enjoy freedom of navigation and fishery,
with the privilege of landing on the coasts to trade with the natives
or form establishments in unoccupied places. It was thought, he said,
that this would be the best way to prevent injurious competition in
making settlements. This principle was to be applied to the Nootka
settlement also, when that should have been returned to Great Britain.
On this, he said, no further observations were necessary. It was a
natural consequence of the foregoing stipulations. This would have
meant, had it been conceded, that England and Spain would have had
equal rights to all of the coast north of Lower California. The fifth
article referred to making establishments in South America, and was not
considered essential by the British Cabinet. The sixth referred to the
exchange of ratifications.[402]

Soon after the presentation of this projet the action of the French
Assembly became known at Madrid, and its influence must next be
considered.

A letter from Madrid of September 10 to the “Gazette de Leide” told
that a courier had just arrived from Paris with the news that a
decree had been rendered by the National Assembly for a provisional
maintenance of the family compact and for increasing the armament.
This had greatly decreased the inquietude over the English demands.
A rumor had arisen that these demands would overthrow many of the
long-established principles of Spain, for they were based on English
pretensions to a right of free navigation and commerce in the South Sea
and on the western coast of America. The expectation of such powerful
aid had produced an agreeable sensation.[403] This was the effect on
the popular mind.

Its influence on Floridablanca was very different. In submitting to a
council of the principal ministers of state the English projet of a
treaty studied above, he said that it was advisable to consider first
the relations of Spain with the principal courts of Europe. He began
with France. In referring to the portion of the decree that limited the
treaty to “defensive and commercial arrangements,” he remarked that
this expression was capable of many interpretations and equivocations.
He noticed further that even the declaration for this partial
maintenance of the treaty was made subordinate to the expression
“taking all proper precautions to preserve the peace.” If, he declared,
the deciding on what were proper precautions be left to the Assembly,
composed of so many members and with such extraordinary ideas, there
was no hope that their decision would accord with Spain’s ideas of
preserving the peace. That body might not consider the Nootka dispute
a casus foederis. It might decide that Spain was to blame, or that she
had motives of aggression, or that she had not admitted all of the
means of conciliation proposed by England. The desire of the Assembly
to negotiate a new treaty on national lines was ominous, he said.
They, of course, wished to modify or explain the old. This new system
of the sovereignty of the nation might present difficulties. The body
asserting it, the National Assembly, was itself a usurper. Referring
to the provision for arming 45 ships of the line, he called attention
to the fact that the reason assigned was not that of supporting Spain.
The decree declared that the armament was in consideration of the
armaments of various nations of Europe, and was for the security of
French commerce and French colonial possessions. Finally, he declared,
even if the Assembly really wished to aid Spain it was doubtful whether
it could do so, on account of the lack of funds and on account of the
disorders of the country. If aid should be sent, the insubordination
of the French sailors would be in danger of contaminating the Spanish
and would impede their own usefulness. He concluded that there was very
little hope of aid. Only in case that England attacked France would
there be any reasonable hope of assistance.

After discussing the unhappy relations with France, the minister took
up each of the other nations in turn. Prussia and the Netherlands
were allies of England, so must be counted as enemies. Of the small
States, the Courts of Lisbon, Naples, and Turin could be counted on as
friendly neutrals. All that could be hoped for from Turkey, Tripoli,
and Algiers was that they would not injure Spain; but not so with
Tunis and Morocco, which were actually threatening and were probably
being reckoned on by England. The Court of Vienna was not open to new
enterprises of war or new alliances. Sweden would not be a safe ally,
and besides would demand a subsidy. Denmark also would have to be
subsidized, and then would join only in case that Russia entered also.
The latter was already engaged in war with Sweden[404] and Turkey, and
was being menaced by England and Prussia. In the absence of money and
support she would have to yield. If Spain had a full treasury to open
to Russia and would enter a war against England, engaging her Baltic
fleet, there was no doubt that Catherine II would form an alliance. But
Spain had not the treasury and was not in a position to undertake a
war for the benefit of Russia. If, however, Spain could not honorably
avoid war and should be attacked, some arrangement with Russia for
reciprocal aid would be useful. Steps had been taken with that in view,
but nothing definite had been done. The United States would be useful
allies, since they could harass English commerce and threaten Canada.
They had been sounded and seemed not unfavorable. But they would desire
the navigation of the Mississippi, which would open to them a door for
contraband trade with Mexico. And besides this they might in the end be
enabled to insist on the boundary of Florida which they had unjustly
arranged with England, usurping a large part from Spain.

After considering the foreign relations of Spain, Floridablanca
reminded the ministers that they ought also to reflect on internal
affairs--the army, the navy, the treasury, and economic conditions. The
army was weak, he said, but could soon be increased as much as would be
necessary in a maritime war. The navy was well equipped at the time,
but provision would have to be made for reënforcements and supplies.
All of this would occasion much expense, and the treasury was scarcely
sufficient for peace. It would be necessary to have recourse to credit.
Bad harvests and weak administration of justice, he said, had increased
the cost of provisions. New taxes could not be imposed without causing
resistance, especially in view of the evil example of France.

These reflections on the conditions of Spain at home and abroad, the
Count said, would have to be kept in mind in considering the plan for
a convention which England had proposed. On the other hand, they must
not lose sight of the loss that would be caused to the rights of Spain
in the two Americas. They must remember the danger to Spanish commerce
and navigation and to the quietude of the colonial establishments.
They must also consider the evil example that would be given to other
nations by a concession to Great Britain, as well as “the incentive
to England to increase her pretensions and exact other condescensions
if we enter easily into the first.”[405] From these reflections it is
evident that Floridablanca had decided to yield to England, but with at
least a show of resistance.

Such a communication from the prime minister to the Council of
State would lead one to infer that the Spanish Court was about to
desert the French alliance, and was willing to sacrifice something
for the friendship of England. But if this is only an inference the
communications with the English ambassador at about the same time leave
no doubt of the fact. At a conference on September 13 Floridablanca
declared to Fitzherbert that His Catholic Majesty regarded the National
Assembly with the utmost horror. He was extremely averse to adopting
the kind of treaty proposed by that body. He feared for the influence
on his own authority that a recognition of the French Assembly would
have. If, however, England should press too hardly in the present
conjuncture, the Count declared, Spain would be compelled to accept the
alliance of France on any condition. But if an accommodation could be
speedily arranged, His Catholic Majesty intended to reject the treaty
proposed by the French Assembly and to establish an intimate concert
and union with England. The Count informed the British ambassador that
he had submitted the latter’s projet and observations to the Council
of State. That body had decided that it would be necessary to send to
America in order to locate definitely the northern and southern limits
of the Spanish settlements as proposed. Since this would delay the
settlement of the Nootka affair, he suggested the immediate conclusion of
a preliminary agreement, which would secure to Great Britain by general,
but sufficient, stipulations, the objects that she had in view. This
would put a stop to the armaments, give time to arrange a system of union
between Spain and England, and allow His Catholic Majesty to disengage
himself entirely from France.[406]

At this conference, on September 13, Floridablanca had said that
he would present a plan for the temporary settlement which he had
suggested. Fitzherbert had found it best in his dealings with the
Spanish Court to be first on the ground. Consequently on the following
day he sent to the Count a projet for the proposed temporary agreement.
On the same evening Floridablanca presented his plan in the form
of a counter-projet. The next day, September 15, they held another
conference to consider the plans. The English ambassador labored in
vain to induce the Spanish minister to admit some alterations in the
latter’s plan, so that it would be acceptable to the British Court.
The Count insisted that he had conceded all that his colleagues and
the King would allow him to grant. He earnestly requested Fitzherbert
to transmit it to the Duke of Leeds in its existing form. He felt
confident that the terms would be accepted by the Court of London. As
a means of shortening by some weeks the continuance of the present
expensive armaments, he would send instructions authorizing Campo, the
Spanish ambassador at London, to sign it in case His Britannic Majesty
should approve it.[407] Since neither of these plans was accepted, it
is not necessary to study their terms in detail.

This shows the influence that the action of the French Assembly had on
the relations of the three countries. In view of it, Spain despaired
of getting any assistance from France, and, further, it promised to
be the occasion for a rearrangement of alliances, Spain breaking the
traditional union with France and arranging an intimate alliance with
England.[408]




CHAPTER XII.

ENGLISH ULTIMATUM--SPANISH DEFIANCE.


In the middle of October the “Gazette de Leide” printed a letter from
Madrid, dated September 24, saying:

    We are assured that the negotiation with England is in a good way
    and is about to terminate in a friendly manner.[409]

This was written a few days after the Spanish Court had decided to
abandon the family compact and form an intimate alliance with England
as studied in the last chapter. The next issue of the same paper
printed a letter from London, dated October 12, which had a very
different tone:

    The warlike appearances have greatly increased in the last eight
    days. The next dispatches from Fitzherbert, replying to the last
    English demand, will probably decide for peace or war. On our side
    all preparations for a rupture have already been made.[410]

This was written a fortnight after news had reached London of
Spain’s proposed change. Instead of receiving the friendly advances
of the Spanish Court in the spirit in which Floridablanca hoped,
and apparently expected, the Court of St. James accepted them as an
announcement that the French alliance had failed, and an acknowledgment
that Spain was at the mercy of England. This is really what they
meant. Instead of following Spain’s example and giving up some of
her pretensions, England took advantage of Spanish helplessness and
gave Spain ten days to decide whether she would accept war in the
face of almost insurmountable difficulties, or peace with humiliating
concessions. Much discontent had arisen in England at the length
to which the negotiation was being drawn out. It was considered
inconsistent with the decisive tone at the beginning. The object to
be gained was thought to be hardly worth such an expensive armament
continued for so many months. The ministry was being severely
criticised, and felt the necessity of forcing a decision.[411]

Although feeling keenly the criticism of the armament, yet the
Government was unwilling to disarm until Spain should have yielded.
On September 10, in consequence of the repeated requests from Spain
for a mutual disarmament, Leeds directed Fitzherbert to represent to
Floridablanca that, with every wish for an amicable adjustment, it did
not appear to the British Government expedient to disarm until such
adjustment should be secured.[412] For the same reason the ministry was
unwilling to accept any temporary arrangement, such as Floridablanca
had suggested, which would postpone the final settlement to a later
date. Consequently, on October 2 two drafts of a treaty were sent to
Fitzherbert. They contained substantially the same terms except that
one provided for the definite demarkation of the limits of Spanish
exclusive sovereignty, and the other did not. These embodied Great
Britain’s ultimatum. Fitzherbert was to give the Spanish Court ten days
in which to decide on an answer. If at the end of that time an answer
had not been received the ambassador was to quit Madrid.

After sending the ultimatum the British Court redoubled its energies
in preparing for war. One is almost led to believe, from the vigor
displayed, that war was desired and that the ultimatum was prepared
with the deliberate intention of forcing a breach. In a letter of
October 22 Leeds asked Auckland, the British ambassador at The Hague,
to communicate to the Government of the Republic the probability
of a rupture. He expected in a few days to send copies of all the
correspondence relating to the discussion that Auckland might lay
them before the Dutch Government. Although it might happen, he said,
that England would be obliged to commence the hostilities, yet he had
no doubt that every circumstance would convince mankind that “Great
Britain was not the aggressor in the war which may, in a few days,
disturb the general tranquillity.” After speaking of the cordiality of
the Dutch Government, he continued:

    It will also, I trust, be understood in Holland how material it
    is to enable us to act with vigor in the outset. I therefore hope
    that there will be no difficulty in furnishing some naval succors
    before the expiration of the two months stipulated. It would be to
    be wished, if possible, that a detachment be sent immediately on the
    news of hostilities, and that it should amount to 8 ships of the
    line and 8 frigates. If, however, so much can not be obtained, even
    a less number will be a material object.[413]

A notion of the popular view of the impending war may be gleaned from a
letter written by Storer to Auckland on the same day that the secretary
for foreign affairs wrote the one just studied. Storer said that all
of the officers were in high spirits at the prospect of a voyage to
Mexico. He thought that the Nootka affair was merely a pretext for a
war that had been previously determined upon. He said:

    Pitt is tired of peace. He bullied France so effectually three years
    ago[414] that he is determined to try the same thing with Spain.

He thought that the negotiators themselves did not know what would
happen.[415] If the British ministers were not actually trying to force
a war, it is, at least, evident that they were willing to accept it
should it come; and that they were not willing to make any considerable
concessions to preserve peace.

The ultimatum, with instructions for his private guidance, reached
Fitzherbert October 12. He was told that Floridablanca’s proposal for a
temporary agreement was not admissible since it would leave the matter
open to a subsequent discussion. It was important that it should be
settled at once. If Floridablanca’s proposal had not been accompanied
by assurances that indicated a sincere desire for accommodation with
England, it would have been doubtful, he was told, whether anything
could have been hoped from a further continuance of the negotiation.
The prospect for a speedy settlement and the chance for dissolving
the family compact compensated largely for the inconvenience of
further delay, but that delay could be only for a few days. The
Count’s committing himself on points of so much delicacy indicated
that the Spanish Court had determined to go a considerable length.
His language respecting France was consistent with his character.
The temporary arrangement proposed by him admitted the British claims
in general terms, but the indefiniteness of its terms would leave
ground for disputes. Fitzherbert was to remind the Count that he
had, in principle, admitted the justice of the British claims. The
present articles, he was told, did no more than to secure definitely
those rights. Their rejection would be considered as a proof either
that Spain was not sincerely desirous of an accommodation or that
she was unwilling to grant distinctly the security which the Spanish
minister had argued to be in fact contained in the articles which he
had suggested. The question as to security of navigation, commerce,
and fisheries in that part of the world depended on whether Spain
did or did not insist on her exclusive claim to the continent in
question and the seas adjacent. This could be decided as well at one
time as another. The question of restitution should depend on whether
Spain rested her case on her pretended exclusive sovereignty or prior
discovery, or whether she could prove that she had actual occupation
of Nootka prior to the time when lands were purchased and buildings
erected there by British subjects.[416] The only matter that could
afford an excuse for delay was the determination of limits. Such an
article would seem to be desirable to both sides, but His Britannic
Majesty would not object seriously to the omission of such demarkation.
The great expense of maintaining the armament ready for service and the
just expectations of the public could not admit of further delay in
coming to a decision on the question of peace or war. Fitzherbert was
to communicate this fact to Floridablanca in the least offensive but
the most explicit manner possible. Ten days was considered a sufficient
time for the Spanish answer.

On the question of disarming in the event of an amicable settlement,
Leeds suggested that mutual confidence would be a stronger security
than any formal stipulations. England did not wish to reduce to a
peace establishment at once, on account of the French armament and
because of the fact that Russia seemed unwilling to adopt a moderate
policy toward Turkey. It was incumbent on the allies to prevent the
dismemberment of Turkey.[417]

On October 13, the next day after receiving the above instructions
and the projets of a convention accompanying them, Fitzherbert had a
conference with the Spanish minister, at which the latter’s language
led the former to doubt the possibility of an amicable settlement. At
an interview on the following day the British minister presented parts
of the drafts of the ultimatum. The Count’s reception of these was so
unfavorable that Fitzherbert thought best to warn all of the British
consuls in Spain of the prospect of an immediate rupture. He wrote to
his home Government that it seemed impossible to obtain a convention
with a demarcation of limits. That no means of effecting a pacification
might be left untried, Fitzherbert delivered to Floridablanca on
October 15 a translation of the entire projet without the demarcation
of limits. The Count’s reply of the next day was still in terms
extremely wide of the English proposals, but it revived Fitzherbert’s
hopes of engaging the Spanish minister by degrees to accede to His
Britannic Majesty’s demands.[418]

In this reply of October 16 Floridablanca said that there were
considerable difficulties in the way of agreeing to the English projet.
He submitted some observations justifying some small but substantial
changes which he had suggested. He remarked that the British projet,
in demanding that the buildings and lands should be restored to the
British subjects, assumed that they had once possessed them. He
declared that this assumption was untrue; that the British subjects
had only been attempting to make an establishment, from which the
Spanish commander had prevented them. If they had ever bought land, as
pretended, they had failed to take possession of it.

Before examining Floridablanca’s observations further it may be well
to remark that this was the point of fact on which it was impossible
for the two Courts to agree. Each relied on the statements made by its
own subjects and these statements were conflicting. Meares told of his
purchase of land and his erection of a building thereon in 1788 in such
a manner as to lead the British Cabinet to believe that he had formed
a substantial English settlement, and that the establishment was still
there in the spring of 1789 when Martinez arrived. On the other hand,
Martinez’s account showed that when he arrived at Nootka there were no
evidences of any British establishment, but that the expedition under
Colnett, which arrived two months later, came to form an establishment.
Neither was wholly right nor wholly wrong.[419]

Floridablanca said that it was very difficult and almost impossible for
Spain to consent that British subjects should land in unoccupied places
to trade with the natives and form establishments. Places without a
substantial Spanish occupation, he said, might be found almost anywhere
along the coast of America. This clause, he said, ought to be omitted
from the projet. Fitzherbert had proposed that British vessels should
not approach within 10 leagues of places occupied by Spain. The Count
insisted that the distance was too short. Instead of the expression,
“occupied by Spain,” he would substitute the expression, “belonging to
Spain.” With his observations the Spanish minister submitted a counter
projet which embodied them. In his letter accompanying these documents,
Floridablanca said that he had proposed a special junta to consider
the English propositions. However, if Fitzherbert would agree to the
Spanish counter projet, he would venture to propose it to the King
and see if the matter could not be settled before the meeting of the
junta.[420]

The Spanish minister had decided that Spain would have to yield to
the English demands. He was directing his efforts toward an attempt
to induce the British ambassador to modify those demands so that they
would give as little offense as possible to Spanish pride. But other
Spanish officials were not so ready to yield as the prime minister was.

Fitzherbert did not accept the count’s terms. He insisted on the
British projet as it stood. The special junta was summoned. It
was composed of eight of the principal ministers, not including
Floridablanca. The order naming the members was dated October 19.
The next day a note requested them to hasten, for the ambassador was
very urgent. Sessions were held on the 21st, 22d, 24th, and 25th. The
English projet was examined article by article.

The findings of the junta furnish an excellent notion of the feeling
of Spaniards respecting the dispute. It was declared that Martinez’s
conduct at Nootka had not been contrary to international law nor an
insult to the English flag. What he had done was to prevent the forming
of an establishment in a place belonging to the Spanish dominions, in
which, by virtue of treaties made before all Europe and guaranteed
by England herself, no foreign disembarkation was permitted without
a just motive, and much less the forming of military or commercial
establishments. Even granting that the proceedings of Martinez had
been culpable, and, by a distortion of ideas, that the resistance to
a usurpation could be considered an insult, Spain had already given
England such satisfaction as was compatible with her dignity. The
increasing of the British pretensions while the Spanish were being
moderated showed that the Nootka affair was only a mask to cover
England’s hostile designs of taking advantage of the revolution in
France to attack the divided House of Bourbon.

Referring to a clause in the British projet providing for the return
of any vessels that might have been seized since April, 1789, the
conclusions of the junta declared that this showed England’s design of
sending new expeditions. They would not limit themselves to fisheries
nor to trading with the natives. They intended to form fortified
establishments and construct vessels there to carry on trade with
all of New Spain. Their first aggressions would lead to others. The
weak and extended Spanish dominions afforded opportunities for their
activity. There were many places that Spain had not been able and
probably never would be able to people. The English pretension was
the more irritating since it extended also to all the coasts of South
America. If Spain should grant their demands she might expect in the
end to surrender to them all of the commerce of Peru and New Spain.

The English offer of not allowing their subjects to approach within 10
leagues of any place occupied by Spain was useless, the junta declared,
since they demanded the privilege of disembarking in all unoccupied
places. By this means they could approach insensibly to those that were
occupied. If the Spanish governors should attempt to prevent them, it
would lead to disputes and to new negotiations which would afford new
opportunities for aggressions. They would finally take all of these
countries from Spain.

The English assumption of rights in South America was branded as an
infamous artifice. Although Spain had for three centuries been in
exclusive and peaceful possession of all South America, the English
were now pretending that they had equal rights to unoccupied places.
Appealing directly to the King, they said:

    Strange, astonishing, unheard-of it is, Señor, that England should
    dare to pretend that Your Majesty should authorize and adopt a
    stipulation which prohibits mutually the forming of establishments
    there as long as the subjects of other powers shall not attempt to
    do so; adding that the respective subjects shall have the right of
    disembarking in those places and building huts and other temporary
    structures for objects connected with their fisheries. … The English
    pretend that all South America is open to all nations, and that its
    territories shall belong to the first that desires to occupy them.

England, they declared, was now exacting more than she had dared to
ask in 1763, when she had so great an advantage. She had forgotten
her guaranty in the treaty of Utrecht that Spain’s American dominions
should be restored as they had been in the reign of King Charles II,
and should remain in that condition. If Spain should grant these
privileges to England, other nations would claim them under the
“most-favored-nation clause” of the same treaty.

The King was asked to consider how his father had resisted England when
there was much less at stake and when the Spanish army and navy were
in no better condition. In case of war England’s attention, they said,
would be directed not against the Peninsula, but against the colonies.
Havana Vera Cruz, Cartagena, Porto Rico, Santo Domingo, Trinidad,
Caracas, Montevideo, and Buenos Ayres were considered likely points of
attack. All of these were declared ready to defend themselves because
of their superior garrisons and of climatic and strategic advantages.

Floridablanca had inclosed with other papers for the junta a copy of
the observations on Spain’s relations to other powers, which he had
prepared early in September on receipt of the news of the decree of
the National Assembly.[421] Because of the frankness shown in other
matters the junta said that they were encouraged to volunteer their own
observations on this. Speaking of Prussia as England’s most powerful
ally, they said that her King was not in a position to dictate terms
to all of the northern powers, consequently he would have to consider
his own defense. In view of this and of the existing state of Turkish
affairs they concluded that England’s position was not an especially
strong one. As to possible support for Spain, they said that France
could not be blind to her interests and to her obligations under the
family compact. To avoid the evil effects on the Spanish fleet of
insubordination in the French navy the two could operate separately.
Spain could probably not get any aid from the United States. Neither
were they likely to join England. Portugal could not aid except by
remaining neutral. There was nothing to ask or expect from Sardinia,
Naples, Venice, or Turkey, and the African states ought to give little
concern. As to Russia they were more hopeful. They suggested that it
would not be impossible for Spain, by offering commercial advantages,
to enter an alliance with Russia, Sweden, and Denmark and secure their
help against England. They respectfully submitted to the King and his
prime minister the idea of a treaty with Russia defining territorial
limits on the western coast of America and guaranteeing each other
against English aggressions on that coast.

The junta then offered several observations on the harshness of the
English demands. England was offering nothing, they said, in return
for the sacrifices demanded of Spain. She had turned a deaf ear to
Spain’s repeated requests for a reciprocal disarmament, hence there
was good reason to fear that she was trying to force a breach. It was
plain that she intended to form new establishments in the Spanish
dominions. She proposed to deprive Spain of the power of repelling the
intrusions which she meditated by allowing no recourse except a report
of the matter to the home governments and a new convention in each
case. This would mean subjection and a continual state of war. She was
inviting other nations to help her despoil Spain. She was insisting
on the establishment of a principle which would allow usurpations in
every uninhabited place. The whole Spanish dominions would shortly be
destroyed. Her demands were as injurious as could be made after the
most disgraceful war. If this cession should be made through fear in
a time of profound peace, it would encourage still greater claims.
Authorized by such a document other nations would form common cause,
and the vast continent of the Indies would be exposed to a general
occupation. Even in an unfortunate war Spain would only have to come
to an understanding with her enemies, and there would be hope for
favorable alliances and better terms with less sacrifices.

Finally the junta gave their conclusions as to the answer that should
be made to England’s ultimatum. The concessions now demanded, they
said, would inevitably lead Spain into a war. She would then suffer
all that the King now wished to avoid, and England would certainly
accept no less afterwards. In case that this projet should be rejected
and war should ensue, what treaty, it was asked, could be concluded
more absolutely ruinous, even in the remote chance of complete
prostration, than the convention which was now proposed? Therefore the
junta could not in any manner accept the unjust terms contained in
the English ultimatum. They recognized that this would mean war. They
advised preparation at once to repel hostile attacks and an immediate
search for allies even before giving a final answer to the English
ambassador.[422]

On October 25, the day of the last session of the junta, its
conclusions were hurried off to Floridablanca to be laid before the
King. Their reception and influence on the negotiation will be studied
in the next chapter.[423]




CHAPTER XIII.

THE NOOTKA SOUND CONVENTION--ITS RECEPTION AND RESULTS.


After submitting the English ultimatum to the extraordinary junta, as
studied in the last chapter, Floridablanca continued his conferences
with Fitzherbert. He made strenuous efforts to induce the British
ambassador to modify the English demands. In the first article, which
declared that the buildings and lands on the Northwest Coast should
be restored to the British subjects, the Count pressed earnestly for
the insertion of the clause, “notwithstanding the exclusive rights
which Spain has claimed.” This would have been almost tantamount to
a recognition of the Spanish claim. Fitzherbert would not consent to
it. But since the declarations of July had expressly reserved the
discussion of those rights, and since the Spanish minister would not be
content without some reference to them in the convention, the British
ambassador consented to mention them in the preamble. Consequently, he
proposed the insertion of the clause, “laying aside all retrospective
discussion of the rights and claims of the two parties.” He was very
careful to word it so that there would not be in it any admission of
the justice of the Spanish claim. After some hesitation the Count
accepted it.

In the second article Fitzherbert consented to the omission of one
word. The projet had provided that “for all other acts of violence or
hostility,” etc., reparation should be made. The Count objected to the
word “other” as an unnecessary and invidious reference to the action
of Martinez at Nootka in 1789, in view of the fact that satisfactory
reparation for it had already been made. The British ambassador
consented to omit “other.” The Spanish minister attempted to limit this
reparation to offenses committed “on the said continent and the islands
adjacent.” Fitzherbert would not agree. This would not have included
the violence recently done to Captain Macdonald in the West Indies,
mentioned in the last chapter. England apprehended other similar
seizures, and such would not have been unnatural under the strained
relations existing between the two countries for so many months.

The last clause of the third article, making the privilege of landing
anywhere on the coast subject to the restrictions contained in the
following articles, was not in the draft _without_ a demarkation of
limits which was made the basis of the treaty, but it was in the
draft _with_ a demarkation of limits. Fitzherbert compromised on this
point and combined the two drafts. He admitted a limitation of the
privilege without obtaining a definite demarkation of the boundaries of
Spanish exclusive sovereignty. If Floridablanca had not secured this
concession, it would have meant that the English could have landed and
established colonies in any unoccupied spot on the coast of California,
Mexico, Central or South America. This concession was not included
in the draft which was examined by the special junta. It was on this
point that they so violently opposed conceding the English demands and
advised war at all hazards instead.

In the fourth article, regarding the limit of 10 leagues within
which English vessels should not approach Spanish establishments,
Floridablanca pressed very earnestly for extending the distance to
15 leagues. As a precedent for his contention, he cited the treaty
of 1763 between England and France, which fixed 15 leagues as the
distance within which French fishermen might not approach the coasts
of Cape Breton. He suggested the insertion of the words “in the said
seas,” which would confine this restriction to the Pacific. Fitzherbert
embodied the last mentioned suggestion, since he conceived that it
might be of advantage to the English fisheries on the Atlantic coasts
of Spanish America, but he would not admit the extension to 15 leagues.
His private instructions, as mentioned in the last chapter, had named
5 leagues as the distance to be first proposed, but had allowed him to
concede 8 or even 10.

The fifth and sixth articles contained the stipulations upon which
there was the most difficulty in agreeing. In the course of their
discussion the negotiation was frequently on the point of being broken
off. Floridablanca would not consent to a convention that failed to
secure to Spain her exclusive intercourse with her establishments.
Neither would he consent to fix any precise line as the boundary of
the Spanish possessions, either on the north or the south. He pleaded
insufficient information. Fitzherbert wrote to the British Cabinet
that the language of the Spanish minister on both of these points was
so firm and decisive as to make it evident beyond a doubt that the
alternative of peace or war rested on finding or not finding a solution
of these difficulties. Neither of the two drafts of the English
ultimatum afforded a solution. The one provided that the subjects of
the two Crowns should have free access to all unoccupied places and
to all establishments formed since April, 1789, or to be formed north
of a fixed line on the Northwest Coast and south of a fixed line on
the South American coast. The other, omitting any reference to fixed
limits, provided that this privilege should extend to the whole Pacific
coast of North and South America.

In order to solve this difficulty the English ambassador admitted the
restriction at the end of the third article, mentioned above. For the
same purpose he consented to insert in the fifth article the clause,
“situated to the north of the parts of the said coast already occupied
by Spain.” This preserved the Spanish exclusive dominion as far
northward as her most northern establishment. The provision in article
6 was materially changed. The draft of the ultimatum had provided that
the subjects of neither nation should make any establishment south
of a definite line to be fixed so long as no settlement should be
formed thereon by the subjects of any other power. Instead of fixing
a definite line the negotiators agreed to insert the clause, “in such
part of those coasts as are situated to the south of those parts of the
same coasts and of the islands adjacent already occupied by Spain.”
They added the provision that in such places the respective subjects
should have the right of landing and constructing temporary buildings
for purposes connected with their fisheries. The clause, “so long as
no establishments shall be formed thereon by the subjects of any other
power,” was omitted from the article. This had been objected to on the
ground that it would be virtually a public invitation to all nations
to make settlements there and so join England in despoiling Spain of
her dominions. In order to remove the Spanish objection to publicity
and still assure England that she would not be compelled to keep her
hands off while other nations should do the thing that she had bound
herself not to do, the stipulation was embodied in a secret article.
This secret clause provided that the stipulation in the sixth article
forbidding the subjects of Spain and England to make establishments
in such places should remain in force only so long as no settlements
should be formed there by the subjects of any other power.[424]

These changes having been agreed to, Fitzherbert presented to
Floridablanca on October 23 a new projet embodying them. He said
that he had conformed to the ideas of Floridablanca as far as his
instructions would permit. In order to discuss the new draft before it
should be laid before the King, the British ambassador proposed to call
on the Count in the evening of the same day.[425] When their conference
closed, the Spanish minister said that he was still in doubt whether
the reply which he should give the next morning would be for peace or
war.[426] On the morning of October 24 Floridablanca said that the King
had agreed to Fitzherbert’s terms and had promised that the convention
should be signed with the usual formalities three or four days
later.[427] The British ambassador pressed for an immediate signature,
but the minister said that he could not consent to it. The Count was at
the time with the King at San Ildefonso, whither His Majesty had gone
on a hunting trip. Fitzherbert had gone to the same place to continue
his conferences with the Count. The latter said that if the convention
should be signed while there his enemies would charge him with having
taken advantage of the fact that he was almost alone with the King to
induce His Majesty to agree to a measure contrary to the interests
of his Crown. He said also that he wished, before signing, to send a
memorial to the junta to justify himself for signing the convention
contrary to their opinion. He pledged His Catholic Majesty’s word
that the convention should be signed “verbatim et literatim.”[428] The
exchange of full powers took place on October 26, and the wording of
the titles of the two negotiators to be inserted in the preamble was
arranged on October 27.[429] According to the agreement made four days
earlier, the following convention was signed on October 28:

                    _The Nootka Sound convention._

    Their Britannic and Catholic Majesties being desirous of
    terminating, by a speedy and solid agreement, the differences
    which have lately arisen between the two Crowns, have considered
    that the best way of attaining this salutary object would be that
    of an amicable arrangement which, setting aside all retrospective
    discussions of the rights and pretensions of the two parties,
    should regulate their respective positions for the future on bases
    which would be conformable to their true interests as well as to
    the mutual desires with which Their said Majesties are animated,
    of establishing with each other, in everything and in all places,
    the most perfect friendship, harmony, and good correspondence.
    With this in view they have named and constituted for their
    plenipotentiaries, to wit, on the part of His Britannic Majesty,
    Alleyne Fitzherbert, of the privy council of His said Majesty in
    Great Britain and Ireland, and his ambassador extraordinary and
    minister plenipotentiary to His Catholic Majesty; and on the part
    of His Catholic Majesty, Don Joseph Moñino, Count of Floridablanca,
    Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Spanish Order of Charles III,
    counselor of state to His said Majesty, and his principal secretary
    of state and of the cabinet, who, after having communicated to each
    other their full powers, have agreed on the following articles:

                              ARTICLE I.

    It is agreed that the buildings and tracts of land situated on the
    Northwest Coast of the continent of North America, or on islands
    adjacent to that continent, of which the subjects of His Britannic
    Majesty were dispossessed about the month of April, 1789, by a
    Spanish officer, shall be restored to the said British subjects.

                              ARTICLE II.

    Further, a just reparation shall be made, according to the nature of
    the case, for every act of violence or hostility which may have been
    committed since the said month of April, 1789, by the subjects of
    either of the contending parties against the subjects of the other;
    and in case any of the respective subjects shall, since the same
    period, have been forcibly dispossessed of their lands, buildings,
    vessels, merchandise, or any other objects of property on the said
    continent or on the seas or islands adjacent, they shall be replaced
    in possession of them or a just compensation shall be made to them
    for the losses which they have sustained.

                             ARTICLE III.

    And in order to strengthen the bonds of friendship and to preserve
    in the future a perfect harmony and good understanding between the
    two contracting parties, it is agreed that their respective subjects
    shall not be disturbed or molested either in navigating or carrying
    on their fisheries in the Pacific Ocean or in the South Seas, or in
    landing on the coasts of those seas in places not already occupied,
    for the purpose of carrying on their commerce with the natives of
    the country or of making establishments there; the whole subject,
    nevertheless, to the restrictions and provisions which shall be
    specified in the three following articles.

                              ARTICLE IV.

    His Britannic Majesty engages to employ the most effective measures
    to prevent the navigation and fishery of his subjects in the Pacific
    Ocean or in the South Seas from being made a pretext for illicit
    trade with the Spanish settlements; and with this in view it is
    moreover expressly stipulated that British subjects shall not
    navigate nor carry on their fishery in the said seas within the
    distance of 10 maritime leagues from any part of the coast already
    occupied by Spain.

                              ARTICLE V.

    It is agreed that as well in the places which are to be restored
    to British subjects by virtue of the first article as in all other
    parts of the Northwest Coast of North America or of the islands
    adjacent, situated to the north of the parts of the said coast
    already occupied by Spain, wherever the subjects of either of the
    two powers shall have made settlements since the month of April,
    1789, or shall hereafter make any, the subjects of the other
    shall have free access and shall carry on their commerce without
    disturbance or molestation.

                              ARTICLE VI.

    It is further agreed with respect to the eastern and western coasts
    of South America and the islands adjacent, that the respective
    subjects shall not form in the future any establishment on the
    parts of the coast situated to the south of the parts of the same
    coast and of the islands adjacent already occupied by Spain; it
    being understood that the said respective subjects shall retain the
    liberty of landing on the coasts and island so situated for objects
    connected with their fishery and of erecting thereon huts and other
    temporary structures serving only those objects.

                             ARTICLE VII.

    In all cases of complaint or infraction of the articles of the
    present convention the officers of either party without previously
    permitting themselves to commit any act of violence or assault
    shall be bound to make an exact report of the affair and of its
    circumstances to their respective Courts, who will terminate the
    differences in an amicable manner.

                             ARTICLE VIII.

    The present convention shall be ratified and confirmed within the
    space of six weeks, to be counted from the day of its signature, or
    sooner if possible.

    In witness whereof we, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of their
    Britannic and Catholic Majesties, have, in their names and by virtue
    of our full powers, signed the present convention, and have affixed
    thereto the seals of our arms.

    Done at the palace of San Lorenzo the 28th of October, 1790.[430]

                                            ALLEYNE FITZHERBERT.
                                            THE COUNT OF FLORIDABLANCA.

                            SECRET ARTICLE.

    Since by article 6 of the present convention it has been stipulated,
    respecting the eastern and western coasts of South America, that the
    respective subjects shall not in the future form any establishment
    on the parts of these coasts situated to the south of the parts
    of the said coasts actually occupied by Spain, it is agreed and
    declared by the present article that this stipulation shall remain
    in force only so long as no establishment shall have been formed
    by the subjects of any other power on the coasts in question. This
    secret article shall have the same force as if it were inserted in
    the convention.

    In witness whereof, etc.[431]

Ratifications were exchanged by Floridablanca and Fitzherbert on
November 22.

       *       *       *       *       *

The fact that the convention was signed in opposition to the advice
of the special junta occasioned lively comment for several weeks in
Spanish official circles. It will be recalled from the last chapter
that the sittings of the junta were on October 21, 22, 24, and 25,
and that on the last date the junta hurried its conclusions off to
Floridablanca, advising war rather than compliance with the English
demands. From a statement in an earlier part of the present chapter,
it will be remembered that the convention was virtually concluded
between Floridablanca and Fitzherbert at their interview of October
23; and that on the next day the King pledged his word to sign the
convention as it then was.

On October 27 a letter from Floridablanca informed Iriarte, the
secretary of the junta, that the conclusions of the junta had been
received on the 25th, had been laid before the King on the 26th,
and were being considered by the Council of State. He cautioned the
members of the junta to keep the proceedings of that body absolutely
secret.[432] The Count evidently hoped to keep concealed the fact that
the convention had already been agreed upon. He did not succeed long in
doing this. On October 28 Iriarte replied to the Count’s letter of the
day before, discussing at length the latter’s injunction to secrecy.
Notes in Iriarte’s hand on slips of paper inserted later in these two
letters show that he had learned of the fact of the convention’s having
been agreed upon before the conclusions of the junta had been received,
though it had not been signed until afterwards. In proof of the fact he
referred to a circular letter which the British ambassador had written
on October 26, telling all of the English consuls in Spain that the
dispute had been settled and that the convention would be formally
signed in a few days. Another brief note similarly inserted censured
the administration very severely for accepting the English terms. It
said:

    This convention of October 28, 1790, is the first treaty that
    has been made during the reign of Charles IV, and in it has been
    conceded to England what has always been resisted and refused to all
    powers since the discovery of the Indies; and the concession means
    much to us.[433]

On November 21 Floridablanca expressed the King’s thanks to all of the
ministers that took part in the junta for their promptness and zeal.
His Majesty assured them that he would not have hesitated a moment to
carry out their recommendations if motives absolutely secret to himself
had not compelled him to order the convention signed. The Count
inclosed some reflections on the convention which His Majesty offered
in addition to the secret motives.[434]

These reflections declared that the purpose of the Convention was to
avoid a war in the present unhappy circumstances, reserving it for a
more favorable time, if it should become necessary. It did not involve
an absolute renunciation in case Spain chose not to observe it. It
was shown that by a strict interpretation of some of its terms the
Convention could be made of little value to England and little loss to
Spain. In the stipulations that granted to English subjects privileges
of commerce and settlement north or south of places already occupied,
attention was called to the expression “already occupied.” The word
“occupied” did not mean nearly so much as “inhabited” or “peopled”
would have meant, and “already” did not mean “actually” or “now.” If
a place had been once occupied and then abandoned this expression
could be made to apply to it. The implication was that formal acts
of taking possession where there had been no thought of making an
actual settlement could be made to come under this head. Such acts had
been performed practically all along the coast. Such a construction
would have almost nullified the privileges granted to England. The
reflections said further that the English were not allowed to approach
Spanish settlements and Spain had equal rights with England anywhere on
the coast. It was thought that Russia’s fear of English encroachments
would be a safeguard against England. English trade and settlements
were limited to the part of the coast north of Nootka. It was insisted
that the treaty simply recognized existing conditions; that it conceded
nothing except what had been allowed, and on the other hand obtained
concessions by limiting the privileges. It was proposed to observe the
Convention only so long as it should be to the advantage of Spain to do
so. Whenever she felt strong enough to assert her ancient rights she
could still do it.[435] The purpose of these arguments was doubtless to
quiet adverse criticism of the Convention. It was partially successful
at the time. A few days later, after the letter of Floridablanca
and the reflections had been considered, all of the ministers of the
junta sent to the King their thanks for his confidence.[436] But this
success did not last long. Criticism of the Convention continued and
finally led to the overthrow of Floridablanca. In May, 1791, the
British ambassador wrote that the Spanish prime minister was very
anxious to have England take effectual measures for preventing British
vessels from touching at Spanish ports, that his enemies might not
find new reasons for attacking him.[437] Finally, in the latter part
of February, 1792, Floridablanca was dismissed from office. The Nootka
business was said to have been the principal cause of his fall.[438]

News of the agreement to sign the convention reached London November
4. On that day Leeds wrote to Auckland that a messenger had just
arrived with a dispatch from Fitzherbert, dated October 24, saying
that the convention had been agreed upon and would be signed four days
later. A copy inclosed with this letter exactly corresponds to the
convention as signed.[439] An unofficial letter, written on the same
day by a clerk in the foreign office and accompanying this official
note, declared that the convention would speak for itself; that it
contained everything that England had demanded. The writer said that
the Spanish ministry had been decidedly for war rather than make the
sacrifice, but that Floridablanca had obtained the King’s consent while
on a hunting trip, and pledged his master’s word that the convention
would be signed on their return, that it might have the sanction of
his colleagues “pro forma.”[440] The signed convention reached London
five days later. Leeds immediately sent a copy of it to Auckland,
that the latter might lay it before the Dutch Government. The Duke
congratulated the ambassador on the happy termination of such a very
important negotiation.[441] On the day of its arrival, November 9, the
British Court ratified the convention, and hurried a messenger off to
Fitzherbert.[442] As stated above, the ratifications were exchanged at
Madrid on November 22.

On November 12 Burges, under secretary for the foreign office, wrote to
Auckland:

    That you and our Dutch friends are satisfied with the conclusion of
    the Spanish business, I am not surprised. Even the opposition here,
    always ready enough to pick holes, as you know, whenever they can,
    seem to be dumfounded, and to have nothing to say against us except
    that we have asked and carried so much that it is impossible such a
    peace can last long.

Speaking of the credit given to Fitzherbert for his success in the
negotiation and of the honor conferred upon him by his being raised to
the peerage, the same letter continued:

    Fitzherbert of course gains much glory, as all good ministers should
    who follow up their instructions, and I understand that he is
    forthwith to receive the high reward of an Irish peerage.[443]

These references are sufficient to show that the English ministry
was highly pleased with the success of the negotiation. On November
24 the mayor, the aldermen, and the commons of the city of London,
in common council assembled, assured the King of their gratitude for
the continuance of peace with Spain, and congratulated him on the
reconciliation.[444] On November 26 Parliament assembled. The King’s
speech mentioned the successful termination of the negotiation and laid
before the Houses copies of the declaration and counter declaration
and the convention.[445] On the same day the House of Lords accorded
enthusiastic thanks and congratulations.[446] Four days later the
Commons, after an extended debate and some criticisms from the
opposition, approved the address, and assured the King that provision
would be made for the expenses of the armament.[447] A general
discussion of the merits of the convention was made the order of the
day for December 13 in the House of Lords. The debate was extended, and
the criticism of the ministry by the opposition was very severe. The
friends of the Government seemed confident of the results and did not
exert themselves greatly to refute the arguments. The convention was
approved.[448] On the same day the Commons debated a motion calling for
all of the correspondence on the dispute. There were the same violent
attacks by the opposition and the same apparent indifference on the
part of the friends of the administration. The motion was defeated by
an overwhelming majority. On the next day, December 14, the merits of
the convention were discussed. The opposing sides manifested much the
same spirit, and in the end the convention was approved by a large
majority.[449]

The logical results of the convention were interfered with by England’s
taking part in the war against France within a little more than
two years after its signature. This absorbed her attention almost
continuously for twenty-two years and prevented her, to a great extent,
from taking advantage of the concessions gained. Before the end of
that period the United States had entered the contest for controlling
the Northwest Coast, and in a few years more purchased the Spanish
claim. Thereby the whole matter was merged in the Oregon controversy.
The immediate result for England was that she obtained free access to
an extended coast, of which she has since come into full possession.
For Spain, it was the first external evidence of the weakness of the
reign of Charles IV, and was the beginning of the series of disasters
which Spain successively suffered under that incompetent Monarch and
his corrupt advisers. It was the first express renunciation of Spain’s
ancient claim to exclusive sovereignty over the American shores of
the Pacific Ocean and the South Seas. It marks the beginning of the
collapse of the Spanish colonial system.[450]




CHAPTER XIV.

SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE NOOTKA SOUND
DISPUTE.


Although the convention was concluded in 1790, yet the Nootka Sound
affair was still far from settled. The first article of the convention,
agreeing to restore to British subjects the buildings and lands
which had been taken from them at Nootka, had to be carried out. The
agreement of the Spanish declaration of July 24 to indemnify the
parties concerned in the ships captured at Nootka was also still to
be fulfilled. It required a long arbitration and two new conventions
to accomplish these results, and in the meantime an intimate treaty
of alliance had been entered into for mutual protection against the
excesses of the French Revolution. It was more than four years before
these matters were finally adjusted. The present chapter will review
them briefly.

The English and Spanish Governments each appointed a commissioner to
go to Nootka and carry out the agreement of the first article of the
convention of October 28, 1790. The commissioners did not meet until
the summer of 1792. A brief statement should be made concerning the
establishment at Nootka between the events of 1789 and the meeting of
the commissioners three years later. Martinez’s abandonment of Nootka
in the fall of 1789 and his return to Mexico was discussed in a former
chapter. The plans of the Viceroy for sending a new expedition under
Eliza to reoccupy the post in the spring of 1790 were studied in the
same chapter.[451] The Viceroy feared that Nootka would be seized by
the English before his expedition could reach the place, or that an
English expedition might later attempt to wrest the post from the
Spanish.[452] His fears were not realized. The port was reoccupied
and held without opposition. During the three following seasons a
substantial Spanish settlement was formed, and, using this as a center,
exploring expeditions examined the neighboring coast.[453]

The British commissioner for carrying out the convention was Captain
Vancouver. He left England in 1791 and was to reach the Northwest
Coast in the spring of the following year. His principal business
was to explore that coast. Additional instructions concerning the
transfer of Nootka were to be sent to him later.[454] These reached
him during the summer of 1792 while he was engaged in exploring the
coast in the neighborhood of the island that later received his name.
He arrived at Nootka late in August. He found there Bodega y Quadra,
the Spanish commissioner. It would be of little value to follow in
detail the negotiations between them, since their mission accomplished
nothing. They could not agree, although, personally, a very strong
friendship sprang up between them. Vancouver expected that the entire
establishment would be transferred to England. Quadra, after careful
investigation, became convinced that the English had never purchased
nor taken possession of any land except the small plat of ground on
which Meares’s temporary house had stood in 1788. Consequently he
offered to transfer this, but no more. Vancouver refused to accept so
little and the whole matter was referred back to the Governments at
London and Madrid.[455] Having continued his survey of the coast for
two years longer, Vancouver returned to Nootka in the summer of 1794
expecting that new instructions would be awaiting him regarding the
transfer. He was disappointed. He waited two months at Nootka for them,
then went to Monterey, where he waited nearly two months more. The
English instructions still did not come, but the Spanish commissioner
had received his orders, and Vancouver was informed that a special
British commissioner had been sent for the purpose. On December 1 he
sailed for England.[456]

While the arrangements were being made to send the above commissioners
to Nootka to carry out the stipulations in the first article of the
convention, steps were also being taken to fulfill the agreement in the
declarations of July 24. The two Governments appointed commissioners
to decide on the amount of the indemnity which Spain should pay to
those interested in the ships captured at Nootka. Their negotiation
was conducted at London. The Spanish agent, Manuel de Las Heras, was
sent in May, 1791. Baron St. Helens [Fitzherbert] wrote on May 29
introducing him to Lord Grenville, who had succeeded the Duke of Leeds
in the foreign office. Heras was also consul-general to England. St.
Helens said:

    He appears to me to be very sensible, well informed, and right
    headed; so that I am persuaded that he will do his best in order to
    execute the commission with which he is charged to the satisfaction
    of both Courts.[457]

When the Spanish commissioner reached London he either misunderstood
his instructions or was intentionally very reserved regarding them. On
August 26 Grenville wrote to St. Helens:

    The sending of M. Las Heras at last without any instructions is
    really abominable, and would be reason enough, if we were so
    disposed, to refuse to hear of alliance or anything else.

He appealed to St. Helens to “make those slow Spaniards send
instructions and powers, and, above all, liberty to refer the matter
to arbitration, by which the ministers of both Courts will get it off
their hands.”[458] On receipt of this letter the British ambassador
called the attention of Floridablanca to the commissioner’s delay
in negotiating. The Spanish minister thought that the instructions
to Heras were clear and explicit; nevertheless, he sent additional
instructions on September 8 authorizing the commissioner to settle
and liquidate the damages, with the concurrence of Campo, the Spanish
ambassador. He was to give the British Court to understand that in
case of difference the Spanish King was willing to submit the matter
to arbitration. The Count had given St. Helens a copy of these
instructions and the latter sent them to Grenville, saying that they
seemed satisfactory except that the commissioner did not have authority
to settle finally without submitting the matter to the Spanish King. He
remarked that such would have been an unprecedented power and said that
His Catholic Majesty had promised to act on it immediately.[459]

It seems that the commissioners failed to agree and that the matter
was referred to a court of arbitration, which sat at or near Madrid
in the early part of the next year. On May 14, 1792, St. Helens wrote
from Aranjuez that the Nootka arbitration business was “en bon train,”
and though it was going more slowly than expected he hoped to send
dispatches concerning it in a very few days.[460] A fortnight later the
business had taken a new turn. The British ambassador wrote:

    I can not but hope that the proposal which goes by this messenger
    for settling what the Count of Aranda[461] calls the fastidious
    business of the Nootka claims by the payment of a round sum of money
    as a discharge in full will strike your fancy as much as it does his
    and mine.

The writer added that if the offer should be thought too small he was
confident that Spain would increase it ten, fifteen, or even twenty
thousand Spanish dollars. If Grenville should reject the offer and
wish the matter to revert to arbitration he said that Aranda would
facilitate it.[462] The amount offered was 200,000 Spanish dollars.
About two months later the Nootka claimants were called upon to decide
whether they wished to accept the offer or to have the matter referred
back to Madrid in hope of having the sum increased.[463] The claimants
apparently did not accept the offer. A month afterwards Dundas, the
home secretary, wrote:

    The Nootka business, I take it for granted, will get on, but it
    hangs rather unaccountably. I suspect that both sides are in some
    degree to blame.[464]

After a delay of several months more, the Spanish Court increased the
offer by $10,000. On February 12, 1793, the following convention was
signed:

                      _Nootka claims convention._

    In virtue of the declarations exchanged at Madrid on the 24th of
    July, 1790, and of the convention signed at the Escorial on the
    18th [28th] of the following October, Their Catholic and Britannic
    Majesties, desiring to regulate and determine definitely everything
    regarding the restitution of the British ships seized at Nootka, as
    well as the indemnification of the parties interested in the ships,
    have named for this purpose and constituted as their commissioners
    and plenipotentiaries, to wit, on the part of His Catholic Majesty,
    Don Manuel de Las Heras, commissary in His said Majesty’s armies,
    and his agent and consul-general in the Kingdoms of Great Britain
    and Ireland; and on the part of His Britannic Majesty, Mr. Ralph
    Woodford, Knight Baronet of Great Britain; who, after having
    communicated their full powers, have agreed upon the following
    articles:

                              ARTICLE I.

    His Catholic Majesty, besides having restored the ship _Argonaut_,
    the restoration of which took place in the port of San Blas in
    the year 1791 [1790], agrees to pay as indemnity to the parties
    interested in it the amount of two hundred and ten thousand hard
    dollars in specie, it being understood that this sum is to serve
    as compensation and complete indemnification for all their losses,
    whatever they may be, without any exception, and without leaving the
    possibility of a future remonstrance on any pretext or motive.

                              ARTICLE II.

    Said payment shall be made on the day on which the present
    convention shall be signed by the commissioner of His Catholic
    Majesty in the presence of the commissioner of His Britannic
    Majesty, which latter shall give at the same time an acknowledgment
    of payment consistent with the terms enunciated in the former
    article and signed by the said commissioner for himself and in the
    name and by the order of His Britannic Majesty and of the said
    interested parties. And there shall be attached to the present
    convention a copy of the said acknowledgment of payment, executed in
    the proper form, and likewise of the respective full powers and of
    the authorizations of the said interested parties.

                             ARTICLE III.

    The ratifications of the present convention shall be exchanged in
    this city of London within a period of six weeks from the date of
    its signature, or before if possible.

    In witness whereof we, the undersigned commissioners and
    plenipotentiaries of Their Catholic and Britannic Majesties, have
    signed the present convention in their names and in virtue of our
    respective full powers, affixing to it the seals of our arms.

    Done at Whitehall, February 12, 1793.[465]

                                                   MANUEL DE LAS HERAS.
                                                   R. WOODFORD.

During all of the time that the negotiations were in progress over
the liquidation of the Nootka claims, a treaty of alliance and
commerce between England and Spain was being discussed. The British
Court attempted to induce the Spanish Government to accept duties on
English manufactures, “instead,” as Grenville said, “of paying an
army not to prevent their being smuggled.” In the same connection he
remarked, “but that, I fear, is a trait of wisdom far beyond their
comprehension.”[466] The negotiation dragged through 1791 and 1792 and
into 1793. In the meantime Spain had twice changed prime ministers. On
the fall of Floridablanca, Aranda had succeeded him. After holding the
position for about a year Aranda was succeeded by the Duke of Alcudia,
the famous Godoy, known as the Prince of Peace, the paramour of the
corrupt Queen. The impulse that finally brought the negotiations to a
crisis was the murder of the French King by order of the Convention.
A shudder of horror passed over Europe. Four days after the death
of Louis XVI the British Cabinet decided to authorize St. Helens to
discuss a permanent alliance with the Court of Spain against the
excesses of the French Revolution. The alliance was to be commercial,
offensive, and defensive.[467] Such an alliance was concluded May
25, 1793, and ratified by the British Court on June 21 following.
Ratifications were exchanged July 5.[468]

This alliance facilitated the settlement of the Nootka business. After
the failure of Vancouver and Quadra to agree in 1792 as to what should
be surrendered at Nootka, the Governments took up the matter again.
While the negotiations for this purpose were in progress a long letter
from Revilla-Gigedo, the Viceroy of Mexico, reached Madrid. This was
the informe of April 12, 1793, to which reference has frequently been
made. Godoy, the Spanish prime minister, wrote to the Viceroy that in
view of this and other letters from the same source he had concluded a
convention with St. Helens.[469] In this long letter the Viceroy, after
having given a brief history of the Spanish operations on the Northwest
Coast, and especially the Nootka expeditions, gave an extended
discussion, the purpose of which was to show that Nootka was not worth
retaining. He dwelt on the millions that had been spent during the
past twenty-five years in erecting and sustaining new establishments
in Upper California, and discouraged attempts to occupy more distant
places. He indorsed the idea of settling the Straits of Juan de Fuca
and southward, but he thought that settlements farther north would be
a cause of anxiety and fruitless expense and would afford occasions
for quarrels and misunderstandings with England. If England wished to
maintain possession of Nootka as a point of honor, he declared that
Spain ought to yield to her. He proposed a generous surrender of the
post to the English.[470]

The convention to which Godoy referred as having been concluded by
himself with the British ambassador was signed at Madrid on January 11,
1794, and was as follows:

          _Convention for the mutual abandonment of Nootka._

    Their Catholic and Britannic Majesties desiring to remove and
    obviate all doubt and difficulty relative to the execution of
    article 1 of the convention concluded between Their said Majesties
    on the 28th of October, 1790, have resolved and agreed to order that
    new instructions be sent to the officials who have been respectively
    commissioned to carry out the said article, the tenor of which
    instructions shall be as follows:

    That within the shortest time that may be possible after the arrival
    of the said officials at Nootka they shall meet in the place, or
    near, where the buildings stood which were formerly occupied by the
    subjects of His Britannic Majesty, at which time and in which place
    they shall exchange mutually the following declaration and counter
    declaration:

                             DECLARATION.

        “I, N---- N----, in the name and by the order of His
        Catholic Majesty, by means of these presents restore to
        N---- N---- the buildings and districts of land situated
        on the Northwest Coast of the continent of North America,
        or the islands adjacent to that continent, of which the
        subjects of His Britannic Majesty were dispossessed by a
        Spanish officer toward the month of April, 1789. In witness
        whereof I have signed the present declaration, sealing it
        with the seal of my arms. Done at Nootka on the ---- day of
        ----, 179--.”

                         COUNTER DECLARATION.

        “I, N---- N----, in the name and by the order of His
        Britannic Majesty, by means of these presents declare
        that the buildings and tracts of land on the Northwest
        Coast of the continent of North America, or on the islands
        adjacent to that continent, of which the subjects of His
        Britannic Majesty were dispossessed by a Spanish officer
        toward the month of April, 1789, have been restored to me
        by N---- N----, which restoration I declare to be full and
        satisfactory. In witness whereof I have signed the present
        counter declaration, sealing it with the seal of my arms.
        Done at Nootka on the ---- day of ----, 179--.”

    That then the British official shall unfurl the British flag
    over the land so restored in sign of possession. And that after
    these formalities the officials of the two Crowns shall withdraw,
    respectively, their people from the said port of Nootka.

    Further, Their said Majesties have agreed that the subjects of
    both nations shall have the liberty of frequenting the said port
    whenever they wish and of constructing there temporary buildings
    to accommodate them during their residence on such occasions. But
    neither of the said parties shall form any permanent establishment
    in the said port or claim any right of sovereignty or territorial
    dominion there to the exclusion of the other. And Their said
    Majesties will mutually aid each other to maintain for their
    subjects free access to the port of Nootka against any other nation
    which may attempt to establish there any sovereignty or dominion.

    In witness whereof we, the undersigned first secretary of state
    and of the Cabinet of His Catholic Majesty, and the ambassador and
    plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty, in the name and by the
    express order of our respective sovereigns, have signed the present
    agreement, sealing it with the seals of our arms.

    Done at Madrid, January 11, 1794.[471]

                                                   THE DUKE OF ALCUDIA.
                                                   ST. HELENS.

The two Courts proceeded to carry out this agreement. Godoy instructed
the Viceroy of Mexico to appoint some one as the commissioner for
Spain.[472] The British commissioner was appointed later, and sent
by way of Spain, Havana, Vera Cruz, and Mexico.[473] He arrived at
La Coruna about the middle of August, 1794.[474] On November 20 he
landed at Vera Cruz, and went by way of Mexico to San Blas.[475] From
this port both commissioners sailed for Nootka. The Englishman was Sir
Thomas Pierce; the Spaniard, Manuel de Alava. They met at Nootka and
on the appointed day, March 23, 1795, carried out the above agreement.
Alava had previously destroyed the buildings of the Spanish settlement.
After the prescribed ceremonies had been performed, both the Spanish
and the English deserted the place.[476] Neither nation ever reoccupied
it. Nootka is still inhabited by Indians.




FOOTNOTES


[1] Schoell, Histoire des Traités de Paix, IV, 112.

[2] See Humboldt, Alex. von, Essai Politique, II, 460.

[3] Oscar Browning, the writer of Chapter X, in Volume VIII, of the
Cambridge Modern History, recently published, gives the least prejudiced
and most accurate account. However, it is very brief. He introduces the
Incident as an important episode in the foreign policy of Pitt. He says:
“An event occurred on the other side of the world which nearly brought
about a European conflagration.” In preparing his brief discussion he
consulted the documents in the public record office.

[4] See Duro, Armada Española, VIII, 8-16.

[5] See Hassall, The French People, 341.

[6] Richard Cadman Etches to Captain Portlock, London, September 3,
1785. (Meares, An Answer to Mr. Dixon, 10.) The instructions were not
carried out by this commander, but the same company was interested in the
expedition which reached Nootka for that purpose in 1789. Nootka Sound was
for a time called King Georges Sound by the English and San Lorenzo by the
Spanish.

[7] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 172.

[8] Sometimes written “Mears.”

[9] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.

[10] This condition and the terms on which relief was offered him by
Portlock and Dixon, who reached the place in the spring, led to a bitter
personal quarrel between Meares and Dixon, which produced several mutually
recriminating pamphlets.

[11] Meares, Voyages. Introductory voyage, i-xl. In this Meares quotes the
letters which passed between him and Portlock in May, 1787, which gave
rise to the quarrel.

[12] Id. 2.

[13] The Merchant Proprietors to John Meares, esq., Commanding the
_Felice_ and _Iphigenia_, China, December 24, 1787. (Id., Appendix I.)

[14] Id.

[15] See Chapter IV below.

[16] Meares, Memorial, Appendix to Voyages. He explains that this ruse
was at first successful, but was later discovered through the financial
failure of the Portuguese merchant who had allowed his name to be thus
used.

[17] Dixon, Further Remarks on Meares’s Voyages, 55. His hostility to
Meares prejudices any statement made by him. See above, p. 287, note b
[10].

[18] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, 1, 193. This author devotes some 10 pages
to a discussion of this expedition.

Greenhow, Oregon and California, 172-178, attempts to prove that the
expedition was purely Portuguese. His account is too prejudiced to be of
much value. The chief purpose of his book was to prove that America had a
better claim to the Oregon country than England. If this expedition had
been purely Portuguese, England could have acquired no possible claim
through it.

[19] Meares. Voyages, 2, 3.

[20] Id., 88.

[21] Id., 104. This date should probably be changed to May 12. When the
English and Spanish not at Nootka in 1789 their calendars were one day
apart. (See below, p. 312, note a [82].) Since there are no conflicting
dates given for the events at Nootka in 1788, those found in the journals
of the English commanders are followed.

[22] Id., 114.

[23] The purchase is confirmed in the information of William Graham,
London, May 5, 1790 (inclosure No. VI, with Meares’s Memorial, appendix
to Voyages). It was also confirmed by Duffin in conversation with
Vancouver in 1792. (Vancouver, Voyages, II, 370-372). Both of these have
strong English prejudices. The purchase is denied by Gray and Ingraham.
(Greenhow, Oregon and California, 414.) They strongly favored the Spanish.
They say that the Indians denied having sold land to the English. That
there was a purchase was practically conceded, however, even by the
Spaniards, since Quadra offered to Vancouver in 1792 the land on which
Meares’s house had stood in 1788. (See Vancouver, Voyages, II, 335 ff.)

[24] Id., 115-116.

[25] Id., 130.

[26] Greenhow, Oregon and California, 175.

[27] Meares, Voyages. 131.

[28] Id., 146, and Memorial in appendix.

[29] Id., 95.

[30] Id., 204.

[31] Meares, Voyages, 173, and Memorial in appendix.

[32] Id., 173-179.

[33] Id., 220.

[34] Greenhow, Oregon and California, 172; and Bancroft, Northwest Coast,
I, 194.

[35] Dixon, Further Remarks on Meares’s Voyages, 24. This writer, in his
controversial pamphlet, quotes from a letter of Captain Duncan, who had
met Meares near the entrance to Nootka Sound in 1788. This letter makes
the statement that Meares had “at that time a small vessel on the stocks
at Nootka, where, he told me, he had a fort, guns mounted, and Portuguese
colors flying.” It was written January 17, 1791, and can hardly be given
absolute credence, since Dixon was so prejudiced against Meares. Greenhow
is too partisan to be fair, and the Americans, Gray and Ingraham, and
Haswell, whom Bancroft quotes on the point, were very pro-Spanish. On the
other hand, Meares’s statements can not be taken for truth unless it is
very plain that there is no reason for his telling anything else.

[36] Meares, Voyages, 220. It is doubtful whether this testimony can be
considered of any value. As to the truthfulness of the picture, it is
interesting to notice the Indian village in the background. He had said
that before this the entire village had been moved some 30 miles up the
sound for the winter.

[37] Meares, Voyages, appendix, Memorial, VI.

[38] Meares to Douglas, _Felice_, Friendly Cove, in King Georges Sound,
September 20, 1788. (Meares, Voyages, Appendix V.)

[39] Id., 334.

[40] Meares to Douglas, _Felice_, Friendly Cove, in King Georges Sound,
September 20, 1788. (Meares, Voyages, Appendix V, p. 217.)

[41] Note his reference to the killing of Callicum by the Spaniards in
1789. (Meares, Voyages, 118; also see 217, 218, referring to Colnett’s
expedition of 1789.) His preface would lead one to think that the writing
of his narrative was entirely an afterthought. He mentions as his motives
the wishes of friends, the political circumstances of the moment [the
diplomatic controversy with Spain], and public expectation. He says: “I
little thought it would be my future lot to give this part of my maritime
life to the world. If I had looked forward to the possibility of such
an event I should have enlarged my observations and been more minutely
attentive,” etc. But the fact that in his list of subscribers he gives
the names of a number of men living in China shows that before leaving
there, at least, he expected to publish his narrative. All of this tends
to depreciate the value of his statements where his interests are at stake.

[42] Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792. (Greenhow,
Oregon and California, 414.) (Prejudiced.)

[43] Colnett, Voyage, vii.

[44] Spanish translation of an extract from the “License from the governor
and company of merchants of Great Britain for trading in the South Sea
and other parts of America, to Richard Cadman Etches and Company to trade
in the places where the South Sea Company has the privilege by an act of
Parliament.” (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) It was signed
by the secretary of the company and dated August 4, 1785. They were
forbidden to trade south of 45° on the northwest coast. (See Colnett to
the Viceroy, October 1, 1789; Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[45] Spanish translation of Colnett to the Viceroy, October 1, 1789. (Id.)

[46] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages. Also Colnett to the Viceroy,
October 1, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) The latter
represents Colnett as the chief promoter, while the former represents
Meares in that capacity. Colnett says that the _Prince of Wales_ had
broken her keel and was not in a condition to make another such a voyage,
so that the correspondents of his company offered him the _Argonaut_. It
seems that some difficulty had arisen over the fact that the license which
Colnett bore was for his use on the _Prince of Wales_. He told the Viceroy
that if he had apprehended any disadvantage arising from his change of
ships it would have been easy to have named the new ship the _Prince of
Wales_ also. He had not considered it necessary.

[47] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages. Inclosure II.

[48] Translation of the instructions given by the owners of the English
ship _Argonaut_ to its captain, James Colnett, not dated. (MS. Arch. Gen.
de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[49] This policy of protecting allied chiefs against their enemies was
begun by Meares during the previous year. He loaned firearms and furnished
ammunition to the Nootka Indians for an expedition against a neighboring
tribe which had committed depredations on one of their villages. (See
Meares, Voyages, 196.)

[50] Nootka was not especially mentioned, but the intention was so evident
that mention was unnecessary. The option as to the place in which it was
to be established probably did not refer to a possible choice between
Nootka Sound and some other part of the coast, but to the selection of the
most favorable spot on the sound. As showing Meares’s tendency to distort
facts, he says in his Memorial: “Colnett was directed to fix his residence
at Nootka Sound, and, with that in view, to erect a substantial house on
the spot which your memorialist had purchased the preceding year, as will
appear by a copy of his instructions hereto annexed.”

[51] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages, Inclosure II; and MS. Arch.
Gen. de Indias, 90-3-18.

[52] Meares, Voyages, 106.

[53] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages, Inclosure II. It is seen
that a majority of the settlers for the proposed colony were Chinese,
conformably to the idea that Meares expresses in his narrative and to
which reference was made in the early part of this chapter. There is a
discrepancy in the statements concerning the number of Chinese. In several
Spanish manuscripts the statement is made that there were 29. The name of
each is given. (See MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[54] Martinez to Florez, San Blas, December 5, 1788. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) La Perouse, of a French scientific expedition,
had reported that Russian settlements were being made on the American
continent north of California. The Spanish expedition was sent under
a royal order of January 25, 1787. Martinez, of the _Princesa_, was
in command, and Lopez de Haro, of the _San Carlos_, was subordinate.
They reported six settlements, having in all about 500 inhabitants. An
autograph copy of Martinez’s diary of this expedition, containing 213
pages, is in the same bundle as the above letter. It contains also the
diary of Mendosia, second pilot. Greenhow, Oregon and California, 185,
gives a short account of this voyage, which he says is based on a copy
of Martinez’s diary obtained from the hydrographical office at Madrid.
Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 184, also gives a brief account, likewise
taken from a copy of Martinez’s diary.

[55] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, December 23, 1788. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[56] Florez to Martinez, December 23, 1788. (Id.)

[57] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, January 2, 1789. (Id.)

[58] Florez to Revilla-Gigedo, Mexico, September 2, 1789. (Id., 90-3-14.)
In this, mention is made of a royal order of April 14, giving approbation.

[59] The ship was the _Columbia_. See the latter part of this chapter.

[60] That of Jonathan Carver from Boston.

[61] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, December 23, 1788. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[62] _San Carlos el Filipino_ seems to have been the full name. It is here
and often elsewhere in the documents spoken of simply as _El Filipino_. In
English writings it is usually called the _San Carlos_.

[63] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, December 23, 1788. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, 90-3-18.)

[64] This reference to Cook’s Voyages reads: “But what was most singular,
two silver tablespoons were purchased from them, which, from their
peculiar shape, we supposed to be of Spanish manufacture.”

[65] An obvious error, since General Washington had nothing to do with it.
This was the _Columbia_. Her consort was the _Lady Washington_. Confusion
arising from the name of the latter perhaps caused the error.

[66] Florez to Martinez, Mexico, December 23, 1788. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) In the above transcript of the instructions,
sections 10 to 15, inclusive, are quoted in full since they were intended
to guide Martinez in his intercourse with foreigners. It will be
interesting later to compare his actions with these instructions. Only the
substance of the other sections is given, since they have no important
bearing on the subject.

[67] Instrumento de posesion, June 24, 1789. (Id.) Revilla-Gigedo in his
Informe gives the date February 19 for the departure from San Blas. (See
Bustamante [Cavo], Los Tres Siglos, III, 127.)

[68] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 170-172; Greenhow, Oregon and
California, 151-153; Cambridge Modern History, VIII, 289.

[69] Deposition of the officers and men of the _Northwest America_.
(Inclosure X, with Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.) They say that
the sound was discovered by the late Capt. James Cook. Similar statements
are made elsewhere.

[70] Instructions of the Merchant Proprietors to John Meares. (Meares,
Voyages, Appendix I.)

[71] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 173-181, gives an account of the most
important.

[72] Informe of Revilla-Gigedo, Bustamante (Cavo), Los Tres Siglos, III,
117-119. This gives a brief description of the voyage and the steps
leading to it. Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 149-158, gives a description
based on the diaries of the voyage. Greenhow, Oregon and California, also
describes it.

[73] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, December 23, 1788. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) See also above transcript of the Instructions
of Florez to Martinez.

[74] Revilla-Gigedo, Informe, Bustamante (Cavo), Los Tres Siglos, II, 199;
Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 158-166, gives a full account.

[75] Id., 172.

[76] Informe of Revilla-Gigedo, Bustamante (Cavo), Los Tres Siglos, III,
123; Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 172.

[77] Cook, Voyages, II, 332, says: “Some account of a Spanish voyage to
this coast in 1774 or 1775 had reached England before I sailed, but the
foregoing circumstances sufficiently prove that these ships had not been
at Nootka.”

[78] Blas Gonzales to Juan Kendrick, Isla de Juan Fernandez, June 3, 1789
[1788]. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[79] Blas Gonzales later appealed to the Government of the United States
to intercede in his behalf, and Jefferson, the Secretary of State, took up
the matter. This will be referred to later. (See Jefferson to Carmichael,
April 11, 1790, Writings V, 155.)

[80] Royal order of November 25, 1692. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville,
90-3-14; Greenhow, Oregon and California, 184.)

[81] See Razon de las Embarcaciones que han hecho Descubrimento al Norte
de California. Firmado abordo de la Fragata _Princesa_ en el Puerto de San
Lorenzo de Nutca á 13 de Julio de 1789, Estevan José Martinez. (MS. Arch.
Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18; Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, Chs. VI,
VII.)

[82] This is the date according to the Spanish documents. The English give
May 6. This difference of one day between the English and Spanish dates
for the events at Nootka continues during the summer of 1789. For some
time no explanation appeared. But Prof. C. H. Hull suggested that it was
probably due to the fact that the English vessels came from Europe by way
of China, while the Spanish came from Mexico. Since the present custom of
dropping a day from or adding one to the calendar in mid-Pacific, or upon
crossing the international date line, was apparently not observed at that
time, the suggestion seems to be a plausible explanation. On the strength
of it the Spanish dates have been adopted instead of the English. Since
all previous writers in English have given the dates according to the
English documents, the dates given in this monograph will disagree with
those of all previous accounts.

[83] Meares, Voyages, 106.

[84] See Chapter II, ante.

[85] Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792. (Appendix
to Greenhow, Oregon and California.) Quadra was the Spanish commissioner
sent in 1792 to carry out the Nootka convention, and was collecting
evidence to strengthen the Spanish case.

[86] Extract from the journal of the _Iphigenia_, entry for May 22.
(Inclosure XII, with Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.)

[87] See Lecky, England in the Eighteenth Century, V, 206-207, who says:
“The Spaniards had never penetrated to it, but by virtue of a bull of
Alexander VI they claimed a sovereignty over all lands comprised between
Cape Horn and the sixtieth degree of north latitude; in other words, the
entire western coast of both South and North America, and when, after
a considerable interval, they discovered the existence of a British
settlement in these parts they determined to suppress it. Two Spanish
ships of war accordingly hastened to Nootka Sound, took possession of the
British settlement, hauled down the British flag, replaced it by the flag
of Spain, captured four English vessels, and treated their crews with
extreme harshness and indignity.” His failure to investigate the subject
is further shown by his statement in the next sentence: “These events took
place in April of 1789.” This error in date is doubtless derived from the
indefinite statement of the date in Article I of the Nootka convention of
October 28, 1790.

Worthington C. Ford, United States and Spain in 1790, p. 18, is still
further in error. He says: “The Spaniards had laid claim to nearly the
whole of the western coast of America, from Cape Horn to the sixtieth
degree of north latitude, and had watched with a feeling of jealousy,
aggravated by a sense of injury, the establishment of a British settlement
in Nootka Sound, on Vancouvers Island. This inlet of the sea had been
first explored by Captain Cook in one of his voyages, and on the
establishment of the English in India became a trading station, colonized
by the English and recognized by grants of land from the natives. After
three years of undisturbed possession the little settlement was surprised
by the arrival of two Spanish ships of war from Mexico, which seized an
English merchant vessel, the _Iphigenia_, imprisoned her crew, looted the
vessel, and pulling down the British flag on the settlement raised that of
Spain, and subsequently treated all comers as intruders.”

Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen Revolution,
282, after speaking of the arrival of Martinez and his seizure of the
_Iphigenia_, says: “Martinez ergriff darauf Besitz von einer der kleinen
Inseln, erbaute auf derselben eine Batterie, bemaechtigte sich der
englischen Gebaeude, nahm die britische Flagge herunter and pflanzte die
spanische auf.”

[88] See discussion of the negotiations of 1790 below.

[89] See ante, Chapter II.

[90] Extract from the journal of the _Iphigenia_. (Inclosure XII, with
Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.)

[91] See ante, Chapter II.

[92] May 9, according to the English account.

[93] Martinez to Florez. San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS. Arch.
Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[94] Variously spelled in the documents--“Cavallo,” “Carvallo,”
“Caravallo,” “Caravalia,” and “Caravalho.”

[95] Spanish translation of the passport of the _Iphigenia_, signed Macao,
October 17, 1787. (Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[96] Spanish translation of the Instructions of Carvalho to Viana, Macao,
October 23, 1788 [1787]. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[97] May 14, according to the English account, is the date usually given.

[98] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 115-118, gives an account of the
supposed voyage of Fonte, which he thinks was never made. Nothing is said
of Fonte’s being a Portuguese, and the expedition is said to have been
under orders from Spain and the viceroys.

[99] MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.

[100] Appendix I to Meares, Voyages. It is interesting to compare the
instructions of Meares, the English captain of the _Felice_ and commander
of both vessels, with the instructions of Viana, the pretended Portuguese
captain of the _Iphigenia_. These two correspond much more closely than
those of Viana and Douglas. The latter’s were subinstructions given
by Meares at sea. It may be that Juan de Mata Montero de Mendoza, the
pretended Portuguese captain of the _Felice_, bore subinstructions from
Viana similar to those of Douglas. The differences between Meares’s and
Viana’s instructions are more striking than their similarities. The former
is told that the coast was first discovered by Drake, in 1570; the latter
by Fonte, in 1640. The former is told to proceed alone to America if
he finds himself retarded by the slow progress of the _Iphigenia_; the
latter is to do the same if detained by the bad sailing of the _Felice_.
The former is instructed to direct Douglas to go to Prince Williams
Sound, then to Nootka; the latter is directed to make this voyage. In
the former’s instructions there is nothing corresponding to the latter’s
instructions to report to the Portuguese correspondents at Lisbon, and to
the ambassador at the court of the aggressor. There are other interesting
contrasts. The minute instructions regarding trade are common to the two.

[101] This is not exactly an untruth, but it is a deception. It would
indicate that he had no instructions in English. His instructions are
quoted in full a few pages before this extract from the journal of the
_Iphigenia_ in Appendix II to Meares, Voyages. It is worthy of note that
they do not direct him to seize vessels at all, but only to guard against
surprise and repel force by force. It should be noted also that the
extract quoted by Meares in the appendix to his Memorial, V, purporting
to be from this letter to Douglas, does not agree with the full letter as
quoted, but that Meares has, in this extract, added two sentences from his
own instructions, which relate to his reporting the outrage if captured
and to his seizing his opponent should he have the superiority.

[102] Extract of the journal of the _Iphigenia_. (Inclosure XII with
Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.)

[103] Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792. (Appendix
to Greenhow, Oregon and California.)

[104] Extract of the journal of the _Iphigenia_. (Inclosure XII, with
Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.)

[105] Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792. (Appendix
to Greenhow, Oregon and California.) The dates in this letter are not
accurate. The more important agree with the Spanish dates, but the rest
with neither Spanish nor English.

[106] Vancouver, Voyages, II, 343.

[107] See note a [101], p. 320, where it is pointed out that in the
instructions of Douglas nothing is said about carrying vessels to Macao.
In the journal of the _Iphigenia_ Douglas says that the interpreter told
Martinez in his presence that there was nothing objectionable in Douglas’s
papers.

[108] An English translation of this bond is given by Meares. (Inclosure
IV, with Memorial, appendix to Voyages.)

[109] All the papers relating to the _Iphigenia_--her passport,
instructions, the inventory, the bond, and the affidavits--are inclosed
with Martinez to Florez, San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS. Arch.
Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[110] This is an interesting comment, showing Douglas’s inconsistency in
saying that the Spaniards had robbed the ship of everything of value.

[111] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.

[112] Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792. (Appendix
to Greenhow, Oregon and California.)

[113] Deposition of Martinez before Canizares, on board the _Princesa_,
June 12, 1789. (MSS., Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) With this
is an inventory of the vessel and cargo, and other affidavits telling
of the helpless condition of the vessel. An English translation of the
inventory is given on the last page of the appendix to Meares, Voyages.

[114] Deposition of the officers and men of the schooner _North-West
America_, Canton, December 5, 1789, and information of William Graham,
London, May 5, 1790. (Inclosures VII and X, with Meares, Memorial,
appendix to Voyages.) The American vessel on which these men were shipped
was the _Columbia_.

[115] Hudson’s receipt to Funter for 203 sea-otter skins, July 2, 1789.
(Inclosure VIII, with Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.)

[116] Martinez’s certificate of 96 skins being shipped on board the
_Columbia_, Nootka, July 14, 1789. (Appendix to Meares, Voyages.) The
English ship to which the furs, taken from the schooner, were at first
transferred had been seized in the meantime, so that the furs again fell
into Martinez’s hand. This was the _Princess Royal_, to be discussed
presently.

[117] John Kendrick’s receipt for provisions on board the _Columbia_, July
13, 1789. (Inclosure XI, with Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.)

[118] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 216, says, incorrectly, that
possession had been taken before the departure of the _Iphigenia_.

[119] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, August 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[120] Martinez to Florez, San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS. Arch.
Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[121] Instrument of possession, San Lorenzo de Nootka, June 24, 1789. (MS.
Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[122] Martinez to Florez, San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS. Arch.
Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[123] The Spanish flag had been changed by a royal decree of May 28, 1785.
The purpose was to remove the confusion due to the similarity between it
and those of the other Bourbon dynasties--France, Naples, Tuscany, and
Parma. Red and yellow were the colors adopted. (Fernandez Duro La Armada
Española, Madrid, 1901, VIII, 349.)

[124] Martinez to [Florez], San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS.
Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[125] June 14 is sometimes given as the date. This probably arises from
the indefinite statement in the Information of William Graham that she
arrived on or about June 14. (See Inclosure VII, with Meares, Memorial,
appendix to Voyages.)

[126] Hudson to Florez, San Blas, September 18, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) With this letter are copies of the letters of
June 18 [17] and 19 [18] from Martinez to Hudson, and Hudson to Martinez
of the latter date, referred to above.

[127] See latter part of foregoing chapter.

[128] Martinez to Florez, San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS.
Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) With this letter explaining his
dealings with the American ships, Martinez inclosed a copy of the passport
given to Kendrick by Blas Gonzales, governor of the islands of Juan
Fernandez.

[129] Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, 106, touches upon the
subject-matter of this chapter.

[130] To save frequent repetition, one reference is given to all five of
these accounts. The particular source of the more important statements is
sufficiently clear from the text:

First. Martinez to Flores, San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS.
Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

Second. Colnett to Flores [written at San Blas in September, 1789]. (MS.
Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

Third. Colnett, Voyages, 96-102, note.

Fourth. Duffin to Meares, Nootka Sound, July 12 [11], 1789; same to same,
July 13 [12], 1789; same to same. July 14 [13], 1789. (Inclosure XIII,
with Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.)

Fifth. Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792.
(Appendix to Greenhow, Oregon and California.)

The information of William Graham, London, May 5, 1790, and the deposition
of the officers and men of the _North-West America_, Canton, China,
December 5, 1789 (Inclosures VII and XI, with Meares, Memorial, appendix
to Voyages), give accounts, but add little of value to the others.

[131] See previous discussion of the voyage of Perez, 1774, in Chapter
III, ante.

[132] Meares, An Answer to Mr. George Dixon.

[133] All of these are inclosed with Martinez’s account to the Viceroy,
referred to above. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[134] Martinez to Florez, San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (1d.) This
letter is of the same date and appears in the same bundle as that referred
to above giving account of the _Argonaut_.

[135] See information of William Graham. (Inclosure VII, with Meares,
Memorial, appendix to Voyages.) He says that Hudson was beaten and thrown
down the hatchway by the Spanish crew, who said: “Get down, you English
dog.” This and other such extravagant statements were probably invented
to produce the desired effect on the English mind. This document is
dated London, May 5, 1790, which was only a week before the Memorial was
presented, and was the time when the excitement was at its height.

[136] There were also 8 officers on board. These with the 8 sailors were
all of the Englishmen that had come to Nootka on the _Argonaut_. The
Portuguese, Filipinos, Chinese, etc., were to be brought to San Blas later
on another vessel.

[137] Colnett to the Viceroy, San Blas [September], 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen.
de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[138] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, September 26, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.)

[139] Id., Inclosing Comancho to Florez, San Blas, September 3, 1789.
Comancho was commandant of the port.

[140] Colnett, Voyage, 96-102, note.

[141] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, December 27, 1789. (MS. Arch.
Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-19.) There are several letters together of
the same date. This is No. 195. No. 194 states that a copy of Martinez’s
diary is inclosed, but a note on a small slip of paper inserted says that
the diary is not being sent on account of Martinez’s not having sent a
duplicate of it. The diary does not appear in the bundle and probably was
never sent. Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 212, says: “I have not been able
to obtain the original diaries of the Spanish expedition of 1789, nor has
any preceding writer in English seen them.”

[142] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, December 27, 1789. (No. 198, MS.
Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-19.)

[143] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 212.

[144] Reference cited, note b [142] above, No. 195.

[145] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 211, repeats Meares’s statement that
there were 70 Chinese.

[146] Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, 107, treats briefly the seizure of
the _Argonaut_ and _Princess Royal_.

[147] Previous accounts give scarcely anything on this subject. This
account is drawn almost wholly from manuscripts in the Spanish archives.

[148] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, August 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.)

[149] [Florez] to the commandant and commissary at San Blas, Mexico,
August 29, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.)

[150] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, August 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) This is another letter of the same date and
found in the same bundle as the one referred to in note b [148] on the
preceding page.

[151] Colnett, Voyage, 96-102, note.

[152] See Chapter III, ante.

[153] The King to the officials of New Spain, Madrid, November 25, 1692.
(MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.) The Viceroy of Peru had
reported that an English vessel had been encountered in the Straits of
Magellan. This order directs officials to exclude all foreign vessels from
the South Sea unless they carry a special license from the King of Spain.

[154] See his instructions in Chapter III, ante.

[155] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, September 26, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.)

[156] Florez to Revilla-Gigedo, Mexico, August 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen.
de Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.)

[157] Revilla-Gigedo to Florez, Veracruz, August 30, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen.
de Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.)

[158] [Florez] to Revilla-Gigedo, Mexico, September 2, 1789. (MS. Arch.
Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.)

[159] See preceding chapter, p. 333.

[160] Revilla-Gigedo to Florez, Veracruz, September 9, 1789. (MS. Arch.
Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-2-14.)

[161] [Florez] to Revilla-Gigedo, Mexico, September 16, 1789. (MS. Arch.
Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.)

[162] Informe of Revilla-Gigedo, Bustamante [Cavo], Los Tres Siglos, III,
130.

[163] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, October 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen.
de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[164] Chapters IV and V.

[165] Spanish translation of Colnett to Florez, San Blas [September 18],
1789. (MS. Arch. den. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[166] Spanish translation of Hudson to Florez, San Blas, September 18,
1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[167] Spanish translation of Colnett to the Viceroy, San Blas, October 1,
1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[168] [Revilla-Gigedo] to Colnett, Mexico, October 21, 1789. (MS. Arch.
Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[169] See last chapter.

[170] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, December 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen.
de Indias. Seville, 90-3-19.)

[171] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, February 26, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen.
de Indias, Seville, 90-3-26.)

[172] Colnett, Voyage, 96-102, note.

[173] Id., 105.

[174] Colnett, Voyage, 96-102, note.

[175] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, October 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen.
de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[176] Informe of Revilla-Gigedo, April 12, 1793. (Bustamante [Cavo], Los
Tres Siglos, III, 132.)

[177] Valdez to Floridablanca, December 30, 1789. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[178] Valdez to Floridablanca, January 2, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[179] Florez’s plan, mentioned in the last chapter, for taking the Chinese
to Nootka and liberating them, had evidently not been carried out.

[180] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, May 1, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[181] Revilla-Gigedo to Colnett, Mexico, April 27, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen.
de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[182] Revilla-Gigedo to Bodega y Quadra, Mexico, April 27, 1790. (MS.
Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[183] Revilla-Gigedo to the commissary of San Blas, Mexico, April 27,
1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[184] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, May 1, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[185] Copies of this letter from Colnett to the British ambassador at
Madrid, one to Cadman, Etches & Co., one to Colnett’s mother, and one to
P. Stephens, of the Admiralty office at London, all dated May 1, 1790, are
in Madrid. (Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[186] Colnett to Revilla-Gigedo, Mexico, May 3, 1790, and answer,
Revilla-Gigedo to Colnett, Mexico, May 4, 1790. (MSS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[187] Had Colnett and the Viceroy known of the feverish excitement in
Europe at this very time in expectation of a war over this quarrel between
sea captains this veiled threat would not have seemed so obscure.

[188] Colnett to Revilla-Gigedo, May 7, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias,
Seville, 90-3-21.)

[189] Passport signed by Revilla-Gigedo, Mexico, May 11, 1790. (MS. Arch.
Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[190] Revilla-Gigedo to Colnett, Mexico, May 11, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[191] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, May 27, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[192] Informe of Revilla-Gigedo, April 12, 1793. (Bustamante (Cavo), Los
Tres Siglos, III, 132.)

[193] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, June 26, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.)

[194] Colnett, Voyage, 96-102, note.

[195] Colnett to [Revilla-Gigedo]. San Blas, July 8, 1790. (Arch. Gen. de
Indias, Seville, Sec. Estado, Audiencia de Mexico, 1790.)

[196] Revilla-Gigedo to Floridablanca, Mexico, December 30, 1791. (Arch.
Gen. de Indias, Seville, Sec. Estado, Audiencia de Mexico, 1791.)

[197] Colnett, Voyage, 96-102, note.

[198] The obscurity of the facts discussed in this chapter is illustrated
by the following quotations:

“It has been generally supposed from later diplomatic correspondence that
the Viceroy in restoring the vessels acted on his own judgment; but it
appears from his own statement that he acted probably in accordance with
orders from Spain, dated January 26, 1790.” (Bancroft, Northwest Coast,
I, 223.) This author’s conclusion is exactly contrary to the fact, as has
been shown above. The Viceroy did act on his own authority, finally, as
has been shown; and this communication of January 26 gave no orders. The
Viceroy’s statement, to which Bancroft here refers, is the Informe of
Revilla-Gigedo, published by Bustamante, which is very brief and sometimes
misleading. Bancroft devotes a little more than one page to discussing the
subject-matter of this chapter. Besides this Informe he had the note in
Colnett’s Voyage.

Greenhow, Oregon and California, p. 200, speaking of the restoration of
the English ships, says: “It was at length decided that … they should be
released, with the understanding, however, that they were not again to
enter any place on the Spanish-American coasts, either for the purpose of
settlement or of trade with the natives.” This was the Viceroy’s order at
first, but in the passport he gave permission to touch at places not under
Spanish control, as shown above. The same writer, speaking of Colnett’s
failure to get the _Princess Royal_ at Nootka, as promised, says: “On
arriving at the sound Colnett found the place deserted.” The sloop was not
there, but there was a substantial Spanish settlement, as will be shown
later.

“La autoridad superior de Nueva España no sancionó el hecho [Martinez’s
seizure of the English vessels]; apenas llegó á su noticia, atendiendo á
las buenas relaciones en que estaban los Gobiernos de ambos Estados y á la
ignorancia en que suponia á las proprietarios de los bajeles, ordenó la
immediata soltura de estas con sus cargamentos.” (Duro, Armada Española,
VIII, 10.) This work was published in 1902, and is considered the best on
the Spanish navy.

The error, which is a common one, of thinking that they were released by
the Viceroy immediately, doubtless arises from the Spanish minister’s
statement in his memorial of June 13, 1790, to the British ambassador,
published in the Annual Register, XXXII, 296. This states that the Viceroy
released the vessels without declaring them lawful prize, and allowed
them to return to Macao under bond as the _Iphigenia_ had been disposed
of. These two statements are exactly contrary to the fact. The Viceroy
did declare them lawful prize, and did not place them under bond. What
the Spanish minister said had been done was what Florez had said, in his
second account to the home Government that he thought ought to be done,
but which he left his successor, Revilla-Gigedo, to do. The Spanish
minister had inferred that the new Viceroy would do this, but that
official had not done it, as has been shown.

Oscar Browning, Cambridge Modern History, VIII, 290, says more correctly
that they “were released by the Viceroy on the ground of the friendly
relations existing between the two nations, and the probability that the
traders were ignorant of Spanish rights.”

[199] Tratchevsky, L’Espagne à l’Epoque de la Révolution française, Revue
Historique, XXXI, 5.

[200] Desdevises du Dezert, L’Espagne de l’Ancien Régime, II, 39.

[201] Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française en Espagne pendant la Révolution,
7.

[202] Quoted by Tratchevsky, work cited above, p. 5. The Russian
ambassador was thoroughly familiar, in an official way, with
Floridablanca. The former had been at the Court of Madrid before the
latter became prime minister and remained until after the latter’s
retirement. He was an ardent admirer of the great Spanish minister.
His dispatches in the archives at Moscow were the chief source for
Tratchevsky’s article.

[203] Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen Rev.,
268. Sandoz was the Prussian ambassador at Madrid. His dispatches sent to
Berlin furnish the chief basis for Baumgarten’s work.

[204] Id., 268-276. In these pages the author discusses the internal
conditions of Spain, the court intrigues and ministerial complications. On
April 25, 1790, there was a reorganization of the ministry. The department
of justice, which Floridablanca had hitherto controlled, was taken from
him, and with it went an extensive appointing power that had contributed
much to his prestige. He was even given an associate in the department of
foreign affairs, who should act when sickness or absence incapacitated the
Count.

[205] Desdevises du Dezert, L’Espagne de l’Ancien Régime, II, 14.

[206] Id., 18.

[207] Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française en Espagne pendant la Rév., 8.
This quotes the following from Comte de Vaudreuil to Comte d’Artois, July
2, 1790, published in Pingaud, Correspondance Intime pendant l’Emigration,
I, 219: “C’est un homme loyal, qui pursuit toujours et sans se rebuter ce
qu’il a une fois entrepris. Soyez sûr que M. Floridablanca est (sans en
excepter même M. Pitt) une des meilleures têtes de tous les cabinets de
l’Europe.”

[208] Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen Rev.,
283.

[209] The Viceroy’s letters were addressed to Valdez. He was minister of
marine and, before the reorganization of the ministry mentioned above,
also treasurer for the Indies. At that reorganization the finances of the
Indies were transferred to the regular department of finance, at the head
of which was the ungrateful Lerena, who was the leader of the ministerial
opposition to Floridablanca in spite of the fact that he owed his entire
political advancement, and even his position in the ministry, to the
Count. Valdez was the man who was made associate to Floridablanca in the
foreign office. He also retained the ministry of marine. (See Baumgarten,
Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen Rev., 268-276.)

[210] See Chapter VI, ante, for a complete discussion of the contents of
these letters from the Viceroy. The first was written August 27, 1789,
on receipt of the news of the arrival of the _Argonaut_ at San Blas, and
the second, September 26, after the arrival of the _Princess Royal_. The
letters from Valdez of December 30 and January 2 give both numbers and
dates of the letters from the Viceroy, showing that they contained full
accounts.

[211] Merry to Leeds, Madrid, January 4, 1790. (A Narrative of the
Negotiations Occasioned by the Dispute Between England and Spain in the
Year 1790, 1.)

This Narrative is a very rare book, and very valuable for the subject
in hand. No previous writer on the Nootka controversy has consulted it.
Probably only a few copies were printed. The King’s own copy is now in
the British Museum. That obtained for use in this study is the only other
copy that Messrs. Henry Stevens, Son & Stiles, antiquarian booksellers
of London, have noted during the whole of their business experience.
Neither date nor name of publisher nor author is given. The British Museum
catalogue gives 1791(?) as the date. It is evidently an official account
prepared in the foreign office especially for the King. In a letter from
J. B. Burges, under secretary for foreign affairs, to Lord Auckland,
dated Whitehall, November 12, 1790, found in B. M. Add. MSS. 34434,
f58, he mentions an “interesting Narrative, which, at leisure hours, I
have prepared for the King, of the whole of this business.” A careful
comparison of the printed Narrative with the documents in the public
record office reveals the identity of the printed Narrative with the
Narrative mentioned by Burges in this letter. The comparison also revealed
the fact that the printed account is full and faithful. It is necessarily
condensed, but nothing of importance is omitted.

The British chargé is the same Merry who, later, as minister to the United
States, was connected with the Aaron Burr conspiracy.

[212] This news reached London January 21. It is usually stated that the
British Court knew nothing of the matter before receiving the Spanish note
of February 10.

[213] “Narrative” cited on foregoing page.

[214] Id., 9.

[215] That these instructions were written January 20 is stated in Campo
to Floridablanca, London, February 28, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) The date is significant when it is noticed
that on the same day he wrote a querulous letter to Montmorin, minister
for foreign affairs at Paris. He expressed pity for France and her King
and complained that in the present circumstances that country was not in
a condition to support Spain as she should. He made no mention of the
Nootka affair or of the sharp protest which he was sending to the British
Court the same day. But he evidently had it in mind and was thinking of
the complications to which it might lead. (See Floridablanca to Montmorin,
Aranjuez, January 20, 1790, MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado,
4291.) The same is printed in Calvo, Recueil Complet des Traités de
l’Amérique Latine, III, 104.

[216] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain in 1790, 12.

[217] Id., 8.

[218] Translated from a manuscript copy in French found in the Archives
des Affaires Etrangères, Paris; Espagne 1790, 5 P^{ers} Mois, f. 96. The
contents of the note are partially reflected in published memoirs written
subsequently. (See Floridablanca to Fitzherbert, June 13, 1790, Annual
Register, XXXII, 296.)

[219] See Chapters III and VI, ante, which show the falsity of these
statements.

[220] See footnote a [211], p. 365.

[221] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 12.

[222] Leeds to Campo, Whitehall, February 26, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) Oscar Browning, Cambridge Modern
History, VIII, 290, says that the original of this reply, now in the
public record office, is in Pitt’s own hand.

Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, 108-109, gives briefly the substance of
the Spanish note of February 10 and the British reply of February 26.

[223] Campo to Floridablanca, London, February 28, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[224] Id.

[225] Miranda to Pitt, London, September 8, 1791. (Am. Hist. Rev., VII,
711, 712.)

[226] Narrative of the Negotiations between Great Britain and Spain, 13,
14.

[227] Id., 15.

[228] Minutes of the supreme junta of state, March 22, 1790. (MS. Arch.
Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[229] Report of Valdez to the supreme junta of state, dated March 28,
presented March 29, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado,
4291.)

[230] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 17.

[231] Minutes of the supreme junta of state, March 29, 1790. (MS. Arch.
Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) In these minutes is a Spanish
rendering of the instructions sent to Campo. They will be studied in the
form of a letter in French which Campo presented to Leeds.

[232] Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen Rev.,
287. This is based on a dispatch of April 19 from Sandoz. The author says
that not only Merry but even Sandoz, who knew Floridablanca’s character so
well, believed this. Shortly afterwards the Prussian ambassador considered
everything so peaceable that he left his post for a time, turning over the
business to his attaché, “a condition,” says the author, “to which is due
the fact that we are less exactly informed concerning the further progress
of these important negotiations.”

[233] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 18-20.

[234] Id., 36-38.

[235] Id., 39.

[236] Id., 69.

[237] Not before published, though later memoirs give a partial account.

[238] An error. Colnett’s license was for the _Prince of Wales_. (See
Chapter II.)

[239] MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291. The same with
slight modifications is to be found in Narrative of the Negotiations
between England and Spain, 20. But this work is so rare that it is little
more accessible than the manuscripts. Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I,
109, mentions this letter.

[240] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 24.

[241] Id., 35.

[242] Grenville to George III, May 1, 1790, inclosing cabinet minute of
April 30, 1790. (Fortescue MSS. I, 579; Hist. MSS. Com. Report, 13, App.
3.) This gives the names of the seven cabinet members who were present.

[243] George III to Grenville, May 1; Grenville to George III, May 2, and
George III to Grenville, May 2. (Fortescue MSS., I, 579, 580.)

[244] Leeds to Campo, Whitehall, May 5, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) In English and apparently the original.
Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, 110, reviews this reply briefly.

[245] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 44.

[246] Haldimand’s Diary, May 5 and May 14, 1790. (Canadian Archives, 1889,
p. 281 ff.) A letter from London of May 7 in Gazette de Leide, May 14,
1790, says: “Les fonds, depuis le message du Rol, ont continué de baisser.”

[247] Parl. Hist., XXVIII, 765; also Annual Register, XXXII, 285. The
latter work incorrectly gives the date May 25. This error is repeated in
many of the books that treat of the subject, since this work has been the
chief source.

[248] This statement was true as far as the English knew or could know,
but there was at least an attempt to justify the procedure. Martinez took
goods from the captured ships and applied them to his own use, but made
provision for their restoration in Mexico. (See Chapter V.) A schooner had
been appropriated to the Spanish service with less show of justice.

[249] Parl. Hist. XXVIII, 766-782. The address of the Lords with the
incorrect date, May 26, is given in the Annual Register, XXXII, 286.

[250] Morris, Diary and Letters, 1, 325.

[251] Parl. Hist., XXVIII, 784.

[252] Letter from London, May 7, in Gazette de Leide, May 14, 1790

[253] Vancouver, Voyages, I, 48.

[254] See Dalrymple, The Spanish Pretensions fairly discussed, London,
1790; also [Etches]. An Authentic Account of all the Facts Relative to
Nootka Sound, etc., London, 1790. Meares’s Memorial was also made public.

[255] Miranda to Pitt, September 18, 1791. (Am. Hist. Rev., VII, 712.)
Haldimand’s diary during May and June, 1790, confirms Miranda’s statements
of his intimacy with the governmental authorities. The writer makes
frequent mention of being with the King, with Grenville, and of being
consulted on Canadian affairs, showing that he was intimate in Court
circles. During the same months he speaks frequently of Miranda’s being
with him, dining with him, driving with him, etc. (See Can. Arch., 1889,
p. 281 ff.)

[256] Parl. Hist., XXVIII, 784.

[257] Official Papers relative to the Dispute between the Courts of Great
Britain and Spain, 42.

[258] Parl. Hist., XXVIII, 805.

[259] Id., 807.

[260] Parl. Hist., 815-822

[261] Id., 875.

[262] Grenville to Westmoreland, May 3, May 7, and May 9; and Westmoreland
to Grenville, May 10 and May 14. (Fortescue MSS., I, 580-584.)

[263] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 56. These
orders were given May 6.

[264] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 59-62.
These orders were given May 6 and May 22.

[265] Id., 62-65. Orders dated May 12.

[266] Id., 57. Orders dated May 6. See also Can. Arch., 1890, pp. 130-133.

[267] Grenville to George III, May 25, and George III to Grenville, May
26. (Fortescue MSS., I, 586, 587.)

[268] Leeds to Auckland, May 4, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34431, f^o 67.)

[269] Leeds to Auckland, May 4, 1790 (private). (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34431,
f^o 81.)

[270] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 70.

[271] Auckland to Grenville, Hague, May 15, 1790. (Fortescue MSS., I, 585.
See also work last cited, 95-97.)

[272] Leeds to Auckland, May 18, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34431, f^o 195.
See also Narrative cited above, 97.)

[273] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 100 ff.

[274] De Jonge, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen, V, 119-120.

[275] Hertzberg to Ewart, Berlin, May 20, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34431,
f^o 205.) Stanhope’s Life of Pitt, II, 551, mentions the Prussian and
Dutch assurances of friendship.

[276] Floridablanca to Montmorin, January 20, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) The same is published In Calvo,
Recueil Complet des Traités de l’Amérique Latine, III, 341. This author
quotes it from Cantillo, Collecion de Tratados de España. See p. 366 ante
note c [215].

[277] Floridablanca to Fernan Nuñez, April 6, 1790; Calvo, Recueil Complet
des Traités de l’Amérique Latine, III, 342.

[278] Fernan Nuñez to Floridablanca, Paris, May 11, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4038.)

[279] This episode of the recall of Vauguyon is treated at length by
Grandmaison, L’Ambassade Française en Espagne pendant la Révolution,
21 ff. This author thinks that the suspicion originated with British
emissaries in Paris, who wished to produce an estrangement between the
Courts of France and Spain. This was, at least, its result. He quotes
several letters that passed between Louis XVI and Charles IV regarding
the matter. The Spanish King’s attitude unfortunately made it seem that
there was some ground for the suspicion of Vauguyon. The French Court was
considerably embarrassed thereby. There seems to be no doubt of the fact
that Vauguyon was innocent, at least in so far as any complicity with the
French Court was concerned.

[280] On May 7 the British Court had given orders to Lord Robert
FitzGerald, chargé at Paris, to make this explanation to Montmorin. (See
Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 68)

[281] Arch. Parl., first series, XV, 510, session for May 14, 1790.

[282] Arch. Parl., first series, XV, 515-519 (May 14, 1790); Willert, P.
F., Mirabeau, 164-170; Loménie, Les Mirabeaus, V, 144-149; Stern, Das
Leben Mirabeaus, II, 151-164.

[283] Arch. Parl., first series, XV, 526-661 (May 16-22, 1790). Cambridge
Modern History, VIII, 188, discusses briefly the debate.

[284] Montmorin to Floridablanca, Paris, May 21, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4038.)

[285] Arch. Parl., first series, XV, 705 (May 28); Id., XVI, 185 (June
12); Id., XVI. 206 (June 13).

[286] Annual Register, XXXII, 294. It is published under a wrong title and
date.

[287] Id., 301. Same in Arch. Parl., first series, XVI. 503.

[288] Montmorin to Fernan Nuñez, Paris, June 26, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Sec. Estado, 4038.)

[289] Fernan Nuñez to Montmorin, Paris, June 25, 1700. (Ibid.)

[290] Montmorin to Fernan Nuñez, Paris, June 30, 1790. (Ibid.)

[291] Leeds to Merry, May 4, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34431, f^o 75.)

[292] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 106.

[293] Merry to Floridablanca, May 16, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[294] That of Campo to Leeds of April 20. (See Chapter VII.)

[295] Campo to Leeds, February 10. (Chapter VII.)

[296] Evidently that of Meares.

[297] British memorial of May 16, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid,
Sec. Estado, 4291.) The reference cited in note b [292] on the preceding
page says that Merry sent with the memorial a copy of the original in
English for fear of mistakes in the translation. The memorial in French
and a copy in English are still to be found together in the archives.

Apparently no previous writer on the Nootka affair has seen this memorial
nor any of the earlier documents. No reference is made to them except
such as is drawn from later documents which give brief reviews of the
earlier correspondence. Bancroft (History of the Northwest Coast, I,
229, note 46) says: “Up to this point the correspondence is not, so far
as I know, extant in its original form, but is only known from citations
and references in later documents.” For English and Spanish material the
documents in the Annual Register seem to have been the only source used to
any extent. In fact this work contains nearly all of the documents that
have been published on the diplomatic phase of the incident. Greenhow
has reprinted most of them in the appendix to his Oregon and California.
Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, 111, mentions this memorial.

[298] Floridablanca to Merry, May 18, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) Up to this time Floridablanca had evidently
not read carefully all of the papers which he had received from the
Viceroy five months before, or he would not have asserted that only one
vessel had been seized unless, indeed, he was intentionally prevaricating.
He seems to have become informed shortly after, for in his formal reply of
June 4 he mentioned the _Princess Royal_.

[299] Merry to Floridablanca, May 19, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[300] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 111.

[301] Letter from Madrid of May 25, Gazette de Leide, June 11, 1790.

[302] Work cited, note c [300] above, 113.

[303] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 113.

[304] [Floridablanca] to Merry, June 4, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) This is a brief note unsigned, but in the
Count’s handwriting. It states that he is sending to Merry a reply to the
latter’s of May 16.

[305] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 115-119.
The same is published in full in the Annual Register, XXXII, 292, under a
wrong title. On the same day Floridablanca issued his circular note to all
the Courts of Europe. (See Chapter VIII.)

[306] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 119.

[307] Id., 72.

[308] Id., 83-90. In these pages is a discussion of the French attitude.
Montmorin gave friendly assurances to the English representatives. The
conflicting interests of the Government and the Assembly were discussed.
On May 21 Earl Gower was sent as ambassador extraordinary to Paris.
He was to reject mediation if offered. (See Id., pp. 91-94.) While in
Paris Fitzherbert attempted to induce Lafayette and the Liberal party to
support the English contention. He had failed to renew his acquaintance
with Lafayette, but understood that the latter still wished to see free
intercourse between the Spanish colonies and the nations of Europe, and
believed that he would not acquiesce in a war undertaken on principles
diametrically opposite. Fitzherbert to Pitt, Paris, May 20, 1790; (Smith
MSS., Hist. MSS. Com. Rpt., 12, appendix 9, p. 367.)

[309] Id., 72-82. These instructions order the ambassador to be firm
in his demands, but express a desire, apparently sincere, to terminate
the difficulty amicably. In case of his hearing that Spain had forced a
breach, he was to proceed no further without new instructions. If after
reaching Madrid he should be ordered to quit the place, he was to go to
Lisbon. If Spain should declare war, but not order him to leave, he was to
await new instructions at Madrid.

[310] Id., 121.

[311] Fitzherbert to Floridablanca, Madrid, June 10, 1790. (MS. Arch.
Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4245.) The credentials were dated
Whitehall, May 7, 1790.

[312] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 121, 123.

[313] Fitzherbert to Floridablanca, June 13, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS.
34431, f^o 402.) The same is published in the Annual Register, XXXII, 298.
The title to this, as well as to the two documents which precede it in the
same work, is wrong.

The following comment on the unreasonableness of the English demand is to
the point: “Es war das in der That eine eigenthuemliche Methode, Gewalt
und Recht zu mischen, einer kuenstigen Eroerterung Alles vorzubehalten und
zugleich das Resultat dieser Eroerterung zu anticipiren.” (Baumgarten,
Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen Revolution, 289.)

[314] Fitzherbert to Leeds, Aranjuez, June 16, 1790. (MS. from the public
record office, London, Chatham MSS., bdle. 341.) The substance of the
same, in Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 125.

[315] Work cited in last note [314], 146.

[316] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 129.

[317] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 145-149.

[318] Fitzherbert to Leeds, Aranjuez, July 1, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[319] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 152.

[320] Leeds to Fitzherbert, July 5, 1790 (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34432, f^o
32-36): Fitzherbert to Leeds, Madrid, July 15, 1790 (MS. public record
office, Spain, XVIII, 159).

[321] Memorial signed by Fitzherbert, July 17, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[322] Instructions cited in note d [309] on foregoing page.

[323] Report submitted June 18, 1790, in consequence of a royal order of
June 7. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 2848.)

[324] Spanish memorial of July 22, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[325] A French version is found in Narrative of the Negotiations between
England and Spain, 156-158. There is an English version in An. Reg.,
XXXII, 300. A Spanish version is in Calvo, Recueil Complet des Traités de
l’Amérique Latine, 347. Many other works have reproduced them.

[326] Compare with draft of declaration and draft of counter declaration
inclosed with Leeds to Fitzherbert, July 5, 1790 (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34432,
f^o 42-44); the same, pp. 142, 143 of the Narrative, cited in last note
[325].

[327] Fitzherbert to Leeds, Madrid, July 29, 1790. (MS. public record
office, Spain, XVIII, 273.)

[328] Grenville to George III, August 4-5, 1790. (Fortescue MSS., 1, 603.)

[329] Leeds to Fitzherbert, August 6, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Sec. Estado, 4243.) Several writers on the subject seem to have made the
mistake of thinking that these declarations were intended as a final
settlement but were rejected. Calvo, in his Recueil, says that the
declaration was rejected by England and the armaments were continued.

[330] Fitzherbert to Leeds, June 16, 1790. (MS. public record office,
London, Chatham MSS., bdle. 341.) Also Merry to Leeds, June 4, 1790. (MS.
public record office, London, vol. for Spain, 17.)

[331] Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen
Revolution, 292.

[332] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 150.

[333] Id., 151. Muriel, Historia de Carlos, IV, I, 112-121. This author
gives an extended discussion of the Spanish fleet, giving the size of each
vessel, its name, and the name of its commander.

[334] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 154.

[335] Id., 66.

[336] Report to the National Assembly. (Arch. Parl., first series, XVI,
692.)

[337] See last chapter.

[338] [Floridablanca] to Merry, May 18, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[339] An. Reg., XXXII, 298.

[340] Leeds to Fitzherbert, July 5, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34432, f^o 46.)

[341] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain. 465.

[342] Id., 194.

[343] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 199.

[344] Id., 240.

[345] Id., 234.

[346] Id., 236.

[347] Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen
Revolution, 294.

[348] Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens sur Zeit der franzoesischen
Revolution, 292.

[349] See Lecky, England In the Eighteenth Century, V, 232-264. A number
of letters between the King of Spain and the Queen of Portugal, running
through the year, show that the latter power was offering her mediation to
settle the quarrel with England; but this is a negligible influence. (See
Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4221.)

[350] See Chapters VII and VIII.

[351] Miranda to Pitt, London, September 8, 1781. (Am. Hist. Rev., VII,
711, 712.) This document and several others, which will be referred to
in this chapter, were collected and published by F. J. Turner. In this
letter Miranda recounts his relations with Pitt between February, 1790,
and September, 1791. It seems that Pitt had made repeated promises of
financial aid, but had delayed them from time to time, until the writer
had become impatient. A small sum had been paid, but much less than had
been promised. He tells of Russian offers of friendship and support. Later
correspondence indicates that he received money from time to time.

[352] Am. Hist. Rev., VII. 711, note 4.

[353] Am. Hist. Rev., VII, 716-735.

[354] See Chapter VIII.

[355] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 57.

[356] Lord Dorchester to Major Beckwith, Quebec, June 27, 1790 (Can.
Arch., 1890, p. 143); and same to same on same day (Id., 144). Very little
is known of Beckwith besides his being sent on this mission. Douglas
Brymner, in his introduction to this volume of the Canadian Archives, p.
xl, gives a brief sketch. He says that the records at Washington reveal
nothing regarding Beckwith or his mission.

[357] Dorchester to Grenville, Quebec, July 7, 1790. (Id., 145.)

[358] Hamilton, Works, IV, 31.

[359] Id., 32. Also Can. Arch., 1890, p. xxxvi

[360] Jefferson, Works, IX, 409.

[361] Hamilton, Works, IV, 32. Also Can. Arch., 1890, p. xxxvii.

[362] Can. Arch., 1890; p. 145. Inclosure with Dorchester to Grenville,
September 25, 1790, marked “Supposed No. 7.” These inclosures and others
similar, sent at various times by Dorchester to the British Cabinet, are
designated as unofficial information. No names are given, but the speakers
are indicated by number. Keys were sent from time to time showing for whom
the numbers stood. A complete key is found in the introduction to this
volume (p. xii). The above information reached Dorchester August 5.

[363] Id., 147, No. 14. The key shows this to have been Mr. Scott.

[364] Id., 162, 163, No. 7.

[365] Jefferson to Monroe, July 11, 1790. (Jefferson, Writings, V, 198.)

[366] Washington to Jefferson, August 27, 1790. (Id., 238.)

[367] Jefferson to Washington, August 28, 1790. (Id.)

[368] Jay to Washington, August 28, 1790. (Ford, The United States and
Spain in 1790, 50.)

[369] Adams to Washington, August 29, 1790. (Id., 45.)

[370] Knox to Washington, August 29, 1790. (Id., 103.)

[371] Hamilton to Washington, September 15, 1790. (Hamilton, Works, IV,
48.)

[372] Jefferson to the United States secret agent, August 11, 1790.
(Writings.)

[373] Morris, Diary and Letters, I, 325, 326, 329; Life and Writings, II,
113.

[374] Jefferson to [Morris], August 12, 1790. (Works or Writings, under
date.)

[375] Morris, Diary and Letters, I, 647; entry for September 15, 1790.

[376] This rumor was traced to Miranda, who, it was reported, said that he
had seen it in a letter to Campo, the Spanish ambassador. (See Hamilton
to Washington, September 21, 1790, Hamilton, Works, IV, 71; see also
Humphreys to the Secretary of State, London, October 20, 1790; Ford, The
United States and Spain in 1790, 31.)

[377] Jefferson to Short, August 10, 1790. (Jefferson, Writings, V, 218.)

[378] Jefferson to Carmichael, August 2 and 22, 1790. (Id., 216 and 225.)

[379] See Am. Hist. Rev., VII, 720.

[380] Short to Jefferson, Paris, October 21, 1790. (MSS. Dept. of State,
Washington, Dispatches, France, Vol. II.)

[381] Humphreys to the Secretary of State, Madrid, January 3, 1791. (Ford,
The United States and Spain in 1790, 32.) It seems that very little news
from Carmichael had been received, and that the Government at New York had
become impatient at his dilatory conduct. He must have received a severe
reprimand from Jefferson, if one can judge from his reply of January 24,
1791 (Id., 37). It begins: “SIR: Colonel Humphreys delivered to me your
letter of the 6th of August on the 15th of last month. Nothing could
equal my astonishment at finding that I have been employing my time in
a situation that has been for many years disagreeable--so little to my
own credit or to the satisfaction of my country.” The rest of the letter
indicates that his dispatches had miscarried. He attributed the fact to
personal enemies. He said that he was sending copies of some of his last
dispatches.

This letter from Carmichael and that from Humphreys referred to above make
interesting comments on the court intrigues in Spain--the dominance of the
Queen’s corrupt influence and the decline of Floridablanca’s prestige.

[382] See Chapter VIII.

[383] Arch. Parl., August 2, 1790. (Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, 122,
mentions this letter of June 16.)

[384] Arch. Parl., August 3, 1790. The observations of the two Deputies
are appended to the minutes of the session. The one who presented the
latter report was Le Couteulx de Canteleu, Deputy from Rouen.

[385] Arch. Parl., August 25, 1790; Miles, W. A., Correspondence, I, 167.

[386] Id., August 26, 1790. Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, 123-126,
discusses Mirabeau’s report of August 25 and the decree of August 26.
Cambridge Modern History VIII, 189, 190, discusses the decree briefly.
The latter reference says, “It is stated on the authority of Miles that
Mirabeau received from the Spanish minister a thousand louis d’or for this
service.” See also Mémoires de Mirabeau, VIII, 36; Loménie, Les Mirabeau,
V, 269; and Correspondence Entre Mirabeau et La Marck, II, 147.

[387] Montmorin to the president of the Assembly, August 30, 1790. (MS.
Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4038.) On October 10 the
Assembly appropriated 5,000,000 livres to defray the expense of the
armament. (See Arch. Parl., October 10, 1790.)

[388] Montmorin to Fernan Nuñez, September 1, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4038.)

[389] Oscar Browning, Cambridge Modern History, VIII, 290, says that “On
June 23, 1790, he had notified the Court that if they wished to give
effect to the family compact they must get it altered in form, as the
nation would never support an agreement which was purely dynastic in
shape.”

[390] Montmorin to Luzerne, August 27, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4038.)

[391] Same to same, August 28, 1790. (Id.)

[392] Gower, Despatches, 26.

[393] Id., 28.

[394] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 204.

[395] Gower to the French Court, September 4, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4038.)

[396] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 218.

[397] Id., 220, 221, 223, 226, 230, 232.

[398] Stanhope, Life of Pitt, II, 56, 59; Hassal, The French People,
352; Cambridge Modern History, VIII, 291; Adams, E. D., The Influence of
Grenville on Pitt’s Foreign Policy, 8, 9; Miles, W. A., Correspondence on
the French Revolution, I, 170, 176, 178; and George III to Pitt, October
26, 1790. Smith MSS. (Hist. MSS. Com., report 12, appendix 9, p. 368.) The
last two are the sources. The last is quoted by Adams and by the Cambridge
Modern History.

[399] See Chapter IX. Early in August, letters from Colnett had reached
London by way of Fitzherbert at Madrid. These told of his detention in
Mexico and of his release. Their influence on the negotiations was only
indirect. (See Narrative, 166.)

In the instructions sent from London on August 17, Fitzherbert was
asked to take up with the Spanish Court the matter of the liberation
of the Chinese which were captured at Nootka. In the same instructions
negotiations concerning a dispute over regulations for governing British
subjects in the Honduras settlement were turned over to Fitzherbert.
These had been in progress between Campo and Leeds at London in February,
when the first Spanish note on the Nootka affair was handed to Leeds. The
British Court immediately suspended all other discussions until Spain
should have offered satisfaction for the insult which they felt that the
British flag had suffered. The declarations of July 24 had been accepted
as affording such, and consequently the usual diplomatic relations had
been resumed. (See Narrative, 201, 208.)

[400] Narrative, 168 ff.

[401] An error in the month, as pointed out formerly. Martinez did not
arrive at Nootka until May 5. (See Chapter IV, ante.) This error was
embodied in the final treaty.

[402] Fitzherbert to Floridablanca, inclosing projet with observations,
September 8, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)
The private instructions of Leeds to Fitzherbert are to be found in the
Narrative, 168-192.

[403] Gazette de Leide, October 1, 1790.

[404] Peace had been concluded between Sweden and Russia on August 15,
but the news had probably not reached Madrid when the Count prepared this
paper. See Lecky, England in the Eighteenth Century, V, 271.

[405] Floridablanca to the principal ministers, September, 1790. (MS.
Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado. 4291.) The same is published
in Calvo, Recueil Complet des Traités de l’Amérique Latine, III, 350-355;
also in Cantillo, Tratados de Paz y Comercio, 630.

[406] Narrative, 242-245.

[407] Id., 247-256. A manuscript copy of Fitzherbert’s projet and
Floridablanca’s counter-projet is to be found in the Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.

[408] Cambridge Modern History, VIII, 189, says of the Spaniards: “Feeling
how vain it was to trust an ally of this kind, they preferred to make
terms with their enemy.”

[409] Gazette de Leide, October 15, 1790.

[410] Id., October 19.

[411] Dundas to Grenville, September 27, 1790. (Fortescue MSS., I, 607.)

[412] Leeds to Fitzherbert, September 10, 1790. (Narrative, 240.)

[413] Leeds to Auckland, October 22, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34433, f^o
349.)

[414] In detaching the Netherlands from the French alliance and uniting
them to England and Prussia by the triple alliance.

[415] Storer to Auckland, October 22, 1790. (Auckland, Correspondence, II,
373.)

[416] This shows that the British Ministry was resting the justice of
its cause on the purchase of land which Meares claimed that he had made
at Nootka on his arrival in 1788, and on the temporary hut which he had
erected to shelter workmen while they were building his little vessel, the
_North-West America_. (See Chapter II.)

[417] Narrative, 257-285. Also, the two drafts are inclosed in Leeds to
Auckland, October 8, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34433 f^o 252.)

With these instructions Fitzherbert was also given orders concerning
the case of Captain Macdonald. He was the captain of a vessel that had
recently been seized by a Spanish frigate in the West Indies on the ground
that she was carrying on contraband trade. Indemnity for this had to be
assured before the Nootka matter could be settled. It was easily adjusted.
(Narrative, 285.)

[418] Id., 289-291.

[419] For a full discussion of these facts, see Chapters II-V.

[420] Floridablanca to Fitzherbert, October 16, 1790, inclosing notes
on the English projet, and a Spanish counter projet. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[421] See last chapter.

[422] Conclusions of the junta of eight ministers, of October 21, 22,
24, and 25, 1790. (MSS. Arch. Hist. Nacional. Madrid, Sec. Estado,
4291; a copy is found also in bundle 2848 of the same section.) In the
former bundle are also copies of all of the more important papers that
had passed between Floridablanca and Fitzherbert since the signing of
the declarations on July 24. They were submitted to the junta. In the
latter bundle are also the following letters relating to the junta and
its sessions: Floridablanca to Iriarte, October 19 and 23; and Iriarte to
Floridablanca, October 21, 22, 24, and 25, 1790. Iriarte was secretary for
the junta and one of its eight members. He belonged to the council for the
Indies.

[423] Duro, Armada Española, VII, 16, makes the mistake of saying that
a majority of the junta favored the convention, though it met with some
opposition. He had evidently not seen the conclusions of the junta, or had
not examined them carefully.

[424] Narrative, 297-303.

[425] Fitzherbert to Floridablanca, October 23, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[426] Narrative, 303.

[427] Id., 291.

[428] Narrative, 304.

[429] Fitzherbert to Floridablanca, October 20, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291), and same to same, October 27, 1790
(Id.).

[430] Narrative, 292; An. Reg., XXXII, 303.; Calvo, Recueil, III, 356.

[431] Calvo adds the secret article, but it has not been published in any
other work.

[432] Floridablanca to Iriarte, October 27, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 2848.)

[433] Iriarte to Floridablanca, October 28, 1790 (Id.), inclosing notes
mentioned above, and Fitzherbert’s letter to the consuls of October 26.

[434] Floridablanca to Iriarte, November 21, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Sec. Estado, 2848.)

[435] Reflections submitted to the junta. (Id.)

[436] Iriarte to Floridablanca, November 24 [29], 1790. (Id.)

[437] St. Helens to Grenville, May 16, 1791. (Fortescue MSS., II, 74.)
Fitzherbert had been raised to the peerage as Baron St. Helens. Grenville
had succeeded Leeds in the foreign office.

[438] St. Helens to Grenville, February 28, 1792 (id., 256), and inclosure
dated Madrid, March 21, 1792, in a letter of Auckland to Grenville,
January 19, 1793 (id., 368).

[439] Leeds to Auckland, November 4, 1790. (Brit. Mus. MSS., 34434, f^o
14.)

[440] Aust to Auckland, November 4, 1790. (Id., f^o 20.)

[441] Leeds to Auckland, November 9, 1790. (Id., f^o 43.)

[442] Narrative, 306.

[443] Burges to Auckland, November 12, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34434,
f^o 58.) This quotation taken with the sentence which follows shows that
Burges considered about as much of the success due to himself as to
Fitzherbert. Continuing, he said: “This has been a very fortunate business
for him, for though undoubtedly he has had some trouble, his instructions
were so full and so positive, that little more on his part was necessary
than a literal adherence to them. From the turn things have unexpectedly
taken, I am apprehensive you must for some time give me credit on this
head.” It was in this letter that Burges made the statement which assisted
in identifying him as the compiler of the anonymous Narrative of the
Negotiations between England and Spain, to which frequent reference has
been made. (See p. 365, antea, note a [211].)

[444] An. Reg., XXXII, 305.

[445] Parl. Hist., XXVIII, 891.

[446] Id., 893.

[447] Id., 899-906.

[448] Id., 933-948.

[449] Id., 949-1003. It would be interesting to discuss these long debates
in detail, but of little value. The arguments of the opposition are much
more extended than those of the supporters of the Government. This is
doubtless what has led many writers into making the misleading statement
that the treaty was unfavorably received. The statement is true only in so
far as it applies to the opposition. Such criticism would be expected from
them, no matter how favorable the treaty really was.

[450] In bundle 2848, Sec. Estado, Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, is a
bunch of documents, about an inch thick, marked “Subsequent references
and notes on the convention concluded on October 28, 1790, regarding
fisheries, navigation, and commerce in the Pacific Ocean and the South
Seas.” They were collected by Iriarte and presented to the Prince of Peace
[Godoy]. They bear a variety of dates, some as late as 1797, and are
quotations from various European newspapers, reports of conversations, and
copies of letters. Their purpose seems to have been to show the injustice
of England in demanding such extravagant terms.

[451] Chapter VI.

[452] Instructions from Bodega y Quadra to Eliza, San Blas, January 28,
1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-26.)

[453] Voyage of the Sutil y Mexicana in 1792, Introduction; México á
Través de Los Siglos, II, 879; Informe of Revilla-Gigedo of April 12,
1793, in Bustamante (Cavo), Los Tres Siglos, III, 330; Pedro Feger,
Nouvelles Annales de Voyages, CI, 19.

[454] Vancouver, Voyages, I, 47-49 and 58-75.

[455] Id., 335 ff.; Bustamante (Cavo), Los Tres Siglos, III, 133-140;
Greenhow, Oregon and California, 241-246.

[456] Vancouver, Voyages, VI, 65-95, 117, 126. The commission was to him
first and to the special commissioner in Vancouver’s absence. (See Id. p.
118.)

[457] St. Helens to Grenville, May 29, 1791; Fortescue MSS., II, 86.

[458] Grenville to St. Helens, August 26, 1791. (Id., 176.)

[459] St. Helens to Grenville, October 3, 1791. (Id., 203.)

[460] Same to same, May 14, 1792. (Id., 268.)

[461] The new prime minister, appointed on the fall of Floridablanca.

[462] St. Helens to Grenville, May 29, 1792. (Fortescue MSS., II, 275.)

[463] Grenville to Dundas, August 4, 1792. (Id., 297.) Dundas was home
secretary.

[464] Dundas to Grenville, September 2, 1792. (Id., 307.)

[465] Translated from the Spanish copy published in Calvo, Recueil Complet
des Traités de l’Amérique Latine, III, 364.

[466] Grenville to St. Helens, August 26, 1791. (Fortescue MSS., II, 176.)

[467] Cabinet minute, January 25, 1793. (Id., 373.)

[468] Grenville to St. Helens, June 21, 1793. (Id., 398.) The documents
relating to the negotiation are found in bundle 4221, Sec. Estado, of the
Archivo Historico Nacional at Madrid.

[469] [Alcudia] to Revilla-Gigedo, January 29, 1794. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[470] Revilla-Gigedo to Alcudia, Mexico, April 12, 1793. (Bustamante
(Cavo), Los Tres Siglos, III, 112-164.)

[471] Translated from a Spanish copy in Calvo, Recueil, III, 386. A
manuscript copy is in bundle 4291, Sec. Estado, Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid.

[472] [Alcudia] to Revilla-Gigedo, January 29, 1794, inclosing
instructions to Bodega y Quadra, or the one whom the Viceroy should
appoint. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.)

[473] Grenville to Dundas, February 22, 1794 (Fortescue MSS., II, 511),
concerning the appointment of a commissioner; and Jackson to Alcudia,
April 17 and 20, 1794 (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado,
4287), both of which relate to the commissioner and the route which he
is to take. Jackson was at the time in charge of the British legation at
Madrid.

[474] Jackson to Alcudia, August 16, 1794. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional,
Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4287.) This announces the British commissioner’s
arrival at La Coruna and requests a passport for him.

[475] Mexico á Través de Los Siglos, II, 880. This work gives a very good
brief account of the transfer and abandonment.

[476] Alava to Alcudia, San Blas, April 23, 1795. (MS. Arch. Hist.
Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4287.) In this letter the Spanish
commissioner reports to Godoy the final ceremonies at Nootka. He gives as
the date of the ceremonies March 28; but since an error may have been made
in copying, and since other accounts agree on the above date, that has
been adopted. Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 301-303, discusses the final
settlement.




BIBLIOGRAPHY.

THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION, ARRANGED IN THE ORDER OF THEIR IMPORTANCE.


I. UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS.

_Documents copied from the Archivo Historico Nacional, Madrid, 169
pages._--Letters and official papers that passed between the British
and Spanish negotiators; correspondence between Floridablanca and other
Spanish officials; negotiations between the Spanish and French Courts.

_Documents copied from the Archivo General de Indias, Seville, 262
pages._--Correspondence between Martinez and the Viceroy relating to
the occupation of Nootka and to the captured English vessels; also
accounts of the matter from the Viceroy to the Government at Madrid,
inclosing copies of all of the documents relating to it.

_Documents copied from the British Museum, 37 pages._--Instructions
from the British Cabinet to Fitzherbert, and correspondence between the
Cabinet and the British ambassadors at Berlin and The Hague.

_Documents copied from the public record office, London, 36
pages._--Letters from Fitzherbert to the British Cabinet.

_Documents copied from the Archives of the Department of State at
Washington, 35 pages._--Correspondence between Jefferson, the Secretary
of State, and Short, the United States chargé at Paris. Very little of
value.


II. PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS.

Meares, John: _Voyages made in the Years 1788 and 1789, from
China to the Northwest Coast of America_, etc. London: 1790.--The
appendix contains important documents relating to Meares’s temporary
establishment at Nootka in 1788, to the plans for planting a permanent
colony in 1789, and to the capture of the English vessels in 1790.
These documents, if taken at their face value, give a decided prejudice
in favor of England. They have hitherto been the principal source of
information for the events at Nootka.

_The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and
Literature for the Year 1790._ London: 1793.--This contains copies
of a few of the more important documents relating to the diplomatic
controversy. They have been the principal source of information for
this phase of the subject. They also give a decided prejudice in favor
of England. The dates of some of the documents are incorrect, and some
have their titles interchanged.

Greenhow, Robert: _The History of Oregon and California and the Other
Territories on the Northwest Coast of North America, Accompanied by
… a Number of Documents_, etc. Second edition. Boston and London:
1845.--The appendix of this copies the documents contained in the
_Annual Register_ and adds some others of importance, most of which
are favorable to Spain. The author makes the Spanish case as strong as
possible in order to strengthen the case of the United States in the
Oregon controversy.

---- _Official Papers Relative to the Dispute Between the Courts
of Great Britain and Spain on the Subject of the Ships Captured in
Nootka Sound, and the Negotiation that Followed Thereon_, etc. London:
[1790].--All of the documents contained in this may be found in the
_Annual Register_, the _Parliamentary History_, and the _Archives
Parlementaires_.

Calvo: _Recueil Complet des Traités de l’Amérique Latine_. Paris:
1862.--Volume III gives a brief account in Spanish, and publishes more
Spanish documents than any other work.

Cantillo, Alej. de: _Tratados de Paz y Comercio_. Madrid: 1843.--Some
of the documents in the preceding are copied from this. It contains a
few others.

Fortescue MSS., Volume I: _Historical Manuscripts Commission.
Thirteenth Report. Appendix, Part III. Report on the Manuscripts of J.
B. Fortescue, Esq., Preserved at Dropmore, Volume I._ London: 1892.

Fortescue MSS., Volume II: _Historical Manuscripts Commission,
Fourteenth Report. Appendix, Part V. Report on the Manuscripts of J. B.
Fortescue, Esq., Preserved at Dropmore, Volume II._ London: 1895.

Gower: _The Despatches of Earl Gower_, June, 1790 to August, 1792.
Edited by Oscar Browning. Cambridge, England: 1885.--Earl Gower was the
English representative at Paris. A few of his dispatches bear on the
subject, especially with reference to the influence of the dispute on
the relations between England and France.

Auckland, William, Lord: _The Journal and Correspondence of, with a
Preface and Introduction by the Right Hon. and Right Rev. The Bishop
of Bath and Wells_. London: 1861.--Lord Auckland was the British
ambassador at The Hague; but his published correspondence contains very
little of value on the subject. His important letters on the Nootka
affair are unpublished.

Martens, Geo. Fred. de: _Recueil de Traités d’Alliance, de Paix, … des
Puissances et Etats de l’Europe_, etc. Tome IV, 1785-1790. A Gottingue:
1818.--This contains the declaration and counter declaration and the
Nootka Sound convention.

Turner, F. J., in _American Historical Review_, Volume VII, gives
documents relating to the conferences and correspondence between Pitt
and Miranda on the South American schemes, and others showing the
English designs on Louisiana and the Floridas.

_Canadian Archives, 1890, Report on_, by Douglas Brymner (being an
appendix to report of the minister of agriculture). Ottawa: 1891.--This
contains important documents concerning Beckwith’s secret mission to
the United States.

Ford, Worthington C.: _The United States and Spain in 1790_. Brooklyn:
1890.--This contains some valuable documents showing the precautions
taken by the Government of the United States in view of the dispute
between England and Spain.

Jefferson: _Writings_. Edited by P. L. Ford. New York:
1892-1899.--Volume V contains some correspondence on the Nootka affair.

Jefferson: _Works_. Congressional edition. Washington:
1853-1855.--Volume IX contains a few of the same as the last.

Hamilton: _Works_. Edited by H. C. Lodge. New York: 1885-86.--Volume IV
contains a few documents on the subject.

Smith MSS.: _Historical Manuscripts Commission_. Twelfth report.
Appendix, Part IX. London: 1891.--The manuscripts of Mr. Vernon Smith
contained in this volume are the papers of his grandfather, Mr. Joseph
Smith, Pitt’s private secretary. A few bear on the Nootka controversy.

Miles, W. A.: _The Correspondence of, on the French Revolution_, Edited
by C. P. Miles. London: 1890.--Letters in Volume I make allusion to
the mission which had been intrusted to him. He and Hugh Elliot were
engaged on the same mysterious mission.


III. SECONDARY SOURCES.

[Burges, Sir James Bland]: _Narrative of the Negotiations Occasioned
by the Dispute Between England and Spain in the Year 1790_. London:
[1791].--This almost deserves to be classed among the published
documents. It was prepared in the foreign office while the negotiations
were in progress. The author’s name is not given, and has hitherto
been unknown, but it may be safely asserted that it was compiled by
Sir James Bland Burges, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs,
especially for the King. It was printed shortly afterwards as an
official document. It gives a full and faithful account of the British
negotiations, and is more valuable for this than anything else that has
ever been printed. Its extreme rarity makes it almost inaccessible, so
that no previous writer has used it, though both Greenhow and Bancroft
mention it. See note a [211], p. 365, antea, and note b [443], p. 460.

---- _Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, Recueil complet des
Débats Legislatifs et Politiques des Chambres Françaises_. Premiere
serie, Tome XV, Assemblée Nationale Constituante, du 21 April, 1790
au 30 Mai, 1790. Paris: 1883.--This contains documents concerning the
arming of 14 ships of the line by France in May, 1790, and also the
debate on the question of the right to make peace and war which the
measure provoked. Volume 17 of this series contains discussions in the
National Assembly concerning Spain and the family compact; and volume
18 contains Mirabeau’s report of August 25 on the same subject and the
decrees of August 26.

---- _The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period
to 1803_ … Volume XXVIII (1789-1791). London: 1816.--This gives the
debates in the British Houses of Parliament on the Nootka affair.

Bancroft, Hubert Howe: _The Works of_, Volume XXVII; _History of the
Northwest Coast_, Volume I (1543-1800). San Francisco: 1884.--This is
the fullest and one of the most reliable accounts hitherto published.
The writer naturally pays more attention to the occurrences at Nootka
than to the diplomatic controversy.

Baumgarten, Hermann: _Geschichte Spanien’s zur Zeit der franzoesischen
Revolution. Mit einen Einleitung ueber die innere Entwicklung Spanien’s
im achtzehnten Yahrhundert._ Berlin: 1861.--His chapter on Nootka
Sound is perhaps the fullest and best account with the exception of
Bancroft’s. He gives, also, a good view of the internal condition of
the Spanish Government.

---- _The Cambridge Modern History_, planned by Lord Acton, edited by
Ward, Prothero, and Leathers. Volume VIII, The French Revolution. New
York and London: Macmillian’s, 1904.--Chapter X, on Pitt’s Foreign
Policy to the Outbreak of the War with France, written by Oscar
Browning, gives a brief account of the Nootka affair. It has avoided
some of the errors of previous treatments. This writer consulted
manuscripts in the public record office.

Lecky, W. E. H.: _A History of England in the Eighteenth Century_,
Volume V. New York: Appleton’s, 1891.--This contains a brief,
inaccurate account strongly tinged with English prejudice. He probably
used few documents other than those published in Meares’s _Voyages_ and
the _Annual Register_, mentioned above.

Twiss: _The Oregon Question Examined with Respect to the Facts and the
Law of Nations_. New York: 1846.--This was written from the English
standpoint to refute Greenhow’s book, referred to above.

Schoell, F.: _Histoire Abréyée des Traités de Paix entre Les Puissances
de l’Europe depuis la Paix de Westphalia_, etc. Paris: 1815.--Volume IV
gives a brief historical statement concerning voyages to the Northwest
Coast, and describes the Nootka region and the natives. It is not
accurate on the negotiation.

Muriel, D. Andrés: _Historia de Carlos IV_. Madrid: 1893.--This is the
fullest recent account in Spanish. The writer gives the details of the
Spanish armament. The work contains errors and is strongly prejudiced.

Duro, Cesáreo Fernandez: _Armada Española desde la Union de las Reinos
de Castillo y de Aragon_. Madrid: 1902.--Volume VIII gives a brief
account. The author is one of the best Spanish historians of the
present, though his work is not without errors and prejudices.

Bustamante, Carlos Maria de: _Historia de Los Tres Siglos de Mexico,
Durante el Gobierno Español_. Supplement by Andrés Cavo. Mexico:
1836.--Volume III quotes the long letter of April 12, 1793, from
Revilla-Gigedo, the Viceroy, to Godoy. It gives a brief history of
the Spanish operations on the Northwest Coast and particularly of the
Nootka expeditions. It advises the surrender of Nootka to England,
giving reasons.

---- _Relacion del Viage Hecho por las Goletas Sutil y Mexicana en el
Año de 1792 Para Reconocer el Estrecho de Fuca_. Madrid: 1802.--The
introduction contains a brief history of the Spanish voyages to the
coast before 1792.

---- _Northwest American Water Boundary Arbitration. Case of England._
British Blue Book series.--This quotes extensively from the work last
named.

Gomez de Arteche, D. José: _Reinado de Carlos IV_. Printed as a part of
the _Historia General de España Escrita por Individuos de Numero de la
Real Academia de la Historia_. Madrid: 1890.--Volume I gives a brief
discussion.

---- _Colleccion de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España_.
Madrid: 1849.--Volume XV contains a little on the subject.

---- _Mexico A Través de Los Siglos, Historia General y Completa …
de Mexico Desde la Antigüedad más remota Hasta la Epoca Actual_.
Under the direction of D. Vicente Riva Palacio. Mexico and Barcelona:
[----].--Volume II of this gives a good brief discussion of the mutual
abandonment of Nootka.

Vancouver, Capt. George: _A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific
Ocean and Round the World; in Which the Coast of North America has been
Carefully Examined and Accurately Surveyed, … Performed in the Years
1790, 1791, 1792, 1793, 1794, and 1795_. London: 1801.--Volumes I and
VI give an account of the futile negotiations between Vancouver and
Quadra in 1792.

Broughton, William Robert: _A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific
Ocean … Performed in His Majesty’s Ship Providence and her Tender_.
(1795-1798.) London: 1804.--This gives an account of the mutual
abandonment.

Colnett, James: _Voyage to the South Atlantic and around Cape Horn into
the Pacific_. London: 1798.--The introduction and a note beginning on
page 96 give Colnett’s own account of his imprisonment, written several
years after his release.

Mirabeau: _Mémoires Biographiques, Littéraires et Politiques, Ecrits
par Lui-même, par son Père, son Oncle et son Fils adoptif_. Second
edition. Paris: 1841.--Volumes VII and VIII contain documents and brief
discussions concerning Mirabeau’s efforts in the National Assembly in
behalf of the family compact.

---- _Correspondance Entre le Comte de Mirabeau et le Comte de le
Marck_. Paris: 1851.--Volume II contains some material on the subject.

Loménie, Louis de: _Les Mirabeau, Nouvelles Etudes sur la Société
Française au XVIII^e Siècle_. Paris: 1891.--Volume V refers to the
relations between France and Spain.

Stern, Alfred: _Das Leben Mirabeaus_. Berlin: 1889.--This discusses
Mirabeau’s part in the discussion on the right to make peace and war
and also his influence on foreign affairs.

Willert, P. F.: _Mirabeau_. London: 1898.--This discusses Mirabeau’s
efforts to strengthen the position of the Monarchy in the debate on the
right of making peace and war.

Segur, le Comte de: _Politiques des Tous les Cabinets de L’Europe,
pendant les règnes de Louis XV et de Louis XVI_. Paris: 1802.--Volume
II devotes some space to a discussion of the family compact in the
National Assembly.

De Jonge, J. C.: _Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen_.
Haarlem: 1862.--Volume V discusses briefly the part taken by the Dutch
fleet in the English naval preparations.

Clowes, William Laird: _The Royal Navy, a History from the Earliest
Times to the Present_. Boston and London: 1899.--Volume IV discusses
the Nootka armament.

---- _Gazette de Leide, ou Nouvelles Extraordinaires de Divers
Endroits. Année 1790._--This gives newspaper comments on the dispute
and the negotiation; also statistics regarding the growth of the
armaments.

Stanhope: _Life of the Right Honorable William Pitt_. London:
1861-62.--This mentions the mission of Hugh Elliot to France.

Adams, E. D.: _The Influence of Grenville on Pitt’s Foreign Policy,
1787-1798_. Washington: 1904.--This discusses the mission of Miles and
Elliot.

Desdevises du Dezert: _L’Espagne de l’Ancien Régime_. Paris:
1897.--This gives an excellent study of the Spanish Government and
institutions.

Tratchevsky: _L’Espagne à l’Epoque de la Révolution Française_,
published in _Revue Historique_, XXXI.--This only mentions the dispute,
but is valuable as giving an insight into the workings of the Spanish
Government.

Hassall, Arthur: _The French People_. New York: 1901.--This discusses
the influence of the dispute on the French Revolution.

Stephens: _Revolutionary Europe_. London: 1897.--This makes very brief
mention of the affair.

Humboldt, Alex. von: _Essai Politique sur le Royaume de la
Nouvelle-Espagne_. Paris: 1811.--This gives a discussion based on
documents found in the archives at Mexico.

Dixon, George: _Remarks on the Voyages of John Meares, esq.,
in a Letter to that Gentleman_. London: 1790. This points out
inconsistencies in Meares’s statements.

---- _Further Remarks on the Voyages, etc. To Which is Added a Letter
from Captain Duncan Containing a Refutation of Several Assertions of
Mr. Meares, etc._ London: 1791.

Meares, John: _An Answer to Mr. Dixon, In Which the Remarks on the
Voyages, etc., are Fully Considered and Refuted_. London: 1791.

Cook, Capt. James: _A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, Undertaken by
Command of His Majesty … in His Majesty’s Ships Resolution and
Discovery_. (1777-1780.) London: 1785.--Volume II tells of the
discovery of Nootka and describes the country and the natives.

Begg, Alex.: _History of British Columbia_. Toronto: 1894.--This gives
a brief discussion of the Nootka affair, drawn chiefly from Meares’s
accounts.

Morris, Gouverneur: _Life of, With Selections from his Correspondence_,
by Jared Sparks. Boston: 1832.

---- _The Diary and Letters of_, by Anne Cary Morris. New York:
1888.--This and the last contain a few references to the dispute.

[Etches, John Cadman:] _An Authentic Statement of all the Facts
Relative to Nootka Sound_. London: 1790.--This is a violently partisan
pamphlet, written by one of the proprietors of the captured vessels.

Dalrymple: _The Spanish Pretensions Fairly Discussed_. London:
1790.--This is similar to the last.