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[Illustration:
Engraved by Edwards, from a Painting by Sir Joshua Reynolds.
ROBERT LORD CLIVE.
London. Published by John Murray. 1836.]


THE LIFE OF ROBERT, LORD CLIVE:

Collected from the Family Papers
Communicated by the Earl Of Powis.

by

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN MALCOLM, G.C.B. F.R.S. &c.

In Three Volumes.

With a Portrait and Map.

VOL. I.







London:
John Murray, Albemarle Street.
MDCCCXXXVI.




  TO
  THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
  THE EARL OF POWIS,
  &c. &c. &c.

  MY LORD,

  This Life of your illustrious Father is dedicated
  to your Lordship, in the conviction
  that, had the Author been spared to complete
  this, his last and favourite work, he
  would have thus endeavoured to testify
  his gratitude for your unvaried kindness,
  and his affectionate esteem for your public
  and private character.

  I remain,
  MY LORD,
  Your Lordship's faithful Servant,
  CHARLOTTE MALCOLM.

  Warfield, April, 1836.




ADVERTISEMENT.


The present work was commenced in consequence of the possession of
a body of unpublished documents, which, having been preserved among
the family records at Walcot, were thrown open to the author by the
friendship of the Earl of Powis. These consisted chiefly of the whole
correspondence of Lord Clive, containing the originals of nearly
every letter which he had received from the time when he first filled
a public situation in India, down to the period at which he finally
quitted that country; with copies of answers to many of the most
important of them. They contained also several memoirs regarding the
chief enterprises in which he was engaged, and minutes of council on
the leading measures of his government.

From these sources, aided by the Reports of the different Parliamentary
Committees, and other authentic materials, published and unpublished,
Sir John had completed the introduction, and the first thirteen
chapters, before he left India, in 1830. The fourteenth and fifteenth
he finished after his return, and was engaged with the sixteenth, when
death put a close to his labours.

The author was accustomed to bestow his final revision upon each
successive portion of his work before he advanced to that which was to
follow it. He had, consequently, made no preparation beyond the point
where his progress was arrested; nor had he sketched out or indicated
the plan he meant to pursue.

A gentleman for whose abilities Sir John Malcolm entertained a high
respect, and by whose judgment it was his intention to have profited
before he committed his work to the press, kindly offered to supply
such a continuation as was necessary to bring down the narrative to the
death of Lord Clive.

The materials which were here available were, of necessity, less
abundant, less original, and less authentic than those from which the
earlier part of the Memoirs had been composed.

After Lord Clive reached England, he filled no public situation, and
had the means of settling his most important affairs directly by
personal communication. The incidents of his English life were to
be drawn chiefly from a limited and occasional correspondence with
his more intimate friends, and the parliamentary proceedings from
the reports in the periodical works of the day; in which the details
of contemporary occurrences are infinitely less ample than are now
afforded by similar publications.

The writer, therefore, by whose pen the concluding chapters were
contributed, laboured under a difficulty which would have discouraged
any person less influenced by friendship for the deceased, and by
kindness for those on whom the publication devolved; but it has been
surmounted in a manner which, it is hoped, will enable the reader to
pursue the subject to its close, without any feeling of unsatisfied
curiosity.

The family of Sir John Malcolm cannot close this brief notice, without
expressing to the continuator of the work their warmest gratitude for
the pains his affection has bestowed upon the last labours of his
friend.




CONTENTS
OF
THE FIRST VOLUME.


  INTRODUCTION.
  General View of the State of India in 1746           Page   1

  CHAPTER I.
  Clive's Family--his Boyhood.--Events of his early Life in
  India.--History of the Carnatic to 1750                    29

  CHAP. II.
  Wars in the Carnatic.--Siege of Arcot, and subsequent
  Operations of Clive till 1752                              67

  CHAP. III.
  Clive returns to England, 1753.--Again sent to India in
  1755.--Capture of Gheriah.--Operations in Bengal.--Calcutta
  retaken, and Sujah-u-Dowlah forced to make
  Peace                                                     128

  CHAP. IV.
  Surrender of Chandernagore.--Quarrel with Sujah-u-Dowlah  183

  CHAP. V.
  Conduct of Sujah-u-Dowlah.--Intrigues at his Court.--Battle
  of Plassey.--He is deposed, and Meer Jaffier raised
  to the Musnud.--Treaty                                    219

  CHAP. VI.
  Transactions subsequent to the Battle of Plassey          273

  CHAP. VII.
  State of Parties in Bengal, and in the Court of Meer Jaffier.--Clive
  proceeds to Patna.--Accepts the Government
  of Bengal                                                 316

  CHAP. VIII.
  Clive projects an Expedition to occupy the northern Circars.--Intrigues
  at the Court of Moorshedabad.--The
  Shahzada's Invasion of Bahar.--Repelled by Clive--who
  receives a Jaghire                                        364




INTRODUCTION.


GENERAL VIEW OF THE STATE OF INDIA IN 1746.

Before entering on the Memoirs of Clive, it will be useful to take a
succinct view of the state of India, at the period when he commenced
his career in that country, and more especially of the coast of
Coromandel, which was the scene on which he first displayed those
talents that were afterwards to raise him to such eminence.

The emperors of Delhi, since the death of Aurungzebe (A. D. 1707), had
rapidly declined from the power they once possessed. The government
of distant countries was intrusted to soubahdars (or viceroys), who
invariably took advantage of the dissensions in the imperial family, or
the weakness of a reigning prince, to endeavour to render themselves
independent. The same motives and principles which governed the
conduct of these vicegerents, actuated those whose allegiance and
obedience they claimed in virtue of their delegated powers from the
nominal Sovereign of India. Hindoo rajahs, and Mahomedan nabobs owned
or rejected the sway of their superiors according to their means of
resistance; while the Mahrattas, a name unknown to the military history
of Asia before the middle of the seventeenth century, threatened, by a
system[1] of predatory warfare, to complete the destruction of these
Mahomedan conquerors, whose chiefs, whether engaged in contest for the
imperial Crown, the high office of soubahdar, or the inferior rank
of nabob, appear to have lost, in their rancorous hostility to each
other, all sense of union and of common danger, and to have blindly
courted the aid of allies who (a little foresight would have shown
them) were rising fast to greatness upon their ruin. These observations
on the conduct of the Mahomedan princes are not more applicable to
the connections they formed with the Mahrattas, than to those which,
in the eighteenth century, they began to contract with Europeans. The
Portuguese, who had discovered a passage to India in 1498, enjoyed
the exclusive commerce with that country for a complete century; but
their short and brilliant career was essentially different from that
of the European nations who succeeded them. Their establishments were
all maritime. They conquered and subdued the princes and chiefs on
the shores and islands of India; but seldom, if ever, carried their
arms into the interior, or engaged in any of those offensive and
defensive alliances with native states, that must have hurried them
into contests, to support which the resources and strength of the
mother country would have been altogether inadequate. In consequence of
this policy, their established character for valour, and the strength
of their fortifications, they did not become objects of attack to the
principal native powers of India. Neither the Emperors of Delhi, nor
their princely delegates had, or desired to have, any naval force.
They attached no value to the sea-coast or to islands, but as they
might produce them profit through the medium of customs: and the
increased commerce, consequent to the settlement of the Portuguese at
Goa and other parts, was calculated to reconcile them to a nation,
whose warfare on the continent of India was almost entirely limited to
contest with the petty princes and chiefs who occupied or claimed the
shores where they desired to settle.

The effect of the victories gained over these princes was improved
by the valour, wisdom, and energy of the great men[2] who first
established the Portuguese power in India; but all these impressions
were lost by the subsequent conduct of their degenerate successors,
who, selected by the favour, or removed by the caprice, of a weak and
corrupt court, became the ready instruments of tyranny and oppression.
This evil was augmented by the continual changes of their local rulers,
and by other circumstances, calculated to bring ultimate ruin on their
affairs, even had that not been accelerated by the attack of European
states; to which the very considerations which saved them from the
hostility of the great native princes of India left them peculiarly
exposed. Every settlement which they had made depended exclusively upon
their possessing a superiority at sea, and having no rivals either in
commerce or war; but their monopoly of the trade of India, for so long
a period, arose chiefly from a respect to their right as the first
settlers, which extended even to that of the exclusive navigation to
that country by the Cape of Good Hope. When this right was invaded,
when their fleets came in contact with those of Holland and England,
their power fell as rapidly as it had risen; and, like a meteor, left
no trace but a recollection of its dazzling and short-lived splendour.

The successful voyages of Drake and others excited the merchants
of England to seek establishments in India: but the enterprise of
individuals was deemed unequal to so expensive and hazardous an
undertaking; and a company was formed, to open and pursue a channel of
commerce, from which such great gains were anticipated. This company
and the nation were stimulated to greater efforts by the Dutch, having
at this period (the close of the sixteenth century) sent several
ships round the Cape of Good Hope. The English now began to settle
in different parts of India. The first factory was established at
Surat, in 1612, and continued to have the control over all the petty
settlements on the western side of the peninsula, till the cession of
Bombay, made in 1668 by the King to the Company, when that town, from
its fine harbour, and central situation for commerce, soon rose to be
the superior settlement in that part of India; while Madras obtained
the same rank on the coast of Coromandel, and for some period counted
Calcutta[3] as one of its subordinates. The latter at the period when
Clive's career in India commenced, had become independent, and, like
the settlements of Madras and Bombay, was under the government of a
president and select committee; but it was still, in its establishment
and means of defence, inferior to either of the other presidencies.

In the year 1698, another East India Company was formed, and received
an exclusive right of trade in consideration of a loan to government;
but the charter of the old Company was a few months afterwards
confirmed, and the trade to the East Indies was divided between the
two Companies. The jarring interests of these bodies, who obtained
advantages over each other according to the favour of corrupt and
changing administrations in England, had brought such distress on both,
that, in 1702, their prayer to unite was attended to; a new charter
was granted, and from that period they have been denominated "The
United East India Company." By this charter, they were permitted to
employ civil servants, to raise troops, and to make war and peace in
India. Their policy, however, had been to avoid (as being ruinous to
their commercial pursuits) all grounds of offence to native states;
and they had not even made those fortifications which were necessary
to defend their property from spoliation. The conduct which they thus
pursued had been strongly recommended[4] to them by Sir Thomas Roe
when ambassador at the court of the Emperor of Delhi, and a modern
historian[5] of India observes, that "if Sir Thomas Roe had lived to
the present day, he might have urged the trade with China as a proof,
by experiment, of the proposition he advanced." But assuredly no cases
ever existed more opposite than those of China and India. Though
the government of the former, by a rigid system of exclusion, keeps
European settlers dependent upon its own power, it secures them against
all enemies. The native powers of the latter, by engaging in alliance,
and inviting to interference in internal politics, the subjects of
one European state, leave to the other, who may be in rivalry or
hostility with it, no option between certain ruin, and employing means
of self-defence and retaliation. This truth was never more completely
evinced than in 1744, when war was declared between France and England.
On receipt of this intelligence, the forces under the control of the
companies of the two nations on the coast of Coromandel, prepared to
prosecute hostilities by land and sea, upon a scale which involved both
in a scene of operations more suited to empires than to commercial
factories. The results of these operations will appear wonderful
to him who only considers the handful of troops which either party
could bring into the field; but the improvements which, within the
last two centuries, had taken place in Europe, gave its soldiers an
incalculable advantage over those of Asia, before the latter were
taught, by repeated defeats, to make war upon more equal terms with
their European opponents. The superiority of a well-constructed machine
over manual labour is not more extraordinary, than the advantages which
discipline and the improvements in fire-arms and artillery afford to
a regular body of troops over an irregular and badly armed force.
No valour can equalise the combat, and the impressions produced by
defeat are rendered tenfold greater by a comparison of numbers. The
well-commanded, and well-trained battalion moves amidst ten thousand
of its rabble opponents, like a giant with a thousand hands, which
defend or strike, according to the dictates of one mind, and to whom an
unconnected force, where every individual acts for himself, can offer
neither injury nor resistance.

It is to this fact far more than to the want of personal courage in
the men, or pusillanimity in their leaders, that we must refer the
astonishing success of small numbers of disciplined troops, in the
early wars of India; and it was from observing this success that the
rulers of the country so eagerly courted their aid.

It was, undoubtedly, good policy in the English to abstain from
all interference with native states. It must have been obvious
that, from the moment they left the limits of their factories, they
would be involved beyond the possibility of retreat; and that the
consequence of the course of policy in which they engaged could be no
further foreseen, than that it was opposed to all those principles
of commercial pursuit, upon which their establishments were founded.
With such a prospect, nothing could justify the authorities in India
in the part they acted, but proof that it was one to which they were
compelled, in order to prevent positive ruin, and to support the honour
and the interests of their country against a powerful enemy. Whether
or not they had this justification at the moment when the following
Memoir opens, will be seen by a short view of the state of affairs in
the Carnatic at that eventful period of our history in India.

The Payeen Ghaut, or Lower Carnatic, well known as the dominions of
the Nabob of Arcot, extends along the coast of Coromandel, from the
southern limits of the Guntoor Circar to Cape Comorin, a distance
of about 560 miles. Its breadth, from the sea to the Ghauts (or
mountains), which separate it from the territories of Hyderabad and
Mysore, is no where above 100 miles; and in some parts little more
than fifty. This country was formerly governed by Hindoo princes, but
these had for several centuries acknowledged a Mahomedan superior. Its
nabob, Sadut Oolla, in the beginning of the eighteenth century (A. D.
1710), having no children, adopted two nephews, the eldest of whom,
Doost Ali, on the death of his uncle, declared himself his successor;
and the younger, Bauker, became governor of the strong fortress of
Vellore. Nizam-ul-Mûlk, who was at this period soubahdar of the
Deckan[6], to which district of the empire the Carnatic belonged,
offended at the want of deference to his supremacy, evinced by this
act of the self-constituted nabob, prevented that regular confirmation
of his title which was required from Delhi. Doost Ali had two sons,
and several daughters, one of whom was married to Mortaza Ali, the son
of his brother at Vellore, and another to a relation of the name of
_Chunda Sahib_, who became soon afterwards his Dewan, or minister; and
on the death of the Hindoo prince of Trichinopoly (A. D. 1736), this
chief was sent with a force, under pretext of demanding tribute of the
Ranee, or queen, but with the real design of making himself master
of that fortress,--an object which he effected more by artifice than
force. The part he acted after obtaining possession of the capital of
the southern part of the Carnatic, combined with his having halted for
some days at Pondicherry, with the governor of which he had several
interviews, give reason to conclude that Chunda Sahib laid, at this
period, the foundation of that friendship, which was subsequently
publicly proclaimed between him and the French government.[7]

Sufder Ali, the son of the nabob who had gone with Chunda Sahib to
Trichinopoly, returned, after its capture, to Arcot, where a new Dewan,
or minister, Meer Assud, was appointed; who took every step he could to
prevent the accomplishment of those ambitious designs which he seemed
convinced his predecessor in office had formed.

The Marathas had formerly been in possession of a great part of the
Carnatic; and one of their chiefs had become Rajah of Tanjore, a small
but rich principality, lying to the southward of the Cavery, and
fertilised by its waters, and those of the Coleroon. Incited by the
reigning rajah, and by the Hindu family who had been expelled from
Trichinopoly, 10,000 of this nation, under Ragojee Bhonsela (A. D.
1740), invaded the Carnatic. In the first action with these plunderers,
Doost Ali was slain, and his son, Sufder Ali, immediately assumed the
title of nabob; but, dreading the results of the Maratha invasion,
he sent his family and treasures for protection to Pondicherry. When
the war with the Marathas was concluded, he took his family away; but
Chunda Sahib left his, fearing, perhaps, the result of the intrigues,
which were going on against him. These became too soon apparent; the
Marathas retired; but, secretly excited by the court of Arcot, they
soon returned, and surrounded Trichinopoly, which they took, after a
siege of three months; and, having appointed one of their leaders,
Morari Row, to be its governor, they sent Chunda Sahib, whom they had
made prisoner, to be confined in a fortress near Sattarah.

Sufder Ali, who was at this time (A. D. 1741) in great alarm at the
apprehended resentment of the Soubahdar of the Deckan, to whom he had
remitted little or no tribute, went, for security, to reside in the
fortress of Vellore, pretending, at the same time, that he was in great
poverty, and intended to proceed to Mecca; and, to give more currency
to this last report, he sent his son and family to Madras, from whence
he said he meant to embark. His minister, Meer Assud, is stated to have
advised him to put his family and property under the protection of the
English, from a conviction of the intrigues the French were carrying
on at this period with Chunda Sahib, of whose ambitious views he
continued to entertain the most serious alarm.

The retreat of the Marathas had been purchased by the promise of a
large sum, and every district of the Carnatic was heavily assessed
to make up this amount. This assessment produced great discontent,
and the principal rulers of districts, leagued with Mortaza Ali, in a
conspiracy against the nabob, who was assassinated; and his treacherous
relative and murderer, having distributed largesses to the army,
proclaimed himself nabob, and marched to Arcot.

Mortaza Ali desired to have Sufder Ali's son and property delivered
up to him; but the English refused to comply with his request, being
urged to this refusal by the Maratha chief Morari Row, and several of
the principal officers of the nabob's army. Many of the latter openly
expressed their detestation of Mortaza Ali; and the cowardly prince was
so alarmed at those symptoms of danger, that he fled in the disguise of
a female from his court at Arcot, and found refuge in his stronghold of
Vellore.

As soon as the flight of Mortaza Ali was known, the army proclaimed
Mahomed Saeed (the young son of Sufder Ali) nabob; and, having
appointed a minister, the prince was conveyed to Wandewash, which
fortress was commanded by one of his near relations.

Such was the state of the Carnatic, when Nizam-ul-Mûlk, Soubahdar of
the Deckan, advanced to Arcot (A. D. 1743). His immense army[8] met
with no resistance. This old and celebrated prince is said to have been
shocked at the state of anarchy in which he found the fine country he
now, for the first time, visited. Every officer who had been trusted
with a petty government was introduced as a nabob, till the soubahdar,
enraged at this assumption of rank, under cover of delegated authority,
exclaimed, "I have seen, this day, eighteen nabobs, in a country where
there should be but one; scourge the next fellow who comes with that
title!"

The son of Sufder Ali paid his homage, and was kindly received; but,
though directed to be treated with lenity and respect, he was refused
leave to return to Wandewash.

Nizam-ul-Mûlk having, by promises and presents, more than by arms,
persuaded Morari Row to evacuate Trichinopoly, completed the settlement
of the Carnatic, and returned to his capital, Hyderabad.

Khojah Abdulla, a native Toork, from beyond the Oxus, one of his
most distinguished officers, who had accompanied him upon his late
expedition, was nominated to the government of the Carnatic; but on the
morning on which he was to commence his march to Arcot, he was found
dead in his bed.[9] The charge of this important province was now given
to Anwar-u-Deen, a brave and experienced soldier, of a respectable,
though not noble family. He had filled several stations of consequence,
and had, for sixteen years, been governor of the extensive districts of
Ellore and Rajahmundry.

Nizam-ul-Mûlk, from regard to popular feeling, which was in favour of
Mahomed Saeed, the son of Sufder Ali, signified his intention to make
that youth nabob of Arcot, whenever he attained the years of manhood;
stating, that the officer, to whom he had given the principal charge,
was only to hold it till that period: but his placing the young prince
under the care of Anwar-u-Deen augured ill for the accomplishment
of this object (A. D. 1744). The youth was, however, for some time,
treated with great honour and respect; subject only to the disquietude
arising from the clamorous demands of some Patan soldiers for arrears
of pay. At the marriage of one of his relations, Mahomed Saeed was
compelled, by usage, to receive Mortaza Ali, the murderer of his
father. The appearance of that chief was ominous. Nothing, however,
happened till near the close of the ceremony. When the young prince
went forward to meet his guardian Anwar-u-Deen, the captain of the
discontented Patans, under the pretence of asking pardon for his former
insolence, approached his person, and stabbed him to the heart. As the
boy fell lifeless, a hundred swords were drawn, and the Patan leader
and his comrades were hewn in pieces. Mortaza Ali was next sought for,
but he had fled to Vellore. Anwar-u-Deen was loud in his lamentations,
and apparently active in the pursuit of all concerned. The whole of
the Patan race were banished, and their houses rased to the ground;
but these demonstrations, though they satisfied Nizam-ul-Mûlk, did
not lull the suspicion of the public; and it was generally believed
that Anwar-u-Deen was concerned with Mortaza Ali in destroying a
prince whose right to be nabob, when he came of age, was recognised
by the soubahdar of the Deckan, and who enjoyed the attachment of all
ranks, not more on account of his promising character, than from the
recollection of the benefits the country had enjoyed, for thirty years,
under the administration of his ancestors.

When war occurred between England and France, the latter country
had every thing to expect from the ability and enterprise of La
Bourdonnais, the commander of her fleet, in India, and Dupleix, the
governor of the settlements on the coast of Coromandel.

It may be questioned, whether France has ever produced a more skilful
or more able naval officer than La Bourdonnais. Nor were his talents
limited to the profession to which he belonged: to his efforts
and genius the islands of Bourbon and the Mauritius owe all their
prosperity. He was as active and successful in improving the colonies
of his own country, as he was fortunate and distinguished in his
attacks upon those of its enemies.

Before the arrival of La Bourdonnais in India, the English had the
superiority at sea, and the French settlements were almost defenceless:
but the government of Pondicherry prevailed upon the nabob of Arcot to
require the governor of Madras to abstain from making any attack upon
the French; and Commodore Barnet, who commanded His Majesty's fleet,
was induced, by the entreaty and representations of the Company's
government, to adopt a similar line of conduct.

When, however, the French admiral arrived, he resolved to be fettered
by no arrangements made on shore, from injuring, to the utmost of his
power, the foes of his country. It is mortifying to read the narrative
of the events of this year (A. D. 1746), when the superior energy of
the French so completely triumphed, both on sea and land. The English
fleet, after some indecisive efforts, left the coast, and Madras[10]
was taken. La Bourdonnais agreed, however, to restore it to the
English, on the payment of a ransom.

Nothing could be more desperate than the situation of the Company's
affairs: fortunately, the jealously and collision of the two great
men, to whom the interests of France were entrusted, prevented their
complete ruin.

Dupleix, governor of Pondicherry, a man of an ardent and comprehensive
mind, cherished, very early, the most ambitious views of raising
his nation to unrivalled power in India. He saw, with jealousy, the
independent power of La Bourdonnais; and, instead of entering into the
plans of that able officer[11], which were directed to the conquest of
all the English settlements in India, he acted in direct opposition to
his views; nor did he hesitate to violate the pledge the admiral had
given.[12]

Possessed, as the French now were, of a very superior force, Dupleix
could not endure the thought of restoring Madras to the English; so
that, when La Bourdonnais left the coast, he declared the capitulation
null and void, and placed a French garrison in the town for its defence.

Anwar-u-Deen, the nabob of Arcot, was not an inattentive observer of
these proceedings.

The English, who, in compliance with his intreaties, had refrained from
attacking the French, when they could have done so with advantage,
expressed a hope that now, when their enemies had the superiority,
the nabob would interpose his authority for their protection; but
they neglected to accompany this reasonable request with that bribe
or offering, which, in an Asiatic court, is deemed an indispensable
concomitant of all solicitations for aid; and Dupleix, already deeply
versed in Indian politics, neutralised the inclinations of the
professed friend of the English, by promising to make him master of
Madras, for the repossession of which he intimated that the English
would pay a rich ransom. The evasions of the French governor, however,
soon convinced the nabob that he had been duped; and he sent an army
of 10,000 men, under his son, Maphuze Khan, to retake Madras, which
he appears to have thought would be very easily effected. The French
garrison, consisting of one battalion, desisted from hostilities as
long as they could, but they were at last compelled to retaliate; and
the repeated defeats of the besiegers soon obliged them to retreat to
Arcot; and that court, whose troops had never before come in contact
with disciplined soldiers, seemed as if awakened from the influence
of a spell, and viewed with just alarm, in all its magnitude and
consequences, the imminent danger they incurred by allowing such
settlements to be made upon their shore.

Dupleix, having been considerably reinforced by troops left by La
Bourdonnais, determined on the siege of Fort St. David (A. D. 1746),
the second settlement of the English on the coast of Coromandel.[13]

The authorities entrusted with that settlement applied for aid to
the nabob of Arcot; and that prince, who was full of resentment at
the French, readily complied with their request, the English having
consented to defray part of the expenses of their auxiliaries.

Maphuze Khan, and his brother, Mahomed Ali, were sent with a
considerable body of troops, who, on their arrival, surprised a
detachment of the French, that had been sent to take up an advanced
position, and compelled them to retreat. The failure of this first,
and of another attempt, on Fort St. David, induced Dupleix to try (and
not without success) to detach the nabob from his connection with the
English; who, deserted by their ally, appeared on the brink of ruin,
when the fortunate arrival of an English fleet, under Admiral Griffin
(March, 1747), obliged the French governor to draw all his troops
within the walls of Pondicherry.

The drooping spirits of the inhabitants of Fort St. David were, at the
same time, raised by reinforcements of troops from Tellicherry and
Bombay. All these were placed under the orders of Major Lawrence, an
officer of high reputation in his Majesty's service (Jan. 1748), who
had been nominated to the command of all the Company's forces in India.

The bad success of the French in their attempts against Fort St. David
was evidently owing to other causes than the valour of its garrison:
but the period was now arrived when the French, in their turn, were to
act upon the defensive.

Admiral Boscawen, after an unsuccessful attempt to make himself master
of the Mauritius, anchored at Fort St. David with a very considerable
armament. The siege of Pondicherry, which he immediately undertook, was
the first military service in which Clive distinguished himself. The
result was unfortunate, owing chiefly to the lateness of the season.
Many questioned the skill of the gallant officer by whom it was
conducted: his fame as a naval commander was justly high; but he had
little, if any, experience of land service. It is, however, due to his
reputation to remark, that he received no aid from the engineer, whose
want of knowledge was apparent in every stage of this siege. Dupleix
transmitted an account of it to all the princes of Coromandel, and to
the Emperor of Delhi; and the result considerably increased his fame in
every part of India.

He received, in return, compliments on his own prowess, and on the
military character of his nation, which was, at this period, throughout
Hindustan, considered greatly superior to that of the English.

The peace concluded between France and England (A. D. 1748) was
expected to terminate hostilities in India; but the trading companies
of each nation, having received great reinforcements of men, which they
were afraid to disband while their rivals retained theirs, both parties
appear to have resolved on employing them in the contests of the native
princes. "The English," according to a contemporary historian[14], "in
the line they pursued on this occasion, acted with great indiscretion;
the French, with the utmost ambition."

Such are the only incidents to which it seems necessary to advert in
this place. Any others requisite for understanding the transactions of
Clive, will be mentioned in the course of the general narrative.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] For a description of this system, see Malcolm's Central India, vol.
i. p. 66.

[2] Of these the most celebrated were, Vasco de Gama, Albuquerque,
Nunez, and John de Castro.

[3] A settlement at Hooghly was first made in 1640, by agents from
Surat, who obtained permission to establish themselves, through the
intercession of Mr. Boughton, a surgeon then in great favour with the
Emperor of Delhi. This settlement was afterwards moved to Calcutta in
1686.

[4] "It is not," Sir Thomas Roe observes, "a number of forts,
residences, and factories that will profit you: they will increase
charge, but not recompense it. The conveniency of one with respect to
your sales and the commodity of investments, and the wise employing of
your servants, is all you need."

[5] Mill, vol. i. p. 30.

[6] The name Deckan, or Deckhan, which means South, a very ancient
name, continued to be given, when the power of the Moghul sovereigns of
Delhi was in its zenith, to that part of the empire which lay to the
southward of the Nerbuddah. This division which was called a Soubah,
was governed by a Soubahdar, or Viceroy, whose authority was for a long
period acknowledged by all the petty states within his circle, though
many of these yielded neither tribute nor obedience unless compelled.
When the house of Delhi declined, Nizam-ul-Mûlk succeeded in rendering
the possession he held as a delegate of the emperor hereditary in his
family; but the example of usurpation spread rapidly, and the other
states, as they attained strength, threw off their dependence upon
him and his descendants, till their sovereignty became limited to
their present territories of Hyderabad. They still retain the title of
Soubhadar of the Deckan; but, their power having been contracted by
political events, their influence in that capacity is now confined to
those territories over which their rule is established, which may be
described as bounded by the river Taptee to the north, the Kishna to
the south, the province of Bider to the west, and the northern Circars
of Masulipatam and Guntoor to the east.

[7] The following note, communicated by a friend eminently acquainted
with the history of India, will be perused with interest:--

"The country mentioned in the text by the name of Paeen-Ghât-Carnatic,
was annexed, after its reduction, by the generals of Aurungzebe,
to the Souba, or imperial province of Hyderabad, and in all the
financial records it is mentioned as only a division of it. The grants
of Jaghires, made at that time by the imperial government, were so
numerous and considerable, as to leave very little of the revenues
arising from it to be received into the treasury. Those who were most
favoured by these grants of Jaghires were of a tribe known by the name
of Noayets, or newcomers, from their late arrival in the Carnatic.
Saadet Ali, the first nabob, as mentioned in Orme's history, was of
that tribe; as were Mortiz-Ali, and many others, who were found in
the possession of extensive Jaghires, when Nizam-ul-Mûlk came into
the Carnatic, in 1743. That prince, in order to restore the Mogul
authority, appointed a deputy of his own at Arcot, Anwer-u-deen Câwn,
who was nowise related to, or connected with, the tribe of Noayets, and
who was one of the officers who had came with him to the Carnatic.

"The person who afterwards made himself so conspicuous by his
connection with the French, viz., Chunda Sahib, was also a Noayet. His
real name was Hussein Dost Câwn. Duff Grant, in his late history of the
Mahrattas, says, that this man was known by no other name when he was
a prisoner at Sattarah.

"The appellation of Chunda Sahib was only given to him in his
family when a boy. Yet it has continued to be used in history in
distinguishing him; although, besides his name above-mentioned, the
title of Shems-ul-Dowla was conferred on him by the Nizams in the
French interest. It is not unlikely, that his being known to the
English only by the name of Chunda Sahib was, in some measure, owing to
his rival Mahomed Ali, supported by them, constantly designating him
by that appellation, and rather contemptuously, Chunda being a vulgar
appellation, often that of menial servants."--D. H.

[8] This army is stated to have consisted of 200,000 foot, and 80,000
horse.--Orme, vol. i. p. 51.

[9] Orme, vol. i. p. 52.

[10] "This settlement," according to Orme, vol. i. p. 65., "had been,
about 100 years, the principal establishment of the English nation on
the coast of Coromandel. It was built on a territory granted by the
Great Mogul to the East India Company, which extended about five miles
along the sea shore, and about one mile inland. The town consisted
of three divisions; that to the south, extended about 400 yards in
length from north to south, and about 100 yards in breadth. None but
the English, or other Europeans under their protection, resided in
this division, which contained about 50 good houses, an English and a
Roman Catholic church, together with a residence for the factory, and
other buildings belonging to the Company. It was surrounded with a
slender wall, defended with four bastions, and as many batteries; but
these were very slight and defective in their construction, nor had
they any outworks to defend them. This quarter has long been known in
Europe by the name of Fort St. George, and was in India called, for
distinction, the White Town. On the north of this, and contiguous, was
another division, much larger and worse fortified, in which were many
very good habitations, belonging to the Armenian and to the richest
of the Indian merchants, who resided in the Company's territory;
this quarter was called the Black Town. Beyond this division, and to
the north of it, was a suburb, where the Indian natives of all ranks
had their habitations promiscuously. Besides these three divisions,
which composed the town of Madras, there were two large and populous
villages, about a mile to the southward of it, within the Company's
territory; and these were likewise inhabited by Indian natives."

[11] The representations of Dupleix received more attention in France
than those of La Bourdonnais; and that great man, instead of the high
rewards to which he was entitled, was imprisoned four years in the
Bastille. The injustice done him was too tardily acknowledged; and he
died before another opportunity was afforded of elevating still more
his own name, and of exposing the ingratitude of his country.

[12] "M. Dupleix was greatly assisted in all his transactions with
the natives of India by his wife, a Creole, born and educated in
Bengal, where he had married her, while he was there in the service
of the French East India Company. Her knowledge of the Hindostanee
language had been the means of introducing her to the family of Chunda
Sahib, when they took refuge at Pondicherry, during his confinement
at Sattarah with the Mahrattas: and this laid the foundation of the
French intrigues with him. In all these, M. Dupleix's lady made herself
conspicuous, by corresponding, in the name of her husband, with those
who could be brought into action for favouring the French views of
interference, and supporting the cause of Chunda Sahib. She then became
known all over that country by the name of Jân Begum, which she assumed
in the seal to all her letters. Her own Christian name was Jeanne,
which gave some colour to her converting it into the Persian word on
her seal, as familiar to Mahomedans.

"It must be acknowledged that the French at this time, viz., during
M. Dupleix's government, had greatly the advantage of the English, by
their superior knowledge of the languages and usages of the nations
of India. Their Catholic missionaries, especially the Jesuits, who
had travelled inland, had been very instrumental in their acquiring
that knowledge; while the English confined themselves to their trade,
and remained in total ignorance of any thing else. The French gave
certain proofs of the superior information they had acquired, when
they produced, at the conference with the English commissioners at
Sadras, in 1754, the sunnuds or grants for the lands they had acquired
in the Carnatic, which were all procured under the authority of the
Mogul Emperor or his viziers; while those of the English were only from
inferior agents of that government. It is true, that the sunnuds there
produced by the French were objected to by the English as under the
forged seals of emperors; yet it shows that they did not rest their
claims on grants of inferiors, as the English did. It is, indeed, very
remarkable, that the latter never, till a late period, possessed any
others but those of the nabob Mahomed Ali in the Carnatic, excepting
for the ground of their original factories. It was not till Lord Clive
obtained regular grants from the Emperor Shah Aulum, in 1765, when he
obtained the dewanee of the provinces of Bengal, that the English could
produce any other grants but those obtained from the nabob whom they
themselves had set up."--D. H.

[13] Orme (vol. i. p. 78.), speaking of this settlement, observes:--

"The East India Company was here in possession of a territory larger
than that of Madras; it had been purchased about 100 years before from
the Indian prince of the country, and their title to it was confirmed
by the Mogul's viceroy, when the Moors conquered the Carnatic. The fort
was situated near the sea, twelve miles to the south of Pondicherry:
it was small, but better fortified than any of its size in India, and
served as a citadel to the Company's territory. About a mile to the
south of it, was situated the town of Cuddalore, in which the principal
Indian merchants, and many of the natives dependent on the Company,
resided. This town extended 1200 yards from north to south, and 900
from east to west: three of its sides were defended by walls flanked
with bastions; that towards the sea was for the greatest part open; but
a river passing from the westward, between Fort St. David and the town,
flowed, just before it gains the sea, along the eastern side of the
town, of which, whilst it washed the skirts on one hand, it was, on the
other, separated from the sea by a mound of sand, which the surf throws
upon the shore in most parts of the coast. To the westward of the
fort, and within the Company's territory, were two or three populous
villages, inhabited by the natives.

"The government of Fort St. David depended on that of Madras, to which
it was immediately the next in rank; but, on the breach of the treaty
of ransom, the Company's agents at Fort St. David regarding those of
Madras as prisoners to the French, took upon themselves the general
administration on the coast of Coromandel."

[14] Orme, vol. i. p. 7.




MEMOIRS
OF
LORD CLIVE.




CHAPTER I.


The family of Clive, established in Shropshire, since the time of Henry
II., have, for a long period, possessed the small estate of Styche, in
the parish of Moreton-Say, near Market-Drayton. At this seat of his
ancestors, Robert Clive, the subject of this memoir, was born on the
29th of September, 1725.

His father, Richard Clive, married Rebecca, daughter of Nathaniel
Gaskill, of Manchester, Esq., by whom he had a family of six sons,
and seven daughters. He had been educated for the law, and continued,
through a great part of his life, to practise that profession.

Mrs. Clive had two sisters, the one of whom, Elizabeth, was married, in
1717, to Daniel Bayley, Esq., of Hope Hall, near Manchester; and the
other, Sarah, to the Right Hon. Hugh, eleventh Lord Sempill.

Mr. Clive's eldest son, Robert, while not yet three years of age, was
sent to his uncle, Mr. Bayley, in whose family he was trained and
educated for several years, as his own son.

In the end of the year 1728, the infant Clive seems to have had a
dangerous attack of fever. "If I were given to be superstitious,"
says Mr. Bayley, writing to the Rev. Mr. King at Styche[15], "and to
believe things ominous, I think I should omit writing to you; for it
has been poor Bob's fate to grow worse, just after I have finished my
letters. From the time of Andrew's leaving us till yesterday about five
o'clock, he was worse than at any time yet; and the doctor discovered,
by all his behaviour, that he apprehended full as much danger as ever;
but since that time he has been much better, and we hope that _then_
was the crisis of the fever. He slept pretty well last night; and,
when awake, talked with his usual cheerfulness; and, I can say, is
now better, and in a more hopeful way to recover than hitherto, if no
relapse come upon him. He is, as you may well imagine, very weak; but
the doctor doubts not his getting more strength if the fever continues
(as it has begun) to leave him. This is what account I can now send:
you will excuse haste. Our services wait on Madame Clive and all the
family."

Two days after Mr. Bayley again writes Mr. King:--

  "Monday Morning, Nine o'clock.

  "Thank God, I do now inform you that Bob continues better, and
  is in a very likely way to recover. We hope that the crisis of
  the fever was on Saturday last about noon, it having abated ever
  since. His exceeding patience is also exchanged for as eminent a
  degree of crossness, which we take as a good omen of his mending.
  I am writing this close to his bed-side, and he is crying with the
  greatest impatience for me to lie on the bed with him; nor will he
  be quiet one moment, with all the fine words I can give him, which
  now makes me conclude abruptly," &c.

On the 11th of January, Mr. Bayley informs his correspondent, that
Robert had had another severe attack of fever; from which, however,
he was so far recovered as to be very merry and able to walk himself.
In answer to some remarks of Mr. King, he details the symptoms, and
mode of cure adopted. The fever seems to have been connected with the
stomach, and yielded to the usual remedies.

Mr. Bayley, about a fortnight afterwards, informs Mr. King of his
nephew's recovery:--

  "Manchester, Jan. 26.[16] 1728.
  "Sabbath Day evening, ten o'clock.

  "REV. AND DEAR SIR,

  "Yesterday Bob came down into the parlour, the first time. He goes
  on successfully with the bark, and is very merry, and good as it
  is possible. He is poor and thin; but in a brave way, and has a
  stomach for more meat than we dare give him. He can run about, and
  chatters continually, and is always asking questions, one of which
  I must enquire of you, before I can answer him; viz., when yourself
  and his aunt Fanny will come over to see him? We are all pretty
  well, and full of that joy which so happy any issue of so long and
  threatening an affliction naturally produceth. Our sincere respects
  and services to all: conclude me," &c.

  "This afternoon, Bob, with some reluctance, suffered his aunt
  Bay[17] to go to chapel."

Young Clive seems to have resided chiefly with his aunt Bayley, down
to at least the year 1732. In June of that year, Mr. Bayley gives his
friend Mr. King some very characteristic traits of his nephew's temper.
"I hope," says he[18], "I have made a little farther conquest over Bob,
and that he regards me, in some degree, as well as his aunt Bay. He
has just had a suit of new clothes, and promises by his reformation to
deserve them. I am satisfied that his fighting (to which he is out of
measure addicted) gives his temper a fierceness and imperiousness, that
he flies out upon every trifling occasion: for this reason I do what
I can to suppress the hero, that I may help forward the more valuable
qualities of meekness, benevolence, and patience. I assure you, Sir, it
is a matter of concern to us, as it is of importance to himself, that
he may be a good and virtuous man, to which no care of ours shall be
wanting."

These strong and early indications of future character, for he had not
yet attained the age of seven, are not a little curious. The spirit of
daring and of command seems to have been natural to him. The anxious
care of his relations may have softened and soothed his impetuosity,
but could not change the bent of his genius. The spirit of "the Hero,"
which already began to show itself, seems to have turned him from the
peaceful sports of childhood, just as, at a later period, it called him
to exchange his mercantile studies and occupations for the bustle and
turmoil of war, so much more congenial to the ardour of his mind.

On the 26th of February, 1735, Clive lost his aunt Mrs. Bayley, but he
continued on an affectionate footing in the family, and always reverted
with pleasure to the years he had spent among them.

Mr. Richard Clive formed high hopes of his son while yet a child.
This anticipation of his future greatness, which seems to have been
founded more on the boy's display of courage and sagacity, than on his
acquirements as a scholar, was confirmed by the opinion of Dr. Eaton,
to whose school, at Lostocke, in Cheshire, he was sent when very young;
and this respectable man had the foresight to predict, "that if his
scholar lived to be a man, and opportunity enabled him to exert his
talents, few names would be greater than his."

At the age of eleven, Robert Clive went from Lostocke to Market
Drayton, where he was placed under the tuition of the Rev. Mr. Burslem.
After a few years, he was sent to the public seminary of Merchant
Taylors' school in London, whence he went again to a private school,
kept by Mr. Sterling, at Hemel Hempstead, in Hertfordshire, with whom
he remained till 1743, when he was appointed a writer in the service of
the East India Company.

The few anecdotes that are preserved of the early life of Clive tend
chiefly to show that he was endowed, in a remarkable degree, with that
constitutional courage which so essentially promoted his rise in the
military profession, and which, it is probable, led him to adopt it.

One well-authenticated and extraordinary instance is recorded of his
boldness as a boy. The church at Market Drayton, which stands on the
side of a hill, has a lofty steeple, near the top of which is a stone
spout of the form of a dragon's head. It was with no slight surprise
and alarm, his companions, and some of the inhabitants, saw young Clive
seated on this spout, and evincing by his manner an indifference, if
not insensibility, to the danger of his situation.[19]

Several of the oldest inhabitants of Market Drayton not only confirm
this fact, but add, on the testimony of their parents, that Clive was
wont to levy from some of the shopkeepers contributions in pence and
trifling articles, in compensation to himself, and the little band he
led, for abstaining from breaking their windows, and other mischievous
tricks; and one old man mentioned to a gentleman[20], who resided near
Styche, that he had been repeatedly told by a person who witnessed the
action, that, when a little dam broke, which the boys had made across
the gutter in the street, for the purpose of overflowing a small shop,
with the owner of which they had quarrelled, Clive unhesitatingly threw
his body into the gutter, and remained there till they had repaired
their work of mischief.[21]

Such anecdotes are not likely to have been invented, though they would
long ago have been forgotten, but for the celebrity of him, of whose
daring and decided mind they gave such early proofs.

Clive, who, wherever he went, had the reputation of being a most
unlucky boy, did not probably carry from school any great stock of
acquired knowledge. He was impatient of control, and his application,
in which, however, he was never deficient, was not directed to his
books. This may have deceived those who measure a boy's talents by his
progress in Latin and Greek. When in after-life he wrote to his father
an account of his first successes, the remark of the old gentleman, who
had probably been often fretted by his son's boyish waywardness, and
neglect of his studies, was, "After all, the booby has sense."

He had, however, laid such a foundation at school, as enabled him,
after his arrival at Madras, to employ to advantage the short leisure
then accidentally afforded him, in that self-education, which, after
all, is of all educations the most important. He seems at that later
period to have revived his acquirements, when he felt that it was
become necessary to apply them to practice in the concerns of life,
and to have improved himself in some branches of useful knowledge in
which he felt his deficiencies. Perhaps his progress in them was not
the slower, that his proud mind felt that it was no longer watched by
a master. But whatever may have been his book-learning, his character,
even in the apparently thoughtless course of his schoolboy sports,
was probably undergoing a training that had the strongest influence
on his future success; and though to the common eye he seemed to
be but indulging the youthful passion of excelling and leading his
contemporaries in the trivial and passing pursuits that then formed the
object of their common ambition, he was really, though unconsciously,
by strengthening his active habits of firmness, perseverance, and
self-possession, preparing himself for the more arduous undertakings
that distinguished his future life.

Though Clive in his boyhood was idle, and impatient of control, he
was, notwithstanding, an affectionate son and a kind brother; and he
appears, from his earliest communications with his family after he
quitted England, to have had a mind imbued with good principles and
feelings. He always retained a deep sense of religion: at no period
of his life did he ever indulge in or sanction light or irreverent
conversation on religious subjects. Like many other eminent men, he
seems to have owed much to his mother,--a woman remarkable for her
virtues and talents, and who is reported to have shown much tact
and good sense in soothing and managing the hasty, and occasionally
violent, temper of her husband.

Clive left England in 1743, and from a letter to his father, which
unfortunately is imperfect, it would appear that he reached Madras
late in 1744, after a long and dangerous passage, during the whole
course of which, however, he enjoyed a perfect state of health. The
ship was detained for nine months at the Brazils, and afterwards put
into the Cape of Good Hope. His forced stay in Brazil enabled him to
gain an easy command of the Portuguese language, which was afterwards
of use to him; but the length of the passage, and especially the long
continuance of the ship in harbour, made his extraordinary expenses
greater than usual. This delay was also the cause of his missing the
gentleman to whom he had been recommended at Madras, who in the interim
had gone home; a circumstance that made it necessary for him to
incur a debt, for essential articles, to the captain in whose ship he
went out, and of the extravagance of whose charges he complains, with
apparent justice. This want of means, joined to the want of friends,
made his situation at first rather uncomfortable. He returns warm and
grateful thanks to his father for his kindness to him, especially
in his education. The public servants at Madras he commends, as, in
general, "a set of very prudent and industrious people;" but asks his
father to use his influence to get him transferred to Bengal, as a more
beneficial situation; or to use his interest to have him advanced to
the rank of factor. Still, however, the young adventurer does not lose
sight of his usual manly and independent habits of thinking, nor of his
affectionate attachment to his friends: "I don't doubt," says he, "but
you'll make use of all possible means for my advancement. The world
seems to be greatly debased of late, and interest carries it entirely
before merit, especially in this service; tho' I should think myself
very undeserving were I only to build my foundation on the strength
of the former. I have been contriving a scheme concerning my cousin
Bobby, but whether it may take effect, or my uncle care to intrust him
to these parts, I am entirely at a loss to know. The Company keep two
clergymen at this presidency: now, as there is a vacancy for one of
them, if you could get him elected for this place, I cannot foresee
any better provision can be made for him in England." He describes
the allowances of the clergy, and leaves the decision to his father's
judgment. The whole of the last part of this letter being lost, we are
left in the dark as to its date, and such other particulars as he may
have communicated.

This defect is in part supplied by a letter to his uncle, Mr. Bayley,
which has been fortunately preserved[22], and in which he describes the
feelings, so natural to a young man of ardent affections, far from his
friends and from home, who turns with longing to the scenes of infancy
and youth. After apologising for his delay in writing, he proceeds:--"I
shall always retain a due sense of gratitude for the many obligations
and favours you have laid me under; and the pleasant and delightful
days I have spent with my kind relations and friends in Lancashire
refreshes and entertains my mind with very agreeable ideas. I must
confess, at intervals, when I think of my dear native England, it
affects me in a very particular manner; however, knowing it to be for
my own welfare, I rest content and patient, wishing the views for which
my father sent me here may, in all respects, be fully accomplished. If
I should be so far blest as to revisit again my own country, but more
especially Manchester (the centre of all my wishes), all that I could
hope or desire for would be presented before me in one view."

In a letter to one of his cousins, written in February, 1745, he
indulges in a strain of sentiment, so natural, and so creditable
to a youthful mind, and gives so lively an idea of his feelings of
loneliness, that a pretty large extract from it may not be considered
as here misplaced:--

  "DEAR COUSIN,

  "The want of a proper conveyance is the only plea I can offer for
  not addressing you sooner. It is a long time since I enjoyed the
  pleasure of your company and conversation, and as both parties have
  been equally culpable, I beg that from henceforth the strictest
  amity may subsist between us. The bond of friendship, especially
  when united by the ties of blood, ought not to be dissolved on any
  consideration whatever; and I believe you'll agree with me, that
  the only effectual means to preserve it entire must be by letters,
  since the vast ocean which divides us so far asunder won't admit
  of it by word of mouth, and which I heartily wish may turn out
  to the mutual satisfaction of both of us. If there is any thing
  which may properly be called happiness here below, I am persuaded
  it is in the union of two friends, who love each other without
  the least guile or deceit, who are united by a real inclination,
  and satisfied with each other's merit: their hearts are full,
  and leave no vacancy for any other passion: they enjoy perpetual
  tranquillity, because they enjoy content." After laying his past
  omissions on the thoughtlessness of youth, and excusing himself
  for not describing the country, as so many histories give a much
  more correct idea of it than he could, after so short a residence,
  he continues:--"I shall only add, that the intemperance of the
  climate, together with the excessive heat of the sun, are very
  noxious to our health; and I really think the advantages which
  accrue to us here, are greatly overbalanced by the sacrifices we
  make of our constitutions. I have not been unacquainted with the
  fickleness of fortune, and may safely say I have not enjoyed one
  happy day since I left my native country. I am not acquainted
  with any one family in the place, and have not assurance enough
  to introduce myself without being asked. If the state I am now in
  will admit of any happiness, it must be when I am writing to my
  friends. Letters surely were first invented for the comfort of
  such solitary wretches as myself. Having lost the substantial
  pleasure of seeing them, I shall in some measure compensate this
  loss, by the satisfaction I shall find in their writings. When you
  write me, I beg it may be carelessly, and without study, for I
  had much rather read the dictates of the heart than those of the
  understanding. The pacquet is just now going to be closed, which
  hastens me to a conclusion sooner than I designed. I desire you
  to tender my duty to my uncle and aunt, love to my cousins, and
  service to all friends; and it will greatly add to the obligations
  of him, who esteems it his greatest happiness to be thought

  "Your kind and loving Cousin,

  "ROBT. CLIVE."

  Fort St. George, Feb. 16th, 1744-5.

These letters, though their rather laboured and incorrect style
indicates the writer to have then had little practice in epistolary
correspondence, show, however, the more essential qualities of
excellent principles and an affectionate heart. His spirits seem
already tinged by that melancholy which occasionally attended him
through life. It is a curious, and not uninstructive sight, to observe
the man who, in a few years, was to raise himself by his commanding
talents and heroic daring, to an acknowledged pre-eminence above
all his countrymen in the East, for several months after his first
touching on the shores of that country, the scene of his future glory,
acknowledging that he knew not one family in it, and shrinking with
a sensitive diffidence from the exertion of introducing himself.
Though affectionate, he was wayward and reserved. From this time till
1746, when Madras was taken, there are no accounts of him, except
some anecdotes, tending to prove that he was very ill suited to the
condition of life in which he was placed. His impatience of control,
and wayward and impracticable firmness, never forsook him. On one
occasion it appears that his conduct to the secretary under whom the
writers were placed on their first arrival, was so inconsistent with
the rules of official discipline, that the governor, to whom it was
reported, commanded him to ask that gentleman's pardon. With this
order he complied rather ungraciously; but the secretary immediately
after, before his irritation had time to subside, having invited him to
dinner,--"No, Sir," replied Clive, "the governor did not command me to
_dine_ with you."[23] He is stated to have hazarded, on more than one
occasion, the loss of the service by acts of wildness: and a story was
long current that, either in a fit of despair, or of low spirits, to
which he was subject from his earliest years, he made, at this period,
an attempt upon his own life. A companion, coming into his room in
Writers' Buildings, was requested to take up a pistol and fire it out
of the window: he did so. Clive, who was sitting in a very gloomy mood,
sprang up, and exclaimed--"Well, I am reserved for something! That
pistol," said he to his astonished friend, "I have twice snapped at
my own head." This is not unlikely to be true, nor is its probability
contradicted, by his never having spoken of it to any of his family
after his return to England. But, while he properly threw a veil over
the more violent ebullitions of his youth, he was fond of recurring to
every act of early kindness which had been shown to him; and amongst
these, he considered as one of the most important, his admission, soon
after his arrival in India, into an excellent library belonging to
the Governor of Madras. He now devoted much of his leisure to study,
and there can be little doubt that it was at this time he laid the
foundation of that knowledge, which was so soon to surprise and benefit
his country.

When Madras was taken by the French Admiral La Bourdonnais (A. D.
1746), Clive became a prisoner of war, and like others gave his parole.
It was agreed by the articles of capitulation that the English should
surrender themselves prisoners of war; that the town should, in the
first instance, be given up, but should be ransomed; and M. de la
Bourdonnais gave his promise that he would settle the ransom on easy
and moderate terms.[24] Dupleix, however, who was then at Pondicherry,
ever at variance with the Admiral, insisted that Madras should be rased
to the ground, and called upon the English officers to renew their
parole to a governor whom he appointed. This infraction of the terms
of capitulation was viewed with indignation by all, and construed
into a release from the engagement into which they had entered. De la
Bourdonnais, with regret, found himself unable to fulfil the conditions
stipulated[25]; and Clive, accompanied by his friends Mr. Edmund
Maskelyne, contrived, in the disguise of a native, to escape to Fort
St. David.

Soon after his arrival at this place, he was engaged in a duel with
an officer, to whom he had lost some money at cards, but who, with
his companion, was clearly proved to have played unfairly. Clive was
not the only loser; but the others were terrified into payment by the
threats of those who had won their money. This example had no effect
on him; he persisted in refusing to pay, and was called out by one
of them who deemed himself insulted by his conduct. They met without
seconds: Clive fired, and missed his antagonist, who immediately came
close up to him, and held the pistol to his head, desiring him to
ask his life, with which he complied. The next demand was, to recant
his assertions respecting unfair play. On compliance with this being
refused, his opponent threatened to shoot him. "Fire, and be d----d,"
said the dauntless young man; "I said you cheated; I say so still, and
I will never pay you." The astonished officer threw away his pistol,
saying, Clive was mad. The latter received from his young companions
many compliments for the spirit he had shown; but he not only declined
coming forward against the officer with whom he had fought, but never
afterwards spoke of his behaviour at the card-table. "He has given me
my life," he said, "and though I am resolved on never paying money
which was unfairly won, or again associating with him, I shall never do
him an injury."[26]

Clive, when at Madras, had, as before stated, access to the governor's
library, and, according to his own account, this opportunity of
improving himself was not neglected; but whatever knowledge he
might have attained, his general habits appear to have continued the
same; and it is probable these might have arrested his progress to
distinction, had not the occurrence of a war with the French led to
his adopting a profession, for which he was by disposition infinitely
better fitted than for that which he abandoned.

Clive sought for and obtained an ensign's commission in the army in
1747, and was present with the troops with which Admiral Boscawen, in
1748, made an unsuccessful attack on Pondicherry. The young soldier
became at once distinguished for his activity and forward gallantry.
It is probable, however, that from having been a civilian, he was at
first viewed with jealousy by his military companions. We are told
that on one occasion, when an anxiety to obtain ammunition for the
battery where he was posted led him, instead of sending a serjeant or
corporal, to run himself to bring it, a remark was made, which implied
that it was fear, not zeal, which caused him to leave his post at such
a moment. This remark was repeated to Clive, who instantly went to the
person by whom it was made, to insist upon a distinct acknowledgment
or disavowal of the slander. The latter was attempted, but not to his
satisfaction, and a challenge ensued. As they were retiring to settle
this dispute, his opponent, irritated by some circumstance, struck
him. Clive instantly drew his sword, but they were prevented fighting
by persons who witnessed the transaction. A court of inquiry was held
on their conduct, and the officer who had defamed Clive was ordered
to ask his pardon in front of the battalion to which they belonged.
The court, however, having taken no notice of the blow, Clive, when
the service was over, insisted on satisfaction for that unpardonable
insult. On this being refused, he waved his cane over the head of his
antagonist, telling him he was too contemptible a coward to be beaten.
The day after this transaction the person he had so disgraced resigned
his commission.[27]

No one of these early disputes with his brother officers can be traced
to a perverse[28] or quarrelsome temper. Clive appears in all to have
been the party offended. The resolute manner in which he resented the
injuries done to him raised his reputation for courage, and no doubt
protected him from further insult and outrage.

From the date of Clive's entering the army till the year 1756, we have
no letters or papers of his own that can throw any light upon this
active and eventful period of his life; but the deficiency is well
supplied by the plain narrative of the gallant commander[29] under whom
he served, and by an able writer[30], who dwells upon the development
of his character and his early exploits, with all the interest which
their local importance was calculated to inspire in one, who, to his
high qualifications as an historian, added the fullest acquaintance
with the scenes and persons he so well describes.

A prince of the name of Sahojee, who had seven years before lost the
throne of Tanjore, came to Fort St. David to solicit the English to
restore him. He represented his title to the throne as just, and
affirmed that he had numerous and powerful adherents, who would come
forward the moment they saw him supported; but what had most weight
with the gentlemen at Fort St. David was his offer to cede Devecotta,
a town situated near the mouth of the Coleroon, the possession of
which, it was thought, would prove most advantageous to the trade of
the Company on the coast of Coromandel. The first expedition, which was
sent under the command of Captain Cope, was early compelled to return,
from the difficulties of the country and want of provisions: and the
report of the commander described Sahojee as being totally destitute of
those adherents of whom he had boasted.

The failure of this expedition served only to stimulate to another
effort those who had the management of the Company's affairs. It was
indispensable, they thought, to repair the disgrace incurred by a
retreat before the troops of a native state, but they so far paid
attention to the information given by Captain Cope, as to determine
that the capture of Devecotta, not the restoration of Sahojee, should
be their first object.

The second expedition, consisting of 800 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys,
which was placed under the command of Major Lawrence, succeeded in
taking Devecotta, and in making a treaty with the rajah of Tanjore,
who ceded that fort with a small portion of territory to the Company,
granting at the same time 4,000 rupees per mensem to the fugitive
prince whose cause they had adopted, on condition that he was not again
to disturb the peace of the country.

Clive, who had received the commission of a lieutenant, was on this
service: he solicited Major Lawrence to allow him to lead the storm of
the embankment thrown up to defend the breach: his request was readily
complied with, for his reputation for gallantry stood high. Exposed to
a severe fire, he passed with some difficulty a rivulet, with a design
of taking the enemy's works in flank: the sepoys were in the rear, but
part of them only crossed the rivulet, and these did not close up with
the Europeans, who, as they were presenting their muskets to fire, were
charged in the rear by a party of horse who were within forty yards,
protected and concealed between the projecting towers of the fort. This
attack was at once so rapid and impetuous that in an instant twenty-six
of the platoon were cut down: four had been killed by the fire of the
fort, and four only of the party remained alive. Clive, who narrowly
escaped being cut down by the sabre of one of the horsemen, ran towards
the sepoys, whom he found drawn up in good order. Their appearance
checked the Tanjore horse, who, satisfied with their success, returned
to the station from whence they had made their onset. Major Lawrence,
on seeing what had occurred, advanced to the assault at the head of all
the Europeans of his force, and was soon master of the fort. This event
was soon followed by a treaty of peace with the king of Tanjore. (A. D.
1749.)

We have already seen how Anwar-u-Deen became possessed of his power
in the Carnatic. The military chiefs, however, and the principal
inhabitants of that country gave a reluctant obedience to his
authority. The family of the former nabob continued to be popular;
but the difficulty was to find a representative fit to contend for
the government. The brother of Mahommed Saeed was yet too young,
and Mortaza Ali, governor of Vellore, was deemed too cowardly and
treacherous to merit elevation. All eyes were turned towards Chunda
Sahib, who continued to linger in a Mahratta prison. He was a soldier
of approved conduct and valour, and the generosity of his disposition
recommended him to all classes. But, as the solicitude for his release
increased, the demand of the Mahrattas for his ransom rose. The
ambition of Dupleix at last ended all difficulties. This bold and able
statesman saw no prospect of the French maintaining themselves in India
through the profits of their limited commerce; but his acquaintance
with the divided interests of the native princes led him to hope, that
if he entered upon the arena of their politics, with a popular, if not
a good cause, he might anticipate splendid and profitable results. He
determined, therefore, to aid Chunda Sahib, with whose family, which
had remained at Pondicherry, he made the necessary arrangement for his
release. A sum of seven lacs of rupees was guaranteed to the Mahrattas
as his ransom, and he left his prison, accompanied by a small party
of horse. But fearing to enter the Carnatic with so few followers,
he sought employment, in the hope of increasing their numbers. The
first contest in which he engaged was most unfortunate. In a battle in
which he aided the rajah of Chittledroog against the ranee (or queen)
of Bednore, his son was killed, and himself made a prisoner; but,
falling into the hands of some Mahommedan officers, he persuaded them
not only to release him, but to join his standard on an expedition to
Adoni, to unite with Muzuffer Jung, the son of a favourite daughter of
Nizam-ul-Mûlk, who, on the death of that prince, had entered the lists
to contend for the sovereignty of the Deckan against six of his uncles,
each of whom was aspiring to the same high station.

Chunda Sahib was received with a cordial welcome, and he advised
Muzuffer Jung to proceed instantly to the Carnatic, stating the
strength and reputation he would gain by giving a nabob to that
country, and promising to obtain the aid of a French corps to establish
his own title in the Deckan. The proposal was immediately adopted. A
body of 400 Europeans and 2000 sepoys joined from Pondicherry, and in
the first battle, which was fought near Amboor, Anwar-u-Deen was slain.
The French corps greatly distinguished themselves in this action, and
above all Bussy, who on this day displayed to the admiring Mahommedan
chiefs that valour and skill which laid the foundation of the merited
fame he afterwards acquired.

Muzuffer Jung, after this victory, assumed all the state of subadar
of the Deckan; and his first act was to issue a patent to his friend
Chunda Sahib, appointing him nabob of the Carnatic. Much valuable time
was lost by these chiefs in vain ceremonies at Arcot, and in a visit
to Pondicherry, where they were received and treated in a magnificent
manner by Dupleix.

(1749.) Maphuze Khan, the eldest son of Anwar-u-Deen, had been made
prisoner on the day his father was killed; but Mahommed Ali, his
younger brother, fled to Trichinopoly, from whence he strongly, but at
first vainly, solicited the English for aid. The committee at Fort St.
David saw too clearly the development of the great plans of Dupleix,
nor were they ignorant that the success of these plans must involve
the ruin of the interests of which they had charge. But they had not,
like Dupleix, foreseen the events which were to occur, and had received
no orders from England that could justify their entering upon a scene
of extended operations; nor could they with a good grace remonstrate
against the proceedings of the French. Their own conduct in aiding a
pretender to the petty principality of Tanjore, though the object was
comparatively insignificant, was not very dissimilar in mode, and as
unjustifiable in principle, as the support given by Dupleix to Muzuffer
Jung. Besides these reasons for temporary inaction, the English were
anxious to repossess Madras, and the period fixed for its delivery by
the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had arrived. The French gave it up with
the fortifications much improved; but those of Fort St. David in the
meanwhile had been much more so, and the Directors commanded that it
should henceforward be deemed the superior settlement.

The English authorities had some time before entered into a
correspondence with Nizam-ul-Mûlk, through his son Nasir Jung; and
Admiral Griffin had called upon the subadar of the Deckan to exercise
his authority in the dependant province of Arcot, in order to obtain
reparation for the injuries they had sustained, particularly by the
capture of Madras. This communication had been favourably received,
and orders had been sent to Anwar-u-Deen to redress the evils of
which the English complained; but these orders met with little or no
attention.[31] The intercourse, however, which had been established
with Nasir Jung was now revived; and when that prince, who had been
proclaimed the successor to his father, marched towards the Carnatic
to reduce his nephew Muzuffer Jung, and summoned Mahommed Ali to his
standard, who carried with him 6000 of his own followers and a small
body of English, the latter were, at Nasir Jung's request, reinforced
by a body of 600 Europeans under Major Lawrence.

Nasir Jung, pleased with these proofs of allegiance and support,
proclaimed Mahommed Ali Nabob of the Carnatic, with whose fortunes
those of the English became from that day intimately associated.
An able author[32], well qualified from the extent and accuracy of
his observation to decide upon the true character of the events he
describes, has justly ridiculed the attempts which have been made
to defend the sacred right of inheritance claimed by any one of the
candidates for power that now appeared upon the stage. The authority of
the Emperor of Delhi over the south of India, during the long life of
Nizam-ul-Mûlk, had been merely nominal. Nasir Jung rested his right of
succession to his father on the falsely assumed pretext of his elder
brother[33] having, in pursuit of his schemes of ambition at Delhi,
resigned the office of subadar of the Deckan. Muzuffer Jung _asserted_
his claim on a pretended will of his grandfather Nizam-ul-Mûlk: no
proof was ever given of the existence of such a will; and if it did
exist, it never could, according to Indian law or usage, be pleaded
to the exclusion of the sons of that prince. Mahommed Ali claimed the
title of nabob, to the exclusion of his elder brother Maphuze Khan, by
virtue of a promise of Nizam-ul-Mûlk, now confirmed by the act of his
son Nasir Jung; while Chunda Sahib put forward no claims beyond his own
character, his near connection with the respected family of Saadet Ali,
and the right of Muzuffer Jung, while exercising the power of subadar
of the Deckan, to appoint whom he chose to be Nabob of Arcot.

These various pretensions, alike groundless as matters of right, were
about to be referred to the sword, which alone could decide claims of
such a character. The troops of the rival trading companies of England
and France, though these nations were at peace, stood arrayed as
mercenaries in the opposing ranks of Indian princes. Each endeavoured
to cast the blame upon the other, as the cause of this hostility; but
it is sufficiently obvious, that whatever pretext the English might
have afforded by their petty unjustifiable attack upon Tanjore, they
could not remain neuter when Dupleix took the part he did in Indian
politics, without the imminent hazard of being deprived of all their
privileges, if not expelled from their possessions on the coast of
Coromandel. The great error they committed was, not to have foreseen
the crisis which had now occurred, and not to have prevented Admiral
Boscawen from returning to England, leaving them every way inferior in
strength, both by land and sea, to their formidable opponents.

Muzuffer Jung and Chunda Sahib had wasted that time which should have
been given to the attack of Trichinopoly, in levying tribute from the
Rajah of Tanjore, who was also compelled to give a sum of money[34],
and to make cession of territory to the French. Alarmed at the rapid
advance of Nasir Jung, they hastened to Pondicherry, where they were
reinforced by Dupleix, who, besides an advance of money, increased
the French contingent to 2000 Europeans, a large body of sepoys, and
a well-served train of artillery (A. D. 1750). This formidable corps
gave every promise of success to Muzuffer Jung, whose army, having
strongly entrenched themselves, waited the attack of their opponents
with the fullest confidence of ultimate success. Their position was
so excellent, that Major Lawrence advised Nasir Jung against an
attack, but that prince replied, "That it did not become the son of
Nizam-ul-Mûlk to retreat before such an enemy: he would," he said,
"attack them in front." A cannonade took place the same day, and a
general action was expected to ensue; but the French corps was suddenly
disorganised by the resignation of no less than thirteen commissioned
officers, who had been for some time discontented, and who disgraced
themselves by abandoning the standard of their country at the very
moment of action; at a period, too, when every personal consideration
should have been sacrificed at the shrine of national glory, and when
private interest should have given way before the public welfare. This
mutiny (for such it was) appeared likely to spread, and the French
commander was compelled to retreat towards Pondicherry. The defection
of the corps on which they so much relied defeated all the hopes
of Chunda Sahib and Muzuffer Jung. The former, with his adherents,
accompanied the French corps; while the latter, fearing the dispersion
or desertion of his army, hastened to throw himself on the mercy of his
uncle, who proffered every kindness, but who, the moment he had him in
his power, threw him into prison.

Dupleix evinced upon this occasion, that his was a character not to
be depressed by reverses. He punished the guilty officers, brought to
trial the commandant for retreating without orders, and took every
step that could restore the discipline and efficiency of the French
troops, or give spirit and confidence to their allies and adherents.
The vain and dissolute Nasir Jung took little advantage of his success.
A refusal to grant to his English allies a tract of territory near
Madras,--the promised reward of their assistance,--induced Major
Lawrence to return with his corps to Fort St. David; while the French,
who had in part redeemed their reputation by a successful attack on
a portion of the subadar's army, and by the capture of Masulipatam,
now ventured to support Chunda Sahib in more extended operations
against the principal strongholds in the Carnatic. Mahommed Ali
earnestly entreated the aid of the English to defend his newly-acquired
territory, representing the ruin which must attend their affairs on
the success of the French. This aid was granted, on his consenting
to pay the troops, but the failure in his engagements, and the weak
and cowardly character of his military operations, led to its being
withdrawn. He was soon afterwards defeated by the French, who followed
up this success by one of still greater importance,--the capture by
storm of Gingee, an almost inaccessible hill fortress.

The manner in which the works of a stronghold, hitherto deemed
impregnable, were successively carried by Bussy, to whose valour and
military skill the arduous task was assigned, struck awe into the
natives of India, and was viewed by Europeans with astonishment. It had
not been discovered (as it has since been by frequent similar successes
in India), that where men rely upon steep and high mountains, and
rugged or scarped rocks, as defences, other means and advantages are
neglected; and if the assailants overcome those natural obstacles which
have been deemed insuperable, the spirit of the defenders is gone,
and they seldom, if ever, offer that bold and determined resistance,
which the same troops have been found to do in half-walled towns, or
villages, where, from the first, they could confide in nothing but
their own firmness and courage.

The success of the French, but particularly their last exploit, roused
Nasir Jung from that dream of security into which he had fallen.
He recalled that part of his army which he had sent to Golconda,
and commenced a correspondence with Dupleix. That able man, while
he carried on a negotiation with this prince, had established a
communication with some of the principal persons[35] in his camp,
who, when their plot against him was matured, were to summon to their
aid a French force of 4000 men encamped near Gingee. The treaty which
Dupleix pretended a desire to negotiate was signed by Nasir Jung on
the same day the conspirators sent in the concerted summons; but the
latter reached its destination first, and the French force, under M.
Delatouche, moved before daylight next morning to commence their attack
on the camp of the subadar. They were opposed by the troops which
remained firm to their duty; but the action was soon decided by Nasir
Jung's death. The unsuspecting prince had repaired to the lines of
the Patan chiefs, with the view of exciting them to exertion; but, as
he raised himself on the seat of his elephant to salute the Nabob of
Kurpa, two carabine balls pierced his body, and he instantly expired.
His head stuck upon a spear, announced his fate to the army. Muzuffer
Jung was released, and by nine o'clock of the same morning was, without
opposition, installed as subadar of the Deckan, although no fewer than
four brothers of the deceased were in camp.[36]

Dupleix had evinced throughout these extraordinary scenes a mixture
of European and Asiatic character, which marked him as the fittest of
all instruments for a government which cherished a wish, as it appears
the French did at this period, to obtain, through the influence of
alliances with native states, the superiority over all their European
rivals in India; and gained, as he merited, a rich reward from Muzuffer
Jung, both by a share in the treasures of the late subadar, and by a
commission which constituted him governor over all the countries south
of the Kistna; making Chunda Saheb his deputy of Arcot.

After all engagements were completed, the new subadar commenced his
march towards Hyderabad, accompanied by a force of 300 Europeans,
and 2000 sepoys. The French troops had, by their recent conduct,
established with the natives of India a high military reputation, the
maintenance of which could not have been entrusted to abler hands than
those of Bussy, who was nominated to the command of the subsidiary
force with Muzuffer Jung. That prince, however, was not destined
long to enjoy the happy turn of his fortune. The Patan nabobs who
raised him to the throne, cherished expectations which he could not
gratify; and their turbulent spirit, not brooking delay, broke out
into rebellion. In an attempt to reduce the insurgents, Muzuffer Jung
was slain. The disastrous consequences which this event was likely
to produce, were averted by the judgment and decision of Bussy, who
instantly proclaimed Salabut Jung (the eldest of the imprisoned sons
of Nizam-ul-Mûlk) Subadar of the Deckan. That prince, grateful for his
unexpected elevation, confirmed all the engagements which his nephew
had contracted with Dupleix, and the army continued its march to
Hyderabad.

It has been necessary to say thus much regarding the different princes
of the Deckan, from their connexion with the scenes which took place in
the Carnatic, and which it would be impossible to understand without
the explanations which have been given.

For the present, we leave Bussy and his force to the prosecution of the
first great enterprise of an European power in the interior of India.
The detail of the remarkable scene of warfare and of politics which
awaited that extraordinary man, in the territories of Hyderabad, is
foreign to the object of this memoir. We return, therefore, to the
narration of events in the Carnatic, which becomes a more pleasing
task, as our countrymen now ceased to be eclipsed, as they had
hitherto been, by the brilliant characters both of the French military
commanders and statesmen.

FOOTNOTES:

[15] Saturday Morning, Dec. 28th. 1728.

[16] Probably old style, and therefore 1729, N. S.

[17] Probably the name by which he designated his aunt Bayley.

[18] Manchester, June 9. 1732.

[19] His object is said to have been to get a smooth stone which lay on
this projecting stone spout, for the pleasure of jerking it.--_Biog.
Brit._ art. CLIVE.

[20] The Rev. Mr. Smithwick related this anecdote to me in 1827.

[21] Mr. Gilbert Davis confirms this anecdote, as having been told him
at Shrewsbury, upwards of forty years ago.

[22] Dated Fort St. George, Dec. 10. 1744.

[23] _Biog. Brit._ art. CLIVE.

[24] Orme, vol. i. p. 68.

[25] Ibid. pp. 70, 71.

[26] Biographia Britannica (2d edit.), art. CLIVE, written by Henry
Beaufoy, Esq. M. P., from family papers and information: see also,
Chalmers' Biographical Dictionary.

[27] Biographia Britannica (2d edit.), art. CLIVE.

[28] Mr. Mill in his History of India (vol. iii. p. 105.), in
reference to these early occurrences of Clive's life, describes him,
at this period, as of a turbulent disposition; but the justice of the
application of such an epithet is not borne out by the facts.

[29] Colonel Lawrence's Narrative.

[30] Orme, War in Hindustan.

[31] This inattention to orders is referred by some native agents of
the company to the parsimony of the English governor, in not making
presents to the nabob, which was contrasted with the liberality of
Dupleix, who well knew how to gain his objects at such courts.

[32] Colonel Wilks.

[33] Ghazee-u-Deen.

[34] Two lacs of rupees were given to the French, and eighty-one
villages were ceded belonging to Karical, which place the French had
seized in 1736, and built a fort there.

[35] The Patan Nabobs of Kurpa, Karnoul, and Savanore were the chief
persons in the conspiracy. They were discontented at the treatment
they received from Nasir Jung. They were joined by Shandraz Khan, and
other high officers of that prince. These latter are stated to have
considered themselves disgraced by the imprisonment of Muzuffer Jung,
whose submission they had obtained by the most sacred pledges of his
being kindly treated.

[36] Wilks, vol. i. p. 269.




CHAP. II.


(A. D. 1750.) The government of Fort St. David had been assumed by Mr.
Saunders, a man of sound sense and unconquerable firmness. Nothing
could be more alarming than the situation in which he found the affairs
of the Company. He saw immediately, that, unless Mahommed Ali was
effectually supported, the Carnatic would fall into the possession of
Chunda Sahib, from whom the Company could expect no favour; and the
probability of this happening was greater, from the recent success
of that chief, in obtaining possession of Madura, which literally
confined Mahommed Ali to the single possession of Trichinopoly; almost
every other place having acknowledged the authority of his rival. The
government of Fort St. David had sent to the aid of Mahommed Ali a body
of 600 men under Captain Cope; but the failure of an attempt made by
this party to recover Madura depressed still more the spirits of the
adherents of their ally, who was soon besieged by the united forces
of Chunda Sahib and the French. This desperate state of his fortunes
led to the renewal of his efforts to obtain more efficient aid from
the English, to whom he not only offered a considerable territory
contiguous to Madras, but agreed to pay the expenses of all the troops
employed in his support. These offers, and the certain ruin in which
the success of Chunda Sahib must involve the Company, would hardly have
roused the Committee of Fort St. David, unauthorised as they were by
their instructions from England, to depart from their neutrality, had
not Dupleix insulted their forbearance by planting white flags, (to
denote that they were French property) in almost every field[37] around
their boundary, and some even within their limits.

The English troops on the coast were, at this period, much inferior
in numbers to the French; and by an inexplicable confidence in the
continuance of peace, Colonel Lawrence, whose character and experience
constituted a great part of their military strength, had been permitted
to return to England on private affairs. Notwithstanding these
circumstances, Mr. Saunders determined to make an attempt to relieve
Trichinopoly; and a body of 500 Europeans, 100 Caffres, and 1000 sepoys
was detached under Captain Gingen, to join the party already in that
garrison. Their march was delayed several weeks, to allow them to
be joined by a party of Mahommed Ali's troops, the Committee being
desirous to avoid appearing as principals in this war; choosing, like
the French, rather to have their forces considered as mercenaries in
the pay of the native prince whom they supported.

Clive, who had alternately been charged with civil and military duties,
as the exigencies of the public service required, had resumed the
civil branch of the service, soon after the reduction of Devecotta (A.
D. 1749), when the pacification with the Rajah of Tanjore produced
a temporary cessation from military operations; and was admitted to
the same rank that he would have held, had he never quitted it. By
the active friendship of Major Lawrence, he was appointed commissary
for supplying the European troops with provisions. He had not been
long settled at Madras, when a fever of the nervous kind attacked his
constitution, and so much affected his spirits, that the constant
presence of an attendant became necessary. For this complaint, which
was accompanied with a hard swelling at the pit of his stomach, he went
to Bengal during the cold season, and returned with his health much
improved; but the hardship and fatigue which he soon after underwent
in the field, while his health was yet imperfectly re-established,
tended so much to shake his constitution, that, during the remainder
of his life, except when his mind was actively engaged, the oppression
on his spirits frequently returned.[38] In his official capacity of
commissary, he now proceeded with Captain Gingen to Trichinopoly.
(A. D. 1751, May.) As he did not then hold any station as a soldier,
no share can be attributed to him in the disgraceful affair at
Volconda[39], where the British troops were discomfited, more by the
irresolution and want of judgment of their officers[40], than by the
efforts or ability of their adversaries.

They retreated to Trichinopoly, pursued and harassed by the enemy,
of whom there appears to have been such a dread, that they did not
even occupy the pagoda of Seringham[41], though the strength of that
post, and its vicinity to Trichinopoly, rendered it as tenable as it
was important. It was instantly taken possession of by the French,
and their ally Chunda Sahib, who thus, under the most favourable
auspices, commenced their operations on a scene destined to be that
of their ultimate defeat. There were at this period so few English
officers of any experience, that the governor was compelled to send
one of the members of council (Mr. Pigot), a man of known firmness
and judgment, in charge of some recruits and stores to Trichinopoly.
Clive, who had returned to Fort St. David, from Volconda, accompanied
this party. On their way back from this service, these two gentlemen,
who had an escort of but twelve sepoys, were attacked by a body of
polygars, who with matchlocks harassed them in their march for some
hours, and killed seven of the sepoys; when, the ammunition of the
survivors being expended, they were ordered to disperse, and Mr. Pigot
and Clive only saved themselves by the fleetness of their horses.
Another small reinforcement was sent soon afterwards through Tanjore,
in charge of Clive, promoted on this occasion to the rank of captain,
which, after a sharp affair with a French detachment, succeeded in
reaching Trichinopoly in safety. But Clive, on his return from that
place, drew such a picture of the situation of the garrison, that
the governor was satisfied the cause of Mahommed Ali could be saved
only by efforts more considerable than any that had been yet made.
Clive suggested, that, as Chunda Sahib had drawn away almost all his
forces to invest Trichinopoly, an attack should be made upon his
capital (Arcot). This suggestion was adopted; and he was, at his own
request, nominated to the conduct of an enterprise, which, whether we
consider the means employed, the obstacles to be surmounted, or the
results that were produced, must ever rank high in the list of those
achievements, where skill and energy supply the place of numbers; and,
mocking every calculation, compel fortune, however reluctant, to pay
homage to superior genius. But the capture and defence of Arcot forms
too important a feature in the life of Clive to be slightly passed
over; and as no man can ever give so clear and so eloquent a relation
of this operation as the historian[42], who may almost be called an
eye-witness of the actions he so admirably described, no apology is
necessary for adopting his narrative; which, in its very minuteness,
is as interesting as it is instructive; and, while it conveys a lesson
to the mere European soldier, paints in true and vivid colours all
that belongs to the character of the yet unimproved system of Asiatic
warfare.

"The English battalion at Trichinopoly," says Orme, "did not exceed
600 men; whereas the French had 900, and the troops of Chunda Sahib
outnumbered the Nabob's ten to one. The strength of the city, indeed,
rendered the reduction of it very difficult; but the Nabob's army,
at the same time that they were incapable of retrieving his affairs,
exhausted his treasures, and his revenues were daily cut off by the
enemy taking possession of the countries which furnished them.

"Captain Clive, on his return from Trichinopoly in the beginning of
August, represented this situation of affairs to the Presidency, and
proposed, as the only resource, to attack the possessions of Chunda
Sahib in the territory of Arcot; offering to lead the expedition
himself, which, he doubted not, would cause a diversion of part of the
enemy's force from Trichinopoly. Fort St. David and Madras were left,
the one with 100, the other with less than 50 men, in order to supply
the greatest force that could be collected for this enterprise. The
detachment, when completed, nevertheless, consisted of no more than
300 sepoys and 200 Europeans, with eight officers, six of whom had
never before been in action; and four of these six were young men in
the mercantile service of the Company, who, inflamed by his example,
took up the sword to follow him. This handful of men, with only three
field-pieces for their artillery, marched from Madras on the 26th
of August, and on the 29th arrived at Conjeveram, a considerable
town, with a large pagoda, lying about forty miles inland, where
they received intelligence that the fort of Arcot was garrisoned
by 1100 men; on which Captain Clive wrote word to Madras, desiring
that two eighteen-pounders might be sent after him without any delay.
On the 31st he halted within ten miles of Arcot, where the enemy's
spies reported, that they had discovered the English marching with
unconcern through a violent storm of thunder, lightning, and rain:
and this circumstance, from their notions of omens, gave the garrison
so high an opinion of the fortitude of the approaching enemy, that
they instantly abandoned the fort, and a few hours after the English
entered the city, which had no walls or defences, and marching through
100,000 spectators, who gazed on them with admiration and respect,
took possession of the fort, in which they found a large quantity
of lead and gunpowder, with eight pieces of cannon, from four to
eight-pounders. The merchants had, for security, deposited in the
fort effects to the value of 50,000_l._; but these were punctually
restored to the owners; and this judicious abstemiousness conciliated
many of the principal inhabitants to the English interest. The fort
was inhabited by 3000 or 4000 persons, who, at their own request, were
permitted to remain in their dwellings.

"Captain Clive made it his first care to collect such provisions and
materials as might enable him to sustain a siege; and foreseeing that
the enemy would soon recover from their flight and return into the
town, if he confined himself to the fort, determined to go in quest of
them; and on the 4th of September marched out with the greatest part
of his men and four field-pieces. In the afternoon he discovered the
fugitive garrison, consisting of 600 horse and 500 foot, drawn up near
Timery, a fort situated six miles south-west of the city. They had a
field-piece managed by two or three Europeans, from which they fired at
a great distance, and killed a camel and wounded a sepoy; but as soon
as they saw the English within musket-shot, retreated to the hills in
the rear; upon which the English returned to the fort.

"The troops marched out again on the 6th, and found the enemy drawn
up within gun-shot of Timery, in a grove, enclosed with a bank and a
ditch, about fifty yards in front of which was a large tank, surrounded
likewise with a bank much higher than that of the grove; but by age and
neglect the tank itself was almost choked up and dry. Their number now
appeared to be 2000, and they had two field-pieces, which fired smartly
as the English advanced, and killed three Europeans; on which accident
the line advanced more briskly towards the enemy, who, frightened by
the vivacity of their approach, did not think themselves safe in the
grove, but hurried with precipitation into the tank, and began to fire
from the banks, exposing so little of their bodies that the English
fire did no execution amongst them, whilst theirs wounded several of
the Europeans and sepoys. The troops were ordered, therefore, to move
behind some neighbouring buildings, from which Ensign Glass was soon
after detached with a platoon of forty men to attack one side of the
tank, whilst another, under the command of Lieutenant Bulkley, pushed
to attack the enemy in front. Both gained the banks, and gave their
fire at the same instant amongst numbers crowded together in the tank,
which immediately put them to flight. The troops then took possession
of the village under the walls of the fort, and summoned the governor.
Messages passed, during which his spies discovered that the English
had no battering cannon, which intelligence determined him not to
surrender. Several shells were therefore thrown into the fort from a
cohorn mortar, which proved ineffectual. The troops marched back to
Arcot, and the enemy's cavalry hovered round them as they retreated,
but kept out of the reach of their fire.

"The garrison remained in the fort ten days, diligently employed in
many necessary works; and the enemy, now augmented to 3000 men,
imputing this intermission of their sallies to fear, encamped within
three miles of the town, giving out that they intended to besiege the
fort. Captain Clive determined to take advantage of their security, and
on the 14th of September marched out two hours after midnight, with the
greatest part of his garrison, and entering their camp by surprise,
found them, as he expected, asleep. The troops beat up the camp from
one end to the other, firing continually on numbers taking flight on
all sides with shrieks and confusion. The terror was so great that
very few made use of their arms, and even those few, after a single
discharge made at random, mingled with the rest of the fugitives; and
when the day broke, none of them remained in sight. This success was
obtained without the loss of a man.

"The two eighteen-pounders, which had been demanded from Madras, with
some military stores, were at this time on the road, but escorted only
by a few sepoys; and the enemy, hoping to intercept them, sent a large
detachment, which took possession of the great pagoda of Conjeveram.
Thirty Europeans and fifty sepoys, with a field-piece, were sent from
the fort to dislodge them, and, on their arrival found the pagoda
abandoned; the enemy having retreated to a fort in the neighbourhood,
where they were continually reinforced from the main body. Much
depending on the safe arrival of the convoy, Captain Clive, reserving
only thirty Europeans and fifty sepoys for the guard of the fort, sent
all the rest to strengthen the detachment which escorted it. On this
the enemy changed their design, and returned hastily to the city, in
expectation that an assault, made on the fort during the absence of a
great part of the garrison, would encourage the inhabitants to rise;
and, in this confidence, their whole force, horse and foot, advanced
as soon as it was dark, and surrounded the fort. Their musketry,
from the adjacent houses, kept a continual fire upon the ramparts;
and this attack producing no effect, a large body of horse and foot
advanced promiscuously to the outer gate, endeavouring, by outcries,
and the noise of their military music, to confound the attention of
the garrison, from which they sustained several discharges of musketry
without quitting their ground. At last some grenades were thrown
amongst them, the explosion of which, frightening the horses, flung
their cavalry into such confusion that they galloped away, trampling
over the foot: but within an hour they recovered their spirits, and
made such another attack at the other gate, where they were received
and beaten off as at the first. Their infantry continued their fire
until daybreak, when the English detachment with the convoy entered
the town; upon which they abandoned it with precipitation.

"The inhabitants in the fort, satisfied with the treatment they had
received from the garrison, betrayed no symptoms of insurrection during
the attack.

"The acquisition of the fort of Arcot soon produced the effect which
had been expected from it. Chunda Sahib detached 4000 of his troops,
horse and foot, from Trichinopoly, who, in their route, were joined by
his son Rajah Sahib with 150 Europeans from Pondicherry, and, together
with the troops already collected in the neighbourhood of Arcot,
entered the city on the 23d of September, and Rajah Sahib fixed his
head-quarters in the palace of the Nabob.

"Captain Clive, finding himself on the point of being closely besieged,
determined to make one vigorous effort to drive the enemy out of the
town, which, if it did not succeed, might at least produce the good
effect of impressing them with an opinion of the courage of his men.
On the 24th at noon, the greatest part of the garrison, with the four
field-pieces, sallied out of the north-west gate: this faced a street,
which, after continuing about seventy yards in a direct line to the
north, turned off to the east, and formed another street, at the end of
which, on the left hand, was situated the Nabob's palace. This fronted
another street, which, striking to the south, continued on the eastern
side of the fort. The square interval between these three streets and
the northern wall of the fort was filled with buildings and enclosures.
Captain Clive, intending to place the enemy between two fires, ordered
a platoon under the command of Ensign Glass to march up the street
on the eastern side of the fort, which led up to the palace, and
advancing himself, with the main body, along the street leading from
the north-west gate, found the French troops, with four field-pieces,
drawn up at the end of the cross street in front of the palace. Captain
Clive's party no sooner came in sight of them, than a hot cannonade
ensued in the cross street, at the distance of only thirty yards. The
French in a few minutes were driven from their guns, and ran into the
palace; but by this time the troops of Rajah Sahib had taken possession
of all the houses in the street; and secure under this cover, kept up a
continual fire from their musketry, with such good aim, that fourteen
men, who pushed to bring away the French guns, were all either killed
or wounded. There was on one side of the street a large choultry: these
are buildings intended for the reception of travellers, covered, and
enclosed on three sides with walls, but open in front, where, instead
of a wall, the roof is supported by pillars.

"Captain Clive, to preserve his men, relinquished the intention
of bringing off the enemy's cannon, and ordered them to enter the
choultry; from hence the artillery-men, stepping out and retreating
into it, immediately after they performed the services allotted to
each of them, continued to load and fire their field-pieces, until
they had recoiled into the north street. The troops then, quitting the
choultry, joined their guns, and proceeded to the fort without meeting
any further molestation. Ensign Glass's platoon returned at the same
time: these had encountered, and put to flight three or four hundred
of the enemy's sepoys, whom they found posted as an advanced guard in
an inclosure adjoining to the street through which they intended to
pass to the palace; where, by this interruption, they were prevented
from arriving in time to render the service expected from them. The
garrison suffered this day the loss of fifteen Europeans, who were
either killed on the spot, or died afterwards of their wounds: amongst
them was lieutenant Trenwith, who, perceiving a sepoy from a window
taking aim at Captain Clive, pulled him on one side; upon which the
sepoy, changing his aim, shot lieutenant Trenwith through the body.
Lieutenant Revel, the only artillery officer, with sixteen other men,
was likewise disabled. This sally would be condemned by the rules of
war established in Europe, for they forbid the besieged to run such a
risk, unless they are assured of greatly outnumbering the party they
attack; but it is not reasonable to strain the rules calculated for one
system to the service of another differing so widely from it, as the
modes of war in Hindustan differ from those in Europe.

"The next day Rajah Sahib was joined by 2000 men from Vellore,
commanded by Mortaza Ali in person; and took possession of all the
avenues leading to the fort, which seemed little capable of sustaining
the impending siege. Its extent was more than a mile in circumference;
the walls were in many places ruinous; the rampart too narrow to admit
the firing of artillery; the parapet low and slightly built; several
of the towers decayed, and none of them capable of receiving more than
one piece of cannon; the ditch was in most places fordable, in others
dry, and in some choked up; there was between the walls of the fort and
the ditch a space, about ten feet broad, intended for a fausse-braye;
but this had no parapet at the scarp of the ditch. The fort had two
gates, one to the north-west, the other to the east: both of them were
large piles of masonry, projecting forty feet beyond the walls; and
the passage from these gates was, instead of a drawbridge, a large
causeway crossing the ditch. The garrison had, from their arrival,
employed themselves indefatigably to remove and repair as many of these
inconveniences and defects as the smallness of their number could
attend to. They had endeavoured to burn down several of the nearest
houses, but without success; for these, having no wood-work in their
construction, excepting the beams which supported the ceiling, resisted
the blaze; of these houses the enemy's infantry took possession, and
began to fire upon the ramparts, and wounded several of the garrison
before night, when they retired. At midnight Ensign Glass was sent with
two men, and some barrels of gunpowder, to blow up the two houses which
most annoyed the fort. This party was let down by ropes over the wall,
and, entering the houses without being discovered, made the explosion,
but with so little skill, that it did not produce the intended effect.
At their return, the rope by which Ensign Glass was getting into the
fort broke, and he was by the fall rendered incapable of further duty;
so that, at the beginning of the siege, the garrison was deprived
of the service of four of the eight officers who set out on the
expedition; for one was killed, two wounded, and another returned to
Madras; and the troops fit for duty were diminished to 120 Europeans
and 200 sepoys; these were besieged by 150 Europeans, 2,000 sepoys,
3,000 cavalry, and 5,000 peons.

"The store of provisions in the fort was only sufficient to supply the
garrison sixty days, which rendered it necessary to send away all the
inhabitants, excepting a few artificers; and the enemy permitted them
to pass through their guard without molestation. Amongst those who
remained was a mason, who had been for many years employed in the fort.
He gave information that there was an aqueduct under ground, known to
very few, but which, if discovered by the enemy, would enable them to
drain the only reservoir of water in the fort. The man was rewarded
for this seasonable intelligence, and employed to prevent the mischief
by choking up a part of the aqueduct within the walls. For fourteen
days the enemy, not yet furnished with battering cannon, carried on
the siege by firing from the houses with musketry, and a bombardment
from four mortars. The bombardment did but little damage; and, to
avoid the effect of the musketry, none of the garrison were suffered
to appear on the ramparts, excepting the few immediately necessary to
avoid a surprise; but, notwithstanding this precaution, several were
killed, and more wounded: for the enemy, secure in the houses, and
firing from resting-places, took such excellent aim, that they often
hit a man when nothing but his head appeared above the parapet; and
in this manner three serjeants were killed, who at different times
singly accompanied Captain Clive in visiting the works. Mortaza Ali,
a few days after his arrival, pretended to be dissatisfied with Rajah
Sahib, and removed his troops to a different part of the city, from
whence he sent a messenger inviting the garrison to make a sally on the
quarters of Rajah Sahib, in which he offered to assist them with his
whole force. Captain Clive mistrusted his professions; but, considering
the advantage of keeping such a number of the enemy's troops inactive,
pretended to approve of the proposal, and carried on for several days a
correspondence, until Mortaza Ali, suspecting his scheme was detected,
rejoined the army.

"On the 24th of October, the French troops received from Pondicherry
two eighteen-pounders, and seven pieces of smaller calibre, and
immediately opened a battery to the north-west, which was so
well served, that their very first shot dismounted one of the
eighteen-pounders in the fort, and the next entirely disabled it.
The garrison mounted the other eighteen-pounder; and this, after a
few shot, was likewise dismounted; after which, it was employed only
in such parts of the fort, where it was not exposed to the enemy's
artillery. The three field-pieces were likewise cautiously reserved to
repulse the enemy when they should storm; so that their battery, firing
without much opposition, in six days beat down all the wall lying
between two towers, and made a practicable breach of fifty feet.

"In the meantime, the garrison were employed in making works to defend
it. A trench was dug just under the rampart, and behind that, at some
distance, another; both of which were scattered with crows'-feet, and
behind them the walls of a house were pulled down to the height of a
breast-work, from whence a row of palisadoes was carried along on each
end of both trenches, and continued up the rampart to the parapet. A
field-piece was planted on one of the towers which flanked the breach
without, and two small pieces of cannon on the flat roof of a house
within the fort, opposite to the entrance. In these employments, as,
indeed, in all others, the officers contributed their labour equally
with the common men; and the enemy, informed of these preparations
to defend the breach, did not think it safe to attack it before
they had made another. They had by this time burst one of their
eighteen-pounders, and removed the other, with one nine-pounder, to a
battery which they erected to the south-west.

"The garrison, intending to convince Rajah Sahib that they were in
a condition to execute even labours not indispensably necessary,
thickened the highest tower of the ramparts, and then raised on the
top of it a mound of earth, to such a height as commanded the palace,
over the interjacent houses. On the top of this mound they hoisted a
vast piece of cannon, sent, according to the tradition of the fort,
from Delhi, by Aurungzebe, and said to have been drawn by 1000 yoke
of oxen. There were several iron balls belonging to it, each weighing
seventy-two pounds. The cannon was laid on the mound, and loaded with
thirty pounds of powder, which was fired by a train carried to a
considerable distance on the ground. The shot went through the palace,
to the no small terror of Rajah Sahib and his principal officers; and,
as this was the only effect intended, the cannon was fired only once in
the day, at the time when the officers assembled at the head-quarters:
on the fourth day it burst.

"The enemy, as if they intended to retaliate this affront, filled
up a large house, which commanded the eastern gate, with earth well
rammed down, and upon this base raised a square mound of earth to
such a height as commanded not only the gate, but likewise every part
within the fort. From hence, they intended to fire on the rampart with
musketry and two small pieces of cannon. They were suffered to go on
with their work until they had completed it and mounted the cannon;
when the garrison began to fire from the reserved eighteen-pounder, and
in less than an hour, the mound gave way, and tumbled at once, with
fifty men stationed on it, some of whom were killed, and many disabled.

"Notwithstanding the numbers of the enemy's guards which surrounded
the fort, the garrison, by means of able spies, carried on a constant
correspondence with Madras and Fort St. David; where the Company's
agents were very solicitous to relieve them; and, having received some
recruits from Europe, formed a party of 100 Europeans, who, with 200
sepoys, set out from Madras under the command of Lieutenant Innis.
Before they had advanced thirty miles on their way to Arcot, they were
surrounded in the town of Trivatore by 2000 of Rajah Sahib's troops,
detached with twenty Europeans, and two field-pieces from the city.
The English party, having no cannon, were so severely annoyed by the
enemy's, that Lieutenant Innis, as the only resource, made a push with
all his Europeans to drive them from their guns. The attempt succeeded,
but not without a sharp contest, in which twenty of the English, and
two of their officers were killed, and a greater number wounded. This
loss deterred the rest from continuing their march, and they retreated
to Poonamalee, a fort built by the Moors, and at this time belonging to
the Company, fifteen miles west of Madras.

"On the 24th of October, the enemy opened their battery to the
south-west. The part of the wall against which they directed their
fire, was in a very ruinous condition; but it had the advantage of
being much less exposed than any other to the fire from the houses. The
garrison, therefore, kept up a constant fire of musketry against the
battery, and several times drove the enemy out of it; but the breach,
notwithstanding, increased every day.

"The retreat of Lieutenant Innis left the garrison little hopes of
succour from the settlements; but at this time their spirits were
raised by the hopes of other resources. A body of 6000 Mahrattas,
under the command of Morari-row, had lain for some time encamped at
the foot of the western mountains, about thirty miles from Arcot: they
had been hired to assist Mahommed-Ali, by the king of Mysore; but the
retreat of the English and the Nabob's troops to Trichinopoly, had been
represented in the neighbouring countries so much to their prejudice,
that the Nabob's affairs were thought to be desperate, and his allies
were suspected of having little intention to support him; and from
this persuasion the Mahrattas remained inactive. Captain Clive had
found means to send a messenger to inform them of his situation, and to
request their approach to his relief. The messenger returning safe to
the fort, brought a letter from Morari-row, in which he said he would
not delay a moment to send a detachment of his troops to the assistance
of such brave men as the defenders of Arcot, whose behaviour had now
first convinced him that the English could fight.

"Rajah Sahib, receiving intelligence of their intentions, sent a flag
of truce on the 30th of October, with proposals for the surrender of
the fort. He offered honourable terms to the garrison, and a large
sum of money to Captain Clive; and, if his offers were not accepted,
he threatened to storm the fort immediately, and put every man to the
sword.

"Captain Clive, in his answer, reproached the badness of Chunda
Sahib's cause; treated Rajah Sahib's offers of money with contempt;
and said that he had too good an opinion of his prudence to believe
that he would attempt to storm until he had got better soldiers than
the rabble of which his army was composed. As soon as the messenger
was despatched, the flag of truce was pulled down; but, the enemy not
understanding the rules of European war, numbers of them remained near
the ditch, parleying with the sepoys, and persuading them to desert.
The crowd was several times warned to retire, but, continuing to
disregard the injunction, was dispersed by a volley of small arms,
which killed several of them.

"Lieutenant Innis's party, reinforced to the number of 150 Europeans,
and with four field-pieces, was now advancing under the command
of Captain Kilpatrick; and on the 9th of November a detachment of
Mahrattas arrived in the neighbourhood, and intercepted some ammunition
going to the enemy. They likewise attempted to enter the town; but,
finding every street and avenue barricadoed, they contented themselves
with plundering and setting fire to some houses in the skirts of it;
after which they retreated.

"By this time the enemy had, from their battery to the south-west,
made a breach much larger than that to the north-west, for it extended
near thirty yards; but the ditch before it was full of water, and not
fordable; and the garrison had counterworked this breach with the same
kind of defences as the other.

"Rajah Sahib, exasperated by the answer he had received to his summons,
and alarmed by the approach of the Mahrattas and the detachment from
Madras, determined to storm the fort. In the evening, a spy brought
intelligence of this to the garrison; and at midnight another came,
with all the enemy's dispositions, and the hour of attack, which was to
begin at the dawn of the day, by the signal of three bombs.

"Captain Clive, almost exhausted with fatigue, lay down to sleep,
ordering himself to be awakened at the first alarm.

"It was the 14th of November, and the festival which commemorates the
murder of the brothers Hassan and Hassein happened to fall out at this
time. This is celebrated by the Mahommedans of Hindustan with a kind
of religious madness, some acting and others bewailing the catastrophe
of their saints with so much energy, that several die of the excesses
they commit: they are likewise persuaded that whoever falls in battle
against unbelievers, during any of the days of this ceremony, shall
instantly be translated into the higher paradise, without stopping at
any of the intermediate purgatories. To the enthusiasm of superstition
was added the more certain efficacy of inebriation; for most of the
troops, as is customary during the agitations of the festival, had
eaten plentifully of bang, a plant which either stupifies, or excites
the most desperate excesses of rage. Thus prepared, as soon as the
morning broke, the army of Rajah Sahib advanced to the attack. Besides
a multitude that came with ladders to every part of the walls that were
accessible, there appeared four principal divisions; two of these
divisions advanced to the two gates, and the other two were allotted to
the breaches.

"Captain Clive, awakened by the alarm, found his garrison at their
posts, according to the dispositions he had made. The parties who
attacked the gates drove before them several elephants, who, with
large plates of iron fixed on their foreheads, were intended to break
them down; but the elephants, wounded by the musketry, soon turned,
and trampled on those who escorted them. The ditch before the breach
to the north-west was fordable; and as many as the breach would admit
mounted it with a mad kind of intrepidity, whilst numbers came and sat
down with great composure in the fausse-braye under the tower where the
field-piece was planted, and waited there, to relieve those who were
employed in the attack: these passed the breach, and some of them even
got over the first trench before the defenders gave the fire: it fell
heavily, and every shot did execution; and a number of muskets were
loaded in readiness, which those behind delivered to the first rank as
fast as they could discharge them. The two pieces of cannon from the
top of the house fired likewise on the assailants, who in a few minutes
abandoned the attack; when another body, and then another succeeded,
who were driven off in the same manner. In the mean time bombs, with
short fusees, which had been prepared and lodged in the adjacent
rampart, were thrown into the fausse-braye, and by their explosion
drove the crowd who had seated themselves there back again over the
ditch.

"At the breach to the south-west the enemy brought a raft, and
seventy men embarked on it to cross the ditch, which was flanked by
two field-pieces, one in each tower. The raft had almost gained the
fausse-braye, when Captain Clive, observing that the gunners fired with
bad aim, took the management of one of the field-pieces himself, and,
in three or four discharges, flung them into such confusion, that they
overset the raft, and tumbled into the ditch; where some of them were
drowned, and the rest, intent only on their own preservation, swam back
and left the raft behind.

"In these different attacks, the enemy continued the storm for an hour;
when they relinquished all their attempts of annoyance at once, and
employed themselves earnestly in carrying off their dead. Amongst these
was the commander of their sepoys, who fell in the fausse-braye of the
northern breach. He had distinguished himself with great bravery in
the attack, and was so much beloved by his troops, that one of them
crossed the ditch, and carried off his body, exposing himself, during
the attempt, to the fire of forty muskets, from which he had the good
fortune to escape. It seemed as if the enemy expected that the garrison
would permit them to fulfil this duty to their friends; but, finding
that they suffered severely in attempting it, they at last retreated
and disappeared. Their loss, during the storm, was computed to be not
less than 400 men killed and wounded; of which very few were Europeans;
for most of the French troops were observed drawn up, and looking on
at a distance. Of the defenders, only four Europeans were killed, and
two sepoys wounded. Many of the garrison being disabled by sickness or
wounds, the number which repulsed the storm was no more than eighty
Europeans (officers included), and 120 sepoys; and these, besides
serving five pieces of cannon, expended 12,000 musket cartridges during
the attack.

"Two hours after, the enemy renewed their fire upon the fort, both with
their cannon and with musketry from the houses. At two in the afternoon
they demanded leave to bury their dead; which was granted, and a truce
allowed until four. They then recommenced, and continued their fire
smartly till two in the morning, when, on a sudden, it ceased totally;
and, at daybreak, intelligence was brought that the whole army had
abandoned the town with precipitation. On receiving this joyful news,
the garrison immediately marched into the enemy's quarters, where they
found four pieces of artillery, four mortars, and a large quantity of
ammunition, which they brought in triumph into the fort. During the
time that the garrison were shut up in the fort, forty-five Europeans
and thirty sepoys were killed, and a greater number of both wounded;
most of whom suffered by the enemy's musketry from the houses.

"Thus ended this siege, maintained fifty days, under every disadvantage
of situation and force, by a handful of men, in their first campaign,
with a spirit worthy of the most veteran troops: and conducted by
their young commander with indefatigable activity, unshaken constancy,
and undaunted courage: and, notwithstanding he had at this time
neither read books, nor conversed with men capable of giving him much
instruction in the military art, all the resources which he employed in
the defence of Arcot, were such as are dictated by the best masters in
the science of war."[43]

I have it in my power, from authority I cannot doubt, to add to the
account of this celebrated siege an anecdote, singularly illustrative
of the character of the native troops of India. When provisions became
so scarce that there was a fear that famine might compel them to
surrender, the sepoys proposed to Clive to limit them to the water[44]
in which the rice was boiled. "It is," they said, "sufficient for our
support: the Europeans require the grain."

This fact is as honourable to Clive, as to those under his command;
for the conduct of the native troops of India will always be found to
depend upon the character of the officers under whom they are employed.
Flattered and elevated by the confidence reposed in them, they will
almost rival Europeans in their efforts to merit such consideration;
but when their character and feelings are not understood, and a
secondary place is assigned them, or when they are treated as an
inferior class of troops, they soon become, from sinking in their own
estimation, what ignorant and unskilful leaders have too often, in
justification of their own failure, described them. From the nature
and constitution of this part of our army, it cannot be otherwise; and
there are abundant examples to prove, that where knowledge and talent
are united in the commander, no fear need be entertained of his success
in stimulating the native part of his force to every effort, of which
patient suffering, under privation and fatigue, or active and daring
valour in front of the enemy, is capable.

Clive took full advantage of the impressions made by his successful
defence of Arcot. Having increased his force by a detachment from Fort
St. David of two hundred Europeans and seven hundred sepoys, he took
the small fort of Timery[45]; and aided by a party of Mahrattas, sent
by Morari-row, the chief of Goothy, he did not hesitate, by a forced
march, to meet a party of three hundred Europeans, two thousand horse,
and two thousand five hundred sepoys, with four field pieces, which had
been sent from Pondicherry to aid Rajah Sahib.

After a well-contested action, the French were completely routed;
and night only saved them from destruction. The Mahrattas, who had
displayed courage in the action, were most eager in the pursuit, in
which they took four hundred horses, and Rajah Sahib's military chest,
containing 100,000 rupees.[46]

These successes turned the tide of the public opinion, in that part
of the country where they occurred, in favour of the English. The
killahdar (or governor) of Arnee proclaimed his allegiance to Mahommed
Ali; and six hundred French sepoys, having brought their arms, were
enlisted, and added by Clive to the strength of his small force.

Clive next proceeded to the attack of Conjeveram, of which the French
had made a post. The commandant compelled two English officers, Revel
and Glass, who were their prisoners, to write, that if the place was
attacked they should be exposed on the wall. They, however, added to
the letter, that they made this communication by desire of the enemy,
but trusted no consideration for them would for one instant stop
operations. When battering cannon arrived, a breach was made; but the
French garrison, dreading the just resentment which their conduct[47]
had excited, did not await a storm, but abandoning the pagoda at night,
left behind the two prisoners they had threatened to expose.

Clive, after destroying the defences of Conjeveram, and strengthening
the garrison of Arcot, proceeded himself to Fort St. David, to report
the details of his success, and to suggest further operations.

These successes had, at first, a favourable impression upon the affairs
of Mahommed Ali, who still remained at Trichinopoly, where he was in
daily expectation of being joined by a large force from Mysore, to the
Regent of which country he had made great promises. He had been joined
by a body of Mahrattas sent by Morari-row; but the comparatively small
force of the English led their cautious commander, Captain Gingen, to
limit himself to the defensive.

This excited a spirit of discontent in the garrison, and more in the
Mahrattas, who, eager for action, upbraided the English for their want
of enterprise, telling them[48], "they were not the same kind of men
whom they had seen fight so gallantly at Arcot!"

In the beginning of the ensuing year (January, 1752), Rajah Sahib
re-assembled a force, which amounted to four hundred Europeans, two
thousand sepoys, and two thousand five hundred horse, with a train of
artillery, and began to lay waste the territories of Mahommed Ali,
plundering those of the English at Poonamalee, and burning their
newly-erected houses at St. Thomas's Mount.

To arrest the progress of this party, a force of three hundred and
eighty Europeans, one thousand three hundred sepoys, and six field
pieces, was placed under Clive. He immediately[49] marched towards
the enemy, who, notwithstanding their superiority in numbers, did not
venture to meet him, but abandoned different strong positions on
his approach; till he came so unexpectedly upon them at the village
of Coverspak, that the leading men of his party received a discharge
from their artillery, posted in a grove, before he was aware of their
vicinity. To remedy the temporary confusion this created, Clive took
advantage of a water-course to afford his infantry shelter, while he
secured his baggage and prepared for an attack. His first efforts
were unsuccessful, from the superiority of the enemy's artillery;
and he soon saw that he must either capture it or retreat. The mango
grove, in which it was placed, was defended in front by a steep bank
and ditch; but the report of those he sent to reconnoitre the rear
of their position, satisfied him it was open and not guarded. He
instantly detached six hundred of his best men to make a detour, and
attack the enemy in rear, while the main body pressed them in front. He
had proceeded some distance with this detachment, in order to ensure
its proper direction, when his temporary absence had nearly caused
the defeat of the troops he left engaged in the water-course. These
men, accustomed to look to him alone for victory, and discouraged by
so large a party being detached, had given way; and on his return,
it was not without great difficulty he rallied them, and made them
recommence a firing, which was continued, and the enemy amused, till a
volley from the party who had been sent to the rear announced their
arrival and success at the same moment. For having reconnoitred the
position by means of an officer who, speaking French, was mistaken for
a friend, they had approached so close before they were discovered,
that the enemy were thrown into inextricable confusion. Nine pieces of
cannon were taken, and all fled, except a party of sixty Europeans,
who surrendered:--fifty Frenchmen and three hundred sepoys were found
dead upon the field. The loss of the English detachment was also
severe. Forty Europeans and thirty sepoys were killed, and a much
greater number were wounded:--but the effect produced by the skill
and gallantry of Clive was decisive. The French force in this part of
the Carnatic was destroyed, and the reputation of the British arms
was restored, or rather founded, in India:--for before his brilliant
successes no event had occurred which could lead the natives to believe
that the English, as soldiers, were equal to the French.[50]

Clive was recalled to Madras to take charge of a considerable
detachment destined to reinforce the garrison of Trichinopoly; but
before he marched, Major Lawrence returned from England, and assumed
the command. The young[51] and successful soldier placed himself
under the veteran, whom he never ceased to regard with attachment
and respect. Of the sentiments which Lawrence entertained towards
him, we have the strongest proof in his narrative. When expressing
his opinion of Clive's operations in the Carnatic, he observes, "The
French bringing almost their whole force into the field with Chunda
Sahib, and leaving Arcot but poorly defended, a scheme was laid to
reduce part of that country to the Nabob's obedience. Captain Clive
commanded the party. The expedition was attended with uncommon success,
which some people were pleased to term fortunate and lucky; but in my
opinion, from the knowledge I have of the gentleman, he deserved and
might expect, from his conduct, every thing as it fell out. A man of an
undaunted resolution, of a cool temper, and of a presence of mind which
never left him in the greatest danger,--born a soldier, for, without
a military education of any sort or much conversing with any of the
profession, from his judgment and good sense he led an army like an
experienced officer and a brave soldier, with a prudence that certainly
warranted success. This young man's early genius surprised and engaged
my attention, as well before as at the siege of Devecottah, where he
behaved in courage and judgment much beyond what could be expected from
his years; and his success afterwards confirmed what I said to many
people concerning him."[52]

The object of this memoir neither admits nor requires a detail of the
military operations or political transactions of which Trichinopoly and
its vicinity now became the theatre. The chief contest was between the
British and French; whose forces, though professedly only subsidiary
to the native princes, were in fact principals, and fought for their
existence in this part of India. It has been already stated, that
Captain Gingen almost entirely confined himself within the walls of the
fort, while the Nabob and his allies were under the protection of its
guns. M. Law, with a superior body of Europeans, and Chunda Sahib were
not only in possession of the strong pagoda of Seringham, and of the
whole island betwixt the Caveri and Coleroon, but had advanced their
batteries and posts to the south of the Caveri, to which they were now
sufficiently bold to remove their encampments.

The arrival, however, of Major Lawrence with his reinforcement, his
established fame, and the rising reputation of Clive, infused new life
into the English and their allies. A spirited and successful affair,
which was the consequence of an attempt made by the French to intercept
the entrance of this party into the fort, gave earnest of that change
in operations which was now to be expected, and M. Law, against the
remonstrances of Chunda Sahib, and contrary to the instructions of
Dupleix, on seeing Lawrence making preparations for a general attack
of his position to the south of the Caveri, withdrew his troops to the
island of Seringham, placing himself from that moment on the defensive.
Every advantage of the retrograde motion of the French was taken by
Major Lawrence.

This officer, equally distinguished for his judgment and spirit,
had none of that petty jealousy which often leads men in superior
stations to deny themselves and their country the full benefit of
the extraordinary talents which may happen to belong to those under
their command. Major Lawrence, perfectly appreciating the character
of Clive, consulted him on all occasions. By his advice he divided
his small force, at a hazard which a knowledge of the mind, or rather
minds, of those opposed to him, could alone have justified. While half
of his troops remained at Trichinopoly, the other half was placed in
a position between Seringham and Pondicherry, in order to interrupt
that intercourse on which the French depended for their support. The
successful result of these operations was the capture and death of
Chunda Sahib[53], and the surrender of the French troops. Whatever may
have been the claim of Chunda Sahib to the station he assumed, and in
which he was supported by his European allies, his personal character
is entitled to more respect than that of any of the native actors who
appeared on the scene during this short but eventful period. He was
active, brave, and generous; and whenever he had the sole direction
of affairs, evinced spirit and judgment. His fate was unhappy. When
M. Law, reduced to distress in the pagoda of Seringham, told him he
could no longer afford him protection, Chunda Sahib listened to a
deceitful offer of Monackjee, the general of the Tanjore forces, who,
instead of that kindness with which he had sworn to treat him, placed
him in confinement, and hastened to inform those with whom he was
co-operating (the English, the Nabob Mahommed Ali, the Mysorians, and
the Mahrattas,) of the noble prize he had decoyed into his toils; but
Monackjee, instead of that applause and profit he anticipated from his
treachery, soon found, that while all resolved he should not retain
his prisoner, each party was desirous of having him under their own
charge. On seeing that they were on the point of quarrelling with his
prince, and amongst each other, for the possession of Chunda Sahib's
person, he determined, with a cruelty equal to his perfidy, to put
that chief to death. The purpose was no sooner formed than executed;
and the head of Chunda Sahib was sent to his rival and enemy, Mahommed
Ali, who exhibited it to his army and followers, under circumstances
meant to throw obloquy upon the deceased, but which, however sanctioned
by usage, have, even in India, more commonly the effect of awakening
personal resentment, and bringing shame upon those who indulge in such
barbarous and unmanly triumphs over the remains of gallant though
unfortunate enemies.

The surrender of the French and the death of Chunda Sahib, instead of
terminating hostilities, and fixing Mahommed Ali in the sovereignty
of the Carnatic, gave rise to disputes between that prince and his
allies, which seemed to place peace at a greater distance than ever.
Reduced to extremity, Mahommed Ali purchased the aid of Nundirauze,
the regent of Mysore, by compliance with his exorbitant demands. The
most important was the cession of Trichinopoly, to which the nabob was
formally pledged by a written engagement, the performance of which was
now demanded, but compliance evaded on a pretext that the period was
not arrived when the nabob could give it up with safety, as many of the
strongholds in the Carnatic were still in the hands of the enemy. The
Mahratta leader, Morari-row, was called in as umpire. That gallant but
wily chief, professing to be with both parties, had no desire but to
possess[54] himself of the place in dispute. He strongly advised the
Mysorian to insist on the fulfilling of the treaty, and became publicly
the advocate for its performance, while, in private with Mahommed Ali,
he ridiculed the idea of any one entertaining the expectation, that
he ever should be so absurd as to give up (when he could keep it) a
fortress which was now conveniently described[55] as the property
of the Emperor of Delhi, and one which it would be treason in his
delegate to surrender. But I quit this scene of evasion, intrigue, and
perfidy, to describe the part which Clive took in the operations which
terminated this short campaign in a manner so honourable to the British
arms. (A. D. 1752.)

Major Lawrence, who, as he himself has observed, early discerned the
extraordinary qualities of Clive, fostered them with a care which
reflects the highest honour on his character. He attended on all
occasions to the suggestions of the young soldier, and as cheerfully
granted, as the other in every case deserved, the post of danger. In
the actions which took place before they entered Trichinopoly, Clive
was eminently distinguished by having occupied and maintained, under a
most severe fire, a small building in front of the French battalion,
which, by his advance and that of Captain Dalton with the grenadiers
and some artillery, was compelled to retreat with the confederate
force, from the position he had so judiciously seized.

But it was in the execution of the plan already noticed, of
interrupting the intercourse between Seringham and Pondicherry, that
Clive found the opportunity of exhibiting those powers of combination,
self-possession, and intrepidity that were so conspicuous in his
character. He suggested, as has been before stated, this bold operation
to Major Lawrence, with whom he lived on terms of the strictest
intimacy; and the latter, in adopting a plan which a contemporary
historian describes "as risking the whole to gain the whole," trusted
entirely for its success to the enterprise and judgment of his young
friend: but Clive was the junior captain of his force, and it was not
easy to appoint him to such an important command over the heads of
so many officers, some of whom had acquired a just reputation. The
difficulty Major Lawrence apprehended on this head was, however, soon
put an end to by the open declaration of the allies, that they would
not detach the portions of their troops necessary to form this corps
under any other but him who had defended Arcot.

The force with which Clive marched[56] from Trichinopoly consisted of
four hundred Europeans, seven hundred sepoys, three thousand Mahratta,
and one thousand Tanjore horse, with eight pieces of artillery, two of
which were battering guns. He passed the Coleroon before daylight, and
occupied a pagoda called Samiaveram, seven miles north of that river,
and on the high road betwixt Seringham and Utatore, a post of the
French on their line of communication with Pondicherry. His first care
was to strengthen this position, and to plant cannon so as to command
the road both to the north and south.

Dupleix, on learning the situation of affairs at Trichinopoly, had
detached a party of seven hundred men under Monsieur D'Autueil, who
had orders to proceed to Seringham and take the command from M. Law,
with whose conduct the French governor was much dissatisfied. The
utmost importance was attached to intercepting this body of men;
and Clive, on learning their arrival at Utatore, and that it was
D'Autueil's intention to attempt the junction by a circuitous route,
marched to oppose him, leaving a small part of his force to guard his
post at Semiaveram; but on finding that D'Autueil, alarmed at his
approach, had hastened back to Utatore, he lost no time in returning.
M. Law, who heard of his leaving his post, but not of his return,
detached[57], as soon as it was dark, a corps of eighty Europeans,
and seven hundred sepoys, to attack the few troops he imagined to be
remaining at Samiaveram. Of these men forty were English deserters. The
extraordinary events which followed cannot be better related than in
the words of the historian[58] to whom we have so often referred.

"The party arrived near the camp at midnight, when one of their spies
informed the commanding officer, that the troops which had marched
against M. D'Autueil had returned; but he, imputing the information
either to cowardice or treachery, gave no credit to the spy, and
proceeded; they were challenged by the advanced guard of English
sepoys, on which the officer of the deserters, an Irishman, stept out
and told them, that he was sent by Major Lawrence to reinforce Captain
Clive: and the rest of the deserters, speaking English likewise,
confirmed the assertion, and persuaded the sepoys so fully, that they
omitted the usual precaution of asking the counter-word, which would
certainly have discovered the stratagem, and sent one of their body
to conduct the enemy to the head-quarters. They continued their march
through a part of the Mahratta camp, without giving or receiving any
disturbance, until they came to the lesser pagoda. Here they were
challenged by the sentinels, and by others posted in a neighbouring
choultry to the north of it, in which Captain Clive lay asleep. They
returned the challenge by a volley into each place, and immediately
entered the pagoda, putting all they met to the sword. Captain Clive,
starting out of his sleep, and not conceiving it possible that the
enemy could have advanced into the centre of his camp, imputed the
firing to his own sepoys alarmed by some attack at the outskirts;
he, however, ran to the upper pagoda, where the greatest part of his
Europeans were quartered, who, having likewise taken the alarm, were
under arms; and he immediately returned with two hundred of them to
the choultry. Here he now discovered a large body of sepoys drawn up,
facing the south, and firing at random. Their position, which looked
to the enemy's encampment, joined to their confusion, confirmed him
in his conjecture, that they were his own troops who had taken some
unnecessary alarm. In this supposition, he drew up his Europeans
within twenty yards of their rear, and then, going alone amongst them,
ordered them to cease, upbraiding some with the panic he supposed
them to have taken, and even striking others: at length, one of the
sepoys, who understood a little of the French language, discovering
that he was an Englishman, attacked and wounded him in two places
with his sword; but, finding himself overpowered, ran away to the
lower pagoda. Captain Clive, exasperated at this insolence from a man
whom he imagined to be in his own service, followed him to the gate,
where, to his great surprise, he was accosted by six Frenchmen. His
usual presence of mind did not fail him on this critical occasion,
but, suggesting to him all that had happened, he told the Frenchmen
with great composure, that he was come to offer them terms, and if
they would look out they would perceive the pagoda surrounded with his
whole army, who were determined to give no quarter if any resistance
were made. The firmness with which these words were delivered made
such an impression, that three of the Frenchmen ran into the pagoda
to carry this intelligence, whilst the other three surrendered their
arms to Captain Clive, and followed him towards the choultry, whither
he hastened, intending to order the Europeans to attack the body of
sepoys, whom he now first knew to be his enemies; but these had already
discovered the danger of their situation, and had marched out of the
reach of the Europeans, who, imagining that they did this in obedience
to Captain Clive's orders, made no motion to interrupt or attack them.
Soon after, eight Frenchmen, who had been sent from the pagoda to
reconnoitre, fell in with the English troops and were made prisoners;
and these, with the other three whom Captain Clive had taken, were
delivered to the charge of a serjeant's party, who, not knowing, in
the time of darkness and confusion, that the enemy were in possession
of the lower pagoda, carried them thither, and, on delivering them to
the guard, found out their error; but such was also the confusion of
the French in the pagoda, that they suffered the serjeant and his party
to return unmolested. The rest of the English troops had now joined
the others, and Captain Clive, imagining that the enemy would never
have attempted so desperate an enterprise without supporting it with
their whole army, deemed it absolutely necessary to storm the pagoda,
before the troops who were in it could receive any assistance. One
of the two folding-doors of the gateway had for some time been taken
down to be repaired, and the other was strongly stapled down, so that
the remaining part of the entrance would admit only two men abreast.
The English soldiers made the attack, and continued it for some time
with great resolution; but the deserters within fought desperately,
and killed an officer and fifteen men, on which the attack was ordered
to cease till daybreak; and, in the mean time, such a disposition was
made as might prevent those in the pagoda from escaping, and at the
same time oppose any other body which might come to their relief. At
daybreak the commanding officer of the French, seeing the danger of
his situation, made a sally at the head of his men, who received so
heavy a fire, that he himself, with twelve others who first came out of
the gateway, were killed by the volley; on which the rest ran back to
the pagoda. Captain Clive then advanced into the porch of the gate,
to parley with the enemy; and, being weak with the loss of blood and
fatigue, stood with his back to the wall of the porch, and leaned,
stooping forward, on the shoulders of two serjeants. The officer of the
English deserters presented himself with great insolence, and, telling
Captain Clive, with abusive language, that he would shoot him, fired
his musket. The ball missed him, but went through the bodies of both
the serjeants on whom he was leaning, and they both fell mortally[59]
wounded. The Frenchmen had hitherto defended the pagoda, in compliance
with the English deserters; but, thinking it necessary to disavow such
an outrage, which might exclude them from any pretensions to quarter,
their officer immediately surrendered. By this time, the body of the
enemy's sepoys had passed out of the camp, with as little interruption
as they had entered it: but orders having been sent to the Mahrattas
to pursue them, Innis-Khan, with all his men, mounted at daybreak, and
came up with them in the open plain, before they gained the bank of the
Coleroon. The sepoys no sooner perceived them, than they flung away
their arms, and attempted to save themselves by dispersing; but the
Mahrattas, who never figure so much as in these cruel exploits, exerted
themselves with such activity, that, according to their own report, not
a single man of seven hundred escaped alive: it is certain that none
ever appeared to contradict this assertion. Besides the escapes already
mentioned, Captain Clive had another which was not discovered until the
hurry of the day was over, when it was found that the volley, which
the enemy fired into the choultry where he was sleeping, had shattered
a box that lay under his feet, and killed a servant who lay close to
him."

The mistakes of the night at Samiaveram were of a character more likely
to be created by the imagination of a dramatic poet, to give incident
and spirit to the sudden change of scene and action, than to take place
in real military operations; but no occurrence of his life called forth
in a more remarkable degree that quickness of perception and that calm
self-possession for which Clive was distinguished.

Major Lawrence, not wishing to hazard again the important post of
Samiaveram, sent a party of four hundred sepoys, five hundred Mahratta
horse, and four field-pieces, under Captain Dalton, to watch the
movements of Monsieur d'Autueil, who still remained at Utatore. The
French outposts were driven back in the dusk of the evening; and the
English, having been divided into two bodies, moved on the flanks of
the line with the hopes of deceiving them into a belief that it was the
whole of Clive's force which had come to assail them. The stratagem
succeeded. D'Autueil not only drew his troops within the walls of the
village, but evacuated it next morning, and retreated to Volcondah,
leaving to Captain Dalton's corps the ammunition and supplies he had
brought for the troops at Seringham. M. Law, who observed from the top
of the pagoda at Seringham the movement of Captain Dalton's detachment,
mistook it for that of Clive, and marched upon Samiaveram; but when he
found the whole body of the English stationed there drawn up to receive
him, he fell back on his position.

The detachment from Trichinopoly had received orders to return, but
a sudden swelling of the Coleroon rendered that impracticable. Clive
determined to take advantage of the state of the river to attack the
French post of Pitchandah, on its northern bank, which M. Law could not
now succour. Captain Dalton, being informed of his resolution, and not
wishing to interfere with his command, immediately placed his corps
under Clive's orders, and requested to be employed as a volunteer![60]
A higher testimony to acknowledged superiority of character cannot be
adduced than this temporary resignation of the claims of senior rank
by a gallant and able officer, and that at the very moment when he was
flushed with the success of the service on which he had been detached.

The camp of Chunda Sahib, near Seringham, was on the south bank of
the Coleroon, opposite to Pitchandah. Clive, in order to annoy the
enemy and to cover his operations against that place, converted into
a six-gun battery a high mound on the north bank of the river, which
had been raised to prevent its encroachment on the low land.[61] This
mound completely commanded the enemy's camp[62], and was at the same
time protected from the guns at Pitchandah. The disorder created by the
opening of this battery was great; men, women, children, elephants,
camels, horses, and bullocks were instantly seen in disordered flight
from this unexpected danger, hastening to the banks of the river, which
they were, however, forced to quit by the guns of Trichinopoly, and at
last found shelter by forming an encampment out of reach of the English
cannon, and at some distance from the pagoda of Seringham.

This operation upon the most defenceless part of the enemy's force
probably produced more effect upon the minds of the allies of the
French, than any of the more substantial successes of the war. The
native armies of India are kept together by very loose ties: the
strongest of these are the expectations which princes can hold out, to
the chiefs that serve them, of future pay and reward--as these diminish
or increase, their attachment ebbs or flows; but they seldom despair
of a cause, till reverses so materially affect the safety of their
numerous armed and unarmed followers, that they can no longer keep them
together. The feelings of the latter have an extraordinary influence
upon success; for as the chief receives little, if any, pay from the
prince, he must support himself by loans from bankers and merchants
residing in his camp, while his soldiers owe the food by which they
are supported to the credit given them by the dealers in the bazaar.
This reciprocal expectation and confidence is seldom shaken by any
danger that is not close at hand. The bulk of the soldiers and camp
followers are amused or deceived by false or exaggerated reports; but
the incontrovertible proof which an attack like that of Clive gave,
of their prince and his allies not being able to protect them, spread
alarm through all ranks; and that alarm was soon rendered irremediable
by the fall of Pitchandah.

The death of Chunda Sahib, the surrender of the French troops, and the
dissensions to which these events gave rise between Mahommed Ali and
his allies have already been recorded. Dupleix, who never desponded,
seeing in these dissensions the means of retrieving the interests
of his nation, fomented them by every means in his power; and his
intrigues to gain the Mysorians and the Mahrattas were powerfully
aided by his lady, who, born in India, and understanding not only the
languages but the character of the natives, is stated to have been
on this occasion, as on various others, of the greatest use to her
ambitious husband.

The Regent of Mysore was promised Trichinopoly, and the Mahrattas
plunder and money. Both had secretly entered into engagements,
which they were encouraged to avow by the complete failure of an
expedition[63] which the governor and committee of Fort St. David sent
to attack Gingee, contrary to the expressed opinion of Major Lawrence.
Fortunately, however, the presumption of Dupleix gave that able
officer an opportunity of correcting the bad impression which had been
thus made, by completely defeating a French force[64] (1752), under
Monsieur Kirjean, a nephew of the governor, who had been compelled
against his better judgment, by the orders of his too ardent uncle,
to hazard this engagement. The Mahrattas, on the occurrence of this
success, declared their continued adherence to the cause of Mahommed
Ali, and were employed with Major Lawrence in reducing the country
near Pondicherry. To aid this operation, a detachment was required to
attack the forts of Chingliput and Covelong; but there were no troops
to form it, except two hundred European recruits just landed at Madras,
who are represented as being the very refuse of the jails of London,
and five hundred newly raised sepoys. These men had neither character
nor discipline, and seemed so little calculated to take forts, that no
officer could be expected to risk his reputation at their head:--but
Clive, though in a state of very impaired health,--the consequence of
his former fatigues,--volunteered to accept this unpromising command,
and marched with his small and ill-composed detachment, and four
twenty-four pounders, to attack Covelong[65], a square fort, which,
though it had no ditch, mounted thirty pieces of cannon, and was
defended by fifty Europeans and three hundred sepoys.

A party having been sent in advance under Lieutenant Cooper, to
take up a position in a garden six hundred yards from the fort, were
attacked by the enemy: they stood for a short time, but, on Lieutenant
Cooper being shot, were so dismayed that they fled with precipitation,
and were with difficulty prevented by Clive from continuing their
flight to Madras. The garden was retaken, a battery constructed, and
a post formed on its left, near a large rock. The fire of the enemy,
however, so disconcerted Clive's party, that they seemed prepared to
fly at every alarm[66]: a shot which struck the rock, and with its
splinters killed and wounded fourteen, so frightened the whole, that
it was some time before they would again venture to expose themselves;
and one of the advanced sentries was found, several hours afterwards,
concealed in the bottom of a well!

Clive, wisely judging that shame would operate more powerfully than
severity in reclaiming his men from such cowardice, exposed himself to
the hottest of the enemy's fire, and his example brought them in a very
few days to tolerable firmness; while their confidence in themselves
and their leader was increased by the surrender of the fort, and still
more by subsequent events.

The morning after Covelong was taken, Ensign Joseph Smith (a name
destined to fill a large space in the future wars of Coromandel)
discovered a large body of men advancing, which he justly considered to
be a detachment from Chingliput to relieve Covelong. He communicated
what he had seen to Clive, who, taking every precaution to prevent this
corps from learning that the fort had fallen, laid an ambuscade on
their route, and the concealed troops (so close and so well directed
was their fire) killed one hundred men at the first volley:--many threw
down their arms and fled, while the commanding officer of the corps,
twenty-five Europeans, and two hundred and fifty sepoys, with two
pieces of cannon, were taken.

The news of this disaster soon reached Chingliput[67] (1752). Clive
was there almost as soon, and, knowing well the influence of the
impression his success had made, he immediately advanced his battery
from a distance of five hundred yards, where it was first constructed,
to within two hundred of the outer wall, which he soon breached as well
as the inner: but there was still the ditch to be filled; for this
fort, strong in some parts by the impracticability[68] of approach,
had been fortified with great care in others; and Clive, now confident
in his men, determined on an assault. The French commandant, observing
his preparations, offered to capitulate on the garrison being permitted
to retire with the honours of war; terms which Clive very readily
granted, as the place, if obstinately defended, still possessed means
of formidable resistance.

It would be difficult to find an example, in any regular army, of one
so young and of such a subordinate rank as Clive, having crowded into
the short space of two years such a series of successful enterprises.
He was not more than twenty-seven years of age, and had only within
the last year been promoted to the rank of Captain. After being
distinguished on several occasions by the most resolute valour, he
had displayed at Arcot, and during the operations which followed that
memorable siege, all the superior qualities of a military leader. In
the wisdom with which he planned, and the ability and gallantry with
which he executed, those operations which so materially contributed
to the defeat and capture of the French at Seringham, he evinced a
calmness of courage, a clearness of judgment, and a decision of spirit,
which gave confidence to his own force, and struck terror into that of
the enemy: and in his last expedition against Covelong and Chingliput
he showed, that where real military talent exists in the leader, there
is no description of troops with which he may not command success:
he can frame the machine at the moment to his purpose, while the
ordinary man of routine can only employ it when prepared to his hands.
Some writers, seemingly desirous of detracting from the character
which Clive thus early established, would insinuate that no marked
superiority of talent was exhibited in these events, and have grounded
their opinion on the comparative smallness of the numbers of regular
troops, and the composition of the other parts of the forces engaged in
these contests; but, with those who are qualified, by experience, to
decide on this subject, and who can appreciate the difficulties these
very circumstances created, Clive's reputation will rise in proportion
to the smallness and unconnected nature of those means with which, at
this early stage of his life, he accomplished objects so important to
his country. It is not in the use of ordinary means that genius appears
to most advantage: it has its amplest range, and its noblest triumph,
where it labours amidst new and untried objects, and converts them to
purposes for which they had always before been judged incompetent. And
no commander of modern times saw more clearly, seized more powerfully,
or used more successfully, than Clive, the various and often discordant
materials placed within his reach. Even at this early period of his
career, he diffused his own spirit around him. The troops under his
direction, however dispirited before, believed that they were destined
to victory and glory: and that victory and glory did invariably attend
them, was owing to his genius alone.

FOOTNOTES:

[37] Orme vol. i. p. 171.

[38] _Biog. Brit._ art. CLIVE, p. 649.

[39] Orme, vol. i. p. 173.

[40] Captain Gingen had on this occasion recourse to a council of war,
whose hesitation spread alarm among the troops. Orme, vol. i. p. 180.

[41] The island of Seringham lies between the Coleroon and Caveri. It
is famous for the pagoda from which it derives its name.

[42] Orme.

[43] Orme, vol. i. p. 183-196.

[44] This water is called Canjee, and contains a sufficient infusion of
the grain to be nutritive, resembling thin gruel.

[45] Orme, vol. i. p. 196.

[46] Id. ibid., p. 199.

[47] Besides the unwarrantable threat of exposing their prisoners, Orme
(vol. i. p. 199.) states, that, though they gave quarter to the two
officers, Revel and Glass, they had murdered in their litters five or
six disabled soldiers, whom they took when on their route from Arcot to
Fort St. David.

[48] Orme, vol. i. p. 206.

[49] He commenced his march, February 22. 1752.

[50] Clive, on his return to Fort St. David, marched by the new
buildings of a town on the site where Nasir Jung was slain, to which
the name of Dupleix-Fatiha Bad (or "the town of victory") had been
given. A pompous pillar was in preparation to commemorate, in every
eastern language, an event which the French deemed a great victory.
Clive and his troops, viewing this transaction in a very different
light, razed to the ground these monuments of pride.

[51] Clive was, at this period, only twenty-six years of age.

[52] Colonel Lawrence's Narrative, p. 14.

[53] When the affairs of Chunda Sahib became desperate, and he could
no longer support his followers, the leaders of the parties of whom
his army was composed, solicited permission to leave him, and this
request was readily granted by that ill-fated prince, who told them
they had only anticipated his wish, as he was no longer able to support
them, but at the same time solemnly promised to liquidate their large
arrears, should fortune ever again smile upon him.

[54] Orme, vol. i. p. 245.

[55] Id., ibid.

[56] April 6th, 1752.

[57] April 14th, 1752.

[58] Orme, vol. i. p. 223.

[59] On this incident, Mr. Beaufoy has the following note:--"As it
may, perhaps, be difficult to conceive how one shot should destroy his
two supporters and leave him unhurt, Mr. Archdeacon Clive mentioned
this difficulty to Lord Clive, who answered, that the two men on whose
shoulders he leaned were shorter than himself, and were both of them in
the line of the shot, his own body being so much behind as to be out of
the line." _Biog. Brit._ art. CLIVE, p. 650. note.

[60] Captain Dalton was wounded in the subsequent operations against
Pitchandah.

[61] April 15th, 1752.

[62] The composition of the camp he cannonaded is well described by
Orme. "Every common soldier," he observes, "in an Indian army is
accompanied either by a wife or a concubine; the officers have several,
and the generals whole seraglios. Besides these, the army is incumbered
by a number of attendants and servants, exceeding that of the fighting
men; and to supply the various wants of this enervated multitude,
dealers, pedlars, and retailers of all sorts follow the camp; to whom
a separate quarter is allowed, in which they daily exhibit their
different commodities in greater quantities, and with more regularity,
than in any fair in Europe, all of them sitting on the ground in a
line, with their merchandise exposed before them, and sheltered from
the sun by a mat supported by sticks."--Orme, vol i. p. 228.

[63] This expedition was commanded by Major Kinneir.

[64] Orme, vol. i. p. 256.

[65] This fort is situated twenty miles south of Madras.

[66] Orme, vol. i. p. 263.

[67] This fort is forty miles south-west of Covelong.

[68] It is completely defended on one face by a lake, and on another by
a swamp covered with rice fields.




CHAP. III.


Clive's health was completely broken by the fatigues he had undergone;
and, as there appeared no prospect of immediate service, he determined
to visit England, where the fame of his military achievements had
preceded him. His father, Mr. Richard Clive, in a letter dated December
15. 1752, observes, "I was at Sir Philip Chetwood's, our neighbour in
the country, when I received your welcome letter, which gave me joy
not to be expressed. Since then, now I am come to London, the pleasure
is repeated by the applause every one gives to your gallant actions
and behaviour, and the success that hath attended you; and you are
compared to no less than some of those brave generals who are gone, but
left their names upon record to their glory and honour. The directors
of the Company you have so faithfully served, I hear, at a public
entertainment drank your health by the name of General Clive, and are
pleased to say they are under great obligations to you. I waited on
the three principal directors last week, in order to find out, if I
could, what they proposed for you, but perceive they are desirous to
have the account the next ships bring, before they give me any positive
answer, other than a general one, that they are very desirous to do
you any service in their power. Your friends, among which is one of
the principal directors, and my intimate acquaintance, advise that you
should not leave Madras before you know how the directors propose to
reward you: but this will be for your own determination, who can best
judge, in the situation we are in, what is most proper to be done. You
may be sure your mother and myself shall think the time long till we
see you."

From his mother, Clive received at the same time one of those letters
which are so precious to him who unites a disposition to cherish family
ties with a devotion to his country. It would be injustice to this
high-minded lady to omit a word of the sentiments she expressed on this
occasion, and which showed her to be every way worthy of her son. I
therefore transcribe the whole letter:--

  "Dear Son,

  "I cannot express the joy yours to your father gave to me. Your
  brave conduct, and success which Providence has blessed you
  with, is the talk and wonder of the public, the great joy and
  satisfaction of your friends; but more particularly so to me, as
  it gives me hopes of seeing you much sooner than I could possibly
  have expected. I find some of your friends wish your longer stay
  in India; but I earnestly entreat you will let no motive induce
  you, except your honour and the peace of the country require it.
  Your relations are all well: four of your sisters are with me; the
  youngest and your two brothers are at school: your cousin Ben has
  no employ; he is only on half-pay as a lieutenant, lives with his
  father, and, I believe, wishes himself with you. We are removed
  to a large house in Swithin's Lane, near the post house, and hope
  to see you in it. May a kind Providence attend and bless you, and
  bring you safe to your native country, is the most sincere wish and
  prayer of

  "Your ever affectionate mother,
  (Signed) "REB. CLIVE."
  "London, 16th Dec., 1752."

The state of Clive's health having compelled him to return to England,
he embarked at Madras in February, 1753, immediately after his marriage
to Miss Margaret Maskelyne; a marriage to which he owed much of the
comfort and happiness of his future life. This lady, the daughter of
Edmund Maskelyne, Esq., of Purton in Wiltshire, and sister of his
friend Edmund Maskelyne, and of the celebrated Dr. Nevil Maskelyne,
afterwards Astronomer Royal, was possessed of both beauty and
accomplishments. His attachment to her appears from many letters to
have been very great. She continued throughout his life to enjoy his
affection and regard, and survived him many years.

In the course of the same year he landed in England, after an absence
of about ten years. His reception was most flattering. He was warmly
welcomed by his parents and many near relations: the Court of Directors
voted him a sword set with diamonds of the value of five hundred
pounds, "as a token of their esteem, and of their sense of his singular
services to the Company on the coast of Coromandel[69];" and in society
he was honoured with those elevating marks of regard, which always
attend a fortunate soldier. Though but a short time in his native
country, he appears to have imbibed, or rather renewed, an attachment
to it, and to have formed friendships and connections, which left him
without any tie in India, but the fulfilment of the public duties he
had to perform in that country, and the acquirement of sufficient
fortune to maintain himself and family.

He had not enjoyed himself two years in England, when the state of
affairs in India made the Court of Directors anxious for his presence
in that country. He was appointed Governor of Fort St. David, with a
provisional commission to succeed to the government of Madras; and
the appointment was accompanied with the expression of their anxious
desire that he should return as soon as possible to a country in which
they deemed his services of the greatest importance. To obviate the
quarrels about rank between the King's and Company's officers, which
had often been attended with much obstruction to the service, the
Directors applied to His Majesty's government, and obtained for him the
commission of Lieutenant-Colonel in the British army; a very honourable
distinction, as he was then but a young man, and only a Captain in
their service.

He left England in 1755; but, instead of sailing direct to his new
government, he proceeded to Bombay, where he landed on the 27th of
November, with three companies of Royal Artillery and three hundred
infantry, destined to form, in conjunction with the Mahrattas, part
of a force for the attack of the French and their allies in the
Deckan. When the project was first formed, it had been intended that
he should command this force; and he was at the time the only man in
the service from whose knowledge and experience success in such a
scheme could reasonably have been anticipated. But we have on this
occasion an early instance of the character of that interference of the
King's government, which, when dictated by narrow considerations of
patronage, must defeat every measure it proposes to promote. Colonel
Scott, who had sailed for India the preceding year, in the quality of
Engineer-General, was, at the powerful recommendation of the Duke of
Cumberland, nominated to the command of this expedition. Nevertheless,
the Directors wished Clive to proceed to Bombay, in the hope that some
event might occur to defeat an appointment in which they had found
themselves compelled to concur. It so happened, that Colonel Scott died
before the troops arrived: but a provisional treaty had been entered
into[70] between Mr. Saunders, the Governor of Madras, and Mr. Godeheu,
the Governor of Pondicherry, by which, among other articles, it had
been agreed, that neither the French nor English companies should take
part in any differences arising between the princes of the country. In
consequence of this convention, the government of Bombay refused to
adopt any proceeding that could disturb the general peace of India; so
that Clive lost the opportunity of opposing the celebrated Bussy on the
plains of the Deckan.

Admiral Watson was lying at Bombay when Clive arrived; and the
opportunity was thought excellent for employing the means which
accident had left disposable, to punish the pirate Angria by the attack
of Gheriah[71], one of his strongholds, which lies a little more than
two degrees south of Bombay, and which derived its strength from the
reputed courage of its defenders, and from its site upon a rocky
promontory almost surrounded by the sea.

The expedition against Gheriah was undertaken in concert with the
Mahrattas; but suspicions being entertained that the latter were in
communication with Angria, operations were precipitated so as to
preclude them from all share in the enterprise. The Admiral having
attacked and burnt the fleet of the pirate, Clive interposed his
force on the land side between the fort and the Mahratta general,
who had hastened to co-operate. The place soon fell[72], and the
booty (about ten lacs of rupees) was divided by the British forces,
without admitting their allies to any participation. This had been
settled before the expedition left Bombay, as well as the respective
shares of prize-money to the officers and men. It is remarkable what
attention was given at this time in India, even before operations were
commenced, to adjust the relative claims to eventual booty. Councils
of war were held, at which very junior officers aided, and arguments
were entered into by the respective parties. The causes of this were
various. Besides that spirit of plunder, and that passion for the
rapid accumulation of wealth, which actuated all ranks, the undefined
relations of the King's and Company's officers made such previous
arrangements indispensable, to prevent those disputes, which, but for
such precautions, must subsequently have occurred.

It is pleasing on this occasion to record the conduct of both the
naval and military commanders. The naval officers, who formed the
majority, had decreed that Lieutenant-Colonel Clive, though he
commanded the land force, should only share in his army rank with
a post-captain in the navy. The officers of the troops claimed for
their commander an equal share with Rear-Admiral Pocock, the second in
command in the navy. This pretension was stated by Clive to Admiral
Watson. The latter, as jealous a defender of what he deemed the rights
of the service to which he belonged, as he was careless of his own
personal interest, rejected the claim, but told Clive he would make
up from his own share the difference between the colonel's and that
of Admiral Pocock. Nor was this mere profession. When the prize-money
was paid, he sent the difference he had promised, but it was declined.
Clive said his sole object had been to satisfy the troops that he had
supported the rights of their commander: they had been pleased with the
admiral's conduct, and he would "never enrich himself with money taken
from Mr. Watson's personal share of the capture."[73]

As nothing further remained to be done on the western coast, Clive
proceeded to Fort St. David[74], of which he took charge on the 20th
June, 1756, the very day, by a remarkable coincidence, on which
the Nabob of Bengal took Calcutta. Intelligence of that event was
not received at Madras till the 16th of August; and on the 18th a
despatch was sent to require the presence of Colonel Clive, it being
in contemplation, in consequence of the state of General Lawrence's
health, that he should proceed in command of the expedition destined to
recover Calcutta, and re-establish the Company's affairs in Bengal.

Accordingly, having been relieved at Fort St. David by Mr. A. Wynch,
Colonel Clive proceeded to Madras, which he reached on the 24th of
August, and assumed the command of the land forces of the expedition,
the strength of which was seriously diminished by the unseasonable
pretensions of Colonel Adlercron, who commanded one of His Majesty's
regiments at Madras, but who was not employed on this occasion, from
being deemed inexperienced in Indian warfare, and from having refused
to engage to return to Madras when requested, or to surrender, for the
reimbursement of the Company's losses, any part of the booty which the
force under him might take. Adlercron, irritated at the appointment of
Clive, stated, in reply to the requisition of the government for men,
that they should have whatever number of His Majesty's troops they
chose sent aboard the fleet: but added[75], "As I cannot answer to
the King my master, nor to my own character, to remain cooped up in a
garrison in a state of inaction, while any part of the forces under my
command are upon actual service, I think it my duty to go along with
them; and should I be of a contrary opinion, my Lieutenant-Colonel
would have just cause of complaint against me, were I not to make
him the first offer. The detachment of His Majesty's artillery is
particularly allotted to attend my regiment, and I cannot consent
to their being employed any where but with a part thereof; unless,
therefore, we are to have the honour of assisting in this expedition, I
do hereby, in the name of the King my master, demand that His Majesty's
artillery, with all the stores thereto belonging, be immediately
disembarked. I am sorry, gentlemen, to be obliged to observe, that I
think it very extraordinary, that, after writing to me two letters,
requesting me to undertake this service with the whole of His Majesty's
troops, and pressing me to give the necessary orders accordingly, you
should now be for putting me off upon such slight pretences."

The resolutions taken in council on the receipt of this letter were as
follow:--

"Colonel Adlercron's avowal, in his letter of the 20th instant, that
he could not engage to return hither upon our request, and that the
Company should not have any part of the plunder that may be taken,
towards the reimbursement of the immense loss they have sustained,
appear to us to be reasons of the greatest importance against his going
on the command; and we flatter ourselves that His Majesty will not be
of opinion with Colonel Adlercron, that they are slight pretences, or
that it will reflect dishonour on Colonel Adlercron to stay for the
defence of a colony of so much consequence as Madras, where, besides,
by much the largest force will remain, and above two thirds of his own
regiment.

"The committee are entirely of opinion, that it is necessary, for the
good of the Company, that the command should be vested in an officer
of the Company's, subject to our orders, and do therefore abide by
the resolution of the council, that Colonel Clive proceed in that
quality; but, as it will cause some delay to land His Majesty's train
of artillery, which is already embarked, it is agreed to write again
to Colonel Adlercron, to represent to him the bad consequences of
such delay: resolving, nevertheless, that it will be disembarked if
he continues to insist on it, but to protest against him for all the
damage which may be caused to the Company by such delay."

The reasonings of the governor and his council were not convincing
to the mind of Colonel Adlercron. He wrote a long letter in reply,
mentioning all his grievances and opinions, and positively refusing to
permit the train, or any part of His Majesty's forces, to proceed on
the expedition.

"The dangerous situation," he observes, "in which you represent things
to be here, rather confirms me in my resolution not to part with His
Majesty's train; but I have already given a full answer in the letter
I wrote this morning to the general council, to which I beg leave to
refer you, as you have offered nothing which can induce me to alter my
sentiments. Surely, gentlemen, you are not so unreasonable as to expect
that I will send away part of His Majesty's train or regiment (who are
so immediately under my direction), and leave to you the nomination of
the person who shall command them."

In consequence of this letter, not only the royal artillery, but
His Majesty's guns and stores were disembarked; and the expedition,
deprived of this strength, consisted of about two thousand four hundred
men. Reinforcements, however, were promised both from Madras and Bombay.

These proceedings are not recorded with any desire to reflect on the
memory of the actors in the scenes here described. A relation of such
facts, however, is indispensable, to convey an idea of the difficulties
which were to be overcome, and of the firmness and temper required in
the situation in which Clive was now placed: but he was animated to
exertion by the obstacles which presented themselves in the way of his
success; and the sanguine hopes he entertained of being the instrument
to avenge the cruel wrongs which his countrymen had sustained, and to
redeem the state he served from the disgrace and ruin brought upon it
by a barbarous enemy, are strongly expressed in the following letter
to the Court of Directors, written before he sailed from Madras:--

  "Honourable Gentlemen,

  "From many hands you will hear of the capture of Calcutta by the
  Moors, and the chain of misfortunes and losses which have happened
  to the Company in particular, and to the nation in general: every
  breast here seems filled with grief, horror, and resentment:
  indeed, it is too sad a tale to unfold, and I must beg leave to
  refer you to the general letters, consultations, and committees,
  which will give you a full account of this catastrophe.

  "Upon this melancholy occasion, the Governor and council thought
  proper to summon me to this place. As soon as an expedition was
  resolved upon, I offered my service, which was at last accepted,
  and I am now upon the point of embarking on board His Majesty's
  squadron, with a fine body of Europeans, full of spirit and
  resentment for the insults and barbarities inflicted on so many
  British subjects.

  "I flatter myself that this expedition will not end with the taking
  of Calcutta only; and that the Company's estate in those parts
  will be settled in a better and more lasting condition than ever.
  There is less reason to apprehend a check from the Nabob's forces,
  than from the nature of the climate and country. The news of a
  war[76] may likewise interfere with the success of this expedition:
  however, should that happen, and hostilities be committed in India,
  I hope we shall be able to dispossess the French of Chandernagore,
  and leave Calcutta in a state of defence.

  "I have a true sense of my duty to my country and the Company; and
  I beg leave to assure you, that nothing shall be wanting, on my
  part, to answer the ends of an undertaking on which so very much
  depends. Success on this occasion will fill the measure of my joy,
  as it will fix me in the esteem of those to whom I have the honour
  to subscribe myself, with great respect,

  (Signed)  "R. CLIVE."
  "Fort St. George, 11th Oct., 1756."

In several private communications from Clive to his friends in England,
we find the same sentiments expressed, in language which denotes the
calm and determined spirit with which he went to the performance of his
duty on this important occasion. Writing to Mr. Mabbot, he observes,
"Providence, who is the disposer of all events, has thought proper
to inflict the greatest calamity that ever happened to the English
nation in these parts; I mean the loss of Calcutta, attended with the
greatest mortifications to the Company, and the most barbarous and
cruel circumstances to the poor inhabitants. This unhappy news has
called me to the presidency; and the gentlemen thereof have thought
proper to put me at the head of the expedition for the recovery of
Calcutta, the Company's losses, rights, and privileges. I have that
sense of duty to my country, and of my obligations to the Company (be
the event what it will), there is no hardship or risk, consistent with
common prudence, I will not undergo to obtain the wished-for success.
I am not so apprehensive of the Nabob of Bengal's forces, as of being
recalled by the news of a war, or checked in our progress by the woods
and swampiness of the country, which is represented as being almost
impassable for a train of artillery."

In a letter to Mr. Roger Drake, a gentleman then high in the Court
of Directors, Clive writes, "A few weeks ago I was happily seated at
St. David's, pleased with the thoughts of obtaining your confidence
and esteem, by my application to the civil branch of the Company's
affairs, and of improving and increasing the investment; but the fatal
blow given to the Company's estate at Bengal has superseded all other
considerations, and I am now at this presidency upon the point of
embarking on board His Majesty's squadron, with a very considerable
body of troops, to attempt the recovery of Calcutta, and to gain
satisfaction from the Nabob for the losses which the Company have
sustained in those parts. The re-capture of Calcutta appears no very
difficult task, but our further progress for reducing the Nabob to
such terms as the gentlemen of Calcutta may think satisfactory, is
precarious and doubtful, from the prospect of a war, which may not
allow time for such an undertaking. You may be assured I never will
turn my back upon Bengal, if not ordered from thence, without trying my
utmost efforts toward obtaining the desired success."

Before proceeding to the narration of the important events which took
place after Clive's arrival in Bengal, it will be useful to take a
short view of the situation of the affairs of the Company at this
period.

By the terms of the truce between the French and English, proclaimed
on the 11th of October, and followed by a provisional treaty of peace
between the two Companies, signed on the 26th and 31st of December,
1754, the English gained on the coast of Coromandel all for which
they had so long contended; for, by the agreement of both parties
to withdraw from any further interference with the native princes,
Mahommed Ali, whom they had supported through so many vicissitudes,
became the reigning[77] sovereign of the Carnatic.

The territorial acquisitions, and the influence established by the
valour and talent of Bussy, which were deemed so valuable by Dupleix,
the former Governor of Pondicherry, appear to have been only viewed by
his successor Godeheu as obstacles to that peace which it was the chief
object of his appointment to establish; and he discouraged all further
progress to power in the Deckan.

The peace, or rather truce, obtained by such sacrifices, did not last
a twelvemonth. Hostilities between the two nations were carried on as
before, under the pretext of supporting the native chiefs and princes
with whom the two companies were respectively allied, but with whose
quarrels they had agreed not to interfere. To add to the embarrassment
which this state of affairs produced, accounts were received at Madras,
on the 12th of November, 1756, that war had broken out between France
and England; and Clive had not sailed above a month, when a letter from
the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, after suggesting an attack
on the French settlement of Chandernagore, entreated his early return,
with as many of his troops as could be spared, to protect them from the
dangers likely to result from the expected arrival of a French armament
from Europe.

The history of the events which brought ruin on the settlement of
Calcutta is short and disgraceful. The kingdom of Bengal, which, with
Orissa, had been, for fifteen years, subject to the able and active
rule of Aliverdi Khan, was now[78] governed by his grand nephew
Suraj-u-Dowlah, a youth, who, to all the effeminacy and luxurious
habits of an eastern prince, added the greatest violence of temper,
and an unrestrained indulgence of his passions. The commercial
settlement of Calcutta, which had been protected by his predecessor,
became an early object of his attack. Whether he was tempted by its
known weakness and reputed wealth, or by a desire to expel the English
from Bengal, is a matter of little moment. The pretexts on which his
aggressions were grounded are too slight to merit consideration. He
first accused the English of an intention to fortify Calcutta. This
was disproved. Then they were charged with giving protection to one
of his subjects[79] who had fled with great treasure. The person of
this subject, he was informed, should be reserved for his pleasure;
and proof was offered, that the treasure he was said to have fled
with had no existence. But the young and rapacious tyrant was only
to be satisfied by the plunder of the English merchants, and all
that belonged to them. This was shown by his conduct at Cossimbazar.
Having prevailed upon the chief, Mr. Watts, to visit him, he made
him prisoner, and afterwards attacked and gained possession of that
fortified factory. But the great object of his ambition was the capture
of Calcutta. When he approached that city[80], a feeble effort was
made at defence; after which it was decided that it would be expedient
to retreat; but no orders were issued to render this measure regular
or effective to its object of saving the persons and property of
the European part of the population, by embarking them on board the
vessels lying near the town. The consequence was, that when embarkation
commenced, every one tried to secure his own personal safety by getting
on board how and when he could. The alarm created by this confusion
spread to the ships, and they began to drop down the river. This was no
sooner perceived, than every boat was filled; and among those who fled
to join the ships on this memorable occasion, were some who were bound
to remain by every call of public duty. Signals were made from the fort
to the ships to return, but they were not heeded; and, though two days
elapsed before the capture, not a boat came to save the few who, either
from a sense of duty, or from not possessing the means of escape, had
remained in the fort. It is difficult to believe that amongst so many
Englishmen, none were found disposed to adventure for the safety of
their countrymen. "Never, perhaps," says Orme, "was such an opportunity
of performing an heroic action so ignominiously neglected; for a single
sloop, with fifteen brave men on board, might, in spite of all the
efforts of the enemy, have come up, and, anchoring under the fort, have
carried away all who suffered in the dungeon."[81]

As the Governor[82] and commandant[83] of the troops were among the
fugitives, those who were left behind chose Mr. Holwell as their chief.
Soon finding that resistance was impossible, he desired to surrender;
but, before he could obtain an answer, the enemy stormed and made
themselves master of the fort. Suraj-u-Dowlah, when Mr. Holwell was
carried into his presence with his hands bound, directed them to be
untied, and spoke to him in a manner calculated to give him hopes of
protection: nothing, at least, indicated the fate that awaited this
gentleman and his unfortunate companions; and indeed, as the Nabob
had no reason for desiring their death, we cannot suppose that it
was by his command they were, on the night of the day they were made
prisoners, thrust into that prison emphatically called the Black Hole,
from which, of a hundred and forty-six persons, only twenty-three came
out alive.

"Some of our company," says Mr. Cooke[84], "expired very soon after
being put in: others grew mad, and having lost their senses, died in a
high delirium. All we could urge to the guard set over us, could not
prevail upon them either to set us at liberty, or separate us into
different prisons; which we desired, and offered money to obtain; but
to no purpose: and when we were released at eight o'clock the next
morning, only twenty-three came out alive."

The indignation excited against Suraj-u-Dowlah in the breast of every
Englishman, on account of the murder of these persons, was just; even
though he never intended[85] to perpetrate so cruel an action.

Wrapt in proud indifference as to what befel those unfortunate beings,
whom fortune had thrown into his power, the tyrant was not to be
approached with the tale of their unexampled sufferings, at the moment
when they might have been alleviated; and he never showed any sense
of remorse when the dreadful catastrophe was narrated to him, nor
evinced any resentment against those who had not only driven their
captives into the dark and narrow place of destruction, but had turned
a deaf ear to the earnest prayers and the dying groans of the unhappy
sufferers.

Two fitter instruments than Watson and Clive could not have been chosen
to avenge their country, and to re-establish the interests of the
Company in Bengal; and their efforts were warmly seconded by Mr. Pigot,
Governor of Madras, who gave them all the assistance he could, to
promote the success of a service of vital importance to the prosperity,
and indeed to the very existence, of the Company in India.

The expedition sailed from Madras the 16th of October, and consisted
of five of His Majesty's ships and five of the Company's, having on
board nine hundred European infantry, and fifteen hundred sepoys. Five
hundred more sepoys were expected from Bombay. (A. D. 1756.) All the
fleet, with the exception of two vessels, the "Cumberland"[86] and
"Marlborough[87]," on board of which were a considerable proportion of
the troops, had reached Fulta[88] by the 22d of December, where they
found the fugitives from Calcutta.

Major Kilpatrick, also an officer of high reputation, was at that
place. He had, it appears from his letter to Clive of the 5th of
August, arrived some weeks after the capture of Calcutta; but did not
think it advisable (as he states in the same letter), until supported
from Madras, to attempt the recovery of the settlement, having "only a
handful" of men, four pieces of artillery, and a very small quantity of
ammunition.

Clive appears, from letters to Major Kilpatrick, dated the 23d of
December, to have been so unwell as to have committed to that officer
the charge of preparations for immediate advance upon the small fort of
Budge-Budge[89], the road to which was through a low swampy country,
covered with jungle and underwood.

Though two hundred and fifty of his small European force, and four
hundred and thirty sepoys, with almost all the artillery, military
stores, &c., were on board the two missing ships, Clive nevertheless
determined to advance: but it appears from his private letter to Mr.
Pigot (dated the 8th of January, 1757), that the march of the small
body of troops by land was against his opinion. "You will find,"
he observes in this letter, "by the return, that our loss in the
skirmish near Budge-Budge was greater than could well be spared, if
such skirmishes were to be often repeated. You must know, our march
from Moidapoor to the northward of Budge-Budge was much against my
inclinations. I applied to the Admiral for boats to land us, at the
place we arrived at, after sixteen hours' march by land. The men
suffered hardships not to be described: it was four in the afternoon
when we decamped from Moidapoor, and we did not arrive off Budge-Budge
till past eight next morning: at nine, the grenadier company and all
the sepoys were despatched to the fort, where I heard Captain Coote[90]
was landed with the King's troops. At ten, Monichund, the Governor of
Calcutta, attacked us with between two and three thousand horse and
foot, and was worsted.[91] The people of the country raise fabulous
reports about the killed and wounded; but there is reason to believe,
from the smartness of the fire, and the nearness of the enemy, some of
whom were within twenty yards, one hundred and fifty might be killed
and wounded, and with them four of the principal jemmadars and an
elephant. Monichund himself received a shot in his turban. Our two
field pieces were of little or no service to us, having neither tubes
nor portfires, and wrong carriages sent with them from Fort St. David;
indeed we still labour under every disadvantage in the world, for want
of the Marlborough. It seems the enemy were encamped within two miles
of us, and we ignorant of the matter: so much for the intelligence of
the country.

"I cannot take upon me to give my sentiments about our future success
against the Nabob in the open field: the little affair above mentioned
was attended with every disadvantage on our side: a number of houses,
jungles, bushes, &c. served as a cover for the enemy--all our sepoys
and the choice of our Europeans absent--our cannon in a manner useless.
Indeed I fear we shall labour under many of these disadvantages when
attacked by the Nabob, and I take it for granted that he will be down
before the Cumberland and Marlborough can arrive. As yet, there appears
but little probability of getting draught bullocks, without which we
cannot move."

Calcutta, which offered no resistance, was taken possession of on the
2d of January, 1757, by Admiral Watson, who, on the 3d, delivered
it over to the Company's representatives. That jealous claim to
superiority on the part of His Majesty's commanders by sea and land,
which created difficulty in every conjunct operation, was evinced on
this occasion in a manner that excited an indignation in the mind of
Clive which he could not conceal.

"Between friends," he observes, in the letter to Mr. Pigot above
quoted, "I cannot help regretting that ever I undertook this
expedition. The mortifications I have received from Mr. Watson and the
gentlemen of the squadron, in point of prerogative, are such, that
nothing but the good of the service could induce me to submit to them.
The morning the enemy quitted Calcutta, a party of our sepoys entered
the fort at the same time with a detachment from the ships, and were
ignominiously thrust out: upon coming near the fort myself, I was
informed that there were orders that none of the Company's officers or
troops should have entrance. This, I own, enraged me to such a degree,
that I was resolved to enter if possible, which I did, though not in
the manner maliciously reported, by forcing the sentries; for they
suffered us to pass very patiently upon being informed who I was. At
my entrance, Captain Coote presented me with a commission from Admiral
Watson, appointing him Governor of Fort William, which I knew not a
syllable of before: and it seems this dirty underhand contrivance was
carried on in the most secret manner, under a pretence that I intended
the same thing, which, I declare, never entered my thoughts. This
affair was compromised, by the Admiral consenting that I should be
Governor, and that the Company's troops should remain in the fort.
The next day the Admiral delivered up the fort to the Company's
representatives in the King's name."

According to Mr. Ives[92], who must be supposed to have given a
faithful record of Admiral Watson's actions, as he was surgeon to
the flag ship, and honoured with his commander's confidence, Captain
King was sent, the moment Calcutta surrendered, to take possession
of that fort in His Majesty's name; and in a few minutes afterwards
it was garrisoned by a party of King's troops serving on board the
flag-ship, under the command of Captain Coote, to whom specific
instructions were given, not to deliver up his command till further
orders. Clive, who had invested the fort on the land face, immediately
entered it, and claimed the command on the ground of his commission
as Lieutenant-Colonel in His Majesty's service, and as senior officer
on shore. Captain Coote refused to recognise his authority, as he
considered himself acting under the specific orders of Admiral Watson.
Clive persisted; and, to prevent extremities, a message was sent to
Admiral Watson, who, after hearing Clive's pretensions, sent Captain
Speke to inform him, that if he did not evacuate the fort immediately,
he would fire upon him. Clive said he would not answer for the
consequences, but would not give up the command. Reflection, however,
seems to have altered this resolution, for I find a note from Captain
Speke, stating that he had communicated to the Admiral Clive's offer of
evacuating the fort, providing he had assurances of having afterwards
the command. This was acceded to; the fort remained, during the day on
which it was captured, under the Admiral, and was next day, as has been
before mentioned, made over to the Company.

Clive, in the letter before quoted to the Governor of Madras, notices
the feelings of dissatisfaction which his independent powers had
produced in the minds of the gentlemen belonging to the settlement
of Calcutta, whom he describes as callous to every feeling but that
of their losses. His sentiments upon this occasion are stated with
that severity and careless boldness, which made him so many enemies,
but which, nevertheless, continued through life to mark all his
communications on points where he considered that private feelings and
interests had interfered with the performance of public duties.

"The gentlemen here," he states, "seem much dissatisfied at the
authority I am vested with. It would be contradicting my own
sentiments, if I was not to acknowledge that I still preserve the
opinion that the gentlemen of Madras could not have taken a step more
prudent, or more consistent with the Company's interests: for I am
sorry to say, the loss of private property, and the means of recovering
it, seem to be the only objects which take up the attention of the
Bengal gentlemen. As an instance, I shall only mention the expeditions
to Dacca, which you may remember to have heard of a little before we
sailed. It was settled that the Company should defray the expenses, and
that what was taken should be divided among the sufferers of Calcutta
in proportion to their losses; the sufferers repaying the Company what
might be advanced on that account. I would have you guard against every
thing these gentlemen can say; for, believe me, they are bad subjects
and rotten at heart, and will stick at nothing to prejudice you and the
gentlemen of the committee; indeed, how should they do otherwise, when
they have not spared one another? I shall only add, their conduct at
Calcutta finds no excuse, even among themselves; and that the riches of
Peru and Mexico should not induce me to dwell among them."

The correspondence which has been noticed between Admiral Watson and
Clive, and between the latter and the select committee at Calcutta,
is of consequence, as it exhibits the obstacles with which Clive
had to struggle at this critical period of his life, and of the
interests of his country in India. It is, however, to be observed, that
notwithstanding the pertinacity and violence on points of professional
claims, which Admiral Watson exhibited, there was a redeeming honesty
and zeal in that gallant seaman, which gave ample pledge that the
public service would always be preferred by him to every other
consideration; and though Clive showed occasional fits of spleen at
the conduct of the Admiral, the whole course of his correspondence,
public and private, proves that he entertained the highest respect and
admiration for his character.

The situation of Clive was at this period most difficult. He found
it more easy to deal with the pretensions and prejudices of Admiral
Watson, than with the weak and disunited select committee of Bengal.
In answer[93] to a letter from the latter, demanding that he should
surrender the power with which he was vested, and place himself under
them, he observed, "I do not intend to make use of my power for acting
separately from you, without you reduce me to the necessity of so
doing; but as far as concerns the means of executing these powers, you
will excuse me, gentlemen, if I refuse to give them up: I cannot do it
without forfeiting the trust reposed in me by the Select Committee of
Fort St. George.

"It does not become me, as an individual, to give my opinion, whether
the conduct of the gentlemen of Fort St. George has been faulty or not;
that point must be determined by our superiors."

After occupying Calcutta, the British commanders, to take advantage, as
Clive states[94], of the consternation caused by their rapid progress,
sent a naval and military force to attack Hooghley. I transcribe from
Orme[95] the following account of this operation:--

"Mr. Drake, notwithstanding his adversities, had retained some
correspondents, and the Company's money some spies, from whom he
received intelligence, as soon as he arrived at Calcutta, that the
town of Hooghley was in great consternation, and that it would be some
time before the Nabob's army would reach from Moorshedabad; upon which
the Committee agreed to attack Hooghley without delay. The twenty-gun
ship, the sloop of war, and three other vessels, were appointed for
this service; and on board of them were embarked one hundred and fifty
Europeans, being those of Adlercron's regiment, with two hundred
sepoys.[96] They sailed on the 4th of January, and hoped to reach
Hooghley in one tide; but the twenty-gun ship struck upon a sand-bank,
which stopped their progress for five days. On the 10th, they arrived
at Hooghley. This town lieth about twenty miles above Calcutta,
adjoining to the north part of the Dutch settlement of Chinsurah, from
whence it extends three miles on the bank of the river. At the northern
extremity of the town is a fort, which was at this time garrisoned by
two hundred men: three thousand more had been sent from Moorshedabad;
but these retreated as soon as the English troops landed, remaining,
however, within a few miles. The vessels battered the fort until night;
and although the breach was scarcely practicable, it was determined
to storm it before break of day. A false attack was made at the main
gate; whilst Captain Coote, with the other division, accompanied by
some sailors, mounted the breach before they were discovered by the
garrison; who no sooner saw the English on the ramparts, than all of
them quitted their posts, and fled out at the lesser gate. Three
Europeans and ten sepoys were killed in the attack. On the 12th,
Captain Coote, with fifty Europeans and one hundred sepoys, marched
to Baudel, a large village three miles north of the fort, where they
destroyed several granaries of rice; and in their turn were surrounded
in the village by the fugitive garrison, and the troops which had been
sent from Moorshedabad, from whom they disengaged themselves without
losing a man. On the 16th, a party proceeded in boats some miles to the
northward, and destroyed several more granaries on each side of the
river; and on the 19th, the Europeans with the smaller vessels returned
to Calcutta."

The account of the expedition against Hooghley is confirmed by every
contemporary writer. The booty taken was estimated by Clive at a lac
and a half of rupees (15,000_l._). The reduction of this important
fort, the destruction and capture of the enemy's property, and the
discomfiture of their troops, whilst they avenged the wrongs which
Suraj-u-Dowlah had inflicted upon the English, were calculated to
impress that prince with a just sense of their power, and of their
determination to use it, for the purpose of compelling him to make
reparation for his unprovoked aggressions. They concluded (and his
character and conduct justified the conclusion) that it was not by
conciliating, but by alarming him, that they could obtain future
exemption from his attacks. What had occurred gave good grounds for the
belief they entertained. Subsequent events proved its correctness.[97]

Clive's letters in January communicate to the Madras government
information of the capture of Hooghley, and of the completion of
the works to strengthen Calcutta. He also informs them, that the
Select Committee of Bengal had confided to him and Admiral Watson all
correspondence with the Nabob, who was advancing towards Calcutta,
making professions of an amicable disposition, and offering to make
restitution of property, provided Mr. Drake were removed from the
management of the Company's affairs in Bengal.

Clive, at this period, cherished sanguine hopes of an early settlement;
and it appears, both from his public and private letters, that he was
most solicitous to obey the instructions of the Madras Government, by
returning to that Presidency the moment he could do so without the most
imminent hazard to the public interests.

"Mr. Watson," he observes[99], "has not yet come to any resolution
about his departure; and I fear it will be difficult for me to leave
this place without his concurrence and assistance: however, nothing
but the prospect of a speedy and honourable peace will induce him
to stay much longer; and you may be assured I shall accompany him,
unless something of the like nature happens, so as to give hopes of a
peace being soon concluded, greatly to the honour and advantage of the
Company. Be assured, gentlemen, I shall follow your instructions, and
not draw out the war to length, on any consideration whatever."

In his private letter of the 25th of January, to Mr. Pigot, he says,
"I need not represent to you the immense consequence of Bengal to the
Company; and, while there is a prospect of concluding matters, either
by a treaty, or by a general battle, which, I think, cannot be far
off, I am persuaded you would not approve of my leaving every thing
unfinished, in a sudden and abrupt manner.

"If we cannot conclude every thing by the end of March, I will give it
up, and content myself with leaving Calcutta in a defensible state. By
the return you will see, exclusive of the King's troops and artillery,
I have not above three hundred European rank and file fit for duty; so
that, if the Bombay troops don't arrive, I cannot possibly bring with
me more than the grenadier company, and fifty of the train, exclusive
of the King's. The sepoys must be left, of which you have no want on
the coast. Fort William cannot be left with a less garrison than three
hundred military and train fit for duty."

In the postscript to the same letter, he observes, "The Admiral has not
wanted a number of people to advise him to pay no manner of attention
to any representations, but what come from the gentlemen here; and that
the gentlemen of the coast cannot be judges of what is fit for the
interest of the Company in these parts. He is very desirous of getting
away by the latter end of next month, but has been persuaded that he is
so much concerned in honour to see matters concluded, that he swears he
will stay till September, if it be necessary. You will easily conclude
how difficult it will be for me to get from hence without his consent
and assistance. I do assure you I believe the Nabob desires peace most
earnestly; and I have told the gentlemen very plainly, that if he will
give such terms as are consistent with the interest of the Company, and
no other, all private satisfaction must be laid aside."

The desire which Clive, at this period, entertained to return to
Madras, and the causes by which he was detained, are strongly expressed
in his letter[100] to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.

"The gentlemen of the Committee of Fort Saint George, on advice of
the war with France, immediately despatched letters to me directing
my return to the coast, as early as possible, with what troops could
be spared; which, considering the reinforcement from Bombay, they
hoped would be nearly as many as I brought with me. Further advices
from them, dated 2d and 11th December, mention Monsieur Bussy's having
set out from Hyderabad on the 16th November, and advanced towards
the sea-coast with about one thousand men, having left one hundred
with Salabut Jung. They conclude his destination is for Pondicherry,
there to join other troops expected from the Islands, and make up
a formidable force for action in the Carnatic; therefore urging my
return with as many troops as possible, both of the Madras and Bombay
detachments: for that all schemes of action in Bengal must be dropped
for the present, and our whole force bent against the collected
strength of the French on the coast.

"I have no accounts myself from the Chief of Vizagapatam: but, by Mr.
Pocock's letter to Mr. Watson, and the information of Lieut. Rumbold,
arrived from thence, I understand that Monsieur Bussy gave out that he
was coming to settle the affairs of this province; but that, by the
direction of his march, he seemed to have a design upon Vizagapatam,
and the English settlements in that neighbourhood. That when he
was within about six days' march of Vizagapatam, and heard of the
Cumberland's arrival there, he detached Monsieur Law with about three
hundred Europeans to Masulipatam, to defend it against any attempts
from that ship, as it is supposed; and he himself halted with the rest
of his army, consisting, it is thought, of about four or five hundred
Europeans, and a very large black force, both foot and horse. The
accident, therefore, of the Cumberland's falling in with Vizagapatam
has saved your northern settlements for the present; which, I fear, on
her coming away, must fall a sacrifice to the superiority of the French
forces in that quarter.

"All circumstances concur to make me wish a speedy accommodation in
this province, both with the Nabob and French; and it is my ardent
desire to be able to embark for the coast this month, with some of
the troops; but it is hardly to be expected that matters will be
sufficiently settled to admit of it. The Admiral declares he is ready
to stay till September if your affairs require it; and it will be
impossible for me to return without the squadron. Indeed, I am myself
so sensible of the consequence which the trade of this province is
of to the Company, that I think I ought not, on any account, to draw
off part of the troops, while a fair prospect remains of a speedy
and advantageous conclusion of affairs, either by force of arms or a
treaty. Whenever we return, I will endeavour to prevail on the Admiral
to call at Vizagapatam, to know the state of the coast, and whether our
services will be necessary in that neighbourhood."

How little Clive contemplated any schemes of wealth, or personal
aggrandizement, as likely to result from the scene in which he was
engaged, may be judged from a letter to his father written at this
period:--"I wrote you last," he observes, "by the Chesterfield, and
acquainted you with my being just ready to set out upon the expedition
to Bengal. I have now the pleasure to inform you, that all are safely
arrived, and that success has hitherto attended our arms by sea
and land. Calcutta is retaken, and fortified; and, some time ago,
the second city in this province (Hooghley) was taken by storm and
plundered.

"We are encamped with our little army; and the Nabob is at the head of
forty thousand men to give us battle. I am in hopes every thing will
be concluded to the Company's advantage, though not in so glorious a
manner as I could wish. For more particulars I must refer you to Mr.
Mabbot.

"It is not possible to describe the distresses of the inhabitants of
this once opulent and populous town. It must be many years before it
is restored to its former grandeur. It is computed the private losses
amount to upwards of two millions sterling.

"I enjoy my health better than could be expected, and think my nervous
complaint decreases. Mrs. Clive was well when I last heard from her,
which was the 4th of last month.

"Colonel Lawrence is Governor of St. David's during my absence. I
believe it would be no difficult matter to get appointed from home
Governor of this place; but it would be neither agreeable to me, nor
to my advantage. I heartily wish, in these perilous and uncertain
times, all my money was in England; for I do not think it safe here:
no one knows what the event of war may be in these parts. My loss by
the capture of Calcutta is not less than 2500_l._; so that hitherto I
am money out of pocket by my second trip to India. I hope the end will
crown all."

The arrival of the Nabob, with a large army, in the immediate vicinity
of Calcutta, put an end, for the moment, to all considerations but that
of a speedy settlement with him. He continued to profess friendship;
but the delays and evasions of his ministers, and the position he
occupied, not only led to doubts of his sincerity, but threatened the
safety of Clive's small force, and with it the city of Calcutta. Clive
persevered, however, in his efforts to effect an amicable settlement;
and, in concert with his second in command, Major Kilpatrick, publicly
stated his opinion, that, while the Committee endeavoured to obtain
better terms, they should not hazard a renewal of hostilities by
rejecting those with which the Nabob appeared ready to comply. The
sentiments they gave upon this occasion are too remarkable and too
honourable to the individuals to be omitted.

"Upon the whole," they stated, "we think the conditions highly
honourable and advantageous to the Company. It would give us great
pleasure, as being considerable sufferers ourselves, if terms
advantageous to private persons could be obtained likewise; but our
present insignificant strength, the situation of affairs upon the
coast, the absolute recall of Col. Clive with the greatest part of the
forces, oblige us to give it as our opinion, that, by insisting upon
terms still more advantageous, we expose the Company to the risk of
losing those already granted them, having neither time nor the means of
making the Nabob comply, should he retreat. We were the more confirmed
in that way of thinking, as Runjut Roy the Seit's[101] Vakeel, who has
through the whole course of this negotiation undertaken the Company's
affairs, in his last letters to Col. Clive, declares that, if the last
articles signed by the Nabob are not satisfactory, he will interfere no
more in the Company's business, but let war take its course."

The hopes indulged of an amicable disposition on the part of
Suraj-u-Dowlah were soon dispelled by the military movements of that
prince. He had, however, to deal with an opponent not to be deceived.
The moment Clive found that, from part of the Nabob's army having
entered the city, and the remainder shutting up all the avenues of its
approach, his own followers were deserting, and he was likely to be
cut off from all supplies, he determined to bring matters to a crisis.
On the 4th of February, two gentlemen were deputed to the Nabob, to
request, if his intentions were friendly, that he would withdraw. The
haughty manner in which his envoys were received, and the refusal to
comply with his request, made Clive instantly determine on an attack.

"As I now plainly perceived," he observes in his letter to the Secret
Committee, dated 22d February, 1757, "that he only meant to amuse
us, and that the little opposition he had received served rather to
elate his hopes than incline him to moderate measures, I determined to
attack him the next morning before daybreak, while two thirds of his
army were still encamped without the Mahratta ditch; for when they had
once passed and got into the streets of the town, it would be too late
to attempt it. Another pressing reason for the immediate execution
of this enterprise, notwithstanding the smallness of my force, was
the sudden distress we found ourselves in, upon the approach of the
Nabob's army, by a general desertion of our workmen, coolies, and
servants, the breaking up of our market, and no provisions to be had
but what were supplied from the fort by water; in which condition we
could not have continued long, but must have retreated into the fort
with disgrace. I therefore desired Admiral Watson to assist me with
five or six hundred seamen, principally for drawing the artillery and
carrying ammunition, which he readily complied with; and, about three
o'clock in the morning, I marched out with nearly my whole force,
leaving only a few Europeans, with two hundred new-raised bucksarees,
to guard our camp. About six, we entered the enemy's camp in a thick
fog, and crossed it in about two hours, with considerable execution.
Had the fog cleared up, as it usually does, about eight o'clock, when
we were entire masters of the camp without the ditch, the action must
have been decisive; instead of which it thickened, and occasioned our
mistaking the way. I avoid troubling you with the particulars of this
undertaking, as they are fully set down in my journal of military
occurrences."

Clive had wished to avoid hostilities, from a desire not to hazard the
advantages which had been obtained, and from the great disparity of
numbers. While his force consisted of one thousand three hundred and
fifty Europeans and eight hundred sepoys, that of the enemy exceeded
forty thousand men; but, in the situation in which he found himself
placed, he had no option betwixt the attack he made and a disgraceful
termination of the enterprise. His was not a mind to hesitate under
such circumstances. He instantly formed his plan to surprise the
Nabob's camp, by marching at three o'clock in the morning to make his
first effort against a train of heavy artillery, and, after spiking
them, to push for the head-quarters of the prince: but his little army,
after penetrating through the multitude of its opponents, became, at
daybreak, so enveloped in thick fog, that the road was missed; and
when the fog cleared, Clive, who found himself at a distance from
the point of his intended attack, had to sustain a very sharp action
with a part of the Nabob's army, in which he lost, besides two field
pieces, one hundred and twenty Europeans and one hundred sepoys, a
great proportion of his small force. Though the success of this attack,
owing to the accident of the fog, was not so complete as it otherwise
would have been, all the effects upon which Clive had calculated were
produced. The alarmed Nabob left the town next day, and encamped on
a plain within sight of the English troops. Preparations were making
for another attack; but Suraj-u-Dowlah made overtures for peace, and
Clive was too anxious for that object not to attend to them, though
advised to the contrary by Admiral Watson; who, in a private note,
written in the strong language and with the characteristic bluntness of
a British seaman, expressed serious doubts of the Nabob's sincerity,
and recommended another attack. "I am now fully convinced," the Admiral
observes, "the Nabob's letter was only to amuse us, in order to cover
his retreat and gain time till he is reinforced, which may be attended
with very fatal consequences. For my own part, I was of opinion,
that attacking his rear when he was marching off, and forcing him to
abandon his cannon, was a most necessary piece of service to bring
him to an accommodation; for till he is well thrashed, don't, Sir,
flatter yourself he will be inclined to peace. Let us, therefore, not
be overreached by his politics, but make use of our arms, which will
be much more prevalent than any treaties or negotiations. In order to
this, I have sent Captain Speke to talk with you on this subject. I
think, too, it might not be amiss, were you to consult some of your
own officers on the same occasion. You will pardon the liberty I take
on this particular, when I assure you, I will do the utmost of my
endeavours to assist you."

Clive was not induced by this advice to depart from the course he had
determined to pursue. He anticipated that what had passed would dispose
the Nabob to peace; and he dreaded that, by driving him to despair,
he might hurry him into an alliance with the French at Chandernagore,
whose European force was nearly equal to the English, and who had just
heard of the breaking out of war between the two nations in Europe.
The events proved he was not mistaken in his conclusion as to the
probable conduct of Suraj-u-Dowlah. That prince no longer hesitated
to sign a treaty, by which he restored the English at Calcutta to all
the privileges they had formerly enjoyed under the imperial firman,
or mandate, gave up the villages he had seized, permitted their
merchandise to pass custom-free, agreed to their fortifying Calcutta,
allowed them to establish a mint, and engaged that all goods taken from
their factories should be restored, and that money compensation should
be given for such as were damaged, plundered, or lost.

This treaty was concluded on the 9th of February, and three days
afterwards the Nabob entered into another agreement with Clive, by
which the English engaged to look upon the Nabob's enemies as their
own, and to grant him any aid in their power.

Various opinions were formed of the policy of this peace. Clive, in
a private letter to Mr. Payne, Chairman of the Court of Directors,
points out, with great force, the grounds on which he acted.

"If I had only consulted the interest and reputation of a soldier, the
conclusion of this peace might easily have been suspended. I know, at
the same time, there are many who think I have been too precipitate in
the conclusion of it; but surely those who are of this opinion never
knew, that the delay of a day or two might have ruined the Company's
affairs, by the junction of the French with the Nabob, which was on
the point of being carried into execution. They never considered the
situation of affairs on the coast, and the positive orders sent me by
the gentlemen there, to return with the major part of the forces at all
events; they never considered that, with a war upon the coast, and in
the province of Bengal at the same time, a trading company could not
subsist without a great assistance from the government; and, last of
all, they never considered, that a long war, attended through the whole
course of it with success, and many great actions, ended at last with
the expense of more than fifty lacs of rupees to the Company.

"Believe me, Sir, I have constantly had this consideration in view, and
my conduct has been always regulated agreeably to it. I can further
say, I never undertook an expedition attended with half so many
disagreeable circumstances as this: the natural jealousy subsisting
between sea and land service has given me much uneasiness; I have
suffered many mortifications; the independent power given me by the
gentlemen of the committee at Madras has created me many enemies;
and, lastly, that attention which, by my public station, I owe to the
interest of the Company, in preference to that of private individuals,
has not passed by unreflected upon. I am a very considerable sufferer
myself; and I can affirm with great truth and sincerity, that I have
left no means untried with the Nabob, when the Company's interest was
not immediately concerned, to induce him to consider the unhappy people
at Calcutta, and he has often promised to do it.

"Nothing harsh, ungenerous, or uncharitable shall fall from my pen; at
the same time, in justice to the Company, I cannot avoid expressing my
concern at the future prospect of their affairs, after the obtainment
of such honourable and advantageous conditions. Do but reflect, Sir,
that most of the gentlemen in power are become bankrupts by the
unfortunate loss of Calcutta. This consideration, I must confess,
added to their apprehensions of being dismissed the service, has often
induced me to wish the gentlemen of Madras had taken the entire
management of affairs into their hands, till the Company's pleasure was
known.

"It cannot be expected that the princes of this country, whose fidelity
is always to be suspected, will remain firm to their promises and
engagements from principle only. It is, therefore, become absolutely
necessary to keep up a respectable force in this province for the
future. How far this is agreeable to the Company's circumstances,
you, Sir, are the best judge. I shall only add, there never was
such attention paid to the advice of military men at Calcutta as
was consistent with the safety of the place when in danger--a total
ignorance of which was the real cause of the loss of Fort William.

"Our design upon Chandernagore is uncertain. I cannot yet fathom the
Nabob's sentiments; the French having in a manner refused a neutrality
this day offered it. As the expedition has so far advanced, I have
given it my opinion to proceed and invest the place; and, if it should
happen, at last, that the Nabob is really against taking it, to accept
the neutrality, and make merit of doing it at his request and in
obedience to his order, by which means he will be convinced of our
friendship and power at the same time.

"I shall conclude this letter with submitting my conduct to your
opinion. It would have required greater abilities than I am master of
to reconcile and satisfy so many different interests. If I have erred,
it has not been with design; whenever that can be made to appear, I
shall very deservedly forfeit the good opinion and favour of the Court
of Directors, to whom I owe every thing."

FOOTNOTES:

[69] This vote is dated the 6th of Feb., 1754. With that delicacy and
tenderness to the feelings of his old commander, Colonel Lawrence,
which he always manifested, he objected to receiving this mark of
distinction, unless a similar present was made to that officer; which
was done accordingly.

[70] December, 1754.

[71] Severndroog, another fort belonging to Angria, had been taken a
few months previously by Commodore James, of the Bombay marines.

[72] Feb. 13, 1756.

[73] Vide Lieutenant-Colonel Clive's evidence, _Reports of the House of
Commons_, vol. iii., and _Ives's Voyage_, p. 82.

[74] Vide extract of consultations, Fort St. David, June 20. 1756.

[75] Orme, vol. ii. p. 88.

[76] A war was at this time expected between England and France.

[77] It is to be observed, that though the French gave upon this
occasion their support to the pretensions of their favourite Nabob,
yet Mahommed Ali was not at that time acknowledged by Salabut Jung,
then subadar of the Deckan, his immediate superior: and it was only at
the peace of Paris, in 1763, that he was acknowledged by the French
government.

[78] Aliverdi Khan died on the 9th of April, 1756; and Suraj-u-Dowlah,
having been nominated successor, mounted the throne without opposition.
The name of this prince was Mirza Mahmud, but he is best known by his
title of Suraj-u-Dowlah, which means "the sun of the state."

[79] The person the Nabob alluded to was Kishendass, the son of the
late Dewan of the Nabob of Dacca, who visited Calcutta on his way
to Juggernaut; and as he was strongly recommended to Mr. Drake, the
President of Calcutta, by Mr. Watts, the chief of Cossimbazar, on
account of services rendered by his family to the Company, he was
treated with kindness and attention.

[80] The outposts of Calcutta were attacked on the 18th of June, 1756.

[81] Orme, vol. ii. p. 78.

[82] Mr. Drake.

[83] Captain Minchin.

[84] Vide Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii. p. 144.

[85] Mr. Mill, by his quotation from Seir Mutaquerin, and his
observations upon the former state of prisons in England and India,
appears desirous not only of palliating the guilt of the Nabob and
his servants, but of throwing a share of the blame upon the unhappy
sufferers: "Some search," he observes, "was made for a convenient
apartment, but none was found; upon which, information was obtained of
a place which the English themselves had employed as a prison, and into
this, without further inquiry, they were impelled. It was unhappily
a small ill-aired and unwholesome dungeon called the Black Hole; and
the English had their own practice to thank, for suggesting it to the
officers of the subadar as a fit place of confinement."--Mill, vol.
iii. p. 149. Though I refrain from commenting on the tone in which
the author quoted treats this memorable catastrophe, I must directly
question the justice of the conclusions he has drawn from his own
premises. Assuredly the use of a room of twenty feet square, with two
small windows, as a prison for one, two, three, or ten prisoners,
can be no justification for forcing, at the point of the sword, 146
captives into this inadequate space; much less for keeping them there,
when their sufferings became so dreadful, and the death of almost all
certain.

[86] The "Cumberland" seventy-four had Sir G. Pocock's flag on board.

[87] The "Marlborough" Indiaman carried a large proportion of the
troops and stores.

[88] A village on the left bank of the river Hooghly, twenty miles in a
straight direction below Calcutta, but more than double that distance
by water.

[89] Situated on the left bank of the river Hooghly, ten miles below
Calcutta in a straight line, but double that number by the windings of
the river.

[90] This officer (afterwards the celebrated Sir Eyre Coote) commanded
a company of H. M. 49th on board the flag ship.

[91] The grenadier volunteers and sepoys had been pushed as near
the fort as they could be, under cover, to be ready for an assault.
The remainder had been halted in a hollow plain, to intercept the
garrison in the event of an attempt at retreat. No enemy was believed
to be near, except in the fort of Budge-Budge. The consequence was
a surprise, the bad effects of which were only remedied by Clive's
presence of mind and courage. He has been censured for not using more
precaution; but having only landed seven days, and being ill, he must
have depended upon others for intelligence, and he justly complains of
their want of it. The nature of the country, however, is such, as to
offer to almost any numbers the power of concealing their advance.

It has further been stated, that "if the enemy's cavalry had advanced
and charged at the same time that the infantry began to fire, it is
not improbable that the war would have been concluded on the very
first trial of hostilities."--Orme, vol. i. p. 124. In answer to this
remark, there is one single fact to be stated;--the thick jungle which
concealed the approach of the infantry was impervious to cavalry, who
had no means of advancing except through openings, where they must have
been seen, and the possibility of surprise defeated.

[92] Vide Ives's Voyage, p. 102.

[93] Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Clive to select committee, of date
20th of January, 1757.

[94] Clive's letters to the Governor of Madras, 8th January, 1757.

[95] vol. ii. p. 126.

[96] Major Kilpatrick and Captain Eyre Coote commanded the King's and
Company's troops. The naval armament was commanded by Admiral Watson.

[97] It is with pain I read, in the page of a modern historian, the
following passage[98]:--"The English were very desirous to make their
peace with that formidable ruler (Suraj-u-Dowlah); but the capture of
Hooghley, undertaken solely with a view to plunder, had so augmented
his rage, that he was not in a frame of mind to receive from them any
proposition." I rejoice to state, I have hitherto searched in vain for
the facts that could warrant so unqualified an imputation upon the
fame and reputation of Admiral Watson, Colonel Clive, and the other
naval and military officers, detached in command of the force employed
on this occasion; and, until proof is produced of their having been
actuated by the sordid motives here ascribed to them, I cannot give
credit to the unsupported opinion of any author, however respectable.

Orme states, that Suraj-u-Dowlah was exasperated at the capture of
Hooghley (as, no doubt, such a despot would be at any operation which
implied a defiance of his power by a nation he had contemned and
injured); but that clear and able historian, to whom his country is so
deeply indebted for a minute narration of the facts connected with the
early establishment of her power in India, has not one word in his page
that can justify the opinions Mr. Mill expresses as to the motives of
their attack.

I have the sincerest personal respect for Mr. Mill: I admire his
accuracy, his industry, and indefatigable research; but our conclusions
from the same premises often differ most widely. In this work, I shall
have frequent occasion to claim that liberty of a free expression of my
sentiments, which he so properly uses towards those who have written on
the same subjects as himself. This will oblige me to question some of
his assertions and opinions, which, however positive and unqualified,
appear to me neither supported by arguments nor borne out by facts. I
am aware of my own defects, and have laboured to amend them; I also
acknowledge that early impressions, and the occupations of my life, may
give a bias to my judgment: but no human mind is free from prejudices,
and those of the closet author are not the fewest in number, or the
easiest to be subdued. With a full sense of my own disadvantages, I
confess that I am not convinced, by the laboured and metaphysical
preface to Mr. Mill's History, that local knowledge, and an
acquaintance with the languages, habits, and characters of the nations
of whom I, and others similarly circumstanced, have treated on this and
other occasions, are disqualifications for the tasks we have attempted.
At all events, our efforts may be useful in collecting facts for more
critical and philosophical historians. Though we do not withhold those
opinions which our experience has led us to adopt, our chief purpose is
to inform--theirs to speculate. We are satisfied if we can lay before
our readers a true picture of the scenes we describe. They have what
they deem a higher object; and the facts of their volumes are often
rendered subservient to the propagation of their general principles and
abstract theories.

[98] Mill's British India, vol. ii. p. 128.

[99] Letter to the Hon. G. Pigot, Esq. and Select Committee of Fort St.
George, dated Camp, Barnague Plain, January 28. 1757.

[100] Dated Camp, on Barnague Plain, 1st February, 1757.

[101] Jugget Seit, here alluded to, was at the head of a great
banking-house, and, from his immense wealth and credit, had much
influence in the country.




CHAP. IV.


The attack of Chandernagore had been strongly recommended to Clive's
attention (A. D. 1757) by the government of Madras; and it was evident
that, while the French kept so strong a force at that settlement, the
safety of Calcutta must be endangered whenever its garrison was weak,
or the Nabob of Bengal chose to contract an intimate alliance with
our European enemy. This danger was at the moment much increased by
the success of Bussy. That leader, alike remarkable for his sagacity
and courage, after rendering the greatest services to the Subadar of
the Deckan, Salabut Jung, and obtaining in reward a large grant of
territory, had become an object of such jealousy to the prince whom he
had placed on the throne, that an effort was made to destroy him and
his party.

Not only were all the chiefs of the Deckan summoned to aid their prince
in effecting this object, but the Mahrattas, also, were called in. The
French general took possession of a palace called the Chahar-Mahal,
within the city of Hyderabad, where he sustained a memorable siege
against this combined force; and on being reinforced by a party from
Pondicherry, commanded by M. Law, he ultimately triumphed over his
numerous assailants, and Salabut Jung was obliged to confirm all the
grants he had before made to him. These included the fruitful provinces
of Masulipatam, Vizagapatam, and Ganjam, which he was now engaged in
settling; and his comparative vicinity gave credit to the daily reports
that he was on his march to Bengal with a force, the numbers of which
had been greatly exaggerated.

Whatever might be Bussy's intention, it was sufficiently obvious that
he possessed the power of forming a junction[102] with the French force
on the Ganges; and it was equally obvious, that such a junction would
be ruinous to the English interests.

These considerations recommended the immediate attack of Chandernagore;
but many and serious objections presented themselves to that measure.
These were the strength of the French, the weakness of the English
force, and the fear of producing a rupture with the Nabob, who was
known to be most adverse to such an attack.

Clive, alluding to the expressed sentiments of Suraj-u-Dowlah on this
subject observes, in the postscript of a letter (under date of the 1st
of March, 1757) to Mr. Watts, the resident at the Nabob's court:--

"The admiral and myself are determined not to be guilty of a breach of
faith in attacking Chandernagore, contrary to the expressed order of
the Nabob."

But at the same time that he communicated this resolution, Mr.
Watts was instructed to make every effort to obtain the consent of
Suraj-u-Dowlah to the prosecution of this measure.

The necessity of this operation appeared more urgent from intelligence
obtained, that the Nabob was carrying on secret intrigues with the
French, and from the declaration of the latter, that, however willing
to enter into an armistice in Bengal, they had no power to pledge
themselves for its observance by the government of Pondicherry, or by
those acting under its orders. The remembrance of Dupleix's disavowing
the authority of La Bourdonnais to ransom Madras, and the position of
Bussy, acting under an authority superior to that of the government
of Chandernagore, made Admiral Watson very reluctant to sanction
an engagement so liable to be broken, whenever it should suit the
convenience of the enemy. Clive endeavoured for a period to overcome
the Admiral's scruples, from an impression that, should the Nabob
join the French, the English force in Bengal was too weak to maintain
a protracted contest; and so far from expecting aid from Madras, the
superiority of the French on the coast of Coromandel urgently required
his early return to that Presidency.

Intelligence of the occurrence of hostilities between France and
England had been received; but the official declaration of war did
not reach Admiral Watson till the first week of March. That officer,
understanding that the Committee still continued apprehensive of the
bad consequences likely to result from the attack of Chandernagore,
wrote[103] to Clive as follows:--

"If the Nabob should not give his consent to our attacking the French,
I will desist, provided the gentlemen of the Committee strongly
represent to me that it will be more for the Company's interest that
I should not undertake any thing against the French; for, as the
declaration of war is an order to all officers under the King to
distress the enemy as far as it is in their power, the Committee here
should take it upon themselves the concluding a neutrality; but I will
take upon me to give my word, that I will not commit any hostility
against the French here, unless the Governor-General and Superior
Council of Pondicherry will not consent to a neutrality within the
Ganges."

Admiral Watson had for some time carried on a correspondence with
the Nabob, from which it appears that he was as anxious as Clive to
convince Suraj-u-Dowlah it was for his interest and safety, as well
as for that of the English, that Chandernagore should be attacked.
"The ready obedience," he observes in one of these letters, "I paid
to your desire, in not attacking the French, will, I persuade myself,
convince you, that nothing but the strongest necessity could make me
again apply to you on that subject. I beg you will give your most
serious attention to what I am going to say. Immediately on the receipt
of your past letters, I not only gave over thoughts of attacking the
French, but invited them to enter into a treaty of neutrality, and
to send people to settle the terms; but judge what must have been my
surprise, when, after they were in some manner settled, the French
deputies owned that they had no power to secure us the observance of
the treaty, in case any commander of theirs should come with a greater
power after my departure! You are too reasonable not to see, that it is
impossible for me to conclude a treaty with people who have no power
to do it; and which, besides, while it ties my hands, leaves those
of my enemies at liberty to do me what mischief they can. They have
also a long time reported, that Monsieur Bussy is coming here with a
great army. Is it to attack you? Is it to attack us? You are going
to Patna. You ask our assistance. Can we, with the least degree of
prudence, march with you, and leave our enemies behind us? You will
then be too far off to support us, and we shall be unable to defend
ourselves. Think what can be done in this situation. I see but one way.
Let us take Chandernagore, and secure ourselves from any apprehensions
from that quarter; and then we will assist you with every man in
our power, and go with you, even to Delhi, if you will. Have we not
sworn reciprocally, that the friends and enemies of the one should
be regarded as such by the other? And will not God, the avenger of
perjury, punish us, if we do not fulfil our oaths? What can I say more?
Let me request the favour of your speedy answer."

Subsequent to the despatch of this letter, the accounts received
from Moorshedabad completely satisfied the Admiral of the Nabob's
insincerity. Suraj-u-Dowlah, while he delayed the execution of the
engagements he had entered into with the English, intrigued with French
agents, and detached a body of men to reinforce the Governor of
Hooghley, which it was fully believed was meant to aid the neighbouring
garrison of Chandernagore.

This intelligence caused the Admiral to address him in a style
calculated to put an end to all further evasions:--"I now acquaint
you," were the concluding words of this letter[104], "that the
remainder of the troops which should have been here long ago (and which
I hear the Colonel told you he expected), will be at Calcutta in a few
days; that in a few days more I shall despatch a vessel for more ships
and more troops; and that I will kindle such a flame in your country,
as all the water in the Ganges shall not be able to extinguish.
Farewell! remember that he who promises you this never yet broke his
word with you or with any man whatsoever."

Suraj-u-Dowlah appears to have been alarmed at this communication; to
which he replied in two notes, one dated the 9th, the other the 10th,
of March. In the first, he endeavours to excuse himself for his want
of punctuality in fulfilling his engagements with the English. In the
second, he gives, though in general terms, that permission which had
been so long desired, to attack Chandernagore. "You have understanding
and generosity," he observes: "if your enemy, with an upright heart,
claims your protection, you will give him his life; but then you
must be well satisfied of the innocence of his intentions; if not,
whatsoever you think right, that do."

Mr. Watts, Resident with the Nabob, had communicated to the Committee
the fullest evidence of that prince's intrigues with the French; and,
in his letter to Clive of the 1st of March, he asserts that he had
advanced them one lac of rupees; and gives his opinion that the capture
of Chandernagore is quite indispensable for the security of the English.

Mr. Watts's letter to the Committee closed (as appears by a letter from
Mr. Drake to Clive) in the following words: "If you have not concluded
with our enemies, I am persuaded you may attack without being under any
apprehensions from the Nabob." In another letter to Clive, of the 10th
of March, the Resident observes, "This serves to enclose a copy of my
letter to the Committee, by which you will observe the Nabob has given
his verbal consent for attacking Chandernagore."

In a letter of the 11th of the same month, Mr. Watts states, that the
Nabob desired him to inform Colonel Clive that if he attacked the
French he would not intermeddle.

The receipt of these letters, and the arrival of reinforcements from
Bombay, led to the attack of Chandernagore being ultimately determined
upon. The negotiation for an armistice, which was far advanced, was
broken off. The letters subsequently written by the Nabob[105],
retracting his assent to this measure, were deemed an indignity; and
the very ground which he urged, the expected advance through Cuttack of
Bussy, was considered an additional reason for hastening the siege.

Clive commenced operations by land, and displayed his usual judgment:
but the early fall of this settlement must be chiefly ascribed to the
daring boldness and admirable skill and intrepidity of Admiral Watson,
and to the valour of those under his command.

Few naval achievements have excited more admiration; and even at
the present day, when the river is so much better known, the success
with which the largest vessels of this fleet were navigated to
Chandernagore, and laid alongside the batteries of that settlement, is
a subject of wonder. The Kent and Tiger, with the flags of Admirals
Watson and Pocock on board, were the only vessels engaged.[107] They
were so close, that the musketry from the tops and poop were most
annoying to the enemy, who behaved with great gallantry, keeping up a
heavy and destructive fire: nor did they offer to capitulate till their
batteries were a heap of ruins, and all their guns dismounted.

Though the outworks of Chandernagore had been taken by Clive, no
breach had been made on the land side; but, while the battery guns and
mortars opened upon the town, the troops were pushed forward, and, from
the tops of the houses adjacent to the wall, kept up a galling and
destructive fire; which, as it increased the loss of the French, no
doubt hastened their surrender.

We cannot give a better account of the immediate causes which led to
the attack of Chandernagore, than in the words of Clive in his report
to the governor of Fort St. George.

"I acquainted you," he observes, "that the neutrality with the French
was not likely to be concluded. I continued encamped on the same
ground; and, on the 7th instant, received a letter from the Nabob,
desiring me to join against the Affghans, the van of whose army was
attempting an irruption into this province. Accordingly, I began my
march the next morning; and, thinking it a convenient opportunity
to prevail on him to suffer us to take Chandernagore, I wrote him
word of our having endeavoured to conclude a neutrality with the
French, but that the Director and Council were not vested with proper
powers for that purpose; that, whilst we were engaged at a distance
assisting him against his enemies, the French, joined by Monsieur
Bussy, might make an attempt on Calcutta; and that therefore I should
wait off Chandernagore, in hopes of receiving his leave to attack it.
Accordingly, on the 12th I encamped at the back of it, within a mile
of the fort; and on the 13th the Admiral received a letter from the
Nabob, the purport of which was, that we might act as we pleased with
respect to the French; and, having intelligence at the same time that
the troops he had sent to their assistance were withdrawn, I summoned
the place to surrender that night; but, receiving no answer, the next
morning I attacked their western battery, which they defended very
briskly the whole day, but at night abandoned it. A detachment I sent
about noon to the southward took post in a garden near the fort, and
within some of their batteries. The loss they had sustained at the
western battery, and the apprehension of their retreat being cut off by
our detachment, made them likewise desert that night all their works
to the southward; among the rest, a strong half-moon on the river
side, mounting heavy metal, and a battery of three guns playing down
the channel, both which must have annoyed our ships greatly in their
passage up. The batteries to the northward were all quitted at the same
time.

"On the 19th, the King's ships got to the Prussian gardens, about
a mile from the fort; but it was the 23d before they attempted to
pass the vessels which had been sunk by the enemy, opposite to the
half-moon. They weighed at daybreak, and in less than an hour were
abreast of the fort. A thirteen-inch mortar of ours, with several
cohorns and royals, had played incessantly the whole night; and when
the ships weighed, we opened two batteries very near the walls, one
of four pieces of cannon, the other three, all twenty-four-pounders;
and kept a continual discharge of musketry from the adjacent houses.
In short, the fire from the ships and the shore was so great, that
they capitulated in three hours. A copy of the terms granted them is
enclosed. You will observe the surrender is made to Admiral Watson;
but common report will be just in publishing how great a share the
land forces had in this conquest!" Clive, in his evidence before the
House of Commons, states, "that Admiral Watson's fleet surmounted
difficulties which he believes no other ships could have done, and that
it was impossible for him to do the officers of the squadron justice on
that occasion."

In a private letter[108] to Mr. Pigot, written upon the same occasion,
Clive observes, "I make no doubt but the forces are impatiently
expected at Madras. It is a very great blow that has detained them--no
less than the attack and taking of Chandernagore; of more consequence
to the Company, in my opinion, than the taking of Pondicherry itself.
It was a most magnificent and rich colony; the garrison consisted of
more than five hundred Europeans and seven hundred blacks, all carrying
arms; three hundred and sixty are prisoners, and near one hundred have
been suffered to give their parole, consisting of civil, military, and
inhabitants. Nearly sixty white ladies are rendered miserable by the
loss of this place. However, nothing has been wanting, either on the
Admiral's part or mine, to render their condition supportable: their
clothes, their linen, and every thing have been suffered to go out.

"I must refer you to the Committee's letter for many particulars. I
fear I shall not be able to send a list of military and artillery
stores by this conveyance, which are very great, and will abundantly
supply Calcutta. By the Nabob's letters, you will find of what a
wavering and pusillanimous disposition he is. However, I am in hopes
this last stroke will fix him. He has already performed almost every
article of the treaty; paid Mr. Watts the three lacs of rupees;
delivered up Cossimbazar, and all the other factories, with the money
and goods therein taken. The gentlemen write from thence, that little
or nothing is wanting.

"Our stay till August, which is now become unavoidable, will, I
hope, settle every thing here in the most advantageous manner for
the Company, and perhaps will induce the Nabob to give up all the
French factories. This will be driving them out root and branch. I am
well informed, without Chandernagore, the Islands must starve, and
Pondicherry suffer greatly. My inclinations always tend towards the
coast; and I hope to be with you, with a very considerable force,
in September. The lateness of the season makes the passage now very
uncertain; and the length of it would certainly cause the loss of a
great part of our forces.

"It was with great reluctance Mr. Watson consented I should sign the
articles of capitulation, though drawn out in his name, notwithstanding
it was impossible the fort could ever have been taken without our
assistance.

"We attacked the enemy six or seven days before the ships, and drove
them from eleven batteries, one of them by the river side, of very
heavy metal, under which were sunk four or five ships and vessels
to prevent the passage of the squadron, which could never have been
effected without mastering that battery. We erected one of five[109]
twenty-four-pounders within a hundred yards of the south-east bastion,
and another of three twenty-four-pounders within a hundred and fifty
yards of the north-east bastion; besides which, we manned all the tops
of the houses, and kept up such a fire of musketry, that the enemy
could not appear either on the ramparts or bastions, by which means the
fire was insignificant to what it would have been."

From this letter, and from one he wrote to Mr. Mabbot, the Chairman
of the Directors, there can be no doubt that Clive's intention was
to return to the coast as early as he could, and that he expected
everything would be settled by September, when the season would be
favourable for that voyage; but the jealousy and alarm of the Nabob
at the rising power of the English were greatly increased by the fall
of Chandernagore; and his character and past actions gave no security
against his intrigues and hostility, unless overawed by the presence of
a superior force, and the establishment of a commanding influence at
his court. The President of the Committee at Calcutta was unequal to
the duties now performed by Clive; nor was there one officer in Bengal
upon whom these could devolve with the slightest hope of preserving,
much less of improving, the advantages that had been obtained.

Placed in such circumstances, Clive, though he had received repeated
orders to repair to Fort St. George, was not therefore exempted from
the duty of exercising his judgment as to the course which it was
best for the general interests of the Company that he should pursue;
and he had to balance against that obedience which he owed, and
was anxious to pay to his superiors, the imminent danger which his
departure from Bengal would produce. The attack of Chandernagore had
been indispensable to give security to the English against an European
enemy: but the very success which had attended their arms upon this
and other occasions was likely, with a prince of Suraj-u-Dowlah's
character, to involve them in a further and more extensive scene of
hostilities.

This Clive foresaw before that operation commenced; and, writing to
the Committee at Calcutta upon this subject, he observed, "If you
attack Chandernagore, you cannot stop there; you must go further.
Having established yourself by force, and not by the consent of the
Nabob, he by force will endeavour to drive you out again." In a private
letter to Mr. Pigot, written a month after the fall of the French
settlement[110], he gives a vivid description of the Nabob's character,
and of the motives and feelings which he supposes to agitate his weak
and vacillating mind, at a period critical both for himself and for the
Company's establishments in Bengal.

"The most of the articles of the peace," he observes, "are complied
with; yet, from the tyranny, cowardice, and suspicion of the Nabob,
no dependence can be had upon him. No consideration could induce him
to deliver up the French: it is true he has ordered them out of his
dominions, and they are at some distance from his capital; but he
has retained them secretly in his pay, and has certainly written to
Monsieur Deleyrit and Bussy, to send men to his assistance. One day
he tears my letters, and turns out our vakeel, and orders his army to
march; he next countermands it, sends for the vakeel, and begs his
pardon for what he has done. Twice a week he threatens to impale Mr.
Watts: in short, he is a compound of every thing that is bad, keeps
company with none but his menial servants, and is universally hated and
despised by the great men. This induces me to acquaint you there is a
conspiracy going on against him by several of the great men, at the
head of whom is Jugget Seit himself, as also Cojah Wazeed. I have been
applied to for assistance, and every advantage promised the Company can
wish. The Committee are of opinion it should be given as soon as the
Nabob is secured. For my own part, I am persuaded, there can be neither
peace nor security while such a monster reigns."

"Mr. Watts and Omichund[111] are at Moorshedabad, and have many
meetings with the great men. The last letter I received from Mr. Watts,
he desires that our proposals may be sent, and that they only wait for
them to put every thing in execution; so that you may very shortly
expect to hear of a revolution which will put an end to all French
expectations of ever settling in this country again. The Patans, who
were coming this way, have been pacified by a sum of money, and are
returning to their own country. Had they approached near, every thing
would have been overset in this country, from three fourths of the
Nabob's army being against him. It is a most disagreeable circumstance,
to find that the troubles are likely to commence again: but the opinion
here is universal, that there can be neither peace nor trade without a
change of government."

When Chandernagore was taken, Clive's next object was to root out the
French from this quarter of India. This appears from all his letters,
public and private. It was, as he repeatedly states, his confirmed
opinion, that the English and their European rivals could not have
coexistence, as political powers, in India; and both had gone too far
to be able to recede. The superiority was, therefore, to be decided by
the sword; and on this ground, he deemed it to be his duty to follow
up the success which had attended the British arms, by the pursuit and
capture of such of the European enemy as yet remained in Bengal.

The corps under the command of M. Law, when joined by the deserters and
French officers, and men who had broken their parole, or escaped from
Chandernagore, amounted to only a hundred Europeans and sixty sepoys;
but they were, notwithstanding his protestations to the contrary,
protected by the Nabob, who evidently looked to them as auxiliaries in
a war which he anticipated with the English.

The hopes with which the French continued to feed him, and in which
they themselves probably indulged, of receiving reinforcements from
Bussy through Cuttack, were not of a nature to be treated with
neglect. The great plan formed by Dupleix, and executed by Bussy,
of establishing a paramount power and influence in the Deckan, had,
to a great degree, succeeded; and though commercial considerations
had, during the short interval of peace in Europe, led to an opposite
policy, which condemned the whole system pursued by the French governor
as one of irrational ambition, and irreconcileable with the interests
of the French company, the moment war with England occurred, prudential
resolutions were forgotten, and every preparation was made to establish
the French supremacy in India. Godeheu, who succeeded Dupleix, and who,
at first, appeared only anxious to abandon all his predecessor had
gained, now sought to preserve and improve every advantage which yet
remained, as the result of former measures. Bussy was promised early
support, and directed to maintain the possessions ceded to France,
which extended six hundred miles along the coast of Coromandel, and
Orissa, from Moodappely south, to the pagoda of Juggernaut, north.

Under such circumstances, nothing appeared more likely, than that this
able and enterprising officer should have reinforced his countrymen
in Bengal: and the probable consequences of a party of any strength
co-operating with the Nabob, were of a character that justified all
the jealousy and alarm which Admiral Watson and Clive entertained upon
this subject; and quite authorised them in those decided measures
they adopted for the permanent security of the British factories and
territories in Bengal and Bahar. To have stopped short--much more to
have left the country--before this important object was accomplished,
would have been to cast away the fruits of their success, and to have
uselessly wasted all the blood and treasure that had been already
expended in this memorable expedition.

That these were the sentiments of Clive at this period, is proved by
the purport of all his letters, public and private; and these afford
strong evidence that he by no means contemplated success as certain. In
a letter (dated the 11th of March) to Mr. Orme, who was his agent at
Madras, he requests him to remit his money to Calcutta, to be sent to
England, as "the times were dangerous." Such facts are important, as
they prove, that the measures he found himself compelled at this period
to adopt originated in a sense of duty, and not in that spirit of
ambition, and desire of wealth and personal aggrandizement, which have
been stated by some as the chief, if not sole, motives of his conduct
at this remarkable epoch of his life.

I have already spoken of the designs of the French, and the means they
had of carrying them into execution. I shall now examine how far they
were likely to be aided by Suraj-u-Dowlah.

Aliverdi Khan, the grand-uncle and predecessor of the reigning Nabob,
had protected those European factories which he found established under
the authority of firmans, or mandates, from the emperors of Delhi. He
gained an increase of revenue by the duties on that commerce which the
enterprise of these foreign merchants encouraged; and he taxed the
wealth they accumulated, by making them give to him or his officers
occasional presents, and by compelling them to contribute their portion
of the sums he had so frequently to pay the Mahrattas, to purchase
either exemption from attack, or the retreat of their predatory bands
from Bengal. The sums thus levied were, during Aliverdi's government,
not immoderate; and the policy of that able prince made him so vary
the time of his demands, that they came at distinct periods, and under
different pretexts, upon the different factories: for though, no doubt,
fearful of the union of the Europeans settled in his country, he was
sufficiently acquainted with their national jealousies to know, that
nothing but a dread of ruin, operating at the same moment upon them
all, could lead them to combine in any effort to oppose his demands.

His grand-nephew, Suraj-u-Dowlah, was of a very different character
from Aliverdi Khan. The latter, trained amid the vicissitudes of
fortune, showed, in every measure he adopted, that he merited the
throne which he had usurped. His successor, cradled in prosperity, came
into power without an effort, and evinced, in every action, a weak
and feeble mind, that had no objects but those of self-gratification,
which he sought by means that were usually as cruel and unjust, as they
were arbitrary and violent. This prince early showed that he owned no
check upon such dispositions but that of personal fear: his cowardice
fully equalled his presumption, and both were excessive. In looking
round for objects of plunder after he ascended the musnud, or throne,
the English settlements at Cossimbazar and Calcutta attracted his
peculiar attention, on account of the reputed wealth, not only of the
Europeans, but of the natives who had settled under their protection.
The injuries and cruelties he had, in the prosecution of this object,
inflicted upon the nation and upon the individuals whom he had wantonly
attacked, were of a nature which a mind like his could not believe
would ever be forgotten or forgiven. The disgrace he had sustained, in
being obliged to fly before the British arms, and to purchase peace
by concessions and a partial restitution of plunder, rankled in his
breast; and, alarmed at a power he had hitherto contemned, he sought
the alliance of the French, whose co-operation he now regretted he had
not earlier obtained.

The government of Chandernagore had so far conciliated him, that they
refused to join the English in their efforts to compel him to make
reparation for his injustice and oppression; though the armistice
which they desired was offered them as the reward of their adopting
a cause which, had commercial considerations alone regulated their
proceedings, was obviously that of every European settled in Bengal.
But Suraj-u-Dowlah well knew that other feelings actuated both the
English and French, and that each desired the total expulsion of the
other from his territories. Acting upon this knowledge, and with that
deep exasperation which belongs to the wounded pride of a despot, he
secretly courted the French, to avenge himself on those by whom he
had been defeated and humbled. He at first sent aid to Chandernagore.
His subsequent assent, imperfect as it was, to the attack of that
place, was only extorted by the fear of the moment; and it was
retracted almost as soon as given. He still cherished hopes that the
French garrison might repel their enemies; but their early surrender,
and the whole character of the attack, particularly the tremendous
fire of the men-of-war, filled his mind with a mixture of dread, and
irreconcileable jealousy and hatred, towards a nation who, in a few
months after he had exulted in his triumph over their defenceless
factory, had established themselves in his country, in a position which
already caused the native princes and chiefs to view them as the future
arbiters of India.

The British commanders were, no doubt, at this period prepared to
consent to any settlement, which gave them indemnity for the past, and
security for the future, rather than incur the hazards of war, at a
moment when they could, in case of reverse, expect no succour: for the
very force by which it must be carried on was urgently required on the
coast of Coromandel. But the mind of Suraj-u-Dowlah was quite incapable
of comprehending the nature and force of such grounds of action. He
probably thought they would act as he would have done if success had
favoured his arms: perhaps he still rested on his own strength, and
the hopes held out by the French. Whatever were his motives, so far
from showing a disposition to pursue a course which might lead the
British authorities to confide in him, he hurried on to the adoption
of every measure that could produce a contrary impression; and, in a
very short period subsequent to the fall of Chandernagore, it became
quite obvious, that his continuing Nabob of Bengal was irreconcileable
with every prospect of peace to the English settled in that country;
and that the departure of the fleet, and a very considerable proportion
of the troops, for Madras, would be the certain signal for renewed
hostilities. But the immediate causes of the war, which terminated in
the dethronement and death of this ill-fated prince, must now be stated.

The sentiments Clive had formed of the Nabob's character and policy
have been fully given in his letter[112] to Mr. Pigot, already quoted.
The proofs that his conclusions were just are to be found in various
documents, but particularly in the letters from Mr. Watts[113], and in
the communications made by the Nabob to the French officers Bussy and
Law, some of which were intercepted at the time, and others found after
the battle of Plassey.

Before Chandernagore was taken, accounts of the Nabob's overtures to
Bussy had been sent by Mr. Watts, the correctness of whose statements
was corroborated at that period from other quarters, and their truth
subsequently confirmed, by the copies of the letters being found at
Moorshedabad.

In a letter to Bussy, about the end of February, the Nabob
observes[114]: "These disturbers of my country, the Admiral and Colonel
Clive (Sabut Jung[115]), whom bad fortune attend! without any reason
whatever, are warring against Zubat ul Toojar[116] (M. Renault), the
governor of Chandernagore. This you will learn from his letter. I, who
in all things seek the good of mankind, assist him in every respect,
and have sent him the best of my troops, that he may join with them,
and fight the English; and if it become necessary, I will join him
myself. I hope in God these English, who are unfortunate, will be
punished for the disturbances they have raised. Be confident; look
on my forces as your own. I have wrote you before for two thousand
soldiers and musqueteers under the command of two trusty chiefs. I
persuade myself you have already sent them, as I desired; should you
not, I desire you will do me the pleasure to send them immediately.
Further particulars you will learn from M. Renault. Oblige me with
frequent news of your health."

In another letter, written in the end of March, the Nabob adds: "I
am advised that you have arrived at Echapore. This news gives me
pleasure: the sooner you come here, the greater satisfaction I shall
have in meeting you. What can I write of the perfidy of the English?
They have, without ground, picked a quarrel with M. Renault, and taken
by force his factory. They want now to quarrel with M. Law, your chief
at Cossimbazar; but I will take care to oppose and overthrow all their
proceedings. When you come to Ballasore, I will then send M. Law to
your assistance, unless you forbid his setting out. Rest assured of
my good will towards you and your Company; and to convince you of my
sincerity, I now send purwannahs (orders) to Deedar Ali, and Ramajee
Pundit, and to Rajaram Singh, that, as soon as you may enter the
province, they may meet and lend you all possible assistance, and not,
on any pretence, impede your march, both at Cuttack, Ballasore, and
Midnapore."

Copies of these letters had been seen at the time of dispatch by
Cojah Wazeed, who had communicated their contents to Mr. Watts; and
this intelligence was corroborated by the fact that servants of the
Nabob, in charge of an elephant and jewels for M. Bussy, had passed
Ballasore; and by the protection given to M. Law, who, notwithstanding
his professions to the contrary, was retained in the service of
Suraj-u-Dowlah.

That prince at first seemed not to oppose the surrender of this small
party of the French to the English; he afterwards pretended to banish
them from his dominions, and they marched from Moorshedabad for Patna,
but in consequence of a note[117] from the Nabob, M. Law remained at
Rajhmahal, the manager of which district had been directed to supply
him with money, and to aid him, in every way he could, until Bussy's
approach.

The Nabob by these acts, by his positive refusal to allow the English
to proceed up the river, by his non-performance of some of the articles
of the treaty, and by his advancing a part of his army to Plassey, had
placed himself in a position hostile to the Company: but he artfully
desired to throw the odium of renewed hostilities upon the English.
He complained of the continuance in the field of the troops under
Clive, and of the fleet's lying off Chandernagore. If the British
commanders would return to Calcutta, or leave the river, he would, he
said, withdraw his advanced corps from Plassey, and remain on friendly
terms, as he would then be convinced that the object of the English
was commerce, not war! This was the purport of several communications;
but every day brought proof of their insincerity, and shewed that the
Nabob's sole object was to lull them into a fatal security, till, from
the departure of their force and the arrival of his French allies, he
could accomplish his design of extirpating them from his dominions.

An intercepted letter[118] from M. Law to the chief of one of the
lesser French factories, afforded, of itself, proof of this fact, had
any been wanting: but the indiscretion of the Nabob was too great to
allow him to conceal his designs; and a number of the chief nobles and
ministers of his government, who had long been discontented with his
rule, perceiving what must early happen, sought the alliance of the
English, concluding that they must desire the dethronement of a prince
whose continuance in power was incompatible with their existence.

One of the chief causes that had hitherto kept the Nabob in check, was
the dread of the Affghân conquerors of Delhi: but news had arrived
of their prince Ahmed Abdalla having returned to his own country,
and its effects were soon visible in the threatening language and
conduct of Suraj-u-Dowlah towards the resident, who now earnestly
recommended Clive to lose no time in decidedly attaching himself to
the party already formed against the Nabob. In one letter[119] Mr.
Watts observes, "Jugget Seit, Runjutroy, Omichund, and others, in
short all degrees of persons, are persuaded he (the Nabob) will break
his agreement, and attack us whenever he is disengaged, or our forces
weakened by your leaving us and the departure of the men-of-war, or
whenever he can be assisted by the French."

The resident commences a letter, written two days after the one quoted,
with the following strong expression: "The Nabob will not keep his
agreement. This you may depend upon." He mentions that Suraj-u-Dowlah
himself publicly speaks in this tone; but adds that three fourths of
his army were his enemies.

The most serious of all the dangers with which the English were
threatened at this period, was the expected arrival of Bussy, of whose
real movements they had no correct intelligence. We find a letter,
under date the 14th of May, A. D. 1757, from Mr. Drake, Governor of
Calcutta, to Colonel Clive, which states: "The report that has so long
been rumoured of M. Bussy's march into this province is now verified,
by advice from the Ballasore factory of the 10th instant, certifying
that M. Bussy was advanced five days on this side Cuttack, with seven
hundred Europeans and five thousand sepoys."

This was the very circumstance, the probability of the occurrence of
which had constituted the chief ground on which the Admiral and Clive
had urged the Nabob to give them substantial proof of his friendly
disposition, by abandoning wholly all connection with their enemies.
Admiral Watson, in his correspondence with him, had insisted strongly
upon this point. Alluding to the Nabob's frequent evasions upon this
and other subjects, the Admiral writes in his letter[120] of the 19th
of April, "I observe in your letter the following particulars, viz.
That for my satisfaction, and according to our mutual agreement to look
upon each other's enemies as our own, you have expelled M. Law and his
adherents from your dominions, and given strict orders, &c. &c. My
brother, Mr. Watts, who is entrusted with all the Company's concerns,
always writes me the particulars of your intended favours towards us;
but I have never found that what he writes is put into execution;
neither do I find that what you wrote me in your letter, dated the 1st
of Rajub (22d of March), is yet complied with. You therein assured me
that you would fulfil all the articles you had agreed to, by the 15th
of that moon. Have you ever yet complied with them all? No.--How then
can I place any confidence in what you write, when your actions are not
correspondent with your promises? Or how can I reconcile your telling
me in so sacred a manner you will be my ally, and assist me with your
forces against the French, when you have given a purwannah to M. Law
and his people to go towards Patna, in order to escape me, and tell me
it is for my satisfaction, and in observance of the mutual agreement,
you have taken this measure? Is this an act of friendship? Or is it in
this manner I am to understand you will assist me? Or am I to draw a
conclusion from what you write? or what you do? You are too wise not
to know, when a man tells you one thing, and does the direct contrary,
which you ought to believe. Why then do you endeavour to persuade me
you will be my friend, when at the same time you give my enemies your
protection, furnish them with ammunition, and suffer them to go out
of your dominions with three pieces of cannon? Their effects I esteem
a trifling circumstance, and as far as they will contribute to do
justice to your people who are creditors to the French Company, I have
no objection to your seizing them for their use; for money is what I
despise, and accumulating riches to myself is what I did not come out
for. But I have already told you, and now repeat it again, that while
a Frenchman remains in this kingdom, I will never cease pursuing him:
but if they deliver themselves up, they shall find me merciful, and I
am confident those who have already fallen into my hands will do me
the justice to say, that they have been treated with a much greater
generosity than is usual by the general custom of war."

Clive, in several letters to Mr. Watts, written immediately after the
fall of Chandernagore, urges the surrender or expulsion of the French,
as an indispensable condition of the Nabob's continued friendship
with the English. Every artifice was used by Suraj-u-Dowlah to evade
compliance with this urgent and repeated demand. He first pleaded
the debts due by the French to his subjects:--he was told, that the
property of their Company could be made responsible for such debts.
He next stated the loss of revenue to the Emperor, from duties paid
on their trade:--this duty[121], he was told, had been estimated at
60,000 rupees, and would henceforward be paid by the English. Driven by
these propositions from every ground of evasion, and not yet willing
to declare openly his real intentions, the Nabob publicly directed the
march of M. Law towards the dominions of the vizier of Oude, but with
no design, as has been before shown, that the French should leave his
territories.

During the siege of Chandernagore, Roydullub, the principal minister
of Suraj-u-Dowlah, had been sent, with a considerable body of men, to
occupy an entrenched camp at Plassey. This armed force, which was meant
to awe the English into attention to the Nabob's wishes, was not only
continued after the French settlement was taken, but was reinforced by
a party under the Bukhshee[122] (or commander of the army), Jaffier
Ali Khan, and the future intentions of the Nabob were almost publicly
proclaimed, when his officers not only prevented the passage of a
few sepoys up the river to Cossimbazar, but stopped the supplies of
ammunition and stores necessary to restore that factory to its former
state.

These orders, Mr. Watts wrote Clive, the Nabob's officers were
commanded to enforce, by cutting the noses and ears of every one that
attempted to pass the stations where they were posted.

Such a state of affairs could not continue long. The important
events of which they were the prelude will occupy the next chapter;
but before we enter upon the narrative of them, it will be useful
to take a concise view of the nature and construction of the power
of Suraj-u-Dowlah, as well as the reputation and influence of his
principal leaders and officers: for without such knowledge it is quite
impossible to understand, much less to judge, the conduct of Clive in
those wide scenes of intrigue, war, and negotiation, into which he was
at this period compelled to enter, or else to abandon his half-executed
enterprise.

FOOTNOTES:

[102] The distance of the northern part of the country ceded to Bussy
was not two hundred miles from Calcutta, through Cuttack.

[103] Admiral Watson's letter, dated March 6th, 1757.

[104] 7th March, 1757.

[105] Mr. Scrafton, in a letter to Mr. Watts, dated the 20th of March,
1757, written by desire of Colonel Clive, observes, "The ten[106]
letters received from the Nabob yesterday are sufficient evidences of
his irresolution and variable disposition. Besides these letters, one
Mutrumul, whom the Nabob mentions as a person in whom he has great
confidence, has been here. The chief purpose of his embassy seems to
be to act as a mediator, if peace is to be effected between the French
and us; but, if not, it should appear the Nabob will trouble himself
no more about it. At all events, things no longer remain upon the
Nabob's determination. The ships and batteries will all begin to play
at daybreak in the morning; and two days will, at the utmost, decide
their fate."

[106] _Sic_: query, _two_?

[107] Owing to the anchor of the Kent not holding, she drifted from her
appointed station to that fixed upon for the Salisbury, close to the
south-east bastion; and the latter vessel was, consequently, thrown out
of action.

[108] 29th March, 1757.

[109] Called a four-gun battery in Clive's report to the Governor of
Fort St. George, p. 194.

[110] 30th April, 1757.

[111] Omichund was a native agent employed by Mr. Watts. A full account
of this person will be given hereafter.

[112] Vide p. 199.

[113] Mr. Watts continued through this period Resident at the Nabob's
court at Moorshedabad.

[114] Reports of House of Commons, vol. iii. p. 221.

[115] Sabut Jung (which signifies "daring in war") is the title by
which Clive is to this day known among the natives of India.

[116] Zubat-ul-Toojar, the title of the French chief, means "the
essence or excellence of merchants."

[117] The following is the translation of the note from Suraj-u-Dowlah
to M. Law: "I send you ten thousand rupees for expenses. Remain quiet
at Rajhmahal. When M. Bahadre, &c. come on this side Cuttack, I will
then send for you." Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii. p. 221.

[118] The following is a copy of this letter: "Je viens de recevoir une
lettre du Nabob, par laquelle il m'ordonne de retourner à Muxadabad.
Il vient, dit-il, se joindre à nous, pour tomber sur les Anglais. J'ai
reçu aussi une lettre du Sieur Çhangeau, qui me donne d'assez bonnes
nouvelles. Je suis surpris, que vous ne m'avez pas écrit; car je ne
puis croire que vous soyez tout-à-fait ignorant de ce que se passe.
J'envois M. de Sinfray au Nabob, avec lequel il est chargé d'entrer
en négociation. Il a ordre de rester à notre loge. Comme il est votre
ancien, vous aurez la bonté de le reconnoître pour chef, et de lui
obéir en cette qualité. Peut-être irai-je bientôt vous trouver."

[119] 26th April, 1757.

[120] Ive's Voyage, p. 149.

[121] The particulars of this offer are in a letter from Mr. Walsh to
Mr. Watts of the 11th April, 1757, written by order of Colonel Clive.

[122] Bukhshee, literally means "Paymaster;" but that office is,
in native armies, almost invariably associated with the station of
commander-in-chief.




CHAP. V.


The power established by the Mahommedans in India has never varied in
its character from their first invasion of that country to the present
time. The different qualities of the individuals by whom it has been
exercised, have introduced a variety of shades both in the mode and
substance of their rule, but the general features have remained the
same. The Mahommedan emperors of Delhi, the Subadars of divisions of
the empire, and the Nabobs and chiefs of kingdoms and principalities,
supplanted and expelled, or extirpated, sovereigns and princes of the
Hindu military tribe:--but while they succeeded to the power which
these potentates had held, the management of the finance and revenue,
and all those minuter arrangements of internal policy, on which the
good order of the machine of government must ever depend, remained
very nearly in the same hands in which the Mahommedans had found
them. The unwarlike but well-educated Hindus of the Brahmin or the
mercantile castes continued, as under the martial princes of their
own tribe, to manage almost all the concerns of the state. A Hindu,
under the denomination of minister, or as Naib (or deputy), continued
at the head of the exchequer; and in this office he was connected
with the richest bankers and monied Hindus of the country. Princes
had private hoards,--but there was no public treasury. Advances were
made to individuals and bodies of men by bankers (denominated Seits
or Soucars), who were repaid by orders on the revenue, and obtained a
double profit on the disbursement and the receipt of money. The proud
and thoughtless Mahommedan prince, anxious only for the means necessary
for his purposes of pleasure or ambition, was not over-scrupulous as
to the terms he granted to the financial agents: and the advantages
they gained, combined with their simple and frugal habits[123], enabled
them to amass immense wealth. This they well knew how to employ, for
purposes both of accumulation, and of establishing political influence;
commanding, as they did, the money resources of the country, the
prince, his officers, and army, were all in a great degree dependent
upon them; and to treat them with extreme severity was certain to incur
obloquy, and often defeated its aim, since, by their natural character,
they were as patient of suffering as they were tenacious of their
gains.

Besides, the wealth of Hindu ministers and managers was usually
deposited with bankers; and the injury done to credit by acts of
injustice or oppression towards any of the latter class, affected
such numbers, as to prove ruinous to the reputation, and often to the
interests, of the despot by whom it was attempted.

The Hindu ministers, or revenue officers, had not the same number of
retainers as the Mahommedan. They were, therefore, seldom in the same
degree objects of jealousy or dread: but though they were from this
cause less exposed to extreme violence, they were more frequently
objects of extortion; and for this they were better prepared, both from
the great profits they made, and from their parsimonious habits.

A very quick and intelligent Mahommedan prince[124], on being asked
why he gave so decided a preference to Hindu managers and renters over
those of his own religion, replied, "that a Mahommedan was like a
sieve,--much of what was poured in went through; while a Hindu was like
a sponge, which retained all, but on pressure gave back, as required,
what it had absorbed!"

But there were other reasons which prompted Mahommedan princes to
employ and encourage Hindus, both at their court and in their armies.
They formed a counterbalance to the ambition and turbulence of their
relatives, and of the chiefs and followers of their own race. This
feeling operated from the emperors on the throne of Delhi, when in the
very plenitude of their power, down to the lowest chief: and it is from
its action combined with that influence which the wealth and qualities
of the Hindus obtained, that we are, in a great measure, to account for
the easy establishment and long continuance of the Mahommedan power in
India. The new dominion was attended with little of change, except to
the Hindu sovereign and his favourites. The lesser Rajas (or princes)
gave their allegiance and paid tribute to a Mahommedan instead of a
Hindu superior, while their condition and local power continued nearly
the same.

Hindu ministers and officers served probably to greater profit the idle
and dissipated Moghul, than they could have done a master of their
own tribe; and as there was complete religious toleration, and their
ancient and revered usages were seldom or never outraged, they were too
divided a people upon other subjects to unite in any effort to expel
conquerors, who, under the influence of various motives, left to them
almost all, except the name, of power.

From the composition and character of such governments, it is obvious
that neither individuals nor the community can recognise, much less
feel an attachment to what we call the state, as separated from the
persons who, for the time being, preside over the different branches
of its administration. The sovereign has his servants and adherents;
his tributaries, chiefs, commanders, and officers have theirs; but
the latter owe no fidelity or allegiance, except to their immediate
superiors. Each individual of this body has personal privileges, and
enjoys protection in certain rights, from established usages, which,
affecting all of the class to which he belongs, cannot be violated
with impunity: but as there is no regular constitution of government
supported by fixed succession to the throne, men derive no benefit
from the state, and owe it therefore no duty. From these facts it is
evident that nothing can be so erroneous as to judge the conduct of
the natives of India, amid the changes and revolutions to which the
governments of that country are continually exposed, by those rules
which apply to nations which enjoy civil liberty and equal laws.
Treachery and ingratitude to their chief or patron are with them the
basest of crimes: and obedience and attachment to those who support
them, the highest of virtues. According as they fail in, or fulfil,
the obligations which the relations of the society in which they live
impose, men are deemed infamous or praise-worthy: and to the reciprocal
ties by which such bands are held together, the prince and chief are
as often indebted for their safety, as their followers for the just
reward of their devoted service. The monarch is secure upon his throne
no longer than while he can preserve a body of personal adherents. The
chief that is threatened by his sovereign looks to his followers for
support or revenge; while the latter, in the lesser vicissitudes to
which they are subject, expect with equal confidence the protection of
him to whom they give their allegiance.

In countries where men are influenced by such motives, the dethronement
of a prince is regarded as no more than the fall of a successful leader
or chief of a party; and the frequency of such an occurrence has
perhaps tended, more than all other causes, to temper the exercise of
despotic power, and to compel sovereigns who owned no other check to
seek its continuance, by reconciling to their rule those by whom it was
so liable to be subverted.

The construction of the government of Suraj-u-Dowlah was like that of
other Mahommedan states: but the elements of which it was composed
wanted the controlling spirit of a superior like Aliverdi Khan.

Among the chiefs of the army there were several who early took alarm
at the excesses of their young prince, and who, confiding more in
their own influence and strength than in his justice or consideration,
assumed an attitude of very doubtful allegiance.

The greater number of these leaders enjoyed jaghiers, or estates, on
the produce of which they maintained a band of followers. The principal
person of this class was the Bukhshee, or commander, of the army, Meer
Jaffier, a soldier of fortune, who had raised himself so high in the
estimation of Aliverdi Khan, that he had not only promoted him to the
highest military rank, but had given him his daughter in marriage.

The country of Bengal has ever been famous for the wealth and talent of
the higher classes of its Hindu inhabitants; and we find, throughout
its history, that these have filled the chief offices of the state.
This was the case at the period of which we are treating. The managers
and renters--of whom Ramnarrain the governor of the province of Patna,
and Raja Ram the manager of Midnapore, were the principal--were
almost all Hindus. Nor were the station and influence of this tribe
less in the army and at court. Monick Chund, who had been governor of
Calcutta, held a high military rank, and Roydullub, the dewan, or
minister of finance, had great influence, which was increased by his
being intimately associated with Jugget Seit, the representative of
the richest soucar, or banking firm, in India; and who, through means
of his riches and extensive connections, possessed equal influence at
Lucknow[125] and Delhi as at Moorshedabad.

The above were the leading persons of the state, each of whom had
numerous adherents who looked to them, not to the prince, for support
and advancement. It is a very remarkable fact, and one that singularly
illustrates the character of Suraj-u-Dowlah, that he appears to have
been the only person for whom no one felt attachment, and in whom no
one had confidence. The Nabob, like princes of similar character,
had unworthy favourites, among whom a Hindu, named Mohun Lal, held a
distinguished place, and without filling any high office, had at one
period more power than any person in this weak and divided government.


Considerations of mutual security had for some time led Roydullub and
Meer Jaffier to a secret understanding, and pledges of friendship had
passed between them; but this connection appears to have been, at
first, formed more for their personal security than with any purpose
hostile to the Nabob; for it was not until a chief called Khuda Yar
Khan Lattee, who aimed at the musnud, had made proposals to Mr. Watts,
which were supported by Jugget Seit, that Meer Jaffier came forward
with an offer to act in concert with the English for the dethronement
of a prince, the continuance of whose reign, all seemed to agree, must
prove destructive to the country.

We cannot have a more convincing proof of the mixed contempt and
dread with which his own subjects regarded Suraj-u-Dowlah, than is
afforded by the transactions of Moorshedabad at this period. Even
the professional caution of Jugget Seit was roused into bold action,
and his name was added to the list of those who invited the English
to a confederacy, which soon spread too wide for concealment; and
which, combining men of all classes and all interests, could only
obtain success by the existence of a general sentiment of distrust and
detestation of the ruler, against whom it was directed.[126]

Notwithstanding appearances and professions, it was with the greatest
hesitation that the Committee of Calcutta ventured on the scene[127]
that now opened to them; and certainly nothing could have justified
the course of proceeding that was adopted, but a conviction that a
change in the reigning prince was indispensable to the existence of
the English in Bengal, combined with a firm belief that the means
which presented themselves were the best to effect that change: but it
was the genius of Clive which guided their councils, and pointed out
the road by which he was to lead them to safety and honour, through
a labyrinth of such apparently inextricable windings that even his
experience and courage were at times startled by its intricacies.

Clive, having received several despatches from Mr. Watts[129], which,
while they established the justice of the conclusions regarding what
was to be expected from Suraj-u-Dowlah, pointed out the dangers of
delay, wrote to Admiral Watson, requesting his opinion on the measures
to be pursued; but the Admiral declined giving it; "as the squadron,"
he observes, "is at present in no condition to act; or, indeed, if
the ships were, do I know of any use they would be at present in this
river, when every thing is done that they are capable of undertaking.
You, gentlemen of the Committee, will therefore best judge what steps
will now be necessary for the Company's interest."[130]

In a letter to Mr. Watts, of the 23d of April, Clive expresses the
following sentiments upon the extraordinary conduct of the Nabob:--"I
have received both your favours of the 14th and 18th. The Nabob's
behaviour makes it very difficult to pursue such measures as may not,
in their consequence, be approved or disapproved of according to our
success. His late transactions carry with them the appearance of an
amendment in the situation of his affairs: surely he has received some
hope of Bussy's approach, or has accommodated matters with the Patans.
If they were approaching, I think he would never put us at defiance,
which I think he has done by his message to you.

"If he has ordered the French out of his dominions, why are they to
take the route to Patna? a route directly contrary to that of Golconda.
I wish, at all events--now the French are gone--you would send the
money and effects to Calcutta immediately, for fear of the worst.

"If Mr. Law and all the gentlemen could be prevailed upon to allow the
common men to be made prisoners, and themselves to be free on condition
of going to Pondicherry, it would be better than letting them travel
through the country."

Clive, in this letter, alludes to a message which the Nabob had
desired Mr. Watts to send to him, intimating that the conduct of the
English, in the proceedings regarding the French, "looked more like a
desire to rekindle war, than having their thoughts fixed on trade and
merchandise."

In a private letter from the Resident to Mr. Walsh[131], secretary
of Colonel Clive (dated 20th April), he observes, "Before I received
your letter enclosing the Nabob's, that letter which was forwarded by
Nuncomar[132] was delivered, on which the Nabob was much displeased;
and on our vakeel going to him this afternoon, before he had time to
speak or deliver the Colonel's letter to him he ordered him out of
his presence; and said, that notwithstanding, to satisfy us, he had
permitted us to take Chandernagore, and had ordered the French here
out of his dominions, yet we were not contented, but were continually
plaguing him with letters about delivering up the French and their
effects: therefore, having done so much to please us, his patience was
worn out. He could suffer no more, but saw he must be obliged again to
march down against us."

Other circumstances occurred at this period, which distinctly proved
the jealous and hostile spirit with which Suraj-u-Dowlah continued to
view the English. A small detachment of sepoys, under Captain Grant,
had been ordered to Cossimbazar; but Mr. Watts wrote, desiring that
officer to return. In his letter to Clive, of the 28th of April, he
observes, "As the Nabob will not allow a Tellingy[133] soldier, or any
ammunition, to come this way, and as he has threatened to treat those
he takes severely, I thought it prudent to desire Captain Grant and his
party to return, lest they should meet with some affront."

Clive, in a letter to Mr. Watts[134], observes, "After the Nabob's last
message I cannot depend upon his friendship; and therefore shall get
every thing ready for a march. I shall consult the Committee, and not
willingly undertake any thing which may occasion a rupture without I am
obliged to it; notwithstanding I shall write the Nabob in high terms. I
dare say there will be no objection to sparing the fifty cannon, if the
Nabob will but convince us of his sincerity of intention by securing
the French."

A letter of the same date was despatched to Mr. Collet, in charge of
the factory at Cossimbazar.

"I think it necessary to advise you," Clive states, "that at a
committee held here this day, it was agreed, in consideration of the
uncertainty of the Nabob's disposition, to withdraw all money and
effects from the subordinates as fast as possible, and that no more
than a corporal and six men, with the Bucksarries, should remain at
Cossimbazar; the rest to return here with the treasure. I shall send
up by boat two of my officers and twenty sepoys, with some spare arms
and ammunition, to escort the treasure likewise; as most of your people
are deserters, and I am uncertain if with arms. You will please to get
the treasure properly packed up, and provide boats, as well for that as
the men of the garrison who are to come. No particular secrecy is to be
used in this matter, but to be transacted in the usual manner."

Notwithstanding these preparations, it appears that even at this period
hopes were entertained of Suraj-u-Dowlah changing his proceedings so
far as to make it possible to preserve peace with him. In answer to
a letter[135] from Mr. Watts, Clive observes, "I wrote the Nabob a
letter a few days ago, which will reconcile him to us, and calm his
resentment:" but emphatically adds, "If he is resolved to sacrifice us,
we must avoid it by striking the first blow."

Suraj-u-Dowlah continued, however, to pursue his course in the most
infatuated manner, while the storm gathered thick around him. The
state of the Nabob's mind, and the intrigues now forming, are strongly
depicted in a secret letter[136] from Clive to Admiral Watson. "I
should be very glad," he observes, "to pay you my respects at Calcutta;
but the critical situation of the Company's affairs will not admit of
my quitting the camp on any consideration. The last letter I wrote the
Nabob he tore in a violent passion, and ordered our vakeel out of the
durbar. He sent for Meer Jaffier, and offered him ten lacs of rupees
if he would march down and destroy us; and he has been often heard to
say they would extirpate the English. The next morning he was sorry for
what he had done, sent for the vakeel, and gave him a dress. I have not
received a letter from him this many a day. In short, there is such a
confusion and discontent at Moorshedabad, from the Nabob's weak conduct
and tyranny, that I have received certain advice of several great men;
among whom are Jugget Seit and Meer Jaffier, being in league together
to cut him off, and set up Khuda Yar Khan Lattee, a man of great
family, power, and riches, supported tooth and nail by Jugget Seit."

Clive, at this critical juncture, was not merely left alone to the
resources of his own mind, but was embarrassed by the conduct of those
who should have aided him. The Committee of Calcutta, though they had
approved of the communications which had passed between him and Meer
Jaffier, now stated their opinion that the negotiation into which
he had entered was of too delicate a nature to be trusted to paper,
and proposed sending a confidential European agent to Mr. Watts. The
Committee also expressed themselves dissatisfied with the expense which
attended the troops having remained so long in the field.

Clive, in his reply to this letter[137], after stating his surprise
at its purport, observes, "You surely forget, gentlemen, that at a
committee held here as late as the 23d, I laid my letters before
you, consulted with you on the general measures to be taken in the
conduct of our affairs with the Government, and was desired to manage
a certain secret correspondence at the durbar. What has since come
to my knowledge I have communicated to the President; and, indeed, I
cannot think I have ever been deficient in acquainting you with all
particulars, and advising with you whenever the subject was important
enough to require it.

"It will not be improper to send a European of capacity and secrecy,
as you observe, to Mr. Watts; but if you mean thereby, that nothing on
so nice a subject is to be committed to writing, you may have occasion
to despatch many such persons before the negotiation is concluded. Let
me observe to you, a correspondence in cyphers, as now practised, is
not less secret, and doubtless much more expeditious, which is of great
moment in particular conjunctures.

"By your manner of expressing yourselves, with regard to putting the
troops into garrison, it somewhat appears as if I had unnecessarily
kept them in the field. Give me leave to say, gentlemen, I am equally
desirous with you of saving every possible expense to the Honourable
Company, and that it is long that I have waited for an opportunity of
going into quarters: but let me ask you, whether the situation of
affairs has admitted of it hitherto? I fully intend, in a day or two,
to put the coast troops into garrison at Chandernagore, and to send
the rest to Calcutta, if nothing very material occurs to prevent it.
The former are entirely under my command; and you may be assured, as
I will never make use of the power vested in me to the injury of the
Honourable Company's affairs, that I will be as far from suffering
you to take away any part of it. I say thus much to prevent further
disagreeable intimations, which can tend to no good end."

About this period, a letter was received by Clive from the Paishwah
Badjerow, expressing his indignation at the treatment the English had
received from Suraj-u-Dowlah, and offering his aid to avenge their
wrongs. The Paishwah proposed, on their co-operating with his troops in
the invasion of Bengal, to repay double the amount of the losses that
had been sustained, and to vest the commerce of the Ganges exclusively
in the East India Company. Though this letter was delivered by the
Mahratta agent at Calcutta, a doubt appears to have been entertained as
to the character of the communication. It was even surmised to be an
artifice of Suraj-u-Dowlah to discover the real sentiments and designs
of the British authorities. Clive, who had no intention of inviting
the destructive aid of a Mahratta army, sent the letter to the Nabob,
concluding, that, if it was genuine, he would receive such a mark of
confidence as a proof of friendship;--and if he had himself forged it,
there could not be a more complete counteraction of his design. The
letter was genuine; and the Nabob expressed himself much gratified by
the conduct of Clive, who, on this occasion and others, endeavoured to
remove the suspicions that Suraj-u-Dowlah entertained of the designs of
the confederates.

As one means of lulling him into security, he ordered the English
troops into garrison, stating that he had done so in expectation that
the Nabob would follow his example, by recalling the detachment from
Plassey. He observed, in a letter to the Nabob, "that, while the
armies continued in the field, their enemies would be endeavouring to
interrupt that perfect harmony and friendship which subsisted between
them; that he had therefore put his army into quarters; and though he
had no reason to doubt his Excellency's strict adherence to, and full
compliance with, all the articles of the treaty, yet, nevertheless,
he wished he could disappoint those hopes their mutual enemies
entertained, by withdrawing his army from Plassey; and that he would
hasten the payment of the money, and other articles of the treaty."

The Nabob expressed great satisfaction with these proofs of friendship;
but, either from a suspicion of their sincerity, or from an obstinate
perseverance in his plans against the English, he limited himself to
promises, and met them with no corresponding acts.

Clive, alluding to his continuing the troops at Plassey, observes,
in a letter to Mr. Watts, of the 30th of April,--"The Nabob is a
villain, and cannot be trusted; he must be overset, or we must fall."
And in a subsequent communication of the 2d of May, he gives him full
authority to come to a settlement with Meer Jaffier upon terms which he
specifies, stating, also, that every thing is prepared for immediate
action. In this letter he observes, "Your letter of the 29th is come
to hand,--every thing is settled with the Committee,--enclosed are the
proposals, and if there be any other articles which you and Omichund
think necessary to be added, you have full liberty to do so, or leave
out any thing which you think may hurt our cause, or give disgust. As
for any gratuity the new Nabob may bestow on the troops, it is left
to his generosity, and to your and Omichund's management.--Now for
business.

"To-morrow morning we decamp; part of our forces go to Calcutta, the
other will go into garrison here; and, to take away all suspicion, I
have ordered all the artillery and tumbrils to be embarked in boats and
sent to Calcutta.

"I have wrote the Nabob a soothing letter: this accompanies another of
the same kind, and one to Mohun Lal agreeable to your desire. Enter
into business with Meer Jaffier as soon as you please. I am ready,
and will engage to be at Nusary in twelve hours after I receive your
letter, which place is to be the rendezvous of the whole army. The
major[138], who commands at Calcutta, has all ready to embark at a
minute's warning, and has boats sufficient to carry artillery-men and
stores to Nusary. I shall march by land and join him there: we will
then proceed to Moorshedabad, or the place we are to be joined at,
directly. Tell Meer Jaffier to fear nothing;--that I will join him with
five thousand men who never turned their backs; and that if he fails
seizing him, we shall be strong enough to drive him out of the country.
Assure him I will march night and day to his assistance, and stand by
him as long as I have a man left."

Clive, in his letter to Mr. Watts, of the 5th of May, expressed his
opinion, that Omichund, on account of his services, should have all his
losses made good by an express article in the treaty. He also proposed,
that a sum, not exceeding fifty lacs of rupees, should be granted for
the reimbursement of private losses: and that ten lacs should be given
to the Company for the expense of the expedition, and as a gratuity for
the army.

At this critical period, it must have been a satisfaction to Clive to
receive such aid as could be afforded by Admiral Watson, who, though he
declined, for very sound reasons, any share of the responsibility of an
enterprise, in which he could not co-operate, and offered his honest
advice as to the hazards with which he thought it would be attended, no
sooner perceived that Clive was determined to proceed alone towards his
object, than he made every effort in his power to strengthen him, and
expressed wishes for his success, in a manner that showed how cordially
he went along with him in every point, except in the anticipation of
the result.

When quite prepared to commence operations, Clive made an application
for two hundred seamen to accompany the troops, with which the Admiral
immediately complied. He appears, however, from the letter in which he
promises this aid, to have still entertained fears for the result of
the expedition. "I don't think," he observes, "your letters convey the
most promising appearance of success. You cannot, therefore, be too
cautious to prevent a false step being taken, which might be of very
fatal consequences to our affairs."

This letter was written on the 29th of May. In one of the 17th of
June, we find him inspired with better hopes. "I am glad to hear," he
states, "that Meer Jaffier's party increases. I hope every thing will
turn out in the expedition to your wishes, and that I may soon have to
congratulate you on the success of it. I most heartily pray for your
health and a speedy return crowned with laurels."

This letter has importance, as written after the troops had marched,
and after all arrangements connected with the intended enterprise had
been completed. Admiral Watson had been informed of every transaction,
and though he might have differed in opinion upon many points, and have
withheld himself from a participation in others, it is a reflection
upon his memory to believe that he could, at this period, have written
in such terms had he entertained the sentiments regarding any part of
Clive's conduct, which were afterwards imputed to him.

The warm temper of this gallant seaman might have led to the occasional
utterance of some hasty and unqualified opinions; but his manly mind
was incapable of such a compromise of his honest feelings, as to
express himself in terms of friendship and regard for the individual
whose acts he was at the same moment describing[139] as dishonourable
and iniquitous.

We discover from Clive's private letters, and those of Mr. Walsh, his
secretary, that, from the period when Meer Jaffier's overture was
accepted, he considered that the revolution was effected. He remained,
however, in a state of the most anxious solicitude. He dreaded delay,
both as it tended to increase the hazard of discovery, and as the
season of the rains was fast approaching, when military operations
would be impracticable. Yet it was difficult to accelerate the
execution of a plan, in which so many interests were to be consulted,
and which was liable to be impeded by so many events. At one time
there appeared great danger lest it should be altogether defeated by
a violent and premature rupture between Meer Jaffier and the Nabob;
nor was the reconciliation that took place between these parties of a
nature calculated to give Clive confidence in his new ally, who, within
a few days, had sworn upon the Koran to be faithful both to the English
and to their enemy Suraj-u-Dowlah.

Notwithstanding these changes, Mr. Watts continued confident in Meer
Jaffier and those with whom he was combined; but he had for some time
taken alarm at Omichund, with whom he had been associated in all his
negotiations at Moorshedabad.

This Hindu merchant possessed great wealth, and was among the sufferers
at the capture of Calcutta. He had, on that occasion, as well as on
others, made himself very useful to the English; and, though known
to be one of the most avaricious and grasping of human beings, yet
the reputation he had for good sense, and the obvious and admitted
profits and advantages which he must derive from being faithful to the
trust reposed in him, banished all fear of his treachery, and led to
his employment as one of the most active instruments in forming the
combination by which the Nabob was to be dethroned.

Meer Jaffier early expressed his doubts of Omichund; whose conduct,
in several instances, had made the same impression on the mind of
Mr. Watts. It appeared to both, that the success or failure of the
enterprise was considered, by this sordid man, as secondary to the
promotion of his personal interests; and that he chiefly valued the
confidence placed in him, as he could make it subservient to his
private views. Clive appears to have been very reluctant to admit
the truth of the suspicions entertained of Omichund; and it was not
till proof which he deemed conclusive as to his treachery was brought
forward, that he consented, with the Committee, to have his name left
out of the treaty.

Mr. Watts, in his letter to Colonel Clive, of the 17th of May, states,
"Meer Jaffier is determined he will by no means trust Omichund. If I
had followed the interested counsel of the latter, all affairs would
have been overset, all confidence of us lost. Contrary to Petrus's[140]
and my advice, he went yesterday to the Nabob, and told him he had a
secret of great importance to communicate to him; which, if discovered,
he should lose his life. The Nabob promised secrecy; on which he told
him the English had sent two gentlemen to Ganjam, to consult with M.
Bussy; that we had made peace together, and that he was coming here
to join us. By this lie, which he himself acquainted me he had told
the Nabob, he has gained the Nabob's favour, who has granted him a
perwannah on the Burdwan Rajah, for the paying him four lacs of rupees
which he owes him, as also express orders for the payment of the ready
money the Nabob had taken of his, and for the delivery of the remainder
of his goods: he was till ten o'clock at night receiving them. This
lie of his, I am apprehensive, will alarm the Nabob, and prevent his
withdrawing his army, which will be very detrimental to our scheme;
and for this reason Petrus and I advised him positively against this
measure when he proposed it; but self-interest overruled. We are
outwardly great friends, and it is necessary to appear so." Mr. Watts,
in the concluding paragraph of his letter, adds, "Cojah Wazeed desires
his respects to you. He is so strictly looked after that he cannot
write. From him I have learned many particulars relating to Omichund,
which would be too tedious to mention: they will astonish you."

These acts, however, were only the prelude to one more daring. Omichund
waited on Mr. Watts, when all was prepared for action, and threatened
instant discovery of the whole plot, unless it was settled that he
should receive thirty lacs of rupees, in reimbursement of losses and
reward of services. Omichund had recently received from the Nabob, as
the reward of his feigned attachment, an order for four lacs of rupees,
the estimated amount of his losses at Calcutta. The ground of the
present demand, therefore, rested exclusively on his means of enforcing
it, from being in possession of a secret which, if revealed, must not
only sacrifice the life of Mr. Watts, of Meer Jaffier, and of all
connected with them, but prove most injurious, if not ruinous, to the
interests of the English. They, if the objects of the confederacy were
defeated, could only hope for safety by calling in the Mahrattas; whose
invasion, whatever other consequences might attend it, was certain to
spread desolation over the whole country.

Mr. Watts, under dread of the consequences of the threatened discovery,
soothed Omichund by promises; while he conveyed, as speedily as he
could, intelligence of his conduct to Clive. The account of this
transaction was probably communicated through Cojah Wazeed, or some
confidential person, as we find no details of what passed with Omichund
in any of Mr. Watts's letters.[141] In one to Mr. Scrafton, of the 20th
of May, he merely states, "We are deceived,--Omichund is a villain; but
this to yourself."

The obvious results of his treachery were not expected to deter
Omichund from his purpose: he was believed to be so infatuated by
the love of gain, that neither the ties of former service, nor the
principles of honesty, would weigh against his desire of enriching
himself. Such was the opinion of all who knew him; and there appeared
no medium between submitting to his exorbitant demands, or deceiving
him into a belief that he would receive, in due season, the exorbitant
price he had fixed upon his fidelity.

Though Clive was aware of the sordid character of Omichund, yet,
deeming him an useful agent, he had been desirous that he should be
treated with favour and liberality. He had advocated his cause when his
character was before questioned; and had censured Mr. Watts on account
of the suspicions he had frequently expressed of his honesty. These
circumstances made him receive with equal surprise and indignation the
incontrovertible proofs now offered of his guilt. Viewing him, from
the position which he had taken, as a public enemy, he considered (as
he stated at the period, and publicly avowed[142] afterwards), every
artifice that could deceive him to be not only defensible, but just and
proper.

"I have your last letter[143]," he observes to Mr. Watts, in his
communication on this subject, "including the articles of agreement.
I must confess the tenor of them surprised me much. I immediately
repaired to Calcutta; and at a committee held, both the admirals and
gentlemen agree that Omichund is the greatest villain upon earth;
and that now he appears in the strongest light, what he was always
suspected to be, a villain in grain. However, to counterplot this
scoundrel, and at the same time to give him no room to suspect our
intentions, enclosed you will receive two forms of agreement; the one
real, to be strictly kept by us; the other fictitious. In short, this
affair concluded, Omichund will be treated as he deserves. This you
will acquaint Meer Jaffier with."

Two treaties were accordingly framed; one real, the other fictitious.
In the former there was no mention of Omichund; the latter had an
article which expressly stipulated that he should receive twenty lacs
of rupees; and Mr. Watts was desired to inform him, that "thirty
lacs" was not inserted, as it might give rise to suspicion; but that
a commission of five per cent. should be given to him upon all sums
received from the Nabob, which would fully amount to the other ten
lacs. Though Omichund appeared satisfied with this proceeding, Mr.
Watts conceived there was no safety till he left Moorshedabad. But he
had yet received only half the money for which the Nabob had given
him orders: and such was his avarice, that he could not suffer the
thoughts of leaving the other half unpaid, even though he stayed at the
hazard[144] of his life.

Though Mr. Watts had succeeded in persuading Omichund that he could
be employed by Clive in a manner that would make up all losses, and
had prevailed upon him to accompany Mr. Scrafton, that gentleman,
when he reached Cossimbazar, missed his companion; and the messenger
despatched in search of him found the old man seated with the Nabob's
treasurer, trying to obtain some more of the promised money. Seeing
this fruitless, he set out on his journey; but again disappeared. When
he rejoined Mr. Scrafton, he said he had been to visit his friend
Roydullub, at Plassey, from whom he was surprised to learn that his
name was not in the treaty; but Mr. Scrafton told him, with truth, that
the last secret treaty had not, for various reasons, been communicated
to Roydullub.

When Omichund arrived at Calcutta, he was received by Clive and by the
members of the Committee with apparent cordiality; for Mr. Watts had
written that his life, and those of all at Moorshedabad concerned in
the confederacy, depended upon his entertaining no suspicion of being
deceived. Not satisfied, however, with the enormous amount he deemed
himself certain of receiving, this avaricious old man commenced further
intrigues.

In a letter, under date the 8th of June, Mr. Watts, after repelling
the charge of having been duped, and of having improperly submitted
to delays and evasions, refers to Omichund as the real cause
of the impediments that had occurred; and to satisfy Clive of
the fact, he transmits him a letter to Petrus, of the following
purport:--"Omichund's compliments to Petrus. There's letters gone down
for Mr. Watts, to forbid his coming down till permission is given him
from hence. You and I are one; let us consider what is for our own
interests, and act so as to endeavour to make it pass that we have had
the whole management of this affair. If our friend is not set out, keep
him a few days. Affairs are not yet settled here; hereafter I will
write you the particulars. You have a good understanding, therefore
there's no occasion to write you much. Our success depends upon each
other; all my hopes are in you."

This communication aggravated the impressions before entertained of
Omichund's conduct, and every caution was taken to avoid giving him any
opportunity of further interference; it being quite evident, that his
views in being employed were exclusively limited to pecuniary gain, to
which he was ready to sacrifice every other object.

Mr. Watts having communicated to the Committee of Calcutta, that Meer
Jaffier was disposed to give a sum to the amount of forty lacs of
rupees to the army and navy, through whose exertions he hoped to mount
the throne; Mr. Becher, a member of the Committee, stated, that as they
(the Committee) had set the machine in motion, it was reasonable and
proper that they should be considered.[145] This suggestion, as may be
imagined, was unanimously adopted, and Clive stated to Mr. Watts[146],
that the Committee had agreed, "that Meer Jaffier's private engagement
should be obtained in writing, to make them (the Committee, in which
you are included) a present of twelve lacs of rupees, and a present of
forty lacs to the army and navy, over and above what is stipulated in
the agreement.

All preliminaries being arranged, and Meer Jaffier having agreed
to separate himself, with a large body of troops, from the Nabob's
army, and join the English on their advance, Clive determined to
commence operations. The intelligence from Moorshedabad was still
unsatisfactory; but relying on Mr. Watts's assurance, that Meer
Jaffier continued firm to his engagement, he re-assembled his army,
which, in the beginning of May, had been sent into quarters, partly in
Chandernagore, partly in Calcutta. On the 12th of June the troops which
were in Calcutta, reinforced by one hundred and fifty sailors from the
fleet, proceeded to Chandernagore. Next day, one hundred seamen being
left as a garrison in the place, the whole army was put in motion, the
Europeans, artillery, and stores proceeding up the river in boats,
while the sepoys marched in the same direction by the high road. On the
14th, at Culna, they were joined by Mr. Watts, who, on the preceding
day, had succeeded in making his escape from Moorshedabad. Continuing
their course up the right bank of the river, the army, on the 16th,
halted at Patlee; whence, on the 17th, Major Coote, with a party, was
pushed forward to attack the fort of Cutwa, which next day fell into
his hands. The same evening, the army reached Cutwa and encamped in
the plain; but on the 19th the rainy season began with such violence,
that the troops were obliged to seek shelter in huts, and in the town.

Meanwhile the flight of Mr. Watts had greatly alarmed Suraj-u-Dowlah,
whose terrors were increased by the receipt of a letter from Clive,
despatched the day on which the army set out from Chandernagore, in
which all the injuries and wrongs he had inflicted on the Company were
recapitulated; and while he was reproached for connecting himself with
the French, he was accused of not fulfilling the treaty into which he
had entered; of having infringed its main article, by proffering only a
fifth part of the sum to be paid into the treasury, and yet demanding
a receipt for the whole[147]; and of cherishing the intention of
attacking the English settlements, the moment the absence of the fleet
and troops gave him a prospect of doing so with success.

For these reasons, Clive stated in this letter[148], "he had determined
(with the approbation of all who are charged with the Company's
affairs) to proceed immediately to Cossimbazar, and submit their
disputes to the arbitration of Meer Jaffier, Roydullub, Jugget Seit,
and others of his great men: that if it should be found that he (the
Colonel) deviated from the treaty, he then swore to give up all further
claims; but that if it appeared his Excellency had broke it, he should
then demand satisfaction for all the losses sustained by the English,
and all the charges of their army and navy." He concluded by telling
him, "that the rains being so near, and it requiring many days to
receive an answer, he found it necessary to wait upon him immediately!"

The style of this communication, and the military movements which
followed, left no doubt as to the hostile intentions of the English;
and the Nabob hastened to assemble his whole force, with which he
advanced to Plassey.

Clive marched with an army[149] of about three thousand men, and nine
pieces of artillery, and was for some days, after the commencement
of operations, in a state of extreme anxiety, from there being no
appearance of Meer Jaffier's separating himself and his adherents
from the Nabob; whence it might be concluded, either that he was
treacherous, or that his party was much weaker than had been
represented.

Under these impressions Clive wrote to the Secret Committee[150]:
"The party I sent has taken Cutwa town and fort. Both are strong.
Notwithstanding which, I feel the greatest anxiety at the little
intelligence I receive from Meer Jaffier; and, if he is not
treacherous, his sangfroid or want of strength will, I fear, overset
the expedition. I am trying a last effort, by means of a Brahmin, to
prevail upon him to march out and join us. I have appointed Plassey
the place of rendezvous, and have told him at the same time, unless
he gives this or some other sufficient proof of the sincerity of his
intentions, I will not cross the river: this, I hope, will meet with
your approbation. I shall act with such caution as not to risk the
loss of our forces; and, whilst we have them, we may always have it in
our power to bring about a revolution, should the present not succeed.
They say, there is a considerable quantity of grain in and about this
place. If we can collect eight or ten thousand maunds[151], we may
maintain our situation during the rains, which will greatly distress
the Nabob; and either reduce him to terms which may be depended upon,
or give us time to bring in the Beer-Boom[152] Rajah, Mahrattas, or
Ghazee-u-Deen.[153] I desire you will give your sentiments freely, how
you think I should act, if Meer Jaffier can give us no assistance."

On the 21st of June, two days after he had despatched this letter,
Clive held a council of war[154], to which he proposed the following
question:--"Whether in our present situation, without assistance, and
on our own bottom, it would be prudent to attack the Nabob; or whether
we should wait till joined by some country power?"

A majority of the officers composing the council voted against an
immediate attack; a minority for giving battle to the Nabob; and at the
head of the latter was Eyre Coote, subsequently so distinguished in
Indian history.

Clive, though he had voted with the majority, appears, almost
immediately afterwards, to have satisfied himself, that there was no
other road to safety and honour, but by moving forward; and without
consulting[155] any individual, much less the council of war he had so
unwisely assembled, on the very evening of the day on which the council
had been held[156], changing his purpose, he determined to march
against the enemy, and accordingly gave orders for his army to cross
the river the following morning.

It is stated[157], that before he carried this resolution into effect,
he had received a letter from Meer Jaffier, which, though it in some
degree removed the doubts he had before entertained of the sincerity
of that leader, confirmed him in his opinion, that the success of the
enterprize must wholly depend upon the advance of the British troops.

Though mature deliberation appears to have convinced Clive, that the
object he had in view, the security of the English in Bengal, quite
warranted the hazard which was incurred for its attainment, he still
proceeded with that caution which was necessary in an enterprize, where
the safety of the whole of the military force in this part of India
might be compromised by the treachery or cowardice of a native chief,
and where even success in a battle would not have accomplished his
purpose, unless those with whom the English interests were associated
proved true to their engagements.

It is only by considering the circumstances in which he was placed
that we can understand the hesitating conduct of Clive previous to his
advance to Plassey, the defensive character of the action, and the
solicitude[158] which he showed to repress that ardour and forward
spirit in those under him, which on ordinary occasions it was his
habit and his pride to stimulate and encourage. It is obvious, that
his qualities as a soldier, in this short and almost bloodless, but
eventful campaign, were rendered strictly subordinate to the talents of
the statesman.

At sunrise next morning[159] the army began to pass the Hooghley, and
at four in the afternoon were all landed on the left bank of the river.
The boats were then towed up the stream with great toil, accompanied
by the army, and having advanced fifteen miles in eight hours, about
one in the morning of the 23d of June, reached Plassey. The troops
immediately took possession of an adjoining grove.[160]

Clive's intelligence had led him to expect that the enemy lay a few
miles from Cossimbazar; but a rapid march had already brought them on
to the fortified camp so long occupied by a part of the Nabob's forces
near Plassey: and soon after he had taken his ground, the sound of
drums, clarions, and cymbals distinctly heard, convinced him, that the
whole force of the enemy was encamped about a mile off. Guards were
immediately stationed, and the troops were permitted to take rest for
the night.

At sunrise the enemy, now aware of his march, issued from their
camp in all their force, with their artillery, and commenced a heavy
cannonade. Clive, who expected a communication from Meer Jaffier,
looked anxiously for its arrival: but the messenger, who on the morning
of this eventful day was charged with a note from that officer, never
delivered it. Still, however, Clive watched with anxiety to see his
friends separate from his foes, ready to take advantage of that
trepidation and confusion which such movements must produce. The charge
of the English forces was accelerated by one of the Nabob's principal
commanders[161] being killed: Clive advanced to an easy victory. But
the account of the events which preceded this battle, the occurrences
which gave success to it, and its results, are clearly and fully stated
in the following letter, written by Clive a month after he reached
Moorshedabad, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors. In
this letter, which is dated the 26th of July, Clive observes:--

"I gave you an account of the taking of Chandernagore; the subject
of this address is an event of much higher importance, no less than
the entire overthrow of Nabob Suraj-u-Dowlah, and the placing of
Meer Jaffier on the throne. I intimated, in my last, how dilatory
Suraj-u-Dowlah appeared in fulfilling the articles of the treaty. This
disposition not only continued but increased, and we discovered that he
was designing our ruin, by a conjunction with the French. To this end
Monsieur Bussy was pressingly invited to come into this province, and
Monsieur Law of Cossimbazar (who before had been privately entertained
in his service) was ordered to return from Patna.

"About this time some of his principal officers made overtures to
us for dethroning him. At the head of these was Meer Jaffier, then
Bukhshee to the army, a man as generally esteemed as the other was
detested. As we had reason to believe this disaffection pretty general,
we soon entered into engagements with Meer Jaffier to put the crown
on his head. All necessary preparations being completed with the
utmost secrecy, the army, consisting of about one thousand Europeans,
and two thousand sepoys, with eight pieces of cannon, marched from
Chandernagore on the 13th, and arrived on the 18th at Cutwa Fort,
which was taken without opposition. The 22d, in the evening, we
crossed the river, and landing on the island, marched straight for
Plassey Grove, where we arrived by one in the morning. At daybreak,
we discovered the Nabob's army moving towards us, consisting, as we
since found, of about fifteen thousand horse, and thirty-five thousand
foot, with upwards of forty pieces of cannon. They approached apace,
and by six began to attack with a number of heavy cannon, supported by
the whole army, and continued to play on us very briskly for several
hours, during which our situation was of the utmost service to us,
being lodged in a large grove, with good mud banks. To succeed in an
attempt on their cannon was next to impossible, as they were planted in
a manner round us, and at considerable distances from each other. We
therefore remained quiet in our post, in expectation of a successful
attack upon their camp at night. About noon, the enemy drew off their
artillery, and retired to their camp, being the same which Roy Dullub
had left but a few days before, and which he had fortified with a good
ditch and breast-work. We immediately sent a detachment, accompanied
with two field-pieces, to take possession of a tank with high banks,
which was advanced about three hundred yards above our grove, and from
whence the enemy had considerably annoyed us with some cannon managed
by Frenchmen. This motion brought them out a second time; but on
finding them make no great effort to dislodge us, we proceeded to take
possession of one or two more eminences lying very near an angle of
their camp, from whence, and an adjacent eminence in their possession,
they kept a smart fire of musketry upon us. They made several attempts
to bring out their cannon, but our advanced field-pieces played so
warmly and so well upon them, that they were always drove back.
Their horse exposing themselves a good deal on this occasion, many
of them were killed, and among the rest four or five officers of the
first distinction, by which the whole army being visibly dispirited
and thrown into some confusion, we were encouraged to storm both
the eminence and the angle of their camp, which were carried at the
same instant, with little or no loss; though the latter was defended
(exclusively of blacks) by forty French and two pieces of cannon; and
the former by a large body of blacks, both foot and horse. On this,
a general rout ensued, and we pursued the enemy six miles, passing
upwards of forty pieces of cannon they had abandoned, with an infinite
number of hackaries[162], and carriages filled with baggage of all
kinds. Suraj-u-Dowlah escaped on a camel, and reaching Moorshedabad
early next morning, despatched away what jewels and treasure he
conveniently could, and he himself followed at midnight, with only two
or three attendants.

"It is computed there are killed of the enemy about five hundred.
Our loss amounted to only twenty-two killed, and fifty wounded,
and those chiefly blacks. During the warmest part of the action we
observed a large body of troops hovering on our right, which proved
to be our friends; but as they never discovered themselves by any
signal whatsoever, we frequently fired on them to make them keep their
distance. When the battle was over, they sent a congratulatory message,
and encamped in our neighbourhood that night. The next morning Meer
Jaffier paid me a visit, and expressed much gratitude at the service
done him, assuring me, in the most solemn manner, that he would
faithfully perform his engagement to the English. He then proceeded to
the city, which he reached some hours before Suraj-u-Dowlah left it.

"As, immediately on Suraj-u-Dowlah's flight, Meer Jaffier found
himself in peaceable possession of the palace, I encamped without, to
prevent the inhabitants from being plundered or disturbed; first at
Maudipoor, and afterwards at the French factory at Sydabad. However, I
sent forward Messrs. Watts and Walsh to inquire into the state of the
treasury, and inform me what was transacted at the palace. By their
representations I soon found it necessary for me to be present, on many
accounts; accordingly, I entered the city on the 29th, with a guard of
two hundred Europeans and three hundred sepoys, and took up my quarters
in a spacious house and garden near the palace. The same evening I
waited on Meer Jaffier, who refused seating himself on the musnud till
placed on it by me; which done, he received homage as Nabob from all
his courtiers. The next morning he returned my visit; when, after a
good deal of discourse on the situation of his affairs, I recommended
him to consult Jugget Seit on all occasions, who being a man of sense,
and having by far the greatest property among all his subjects, would
give him the best advice for settling the kingdom in peace and security.

"On this, he proposed that we should immediately set out together to
visit him, which being complied with, solemn engagements were entered
into by the three parties, for a strict union and mutual support of
each other's interests. Jugget Seit then undertook to use his whole
interest at Delhi (which is certainly very great), to get the Nabob
acknowledged by the Mogul, and our late grants confirmed; likewise to
procure for us any firmans we might have occasion for.

"The substance of the treaty with the present Nabob is as follows:--

"1st. Confirmation of the mint, and all other grants and privileges in
the treaty with the late Nabob.

"2dly. An alliance, offensive and defensive, against all enemies
whatever.

"3dly. The French factories and effects to be delivered up, and they
never permitted to resettle in any of the provinces.

"4thly. 100 lacs of rupees to be paid to the Company, in consideration
of their losses at Calcutta and the expenses of the campaign.

"5thly. 50 lacs to be given to the English sufferers at the loss of
Calcutta.

"6thly. 20 lacs to Gentoos, Moors, &c., black sufferers at the loss of
Calcutta.

"7thly. 7 lacs to the Armenian sufferers.

"These three last donations to be distributed at the pleasure of the
Admiral and gentlemen of Council, including me.

"8thly. The entire property of all lands within the Mahratta ditch,
which runs round Calcutta, to be vested in the Company: also, six
hundred yards, all round, without the said ditch.

"9thly. The Company to have the zemindary of the country to the south
of Calcutta, lying between the lake and river, and reaching as far as
Culpee, they paying the customary rents paid by the former zemindars to
the government.

"10thly. Whenever the assistance of the English troops shall be wanted,
their extraordinary charges to be paid by the Nabob.

"11thly. No forts to be erected by the government on the river side,
from Hooghley downwards.

"12thly. The foregoing articles to be performed without delay, as soon
as Meer Jaffier becomes Subadar.

"On examining the treasury, there were found about 150 lacs of rupees,
which being too little to answer our demands, much less leave a
sufficiency for the Nabob's necessary disbursements, it was referred to
Jugget Seit, as a mutual friend, to settle what payment should be made
to us; who accordingly determined, that we should immediately receive
one half of our demand,--two thirds in money and one third in gold and
silver plate, jewels, and goods; and that the other half should be
discharged in three years, at three equal and annual payments.

"The part to be paid in money is received and safely arrived at
Calcutta; and the goods, jewels, &c. are now delivered over to us;
the major part of which will be bought back by the Nabob for ready
money, and on the remaining there will be little or no loss. A large
proportion was proposed to have been paid us in jewels; but as they are
not a very saleable article, we got the amount reduced one half, and
the difference to be made up in money.

"It is impossible as yet to form a judgment how much the granted lands
will produce you, as the Europeans are quite ignorant of the extent of
the country between the river and lake; but, in order to give you some
idea of the value, I'll estimate it at 10 lacs per annum. An officer on
the part of the Nabob is already despatched to Calcutta to begin the
survey, in company with one of ours. Suraj-u-Dowlah was not discovered
till some days after his flight; however, he was at last taken in
the neighbourhood of Rajahmahul, and brought to Moorshedabad on the
2d inst., late at night. He was immediately cut off by order of the
Nabob's son, and (as it is said) without the father's knowledge. Next
morning the Nabob paid me a visit, and thought it necessary to palliate
the matter on motives of policy; for that Suraj-u-Dowlah had wrote
letters on the road to many of the jemidars of the army, and occasioned
some commotions among those in his favour.

"Monsieur Law and his party came as far as Rajahmahul to
Suraj-u-Dowlah's assistance, and were within three hours' march of
him when he was taken. As soon as they heard of his misfortunes, they
returned by forced marches; and, by the last advices, had passed by
Patna, on the other side of the river. A party of Europeans and sepoys
were quickly despatched after them; but I am doubtful if we shall be
able to overtake them before they get out of the Nabob's dominions.
Strong letters have been wrote from the Nabob to the Naib of Patna, to
distress them all in his power, and to take them prisoners if possible.
A compliance with which I am in anxious expectation of.

"I ought to observe, that the French I spoke of in the action were some
fugitives from Chandernagore, who had assembled at Sydabad. It was by
their advice, and indeed by their hands, that the English factory at
Cossimbazar was burned and destroyed, after our gentlemen had quitted
it on the renewal of the troubles.

"The present Nabob has every appearance of being firmly and durably
seated on the throne.

"The whole country has quietly submitted to him, and even the
apprehension of an inroad from the side of Delhi is vanished; so that
this great revolution, so happily brought about, seems complete in
every respect. I persuade myself the importance of your possessions
now in Bengal will determine you to send out, not only a large and
early supply of troops and good officers, but of capable young
gentlemen for the civil branches of your business."

FOOTNOTES:

[123] This observation alludes to their general habits. On religious
festivals, and on their own marriages, and those of their children, the
most parsimonious Hindu often spends great sums.

[124] Ameer-ul-Omra, the second son, and for some period minister, of
Mahommed Ali, the former Nabob of the Carnatic.

[125] Lucknow is the capital of the vizier of Oude.

[126] It is believed to have been principally at the suggestion of
the great banker Jugget Seit, that the English were applied to as the
instruments of this revolution. One great reason assigned, was the good
faith they had always shown in their commercial transactions, from
which a favourable judgment was formed of their general character. M.
Law, than whom there could be no better authority, and who many years
after was Governor of Pondicherry, always gave it as his opinion, that
the English were obliged to none so much as the banker Jugget Seit, for
bringing about this revolution.--D. H.

[127] The grounds upon which the Bengal Committee were ultimately
induced to come to a resolution to join the confederacy against
Suraj-u-Dowlah, are fully explained in their letter of the 14th July,
1757, to the Secret Committee[128] in England. They state, that they
had no doubt but that the Nabob would attack them whenever the squadron
and the troops left the river; that they not only had no confidence in
his friendship, but were convinced he was the determined enemy of the
English, and was using every means in his power to bring the French
to Bengal: that from his conduct in this and numerous other cases,
it was certain he would seize the first opportunity of extirpating
the Company; and lastly, they express their opinion, that from the
detestation in which Suraj-u-Dowlah was held, the confederacy formed
against him must succeed; but that, if they withheld their aid, they
could expect no advantages from such success: whereas, if they took a
prominent part, they might look for remuneration for past losses, and
full security against any future misfortune, similar to that to which
their weakness had before exposed them.

[128] Vide Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii. p. 216.

[129] Mr. Watts writes, under date the 14th of April:--"The Nabob,
before our success at Chandernagore, threatened, in the presence of
Runjutroy and others, to impale, or cut off my head; and yesterday
repeated those threats in the presence of Jugget Seit, Monichund, Cojah
Wazeed, Meer Abdul Caussim, Runjutroy, and Omichund. I write this for
yours and the Colonel's notice alone, and desire no public affair may
be made of it, for I despise what the Nabob can do to me, and would not
have you desist from any vigorous measures you may intend to pursue on
my account."

[130] 22d April, 1757.

[131] Mr. Walsh was paymaster to the Madras troops, but acted
throughout the expedition as secretary to Colonel Clive.

[132] Governor of Hooghley.

[133] Tellingy means a native of Tellingana, one of the ancient
Hindu divisions of India, which includes the north-eastern parts of
the Deckan. Some tribes of the natives of Tellingana have long been
celebrated as foot-soldiers; hence the term Tellingy and sepoy became
synonymous.

[134] 23d April, 1757.

[135] 28th April, 1757.

[136] 26th April, 1757.

[137] 29th April, 1757.

[138] Major Kilpatrick.

[139] Such are the terms said to have been used by Admiral Watson,
in speaking of those who had signed the treaty (proposed by Clive)
to deceive Omichund. This is stated in evidence by Captain Brereton
(Parl. Reports, vol. iii. p. 151.); but a more general and inconclusive
testimony perhaps never was given.

[140] Petrus, an Armenian, was the agent of Meer Jaffier.

[141] The evidence of Mr. Sykes, as taken before a Committee of the
House of Commons, fully corroborates all that Mr. Watts represented
regarding the substance and manner of Omichund's demand, as well as the
threat by which it was accompanied. Mr. Sykes stated, "That in the year
1757 he was stationed at the subordinate factory called Cossimbazar,
in council; that he does not know particularly the terms demanded by
Omichund; but that, being on a visit to Mr. Watts, he found him under
great anxiety; that he took him aside, and told him that Omichund had
been threatening to betray them to Suraj-u-Dowlah, and would have them
all murdered that night, unless he would give some assurances that the
sum promised him (by Mr. Watts) should be made good; that, upon the
visit to Mr. Watts, he further said that he was under the greatest
anxiety how to counteract the designs of Omichund."--Parliamentary
Reports, vol. iii. p. 145.

[142] Lord Clive, being examined by the Committee of the House of
Commons regarding the fictitious treaty, stated, "That when Mr.
Watts had nearly accomplished the means of carrying that revolution
into execution, he acquainted him by letter that a fresh difficulty
had started; that Omichund had insisted upon five per cent. on all
the Nabob's treasures, and thirty lacs in money; and threatened, if
he did not comply with that demand, he would immediately acquaint
Suraj-u-Dowlah with what was going on, and Mr. Watts should be put to
death. That, when he received this advice, he thought art and policy
warrantable in defeating the purposes of such a villain; and that his
Lordship himself formed the plan of the fictitious treaty, to which
the Committee consented. It was sent to Admiral Watson, who objected
to the signing of it; but, to the best of his remembrance, gave the
gentleman who carried it (Mr. Lushington) leave to sign his name
upon it; that his Lordship never made any secret of it; he thinks it
warrantable in such a case, and would do it again a hundred times;
he had no interested motive in doing it, and did it with a design
of disappointing the expectations of a rapacious man; that he never
heard Mr. Watts had made a promise to Omichund of any money, directly
or indirectly; that when he was last abroad, he had given the same
account, which is entered in the public proceedings; that Omichund was
employed only as an agent to Mr. Watts, as having most knowledge of
Suraj-u-Dowlah's court, and had commission to deal with three or four
more of the court. Omichund's only chance of obtaining retribution was
depending on this treaty; he did not believe that Omichund was known to
Meer Jaffier, but through Mr. Watts."--Parl. Reports, vol. iii. p. 149.

[143] 19th May, 1757.

[144] Omichund had been on the most intimate footing with the Nabob,
who, trusting to him for secret information, was averse to his leaving
Moorshedabad. But as he now desired to go to Calcutta, he told Mr.
Scrafton to remove this impediment, by applying for a present which
the Nabob had promised to make the British commanders in February.
This promise, it appears, was made to Omichund, who afterwards pledged
himself to conceal it. Suraj-u-Dowlah, thinking he had broken that
pledge, was much enraged, and as anxious for his departure as he had
been before for his remaining at his court.

[145] Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii. p. 145.

[146] Letter from Col. Clive to Mr. Watts, May 19th.

[147] This demand of a full acquittance, on paying one fifth of what
was due, had been made some weeks before through Mr. Watts. It had been
rejected with indignation by Admiral Watson and Col. Clive.

[148] Scrafton's Letters, p. 88.

[149] Clive's force consisted of--

  Six hundred and fifty European infantry;
  One hundred topases;
  One hundred Malabar Portuguese;
  One hundred and fifty artillery, including fifty seamen;
  Two thousand one hundred sepoys;
  Eight six-pounders;
  One howitzer.

[150] Clive's letters to the Secret Committee, June 19th, 1757.

[151] A maund is 80 pounds.

[152] A considerable province of the kingdom of Bengal, the Rajah (or
Prince) of which was hostile to Suraj-u-Dowlah.

[153] Ghazee-u-Deen, the eldest son of the celebrated Nizam-ul-Mûlk,
was at this period chief minister of Delhi, and had almost uncontrolled
power.

[154] The following is the list of the officers of this council, and
the order in which they voted:--

    _Negative._             _For immediate attack._
  Rob^t. Clive.         Eyre Coote.
  James Kilpatrick.     G. Alex. Grant.
  Arch^d. Grant.        G. Muir.
  Geo. Fred. Goupp.     Cha^s. Palmer.
  Andrew Armstrong.     Rob^t. Campbell.
  Tho^s. Rumbold.       Peter Carstairs.
  Christian Firkan.     W. Jennings.
  John Corneille.
  H. Popham.

The query and list of the officers are transcribed from the original
proceedings of the council of war, as found in the Clive MSS.

[155] It has been asserted that Clive was induced to change his opinion
by the representations of Major Coote. This was contradicted by the
latter, in his evidence before the House of Commons. He said, "After
the council of war, Lord Clive spoke to him first, unasked, of the
army marching, without his having mentioned a word to him upon the
subject."--Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii. p. 153.

[156] June 21st.

[157] Scrafton's Letters, p. 90.

[158] Major Kilpatrick, observing an opportunity of attacking an
advanced party, under a French officer, by whom the troops in the grove
were annoyed, put himself at the head of two companies and two guns, to
charge; sending, at the same time, to inform Clive of what he had done.
The latter hastened to the spot, commanded the party back to the grove,
and severely reprimanded the Major for acting without his orders. It
has been stated, by those who were desirous of detracting from Clive's
fame, that he was asleep in a hunting-house, which he had made his
head-quarters, when the account was brought him of Kilpatrick's attack.
This assertion has been denied; but, if admitted, it will prove no more
than that this extraordinary man could give, amid such scenes, a few
minutes to necessary repose.

[159] June 22d.

[160] Orme, vol. ii. p. 171.

[161] Moodeen Khan.

[162] A species of cart drawn by a couple of bullocks.




CHAP. VI.


The events which have been so minutely detailed in the preceding
chapter are memorable from being connected with the foundation of our
Indian empire. They have a peculiar importance to us, as they affect
the fame and reputation of the individual by whom this rapid and
extraordinary change in the condition of the English in Bengal was
effected.

From the period of the capture of Chandernagore, till Meer Jaffier
was established upon the throne, Clive was unaided in the great and
difficult task he had undertaken. He rested solely upon his own
judgment, which in almost all cases was in opposition to that of the
persons with whom he was associated.

Admiral Watson, though he had withdrawn himself from any participation
in the enterprise, stated honestly and decidedly his doubts of its
success. The Select Committee of Calcutta threw off all responsibility.
Thus unaided and alone, Clive had to counteract treachery, to stimulate
timidity into action, and when the period arrived, openly and boldly
to confront danger. He was throughout this arduous labour supported
by the conviction, that the end he sought was indispensable to the
interests, and indeed to the safety, of the government he served, and
that the means he employed were the only ones by which it could be
accomplished. With this conviction he proceeded towards his object
with a caution and firmness that have seldom been equalled, and never
surpassed.

His success was great beyond all expectation; but it has been
erroneously attributed to the battle of Plassey. It was not the result
of that action, but of the whole series of his measures, and of the
operation of well laid plans carried into execution by the same wise
and firm mind by which they had been formed.

The moderation with which Clive exercised the great power which he
acquired will be shown hereafter. I shall confine myself in this
chapter to a detail of the immediate consequences of his success, and
to an examination of his conduct throughout the scenes which preceded
and followed the dethronement of Suraj-u-Dowlah; and endeavour to lay
all the facts before the reader, in such a manner as will enable him
to judge how far Clive has merited the reproaches which have been cast
upon his memory by those who have desired to find in the record of his
glory the means of destroying his reputation.

The great amount which Meer Jaffier had stipulated to pay by his first
treaty was increased by the addition of the sum of fifty lacs, as a
donation to the army and navy, besides a gift to[163] each of the
Members of the Secret Committee, and of Council. In addition to these
sums, Meer Jaffier was induced by gratitude and policy, as well as by
usage, to make liberal presents to those who had been the immediate
instruments of placing him on the throne. No exact account of the
latter presents exists on record, but that of Clive is stated by
himself to have amounted to sixteen lacs of rupees, or 160,000_l._

The treasures of Suraj-u-Dowlah had been greatly over estimated by
Mr. Watts, who states, in one letter[164], that they were computed to
amount to 40,000,000_l._ sterling, a sum so extravagantly beyond what
the revenues of the country could have enabled Aliverdi Khan, or his
successor, to amass, that it is quite extraordinary how such a belief
could have been entertained.

The city of Moorshedabad suffered in no degree from this change. Clive,
while he accepted on grounds that he deemed just the liberality of the
Prince he had placed upon the throne, so far from laying himself under
obligation to others, refused every present offered him by Roy Dullub,
Jugget Seit, and the wealthy inhabitants of the capital. This conduct
was alike necessary to support his character, and to give an example
to the army, with whom the large sum which it was settled they should
receive as prize or donation, (for it was indifferently called by both
names) had the usual effect of a sudden influx of money among such a
body of men.

Disputes arose of a very serious nature, as to the division of prize
money with the navy. In order that this, and various other points,
should be equitably settled, Clive assembled a council of war, to which
officers were deputed from every branch of the troops employed. It was
agreed, that every question should be decided by the majority; and so
selfish were the principles by which many of them were influenced,
that, contrary to the strong protest of Clive, a resolution was
carried, that the officers[165] and sailors belonging to the squadron,
which came with the army on this expedition, should not share the prize
money.

The majority of the Council of War came to a further vote, that the
money should be immediately divided; but this Clive thought so unjust
to the navy, whose agents were not present, that he immediately
over-ruled their votes, and broke up the council. His letter to Admiral
Watson of the 7th of July fully explains his conduct on this occasion.


"I took the first opportunity," he observes, "of a little spare time to
call a Council of War for the division of that share of the prize money
which belongs to the army. I am sorry to say, that several warm and
selfish debates arose; and I cannot help thinking, that the officers
belonging to the navy with the expedition have had injustice done them,
in not being allowed to share agreeable to the land division, which
was carried against them by a great majority.--Enclosed I send you
the proceedings of the Council of War. The last article, after having
been in a manner agreed to, was again brought upon the carpet; and
notwithstanding I represented to the gentlemen, in the strongest sense,
that the money could not be divided till it was shroffed, and the
agents of both parties present, without the greatest injustice to the
navy, they still persisted in giving their opinions for an immediate
division of the money; upon which I over-ruled their votes, and broke
up the Council of War.

"Yesterday I received the enclosed paper and protest, which you have
with my answer. I have put those officers who brought the paper in
arrest, and ordered Captain Armstrong, one of the ringleaders, down
to Calcutta this morning. The Major was deputed to me by the officers
to desire I would forget and forgive what was past, upon a proper
acknowledgment in writing: I promised to comply with his request, so
that I beg you will not make this public, till you hear further from
me."

The answer to the officers, of which Clive sent a copy to the Admiral,
is too remarkable a document to be omitted. It singularly exhibits
the openness and decision of his character. It is addressed to the
"Officers who sent the remonstrance and protest," and proceeds:----

  "Gentlemen,

  "I have received both your remonstrance and protest. Had you
  consulted the dictates of your own reason, those of justice, or
  the respect due to your commanding officer, I am persuaded such a
  paper, so highly injurious to your own honour as officers, could
  never have escaped you.

  "You say you were assembled at a council to give your opinion about
  a matter of property. Pray, Gentlemen, how comes it that a promise
  of a sum of money from the Nabob, entirely negotiated by me, can be
  deemed a matter of right and property? So very far from it, it is
  now in my power to return to the Nabob the money already advanced,
  and leave it to his option, whether he will perform his promise or
  not. You have stormed no town, and found the money there; neither
  did you find it in the plains of Plassey, after the defeat of
  the Nabob. In short, Gentlemen, it pains me to remind you, that
  what you are to receive is entirely owing to the care I took of
  your interest. Had I not interfered greatly in it, you had been
  left to the Company's generosity, who perhaps would have thought
  you sufficiently rewarded, in receiving a present of six months'
  pay; in return for which, I have been treated with the greatest
  disrespect and ingratitude, and, what is still worse, you have
  flown in the face of my authority, for over-ruling an opinion,
  which, if passed, would have been highly injurious to your own
  reputation, being attended with injustice to the navy, and been of
  the worst consequences to the cause of the nation and the Company.

  "I shall, therefore, send the money down to Calcutta, give
  directions to the agents of both parties to have it shroffed; and
  when the Nabob signifies his pleasure (on whom it solely depends)
  that the money be paid you, you shall then receive it, and not
  before.

  "Your behaviour has been such, that you cannot expect I should
  interest myself any further in your concerns. I therefore retract
  the promise I made the other day, of negotiating either the rest of
  the Nabob's promise, or the one third which was to be received in
  the same manner as the rest of the public money, at three yearly
  equal payments.

  "I am, Gentlemen,
  "Your most obedient, humble servant,

  (Signed) "ROB^T. CLIVE.
  "Moorshedabad,
  5th July, 1757."

The officers to whom this letter was addressed sent an acknowledgment
of their error; to which Clive instantly replied in the following
terms:--

  "Gentlemen,

  "I have ever been desirous of the love and good opinion of my
  officers, and have often pursued their interest in preference of my
  own. What passed the other day is now forgotten, and I shall always
  be glad of an opportunity of convincing you how much

  "I am, Gentlemen,
  "Your most obedient, humble servant,

  (Signed) "ROB^T. CLIVE.
  "Moorshedabad,
  9th July, 1757."

On the 19th of July Clive wrote to Admiral Watson,--"Since my last
letter, the officers of the army, sensible of their error, have thought
proper to retract, and all is forgotten on my part."

Admiral Watson in his answer to Clive (of the same date) expressed
his gratitude for the part he had taken in favour of the navy; and we
find, in a letter from Captain Latham to Clive, dated the 3d of July,
an honest proof of Admiral Watson's approbation of his proceedings at
this period:--"The Admiral drinks every day," Captain Latham observes,
"a bumper to your health." The amount of the sums to be given, as
a donation to the members of the Committee, Council, and others,
had not been determined before Meer Jaffier was enthroned. When a
settlement was made, Admiral Watson put forth his claim, which was
opposed on the grounds of his never having sat in the Committee, or
taken any part or responsibility in the plans and operations by which
the revolution was effected. When this point was referred to Clive, he
denied that Admiral Watson had a specific right, but admitted his claim
from his association in the public service, and the zeal and talent
with which he had co-operated. On this ground, he proposed that the
Admiral's share should be made equal to the Governor's and his own,
by a deduction of ten per cent. from each portion of Meer Jaffier's
donation, and instantly remitted that deduction from what he had
received on this account. His example was followed by a considerable
number; but others were more tenacious of what they had obtained; nor
were the heirs of the Admiral successful in compelling them by law to
this act of liberal justice.

The conduct of the Select Committee before the battle of Plassey had
excited Clive's just indignation. "I have received[166]," he observes,
"a letter from Mr. Drake, in answer to my letter to the Committee,
which is very unusual on such important occasions; and I cannot help
thinking, that had the expedition miscarried, you would have laid the
whole blame on me."

A subsequent communication[167] called forth more severe
animadversions. "I have received" (he indignantly states) "your letter
of the 23d instant[168], the contents of which are so indefinite and
contradictory, that I can put no other construction upon it than an
intent to clear yourself at my expense, had the expedition miscarried.
It puts me in mind of the famous answer of the Delphic oracle to
Pyrrhus, 'Aio te, Æacide, Romanos vincere posse.'"

But all angry feelings were soon lost in those of joy and triumph.
Within a few months the European and native inhabitants of Calcutta
had experienced a transition from the most abject state of poverty and
misery to one of exaltation and abundance. The cruel author of their
wrongs had lost his fortune and his life. The French were, with the
exception of a small party, expelled from Bengal; and the Prince, who
was raised to the sovereignty of that country, owed his crown to the
British arms, and must trust to them for his support. For a period, all
eyes and all hearts turned with admiration and gratitude to him by whom
this great change had been chiefly effected.

But such sentiments are not enduring; and a few years only elapsed
before acts, which were approved and applauded at the moment of their
occurrence, were brought forward as accusations against the man, to
whom his country owed the establishment of her empire in India. It is
not, however, intended to anticipate an account of those events which
gave rise to this change of feeling in individuals, or public bodies:
but I have dwelt thus minutely upon the transactions of this remarkable
epoch of Clive's life, and of Indian history, for the purpose of
affording materials to determine how far those writers are correct, or
justified by facts, who, referring chiefly to documents furnished by
his accusers, have censured and condemned many parts of his conduct,
both military and political, during this short but memorable expedition.

It has already been shown, that throughout this eventful period
the military operations of Clive were subordinate to his political
negotiations. But independent of this fact, which placed his conduct as
a military officer beyond the common rules of judgment, I confess that
I have little faith in the correctness of that general criticism which
refers exclusively to the numbers and quality of the troops engaged,
and to the ground upon which the conflict was decided. Even in Europe,
where the character of the troops is known, and their fidelity to their
banners undoubted, it is much oftener the genius of the commander,
exercised during the changing moments of a battle, than the best
preconcerted plan, which decides the combat. The mere tactician rests
entirely on his plans; if they fail, he is lost: but the eye of an
able leader penetrates the mind of his own army and that of the enemy,
and by exciting valour to extraordinary efforts, or pressing upon
faltering opponents, he snatches a victory which is the more glorious
from having been gained contrary to all calculations of art. In India,
success in war depends far less upon plans and evolutions than on a
correct knowledge of the nature of the enemy's force. The character
and composition of the incongruous materials of which eastern armies
are formed have already been explained. From some part of this body
the most resolute resistance may be expected, from their attachment to
their chief. Others, probably from being lukewarm in the cause, and
discontented with their leader, require only a pretext to fly. No corps
places confidence in, or expects support from, that which is next to
it. The consequence is, that the mere suspicion of treachery, or any
misfortune or misconduct in the Prince under whom these bands are for
the moment united, dissolves the whole. These facts will account for
the frequent defeat of large armies in India by a few disciplined and
united men. Yet the armies thus discomfited contain thousands of the
same tribes and nations of whom a few hundreds (when attached to their
chiefs and loyal to the cause for which they fought) have been found
to resist, with the aid of very slight defences, all the efforts of a
large and highly disciplined European force.

I have already stated, in the course of this narrative, the successive
causes which combined to prevent Clive's return to Madras, after the
fall of Chandernagore, and have afforded the reader ample materials to
judge this question from the most authentic documents.

To deny to Clive the right of exercising his judgment amid the
exigencies of the public service in which he was placed would be to
deny him the means of consulting and promoting the interests and
honour of his country. When he acted, as he did upon this occasion,
against the positive and reiterated orders of the government of
Madras, he did so under a deep and alarming responsibility: but in
such extreme cases, the greater the hazard which an individual incurs
the greater his merit, if he can establish that the public interests
have been promoted by his conduct. The dangers which threatened the
English settlements on the coast of Coromandel were great, but they
were prospective, and the issue uncertain. The dangers at Bengal, had
Clive abandoned the scene, were immediate; and even if we suppose that
Calcutta had not been retaken by the resentful Suraj-u-Dowlah, aided by
the party of French[169] who still remained, it was certain that all
those impressions and advantages which had been gained by the combined
efforts of Admiral Watson and Clive would have been lost, and future
armaments required to restore the English in Bengal to that power from
which they had fallen, and which was henceforth indispensable to their
existence; for from the moment they had been compelled to undertake
offensive operations against the native sovereign of the country their
reverting to their former condition of merchants was impossible.

Such was the actual situation of affairs. The penetrating eye of
Clive saw, at this moment, the future importance of Bengal; and
though fully aware of the dangers that threatened Madras, rested,
with a confidence that was not disappointed, upon the able civil and
military officers[170] to whom its affairs were entrusted. He had no
such consolatory feelings when he looked to those[171] on whom the
chief authority must devolve at Calcutta; and the details which have
been given fully prove the correctness of that judgment which he early
formed upon a point so important in the decision of the question.

Orme ascribes Clive's disobedience to his "being convinced that the
Nabob would never fulfil the terms of the treaty." The situation of
this writer[172] gave him the completest means of forming a correct
judgment; and the events which we have detailed fully prove, that
from the day on which Chandernagore fell Clive could at no period
have quitted the scene of action without an abandonment of the public
interests. The facts already stated will also show that, as long as
a hope existed of its practicability, he laboured to effect such a
settlement as would enable him to return to Fort St. George.[173]

The next point on which the character and conduct of Clive have been
arraigned, is the treatment of Omichund. The charges which have been
brought against him on this ground are of a nature that require a clear
understanding of the subject, which I shall endeavour to convey to the
reader, that he may form his own opinion upon the whole question.

Omichund, who was a wealthy Hindu merchant, residing at Calcutta, was
employed for some period in providing the Company's investment, and at
the same time carried on large dealings on his own account; and was
much connected, not only with Hindu merchants, but with the ministers
of that religion at the court of Moorshedabad. The latter connection
led to his occasional employment by the heads of the English factory,
as a medium of communication with the ministry of the Nabob of Bengal.

The pre-eminence Omichund obtained, no doubt excited envy; and some of
the accusations brought against him might have been fabricated; but
a deterioration in the quality, and an increase of the price of the
articles furnished by him to the Company, gave sufficient grounds to
suspect some dishonest proceedings.

A new system[174] of providing the investment was adopted, and Omichund
lost the profitable employ he had hitherto monopolized. Though fond
of display, and maintaining a large establishment of followers, his
ruling passion was avarice. The loss he sustained by this change
rankled in his mind, and was believed to have rendered him personally
hostile to those entrusted with the Company's affairs at Calcutta. He
appears, as he withdrew from intercourse with them, to have laboured to
strengthen his connexion with the Nabob's court, and to have contracted
a particular intimacy with the Rajah Dullub, whose son Kishendass, when
he came to reside at Calcutta, was received and treated by Omichund
with kindness and hospitality.

Suraj-u-Dowlah had endeavoured to persuade his predecessor, Aliverdi
Khan, that the English were plotting against him, and giving protection
to his subjects. The moment he succeeded to the throne, he demanded
that Kishendass should be delivered up; but the extraordinary mode in
which this demand was made, through a man[175] who came clandestinely
to Calcutta, and went first to Omichund's house, gave rise to a belief
that this communication was part of an intrigue to re-establish the
importance of the latter person. With such impressions, and having
intercepted, after the commencement of hostilities, a letter from
Ram Bam Sing (the Nabob's head spy) to Omichund, advising him to
remove his effects from Calcutta, it is not surprising that the
Committee should have suspected their former contractor to be one
of the principal instigators of the attack with which the English
settlement was threatened. A conviction of this fact led to his being
seized, and imprisoned in the fort. His guest Kishendass, and his
brother-in-law[176] Hazarimul, were also made prisoners: the search
after the latter was attended with circumstances of violence, which led
to the death of several of Omichund's family.

When Calcutta was taken, Omichund and Kishendass were released, and
treated with civility by the Nabob; a circumstance which confirmed
some in the belief of their treachery: but, as the former lost money
and property to an amount of four lacs of rupees, it is sufficiently
obvious that, though he might have stimulated the Nabob's anger against
the English, he never could have desired results which involved his own
ruin. But it is a common fate of such intriguers to raise the storm
they cannot control, and by whose fury they themselves are overwhelmed.

The dismissal of Omichund from his employ as contractor for the
investment, his imprisonment, and the cruel fate of part of his family,
were circumstances calculated to have separated him for ever from any
connection with the English: but all feelings and passions in his mind
were absorbed by the desire of gain. To that object his abilities,
which were considerable, were invariably and unceasingly directed.
He had established himself, after Calcutta was taken, at the Nabob's
court; first ingratiating himself with the favourite of that prince,
Mohun Lal; and afterwards with Suraj-u-Dowlah himself. When Clive came
to Calcutta, Omichund was the ready medium to aid in promoting peace,
and had so far established himself in favour, that Mr. Watts, when he
went to Moorshedabad, was permitted to employ him in his negotiations.

The object of Omichund was to stand so well with both parties as
to make his profit of each, on the ground of his real or reputed
influence with the other. There can be no doubt, from his character
and the scenes in which he was employed, that he had recovered a great
part of his losses before he prevailed upon the Nabob to direct, not
only the restoration of his property, but the payment of four[177]
lacs of rupees that had been plundered from his house at Calcutta.
Suraj-u-Dowlah also gave him an order, commanding the Rajah of
Purneah[178] to pay him a debt he had long owed him of four lacs and
fifty thousand rupees.

Omichund, as has been shown, became an active agent in forming the
confederacy against Suraj-u-Dowlah; and when possessed of the secrets
of the different parties concerned, he threatened to reveal the whole
plot, unless an article was introduced into the treaty, stipulating
that he should receive thirty lacs of rupees on the enthronement of
Meer Jaffier.

The enormity of this demand, great as it was, appears to have been
viewed as a slight consideration in comparison to that of the time and
manner in which it was made. It was the companion of the road watching
his opportunity, and turning upon his fellow-traveller to threaten him
with instant destruction unless he complied with all his demands. Few
have endeavoured to excuse, or even to extenuate, the deep and daring
guilt of Omichund; but many have questioned the fitness of the mode
that was adopted to disappoint his avarice, and at the same time to
avert the consequences of his threatened treachery.

Deceitful professions, promises, and engagements, which are adopted
at a particular crisis to lull suspicion for the moment, can never
be defended but in those extreme cases where, after confidence has
been established, the violation of faith by one party enables him to
take such advantage of the other as gives the latter no alternative
except a counterplot, or submission to fraud and injustice. In such a
case, the most scrupulous would find an excuse for the retaliation of
deceit, provided it could be proved to be the only means of placing
the parties on the footing upon which they stood before the aggressor
broke faith, and, abusing the confidence placed in him, demanded terms
of unreasonable and extravagant advantage. This appears to be the exact
position in which Omichund stood. After vicissitudes of favour and
disgrace, he had been restored to confidential employment, from which
he had already derived great advantages. He must have been certain, had
he continued faithful and honest, not only of recovering his losses,
but of being liberally rewarded. Every consideration, however, of
duty and of interest, gave way before a prospect of acquiring, by one
well-timed and daring act of perfidy, great and sudden riches. "Secure
to me, under a sealed treaty, thirty lacs of rupees, or I will this
night inform the Nabob of your plot for his dethronement, and have
you all put to death," was the direct emphatic meaning, if not exact
words, of his speech to Mr. Watts. This is proved by three short
notes written by that gentleman on the day the communication was made;
by Clive's letters written the moment he learned what had passed; by
the evidence of Mr. Sykes; and by the expedient which it was thought
necessary to adopt, to disappoint his avarice and to guard against his
treachery. Orme, describing the conduct of Omichund on this occasion,
observes[179], "Grounded on his importance by knowing the secret, he
held out the terror of betraying it to secure his own advantages.
Whether he would have betrayed it is uncertain; for part of his fortune
was in the power of the English, and he had the utmost vengeance of
Jaffier and his confederates to fear. However, the experiment was
not to be tried." The same author adds, "But, on the other hand, as
his tales and artifices prevented Suraj-u-Dowlah from believing the
representations of his most trusty servants, who early suspected, and
at length were convinced, that the English were confederated with
Jaffier, the twenty lacs of rupees he expected should have been paid to
him, and he left to employ them in oblivion and contempt."

It was not twenty lacs of rupees, but thirty, that Omichund expected;
for he was promised five per cent. upon the whole amount, independent
of what was specified in the fictitious treaty. He had stipulated
with a sword, or rather a dagger, in his hand, that he should receive
this great sum, though his unpaid losses did not exceed two lacs. The
distinct ground upon which he demanded the remainder was, his power to
extort it: the very extent of the sum proved the extortion. If he had
succeeded in his object, this subordinate agent would have received
much more than double the amount of the sum fixed to be divided between
the Governor, Military Commander, Select Committee, and Members of
Council; and his share of the Nabob's donations would have been equal
to two thirds of what had been stipulated as the reward of the services
of the whole army and navy.

There is another view of this question to be taken, to which the
circumstances of the moment gave great importance. The recently
established influence and power of the English, compelled them
to confide their public, as well as private, concerns, to native
associates and agents: and, with reference to the ruling passions
of the Hindus, we may affirm, that an example more likely to be
detrimental to their future interests could not have occurred than a
successful issue of the treachery of Omichund.

These considerations, however, relate only to the policy or impolicy
of complying with his demand. We have now to examine the mode that
was adopted to defeat its object; and here, it must be admitted, that
of all modes by which his machinations could be defeated, a fictitious
treaty appears the most seriously objectionable; but the alternative
of complying with his demand, or of framing such a treaty, was forced
upon the Committee of Calcutta. Omichund demanded that document as the
condition of refraining from his threatened communication to the Nabob.
No verbal promise could satisfy a person who was conscious of having
broken every tie with those by whom he had been trusted. He demanded,
therefore, what he thought the most sacred of all pledges that could
be given; and it was obvious, that they must either comply with his
request, deceive him with a false treaty, or vitiate the real one by
the insertion of an article not meant to be performed.

It is here to be remarked, that Omichund was no party to the treaty.
That treaty was contracted between the Committee at Calcutta and Meer
Jaffier; and both these parties were agreeing to the fictitious treaty,
which was prepared for the sole purpose of being shown to Omichund, to
lull him into security till the hour of danger from his hostility was
past. This distinction is important: for, though it does not clear
the parties concerned of deliberate deceit towards an individual, it
removes all imputation of their having brought a stain on the good
faith of the State, by the substitution, to the party with whom they
treated, of a false for a real engagement.

Clive was the person who proposed the expedient of a fictitious treaty;
and his sentiments were unanimously adopted by the Committee.

Admiral Watson, it is stated, refused to sign this engagement; but it
is at the same time affirmed, and apparently on undoubted testimony,
that he offered no objection to the signature of his name[180] by
another person. The Admiral had withheld himself from taking any active
part in the scenes at Moorshedabad; and, in the proceeding towards
Omichund, he probably conceived that he was not called upon, by that
sense of necessity that influenced others, to lend his name to an act
which must have been repugnant to the feelings even of those who deemed
themselves compelled by duty to have recourse to such an artifice.

Orme, speaking of the difference which arose between Mr. Watts and
Omichund, after explaining the grounds upon which he supposes the
latter to have acted, observes, that if his demand had been realised,
it would have been 650,000_l._ "The audacity of the pretension," he
adds, "implied malignant art; but it is said he threatened to reveal
the conspiracy to the Nabob, if not complied with. If so, the boldest
iniquity could not have gone further."

I have already shown, that Omichund did threaten to inform the Nabob.
Indeed, nothing but a conviction of his resolution to take that step
unless his avarice was gratified, could possibly have called for the
extreme measure which was adopted. The author already quoted gives a
pathetic account of the effect which the communication of the deception
had upon Omichund. He was, Mr. Orme states, overwhelmed by it at the
moment, fainted on the spot, was carried home, evinced symptoms of
a disturbed reason[181], and subsequently went upon a pilgrimage to
a holy Hindu shrine near Maulda, whence he returned in a state of
idiotism, from which he never recovered.

The story of the termination of Omichund's life is affecting, and must
make an impression upon every well-constituted mind. We view with pity
the effects which the sudden dissolution of his golden dreams had upon
this wretched, though wealthy Hindu; but we cannot allow the feelings
in which we indulge to subdue our judgment. While we give a tear to
weak and suffering humanity, we must do justice to those who deemed
themselves compelled by circumstances, and by the situation in which
they were placed, to repress all private feeling, and even to incur
obloquy, in the performance of their public duty. With such sentiments
I cannot, like Mr. Mill[182], proclaim my sympathy and regret for
this martyr to avarice; and stamp, with the term of "consummate
treachery[183]," the expedient by which his exorbitant demands and
wicked designs were disappointed and frustrated; far less can I admit
the truth of the historian's remark, "That Clive was a person to whom
deception, when it suited his purpose, never gave a pang." This general
and sweeping assertion, far from being supported by any facts that
have come to my knowledge[184], is contradicted by every evidence we
possess, and is altogether contrary to the general character of his
open and manly, but sensitive mind. I do not pretend to look into the
hearts of men, and to pronounce dogmatically upon their inmost thoughts
and feelings; but, in admitting that Clive, in the extraordinary
situation in which he was placed, resisted art by art, and counteracted
the treachery of the enemies of the Government he served, by deceiving
them, I am satisfied, from all his own statements, as well as from
those of others, that he had recourse to such an expedient only because
he considered himself to be called upon to employ it, by the duty he
owed to his country. He may, like other men, have erred, both in his
objects and in the mode of their accomplishment; but I deem the whole
history of his life, and, above all, the unbounded confidence we find
placed in him, both by the natives of India and by his own countrymen,
to be altogether incompatible with the truth of the charge, that he
was a man "to whom deception, when it suited his purpose, never gave a
pang."

The wealth Clive acquired by the revolution which placed Meer Jaffier
upon the throne, excited envy at the moment, and became afterwards a
subject of reproach, and even of accusation; I shall, therefore, offer
a few observations upon the subject.

I have elsewhere[185] adverted to this point, and shown that Clive,
in accordance with the usages of the Company's service in India, at
that period, received presents, as Commander in Chief, to a very
large amount. His acceptance of this reward (as it was termed) of his
labours and success, was open and avowed; and, though subsequently
made the subject of a charge against him, we do not find that at the
time any one arraigned, either the amount of the donation, or the
principle of receiving it. The fact is, that at that epoch of our
Indian government, the public officers of the Company had very limited
salaries: their perquisites and advantages, when employed on civil,
military, or political stations, appear to have been such as had been
enjoyed by native functionaries, performing the duties to which they,
in times of conquest and revolution, had succeeded. These, on ordinary
occasions, were derived from a per centage on particular branches of
revenue, privileges of trade, or presents from inferiors, and were
always considerable; but when such events occurred as negotiating a
peace[186], or replacing a monarch upon a throne, the money, gifts,
and territorial grants to the chief instruments of such changes, were
limited only by the moderation of one party and the ability of the
other.

Public servants[187], in receiving, instead of a regulated salary,
the fees and profits which had been enjoyed by the natives to whose
offices they had succeeded in newly-acquired territories, only followed
the usage of the country; and they were sanctioned in it by their own
Government. It suited the character of the Indian administration in
England, and was altogether adapted to that of our first rule in India.
That it was loose, undefined, and liable to great abuses, is admitted.
The evils of such a system became manifest, and were remedied; but
assuredly, while it continued, the public servant, who drew his
emoluments from open and recognised sources, was no more blamable than
some of the first men in England, who hold offices that continue to be
paid by fees or fines, in the manner established by their ancestors.

Clive, independent of the share of the donation to the Select
Committee, of which he was a member, was offered a present of sixteen
lacs of rupees[188] by Meer Jaffier, after he had placed that prince
on the throne; and he took it, as a boon which he deemed himself fully
warranted in accepting. He acquired, on this occasion, as he stated,
great wealth; but its acquisition injured no interests either of
individuals or of the state he served; and did not, in the slightest
degree, compromise the obligations of public duty; for the gift was
unsolicited, free, and unconditional.

Of the sense Clive entertained of this transaction we have the best
proof, not only in his private, but in his official letters, in which
he announced this sudden and surprising influx of riches. In his
letter, under date the 20th of August, 1757, to Mr. Mabbot, one of
the principal Directors, after giving an account of the revolution
he had effected, he adds, "I have the pleasure to acquaint you, that
the greatest success at Golconda could not have equalled the present
one for advantages, either to the Company or myself."--"Indeed," he
concludes, "there is nothing but the good of the service can induce
me to stay in this unhealthy climate." In all his letters to his
attorneys, to his friends and relatives, we find the amount of this
donation represented as great; and he distinctly states in one letter,
that he had no desire whatever to conceal the Nabob's liberality,
which he thought was as honourable to that prince as to himself. There
is, however, no document which more fully establishes the character
of this donation, and the view that he took of it, than his letter to
Mr. Payne, of the 25th of December, 1757. After alluding to the envy
which his good fortune had excited, he observes, "The Nabob, of his
own free will, for the service rendered him, made me a present much
beyond my expectations; part of which I bestowed on those immediately
about me, and one or two of the principal officers. I never made the
least secret of this affair, but always thought the world ought to be
acquainted with the Nabob's generosity. If I had been disposed to grow
rich by receiving presents from any other hands but those of the Nabob,
surely no one had ever the like opportunity; but there is not that
man living, among the daily temptations which offered, who can accuse
me of receiving any thing of value but from the Nabob himself. I have
troubled you with these particulars," he concludes, "because among some
it may be considered as a crime my being rich. If it be a crime, you,
Sir, are truly acquainted with the nature of it."

The Court of Directors, in their letter to the Select Committee at
Bengal, dated the 8th of March, 1758, fully recognise the usage upon
which presents were at that period given and received by their public
servants. After stating their decision that the surplus of the sums
received, after the reimbursement of losses, should be deposited in
the Company's treasury, they add, "We do not intend, by this, to
break in upon any sums of money which have been given by the Nabob
to particular persons, by way of free gift, or in reward of their
services." In the subsequent changes in the Direction, a more hostile
spirit arose against Clive; and, among other accusations, one grounded
on his acquisition of wealth by this present, and by the subsequent
grant of a jaghire (or estate), was brought forward. To this charge
we find an animated reply in his well-known letter to the Court of
Proprietors. "The Nabob, then," Clive writes, "agreeable to the known
and usual custom of Eastern princes, made presents, both to those
of his own court, and to such of the English who, by their rank and
abilities, had been instrumental in the happy success of so hazardous
an enterprise, suitable to the rank and dignity of a great prince.
I was one, amongst the many, who benefited by his favour. I never
sought to conceal it; but declared publicly, in my letter to the
Secret Committee of the India Directors, that the Nabob's generosity
had made my fortune easy, and the Company's welfare was now my only
motive for staying in India. What injustice was this to the Company?
They could expect no more than what was stipulated in the treaty. Or,
what injunction was I under to refuse a present from him, who had the
power to make me one, as the reward of honourable services? I know
of none. I had surely, myself, a particular claim, by having devoted
myself to the Company's military service, and neglected all commercial
advantages. What reason can then be given, or what pretence could the
Company have to expect, that I, after having risked my life so often
in their service, should deny myself the only honourable opportunity
that ever offered of acquiring a fortune without prejudice to them,
who, it is evident, could not have had more for my having less? When
the Company had acquired 1,500,000_l._ sterling, and a revenue of
near 100,000_l._ per annum, from the success of their forces under my
command,--when ample restoration had been made to those whose fortunes
suffered by the calamity of Calcutta,--and when individuals had, in
consequence of that success, acquired large estates,--what would the
world have said, had I come home and rested upon the generosity of the
present Court of Directors? It is well known to every gentleman in
Bengal, that the honour of my country and the interest of the Company
were the principles that governed all my actions; and that had I only
taken the advantageous opportunities that presented themselves, by
my being Commander-in-chief, at the head of a victorious army, and
what by the custom of that country I was entitled to, the jaghire
itself, great as it is, would have been an object scarce worthy my
consideration. The city of Moorshedabad is as extensive, populous,
and rich as the city of London; with this difference, that there are
individuals in the first possessing infinitely greater property than
any in the last city. These, as well as every other man of property,
made me the greatest offers, (which, nevertheless, are usual upon
such occasions, and what they expected would have been required,)
and had I accepted these offers I might have been in possession of
millions, of which the present Court of Directors could not have
dispossessed me; but preferring the reputation of the English nation,
the interest of the Nabob, and the advantage of the Company, to all
pecuniary considerations, I refused all offers that were made me, not
only then, but to the last hour of my continuance in the Company's
service in Bengal; and do challenge friend or enemy to bring one single
instance of my being influenced by interested motives to the Company's
disadvantage; or to do any act that could reflect dishonour on my
country or the Company in any one action of my administration, either
as governor or commanding officer."

That Clive was far from being influenced by sordid motives was never
more clearly proved than during the period of which this chapter
treats. While it was yet thought a settlement might be effected with
Suraj-u-Dowlah, an offer had been made to pay the amount of 3500_l._,
which he had personally lost at the capture of Calcutta. His reply to
this communication was short, but conclusive: "Pray think no more of my
losses," he states in a letter to Mr. Scrafton; "I would not be thought
mercenary or selfish for the world."

His liberal behaviour toward Admiral Watson has been noticed. On this
occasion, and on several others[189], he chose rather to diminish the
amount of his own portion than allow further demands upon the Nabob. Of
his great generosity to his family and friends I shall speak hereafter.
Those who desire to detract from his title to praise for such conduct,
on the ground of his wealth, are little acquainted with the effect that
riches usually have upon men possessing less liberal minds; in whom
they oftener generate a spirit of cupidity than a desire, such as Clive
felt, to dispense to others the relief and blessings they can afford.

I have it in my power to add a remarkable testimony to show the
circumstances under which Clive acted upon the occasion to which I have
alluded.

A highly respectable gentleman, long resident in Suffolk, who had
filled official stations in India, a few years ago addressed a letter
to the present Lord Powis; in which, after stating facts that will be
hereafter noticed, he informs his Lordship that it being known he was
on personal grounds discontented with his father, he was summoned,
in 1773, as an evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons
who investigated the charges against him: "I of course attended," he
observes, "but was far from being inimically disposed to his Lordship;
and never can I forget what passed at the Committee on that day.
Governor Johnstone, after some deliberation, suddenly rose, and with
apparent exultation observed, 'It was now sufficiently proved on the
proceedings, that his Lordship had received upwards of 100,000_l._ soon
after the battle of Plassey;' when Lord Clive, rising from his seat,
calmly replied, that 'If any gentleman of the Committee had privately
asked him if that charge was true, he should have frankly acknowledged
to him that he had received a much larger sum;' adding, 'but when I
recollect entering the Nabob's treasury at Moorshedabad, with heaps of
gold and silver to the right and left, and these crowned with jewels,'
striking his hand violently on his head, 'by God, at this moment, do I
stand astonished at my own moderation.'"

A guilty mind seeks concealment. Such, evidently, was not the object of
Clive on this or any other occasion of his life; and those, even, who
condemn his actions, must acknowledge that they were grounded upon a
complete conviction in his own mind that they were not only defensible,
but consistent with his principles of honour as a gentleman, and with
those of his duty as a public servant.

I have, in this chapter, stated, with much freedom, my difference of
opinion from Mr. Mill, on some points connected with the revolution
at Moorshedabad; I have great pleasure, however, in referring to his
subsequent general remarks on this subject.

The chairman of the Select Committee of the House of Commons of
1773, when he brought up its report, made a motion, that the House
should inquire into the circumstances of the death and deposition of
Suraj-u-Dowlah, the fictitious treaty, and other matters which took
place on the elevation of Meer Jaffier. This was rejected, on the
plea of the reports of the Committee not being evidence. Mr. Mill
deems this ground of rejection a "subterfuge of the nature of a legal
shuffle:"--"but there were other considerations," he states, "to which
the House never adverted, which fairly recommended the rejection, or
at least a very great modification, of the penal proceeding; that the
punishment threatened was more grievous than the offence; that it was
punishment by an _ex-post-facto_ law, because, however contrary to
the principles of right government the presents received from Meer
Jaffier, and however odious to the moral sense the deception practised
upon Omichund, there was no law at the time which forbid them; that
the presents, how contrary soever to European morals and ideas, were
perfectly correspondent to those of the country in which they were
received, and to the expectations of the parties by whom they were
bestowed; that the treachery to Omichund was countenanced and palliated
by some of the principles and many of the admired incidents of
European diplomacy; that Clive, though never inattentive to his own
interests, was actuated by a sincere desire to promote the prosperity
of the Company, and appears not, in any instance, to have sacrificed
what he regarded as their interests to his own; and that it would have
required an extraordinary man, which no one ought to be punished for
not being, to have acted, in that most trying situation in which he was
placed, with greater disinterestedness than he displayed."[190]

FOOTNOTES:

[163] Though Clive, in his letter to Mr. Watts of the 19th of May,
estimates this gift at 12 lacs, the precise amount, and the proportions
in which it was to be given, were not settled by Mr. Watts till some
time afterwards. The shares made public were as follows:--

To Clive, 280,000 rupees, or 28,000_l._

To each member of the Committee, 240,000 rupees, or 24,000_l._

The former amounts are given in the Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii.
p. 145.; and we find a public letter from Clive, under date the 8th of
July, to Mr. Franckland, to the following purport:--

"Please to acquaint the gentlemen of the Council, not of the Committee,
that the Nabob has been so generous as to make them a present of 6 lacs
of rupees, which is to be paid in like proportions as the public money;
viz. half is paid down in money and plate, and the other half will be
paid as soon as his circumstances will admit of it."

[164] Letter to Clive, June 26th, 1757.

[165] The officers and men so excluded became, in consequence, entitled
to no more than their share with the naval force in the river, to whom
was allotted half the donation given by the Nabob. This share appears
to have been less than that of corresponding ranks in the army, with
which they had acted, and with whom they had an undoubted right to be
put on an equal footing.

[166] Maudipoor, June 26th, 1757.

[167] Cossimbazar, June 27th, 1757.

[168] June 23d. The very day on which the battle of Plassey was fought.

[169] Supposing Bussy neither came to Bengal, as was expected, nor sent
any reinforcements to his countrymen, the strength of the party under
Law was above two hundred men, and a large proportion of officers.
Clive's whole strength of Europeans in September (the earliest time at
which the season permitted his sailing to Madras) was only five hundred.

[170] Mr. Pigot was governor, and Colonel Lawrence commanded the troops.

[171] Sufficient evidence of their incompetency appears in this
narrative. I refrain from quoting passages in the correspondence before
me, in which more serious charges than those of incapacity are stated.

[172] Mr. Orme was, at this period, one of the Council at Madras.

[173] I leave, however, this question to the judgment of my readers,
who will also decide on the assertion of Mr. Mill, that "Clive, on
beholding an opening for exploits both splendid and profitable in
Bengal, overlooked all other considerations, violated his instructions,
and remained." This unqualified assertion appears to be a gratuitous
assumption of motives of action, in no degree borne out or warranted by
the facts of the case.

[174] In 1753 gomastahs (or agents) were sent to several parts of
the country, where the cloths for the Company's investment were
manufactured.

[175] The name of this messenger was Narraindass. He was brother to the
Nabob's head spy.

[176] Orme, from whom we have taken the above facts, adds, "His
(Omichund's) brother-in-law, Hazarimul, who had the chief management
of his affairs, concealed himself in the apartments of the women until
the next day, when the guard, endeavouring to take him, was resisted
by the whole body of Omichund's peons and armed domestics, amounting
to three hundred. Several were wounded on both sides before the fray
ended; during which the head of the peons, who was an Indian of high
caste, set fire to the house; and, in order to save the women of the
family from the dishonour of being exposed to strangers, entered their
apartments and killed, it is said, thirteen of them with his own hand,
after which he stabbed himself, but, contrary to his intention, not
mortally."

[177] Omichund received, upon the spot, one half of this amount: the
date of the payment of the remainder was deferred, and it was probably
to gain time to recover this sum, that he created those delays in the
proceedings of the confederates, of which Mr. Watts accused him.

[178] Purneah is a province of Bengal.

[179] Orme, vol. ii. p. 182.

[180] Lord Clive's evidence goes to prove, that Admiral Watson
did not object to his name being put by Mr. Lushington to the
fictitious treaty; and his knowledge of the transaction, at the
period it occurred, is established by the direct testimony of Mr.
Cooke, Secretary to Government, who stated, "That, after the battle
of Plassey, he waited upon Admiral Watson with a message from the
Select Committee: that, among other things, the fictitious treaty was
mentioned in conversation; and that the Admiral said he had not signed
it, but left them to do as they pleased."--Parliamentary Reports, vol.
iii. p. 152.

[181] One month after Omichund was informed of the fictitious treaty,
Clive, in a letter to the Committee at Calcutta, requests their
support to enable Omichund to perform his contract for the supply of
saltpetre at Patna: and in a subsequent letter (dated August 6th, 1757)
to the Secret Committee of the Directors, after stating that he had
recommended Omichund to pay a visit of devotion to Maulda, he adds,
"He is a person capable of rendering you great services, therefore not
wholly to be discarded." These notices of this man do not imply that
his reason was, at this period, so much affected as might be concluded
from the perusal of Orme's narrative.

[182] History of India, vol. iii. p. 170.

[183] An author for whom I entertain sincere respect, and with whose
sentiments my own, in most points, coincide, startled at the means
taken to deceive Omichund, expresses an opinion, "That the principles
of honour and integrity should have prescribed a more open conduct,
even at somewhat greater expense of danger."--Grant's Sketches of
India, p. 162. We should quite agree in this opinion, if the danger
was personal to the individuals; but when it was that of the State, we
should find it as difficult to point out the exact line of demarcation
to be observed by men entrusted with its interests, as to define what
should be the conduct of a lawyer in a particular case, where his
personal feelings and general principles of action were in opposition
to his duty to his client and to his professional reputation.

[184] I received from Lord Powis several trunks full of his father's
papers unexamined by himself. In these were documents of every
description, from copies of all his despatches, to the most private
notes: and I have not discovered one line that can justify the sweeping
assertion of Mr. Mill.

[185] Pol. India, vol. ii.

[186] A remarkable instance of this mode of paying those concerned in
such important transactions, is afforded in the treaty of peace with
Tippoo Sultaun, concluded by Lord Cornwallis in 1792. Thirty lacs
of rupees were demanded, and given as _Durbar khurutch_ (or Durbar
expenses), avowedly to be distributed amongst the officers concerned in
settling the treaty. Lord Cornwallis, it may be observed, obtained no
share of this money: but it may be answered, that while a commander, in
Lord Clive's situation, had not 3000_l._ per annum of direct salary,
and could have no expectation of pecuniary reward in England, Lord
Cornwallis had 30,000_l._ per annum, besides a donation of 100,000_l._
from the Government he so ably served; which, with a liberal wisdom
that does it honour, after that nobleman's death gave 60,000_l._ to his
son and successor.

[187] Political India, vol. ii. p. 188.

[188] 180,000_l._

[189] It appears from his papers and accounts that he gave away large
sums, not only to those who had personal claims upon him, but to others
whose merit, as public servants, had not, he thought, been sufficiently
rewarded.

[190] Mill's History of British India, vol. iii. p. 454.




CHAP. VII.


From causes which we have already been repeatedly called upon to
observe,--the unity of action of Europeans, and the want of it in
their Indian enemies,--the most extraordinary advantages have often
been gained by apparently the most inadequate means. The work of
force is easy; violence and strength can cast down, but wisdom alone
can rebuild. This task is always far more difficult than the first,
especially when the materials of which the new fabric is to be
constructed must be taken from the ruins of the old. These are, in such
cases, too often impaired and rendered unfit for use by the previous
shock they have sustained.

Clive soon found the truth of these facts. Meer Jaffier had no
qualities but as a soldier: his son was a headstrong youth; and his
brother, whom he wished to employ, was weak and incompetent. These,
and the Nabob's other relations and Mahommedan adherents, were alike
desirous of removing and plundering the wealthy and experienced Hindus
who were at the head of the administration, and governed the richest
provinces of Bengal. Roy Dullub, who saw that his ruin was their
object, had fenced himself round with his followers, and withdrawn from
all personal communication with the Nabob. Addul Sing, the Rajah of
Purneah, Rajah Ram, the Manager of Midnapore, and Rajah Ram Narrain,
the Ruler of Patna, were within a few months driven to rebellion
by acts of violence, which too plainly indicated that successful
opposition was their only road to safety. The defection of Ram Narrain,
at this period, was more unfortunate, as it afforded a safe progress
towards Oude to the French party under Law, in pursuit of whom a
detachment had marched, commanded by Major Coote.

The events which led to this general spirit of rebellion took place
while Clive was at Calcutta, whither he had been called by urgent
public and private concerns. His first melancholy duty after his
arrival was to attend the funeral of his brave associate Admiral
Watson. That gallant officer was seized, on the 12th of August, with
a putrid fever, which terminated his existence in four days. No
man appears to have felt more deeply than Clive the loss which was
sustained by this event. In a letter to the Committee of the Direction,
written immediately subsequent to its occurrence, he observes:--

"Mr. Watson is no more. Every one here received the melancholy news of
his death with much concern: his generosity, disinterestedness, and
zeal for the service, must for ever endear his memory to the Company.
Unhappy fate! after having escaped all the risk of war, to be thus
untimely cut off in the midst of his successes, crowned with glory
and reputation. This is but one of the many lessons given us of the
instability of human nature. Concern for this good man's death hastens
me to a conclusion."

It appears from Clive's letter[191] to the Court of Directors from
Calcutta, that he still cherished a hope that he might be able to
return to Madras when the season admitted. "Your Honours may be
persuaded," he observes, "that next to this province, the Carnatic
takes up the whole of my attention. It gives me much concern the
gentlemen on the coast should be displeased at my not returning a
part of the forces: had I done so, nothing could have been effected
here. Your Honours, who bestow an impartial attention upon all the
Company's settlements, will, I hope, approve of my conduct. The time
draws near when we may expect to hear of the new Soubah, Meer Jaffier's
confirmation from Delhi, and that the Mahrattas are satisfied with
the present change. I shall then proceed to the Carnatic with a force
which, I hope, will give our arms the superiority in those parts. I
make no doubt of being there soon after the breaking up of the monsoon,
which will be as early as the two contending parties can take the
field; and upon my arrival there I shall with pleasure resign the sword
to my superiors."

During the period Clive was at Calcutta he was much occupied in
settling the distribution of the sums allotted for the remuneration
of losses, and the donation to the army and navy. The former appears
to have been arranged on the justest principles, and to have given
universal satisfaction, but the discussions regarding the latter,
though they had been once settled, were revived, and took a more
acrimonious shape; and it was not till after much trouble and vexation
that they were ultimately adjusted.[192]

Clive, after having settled these disputes, found himself compelled to
make preparations to accompany the Nabob to Patna; for, independent
of the three rebellions before alluded to, Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Vizier
of Oude, now threatened the frontier. This Prince, who held (like
the Nabob of Bengal) a delegated power from the Emperor of Delhi,
had become, like others, independent of the weak superior to whom
he continued to give a nominal obedience. His territories, bounded
on the west by the river Jumna, and on the east by the mountains of
Nepaul, stretched to near Delhi on the north, and on the south bordered
on Bahar, one of the richest provinces subject to the rule of Meer
Jaffier. Sujah-u-Dowlah was to be dreaded both from his character and
resources: he had, besides, the aid of the French party, and was
believed to have established the ties of friendship with Ram Narrain,
the discontented ruler of the country he was expected to invade.

Clive's force was at this period greatly reduced from sickness: he
could not bring into the field more than five hundred and fifty
Europeans, and fifteen hundred natives. He complains, in all his
letters, of the bad effects the prize-money had produced, both on
the health and discipline of those under his command. He had applied
for, and obtained leave of the Admiral, Sir George Pocock, to employ
the detachment of His Majesty's troops in Bengal; but the conduct of
the officers (with two exceptions) made him decline accepting their
unwilling services.

"Notwithstanding your offer," he observes in his reply[193] to the
Admiral, "of putting the King's detachment under my command on this
expedition, I am sorry to inform you I cannot accept it, without
prejudicing the service; for all the officers (Captain Weller[194] and
Captain Coote excepted) have expressed by letter a disinclination to
go upon it. Under these circumstances, I think it is better for the
Company to be served by those who are willing, and may be attached to
their service, than by persons who seem to have lost all remembrance
of what they owe to them! For my own part, though I have before
represented to you the many disadvantages I must labour under, during
the present expedition, I shall endeavour to surmount them, and be
ready to render the Company all the service, which every wellwisher to
his country is bound to do."

The rising talents of Major Coote were already employed in the command
of a detachment. The death of Major Kilpatrick, an officer who had been
highly distinguished throughout the scenes above described, occasioning
a vacancy in the command of the military at Bengal, Clive recommended
that the station should be offered to Colonel Forde[195], an officer
of whom he entertained the highest opinion. The terms, in which this
offer was conveyed, are honourable to the reputation of him to whom
it was made, and reflect great credit on Clive's discernment; for no
opportunities had been yet afforded to Colonel Forde of developing
those talents as a soldier, which soon afterwards rendered him so
distinguished. Notwithstanding the encouragement offered, from the
distinction obtained by Coote and Forde, when Adlercron's regiment went
to England a short time after, none of the other officers belonging to
it availed themselves of the option given them, of remaining in the
Company's service, except Captain Carnac, who joined Clive, by whom he
was early noticed; and his subsequent career in Bengal did ample credit
to the judgment of his penetrating commander.

I have deemed it of importance to dwell on these particulars. In
nothing does the power of genius more strikingly display itself than
in the selection of persons most fit to be employed, and in the
application of their peculiar talents to the work for which they are
suited. The personal efforts of one man can do little; but aided by
the power of creating and employing subordinate instruments, can
effect every thing. The sphere of Clive's selection, however, was
very limited; and there are, in his private letters of this period,
continual complaints of his being forced, from want of aid, to make
personal efforts injurious to his health[196], which had never been
good, and which he now represents as declining from the effects of a
nervous complaint, to which he had been subject from his youth.

Affairs at Moorshedabad had, from the moment Clive left that city,
become worse. Besides other evils, the Nabob had hitherto evaded
compliance with several of the most important articles of the treaty;
and he every day showed less disposition to comply with the reiterated
demands made for its speedy fulfilment. Mr. Scrafton, who was at this
period acting as political resident at his Court, urged Clive to hasten
to Moorshedabad, with or without his force; as his presence appeared
the only means of averting confusion and ruin.

"I shall march," said Clive, in answer[197] to several of Mr.
Scrafton's letters[198], "with the whole army. I have wrote to the
Nabob and Ram Narrain, of which copies are enclosed you. Do not suffer
yourself to be unquieted beyond reason at the situation of affairs, but
consider them coolly, and give me daily accounts of what is passing.
The march of the army is absolutely necessary, as well to support the
Nabob against his enemies, as to see justice done ourselves."

After Clive had joined the Nabob at Rajahmahul, he received a letter
from the Select Committee, stating that as Sir G. Pocock was about to
leave the river, were he to proceed to Patna the safety of Calcutta
might be endangered. Clive observes in reply; "Without a foreknowledge
of events, we cannot be at any certainty, whether the steps we take
may or may not be for the advantage of the Company. By accompanying
the Nabob to Patna, it is very possible, though I think not probable,
for a French squadron to push up the river, and endanger Calcutta, and
in consequence all of the Company's possessions in these parts; and by
refusing to lend the Nabob our assistance, we must lose that influence
with him which seems essentially necessary to obtain his fulfilling the
rest of the treaty, and his continuing to us our valuable possessions.

"Yesterday the Nabob and his minister paid me a visit. After
discoursing for some time on the promising prospect of his affairs,
he desired I would march with him to Patna. This I consented to, on
condition he gave us security for paying the rest of his debts. The
orders upon Burdwaun, Nuddea, Hooghley, and Fugellie are making out,
which I hope to send you in a day or two: I have reason to think you
will receive in ready money the full of the half-year's payment. As Ram
Narrain[199] refuses to trust his person in the Nabob's power without
a letter from me, I have wrote him that he may come with safety,
having the Nabob's authority for so doing, and I am in great hopes
there will be no necessity for marching further than Telliagully. If
the affairs of Patna can be settled in this manner, it will save the
Nabob an expense which he is not well able to bear, and ease you of all
apprehensions from the arrival of a French squadron."

In Clive's letter[200] from Rajahmahul to the Select Committee of the
Directors, we find a concise and clear account of the condition of the
Nabob's government, as well as the measures which were adopted for its
settlement.

"In laying open the state of this government," he observes, "I am
concerned to mention that the present Nabob is a prince of little
capacity, and not at all blessed with the talent of gaining the love
and confidence of his principal officers. His mismanagement threw
the country into great confusion in the space of a few months, and
might have proved of fatal consequence to himself, but for our known
attachment to him. No less than three rebellions were on foot at one
time; one at Midnapore, headed by Rajah Ram; another at Purnea, under
Addul Sing; and a third at Patna, under Ram Narrain: all which may be
very well attributed to the Nabob's own imprudence. Rajah Ram's two
brothers, after being invited to Moorshedabad, were imprisoned, which
was quite sufficient to deter him from surrendering himself as he
intended. Meer Azuffee was appointed to the government of Purnea to
the general satisfaction of the people; but soon laid aside for Cuddum
Hussein Khan, a relation (it is true) of the Nabob, but a tyrannical,
rapacious fellow, and odious to the last degree to the Purneans. As for
Ram Narrain, after he made his submission, and the Nabob had sworn to
continue him in his government, apparent measures were taken for his
overthrow.

"The prime minister, Roy Dullub, who was one of the chief instruments
of the Nabob's promotion, and had received in return solemn assurances
of continuing his Dewan, was suspected to be engrossing the power
in his hands, and rather to have encouraged the rebellions than
endeavoured to suppress them. It is very certain that Roy Dullub
had a powerful party in the state, and more than probable that he
took measures to strengthen it, according to the common policy of
all Dewans. However this might be, the Nabob's jealousy of him was
arrived to such a height, that Suraj-u-Dowlah's brother, a young
lad, and almost an idiot, was suddenly cut off, on a surmise of Roy
Dullub's intending to make him Nabob, and having sent his own brother
to Chandernagore to engage me in the design, which is altogether
groundless. Roy Dullub no sooner knew of this sudden execution, and
the motives for it, than he began to fear for his own life; and open
hostilities might possibly have ensued if we had not been a check
upon each party. The Nabob, who at this time was encamped in the
neighbourhood of Moorshedabad, accompanied by a detachment of our
troops, excuses himself from any knowledge of the transaction, and lays
the whole blame on his son, who was left in government of the city;
but many circumstances induced us to believe otherwise. Roy Dullub, on
pretence of sickness, was still at Moorshedabad, having a large body
of his own troops with him, as is usual in these governments; but it
is not improbable the chief reason for his remaining behind was a view
to his own safety. Affairs were in this situation when I arrived at
Moorshedabad. I would willingly have engaged Roy Dullub to accompany
me to the Nabob's, that I might have effected a reconciliation between
them; but his illness not admitting him to set out immediately, I could
only assure him of my protection, and engage his promise to follow me
as soon as possible.

"The 3d instant, our army came up with the Nabob's at Fettiapoor, near
Rajahmahul, where we still continue encamped, chiefly to wait the
minister's arrival. I should have acquainted you that some days before
I set out from Chandernagore, Rajah Ram, the Midnapore rebel, came and
delivered himself up to me; on promise of the Nabob's pardon and our
protection. This first unlinked the chain of the three rebellions,
the chiefs of which had held a correspondence, and were connected
together. Rajah Ram's submission may be deemed a very fortunate event
in all respects; for his good sense, long experience in the affairs
of this government, and the great influence he has in the country,
would have made him as dangerous an enemy to the Nabob as he is now
a useful friend to us. Upon our approach, and some of the Nabob's
troops having passed the river into the Purnea country, the rebels of
that quarter quitted their intrenchments and dispersed, but some of
their chiefs were overtaken and made prisoners; so that two of the
rebellions are effectually quieted, and the third is in a fair way
of being peaceably accommodated. If it is in my power to bring about
the thorough reconciliation which I intend between the Nabob and Roy
Dullub, all domestic troubles may be fully put an end to in this
country. As for any apprehensions of a foreign enemy, they are not very
strong at present. The Vizier, with the assistance of the Mahrattas,
drove Nujeeb Khan, the Affghân Bukhshee, out of Delhi; but the latter
being reinforced with a large body of Patans, who are the Affghans that
have settled for some time in Hindustan, is again making head in the
neighbourhood of Delhi, and will be joined by Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Nabob
of Oude. So that all the powers from whom any danger might be expected
are too much engaged among themselves to bend their thoughts this way
for the present. The Nabob's confirmation is not yet procured at Delhi,
nor can I judge when it will. The difficulty is in the price.

"I have waited for Roy Dullub's arrival with great impatience, as
Durbar business cannot be transacted without him; and we have some
points to settle of great consequence to your interest. We have
already had occasion to observe the difficulties attending every
application for money to the Durbar, and I foresee they will increase
as the Nabob grows stronger, and we become less necessary; therefore
I have determined not to leave this ground till I procure sufficient
assignments on the revenues of some country near Calcutta for the
annual payment of the money still due by treaty; together with proper
writings from the Zemindars of such country for the regular discharge
of the same, which we may enforce if necessary. We have already
obtained the Nabob's promise to comply as soon as his minister arrives;
but it was not without much private opposition from Jugget Seit, who,
following the same method with regard to all debts due to him from the
government, has already demands on most of the Zemindars. However,
on being threatened with the loss of our friendship, he desisted.
It is not impossible but we may find Roy Dullub likewise averse to
our carrying this point, as he may become, by it, a good deal less
necessary to us, than when our applications were to be directed to him;
but as the Nabob has given his promise, and the matter now wholly
rests with him, he cannot find any way of evading a compliance, without
a manifest breach of friendship, which I think he would not venture on
in his present situation."

Major Coote, who pursued M. Law, till the French party passed Benares,
made a complaint of the conduct of the ruler of Patna, from whom he
states that he met with obstruction instead of aid. This letter was
dated on the 8th of August, a period when Ram Narrain had sufficient
proofs of the hostile disposition of the Nabob, but was ignorant what
part the English commander meant to take. The moment he received the
assurance of protection which Clive gave him, he not only submitted,
but went to Meer Jaffier's camp, which had then reached the vicinity of
Patna.

Intrigues were commenced, which, notwithstanding the promises made to
him, had for their object, the removal of this powerful Hindu, in whose
place the Nabob desired to put his brother. On the other hand, Ram
Narrain united his interests with Roy Dullub, who, though assured of
protection from the English, appeared still to entertain doubts of his
own safety. All parties looked to Clive, who was encamped at Bankapore,
a village a few miles west of Patna.

While affairs were yet unsettled, an affray occurred in the market
between some of the English sepoys and Ram Narrain's horsemen, in which
several lives were lost. The excited state of men's minds was such,
that this trifling dispute had nearly been attended with the most
serious consequences. Apprehension of the recurrence of such accidents
induced Clive to move his troops to an island in the Ganges, opposite
to his former position.

Though Meer Jaffier does not appear to have entertained, at this
period, the treacherous designs imputed to him, he continued
irresolute, until Clive, in a personal conference, succeeded in
convincing him that both his honour and his interests were concerned in
the re-establishment of Ram Narrain. Clive has stated what occurred on
this occasion in a letter[201] to the Court of Directors. "The Nabob,"
he observes in this despatch, "applying to me to accommodate between
him and Ram Narrain, and promising that if he would submit himself,
his life and property should be secure, and his government continued
to him, I wrote him conformably, engaging myself to be security for
the Nabob's promise. On receipt of my letter, he immediately left
Patna, and met me the 25th ultimo at Hybut-Gunge. It was the 29th
before he could wait on the Nabob, for want of a lucky day, and then
I sent Mr. Watts to introduce him. The wavering disposition of the
Nabob, and the ear he gives to evil counsellors, who endeavour to
inspire notions into him of our having too great an influence in the
country, have occasioned me some trouble in these mediations. However,
as he perceives in the end that my endeavours are entirely directed
to his good and the public quiet, his jealousies are quickly effaced.
The distance between us during the march prevented any interview
from my leaving Rajahmahul till our arrival at Patna; which time was
industriously made use of, by the envious and self-interested, to
alienate him from the English, and induce him to break his promise to
Ram Narrain. Their artful suggestions were too easily admitted; and
many signs appeared of coolness towards us, as well as an intention
of giving the province of Bahar to his brother Meer Cassim Ali Khan.
Having occasion, however, to wait on the Nabob the 14th instant, to
congratulate him on his entry into Patna, I represented to him the
impossibility of retracting the promise he had made through me to
Ram Narrain; and intimated, as well as the nicety of the subject
would bear, the advantage of trusting the government to a person of
his moderate and peaceable disposition, rather than putting it into
imprudent, and at the same time dangerous, hands. My discourse had
weight, and Ram Narrain was confirmed."

In a private letter, written the day after this despatch, to his friend
Mr. Pigot, Clive gives a forcible description of the actual condition
of affairs at Meer Jaffier's court, and of his own situation at this
period. He observes, "The Nabob's conduct is weak beyond conception;
and you may be assured, whenever we are wanting in a force to overawe
and protect him, ruin will ensue. You cannot imagine the trouble I have
had these three weeks past, in our march to this place; and, since his
arrival, he has been wanting to make his brother, who is a greater fool
than himself, Nabob of Bahar, in prejudice of Ram Narrain, a Gentoo,
universally beloved and respected, and that in breach of his promises
to me, whom he desired to write to him to engage him to come down and
pay his respects. Not one of his rajahs would come to or treat with
him, without letters of assurance from me. His Prime Minister, Roy
Dullub, who has more than half the army under his command, is entirely
in our interests, as is Ram Narrain and all Bahar; so that, in spite of
his folly, we can oblige him to act for his own interest and that of
the Company.

"Though there is nothing I so earnestly wish for as returning to
the coast, that I may have a good plea for quitting the service
entirely, yet I have set my heart so much upon a happy conclusion of
the Moorshedabad expedition, that I am determined to stay in Bengal
another year, if no news from England prevents it; for there is such a
connection between the Nabob, myself, and his great men, that I greatly
fear my absence would throw all into confusion, and there would be
an end of the remaining part of the debt and of the fortifications.
Whereas, by staying till this time twelve months, two thirds of the
debt will be paid, and the fortifications in great forwardness.
Besides, so large a sum has been advanced by the Company to the navy
and army, I think myself bound to see the major part of it repaid by
the Nabob. By that time eighteen of the twenty will be received.

"I hope my good friend will acquit me of the crime of vanity in
expressing my apprehension of the evil consequences of quitting Bengal
at this juncture. These foolish people ground their opinions and
confidence in one man's abilities alone. Before we took the field, it
was with the greatest difficulty he could be prevailed upon to issue
out of his treasury 10,000 rupees; and since my joining him he has
already paid twenty-five lacs, and given security for the payment of
ten more."

Clive's negotiations with the Nabob were finally attended with all the
success that such a court and so weak a character allowed. A supply
of money was procured for the extraordinary expenses of the army; the
perwannah, or grant of lands yielded to the Company, was passed in
all its forms; orders were issued for the immediate discharge of all
arrears on the first six months of the Nabob's debt, and the revenues
of Burdwan, Nuddea, and Hooghley assigned over for payment of the
rest: "so that," says Clive, writing[202] to the Court of Directors,
"the discharge of the debt is now become independent of the Nabob,
which precaution is become absolutely necessary, as his calls for
money are greater than he can answer. Nothing but a total revolution
in the government can well interrupt your payments." These matters
being settled to his satisfaction, he had accompanied the Nabob, at his
urgent request to Patna, that by his presence he might assist him in
settling that province, and by showing himself on the frontier along
with the Nabob, and his numerous army, he might at once awe all foreign
enemies, and hasten down the Sunnud in favour of the Nabob, from Delhi.
"All domestic troubles," he adds in the same letter, "are now happily
ended; and the Nabob seems so well fixed in his government, as to be
able, with a small degree of prudence, to maintain himself quietly in
it. For ourselves, we have been so fortunate in these transactions as
to attach to us the most considerable persons in the kingdom; and,
by the constancy with which we successively supported Rajah Ram,
Roy Dullub, and Ram Narrain, to acquire the general confidence, and
make our friendship be solicited on all sides. On the whole, we may
pronounce, that this expedition, without bloodshed, has been crowned
with all the advantages that could be expected or wished, both to the
Nabob and the Company."

Clive, nevertheless, saw every moment more and more the necessity of
the English permanently emancipating themselves from dependence upon
their native allies. The Select Committee at Fort William, alarmed lest
the French should make an attempt on Calcutta, wished him to apply to
the Nabob to send a large force to Hooghley, to act in co-operation
with them in the event of an attack. The reply from Clive, and Mr.
Watts, who was associated with him in his civil and political duties,
while it exposes the impolicy of such an application, shows their
opinion regarding the little reliance that could be placed on the
friendship of Meer Jaffier, however recent and great his obligation to
the English.

"We cannot," they observe[203], "avoid differing greatly in opinion
from you, gentlemen, on the subject of requesting the Nabob to have
a large force down at Hooghley, to be ready for assistance against
our enemies the French. Such a publication of our fear and weakness
would, we think, be a step the most impolitic and most prejudicial
to the Company's interest that could possibly be taken. Meer Jaffier
(according to the practice of all Mussulmen) has long since forgot
the services rendered him by the English, and looks upon them as
encroachers upon his power, reputation, and authority. It is now some
months, gentlemen, that we have been fully convinced that the Nabob has
looked upon the English with an envious eye, and that he is influenced
by his fears only to do them justice.

"The consequence of our application to the Nabob would occasion a great
coolness in his behaviour towards us, and a refusal to fulfil the
rest of his treaty; neither does this prospect of danger appear to us
so near as to oblige us to make known our apprehensions to the whole
province."

The same feeling of the necessity of the Presidency of Bengal providing
for its own security, led Clive at this period to express to the Select
Committee at Fort William his pointed disapprobation of their delays in
repairing their fortifications.

"I cannot conclude," he observes in a letter[204] written the day he
left Patna, "without representing to you, gentlemen, in the strongest
terms, the great stake the Company have in Bengal, and how much that
stake is exposed for want of a fortification. It gives me concern,
beyond what I can express, to hear from all hands that the works go on
very slowly. At a time like this, no private workmen should be allowed,
but all employed for the public service; and if the want of hands arise
only from the want of a few pice[205] more, I think such a saving does
not merit one moment's consideration, or that such economy can meet
with the Company's approbation at this juncture. Be assured, gentlemen,
if Calcutta be left defenceless through any neglect of ours, and should
fall into the hands of our enemies a second time, we shall entail upon
ourselves a censure never to be effaced."

Clive obtained, before he quitted Patna, a monopoly of the saltpetre
of that province for the Company. This grant was, in every respect,
very advantageous to the English; and no less so to the Nabob, who
received as much revenue, and more certain payment, than he had done
before. The officers of Meer Jaffier were, however, discontented with
an arrangement by which they lost the bribes and presents which they
formerly received from the contractors for that article. After this
and other matters were settled, Clive proceeded to Moorshedabad,
accompanied by Roy Dullub, with whom he had to adjust many points
connected with the full performance of the treaty.

The object of Clive, throughout this short expedition to Patna,
was to reconcile, as far as he could, the jarring interests which
distracted the court of Meer Jaffier, and threatened to disturb the
peace of the country. His honour, and the public interests, strongly
attached him to the Nabob; though, at the same time, it was not only
politic, but indispensably necessary, to keep the power of that prince
within limits. He felt himself especially bound to protect Roy Dullub
from the enemies by whom he was threatened. That minister, it will
be recollected, was one of the chief instruments in effecting the
revolution; and had subsequently received, both from Clive and Meer
Jaffier, the fullest assurances of safety to his life and property.

Clive, on the expedition to Patna, and on all other occasions,
communicated with Meer Jaffier upon every subject. He often visited
him; and giving scope to the natural bent of his temper, entered into
his amusements. But it was impossible to reconcile that prince to his
condition; which was more humiliating from the circumstance of his
presenting to his countrymen the first instance, in Bengal, of the
power of a proud Mahommedan sovereign being overshadowed by that of a
body of merchants, who, before this great change, had never appeared at
the court of his predecessors but as humble supplicants endeavouring to
obtain commercial privileges. Many of the nobles and generals by whom
the Nabob was surrounded had been, a year or two before, courted by
bribes and flattery to protect the persons, or to promote the trade,
of the very English agents on whose pleasure or policy their fortune
and character now depended. To add to the strong and rankling feelings
which such a change must have excited, the Mahommedan prince and his
chiefs found themselves deserted by the wary and pliant Hindus, who,
possessing greater foresight, and expecting security and advancement
from the change of masters, were ready, on the first alarm of danger
to their life or property, to seek the protection of the English. This
the latter were in many cases under the necessity of granting; for,
from the first, they had not intrinsic strength which could enable
them to cope with those with whom they were hourly exposed to come
in collision. They could not have remained in Bengal without the
means of self-defence; they could not repel or retaliate an attack
without counteracting and defeating their enemies; they could not
retreat without ruin, from the ground to which their successes had
advanced them; and they could only maintain themselves by forming and
improving their connections in the country. Though the cultivation and
support of the ties, which this course led them to establish, created
divisions among those whose union would have been their destruction,
it had at the same time the evil of cherishing feuds, rebellions, and
revolutions. Supposing those who had lost all but the name of authority
by our progress had been so well satisfied of our decided superiority
as to become patient wearers of the degraded trappings of state, could
they have reconciled their proud followers to obedience and submission
to those whom they deemed foreign upstarts, and whose power became
every day more galling from the abuses committed by the meanest of the
natives[206] of India employed in their service, or guarded by their
protection?

It is not meant, by these observations, to question the necessity which
compelled our advance to power in Bengal. There was no alternative
between its attainment and abandoning that country altogether; but
while we do justice to ourselves, we should not be unjust to those who
opposed us by intrigue or in battle. We should, at all events, judge
them according to their habits, their knowledge, and the feelings and
opinions of the community to which they belonged. Alarm for their
lives, hatred and distrust of each other, or the lust of power, might
make them confederate with us for the purpose of the moment. To
this they might also be induced by that arrogant confidence, which
is ever the concomitant of ignorance. They might hope to direct or
command those with whom they had combined to destroy their enemies.
But when this dream of self-delusion was dispelled, when they found
that they themselves had been made the instruments of subverting the
dominion of the race to which they belonged, and that their power was
now controlled by the very persons by whom it had been so recently
established,--it became natural for them, and for all whose fame and
fortune were associated with them, to seek, through every means,
emancipation from such humiliating thraldom. I have expressed my
sentiments very strongly upon this subject, and may be condemned by
those who, alike regardless of usage and of feeling, are guided in
their judgment of every public and private act by partial principles,
and by a local and limited scale of moral rectitude; but I shall appeal
from such a decision to all who, true to the feelings and affections
which are implanted in every breast, cherish attachment to their
family, their tribe, and their country. I ask of these, what would have
been their conduct, if placed in the depressed and degraded condition
of Meer Jaffier, his kindred, his nobles, and their followers?

Clive was fully sensible of the character of the motives by which
the latter were influenced. He saw and felt for their condition, and
imputed their intrigues and conspiracies, less to their personal
characters than to the general causes to which I have alluded. He did
not, therefore, expect any sudden change in their sentiments; but he
tried, by every act in his power, to render that control which it was
necessary to exercise less irksome. His conduct, however, had often
the effect of lowering those he desired to exalt; for it brought his
actions into strong contrast with the weak machinations of men, who
could neither conceal their jealousy of his power, nor their own
inability to cope with his superior mind.

The natives of Bengal, as yet ignorant of the construction of the
English government, ascribed every thing to Clive. They considered him
as the exclusive author of the success which had attended the English
arms; and with his life many expected it to terminate. The existence of
such sentiments gave probability to the reports of plots said to have
been formed, both at Moorshedabad and at Patna, for his assassination;
and he was warned of them by persons who deemed their information
authentic. But he does not appear to have given such warnings any
attention. He continued steadily to pursue his object of supporting
the Nabob he had raised to the throne, while at the same time he took
every measure to save the interests of his country from the dangers to
which they were exposed from the vacillating weakness, or the excited
feelings, of that prince.

When Clive arrived at Moorshedabad with Roy Dullub, he found the
Nabob's son Meeran in a state of great irritation, at the restoration
of that Hindu influence, which it was the real though concealed object
of Meer Jaffier's expedition to Patna to destroy. The disposition
of this young man, as far as it had yet developed itself, was
sanguinary and rapacious. He was, as has been related, the cause of
Suraj-u-Dowlah's being put to death: and this act, with the more recent
assassination of the son of that Prince, and the imprisonment of his
mother, had made him unpopular with the more peaceable part of his
father's subjects, particularly the Hindus, who dreaded his cruelty and
violence. But the Mahommedan chiefs and soldiers, whose pride had been
wounded, and who were checked in their licentious habits, hailed these
qualities, which, combined with Meeran's known jealousy and hatred of
the English, gave them hopes of recovering, through his means, their
lost influence and power.

Meeran had entered warmly into his father's feelings of jealousy of the
rising consequence of Clive, increased as it had been by his success in
quelling, through the influence of his personal character, the three
rebellions which lately threatened the state; but the chief subjects of
irritation were his open protection of Roy Dullub, and his travelling
with that minister to Moorshedabad. The Prince felt, or affected to
feel, alarmed at their approach: he commenced levying troops, and
declared to Mr. Scrafton, that unless Clive gave him a solemn promise
of protection, he would be compelled to have recourse to arms, to avert
the danger with which his life was threatened by the hostility of Roy
Dullub. He not only made these sentiments public, but went out of the
city in apparent alarm as Clive entered it. Clive, who had received
a private letter from Mr. Scrafton[207] informing him of Meeran's
conduct, was not prepared for this step, which threw Moorshedabad into
the utmost consternation. To this was added the receipt of intelligence
of a French squadron on the coast of Coromandel, and of the superiority
which that nation had acquired in land forces. To counteract the bad
impressions which such news might make at so critical a moment, Clive
exaggerated a slight naval success which had been obtained by the
English into a complete victory.[208] He also wrote to the Nabob on the
same day, complaining of the strange behaviour of Meeran, and stating
that he could not continue in Bengal, if his zeal to support him was
to be rewarded with suspicion and distrust. But before an answer was
received, the Prince, persuaded of his error, had returned to the city,
and made the most submissive apologies for his conduct.

Clive remained only a few days at Moorshedabad. Soon after his arrival
at Calcutta, a vessel[209] from England brought out the arrangements
made by the Directors subsequently to their receiving the intelligence
of their misfortunes in Bengal. The first measure, adopted in August,
1757, was the appointment of a temporary Committee of five, in which
Clive was to preside. This was changed in November; and it was resolved
to dismiss Mr. Drake, upon whose incompetency all appear to have been
agreed; and a council of ten was nominated, the four senior members
of which were to preside alternately, each for three months. In this
second arrangement no mention whatever was made of Clive; and as the
letter of August did not reach Bengal before that of November, he
received at the same moment the account of his first appointment, and
of the subsequent marked neglect of the Directors. But their last
resolution was of little consequence, as circumstances rendered its
execution impossible, except at the serious hazard of all the great
advantages which had been obtained. This sentiment was universal; but
by none was it felt so strongly as by the gentlemen appointed to the
Council, and above all by those who were advanced by the Court of
Directors to a share in the divided office of Governor. I shall spare
the reader all comments upon this extraordinary expedient, which was
no doubt the crude offspring of faction and mistrust. It is a more
pleasing task to record the better feeling and better understanding of
the true interests of their country which pervaded the councils of the
local government.

I am induced to insert the following letter to Clive from the new
Council, not more from its containing an excellent summary of the
reasons which led them to request he would fill the station of their
President, than because I deem it alike honourable to their zeal and
disinterestedness.

  "Sir,

  "Our most serious attention has been devoted to the commands of our
  honourable employers per Hardwicke, naming a rotation of Governors
  for the future management of their affairs at this settlement; and,
  having duly weighed the nature of this regulation with all its
  attending circumstances, a sincere conviction of its being, in our
  present situation and circumstances, repugnant to the true interest
  of our honourable masters, and the welfare of the settlement in
  general, obliges us (though with the utmost respect and deference)
  to believe, that had our employers been apprised of the present
  state of their affairs in this kingdom, they would have placed
  the presidentship in some one person, as the clearest and easiest
  method of conducting their concerns, as well as preserving and
  maintaining the weight and influence the late happy revolution has
  given us with the Soubah of these provinces; on which influence, at
  the present period, the interest and welfare of the Company depends
  in the highest degree, at this settlement.

  "The difficulties we may be liable to by a rotation in the
  executive part of government, with its consequences, are
  sufficiently obvious in our present state of affairs; we will,
  however, mention only a few points: the treaty with the Nabob
  not perfected in all its branches, the possession of the lands
  incomplete, the settlement in no posture of defence, the French
  considerably reinforced with a military and a fleet, their designs
  with respect to Bengal hitherto unknown, and the impossibility of
  impressing a proper idea of this divided power on the minds of
  the Soubah and others of this kingdom, who have, at all times,
  been accustomed to the government of a single person. A little
  reflection will introduce many more, and clearly evince the
  necessity of this address.

  "The gentlemen nominated Governors in the Honourable Company's
  commands per Hardwicke, have the highest sense of gratitude for the
  honour conferred on them by our employers in their appointment;
  but deem themselves in duty bound, at this juncture of affairs, to
  wave all personal honours and advantages, and declare, as their
  sentiments, that a rotation in the executive part of Government,
  for the foregoing reasons, would be extremely prejudicial to the
  real interest of the Company; in which opinion we unanimously
  concur, and judge it for the welfare of our honourable employers,
  and of the settlement in general, to deviate in this instance from
  the commands of our honourable masters, and fix the presidentship
  in a single person till we hear further from Europe.

  "Your being named as head of the General Committee (in the letter
  of the 3d of August last) established at that time for conducting
  the Company's affairs in Bengal, your eminent services, abilities,
  and merit, together with your superior weight and influence with
  the present Soubah and his officers, are motives which have great
  force with us on this occasion; and all concur in pointing out you,
  at the present, as best able to render our honourable employers
  necessary service at this juncture, till they shall make their
  further pleasure known by the appointment of a President for their
  affairs here.

  "These reasons urge us to make you an offer of being President of
  the Company's affairs in Bengal, till a person is appointed by the
  Honourable Company; and we flatter ourselves you will be induced to
  accept of our offer, from your wonted regard to the interest of our
  honourable employers, and zeal for the welfare of their affairs,
  which we doubt not you are, as well as ourselves, convinced will be
  much prejudiced by a rotation in the executive part of government.

  "We wait your reply, and have the honour to be,

  "Sir,
  "Your most obedient,
  "and most humble servants.

  "Fort William,
  "26th June, 1758."

Clive appears to have been so much hurt by the conduct of the Court
of Directors, that he had determined not to accept the station
offered him. Mr. Watts, whose name was first upon the list of the
Rotation-government (as it was termed) wrote him a private letter,
in which he entreated him, by every consideration for the public
interests, not to refuse his services at so critical a period. His
answer to this letter is remarkable, as it shows the feelings under
which he acted.

"I have considered[210]," he states, "what you proposed to me, and
judge myself under a necessity of declining the Government. Both the
public and my private advices, I think, plainly discover that the
Presidency of Bengal was by no means intended for me by the Court of
Directors; and a temporary acceptance can only expose me, upon the
further alterations which may arrive from Europe, to circumstances of
disgrace in the eyes of the Country Government, which, I believe it is
unnecessary for me to remark, might be prejudicial to the Company's
affairs. At the same time I cannot sufficiently express my sense of
the disinterestedness which you, and the gentlemen of the Council
have shown in this generous offer, and of the honour you have thereby
conferred on me."

The representations of all ranks and parties, and the conviction of the
truth of the grounds on which they were founded, led Clive to alter
this resolution, and to write the following letter to the Council.

  "Gentlemen,

  "I have received your letter of this day's date, and cannot
  sufficiently express the grateful sense I have of the favourable
  opinion you are pleased to entertain of me, which has induced you
  to desire my acceptance of the Presidency at this critical juncture.

  "Though I think I have cause to be dissatisfied with the Court of
  Directors, for laying me aside in their new form of Government,
  without any reason assigned, after having named me as head of the
  General Committee in the letter of the 3d of August last, yet,
  animated by the noble example of public spirit which you have set
  me, I have determined to wave all private considerations, where
  the general good is concerned; and as there is no doubt but the
  government of a single person, involved as we are now with the
  country powers, must have infinite advantage over that complicated
  form of government established from home, I shall, from that motive
  (though both my health and private concerns strongly require my
  returning to Europe), accept the offer you have done me the honour
  to make me, till such time as our employers have appointed a
  President in the usual form.

  "I cannot omit testifying my acknowledgments, Gentlemen, to you all
  in general, for the zeal you have discovered for the service of our
  masters upon this occasion; but in particular to you who have been
  nominated to be in the rotation of governors. You have made such a
  sacrifice, that few, if any instances can be given of the like. You
  have, of your own accord, parted with the dignity of government,
  and all the advantages thereunto annexed, because you apprehend
  that the Company's affairs could not be properly conducted under a
  government so constituted.

  "Unequal as I am to the weighty task of directing this Presidency,
  especially in civil matters, to which I have never been able to
  give due attention, on account of my military avocations, I am
  now, Gentlemen, to beg the assistance of your advice, and therefore
  hope you will persevere in the zeal you have hitherto so abundantly
  shown, and that none of you, but more particularly Mr. Watts, who
  can render me considerable services from his thorough knowledge of
  the politics of the country, will entertain a thought of leaving
  me, till affairs are finally determined from home.

  "I am, Gentlemen,
  "Your most obedient, humble Servant,
  (Signed)  "R. CLIVE.

  "Calcutta,
  "June 26th, 1758."

Clive states that he was in a great degree induced to change his first
resolution, by the tenor of a letter from Mr. Payne, the Chairman of
the Court of Directors, which satisfied him that, notwithstanding what
had occurred, there was a strong feeling, in some of that body, as well
as the principal members of the administration in England, to treat him
with favour and distinction.

"I have a perfect sense[211]," Mr. Payne states, "of the many
disagreeable circumstances that may have attended the several
expeditions of this year, wherein you have had so great a share; nor
can any one have felt more experimentally than myself the difficulty of
pleasing every one, with the most disinterested conduct and the warmest
pursuits for that purpose; nor have I been wanting in reflections
on the many mortifications you may have met with, from the jealousy
that the almost unlimited powers you were vested with by the Select
Committee at Fort St. George gave rise to. I must confess, I should
think them dangerous, in other hands than yours, and such as, I really
think, our Court of Directors could scarce have been justified in
giving to any one person whatever. Had the powers been more limited,
I think you could not have had it less in your power to show and
exercise your readiness and abilities in serving the Company, which I
am persuaded you have done without mean or selfish views."

The Chairman, after noticing in this communication the difficulty
the Court of Directors have had in framing a temporary arrangement
for Bengal, and expressing a hope that the expedient they had fallen
upon would answer better than was expected, states their intention of
adopting every means to add to their military force.

"After being disappointed," he observes, "in various attempts for
raising recruits in Germany, Ireland, Scotland, and England, His
Majesty has been pleased to order us a battalion of about one thousand
men out of the new regiments. Mr. Pitt was the first to propose the
measure to His Majesty. Upon his mentioning it the next day to me,
I took the liberty of suggesting to him the many difficulties and
evils we had been exposed to, during the stay of Colonel Adlercron's
regiment, in instances which I certainly need not point out to you. He
stopt me very short, by saying, he would forestall me in regard to any
apprehensions I might have by the clashing of different commands; as it
was his intention the troops should be under Colonel Lawrence and your
command."

Mr. Payne also informed Clive in this letter, that Mr. Pitt and Lord
Barrington had hinted a desire to send Clive a Colonel's commission;
but that, while he had expressed thankfulness for this intended mark of
favour, he had suggested the name of Colonel Lawrence also. "I could
not be unmindful," he adds, "of your most genteel and disinterested
conduct on a former occasion in England, in regard to that mark[212]
of the Company's respect for you, which you rather declined and were
unwilling to accept of, without Colonel Lawrence sharing with you.
I am well persuaded you will continue to act and think upon the
same generous principles; and that you must be so sensible of that
gentleman's good services, and the need the Company still have of
the continuance of them, that you will be far from looking with a
jealous eye on the mention I have made to those Honourable Gentlemen
of my apprehension of our being entirely deprived of the Colonel's
future services, if he should be taken no notice of, though he was
not immediately concerned in the late actions, which had particularly
attracted His Majesty's attention in regard to yourself."

Mr. Payne further informed Clive that the Duke of Newcastle had written
to the Court of Directors, regarding the propriety of conferring
upon him a distinguished mark of the royal favour; but, as this was
unaccompanied by any suggestion of a similar honour being intended
for Admiral Watson, he thought it would embarrass the Directors;
and he had, therefore, with the Duke's concurrence, withheld the
communication. He expressed his confidence that Clive would approve
of what he had done; and, at all events, that he would be acquitted
of having been actuated by any little motive in the part he had taken
on that occasion. "Be assured, Sir," Mr. Payne concludes, "I shall
always be as ready to propose as to concur in any measures that may
be hereafter thought of to do you honour or pleasure; and that it is a
great one to me to reflect, that your attention to the service you are
engaged in, by exposing your person on so many different occasions,
may and has been attended not only with the honours and laurels that
adorn the brow of a conqueror, but with some more solid fruits of your
labour; which may in some degree compensate for the toils that precede
victory and success."

This communication could not but be agreeable to Clive; and, in his
reply, he expresses satisfaction with Mr. Payne's conduct on all
those points which related to his personal honour and preferment. He
also states, that a knowledge of the favourable sentiments which were
entertained of his conduct by some of the principal members of the
Court was his chief inducement for accepting the proffered station of
President.

The Court of Directors had formed this Government of Rotation at a
period when they could not have anticipated the great changes which
had taken place in Bengal: that this was the case, is proved by
the fact of the subsequent appointment of Clive to the station of
Governor, the moment they heard of the battle of Plassey. They appear,
also, to have recognised the high and disinterested motives which
induced the Council to invite him to be their President; and, though
sufficiently alive on such points, we cannot discover from the records,
that they ever viewed the setting aside of their arrangement on this
extraordinary and unprecedented occasion as a measure that evinced
contempt for their judgment and authority.[213]

FOOTNOTES:

[191] 22d August, 1757.

[192] By Clive's letter to Colonel Adlercron (dated 27th September)
it appears that some of the officers had resisted his endeavours to
make an arrangement that should put an end to the discontents which
had arisen from the share of a private soldier being less than that
of a seaman. Clive, to effect this purpose, was willing to make a
considerable deduction from his own share. Major Kilpatrick, and
several other officers of rank, cheerfully concurred in this object,
but it was violently opposed by others; and Captain Armstrong, who
commanded at Calcutta, refused to publish Clive's order upon the
subject. He was brought to a court-martial, but acquitted. Clive
refused to approve the sentence; and concluded his letter to Colonel
Adlercron with the following just observations on the subversion of
the principles of discipline by Captain Armstrong's conduct:--"You,
Sir, will be the best judge whether setting aside my order, by any
indirect and underhand methods, to serve a self-interested view;
whether assembling the officers together without a proper authority,
and even disputing the rank of the officers given by me, especially
in the case of Lieutenant Corneille, be consistent with the duty and
obedience which is due to the commanding officer; and I cannot help
thinking it was the duty of Captain Armstrong to have given out my
orders, when ordered to do so by the Governor, even if he thought them
unjust: for if officers are allowed to disobey the orders of their
superiors (unless in cases of an extraordinary nature) there must be
an end to all discipline and subordination. If I took upon me to act
wrong, justice was open to them by complaining to you, Sir, or any of
my superiors."

[193] 16th November, 1757.

[194] Clive found himself compelled to decline the offer of Captain
Weller, in terms which, although they disappointed his forward zeal,
must have gratified him. His employment, distinct from his corps,
would, in effect, have superseded several officers in the Company's
service, whom it would naturally have rendered discontented.

[195] This officer belonged to Col. Adlercron's regiment.

[196] In a letter, under date the 2d of August, 1757, to his friend
Mr. Pigot, he observes, "If I was to consult my own interests only,
every thing conspires to make me desirous of leaving this province. An
unhealthy climate, a bad constitution, a genteel competence, a possible
reverse of fortune, are strong motives to have done so; but a superior
consideration to all these obliges me to continue some time longer."

[197] 6th November, 1757.

[198] The letters from Mr. Scrafton, at this period, convey a vivid
picture of the state both of Meer Jaffier's mind and his own. In his
letter of the 3d November, in which he reports a visit to the durbar,
he describes the Nabob as looking very grim when he approached. For
half an hour he took no notice of him, but abused every one present;
then turning quickly round, he said to Scrafton, "What have you to say
to me?"--"What! here, Sir?" Scrafton replied.--"We will go there,"
said the Nabob, pointing to a small room. Mr. Scrafton, ashamed of
this proceeding, tried to change the subject by saying, "Have you
written for the Colonel?"--"Yes, with his whole army, to be sure."--"Do
you know the expense?"--"Will a lac per month do? But I shall not
settle with you; when Sabut Jung comes, I will talk with him about
it." Mr. Scrafton, after commenting upon the passion displayed by
the Nabob on this occasion, and representing the danger of rebellion
from his violent conduct, concludes by entreating Clive to hasten to
Moorshedabad, leaving his army to follow. "We are lost," he says, "if
we do not act as principals." In two letters written subsequently,
Mr. Scrafton gives a further account of the Nabob's distraction,
irritation, and alarm at the treachery and rebellion with which he is
surrounded. In his communication to Clive, of the 7th November, he
states, "I hope you are set out. Our honour, our interests, and our
reputation, are all at stake." He closes this letter in the following
words:--"The Nabob pitched his tent in the garden yesterday, and had
about two hundred men with him. Not an officer has joined him yet
with any forces; nor will they till Roy Dullub marches. His son is
absolutely ill with grief and shame, and goes no more near his father.
Sir, I can only say, if you don't set out, with or without troops,
permit me to go to Calcutta. I can't carry that authority, that sway,
which the Company's affairs require; and will not stay on the terms I
am now with the Nabob. I clearly comprehend the political disease of
the Nabob's affairs, but it is you only that can apply the remedy. I
was an hour alone with Roy Dullub: I see all their schemes, and what
all these seeds of division will inevitably produce. I conclude with
this sentence; that if Sujah-u-Dowlah joins Ram Narrain, adieu to the
Nabob and the remainder of the treaty, for he certainly carries Bengal."

[199] When Ram Narrain was believed to have joined the Vizier of
Oude, Clive (according to Scrafton) advised the Nabob to remove him
openly. The Nabob dreaded the consequences of such a direct proceeding.
Subsequently to this, Ram Narrain fully satisfied Clive, through Roy
Dullub, that he had no treasonable intentions, and required only
security for his life and a continuance in his employment. A conviction
of his sincerity led Clive to advise the Nabob to the course he pursued.

[200] 23d December, 1757.

[201] Dated Rockypoor, near Patna, 18th February, 1758.

[202] 18th February, 1758.

[203] 6th March, 1758.

[204] 12th January, 1758.

[205] A small copper coin, forty to a rupee.

[206] Clive early saw all the evils that would arise from the conduct
of the natives employed by the English, and adopted every measure he
could to check the growth of this danger; but this subject will be
fully noticed hereafter.

[207] Mr. Scrafton, in his private letter, under date 15th May, 1758,
observes, "In the morning, early, I was informed the young Nabob's
troops were ready for a march, and presently Petrus came to me and
told me the Nabob had got his cannon loaded and his troops ready.
I sent him to know the cause. The Nabob, when he had dismissed his
servants, put on a face of importance, and Petrus asked him what all
these preparations were for. He said Roy Dullub was not true to him,
and that he was afraid of Sabut Jung; that if Sabut Jung would send
him his promise and faith to attempt nothing against him, it was well;
if not, he would leave the city with those who were faithful to him,
and go to his father; and, if any body offered to stop him, he would
fight his way. That Roy Dullub had brought down a relation of Sunder
Sing's, who had wrote to an officer in his service to offer his oath of
fidelity to Cunjoo Beharry, which he had actually given. In short, he
gave to understand that Roy Dullub was his enemy, and if you did not
give him some security one of them must fall. I intend to go to him
in the evening, and set his brain right if I can. He has entertained
some Tellingays (about fifty) that are come _via_ Ballasore. Either he
shams, and has orders sent him by Goolam Hassen Khan and Monickchund,
who arrived yesterday, to attempt Roy Dullub's life, or his fears have
got the better of his _blockhead-ship_. The old Begum sent for Petrus
and fell a blubbering, saying that she had but that son, and could not
spare him."

[208] In the indecisive action between Sir G. Pocock and M. D'Aché, one
of the enemy's vessels was stranded. It was reported at Moorshedabad
that two were taken.

[209] The Hardwicke Indiaman.

[210] The date of Clive's private letter to Mr. Watts is the 22d June,
four days previous to the date of the above public letter and of his
answer to it, in which he accepted the government.

[211] Nov. 11. 1757.

[212] This probably alludes to the diamond-hilted sword which the Court
of Directors voted Clive for his services in the Carnatic.

[213] Mr. Mill, when noticing the Council's request to Clive, observes,
"Convinced that he alone had sufficient authority to overcome the
Nabob into the performance of his obligations, the Council (including
the four gentlemen who were appointed governors) came to a resolution
highly expressive of their own disinterestedness and patriotism, but
full of disregard and contempt for the judgment and authority of their
superiors."--Mill, vol. iii. p. 244.




CHAP. VIII.


Clive's first object, after he accepted the Government of Bengal, was
to give what aid he could to Fort St. George. The view he took of the
dangers of that settlement, and the measures he adopted to afford it
relief, are thus described by a contemporary historian.[214]

"No one doubted that Madras would be besieged, as soon as the monsoon
had sent the squadrons off the coast, if reinforcements should not
arrive before. But Clive did not entertain the surmise that it could
be taken whilst it had provisions; and, as troops were known to be on
the way from England, if the ships in which they were embarked should
lose their passage in this year, they would probably arrive in the
first months of the next. Nevertheless it was necessary, if possible,
to alleviate the inequality between the English and French force in
Coromandel.

"But the preference which each of the Company's Presidencies was
naturally inclined to give to its own safety, as the only ground
on which the property and fortunes of the whole community were
established, suggested apprehensions that Madras, in the same manner
as it had been treated by the Presidency of Calcutta, would, whatever
might be the necessity of Bengal, detain on their own service
whatsoever troops might be sent to their assistance; and, although
little was to be immediately apprehended in Bengal from the French,
yet the entire estrangement of the Nabob, and the hazard of all that
remained due from him, were to be expected, if he saw the English force
too considerably diminished, without the immediate power of recall,
to oppose either his own attempts against them, or to afford the
assistance he might want, whether in the maintenance of his authority
against his own subjects, or the defence of his territory against
foreign enemies.

"In consequence of these conclusions it was determined not to send a
body of troops to Madras, but to employ all that could with prudence be
spared, in concert with Anunderauze, against the French in the ceded
provinces[215]; which would either occasion a diversion of their troops
in the Carnatic, or, if they neglected this assistance, would deprive
them at once of all they had acquired by their long connection with the
Soubah of the Deckan; and, lest any danger during the expedition should
threaten Bengal, the troops were only to obey the immediate orders of
Calcutta.

"The conduct of the expedition was committed to Lieutenant-Colonel
Forde, who, on the invitation of the Presidency to take the command of
the army in case of the departure of Colonel Clive, had quitted the
King's service in Adlercron's regiment, and arrived from the coast in
the month of April. Mr. George Grey was sent to continue the course
of intelligence at Cuttack, and Mr. John Johnstone was despatched in
the Mermaid sloop to make the necessary preparations in concert with
Anunderauze at Vizagapatam. The force allotted for the expedition was
five hundred Europeans, including the artillery men, two thousand
sepoys, and one hundred lascars: the artillery were six field-pieces,
the best brass six-pounders, six twenty-four-pounders for battery, a
howitz, and an eight-inch mortar: eighty thousand rupees, and four
thousand gold mohurs, equivalent to sixty thousand rupees, were in the
military chest for immediate expenses. The embarkation was made on
three of the Company's ships arrived lately from Europe, on the Thames,
a private ship of seven hundred tons, with two of the pilot sloops of
the river. The Thames, likewise, carried a great quantity of provisions
intended for Madras, whither she was to proceed as soon as the present
service would permit. By altercations in the Council, for the measure
was too vigorous to be acceptable to all of them, and by delays in
the equipment, the vessels were detained in the river till the end
of September. Their departure left the English force in the province
barely equal to what they carried away."[216]

Of the brilliant success which attended the expedition under Colonel
Forde I shall speak hereafter. I shall content myself at present with
the insertion of extracts from the private letters of Clive written
at the period of its formation. These, while they show the enlarged
and just view he took of the state of affairs on the coast, will prove
that he not only gave to that settlement all the aid he had the power
of giving it, but that he actually left Bengal almost without European
troops, in order to provide for its defence.

The following are extracts from Clive's letters, under different dates,
to Mr. Pigot.

"I cannot quit the coast without explaining to you my sentiments of
affairs there. I do not find that M. Lally is able to take the field
with three thousand men. When our expected forces arrive, and we
are joined with those of Madras and Trichinopoly, we shall be two
thousand five hundred strong; and I do not think victory so much
depends upon equality of numbers as conduct and resolution. From the
several accounts I have received of M. Lally, I do not entertain the
high opinion of him which he seems to have gained upon the coast;
and, indeed, his late behaviour has confirmed me in this opinion.
Captain Monchanin, who is here, received a letter from his brother at
Paris, informing him of the manner in which these troops were raised:
they were not draughted out of any of the regiments of France, but
are composed of foreigners and deserters; these latter had a pardon
promised them on condition of enlisting for the East Indies. Although
M. Lally is a Colonel on the Irish Brigade, I do not find any of that
corps have come out with him. The capture of St. David's ought to add
nothing to our apprehensions of his succeeding in future enterprises,
for there was no opportunity given of experiencing the courage of his
troops, excepting the attack of the fascine party, which, I think,
makes rather in praise of our forces than his, since an officer and
fifty men could defend it from all attempts of the French from ten in
the evening till three next morning. If Colonel Lawrence could, by any
means, draw the enemy upon a spot of ground he is well acquainted with,
and attack them in the manner he did at Bawoor, I should entertain
great hopes of his success.

"By this time the superiority of our force at sea, I take for granted,
is beyond dispute, and of consequence our resources must be more than
those of the French. This will be another inducement for us to hazard
an engagement, whenever we can do it with the least probability of
success. A victory on our side must confine the French within the
walls of Pondicherry; and when that happens, nothing can save them
from destruction, but a superior force at sea, of which I see little
probability, notwithstanding the report of a third division.

"If it should be thought that we are not strong enough for an offensive
war, other measures, I think, may be pursued, which will greatly
distress, if not in the end ruin, our enemies. Their great want of
money is well known; and every method, which can be thought of, to
increase their want of it, must greatly conduce to overset all their
offensive schemes. Can't a body of Mahratta or other horse be taken
into pay, to burn, ravage, and destroy the whole country in such a
manner as that no revenue can be drawn from thence? Bengal is in itself
an inexhaustible fund of riches, and you may depend upon being supplied
with money and provisions in abundance. In the mean time, what must
become of the French if they cannot raise money sufficient to pay
their forces? They must disband their blacks, and their white ones
will disband themselves. I find M. Lally is gone south. If the King
of Tanjore be not overawed into a compliance with M. Lally's demands,
and give assistance to Captain Caillaud, I have such an opinion of
that gentleman's abilities, and the goodness of his garrison, that
I sincerely believe the French will meet with some disgrace before
Trichinopoly.

"You are acquainted with the troubles at Golconda, and that the French
are drove out of Ganjam, Vizagapatam, and Chicacole. One Bristow, who
resided at Cuttack, is gone to Vizagapatam at the particular request of
the Rajah; and I have received a letter from him, desiring assistance
in the strongest terms. Two trusty agents are gone to Vizaram-Rauze;
and if they bring a promising account of affairs, although our
effective force does not exceed seven hundred Europeans, I propose
sending into those parts three hundred and fifty Europeans, and two
thousand sepoys, and a train of artillery under the command of Colonel
Forde. This is not mentioned in the Committee's letters, because not
absolutely determined upon. The news from the North may occasion
an alteration of measures, though at present there is the greatest
prospect of tranquillity.

"If this (expedition) only throw the country into such confusion, as to
prevent our enemies collecting any revenues, it will in a great measure
answer the design and the expense."[219]

"Since my last, the three Europe ships, one country, and two
sloops, are dropped down to Ingillie. The stores are on board, and
the troops will embark in two or three days, and will, I hope, be
landed at Vizagapatam, or elsewhere, by the last of this month. You
must not expect that these forces will be ordered to proceed to
your Presidency. All here are much alarmed at so large a detachment
leaving the place, and the gentlemen in Council have made great
opposition to it. The expedition, whilst at a distance, did not seem
to attract their attention; but now the troops are upon the point
of embarking, self-preservation for the present seems to possess
every breast, without any regard for the future, or the good of the
service in general; and you may be assured, if I was to propose the
troops proceeding to Madras, a negative would be given by every one
but myself. And to tell you the truth, the gentlemen here seem fully
persuaded that the detachments would never be returned, should the
exigency of affairs here require it. We shall see what may be effected
by January, and whether Bussy may not be kept at bay, and his resources
of money, &c. be cut off. If this can be effected, I think the troops
cannot be employed more for your advantage, as it may prevent his
forces from joining M. Lally.

"You may be persuaded that whilst I preside the most vigorous measures
shall be pursued, and I think the present expedition a very strong
proof of it; for I will not conceal from you, that we are in no
condition to receive the French, should there be any possibility
of their paying us a visit during the absence of our troops. Our
effectives are not two hundred and eighty, and those the very scum of
the men. Our garrison is drained of stores and ammunition."[220]

"The detachment of King's[221] troops on the Warren will return in the
same ship, which will sail in a few days for Madras. Not a man shall be
kept, but you may depend upon every assistance in our power; and if you
can but give M. Lally one blow in the field he is ruined. You may draw
upon us for what money you choose: we have twenty lacs of rupees in the
treasury, but no bullion: the gold in the Warren will be sent you. The
Warren and Cuddalore sloops will be loaded with provisions."[222]

Clive wrote[223] on the same subject to Colonel Lawrence as follows:--

"Colonel Forde is in the Deckan with a very fine detachment of men.
The news from thence you will receive much fresher by this conveyance
than I can possibly send you. If we receive any supplies from England
by the two latter ships, I will endeavour to reinforce him with one
hundred Europeans; and the whole shall have orders to proceed your
way, if we are successful there, and our squadron be arrived upon the
coast. The detachment of his Majesty's 64th regiment, which came on the
Warren, shall be sent you on the same ship, which will sail in a few
days. Remember, my dear Colonel, that if our squadron be superior to
that of the French, our enemies will have no resources. I think a body
of Mahratta horse, well employed, and supported by our troops, would
make such a man as Lally hang himself. You have my most ardent wishes
for success: I have contributed all in my power towards it."

A proportion of the recruits which had arrived by the ships of the
season were subsequently sent to Madras; and a judgment may be formed
of the small military force left in Bengal, from the fact that in the
month of February, on the province of Patna being invaded by the Shah
Zada (or heir-apparent of the Emperor of Delhi), Clive could only form
a force of three hundred European infantry, one hundred artillery, and
two thousand five hundred sepoys. With this small body of men, he not
only marched towards Patna, but while on that expedition directed that
Colonel Forde should proceed to Madras if required.

Clive was anxious for many reasons that Meer Jaffier should pay him a
visit at Calcutta. He considered that such an appearance of cordiality
would be most useful by the impressions it was likely to produce both
upon friends and enemies. This became the more necessary from the state
of affairs at Moorshedabad. A packet had been intercepted from the
French chief[224] at Masulipatam, by which it appeared that some of the
Nabob's generals had offered to join him. Cojah Wazeed was apparently
the principal person concerned in this intrigue. This man, who was
formerly the native agent of the French Company, had made himself
useful to the English during the confederacy against Suraj-u-Dowlah;
but disappointment in his expectations, or some other cause, had
alienated him from our interests.

During these intrigues the minister, Roy Dullub, was deprived of his
employment, and disgraced. The first step taken to lower him was the
appointment of another dewan to the Prince Meeran; and Roy Dullub was
commanded to make over to him the accounts of several of the countries
in his charge. Nundcomar, the governor of Hooghley, appears also to
have been accessory to the disgrace of a minister who had, by his
success and the wealth he had acquired, excited as great a spirit of
envy in his own tribe as of cupidity among the Mahommedans. Besides
being such an object for the rapacity of the Nabob and his son, Roy
Dullub's professed dependence upon the English was a crime not to be
forgiven.

Mr. Watts, who had been deputed to invite the Nabob to Calcutta,
succeeded in his mission. The few obstacles which interposed were
easily overcome, the proposed meeting being for the interest of
both parties. Besides, we are assured by one[225] who had a full
opportunity of knowing his most secret sentiments, that Meer Jaffier,
notwithstanding his jealousy and discontent with his condition, never
could divest himself of a sincere personal regard for Clive. The Nabob
probably thought, that his compliance with this request afforded a
good opportunity to rid himself of the obnoxious Roy Dullub; and he
had no sooner left Moorshedabad, than his son Meeran, no doubt on a
preconcerted plan, prepared to attack the minister's house. But the
resident, Mr. Scrafton, seeing matters come to an extremity, marched
a company of men to his assistance, and took him publicly under the
Company's protection. The accounts of these proceedings were sent to
Mr. Watts, then with the Nabob, who deemed it politic to disown the
proceedings of his son, and consequently could not refuse the request
of Mr. Watts to allow Roy Dullub to accompany them to Calcutta; the
resident having satisfied him that while the English were compelled, by
the obligations of good faith, to protect the life and honour of a man
to whom it was pledged, they had no desire to impose upon Meer Jaffier
the employment of a minister to whom he was adverse.

The Nabob was received at Calcutta with every mark of honour and
respect: great presents were given to him, and every thing done which
could afford him gratification. He appeared much pleased with his
treatment; and Clive expressed himself convinced, that, besides the
salutary impression in other quarters, the best effects had been
produced upon Meer Jaffier's mind by this visit.

Mr. Scrafton at this period left Moorshedabad, and Clive[226] nominated
Mr. Warren Hastings resident at the court of the Nabob; giving, in
the selection of this young[227] but promising civil servant, another
proof of that discernment which enabled him to promote his own fame,
and the interests of his country, by the employment of men adequate to
the task he assigned them. It is here, however, to be remarked, that
no consideration which he gave to those under him exempted them from
open, and often severe censure, when they deviated from what he deemed
their duty. His private letters, even when addressed to men in official
stations, though kind, have always the tone of the superior; but though
Clive evidently brooked no approach to equality in such persons, their
letters evince the greatest confidence in his temper and good feeling,
for they are often as full of long and fretful complaints of his own
conduct towards them as of their reliance on his friendship. We find
this in the correspondence of Mr. Watts, by whom he was greatly aided;
and it occurs more frequently in that of Mr. Scrafton, who, though
personally much attached to Clive, seems to have been, at different
times, very much dissatisfied with the situation in which he was placed.

The first affair in which Mr. Hastings became engaged was of a very
delicate nature. Roy Dullub's family were refused leave to follow
him to Calcutta, where he had remained after the Nabob left it. Mr.
Hastings had hesitated how to act on this occasion, conceiving that the
removal of his family, and their property, could not be effected with
the same just pretence for interference as that which had obtained for
Roy Dullub himself liberty to leave Moorshedabad.

Clive, in answer to this and other letters upon the same subject,
observes, "Your apprehension of matters coming to extremities in case a
guard be sent to bring away Roy Dullub's family is founded on reason.
I never intended you should use force, but merely furnish them with a
party of sepoys to escort them down to Calcutta. You are not acquainted
with the connections between Roy Dullub and the English, and that
they are bound not only to protect him but his family also. You may
remonstrate with decency, as often as opportunity offers, that it is
unjust to keep the mother and daughter from him. As for his brothers,
it is not worth interfering about them. In short, I would have you act
upon all occasions so as to avoid coming to extremities, and at the
same time show as much spirit and resolution as will convince the
durbar that we always have it in our power to make ourselves respected."

The determined conduct of Clive alarmed the Nabob into an abandonment
of the plunder of Roy Dullub's family, who were afterwards allowed to
join him; but Cajah Haddee and Cossim Ali Khan, two Mahommedan leaders,
who were supposed to be attached to the ex-minister, were dismissed,
and afterwards cut off. They were charged with real or pretended
plots against the Nabob's life[228]; and, in the hope of inducing
the English government to abandon the protection of Roy Dullub, Meer
Jaffier informed Mr. Hastings that Clive and that minister were both
said to have written to Cajah Haddee, to encourage him to the act of
assassination. He also stated, that he had intercepted a letter from
Roy Dullub to Cajah Haddee, to the following purport:--"That he had
sent him a lac of rupees by Meer Allee, to forward the design then
in hand; and advised him to take the present occasion to put it into
execution; that both Mr. Watts and Mr. Scrafton had consented to the
enterprise; and that he (Roy Dullub) had engaged to be responsible for
your tunkaws."[229]

Clive appears to have been little pleased with the degree of attention
paid by Mr. Hastings to this intrigue. "You have not yet[230]," he
observes in reply, "been long enough at the durbar to make yourself
acquainted with the dark designs of these Mussulmen. The moment I
perused your letter I could perceive a design in the Nabob, and those
about him, against Roy Dullub; and you may be sure what is alleged
against him, and of his letter to Cajah Haddee, is a forgery from
beginning to end. Roy Dullub is not such a fool as to give any thing
under his own hand; his cautious behaviour, previous to the affair of
Plassey, is a convincing proof of it. Besides, let his inclinations be
what they will, he knows my attachment to the Nabob to be so firmly
fixed, that he would never dare to intrigue against him, well knowing
his life and fortune are in my power. How easy is it to counterfeit
hands and seals in this country; and the Moors, in general, are
villains enough to undertake any thing which may benefit themselves at
another's expense. In short, the whole of the scheme is to exasperate
me so much against Roy Dullub that the Nabob may have the plucking of
all his money. The withdrawing of our protection from a man to whom it
has been once promised would entail disgrace and infamy on the English
nation.

"I cannot avoid entertaining the strongest resentment against the
Nabob, if what you write about Cajah Haddee be true. The man who
dared to accuse me of entering into schemes of assassination ought
to have been punished upon the spot. After the treatment he received
at Calcutta, he must have known that the English are endowed with
sentiments of conscience and honour, which the Moors are strangers
to; and I must desire you will inform him, that if he gives ear to
such things as these, there will soon be an end to all confidence and
friendship between us."

The future inquiries of Mr. Hastings left no doubt that the letter said
to be from Roy Dullub to Cajah Haddee was a fabrication[231] contrived
to injure that person with the English, and to afford a pretext for
plundering or destroying all at Moorshedabad who were connected with,
or attached to, the ex-minister.

The Nabob evinced the greatest anxiety to justify himself to Clive, for
his conduct on this occasion; and as the unwearied object of the latter
was to conciliate Meer Jaffier, and inspire him with confidence in the
alliance, his explanations were readily received.

Clive's correspondence, at this period, shows that he was most
solicitous to improve the efficacy of his small military force; but,
in effecting this object, he had much opposition to overcome. He had
recommended a plan, which was carried into execution, of incorporating
troops of the different settlements who had served under him into one
army; giving the officers and men, from Madras and Bombay, the option
of remaining, or of returning to their respective presidencies; those
that remained, enjoying, of course, their rank. This arrangement
was dictated by the exigencies of the service, and grounded upon
the justest principles; some of the captains of the Bengal troops
deemed it, however, in the instance of Captain Govin, of the Bombay
establishment, to be so injurious to their interests, that they not
only remonstrated against it as a supercession, but tendered the
resignation of their commissions unless the grievance was redressed.
This remonstrance was addressed to the Council at Calcutta, who
referred it to Clive, in his station of Commander of the army. His
opinion upon this case will be found in the following letter[232]:--

"The remonstrating captains," he observes, "have either wilfully,
or ignorantly, misrepresented the nature of superseding. An officer
cannot be said to be superseded, unless one of inferior rank, in the
same corps, be put over his head. Now, I can safely aver that I never,
during the whole of my command, have done so by any officer, except
in the case of Captain-Lieutenant Wagner, to whom I refused giving a
vacant company, as I did not think him deserving thereof.

"The incorporation of the troops having been determined on as a
necessary measure, the several officers of the three different
establishments being now united, were, of course, to take rank
according to the date of their respective commissions, in the same
manner as the officers of different corps in His Majesty's service,
when they happen to meet. Now, as Captain Govin had been ordered here
by the Presidency of Bombay, to take the command of their detachment,
without their knowing that such incorporation was to take place, it
is evident they could have no design of injuring the officers of this
establishment, as has been injuriously represented; and, therefore, to
have sent him back, after having been so formally ordered here, would
have been the highest indignity to the Council of Bombay, as well as to
the gentleman himself; and, as he remained here, he had an undoubted
right to maintain that rank which the seniority of the commission gave
him.

"The truth of the matter is, the most of the gentlemen who have been
so violent in their remonstrances were grown sufficiently rich in your
service to be desirous of any pretence for quitting it. They will
prove, however, no great loss, as no services can be expected from men
who have so little spirit and gratitude as to resign their commissions
at this critical time, and on ill-grounded pretences.

"I flatter myself it will be now obvious to every unprejudiced person,
that I have been unjustly charged by these gentlemen with having
superseded them, the doing of which, I readily agree, ought to be
practised as seldom as possible. Yet such is the nature of the service
in this country, that the preservation of your settlement may at times
depend upon the taking of such a step; and as, by the want of field
officers, your captains are often intrusted with the conducting of
expeditions of the utmost importance, in such case, if you be desirous
of insuring success you must have regard to the man only, and not the
rank."

No reasoning could be more clear, no opinions more correct, than those
contained in this letter. The principles inculcated, both as to general
rules and exceptions, are alike just. It breathes, also, that calm
but high spirit of command, and that firmness of purpose, which could
alone support discipline in an army so constituted and so situated.
It is often from such instances of conduct, more than from the most
brilliant achievements, that we are enabled to form a true estimate of
individual character. Clive, as appears from the correspondence in my
possession, was censured by many as hazarding the territories of Bengal
by the expedition under Colonel Forde; but all his private letters
show that he was very sanguine in his anticipation of that brilliant
success which was the result of this measure. After expressing to one
of the Directors[233] his hope of expelling, by the operations of this
detachment, the French from Golconda, and aiding the Presidency of Fort
St. George, he concludes his letter in the following words:--"Success
is in the hands of the Almighty; but I own I entertain the most
sanguine expectations from the late armament."

With respect to the safety of Bengal, he evidently trusted in a very
great degree to the influence of his own name and character. He was
perfectly acquainted with the natives of India; and he knew that,
with them, personal confidence, and a belief in the good fortune of
an individual, had an almost superstitious influence, and gave him a
strength which more than made amends for the inefficiency of his force.

In the beginning of the year 1759, intelligence was received that the
Shah Zada[234], Shah Alum (eldest son of the Emperor of Delhi), had
arrived at Benares, accompanied by a force of eight thousand men, and
that his purpose was to invade Bahar, to which it was reported he was
invited by Ram Narrain, the Governor of that province, whose fidelity
to his allegiance continued to be suspected by the Prince Meeran, and
by the Mahommedan nobles of Meer Jaffier's court.[235] Before we detail
the measures which the advance of the Prince led the Nabob and the
English to adopt, it will be useful to say a few words upon the actual
condition at this period of the imperial family of Delhi.

The power of the Emperors of Delhi, subsequent to the death of
Aurungzebe[236] had rapidly declined. That artful prince had struggled
through life to maintain the appearance of health in an empire which
was in a disordered and decaying state before he attained it; and by
his crooked policy accelerated that destruction which was completed by
the weakness of his successors.

Forty years after his decease, and after the murder or death of five
intermediate princes, Mahommed Shah ascended the throne, and reigned
twenty-seven years. The direction of the limited power he possessed
was, during the whole of that period, an object of violent contention
to the turbulent and ambitious nobles by whom he was surrounded;
and, while these were engaged in intrigues and hostile struggles
for the possession of the Emperor's person and his capital, others
took advantage of their divisions, and of the general confusion, to
usurp the fairest provinces of the empire, and to transmit them as an
inheritance to their descendants.

The Mahrattas, who had only fifty years before emerged from obscurity,
were so powerful in the reign of Mahommed Shah, that they plundered the
suburbs of Delhi; and that capital was, during the same unpropitious
period, taken and sacked by Nadir Shah, who, after his terrible
invasion, restored to the unhappy sovereign of India his degraded
throne and distracted dominions.

Mahommed Shah died in 1747. He was succeeded by Ahmed Shah, who reigned
but a few years, when he was dethroned, and had his eyes put out in
1753. He was succeeded by Alumgeer the Second, with whom perished
even that semblance of authority which his immediate predecessors had
preserved. Soon after his accession, he became a mere instrument in the
hands of his vizier (or minister) Ghazee-u-Deen[237], the grandson of
the celebrated Nizam-ul-Mûlk.

Shah Alum[238], the eldest son of the Emperor of Delhi, fled from
that capital. His first object was emancipation from that thraldom
in which his father and family were kept by the cruel and ambitious
Ghazee-u-Deen. When at a distance from court, he began to collect
followers. India, at this period, abounded with military adventurers;
and the high name of Shah Alum, and the reputation of his minister
Ali Murad Khan, brought many to his standard. He was kindly received
by some of the principal chiefs in Hindustan; but, according to the
reports at Moorshedabad, it was Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Vizier of Oude,
who directed his views to the invasion of Bahar. That prince, however,
artfully kept in the back-ground, until he saw the result of the
attempt upon Patna, the capital of that province.

The belief of the Shah Zada being connected with the Vizier, combined
with the report of his being joined by the French party under Law[239],
(added to the doubts entertained of Ram Narrain's fidelity), created
serious alarm to the Nabob, whose mind was agitated by other causes.
His son[240] continued to pursue a conduct calculated to give him very
serious uneasiness, while his troops mutinied, and refused to march
unless their arrears were paid. To add to these difficulties, Jugget
Seit and his brother, who have been often mentioned as the principal
soucars (or bankers) of the country, had obtained leave to proceed on
a pilgrimage to Pursnath[241], and had commenced their journey, when
information was received that they were in correspondence with the
Shah Zada, and had actually furnished him with the means of paying
his new levies. The Nabob, giving credit to this report, sent to stop
them; but they refused compliance with his orders, and proceeded under
the guard of the two thousand men which he had furnished for their
escort. These troops, on receiving a promise of the liquidation of
their arrears, readily transferred their allegiance from the Prince to
his bankers. The Nabob, if he had had the disposition, would probably
have found himself without the means of coercing these wealthy subjects
into obedience. The principal bankers of India command, through the
influence of their extensive credit, the respect of sovereigns, and
the support of their principal ministers and generals. Their property,
though often immense, is seldom in a tangible form. Their great profits
enable them to bear moderate exactions; and the prince who has recourse
to violence towards one of this class is not only likely to fail in
his immediate object of plunder, but is certain to destroy his future
resources, and to excite an impression of his character that must
greatly facilitate those attempts against his life and power to which
it is the lot of despots to be continually exposed.

Amid his difficulties and distresses, Meer Jaffier looked exclusively
to Clive, to whom he wrote every day; and Mr. Hastings's letters of
similar dates represent that not only that prince, but all classes
(even to the mutinous troops), confided in him, and in him alone.

Clive, before these occurrences, had been appointed by the Directors to
the station of Governor of Bengal; and his nomination was accompanied
with such marks of regard and esteem, as induced him to forego his
intention of going to England, and to determine to remain fourteen or
fifteen months longer, "by which time," he observes, in a letter[242]
to the Council at Fort William, "I persuade myself the treaty with the
Nabob will be fulfilled, the fortifications in a state of defence, and
such a force arrived from England as may secure to the Company their
valuable acquisitions. These three objects are what I have always had
much at heart; and if they can be completed, I flatter myself the
Court of Directors will think I have answered their expectations, and
will approve of my returning to Europe, to enjoy the fruits of war,
which has been carried on for upwards of seven years almost without
intermission."

Clive complains in this letter of the intention signified by several
of the members of Council to quit the service, and particularly calls
upon Mr. Manningham and Mr. Frankland to alter their resolution, and to
continue to him and to the public their valuable aid. He concludes this
despatch with a merited compliment to Mr. Watts[243], whom he considers
to have had just cause given him for resigning the service.

The moment the report of the Shah Zada's advance was confirmed, Clive
gave the Nabob every assurance of complete support. He wrote also to
Mr. Hastings[244], directing him to give confidence to the court of
Moorshedabad. "The dissensions," he states, "subsisting between the
Nabob and his people give me much more concern than the news of the
Shah Zada's motions, as there would be little to fear from the latter,
did the former take the proper measures to secure his being well
served."

Alluding to the mutinous commanders who had signified, through Golam
Shah[245], their willingness to march, and do their duty, if Clive
would give them his protection, he observes in the same letter, "I
don't think it would be right to enter into any engagements with Golam
Shah; but you may assure him from me, that, on my arrival in the city
(which I expect will be in five or six days), I will endeavour to
settle matters, that the jemidars shall have nothing to apprehend in
future."

Ram Narrain had with reason taken alarm at the Nabob's designs, and
communicated his fears through Mr. Amyatt[246], the chief of the
factory at Patna. Clive desired he might be assured of his constant
support and protection. "Should any movements," he wrote, "be made
with an ill design towards him, I will march myself in person to his
assistance."

When Clive found that the Shah Zada was advancing to Allahabad, and
had summoned Ram Narrain to obey his orders, he wrote to Meer Jaffier,
stating that he did not think there was much to be apprehended from
the Emperor's son. "I would not," he observes[247], "have you think
of coming to any terms with him, but proceed to take the necessary
measures to defend your city to the last. On Monday, the last of this
month, I shall take the field, and will have every thing in readiness
to march to your assistance if necessary. Rest assured that the English
are your stanch and firm friends, and that they never desert a cause in
which they have once taken a part."

Clive subsequently wrote[248] Meer Jaffier that, though he considered
the troops at Patna quite equal to repel the Shah Zada, the
apprehension entertained of the latter being joined or supported by
Sujah-u-Dowlah required that an army should march. In this letter he
entreats the Nabob to have confidence in Ram Narrain.

"He is not a great sepoy (soldier)," he observes, "but he is an honest
man."

A letter[249] from Ram Narrain to Clive, at this period, showed that
his allegiance depended exclusively upon the assurances of support he
received from the English Government.

"I have from time to time," he writes, "advised you of the Shah Zada's
coming this way; but Mr. Amyatt's letters will make you acquainted
with every circumstance; for I always acquaint him as soon as I have
any fresh intelligence. My dependance is solely upon you. Troubles are
very near at hand: this is the time for assisting me. I beg you will
without delay send me your orders in what manner I am to act. I am very
impatient for an answer to this letter."

"Since writing the above, I learn some wicked people have been
representing me in a bad light to the Nabob, and that he is very
angry with me. God knows, it is on your account that I am the Nabob's
servant. If at this time the Chuta Nabob[250] only should be sent with
forces to my assistance, it will raise doubts in many people's minds,
and I myself shall be suspicious. I have no dependance on any soul
living but yourself. Mr. Amyatt's letter will give you many particulars
about this city."

The suspicions which Ram Narrain entertained of the Nabob's hostile
disposition were well founded: many documents prove this fact. Mr.
Hastings, in a letter[251] to Clive, observes, "What the Nabob's
design is in sending Cassim Ali Khan to Patna, or in deferring his
own departure, I am not informed; but, as it is past a doubt that the
Nabob is no friend to Ram Narrain, and has almost openly accused him of
treachery in this late affair, there is but too much reason to suspect
that something is intended to Ram Narrain's prejudice."

The Court of Moorshedabad continued to pursue its favourite object--the
removing and plundering an able but rich Hindu, at a moment when the
safety or loss of Bahar depended upon his fidelity or defection.
Clive saw, and pitied this wretched policy, which he was successful
in counteracting, in a manner that gave confidence to the alarmed
Ram Narrain, without outraging the feelings, or bringing into public
disrepute the conduct, of Meer Jaffier. There is no transaction of his
life in which he more displayed that temper and consideration which
the character and circumstances of those with whom he was associated
required, or more calmly and firmly maintained that high reputation
for good faith on which the stability of the British power so much
depended.

The fears of Meer Jaffier were so great, that he proposed, as one
expedient, to purchase the retreat of the Shah Zada; but Clive, the
moment he heard of this intention, wrote to dissuade him from a
measure which could have no effect but that of inviting others to like
profitable inroads. "I have just heard," Clive writes to the Nabob, "a
piece of intelligence[252], which I can scarce give credit to; it is,
that your Excellency is going to offer a sum of money to the King's
son. If you do this, you will have Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Mahrattas, and
many more, come from all parts to the confines of your country, who
will bully you out of money, till you have none left in your treasury.
If your Excellency should pursue this method, it will be furnishing the
King's son with the means to raise forces, which, indeed, may endanger
the loss of your country. What will be said, if the great Jaffier Ali
Khan, Subah of this province, who commands an army of sixty thousand
men, should offer money to a boy who has scarce a soldier with him? I
beg your Excellency will rely on the fidelity of the English, and of
those troops which are attached to you."

To Ram Narrain Clive reiterated his assurances of aid and protection.
"It was," he states, in a letter[253] to that ruler, "on account of
your strictness for justice, your courage, and your fidelity, that I
got the Nabob to confirm you in the Subahship of Patna. It surprises me
much to hear that you suffer yourself to be under such apprehensions of
the King's son, who has not more than two thousand men. I would have
you march out of the city with your forces, and encamp at a distance.
Mr. Amyatt will accompany you. I have this day pitched my tent, and
(with the blessing of God), if it be necessary, I will come to your
assistance."

Clive received a very flowery and complimentary letter[254] from the
Shah Zada, and another from his minister Maddar-u-Dowlah. The purport
of both was to invite him to pay his personal respects; and a letter
from Fyaz Ali Khan, received at the same time, intimated that the
Prince had thoughts of doing great things by Clive's counsel, and in
conjunction with him."

Conceiving, no doubt, that a knowledge of this correspondence might
alarm Meer Jaffier, Clive sent him copies of all the letters. He also
informed him that some of the Shah Zada's agents had been with him.
"They made me," he observes, "offers of provinces upon provinces,
with whatever my heart could desire; but could he give, as well as
offer me, the whole empire of Hindustan, it would have no weight with
the English. I am well assured, too, that he wrote to every man of
consequence in these parts; which convinces me that he has designs
against these provinces. It is the custom of the English to treat the
persons of ambassadors as sacred, and I told the Shah Zada's agents as
much; but at the same time warned them never to come near me again,
for, if they did, I would take their heads for their pains."

Clive, having received a request from the Nabob, marched on the 25th
of February; and, after remaining a short time at Moorshedabad, he
proceeded, accompanied by the Nabob's son, towards Patna.

Though the Emperor of Delhi possessed, personally, no authority;
though his mandates were evaded or disregarded throughout the greater
part of his dominions, on the just ground of their being issued by
one notoriously not a free agent; still there existed the greatest
reverence for his name. He was, as yet, deemed the sole fountain
of honour; and every outward mark of respect, every profession of
allegiance, continued to be paid to the person who filled the throne
of the house of Timour. Until his sunnud (or commission) was received,
no possession, whether obtained by inheritance or usurpation, was
deemed valid, and no title of nobility was recognised as legitimate
unless conferred by him. In countries like India, where the community
is almost in a primitive state, usage has a power, of which it is
difficult to convey an idea to those accustomed only to a more
artificial and advanced state of society. At the period here treated
of, when the Emperor was known to be quite powerless, and to act under
personal restraint, such was the impression throughout India of the
nominal allegiance to which he was entitled, that no usurper, however
daring, could outrage the general feeling so far as to treat his name
with disrespect, or neglect forms to which consequence continued to be
attached long after all the substance of authority was fled from that
family for whose support they were instituted.

Clive appears to have been deeply impressed with the necessity of
attention to this popular feeling, and to have studiously established
an influence at the Court of Delhi. When Meer Jaffier obtained the
sunnud (or commission) and investiture as Nabob of Bengal, Bahar, and
Orissa, Clive was honoured, at the same time, with a high title[256]
of nobility, and the grade of Munsubdar, or Commander in the Imperial
Army; distinctions to which he appears to have attached considerable
importance, and which were, no doubt, of value, as they increased his
consequence in the eyes of the natives.

I have elsewhere given my opinion very fully upon this subject, and
have expressed my sentiments as to the motives by which Clive was
governed in all his intercourse with the Court of Delhi. I have stated
"that, though general reasoners may deem such conduct a sacrifice to
prejudice, a reverence to a shadow; yet the fact cannot be denied,
that, by making that sacrifice, and by reverencing that shadow, Clive
went in unison with the feelings and opinions of millions of men.
Such inconsistencies as those which exist in our connection with the
fallen descendants of the house of Timour are frequent in political
communities, and particularly as they have existed from time immemorial
in India. They grow out of the habits, the sentiments, and sometimes
the superstition, of human beings; and wise statesmen, referring to
their source, will ever treat them with consideration and respect."[257]

Clive, when he dismissed the agents of Shah Alum, wrote to that prince
in a manner which left him without the slightest hope of success
in forming a connection with the English. The substance of this
letter[258] was as follows:--"I have had the honour to receive your
Highness's firman.[259] It gives me great concern to find that this
country must become a scene of troubles. I beg leave to inform you that
I have been favoured with a sunnud from the Emperor, appointing me a
Munsubdar of the rank of six thousand foot and five thousand horse,
which constitutes me a servant of his; and as I have not received any
orders, either from the Emperor or Vizier, acquainting me of your
coming down here, I cannot pay that due regard to your Highness's
orders which I would otherwise wish to do. I must further beg leave to
inform you, that I am under the strictest engagements with the present
Subadar of these provinces to assist him at all times; and it is not
the custom of the English nation to be guilty of insincerity."

This communication was expressed in terms which could not be
misunderstood; but it, at the same time, preserved that tone of
respect, and professed obedience to the Emperor, which it would have
been prejudicial to the interests of the English Government and its
ally to have neglected.

Clive, when he arrived at Moorshedabad, on his march to Patna, had a
long conference with the Nabob, the substance of which he details in
his letters to the Select Committee. He laid before him the causes of
the internal danger with which he was threatened from seditious nobles
and a mutinous army. His own conduct, he informed him, had produced
these effects; and his loss of the confidence of all classes of his
subjects had the natural consequence of inviting foreign invasion.
These truths, he appeared to hope, might make some impression; and
he further informed the Committee, that, though he had stated his
sentiments so frankly, he had, at the same time, complied with the
Nabob's solicitation to ride on the same elephant with him, and adopted
every measure that could support him in his administration.

In a letter, dated the 12th of March, to the Secret Committee of the
Court of Directors, Clive informs them of the cause of the expedition
to Patna, the strength of his force, and his expectations of the result.

"The Select Committee," he observes, "have already acquainted you that
we were threatened with a storm from the north, and that the Mogul's
son, who has for some time been in-arms against his father, or rather
the Vizier, his father's minister, had entered the frontiers of these
provinces in a hostile manner. As the Prince is daily advancing, though
but slowly, it was judged expedient that our forces should march to
the northward, in order, in conjunction with those of the Nabob, to
put a stop to his progress. As I flatter myself my presence will be of
service to the common cause (my former successes having gained me some
degree of influence in the country), I have put myself at the head of
the forces. They consist of about four hundred and fifty Europeans,
and two thousand five hundred sepoys; and with these, few as they
are, I trust we shall give a good account of the Shah Zada, though
his army is said to be thirty thousand strong, provided the Nabob's
people keep firm to him: and should even the contrary happen, and the
Subadar's troops desert him, we shall be able to make our party good,
and to maintain our own. Indeed, the only danger, in my opinion, to be
apprehended is from the dissatisfaction among the Nabob's principal
officers, occasioned by his treachery towards and ill-usage of them.
However, in the several conferences I have had with him, since my
arrival here, I have so strongly pointed out to him the danger of such
like behaviour, as cannot fail inducing him to a change of conduct
for the future; and the confidence which I know the jemidars have in
the English will, I hope, retain them in their allegiance to their
sovereign.

"We shall leave this to-morrow; and I propose marching with the
utmost expedition to the relief of Patna, which is in great danger
of being lost, as well as the whole province of Bahar, the Shah Zada
being actually arrived at the Caramnassa, the river which divides the
countries of Oude and Bahar. It is yet uncertain whether M. Law, with
his few fugitives, will join him, or not."

When the troops reached Shahabad, advices reached Meeran[260] that Ram
Narrain had actually gone over to the Shah Zada. This, however, proved
incorrect; the wary Hindu had only faltered in his allegiance until he
heard Clive was advancing.

His visit to the Shah Zada, which gave rise to the report of his
defection, was merely to gain time. It was now learnt from subsequent
accounts that he was defending the city, and had already repelled two
attacks. Clive, who was making very rapid marches to join him, directed
Ensign Mathews, who was in advance in command of a battalion of sepoys,
to hasten to Patna and co-operate with Ram Narrain; a service which
was effected by that young officer in a way which gave promise of the
eminence which he afterwards attained.

Confident from the efforts which were made to support him, and the near
approach of his friends, Ram Narrain made the most gallant exertions
to save the city. Every assault was repelled, and the enemy drew
back after they had possessed themselves of some of the bastions.
Discouraged at these defeats, and alarmed at the near approach of the
corps under Mathews[261], and Clive's rapid advance, the Shah Zada
broke up his camp, and retreated.

Clive, in a letter to Mr. Spencer of the Bombay establishment, thus
shortly describes the Shah Zada's advance and flight:--"The King's son,
who, about a year ago, escaped out of the Vizier's hands, has been ever
since fishing in troubled waters; he has been with the Rohillas, the
Jauts, the Mahrattas, and Patans; and, about three months ago, fled
for protection to Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Nabob of Oude, a mortal enemy
to the Vizier, and was received by him with great respect. He sent
his brother-in-law, Mahommed Kooli Khan, with five thousand horse,
into these parts, in hopes of effecting a revolution: and, indeed,
the name of the King's eldest son was so great, that, as soon as he
entered the province, he was joined from all parts; and, by the time
of his arrival before Patna, his army was forty thousand strong. The
ruler of this place being entirely in the English interest, what with
small presents and negotiation, delayed the attack of the city for some
time: but on the 23d of March the fighting began, and lasted till the
4th of April, when our advanced guard arrived within four coss of the
city, upon which the Shah Zada and his forces retired with the utmost
precipitation, and are now getting much faster out of the province
than they came in. We shall continue following them to the bank of the
Caramnassa. I hope to secure the peace of these provinces for one year
longer at least, by which time the whole of the Nabob's treaty will be
concluded.

"The enemy made several vigorous attacks upon the city, and were
once in possession of two bastions, but were driven off with great
slaughter: they have certainly lost a great many men. M. Law, with his
small party, joined the King's son on the day of their retreat, but
could not prevail upon him to make another attack."

While Clive was advancing towards Patna, a letter[262] from Meer
Jaffier informed him that he had received the command of the Emperor to
seize the person of the Shah Zada. The imperial edict was enclosed; its
contents were as follows:--"Know that you are under the shadow of my
favour. Some ill-designing people have turned the brain of my beloved
son Mahommed Ali Gohur[263], and are carrying him to the eastern part
of the empire, which must be the cause of much trouble and ruin to
my country. I therefore order you, who are my servant, to proceed
immediately to Patna, and secure the person of my son, and keep him
there. You are likewise to punish his attendants, that other people may
take warning thereby. In doing this you will gain my favour and have a
good name. Know this must be done."

The Vizier[264], Ghazee-u-Deen, addressed a letter of the same purport
to Clive, who, as well as the Nabob, appears to have considered it an
object to proclaim, that, in opposing the Shah Zada, they were acting
in conformity with the commands of his offended father.

The retreat of the Shah Zada was precipitate. He hastened to cross
the Caramnassa, a river which divides the territories of the Nabob of
Bengal from those of the Vizier of Oude; but the latter, who would
have been ready to support him had he been successful, now proclaimed
himself the enemy of that unhappy prince, who, abandoned by his
followers, and not knowing whither to fly, sought the protection of the
English Government.[265]

Clive communicates the overture which he made in a letter, under date
the 24th of April, to Mr. Manningham.

"The force of the Shah Zada," he observes, "is now entirely broken:
he has himself been obliged to repass the Caramnassa for fear of
Sujah-u-Dowlah, who sent a body of troops to prevent his entering
into his dominions. The Prince, reduced to no more than three hundred
followers, has again written to me; and, from the conversation I had
with the horseman who brought the letter, a person greatly in his
confidence, I find he wants, in his present distress, to throw himself
upon the English, from a conviction that there is none else in whom he
can trust. I have consulted with Ram Narrain, who is of opinion[266]
that the Nabob can never be safe, should a person of his high rank be
admitted into these provinces; and that his presence would expose the
country to continual commotions. I have therefore answered him, that
my connections with the Nabob were of so solemn a nature, as would not
allow of my affording him any protection; and on that account advised
him to keep out of the way, as I was now on the point of marching to
the Caramnassa. M. Law has passed the Great River[267], but, we are
informed, has only from twenty to thirty men with him: if so, a great
number must have deserted from him, and it is probable we shall soon
have some of them with us."

Notwithstanding the decided terms of this letter, the Shah Zada
continued to hope that he might yet prevail upon the generosity of
Clive to afford him the protection of the British Government. This,
however, would have been attended with more hazard to the peace of
the country than Clive thought himself justified in incurring; but,
while he was compelled by policy to refuse his request, he did so in
a manner calculated to add as little as possible to the distress and
difficulties with which he was surrounded.

"I have had," he observes in a letter[268] to Mr. Manningham,
"repeated letters from the Shah Zada, evidently intending to throw
himself upon us; but, for the reasons alleged in my last, have
absolutely determined against receiving him. I have indeed, (so great
is his distress), sent him a present of five hundred gold mohurs[269],
to enable him to get out of our country; and he has, in consequence
thereof, passed the Caramnassa, and is endeavouring to cross the Great
River, with intention, it is said, to take refuge in the Gazipoor
country."

Clive's letter to the Prince (of the 30th of April), though kind, is
at once decided and explicit. "The only letter," he observes, "I had
the honour to write you was by Fyaz Ali Khan's brother from Calcutta.
I therein acquainted your Highness that I was under the strictest
alliance with Meer Jaffier, and bound by oath to assist him. Since
that time I have received repeated orders from the Vizier, and even
from the King, not only to oppose your Highness, but even to lay
hold of your person. I am sorry to acquaint your Highness with these
disagreeable things, but I cannot help it. Were I to assist your
Highness in any respect, it would be attended with the ruin of this
country. It is better that one should suffer, however great, than that
so many thousands should be rendered unhappy. I have only to recommend
your Highness to the Almighty's protection. I wish to God it were in
my power to assist you, but it is not. I am now on my march to the
Caramnassa, and earnestly recommend it to you to withdraw before I
arrive there."

Clive, as already stated, had received several letters[270], written
by command of the Emperor, to urge him to act against the Shah Zada.
When all was settled, he addressed a letter[271] to the Vizier, in
which he states, that, "after putting an end to the troubles in Bahar,
agreeable to his Excellency's orders, he had set out for Bengal."

Clive had proceeded with the troops of the Nabob against the Rajpoot
and hill chiefs, who had invited and aided Shah Alum. These were soon
compelled by his operations to submit to terms; and this settlement
enabled him to return to Calcutta, leaving a small force to aid Ram
Narrain in his local administration.

Before Clive left Patna, the dangers which three months before
threatened Bengal were completely dispelled; and it is not too
much to aver, that the happy result of this unpromising expedition
was exclusively to be ascribed to his personal efforts, and to the
influence of his character. His prompt and open manner allayed, for
the moment, the jealousy of the Nabob and the violence of Meeran.
Their disaffected chiefs and mutinous soldiers were alone prevented
from defection or excess by his presence and exhortations. It was
exclusive confidence in Clive that preserved the fidelity and animated
the courage of Ram Narrain to those exertions which saved the city of
Patna from being plundered, and the rich province under his rule from
being laid waste; and, when the Shah Zada fled, the personal reliance
of the Rajpoot chiefs of Bahar on the British commander accelerated
the settlement of those districts which the advance of the Prince had
incited to rebellion.

We have stated how much Clive studied popular feeling throughout this
service, by acting in conformity with the wishes and commands of the
Court of Delhi. The information of the modern historian of India
appears here very defective, from the observations he has made upon
this part of Clive's conduct. In describing the invasion of Bahar,
Mr. Mill[273] states, that "the Prince (Shah Alum) having obtained
from the Emperor legal investiture as Subadar of Bengal, Bahar, and
Orissa, crossed the Caramnassa;" and, after detailing the result of
his enterprise, observes[274], "The hardihood of Clive was seldom
overcome by scruples. Yet the Emperor Alumgeer was legitimate sovereign
of Bengal, and had undoubted right to appoint his eldest son to be
his deputy in the government of that province: to oppose him, was
undisguised rebellion."

The facts of the case are directly opposed to the statement here given
by the historian. The Prince Shah Alum, who invaded Bahar, had fled
from Delhi, and was deemed to be in open rebellion against his father.
He might have been, before this period, titular Subah of Bengal, Bahar,
and Orissa, such rank being often given to princes of the imperial
family; but we have shown that, before he crossed the Caramnassa, even
that title was given to his younger brother, and Meer Jaffier appointed
his naib, being a confirmation of the sunnud (or patent) he had before
received from the Emperor, empowering him to rule over these provinces.
Further, the Emperor Alumgeer had called upon the Nabob by his
allegiance as his viceroy, and upon Clive by his duty as a commander
in the imperial army, to oppose his rebellious son in his unwarranted
invasion of Bahar, and urged them to seize and imprison his person, and
to attack and punish his seditious followers. The first commands of the
Court of Delhi upon the subject were written in February. They were
frequently repeated; and in a letter, dated 18th of June, 1759, from
the Prime Minister at Delhi to Clive, the commands of the Emperor were
conveyed in very strong language.

"The faithful services," the Vizier observes, "which you have
performed, and the pains which you have taken in the late affairs, have
given me great joy; nor can I sufficiently express your praises for
what you have done. Continue to behave with the same fidelity; seize
the rebel, and send him to court. By the will of God, this service
performed, the King will show you the greatest favour, and your
honours shall be increased."

The impression made at Alumgeer's court by Clive's conduct is further
proved by the invitation given in this letter to the English to
establish a factory in the city of Delhi.

"In the same manner," the Vizier adds, "as your factories are settled
at Calcutta, Azimabad, and Moorshedabad, send and establish a factory
at the royal city."

From these facts, of the correctness of which there cannot be the
slightest doubt, it must fully appear that the Nabob and Clive, so
far from being guilty of rebellion against the legitimate sovereign
of India, with which they are charged, were acting throughout in
conformity with the reiterated mandates of the imperial court, and were
congratulated and applauded by the Emperor and his minister upon the
successful results of their efforts.

Meer Jaffier remained in Bengal during the whole time Clive was in
Bahar. He appears to have continued his inveterate hatred to Roy
Dullub, and to have devised every means to obtain possession of his
person. Mr. Hastings at one time thought he would have recourse to
force for this purpose; and conjectured that a body of Mahrattas,
approaching from Cuttack, which the Nabob had first invited from dread
of his own troops, and the invasion of the Shah Zada, were meant to be
subsequently employed in seizing the person of Roy Dullub. He appears
to have given more attention to this affair than Clive thought it
merited; the latter being satisfied that Meer Jaffier, however he might
enter into intrigues, would never openly commit any act which could
place him in the light of an enemy to the British government, by whom
he had been raised to a throne, and whose friendship and support, he
must be sensible, were indispensable to enable him to preserve his
power.

Meer Jaffier appears, from the correspondence of the resident, to
have from the first looked to Clive as the only person who could save
him in this period of difficulty and alarm; and it is but justice to
his character to state that, when the danger was past, his sentiments
underwent no change. His gratitude was excessive: nor was it limited
to words. He conferred upon the man whom he now considered as the
preserver of that throne upon which he had established him, a jaghire
(or estate) of the reputed value of thirty lacs of rupees.

The first mention of his intention to bestow this gift on Clive is
in a letter[275] from Mr. Hastings, in which he observes, "He (the
Nabob) expresses the most grateful sense of the services which you have
performed for him, and declared to me his resolution to use every means
in his power to procure an order from the Court[276] for your jaghire,
being ashamed that you should do so much for him without the prospect
of reaping any advantage to yourself by it."

This letter was written immediately after the Nabob had received
full accounts of the flight of the Shah Zada, and the happy result
of the expedition to Patna. It was not surprising that he, knowing
the source to which he owed his safety on this occasion, should be
anxious to reward Clive; but we learn from Mr. Sykes, who, a few months
afterwards, was appointed to act for Mr. Hastings at Moorshedabad, that
Meer Jaffier was influenced by additional motives to this munificent
act.

In his evidence before the House of Commons, Mr. Sykes stated to the
Committee[277], that the Nabob, speaking to him of the expedition to
Patna, "mentioned the sense he entertained of Lord Clive's conduct
towards him, and likewise in reducing the Shah Zada to such necessity
as to apply to his Lordship to put him under the English protection; he
mentioned, also, that he owed his government to Colonel Clive before,
and this was the second time he was indebted to him for it; that he
had been a means of having honours conferred on Colonel Clive, in
creating him an Omrah of the Empire, but that he had given him nothing
to support these honours: he had frequently had it in his thoughts,
but never entered seriously upon it till now; that he had thoughts
of giving him a jaghire in the Patna province, but found it would be
attended with inconvenience to the officers of his government; and that
Jugget Seit had fallen upon a method of obviating these difficulties,
by giving him the quit-rent arising from the lands ceded to the Company
to the southward of Calcutta; that he thought it would interfere the
least with his government, and stood the clearest in relation to the
Company's affairs.

"Mr. S. said that, to the best of his remembrance, he mentioned to
the Nabob that he thought it was a large sum; but the Nabob told him
that it was very little adequate to the services he had received from
the Colonel, but more especially for his behaviour upon the capture
of Moorshedabad, when the whole inhabitants expected to be put under
contribution; and that none of them had experienced a conduct of
that kind, for that their persons, as well as their properties, were
entirely secured to them."

Mr. Sykes states, that the Nabob, having prepared the deeds, desired
him to be present at the delivery of them to Clive; which took place
when the Nabob went to meet and welcome him on his return from Patna.

The next mention of this subject is made in a letter[278] to Clive
from Mr. Hastings, after his return to Moorshedabad, in which he
observes, "The Nabob desired me to draw out the form of the letter to
be written to the Council about your jaghire." This letter was a few
days afterwards transmitted to Calcutta.

I shall have occasion, hereafter, to speak of this grant, which
gave rise to great discussion; but we must, nevertheless, make some
observations upon the subject in this place.

Though Clive appears to have thought that the high titles obtained
for him from Delhi should have been accompanied[279] by a jaghire,
there exists no evidence, amongst all the documents I have examined,
to show that he had any previous intimation of its amount, or that he,
in any shape, compromised either his personal honour, or his duty to
the government he served, by accepting of this grant. Conscious that
he had performed great services to the Nabob, he received this reward
as a recompence which that prince had a right to bestow, and which
was one conformable to the usage of the country, and rendered more
appropriate, according to that usage, from the high honour which the
Emperor of Delhi had, at the request of Meer Jaffier, conferred upon
him. Clive gave a complete proof of his anticipation of the approbation
of his superiors in England, and of his wish to give publicity to
this transaction, by accepting, as his jaghire, an assignment of the
quit-rent, or government share, of the lands farmed by the Company in
the vicinity of Calcutta. This arrangement, which placed his income
in the hands of the Company, though it presented the best possible
security, would never have been consented to by a person who had not
acted with a perfect consciousness that he was violating no duty, and
inflicting no injury on the interests either of individuals or the
public.

These were evidently Clive's sentiments; and the transaction, at the
time of its occurrence, appears to have been generally viewed in the
same light. If some argued (as they might with reason) that, though no
existing regulations forbade individuals from accepting such gifts,
when spontaneously made by the Princes of India, a person in Clive's
situation ought not to have received a reward of a nature so likely
to establish a precedent dangerous to the future integrity of the
service: it was probably answered, that this was no doubt correct as a
common rule; but that the circumstances in which he was placed were
altogether peculiar, and never likely to recur to any individual; that
he first saved from ruin, and afterwards established upon a firmer
and more extended basis, the British interests in India; that he had,
in his career, overcome the army of one prince whose hostility to the
English was unconquerable, and raised and preserved upon his throne
another, by whom the ruined inhabitants of Calcutta were restored to
affluence, and a defenceless factory and a precarious trade converted
into a strong government and a flourishing commerce. Was he, they
would ask,--the sole and acknowledged author of this almost miraculous
change,--to obtain no benefit except empty honour? Restricted by his
military occupation from trade,--denying himself, upon principle, every
advantage from a corrupt source,--inadequately paid by the government
he served, and without a hope of any remuneration from a fluctuating
body of Directors,--was he, when he compromised no duty, when he
offended no law, when he injured neither the interests of individuals
nor of the state, to reject ungraciously the munificent reward
spontaneously proffered to him by a prince, who, though he had already
enriched him with a liberal share of the treasures which he distributed
to the English government and its army when they placed him upon the
throne, now owed him an obligation of almost equal magnitude? For there
could be no doubt, the defenders of Clive would argue, that to him Meer
Jaffier was exclusively indebted for the successful issue of the late
campaign: and his merits and claims were enhanced from his having, by
his qualities of a soldier and a statesman, and by the influence of his
great name, reaped all the fruits of the most decided victory without
shedding one drop of blood.

Such were the arguments by which the great majority became satisfied
with Clive's conduct on this occasion. Their force cannot be denied;
nor can their validity be impugned on any ground unconnected with his
peculiar situation and extraordinary achievements. It is, assuredly,
a great injustice to his memory, to view his conduct on this and
similar points without the fullest reference, not only to the singular
circumstances in which he was placed, but to the usages of the service
to which he belonged, to those of Eastern governments, and to the
principles of action which, at that period, governed the Directors of
the East India Company. Besides, if, even with ourselves, there is not
a man who thinks the more meanly of Cornwallis or Wellesley for the
large pecuniary donations which they received from the Company, or of
our Marlborough and our Wellington for the splendid estates which they
received from the government of a grateful country; can it be deemed
honest or fair to apply a different rule to the similar testimony of
gratitude which Clive received from the prince (the sole representative
of the government) whom he had so eminently served? According to the
ideas of that country, the reward was not excessive: no native of the
East certainly deemed it so. And, if it be objected to as conferred by
a foreign potentate, Clive must be content to share, in his fortunes as
his fame, the fate of the Prince of Mindelheim, the Duke of Bronte, and
the Duke of Vittoria.


END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.


LONDON:
Printed by A. SPOTTISWOODE,
New-Street-Square.

FOOTNOTES:

[214] Orme, vol. ii. p. 363.

[215] The country usually known by the name of the Northern Circars,
which had been ceded by the Soubah Salabut Jung to the French.

[216] A modern writer has noticed Clive's conduct on this occasion in
less favourable terms:--

"Clive," Mr. Mill observes[217], "chose to remain in Bengal, where he
was master, rather than go to Madras, where he would be under command;
and determined not to lessen his power by sending troops to Madras,
which the Presidency, copying his example, might forget to send back.
An enterprise at the same time presented itself, which, though its
success would have been vain had the French in the Carnatic prevailed,
bore the appearance of a co-operation in the struggle, and afforded a
colour for detaining the troops."

I conceive no remark is necessary upon the first part of this
paragraph. Every one acquainted with our condition in India at this
period must be sensible that Clive's presence was comparatively of
little consequence at Fort St. George[218], and that it was essential
to the very existence of our power in Bengal; he, therefore, having
the option, very properly chose to remain where he was most urgently
required.

[217] Vol. iii. p. 247.

[218] Mr. Pigot was governor, and Colonel Lawrence commanded the troops.

[219] Calcutta, 14th August, 1758.

[220] Calcutta, 15th September, 1758.

[221] Two companies of Draper's regiment.

[222] Calcutta, 26th December, 1758.

[223] Calcutta, 25th December, 1758.

[224] M. Moracin.

[225] Mr. Scrafton.

[226] In a letter from Mr. Hastings to Clive, of the 13th August, 1758,
he observes:--

"As I look upon myself to be principally indebted to you for my
appointment to this office (of what advantage soever it may prove to
me with respect to my own particular interest), I think it incumbent
upon me to make my sincere acknowledgments to you, for your favourable
intentions herein; which I cannot do better than by a constant
attention to the business entrusted to my charge, and my earnest
endeavours to promote the interests of the Company, as far as my
capacity will enable me; in which, I hope, I shall always have the
happiness to meet with your approbation."

[227] Mr. Hastings could not have been above twenty-five years of age
when appointed to this arduous and responsible situation.

[228] Mr. Hastings, in a letter to Clive of the 18th September,
reports the suspicious circumstances that led to the dismission of
Cajah Haddee, who was accused of having armed his followers with an
intention of murdering the Nabob when he went on a visit to his son.
This accusation was probably false, and invented, as the ground of the
fictitious plot, before alluded to, against Meer Jaffier's life, said
to be formed by Roy Dullub, with the knowledge and approbation of Clive.

[229] Tunkaws are the orders upon the revenue of the country.

[230] 6th October, 1758.

[231] The Nabob gave a copy of this letter to Mr. Hastings, to forward
to Clive. Its purport was as follows:--

"Your acceptable letter I have received: the purport of it I have
duly attended to. You write that the sepoys are all unanimous in this
affair, which I am very glad of. At present, it is your business to
put in immediate execution the affair in which you are engaged. I will
be with you in time: with regard to the expenses, I have wrote to Meer
Allee, who will supply you.

"I have talked with Sayeed Cossim Ali Khan as far as necessary, and
half engaged his consent. As you judge most effectual, do you bring
him entirely over to our design. What was agreed upon between us, you
may be assured shall be fully complied with: of this you may rest
perfectly satisfied. By the means of Mr. Watts and Mr. Scrafton I
have communicated the whole affair to Sabut Jung, and have gained his
concurrence in it. Sabut Jung's tunkaw money, and the sepoys' arrears,
I have taken upon myself.

"Let these particulars entirely satisfy you in this affair, which I
desire you will bring to a speedy conclusion."

Mr. Hastings, in the letter to Clive which accompanies this document,
observes, "Whether the letter is genuine or forged, I shall leave to
yourself to judge, and time to determine. I own I cannot help making
one obvious remark,--that if Roy Dullub was really the author of the
letter, it will be a matter of some difficulty to find out what his
intent could have been in writing it; as it appears of very little
consequence towards the design in hand, and rather calculated to
discover the whole affair, and put himself entirely in Cajah Haddee's
power, than to answer any other purpose, at least that I can discover."

[232] To the Council of Fort William, 5th December, 1758.

[233] Private letter to Mr. Drake, sen., 30th December, 1758.

[234] Shah Zada means "King's son;" but, in India, has latterly been
always applied, by way of distinction, to the princes of the family of
Delhi. Indeed, before the assumption of the title of Sultan by Tippoo,
and of that of Shah by the present Vizier of Oude, no Indian Mahommedan
prince or chief, in recent times, ever styled himself Sovereign.

[235] Mr. Hastings, in his letter to Clive of the 8th July, 1759,
observes, "The Nabob suspects Ram Narrain to have taken the part of
the King's son; which I do not wonder at, as the Nabob has never been
thoroughly reconciled to Ram Narrain."

[236] Aurungzebe died at Ahmednagar, in the Deckan, on the 21st
February, 1707.

[237] The name of this chief was Meer Shah-u-Deen. He took the title of
his father, Ghazee-u-Deen, or, "The Champion of the Faith."

[238] This prince is often called Ali Gohur; but the title of Shah Alum
(or, "King of the World") is that by which he designates himself in
all his letters written at this period. The Vizier, in his letters to
Clive, gives the Prince this title; and it is also that by which he has
since become so well known, as titular Emperor of Delhi, throughout a
long life of vicissitude and misfortune.

[239] M. Law, who was an able man, and well acquainted with the
natives, was incessant in his intrigues at this period. Clive obtained
copies of his letters to Sujah-u-Dowlah, whom he endeavoured to
stimulate to action by representing the unsettled state of Bengal, and
the certainty of a large French force soon invading that kingdom.--See
Country Correspondence, MSS. vol. xiii.

[240] _Antè_, pp. 348, 349.

[241] Pursnath is the name given by the Jains (the sect to which the
Seits belonged) to their principal idol; and their pilgrimage was to
Samet Sechara, at which there is one of his most celebrated temples.

[242] 23d November, 1758.

[243] "I cannot close this letter," Clive states, "without doing that
justice to Mr. Watts which I think his great services entitle him
to. That gentleman, at the manifest hazard of his life, brought to
perfection the treaty with the new Nabob and other great men of the
Durbar, and sent it down to Calcutta to be put in execution; that
gentleman attended the army throughout the long expedition to Patna, in
which his knowledge of the language, and of the natives in general, has
been of great service to the Company. I could not say less in favour
of one who, I think, has had just cause given him for resigning the
service."

[244] 4th March, 1759.

[245] Mr. Hastings, in a letter to Clive of the 4th March, observes,
"Golam Shah was yesterday with me, with whom I had some discourse
upon the subject of the present dissensions betwixt the Nabob and
his sepoys. He said the greatest part would assuredly quit the Nabob
as soon as he took the field, and that he did not know one who would
stand by him against the Shah Zada. But he added, that if you would act
as mediator betwixt the Nabob and his jemidars, and engage your word
for the safety of their lives and honour, he did not doubt that they
would continue faithful to the Nabob, as the fear of his treacherous
behaviour was the principal reason that they had to be displeased with
his service."

[246] Letter to Mr. Amyatt, 29th December, 1758.

[247] 10th February, 1759.

[248] 13th February.

[249] Received at Calcutta 11th February.

[250] Chuta Nabob means, "the Little Nabob;" by which name the son of
Meer Jaffier was always known.

[251] 20th February, 1759.

[252] The Nabob, in his answer to Clive, denied the truth of this
report.

[253] 12th February, 1759.

[254] The following is a translation of this letter:--

  "To the most High and Mighty, Protector of the Great, Colonel Sabut
  Jung Bahader.[255]

  "I know that you are under the shadow of the King's favour. My
  beloved son, Maddar-u-Dowlah Bahader, and the magnificent Fyaz
  Ali Khan, worthy of our favour, have fully represented to me your
  readiness to expose your life for me, and many other particulars
  relating to you. In this happy time, with a view of making the tour
  of Patna and Bengal, I have erected my standard of glory at this
  place. It is my pure intention to bestow favour upon you, the high
  and mighty, and all faithful servants, agreeable to their conduct.
  This world is like a garden of flowers, interspersed with weeds and
  thorns; I shall, therefore, root out the bad, that the faithful and
  good ryots (God willing) may rest in peace and quietness. Know you
  who are great, that it is proper you should pay a due obedience
  to this my firman, and make it your business to pay your respects
  to me like a faithful servant, which will be great and happy for
  you. It is proper you should be earnest in doing this, when, by the
  blessing of God, you stand high in my favour. Know this must be
  done."

[255] The following remarks on this title, communicated by David
Haliburton, Esq., to his friend Sir John Malcolm, are too curious to be
omitted.

"The title of Sabut Jung, viz. 'firm or steady in war,' was first
given by the Nabob Mahommed Ali to Colonel Clive, in allusion to his
memorable defence of Arcot some years before; but it was after his
arrival in Bengal, in 1757, that he was best known there by that title,
which was engraven on his Persian seal. One reason might be, that his
own name of Clive is difficult to be pronounced in any of the languages
of India. Even after a higher title, Zubdut-ul-Mulk, was conferred upon
him by the Mogul Emperor, when he created him an Omra of the empire,
Clive was better known through the country by the original title of
Sabut Jung, which he had brought when he commanded the expedition from
Madras.

"Mahommed Ali had, indeed, no right himself to grant titles. He had
assumed for himself that of Suraj-u-Dowlah, which, he asserted, had
been conferred on him by the Subadar of the Deckan, Nasir Jung; but
it had not been acknowledged by those in the French interest, who had
succeeded as Subadars of the Deckan. Be this as it may, Mahommed Ali
retained that title of Suraj-u-Dowlah in his correspondence with the
English. It is that even on his seals to the sunnuds for the lands he
gave them near Madras, commonly called the Jaghire; and he never took
any other, till he assumed that of Wala-Jah, by which he was known in
his latter years.

"It is, however, remarkable, that the first title he had, of
Suraj-u-Dowlah, was the same as that by which the Nabob of Bengal was
known to the English, by whom he was dethroned in 1757; and perhaps was
assumed by him with as little right as Mahommed Ali had: but certainly,
of the two, he was placed in the higher situation, when he succeeded
his grandfather Aliverdi Khan as Subah of Bengal and Bahar, which would
command his procuring a high title from the Court of Delhi."

[256] Clive's sunnud (of which a translation was made by Mr. Hastings)
is a curious document, not only as being a good specimen of that florid
style in which such patents were written, but as it exhibits their
form, and the various offices of government through which they passed
before they were sent to the individuals distinguished by such marks of
imperial favour. I have given, therefore, a literal transcript of this
sunnud in the Appendix.

[257] Polit. Hist. of India, vol. i. p. 510.

[258] 27th February, 1759.

[259] A letter from a prince to a subject is, in India, invariably
termed a firman, or mandate.

[260] Clive, on the assurance of Meeran, appears, for the moment,
to have believed this report. He wrote to Meer Jaffier, urging him
to abandon the play of the Hooley (a Hindu feast), and to hasten to
the field, if he desired to preserve his country. To Ram Narrain he
wrote in the following terms:--"I have neither eyes to see, nor ears
to hear, the letter I have now received from Mr. Amyatt; nor could
aught but the great confidence I have in him induce me to give credit
to its contents. Have you no sense of the obligations you are under
to me for all the care and pains I have taken for you? If you had not
courage equal to the occasion, yet what could have induced you to act
so imprudent a part? What power has the Shah Zada to resist the united
forces of the Nabob and the English? Think, then, what will be your
fate. For God's sake reflect on the duty you owe to your master, to my
friendship, and to your own safety. Turn from this bad design, and act
in such a manner that your master may be satisfied with you, and the
world acknowledge you worthy of the friendship I have shown you. Should
you, from want of courage, forsake your city, be assured it will not
remain ten days in the Shah Zada's power."

Ram Narrain, in answer to this letter, urged the difficulties of his
situation, and his want of means for a protracted defence; but asserted
his fidelity. Clive wrote in reply (29th March), "I shall continue to
march, with the utmost expedition, to your assistance. Let my approach
animate you to a vigorous defence; and let your conduct be such that I
may never repent the protection I have given you."

When Clive was informed of Ram Narrain's having repulsed the Shah Zada,
he wrote him in terms of the highest applause and encouragement: "Your
behaviour convinces me not only of your fidelity, but of your bravery
as a soldier; and you may be assured of my maintaining you in your
subahship, even at the hazard of my life." He adds, "Continue thus
gloriously to exert yourself, and be assured of my coming shortly to
your aid."

[261] Ensign Mathews writes to Clive, from Patna, on the 6th of April,
as follows:--"The Shah Zada's army, on the arrival of the English
advanced guard (as they term it), raised the siege yesterday morning.
Had we not been so expeditious on our marches, they would have had the
town this day, as they meant to storm, and had undermined one place."

[262] 19th March, 1759.

[263] The Prince, in his letter to Clive, assumed his title of "Shah
Alum," by which we denominate him.

[264] The Vizier wrote two letters to the Nabob, to the same purport
as that from the Emperor. He further states, in the second letter,
that Mahommed Hedayet-Buksh, second son of the Emperor, was appointed
Subadar of Patna, and Meer Jaffier his naib. The nomination of the
Prince was titular; but, by its being made at this period, it was, no
doubt, meant to take away every shadow of a pretext that could justify
the invasion of that province by the Prince Shah Alum. These letters
were received at Moorshedabad on the 29th of March, and must have been
written before Shah Alum left Benares.

[265] Clive, in a letter to Mr. Manningham of the 24th of April,
makes the following observations on Shah Alum's situation at this
period:--"The Prince, beset as he is on all sides, must be in great
distress, and much puzzled where to retire to. I herewith send you a
translation of a letter lately received from him. The letter to which
he alludes, as having received from me, is an absolute forgery, as I
never wrote him but one, and that from Calcutta, to which this bears
no resemblance. The affair appears to be a contrivance of his, in
order to sow dissension between the Nabob and me; unless it be really
the consequence of the necessitous state to which he is reduced,
and intended as an introduction to his throwing himself upon us for
protection."

[266] There cannot be a greater proof of Ram Narrain's desire to
preserve his fidelity to Meer Jaffier, than this opinion; for had he
cherished different sentiments, the ex-Prince was a fit instrument to
aid his future designs.

[267] Ganges.

[268] 8th May, 1759.

[269] About 1000_l._

[270] He received one, on the 23rd of May, from Ahmed Khan, the
Vizier's brother, who states, "I have heard, with pleasure, of your
great fame, good actions, and sincerity. Your coming with Nabob
Nasser-ul-Mulk[272], to assist and join Ram Narrain Bahader against the
Shah Zada, who went into these parts against the Emperor's pleasure,
and that of the Vizier my brother, and raised disturbances, was very
proper and advisable. I return God thanks that, on your approach, and
by your influence, the Naib of Azimabad (Ram Narrain) soon put an
end to these disturbances, which has saved the King, my brother, and
myself, much trouble and fatigue, as we should have been obliged to
take a long journey."

[271] 29th June, 1759.

[272] The title of Meeran.

[273] Hist. of India, vol. iii. p. 254.

[274] Vol. iii. p. 255.

[275] 24th April, 1759.

[276] This means the Court of Delhi. No jaghire, or other grant, was
deemed complete in form till sanctioned by the command of the Emperor.

[277] House of Commons Reports, vol. iii. p. 154.

[278] 9th August, 1759.

[279] In a letter to Mr. Amyatt, Chief of Patna, Clive objects, on the
ground of having as yet no jaghire, to pay the enormous sum demanded as
a fee for the patent of nobility sent him from Delhi; but he desires
Mr. Amyatt to give the royal agent, Shitabroy, the nazeranna (or
offering) customary from omrahs of similar rank. In the evidence of
Clive, given before the Committee of the House of Commons, we find the
following testimony on the subject:--

"That the first letter he (Clive) ever wrote about a jaghire was, to
the best of his remembrance, on the 31st of January, 1759, to Jugget
Seit, informing him that the Nabob had made him an omrah, without a
jaghire. In answer to which he replied, that the Nabob never granted
jaghires in Bengal; that Orissa was too poor, but that he might have
one in Bahar; and he declared, upon his honour, that he never applied
for any jaghire, directly or indirectly, after that period; and that,
when the Nabob presented him the jaghire (which was near six months
afterwards), he did not know what that jaghire was; had not the least
idea of the amount of it, nor of its being the quit-rent upon the
Company's lands; and that he did believe the Nabob gave him that
jaghire in consequence of the services he had rendered him, which have
been stated by Mr. Sykes.

"That having looked upon the Nabob's answer as an evasive one, and
that he was not inclined to comply with his request, he never wrote,
nor thought, more upon the subject, until he received a second letter
from Jugget Seit, in answer to his first, after the success against the
King's son, mentioning that the Nabob had turned the thing in his mind,
and was willing to grant him a jaghire in Bengal; but the nature of it,
where, or what value it was to be, he was entirely ignorant of till
the patent explained it. Jugget Seit was a banker, and a man of great
interest and weight with the Nabob."--Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii.
p. 154.




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Transcriber's note:


Obvious errors of punctuation and diacritics were corrected.

There are at least two unpaired double quotation marks which
the transcriber felt unable to correct with confidence.

Inconsistent hyphenation was made consistent.

The footnotes themselves have footnotes and have been included in the
consecutive numbering; therefore, there appear to be missing numbers in
the text itself.

P. 7: embassador at the court -> ambassador at the court.

P. 9: want of of personal courage -> want of personal courage.

Pp. 19, 21, 22fn, 25fn, 26, 27: Pondichery -> Pondicherry.

P. 86: informed of these prepaparations -> informed of these
preparations.

P. 137: Footnote anchor was missing and placed at a conjectured
location.

P. 150fn: can be no justication -> can be no justification.

P. 173: the absolute recal -> the absolute recall.

P. 375: accessary to the disgrace -> accessory to the disgrace.