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  THE

  INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER

  UPON THE

  FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE

  1793-1812


  BY

  CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U.S.N.

  PRESIDENT UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

  AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783"
  OF "THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS," AND OF A
  "LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT"


  IN TWO VOLUMES

  VOL. II.


  FOURTH EDITION.


  LONDON:
  SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE, & RIVINGTON.
  (LIMITED.)




UNIVERSITY PRESS:

JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A.




CONTENTS OF VOL. II.


  CHAPTER XII.

  EVENTS ON THE CONTINENT, 1798-1800.

  DISORDERS OF FRANCE UNDER THE DIRECTORY.—DISASTROUS WAR OF THE SECOND
  COALITION.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULATE.—BONAPARTE OVERTHROWS
  AUSTRIA AND FRAMES AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN THE ARMED NEUTRALITY OF
  1800.—PEACE OF LUNÉVILLE WITH AUSTRIA.

                                                                   PAGE

  Hostilities of Naples against the French                            1

  Disastrous defeat of the Neapolitans                                2

  The French enter Naples                                             2

  Piedmont annexed to France                                          2

  Beginning of the war of the Second Coalition                        3

  Reverses of the French in Germany and Italy                         3

  Masséna falls back in Switzerland                                   4

  Further French disasters in Italy                                   5

  The French evacuate southern Italy                                  6

  Battle of the Trebia won by Suwarrow                                6

  Loss of northern Italy by the French                                7

  The French defeated at the battle of Novi by Suwarrow               8

  Change in the plans of the Coalition                                8

  Masséna defeats the allies at the battle of Zurich                  9

  Disastrous march of Suwarrow into Switzerland                       9

  Failure of the Anglo-Russian expedition against Holland            10

  Loss of Bonaparte's conquests in Italy and of the Ionian Islands   10

  Internal disorders of France                                       11

  Bonaparte's return, and the revolution of Brumaire 18              15

  Bonaparte's measures to restore order                              15

  His advances toward Great Britain and Austria to obtain peace      16

  Reasons of the two governments for refusing                        17

  Prosperity of Great Britain                                        17

  Russia abandons the coalition                                      19

  Forces of France and Austria in 1800                               19

  Bonaparte's plan of campaign                                       20

  Opening of the campaign in Italy                                   21

  Masséna shut up in Genoa                                           21

  Moreau's advance into Germany                                      21

  Bonaparte crosses the Saint Bernard                                22

  Battle of Marengo, and armistice following it                      23

  Armistice in Germany                                               24

  Diplomatic negotiations                                            25

  Bonaparte's colonial and maritime anxieties                        25

  The Czar Paul I.'s hostility to Great Britain                      26

  Dispute between England and Denmark concerning neutral rights      26

  Effect of this upon Bonaparte's plans                              27

  Policy of Russia and Prussia                                       28

  Bonaparte undertakes to form a coalition against Great Britain     29

  Factors in the question                                            29

  Vacillations of Prussia                                            31

  Bonaparte's advances to Russia                                     32

  Hostile action of Paul I. toward Great Britain                     33

  His pretensions to Malta                                           33

  Negotiations for a maritime truce                                  34

  Their failure                                                      35

  Action of Prussia against Great Britain                            35

  Armed Neutrality of 1800                                           36

  Its claims                                                         37

  Renewal of hostilities between Austria and France                  38

  Defeat of Austria at the battle of Hohenlinden                     38

  Peace of Lunéville                                                 39

  Terms of the treaty                                                40


  CHAPTER XIII.

  EVENTS OF 1801.

  BRITISH EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC.—BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN.—BONAPARTE'S
  FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO CONTEST CONTROL OF THE SEA.—HIS CONTINENTAL
  POLICY.—PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH GREAT BRITAIN, OCTOBER,
  1801.—INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER, SO FAR, ON THE COURSE OF THE
  REVOLUTION.

  Isolation of Great Britain in Europe, in 1801                      41

  Expedition to the Baltic planned                                   41

  Instructions to Sir Hyde Parker, commander-in-chief                42

  Nelson second in command                                           42

  The fleet sails                                                    42

  Nelson's plan of operations                                        43

  The military situation, strategic and tactical                     44

  Characteristics of Nelson's military genius                        45

  Denmark's relation to the league of the northern States            46

  Half measures of Sir Hyde Parker                                   47

  Nelson advances against Copenhagen                                 47

  Battle of Copenhagen                                               48

  Results of the battle                                              51

  Nelson's negotiations with the Danish government                   51

  Armistice concluded with Denmark                                   51

  Assassination of the Czar Paul I.                                  51

  Merits of Nelson's conduct in the Baltic                           52

  British embargo upon merchant ships of the Baltic powers           53

  Resulting retaliatory action of Prussia                            54

  Inherent weakness of the Northern League                           55

  Conciliatory action of the new Czar                                55

  Sir Hyde Parker relieved from command                              56

  Nelson takes the British fleet to Revel                            56

  His action rebuked by the Czar                                     57

  Convention between Great Britain and Russia                        57

  Dissolution of the Armed Neutrality                                57

  Nature of the claims maintained by it                              58

  Bonaparte's proceedings in the Italian and Spanish peninsulas      59

  Failure of his maritime projects for the relief of Malta and Egypt 60

  His attempt to collect a naval force in Cadiz                      63

  Naval battle of Algesiras, and its consequences                    64

  Strategic significance of these events                             65

  Cession of Louisiana by Spain to France                            67

  Bonaparte's intended occupation of Portugal frustrated             67

  His diplomatic dilemma in the summer of 1801                       68

  Coolness towards him of Russia and Prussia                         69

  Triumphant influence of the British Sea Power                      69

  Preliminaries of Peace between Great Britain and France            70

  Terms of the preliminaries signed at London, October, 1801         71

  Cessation of hostilities                                           72

  Criticism of the terms by the British Opposition                   72

  Influence of Sea Power upon the course of the Revolution           74

  Pitt's opinions                                                    75


  CHAPTER XIV.

  OUTLINE OF EVENTS FROM THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRELIMINARIES
  TO THE RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS.

  Unstable character of the settlement of 1801                       76

  Treaties with Turkey and Portugal contracted secretly by France    77

  Impression produced in Great Britain by these and by the cession
  of Louisiana                                                       78

  Expedition sent to Haïti by Bonaparte                              78

  Delays in negotiating the definitive treaty                        79

  Bonaparte accepts the presidency of the Cisalpine Republic         80

  Effect produced in Great Britain by this step                      80

  Signature of the Peace of Amiens, March 25, 1802                   81

  Provisions concerning Malta                                        81

  Illusive effects caused by Bonaparte's system of secret treaties   82

  Annihilation of the Sea Power of France                            83

  Bonaparte proclaimed First Consul for life                         83

  Action of Bonaparte in the German indemnities                      84

  Injury to Austria and annoyance of Great Britain                   85

  Bonaparte's reclamations against the British press                 85

  Piedmont and Elba formally incorporated with France                85

  The Valais wrested from Switzerland for military reasons           86

  Bonaparte's armed intervention in Switzerland, 1802                87

  Emotion of Europe and remonstrance of Great Britain                88

  The British ministry countermands restitution of captured
  colonies                                                           89

  Bonaparte's wrath at the British remonstrance                      89

  Strained relations between the two States                          90

  Bonaparte demands the evacuation of Egypt and Malta                91

  Attitude of the British ministry concerning Malta                  91

  Causes of the delay in evacuating it                               92

  Importance of Malta                                                92

  Broad ground now taken by the ministry                             93

  Publication of Sébastiani's report, January, 1803                  93

  Its effect in Great Britain                                        94

  Disasters of the French in Haïti                                   94

  Bonaparte's preponderant interest in Malta and the East            95

  High tone now assumed by the British ministry                      96

  Additional provocation given by Bonaparte                          96

  Ominous proceedings of the ministry                                97

  The British ultimatum                                              98

  Great Britain declares war, May 16, 1803                           98

  Universal character of the strife thus renewed                     98

  Unanimity of feeling in Great Britain                              99

  Pitt's forecast of the nature of the struggle                     100


  CHAPTER XV.

  THE TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN TO THE SPANISH DECLARATION OF WAR.
  MAY, 1803—DECEMBER, 1804.

  PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION OF ENGLAND.—THE GREAT
  FLOTILLA.—NAPOLEON'S MILITARY AND NAVAL COMBINATIONS,
  AND BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY.—ESSENTIAL UNITY OF NAPOLEON'S
  PURPOSE.—CAUSES OF SPANISH WAR.

  Preparations of the two States                                    101

  Cession of Louisiana to the United States                         104

  Effect of the British Sea Power upon this measure                 105

  Resources of Great Britain and France as affected by their social
  systems                                                           105

  Offensive and defensive gain to Great Britain by forcing the war  106

  Inconvenience to Bonaparte from the premature outbreak            107

  Exhaustion of France under the pressure of Sea Power              108

  Bonaparte's resolution to invade Great Britain                    109

  Seizure by him of Hanover and of the Heel of Italy                109

  Object of these measures                                          110

  Offence and injury to Prussia by occupation of Hanover            110

  French troops quartered on Holland, Hanover, and Naples           111

  Bonaparte's plans for the invasion of England                     111

  His naval combinations to that end                                112

  Building of the great flotilla                                    113

  Its points of concentration described                             114

  Difficulties of the undertaking                                   115

  Certainty of Napoleon's purpose                                   116

  Interesting character of this historical crisis                   117

  Strategic effect of the British blockading squadrons              118

  Strategic dispositions in the British Channel                     119

  Security felt by British naval officers                           120

  St. Vincent's opposition to small gun-vessels                     121

  The Sea Fencibles                                                 121

  Deterioration of naval material under St. Vincent's
  administration                                                    122

  Effects upon the Channel and Mediterranean ships                  123

  Embarrassment caused to Nelson                                    124

  Bonaparte's naval combination hinges upon Nelson's perplexities   124

  Details of his first plan                                         125

  Merits of St. Vincent's general strategic dispositions            126

  Nelson's uncertainties as to the French purposes                  127

  His certainty as to his own course                                127

  Embarrassment caused by the condition of his ships                128

  Delays encountered by Napoleon                                    129

  Death of the commander of the Toulon fleet                        130

  Villeneuve appointed to succeed him                               130

  Change of detail in Napoleon's naval combination                  131

  Significance of this new combination                              132

  War begins between Great Britain and Spain                        133

  Train of causes which led to this outbreak                        133

  Detention of the Spanish treasure-ships                           137


  CHAPTER XVI.

  THE TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN—CONCLUDED.
  JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1805.

  SUCCESSIVE MODIFICATIONS OF NAPOLEON'S PLAN.—NARRATIVE OF NAVAL
  MOVEMENTS.—FINAL FAILURE OF NAPOLEON'S NAVAL COMBINATIONS.—WAR
  WITH AUSTRIA, AND BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.—BATTLE OF
  TRAFALGAR.—VITAL CHANGE IMPOSED UPON NAPOLEON'S POLICY BY THE
  RESULT OF THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN.

  Napoleon has direction of both Spanish and French fleets          140

  His lack of familiarity with maritime difficulties                141

  Instructions to the Rochefort and Toulon admirals                 142

  The Rochefort squadron puts to sea                                142

  Delay, and final departure, of the Toulon fleet                   143

  Nelson's movements                                                143

  He takes his fleet to Alexandria                                  144

  The Toulon ships being crippled in a gale, Villeneuve returns to
  Toulon                                                            144

  Napoleon's plans again modified by this delay                     146

  Stations of the British and Allied fleets in March, 1805          147

  Napoleon's new instructions to his admirals                       149

  Return of Nelson to Toulon, and his subsequent movements          150

  Second Sailing of Villeneuve                                      151

  Joined by a Spanish division at Cadiz, and reaches Martinique     151

  Nelson's uncertainties and head winds                             152

  He reaches Gibraltar, and follows Villeneuve to West Indies       152

  Napoleon goes to Italy                                            153

  His naval measures and surmises                                   154

  Nelson's sound strategy and sagacity                              156

  Miscalculations of Napoleon                                       157

  The measures of the British Admiralty                             159

  Nelson in the West Indies                                         161

  Divergent directions taken by the hostile fleets                  161

  Villeneuve returns to Europe                                      162

  Nelson penetrates his intention and sails in pursuit              163

  Napoleon sends to Ferrol instructions for Villeneuve              164

  Napoleon's efforts to distract the British navy                   165

  The British resist the diversions raised for them                 166

  Villeneuve sighted at sea by a dispatch ship from Nelson          167

  The news brought to London                                        168

  Energetic and skilful measures of the Admiralty                   168

  Villeneuve intercepted by Calder off Cape Finisterre              169

  Nelson reaches Gibraltar                                          169

  Napoleon misled by the rapidity of the British action             170

  Napoleon goes to Boulogne to await Villeneuve                     171

  The engagement between Calder and Villeneuve                      171

  Subsequent mistakes of the British admiral                        172

  Villeneuve puts into Vigo, and reaches Coruña                     173

  Calder joins Cornwallis off Brest                                 174

  Nelson also joins Cornwallis from Gibraltar                       174

  Strategic advantage now in the hands of the British               175

  Cornwallis divides his fleet and destroys his advantage           176

  Imminent hostilities on the Continent                             176

  The Third Coalition formed                                        177

  Urgent orders from Napoleon to Villeneuve                         178

  Napoleon's decision as to his own movements                       179

  Villeneuve sails from Coruña for Brest                            179

  He abandons his purpose and enters Cadiz                          180

  The allied fleets blockaded in Cadiz by Collingwood               181

  Napoleon's campaign of 1805 in Germany                            181

  Battle of Austerlitz and peace of Presburg                        182

  Fate of the great flotilla                                        182

  Discussion of the chances of Napoleon's project of invasion       182

  Necessity of making the attempt                                   184

  Napoleon's orders to Villeneuve in Cadiz                          185

  Nelson takes command off Cadiz                                    186

  The combined fleets put to sea                                    187

  Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar discussed                           188

  Battle of Trafalgar                                               190

  Death of Nelson                                                   192

  Nautical disasters succeeding the battle                          194

  Immediate results of the battle                                   195

  Subsequent fate of the French ships in Cadiz                      195

  Momentous consequences flowing from the battle of Trafalgar       196

  Commerce-destroying henceforth the sole resource of Napoleon      197


  CHAPTER XVII.

  THE WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
  AND EMPIRE, TO THE BERLIN DECREE. 1793-1806.

  Characteristics of the Warfare against Commerce                   199

  Measures of France and of Great Britain                           200

  Conduct of Napoleon and of the ministry contrasted                201

  Identity of the methods of the Republic and of the Emperor        202

  Primary measures of the belligerents                              203

  Twofold system of Great Britain for the protection of trade       204

  Seamen a part of the military strength of a nation                205

  The British Convoy Act                                            205

  Results to France of her dependence upon commerce-destroying      206

  Activity of French cruisers                                       207

  Amount and distribution of British trade                          207

  Character of French Channel privateers                            208

  Indifferent efficiency of many British cruisers                   210

  French privateering in the Atlantic                               210

  French privateering in the West Indies                            211

  Its piratical character, arising from remoteness from Europe      213

  Size and force of British East India ships                        214

  Consequent character of French privateering in Indian seas        215

  Efficient protection of British trade in India                    216

  Advantages of the convoy system                                   217

  Destruction of French commerce by British control of the sea      218

  Numbers of British captures                                       219

  The French flag swept from the sea                                219

  Annihilation of French commerce except the coasting trade         220

  Discussion of the number and value of British vessels captured    221

  Deductions as to the losses of Great Britain                      226

  Swelling prosperity of the country                                227

  Support to British trade contributed by neutral shipping          228

  Conclusions thence drawn by the French government                 230

  Effect of the appearance of the United States as neutral carriers 231

  Rapid increase of American merchant shipping                      232

  Other neutral carriers                                            233

  Attitude taken by Russia in 1793                                  233

  Severe restrictions on neutrals imposed by Great Britain          234

  Rule of 1756                                                      234

  Seizures of American ships in West Indies, 1793                   236

  Jay's Mission to Great Britain, 1794                              237

  Terms of treaty concluded by him                                  238

  Indignation of French government                                  239

  Effect of Jay's treaty upon American relations with Great
  Britain                                                           240

  Gradual shaping of British commercial war policy                  242

  Vacillating action of French government towards neutrals          242

  France breaks off relations with the United States                244

  French aggressions upon neutrals after 1796                       244

  Embargo upon American vessels in 1793                             246

  Growing exasperation between France and the United States         246

  Effect of Bonaparte's successes upon French foreign policy        247

  Early attempts to stifle British trade                            248

  Determination to arrest neutral trade with Great Britain          249

  Law of January 18, 1798                                           250

  Modification of channels of British trade caused by the war       250

  Policy of Pitt in seeking to dominate the Caribbean Sea           252

  Carriage of tropical produce by neutrals                          253

  Course of trade in Europe, 1793-1798                              254

  Effects of the law of January 18, 1798                            254

  Discussion in the Conseil des Anciens, January, 1799              255

  Measures of the United States caused by the law of January 18     258

  _Quasi_ war of 1798 with France                                   258

  French reverses in 1799                                           259

  French successes in 1800                                          260

  Questions involved in the Armed Neutrality of 1800                260

  Opinions of Pitt and of Fox on the disputed points                261

  British conventions with the neutral Baltic States, 1801          261

  Concession of the Rule of 1756 by Russia                          262

  Lessons as to belligerent interest in neutral trade, afforded by
  the war between Great Britain and France, 1793-1801               262

  Further lesson afforded by the short peace of Amiens, 1801-1803   265

  Renewal of war, May, 1803                                         265

  Bonaparte's measures against British trade, 1803-1805             265

  Threatened injury to British commerce by neutral carriers         266

  Extent of American trade with colonies of enemies to Great
  Britain                                                           267

  Pitt's commercial measures upon resuming power in 1804            267

  Methods of American trade between belligerent countries and
  their colonies                                                    268

  Condemnation of American ships in British prize courts, 1804      269

  Death of Pitt. Fox becomes Foreign Minister, 1806                 269

  Fox's desire to conciliate the United States                      269

  Order in Council of May 16, 1806, substituted for Rule of 1756    269

  Character of the blockade of French coast thus imposed            270

  Intention of the new measure, and its consequences                270

  Death of Fox, September, 1806                                     270

  War between France and Prussia                                    270

  Napoleon enters Berlin and issues the Berlin Decree               271

  Object of the decree                                              271


  CHAPTER XVIII.

  THE WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE, 1806-1812.

  THE BERLIN AND MILAN DECREES OF NAPOLEON, 1806 AND 1807.—THE
  BRITISH ORDERS IN COUNCIL, 1807-1809.—ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY
  OF THESE MEASURES OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS.—OUTLINE OF
  CONTEMPORARY LEADING EVENTS.

  Object of, and pretext for, the Berlin Decree                     272

  Terms of the Decree                                               272

  Napoleon's winter campaign against Russia, 1806-1807              273

  The Decree remains inoperative                                    274

  Battle of Friedland and conventions of Tilsit, June-July, 1807    274

  British retaliatory Order in Council, January, 1807               275

  Its terms and object                                              275

  Effect upon American traders                                      276

  Napoleon's designs upon Denmark and Portugal                      276

  Prompt action of the British ministry                             277

  Portuguese court withdraws to Brazil                              277

  General exclusion of British goods from the Continent             278

  Attitude of Napoleon towards the United States                    279

  Nature of the questions confronting Napoleon                      280

  Jealousy of Great Britain towards neutral trade                   281

  Momentous decision of Napoleon as to the scope of the Berlin
  Decree                                                            281

  Effect of this decision in Great Britain                          282

  Embargo Act of the United States, 1807                            282

  Succeeded by Non-Intercourse Act, 1809                            283

  British Orders in Council of November, 1807                       283

  Object of these orders                                            285

  Summary of their requirements                                     286

  Their effect upon neutrals                                        287

  The effect upon the continental nations                           288

  Essential features of the opposing British and French policies    289

  Napoleon's Milan Decree                                           290

  Duration of the two policies                                      291

  Napoleon's usurpation in Spain                                    291

  The Bayonne and Rambouillet Decrees                               292

  The Spanish revolt and French disasters                           292

  Battle of Vimiero and French evacuation of Portugal               292

  Conventions of Erfurt and war between Russia and Sweden           293

  The British navy in the Baltic                                    294

  Letter of Napoleon and the Czar to the King of Great Britain      294

  Napoleon in the Spanish Peninsula                                 295

  Diversion made by Sir John Moore                                  296

  Opening of the year 1809                                          296

  Austria's preparations for war                                    297

  State of the commercial warfare in 1809                           298

  Evasion of Napoleon's decrees by the Dutch                        299

  Consequent measures of Napoleon                                   300

  Passive resistance of the Continent to the decrees                301

  British seizure of Heligoland                                     302

  Conditions in the Baltic                                          303

  General conditions of British trade, 1806-1809                    304

  The License System                                                307

  Origin of "neutralization"                                        309

  Its effect upon the action of British cruisers                    310

  Workings of the License System                                    311

  British Order in Council of April, 1809                           313

  War between Austria and France                                    314

  Wellesley's operations in the Peninsula                           315

  Battles of Essling and Wagram                                     316

  Sweden forced to join in the Continental System                   316

  Napoleon's urgent attempts to enforce the System                  317

  Conditions in the Peninsula                                       318

  Northern Germany occupied by French troops                        319

  Holland united to the Empire                                      321

  Napoleon's demands upon Prussia and Sweden                        322

  Extensive seizure of ships with British goods                     323

  Napoleon's Customs Decree of August 5, 1810                       324

  Universal application of this decree                              325

  Napoleon's fiscal measures and license system                     326

  Decree of October 19, 1810, to burn British manufactured goods    327

  Uneasiness of Russia                                              329

  Napoleon's annexation of Oldenburg and the Hanse towns            330

  Commercial distress in Great Britain                              331

  Embarrassment and suffering in France                             333

  Napoleon's financial expedients                                   337

  Credit of France and of Great Britain                             338

  Internal condition of France and of England                       340

  The conscription in France                                        342

  Exhaustion of the two nations                                     343

  Difficulties between France and Russia                            344

  Admiral Saumarez in the Baltic                                    346

  Understanding between Sweden, Russia, and Great Britain           347

  Affairs in the Spanish Peninsula                                  348

  Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz                                349

  Discontent and misery in France                                   350

  Russian treaties with Sweden and Turkey                           350

  Napoleon invades Russia                                           351

  Revocation of the British Orders in Council                       351

  The United States declare war against Great Britain               351

  Analysis of the British and French measures                       351


  CHAPTER XIX.

  SUMMARY.—THE FUNCTION OF SEA POWER AND THE POLICY OF GREAT
  BRITAIN IN THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS.

  Great Britain's unpreparedness for war in 1792                    358

  Spirit and aims of the French leaders                             359

  Decree of the National Convention, November 19, 1792              361

  Significance of this step                                         362

  Annexation of Belgium, and opening of the Scheldt                 362

  Interest of Great Britain in the Netherlands                      363

  British preparations for war                                      363

  Consistency of Pitt's course                                      364

  Convention's decree of December 15, 1792                          367

  Aggressive spirit of the French Revolution                        368

  Misconception of its strength by European statesmen               370

  Conservative temper of the British nation                         371

  Irrepressible conflict between the two forces                     372

  Twofold aspect of Sea Power                                       372

  Origin and character of the British Sea Power                     373

  Annihilation of French, Dutch, and Spanish navigation             375

  Consequent opportunities for neutral carriers                     376

  Restrictions imposed upon these by Great Britain                  377

  Rise of prices on the continent of Europe                         377

  Great Britain becomes the depot for supplying the Continent       378

  Direct and indirect effects upon British prosperity               380

  Strength of Great Britain dependent upon Sea Power                381

  Use of Sea Power made by the ministry                             382

  "Security" the avowed object of the war                           383

  The war, therefore, avowedly defensive                            384

  British treaty obligations to Holland                             384

  Relation of Great Britain to the general struggle                 385

  Two resources arising from Sea Power                              386

  Great land operations inexpedient for Great Britain               386

  Characteristics of the Seven Years' War                           387

  Contrasts between the elder and the younger Pitt                  387

  Pitt's war policy not simply a military question                  391

  General direction given by him to the national effort             392

  Justification of his colonial enterprises                         393

  Unprecedented naval development and commercial prosperity
  secured by him                                                    394

  Importance of these results                                       394

  Exhaustion of France caused by Pitt's measures                    395

  Bonaparte's opinion as to the influence of Sea Power              396

  Ruinous results to France of the measures to destroy British
  commerce                                                          396

  Napoleon forced to these steps by Pitt's policy                   397

  Identity of spirit in the Republic and in Napoleon                398

  France forced into the battle-field of Great Britain's choosing   400

  Strain of the Continental System upon Europe                      401

  Revolt from it of Spain and Russia                                401

  Effect of these movements                                         402

  Napoleon submits to divide his forces                             402

  General correctness of Pitt's war policy                          402

  The criticisms on the campaign of 1793 considered                 403

  Peculiar character of the Revolutionary War                       403

  Dependence of statesmen upon military advice                      404

  Peculiar merit of Pitt                                            404

  His death                                                         405

  His policy pursued by his successors                              405

  Exhaustion the only check upon a great national movement          406

  France revived by Bonaparte in 1796 and 1799                      407

  He unites the nation in a renewed forward movement                407

  Bonaparte the incarnation of the Revolution                       408

  Combination of powers in Napoleon's hands                         408

  His career dependent upon the staying power of France             408

  Effect of Great Britain upon French endurance                     409

  Function of Great Britain in the Napoleonic wars                  411

  Accuracy of Pitt's forecast                                       411

  Result postponed only by Bonaparte's genius                       411


  INDEX                                                             413

NOTE.—The references to the "Correspondance de Napoléon" are to the
quarto edition, in thirty-two volumes, published in Paris between 1858
and 1869.




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.


  VOLUME II.

  MAP AND BATTLE PLANS.

                                                                   PAGE

    I. Battle of Copenhagen                                          44

   II. Map of North Atlantic                                        117

  III. The Attack at Trafalgar                                      190




THE

INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER

UPON THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE.




CHAPTER XII.

EVENTS ON THE CONTINENT, 1798-1800.

DISORDERS OF FRANCE UNDER THE DIRECTORY.—DISASTROUS WAR OF THE SECOND
COALITION.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULATE.—BONAPARTE OVERTHROWS AUSTRIA
AND FRAMES AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN THE ARMED NEUTRALITY OF 1800.—PEACE OF
LUNÉVILLE WITH AUSTRIA.


While Bonaparte was crossing the Syrian desert and chafing over the
siege of Acre, the long gathering storm of war known as the Second
Coalition had broken upon France. It had been preceded by a premature
outburst of hostility on the part of the Two Sicilies, induced by the
excitement consequent upon the battle of the Nile and fostered by
Nelson;[1] who, however influenced, was largely responsible for the
action of the court. Despite the advice of Austria to wait, a summons
was sent to the French on the 22d of November, 1798, to evacuate
the Papal States and Malta. A Neapolitan army of fifty thousand men
marched upon Rome; and five thousand were carried by Nelson's ships to
Leghorn with the idea of harassing the confidently-expected retreat
of the enemy.[2] Leghorn was at once surrendered; but in the south
the campaign ended in utter disaster. The French general Championnet,
having but fifteen thousand men, evacuated Rome, which the Neapolitans
consequently entered without opposition; but their field operations met
with a series of humiliating reverses, due partly to bad generalship
and partly to inexperience and the lack of mutual confidence often
found among untried troops. The French re-entered Rome seventeen days
after the campaign opened; and the king of Naples, who had made a
triumphal entry into the city, hurried back to his capital, called upon
the people to rise in defence of their homes against the invaders, and
then fled with the royal family to Palermo, Nelson giving them and
the Hamiltons passage on board his flag-ship. The peasantry and the
populace flew to arms, in obedience to the king's proclamation and to
their own feelings of hatred to the republicans. Under the guidance
of the priests and monks, with hardy but undisciplined fury, they in
the field harassed the advance of the French, and in the capital rose
against the upper classes, who were suspected of secret intelligence
with the enemy. Championnet, however, continued to advance; and on
the 23d of January, 1799, Naples was stormed by his troops. After the
occupation, a series of judicious concessions to the prejudices of the
people induced their cheerful submission. The conquest was followed
by the birth to the Batavian, Helvetian, Ligurian, Cisalpine, and
Roman republics, of a little sister, named the Parthenopeian Republic,
destined to a troubled existence as short as its name was long.

The Neapolitan declaration of war caused the ruin of the Piedmontese
monarchy. The Directory, seeing that war with Austria was probable,
decided to occupy all Piedmont. The king abdicated on the 9th of
December, 1798; retiring to the island of Sardinia, which was left in
his possession. Piedmont was soon after annexed to the French Republic.

On the 20th of February, 1799, having failed to receive from the
emperor the explanations demanded concerning the entrance of the
Russian troops into his dominions, the Directory ordered its generals
to advance. Jourdan was to command in Germany, Masséna in Switzerland,
and Schérer in Italy. The armies of the republic, enfeebled by two
years of peace and by the economies of a government always embarrassed
for money and deficient in executive vigor, were everywhere inferior
to those of the enemy; and the plan of campaign, providing for several
operations out of reach of mutual support, has been regarded by
military critics as essentially vicious.

Jourdan crossed the Rhine at Strasburg on the first of March, advancing
through the Black Forest upon the head waters of the Danube. On the 6th
Masséna crossed the river above Lake Constance, and moved through the
Alps toward the Tyrol, driving the Austrians before him on his right
and centre; but on the left he entirely failed to carry the important
position of Feldkirch, upon which would depend the communication
between his left and the right of Jourdan, if the latter succeeded in
pushing on as ordered. This, however, he was unable to do. After some
severe partial encounters there was fought on March 25th, at Stokach,
near the north-west extremity of Lake Constance, a pitched battle in
which the French were defeated. Jourdan then saw that he had to do
with largely superior forces and retreated upon the Rhine, which he
recrossed above Strasburg on the 6th of April.

On the 26th of March, the day after the defeat of Jourdan at Stokach,
Schérer in Italy attacked the Austrians, who were occupying the line of
the Adige, rendered famous by Bonaparte in his great campaign of 1796.
The events of that day were upon the whole favorable to the French;
but Schérer showed irresolution and consequent delay in improving such
advantages as he had obtained. After a week of manœuvring the two
armies met in battle on the 5th of April near Magnano, and after a long
and bloody struggle the French were forced to give way. On the 6th,
the day that Jourdan retreated across the Rhine, Schérer also fell back
behind the Mincio. Not feeling secure there, although the Austrians did
not pursue, he threw garrisons into the posts on that line, and on the
12th retired behind the Adda; sending word to Macdonald, Championnet's
successor at Naples, to prepare to evacuate that kingdom and bring to
northern Italy the thirty thousand men now so sorely needed.

Jourdan having offered his resignation after the battle of Stokach,
the armies in Germany and in Switzerland were united under the command
of Masséna; whose long front, extending from the Engadine, around the
sources of the Inn, along the Rhine as low as Dusseldorf, was held by
but one hundred thousand men, of whom two-thirds were in Switzerland.
In the position which Switzerland occupies, thrust out to the eastward
from the frontiers of France, having on the one flank the fields of
Germany, on the other those of Italy, and approachable from both sides
by many passes, the difficulties of defence are great;[3] and Masséna
found himself menaced from both quarters, as well as in front, by
enemies whose aggregate force was far superior to his own. Pressed
along the line of the Rhine both above and below Lake Constance, he was
compelled to retire upon works constructed by him around Zurich; being
unable to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces, which approached
from both directions. On the 4th of June the Austrians assaulted his
lines; and, though the attack was repulsed, Masséna thought necessary
to evacuate the place forty-eight hours later, falling back upon a
position on the Albis mountains a few miles in his rear.

During the two months over which these contests between Masséna and his
enemies were spread, the affairs of the French in Italy were growing
daily more desperate. After the victory of Magnano the Austrians were
joined, on the 24th of April, by twenty thousand Russians under Marshal
Suwarrow, who became general-in-chief of the allied armies. On the 26th
Schérer turned over his command to Moreau; but, although the latter was
an officer of very great capacity, the change was too late to avoid
all the impending disasters. On the 27th the passage of the Adda was
forced by the allies, and on the 29th they entered Milan; the French
retiring upon the Ticino, breaking down the bridges over the Po, and
taking steps to secure their communications with Genoa. Pausing but a
moment, they again retreated in two columns upon Turin and Alessandria;
Moreau drawing together near the latter place the bulk of his force,
about twenty thousand men, and sending pressing invitations to
Macdonald to hasten the northward march of the army of Naples. The new
positions were taken the 7th of May, and it was not till the 5th that
the Austro-Russians, delayed by the destruction of the bridges, could
cross the Po. But the insurrection of the country in all directions was
showing how little the submission of the people and the establishment
of new republics were accompanied by any hearty fidelity to the French
cause; and on the 18th, leaving a garrison in Alessandria, Moreau
retreated upon the Apennines. On the 6th of June his troops were
distributed among the more important points on the crest of the range,
from Pontremoli, above Spezia, to Loano, and all his convoys had safely
crossed the mountains to the latter point. It was at this moment that
he had an interview with Admiral Bruix, whose fleet had anchored in
Vado Bay two days before.[4]

While events were thus passing in Upper Italy, Macdonald, in obedience
to his orders, evacuated Naples on the 7th of May, at the moment
when Moreau was taking his position on the Apennines and Bonaparte
making his last fruitless assault upon Acre. Leaving garrisons at the
principal strong places of the kingdom, he hurried north, and on the
25th entered Florence, where, though his junction with Moreau was far
from being effected, he was for the first time in sure communication
with him by courier. There were two routes that Macdonald might
take,—either by the sea-shore, which was impracticable for artillery,
or else, crossing the Apennines, he would find a better road in the
plain south of the Po, through Modena and Parma, and by it might join
the army of Italy under the walls of Tortona. The latter course was
chosen, and after a delay too much prolonged the army of Naples set
out on the 9th of June. All went well with it until the 17th, when,
having passed Modena and Parma, routing the allied detachments which he
encountered, Macdonald reached the Trebia. Here, however, he was met
by Suwarrow, and after three days' desperate fighting was forced to
retreat by the road he came, to his old positions on the other side of
the mountains. On the same day the citadel of Turin capitulated to the
allies. After pursuing Macdonald some distance, Suwarrow turned back
to meet Moreau, and compelled him also to retire to his former posts.
This disastrous attempt at a junction within the enemies' lines cost
the French fifteen thousand men. It now became necessary for the army
of Naples to get to Genoa at all costs by the Corniche road, and this
it was able to do through the inactivity of the enemy,—due, so Jomini
says, not to Suwarrow, but to the orders from Vienna. By the middle of
July both armies were united under Moreau. As a result of the necessary
abandonment of Naples by the French troops, the country fell at once
into the power of the armed peasantry, except the garrisons left in a
few strong places; and these, by the help of the British navy, were
also reduced by the 1st of August.

This striking practical illustration of the justness of Bonaparte's
views, concerning the danger incurred by the French in Upper Italy
through attempting to occupy Naples, was followed by further disasters.
On the 21st of July the citadel of Alessandria capitulated; and this
loss was followed on the 30th by that of Mantua, which had caused
Bonaparte so much delay and trouble in 1796. The latter success
was somewhat dearly bought, inasmuch as the emperor of Germany had
positively forbidden Suwarrow to make any further advance before
Mantua fell.[5] Opportunity was thus given for the junction of Moreau
and Macdonald, and for the reorganization of the latter's army, which
the affairs of the Trebia and the subsequent precipitate retreat had
left in a state of prostration and incoherence, from which it did not
recover for a month. The delay would have been still more favorable to
the French had Mantua resisted to the last moment; but it capitulated
at a time when it could still have held out for several days, and
Suwarrow was thus enabled to bring up the besieging corps to his
support, unknown to the enemy.

Meanwhile Moreau had been relieved by Joubert, one of the most
brilliant of the young generals who had fought under Bonaparte in
Italy. The newcomer, reaching his headquarters on the 2d of August,
at once determined upon the offensive, moved thereto by the wish to
relieve Mantua, and also by the difficulty of feeding his army in the
sterile mountains now that ruin had befallen the coastwise traffic of
Genoa, by which supplies had before been maintained.[6] On the 10th
of August the French advanced. On the 14th they were in position at
Novi; and there Joubert saw, but too late, that Suwarrow's army was
far larger than he had expected, and that the rumor of Mantua's fall,
which he had refused to credit, must be true. He intended to retreat;
but the Russian marshal attacked the next morning, and after a fierce
struggle, which the strength of their position enabled the French to
prolong till night, they were driven from the field with heavy loss,
four general officers and thirty-seven guns being captured. Joubert
was killed early in the day; and Moreau, who had remained to aid him
until familiar with all the details of his command, again took the
temporary direction of the army by the agreement of the other generals.
Immediately after the battle Suwarrow sent into the late Papal States
a division which, co-operating with the Neapolitan royalists and the
British navy, forced the French to evacuate the new Roman republic on
the 27th of September, 1799.

At this moment of success new dispositions were taken by the allied
governments, apparently through the initiative of Austria; which
wished, by removing Suwarrow, to keep entire control of Italy in her
own hands. This change of plan, made at so critical a moment, stopped
the hitherto triumphant progress; and, by allowing time for Bonaparte
to arrive and to act, turned victory into defeat. By it Suwarrow was to
march across the Alps into Switzerland, and there take charge of the
campaign against Masséna, having under him an army composed mainly of
Russians. The Archduke Charles, now commanding in Switzerland, was to
depart with the greater part of the Austrian contingent to the lower
Rhine, where he would by his operations support the invasion of Holland
then about to begin.

On the 13th of August,—the same day that Bruix entered Brest, carrying
with him the Spanish fleet, and two days before the battle of Novi,—the
expedition against Holland, composed of seventeen thousand Russians
and thirty thousand British troops, sailed from England. Delayed first
by light winds and then by heavy weather, the landing was not made
till the 27th of the month. On the 31st the Archduke, taking with him
thirty-six thousand Austrians, started for the lower Rhine, leaving
General Hotze and the Russian Korsakoff to make head against Masséna
until the arrival of Suwarrow. The latter, on the 11th of September,
immediately after the surrender of Tortona, began his northward march.

At the moment the Archduke assumed his new command, the French on the
lower Rhine, crossing at Mannheim, invested and bombarded Philipsburg;
and their operations seemed so far serious as to draw him and a large
part of his force in the same direction. This greatly diminished one
of the difficulties confronting Masséna in the offensive movement he
then had in contemplation. Hearing at the same time that Suwarrow had
started from Italy, he made his principal attack from his left upon
the Russians before Zurich on the 25th of September, the right wing of
his long line advancing in concert against the Austrian position east
of Lake Zurich upon its inlet, the Linth. Each effort was completely
successful, and decisive; the enemy being in both directions driven
back, and forced to recross the streams above and below the lake.
Suwarrow, after a very painful march and hard fighting, reached his
first appointed rendezvous at Mutten two days after the battle of
Zurich had been lost; and the corps that were to have met him there,
fearing their retreat would be cut off, had not awaited his arrival.
The old marshal with great difficulty fought his way through the
mountains to Ilanz, where at length he assembled his exhausted and
shattered forces on the 9th of October, the day on which Bonaparte
landed at Fréjus on his return from Egypt. By that time Switzerland
was entirely cleared of Russians and Austrians. The river Rhine, both
above and below Lake Constance, marked the dividing line between the
belligerents.

The Anglo-Russian attack upon Holland had no better fate. Landing upon
the peninsula between the Zuyder Zee and the North Sea, the allies were
for awhile successful; but their movements were cautious and slow,
giving time for the local resistance to grow and for re-enforcements to
come up. The remnants of the Dutch navy were surrendered and taken back
to England; but the Duke of York, who had chief command of the allied
troops, was compelled on the 18th of October to sign a convention, by
which the invading force was permitted to retire unmolested by the
first of December.

During the three remaining months of 1799 some further encounters took
place in Germany and Italy. In the latter the result was a succession
of disasters to the French, ending with the capitulation, on the 4th
of December, of Coni, their last remaining stronghold in Piedmont,
and the retreat of the army into the Riviera of Genoa. Corfu and the
Ionian Islands having been reduced by the combined Russian and Turkish
fleets in the previous March, and Ancona surrendered on the 10th of
November, all Bonaparte's conquests in Italy and the Adriatic had been
lost to France when the Directory fell. The brave soldiers of the army
of Italy, destitute and starving, without food, without pay, without
clothing or shoes, without even wood for camp-fires in the bitter
winter nights on the slopes of the Apennines, deserted in crowds and
made their way to the interior. In some regiments none but officers
and non-commissioned officers were left. An epidemic born of want and
exposure carried off men by hundreds. Championnet, overwhelmed by his
misfortunes and by the sight of the misery surrounding him, fell ill
and died. Bonaparte, now First Consul, sent Masséna to replace him.

In Germany nothing decisive occurred in the field; but in consequence
of some disagreements of opinion between himself and the Archduke,
Suwarrow declined further co-operation, and, alleging the absolute
need of rest for his soldiers after their frightful exposure in
Switzerland, marched them at the end of October into winter quarters
in Bavaria. This closed the share of the Russians in the second
coalition. The Czar, who had embarked in the war with the idea of
restoring the rights of monarchs and the thrones that had been
overturned, was dissatisfied both with the policy of Austria, which
looked to her own predominance in Italy, and with Great Britain.
A twelvemonth more was to see him at the head of a league of the
northern states against the maritime claims of the great Sea Power,
and completely won over to the friendship of Bonaparte by the military
genius and wily flattery of the renowned captain.

During this disastrous year, in which France lost all Italy except the
narrow strip of sea-coast about Genoa, and after months of desperate
struggle had barely held her own in Switzerland, Germany, and Holland,
the internal state of the country was deplorable. The Revolutionary
government by the Committee of Public Safety had contrived, by the
use of the extraordinary powers granted to it, to meet with greater
or less success the demands of the passing hour; although in so doing
it was continually accumulating embarrassments against a future day
of reckoning. The Directory, deprived of the extraordinary powers of
its predecessor, had succeeded to these embarrassments, and the day of
reckoning had arrived. It has been seen how the reactionary spirit,
which followed the rule of blood, had prevailed more and more until,
in 1797, the political composition of the two Councils was so affected
by it as to produce a strong conflict between them and the executive.
This dead-lock had been overcome and harmony restored by the violent
measures of September, 1797, by which two Directors and a number of
members of the legislature had been forcibly expelled from their
office. The parties, of two very different shades of opinion, to which
the ejected members belonged, had not, however, ceased to exist. In
1798, in the yearly elections to replace one-third of the legislature,
they again returned a body of representatives sufficient to put the
Councils in opposition to the Directory; but this year the choice of
the electors was baffled by a system of double returns. The sitting
Councils, of the same political party as the Directory, pronounced upon
these, taking care in so doing to insure that the majority in the new
bodies should be the same as in the old. In May, 1799, however, the
same circumstance again recurred. The fact is particularly interesting,
as showing the opposition which was felt toward the government
throughout the country.

This opposition was due to a cause which rarely fails to make
governments unpopular. The Directory had been unsuccessful. It was
called upon to pay the bills due to the public expectation of better
things when once the war was over. This it was not able to do. Though
peace had been made with the continent, there remained so many matters
of doubt and contention that large armies had to be maintained. The
expenses of the state went on, but the impoverished nation cried
out against the heavy taxation laid to meet them; the revenues
continually fell short of the expenditures, and the measures proposed
by the ministers to remedy this evil excited vehement criticisms.
The unpopularity of the government, arising from inefficient action,
reacted upon and increased the weakness which was inherent in its
cumbrous, many-headed form. Hence there resulted, from the debility of
the head, an impotence which permeated all the links of the executive
administration down to the lowest members.

In France itself the disorder and anarchy prevailing in the interior
touched the verge of social dissolution.[7] Throughout the country,
but especially in the south and west, prevailed brigandage on a large
scale—partly political, partly of the ordinary highway type. There
were constant reports of diligences and mail-wagons stopped,[8] of
public treasure plundered, of republican magistrates assassinated.
Disorganization and robbery spread throughout the army, a natural
result of small pay, irregularly received, and of the system of
contributions, administered with little responsibility by the
commanders of armies in the field. The attempt of the government to
check and control this abuse was violently resented by generals, both
of the better and the worse class; by the one as reflecting upon their
character and injuring their position, by the other as depriving them
of accustomed though unlawful gains. Two men of unblemished repute,
Joubert and Championnet, came to a direct issue with the Directory
upon this point. Joubert resigned the command of the army of Italy, in
which Bernadotte from the same motive refused to replace him; while
Championnet, in Naples, compelled the commissioner of the Directory to
leave the kingdom. For this act, however, he was deprived and brought
to a court-martial.

From the weakness pervading the administration and from the inadequate
returns of the revenue, the government was driven to extraordinary
measures and to the anticipation of its income. Greater and more
onerous taxes were laid; and, as the product of these was not
immediate, purchases had to be made at long and uncertain credit, and
consequently were exorbitant in price while deficient in quantity and
quality. From this arose much suffering among all government employés,
but especially among the soldiers, who needed the first attention, and
whose distress led them easily to side with their officers against
the administration. Contracts so made only staved off the evil day,
at the price of increasing indebtedness for the state and of growing
corruption among the contractor class and the officials dealing with
them. Embarrassment and disorder consequently increased apace without
any proportionate vigor in the external action of the government, and
the effects were distributed among and keenly felt by all individuals,
except the small number whose ability or whose corruptness enables
them to grow rich when, and as, society becomes most distressed. The
creditors of the nation, and especially the holders of bonds, could
with difficulty obtain even partial payment. In the general distrust
and perplexity individuals and communities took to hoarding both money
and food, moved by the dangers of transit and by fear of the scarcity
which they saw to be impending. This stagnation of internal circulation
was accompanied by the entire destruction of maritime commerce, due to
the pressure of the British navy and to the insane decree of Nivôse 29
(January 19, 1798).[9] Both concurred to paralyze the energies of the
people, to foster indolence and penury, and by sheer want to induce a
state of violence with which the executive was unable to cope.

When to this internal distress were added the military disasters just
related, the outcry became loud and universal. All parties united
against the Directors, who did not dare in 1799 to repeat the methods
by which in the two previous years a majority had been obtained in the
legislature. On the 18th of June the new Councils were able to force
a change in the composition of the Directory, further enfeebling it
through the personal weakness of the new members. These hastened to
reverse many of the measures of their predecessors, but no change of
policy could restore the lost prestige. The effect of these steps was
only further to depress that branch of the government which, in so
critical a moment and in so disordered a society, should overbear all
others and save the state—not by discussion, but by action.

Such was the condition of affairs found by Bonaparte when he returned
from Egypt. The revolution of Brumaire 18 (November 9, 1799) threw
into his hands uncontrolled power. This he proceeded at once to use
with the sagacity and vigor that rarely failed him in his early
prime. The administration of the country was reconstituted on lines
which sacrificed local independence, but invigorated the grasp of
the central executive, and made its will felt in every corner of the
land. Vexatious measures of the preceding government were repealed,
and for them was substituted a policy of liberal conciliation,
intended to rally all classes of Frenchmen to the support of the new
rule. In the West and North, in La Vendée, Brittany, and Normandy,
the insurrection once suppressed by Hoche had again raised its head
against the Directory. To the insurgents Bonaparte offered reasonable
inducements to submission, while asserting his firm determination
to restore authority at any cost; and the rapid gathering of sixty
thousand troops in the rebellious districts proved his resolution to
use for that purpose a force so overwhelming, that the completion of
its task would release it by the return of spring, to take the field
against external foes. Before the end of February the risings were
suppressed, and this time forever. Immediate steps were taken to put
the finances on a sounder basis, and to repair the military disasters
of the last twelvemonth. To the two principal armies, of the Rhine and
of Italy, were sent respectively Moreau and Masséna, the two greatest
generals of the republic after Bonaparte himself; and money advanced by
Parisian bankers was forwarded to relieve the more pressing wants of
the destitute soldiery.

At the same time that these means were used to recover France herself
from the condition of debility into which she had fallen, the first
consul made a move calculated either to gain for her the time she yet
needed, or, in case it failed, to rally to his support all classes in
the state. Departing from the usual diplomatic routine, he addressed
a personal letter to the king of Great Britain and to the emperor
of Germany, deploring the existing war, and expressing a wish that
negotiations for peace might be opened. The reply from both sovereigns
came through the ordinary channels of their respective ministries.
Austria said civilly that she could not negotiate apart from her
allies; and furthermore, that the war being only to preserve Europe
from universal disorder, due to the unstable and aggressive character
of the French governments since the Revolution, no stable peace could
be made until there was some guarantee for a change of policy. This
she could not yet recognize in the new administration, which owed its
existence only to the violent overthrow of its predecessor. Great
Britain took substantially the same ground. Peace was worse than
worthless, if insecure; and experience had shown that no defence except
that of steady and open hostility was availing, while the system which
had prevailed in France remained the same. She could not recognize a
change of system in the mere violent substitution of one set of rulers
for another. Disavowing any claim to prescribe to France what should
be her form of government, the British ministry nevertheless said
distinctly that the best guarantee for a permanent change of policy
would be the restoration of the Bourbons. This seemingly impolitic
suggestion insured—what was very possibly its object—the continuance of
the war until were realized the advantages that seemed about to accrue.
Not only were the conditions at that time overwhelmingly in favor of
the allies, but there was also every probability of the reduction of
Egypt and Malta, and of further decisive successes in Italy. These,
if obtained, would be so many cards strengthening their hands in the
diplomatic game to be played in the negotiations for peace. Believing,
as the British ministry of that day assuredly did, that a secure peace
could only be based on the exhaustion, and not upon the moderation or
good faith, of their enemy, it would have been the height of folly to
concede time, or submit to that vacillation of purpose and relaxation
of tension which their own people would certainly feel, if negotiations
were opened.

Nor were these military and moral considerations the only ones
affecting the decision of the government. Despite the immense burdens
imposed by the war to support her own military expenditures and
furnish the profuse subsidies paid to her allies, the power of the
country to bear them was greatly increased. Thanks to the watery
rampart which secured peace within her borders, Great Britain had now
become the manufactory and warehouse of Europe. The commercial and
maritime prostration of Holland and France, her two great rivals in
trade and manufactures, had thrown into her hands these sources of
their prosperity; and she, through the prodigious advances of the ten
years' peace, was fully ready to profit by them. By the capture of
their foreign possessions and the ruin of the splendid French colony
in Haïti, she now controlled the chief regions whence were drawn the
tropical products indispensable to Europeans. She monopolized their
markets as well as the distribution of their produce. Jealously
reserving to British merchant shipping the trade of her own and
conquered colonies, she yet met the immense drain made by the navy
upon her merchant seamen by relaxing the famous Navigation Laws;
permitting her ships to be manned by foreigners, and foreign ships to
engage in branches of her commerce closed to them in time of peace.
But while thus encouraging neutrals to carry the surplus trade, whose
rapid growth was outstripping the capacity of her own shipping, she
rigorously denied their right to do as much for her enemies. These
severe restrictions, which her uncontrolled sea-power enabled her
to maintain, were re-enforced by suicidal edicts of the French
government, retaliating upon the same unhappy neutrals the injury their
weakness compelled them to accept from the mistress of the seas,—thus
driving them from French shores, and losing a concurrence essential
to French export and import. In this time of open war no flag was so
safe from annoyance as the British, for none other was protected by a
powerful navy. Neutrals sought its convoy against French depredations,
and the navigation of the world was now swayed by this one great power,
whom its necessities had not yet provoked to lay a yoke heavier than
the oppressed could bear.

To this control of the carrying trade, and of so much of the
agricultural production of the globe, was added a growing absorption
of the manufactures of Europe, due to the long war paralyzing the
peaceful energies of the continental peoples. In the great system of
circulation and exchange, everything thus tended more and more to Great
Britain; which was indicated as the natural centre for accumulation
and distribution by its security, its accessibility, and its nearness
to the continent on which were massed the largest body of consumers
open to maritime commerce. Becoming thus the chief medium through
which the business of the civilized world was carried on and its wants
supplied, her capital grew apace; and was steadily applied, by the able
hands in which it accumulated, to develop, by increased production and
increased facilities of carriage, the powers of the country to supply
demands that were continually increasing on both sides of the Atlantic.
The foreign trade, export and import, which in 1792, the last year of
peace, had amounted to £44,500,000, rose in 1797 to £50,000,000, and
in 1800 to £73,700,000. Encouraged by these evident proofs of growing
wealth, the ministry was able so to increase the revenue that its
receipts, independent of extraordinary war taxes, far exceeded anything
it had ever been before, "or," to use Pitt's words, "anything which
the most sanguine hopes could have anticipated. If," he continued,
"we compare this year of war with former years of peace, we shall in
the produce of our revenue and in the extent of our commerce behold a
spectacle at once paradoxical, inexplicable, and astonishing. We have
increased our external and internal commerce to a greater pitch than
ever it was before; and we may look to the present as the proudest year
that has ever occurred for this country."[10]

With such resources to sustain the armies of their allies, and certain
of keeping a control of the sea unparalleled even in the history of
Great Britain, the ministry looked hopefully forward to a year which
should renew and complete the successes of 1799. They reckoned without
Bonaparte, as Bonaparte in his turn reckoned again and again without
Nelson.

Russia took no more part in the coalition; but the forces of Germany,
under the control of Austria and subsidized by Great Britain, either
actually in the field or holding the fortified posts on which the
operations depended, amounted to something over two hundred and fifty
thousand men. Of these, one hundred and twenty-five thousand under
Mélas were in Italy. The remainder under General Kray were in Germany,
occupying the angle formed by the Rhine at Bâle, where, after flowing
west from Lake Constance, it turns abruptly north for the remainder
of its course. The plan of campaign was to stand on the defensive in
Germany, holding in check the enemies there opposed to them, and in
Italy to assume a vigorous offensive, so as to drive the French finally
out of the country. That achieved, the idea was entertained of entering
France at the extreme south, and possibly investing Toulon, supported
by the British navy.

When Bonaparte first took charge, there remained to France only two
hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, of whom at the opening of the
campaign of 1800 there were in the field, opposed to the Austrians, but
one hundred and sixty-five thousand. One hundred thousand conscripts
were called for; but time would be needed to turn these into soldiers,
even with the advantage of the nucleus of veterans around whom they
would be gathered. The equipment and provisioning both of the old and
new levies also required time and effort. Bonaparte's project was to
assume the offensive in Germany, turning there the position of the
Austrians, and driving them northward from the Rhine towards the head
waters of the Danube. For this great operation the army under Moreau
was raised to an equality with the enemy opposed to him. Masséna in
Italy was directed to stand solely on the defensive, concentrating
around Genoa the bulk of the thirty-five or forty thousand men which
alone he had. While he held this position in such force, the Austrians
could scarcely advance into France along the narrow coast road, leaving
him in the rear. When the expected success in Germany was won, there
was to be detached from that army, which should then assume an attitude
of observation, a corps twenty thousand strong. This should cross
Switzerland, entering Italy by the St. Gothard Pass, and there joining
a force of forty thousand to be led by the First Consul in person
through the Pass of St. Bernard. This mass of sixty thousand men was to
throw itself in rear of the Austrians, forcing them to fight for their
communications through Lombardy, and hoping under the first general of
the age to win, over a less skilful opponent, such victories as had
illustrated the famous campaigns of 1796 and 1797.

Bonaparte's plan thus hinged upon the French occupation of Switzerland,
which, intervening as a great rampart between the Austrians in Germany
and Italy, permitted him to cover the movements against the former by
the curtain of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Bâle, and to use
safely and secretly the passes leading into the plains of Lombardy
and Piedmont. To this advantage of position he conjoined, with
inconceivable wiliness, an absolute secrecy as to the very existence
of the forty thousand, known as the Army of Reserve, which he himself
was to lead. The orders constituting this force were given the utmost
publicity. Its headquarters were established at Dijon, and one of
Bonaparte's most trusted subordinates was sent to command it. An appeal
was made to discharged soldiers to join its ranks; some material of
war and some conscripts, with a corps of officers, were assembled.
There preparations stopped—or went on so feebly in comparison with the
glowing boasts of the French journals, that hostile spies were entirely
deceived. The Army of Reserve became the joke of Europe, while the
scattered detachments that were to compose it were assembling at points
separated, yet chosen with Bonaparte's consummate skill to permit
rapid concentration when the hour came. To insure perfect secrecy,
the correspondence of these different bodies was with him alone, not
through the Ministry of War.

The campaign was opened by the Austrians in Italy. Mélas, with seventy
thousand men, attacked Masséna along the chain of the Apennines.
Difficulties of subsistence had forced the latter to disseminate his
troops between Genoa and Nice. Through this necessarily thin line
the Austrians broke on the 5th of April, and after several days of
strenuous resistance, furthered by the facilities for defence offered
by that mountainous region, Masséna was driven into Genoa. The left
wing of his army under Suchet was forced back toward Nice, where it
took position on the Var. On the 18th of April Masséna was definitively
shut up in Genoa with eighteen thousand men, and so short of provisions
that it became a matter of the utmost urgency to relieve him.

On April 25 Moreau began his movements, of a somewhat complicated
character, but resulting in his whole army being safely across the
Rhine on the first of May. Eighty thousand French troops were then
drawn up between Bâle and Lake Constance in an east and west direction,
threatening the left flank of the enemy, whose front was north and
south, and in position to attack both their line of retreat and the
immense depots whose protection embarrassed all the movements of
the Austrians. On the 3d of May the latter were defeated at Engen,
and their depot at Stokach was captured. On the 5th they were again
beaten at Moesskirch, and on the 9th at Biberach, losing other
large deposits of stores. General Kray then retired upon Ulm on the
Danube, and the first act of Bonaparte's design was accomplished.
It had not corresponded with the lines laid down by him, which were
too adventurous to suit Moreau, nor was the result equal to his
expectations; but the general strategic outcome was to check for the
time any movements of the enemy in Germany, and enable Moreau to send
the force needed to co-operate with Bonaparte in Italy. This started
on the 13th of May, and was joined on the way by some detachments in
Switzerland; the whole amounting to between fifteen and twenty thousand
men.[11]

On the 6th of May the first consul left Paris, having delayed to
the last moment in order to keep up the illusions of the Austrian
commander-in-chief in Italy. The crossing of the St. Bernard began
on the 15th, and on the 20th the whole army had passed. On the 26th
it issued in the plains of Piedmont; whence Bonaparte turned to the
eastward, to insure his great object of throwing his force across the
enemy's communications and taking from him all hope of regaining them
without a battle. On the first of June he entered Milan.

Meanwhile Masséna's army, a prey to horrible famine, prolonged in Genoa
a resistance which greatly contributed to the false position of the
Austrians. Of these, twenty-five thousand were before Nice, thirty
thousand before Genoa. Twenty thousand more had been lost by casualties
since the campaign opened. Unwilling to relinquish his gains, Mélas
waited too long to concentrate his scattered troops; and when at
last he sent the necessary orders, Masséna was treating to evacuate
Genoa. The Austrian officer on the spot, unwilling to lose the prize,
postponed compliance until it was secured,—a delay fraught with serious
results. On the 5th Genoa was given up, and the besiegers, leaving a
garrison in the place, marched to join the commander-in-chief, who
was gathering his forces around Alessandria. Meanwhile Bonaparte had
crossed to the south side of the Po with half his army. On the 14th
of June was fought the battle of Marengo. Anxious lest the foe might
give him the slip, the first consul had spread his troops too widely;
and the first events of the day were so far in favor of the Austrians
that Mélas, who was seventy-six years old, left the field at two in
the afternoon, certain of victory, to seek repose. An hour later the
opportune arrival of General Desaix turned the scales, and Bonaparte
remained conqueror on the ground, standing across the enemy's line
of retreat. The following day Mélas signed a convention abandoning
all northern Italy, as far as the Mincio, behind which the Austrians
were to withdraw. All the fortified places were given up to France,
including the hardly won Genoa. While awaiting the Emperor's answer
to propositions of peace, sent by the First Consul, there was to be
in Italy a suspension of arms, during which neither army should send
detachments to Germany. On the 2d of July Bonaparte re-entered Paris in
triumph, after an absence of less than two months.

Meantime Moreau, after learning the successful crossing of the St.
Bernard, had resumed the offensive. Moving to the eastward, he crossed
the Danube below Ulm with part of his force on the 19th of June,
threatening Kray's communications with Bohemia. A partial encounter on
that day left five thousand prisoners in the hands of the French, who
maintained the position they had gained. The same night Kray evacuated
Ulm, moving rapidly off by a road to the northward and so effecting
his escape. Moreau, unable to intercept, followed for some distance
and then stopped a pursuit which promised small results. He was still
ignorant of the battle of Marengo, of which the Austrians now had news;
and the latter, while concealing the victory, announced to him the
suspension of arms, and suggested a similar arrangement in Germany.
Convinced that events favorable to France lay behind this proposition,
Moreau would come to no agreement; but on the contrary decided at once
to secure for his victorious army the most advantageous conditions
with which to enter upon negotiations. Closely investing the important
fortresses of Ulm and Ingolstadt on the Danube, with part of his force,
he recrossed the river with the remainder and advanced into Bavaria. On
the 28th of June he entered Munich; and near there was signed on the
15th of July an armistice, closely corresponding with that concluded
by Bonaparte in Italy just one month before. The two belligerents
retired behind appointed lines, not again to engage in hostilities
without twelve days' notice. During this suspension of arms the
blockaded Austrian fortresses should receive every fortnight provisions
proportioned to their consumption, so that in case of renewed
operations they would be in the same condition as when the truce began.
The two great French armies were now encamped in the fertile plains of
Italy and Germany, living in quiet off districts external to France,
which was thus relieved of the larger part of their expense.

The effect of this short and brilliant campaign of unbroken French
successes was to dispose to peace both members of the coalition.
Neither, however, was yet reduced to negotiate apart from its ally. On
the very day the news of Marengo was received at Vienna, but before
the last reverses in Germany, Austria had renewed her engagements with
Great Britain, both powers stipulating not to treat singly. The first
consul, on the other hand, was distinctly opposed to joint discussions,
his constant policy in the cabinet as in the field being to separate
his opponents. As Austria's great need was to gain time, she sent to
Paris an envoy empowered to exchange views with the French government
but to conclude nothing. The emperor also intimated his wish for a
general pacification, and on the 9th of August the British minister at
Vienna notified to that court the willingness of his own to enter into
negotiations for a general peace.

With this began an encounter of wits, in which Bonaparte showed himself
as astute at a bargain as he was wily in the field. Austria, if not
given too much time, was at his mercy; but Great Britain held over him
a like advantage in her control of the sea, which was strangling the
colonial empire he passionately wished to restore. Haïti had escaped
from all but nominal control; Martinique, the gem of the Antilles, was
in British hands; Malta and Egypt, the trophies of his own enterprise,
were slowly but surely expiring. For these he too needed time; for
with it there was good prospect of soon playing a card which should
reverse, or at least seriously modify, the state of the game, by
bringing Russia and the Baltic navies into the combination against
Great Britain. In this support, and in the extremity to which he might
reduce Austria, lay his only chances to check the great opponent of
France; for, while almost supreme on the Continent, he could not from
the coast project his power beyond the range of a cannon's ball. His
correspondence throughout this period abounds with instructions and
exhortations to fit out the fleets, to take the sea, to relieve Malta
and Egypt, to seize Sardinia by an expedition from Corsica, and Mahon
by a squadron from Brest. All fell fruitless before the exhaustion of
French sea power, as did also his plan for an extensive cruise on a
grand scale against British commerce in many quarters of the world.
"I see with regret," wrote he to the minister of Marine, "that the
armament of the fleet has been sacrificed to that of a great number of
small vessels;" but in truth there was nothing else to do. His ablest
admirals failed to equip ships from which every resource was cut off by
the omnipresent cruisers of the enemy. "We can never take Mahon," he
writes to the court of Spain, in the full swing of his triumphs after
Marengo; "therefore make war on Portugal and take her provinces, so as
to enter negotiations for peace with your hands as full as possible of
equivalents."

The Czar Paul had joined the second coalition full of ardor against the
French revolution and determined to restore the princes who had lost
their thrones. He had been bitterly mortified by the reverses to his
troops in 1799, and especially by the disaster to Suwarrow, for which
he not unjustly blamed Austria. He was also dissatisfied to find in his
allies less of zeal for unfortunate sovereigns than of desire to reduce
the power of France, to whose system they attributed the misfortunes of
Europe. Disappointment in his unbalanced mind turned soon to coolness
and was rapidly passing to hostility. The transition was assisted, and
a pretext for a breach with Great Britain afforded, by a fresh outbreak
of the old dispute between her and the Baltic powers concerning the
rights of neutrals. Denmark in 1799 adopted the policy of convoying her
merchant vessels by ships of war, and claimed that a statement from the
senior naval officer, that the cargoes contained nothing forbidden by
the law of nations, exempted the convoy from the belligerent right of
search. British statesmen denied that this conceded belligerent right
could be nullified by any rule adopted by a neutral; to which they were
the more impelled as the Danes and themselves differed radically in the
definition of contraband. Danish naval officers being instructed to
resist the search of their convoys, two hostile encounters took place;
one in December, 1799, and the other in July, 1800. In the latter
several were killed on both sides, and the Danish frigate was carried
into the Downs. Seeing the threatening character of affairs, the
British ministry took immediate steps to bring them to an issue. An
ambassador was sent to Copenhagen supported by nine ships-of-the-line
and several bomb-vessels; and on the 29th of August, barely a month
after the affray, a convention was signed by which the general subject
of searching ships under convoy was referred to future discussion, but
Denmark consented to suspend her convoys until a definitive treaty was
made. The Danish frigate was at once released.

It will be observed that this collision occurred in the very midst of
the negotiations between Austria and France, to which Great Britain
claimed the right to be a party. The whole vexed question of neutral
and belligerent rights was thus violently raised, at a moment most
inauspicious to the allies and most favorable to Bonaparte. The latter,
crowned with victory upon the Continent, found every neutral commercial
state disposed to side with him in contesting positions considered by
Great Britain to be vital to her safety. It was for him to foster this
disposition and combine the separate powers into one great effort,
before which the Mistress of the Seas should be compelled to recede
and submit. The occasion here arose, as it were spontaneously, to
realize what became the great dream of his life and ultimately led him
to his ruin,—to unite the Continent against the British Islands and,
as he phrased it, "to conquer the sea by the land." Circumstances,
partly anterior to his rise to power, and partly contrived by his
sagacious policy during the previous few months, particularly favored
at this moment such a league, for which the affair of the Danish
convoy supplied an impulse, and the prostration of Great Britain's
ally, Austria, an opportunity. Bonaparte underestimated the vitality
and influence of a state upon which centred a far-reaching commercial
system, and in valuing naval power he did not appreciate that a mere
mass of ships had not the weight he himself was able to impart to a
mass of men. He never fully understood the maritime problems with
which from time to time he had to deal; but he showed wonderful skill
at this critical period in combining against his principal enemy an
opposition, for which Prussia afforded the body and the hot temper of
the Czar the animating soul.

Since 1795 Prussia had shut herself up to a rigorous neutrality, in
which were embraced the North German states. Under this system, during
the maritime war, the commerce of the larger part of the Continent
poured in through these states—by the great German rivers, the Ems, the
Weser, and the Elbe—and through the cities of Hamburg and Bremen. The
tonnage clearing from Great Britain alone to North Germany increased
from 120,000 in 1792 to 389,000 in 1800; a traffic of which Prussia
took the lion's share. To these advantages of neutral territory it
was desirable to join the utmost freedom for neutral navigation. Upon
this Great Britain bore heavily; but so large a proportion of the
trade was done through her, and the sea was so entirely under the
power of her navy, that prudence had so far dictated acquiescence in
her claims, even when not admitted. This was particularly the case
while Russia, under Catherine II., and in the first years of her son,
tacitly or openly supported Great Britain; and while Austria, though
badly beaten in the field, remained unshaken in power. The weaker
maritime countries, Sweden, Denmark, and the United States of America,
were determined by similar motives. They groaned under the British
exactions; but the expansion of their commerce outweighed the injuries
received, and submission was less hurtful than resistance in arms.
Russia herself, though not strictly a maritime state, was a large
producer of articles which were mainly carried by British ships and
for which England was the chief customer. The material interests of
Russia, and especially of the powerful nobles, were therefore bound up
with peace with Great Britain; but an absolute monarch could disregard
this fact, at least for a time. The furious, impulsive temper of
Paul I., if aroused, was quite capable of overleaping all prudential
considerations, of using the colossal power of his empire to support
the other states, and even of compelling them to act in concert with
him.

Such were the discordant elements which Bonaparte had to reconcile
into a common effort: on the one hand, the strong though short-sighted
mercantile interests, which to retain great present advantages would
favor submission rather than resistance to the exactions of Great
Britain. These were represented by the development of carrying trade
in the neutral Baltic states, by the enlarged commerce of Prussia and
North Germany,—which through their neutrality in a maritime war had
become the highway of intercourse between the Continent and the outer
world,—and by the productions of Russia, which formed the revenue of
her great proprietors, and found their way to market wholly by sea.
Bound together by the close relations which commerce breeds between
states, and by the dependence of each upon the capital and mercantile
system of Great Britain, these interests constituted the prosperity
of nations, and could by no rulers be lightly disregarded. On the
other hand stood the dignity of neutral flags and their permanent
interests,—always contrary to those of belligerents,—the ambition
of Prussia and her jealousy of Austria, and finally the chivalrous,
reckless, half insane Paul I., seeking now with all the bitterness of
personal feeling to gratify his resentment against his late allies.

Bonaparte had already begun to work upon the Czar as well as upon the
neutral powers. Closely observing the political horizon from his first
accession to office, he had noted every condition capable of raising
embarrassments to Great Britain, whom his unerring military insight
had long before recognized[12] as the key to a military situation, in
which his own object was the predominance of France, not only on the
Continent but throughout the world. Sagacious a statesman as he was,
and clearly as he recognized the power of moral and political motives,
his ideal of control was essentially forcible, based upon superior
armies and superior fleets; and consequently every political problem
was by him viewed much as a campaign, in which forces were to be moved,
combined, and finally massed upon the vital points of an enemy's
position. The power of Great Britain was sea power in its widest sense,
commercial and naval; against it, therefore, he aimed to effect such a
combination as would both destroy her commerce and cripple her navy.
The impotence of France and Spain, united, to injure the one or the
other had been clearly shown by repeated defeats, and by the failure
of the commerce-destroying so industriously carried on during seven
years of war. Far from decaying or languishing, the commerce of Great
Britain throve everywhere with redoubled vigor, and her fleets rode
triumphant in all seas. There was, however, one quarter in which she
had not hitherto been disturbed, except by the quickly extinguished
efforts of the Dutch navy; and just there, in the Baltic and North Sea,
was the point where, next to the British islands and seas themselves,
she was most vulnerable. There was concentrated a great part of her
shipping; there was the market for the colonial produce stored in her
overflowing warehouses; there also were gathered three navies, whose
united masses—manned by hardy seamen trained in a boisterous navigation
and sheltered in an enclosed sea of perilous access—might overweight a
force already strained to control the Mediterranean, to blockade the
hostile arsenals, and to protect the merchant shipping which thronged
over every ocean highway.

To close the north of Europe to British trade, and to combine the
Baltic navies against that of Great Britain, became thenceforth the
fixed ideas of Bonaparte's life. To conciliate Denmark he released a
number of Danish ships, which had been arrested by the Directory for
submitting to search by British cruisers. The extent of the czar's
alienation from his former allies not being at first apparent, he next
courted Prussia, the head of the North German neutrality, in whose
power it was to arrest British trade both through her own territory
and through Hamburg. Prussia was ambitious to play a leading part in
Europe. The five years spent by Austria, France, and Great Britain in
exhausting warfare, she had used to consolidate her power and husband
her resources. She wished now to pose as a mediator, and looked for
the time when the prostration of the combatants and her own restored
strength would cause them to bend to her influence, and yield her
points, through the simple exhibition of her force. The advances and
flatteries of the first consul were graciously received, but the path
Prussia had traced for herself was to involve no risks—only gains;
she wished much, but would venture naught. It was a dangerous part to
play, this waiting on opportunity, against such a man as swayed the
destinies of the Continent during the next twelve years. From it arose
a hesitating, selfish, and timid policy, fluctuating with every breath
of danger or hope of advantage, dishonoring the national name, until it
ended in Jena and the agonies of humiliation through which the country
passed between that disaster and the overthrow of Napoleon. Such a
spirit is prone to side with a strong combination and to yield to a
masterful external impulse.

Under this Bonaparte next sought to bring her. "We shall make nothing
out of Prussia," he writes to Talleyrand on the first of June, 1800, on
his way to Marengo; and he adds, "If the news from Egypt [apparently
the defeat of the Turks by Kleber] is confirmed, it will become
important to have some one in Russia. The Ottoman Empire cannot exist
much longer, and if Paul I. turns his looks in that direction our
interests become common."[13] Bonaparte was at no pains to reconcile
this view with an assurance made a month later to Turkey that "no
anxiety need be felt about Egypt, which will be restored as soon as the
Porte shall resume its former relations with France."[14] On the 4th
of June he recommends general and flattering overtures to the czar,
accompanied by special marks of consideration. The latter was fully
prepared to be won by compliments from the man for whose military
glory he had come to feel a profound enthusiasm. On the 4th of July
Bonaparte's general advances took form in a definite proposal to
surrender to Russian troops Malta, whose speedy loss by himself he saw
to be inevitable; an offer calculated not only to charm the Czar, who
delighted to fancy himself the head and protector of an ancient order
of knights, but also to sow discord between him and Great Britain, if,
as was probable, the latter declined to yield her prey to a friend
who at a critical moment had forsaken her. The letter sketched by the
first consul was carefully worded to quicken the ready vanity of its
recipient. "Desiring to give a proof of personal consideration to the
emperor of Russia and to distinguish him from the other enemies of
the republic, who fight from a vile love of gain, the first consul
wishes, if the garrison of Malta is constrained by famine to evacuate
the place, to restore it to the hands of the czar as grand master of
the order; and although the first consul is certain that Malta has
provisions for several months,[15] he wishes his Majesty to inform him
what conventions he would wish to make, and what measures to take, so
that, if the case arise, his troops may enter that place."[16] This was
shortly followed by the release of the Russian prisoners in France,
in number between seven and eight thousand, whom Bonaparte clad and
dismissed with their colors and their officers to return into Russia;
suggesting that, if the czar thought proper, he "might demand of the
English to release an equal number of French prisoners; but if not, the
first consul hoped he would accept his troops as an especial mark of
the esteem felt for the brave Russian armies."[17]

Immediately after these transactions occurred the collision between
British and Danish cruisers in the Channel, and the entrance of
the Baltic by the British fleet, to support its ambassador in his
negotiation with Denmark. Paul I. made of the latter a pretext for
sequestrating all British property in Russia, to be held as a guarantee
against the future action of Great Britain. This order, dated August
29, 1800, was followed by another of September 10, announcing that
"several political circumstances induced the emperor to think that
a rupture of friendship with England may ensue," and directing a
concentration of Russian troops. The cloud blew over for a moment,
the sequestration being removed on the 22d of September; but the fall
of Malta, which had surrendered on the 5th of the same month, brought
matters to an issue. The czar had gladly accepted Bonaparte's adroit
advances and designated a general to go to Paris, take command of the
released prisoners and with them repair to Malta. The capitulation
became known to him early in November; before which he had formally
published his intention to revive the Armed Neutrality of 1780 against
the maritime claims of Great Britain. It being very doubtful whether
the latter would deliver the island after his unfriendly measures,
a sequestration of British property was again decreed. Some three
hundred ships were seized, their crews marched into the interior,
and seals placed on all warehouses containing British property; the
czar declaring that the embargo should not be removed until the
acknowledgment of his rights to Malta, as grand master of the Order.
The sequestrated property was to be held by an imperial commission and
applied to pay debts due to Russian subjects by private Englishmen.

Affairs had now reached a stage where Prussia felt encouraged to move.
The breach between Great Britain and Russia had opened wide, while the
relations of the czar and first consul had become so friendly as to
assure their concert. The armistice between Austria and France still
continued, pending the decision whether the latter would negotiate with
the emperor and Great Britain conjointly; but Bonaparte was a close as
well as a hard bargainer. He would not admit the joint negotiation,
nor postpone the renewal of hostilities beyond the 11th of September,
except on condition of a maritime truce as favorable to France as he
considered the land armistice to be to Austria. He proposed entire
freedom of navigation to merchant vessels, the raising of the blockades
of Brest, Cadiz, Toulon, and Flushing, and that Malta and Alexandria
should be freely open to receive provisions by French or neutral
vessels. The effect would be to allow the French dockyards to obtain
naval stores, of which they were utterly destitute, and Malta and
Egypt to receive undefined quantities of supplies and so prolong their
resistance indefinitely. Great Britain was only willing to adopt for
Egypt and Malta the literal terms of the armistice applied to the three
Austrian fortresses blockaded by French troops. These were to receive
every fortnight provisions proportioned to their consumption, and the
British ministry offered to allow the same to Malta and Egypt. They
also conceded free navigation, except in the articles of military and
naval stores. Bonaparte refused. Austria's advantage in the armistice,
he said, was not the mere retention of the fortresses, but the use
she was making of her respite. Between these two extreme views no
middle term could be found. In fact, great as were the results of
Marengo, and of Moreau's more methodical advance into Germany, the
material advantage of Great Britain over France still far exceeded
that of France over Austria. The French had gained great successes,
but they were now forcing the enemy back upon the centre of his power
and they had not possession of his communications; whereas Great
Britain had shut off, not merely Egypt and Malta, but France herself
from all fruitful intercourse with the outer world. The negotiation
for a maritime truce was broken off on the 9th of October. Meanwhile
Bonaparte, declining to await its issue, had given notice that
hostilities would be resumed between the 5th and 10th of September;
and Austria, not yet ready, was fain to purchase a further delay by
surrendering the blockaded places, Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg.
A convention to this effect was concluded, and the renewal of the war
postponed for forty-five days dating from September 21st.

In such conditions Prussia saw one of those opportunities which, under
Bonaparte's manipulation, so often misled her. The prostration of her
German rival would be hastened, and the support of the first consul in
the approaching apportionment of indemnities to German states secured,
by joining the concert of the Baltic powers against Great Britain.
Without this accession to the northern league the quarrel would be
mainly naval, and its issue, before the disciplined valor of British
seamen, scarcely doubtful. Prussia alone was so situated as to deal the
direct and heavy blow at British commerce of closing its accustomed
access to the Continent; and the injury thus inflicted so far exceeded
any she herself could incidentally receive, as to make this course less
hazardous than that of offending the czar and the French government.
The political connection of Hanover with Great Britain was a further
motive, giving Prussia the hope, so often dangled before her eyes by
Bonaparte, of permanently annexing the German dominions of the British
king. An occasion soon arose for showing her bias. In the latter part
of October a British cruiser seized a Prussian merchantman trying to
enter the Texel with a cargo of naval stores. The captor, through
stress of weather, took his prize into Cuxhaven, a port at the mouth
of the Elbe belonging to Hamburg, through which passed much of the
British commerce with the Continent. Prussia demanded its release of
the Hamburg senate, and upon refusal ordered two thousand troops to
take possession of the port. The senate then bought the prize and
delivered it to Prussia, and the British government also directed its
restoration; a step of pure policy with which Fox taunted the ministry.
It was, as he truly remarked, a concession of principle, dictated
by the fact that Prussia, while capable of doing much harm to Great
Britain, could not be reached by the British navy.

Whether it was wise to waive a point, in order to withhold an important
member from the formidable combination of the North, may be argued; but
the attempt met the usual fate of concessions attributed to weakness.
The remonstrances of the British ambassador received the reply that
the occupation, having been ordered, must be carried out; that the
neutrality of Cuxhaven "being thus placed under the guarantee of the
king will be more effectually out of the reach of all violation." Such
reasoning indicated beyond doubt the stand Prussia was about to take;
and her influence fixed the course of Denmark, which is said to have
been averse from a step that threatened to stop her trade and would
probably make her the first victim of Great Britain's resentment. On
the 16th of December a treaty renewing the Armed Neutrality of 1780
was signed at St. Petersburg by Russia and Sweden, and received the
prompt adherence of Denmark and Prussia. Its leading affirmations were
that neutral ships were free to carry on the coasting and colonial
trade of states at war, that enemy's goods under the neutral flag
were not subject to seizure, and that blockades, to be respected, must
be supported by such a force of ships before the port as to make the
attempt to enter hazardous. A definition of contraband was adopted
excluding naval stores from that title; and the claim was affirmed
that vessels under convoy of a ship of war were not liable to the
belligerent right of search. Each of these assertions contested one
of the maritime claims upon which Great Britain conceived her naval
power, and consequently her place among the nations, to depend; but
the consenting states bound themselves to maintain their positions by
force, if necessary.

Thus was successfully formed the combination of the Northern powers
against Great Britain, the first and most willing of those effected by
Bonaparte. By a singular coincidence, which recalls the opportuneness
of his departure from England in 1798 to check the yet undivined
expedition against Egypt,[18] Nelson, the man destined also to
strike this coalition to the ground, was during its formation slowly
journeying from the Mediterranean, with which his name and his glory
both before and after are most closely associated, to the North Sea;
as though again drawn by some mysterious influence, to be at hand for
unknown services which he alone could render. On the 11th of July,
a week after Bonaparte made his first offer of Malta to the czar,
Nelson left Leghorn for Trieste and Vienna. He passed through Hamburg
at the very time that the affair of the Prussian prize was under
discussion, and landed in England on the 6th of November. Finding his
health entirely restored by the land journey, he applied for immediate
service, and was assigned to command a division of the Channel fleet
under Lord St. Vincent; but he did not go afloat until the 17th of
January, 1801, when his flag was hoisted on board the "San Josef,"
the three-decker he had captured at the battle of Cape St. Vincent.
Meanwhile, however, it had been settled between the Admiralty and
himself that if a fleet were sent into the Baltic, he should go as
second in command to Sir Hyde Parker; and when in the very act of
reporting to St. Vincent, the day before he joined the San Josef, a
letter arrived from Parker announcing his appointment.

By this time Austria had received a final blow, which forced her to
treat alone, and postponed for nearly five years her reappearance in
the field. The emperor had sent an envoy to Lunéville, who was met
by Joseph Bonaparte as the representative of France; but refusing
to make peace apart from Great Britain, hostilities were resumed on
the 28th of November. On the 3d of December Moreau won the great
battle of Hohenlinden, and then advanced upon Vienna. On the 25th an
armistice was signed at Steyer, within a hundred miles of the Austrian
capital. Successes, less brilliant but decided, were obtained in Italy,
resulting on the 16th of January, 1801, in an armistice between the
armies there. At nearly the same moment with this last news the first
consul received a letter from the czar, manifesting extremely friendly
feelings towards France, while full of hatred towards England, and
signifying his intention to send an ambassador to Paris. This filled
Bonaparte with sanguine hopes, the expression of which shows how
heavily sea power weighed in his estimation. "Peace with the emperor,"
he wrote to his brother at Lunéville, "is _nothing_ in comparison with
the alliance of the czar, which will _dominate England_ and preserve
Egypt for us;"[19] and he ordered him to prolong the negotiations until
the arrival of the expected ambassador, that the engagements contracted
with Germany might be made in concert with Russia. Upon a similar
combined action he based extravagant expectations of naval results,
dependent upon the impression, with which he so hardly parted, that one
set of ships was equal to another.[20] A courier was at once dispatched
to Spain to arrange expeditions against Ireland, against Brazil and the
East Indies, to the Caribbean Sea for the recovery of the French and
Spanish islands, and to the Mediterranean to regain Minorca. "In the
embarrassment about to come upon England, threatened in the Archipelago
by the Russians and in the northern seas by the combined Powers, it
will be impossible for her long to keep a strong squadron in the
Mediterranean."[21]

The Russian envoy not arriving, however, Joseph Bonaparte was
instructed to bring matters to a conclusion; and on the 9th of February
the Austrian minister at Lunéville, after a stubborn fight over the
terms, signed a treaty of peace. The principal conditions were: 1.
The definitive surrender of all German possessions west of the Rhine,
so that the river became the frontier of France from Switzerland to
Holland. 2. The cession of Belgium made at Campo Formio was confirmed.
3. In Italy, Austria herself was confined to the east bank of the
Adige, and the princes of that house having principalities west of
the river were dispossessed; their territories going to the Cisalpine
Republic and to an infante of Spain, who was established in Tuscany
with the title of King of Etruria. The Cisalpine and Etruria being
dependent for their political existence upon France, the latter,
through its control of their territory, interposed between Austria and
Naples and shut off the British from access to Leghorn. 4. The eleventh
article of the treaty guaranteed the independence of the Dutch, Swiss,
Cisalpine and Ligurian republics. In its influence upon the future
course of events this was the most important of all the stipulations.
It gave to the political status of the Continent a definition, upon
which Great Britain reckoned in her own treaty with France a few months
later; and its virtual violation by Bonaparte became ultimately both
the reason and the excuse for her refusal to fulfil the engagements
about Malta, which led to the renewal of the war and so finally to
the downfall of Napoleon. 5. The German Empire was pledged to give to
the princes dispossessed on the west of the Rhine, and in Italy, an
indemnity within the empire itself. By this Prussia, which was among
the losers, reaped through Bonaparte's influence an abundant recompense
for the support already given to his policy in the North. This success
induced her to continue the same time-serving opportunism, until, when
no longer necessary to France, she was thrown over with a rudeness that
roused her to an isolated, and therefore speedily crushed resistance.




CHAPTER XIII.

EVENTS OF 1801.

BRITISH EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC—BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN—BONAPARTE'S
FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO CONTEST CONTROL OF THE SEA—HIS CONTINENTAL
POLICY—PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH GREAT BRITAIN, OCTOBER,
1801—INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER SO FAR UPON THE COURSE OF THE REVOLUTION.


By the peace of Lunéville Great Britain was left alone, and for the
moment against all Europe. The ministry met the emergency with vigor
and firmness, though possibly with too much reliance upon diplomacy
and too little upon the military genius of the great seaman whose
services were at their disposal. Upon the Continent nothing could be
effected, all resistance to France had been crushed by the genius of
Bonaparte; but time had to be gained for the expedition then under way
against Egypt and destined to compel its evacuation by the French. The
combination in the North also must be quickly dissolved, if the country
were to treat on anything like equal terms.

An armed negotiation with the Baltic powers, similar to that employed
with Denmark the preceding August, was therefore determined; and a
fleet of eighteen sail-of-the-line with thirty-five smaller vessels
was assembled at Yarmouth, on the east coast of England. Rapidity of
movement was essential to secure the advantage from the ice, which,
breaking up in the harbors less rapidly than in the open water, would
delay the concentration of the hostile navies; and also to allow the
Baltic powers the least possible time to prepare for hostilities
which they had scarcely anticipated. Everything pointed to Nelson,
the most energetic and daring of British admirals, for the chief
command of an expedition in which so much depended upon the squadron,
numerically inferior to the aggregate of forces arrayed against it,
attacking separately each of the component parts before their junction;
but Nelson was still among the junior flag-officers, and the rather
erratic manner in which, while in the central Mediterranean and under
the influence of Lady Hamilton, he had allowed his views of the
political situation to affect his actions even in questions of military
subordination, had probably excited in Earl Spencer, the First Lord,
by whom the officers were selected, a distrust of his fitness for a
charge requiring a certain delicacy of discretion as well as vigor
of action. Whatever the reason, withholding the chief command from
him was unquestionably a mistake,—which would not have been made by
St. Vincent, who succeeded Spencer a few weeks later upon the fall of
the Pitt ministry. The conditions did not promise a pacific solution
when the expedition was planned, and the prospect was even worse when
it sailed. The instructions given to Sir Hyde Parker allowed Denmark
forty-eight hours to accept Great Britain's terms and withdraw from her
engagements with the other Powers. Whether she complied peaceably or
not, after she was reduced to submission the division of the Russian
fleet at Revel was to be attacked, before the melting ice allowed it to
join the main body in Cronstadt; and Sweden was to be similarly dealt
with. Under such orders diplomacy had a minor part to play, while in
their directness and simplicity they were admirably suited to the fiery
temper and prompt military action which distinguished Nelson; and, but
for the opportune death of Paul I., Great Britain might have had reason
to regret that the opportunity to give Russia a severe reminder of
her sea power was allowed to slip through the lax grasp of a sluggish
admiral.

The fleet sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th of March, 1801; and on the
19th, although there had been some scattering in a heavy gale, nearly
all were collected off the Skaw, the northern point of Jutland at the
entrance of the Kattegat. The wind being north-west was fair for going
to Copenhagen, and Nelson, if in command, would have advanced at once
with the ambassador on board. "While the negotiation is going on,"
he said, "the Dane should see our flag waving every moment he lifted
his head." As it was, the envoy went forward with a frigate alone and
the fleet waited. On the 12th it was off Elsineur, where the envoy
rejoined, Denmark having rejected the British terms.

This amounted to an acceptance of hostilities, and it only remained
to the commander-in-chief to act at once; for the wind was favorable,
an advantage which at any moment might be lost. On this day Nelson
addressed Parker a letter, summing up in a luminous manner the features
of the situation and the different methods of action. "Not a moment
should be lost in attacking," he said; "we shall never be so good a
match for them as at this moment." He next hinted, what he had probably
already said, that the fleet ought to have been off Copenhagen, and not
at Elsineur, when the negotiation failed. "Then you might instantly
attack and there would be scarcely a doubt but the Danish fleet would
be destroyed, and the capital made so hot that Denmark would listen to
reason and its true interest." Since, however, the mistake of losing so
much time had been made, he seeks to stir his superior to lose no more.
"Almost the safety, certainly the honor, of England is more entrusted
to you than ever yet fell to the lot of any British officer; ... never
did our country depend so much on the success of any fleet as of this."

Having thus shown the necessity for celerity, Nelson next discussed the
plan of operations. Copenhagen is on the east side of the island of
Zealand, fronting the coast of Sweden, from which it is separated by
the passage called the Sound. On the west the island is divided from
the other parts of Denmark by the Great Belt. The navigation of the
latter being much the more difficult, the preparations of the Danes
had been made on the side of the Sound, and chiefly about Copenhagen
itself. For half a mile from the shore in front of the city, flats
extend, and in the Sound itself at a distance of little over a mile,
is a long shoal called the Middle Ground. Between these two bodies of
shallow water is a channel, called the King's, through which a fleet
of heavy ships could sail, and from whose northern end a deep pocket
stretches toward Copenhagen, forming the harbor proper. The natural
point of attack therefore appears to be at the north; and there the
Danes had erected powerful works, rising on piles out of the shoal
water off the harbor's mouth and known as the Three-Crown Batteries.
Nelson, however, pointed out that not only was this head of the line
exceedingly strong, but that the wind that was fair to attack would
be foul to return; therefore a disabled ship would have no escape but
by passing through the King's Channel. Doing so she would have to run
the gantlet of a line of armed hulks, which the Danes had established
as floating batteries along the inner edge of the channel—covering the
front of Copenhagen—and would also be separated from her fleet. Nor
was this difficulty, which may be called tactical, the only objection
to a plan that he disparaged as "taking the bull by the horns." He
remarked that so long as the British fleet remained in the Sound,
without entering the Baltic, the way was left open for both the Swedes
and the Russians, if released by the ice, to make a junction with the
Danes. Consequently, he advised that a sufficiently strong force of
the lighter ships-of-the-line should pass outside the Middle Ground,
despite the difficulties of navigation, which were not insuperable, and
come up in rear of the city. There they would interpose between the
Danes and their allies, and be in position to assail the weaker part of
the hostile order. He offered himself to lead this detachment.

[Illustration: Battle of Copenhagen.]

This whole letter of March 24, 1801,[22] possesses peculiar interest;
for it shows with a rare particularity, elicited by the need he felt
of arousing and convincing his superior, Nelson's clear discernment of
the decisive features of a military situation. The fame of this great
admiral has depended less upon his conduct of campaigns than upon the
renowned victories he won in the actual collision of fleet with fleet;
and even then has been mutilated by the obstinacy with which, despite
the perfectly evident facts, men have persisted in seeing in them
nothing but dash,—heart, not head.[23] Throughout his correspondence,
it is true, there are frequent traces of the activity of his mental
faculties and of the general accuracy of his military conclusions; but
ordinarily it is from his actions that his reasonings and principles
must be deduced. In the present case we have the views he held and the
course he evidently would have pursued clearly formulated by himself;
and it cannot but be a subject of regret that the naval world should
have lost so fine an illustration as he would there have given of the
principles and conduct of naval warfare. He concluded his letter with
a suggestion worthy of Napoleon himself, and which, if adopted, would
have brought down the Baltic Confederacy with a crash that would have
resounded throughout Europe. "Supposing us through the Belt with the
wind first westerly, would it not be possible to go with the fleet,
or detach ten ships of three and two decks, with one bomb and two
fire-ships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian squadron at that place? I
do not see the great risk of such a detachment, and with the remainder
to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The measure may be thought bold,
but I am of opinion the boldest are the safest; and our country demands
a most vigorous exertion of her force, directed with judgment."

Committed as the Danes were to a stationary defence, this
recommendation to strike at the soul of the confederacy evinced the
clearest perception of the key to the situation, which Nelson himself
summed up in the following words: "I look upon the Northern League to
be like a tree, of which Paul was the trunk and Sweden and Denmark
the branches. If I can get at the trunk and hew it down, the branches
fall of course; but I may lop the branches and yet not be able to
fell the tree, and my power must be weaker when its greatest strength
is required"[24]—that is, the Russians should have been attacked
before the fleet was weakened, as it inevitably must be, by the
battle with the Danes. "If we could have cut up the Russian fleet,"
he said again, "that was my object." Whatever Denmark's wishes about
fighting, she was by her continental possessions tied to the policy
of Russia and Prussia, either of whom could overwhelm her by land.
She dared not disregard them. The course of both depended upon the
czar; for the temporizing policy of Prussia would at once embrace
his withdrawal from the league as an excuse for doing the same. At
Revel were twelve Russian ships-of-the-line, fully half their Baltic
fleet, whose destruction would have paralyzed the remainder and the
naval power of the empire. To persuade Parker to such a step was,
however, hopeless. "Our fleet would never have acted against Russia
and Sweden," wrote Nelson afterwards, "although Copenhagen would have
been burned; for Sir Hyde Parker was determined not to leave Denmark
hostile in his rear;"[25] a reason whose technical accuracy under all
the circumstances was nothing short of pedantic, and illustrates the
immense distance between a good and accomplished officer, which Parker
was, and a genius whose comprehension of rules serves only to guide,
not to fetter, his judgment.

Although unable to rise equal to the great opportunity indicated by
Nelson, Sir Hyde Parker adopted his suggestion as to the method and
direction of the principal attack upon the defences of Copenhagen.
For this, Nelson asked ten ships-of-the-line and a number of smaller
vessels, with which he undertook to destroy the floating batteries
covering the front of the city. These being reduced, the bomb vessels
could be placed so as to play with effect upon the dockyard, arsenals,
and the town, in case further resistance was made.

The nights of the 30th and 31st of March were employed sounding the
channel. On the first of April the fleet moved up to the north end of
the Middle Ground, about four miles from the city; and that afternoon
Nelson's division, to which Parker had assigned two ships-of-the-line
more than had been asked—or twelve altogether—got under way, passed
through the outer channel and anchored towards sundown off the
south-east end of the shoal, two miles from the head[26] of the
Danish line. Nelson announced his purpose to attack as soon as the
wind served; and the night was passed by him in arranging the order
of battle. The enterprise was perilous, not on account of the force
to be engaged, but because of the great difficulties of navigation.
The pilots were mostly mates of merchantmen trading with the Baltic;
and their experience in vessels of three or four hundred tons did
not fit them for the charge of heavy battle-ships. They betrayed
throughout great indecision, and their imperfect knowledge contributed
to the principal mishaps of the day, as well as to a comparative
incompleteness in the results of victory.

The next morning the wind came fair at south-south-east, and at eight
A. M. the British captains were summoned to the flag-ship for their
final instructions. The Danish line to be attacked extended in a
north-west and south-east direction for somewhat over a mile. It was
composed of hulks and floating batteries, eighteen to twenty in number
and mounting 628 guns, of which about 375 would—fighting thus at
anchor—be on the engaged side. The southern flank now to be assailed
was partly supported by works on shore; but from the intervening shoal
water these were too distant for thoroughly efficient fire. Being thus
distinctly weaker than the northern extremity, which was covered by the
Three-Crown Battery and a second line of heavy ships, this southern end
was most properly chosen by the British as the point of their chief
assault for tactical reasons, independently of the strategic advantage
urged by Nelson in thus interposing between the enemy and his allies.
At half-past nine signal was made to weigh. The ships were soon under
sail; but the difficulties of pilotage, despite careful soundings made
during the night by an experienced naval captain, were soon apparent.
The "Agamemnon," of sixty-four guns, was unable to weather the point
of the Middle Ground, and had to anchor out of range. She had no share
in the battle. The "Bellona" and "Russell," seventy-fours, the fourth
and fifth in the order, entered the Channel; but keeping too far to
the eastward they ran ashore on its farther side—upon the Middle
Ground. They were not out of action, but beyond the range of the
most efficient gunnery under the conditions of that period. Nelson's
flag-ship following them passed clear, as did the rest of the heavy
ships; but the loss of these three out of the line prevented by so
much its extension to the northward. The result was to expose that
part of the British order to a weight of fire quite disproportioned to
its strength. A body of frigates very gallantly undertook to fill the
gap, which they could do but inadequately, and suffered heavy loss in
attempting.

The battle was at its height at half-past eleven. There was then no
more manœuvring, but the simple question of efficient gunnery and
endurance. At about two P. M. a great part of the Danish line had
ceased to fire, and the flag-ship "Dannebrog" was in flames. During the
action the Danish crews were frequently re-enforced from the shore;
and the new-comers in several cases, reaching the ships after they had
struck, renewed the fight, either through ignorance or indifference
to the fact. The land batteries also fired on boats trying to take
possession. Nelson seized on this circumstance to bring the affair to a
conclusion. He wrote a letter addressed "To the brothers of Englishmen,
the Danes," and sent it under flag of truce to the Crown Prince, who
was in the city. "Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when
no longer resisting; but if the firing is continued on the part of
Denmark, Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all the floating
batteries he has taken, without having the power of saving the brave
Danes who have defended them." The letter was sent on shore by a
British officer who had served in the Russian navy and spoke Danish.
The engagement continued until about three P. M., when the whole line
of floating defences south-east of the Crown Batteries had either
struck or been destroyed.

The fortifications were still unharmed, as were the ships west of them
covering the harbor proper; but their fire was stopped by the bearer
of a flag of truce who was bringing to Nelson the reply of the Crown
Prince. The latter demanded the precise purport of the first message.
Nelson took a high hand. He had destroyed the part of the enemy's
line which he had attacked; but it was important now to withdraw his
crippled ships, and with the existing wind that could only be done by
passing the Crown Batteries. Had the three that ran aground been in the
line, it is permissible to believe that that work would have been so
far injured as to be practically harmless; but this was far from the
case. The admiral in his second letter politicly ignored this feature
of the situation. He wrote, "Lord Nelson's object in sending on shore a
flag of truce is humanity;[27] he therefore _consents_ that hostilities
shall cease till Lord Nelson can take his prisoners out of the prizes,
and he consents to land all the wounded Danes and to burn or remove
his prizes. Lord Nelson, with humble duty to His Royal Highness, begs
leave to say that he will ever esteem it the greatest victory he ever
gained, if this flag of truce may be the happy forerunner of a lasting
and happy union between my most gracious Sovereign and His Majesty the
King of Denmark." Having written the letter, he referred the bearer
for definite action to Sir Hyde Parker, who lay some four miles off
in the "London;" foreseeing that the long pull there and back would
give time for the leading ships, which were much crippled, to clear
the shoals, though their course for so doing lay close under the Crown
Batteries. Thus the exposed part of the British fleet was successfully
removed from a dangerous position and rejoined Parker north of the
Middle Ground. The advantage obtained by Nelson's presence of mind
and promptness in gaining this respite was shown by the difficulties
attending the withdrawal. Three out of five ships-of-the-line grounded,
two of which remained fast for several hours a mile from the batteries,
but protected by the truce.

The result of the battle of Copenhagen was to uncover the front of the
city and lay it, with its dockyards and arsenals, open to bombardment.
It was now safe to place the bomb vessels in the King's Channel. It
became a question for Denmark to decide, whether fear of her powerful
allies and zeal for the claims of neutrals should lead her to undergo
further punishment, or whether the suffering already endured and the
danger still threatening were excuse sufficient for abandoning the
coalition. On the other hand, Nelson, who was the brains as well as the
backbone of the British power in the North, cared little, either now or
before the battle, about the attitude of Denmark, except as it deterred
Parker from advancing. Now, as before, his one idea was to get at the
Russian division still locked in Revel by the ice. The negotiations
were carried on by him and resulted in an armistice for fourteen weeks,
after which hostilities could be resumed upon fourteen days' notice.
Thus was assured to Parker for four months the entire immunity he
desired for his communications. Fear of Russia long deterred the Danes
from this concession, which Nelson frankly told them he must have, so
as to be at liberty to act against the Russian fleet and return to
them; and he made it the indispensable requisite to sparing the city.
During the discussions, however, the Crown Prince received news of the
czar's death. Paul I. had been murdered by a body of conspirators on
the night of March 24. The Danish government concealed the tidings;
but the departure of the soul of the confederacy relieved their worst
fears and encouraged them to yield to Nelson's demands.

Denmark's part in the Armed Neutrality was suspended during the
continuance of the armistice; but the British ministers showed
as little appreciation of the military situation as did their
commander-in-chief in the Baltic. "Upon a consideration of all the
circumstances," they wrote to Nelson,[28] "His Majesty has thought fit
to approve the armistice." Nelson was naturally and justly indignant at
this absurdly inadequate understanding of the true nature of services,
concerning whose military character a French naval critic has truly
said that "they will always be in the eyes of seamen his fairest
title to glory. He alone was capable of displaying such boldness and
perseverance; he alone could confront the immense difficulties of that
enterprise and overcome them."[29] But his conduct at Copenhagen,
brilliant as was the display of energy, of daring and of endurance,
was far from exhausting the merits of his Baltic campaign. He had
lifted and carried on his shoulders the dead weight of his superior,
he had clearly read the political as well as the military situation,
and he never for one moment lost sight of the key to both. To bombard
Copenhagen was to his mind a useless piece of vandalism, which would
embitter a nation that ought to be conciliated, and destroy the
only hold Great Britain still had over Denmark.[30] Except for the
necessity of managing his lethargic and cautious commander-in-chief,
we may believe he would never have contemplated it; but under the
circumstances he used the threat as the one means by which he could
extort truce from Denmark and induce Parker to move. With the latter
to handle, the armistice slipped the knot of the military difficulty;
it was the one important point, alongside which every other fell into
insignificance. "My object," he said, "was to get at Revel before the
frost broke up at Cronstadt, that the twelve sail-of-the-line might
be destroyed." Well might St. Vincent write, "Your Lordship's whole
conduct, from your first appointment to this hour, is the subject of
our constant admiration. It does not become me to make comparisons; all
agree there is but one Nelson."

Meantime, while the British fleet had been dallying in the approaches
to the Baltic, important events had occurred, furthering the projects
of Bonaparte in the North and seriously complicating the position of
Great Britain. No formal declaration of war was at any time issued by
the latter country; but its government had not unjustly regarded as
an act of direct hostility the combination of Denmark, Sweden, and
Prussia, to support the czar in a course first undertaken to assure
his claim upon Malta, and in furtherance of which he had seized as
pledges three hundred British merchant vessels with their crews.[31]
As an offset to the British interests thus foreclosed upon by Russia,
and to negotiate upon somewhat equal terms, the government, on the 14th
of January, 1801, ordered an embargo laid upon Russian, Danish, and
Swedish vessels in British ports, and the seizure of merchant ships of
these powers at sea. Of four hundred and fifty Swedish vessels then
abroad, two hundred were detained or brought into British harbors.
They were not, however, condemned as prizes, but held inviolable to
await the issue of the existing difficulties. To the remonstrances of
Sweden and Denmark, supported by Prussia, the British ministry replied
definitely, on the 7th of March, that the embargo would not be revoked
so long as the Powers affected "continued to form part of a confederacy
which had for its object to impose by force on his Majesty a new system
of maritime law, inconsistent with the dignity and independence of his
crown, and the rights and interests of his people."[32] In consequence
of this and of the entrance of the Sound by Parker's fleet, Prussia, on
the 30th of March, and as a measure of retaliation, closed the mouths
of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems—in other words, the ports of North
Germany—against British commerce, and took possession of the German
states belonging to the king of Great Britain. On the same day a corps
of Danish troops occupied Hamburg, more certainly to stop British trade
therewith.

Thus Bonaparte's conception was completely realized. There was not
only a naval combination against Great Britain, but also an exclusion
of her trade from one of its chief markets. The danger, however, was
much less than it seemed. On the one hand, while the annoyances to
neutral navigation were indisputable, the advantages it drew from the
war were far greater; its interests really demanded peace, even at
the price set by Great Britain. On the other hand, the more important
claims of the great Sea Power, however judged by standards of natural
right, had prescription on their side; and in the case of contraband,
whatever may be thought of classifying naval stores as such, there
was for it a colorable pretext in the fact that France then had no
merchant shipping, except coasters; that naval stores entering her
ports were almost certainly for ships of war; and that it was in
part to the exclusion of such articles that Great Britain owed the
maritime supremacy, which alone among armed forces had successfully
defied Bonaparte. In short, the interest of the Northern states was
to yield the points in dispute, while that of Great Britain was not
to yield; a truth not only asserted by the ministry but conceded in
the main by the opposition. There needed therefore only to throw a
little weight into one scale, or to take a little from the other, to
turn the balance; while the coalition would dissolve entirely either
upon decisive naval operations by Great Britain, or upon the death
of Paul I. The czar was the only person embarked heart and soul in
the Northern quarrel, because the only one deaf to the call of clear
interest. Herein is apparent the crying mistake of intrusting the
conduct of the naval campaign to another than Nelson. The time placidly
consumed by Parker in deliberations and talking would have sufficed his
lieutenant to scour the Baltic, to destroy the Russians at Revel as he
did the Danish line at Copenhagen, and to convince the neutral states
of the hopelessness of the struggle. Fortunately for Great Britain,
the interests of Russian proprietors, which were bound up with British
commerce, and hardly yielded eight years later to restrictions imposed
by the popular Alexander I., rebelled against the measures of a ruler
whose insanity was no longer doubtful. The murder of Paul opened the
way for peace.

Among the first measures of the new czar was the release of the British
seamen imprisoned by his father. This order was dated April 7. On the
12th the British ships entered the Baltic,—much to the surprise of
the Northern Powers, who thought their heavy draught would prevent.
The three-deckers had to remove their guns to pass some shoal ground
ten miles above Copenhagen. After an excursion to intercept a Swedish
fleet said to be at sea, Parker anchored his ships in Kioge Bay,—off
the coast of Zealand just within the entrance to the Baltic,—and
there awaited further instructions from home; the Russian minister
at Copenhagen having informed him that the new czar would not go to
war.[33] Nelson entirely disapproved of this inactive attitude. Russia
might yield the conditions of Great Britain, but she would be more
likely to do so if the British fleet lay off the harbor of Revel. This
seems also to have been the view of the ministry. It received news
of the battle of Copenhagen on April 15, and at about the same date
learned the death of Paul I. Advantage was very properly taken of the
latter to adopt a policy of conciliation. On the 17th orders were
issued to Parker modifying his first instructions. If Alexander removed
the embargo and released the seamen, all hostile movements were to be
suspended. If not, a cessation of hostilities was to be offered, if
Russia were willing to treat; _but upon condition that, until these
ships and men were released, the Revel division should not join that in
Cronstadt, nor vice versâ_.[34] This presumed a position of the British
fleet very different from Kioge Bay, over four hundred miles from Revel.

Four days later, orders were issued relieving Parker and leaving Nelson
in command. Taken as this step was, only a week after the news of a
victory, it can scarcely be construed otherwise than as an implied
censure. To this view an expression of Nelson's lends color. "They
are not Sir Hyde Parker's real friends who wish for an inquiry," he
wrote to a confidential correspondent. "His friends in the fleet wish
everything of this fleet to be forgot, for we all respect and love Sir
Hyde; but the dearer his friends, the more uneasy they have been at
his _idleness,_ for that is the truth—no criminality."[35] The orders
were received on May 5. Nelson's first signal was to hoist the boats
aboard and prepare to weigh. "If Sir Hyde were gone," he wrote the
same afternoon, "I would now be under sail." On the 7th the fleet left
Kioge Bay and on the 12th appeared off Revel. The Russian division had
sailed three days before and was now safe under the guns of Cronstadt.
From Revel Nelson dispatched very complimentary letters to the Russian
minister of foreign affairs, but received in reply the message that
"the only proof of the loyalty of his intentions that the czar could
accept was the prompt withdrawal of his fleet; and that until then no
negotiation could proceed." "I do not believe he would have written
such a letter," said Nelson, "if the Russian fleet had been in
Revel;"[36] but the bird was flown, and with a civil explanation he
withdrew from the port. He still remained in the Baltic, awaiting the
issue of the negotiations; but Russia meant peace, and on the 17th of
May the czar ordered the release of the embargoed British ships. On the
4th of June Great Britain also released the Danes and Swedes detained
in her ports. Russia and Prussia had already agreed, on the 27th of
April, that hostile measures against England should cease, Hamburg and
Hanover be evacuated, and the free navigation of the rivers restored.

On the 17th of June was signed at St. Petersburg a convention between
Russia and Great Britain, settling the points that had been in dispute.
The question of Malta was tacitly dropped. As regards neutral claims
Russia conceded that the neutral flag should not cover enemy's goods;
and while she obtained the formal admission that articles of hostile
origin which had become _bonâ fide_ neutral property were exempt from
seizure, she yielded the very important exception of colonial produce.
This, no matter who the owner, could not by a neutral be carried
direct from the colony to the mother country of a nation at war.[37]
Great Britain, on the other hand, conceded the right of neutrals to
carry on the coasting trade of a belligerent; and that naval stores
should not be classed as contraband of war. The latter was an important
concession, the former probably not, coasting trade being ordinarily
done by small craft especially adapted to the local conditions. As
regards searching merchant vessels under convoy of a ship of war,
Russia yielded the principle and Great Britain accepted methods which
would make the process less offensive. Privateers in such case could
not search. The question was unimportant; for neutral merchant ships
will not lightly submit to the restraint and delays of convoy, and
so lose the chief advantage, that of speed, which they have over
belligerents. When a neutral sees necessary to convoy her merchantmen,
the very fact shows relations already strained.

Sweden and Denmark necessarily followed the course of Russia and
acceded to all the terms of the convention between that court and Great
Britain; Sweden on the 23d of October, 1801, and Denmark on the 30th
of the following March. The claim to carry colonial produce to Europe,
thus abandoned, was of importance to them, though not to Russia. At the
same time the Baltic states renewed among themselves the engagements,
which they had relinquished in their convention with Great Britain,
that the neutral flag should cover enemy's property on board and
that the convoy of a ship of war should exempt merchant vessels from
search. These principles were in point of fact modifications sought to
be introduced into international law, and not prescriptive rights, as
commonly implied by French historians[38] dealing with this question.
For this reason both the United States and the Baltic powers, while
favoring the new rule, were little disposed to attempt by arms to
compel the surrender by Great Britain of a claim sanctioned by long
custom.

Thus had fallen resultless, as far as the objects of the first consul
were concerned, the vast combination against Great Britain which he
had fostered in the North. During its short existence he had actively
pursued in the south of Europe, against Naples and Portugal, other
measures intended further to embarrass, isolate, and cripple the
great Sea Power, and to facilitate throwing much needed supplies and
re-enforcements into Egypt. "The ambassador of the republic," he wrote
in February, 1801, "will make the Spanish ministry understand that we
must at whatsoever cost become masters of the Mediterranean.... France
will have fifteen ships-of-the-line in the Mediterranean before the
equinox; and, if Spain will join to them fifteen others, the English,
who are about to have the ports of Lisbon, Sicily, and Naples closed to
them, will not be able to keep thirty ships in the Mediterranean. That
being so, I doubt not they will evacuate Mahon, being unable to remain
in that sea."[39]

For the closure of the ports Bonaparte relied with good reason upon
his armies; but in the concurrent expectation of uniting thirty French
and Spanish ships he reckoned without his host, as he did also upon
the Russian Black Sea fleet, and the numbers the British must keep
in the Baltic and off Brest. After the armistice with Austria in
Italy, a corps under Murat was pushed toward Naples; and on the same
day that the treaty of Lunéville was concluded, February 9, a truce
for thirty days was signed with the Two Sicilies. This was followed
on the 28th of March by a definitive treaty of peace. Naples engaged
to exclude from all her ports, including those of Sicily, the ships
both of war and commerce belonging to Great Britain and Turkey; while
those of France and her allies, as well as of the Northern powers,
should have free access. She also suffered some slight territorial
loss; but the most significant article was kept secret. The boot of
Italy was to be occupied by a division of twelve or fifteen thousand
French, whom Naples was to pay and support, and to whom were to be
delivered all the maritime fortresses south of the river Ofanto and
east of the Bradano, including the ports of Taranto and Brindisi. "This
occupation," wrote Bonaparte to his war-minister, "is only in order to
facilitate the communications of the army of Egypt with France."[40]
The Neapolitan ports became a refuge for French squadrons; while the
army of occupation stood ready to embark, if any body of ships found
their way to those shores. Unfortunately, the combined British and
Turkish armies had already landed in Egypt, and had won the battle of
Alexandria a week before the treaty with Naples was signed. As a speedy
result the French in Egypt were divided; part being forced back upon
Cairo and part shut up in Alexandria,—while the fleet of Admiral Keith
cruised off the coast.

No French squadron succeeded in carrying to Egypt the desired
re-enforcements, notwithstanding the numerous efforts made by the
first consul. The failure arose from two causes: the penury of the
French arsenals, and the difficulty of a large body of ships escaping
together, or of several small bodies effecting a combination, in face
of the watchfulness of the British. Both troubles were due mainly to
the rigid and methodical system introduced by Earl St. Vincent; who,
fortunately for Great Britain, assumed command of the Channel fleet
at the same time that Bonaparte sought to impress upon the French
navy a more sagacious direction and greater energy of action. His
instructions to Admiral Bruix in February, 1800,[41] were to sail
from Brest with over thirty French and Spanish sail-of-the-line, to
drive the British blockaders from before the port, to relieve Malta,
send a light squadron to Egypt, and then bring his fleet to Toulon,
where it would be favorably placed to control the Mediterranean.
Delay ensuing, owing to lack of supplies and the unwillingness of the
Spaniards, he wrote again at the end of March, "If the equinox passes
without the British fleet dispersing, then, great as is our interest in
raising the blockade of Malta and carrying help to Egypt, they must be
abandoned;"[42] and throughout the summer months he confined his action
to the unremitting efforts, already noticed, to keep a stream of small
vessels constantly moving towards Egypt.

After the autumn equinox Bonaparte again prepared for a grand naval
operation. Admiral Ganteaume was detailed to sail from Brest with
seven ships-of-the-line, carrying besides their crews four thousand
troops and an immense amount of material. "Admiral Ganteaume," wrote
he to Menou, commander-in-chief in Egypt, "brings to your army the
succor we have not before been able to send. He will hand you this
letter." The letter was dated October 29, 1800, but it never reached
its destination. Ganteaume could not get out from Brest till nearly
three months later, when, on January 23d, 1801, a terrible north-east
gale drove off the British squadron and enabled him to put to sea. "A
great imprudence," says Thiers, "but what could be done in presence of
an enemy's fleet which incessantly blockaded Brest in all weathers, and
only retired when cruising became impossible. It was necessary either
never to go out, or to do so in a tempest which should remove the
British squadron." The incident of the sortie, as well as Ganteaume's
subsequent experiences, illustrates precisely the deterrent effect
exercised by St. Vincent's blockades.[43] They could not prevent
occasional escapes, but they did throw obstacles nearly insuperable in
the way of combining and executing any of the major operations of war.
Owing to the weather which had to be chosen for starting, the squadron
was at once dispersed and underwent considerable damage.[44] It was
not all reunited till a week later. On the 9th of February it passed
Gibraltar; but news of its escape had already reached the British
admiral Warren cruising off Cadiz, who followed quickly, entering
Gibraltar only twenty-hours after the French went by. On the 13th of
January Ganteaume captured a British frigate, from which he learned
that the Mediterranean fleet under Lord Keith was then convoying an
army of fifteen thousand British troops against Egypt. He expected
that Warren also would soon be after him, and the injuries received in
the gale weighed upon his mind. Considering all the circumstances, he
decided to abandon Egypt and go to Toulon. Warren remained cruising
in the Mediterranean watching for the French admiral, who twice again
started for his destination. The first time he was obliged to return
by a collision between two ships. The second, an outbreak of disease
compelled him to send back three of the squadron. The other four
reached the African coast some distance west of Alexandria, where
they undertook to land the troops; but Keith's fleet appeared on the
horizon, and, cutting their cables, they made a hasty retreat, without
having effected their object.

Similar misfortune attended Bonaparte's attempt to collect an efficient
force in Cadiz, where Spain had been induced or compelled to yield to
him six ships-of-the-line, and where she herself had some vessels.
To these he intended to send a large detachment from Rochefort under
Admiral Bruix, who was to command the whole, when combined. To
concentrations at any point, however, British squadrons before the
ports whence the divisions were to sail imposed obstacles, which, even
if occasionally evaded, were fatal to the final great design. The
advantage of the central position was consistently realized. On the
other hand, where a great number of ships happened to be together,
as at Brest in 1801, the want of supplies, caused by the same close
watch and by the seizure of naval stores as contraband, paralyzed
their equipment. Finding himself baffled at Brest for these reasons,
the first consul appointed Rochefort for the first concentration. When
the second was effected at Cadiz, Bruix was to hold himself ready for
further operations. If Egypt could not be directly assisted, it might
be indirectly by harassing the British communications. "Every day,"
wrote Bonaparte, "a hundred sails pass the straits under weak convoy,
to supply Malta and the English fleet." If this route were flanked at
Cadiz, by a squadron like that of Bruix, much exertion would be needed
to protect it. But the concentration at Rochefort failed, the ships
from Brest could not get there, and the Rochefort ships themselves
never sailed.

Coincidently with this attempt, another effort was made to strengthen
the force at Cadiz.[45] The three vessels sent back by Ganteaume, after
his second sailing from Toulon, were also ordered to proceed there,
under command of Rear Admiral Linois. Linois successfully reached
the Straits of Gibraltar, but there learned from a prize that seven
British ships were cruising off his destination. These had been sent
with Admiral Saumarez from the Channel fleet, to replace Warren, when
the admiralty learned the active preparations making in Cadiz and the
French ports. Not venturing to proceed against so superior an enemy,
Linois put into Gibraltar Bay, anchoring on the Spanish side under
the guns of Algesiras. Word was speedily sent to Saumarez; and on
July 6, two days after Linois anchored, six British ships were seen
rounding the west point of the bay. They attacked at once; but the
wind was baffling, they could not get their positions, and both flanks
of the French line were supported by shore batteries, which were
efficiently worked by soldiers landed from the squadron. The attack was
repulsed, and one British seventy-four that grounded under a battery
was forced to strike. Saumarez withdrew under Gibraltar and proceeded
to refit; the crews working all day and by watches at night to gain
the opportunity to revenge their defeat. Linois sent to Cadiz for the
help he needed, and on the 10th five Spanish ships-of-the-line and one
French[46] from there anchored off Algesiras. On the 12th they got
under way with Linois's three, and at the same time Saumarez with his
six hauled out from Gibraltar. The allies retreated upon Cadiz, the
British following. During the night the van of the pursuers brought
the hostile rear to action, and a terrible scene ensued. A Spanish
three-decker caught fire, and in the confusion was taken for an enemy
by one of her own fleet of the same class. The two ships, of one
hundred and twelve guns each and among the largest in the world, ran
foul of each other and perished miserably in a common conflagration.
The French "St. Antoine" was captured.

The incident of Saumarez's meeting with Linois has a particular value,
because of the repulse and disaster to the British vessels on the first
occasion. Unvarying success accounts, or seems to account, for itself;
but in this case the advantage of the squadron's position before Cadiz
transpires through a failure on the battle-field. To that position
was due, first, that Linois's detachment could not make its junction;
second, that it was attacked separately and very severely handled;
third, that in the retreat to Cadiz the three French ships were not
in proper condition to engage, although one of them when brought to
action made a very dogged resistance to, and escaped from, an inferior
ship. Consequently, the six British that pursued had only six enemies
instead of nine to encounter. After making allowance for the very
superior quality of the British officers and crews over the Spanish, it
is evident the distinguishing feature in these operations was that the
British squadron brought the enemies' divisions to action separately.
It was able to do so because it had been kept before the hostile port,
interposing between them.

Saumarez had wrung success out of considerable difficulty. The failure
of the wind greatly increased the disadvantage to his vessels, coming
under sail into action with others already drawn up at anchor,
and to whom the loss of spars for the moment meant little. These
circumstances, added to the support of the French by land batteries and
some gunboats, went far to neutralize tactically the superior numbers
of the British. With all deductions, however, the fight at Algesiras
was extremely creditable to Linois. He was a man not only distinguished
for courage, but also of a cautious temper peculiarly fitted to secure
every advantage offered by a defensive position. Despite his success
there, the broad result was decisively in favor of his opponents. "Sir
James Saumarez's action," wrote Lord St. Vincent, "has put us upon
velvet." Seven British had worsted nine enemy's ships, as distinctly
superior, for the most part, in individual force as they were in
numbers. Not only had the Spaniards three of ninety guns and over, and
one of eighty, but two of Linois's were of the latter class, of which
Saumarez had but one. The difference between such and the seventy-fours
was not only in number of pieces, but in weight also. The substantial
issue, however, can be distinguished from the simple victory, and it
was secured not only by superior efficiency but also by strategic
disposition.

Brilliant as was Saumarez's achievement, which Nelson, then in
England, warmly extolled in the House of Lords, the claim made by his
biographer, that to these operations alone was wholly due the defeat
of Bonaparte's plan, is exaggerated. It was arranged, he says, that
when the junction was made, the Cadiz ships should proceed off Lisbon,
sack that place, and destroy British merchantmen lying there; "then,
being re-enforced by the Brest fleet, they were to pass the Straits of
Gibraltar, steer direct for Alexandria, and there land such a body of
troops as would raise the siege and drive the English out of Egypt.
_This would certainly have succeeded_ had the squadron under Linois not
encountered that of Sir James, which led to the total defeat of their
combined fleets and to the abandonment of the grand plan."[47] This
might be allowed to stand as a harmless exhibition of a biographer's
zeal, did it not tend to obscure the true lesson to be derived from
this whole naval period, by attributing to a single encounter, however
brilliant, results due to an extensive, well-conceived general
system. Sir James Saumarez's operations were but an epitome of an
action going on everywhere from the Baltic to Egypt. By this command
of the sea the British fleets, after they had adopted the plan of
close-watching the enemy's ports, held everywhere interior positions,
which, by interposing between the hostile detachments, facilitated
beating them in detail. For the most part this advantage of position
resulted in quietly detaining the enemy in port, and so frustrating his
combinations. It was Saumarez's good fortune to illustrate how it could
also enable a compact body of highly disciplined ships to meet in rapid
succession two parts of a force numerically very superior, and by the
injuries inflicted on each neutralize the whole for a definite time.
But, had he never seen Linois, Bonaparte's plan still required the
junctions from Rochefort and Brest which were never effected.

By naval combinations and by holding the Neapolitan ports Bonaparte
sought to preserve Egypt and force Great Britain to peace. "The
question of maritime peace," he wrote to Ganteaume,[48] "hangs now upon
the English expedition to Egypt." Portugal, the ancient ally of Great
Britain, was designed to serve other purposes of his policy,—to furnish
equivalents, with which to wrest from his chief enemy the conquests
that the sea power of France and her allies could not touch. "Notify
our minister at Madrid," wrote he to Talleyrand, September 30, 1800,
"that the Spanish troops must be masters of Portugal before October 15.
This is the only means by which we can have an equivalent for Malta,
Mahon, and Trinidad. Besides, the danger of Portugal will be keenly
felt in England, and will by so much quicken her disposition to peace."

A secret treaty ceding Louisiana to France, in return for Tuscany
to the Spanish infante, had been signed the month before; and Spain
at the same time undertook to bring Portugal to break with Great
Britain. Solicitation proving ineffectual, Bonaparte in the spring
again demanded the stronger measure of an armed occupation of the
little kingdom; growing more urgent as it became evident that Egypt
was slipping from his grasp. Spain finally agreed to invade Portugal,
and accepted the co-operation of a French corps. The first consul
purposed to occupy at least three of the Portuguese provinces;
but he was outwitted by the adroitness of the Spanish government,
unwillingly submissive to his pressure, and by the compliance of his
brother Lucien, French minister to Madrid. Portugal made no efficient
resistance; and the two peninsular courts quickly reached an agreement,
by which the weaker closed her ports to Great Britain, paid twenty
million francs to France, and ceded a small strip of territory to Spain.

Bonaparte was enraged at this treaty, which was ratified without
giving him a chance to interfere;[49] but in the summer of 1801 his
diplomatic game reached a stage where further delay was impossible.
He saw that the loss of Egypt was only a question of time; but so
long as any French troops held out there it was a card in his hand,
too valuable to risk for the trifling gain of a foothold in Portugal.
"The English are not masters of Egypt," he writes boldly on the 23d
of July to the French agent in London. "We have certain news that
Alexandria can hold out a year, and Lord Hawkesbury knows that Egypt is
in Alexandria;"[50] but four days later he sends the hopeless message
to Murat, "There is no longer any question of embarking"[51] the troops
about Taranto, sent there for the sole purpose of being nearer to
Egypt.[52] He continues, in sharp contrast with his former expectation,
"The station of the troops upon the Adriatic is intended to impose upon
the Turks and the English, and to serve as material for compensation
to the latter by evacuating those provinces." Both Naples and Portugal
were too distant, too ex-centric, and thrust too far into contact with
the British dominion of the sea to be profitably, or even safely,
held by France in her condition of naval debility; a truth abundantly
witnessed by the later events of Napoleon's reign, by the disastrous
occupation of Portugal in 1807, by the reverses of Soult and Masséna
in 1809 and 1811, and by the failure even to attempt the conquest of
Sicily.

Russia and Prussia had grown less friendly since the death of Paul.
Even their agreement that Hanover should be evacuated, disposed as they
now were to please Great Britain, was to be postponed until "it was
ascertained that a certain power would not occupy that country;"[53]
a stipulation which betrayed the distrust felt by both. Since then
each had experienced evasions and rebuffs showing the unwillingness of
the first consul to meet their wishes in his treatment of the smaller
states; and they suspected, although they did not yet certainly know,
the steps already taken to incorporate with France regions to whose
independence they held.[54] Both were responding to the call of their
interests, beneficially and vitally connected with the sea power of
Great Britain, and threatened on the Continent by the encroaching
course of the French ruler. Bonaparte felt that the attempt to make
further gains in Europe, with which to traffic against those of Great
Britain abroad, might arouse resistance in these great powers, not yet
exhausted like Austria, and so indefinitely postpone the maritime peace
essential to the revival of the French navy and the re-establishment
of the colonial system; both at this time objects of prime importance
in his eyes. Thus it was that, beginning the year 1801 without a
single ally, in face of the triumphant march of the French armies and
of a formidable maritime combination, the Sea Power of Great Britain
had dispersed the Northern coalition, commanded the friendship of the
great states, retained control of the Mediterranean, reduced Egypt to
submission, and forced even the invincible Bonaparte to wish a speedy
cessation of hostilities.

The great aim of the first consul now was to bring Great Britain
to terms before news of the evacuation of Alexandria could come to
hand. Negotiations had been slowly progressing for nearly six months;
the first advances having been made on the 21st of March by the new
ministry which came into power upon Pitt's resignation. Both parties
being inclined to peace, the advantage necessarily belonged to the man
who, untrammelled by associates in administration, held in absolute
control the direction of his country. The Addington ministry, hampered
by its own intrinsic weakness and by the eagerness of the nation,
necessarily yielded before the iron will of one who was never more firm
in outward bearing than in the most critical moments. He threatened
them with the occupation of Hanover; he intimated great designs for
which troops were embarked at Rochefort, Brest, Toulon, Cadiz, and
ready to embark in Holland; he boasted that Alexandria could hold out
yet a year. Nevertheless, although the terms were incontestably more
advantageous to France than to Great Britain, the government of the
latter insisted upon and obtained one concession, that of Trinidad,
which Bonaparte at first withheld.[55] His eagerness to conclude was in
truth as great as their own, though better concealed. Finally, he sent
on the 17th of September an ultimatum, and added, "If preliminaries are
not signed by the 10th of Vendémiaire (October 2), the negotiations
will be broken." "You will appreciate the importance of this clause,"
he wrote confidentially to the French envoy, "when you reflect that
Menou may possibly not be able to hold in Alexandria beyond the first
of Vendémiaire, that at this season the winds are fair to come from
Egypt, and ships reach Italy and Trieste in very few days. Thus it
is essential to push them to a finish before Vendémiaire 10;" that
is, before they learn the fall of Alexandria. The question of terms,
as he had said before, hinged on Egypt. The envoy, however, was
furnished with a different but plausible reason. "Otto can give them
to understand that from our inferiority at sea and our superiority on
land the campaign begins for us in winter, and therefore I do not wish
to remain longer in this stagnation."[56] Whatever motives influenced
the British ministry, it is evident that Bonaparte was himself in a
hurry for peace. The preliminaries were signed in London on the first
of October, 1801.

The conditions are easily stated. Of all her conquests, Great Britain
retained only the islands of Ceylon in the East Indies and Trinidad in
the West. How great this concession, will be realized by enumerating
the chief territories thus restored to their former owners. These were,
in the Mediterranean, Elba, Malta, Minorca; in the West Indies, Tobago,
Santa Lucia, Martinique, and the extensive Dutch possessions in Guiana;
in Africa, the Cape of Good Hope; and in India, the French and Dutch
stations in the peninsula. France consented to leave to Portugal her
possessions entire, to withdraw her troops from the kingdom of Naples
and the Roman territory, and to acknowledge the independence of the
Republic of the Seven Islands. Under this name the former Venetian
islands, Corfu and others—given to France by the treaty of Campo
Formio—had, after their conquest in 1799 by the fleets of Russia and
Turkey, been constituted into an independent state under the guarantee
of those two powers. Their deliverance from France was considered an
important security to the Turkish Empire. The capitulation of the
French troops in Alexandria was not yet known in England; and the
preliminaries merely stipulated the return of Egypt to the Porte,
whose dominions were to be preserved as they existed before the war.
Malta, restored to the Knights of St. John, was to be freed from
all French or British influence and placed under the guarantee of a
third Power. Owing to the decay of the Order, the disposition of this
important naval station, secretly coveted by both parties, was the most
difficult matter to arrange satisfactorily. In the definitive treaty
its status was sought to be secured by a cumbrous set of provisions,
occupying one third of the entire text; and the final refusal of Great
Britain to evacuate, until satisfaction was obtained for what she
claimed to be violations of the spirit of the engagements between the
two countries, became the test question upon which hinged the rupture
of this short-lived peace.

As the first article of the preliminaries stipulated that upon their
ratification hostilities in all parts of the world, by sea and land,
should cease, they were regarded in both Great Britain and France as
equivalent to a definitive treaty; the postponement of the latter
being only to allow the negotiators time to settle the details of the
intricate agreements, thus broadly outlined, without prolonging the
sufferings of war. To France they could not but be acceptable. She
regained much, and gave up nothing that she could have held without
undue and often useless exertion. In Great Britain the general joy was
marred by the severe, yet accurate, condemnation passed upon the terms
by a body of exceptionally able men, drawn mainly from the ranks of the
Pitt cabinet, although their leader gave his own approval. They pointed
out, clearly and indisputably, that the disparity between the material
gains of Great Britain and France was enormous, disproportionate to
their relative advantages at the time of signature, and not to be
reconciled with that security which had been the professed object
of the struggle. They asserted with little exaggeration that the
conditions were for France to hold what she had, and for Great Britain
to recede to her possessions before the war. They predicted with fatal
accuracy the speedy renewal of hostilities, under the disadvantage of
having lost by the peace important positions not easy to be regained.
The ministry had little to reply. To this or that item of criticism
exception might be taken; but in the main their defence was that by
the failure of their allies no hope remained of contesting the power
of France on the Continent, and that Trinidad and Ceylon were very
valuable acquisitions. Being insular, they were controlled by the
nation ruling the sea, while, from their nearness to the mainlands of
South America and of India, they were important as depots of trade,
as well as for strategic reasons. The most assuring argument was put
forward by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had negotiated the
preliminaries. At the beginning of the war Great Britain had 135
ships-of-the-line and 133 frigates; at its close she had 202 of the
former and 277 of the latter. France had begun with 80 of the line and
66 frigates, and ended with 39 and 35 respectively. However the first
consul might exert himself, Lord Hawkesbury justly urged that the
British might allow him many years labor and then be willing to chance
a maritime war.[57]

Material advantages such as had thus been given up undoubtedly
contribute to security. In surrendering as much as she did abroad,
while France retained such extensive gains upon the Continent and
acquired there such a preponderating influence, Great Britain, which
had so large a stake in the European commonwealth, undoubtedly incurred
a serious risk. The shortness of the peace, and the disquieting
disputes which arose throughout it, sufficiently prove this.
Nevertheless, could contemporaries accurately read the signs of their
times, Englishmen of that day need not have been dissatisfied with
the general results of the war. A long stage had been successfully
traversed towards the final solution of a great difficulty. In 1792 the
spirit of propagating revolution by violence had taken possession of
the French nation as a whole. As Napoleon has strikingly remarked, "It
was part of the political religion of the France of that day to make
war in the name of principles."[58] "The Montagnards and the Jacobins,"
says the republican historian Henri Martin, the bitter censurer of
Bonaparte, "were resolved, like the Girondists, to propagate afar, by
arms, the principles of the Revolution; and they hoped, by hurling a
defiance at all kings, to put France in the impossibility of recoiling
or stopping herself."[59] Such a design could be checked only by
raising up against it a barrier of physical armed opposition. This
had been effected and maintained chiefly by the Sea Power of Great
Britain, the prime agent and moving spirit, directly through her navy,
indirectly through the subsidies drawn from her commerce; and the
latter had nearly doubled while carrying on this arduous and extensive
war. In 1801 the aggressive tendencies of the French nation, as a
whole, were exhausted. So far as they still survived, they were now
embodied in and dependent upon a single man, in which shape they were
at once more distinctly to be recognized and more odious. They were
also less dangerous; because the power of one man, however eminent for
genius, is far less for good or evil than the impulse of a great people.

The British statesmen of that day did not clearly distinguish this
real nature of their gains, though they did intuitively discern the
true character of the struggle in which they were engaged. As is
not infrequent with intuitions, the reasoning by which they were
supported was often faulty; but Pitt's formulation of the objects of
Great Britain in the one word "security" was substantially correct.
Security was her just and necessary aim, forced upon her by the
circumstances of the Revolution,—security not for herself alone, but
for the community of states of which she was an important member. This
was threatened with anarchy through the lawless spirit with which
the French leaders proposed to force the spread of principles and
methods, many of them good as well as many bad, but for whose healthful
development were demanded both time and freedom of choice, which they
in their impatience were unwilling to give. "Security," said Pitt in
his speech upon the preliminaries, "was our great object; there were
different means of accomplishing it, with better or worse prospects
of success; and according to the different variations of policy
occasioned by a change of circumstances, we still pursued our great
object, Security. In order to obtain it we certainly did look for the
subversion of that government founded upon revolutionary principles....
We have the satisfaction of knowing that we have survived the violence
of the revolutionary fever, and we have seen the extent of its
principles abated. We have seen Jacobinism deprived of its fascination;
we have seen it stripped of the name and pretext of liberty; it has
shown itself to be capable only of destroying, not of building, and
that it must necessarily end in a military despotism."[60] Such, in
truth, was the gain of the first war of Great Britain with the French
Revolution. It was, however, but a stage in the progress; there
remained still another, of warfare longer, more bitter, more furious,—a
struggle for the mastery, whose end was not to be seen by the chief
leaders of the one preceding it.




CHAPTER XIV.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS FROM THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE
RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS.

OCTOBER, 1801.-MAY, 1803.


The preliminaries of peace between Great Britain and France, signed
on the first of October, 1801, were regarded by both parties, at
least ostensibly, as settling their relative status and acquisitions.
In their broad outlines no change would be worked by the definitive
treaty, destined merely to regulate details whose adjustment would
demand time and so prolong the distress of war. This expectation,
that the basis of a durable peace had been reached, proved delusive.
A series of unpleasant surprises awaited first one party and then
the other, producing in Great Britain a feeling of insecurity, which
gave point and added vigor to the declamations of those who from the
first had scoffed at the idea of any peace proving permanent, if it
rested upon the good faith of the French government and surrendered
those material guarantees which alone, they asserted, could curb the
ambition and enforce the respect of a man like Bonaparte. Bitter
indeed must have been the unspoken thoughts of the ministry, as the
revolving months brought with them an unceasing succession of events
which justified their opponents' prophecies while proving themselves
to be outwitted; and which, by the increase given to French influence
and power in Europe, necessitated the maintenance of large military
establishments, and converted the peace from first to last into a
condition of armed truce.

The day after the signature of the preliminaries news reached
London[61] of the surrender of Alexandria, which completed the loss of
Egypt by the French. It was believed that Bonaparte had, at the time
of signing, possessed this information, which would have materially
affected the footing upon which he was treating. However that was, he
was undoubtedly assured of the issue,[62] and therefore precipitated a
conclusion by which to France, and not to Great Britain, was attributed
the gracious act of restoring its dominion to the Porte. Concealing
the fact from the Turkish plenipotentiary in Paris, the French
government on the 9th of October signed with him a treaty, by which
it undertook to evacuate the province it no longer held. In return,
Turkey conceded to France, her recent enemy, commercial privileges
equal to those allowed Great Britain, to whose sea power alone she
owed the recovery of Syria and Egypt. This bargain, concluded without
the knowledge of the British ministry, was not made public until after
the ratification of the preliminaries. At the same time became known a
treaty with Portugal, signed at Madrid on the 29th of September. By the
preliminaries with Great Britain, Portuguese territory was to remain
intact; but by the treaty of Madrid so much of Brazil was added to
French Guiana as to give the latter control of the northern outlet of
the Amazon.

These events were surprises, and disagreeable surprises, to the
British ministers. On the other hand, the existence of the secret
treaty of March 21, 1801, by which Spain ceded to France the colony
of Louisiana, was known to them,[63] though unavowed at the time of
signing. While impressed with the importance of this transaction,
following as it did the cession of the Spanish half of San Domingo, the
ministry allowed the veil of mystery, with which Bonaparte had been
pleased to shroud it, to remain unlifted. The United States minister
to London had procured and forwarded to his government on the 20th
of November a copy of this treaty,[64] which so closely affected his
fellow countrymen; but it was not until January, 1802, that the fact
became generally known in England. Gloomy prophecies of French colonial
aggrandizement were uttered by the partisans of the Opposition, who
pictured the hereditary enemy of Great Britain planted by the Spanish
treaty at the mouth of the great river of North America, and by the
Portuguese at that of the artery of the southern continent; while the
vast and rich colonies of Spain, lying between these two extremes,
would be controlled by the supremacy of France in the councils of the
Peninsular courts. In a generation which still retained the convictions
of the eighteenth century on the subject of colonial expansion, these
predictions of evil struck heavily home,—enforced as they were by the
knowledge that full one fourth of the trade which made the strength
of Great Britain rested then upon that Caribbean America, into which
France was now making a colossal intrusion. Faithful to the sagacious
principle by which he ever proportioned the extent of his military
preparation to the vastness of the end in view, the expedition sent
by Bonaparte to reassert in Haïti the long dormant authority of
the mother-country was calculated on a scale which aroused intense
alarm in London. On the 4th of December, 1801, only ten weeks after
the preliminaries were signed, and long before the conclusion of
the definitive treaty, fifteen ships-of-the-line and six frigates
sailed from Brest for Haïti; and these were rapidly followed by other
divisions, so that the whole force dispatched much exceeded twenty
ships-of-the-line, and carried over twenty thousand troops. The number
was none too great for the arduous task,—indeed experience proved it to
be far from adequate to meet the waste due to climatic causes; but to
Great Britain it was portentous. Distrusting Bonaparte's purposes, a
large division of British ships was ordered to re-enforce the squadron
at Jamaica. Weary of a nine-years war and expecting their discharge,
the crews of some of the vessels mutinied; and the execution of several
of these poor seamen was one of the first results of Bonaparte's
ill-fated attempt to restore the colonial system of France.

The apprehensions shown concerning these distant undertakings partook
more of panic than of reasonable fear. They overlooked the long period
that must pass between possession and development, as well as the
hopeless inferiority of France in that sea power upon which the tenure
of colonies must depend. They ignored the evident enormous difficulties
to be overcome, and were blind to the tottering condition of the
Spanish colonial system, then rapidly approaching its fall. But if
there was exaggeration in an anticipation of danger, which the whole
history of her maritime past entitled Great Britain to reject with
scorn, there was no question that each month was revealing unexpected
and serious changes in the relative positions of the two powers, which,
if not wilfully concealed by France, had certainly not been realized by
the British ministers when the preliminaries were signed. Whether they
had been cheated or merely out-manœuvred, it became daily more plain
that the balance of power in Europe, of which Great Britain was so
important a factor, was no longer what it had been when she made such
heavy sacrifices of her maritime conquests to secure the status of the
Continent.

At the same time was unaccountably delayed the work of the
plenipotentiaries, who were to settle at Amiens the terms of the
definitive treaty. The British ambassador left London on the first of
November, and after some stop in Paris reached Amiens on the first of
December. The French and Dutch envoys arrived shortly after; but the
Spanish failed to appear, and on different pretexts negotiations were
spun out. That this was contrary to the wishes of the British ministers
scarcely admits of doubt. They had already made every sacrifice they
could afford; and the position of a popular government, under the free
criticism of a people impatient for a settled condition of affairs, and
forced to temporizing expedients for carrying on the state business
during a period of uncertainty, was too unpleasant to suggest bad
faith on their part. While this suspense still lasted, a startling
event occurred, greatly affecting the balance of power. The Cisalpine
Republic, whose independence was guaranteed by the treaty of Lunéville,
adopted toward the end of 1801 a new constitution, drawn up under the
inspection of Bonaparte himself. Delegates of the republic, to the
number of several hundred, were summoned to Lyon to confer with the
first consul on the permanent organization of their state; and there,
under his influence, as was alleged, offered to him the presidency,
with functions even more extensive than those he enjoyed as ruler of
France. The offer was accepted by him on the 26th of January, 1802; and
thus the power of the Cisalpine, with its four million inhabitants, was
wielded by the same man who already held that of the French republic. A
few days later for the name Cisalpine was substituted Italian,—a change
thought to indicate an aggressive attitude towards the remaining states
of Italy.

These proceedings at Lyon caused great alarm in England, and many
persons before pacifically disposed now wished to renew the war.
The ministers nevertheless ignored what had passed so publicly, and
continued the effort for peace, despite the delays and tergiversations
of which their envoy, Lord Cornwallis, bitterly complained; but by
the beginning of March, when negotiations had lasted three months,
their patience began to give way. A number of ships were ordered into
commission, and extensive naval preparations begun. At the same time
an ultimatum was sent forward, and Cornwallis instructed to leave
Amiens in eight days if it were not accepted. The first consul had too
much at stake on the seas to risk a rupture,[65] when he had already
gained so much by the protraction of negotiations and by his astute
diplomacy. The definitive treaty was signed on the 25th of March, 1802.
The terms did not materially differ from those of the preliminaries,
except in the article of Malta. The boundary of French Guiana obtained
from Portugal was indeed pushed back off the Amazon, but no mention was
made of the now notorious cession of Louisiana.

The provisions touching the little island of Malta and its
dependencies, Gozo and Comino, were long and elaborate. The object of
each country was to secure the exclusion of the other from a position
so important for controlling the Mediterranean and the approaches
thereby to Egypt and India. The Order of Knights was to be restored,
with the provision that no citizen either of Great Britain or France
was thereafter to be a member. The independence and neutrality of the
Order and of the island were proclaimed. The British forces were to
evacuate within three months after the exchange of ratifications; but
this stipulation was qualified by the proviso that there should then
be on the spot a Grand Master to receive possession, and also two
thousand Neapolitan troops which the king of Naples was to be invited
to send as a garrison. These were to remain for one year after its
restitution to the Grand Master; or longer, if the Order had not then
provided the necessary force. Naples was thus selected as guardian of
the coveted position, because its weakness could arouse no jealousy.
The independence of the islands was placed under the guarantee of Great
Britain, France, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia; the last four
being also invited to accede to the long list of stipulations. The
presence of a grand master and the guarantee of the four powers—whose
acquiescence was not first obtained—were thus integral parts of the
agreement; and upon their failure Great Britain afterwards justified
the delays which left Malta still a pledge in her hands, when she
demanded from France explanations and indemnities for subsequent
actions, injurious, as she claimed, to her security and to her dignity.

By another clause of the treaty Great Britain consented to evacuate
Porto Ferrajo, the principal port in Elba, which she had up to that
time held by force of arms. It was then known that this was in effect
to abandon the island to France, who had obtained its cession from
Naples and Tuscany, formerly joint owners, by conventions first made
known some time after the signature of the preliminaries. Elba was by
its position fitted seriously to embarrass the trade of Great Britain
with Northern Italy, under the restrictions laid wherever Bonaparte's
power extended; but the most important feature of the transaction
was the impression produced by the long concealment of treaties thus
unexpectedly divulged. These sudden, unforeseen changes imparted an air
of illusion to all existing conditions, and undermined the feeling of
security essential to the permanent relations of states.

Despite the shocks caused by these various revelations, the treaty of
Amiens was received in Great Britain with satisfaction, though not
with the unmeasured demonstrations that followed the announcement of
the preliminaries. In France the general joy was no less profound. "It
was believed," writes M. Thiers, "that the true peace, the peace of
the seas, was secured,—that peace which was the certain and necessary
condition of peace on the Continent." The enthusiasm of the nation
was poured out at the feet of the first consul, to whose genius for
war and for diplomacy were not unjustly attributed the brilliant, as
well as apparently solid, results. Statesmen might murmur that France
had lost her colonial empire and failed to hold Egypt and Malta,
while Great Britain had extended and consolidated her Indian empire
by overthrowing the Sultan of Mysore, the ancient ally of France and
her own most formidable foe in the peninsula; but the mass even of
intelligent Frenchmen stopped not to regard the wreck of their sea
power, of which those disastrous events were but the sign. Facts so
remote, and whose significance was not immediately apparent, were lost
to sight in the glare of dazzling deeds wrought close at hand. All
eyes were held by the splendid succession of victories in Italy and
Germany, by the extension of the republic to her natural limits at the
Rhine and the Alps, by the restoration of internal order, and by the
proudly dominant position accorded their ruler in the councils of the
Continent. To these was now added free access to the sea, wrung by the
same mighty hand—as was fondly believed—from the weakening of the great
Sea Power. At an extraordinary session of the Legislature, convoked to
give legal sanction to the treaties and measures of the government,
the Treaty of Amiens was presented last, as the crowning work of the
first consul; and it was used as the occasion for conferring upon him
a striking mark of public acknowledgment. After some hesitations, the
question was submitted to the nation whether his tenure of office
should be for life. The majority of votes cast were affirmative; and
on the 3d of August, 1802, the senate formally presented to him a
_senatus-consultum_, setting forth that "the French people names, and
the senate proclaims. Napoleon Bonaparte consul for life."

Bonaparte had not waited for this exaltation to continue his restless
political activity, destined soon to make waste paper of the Treaty of
Amiens. Great Britain having steadfastly refused to recognize the new
states set up by him in Italy, he argued she had forfeited all right to
interfere thenceforth in their concerns. From this he seems to have
advanced to the position that she had no further claim to mingle in the
affairs of the Continent at large. The consequent indifference shown
by him to British sentiment and interests, in continental matters,
was increased by his conviction that "in the existing state of Europe
England cannot reasonably make war, alone, against us;"[66] an opinion
whose open avowal in more offensive terms afterwards became the spark
to kindle the final great conflagration.

The treaty of Lunéville had provided that the German princes, who by
it lost territory on the west bank of the Rhine and in Italy, should
receive compensation elsewhere in the German empire; and it was agreed
that these indemnities should be made mainly at the expense of the
ecclesiastical principalities, where, the tenure being for life only,
least hardship would be involved. The difficulties attending these
distributions, and the fixed animosity between Prussia and Austria,
gave Bonaparte a fair pretext to intervene as mediator, and to guide
the final settlement upon lines which should diminish the relative
power and prestige of France's traditional enemy, Austria, and exalt
her rivals. In doing this he adroitly obtained the imposing support
of Russia, whose young sovereign readily accepted the nattering offer
of joint intervention; the more so that the princes allied to his
family might thus receive a disproportionate share of the spoils. Under
Bonaparte's skilful handling, the acquisitions of Prussia were so far
greater than those of Austria as to fulfil his prediction, that "the
empire of Germany should be really divided into two empires, since
its affairs will be arranged at two different centres."[67] After the
settlement he boasted that "the affairs of Germany had been arranged
entirely to the advantage of France and of her allies."[68] Great
Britain was not consulted; and her people, though silent, saw with
displeasure the weakening of their ally and the aggrandizement of a
state they held to be faithless as well as hostile. At the same time
bad feeling was further excited by the peremptory demands of Bonaparte
for the expulsion from England of certain French royalists, and for
the repression of the freedom of the British press in its attacks upon
himself. To these demands the British government declined to yield.

The reclamations of Bonaparte against the press, and his intervention
in German affairs, preceded the proclamation of the consulate for
life. It was followed at a short interval by the formal incorporation
with France of Piedmont and Elba, by decree dated September 11, 1802.
Piedmont had been organized as a French military department in April,
1801;[69] and Bonaparte had then secretly avowed the measure to be a
first step to annexation. The significance of the present action was
that it changed a condition which was _de facto_ only, and presumably
temporary, to one that was claimed to be _de jure_ and permanent. As
such, it was a distinct encroachment by France, much affecting the
states of the Continent, and especially Austria, against whose Italian
possessions Piedmont was meant to serve as a base of operations. The
adjacent Republic of Liguria, as the Genoese territory was then styled,
was also organized as a French military division,[70] and no security
existed against similar action there,—most injurious to British
commerce, and adding another to the transformation scenes passing
before the eyes of Europe. Nor was the material gain to France alone
considered; for, no compensation being given to the King of Sardinia
for the loss of his most important state, this consummated injury was
felt as a slight by both Great Britain and Russia, which had earnestly
sought some reparation for him. For the time, however, no remonstrance
was made by the ministry.

New offence was soon given, which, if not greater in degree, produced
all the effect of cumulative grievance. The little canton of Valais,
in south-western Switzerland, had in the spring of 1802 been forcibly
detached from the confederation and proclaimed independent, in order
to secure to the French the Simplon route passing through it to Italy;
a measure which, wrote Bonaparte, "joined to the exclusive right
of France to send her armies by that road, has changed the system
of war to be adopted in Italy."[71] No further open step was then
taken to control the affairs of Switzerland; but the French minister
was instructed to support secretly the party in sympathy with the
Revolution,[72] and an ominous sentence appeared in the message of the
first consul to the Legislature, May 6, 1802, that "the counsels of
the French government to the factions in Switzerland had so far been
ineffective. It is still hoped that the voice of wisdom and moderation
will command attention, and that the powers adjoining Helvetia will
not be forced to intervene to stifle troubles whose continuance would
threaten their own tranquillity."[73]

In Switzerland, perhaps more than in any other part of Europe, had
been realized the purpose, announced by the National Convention in
the celebrated decrees of November 19 and December 15, 1792, to
propagate by force changes in the government of countries where the
French armies could penetrate. Vast changes had indeed been made in
Belgium, Holland, and Italy; but these when first invaded were in
open war with France. The interference in Switzerland in 1798 had no
characteristic of serious war, for no means of opposition existed in
the invaded cantons. It was an armed intervention, undertaken by
the Directory under the impulsion of Bonaparte, avowedly to support
citizens of a foreign state "wishing to recover their liberty."[74] "As
soon as the signal was given by the entrance of the French armies in
1798 the rising was prompt and general;"[75] and was followed by the
adoption of a highly centralized constitution, for which the country
was unprepared. From that time forward agitation was incessant. Two
parties strove for the mastery; the one favoring the new order, known
as the Unitarians, whose sympathies were with the French Revolution,
the other the Aristocratic, which sought to return towards the former
Constitution, and looked for countenance and support to the older
governments of Europe. Between the two there was a central party of
more moderate opinions.

Having secured the Valais for France, Bonaparte in August, 1802,
withdrew the French troops till then maintained in Switzerland;
a politic measure tending to show Europe that he respected the
independence of the country guaranteed at Lunéville. The opposing
parties soon came to blows; and the nominal government of moderates,
which had obtained its authority by extra-constitutional action,[76]
found that it had on its side "neither the ardent patriots, who wished
absolute unity, nor the peaceable masses sufficiently well disposed
to the revolution, but who knew it only by the horrors of war and the
presence of foreign troops."[77] The aristocratic party got the upper
hand and established itself in the capital, whence the government was
driven. The latter appealed to Bonaparte to intervene; and after a
moment's refusal he decided to do so. "I will not," he said, "deliver
the formidable bastions of the Alps to fifteen hundred mercenaries
paid by England." A French colonel was sent as special envoy bearing
a proclamation, dated September 30, 1802, to command the oligarchic
government to dissolve and all armed assemblies to disperse. To support
this order, thirty thousand French soldiers, under General Ney, were
massed on the frontiers and soon entered the country. Before this show
of force all opposition in Switzerland at once ceased.

The emotion of Europe was profound; but of the great powers none
save Great Britain spoke. What to Bonaparte was a step necessary
to the supremacy of France, even though a violation of the treaty
of Lunéville, was, in the eyes of Englishmen, not only among the
ministry but among the most strenuous of the opposition, an oppressive
interference with "the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people
to recover their ancient laws and government, and to procure the
re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated not only
to be favorable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to
be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other
powers." The British cabinet expressed an unwillingness to believe that
there "would be any further attempt to control that independent nation
in the exercise of its undoubted rights."[78]

Despite this avowed confidence, the ministry on the same day, October
10, that this vigorous remonstrance was penned, dispatched a special
envoy with orders to station himself on the frontiers of Switzerland,
ascertain the disposition of the people, and assure them that, if
they were disposed to resist the French advance, Great Britain would
furnish them pecuniary succors. The envoy was carefully to refrain
from promoting resistance, if the Swiss did not spontaneously offer
it; but if they did, he was to give them every facility to obtain arms
and supplies. Being thus committed to a course which could scarcely
fail to lead to hostilities, the British ministry next bethought itself
to secure some conquests of the late war, for whose restitution, in
compliance with the treaty, orders had already gone forward. On the
17th of October dispatches were sent to the West Indies, to Dutch
Guiana, and to the Cape of Good Hope, directing that the French and
Dutch colonies ordered to be restored should be retained until further
instructions.

Upon receiving the British remonstrance, Bonaparte broke into furious
words mingled with threats. On the 23d of October he dictated
instructions to M. Otto, the French minister in London, which are
characterized even by M. Thiers as truly extraordinary. "He would not
deliver the Alps to fifteen hundred mercenaries paid by England. If
the British ministry, to support its parliamentary influence, should
intimate that there was anything the first consul had not done,
because he was prevented from doing it, that instant he would do it."
He scouted the danger to France from maritime war, and said plainly
that, if it arose, the coasts of Europe from Hanover to Taranto would
be occupied by French troops and closed to British commerce. "Liguria,
Lombardy, Switzerland and Holland would be converted into French
provinces, realizing the Empire of the Gauls." Great Britain herself
was threatened with invasion by a hundred thousand soldiers; and if,
to avert the danger, she succeeded in arousing another continental
war, "it would be England that forced us to conquer Europe. The first
consul was but thirty-three. He had as yet destroyed only states of
the second order. Who knows how long it would take him, if forced
thereto, to change again the face of Europe and revive the Empire of
the West?" The minister was directed to state to the British government
that the policy of France towards England was "the whole treaty of
Amiens; nothing but the treaty of Amiens." A week later the same phrase
was repeated in the Moniteur, the official journal, in an article
which expressly denied Great Britain's right to appeal to the treaty
of Lunéville, because she had refused to recognize the new states
constituted by it. M. Otto wisely withheld the provoking language of
the dispatch, but necessarily communicated the demand for the whole
treaty of Amiens and the refusal of aught not therein found. To this
the British minister of foreign affairs replied with the pregnant
words, "The state of the Continent when the treaty of Amiens was
signed, and nothing but that state." The two declarations created a
dead-lock, unless one party would recede.

Despite these explicit formulas both governments were somewhat in
the dark as to the extent of the dangers. The British ministry had
not heard all that Bonaparte said, and he was ignorant of the orders
sent to retain the captured colonies. Meanwhile, Swiss opposition
having failed, the British envoy to them was recalled; and on the
15th of November new instructions were sent to the Cape of Good Hope
and the West Indies, revoking those of the previous month to stop the
restitutions. It remained, however, a question whether the second
vessel would overtake the first. If she did not, the action of the
British ministry would transpire in an offensive way. Accordingly, when
Parliament met on the 23d of November, the king's speech took the color
of this perplexity, alluding somewhat enigmatically to the necessity
of watching the European situation and providing for security as well
as for peace. The debates which followed were tinged with the same
hue of uncertainty. The ministry could only say that its policy was
to preserve peace, if possible; but that, in view of recent events,
it must call upon the House and the country to entertain a spirit of
watchfulness.[79]

The Swiss affair was the turning-point in the relations of the two
countries. The first consul's vigilance had been lulled by the seeming
easy acquiescence of the British ministry in previous encroachments,
and the readiness with which, notwithstanding these, they had
surrendered their conquests and continued to fulfil the terms of the
treaty. Their present action not only exasperated, but aroused him.
The remonstrance ended in words; but, like the little trickle which
betrays the fissure in a dam, it betokened danger and gave warning
that the waters of strife were ready to burst through the untempered
barrier put together to restrain them, and again pour their desolating
flood over Europe. Bonaparte began to look carefully at the existing
situation, and found that the British troops had not yet quitted Egypt
nor surrendered Malta to the Order of St. John. Representations were
made on both these subjects, and the British government was pressed to
evacuate Malta.[80]

The ministry, however, were also alive to the gravity of the situation,
increased as it was by the orders, not yet known, to stop the
restitutions. To abandon Egypt to Turkey they had no objection; and
to the French ambassador's demand replied, on November 30, that the
failure to do so had resulted from a misunderstanding on the part of
the British commander-in-chief, to whom explicit instructions were
now sent. Regarding Malta, their feeling was very different. Honestly
intending to carry out the treaty, they had admitted the Neapolitan
garrison to the island, though not yet to the fortifications; and their
ambassadors to the Great Powers had been early directed to ask their
guarantee for the independence of the Order. The French government
did not instruct its representatives to do the same. Whether this was
due, as Thiers says, to the negligence of Talleyrand, or whether the
first consul preferred not to be troubled by the resistance of other
powers in case he again seized the island, the failure of France
to join in the application caused Russia and Prussia to defer their
answer to the British ambassadors. The joint request was not made to
Prussia until September, nor to the czar until November 3. By this time
the Swiss incident had come and gone, leaving behind it the state of
tension already described. Not till the 25th of the month did the czar
reply; and then, before giving his acquiescence, he required in the
organization of the island changes seriously affecting the object of
the treaty, which aimed to base its independence upon its own people
as well as upon guarantees. At Amiens it had been agreed that the
Order should be open to native Maltese, by whom also at least half the
government offices should be filled. Half the garrison likewise was
to be composed of natives. To these provisions the czar excepted. All
such points of interior organization were to be left to the decision of
the legal government of the Order;[81] i. e., of the Order as before
constituted.

The record of the ministry in the matter of Malta was so clear that
it could well afford to protract discussion on the points raised by
Russia. No cession made by the treaty had been more generally lamented
by Englishmen, keenly sensitive to all that affected their position
in the Mediterranean or threatened the approaches to India. In case
the peace which was its sole achievement failed, the ministry could
save from the wreck of its hopes no more welcome prize with which to
meet a disappointed people. Other valid objections to restoration were
not wanting. No Grand Master had yet accepted. Spain, notoriously
under Bonaparte's influence, had suppressed the revenues of the Order
within her limits. Similar action had followed elsewhere, and it was
argued that the income of the Order would not suffice to maintain the
defence of the island, nor consequently its independence. But, while
thus keeping its hold on Malta by diplomatic pleas, the ministry took
broader ground in its discussions with France. Its envoy there was
replaced by an ambassador of the highest rank, Lord Whitworth; who was
instructed to affirm explicitly Great Britain's right to interfere
in continental affairs, whenever in her judgment required by her own
interests, or those of Europe in general. He was also to point out the
various encroachments which had added to the influence and power of
France, and to intimate that these changes in the conditions since the
treaty had been concluded entitled Great Britain to compensations. The
annexation of Piedmont, the renunciation of the Grand Duke of Parma in
favor of France, the invasion of Switzerland, were specifically named
as making a most material alteration in the state of engagements since
the conclusion of the definitive treaty. Attention was also called to
the fact that although, by a convention signed in August, 1801, French
troops were to remain in Holland only until the conclusion of peace
between Great Britain and France, they had not yet been withdrawn,
thus violating the independence of the Batavian republic guaranteed
at Lunéville. The ambassador was warned, however, not to commit the
government to any specific determinations, and especially on the
subject of Malta.[82]

The ministers, therefore, were still undecided. They had climbed upon
the fence, but were prepared to get down again on the side whence
they had started, if a fair opportunity were given. Unfortunately for
the interests of peace, Bonaparte, in the madness of his strength,
either exaggerating the weakness of the ministry or underestimating
the impulsion it could receive from popular feeling, proceeded
deliberately to arouse the spirit which he was never again able to
lay. On the 30th of January, 1803, was published in the "Moniteur"
Colonel Sébastiani's famous report of his mission to the Levant.
Sébastiani had been dispatched in a frigate the previous September, to
visit Tripoli, Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian islands, and ascertain the
political and military conditions. His report was in the main a fulsome
narrative of the reverence in which the first consul was said to be
held by the Eastern peoples; but, upon the very detailed account of the
indifference to military preparations, followed the startling statement
that "six thousand French troops would now suffice to conquer Egypt."
The Ionian islands were also pronounced ready to declare themselves
French at the first opportunity. Finally, General Stuart, commanding
the British troops in Alexandria, was accused of seeking to compass
Sébastiani's murder by sending to the Pasha a copy of a general order
issued by Bonaparte when in Egypt.

The exasperation such a paper would excite in Great Britain was so
obvious, that its publication has been attributed to the deliberate
design to provoke a maritime war; under cover of which the first
consul could, without open humiliation, abandon the enterprise against
Haïti.[83] The first and general success of the French troops in that
colony had been followed by a frightful pestilence of yellow fever;
after which the negroes in every quarter again rose and defied the
weakened bands of their enemies. On the 8th of January the "Moniteur"
published the death of Leclerc, the commander-in-chief, with an account
of the ravages of the disease. It was indeed painfully apparent that
the colony could not be regained, and utilized, without an expenditure
of life impossible to afford;[84] but the fever itself was an excuse
even more potent than the British navy for abandoning the attempt
without military dishonor. To penetrate the real motives of a spirit
so subtle and unscrupulous as Bonaparte's is hopeless; nor can
dependence be placed upon the statements of his brothers Lucien and
Joseph, who are the sole authorities for the purpose thus alleged for
the publication. There seems little cause to seek another reason than
the same truculent arrogance manifested in his instructions to Otto of
October 23, and the success which his past experience had taught him to
expect from bluster. The secret mission to Prussia of his confidential
aid, Duroc, six weeks later, clearly indicates that the result had
disappointed him and that he did not want war,—at least as yet.[85]
Duroc was instructed to see the king personally and say that, if war
broke out, French troops would occupy Hanover, a step known to be
particularly obnoxious to Prussia, who wished herself to absorb it. Her
repugnance was to be used as a lever, to induce intervention with Great
Britain to evacuate Malta.[86]

Bonaparte in truth was less interested in the West than in the East,
whose vast populations, vivid history, and fabled riches struck his
imagination far more forcibly than the unpeopled wildernesses of
America. Access to the East, as to the West, was perforce by water,
and so controlled by the power that ruled the sea; but the way by the
Levant was shorter, evasion therefore easier. Malta, Taranto, the
Ionian islands, the Morea were gateways to the East. The last three,
as practically continental,[87] he considered to be within his own
grasp; the first alone could be readily and securely held by the Power
of the Seas. From it therefore he sought to hasten her. On the 27th of
January Talleyrand, "with great solemnity and by express order of the
first consul," required of Lord Whitworth to inform him what were his
Majesty's intentions regarding the evacuation of Malta. No reply was
given, except a promise to report the conversation.[88] On the 30th
was issued Sébastiani's report, whose scarcely veiled threats against
British interests in the East might perhaps induce a weak government to
propitiate the first consul by compliance.

If so meant, the attempt was miscalculated. The British ministry
replied that, despite his just claim for compensation, the king would
have withdrawn his force from Malta, when the clauses of the treaty
affecting it were fulfilled; but that, in view of Sébastiani's report,
he would not do so until substantial security was provided against
the purposes therein revealed. From that time forward letters and
interviews followed in rapid succession, the British ministry gradually
stiffening in its attitude concerning the island. On the 20th of
February Bonaparte gave a fresh provocation which deeply stirred the
British people, although no notice was taken of it by the ministry. In
a message sent that day to the legislature, he declared the certainty
of continental peace; but concerning Great Britain he continued: "Two
parties there strive for power. One has made peace and wishes to keep
it; the other has sworn implacable hatred to France.... Whatever the
success of intrigue in London, it will not drag other nations into new
leagues, and this government says with just pride: 'England, alone,
cannot to-day contend against France.'"

On March 8 the British government sent a message to Parliament, that,
in consequence of military preparations going on in the ports of France
and Holland, the king judged expedient to adopt additional measures
of precaution for the security of his dominions. It is fair to say
that these preparations were not on a scale by themselves to warrant
the proposed action; which was asserted by critics of the ministry to
be due to information of transactions at the Cape of Good Hope. This
had already been delivered to the Dutch authorities when the orders
countermanding the restitution arrived; but the British commander
had adroitly repossessed himself of the works. This news reached
London early in March; and the proposed armaments were thought to be
precautions rather against Bonaparte's action, when he too heard it,
than against the existing movements in French or Dutch ports.

From this time forward Great Britain rather than France was aggressive.
Receiving no explanation upon the grievances advanced, Lord Whitworth
was on the 4th of April instructed to say that, if the French
government continued to evade discussion about compensations due for
its aggressions on the Continent and satisfaction for Sébastiani's
report, and yet demanded the evacuation of Malta, he should declare
that relations of amity could not continue to exist, and that he must
leave Paris within a certain time. If they were willing to discuss, he
was instructed to propose the cession of Malta in perpetuity to Great
Britain and the evacuation of Holland and Switzerland by French troops;
in return for which Great Britain would confirm Elba to France and
acknowledge the kingdom of Etruria. If a satisfactory arrangement were
made in Italy for the king of Sardinia, she would further acknowledge
the Italian and Ligurian republics. The first consul replied that
he would sooner see the British on the heights of Montmartre than
in the possession of Malta. Some futile efforts were made to find a
middle term; but the ministry having insisted, as its ultimatum,
upon occupying the island for at least ten years, the ambassador
demanded his passports and left Paris on the 12th of May. On the 16th
Great Britain declared war against France. The following day Admiral
Cornwallis sailed from Plymouth with ten ships-of-the-line, and two
days later appeared off Brest, resuming the watch of that port. On the
afternoon of the 18th Nelson hoisted his flag on board the "Victory" at
Portsmouth, and on the 20th sailed for the Mediterranean, there to take
the chief command.

Thus again, after a brief intermission, began the strife between
Great Britain and France, destined during its twelve years' course
to involve successively all the powers of Europe, from Portugal to
Russia, from Turkey to Sweden. On the land, state after state went
down before the great soldier who wielded the armies of France and the
auxiliary legions of subject countries, added to her standards by his
policy. Victory after victory graced his eagles, city after city and
province after province were embodied in his empire, peace after peace
was wrested from the conquered; but one enemy remained ever erect,
unsubdued, defiant; and on the ocean there was neither peace nor truce,
until the day when he himself fell under the hosts of foes, aroused by
his vain attempt to overthrow, through their sufferings, the power that
rested upon the seas.

The debates in the House of Commons revealed an agreement of sentiment
unparalleled in the former war. Differences of opinion there were. A
very few thought that hostilities might even yet be averted, while
others argued bitterly that, had Bonaparte's first encroachments been
resisted, the nation might have been spared, if not war, at least
humiliation. But, while both groups condemned the administration, the
one for precipitation, the other for pusillanimous and protracted
submission, both agreed that just occasion for war had been given. As
usual, opposition took the form of an amendment to the address, which,
while carefully excluding any approval of the ministry, still "assured
his Majesty of our firm determination to co-operate with his Majesty
in calling forth the resources of the United Kingdom for the vigorous
prosecution of the war in which we are involved." The proposer, Mr.
Grey—one of the most strenuous opponents of the former war—was careful
to say that, though he objected to some points of the late negotiation,
he acknowledged the necessity of resisting the spirit of encroachment
shown by France. Even for this very qualified disapproval of a ministry
in whose capacity none had confidence, there could in this grave crisis
be found only 67 votes, against 398 who preferred not to weaken, by an
apparent discord, the unanimous voice. Having regard to the reasons
for their dissent urged by the various speakers, the result disposes
forever of the vain assertion that Great Britain feared to meet France
alone. The solemn decision was not taken blindfold nor in haste. The
exorbitant power of Bonaparte, the impossibility of allies, the burden
that must be borne, were all quoted and faced; and Mr. Pitt, who
then spoke for the first time in many months, while fully supporting
the war, warned the members in his stately periods of the arduous
struggle before them. "In giving their assurances he trusted that
other gentlemen felt impressed with the same sense which he did of
the awful importance of the engagement into which they were preparing
to enter; and that they considered those assurances, not as formal
words of ceremony or custom, but as a solemn and deliberate pledge, on
behalf of themselves and of the nation whom they represented,—knowing
and feeling to their full extent the real difficulties and dangers of
their situation, and being prepared to meet those difficulties and
dangers with every exertion and every sacrifice which the unexampled
circumstances of the times rendered indispensable for the public
safety.... The scale of our exertions could not be measured by those
of former times, or confined within the limits even of the great, and
till then unexampled, efforts of the last war."[89]

In the same speech Pitt correctly and explicitly indicated the two
methods by which France might seek to subdue Great Britain. "If they
indulge themselves in any expectation of success in the present
contest, it is built chiefly on the supposition (1) that they can
either break the spirit and shake the determination of the country by
harassing us with perpetual apprehension of descent upon our coasts, or
(2) that they can impair our resources and undermine our credit, by the
effects of an expensive and protracted contest." Not to one only, but
to both of these means did Bonaparte resort, on a scale proportioned to
his comprehensive genius and his mighty resources. For the invasion of
England preparations were at once begun, so extensive and so thorough
as to indicate not a mere threat, but a fixed purpose; and at the
same time measures were taken to close to Great Britain the markets
of the Continent, as well as to harass her commerce by the ordinary
operations of maritime war. Trafalgar marked the term when all thought
of invasion disappeared, and was succeeded by the vast combinations of
the Continental System, itself but an expansion of the former measures
of exclusion. Framed to impair the resources and sap the credit of
Great Britain, this stupendous fabric, upheld, not by the cohesion of
its parts, but by the dextrous balancing of an ever watchful policy,
overtaxed the skill and strength of its designer, and crushed him in
its fall.




CHAPTER XV.

THE TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN TO THE SPANISH DECLARATION OF WAR. MAY,
1803—DECEMBER, 1804.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION OF ENGLAND.—THE GREAT
FLOTILLA.—NAPOLEON'S MILITARY AND NAVAL COMBINATIONS AND BRITISH NAVAL
STRATEGY.—ESSENTIAL UNITY OF NAPOLEON'S PURPOSE.—CAUSES OF SPANISH WAR.


Although Great Britain and France had each, up to the last moment,
hoped to retain peace upon its own terms, preparations for war had gone
on rapidly ever since the king's message of March 8. Immediately upon
issuing this, couriers were dispatched to the various sea-ports, with
orders to impress seamen for the numerous ships hastily ordered into
commission. Some details have come down giving a vivid presentment of
that lawless proceeding known as a "hot press," at this period when it
was on the point of disappearing. "About 7 P. M. yesterday," says the
Plymouth report of March 10, "the town was alarmed with the marching
of several bodies of Royal Marines in parties of twelve or fourteen
each, with their officers and a naval officer, armed. So secret were
the orders kept that they did not know the nature of the service on
which they were going, until they boarded the tier of colliers at the
new quay, and other gangs the ships at Catwater, the Pool and the
gin-shops. A great number of prime seamen were taken out and sent
on board the admiral's ship. In other parts of the town, and in all
the receiving and gin-shops at Dock, several hundreds of seamen and
landsmen were picked up. By returns this morning it appears that
upwards of four hundred useful hands were pressed last night. One gang
entered the Dock theatre and cleared the whole gallery except the
women." Parties of seamen and marines were placed across all roads
leading out of the towns, to intercept fugitives. In Portsmouth the
colliers were stripped so clean of men that they could not put to
sea; while frigates and smaller vessels swept the Channel and other
sea-approaches to the kingdom, stopping all merchant ships, and taking
from them a part of their crews. The whole flotilla of trawl-boats
fishing off the Eddystone, forty in number, were searched, and two
hands taken from each. Six East India ships, wind-bound off Plymouth
on their outward voyage, were boarded by armed boats and robbed of
three hundred seamen, till then unaware that a rupture with France was
near.[90]

Bonaparte on his side had been no less active, although he sought by
the secrecy of his movements to avert alarm and postpone, if possible,
the war which for his aims was premature. Orders were given that
re-enforcements for the colonies should go forward rapidly, ere peace
was broken. No ships-of-the-line or frigates should henceforth go with
them; and those already abroad were for the most part at once recalled.
Troops were concentrated on the coasts of Holland and Flanders; and
the flat-boats built in the last war with a view to invading England
were assembled quietly in the Scheldt and the Channel ports. Plans were
studied for the harassment of British commerce. On the 9th of April was
commanded the armament of the shores, from the Scheldt westward to the
Somme, a distance of one hundred and twenty miles, which afterwards
became, to use Marmont's vivid expression, "a coast of iron and
bronze." A few days later Elba and all the coasts and islands of France
were ordered fortified; and the first consul's aides-de-camp sped north
and east and west, to see and report the state of preparation in all
quarters.

One affair of great importance still remained to arrange. The
smaller French islands in the East and West Indies could be held in
subjection by a moderate number of troops, who could also resist for a
considerable time any attempt of the British, unless on a very large
scale. This was not the case with Haïti or Louisiana. In the former
the French, reduced by the fever, were now shut up in a few sea-ports;
communication between which, being only by water, must cease when the
maritime war broke out. Between the blacks within and the British
without, the loss of the island was therefore certain. Louisiana
had not yet been occupied. Whatever its unknown possibilities, the
immediate value to France of this possession, so lately regained, was
as a source of supplies to Haïti, dependent for many essentials upon
the American continent. With the fall of the island the colony on the
mainland became useless. Its cession by Spain to France had at once
aroused the jealousy, with which, from colonial days, the people of
the United States have viewed any political interference by European
nations on the American continent, even when involving only a transfer
from one power to another. In the dire straits of the Revolution, when
the need of help from abroad was so great, they had been careful to
insert in the Treaty of Alliance with France an express stipulation,
that she would not acquire for herself any of the possessions of Great
Britain on the mainland; having then in view Canada and the Floridas.
This feeling was intensified when, as now, the change of ownership was
from a weak and inert state like Spain to one so powerful as France,
with the reputation for aggressiveness that was fast gathering around
the name of Bonaparte.

The fear and anger of the American people increased with the reserve
shown by the French government, in replying to the questions of their
minister in Paris, who asked repeatedly, but in vain, for assurances
as to the navigation of the Mississippi; and the excitement reached
a climax when in November, 1802, news was received that the Spanish
authorities in New Orleans had refused to American citizens the right
of deposit, conceded by the treaty of 1795 with Spain. This was
naturally attributed to Bonaparte's influence, and the inhabitants of
the upper Mississippi valley were ready to resort to arms to enforce
their rights.

Such was the threatening state of affairs in America, while war with
Great Britain was fast drawing on. Bonaparte was not the man to
recede before a mere menace of hostilities in the distant wilderness
of Louisiana; but it was plain that, in case of rupture with Great
Britain, any possessions of France on the Gulf of Mexico were sure to
fall either to her or to the Americans, if he incurred the enmity of
the latter. It was then believed in Washington that France had also
acquired from Spain the Floridas, which contained naval ports essential
to the defence of Louisiana. On the 12th of April, 1803, arrived in
Paris Mr. Monroe, sent by Jefferson as envoy extraordinary, to treat,
in conjunction with the regular minister to France, for the cession of
the Floridas and of the island of New Orleans to the United States; the
object of the latter being to secure the Mississippi down to its mouth
as their western boundary. Monroe's arrival was most opportune. Lord
Whitworth had five days before communicated the message of the British
cabinet that, unless the French government was prepared to enter into
the required explanations, relations of amity could not exist, and at
the same time the London papers were discussing a proposition to raise
fifty thousand men to take New Orleans.[91] Three days later, April
10, the first consul decided to sell Louisiana;[92] and Monroe upon
his arrival had only to settle the terms of the bargain, which did
not indeed realize the precise object of his mission, but which gave
to his country control of the west bank of the Mississippi throughout
its course, and of both banks from its mouth nearly to Baton Rouge,
a distance of over two hundred miles. The treaty, signed April 30,
1803, gave to the United States "the whole of Louisiana as Spain had
possessed it," for the sum of eighty million francs. Thus the fear of
Great Britain's sea power was the determining factor[93] to sweep the
vast region known as Louisiana, stretching from the Gulf toward Canada,
and from the Mississippi toward Mexico, with ill-defined boundaries in
either direction, into the hands of the United States, and started the
latter on that course of expansion to the westward which has brought
her to the shores of the Pacific.

Having thus relinquished a position he could not defend, and, as far as
in him lay, secured the French possessions beyond the sea, Bonaparte
could now give his whole attention to the plans for subjugating the
British Islands which had long been ripening in his fertile brain.

It was from the first evident that Great Britain, having in the
three kingdoms but fifteen million inhabitants, could not invade the
territory of France with its population of over twenty-five millions.
This was the more true because the demands of her navy, of her great
mercantile shipping, and of a manufacturing and industrial system not
only vast but complex, so that interference with parts would seriously
derange the whole, left for recruiting the British armies a fraction,
insignificant when compared with the resources in men of France; where
capital and manufactures, commerce and shipping, had disappeared,
leaving only an agricultural peasantry, upon which the conscription
could freely draw without materially increasing the poverty of the
country, or deranging a social system essentially simple.

This seeming inability to injure France gave rise to the sarcastic
remark, that it was hardly worth while for a country to go to war
in order to show that it could put itself in a good posture for
defence. This, however, was a very superficial view of the matter.
Great Britain's avowed reason for war was the necessity—forced upon a
reluctant ministry and conceded by a bitter opposition—of resisting
encroachments by a neighboring state. Of these, on the Continent, part
had already occurred and were, for the time at least, irremediable; but
there had also been clearly revealed the purpose of continuing similar
encroachments, in regions whose tenure by an enemy would seriously
compromise her colonial empire. To prevent this, Great Britain, by
declaring war, regained her belligerent rights, and so resumed at
once that control of the sea which needed only them to complete. She
pushed her sway up to every point of her enemy's long coast-line; and
following the strategy of the previous war, under the administration
of the veteran seaman who had imparted to it such vigor, she prevented
her enemy from combining any great operation, by which her world-wide
dominion could be shaken or vital injury be inflicted at any point.
The British squadrons, hugging the French coasts and blocking the
French arsenals, were the first line of the defence, covering British
interests from the Baltic to Egypt, the British colonies in the four
quarters of the globe, and the British merchantmen which whitened every
sea.

This was the defensive gain in a war whose motive was essentially
defensive. Offensively Great Britain, by the suddenness with which she
forced the issue, dealt a blow whose weight none understood better
than Bonaparte. That he meant war eventually is most probable. His
instructions to Decaen, Captain-General of the French East Indies,
dated January 15, 1803, speak of the possibility of war by September,
1804; but how little the bravado of Sébastiani's report indicated a
wish for an immediate rupture, is shown by the secret message sent to
Andréossy in London, on the very day Whitworth left Paris. Despite
the bluster about his willingness to see Great Britain on Montmartre
rather than in Malta, he then wrote: "Direct General Andréossy that
when he is assured the accompanying note has been communicated to
the English government, he cause it to be understood through Citizen
Schimmelpenninck _or by any other indirect means_, that if England
absolutely rejects the proposition of giving Malta to one of the
guaranteeing powers, we would not here be averse from accepting that
England should retain Malta for ten years, and France should occupy
the peninsula of Otranto. _It is important, if this proposition has no
chance of success, that no communication be made leaving any trace_;
and that we here may always be able to _deny that this government could
have adhered to this proposition_."[94] Bonaparte understood perfectly
that Great Britain, by forcing his hand, had struck down the French
navy before it had begun to rise. "Peace," he said, "is necessary to
restore a navy,—peace to fill our arsenals empty of material, and
peace because then only the one drill-ground for fleets, the sea,
is open." "Ships, colonies, commerce," the wants he avowed later at
Ulm, were swept away by the same blow. How distressed the finances
of France, how devoid of credit, none knew better than he, who then,
as throughout his rule, was engaged in keeping up the quotations by
government manipulation; and the chief of all sources of wealth,
maritime commerce, was crushed by the sea power of Great Britain, which
thenceforth coiled closely and with ever tightening compression round
the coasts of France.

Bonaparte could not indeed realize the full extent of the injury that
would be done. Impatient of obstacles, he refused to see that the
construction of the flotilla to invade England would devour the scanty
material for ship-building, occupy all the workmen, and so stop the
growth of the real navy. Even when built, the ever-recurring demand
for repairs drained the dockyards of mechanics.[95] Nor could he
foresee how completely Great Britain, by reviving the Rule of 1756 in
all its rigor, and by replying to each blow from the land by one yet
heavier from the sea, would cut off the resources of France and destroy
her as a fortress falls by blockade. Unsparing ridicule has been heaped
upon Pitt for predicting the break-down of the French Revolution, in
its aggressive military character, by financial distress; but in fact
Pitt, though he underestimated the time necessary and did not look
for the vast system of spoliation which supplied the lack of regular
income, was a true prophet. The republic had already devoured an
immense capital;[96] and when the conquering spirit it ever displayed
reached its natural culmination in Bonaparte, the constantly recurring
need of money drove him on from violence to violence till it ended in
his ruin. This penury was caused directly by the maritime war, which
shut France off from commerce beyond the seas; and indirectly by the
general prostration of business in Europe and consequent poverty of
consumers, due to their isolation from the sea, enforced by Bonaparte
as the only means of wearing out Great Britain.

In 1798, when the Peace of Campo Formio had left France face to face
with Great Britain alone, the question of invading the latter had
naturally arisen; but Bonaparte easily convinced himself and the
Directory that the attempt was impossible with any naval force that
could at that time be raised. He then pointed out that there were two
other principal ways of injuring the enemy: one by occupying Hanover
and Hamburg, through which British trade entered the Continent; the
other by seizing Egypt as a base of operations against India. These two
were somewhat of the nature of a flank attack; and the former being
in the then state of the Continent inexpedient,—for both Hamburg
and Hanover were included in the North German neutrality under the
guarantee of Prussia, while Austria was by no means so reduced as in
1803,—the expedition against Egypt was determined. Whatever personal
motives may then have influenced Bonaparte, that undertaking, from the
military point of view and in the then condition of the Mediterranean,
was well conceived; and, while allowing for a large amount of good
luck, the measure of success achieved must be ascribed to the
completeness and secrecy of his preparations, as the final failure must
to the sea power of Great Britain.

In 1803 Bonaparte found himself no longer a simple general, under
a weak and jealous government upon whose co-operation he could not
certainly depend, but an absolute ruler wielding all the resources of
France. He resolved therefore to strike straight at the vital centre
of the British power, by a direct invasion of the British Islands. The
very greatness of the peril in crossing the Channel, and in leaving
it between him and his base, was not without a certain charm for his
adventurous temper; but, while willing to take many a risk for so great
an end, he left to chance nothing for which he himself could provide.
The plan for the invasion was marked by the comprehensiveness of view
and the minute attention to detail which distinguished his campaigns;
and the preparations were on a scale of entire adequacy, which he never
failed to observe when the power to do so was in his hands.

For these in their grandeur, however, time was needed; but the first
consul was ready to move at once, as far as was possible to land
forces, upon the two flanks of the British position. On the 26th of May
a corps under General Mortier entered Hanover; while a few days later
another corps, under General St. Cyr, passed through the Papal States
into the kingdom of Naples, and resumed possession of the peninsula
of Otranto with the ports of Brindisi and Taranto. From the latter
the Ionian islands, the Morea, and Egypt, were all threatened; and the
position kept alive, as in the deep strategy of Napoleon it was meant
to do, the anxiety of Nelson concerning those points and the Levant
generally. Upon this distraction of the greatest British admiral,
justified as it was by the enemy's undoubted purposes in the eastern
Mediterranean, depended a decisive part of Bonaparte's combination
against Great Britain.

In Hanover British trade was struck. This German electorate of George
III. bordered on both the Elbe and the Weser, in the lower part of
their course; by occupying it France controlled the two great rivers
and excluded from them all British goods. The act was censured as
infringing the neutrality of Germany. Bonaparte justified it by the
hostile character of the elector as king of Great Britain; but no
such plea could be advanced for the occupation of Cuxhaven, the port
of Hamburg, which lay on the Elbe outside Hanover. Triple offence was
given to Prussia. Her ambition to figure as the guardian of North
German neutrality was affronted, her particular wish to control Hanover
slighted, and her trade most injuriously affected. To the exclusion of
British goods Great Britain replied by blockading the mouths of the
rivers, suffering no ships to pass where her own were not allowed, and
holding Germany responsible for permitting a breach of its neutrality
injurious to herself. The commerce of Hamburg and Bremen was thus
stopped; and as they were the brokers who received and distributed the
manufactures of Prussia, the blow was felt throughout the kingdom. The
distress among the workmen was so wide-spread that the king had to
come to their relief, and many wealthy men lost half their incomes. In
addition to the advantages of position obtained in Hanover and Naples,
Napoleon threw on these two neutral states the charge of supporting
the corps quartered on them, amounting to some thirty thousand men in
Hanover and half that number in Naples. Holland, against which as the
ally of France[97] Great Britain also declared war, had to maintain
a somewhat larger force. By such expedients Bonaparte eased his own
finances at the expense of neutral or dependent countries; but he was
not therefore more beloved.

To invade Great Britain there had first to be concentrated round a
chosen point the great armies required to insure success, and the
very large number of vessels needed to transport them. Other corps,
more or less numerous, destined to further the principal movement by
diversions in different directions, distracting the enemy's attention,
might embark at distant ports and sail independently of the main
body; but for the latter it was necessary to start together and land
simultaneously, in mass, at a given point of the English coast. To this
principal effort Bonaparte destined one hundred and thirty thousand
men; of whom one hundred thousand should form the first line and
embark at the same hour from four different ports, which lay within a
length of twenty miles on the Channel coast. The other thirty thousand
constituted the reserve, and were to sail shortly after the first.

To carry any such force at once, in ordinary sea-going vessels of that
day, was impracticable. The requisite number could not be had, and
there was no French Channel port where they could safely lie. Even were
these difficulties overcome, and the troops embarked together, the mere
process of getting under way would entail endless delays, the vessels
dependent upon sail could not keep together, and the only conditions
of wind under which they could move at all would expose them to be
scattered and destroyed by the British navy, which would have the same
power of motion, and to which Bonaparte could oppose no equal force.
The very gathering of so many helpless sailing transports would betray
the place where the French navy must concentrate, and where therefore
the hostile ships would assemble at the first indication of a combined
movement. Finally, such transports must anchor at some distance from
the British coast and the troops land from them in boats, an additional
operation both troublesome and dangerous.

For these reasons the crossing must be made in vessels not dependent
upon sail alone, but capable of being moved by oars. They must
therefore be small and of very light draught, which would allow them
to shelter in the shallow French harbors and be beached upon reaching
the English coast, so that the troops could land directly from them. It
was possible that a number of such vessels once started, and favored
by fog or calm, might pass unseen, or even in defiance of the enemy's
ships-of-war, lying helpless to attack through want of wind. It was
upon this possibility that Bonaparte sought to fix the attention of the
British government. As the occupation of Taranto and the movements in
Italy were designed to divert Nelson's attention to the Levant, so the
ostentatious preparation of the great flotilla to pass unsupported was
meant to conceal the real purpose of supporting it. To concentrate the
apprehensions of the British authorities upon the flotilla, to draw
their eyes away from the naval ports in which lay the French squadrons,
and then to unite the latter in the Channel, controlling it for a
measurable time by a great fleet, was the grand combination by which
Bonaparte hoped to insure the triumphant crossing of the army and the
conquest of England. He kept it, however, in his own breast; a profound
secret only gradually revealed to the very few men intrusted with its
execution.

To create and organize the flotilla and the army of invasion was
the first task. Preparations so extensive and rapid demanded all the
resources of France. To build at the same time the thousand and more
of boats, each of which should carry from sixty to a hundred soldiers,
besides from two to four heavy cannon for its own defence, overpassed
the powers of any single port. Far in the interior of France, on the
banks of the numerous streams running toward the Channel and the Bay of
Biscay, as well as in all the little coast harbors themselves, hosts of
men were busily working. The North Sea and Holland were also required
to furnish their quota. At the same time measures were taken to
facilitate their passage in safety to the point of concentration, which
was fixed at Boulogne, and to harbor them commodiously upon arrival.
They could from their light draught run close along shore, and from
their construction be beached without harm. Within easy gunshot of the
coast, therefore, lay the road they followed in their passages, which
were commonly made in bodies of thirty to sixty, and from port to port,
till the journey's end. To support the movements, sea-coast batteries
were established at short intervals; under which, if hard pressed, they
could take refuge. In addition there were organized in each maritime
district batteries of field artillery, which stood ready to drive at
once to the scene of action in case the enemy attacked. "One field-gun
to every league of coast is the least allowance," wrote Bonaparte.
In the early months of the war great importance was attached by the
British to harassing these voyages and impeding the concentration, but
the attempt was soon abandoned. The boats, if endangered, anchored
under the nearest guns, infantry and horse-artillery summoned by the
coast-telegraph hurried to the scene, and the enemy's vessels soon
found the combined resistance too strong. Ordinarily, indeed, the
coastwise movement of a division of the flotilla was a concerted
operation, in which all the arms, afloat and ashore, assisted. In
extreme cases the vessels were beached, and British seamen fought hand
to hand with French soldiers for possession; rarely, however, with
success. "The cause of our flotilla not having succeeded in destroying
the gun-vessels of the enemy," wrote Lord St. Vincent, "did not arise
from their draught of water, but from the powerful batteries on the
coast." The concentration, though accomplished less swiftly than
Bonaparte's eagerness demanded, was little impeded by the British.

The port of Boulogne, near the eastern end of the English Channel, lies
on a strip of coast which runs due south from the Straits of Dover to
the mouth of the Somme, a distance of about fifty miles. It is a tidal
harbor, the mouth of a little river called the Liane, on the north side
of which the town is built. In it even boats of small draught then
lay aground at low water; and its capacity at high water was limited.
Extensive excavations were therefore ordered to be made by the soldiers
encamped in the neighborhood, who received extra wages for the work.
When finished, the port presented a double basin; the outer, oblong,
bordering the river bed on either side of the channel, which was left
clear; the inner of semi-circular form, dug out of the flats opposite
the town and connected with the former by a narrow passage. Both were
lined with quays, alongside which the vessels of the flotilla lay
in tiers, sometimes nine deep; and in July, 1805, when the hour for
the last and greatest of Napoleon's naval combinations was at hand,
and Trafalgar itself in the near distance, Boulogne sheltered over a
thousand gunboats and transports ready to carry forty thousand men to
the shores of England. North and south, not only the neighborhood of
the harbor but the whole coast bristled with cannon; and opposite the
entrance rose a powerful work, built upon piles, to protect the vessels
when going out and also when anchored outside. For here was one of the
great difficulties of the undertaking. So many boats could not pass
out through the narrow channel during one high water. Two tides at
the least, that is, twenty-four hours, were needed, granting the most
perfect organization and most accurate movement. Half of the flotilla
therefore must lie outside for some hours; and it was not to be
expected that the British cruisers would allow so critical a moment to
pass unimproved, unless deterred by the protection which the foresight
of Bonaparte had provided.

North of Boulogne and within five miles of it were two other much
smaller harbors, likewise tidal, called Vimereux and Ambleteuse; and
to the south, twelve miles distant, a third, named Étaples. Though
insignificant, the impossibility of enlarging Boulogne to hold the
whole flotilla compelled Bonaparte to develop these, and they together
held some seven hundred more gun-vessels and transports. From the
three, sixty-two thousand soldiers were to embark; and from each of
the four ports a due proportion of field artillery, ammunition and
other supplies were to go forward. Some six thousand horses were also
to be transported; but the greater part of the cavalry took only their
saddles and bridles, looking to find mounts in the enemy's country. In
the North Sea ports, Calais, Dunkirk, and Ostend, the flotilla numbered
four hundred, the troops twenty-seven thousand, the horses twenty-five
hundred. These formed the reserve, to follow the main body closely, but
apart from it. In the end they also were moved to the Boulogne coast;
and their boats, after some sharp fighting with British cruisers,
joined the main flotilla in the four Channel ports.

To handle such a mass of men upon the battle-field is a faculty to
which few generals, after years of experience, attain. To effect the
passage of a broad river with an army of that size, before a watchful
enemy of equal force, is a delicate operation. To cross an arm of
the sea nearly forty miles wide—for such was the distance separating
Boulogne and its sister ports from the intended place of landing,
between Dover and Hastings—in the face of a foe whose control of the
sea was for the most part undisputed, was an undertaking so bold that
men still doubt whether Napoleon meant it; but he assuredly did. For
success he looked to the perfect organization and drill of the army
and the flotilla, which by practice in embarking and moving should
be able to seize, without an hour's delay, the favorable moment he
hoped to provide by the great naval combination concealed in his
brain. This combination, modified and expanded as the months rolled
by, but remaining essentially the same, was the germ whence sprang
the intricate and stirring events recorded in this and the following
chapters,—events obscured to most men by the dazzling lustre of
Trafalgar.

     [Between the penning and the publishing of this very positive
     assertion of the author's convictions, he has met renewed
     expressions of doubts as to Napoleon's purpose, based upon his
     words to Metternich in 1810,[98] as well as upon the opinions
     of persons more or less closely connected with the emperor. As
     regards the incident recorded by Metternich—it is not merely
     an easy way of overcoming a difficulty, but the statement of
     a simple fact, to say that no reliance can be placed upon any
     avowal of Napoleon's as to his intentions, unless corroborated
     by circumstances. That the position at Boulogne was well chosen
     for turning his arms against Austria at a moment's notice, is
     very true; but it is likewise true that, barring the power of the
     British navy, it was equally favorable to an invasion of England.
     What then does this amount to, but that the great captain, as
     always in his career, met a strategic exigency arising from the
     existence of two dangers in divergent directions, by taking a
     central position, whence he could readily turn his arms against
     either before the other came up?

     The considerations that to the author possess irresistible force
     are: (1) that Napoleon actually did undertake the almost equally
     hazardous expedition to Egypt; (2) that he saw, with his clear
     intuition, that, if he did not accept the risk of being destroyed
     with his army in crossing the Channel, Great Britain would in the
     end overwhelm him by her sea power, and that therefore, extreme
     as was the danger of destruction in one case, it was less than in
     the other alternative,—an argument further developed in the later
     portions of this work. (3) Inscrutable as are the real purposes
     of so subtle a spirit, the author holds with Thiers and Lanfrey,
     that it is impossible to rise from the perusal of Napoleon's
     correspondence during these thirty months, without the conviction
     that so sustained a deception as it would contain—on the
     supposition that the invasion was not intended—would be impossible
     even to him. It may also be remarked that the Memoirs of Marmont
     and Ney, who commanded corps in the Army of Invasion, betray no
     doubt of a purpose which the first explicitly asserts; nor does
     the life of Marshal Davout, another corps commander, record any
     such impression on his part.[99]]

[Illustration: North Atlantic Ocean.]

Meanwhile that period of waiting from May, 1803, to August, 1805, when
the tangled net of naval and military movements began to unravel, was
a striking and wonderful pause in the world's history. On the heights
above Boulogne, and along the narrow strip of beach from Étaples to
Vimereux, were encamped one hundred and thirty thousand of the most
brilliant soldiery of all time, the soldiers who had fought in Germany,
Italy, and Egypt, soldiers who were yet to win, from Austria, Ulm and
Austerlitz, and from Prussia, Auerstadt and Jena, to hold their own,
though barely, at Eylau against the army of Russia, and to overthrow
it also, a few months later, on the bloody field of Friedland.
Growing daily more vigorous in the bracing sea air and the hardy life
laid out for them, they could on fine days, as they practised the
varied manœuvres which were to perfect the vast host in embarking and
disembarking with order and rapidity, see the white cliffs fringing the
only country that to the last defied their arms. Far away, Cornwallis
off Brest, Collingwood off Rochefort, Pellew off Ferrol, were battling
the wild gales of the Bay of Biscay, in that tremendous and sustained
vigilance which reached its utmost tension in the years preceding
Trafalgar, concerning which Collingwood wrote that admirals need to
be made of iron, but which was forced upon them by the unquestionable
and imminent danger of the country. Farther distant still, severed
apparently from all connection with the busy scene at Boulogne, Nelson
before Toulon was wearing away the last two years of his glorious
but suffering life, fighting the fierce north-westers of the Gulf of
Lyon and questioning, questioning continually with feverish anxiety,
whether Napoleon's object was Egypt again or Great Britain really.
They were dull, weary, eventless months, those months of watching and
waiting of the big ships before the French arsenals. Purposeless they
surely seemed to many, but they saved England. The world has never
seen a more impressive demonstration of the influence of sea power
upon its history. Those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which
the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the
world. Holding the interior positions they did, before—and therefore
between—the chief dockyards and detachments of the French navy, the
latter could unite only by a concurrence of successful evasions, of
which the failure of any one nullified the result. Linked together as
the various British fleets were by chains of smaller vessels, chance
alone could secure Bonaparte's great combination, which depended
upon the covert concentration of several detachments upon a point
practically within the enemy's lines. Thus, while bodily present before
Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon, strategically the British squadrons lay
in the Straits of Dover barring the way against the Army of Invasion.

The Straits themselves, of course, were not without their own special
protection. Both they and their approaches, in the broadest sense of
the term, from the Texel to the Channel Islands, were patrolled by
numerous frigates and smaller vessels, from one hundred to a hundred
and fifty in all. These not only watched diligently all that happened
in the hostile harbors and sought to impede the movements of the
flat-boats, but also kept touch with and maintained communication
between the detachments of ships-of-the-line. Of the latter, five
off the Texel watched the Dutch navy, while others were anchored off
points of the English coast with reference to probable movements of the
enemy. Lord St. Vincent, whose ideas on naval strategy were clear and
sound, though he did not use the technical terms of the art, discerned
and provided against the very purpose entertained by Bonaparte, of a
concentration before Boulogne by ships drawn from the Atlantic and
Mediterranean. The best security, the most advantageous strategic
positions, were doubtless those before the enemy's ports; and never in
the history of blockades has there been excelled, if ever equalled,
the close locking of Brest by Admiral Cornwallis, both winter and
summer, between the outbreak of war and the battle of Trafalgar. It
excited not only the admiration but the wonder of contemporaries.[100]
In case, however, the French at Brest got out, so the prime minister
of the day informed the speaker of the House, Cornwallis's rendezvous
was off the Lizard (due north of Brest), so as to go for _Ireland, or
follow the French up Channel_, if they took either direction. _Should
the French run for the Downs_, the five sail-of-the-line at Spithead
would also follow them; and Lord Keith (in the Downs) would in addition
to his six, and six block ships, have also the North Sea fleet at his
command.[101] Thus provision was made, in case of danger, for the
outlying detachments to fall back on the strategic centre, gradually
accumulating strength, till they formed a body of from twenty-five to
thirty heavy and disciplined ships-of-the-line, sufficient to meet all
probable contingencies.

Hence, neither the Admiralty nor British naval officers in general
shared the fears of the country concerning the peril from the flotilla.
"Our first defence," wrote Nelson in 1801, "is close to the enemy's
ports; and the Admiralty have taken such precautions, by having such
a respectable force under my orders, that I venture to express a
well-grounded hope that the enemy would be annihilated before they get
ten miles from their own shores."[102] "As to the possibility of the
enemy being able in a narrow sea to pass through our blockading and
protecting squadron," said Pellew, "with all the secrecy and dexterity
and by those hidden means that some worthy people expect, I really,
from anything I have seen in the course of my professional experience,
am not much disposed to concur in it."[103] Napoleon also understood
that his gunboats could not at sea contend against heavy ships with
any founded hope of success. "A discussion was started in the camp,"
says Marmont, "as to the possibility of fighting ships of war with
flat boats, armed with 24- and 36-pounders, and as to whether, with
a flotilla of several thousands, a squadron might be attacked. It
was sought to establish the belief in a possible success; ... but,
notwithstanding the confidence with which Bonaparte supported this
view, he never shared it for a moment."[104] He could not, without
belying every military conviction he ever held. Lord St. Vincent
therefore steadily refused to countenance the creation of a large force
of similar vessels on the plea of meeting them upon their own terms.
"Our great reliance," he wrote, "is on the vigilance and activity of
our cruisers at sea, any reduction in the number of which, by applying
them to guard our ports, inlets, and beaches, would in my judgment
tend to our destruction." He knew also that gunboats, if built, could
only be manned, as the French flotilla was, by crippling the crews of
the cruising ships; for, extensive as were Great Britain's maritime
resources, they were taxed beyond their power by the exhausting demands
of her navy and merchant shipping.

It is true there existed an enrolled organization called the Sea
Fencibles, composed of men whose pursuits were about the water on
the coasts and rivers of the United Kingdom; men who in the last war
had been exempted from impressment, because of the obligation they
took to turn out for the protection of the country when threatened
with invasion. When, however, invasion did threaten in 1801, not
even the stirring appeals of Nelson, to whom was then entrusted the
defence system, could bring them forward; although he assured them
their services were absolutely required, at the moment, and on board
the coast-defence vessels. Out of a total of 2600 in four districts
immediately menaced, only 385 were willing to enter into training or
go afloat. The others could not leave their occupations without loss,
and prayed that they might be held excused.[105] When the French were
actually on the sea, coming, they professed their readiness to fly on
board; so, wrote Nelson, we must "trust to our ships being manned at
the last moment by this (almost) scrambling manner." In the present
war, therefore, St. Vincent resisted the re-establishment of the corps
until the impress had manned the ships first commissioned, and even
then yielded only to the pressure in the cabinet. "It was an item in
the estimates," he said with rough humor, "of no other use than to
calm the fears of the old ladies, both in and out." It was upon his
former system of close watching the enemy's ports that he relied for
the mastery of the Channel, without which Bonaparte's flotilla dared
not leave the French coast. "This boat business," as Nelson had said,
"may be a part of a great plan of invasion; it can never be the only
one."[106] The event did not deceive them.

In one very important particular, however, St. Vincent had seriously
imperilled the success of his general policy. Feeling deeply the
corruption prevailing in the dockyard and contract systems of that
day, as soon as he came to the head of the Admiralty he entered upon a
struggle with them, in which he showed both the singleness of purpose
and the harshness of his character. Peace, by reducing the dependence
of the country upon its naval establishments, favored his designs of
reform; and he was consequently unwilling to recognize the signs of
renewing strife, or to postpone changes which, however desirable,
must inevitably introduce friction and delay under the press of war.
Hence, in the second year of this war, Great Britain had in commission
ten fewer line-of-battle-ships than at the same period of the former.
"Many old and useful officers and a vast number of artificers had been
discharged from the king's dockyards; the customary supplies of timber
and other important articles of naval stores had been omitted to be
kept up; and some articles, including a large portion of hemp, had
actually been sold out of the service. A deficiency of workmen and of
materials produced, of course, a suspension in the routine of dockyard
business. New ships could not be built; nor could old ones be repaired.
Many of the ships in commission, too, having been merely patched up,
were scarcely in a state to keep the sea."[107] On this point St.
Vincent was vulnerable to the attack made upon his administration by
Pitt in March, 1804; but as regarded Pitt's main criticism, the refusal
to expend money and seamen upon gunboats, he was entirely right, and
his view of the question was that of a statesman and of a man of
correct military instincts.[108] Nor, after his experience with the
Sea Fencibles, can he be blamed for not sharing Pitt's emotion over "a
number of gallant and good old men, coming forward with the zeal and
spirit of lads swearing allegiance to the king," &c.[109]

These ill-timed changes affected most injuriously that very station—the
Mediterranean—upon which hinged Bonaparte's projected combination. Out
of the insufficient numbers, the heaviest squadrons and most seaworthy
ships were naturally and properly massed upon the Channel and Biscay
coasts. "I know," said Sir Edward Pellew, speaking of his personal
experience in command of a squadron of six of the line off Ferrol, "I
know and can assert with confidence that our navy was never better
found, that it was never better supplied and that our men were never
better fed or better clothed;"[110] and the condition of the ships
was proved not only by the tenacity with which Pellew and his chief,
Cornwallis, kept their stations, but by the fact that in the furious
winter gales little damage was received. But at the same time Nelson
was complaining bitterly that his ships were not seaworthy, that they
were shamefully equipped, and destitute of the most necessary stores;
while St. Vincent was writing to him, "We can send you neither ships
nor men, and with the resources of your mind, you will do without them
very well."[111] "Bravo, my lord!" said Nelson, ironically; "but," he
wrote a month later, "I do not believe Lord St. Vincent would have kept
the sea with such ships;"[112] and again, naming seven out of the ten
under his command, "These are certainly among the very finest ships in
our service, the best commanded and the very best manned, yet I wish
them safe in England and that I had ships not half so well manned in
their room; for it is not a store-ship a week that would keep them in
repair."[113]

Such weakness interfered seriously with the close watch of Toulon, in
face of the furious weather for which the Gulf of Lyon is noted; yet,
from the strategic conditions of the Mediterranean, in no station was
it more important to get the earliest news of an enemy's sailing and
to keep constant touch with him. With the Straits of Gibraltar at one
end, involving in case of escape several different possibilities, and
with Egypt fifteen hundred miles away at the other, the most sagacious
admiral might be misled as to the destination of a French squadron,
if once lost to sight. Upon this difficulty Bonaparte framed his
combination. In his first purpose the Toulon fleet was to be raised
to ten sail-of-the-line, and at the fitting moment was to sail with
a north-west wind, steering a course which, if seen by any British
lookout, would indicate an intention of going eastward. To strengthen
this presumption, General St. Cyr at Taranto was ordered to raise
batteries to shelter a fleet of ten sail, and to prepare half a million
rations; while the Minister of War was instructed that an extraordinary
operation in that direction was contemplated about the 20th of
November.[114] Simultaneously, twenty ships-of-the-line carrying twenty
thousand troops were to be ready in Brest for a descent upon Ireland,
and to be maintained in a state of readiness for instant sailing.
This would conduce to keep Cornwallis close to Brest and away from the
approaches to the Channel. The Toulon fleet, after losing sight of the
British, was to haul up for the Straits, be joined off Cadiz or Lisbon
by a squadron from Rochefort, raising its force to fifteen or sixteen
sail-of-the-line, and thence, passing midway between Ushant and the
Scilly islands, come about the middle of February off Boulogne; were
the first consul expected then to be ready for crossing with his one
hundred and thirty thousand men.

For the Toulon fleet, as the pivot on which all turned, Bonaparte
selected his boldest admiral, Latouche Tréville, and fixed the middle
of January, 1804, as the time of sailing. All the French authorities
were scrupulously deceived, except the admiral himself, the Minister
of Marine, and the maritime prefect at Toulon, Ganteaume, who had
divined the secret.[115] The orders to the latter, ostentatiously
confidential to deceive the office clerks, announced Martinique as
the real destination, but enjoined him to tell the general commanding
the troops that the squadron was going to the Morea, touching at
Taranto. At the same time staff-officers were sent to notify St. Cyr
that re-enforcements, which would raise his force to thirty thousand
men, were coming not only from Toulon but from other ports; and troops
throughout northern Italy began to move toward the sea-board.

It is not wonderful that Nelson was misled by such an elaborate scheme
of deception. To this day men doubt whether Bonaparte seriously
meant to invade England, and naval men then realized too keenly the
dangers of the undertaking not to suspect a feint in it. Under all
the conditions of the problem, Egypt and the Straits were equally
probable solutions, and Egypt was not the only possible objective
east of Toulon. Sicily and Sardinia, the Ionian Islands and the
Morea, were coveted by Bonaparte; both as forwarding his control of
the Mediterranean and as measurable advances towards Egypt and the
Levant, traditional objects of French ambition. Nelson also suspected
a secret understanding between France and Russia to divide the Turkish
Empire;[116] a suspicion justified in the past by Bonaparte's actions
and to be vindicated in the future by the agreements of Tilsit.
The perplexities of the British admiral were therefore simply the
inevitable uncertainties of the defence, the part assumed perforce by
the British Empire at large in this war. He had to provide against
widely divergent contingencies; and the question is not how far he
guessed[117] the inscrutable purposes of Bonaparte, but how well he
took measures for meeting either fortune.

Let it, however, be remarked in passing, that the great merit of St.
Vincent's strategy was that it minimized the evil resulting from a
single admiral's mis-step. To the success of the French scheme it was
necessary that, not only one but, all their detached efforts should
succeed. The strength of the British strategy lay not in hermetically
sealing any one port, but in effectually preventing a great combination
from all the ports. It was essential to Bonaparte not merely that his
scattered squadrons should, one at one time and another at another,
escape to sea, but that they should do so at periods so ordered, and
by routes so determined, as to insure a rapid concentration at a
particular point. Against this the British provided by the old and
sound usage of interior positions and lines. This advantage Bonaparte
recognized, and sought to overthrow by inducing them to diverging
operations—toward the Levant on one flank, toward Ireland on the other.
Both diverted from Boulogne.

To return to Nelson. During the first six months of his command he
believed that the Toulon fleet was bound out of the Mediterranean;[118]
and indeed, despite Bonaparte's wiles and the opinions of most of his
own friends, he continually reverted to that conviction up to the final
escape of Villeneuve. He could not, however, on the ground of his own
intuitions resist the facts reported to him. On December 12, 1803, he
writes: "Who shall say where they are bound? My opinion is, certainly,
out of the Mediterranean."[119] Again, January 16, 1804: "It is
difficult to say what may be the destination of the Toulon fleet, Egypt
or Ireland. I rather lean to the latter."[120] A week later, January
23, the effect of Bonaparte's feints begins to show: "Information just
received leads me to believe the French fleet is about to put to sea
bound to the eastward toward Naples and Sicily."[121] February 10:
"The French have thirty thousand men ready to embark from Marseilles
and Nice, and I am led to believe the Ferrol ships will push for the
Mediterranean. Egypt is Bonaparte's object."[122]

Against either contingency his course is perfectly clear,—never
to lose touch of the Toulon fleet. "My eyes are constantly fixed
on Toulon,"[123] he says. "I will not lose sight of the Toulon
fleet."[124] "It is of the utmost importance," he writes to his lookout
frigates, "that the enemy's squadron in Toulon should be most strictly
watched, and that I should be made acquainted with their sailing and
route with all dispatch."[125] But here the inadequacy of St. Vincent's
navy told heavily; and to that, not to Nelson, must be attributed the
mis-steps of the later campaign. "My crazy fleet," he writes. "If I
am to watch the French I must be at sea, and if at sea must have bad
weather; and if the ships are not fit to stand bad weather they are
useless."[126] "I know no way of watching the enemy but to be at sea,"
he tells St. Vincent himself, "and therefore good ships are necessary."
Under such conditions, with "terrible weather," in winter, not four
fine days in six weeks, and even in summer having a hard gale every
week,[127] it was impossible to keep his rickety ships close up against
Toulon, as Cornwallis kept against Brest. "I make it a rule not to
contend with the north-westers," he said. "Going off large or furling
all sail we escape damage by the constant care of the captains;" and he
not unjustly claimed equal credit with Cornwallis, in that with such
a fleet, to which nothing was sent, he kept the sea ten consecutive
months, "not a ship refitted in any way, except what was done at
sea."[128]

Though desirable for the battle-ships themselves to be near Toulon, it
would have been possible, in so narrow a sea, to dispense with that by
taking a central position, and keeping touch with the enemy by numerous
frigates; but here also the deficiencies of the navy interfered.
Among the Maddalena Islands, at the north end of Sardinia, was found
an admirable central anchorage, well sheltered, and having eastern
and western exits by which it could be left at a moment's notice in
all winds. Here the fleet could safely lie, ready for instant action,
within striking distance of any route taken by the enemy, and sure to
be found by lookout ships bringing tidings. Thither, therefore, as the
direction most favorable for intercepting the French,[129] Nelson went
in January, 1804, when informed they were about to sail; but he wrote:
"I am kept in great distress for frigates and smaller vessels at this
critical moment. I want ten more than I have, in order to watch that
the French should not escape me."[130] This but summed up the constant
worry of those anxious two years,[131] as it does also the results of
recent experience in the annual manœuvres of European navies. Under
such circumstances all depends upon the position taken by the main body
and the number of scouts it can throw out. Properly, these should move
in couples; one of which can carry information, while its consort keeps
touch of the enemy till it meets another of the lookouts scattered on
their different radii of action.

The situation of Nelson in the Mediterranean, the character of his
anxieties, and the condition of his ships have been given in some
detail, because upon the opposing Mediterranean fleets turns the chief
strategic interest of the intended invasion of England and of the
campaign which issued in Trafalgar. Lord St. Vincent left office with
the Addington Ministry in May, 1804, and under the energetic rule of
his successor, who threw his administrative system to the winds, the
condition of Nelson's fleet was somewhat bettered; but the change came
too late to remedy it altogether.

Various events meanwhile concurred to postpone the execution of
Bonaparte's project and so to prolong the watch of the British admiral.
The Boulogne flotilla itself was not as forward as had been expected;
but the drain made by it upon the French arsenals, for workmen and
materials, was a greater cause of delay, by retarding the equipment
of the ships meant to cover the crossing. In December only seven of
the line were ready in Toulon.[132] In the spring of 1804, the first
consul's attention was absorbed by the royalist plot, which led to the
arrest of Pichegru and Moreau, to the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien
on German soil and to his execution at Vincennes in March. This last
event had diplomatic consequences, in the attitude taken by Russia and
Prussia, which still farther engrossed him; and the invasion of Great
Britain was thus by successive delays put off to the summer of 1804.
On May 25, Napoleon, who had assumed the imperial title on the 18th
of that month, writes to Latouche[133] that on the ocean side all was
prepared, that the project was only postponed, not abandoned, and asks
if he will be ready by July. July 2 he writes again,[134] anticipating
his sailing from Toulon by the first of August, instructs him to pick
up at Cadiz one French ship-of-the-line which had taken refuge there,
thence to go to Rochefort, and finally to reach Boulogne, according to
the first plan, by passing through the Channel; or, if necessary, by
going north of the British islands. In all passages from port to port
he was to keep far out to sea to avoid detection. "Let us," he adds,
"be masters of the Strait for six hours and we shall be masters of the
world." On the 2d of August, however, Napoleon postpones the invasion
for some weeks, because some divisions of the flotilla had not yet
joined; and on the 20th of that month Latouche Tréville died.

This loss was serious, as there was not among the surviving French
admirals any who had shown himself fit for so important a task, except
perhaps Bruix. He, being already definitely associated with the
flotilla, could not well be displaced; and his health, moreover, was
very bad, so that he also died the following March. Of two others who
might possibly prove equal to high command, Rosily and Villeneuve,
Napoleon, after some hesitation and with much mistrust, chose the
latter. "All naval expeditions undertaken since I have been at the head
of the government," said he, "have always failed, because the admirals
see double, and have learned—where, I do not know—_that war can be
made without running risks_."[135] From this simple and undeniable
standpoint no choice more unfortunate than Villeneuve could have been
made. Accomplished, brave, and skilful, he saw the defects of the
French navy with a clearness which absolutely sapped his power to take
risks. Although capable of the utmost self-devotion, he was unable to
devote his command as the forlorn hope upon which might follow a great
achievement.

Doubting Villeneuve's resolution, Napoleon now changed the details of
his combination; giving to the Toulon fleet the inferior rôle of a
diversion, instead of the great part of covering the flotilla at the
chief centre of strategic action. The Brest fleet, during the life of
Latouche Tréville, had been destined to tie Cornwallis to the French
coast by the passive service of a mere demonstration. It was now given
the principal part. Its admiral, Ganteaume, had in 1801 been blamed for
not relieving Egypt; but Napoleon still felt for him the partiality
of close personal association, and knew him to be an able officer. In
the new plan, therefore, the Irish expedition passed definitively from
a demonstration to a resolve. To it were assigned eighteen thousand
troops under Marshal Augereau. Embarking them, Ganteaume should sail
with a fleet of twenty ships-of-the-line, pass far out into the
Atlantic to baffle pursuit, and then head for the north of Ireland
as though coming from Newfoundland. Having landed the soldiers, for
which only thirty-six hours were allowed, the fleet should sail for
the straits of Dover, either by the English Channel or by the north of
Scotland, according to the winds. Arriving near its destination two
courses were open, the choice between which would again depend on the
wind. Either the Grand Army at Boulogne would cross at once to England,
or a corps of twenty-five thousand assembled in Holland under General
Marmont, would sail under Ganteaume's convoy for Ireland. "With only
eighteen thousand men in Ireland," wrote Napoleon, "we would run great
risks; but whether they be increased to forty thousand, or I myself be
in England and eighteen thousand in Ireland, the gain of the war will
be ours."[136]

The Toulon and Rochefort squadrons were to favor these operations
by a powerful diversion. They were to sail separately for the West
Indies, the former numbering twelve of the line and the latter five.
Upon reaching the Atlantic two of the Toulon ships were to be directed
against St. Helena, which they were to seize and then cruise in its
neighborhood for three months against British commerce. The rest of
the division, carrying four thousand troops, was to retake Dutch
Guiana and re-enforce San Domingo,[137] if possible. The Rochefort
division, lately commanded by Villeneuve, but now by Missiessy, was
to seize the islands Santa Lucia and Dominica, re-enforce Martinique
and Guadaloupe and then join Villeneuve. Thus combined, all would
return to Europe, appear before Ferrol, releasing five French ships
which were there blockaded, and finally anchor at Rochefort. "Thus
attacked simultaneously in Asia, Africa, and America," wrote Napoleon,
"the English, long accustomed not to suffer from the war, will by
these successive shocks to their commerce feel the evidence of their
weakness. I think that the sailing of these twenty ships-of-the-line
will oblige them to dispatch over thirty in pursuit."[138] Villeneuve
was to sail by October 12, and Missiessy before November 1. The Irish
expedition should await the departure of the others, but it was hoped
might get away before November 23.

This second combination was more vast, more complicated and therefore
much more difficult than the first. It is interesting chiefly as
indicating the transition in the emperor's mind, from the comparatively
simple scheme laid down for Latouche Tréville to the grandiose
conception which ended in Trafalgar and claimed Villeneuve as its
victim. The course of events, mightier than the wills of sovereigns,
now intervened to change again Napoleon's purpose and restore to the
Toulon fleet the central part in the great drama. In December, 1804,
formal war broke out between Great Britain and Spain.

Spain since 1796 had been in defensive and offensive alliance with
France. By the treaty of San Ildefonso, then signed, she had bound
herself to furnish, upon the simple demand of the French government,
fifteen ships-of-the-line to re-enforce the French navy, as well
as a specified body of troops. Holland also had entered into a
similar covenant "forever" against Great Britain. At the outbreak of
hostilities, therefore, Bonaparte found on either flank a maritime
state formally obliged to aid him, whatever its present wish. Holland,
a small flat country near at hand, was easily dominated by his army.
It was rich, had a valid government and energetic people; and its
position admirably seconded his schemes against Great Britain. It
therefore suited him to have the Batavian republic join in the war.
Spain, on the contrary, being extensive and rugged, was with difficulty
controlled by an armed force, as Napoleon afterwards learned to his
cost. It was remote from the centre of his power and from the intended
operations; while effective military support could not be had from its
government, feeble to disorganization, nor from its people, indolent
and jealous of foreigners. One thing only was left to Spain of her
former greatness,—the silver poured into her treasury from her colonies.

Bonaparte therefore decided to allow the neutrality of Spain, and to
relinquish the stipulated aid in kind, upon condition of receiving an
equivalent in money. This he fixed at six million francs per month,
or about fourteen million dollars annually. Spain protested earnestly
against the amount, but the first consul was inexorable. He required
also that all levies of troops should cease, any land forces sent
into the provinces adjoining France, since September, 1801, should
be withdrawn, and the Spanish navy reorganized. Further, he demanded
that five French ships-of-the-line then in Ferrol, where they had
taken refuge from the British navy in July, 1803, when returning from
Haïti, should be by Spain repaired and got ready for sea. "Spain," said
Bonaparte, "has three alternatives: 1, she may declare war against
England; 2, she may pay the specified subsidy; 3, war will be declared
by France against Spain."[139]

When war began, the British minister at Madrid was instructed to ask
if Spain intended to furnish France the ships promised by the treaty.
If the answer was yes, he was to express no opinion, but say that any
excess over the stipulations would be regarded as a declaration of war.
Later, when it became known that Spain had signed a convention[140]
stipulating the payment of subsidies to France, the ministry took
the ground that this was a just cause of war, whenever Great Britain
chose so to consider it; though for the time she might pass it over.
"You will explain distinctly," ran the ambassador's instructions,
dated November 24, 1803, "that his Majesty can only be induced to
abstain from immediate hostilities in consequence of such a measure,
upon the consideration that it is a temporary expedient, ... and that
his Majesty must be at liberty to consider a perseverance in the
system of furnishing succors to France as, at any future period, when
circumstances may render it necessary, a just cause of war."[141] "I am
expressly enjoined to declare," wrote the British ambassador, in making
this communication, "that such payments are a war subsidy, a succor
the most efficacious, the best adapted to the wants and situation
of the enemy, the most prejudicial to the interests of his Britannic
Majesty's subjects, and the most dangerous to his dominions; in fine,
more than equivalent to every other species of aggression."[142]
Repeated inquiries failed to draw from the Spanish government any
official statement of the terms of its bargain, either as to the
amount of the subsidy, the period during which it should continue, or
other conditions of the agreement.[143] Such communication the French
ambassador positively over-ruled.[144]

Warning was therefore early given[145] that a condition essential to
postponement of action by Great Britain was the suspension of all
further arming in Spanish ports. This was repeated in the most formal
terms, and as an ultimatum, a few weeks later, on the 18th of February,
1804. "I am ordered to declare to you that the system of forbearance
on the part of England absolutely depends on the cessation of every
naval armament, and I am expressly forbidden to prolong my residence
here, if unfortunately this condition should be rejected."[146] It
was alleged and was incontrovertibly true, that, while Spain was so
evidently under Bonaparte's influence, armaments in her ports as
effectively necessitated watching, and so as greatly added to Great
Britain's burdens, as if war actually existed.[147] Another complaint
was that prizes made by French privateers were, by process of law,
condemned and sold in Spanish ports.[148] The same was doubtless
allowed to Great Britain; but in the strict blockade of the ports of
France the latter here derived a great benefit, while upon her enemy
was simply imposed an additional burden in scouring all the Spanish
coast, as though actually at war, in order to recapture inward-bound
prizes. Once condemned, the prize goods found their way to the French
ports by Spanish coasters. Independent of the difficulty of identifying
the property, the small size of these neutral carriers made seizure
inexpedient; for the costs of condemnation were greater than the value
of the prize.[149] The Spanish government claimed that the condemnation
and sale of prize goods in their ports was simply an act of authorized
commerce, free from all hostility.[150] Americans who recall the
cruises of the Alabama and her fellows will be disposed to think that,
whatever the technical accuracy of the plea, neutrality benevolent to
an enemy's cruisers constitutes a just cause of war, whenever policy so
advises.

The relations between the two countries continued in this strained and
critical condition during the greater part of 1804. Bonaparte insisted
that the Spanish dockyards should repair the French ships in Ferrol
and Cadiz,—which was indeed one of the conditions of the convention
of October 19, 1803, concealed from Great Britain,—and should permit
seamen to pass by land from one port of Spain to another, and from
France through Spain, to complete their crews. He consented indeed that
they should go in small bodies of thirty or forty, but the vigilance
of the British officials could not be deceived. The relations between
France and Spain at this time were not inaptly described in the letter
of Napoleon to the king, announcing his assumption of the imperial
dignity. He styled him therein "ally and confederate." In June, 1804,
an aide-de-camp of the emperor visited Ferrol and Madrid, charged to
ascertain the condition of the ships and demand their completion.[151]
The British minister could obtain no explanation of this mission, which
naturally aroused his attention.[152] Spain in truth was no longer
a free agent. On the 3d of July, Napoleon ordered his Minister of
Marine to send to Ferrol the men still needed to man the ships there;
and on the 19th of the month[153] the British admiral Cochrane, then
blockading the port, remonstrated with the governor of Galicia upon
this procedure as hostile to Great Britain. On the 3d of September, and
again on the 11th, Cochrane wrote to his government that Spanish ships
in Ferrol were fitting for sea, that three first-rates were expected
from Cadiz, and that no doubt remained that the French, Spanish, and
Dutch ships in the port were to act together. He had consequently found
necessary to concentrate his force.[154] Immediately upon receiving
this information, the British ministry notified the Spanish government
that orders had been sent to their admiral off Ferrol to prevent
any Spanish ships of war from entering or leaving that port. The
ambassador at Madrid was directed to require that the armaments should
be discontinued, and placed upon the same footing as before the war.
He was also to demand a clear explanation of the relations existing
between France and Spain. Unless satisfactory replies were given, he
was ordered to quit Madrid.

At the same time the ministry took a more questionable step.
Orders were sent to Cornwallis, to Cochrane, to Nelson, and to the
naval officer off Cadiz to detain and send to England all Spanish
treasure-ships; the intention being to keep them as a pledge until
satisfactory arrangements with Spain were made. In consequence of this,
on the 5th of October, four British frigates stopped, near Cadiz,
four Spanish vessels, of the same class but of inferior armament.
The disparity of force was not great enough to justify the Spanish
commodore in yielding; and an action followed in which one of his
frigates blew up. The other three surrendered and were taken to
England. Curiously enough, the news of this transaction had not reached
Madrid when the British representative, on the 10th of November, left
the city. The final discussions between him and the Spanish government
went on in complete ignorance of so decisive an event; but as he could
get no explanation of the agreements between France and Spain, he
persisted in demanding his passports. On the 12th of December, 1804,
Spain declared war.

That Great Britain had just cause for war can scarcely be denied. She
now for the first time came into contact with Napoleon's claim that it
was, not merely the interest, but the bounden duty of every maritime
state to join his attempt to crush her.[155] Upon this principle
he justified his policy of coercing all into such hostilities, and
formulated at a later day the maxim, "There are no neutrals." The
subsidy paid by Spain, calculated on British rates of expenditure, was
annually worth to France fifteen ships-of-the-line and two hundred
thousand troops;[156] but against Napoleon's further extension of his
principle, by suddenly calling into activity the Spanish navy, Great
Britain's only safeguard was to insist upon the latter's remaining
unarmed. The Spanish government, having promised not to arm, suddenly
and without explanation began to equip vessels in Ferrol,—an act
which, coinciding with the passage of French seamen through Spain to
that place, fairly excited alarm and justified the orders not to allow
Spanish ships to enter or leave the port.

The seizure of the treasure-ships is less easily excused, though
the obloquy attending it has been unduly heightened by the tragical
explosion. Its best palliation lies in Great Britain's previous
experience that, in the commercial decadence and poverty of Spain, the
treasures of the colonies were a determining factor in negotiations.
While they were on the sea, Spain temporized; when they arrived, she
stiffened. The purpose was to retain them as a pledge, to be restored
in case of a peaceable issue; as Swedish merchantmen were embargoed in
1801, and released when the Armed Neutrality dissolved. A Spanish naval
historian, while censuring other acts of Great Britain, says: "The mere
detention of the division from America, carrying specie which might be
used in behalf of French preparations, could have been overlooked as
an able and not very illegal means of bettering the prospects of the
English reclamations, in consequence of the scanty satisfaction they
obtained from our Court;" and again: "If all the circumstances are
impartially weighed, ... we shall see that all the charges made against
England for the seizure of the frigates may be reduced simply to want
of proper foresight in the strength of the force detailed to effect
it."[157] The action, nevertheless, was precipitate, and extenuated by
no urgent political necessity. Nelson, who certainly was not averse to
strong measures, directed his captains to disobey the order, which he
at first thought came only from Cornwallis; for, he said, "I am clearly
of the opinion that Spain has no wish to go to war with England."[158]




CHAPTER XVI.

THE TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN—CONCLUDED.

JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1805.

SUCCESSIVE MODIFICATIONS OF NAPOLEON'S PLAN.—NARRATIVE OF NAVAL
MOVEMENTS.—FINAL FAILURE OF NAPOLEON'S NAVAL COMBINATIONS.—WAR WITH
AUSTRIA, AND BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.—BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.—VITAL CHANGE
IMPOSED UPON NAPOLEON'S POLICY BY THE RESULT OF THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN.


The Spanish declaration of war was followed by a new treaty of alliance
with France, signed in Paris on the 5th of January, 1805, and confirmed
on the 18th of the month at Madrid. Spain undertook to furnish, by
March 21, to the common cause, at least twenty-five ships-of-the-line
and eleven frigates; but the military direction of the whole allied
effort was entrusted to Napoleon.

This accession of Spain could not become immediately operative, owing
to the backward state of her armaments caused by the previous demands
of Great Britain. The emperor therefore adhered for the time to his
existing plans, formulated on the 27th and 29th of September. These
proving abortive, he next framed, upon lines equal both in boldness and
scope to those of the Marengo and Austerlitz campaigns, the immense
combination which resulted in Trafalgar.

The events of the ten following months, therefore, have an interest
wholly unique, as the development of the only great naval campaign ever
planned by this foremost captain of modern times. From his opponents,
also, upon whom was thrown the harder task of the defensive,
was elicited an exhibition of insight, combination, promptitude,
and decision, which showed them to be, on their own element, not
unworthy to match with the great emperor. For Napoleon was at this
disadvantage,—he could not fully realize the conditions of the sea.
Accustomed by forethought and sheer will to trample obstacles under
foot, remembering the midwinter passage of the Splugen made by
Macdonald at his command, and the extraordinary impediments overcome
by himself in crossing the Saint Bernard, he could not believe that
the difficulties of the sea could not be vanquished by unskilled men
handling the ponderous machines entrusted to them, when confronted
by a skilful enemy. To quote an able French writer: "But one thing
was wanting to the victor of Austerlitz,—_le sentiment exact des
difficultés de la marine_."[159]

With steam, possibly, this inequality of skill might have been so
reduced as to enable the generalship of Napoleon, having also the
advantage of the initiative, to turn the scale. With sailing ships
it was not so; and in following the story of Trafalgar it must be
remembered that the naval superiority of Great Britain lay not in
the number of her ships, but in the wisdom, energy, and tenacity
of her admirals and seamen. At best her numbers were but equal to
those arrayed against her. The real contest was between the naval
combinations of Napoleon and the insight of British officers, avoiding
or remedying the ex-centric movements he untiringly sought to impress
upon their forces.

In December detailed instructions for executing the plan of September
29 were issued to Admirals Villeneuve and Missiessy.[160] The latter,
after leaving Rochefort, was to steer between the Azores and Canaries,
so as to avoid the British squadrons off the Biscay coast of Spain,
go direct to Martinique, take the British islands Santa Lucia and
Dominica, and upon Villeneuve's arrival place himself under his
command. In pursuance of these orders Missiessy escaped from Rochefort
on January 11. He was seen next day by a lookout vessel belonging to
the blockading squadron; but the latter, for whatever reason, was
off its post, and Missiessy reached Martinique safely on the 20th of
February. On the 24th of that month six British ships-of-the-line,
under Rear-Admiral Cochrane, sailed in pursuit from before Ferrol;
where their place was taken by a detachment of equal force drawn from
before Brest.

Villeneuve's orders were to go from Toulon direct to Cayenne, recapture
the former Dutch colonies of Guiana, form a junction with Missiessy,
re-enforce San Domingo, and start on his return for Europe not later
than sixty days after reaching South America. With the combined
squadrons he was to appear off Ferrol, release the French ships there
blockaded, and bring the whole force, amounting to twenty of the line,
to Rochefort. "The result of your cruise," wrote Napoleon to him, "will
be to secure our colonies against any attack, and to retake the four
Dutch colonies on the Continent, as well as such other British islands
as may appear open to the force under your command." Six thousand
troops were embarked on board his squadron for the operations on shore.
Both he and Missiessy were expressly forbidden to land their crews for
that purpose; a decision of the great emperor worthy to be remembered
in these days.

Villeneuve was ready to sail early in January, but his first need was
to elude the watchfulness of Nelson. The British admiral was known to
move from point to point in his command, between the Maddalena Islands
and Cape San Sebastian on the Spanish coast, while he kept before
Toulon lookout ships always informed of his whereabouts. Villeneuve
therefore thought indispensable to start with a breeze strong enough
to carry him a hundred miles the first night. For a fortnight the wind
hung at north-east and south-east—fair but very light; but on the 17th
of January it shifted to north-west, with signs of an approaching gale.
The next morning Villeneuve sent a division to drive off the enemy's
lookouts; and when these disappeared the squadron sailed, numbering ten
of the line and seven frigates. Nelson with eleven ships-of-the-line
was at the moment at anchor in Maddalena Bay.

Following Napoleon's plan for deceiving the British admiral, the
French squadron steered for the south end of Sardinia, as though bound
eastward. During the night it was dogged by the enemy's frigates, which
had retired no further than was necessary to avoid capture. At ten
o'clock they were close by; and at two in the morning, satisfied as
to the French course, they parted company and hastened to Nelson,—the
wind then blowing a whole gale from the north-west. Twelve hours later
they were seen from the flag-ship with the signal flying that the
enemy was at sea, and in two hours more the British fleet was under
way. Unable to beat out by the western entrance in the teeth of the
storm, it ran in single column through the narrow eastern pass as night
fell,—Nelson's ship leading, the others steering by the poop lanterns
of the vessel next ahead. When clear of the port the fleet hauled up to
the southward, and during the night, which was unsettled and squally,
kept along the east coast of Sardinia. The frigate "Seahorse" was sent
ahead to pass round the south end of the island and get touch again of
the enemy.

During the night the wind changed to south-south-west, and blew heavily
throughout the 21st. On the forenoon of the 22d the fleet, still
struggling against a heavy southwesterly gale, was fifty miles east of
the south end of Sardinia. There it was rejoined by the "Seahorse,"
which the day before had caught sight of a French frigate standing
in toward Cagliari, but had not seen the main body. Not till the 26th
did Nelson reach Cagliari, where to his relief he found the French had
not been. Nothing even was known of their movements; but the same day
the frigate "Phœbe" joined from the westward with news that a French
eighty-gun ship, partially dismasted, had put in to Ajaccio. The
British fleet then stretched across to Palermo, where it arrived on the
28th. Having now fairly covered the approaches from the westward to
Sardinia, Sicily, and Naples, Nelson reasoned that one of two things
must have happened: either the French, despite the southerly gale, had
succeeded in going east between Sicily and Africa, or they had put back
disabled. In the latter case he could not now overtake them; in the
former, he must follow.[161] Accordingly, after sending scouts to scour
the seas, and three frigates to resume the watch off Toulon, he shaped
his course along the north side of Sicily, and on the 30th of January
passed through the straits of Messina on his way to Egypt.

Villeneuve had in fact returned to Toulon. On the first night an
eighty-four-gun ship and three frigates separated, and the former put
in dismasted to Ajaccio, as Nelson had learned. The following day
and in the night, when the wind shifted to south-west, three more
ships-of-the-line were crippled. Forced to the eastward by the gale,
and aware that two enemy's frigates had marked his course, the admiral
feared that he should meet the British at a disadvantage and determined
to retreat.

Thus prematurely ended the first movement in Napoleon's naval
combination for the invasion of England. The Rochefort squadron had
escaped only to become a big detachment, wholly out of reach of support
or recall. The Toulon fleet, forced to await a heavy wind in order to
effect the evasion by which alone the combination could be formed, was
through the inexperience of its seamen crippled by the very advantage
it had secured. In truth, however, had it gone on, it would almost
infallibly have been driven by the south-west gale into the very spot,
between Sardinia and Sicily, where Nelson went to seek it, and which
was ransacked by his lookouts.[162] Neither Villeneuve nor Nelson
doubted the result of such meeting.[163]

The other factor in this combination, the Brest fleet and army corps
of twenty thousand men, had been held in readiness to act, dependent
upon the successful evasion of the two others. "I calculate," Napoleon
had said, "that the sailing of twenty ships from Rochefort and Toulon
will force the enemy to send thirty in pursuit;"[164] a diversion that
would very materially increase the chances for the Brest armament. For
a moment he spoke of sending to India this powerful body, strongly
re-enforced from the French and Spanish ships in Ferrol.[165] This was,
however, but a passing thought, rejected by his sound military instinct
as an ex-centric movement, disseminating his force and weakening the
purposed attack upon the heart of the British power. Three months
later, when he began to fear failure for the latter attempt, he
recurred to the East India project in terms which show why he at first
laid it aside. "In case, through any event whatsoever, our expedition
have not full success, and I cannot compass _the greatest of all ends,
which will cause all the rest to fall_,[166] I think we must calculate
the operation in India for September."[167] India in truth was to the
imagination of Napoleon what Egypt was to Nelson,—an object which
colored all his ideas and constantly misled him. As was shrewdly said
by an American citizen to the British government, in this very month
of January, 1805, "The French in general believe that the fountains of
British wealth are in India and China. They never appeared to me to
understand that the most abundant source is in her agriculture, her
manufactures, and the foreign demand."[168] This impression Napoleon
fully shared, and it greatly affected his judgment during the coming
campaign.

The return of Villeneuve and the delay necessary to repair his ships,
concurring with the expected re-enforcements from Spain, wholly changed
the details of Napoleon's plan. In essence it remained the same from
first to last; but the large number of ships now soon to be at his
command appealed powerfully to his love for great masses and wide
combinations. Now, also, Villeneuve could not reach the West Indies
before the sickly season.

The contemplated conquests in America, which had formed so important
a part of the first plan, were therefore laid aside, and so was also
the Irish expedition by Ganteaume's fleet. The concentration of naval
forces in the West Indies or at some point exterior to France became
now the great aim; and the sally of the various detachments, before
intended to favor the crossing of the flotilla by a diversion, was now
to be the direct means of covering it, by bringing them to the English
Channel and before Boulogne. The operations were to begin in March; and
urgent orders were sent to Spain to have the contingents in her several
ports ready to move at a moment's notice.

The situations of the squadrons in March, when the great Trafalgar
campaign opened, need to be stated. On the extreme right, in the Texel,
were nine ships-of-the-line with a due proportion of lighter vessels;
and some eighty transports lay ready to embark Marmont's army corps of
twenty-five thousand men.[169] The Boulogne flotilla was assembled;
the few detachments still absent being so near at hand that their
junction could be confidently expected before the appearance of the
covering fleet. The army, one hundred and thirty thousand strong, was
by frequent practice able to embark in two hours.[170] Two tides were
needed for all the boats to clear the ports; but as word of the fleet's
approach would precede its arrival, they could haul out betimes and
lie in the open sea, under the batteries, ready to start. In Brest,
Ganteaume had twenty-one ships-of-the-line. The Rochefort squadron was
now in the West Indies with Missiessy; but two more ships were ready
in that port and one in Lorient. In Ferrol were five French and ten
Spanish; of the latter it was expected that six or eight could sail in
March. In Cadiz the treaty called for twelve or fifteen to be ready at
the same time, but only six were then actually able to move. There was
also in Cadiz one French ship. In Cartagena were six Spaniards, which,
however, took no part in the campaign. At Toulon Villeneuve would have
eleven ships. All these were ships-of-the-line. The total available
at the opening of the campaign was therefore sixty-seven; but it will
be observed that they were disseminated in detachments, and that the
strategic problem was, first, to unite them in the face of an enemy
that controlled the communications, and, next, to bring them to the
strategic centre.

As in 1796, the declaration of Spain in 1805 added immensely to the
anxieties of Great Britain. Lord Melville, who succeeded St. Vincent
as First Lord in May, 1804, had at once contracted for several
ships-of-the-line to be built in private yards;[171] but these were not
yet ready. A somewhat singular expedient was then adopted to utilize
worn-out vessels, twelve of which were in February, 1805, cased with
two-inch oak plank, and with some additional bracing sent to sea. It is
said some of these bore a part in the battle of Trafalgar.[172]

The disposition and strength of the British detachments varied with the
movements of the enemy and with the increasing strength of their own
navy. Lord Keith, in the Downs with eleven small ships-of-the-line,
watched the Texel and the Straits of Dover. The Channel fleet under
Cornwallis held Brest under lock and key, with a force varying from
eleven, when the year began, to twenty or twenty-four in the following
April. This was the centre of the great British naval line. Off
Rochefort no squadron was kept after Missiessy's escape. In March
that event had simply transferred to the West Indies five French and
six British ships. Off Ferrol eight ships were watching the combined
fifteen in the port. In October, when the Spanish war was threatening,
a division of six was sent to blockade Cadiz. Nelson's command, which
had before extended to Cape Finisterre, was now confined to Gibraltar
as its western limit, and the Cadiz portion assigned to Sir John
Orde,—a step particularly invidious to Nelson, depriving him of the
most lucrative part of his station, in favor of one who was not only
his senior, with power to annoy him, but reputed to be his personal
enemy. Nelson had within the Straits twelve of the line, several of
which, however, were in bad condition; and one, kept permanently
at Naples for political reasons, was useless to him. Two others
were on their way to join, but did not arrive before the campaign
opened. It may be added that there were in India from eight to ten
ships-of-the-line, and in the West Indies four, which Cochrane's
arrival would raise to ten.[173]

On the 2d of March Napoleon issued specific orders for the campaign
to Villeneuve and Ganteaume. The latter, who was to command-in-chief
after the junction, was directed to sail at the first moment possible
with his twenty-one ships, carrying besides their crews thirty-six
hundred troops. He was to go first to Ferrol, destroy or drive off the
blockading squadron, and be joined by the French and Spanish ships
there ready; thence by the shortest route to Martinique, where he
was to be met by Villeneuve and, it was hoped, by Missiessy also. If
Villeneuve did not at once appear, he was to be awaited at least thirty
days. When united, the whole force, amounting to over forty of the
line, would, to avoid detection, steer for the Channel by an unusual
route and proceed direct to Boulogne, where the emperor expected it
between June 10 and July 10. If by Villeneuve's not coming, or other
cause, Ganteaume found himself with less than twenty-five ships, he
was to go to Ferrol; where it would be the emperor's care to assemble
a re-enforcement. He might, however, even with so small a number, move
straight on Boulogne if he thought advisable.[174]

Villeneuve's orders were to sail at the earliest date for Cadiz, where
he was not to enter but be joined outside by the ships then ready.
From Cadiz he was to go to Martinique, and there wait forty days for
Ganteaume. If the latter did not then appear he was to call at San
Domingo, land some troops and thence go to the Bay of Santiago in the
Canary Islands,[175] where he would cruise twenty days. This provided a
second rendezvous where Ganteaume could join, if unexpectedly delayed
in Brest. The emperor, like all French rulers, did not wish to risk
his fleet in battle with nearly equal forces. Whatever the result,
his combinations would suffer. "I prefer," said he, "the rendezvous
at Martinique to any other; but I also prefer Santiago to a junction
before Brest, by raising the blockade, in order to avoid fighting of
any kind."[176] When Ganteaume, at a most critical instant, only six
days before Villeneuve got away, reported that he was ready,—that
there were but fifteen British ships in the offing and success was
sure,—Napoleon replied: "A naval victory now would lead to nothing.
Have but one aim,—to fulfil your mission. Sail without fighting."[177]
So to the old delusion of ulterior objects was sacrificed the one
chance for compassing the junction essential to success. By April 1 the
British fleet off Brest was increased to twenty-one sail.

Meanwhile Nelson had returned from his fruitless search at Alexandria,
and on the 13th of March again appeared off Toulon. Thence he went
to Cape San Sebastian, showing his ships off Barcelona to convince
the enemy he was fixed on the coast of Spain; reasoning that if they
thought him to the westward they would more readily start for Egypt,
which he still believed to be their aim. He had by his communications
with Alexandria learned the distracted state of that country since the
destruction of the Mameluke power and its restoration to the Turks, and
reported that the French could easily hold it, if they once effected a
lodgment.[178] From Cape San Sebastian the fleet next went to the Gulf
of Palmas, a convenient roadstead in the south of Sardinia, to fill
with provisions from transports lately arrived. It anchored there on
the 26th of March, but was again at sea when, at 8 A. M. of April 4,
being then twenty miles west of the Gulf, a frigate brought word of
the second sailing of the Toulon fleet. When last seen, in the evening
of March 31, it was sixty miles south of Toulon, steering south with a
north-west wind. One of the pair of lookouts was then sent to Nelson;
and the other, losing sight of the enemy during the night, joined him
a few hours after the first. The only clue she could give was that,
having herself steered south-west with a wind from west-north-west, the
enemy had probably kept on south or borne away to the eastward. Nelson,
therefore, took the fleet midway between Sardinia and the African
coast, scattering lookout ships along the line between these two
points.[179] He was thus centrally placed to cover everything east of
Sardinia, and with means of speedy information if the French attempted
to pass, at any point, the line occupied by him.

Villeneuve had indeed headed as reported by the British frigates,
swayed by Nelson's ruse in appearing off Barcelona.[180] Believing
the enemy off Cape San Sebastian, he meant to go east of the Balearic
Islands. The next day, April 1; a neutral ship informed him that it
had seen the British fleet south of Sardinia. The wind fortunately
hauling to the eastward, Villeneuve changed his course to pass north
of the Balearics; and on the 6th of April, when Nelson was watching
for him between Sardinia and Africa, he appeared off Cartagena. The
Spanish division there declined to join him, having no instructions
from its government; and the French fleet, continuing at once with a
fresh easterly wind, passed Gibraltar on the 8th. On the 9th it reached
Cadiz, driving away Orde's squadron. Following his orders strictly,
Villeneuve anchored outside the port; and was there at once joined by
the French seventy-four "l'Aigle," and six Spanish ships. During the
night the combined force of eighteen of the line sailed for Martinique,
where it anchored May 14, after a passage of thirty-four days. Some
Spanish ships separated the day after sailing; but, having sealed
instructions giving the rendezvous, they arrived only two days later
than the main body.

This sortie of Villeneuve had so far been exceptionally happy. By a
mere accident he had learned Nelson's position, while that admiral was
misled by what seems to have been bad management on the part of his
carefully placed lookouts. Nelson was not prone to blame subordinates,
but he apparently felt he had not been well served in this case. Not
till April 16, when Villeneuve was already six days on his way from
Cadiz, did he learn from a passing ship that nine days before the
French were seen off Cape de Gata, on the coast of Spain, steering
westward with an east wind, evidently bound to the Atlantic. To this
piece of great good luck Villeneuve's fortune added another. While
he carried an east wind with him till clear of the Straits, Nelson,
from the 4th of April to the 19th, had a succession of strong westerly
gales. "We have been nine days coming two hundred miles," he wrote.
"For a whole month we have had nothing like a Levanter except for
the French fleet."[181] Not till May 6, after a resolute struggle of
over three weeks against contrary fortune, did he anchor his fleet in
Gibraltar Bay. Five days later he was on his way to the West Indies.
But while the escape from Toulon showed the impossibility of securing
every naval detachment of the enemy, the events elsewhere happening
proved the extreme difficulty of so timing the evasions as to effect a
great combination. While Villeneuve with eighteen ships was hastening
to the West Indies, Missiessy,[182] with five others, having very
imperfectly fulfilled his mission to annoy the enemy's islands, was
speeding back to Rochefort, where orders at once to retrace his steps
were waiting. At the same time Ganteaume with his twenty-one was
hopelessly locked in Brest. Amid all the difficulties of their task,
the British fleets, sticking close to the French arsenals, not only
tempered their efficiency for war to the utmost toughness, but reaped
also the advantages inseparable from interior positions.

The better to divert attention from his real designs, Napoleon took
the time appointed for his squadrons' sailing to visit Italy. Leaving
Paris April 1, and journeying leisurely, he was in Alessandria on the
first of May and in Milan on the 10th. There he remained a month, and
was on the 26th crowned king of the late Italian Republic. His stay in
Italy was prolonged to July. It is probably to this carefully timed
absence that we owe the full and invaluable record of his hopes and
fears, of the naval combinations which chased each other through his
tireless mind, of the calculations and surmises—true or false, but
always ingenious—which are contained in his almost daily letters to the
Minister of Marine.

Prominent among his preoccupations were the detention of
Ganteaume,—who, "hermetically blockaded and thwarted by constant
calms,"[183] could not get away,—and the whereabouts of Nelson, who
disappeared from his sight as entirely, and from his knowledge far more
completely, than Villeneuve did from the British ken. "In God's name!
hurry my Brest squadron away, that it may have time to join Villeneuve.
Nelson has been again deceived and gone to Egypt. Villeneuve was out of
sight on the 10th of April. Send him word that Nelson is seeking him in
Egypt; I have sent the same news to Ganteaume by a courier. God grant,
however, that he may not find him in Brest."[184] On the 15th of April
Ganteaume did make an attempt. The British fleet had been driven off
by a gale on the 11th, but reappeared on the 13th. On the afternoon
of the 14th word was brought to Admiral Gardner, who had temporarily
relieved Cornwallis, that the French were getting under way. The next
day they came out; but the enemy now numbered twenty-four sail to their
twenty-one, and after a demonstration they retired within the port.

As the advancing season gave less and less hope of the blockade
relaxing, Napoleon formed a new combination. Two ships-of-the-line,
now nearly ready at Rochefort, should sail under Rear-Admiral Magon,
carrying modified instructions to Villeneuve. The latter was now
commanded to wait thirty-five days after Magon's arrival, and then, if
Ganteaume had not appeared, return direct to Ferrol, discarding the
alternative rendezvous of Santiago. At Ferrol he would find fifteen
French and Spanish ships, making with his own and Magon's a total of
thirty-five. With these he was to appear before Brest, where Ganteaume
would join him, and with the combined force of fifty-six of the line at
once enter the Channel. Magon sailed with these orders early in May,
and on June 4 reached Villeneuve just in time to insure the direction
given by the latter to his fleet upon its return. To facilitate the
junction at Brest very heavy batteries were thrown up, covering the
anchorage outside the Goulet; and there, in May, Ganteaume took up his
position, covered by one hundred and fifty guns on shore.

It will be recognized that the emperor's plan, while retaining its
essential features, had now undergone a most important modification,
due to the closeness of the British blockade of Brest. A combination
of his squadrons still remained the key-stone of the fabric; but the
tenacity with which the largest of his detachments was held in check
had forced him to accept—what he had rejected as least advantageous—a
concentration in the Bay of Biscay, the great hive where swarmed the
British navy.

It became therefore more than ever desirable to divert as many as
possible of the enemy's cruisers from those waters; an object which
now continuously occupied Napoleon's mind and curiously tinged his
calculations with the color of his hopes. In defiance of statistics,
he thought the East Indies, as has before been said, the first of
British interests. He sought therefore to raise alarms about India,
and persisted in believing that every division sailing from England
was bound there. "Cochrane," he writes on April 13, "was before Lisbon
on March 4. He must first have gone to the Cape de Verde, thence to
Madeira, and if he gets no information he will go to India. That is
what any admiral of sense would do in his case."[185] On the 10th
of May, when Cochrane had been over a month in the West Indies,
he reiterates this opinion, and at the same time conjectures that
five thousand troops which sailed from England on the 15th of April
with most secret orders were gone to the Cape of Good Hope. "Fears
of Villeneuve's meeting this expedition will force them to send
more ships to India."[186] On the 31st of May he guesses that eight
ships-of-the-line, which sailed ten days before under Collingwood, were
bound to India,[187] and a week later repeats the surmise emphatically:
"The responsibility of the ministers is so great they cannot but send
him to the East Indies."[188] On the 9th of June he writes: "Everything
leads me to believe the English sent fifteen ships to the East Indies,
when they learned that Cochrane reached Barbadoes a fortnight after
Missiessy sailed; and in that case it is quite possible Nelson has
been sent to America."[189] This opinion is repeated on the 13th and
14th; and on the 28th, as the veil was about to fall from his eyes,
he sums up the acute reasoning which, starting from a false premise,
had so misled him: "It is difficult to believe that without any news
the English have sent seventeen ships-of-the-line (i. e. Nelson and
Collingwood combined) to the West Indies, when Nelson, joining his ten
to Cochrane's six, and three at Jamaica, would have nineteen—superior
to our squadron; while Collingwood going to the East Indies with eight
and finding there nine, in all seventeen, also superior to us—it is
difficult, I say, to believe that the enemy, with the chance of being
everywhere superior, should blindly abandon the East Indies."[190]

Some French writers,[191] as well as some English, have disparaged the
insight of Nelson, comparing him unfavorably with Napoleon, and basing
their estimate largely upon his error in esteeming Egypt the aim of the
French. In view of the foregoing extracts, and of other miscalculations
made by the emperor during this remarkable campaign—which will appear
farther on—it must be admitted that when in the dark, without good
information, both were forced to inferences, more or less acute,
but which, resting on no solid data, rose, as Nelson said, little
above guesses. So also Collingwood has been credited with completely
unravelling Napoleon's plan, and his penetration has been exalted above
Nelson's because, _after_ the latter's return from chasing Villeneuve
to the West Indies, he wrote that the flight there was to take off the
British naval force; overlooking his conjecture, two lines before, that
(not England, but) "Ireland is the real mark and butt of all these
operations." Rather might each adopt for himself Napoleon's own words,
"I have so often in my life been mistaken that I no longer blush for
it."[192] When his frigates lost sight of Villeneuve, on the night
of March 31, Nelson went neither east nor west; he concentrated his
force to cover what he thought the most likely objects of the enemy,
and awaited information as to his movements. "I shall neither go to
the eastward of Sicily nor to the westward of Sardinia until I know
something positive."[193] It can be confidently said that under like
conditions Napoleon would have done the same.

The fault of Napoleon's calculations was in over-estimating both the
importance and the danger of India, and also in not allowing for
the insight and information of the British government. He himself
laid down, with his peculiarly sound judgment, the lines it ought to
follow: "If I had been in the British Admiralty, I would have sent
a light squadron to the East and West Indies, and formed a strong
fleet of twenty of the line which I would not have dispatched until I
knew Villeneuve's destination."[194] This was just what the Admiralty
did. A light squadron was on its way to India, and eight ships were
ordered to the West Indies under Collingwood; but that able officer,
finding Nelson had started, contented himself with sending two to
re-enforce him, and took up his own position with six before Cadiz,
thus blocking the junction of the Cartagena ships. The strong body
of twenty was kept before Brest, much to Napoleon's annoyance. "If
England realizes the serious game she is playing, she ought to raise
the blockade of Brest."[195] But here, as with regard to the Indian
expeditions, Napoleon's thought was fathered by his wish. To weaken the
Brest blockade, as he confessed a little later, was the great point for
France.[196]

Nothing in fact is more noteworthy, nor more creditable, than the
intelligence and steadiness with which the British naval authorities
resisted Napoleon's efforts to lead them into ex-centric movements.
This was partly due to an accurate judgment of the worth of the
enemy's detached squadrons, partly to an intuitive sense of the supreme
importance of the Biscay positions, and partly to information much
more accurate than Napoleon imagined, or than he himself received in
naval transactions. "Those boasted English," jeered he, when he thought
them ignorant of Villeneuve's second sailing, "who claim to know of
everything, who have agents everywhere, couriers booted and spurred
everywhere, knew nothing of it."[197] Yet, by a singular coincidence,
on the very day, April 25, that they were supposed thus deceived, the
Admiralty were hurrying letters to Nelson and to the West Indies with
the important tidings. "You reason," wrote he to Decrès, "as if the
enemy were in the secret."[198] This is just what they were,—not as
to all details, but as to the main features of his plans. While the
emperor was wildly reckoning on imaginary squadrons hastening to India,
and guessing where Nelson was, both the latter and his government knew
where Villeneuve had gone, and the British admiral was already in the
West Indies. About the beginning of May it was known in England not
only that the Toulon fleet had sailed, but whither it was bound;[199]
and about the first of June, despite the cautions about secrecy
imposed by Bonaparte, the British were informed by a prisoner that
"the combined fleet, of sixty sail-of-the-line, will fight our fleet
(_balayer la Manche_), while the large frigates will come up channel
to convoy the flotilla over. The troops are impatiently awaiting the
appearance of the ships to set them free."[200]

The Admiralty therefore understood as well as did Napoleon that the
crucial necessity in their dispositions was to prevent the combination
of the enemy's squadrons, and that the chief scene of operations
would be the Bay of Biscay and the approaches to the Channel. They
contented themselves, consequently, with strengthening the force
there, and keeping before Cadiz alone a detachment under Collingwood,
lest a concentration in that port should compel them to weaken the
Biscay squadrons. At the time Villeneuve sailed, an expedition of five
thousand troops, whose destination was kept profoundly secret, was
ready to start for the Mediterranean. This re-enforcement secured the
naval bases of Gibraltar and Malta, and the Mediterranean otherwise was
abandoned to frigates, supported by two or three ships-of-the-line.
Herein also the practice of the Admiralty agreed with the precept of
Napoleon. "The Mediterranean," wrote he on June 7 to his Minister of
Marine, "is now nothing. I would rather see there two of Villeneuve's
ships than forty;" and he added the pregnant counsel, which was
exemplified by the British action, "It seems to me your purpose is _not
exclusive enough_ for a great operation. You must correct this fault,
for that is the art of great successes and of great operations."

The secret expedition was met by Nelson just as he started for the
West Indies. During his heavy beat down the Mediterranean he too, as
carefully as Napoleon, had been studying the field on which he was to
act; but while the one planned with all the freedom and certainty of an
offensive, which, disposing of large means, moves upon a known object,
the other, though in a restricted sphere, underwent the embarrassments
of the defensive, ignorant where the blow was to fall. One clear light,
however, shone step by step on his path,—wherever the French fleet was
gone there should he go also.

The west wind which delayed his progress brought swiftly to him, on
April 19, a vessel[201] from Gibraltar, with word that, two hours
after Villeneuve passed the Straits, a frigate had started for England
with the news, and that the French and Spaniards had sailed together
from Cadiz. From this circumstance he reasoned, accurately, that the
destination was the British Islands;[202] but he did not penetrate the
deep design of a concentration in the West Indies. He therefore sent
the frigate "Amazon" ahead of the fleet to Lisbon, to gather news and
rejoin him off Cape St. Vincent; and by her he wrote the Admiralty,
and also to the admirals off Brest and in Ireland, that he should take
position fifty leagues west of the Scilly Islands, and thence steer
slowly toward them. To any person who will plot this position on a map
it will be apparent that, with winds prevailing from the westward, he
would there be, as he said, equally well situated to reach Brest or
Ireland; in short, in an excellent strategic position known to the
authorities at home.

Stopping but four hours at Gibraltar on May 6, on the 9th he was off
Cape St. Vincent, and there received news that the combined squadrons,
to the number of eighteen of the line, had gone to the West Indies. His
concern was great, for he fully understood the value of those islands.
He had served there, knew them intimately, and had married there. Not a
year before he had written, "If our islands should fall, England would
be so clamorous for peace that we should humble ourselves."[203] Still,
with all his anxiety, he kept his head. The convoy of troops was close
at hand, he must provide for its safety. On the 11th of May it arrived,
Nelson's fleet being then under way. To the two ships-of-the-line
guarding it he added a third, the "Royal Sovereign," whose bad sailing
delayed him; and to this circumstance it was owing that that ship,
newly coppered, bore Collingwood's flag far in advance of either
British column into the fire at Trafalgar. Three hours after the
convoy's junction, at 7 P. M.of May 11, Nelson with ten ships was on
his way to the West Indies, to seek eighteen which had thirty-one days'
start.

On the 4th of June the British fleet, having gained eight days on
the allies, anchored at Barbadoes, where it found Cochrane with two
sail-of-the-line. The same day Magon with his two joined Villeneuve.
In the three weeks the latter had now been in Martinique he had
accomplished nothing but the capture of Diamond Rock, a small islet
detached from the main island, which the British held and from which
they annoyed the coasters. A frigate outstripping Magon had brought
pressing orders to make conquests in the British possessions, during
the thirty-five days of waiting for Ganteaume. In consequence, when
Magon joined, the fleet was under way, standing north to clear the
islands before making the stretch to the southward, and to windward, to
reach Barbadoes; which Villeneuve had selected as his first point of
attack.

On the 4th of June, therefore, the two hostile fleets were but a
hundred miles apart, the distance separating Barbadoes from Martinique.
Most singularly, at the very moment Villeneuve started north to return
upon Barbadoes, false news, too plausible to be slighted, induced
Nelson to go south. Positive information was sent by the officer
commanding at Santa Lucia that the allies had been seen from there,
May 29, steering south. Nelson anchored at Barbadoes at 5 P. M. June
4, embarked two thousand troops during the night, and at 10 A. M. next
day made sail for the southward. On the 6th he passed Tobago, which
was reported safe, and on the 7th anchored off Trinidad; where to the
astonishment of every one nothing had been heard of the enemy. Cursing
the news which had forced him to disregard his own judgment, when only
a hundred miles of fair wind severed him from his prey, Nelson turned
upon his tracks and steered for Martinique, tortured with fears for
Jamaica and every exposed British possession.

On the 8th of June, when Nelson left Trinidad, the combined fleets were
nearly four hundred miles from him, off the west side of Antigua. Here
they captured fourteen merchant ships which had imprudently left port,
and by them were informed that Nelson with fourteen ships (instead
of ten) had reached Barbadoes. To these fourteen, Villeneuve, whose
information was poor, added five as the force of Cochrane, making
nineteen to his eighteen. Supposing therefore the enemy to be superior,
not only in quality, which he conceded, but in numbers also, he
decided, in view of so unexpected an event as the arrival on the scene
of the greatest British admiral, to return at once to Europe. In this
he doubtless met the wishes of Napoleon. "I think," said the latter,
ere he knew the fact, "that the arrival of Nelson may lead Villeneuve
to return to Europe;"[204] and he argued, still seeing things as he
wished,—certainly not as a seaman would,—"When Nelson learns Villeneuve
has left the Windward Islands, he will go to Jamaica,"[205] a thousand
miles to leeward. "So far from being infallible like the Pope," wrote
Nelson at the same moment, "I believe my opinions to be very fallible,
and therefore I may be mistaken that the enemy's fleet is gone to
Europe; but I cannot bring myself to think otherwise."[206] Then,
having given his reasons, he seems to dive into Napoleon's mind and
read his thoughts. "The enemy will not give me credit for quitting the
West Indies for this month to come."[207]

Villeneuve also doubtless hoped to shake off his pursuer by his sudden
change of purpose. Transferring troops necessary to garrison the French
islands to four frigates, he directed the latter to land them at
Guadaloupe and rejoin him off the Azores,—a mistaken rendezvous, which
materially lengthened his backward voyage. The combined fleet then made
sail on the 9th of June to the northward, to reach the westerly winds
that favor the passage to Europe.

Three days later Nelson also was off Antigua, and convinced himself
that the allies were bound back to Europe. With the tireless energy
that brooked no rest when once resolve was formed, the night was passed
transferring the troops which but one week before he had embarked at
Barbadoes. But not even a night's delay was allowed in sending news to
Europe. At 8 P. M. he hurried off the brig "Curieux" with dispatches
to the Admiralty, which the captain, Bettesworth, was to deliver in
person; a momentous action, and one fraught with decisive consequences
to the campaign, although somewhat marred by an overcautious admiral.
On the 13th, at noon, the fleet itself, accompanied by one of
Cochrane's two ships, the "Spartiate," sailed for the Straits of
Gibraltar; but Nelson, uncertain as to the enemy's destination, also
sent word to the officer commanding off Ferrol,[208] lest he might be
taken unawares.

Although Villeneuve's decision to return was fortunate and
characterized by the extraordinary good luck which upon the whole had
so far attended him, it is evident that he ran the chance of crossing
Ganteaume on the Atlantic, as he himself had been crossed by Missiessy.
Napoleon had taken precautions to insure both his waiting long enough,
and also his return in case Ganteaume could not get away by a certain
time; but not having foreseen, nor until June 28[209] even known,
Nelson's pursuit of Villeneuve, he could not anticipate the course of
the latter in such a contingency, nor combine with it the action of the
Brest fleet.

Ganteaume, however, was not able to elude Lord Gardner, and on the
8th of May the emperor, having received in Italy the news of Magon's
sailing, gave his final decision. If before midnight of May 20 an
opportunity offered, the Brest fleet should start; but from daybreak
of the 21st, had it every chance in the world, it should stand fast. A
frigate was to be kept ready to sail the instant the latter condition
took effect, carrying to Villeneuve orders for his action upon reaching
Ferrol. This frigate did sail May 21, but of course did not find the
admiral in the West Indies. Duplicate instructions were sent to Ferrol.

Villeneuve was by them informed that he would in Ferrol find ready for
sea five French and nine Spanish ships, which, with those already under
his orders, would make a force of thirty-four sail-of-the-line. In the
roads off Rochefort would be five more. At Brest twenty-one ships were
lying outside the Goulet, under the protection of one hundred and fifty
cannon, ready to get under way at a moment's notice. The great point
was to concentrate these three masses, or as much of them as possible,
off Boulogne. Three courses were open to him. If the squadron at Ferrol
could not leave the port when he appeared, on account of head winds, he
should order it to join him at Rochefort and go there at once himself.
Thence with forty ships he should proceed off Brest, join Ganteaume,
and at once enter the Channel. If, however, the wind was fair for
leaving Ferrol, that is, southerly, he would see in that a reason for
hastening to Brest, without stopping for the Rochefort squadron; the
more so as every delay would increase the British force before Brest.
Thirdly, he might possibly, as he drew toward Ushant, find the winds so
fair as to give the hope of getting to Boulogne with his thirty-five
ships three or four days before the enemy's fleet at Brest could
follow. If so, it was left to his discretion to embrace so favorable
an opportunity. To these three courses Napoleon added a fourth as a
possible alternative. After rallying the Ferrol ships he might pass
north of the British Islands, join the Dutch squadron of the Texel with
Marmont's corps there embarked, and with these appear off Boulogne.
The emperor, however, looked upon this rather as a last resort. A great
concentration in the Bay of Biscay was the one aim he now favored.

To facilitate this he busied himself much with the question of
diverting the enemy from that great centre of his operations. This it
was that made him so ready to believe that each squadron that sailed
was gone to the East Indies. If so, it was well removed from the Bay
of Biscay. For this he sought to get the Cartagena ships to Toulon
or to Cadiz. "If we can draw six English ships before each port," he
writes, "that will be a fine diversion for us; and if I can get the
Cartagena ships in Toulon I will threaten Egypt in so many ways that
they will be obliged to keep there an imposing force. They will believe
Villeneuve gone to the East Indies in concerted operation with the
Toulon squadron."[210] For this he purposes to send Missiessy to Cadiz.
In Rochefort that admiral will occupy a British detachment, but on the
spot where the emperor does not wish it; at Cadiz it will be remote
from the scene. But later on he says, "Perhaps the enemy, who are now
thoroughly frightened, will not be led away; in that case I shall have
dispersed my force uselessly."[211] Therefore he concludes to keep him
at Rochefort, where, if blockaded, he reduces the force either off
Ferrol or off Brest. If not blockaded, he is to go to sea, take a wide
sweep in the Atlantic, and appear off Ireland. The English will then
doubtless detach ships to seek him; but he will again disappear and
take position near Cape Finisterre, where he will be likely to meet
Villeneuve returning.[212] Finally, for the same reason, toward the end
of June he tries to create alarm about the Texel. Marmont is directed
to make demonstrations and even to embark his troops, while part of
the emperor's guard is moved to Utrecht. "This will lead the enemy to
weaken his fleet before Brest, which is the great point."[213]

All these movements were sound and wise; but the emperor made the
mistake of underestimating his enemy. "We have not to do," he said,
"with a far-sighted, but with a very proud government. What we are
doing is so simple that a government the least foresighted would not
have made war. For an instant they have feared for London; soon they
will be sending squadrons to the two Indies."[214]

The British government and the British Admiralty doubtless made
blunders; but barring the one great mistake, for which the previous
administration of St. Vincent was responsible, of allowing the material
of the navy to fall below the necessities of the moment, the Trafalgar
campaign was in its leading outlines well and adequately conceived, and
in its execution, as event succeeded event, ably and even brilliantly
directed. Adequate detachments were placed before each of the enemy's
minor arsenals, while the fleet before Brest constituted the great
central body upon which the several divisions might, and when necessity
arose, actually did fall back. Sudden disaster, or being beaten in
detail, thus became almost impossible. In the home ports was maintained
a well-proportioned reserve, large enough to replace ships disabled or
repairing, but not so large as seriously to weaken the force at sea.
As a rule the Admiralty successfully shunned the ex-centric movements
to which Napoleon would divert them, and clung steadfastly to that
close watch which St. Vincent had perfected, and which unquestionably
embodied the soundest strategic principles. Missiessy returned to
Rochefort on the 26th of May and was promptly blocked by a body of five
or six ships. As the force in Ferrol increased, by the preparation
of ships for sea, the opposing squadron of six or seven was raised
to ten, under Rear-Admiral Calder. Before Brest were from twenty to
twenty-five, to whose command Admiral Cornwallis returned early in
July, after a three months' sick leave. Collingwood with half a dozen
was before Cadiz, where he effectually prevented a concentration,
which, by its distance from the scene of action, would have seriously
embarrassed the British navy. Such was the situation when Villeneuve
and Nelson, in June and July, were re-crossing the Atlantic, heading,
the one for Ferrol, the other for the Straits; and when the crisis, to
which all the previous movements had been leading, was approaching its
culmination.

When Nelson started back for Europe, although convinced the French
were thither bound, he had no absolute certainty of the fact.[215]
For his decision he relied upon his own judgment. In dispatching the
"Curieux" the night before he himself sailed, he directed her captain
to steer a certain course, by following which he believed he would fall
in with the allied fleet.[216] Accordingly the "Curieux" did, on the
19th of June, sight the enemy in latitude 33° 12' north and longitude
58° west, nine hundred miles north-north-east from Antigua, standing
north-north-west. The same day Nelson himself learned from an American
schooner that a fleet of about twenty-two large ships of war had been
seen by it on the 15th, three hundred and fifty miles south of the
position in which Bettesworth saw it four days later.

Bettesworth fully understood the importance of the knowledge thus
gained. The precise destination of the enemy did not certainly appear,
but there could be no doubt that he was returning to Europe. With that
intelligence, and the information concerning Nelson's purposes, it
was urgent to reach England speedily. Carrying a press of sail, the
"Curieux" anchored at Plymouth on the 7th of July. The captain posted
at once to London, arriving the evening of the 8th, at eleven. The head
of the Admiralty at that time was Lord Barham, an aged naval officer,
who had been unexpectedly called to the office two months before, in
consequence of the impeachment of Lord Melville, the successor to St.
Vincent. It was fortunate for Great Britain that the direction of naval
operations at so critical a moment was in the hands of a man, who,
though over eighty and long a stranger to active service, understood
intuitively, and without need of explanation, the various conditions
of weather and service likely to affect the movements of the scattered
detachments, British and hostile, upon whose rapid combinations so much
now depended.

Barham having gone to bed, Bettesworth's dispatches were not given him
till early next morning. As soon as he got them he exclaimed angrily
at the loss of so many precious hours; and, without waiting to dress,
at once dictated orders with which, by 9 A. M. of the 9th, Admiralty
messengers were hurrying to Plymouth and Portsmouth. Cornwallis was
directed to raise the blockade at Rochefort, sending the five ships
composing it to Sir Robert Calder, then watching off Ferrol with ten;
and the latter was ordered, with the fifteen ships thus united under
his command, to cruise one hundred miles west of Cape Finisterre,
to intercept Villeneuve and forestall his junction with the Ferrol
squadron. With Nelson returning toward Cadiz, where he would find
Collingwood, and with Cornwallis off Brest, this disposition completed
the arrangements necessary to thwart the primary combinations of
the emperor, unknown to, but shrewdly surmised by, his opponents.
It realized for Ferrol that which Napoleon had indicated as the
proper course for the British fleet off Brest, in case it received
intelligence of Villeneuve's approach there,—to meet the enemy so far
at sea as to prevent the squadron in port from joining in the intended
battle.[217]

Fair winds favoring the quick, Cornwallis received his orders on the
11th; and on the 15th, eight days after the "Curieux" anchored in
Plymouth, the Rochefort ships joined Calder. The latter proceeded at
once to the post assigned him, where on the 19th he received through
Lisbon the tidings of Villeneuve's return sent by Nelson from the West
Indies. The same day Nelson himself, having outstripped the combined
fleets, anchored in Gibraltar. On the 22d the sudden lifting of a
dense fog revealed to each other the hostile squadrons of Calder and
Villeneuve; the British fifteen sail-of-the-line, the allies twenty.
The numbers of the latter were an unpleasant surprise to Calder, the
"Curieux" having reported them as only seventeen.[218]

It is difficult to praise too highly the prompt and decisive step taken
by Lord Barham, when so suddenly confronted with the dilemma of either
raising the blockade of Rochefort and Ferrol, or permitting Villeneuve
to proceed unmolested to his destination, whatever that might be. To
act instantly and rightly in so distressing a perplexity—to be able
to make so unhesitating a sacrifice of advantages long and rightly
cherished, in order to strike at once one of the two converging
detachments of an enemy—shows generalship of a high order. It may be
compared to Bonaparte's famous abandonment of the siege of Mantua in
1796, to throw himself upon the Austrian armies descending from the
Tyrol. In the hands of a more resolute or more capable admiral than
Calder, the campaign would probably have been settled off Finisterre.
Notice has been taken of Barham's good luck, in that the brilliant
period of Trafalgar fell within his nine months' tenure of office;[219]
but Great Britain might better be congratulated that so clear-headed a
man held the reins at so critical a moment.

The length of Villeneuve's passage, which so happily concurred to
assure the success of Barham's masterly move, was due not only to the
inferior seamanship of the allies, but also to the mistaken rendezvous
off the Azores,[220]—assigned by the French admiral when leaving the
West Indies. The westerly gales, which prevail in the North Atlantic,
blow during the summer from the south of west, west of the Azores, and
from the north of west when east of them. A fleet bound for a European
port north of the islands—as Ferrol is—should therefore so use the
south-west winds as to cross their meridian well to the northward.
Nelson himself sighted one of the group, though his destination was in
a lower latitude. In consequence of his mistake, Villeneuve was by the
north-west winds forced down on the coast of Portugal, where he met the
north-easters prevalent at that season, against which he was struggling
when encountered by Calder. This delay was therefore caused, not by bad
luck, but by bad management.

Napoleon himself was entirely misled by Barham's measures, whose
rapidity he himself could not have surpassed. He had left Turin on the
8th of July, and, travelling incessantly, reached Fontainebleau on the
evening of the 11th. About the 20th he appears to have received the
news brought ten days before by the "Curieux," and at the same time
that of the Rochefort blockade being raised.[221] Not till the 27th did
he learn that the British squadron off Ferrol had also disappeared,
after being joined by the Rochefort ships. "The 'Curieux' only reached
England on the 9th," he wrote to Decrès; "_the Admiralty could not
decide the movements of its squadrons in twenty-four hours_, yet the
Rochefort division disappeared on the 12th. On the 15th it joined that
off Ferrol, and the same day, or at latest the next, these fourteen
ships departed by orders given _prior to_ the arrival of the 'Curieux.'
What news had the English before the arrival of that brig? That the
French were at Martinique; that Nelson had then but nine ships. What
should they have done? I should not be surprised if they have sent
another squadron to strengthen Nelson, ... and that it is these
fourteen ships from before Ferrol they have sent to America."[222]

On the 2d of August the emperor set out for Boulogne, and there on
the 8th received news of Villeneuve's action with Calder and of his
subsequent entry into Ferrol. The fleets had fought on the afternoon of
July 22, and two Spanish ships-of-the-line had been taken. Night-fall
and fog parted the combatants; the obscurity being so great that the
allies did not know their loss till next day. One of the British ships
lost a foretopmast, and others suffered somewhat in their spars; but
these mishaps, though pleaded in Calder's defence, do not seem to have
been the chief reasons that deterred him from dogging the enemy till
he had brought him again to action. He was preoccupied with the care
of the prizes, a secondary matter, and with the thought of what would
happen in case the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons sailed. "I could
not hope to succeed without receiving great damage; I had no friendly
port to go to, and had the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons come out, I
must have fallen an easy prey. They might have gone to Ireland. Had I
been defeated it is impossible to say what the consequences might have
been."[223] In short, the British admiral had fallen into the error
against which Napoleon used to caution his generals. He had "made to
himself a picture," and allowed the impression produced by it to blind
him to the fact (if indeed he ever saw it) that he had before him the
largest and most important of the several detachments of the enemy,
that it was imperatively necessary not to permit it to escape unharmed,
and that at no future day could he be sure of bringing his own squadron
into play with such decisive effect. The wisdom of engaging at any
particular moment was a tactical question, to be determined by the
circumstances at the time; but the duty of keeping touch with the
enemy, so as to use promptly any opportunity offered, was a strategic
question, the answer to which admits of no doubt whatever. On the
evening of the 24th the wind was fair to carry him to the enemy, but he
parted from them. During the night it blew fresh; and on the morning
of the 25th, says a French authority, the fleet was without order,
several vessels had lost sails, and others sustained injuries to their
spars.[224] Calder, however, was not on hand.

It is related of Nelson that, on his return voyage from the West
Indies, he used to say to his captains, speaking of the fleet which
Calder allowed to escape, "If we meet them we shall find them not less
than eighteen, I rather think twenty, sail-of-the-line, and therefore
do not be surprised if I should not fall on them immediately; _we
won't part without a battle_. I will let them alone till we approach
the shores of Europe, _or they give me an advantage too tempting to be
resisted_."[225] And again, after reaching England, he found on the
23d of August great anxiety prevailing about Calder, who with eighteen
ships was then again cruising for Villeneuve, supposed to have been
re-enforced to twenty-eight by the Ferrol squadron. "I am no conjuror,"
he wrote, "but this I ventured without any fear, that if Calder got
fairly alongside their twenty-eight sail, by the time the enemy had
beat our fleet soundly, they would do us no harm this year."[226] These
two utterances of this consummate warrior sufficiently show how Calder
should have viewed his opportunity in July.

Villeneuve had no more wish to renew the action than had Calder.
Less even than that admiral could he rise to the height of risking a
detachment in order to secure the success of a great design. In the
eighteen ships left to him were over twelve hundred men so ill that
it was necessary to put them ashore. Constrained by the winds, he put
into Vigo on the 28th of July. Calder, on the other hand, having seen
his prizes so far north as to insure their safety, returned off Cape
Finisterre where he hoped to meet Nelson. Not finding him, he on the
29th resumed the blockade of Ferrol. On the 31st Villeneuve, leaving
three of his worst vessels in Vigo, sailed for Ferrol with fifteen
ships, of which two only were Spaniards. The fleet, having a strong
south-west gale, kept close along shore to avoid meeting Calder; but
the latter, having been blown off by the storm, was not in sight
when Villeneuve reached the harbor's mouth. The allied ships were
entering with a fair wind, when the French admiral received dispatches
forbidding him to anchor in Ferrol. If, from injuries received in
battle, or losses from any causes whatever, he was unable to carry out
the plan of entering the Channel, the emperor preferred that, after
rallying the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons, he should go to Cadiz;
but, the Brest fleet being ready and the other preparations complete,
he hoped everything from the skill, zeal, and courage of Villeneuve.
"Make us masters of the Straits of Dover," he implored, "be it but for
four or five days."[227] Napoleon leaned on a broken reed. Forbidden
to enter Ferrol, Villeneuve took his ships into the adjacent harbor of
Coruña,[228] where he anchored August 1.

Thus was effected the junction which Calder had been expected to
prevent. His absence on the particular day may have been unavoidable;
but, if so, it does but emphasize his fault in losing sight of the
allies on the 24th of July, when he had a fair wind. Twenty-nine French
and Spanish ships were now concentrated at Ferrol. The popular outcry
was so great that he felt compelled to ask an enquiry. The Admiralty
having, by a movement both judiciously and promptly ordered, secured
a meeting with the enemy's force so far from Ferrol as to deprive it
of the support of the ships there, was justly incensed at the failure
to reap the full advantage. It therefore ordered a court-martial. The
trial was held the following December; and the admiral, while expressly
cleared of either cowardice or disaffection, was adjudged not to have
done his utmost to renew the engagement and to take or destroy every
ship of the enemy. His conduct was pronounced highly censurable, and he
was sentenced to be severely reprimanded.

This was after Trafalgar. The immediate result of the junction in
Ferrol was the abandonment of the blockade there. On the 2d of August
Calder sent five ships to resume the watch off Rochefort, whence the
French squadron had meantime escaped. Not till August 9 did he know of
Villeneuve's entrance into Ferrol. Having with him then but nine ships,
he fell back upon the main body before Brest, which he joined on the
14th,—Cornwallis then having under him seventeen ships, which Calder's
junction raised to twenty-six.

The next day, August 15, Nelson also joined the fleet. On the 25th of
July, a week after reaching Gibraltar, he had received the "Curieux's"
news. Obeying his constant rule to seek the French, he at once started
north with the eleven ships which had accompanied him from the West
Indies,—intending to go either to Ferrol, Brest, or Ireland, according
to the tidings which might reach him on the way. After communicating
with Cornwallis, he continued on to England with his own ship, the
"Victory," and one other whose condition required immediate repairs. On
the 18th he landed in Portsmouth, after an absence of over two years.

Cornwallis had now under his command a concentrated force of
thirty-four or thirty-five sail-of-the-line, all admirably seasoned
and disciplined. The allies had in Brest twenty-one, in Ferrol
twenty-nine; two great bodies, neither of which, however, was equal in
number, nor still less in quality, to his. Adrift somewhere on the sea
were the five French ships from Rochefort. For more than five months
these vessels, which sailed on the 17th of July, five days after the
blockading ships had left to join Calder, ranged the seas without
meeting an equal British division,—a circumstance which earned for them
from the French the name of "the Invisible Squadron." But, while thus
fortunately unseen by the enemy, Napoleon found it equally impossible
to bring them within the scope of his combinations;[229] and it may be
doubted whether commerce-destroying to the sum of two million dollars
compensated for the loss of so important a military factor.

The ships in Cadiz being blocked by Collingwood, and those in Cartagena
remaining always inert, the naval situation was now comparatively
simple. Cornwallis was superior to either of the enemy's detachments,
and he held an interior position. In case Villeneuve approached, it
was scarcely possible that the two hostile squadrons, dependent upon
the wind, which if fair for one would be foul to the other, could
unite before he had effectually crushed one of them. It ought to be
equally improbable, with proper lookouts, that Villeneuve could
elude the British fleet and gain so far the start of it as to cover
the Straits of Dover during the time required by Napoleon. In his
concentrated force and his interior position Cornwallis controlled the
issue,—barring of course those accidents which cannot be foreseen, and
which at times derange the best-laid plans.

Such was the situation when, on August 17, Cornwallis was informed
that Villeneuve had put to sea with, it was said, twenty-seven or
twenty-eight ships-of-the-line. He at once detached toward Ferrol Sir
Robert Calder with eighteen sail, keeping with himself sixteen. This
division of his fleet, which is condemned by the simplest and most
generally admitted principles of warfare, transferred to Villeneuve
all the advantage of central position and superior force, and was
stigmatized by Napoleon as a "glaring blunder." "What a chance," he
wrote, upon hearing it when all was over, "has Villeneuve missed. He
might, by coming upon Brest from a wide sweep to sea, have played
hide and seek with Calder and fallen upon Cornwallis; or else, with
his thirty ships have beaten Calder's twenty and gained a decided
preponderance."[230] This censure of both admirals was just.

While the British squadrons were concentrating in the Bay of Biscay,
and the happy insight and diligence of Nelson were bringing the
Mediterranean ships to the critical centre of action, Napoleon, from
the heights overlooking Boulogne, was eagerly awaiting news from
Villeneuve, and at the same time anxiously watching the signs of the
times on the Continent, where the sky was already dark with a gathering
storm. The encroachments which led to the second war with Great
Britain, in 1803, had excited no less distrust among the continental
powers, who were indeed more immediately and disastrously affected
by them; but none had then dared to move. The violation of German
neutrality in 1804, by the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien on the soil of
Baden, had caused a general indignation; which, on the part of Russia
and Austria, was quickened into a desire to act by his execution,
regarded by most as a judicial murder. Prussia shared the anger and
fears of the other powers, but not enough to decide her vacillating
government.

In this state of things the fall of the Addington ministry, and the
consequent vigor imparted to the foreign policy of Great Britain by
Pitt's second accession to power, led naturally to another coalition;
the centre of which, as ever, was found in London. The czar having
remonstrated vigorously, both with Napoleon and the German Diet, upon
the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien, a bitter correspondence had followed,
causing the rupture of diplomatic relations between France and Russia
in August, 1804. For similar reasons, and at the same time, the French
embassy to Sweden was recalled. Austria still temporized, though her
actions excited Napoleon's suspicions.

Early in 1805 the czar sent special envoys to London, to treat
concerning certain vast schemes for the reorganization of Europe in
the interests of general peace. The particular object was not reached;
but on the 11th of April a treaty between Great Britain and Russia was
signed, the two agreeing to promote a league among the powers to stop
further encroachments by Napoleon. Six weeks later the emperor was
crowned King of Italy, and in June Genoa was annexed to France. This
last act, contemplated by Napoleon for many years,[231] determined
Austria's accession to the treaty. By her signature, given August
9,[232] the third coalition was formed. Sweden became a party to it at
the same time, and Great Britain undertook to pay subsidies to all the
members.

The preparations of Austria, ever deliberate, could not escape
Napoleon's watchful eye. "All my news from Italy is warlike," he
writes, "and indeed Austria no longer observes any concealment."[233]
Yet, trusting to his enemy's slowness and his own readiness, he did
not lose hope. The position was precisely analogous to those military
situations in which he had so often snatched success from overwhelming
numbers, by rapidly throwing himself on one enemy before the other
could join. He might even yet deal his long cherished blow to Great
Britain, under which, if successful, Austria also would at once
succumb. On August 13, two days after learning of Villeneuve's entry
into Coruña, he instructs Talleyrand to notify the emperor that the
troops assembled in the Tyrol _must_ be withdrawn to Bohemia, leaving
him free to carry on his war with England undisturbed, or by November
he will be in Vienna.[234] Urgent messages are the same day sent to
Villeneuve to hasten and fulfil his mission, for time was pressing;
threatened by Austria and Great Britain, a blow must speedily be
struck. He is no longer ordered to refrain from fighting. On the
contrary, if superior to the British, counting two Spanish ships equal
to one French, he is to attack at all hazards.[235] "If with thirty
ships my admirals fear to attack twenty-four British, we may as well
give up all hope of a navy."[236]

On the 23d of August the emperor announces to Talleyrand his final
and momentous decision: "My squadron sailed August 14 from Ferrol
with thirty-four ships;[237] it had no enemy in sight. If it follows
my instructions, joins the Brest squadron and enters the Channel,
there is still time; I am master of England. If, on the contrary, my
admirals hesitate, manœuvre badly, and do not fulfil their purpose,
I have no other resource than to wait for winter to cross with the
flotilla. That operation is risky; it would be more so if, pressed by
time, political events should oblige me to postpone it to the month of
April. Such being the case, I hasten to meet the most pressing danger:
I raise my camp here, and by September 23 I shall have in Germany two
hundred thousand men, and twenty-five thousand in Naples. I march upon
Vienna, and do not lay down my arms until I have Naples and Venice,
and have no more to fear from Austria. Austria will certainly thus
be quieted during the winter." These words were a prophecy. The same
day numerous orders, strictly preparatory as yet, were issued to the
troops in Hanover, Holland, and Italy, and other provision made for
the contemplated change of purpose. At the same time, still clinging
to every hope of arresting Austria, and so being left free for the
invasion of England, he sent Duroc to Berlin to offer Hanover to
Prussia, upon condition that the latter should move troops toward
Bohemia or at least make a clear declaration to Austria.

The issue was already decided. On the 13th of August, after three
fruitless attempts, Villeneuve got to sea with his twenty-nine
ships-of-the-line. The frigate "Didon" was sent to seek the Rochefort
squadron and direct it also upon Brest. Yet the unfortunate admiral was
even then hesitating whether he should go there with his vastly greater
force, and the orders were likely seriously to endanger the smaller
division. As he sailed, he penned these significant words to the
Minister of Marine: "The enemy's forces, more concentrated than ever,
leave me little other resource than to go to Cadiz."[238]

Shortly after he cleared the harbor the wind shifted to north-east,
foul for his purpose. The fleet stood to the north-west; but the
ships were badly handled and several received damage. On the morning
of the 15th they were two hundred and fifty miles west-north-west
from Cape Finisterre; the wind blowing a moderate gale, still from
the north-east. Three ships of war were in sight,—two British, the
third the frigate that had been sent to seek the Rochefort squadron,
but which had been captured. A Danish merchantman reported that they
were lookouts from a hostile body of twenty-five ships. The story
had no foundation, for Cornwallis had not yet divided his fleet; but
Villeneuve pictured to himself his inefficient command meeting a force
with which it was wholly unable to cope. Losing sight of the great
whole of which his own enterprise was but a part, though one of vital
importance, his resolution finally broke down. That evening he ordered
the fleet to bear up for Cadiz. On the 20th[239] it was sighted from
the three ships commanded by Collingwood, who with a small division
of varying strength had watched the port since the previous May. With
steady judgment, that admiral in retiring kept just out of gunshot,
determined, as he said, not to be driven into the Mediterranean without
dragging the enemy too through the Straits. Villeneuve had little
heart to pursue. That afternoon he anchored in Cadiz, where were then
assembled thirty-five French and Spanish ships-of-the-line. Collingwood
at once resumed his station outside. That night one ship-of-the-line
joined him, and on the 22d Sir Richard Bickerton arrived with four from
the Mediterranean. On the 30th Calder appeared, bringing with him the
eighteen detached by Cornwallis. In compliance with his orders he had
been before Ferrol, found the port empty, and, learning that Villeneuve
had sailed for Cadiz, had hastened to re-enforce the blockade. With
twenty-six ships-of-the-line Collingwood held the enemy securely
checked, and remained in chief command until the 28th of September,
when Nelson arrived from England.

Thus ended, and forever, Napoleon's profoundly conceived and
laboriously prepared scheme for the invasion of England. If it be
sought to fix a definite moment which marked the final failure of so
vast a plan, that one may well be chosen when Villeneuve made signal
to bear up for Cadiz. When, precisely, Napoleon learned the truth,
does not appear. Decrès, the Minister of Marine, had however prepared
him in some measure for Villeneuve's action; and, after a momentary
outburst of rage against the unfortunate admiral, he at once issued
in rapid succession the directions, by which, to use his own graphic
expression, his legions were made to "pirouette," and the march toward
the Rhine and Upper Danube was begun. "My decision is taken," he writes
to Talleyrand, August 25; "my movement is begun. Three weeks hence I
shall be in Germany with two hundred thousand men." During that and
the two following days order after order issued from his headquarters;
and on the 28th he wrote to Duroc that the army was in full movement.
To conceal his change of purpose and to gain all-important time, by
lulling the suspicions of Austria, he himself remained at Boulogne,
with his eyes seemingly fixed seaward, until the 3d of September, when
he went to Paris. On the 24th he left the capital for the army, on
the 26th he was at Strasbourg, and on the 7th of October the French
army, numbering near two hundred thousand, struck the Danube below
Ulm; cutting off some eighty thousand Austrians there assembled under
General Mack. On the 20th, the day before Trafalgar, Ulm capitulated;
thirty thousand men laying down their arms. Thirty thousand more had
been taken in the actions preceding this event.[240] On the 13th of
November French troops entered Vienna, and on the 2d of December the
battle of Austerlitz was won over the combined Russians and Austrians.
On the 26th the emperor of Germany signed the Peace of Presburg. By it
he relinquished Venice with all other possessions in Italy, and ceded
the Tyrol to Bavaria, the ally of France.

Austria was thus quieted for three years, but the expedition against
Great Britain was never resumed. In the course of the following year
difficulties arose between Prussia and France, which led to war and
the overthrow of the North German kingdom at Auerstadt and Jena. Yet
another campaign was needed to bring Russia to peace in 1807. Meanwhile
the Boulogne flotilla was rotting on the beach. In October, 1807,
Decrès, by Napoleon's orders, made an inspection of the boats and the
four ports. Of the twelve hundred of the former, specially built for
the invasion, not over three hundred were fit to put to sea; of the
nine hundred transports nearly all were past service. The circular port
at Boulogne was covered two feet deep with sand; those of Vimereux and
Ambleteuse, three feet. A very few years more would suffice to bury
them.[241] In 1814 an English lady, visiting Boulogne after Napoleon's
first abdication, noted in her journal that the mud walls of the
encampment were still to be seen on the heights behind the town,—the
crumbling record of a great failure.

The question will naturally here arise, What at any time were the
chances of success? To a purely speculative question, involving so many
elements and into which the conditions of sea war then introduced so
many varying quantities, it would be folly to reply with a positive
assertion. Certain determining factors may, however, be profitably
noted. It is, for instance, evident that, if Villeneuve on leaving the
West Indies had had with him the Ferrol squadron, and still more if he
had been joined by Ganteaume, he could have steered at once for the
Channel; and, by attending to well-known weather conditions, could
have entered it with a favoring wind sure to last him to Boulogne. The
difficulty of effecting such a combination in the West Indies, which
was Napoleon's favorite project, was owing to the presence of British
divisions before the hostile ports; and step by step this circumstance
drove the emperor back on what he pronounced the worst alternative,—a
concentration in front of Brest. As has been noticed, at the critical
moment when this final concentration was to be attempted, the British,
by a series of movements which resulted naturally from their strategic
policy, were before that port in force superior to either of the French
detachments seeking there to make their junction. Cornwallis's blunder
in dividing that force cannot obscure the military lesson involved.

Nor can Calder's error, in suffering Villeneuve to escape him in July,
detract from the equally significant and precisely similar lesson
then illustrated. There also the British fleet was on hand to check
an important junction—at a point so far from Ferrol as to be out
of supporting distance by the division in the port—by virtue of an
intelligent use of interior positions and interior lines.

To the strategic advantage conferred by these interior positions,
for clinging to which credit is due above all to St. Vincent,
is to be added the very superior character of the British
personnel,—particularly of the officers; for the immense demand for
seamen made it hard to maintain the quality of the crews. Continually
cruising, not singly but in squadrons more or less numerous, the ships
were ever on the drill ground,—nay, on the battle-field,—experiencing
all the varying phases impressed upon it by the changes of the ocean.
Thus practised and hardened into perfect machines, though inferior in
numbers, they were continually superior in force and in mobility to
their opponents.

Possessing, therefore, strategic advantage and superior force, the
probabilities favored Great Britain. Nevertheless, there remained to
Napoleon enough chances of success to forbid saying that his enterprise
was hopeless. A seaman can scarcely deny that, despite the genius of
Nelson and the tenacity of the British officers, it was possible that
some favorable concurrence of circumstances might have brought forty
or more French ships into the Channel, and given Napoleon the mastery
of the Straits for the few days he asked. The very removal of the
squadrons of observation from before Rochefort and Ferrol, in order
to constitute the fleet with which Calder fought Villeneuve, though
admirable as a display of generalship, shows that the British navy, so
far as numbers were concerned, was not adequate to perfect security,
and might, by some conceivable combination of circumstances, have been
outwitted and overwhelmed at the decisive point.

The importance attached by the emperor to his project was not
exaggerated. He might, or he might not, succeed; but, if he failed
against Great Britain, he failed everywhere. This he, with the
intuition of genius, felt; and to this the record of his after history
now bears witness. To the strife of arms with the great Sea Power
succeeded the strife of endurance. Amid all the pomp and circumstance
of the war which for ten years to come desolated the Continent, amid
all the tramping to and fro over Europe of the French armies and their
auxiliary legions, there went on unceasingly that noiseless pressure
upon the vitals of France, that compulsion, whose silence, when once
noted, becomes to the observer the most striking and awful mark of the
working of Sea Power. Under it the resources of the Continent wasted
more and more with each succeeding year; and Napoleon, amid all the
splendor of his imperial position, was ever needy. To this, and to
the immense expenditures required to enforce the Continental System,
are to be attributed most of those arbitrary acts which made him the
hated of the peoples, for whose enfranchisement he did so much. Lack
of revenue and lack of credit, such was the price paid by Napoleon
for the Continental System, through which alone, after Trafalgar, he
hoped to crush the Power of the Sea. It may be doubted whether, amid
all his glory, he ever felt secure after the failure of the invasion
of England. To borrow his own vigorous words, in the address to the
nation issued before he joined the army, "To live without commerce,
without shipping, without colonies, subjected to the unjust will of our
enemies, is to live as Frenchmen should not." Yet so had France to live
throughout his reign, by the will of the one enemy never conquered.

On the 14th of September, before quitting Paris, Napoleon sent
Villeneuve orders to take the first favorable opportunity to leave
Cadiz, to enter the Mediterranean, join the ships at Cartagena, and
with this combined force move upon southern Italy. There, at any
suitable point, he was to land the troops embarked in the fleet to
re-enforce General St. Cyr, who already had instructions to be ready
to attack Naples at a moment's notice.[242] The next day these orders
were reiterated to Decrès, enforcing the importance to the general
campaign of so powerful a diversion as the presence of this great fleet
in the Mediterranean; but, as "Villeneuve's excessive pusillanimity
will prevent him from undertaking this, you will send to replace him
Admiral Rosily, who will bear letters directing Villeneuve to return
to France and give an account of his conduct."[243] The emperor had
already formulated his complaints against the admiral under seven
distinct heads.[244] On the 15th of September, the same day the orders
to relieve Villeneuve were issued, Nelson, having spent at home only
twenty-five days, left England for the last time. On the 28th, when he
joined the fleet off Cadiz, he found under his command twenty-nine
ships-of-the-line, which successive arrivals raised to thirty-three by
the day of the battle; but, water running short, it became necessary to
send the ships, by divisions of six, to fill up at Gibraltar. To this
cause was due that only twenty-seven British vessels were present in
the action,—an unfortunate circumstance; for, as Nelson said, what the
country wanted was not merely a splendid victory, but annihilation;
"numbers only can annihilate."[245] The force under his command was
thus disposed: the main body about fifty miles west-south-west of
Cadiz, seven lookout frigates close in with the port, and between these
extremes, two small detachments of ships-of-the-line,—the one twenty
miles from the harbor, the other about thirty-five. "By this chain," he
wrote, "I hope to have constant communication with the frigates."

Napoleon's commands to enter the Mediterranean reached Villeneuve on
September 27. The following day, when Nelson was joining his fleet,
the admiral acknowledged their receipt, and submissively reported his
intention to obey as soon as the wind served. Before he could do so,
accurate intelligence was received of the strength of Nelson's force,
which the emperor had not known. Villeneuve assembled a council of
war to consider the situation, and the general opinion was adverse to
sailing; but the commander-in-chief, alleging the orders of Napoleon,
announced his determination to follow them. To this all submitted. An
event, then unforeseen by Villeneuve, precipitated his action.

Admiral Rosily's approach was known in Cadiz some time before he could
arrive. It at first made little impression upon Villeneuve, who was
not expecting to be superseded. On the 11th of October, however, along
with the news that his successor had reached Madrid, there came to him
a rumor of the truth. His honor took alarm. If not allowed to remain
afloat, how remove the undeserved imputation of cowardice which he knew
had by some been attached to his name. He at once wrote to Decrès that
he would have been well content if permitted to continue with the fleet
in a subordinate capacity; and closed with the words, "I will sail
to-morrow, if circumstances favor."

The wind next day was fair, and the combined fleets began to weigh.
On the 19th eight ships got clear of the harbor, and by ten A. M.
Nelson, far at sea, knew by signal that the long-expected movement had
begun. He at once made sail toward the Straits of Gibraltar to bar
the entrance of the Mediterranean to the allies. On the 20th, all the
latter, thirty-three ships-of-the-line accompanied by five frigates
and two brigs, were at sea, steering with a south-west wind to the
northward and westward to gain the offing needed before heading direct
for the Straits. That morning Nelson, for whom the wind had been fair,
was lying to off Cape Spartel to intercept the enemy; and learning from
his frigates that they were north of him, he stood in that direction to
meet them.

During the day the wind shifted to west, still fair for the British and
allowing the allies, by going about, to head south. It was still very
weak, so that the progress of the fleets was slow. During the night
both manœuvred; the allies to gain, the British to retain, the position
they wished. At daybreak of the 21st they were in presence, the French
and Spaniards steering south in five columns; of which the two to
windward, containing together twelve ships, constituted a detached
squadron of observation under Admiral Gravina. The remaining twenty-one
formed the main body, commanded by Villeneuve. Cape Trafalgar, from
which the battle took its name, was on the south-eastern horizon, ten
or twelve miles from the allies; and the British fleet was at the same
distance from them to the westward.

Soon after daylight Villeneuve signalled to form line of battle on
the starboard tack, on which they were then sailing, heading south.
In performing this evolution Gravina with his twelve ships took post
in the van of the allied fleet, his own flag-ship heading the column.
It is disputed between the French and Spaniards whether this step was
taken by Villeneuve's order, or of Gravina's own motion. In either
case, these twelve, by abandoning their central and windward position,
sacrificed to a great extent their power to re-enforce any threatened
part of the order, and also unduly extended a line already too long.
In the end, instead of being a reserve well in hand, they became the
helpless victims of the British concentration.

At 8 A. M. Villeneuve saw that battle could not be shunned. Wishing to
have Cadiz under his lee in case of disaster, he ordered the combined
fleet to wear together. The signal was clumsily executed; but by ten
all had gone round and were heading north in inverse order, Gravina's
squadron in the rear. At eleven Villeneuve directed this squadron to
keep well to windward, so as to be in position to succor the centre,
upon which the enemy seemed about to make his chief attack; a judicious
order, but rendered fruitless by the purpose of the British to
concentrate on the rear itself. When this signal was made, Cadiz was
twenty miles distant in the north-north-east, and the course of the
allies was carrying them toward it.

Owing to the lightness of the wind Nelson would lose no time in
manœuvring. He formed his fleet rapidly in two divisions, each in
single column, the simplest and most flexible order of attack, and
the one whose regularity is most easily preserved. The simple column,
however, unflanked, sacrifices during the critical period of closing
the support given by the rear ships to the leader, and draws upon the
latter the concentrated fire of the enemy's line. Its use by Nelson
on this occasion has been much criticised. It is therefore to be
remarked that, although his orders, issued several days previous to the
battle, are somewhat ambiguous on this point, their natural meaning
seems to indicate the intention, if attacking from to windward, to draw
up with his fleet in two columns parallel to the enemy and abreast
his rear. Then the column nearest the enemy, the lee, keeping away
together, would advance in line against the twelve rear ships; while
the weather column, moving forward, would hold in check the remainder
of the hostile fleet. In either event, whether attacking in column or
in line, the essential feature of his plan was to overpower twelve of
the enemy by sixteen British, while the remainder of his force covered
this operation. The destruction of the rear was entrusted to the second
in command; he himself with a smaller body took charge of the more
uncertain duties of the containing force. "The second in command,"
wrote he in his memorable order, "will, after my instructions are made
known to him, have the entire direction of his line."

The justification of Nelson's dispositions for battle at Trafalgar
rests therefore primarily upon the sluggish breeze, which would so have
delayed formations as to risk the loss of the opportunity. It must
also be observed that, although a column of ships does not possess the
sustained momentum of a column of men, whose depth and mass combine to
drive it through the relatively thin resistance of a line, and so cut
the latter in twain, the results nevertheless are closely analogous.
The leaders in either case are sacrificed,—success is won over their
prostrate forms; but the continued impact upon one part of the enemy's
order is essentially a concentration, the issue of which, if long
enough maintained, cannot be doubtful. Penetration, severance, and
the enveloping of one of the parted fragments, must be the result.
So, exactly, it was at Trafalgar. It must also be noted that the rear
ships of either column, until they reached the hostile line, swept
with their broadsides the sea over which enemy's ships from either
flank might try to come to the support of the attacked centre. No such
attempt was in fact made from either extremity of the combined fleet.

[Illustration: The Attack at Trafalgar.]

The two British columns were nearly a mile apart and advanced on
parallel courses,—heading nearly east, but a little to the northward
to allow for the gradual advance in that direction of the hostile
fleet. The northern or left-hand column, commonly called the "weather
line" because the wind came rather from that side, contained twelve
ships, and was led by Nelson himself in the "Victory," a ship of one
hundred guns. The "Royal Sovereign," of the same size and carrying
Collingwood's flag, headed the right column, of fifteen ships.

To the British advance the allies opposed the traditional order of
battle, a long single line, closehauled,—in this case heading north,
with the wind from west-north-west. The distance from one flank to
the other was nearly five miles. Owing partly to the lightness of
the breeze, partly to the great number of ships, and partly to the
inefficiency of many of the units of the fleet, the line was very
imperfectly formed. Ships were not in their places, intervals were of
irregular width, here vessels were not closed up, there two overlapped,
one masking the other's fire. The general result was that, instead
of a line, the allied order showed a curve of gradual sweep, convex
toward the east. To the British approach from the west, therefore, it
presented a disposition resembling a re-entrant angle; and Collingwood,
noting with observant eye the advantage of this arrangement for a
cross-fire, commented favorably upon it in his report of the battle. It
was, however, the result of chance, not of intention,—due, not to the
talent of the chief, but to the want of skill in his subordinates.

The commander-in-chief of the allies, Villeneuve, was in the
"Bucentaure," an eighty-gun ship, the twelfth in order from the van of
the line. Immediately ahead of him was the huge Spanish four-decker,
the "Santisima Trinidad," a Goliath among ships, which had now come
forth to her last battle. Sixth behind the "Bucentaure," and therefore
eighteenth in the order, came a Spanish three-decker, the "Santa Ana,"
flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Alava. These two admirals marked the
right and left of the allied centre, and upon them, therefore, the
British leaders respectively directed their course,—Nelson upon the
"Bucentaure," Collingwood upon the "Santa Ana."

The "Royal Sovereign" had recently been refitted, and with clean new
copper easily outsailed her more worn followers. Thus it happened that,
as Collingwood came within range, his ship, outstripping the others
by three quarters of a mile, entered alone, and for twenty minutes
endured, unsupported, the fire of all the hostile ships that could
reach her. A proud deed, surely, but surely also not a deed to be
commended as a pattern. The first shot of the battle was fired at her
by the "Fougueux," the next astern of the "Santa Ana." This was just at
noon, and with the opening guns the ships of both fleets hoisted their
ensigns; the Spaniards also hanging large wooden crosses from their
spanker booms.

The "Royal Sovereign" advanced in silence until, ten minutes later,
she passed close under the stern of the "Santa Ana." Then she fired a
double-shotted broadside which struck down four hundred of the enemy's
crew, and, luffing rapidly, took her position close alongside, the
muzzles of the hostile guns nearly touching. Here the "Royal Sovereign"
underwent the fire not only of her chief antagonist, but of four other
ships; three of which belonged to the division of five that ought
closely to have knit the "Santa Ana" to the "Bucentaure," and so fixed
an impassable barrier to the enemy seeking to pierce the centre. The
fact shows strikingly the looseness of the allied order, these three
being all in rear and to leeward of their proper stations.

For fifteen minutes the "Royal Sovereign" was the only British ship
in close action. Then her next astern entered the battle, followed
successively by the rest of the column. In rear of the "Santa Ana" were
fifteen ships. Among these, Collingwood's vessels penetrated in various
directions; chiefly, however, at first near the spot where his flag had
led the way, enveloping and destroying in detail the enemy's centre
and leading rear ships, and then passing on to subdue the rest. Much
doubtless was determined by chance in such confusion and obscurity;
but the original tactical plan insured an overwhelming concentration
upon a limited portion of the enemy's order. This being subdued with
the less loss, because so outnumbered, the intelligence and skill of
the various British captains readily compassed the destruction of the
dwindling remnant. Of the sixteen ships, including the "Santa Ana,"
which composed the allied rear, twelve were taken or destroyed.

Not till one o'clock, or nearly half an hour after the vessels next
following Collingwood came into action, did the "Victory" reach the
"Bucentaure." The latter was raked with the same dire results that
befell the "Santa Ana;" but a ship close to leeward blocked the way,
and Nelson was not able to grapple with the enemy's commander-in-chief.
The "Victory," prevented from going through the line, fell on board
the "Redoutable," a French seventy-four, between which and herself a
furious action followed,—the two lying in close contact. At half-past
one Nelson fell mortally wounded, the battle still raging fiercely.

The ship immediately following Nelson's came also into collision
with the "Redoutable," which thus found herself in combat with two
antagonists. The next three of the British weather column each in
succession raked the "Bucentaure," complying thus with Nelson's
order that every effort must be made to capture the enemy's
commander-in-chief. Passing on, these three concentrated their efforts,
first, upon the "Bucentaure," and next upon the "Santisima Trinidad."
Thus it happened that upon the allied commander-in-chief, upon his
next ahead, and upon the ship which, though not his natural supporter
astern, had sought and filled that honorable post,—upon the key, in
short, of the allied order,—were combined under the most advantageous
conditions the fires of five hostile vessels, three of them
first-rates. Consequently, not only were the three added to the prizes,
but also a great breach was made between the van and rear of the
combined fleets. This breach became yet wider by the singular conduct
of Villeneuve's proper next astern. Soon after the "Victory" came
into action, that ship bore up out of the line, wore round, and stood
toward the rear, followed by three others. This movement is attributed
to a wish to succor the rear. If so, it was at best an indiscreet and
ill-timed act, which finds little palliation in the fact that not one
of these ships was taken.

Thus, two hours after the battle began, the allied fleet was cut in
two, the rear enveloped and in process of being destroyed in detail,
the "Bucentaure," "Santisima Trinidad," and "Redoutable" practically
reduced, though not yet surrendered. Ahead of the "Santisima Trinidad"
were ten ships, which as yet had not been engaged. The inaction of
the van, though partly accounted for by the slackness of the wind,
has given just cause for censure. To it, at ten minutes before two,
Villeneuve made signal to get into action and to wear together. This
was accomplished with difficulty, owing to the heavy swell and want
of wind. At three, however, all the ships were about, but by an
extraordinary fatality they did not keep together. Five with Admiral
Dumanoir stood along to windward of the battle, three passed to leeward
of it, and two, keeping away, left the field entirely. Of the whole
number, three were intercepted, raising the loss of the allies to
eighteen ships-of-the-line taken, one of which caught fire and was
burned. The approach of Admiral Dumanoir, if made an hour earlier,
might have conduced to save Villeneuve; it was now too late. Exchanging
a few distant broadsides with enemy's ships, he stood off to the
south-west with four vessels; one of those at first with him having
been cut off.

At quarter before five Admiral Gravina, whose ship had been the rear
of the order during the battle and had lost heavily, retreated toward
Cadiz, making signal to the vessels which had not struck to form around
his flag. Five other Spanish ships and five French followed him. As
he was withdrawing, the last two to resist of the allied fleet struck
their colors.

During the night of the 21st these eleven ships anchored at the mouth
of Cadiz harbor, which they could not then enter, on account of a land
wind from south-east. At the same time the British and their prizes
were being carried shoreward by the heavy swell which had prevailed
during the battle; the light air blowing from the sea not enabling them
to haul off. The situation was one of imminent peril. At midnight the
wind freshened much, but fortunately hauled to the southward, whence
it blew a gale all the 22d. The ships got their heads to the westward
and drew off shore, with thirteen of the prizes; the other four having
had to anchor off Cape Trafalgar. That morning the "Bucentaure,"
Villeneuve's late flag-ship, was wrecked on some rocks off the entrance
to Cadiz; and toward evening the "Redoutable," that had so nobly
supported her, was found to be sinking astern of the British ship that
had her in tow. During the night of the 22d she went down, with a
hundred and fifty of her people still on board. On the 24th the same
fate befell the great "Santisima Trinidad," which had been the French
admiral's next ahead. Thus his own ship and his two supports vanished
from the seas.

For several days the wind continued violent from north-west and
south-west. On the 23d five of the ships that had escaped with Gravina
put out, to cut off some of the prizes that were near the coast. They
succeeded in taking two; but as these were battered to pieces, while
three of the five rescuers were carried on the beach and wrecked with
great loss of life, little advantage resulted from this well-meant
and gallant sortie. Two other prizes were given up to their own crews
by the British prize-masters, because the latter were not able with
their scanty force to save them. These got into Cadiz. Of the remaining
British prizes, all but four either went ashore or were destroyed by
the orders of Collingwood, who despaired of saving them. No British
ship was lost.

Of thirty-three combined French and Spanish ships which sailed out of
Cadiz on the 20th of October, eleven, five French and six Spanish,
mostly now disabled hulks, lay there at anchor on the last day of
the month. The four that escaped to sea under Dumanoir fell in with
a British squadron of the same size near Cape Ortegal, on the 4th
of November, and were all taken. This raised the allied loss to
twenty-two,—two more than the twenty for which Nelson, in his dying
hour, declared that he had bargained.

No attempt to move from Cadiz was again made by the shattered relics
of the fight. On the 25th of October Rosily arrived and took up his
now blasted command. Nearly three years later, when the Spanish
monarchy, so long the submissive tool of the Directory and of Napoleon,
had been overthrown by the latter, and the Spanish people had risen
against the usurper, the five French ships were still in the port.
Surprised between the British blockade and the now hostile batteries
of the coast, Rosily, after an engagement of two days with the latter,
surrendered his squadron, with the four thousand seamen then on board.
This event occurred on the 14th of June, 1808. It was the last echo of
Trafalgar.

Such, in its leading outlines and direct consequences, was the famous
battle of Trafalgar. Its lasting significance and far-reaching results
have been well stated by a recent historian, more keenly alive than
most of his fellows to the paramount, though silent, influence of Sea
Power upon the course of events: "Trafalgar was not only the greatest
naval victory, it was the greatest and most momentous victory won
either by land or by sea during the whole of the Revolutionary War.
No victory, and no series of victories, of Napoleon produced the same
effect upon Europe.... A generation passed after Trafalgar before
France again seriously threatened England at sea. The prospect of
crushing the British navy, so long as England had the means to equip
a navy, vanished. Napoleon henceforth set his hopes on exhausting
England's resources, by compelling every state on the Continent to
exclude her commerce. Trafalgar forced him to impose his yoke upon
_all_ Europe, or to abandon the hope of conquering Great Britain....
Nelson's last triumph left England in such a position that no means
remained to injure her but those which _must result in the ultimate
deliverance of the Continent_."[246]

These words may be accepted with very slight modification. Napoleon's
scheme for the invasion of Great Britain, thwarted once and again by
the strategic difficulties attendant upon its execution, was finally
frustrated when Villeneuve gave up the attempt to reach Brest and
headed for Cadiz. On the part of the allies Trafalgar was, in itself,
a useless holocaust, precipitated in the end by the despair of the
unfortunate admiral, upon whose irresolution Napoleon not unjustly
visited the anger caused by the wreck of his plans. Villeneuve
was perfectly clear-sighted and right in his appreciation of the
deficiencies of his command,—of the many chances against success.
Where he wretchedly failed was in not recognizing the simple duty of
obedience,—the obligation to persist at all hazards in the part of a
great scheme assigned to him, even though it led to the destruction of
his whole force. Had he, upon leaving Ferrol, been visited by a little
of the desperation which brought him to Trafalgar, the invasion of
England might possibly—not probably—have been effected.

An event so striking as the battle of Trafalgar becomes, however, to
mankind the symbol of all the circumstances—more important, perhaps,
but less obvious—which culminate in it. In this sense it may be said
that Trafalgar was the cause—as it certainly marked the period—of
Napoleon's resolution to crush Great Britain by excluding her commerce
from the Continent. Here, therefore, the story of the influence of
Sea Power upon this great conflict ceases to follow the strictly
naval events, and becomes concerned simply with commerce-destroying,
ordinarily a secondary operation of maritime war, but exalted in the
later years of Napoleon's reign to be the principal, if not the sole,
means of action.

To this the two next chapters are devoted. Of these, the first deals
with commerce-destroying in the ordinary sense of the words, directed
against enemies' property on the high seas; beginning with the outbreak
of war in 1793, and narrating the series of measures by which the
republic sought to break down British commerce and foreshadowed the
policy of Napoleon's Berlin and Milan decrees. The second begins
with the Berlin decree, in 1806; and, tracing one by one the steps
which carried the emperor from violence to violence, seeks to show
how these found their necessary outcome in the Russian expedition and
the fall of the Empire. Detached thus, as far as may be, from the
maze of contemporary history in which they are commonly lost, these
successive acts of the French government are seen to form a logical
sequence, connected by one motive and dominated by one necessity. The
motive is the destruction of Great Britain, the necessity that of
self-preservation. Each nation, unassailable on its own element, stood
like an impregnable fortress that can be brought to surrender only by
the exhaustion of its resources. In this struggle of endurance Napoleon
fell.




CHAPTER XVII.

THE WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE,
TO THE BERLIN DECREE. 1793-1806.


The Warfare against Commerce during the French Revolution, alike under
the Republic and under Napoleon, was marked by the same passionate
vehemence, the same extreme and far-reaching conceptions, the same
obstinate resolve utterly to overthrow and extirpate every opposing
force, that characterized the political and military enterprises of
the period. In the effort to bring under the yoke of their own policy
the commerce of the whole world, the two chief contestants, France and
Great Britain, swayed back and forth in deadly grapple over the vast
arena, trampling under foot the rights and interests of the weaker
parties; who, whether as neutrals, or as subjects of friendly or allied
powers, looked helplessly on, and found that in this great struggle
for self-preservation, neither outcries, nor threats, nor despairing
submission, availed to lessen the pressure that was gradually crushing
out both hope and life. The question between Napoleon and the British
people became simply one of endurance, as was tersely and powerfully
shown by the emperor himself. Both were expending their capital, and
drawing freely drafts upon the future, the one in money, the other in
men, to sustain their present strength. Like two infuriated dogs, they
had locked jaws over Commerce, as the decisive element in the contest.
Neither would let go his grip until failing vitality should loose it,
or until some bystander should deal one a wound through which the
powers of life should drain away. All now know that in the latter way
the end came. The commercial policy of the great monarch, who, from the
confines of Europe, had watched the tussle with all the eagerness of
self-interest, angered Napoleon. To enforce his will, he made new and
offensive annexations of territory. The czar replied by a commercial
edict, sharp and decisive, and war was determined. "It is all a scene
in the Opera," wrote Napoleon,[247] "and the English are the scene
shifters." Words failed the men of that day to represent the grandeur
and apparent solidity of the Empire in 1811, when Napoleon's heir was
born. In December, 1812, it was shattered from turret to foundation
stone; wrecked in the attempt "to conquer the sea by the land." The
scene was shifted indeed.

Great Britain remained victorious on the field, but she had touched
the verge of ruin. Confronted with the fixed resolution of her enemy
to break down her commerce by an absolute exclusion from the continent
of Europe, and as far as possible from the rest of the world, she met
the challenge by a measure equally extreme, forbidding all neutral
vessels to enter ports hostile to her, unless they had first touched
at one of her own. Shut out herself from the Continent, she announced
that while this exclusion lasted she would shut the Continent off from
all external intercourse. "No trade except _through_ England," was the
formula under which her leaders expressed their purpose. The entrance
of Russia into this strife, under the provocations of Napoleon,
prevented the problem, which of these two policies would overthrow the
other, from reaching a natural solution; and the final result of the
measures which it is one object of this and the following chapter to
narrate must remain for ever uncertain. It is, however, evident that
a commercial and manufacturing country like Great Britain must, in a
strife the essence of which was the restriction of trade, suffer more
than one depending, as France did, mainly upon her internal resources.
The question, as before stated, was whether she could endure the
greater drain by her greater wealth. Upon the whole, the indications
were, and to the end continued to be, that she could do so; that
Napoleon, in entering upon this particular struggle, miscalculated his
enemy's strength.

But besides this, here, as in every contest where the opponents are
closely matched, where power and discipline and leadership are nearly
equal, there was a further question: which of the two would make the
first and greatest mistakes, and how ready the other party was to
profit by his errors. In so even a balance, the wisest prophet cannot
foresee how the scale will turn. The result will depend not merely upon
the skill of the swordsman in handling his weapons, but also upon the
wariness of his fence and the quickness of his returns; much, too, upon
his temper. Here also Napoleon was worsted. Scarcely was the battle
over commerce joined, when the uprising of Spain was precipitated by
over-confidence; Great Britain hastened at once to place herself by the
side of the insurgents. Four years later, when the British people were
groaning in a protracted financial crisis,—when, if ever, there was
a hope that the expected convulsion and ruin were at hand,—Napoleon,
instead of waiting for his already rigorous blockade to finish the work
he attributed to it, strove to draw it yet closer, by demands which
were unnecessary and to which the czar could not yield. Again Great
Britain seized her opportunity, received her late enemy's fleet, and
filled his treasury. Admit the difficulties of Napoleon; allow as we
may for the intricacy of the problem before him; the fact remains that
he wholly misunderstood the temper of the Spanish people, the dangers
of the Spanish enterprise, the resolution of Alexander. On the other
hand, looking upon the principal charge against the policy of the
British government, that it alienated the United States, it is still
true that there was no miscalculation as to the long-suffering of the
latter under the guidance of Jefferson, with his passion for peace. The
submission of the United States lasted until Napoleon was committed to
his final blunder, thus justifying the risk taken by Great Britain and
awarding to her the strategic triumph.

The Continental System of Napoleon, here briefly alluded to, and to be
described more fully further on, was, however, only the continuation,
in its spirit and aims, of a policy outlined and initiated by the
Republic under the Directory; which in turn but carried into its
efforts against commerce the savage thoroughness which the Convention
had sought to impress upon the general war. The principal measures of
the emperor found antitypes in the decrees of the Directory; the only
important difference being, that the execution of the latter reflected
the feeble planning and intermittent energy of the government which
issued them; whereas Napoleon, as always, impressed upon his system
a vigor, and employed for its fulfilment means, proportioned to the
arduousness of the task and the greatness of the expected results.
The one series being therefore but the successor and fulfilment of
the other, it has been thought best to present them in the same close
connection in which they stand in the order of events, so as to
show more clearly the unity of design running throughout the whole
history,—a unity due to the inexorable logic of facts, to the existence
of an external compulsion, which could in no other way be removed or
resisted. Both in common owed their origin to the inability of France
seriously to embarrass, by the ordinary operations of war, the great
commerce of her rival, though she launched her national cruisers and
privateers by dozens on every sea. The Sea Power of England held its
way so steadily, preserved its trade in the main so successfully, and
was withal so evidently the principal enemy, the key of the hostile
effort against France, that it drove not only the weak Directors, but
the great soldier and statesman who followed them, into the course
which led straight to destruction.

The declarations of war were followed by the customary instructions to
commanders of ships-of-war and privateers to seize and bring into port
the merchant vessels of the enemy, as well as neutrals found violating
the generally acknowledged principles of international law. So far
there was nothing in the course of either belligerent that differed
from the usual and expected acts of States at war. At once the sea
swarmed with hastily equipped cruisers; and, as always happens on an
unexpected, or even sudden, outbreak of hostilities, many valuable
prizes were made by ships of either nation. The victims were taken
unawares, and the offence on each side was more active and efficient
than the defence. This first surprise, however, soon passed, and was
succeeded by the more regular course of maritime war. The great British
fleets gradually established a distinct preponderance over the masses
of the enemy, and the latter was quickly reduced to the ordinary
operations of commerce-destroying, in the sense usually given to that
word,—a policy, moreover, to which the national tradition and the
opinion of many eminent naval officers particularly inclined.

To these raids upon their shipping, by numerous scattered cruisers, the
British opposed a twofold system. By the one, their merchant vessels
bound to different quarters of the globe were gathered in specified
ports, and when assembled sailed together under the care of a body of
ships of war, charged to conduct them to their voyage's end. This was
the convoy system, the essence of which was to concentrate the exposed
wealth of the country, under the protection of a force adequate to meet
and drive away any probable enemy. Immense numbers of ships thus sailed
together; from two to three hundred was not an unusual gathering; and
five hundred, or even a thousand,[248] were at times seen together
in localities like the Chops of the Channel or the entrance to the
Baltic, where the especial danger necessitated a stronger guard and a
more careful acceptance of protection by the trader,—thus emphasizing
and enlarging the peculiar features of the practice. It is scarcely
necessary to remark that much time was lost in collecting such huge
bodies, and that the common rate of sailing was far below the powers
of many of their members; while the simultaneous arrival of great
quantities of the same goods tended to lower prices. Consequently, many
owners, relying upon the speed of their vessels and upon good luck,
sailed without convoy upon completing their cargoes,—willing, after the
manner of merchants, to take great risks for the sake of great returns,
by being first in the market. To protect these, and others, which, by
misfortune or bad management parted from their convoy, as well as to
maintain their general command of the sea, the British resorted to
another system, which may be called that of patrol. Fast frigates and
sloops-of-war, with a host of smaller vessels, were disseminated over
the ocean, upon the tracks which commerce follows and to which the
hostile cruisers were therefore constrained. To each was assigned his
cruising ground, the distribution being regulated by the comparative
dangers, and by the necessary accumulation of merchant shipping in
particular localities, as the North Sea, the approach to the English
Channel, and, generally, the centres to which the routes of commerce
converge. The forces thus especially assigned to patrol duty, the ships
"on a cruise," to use the technical expression, were casually increased
by the large number of vessels going backward and forward between
England and their respective stations, dispatch-boats, ships going in
for repairs or returning from them, so that the seas about Europe
were alive with British cruisers; each one of which was wide-awake for
prizes. To these again were added the many privateers, whose cruising
ground was not indeed assigned by the government, but which were
constrained in their choice by the same conditions that dictated at
once the course of the trader and the lair of the commerce-destroyer.

Through this cloud of friends and foes the unprotected merchantman had
to run the gantlet, trusting to his heels. If he were taken, all indeed
was not lost, for there remained the chance of recapture by a friendly
cruiser; but in that case the salvage made a large deduction from the
profits of the voyage. The dangers thus run were not, however, solely
at the risk of the owner; for, not to speak of the embarrassment caused
to others by the failure of one merchant, the crews of the ships,
the sailors, constituted a great potential element of the combatant
force of the nation. A good seaman, especially in those days of simple
weapons, was more than half ready to become at once a fighting man. In
this he differed from an untrained landsman, and the customs of war
therefore kept him, whenever taken afloat, a prisoner till exchanged.
Every merchant ship captured thus diminished the fighting power of
Great Britain, and the losses were so numerous that an act, known as
the Convoy Act, was passed in 1798, compelling the taking of convoy and
the payment of a certain sum for the protection. In the first year of
its imposition this tax brought in £1,292,000 to the Treasury, while
resulting in a yet greater saving of insurance to owners; and the
diminished number of prizes taken by the French was thought to be a
serious inconvenience to them, at a time when, by the admission of the
Directory, foreign commerce under their own flag was annihilated. This
remarkable confession, and the experience which dictated the Convoy
Act, may together be taken as an indication that, in the defence and
attack of commerce, as in other operations of war, concentration of
effort will as a rule be found a sounder policy than dissemination.
In 1795 the French formally abandoned the policy of keeping great
fleets together, as they had before done in their history, and took
to the _guerre de course_. Within three years, ending in December,
1798, "privateers alone put more than twenty thousand individuals in
the balance of exchanges favorable to England," and "not a single
merchant vessel sailed under the French flag."[249] "The fate of almost
all mere cruisers (_bâtimens armés en course_) is to fall, a little
sooner or later, into the hands of the enemy," and in consequence,
"out of a maritime conscription of eighty thousand seamen, to-day
but half remain" with which to man the fleet. British contemporary
authority gives 743 as the number of privateers taken from France
alone, between the outbreak of war in 1793 and the 31st of December,
1800,—not to speak of 273 ships of war of the cruiser classes.[250] The
absolute loss inflicted by the efforts of these vessels and their more
fortunate comrades cannot be given with precision; but as the result
of an inquiry, the details of which will be presented further on, the
author is convinced that it did not exceed two and a half per cent,
and probably fell below two per cent of the total volume of British
trade. This loss may be looked upon as a war tax, onerous indeed, but
by no means insupportable; and which it would be folly to think could,
by itself alone, exercise any decisive influence upon the policy of a
wealthy and resolute nation. Yet no country is so favorably situated as
France then was for operations against British commerce, whether in the
home waters or in the West Indies, at that time the source of at least
a fourth part of the trade of the Empire.

The indecisiveness of the results obtained by the French in their war
against British shipping was not due to want of effort on their part.
On the contrary, the activity displayed by their corsairs, though
somewhat intermittent, was at times phenomenal; and this fact, as well
as the extraordinarily favorable position of France, must be kept in
view in estimating the probable advantages to be obtained from this
mode of warfare. At the period in question London carried on more than
half the commerce of Great Britain; in addition to its foreign trade
it was the great distributing centre of a domestic traffic, carried
on principally by the coasters which clustered by hundreds in the
Thames. The annual trade of export and import to the metropolis was
over £60,000,000, and the entries and departures of vessels averaged
between thirteen and fourteen thousand. Of this great going and coming
of ships and wealth, nearly two thirds had to pass through the English
Channel, nowhere more than eighty miles wide and narrowing to twenty at
the Straits of Dover; while the remaining third, comprising the trade
from Holland, Germany, and the Baltic, as well as the coasting trade
to North Britain, was easily accessible from the ports of Boulogne,
Dunkirk, and Calais, and was still further exposed after the French,
in 1794 and 1795, obtained complete control of Belgium and Holland.
From St. Malo to the Texel, a distance of over three hundred miles, the
whole coast became a nest of privateers of all kinds and sizes,—from
row-boats armed only with musketry and manned by a dozen men, or even
less, up to vessels carrying from ten to twenty guns and having crews
of one hundred and fifty. In the principal Channel ports of France
alone, independent of Belgium and Holland, there were at one time in
the winter of 1800 eighty-seven privateers, mounting from fourteen to
twenty-eight guns, besides numerous row-boats. These were actually
employed in commerce-destroying, and the fishing-boats of the coast
were capable upon short notice of being fitted for that service, in
which they often engaged.

The nearness of the prey, the character of the seas, and the ease of
making shelter either on the French or English shore in case of bad
weather, modified very greatly the necessity for size and perfect
sea-worthiness in the vessels thus used; and also, from the shortness
of the run necessary to reach the cruising ground, each one placed on
this line of coast was easily equal to ten starting for the same object
from a more remote base of operations. Privateers sailing at sundown
with a fair wind from St. Malo, or Dieppe, or Dunkirk to cruise in the
Channel, would reach their cruising ground before morning of the long
winter nights of that latitude. The length of stay would be determined
by their good fortune in making prizes, if unmolested by a British
cruiser. They ventured over close to the English side; they were seen
at times from the shore seizing their prizes.[251] At Dover, in the
latter part of 1810, "signals were out almost every day, on account
of enemy's privateers appearing in sight."[252] Innocent-looking
fishing-boats, showing only their half-dozen men busy at their work,
lay at anchor upon, or within, the lines joining headland to headland
of the enemy's coast, watching the character and appearance of passing
vessels. When night or other favorable opportunity offered, they pulled
quickly alongside the unsuspecting merchantman, which, under-manned
and unwatchful, from the scarcity of seamen, was often first awakened
to the danger by a volley of musketry, followed by the clambering of
the enemy to the decks. The crews, few in number, poor in quality,
and not paid for fighting, offered usually but slight resistance to
the overpowering assault. Boarding was the corsair's game, because he
carried many men.

It seems extraordinary that even the comparative impunity enjoyed by
the privateers—for that it was only comparative is shown by the fact
that an average of fifty were yearly captured—should have been attained
in the face of the immense navy of Great Britain, and the large number
of cruisers assigned to the protection of the coasts and the Channel.
There were, however, many reasons for it. The privateering spirit is
essentially that of the gambler and the lottery, and at no time was
that spirit more widely diffused in France than in the period before
us. The odds are not only great, but they are not easy to calculate.
The element of chance enters very unduly, and when, as in the present
case, the gain may be very great, while the immediate risk to the
owner, who does not accompany his ship, is comparatively small, the
disposition to push venture after venture becomes irresistible. The
seaman, who risks his liberty, is readily tempted by high wages and
the same hope of sudden profits that moves the owner; and this was
more especially true at a time when the laying up of the fleets,
and the disappearance of the merchant shipping, threw seafaring men
wholly upon the coasting trade or privateering. The number of ships
and men so engaged is thus accounted for; but among them and among
the owners there was a certain proportion who pursued the occupation
with a thoughtfulness and method which would distinguish a more
regular business, and which, while diminishing the risk of this, very
much increased the returns. Vessels were selected, or built, with
special reference to speed and handiness; captains were chosen in whom
seamanlike qualities were joined to particular knowledge of the British
coast and the routes of British trade; the conditions of wind and
weather were studied; the long winter nights were preferred because
of the cover they afforded; they knew and reckoned upon the habits of
the enemy's ships-of-war; account was kept of the times of sailing and
arrival of the large convoys.[253] On the British side, a considerable
deduction must be made from the efficiency indicated by the mere number
of the coast cruisers. Many of them were poor sailers, quite unable
to overtake the better and more dangerous class of privateers. The
inducements to exertion were not great; for the privateer meant little
money at best, and the abuses that gathered round the proceedings of
the Admiralty Courts often swallowed up that little in costs. The
command of the small vessels thus employed fell largely into the hands
of men who had dropped hopelessly out of the race of life, while their
more fortunate competitors were scattered on distant seas, and in
better ships. To such, the slight chance of a bootless prize was but a
poor inducement to exposure and activity, on the blustering nights and
in the dangerous spots where the nimble privateer, looking for rich
plunder, was wont to be found. It was worth more money to recapture a
British merchantman than to take a French cruiser.

Privateering from the Atlantic, or Biscay, coast of France was
necessarily carried on in vessels of a very different class from those
which frequented the Channel. There was no inducement for the merchant
ships of Great Britain to pass within the line from Ushant to Cape
Finisterre; while, on the other hand, her ships-of-war abounded there,
for the double purpose of watching the French fleets in the ports,
and intercepting both the enemy's cruisers and their prizes, as they
attempted to enter. For these reasons, privateers leaving Bordeaux,
Bayonne, or Nantes, needed to be large and seaworthy, provisioned and
equipped for distant voyages and for a long stay at sea. Their greatest
danger was met near their home ports, either going or returning;
and their hopes were set, not upon the small and often unprofitable
coaster, but upon the richly laden trader from the East or West Indies
or the Mediterranean. Out, therefore, beyond the line of the enemy's
blockade, upon the deep sea and on one of the great commercial highways
converging toward the Channel, was their post; there to remain as long
as possible, and not lightly to encounter again the perils of the Bay
of Biscay. Moreover, being larger and more valuable, the owner had
to think upon their defence; they could not, like the cheap Channel
gropers, be thrown away in case of any hostile meeting. While they
could not cope with the big frigates of the enemy, there were still
his smaller cruisers, and the hosts of his privateers, that might be
met; and many a stout battle was fought by those French corsairs. One
of these, the "Bordelais," taken in 1799, was said then to be the
largest of her kind sailing out of France. She had the keel of a 38-gun
frigate, carried twenty-four 12-pounder guns, and a crew of two hundred
and twenty men. In four years this ship had captured one hundred and
sixty prizes, and was said to have cleared to her owners in Bordeaux a
million sterling.[254]

A third most important and lucrative field for the enterprise of French
privateers was found in the West Indies. The islands of Guadaloupe and
Martinique served as excellent bases of operations. The latter indeed
was for many years in British possession, but the former remained,
practically without interruption, in the hands of France until its
capture in 1810. During the many years of close alliance, from 1796 to
1808, between France and Spain, the West Indian ports of the latter
served not only to maintain her own privateers, but to give a wide
extension to the efforts of her more active partner. The geographical
and climatic conditions of this region tended also to modify the
character both of the cruisers and of their methods. Along with a
very large European trade, carried on by ships of an average burden
of two hundred and fifty tons, there was also a considerable traffic
from island to island by much smaller vessels. This local trade was
not only between the possessions of the same nation or of friendly
States, but existed also, by means of neutrals or contraband, between
those of powers at war; and through these and her system of free ports,
together with liberal modifications of her commercial code wherever an
advantage could thereby be gained, Great Britain succeeded in drawing
into her own currents, in war as well as in peace, the course of much
of the export and import of the whole Caribbean Sea and Spanish Main.
From these two kinds of trade—combined with the general good weather
prevailing, with the contiguity of the islands to each other, and with
the numerous ports and inlets scattered throughout their extent—there
arose two kinds of privateering enterprise. The one, carried on mainly
by large and fast-sailing schooners or brigs, was found generally
suitable for undertakings directed against ships bound to or from
Europe; while for the other the various islands abounded with small
row-boats or other petty craft, each with its group of plunderers,
which lay in wait and usually in profound concealment to issue out
upon the passing trader.[255] The uncertain character of the wind in
some parts of the day particularly favored an attack, by two or three
heavily manned rowing boats, upon a vessel large enough to take them
all on board bodily, but fettered by calm and with a small crew. On one
occasion a United States sloop-of-war, lying thus motionless with her
ports closed, was taken for a merchantman and assailed by several of
these marauders, who then paid dearly for the mistake into which they
had been led by her seemingly unarmed and helpless condition.

The remoteness of this region from Europe covered very great
irregularities, both by the privateers and in the courts. This evil
became greater in the French and Spanish islands, when, by the
progress of the war, the Sea Power of Great Britain more and more
broke off correspondence between them and the mother countries; and
when Napoleon's aggression drove the Spaniards into revolution and
anarchy, the control of Spain, always inert, became merely nominal.
These circumstances, coinciding with the presence of a very large
neutral shipping, mainly belonging to the United States, whose
geographical nearness made her one of the chief sources of supplies to
these colonies, caused the privateering of the Latin and mixed races
to degenerate rapidly into piracy, towards which that mode of warfare
naturally tends. As early as 1805, an American insurance company
complained to the Secretary of State that "property plundered by real
or pretended French privateers was uniformly taken into the ports of
Cuba, and there, with the connivance of the Spanish government, was
sold and distributed, _without any form of trial_, or pretence for
legal condemnation."[1] And the United States consul at Santiago de
Cuba reported officially that more than a thousand American seamen had
been landed in that port, most of them without clothes or any means of
support; and that "the scene of robbery, destruction, evasion, perjury,
cruelty, and insult, to which the Americans captured by French pirates,
and brought into this and adjacent ports, have been subjected, has
perhaps not been equalled in a century past."[256] This lawlessness
ended, as is generally known, in an actual prevalence of piracy on an
extensive scale, about the south side of Cuba and other unfrequented
parts of the archipelago, for some years after the war. From the
character of the ground and the slow communications of the day, these
desperadoes were finally put down only by the systematic and long
continued efforts of the various governments concerned.

The Eastern trade of Great Britain was in the hands of the East India
Company; and its ships, which carried on the intercourse between India
and Europe, were of a size altogether exceptional in those days. At a
time when a small ship-of-the-line measured from fourteen to sixteen
hundred tons, and the traders between America and Europe averaged
under three hundred, a large proportion of the East Indiamen were of
twelve hundred tons burden, exceeding considerably the dimensions
of a first-class frigate.[257] Being pierced for numerous guns and
carrying many men, both crew and passengers, among whom often figured
considerable detachments of troops, they presented a very formidable
appearance, and were more than once mistaken for ships of war by French
cruisers; so much so that in the year 1804 a body of them in the China
seas, by their firm bearing and compact order, imposed upon a hostile
squadron of respectable size, commanded by an admiral of cautious
temper though of proved courage, making him for a brief period the
laughing stock of both hemispheres, and bringing down on his head a
scathing letter from the emperor. Their armament, however, was actually
feeble, especially in the earlier part of the French Revolution. About
the year 1801, it was determined to increase it so that the larger
ships should carry thirty-eight 18-pounders;[258] but the change seems
to have been but imperfectly effected, and upon the occasion in
question the ships which thus "bluffed" Admiral Linois were none of
them a match for a medium frigate. It is, indeed, manifestly impossible
to combine within the same space the stowage of a rich and bulky cargo
and the fighting efficiency of a ship of war of the same tonnage.
Still, the batteries, though proportionately weak, were too powerful
for ordinary privateers to encounter, unless by a fortunate surprise;
and, as the French entertained great, if not exaggerated, ideas of the
dependence of Great Britain upon her Indian possessions, considerable
efforts were made to carry on commerce-destroying in the Eastern
seas by squadrons of heavy frigates, re-enforced occasionally by
ships-of-the-line. These were the backbone of the _guerre de course_,
but their efforts were supplemented by those of numerous privateers of
less size, that preyed upon the coasting trade and the smaller ships,
which, from China to the Red Sea, and throughout the Indian Ocean,
whether under British or neutral flags, were carrying goods of British
origin.

At the outbreak of the war Great Britain was taken unawares in India,
as everywhere; and, as the operations in Europe and in the West Indies
called for the first care of the government, the Indian seas were
practically abandoned to the enemy for over a year. After the fall
of Pondicherry, in September, 1793, Admiral Cornwallis returned to
Europe with all his small squadron, leaving but a single sloop-of-war
to protect the vast expanse of ocean covered by the commerce of the
East India Company.[259] Not till the month of October, 1794, did his
successor reach the station. Under these circumstances the losses were
inevitably severe, and would have been yet more heavy had not the
company itself fitted out several ships to cruise for the protection
of trade.[260] An animated warfare, directed solely toward the
destruction and protection of commerce, now ensued for several years,
and was marked by some exceedingly desperate and well-contested frigate
actions; as well as by many brilliant exploits of French privateersmen,
among whom the name of Robert Surcouf has attained a lasting celebrity.
Depending at first upon the islands of France and Bourbon as their
base of operations, the distance of these from the peninsula of
Hindoostan, combined with the size of the East India ships, compelled
the employment of relatively large vessels, able to keep the sea for
long periods and to carry crews which would admit of many detachments
to man prizes without unduly weakening the fighting capacity. When,
in 1795, the conquest of Holland and flight of the Orange government
turned the Dutch from enemies into allies of France, their colonies and
ports became accessories of great importance to the cruisers, owing to
their nearness to the scene of action and especially to the great trade
route between China and Europe. On the other hand the British, long
debarred from rewards for their efforts, other than recaptures of their
own merchant ships, now found the whole of the Dutch trade thrown open
to them, and the returns bear witness both to its numbers and to their
activity.

Notwithstanding, however, the unprotected state of British commerce
in the early years of the war, and the distinguished activity of
the French cruisers, the insurance premiums at no time rose to the
sums demanded in 1782, when a concentrated effort to control the
sea by a fleet, under Admiral Suffren, was made by France.[261] At
that time the premiums were fifteen per cent; between 1798 and 1805
they fluctuated between eight and twelve per cent. In 1805 the chief
command in the Indian seas was given to Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Pellew,
afterwards Lord Exmouth, and by his skilful arrangements such security
was afforded to the trade from Bombay to China, one of the most exposed
parts of the Eastern commercial routes, that the premium fell to eight
per cent, with a return of three per cent, if sailing with convoy.
Under this systematic care the losses by capture amounted to but one
per cent on the property insured, being less than those by the dangers
of the sea.[262] But during the very period that these happy results
were obtained by wisely applying the principle of concentration of
effort to the protection of commerce, disaster was overtaking the trade
of Calcutta; which lost nineteen vessels in two months through the
neglect of its merchants to accept the convoys of the admiral.[263] In
fact, as the small proportionate loss inflicted by scattered cruisers
appears to indicate the inconclusiveness of that mode of warfare, so
the result of the convoy system, in this and other instances, warrants
the inference that, when properly systematized and applied, it will
have more success as a defensive measure than hunting for individual
marauders,—a process which, even when most thoroughly planned, still
resembles looking for a needle in a haystack.

Soon after this time the British government reverted most properly
to the policy of Pitt, by directing expeditions against the enemies'
colonies, the foreign bases of their Sea Power, and, in the absence of
great fleets, the only possible support upon which commerce-destroying
can depend; with whose fall it must also fall. The islands of Bourbon
and of France capitulated in 1810, the same year that saw the surrender
of Guadaloupe, the last survivor of the French West India Islands.
This was followed in 1811 by the reduction of the Dutch colony of
Java. Thus "an end was put to the predatory warfare which had been
successfully carried on against the British trade in India for a number
of years."[264]

While the scattered cruisers of France were thus worrying, by a petty
and inconclusive warfare, the commerce of Great Britain and its neutral
carriers, the great British fleets, being left in quiet possession of
the seas by the avowed purpose of the Directory to limit its efforts
to the _guerre de course_, swept from the ocean every merchant ship
wearing a hostile flag, and imposed upon the neutral trade with France
the extreme limitations of maritime international law, as held by the
British courts. Toward the end of the war, indeed, those principles
were given an extension, which the government itself admitted was
beyond anything before claimed as reconcilable with recognized law.
The precise amount of the injury done, the exact number of the vessels
detained, sent in, and finally condemned, in all parts of the world
will perhaps never be known; it is certainly not within the power
of the present writer to determine them. The frequent, though not
complete, returns of British admirals give some idea of the prevailing
activity, which will also appear from the occasional details that must
be cited in the latter part of this chapter. Into the single port of
Plymouth, in the eight years and a half ending September 29, 1801,
there were sent 948 vessels of all nations;[265] of which 447 were
enemy's property, 156 recaptured British, and the remainder neutrals,
belonging mostly to America, Denmark, and Sweden, the three chief
neutral maritime states. From Jamaica, the British commander-in-chief
reports that, between March 1 and August 3, 1800,—that is, in five
months,—203 vessels have been captured, detained, or destroyed.[1]
This was in but one part of the West Indian Seas. The admiral at the
Leeward Islands reports that in two months of the same year 62 vessels
had been sent in.[1] In five months, ending September 3, 1800, Lord
Keith reports from the Mediterranean 180 captures.[266] How far these
instances may be accepted as a fair example of the usual results of
British cruising, it is impossible to say; but it may be remarked that
they all occur at a period when the war had been raging for seven
years, and that captures are more numerous at the beginning than at
the latter end of long hostilities. In war, as in all states of life,
people learn to accommodate themselves to their conditions, to minimize
risks; and even prize lists become subject to the uniformity of results
observed in other statistics.

Whatever the particulars of French losses, however, they are all summed
up in the unprecedented admission of the Directory, in 1799, that "not
a single merchant ship is on the sea carrying the French flag." This
was by no means a figure of speech, to express forcibly an extreme
depression. It was the statement of a literal fact. "The former sources
of our prosperity," wrote M. Arnould, Chef du Bureau du Commerce,
as early as 1797, "are either lost or dried up. Our agricultural,
manufacturing, and industrial power is almost extinct." And again
he says, "The total number of registers issued to French ships from
September, 1793, to September, 1796, amounts only to 6028." Of these,
3351 were undecked and of less than thirty tons burden. "The maritime
war paralyzes our distant navigation and even diminishes considerably
that on our coasts; so that a great number of French ships remain
inactive, and perhaps decaying, in our ports. This remark applies
principally to ships of over two hundred tons, the number of which,
according to the subjoined table,[267] amounts only to 248. Before
the revolution the navigation of the seas of Europe and to the French
colonies employed more than 2,000 ships."

In the year ending September 20, 1800, according to a report submitted
to the consuls,[268] France received directly from Asia, Africa, and
America, all together, less than $300,000 worth of goods; while her
exports to those three quarters of the world amounted to only $56,000.
Whether these small amounts were carried in French or neutral bottoms
is immaterial; the annihilation of French shipping is proved by them.
The same report shows that the average size of the vessels, which, by
hugging closely the coast, avoided British cruisers and maintained the
water traffic between France and her neighbors, Holland, Spain, and
Italy, was but thirty-six tons. Intercourse by water is always easier
and, for a great bulk, quicker than by land; but in those days of
wagon carriage and often poor roads it was especially so. In certain
districts of France great distress for food was frequently felt in
those wars, although grain abounded in other parts; because the surplus
could not be distributed rapidly by land, nor freely by water. For the
latter conveyance it was necessary to depend upon very small vessels,
unfit for distant voyages, but which could take refuge from pursuers in
the smallest port, or be readily beached; and which, if captured, would
not singly be a serious loss.

Towards the end of 1795, a contemporary British authority states
that over three thousand British ships had been captured, and about
eight hundred French.[269] This was, however, confessedly only an
estimate, and probably, so far as concerns the British losses, a
large exaggeration. Ten years later a member of the House of Commons,
speaking with a view rather to disparage the earlier administration,
gave the British losses for the same years as 1,395.[270] Lloyd's lists
give the whole number of British captured, for the years 1793-1800,
both inclusive, as 4,344, of which 705 were recaptured; leaving a total
loss of 3,639.[271] Assuming, what is only for this purpose admissible,
that the average loss each year was nearly the same, these figures
would give for the three years, 1793-1795, 1,365 as the number of
captures made by hostile cruisers. In the tables appended to Norman's
"Corsairs of France" the losses for the same period are given as
1,636.[272]

Finally, the number of prizes brought into French ports up to September
16, 1798, was stated by M. Arnould, in the Conseil des Anciens, as
being 2,658. The table from which his figures were taken he called "an
authentic list, just printed, drawn up in the office of the French
Ministry of Marine, of all prizes made since the outbreak of the
war."[273] It included vessels of all nationalities, during a period
when France had not only been at war with several states, but had made
large seizures of neutral vessels upon various pretexts. Of the entire
number M. Arnould considered that not more than 2,000 were British. If
we accept his estimate, only 900 British ships would have been taken in
three years. It is to be observed, however, as tending to reconcile the
discrepancy between this and the English accounts, that the tables used
by him probably did not give, or at most gave very imperfectly, the
French captures made in the East and West Indies; and, furthermore, the
aggregate British losses, as given by Lloyd's lists, and by Norman's
tables, include captures made by the Dutch and Spaniards as well as by
the French.[274]

The British reports of their own losses are thus seen largely to exceed
those made by the French. According equal confidence to the statements
of Sir William Curtis, of Norman, and of Lloyd's list, we should reach
an annual loss by capture of 488 British ships; which would give a
total, in the twenty-one years of war, from 1793-1814,[275] of 10,248.
Norman's grand total of 10,871 considerably exceeds this amount; but
it will be safer, in considering a subject of so great importance as
the absolute injury done, and effect produced, by war upon commerce,
to accept the larger figure, or to say, in round numbers, that
eleven thousand British vessels were captured by the enemy during
the protracted and desperate wars caused by the French Revolution. It
is the great and conspicuous instance of commerce-destroying, carried
on over a long series of years, with a vigor and thoroughness never
surpassed, and supported, moreover, by an unparalleled closure of the
continental markets of Great Britain. The Directory first, and Napoleon
afterwards, abandoned all attempts to contest the control of the sea,
and threw themselves, as Louis XIV. had done before them, wholly upon
a cruising war against commerce. It will be well in this day, when the
same tendency so extensively prevails, to examine somewhat carefully
what this accepted loss really meant, how it was felt by the British
people at the time, and what expectation can reasonably be deduced
from it that, by abandoning military control of the sea, and depending
exclusively upon scattered cruisers, a country dependent as Great
Britain is upon external commerce can be brought to terms.

Evidently, a mere statement of numbers, such as the above, without
any particulars as to size, or the value of cargoes, affords but a
poor indication of the absolute or relative loss sustained by British
commerce. It may, however, be used as a basis, both for comparison
with the actual number of vessels entering and clearing annually from
British ports, and also for an estimate as to the probable tonnage
captured. The annual average of capture, deduced from 11,000 ships in
twenty-one years is 524. In the three years 1793-1795, the average
annual number of British vessels entering and clearing from ports of
Great Britain was 21,560.[276] Dividing by 524, it is found that one
fortieth, or two and a half per cent of British shipping, reckoning
by numbers, was taken by the enemy. In the three years 1798-1800,
1801 being the year of broken hostilities, the average annual entries
and departures were 21,369,[1] which again gives two and a half as
the percentage of the captures. It must be noted, also, that only the
commerce of England and Scotland with foreign countries, with the
colonies, with Ireland and the Channel Islands, and with British India
enters into these lists of arrivals and departures. The returns of that
day did not take account of British coasters, nor of the local trade
of the colonies, nor again of the direct intercourse between Ireland
and ports other than those of Great Britain. Yet all these contributed
victims to swell the list of prizes,[277] and so to increase very
materially the apparent proportion of the latter to a commerce of which
the returns cited present only a fraction. Unfortunately, the amount of
the coasting trade cannot now be ascertained,[278] and the consequent
deduction from the calculated two and a half per cent of loss can only
be conjectured.

To obtain the tonnage loss there appears to the writer no fairer means
than to determine the average tonnage of the vessels entering and
departing as above, at different periods of the war. In the three years
1793-1795, the average size of each ship entering or sailing from the
ports of Great Britain, including the Irish trade, was 121 tons. In
the year 1800 the average is 126 tons. In 1809 it has fallen again to
121, and in 1812 to 115 tons. We cannot then go far wrong in allowing
125 tons as the average size of British vessels employed in carrying on
the foreign and the coasting trade of Great Britain itself during the
war.[279] On this allowance the aggregate tonnage lost in the 11,000
British prizes, would be 1,375,000 in twenty-one years. In these years
the aggregate British tonnage entering and leaving the ports of Great
Britain, exclusive of the great neutral tonnage employed in carrying
for the same trade, amounted to over 55,000,000;[280] so that the loss
is again somewhat less than one fortieth, or 2½ per cent.

Another slight indication of the amount of loss, curious from its
coincidence with the above deductions, is derived from the report of
prize goods received into France in the year ending September, 1800,
which amounted to 29,201,676 francs. At the then current value of the
franc this was equivalent to £1,216,000. The real value of British
exports for 1800 was £56,000,000, the prize goods again being rather
less than one fortieth of the amount. The imports, however, being
also nearly £56,000,000, the loss on the entire amount falls to one
eightieth. It is true that many of these prize goods were probably
taken in neutrals, but on the other hand the report does not take into
account French capture in the colonies and East Indies; nor those made
by Holland and Spain, the allies of France.

If the total number of vessels _belonging_ to Great Britain and all
her dependencies be taken, as the standard by which to judge her loss
by captures, it will be found that in 1795 they amounted to 16,728;[1]
in 1800, 17,885;[281] in 1805, 22,051;[2] in 1810, 23,703.[282] Using
again 524 as the annual number of captures, the annual proportion of
loss is seen gradually to fall from a very little over 3 per cent, in
the first year, to somewhat less than 2½ per cent, in the last.

Finally, it may be added that the Lloyd's list before quoted gives
the total number of losses by sea risks, 1793-1800, as 2,967; which,
being contrasted with the losses by capture, 3,639, shows that the
danger from enemy's cruisers very little exceeded those of the ocean.
To offset, though only partially, her own losses, Great Britain
received prize goods, during the same years, to the amount of over
£5,000,000.[283] There were also engaged in carrying on her commerce,
in 1801, under the British flag, 2,779 vessels, measuring 369,563 tons,
that had been brought into her ports as prizes; which numbers had
increased in 1811 to 4,023 ships and 536,240 tons.[284]

Taking everything together, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
direct loss to the nation, by the operation of hostile cruisers, did
not exceed 2½ per cent of the commerce of the Empire; and that this
loss was partially made good by the prize ships and merchandise taken
by its own naval vessels and privateers. A partial, if not a complete,
compensation for her remaining loss is also to be found in the great
expansion of her mercantile operations carried on under neutral flags;
for, although this too was undoubtedly harassed by the enemy, yet to
it almost entirely was due the increasing volume of trade that poured
through Great Britain to and from the continent of Europe, every ton of
which left a part of its value to swell the bulk of British wealth. The
writings of the period show that the injuries due to captured shipping
passed unremarked amid the common incidents and misfortunes of life;
neither their size nor their effects were great enough to attract
public notice, amid the steady increase of national wealth and the
activities concerned in amassing it. "During all the operations of war
and finance," says one writer, "the gains of our enterprising people
were beyond all calculation, however the unproductive classes may
have suffered from the depreciation of money and the inequalities of
taxation. Our commerce has become more than double its greatest extent
during the happiest years of peace."[285] There were, indeed, darker
shades to the picture, for war means suffering as well as effort; but
with regard to the subject-matter of this chapter, Commerce, and its
fate in this war, there was for many years but one voice, for but one
was possible. The minister, essentially a master of trade and finance,
delighted year by year to enlarge upon the swelling volume of business
and the growing returns of the revenue. Not only did the new taxes
bring in liberally, but the older ones were increasingly productive.
These signs of prosperity were not seen all at once. The first plunge
into the war was followed, as it always is, by a shrinking of the
system and a contraction of the muscles; but as the enemy more and more
surrendered the control of the sea, as the naval victories of the years
1797 and 1798 emphasized more and more the absolute dominion of Great
Britain over it, and as the new channels of enterprise became familiar,
the energies of the people expanded to meet the new opportunities.

The share borne by neutral shipping in the extension and maintenance
of this extraordinary fabric of prosperity, thus existing in the
midst of all the sorrow, suffering, and waste of war, must next be
considered; for it was the cause of the remarkable measures taken by
both belligerents against neutral trade, which imparted so singular
and desolating a character to the closing years of the struggle and
affected deeply the commerce of the whole world. At the very beginning
of the war Great Britain proceeded to avail herself of the services
of neutrals, by a remission of that part of the Navigation Act which
required three fourths of the crews of British merchantmen to be
British subjects. On the 30th of April, 1793, this was so modified
as to permit three fourths to be foreigners, to replace the large
body taken for the fleets. This was followed, from time to time, as
the number of enemies multiplied through the extending conquests
and alliances of France, by a series of orders and proclamations,
infringing more and more upon the spirit of the Act, with the direct
and obvious purpose of employing neutral vessels to carry on operations
hitherto limited to the British flag. The demands of the navy for
seamen, the risks of capture, the delays of convoy, entirely arrested,
and even slightly set back, the development of the British carrying
trade; while at the same time the important position of Great Britain
as the great manufacturing nation, coinciding with a diminution in the
productions of the Continent, consequent upon the war, and a steadily
growing demand for manufactured goods on the part of the United
States, called imperiously for more carriers. The material of British
traffic was increasing with quickened steps, at the very time that
her own shipping was becoming less able to bear it. Thus in 1797,
when the British navy was forced to leave the Mediterranean, all the
Levant trade, previously confined to British ships, was thrown open
to every neutral. In 1798, being then at war with Spain, the great
raw material, Spanish wool, essential to the cloth manufactures, was
allowed to enter in vessels of any neutral country. The produce even
of hostile colonies could be imported by British subjects in neutral
bottoms, though not for consumption in England, but for re-exportation;
a process by which it paid a toll to Great Britain, without directly
affecting the reserved market of the British colonist. The effect
of these various conditions and measures can best be shown by a few
figures, which indicate at once the expansion of British commerce, the
arrest of British carrying trade, and the consequent growth of the
neutral shipping. In 1792, the last year of peace, the total British
exports and imports amounted to £44,565,000; in 1796 to £53,706,000;
in 1800, the last unbroken year of war, to £73,723,000.[286] For the
same years the carrying of this trade was done, in 1792, by 3,151,389
tons of British, and 479,630 tons of foreign shipping; in 1796, by
2,629,575 British, and 998,427 foreign; in 1800, by 2,825,078 British
and 1,448,287 foreign. Thus, while there was so great an increase in
the commerce of the kingdom, and it employed nearly 650,000 more tons
of shipping in 1800 than in 1792, the amount carried in British ships
had fallen off; and the proportion of neutral bottoms had risen from
thirteen to nearly thirty-four per cent.

The significance of these facts could not escape the French government,
nor yet the jealousies of certain classes connected with the carrying
trade in Great Britain herself; but in the first war the latter were
not joined by the other powerful and suffering interests, which
gradually impelled the ministry into a series of acts deeply injurious
to all neutrals, but chiefly to the United States. In France, the early
effusiveness of the revolutionists toward England, based upon the hope
that she too would be swept into the torrent of their movement, had
been quickly chilled and turned to bitterness, greater even than that
which had so long divided the two nations. Victorious everywhere upon
the Continent, the government saw before it only one unconquerable
enemy, the Power of the Sea; it knew that she, by her subsidies and
her exhortations, maintained the continental states in their recurring
hostilities, and it saw her alone, amid the general confusion and
impoverishment, preserve quiet and increase a wealth which was not only
brilliant, but solid. The Directory therefore reached the conclusion,
which Napoleon made the basis of his policy and which he never wearied
of proclaiming, that Great Britain maintained the war and promoted
the discord of nations for the simple purpose of founding her own
prosperity upon the ruin of all other commerce, her power upon the
ruin of all other navies.[287] At the same time the French government
held tenaciously to that profound delusion, the bequest to it from
past generations of naval officers and statesmen, that a war directed
against the commerce of Great Britain was a sure means of destroying
her. It knew that hosts of privateers were employed, and that very
many British prizes were brought in; yet, withal, the great Sea Power
moved steadily on, evidently greater and stronger as the years went
by. It knew also that her manufactures were increasing, that their
products filled the Continent; that the produce of the East and of the
West, of the Baltic and of the Mediterranean, centred in Great Britain;
and that through her, not the Continent only, but France herself,
drew most of her tropical articles of consumption. There was but one
solution for this persistent escape from apparently sure destruction;
and that was to be found in the support of the neutral carrier and the
pockets of the neutral consumer. From this premise the fatal logic of
the French Revolution was irresistibly drawn to the conclusion that,
as every neutral ship engaged in the British carrying trade was a
help to England, it was consequently an enemy to France and liable to
capture.[288] Napoleon but amplified this precedent when he declared
that there were no more neutrals, and placed before Sweden, longing
only for quiet, the option "war with France or cannon-balls for English
vessels approaching your ports."

The exceptionally intense spirit which animated the parties to this
war trenched with unusual severity upon the interests of neutral
powers, always more or less in conflict with the aims of belligerents.
These questions also received new importance, because now appeared
for the first time a neutral maritime state, of great extent and
rapidly growing, whose interests and ambitions at that time pointed to
shipping and carrying trade as forms of enterprise for which it had
received from nature peculiar facilities. In all previous wars the
Americans had acted as the colonists of Great Britain, either loyal or
in revolt. In 1793 they had for four years been a nation in the real
sense of the word, and Washington's first term closed. In the very
first Congress measures were taken for developing American shipping,
by differential duties upon native and foreign ships.[289] From the
impulse thus given, combined with the opening offered by the increase
of British trade and the diminished employment of British shipping,
the ship-builders and merchants extended their operations rapidly. By
the report of a committee of the House, January 10, 1803, it appears
that the merchant tonnage of the United States was then inferior to
that of no other country, except Great Britain.[290] In 1790 there had
entered her ports from abroad, 355,000 tons of her own shipping and
251,000 foreign, of which 217,000 were British.[291] In the year 1801
there entered 799,304 tons of native shipping,[292] and of foreign but
138,000.[293] The amount of British among the latter is not stated;
but in the year 1800 there cleared from Great Britain under her own
flag, for the United States, but 14,381 tons.[294] Figures like these
give but a comparative and partial view of the activity of American
shipping, leaving out of account all the carrying done by it outside
the ken of the home authorities; but it is safe to say that the United
States contributed annually at least six hundred thousand tons to
maintain the traffic of the world, which, during those eventful years,
centred in Great Britain and ministered to her power. Among the forms
of gain thus opened to American traders there was one to which allusion
only will here be made, because at a later period it became the source
of very great trouble, leading step by step to the war of 1812. This
was the carriage of the productions of French and other colonies,
enemies of Great Britain, to the United States, and thence re-exporting
them to Europe.

Besides the new state in the Western Hemisphere, there were three
others whose isolated position had hitherto given them the character
of neutrals in the maritime wars of the eighteenth century. These were
the Baltic countries, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, which had combined
in 1780 to defend their neutral rights, if need were, by force of arms.
The power of this confederacy to assume the same attitude in 1793
was broken by the policy of Russia. By whatever motives swayed, the
Empress Catharine took decided ground against the French Revolution.
On the 25th of March, 1793, a convention between her and the British
government was signed, by which both parties agreed, not only to close
their own ports against France and not to permit the exportation
of food to that country, but also "to unite all their efforts _to
prevent other powers_, not implicated in the war, from giving, on this
occasion of common concern to every civilized state, any protection
whatever, directly or indirectly in consequence of their neutrality,
to the commerce or property of the French on the sea."[295] How the
empress understood this engagement was shown by her notification,
during the same summer, to the courts of Sweden and Denmark, that
she would station a fleet in the North Sea to prevent neutrals bound
to France from proceeding.[296] Great Britain had already—June 8,
1793—directed the commanders of cruisers to detain all vessels loaded
with flour or grain, bound to French ports, and to send them to
England, where the cargo would be purchased and freight paid by the
British government.[297] These instructions were duly communicated to
the government of the neutral states, which protested with more or
less vigor and tenacity, but found themselves helpless to resist force
with force. Singularly enough, the French government had preceded the
British on this occasion, having issued orders to the same effect on
the 9th of the previous May; but the fact appears to have escaped the
ministry, for, in justifying their action to the United States, they do
not allude to it. Their course is defended on the broad ground that,
from the character of the war and the situation of France, there was
a fair prospect of starving her into submission,[298] and that under
such circumstances provisions, always a questionable article, became
contraband of war. The answer was not satisfactory to the neutral,
deprived of part of his expected gains, but the argument was one of
those that admit of no appeal except to arms. A further justification
of the order was found by the British ministry in the undoubted fact
that "the French government itself was the sole legal importer of
grain in France" at that time; and therefore "the trade was no longer
to be regarded as a mercantile speculation of individuals, but as an
immediate operation of the very persons who have declared war, and are
now carrying it on, against Great Britain." The American minister to
France, Monroe, confirms this, in his letter of October 16, 1794: "The
whole commerce of France, to the absolute exclusion of individuals, is
carried on by the government itself."[299]

Soon after, on the 6th of November, 1793, another order was issued
by the British ministry, directing the seizure of "all ships laden
with goods the produce of any colony belonging to France, or carrying
provisions or other supplies for the use of any such colony." This
order was based upon the Rule of 1756, so called from the war in which
it first came conspicuously into notice, and the principle of which, as
stated by British authorities, was that a trade forbidden to neutrals
by the laws of a country, during peace, could not be lawfully carried
on by them in time of war, for the convenience of the belligerent;
because, by such employment, their ships "were in effect incorporated
in the enemy's navigation, having adopted his commerce and character
and identified themselves with his interests and purposes."[300] At
that time the colonial trade was generally reserved to the mother
country; and against it particularly, together with the coasting
trade, similarly restricted, was this ruling of the British courts and
government directed. Neutrals replied, "Because the parent country
monopolizes in peace the whole commerce of its colonies, does it follow
that in war it should have no right to regulate it at all?"[301] "We
deny that municipal regulations, established in peace, can in any wise
limit the public rights of neutrals in time of war."[302] It is evident
that these two lines of argument do not fairly meet each other; they
resemble rather opposite and equal weights in a balance, which will
quickly be overturned when passion or interest, combined with power, is
thrown in upon either side. Starting from such fundamentally different
premises, interested parties might argue on indefinitely in parallel
lines, without ever approaching a point of contact.

The chief present interest in this question, referring as it does
to an obsolete colonial policy, is as illustrative of one of those
dead-locks, which, occurring at a critical moment, when passion or
interest is aroused, offer no solution but by war. It was useless to
point out that Great Britain relaxed in every direction her own peace
regulations, for the advantage of British commerce in the present
contest. The reply was perfectly apt, that she did not dispute the
right of her enemy to avail himself of any help the neutral could give;
she only asserted the determination not to permit the neutral to extend
it with impunity. There was no doubt, in the mind of any considerable
body of Englishmen, as to the perfect soundness of the English
doctrine. Lord Howick, who, as Mr. Grey, had embarrassed his party in
1792 by the exuberance of his liberalism,[303] as foreign minister
in 1807 wrote: "Neutrality, properly considered, does not consist in
taking advantage of every situation between belligerent states by which
emolument may accrue to the neutral, whatever may be the consequences
to either belligerent party; but in observing a strict and honest
impartiality, so as not to afford advantage in the war to either; and,
particularly, in so far restraining its trade to the accustomed course
which it held in time of peace, as not to render assistance to one
belligerent in escaping the effects of the other's hostilities."[304]
An agreement among any number of the subjects of the interested nation
proves nothing as to the right of the question, but the irreconcilable
divergence of views at this time shows most clearly the necessity,
under which every country lies, to be ready to support its own sense of
its rights and honor by force, if necessary.

Under the order of November 6, some hundreds of American ships were
seized and brought into West Indian ports by British cruisers.[305] The
application of the order to them was, however, liable to two serious
objections, even admitting the principle. In the first place, it was
made without warning, under a rule that was at least not generally
accepted; and in the second place, the trade between the French West
India Islands and the United States had been permitted, before the
war, in vessels of sixty tons and upwards.[306] In the year ending
September 30, 1790, fifty-seven thousand tons of American shipping
entered home ports from the French colonies. The trade, therefore, was
one that existed prior to the war, and so did not come under the rule
of 1756.[307] The order of November 6 was not made public until nearly
the end of the year; the United States minister in London not receiving
a copy until Christmas Day. He hastened at once to protest, but before
he could obtain an audience a second was issued, January 8, 1794,
revoking the former and limiting the operations of the rule to vessels
bound from the colonies direct to Europe. Although the principle was
maintained by the new order, and not admitted by the United States,
still, as their own trade was excepted, much dissatisfaction was
removed.

The serious nature of the difficulties that had already arisen
determined the government to send an extraordinary envoy to England.
John Jay was nominated to this office, and reached London in June,
1794. The British government, having already receded from its first
position, as well as revoked the order of June 8, 1793, for the
seizure of provisions, found no difficulty in assuming a conciliatory
attitude. The result of Jay's mission was a treaty of Commerce and
Navigation, concluded November 19, 1794, the first contracted between
the two countries since the separation. The injuries done to American
commerce, under the orders of November 6, were to be submitted to a
joint commission. The report of the latter was not made until 1804,
but by it compensation was made for most of the seizures; and it was
claimed in the following year by Mr. Monroe, then envoy in London, that
the decision of the commission definitely disposed of the principle of
the Rule of 1756. It does not appear, however, that its power extended
further than the settlement of the cases. There, its decision was to be
final; but it had no power to commit either government to any general
principle of international law not otherwise established.[308] The
Rule of 1756 was not mentioned in the treaty, and the failure to do so
may be construed as a tacit acquiescence, or at least submission, on
the part of the United States.[309] On the other hand, considerable
commercial advantages were obtained. Great Britain conceded to American
ships the privilege of direct trade between their own country and the
British East and West Indies, but they were precluded from carrying
the produce of those colonies to other foreign ports. Indeed, so great
was the anxiety of the British ministers to prevent coffee and sugar
from being taken to Europe, indirectly, by neutral ships, that they
insisted upon, and Jay admitted, a stipulation that while the trade
with the British West Indies was permitted, the United States would not
allow the carrying of any molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton
in American vessels to any other part of the world than to the United
States. This would have stopped a profitable trade already open to
American merchants, who first imported, and then re-exported to France,
the produce of the French islands; the broken voyage being considered
to purge the origin of the commodities. This article (the twelfth) was
accordingly rejected by the Senate, and only as thus modified was the
treaty ratified by both powers.

The French government had viewed with distrust the negotiation between
Great Britain and the United States. Although assured by Mr. Jay,
through the American minister at Paris, that the treaty contained an
express stipulation guarding the existing conventions between France
and his own country, the Directory had the insolence to demand a copy
of the instrument, to which it considered itself entitled, although
it had not yet been communicated to the United States government.
When the terms finally became known, its indignation passed bounds.
The principal points to which it took exception were two, wherein
the United States admitted conditions favoring the interests of
belligerents relatively to neutrals, and against which the chief
efforts of the weaker maritime states had been addressed. The first
of these was the well-settled principle that a neutral ship did not
protect property belonging to an enemy, laden on board it. The United
States had always admitted this as valid, while trying to introduce, as
an innovation, the contrary rule. In the treaty of 1778 with France,
the two countries had stipulated that in any future war in which one
of them should be engaged the belligerent should respect his enemy's
property, if under the flag of the other party to the compact; but
the United States did not think that this agreement between two
nations overturned for all others a settled usage. The interests of
Great Britain indisposed her to accept the proposed change, and the
old principle was explicitly accepted in the seventeenth article of
Jay's treaty. The other point objected to by France referred to the
definitions of contraband of war. This has always been, and still
is, one of the most difficult problems of international law; for an
article may be of the first importance in the wars of one age or one
country, and of slight consequence in another century or a different
scene. By Jay's treaty the United States allowed that naval stores
were, and under some circumstances provisions might be, contraband of
war, and therefore liable to seizure. A free trade in these articles
was of great importance to the Americans; but they were weak then, as
in a military sense they, with far less excuse, are now; and then, as
now, they must submit in questions of doubtful right. The material
interests of United States citizens, as distinguished from the national
self-respect, were in part saved by Great Britain undertaking to pay
for provisions when seized as contraband. All these conditions bore
against the wishes of the French, who regarded the Americans as owing
an undischarged debt of gratitude to them for the scanty, though
certainly most important, aid extended in the Revolutionary struggle
by the monarch whom his people had since beheaded; and from this time
the arrogance with which the French government had treated that of
the United States became tinged with acrimony. It refused to see the
difficulties and weakness of the new and still scarcely cemented body
of states; or that, indirectly, the bargain struck by the latter was
upon the whole as advantageous to France herself as could be expected,
when Great Britain had an absolute control over the sea and all that
floated upon it. To imperious rebukes and reproaches succeeded a series
of measures, outraging neutral and treaty rights, which finally led to
hostilities between the two countries.

From the time of Jay's treaty to the peace of Amiens, and until the
year 1804 in the following war, the relations between Great Britain
and the United States remained on a fairly settled basis. Innumerable
vexations, indeed, attended neutral commerce at the hands of cruisers
who were willing on slight grounds to seize a prize, taking the
chance of the courts deciding in their favor, and the delays of prize
courts added greatly to the annoyance; but upon the whole American
trade throve greatly. In June, 1797, the Secretary of State reported,
in reply to a resolution of the House, that "captures and losses by
British cruisers, it is presumed, have not been numerous; for the
citizens of the United States having, these three years past, been
accustomed to look to the government for aid in prosecuting these
claims, it is not to be doubted that, generally, these cases have
been reported to the Department." In 1801 there was an outbreak of
lawless seizure in the West Indies.[310] The American vessels engaged
in that trade were small, and, as legal expenses were the same for
a large as for a small prize, the cost of a contest amounted to a
sum very disproportionate to the value of the ship; so the captors
hoped, by the well-known delays of procedure, to extort a compromise.
An abuse of this kind, however outrageous, is different in principle
from the direct action of a government; nor are such cases the only
ones in which men have been willing to take dishonest advantage of the
imperfections, ambiguities, or delays of the law.[311] The Secretary
of State, in transmitting a report on the subject to the House of
Representatives, said, "Neither the communications from our minister
at London, nor my conversations with the Chargé d'Affaires of his
Britannic Majesty in the United States, would lead to an opinion that
any additional orders have lately been given by the British government,
authorizing the system of depredation alluded to."[312]

In fact, at this time Pitt's government seems to have considered all
trade, which did not go direct to hostile countries, an advantage to
Great Britain, and especially if it could be drawn to pass through
her own ports. Accordingly, in January, 1798, a further relaxation of
the Rule of 1756 was promulgated, extending to European neutrals the
concession made in 1794 to the United States. British cruisers were now
directed not to capture neutral ships, bound from the hostile colonies
to Europe and laden with colonial produce, provided the latter had
become neutral property and its destination was to their own country,
or to a port of Great Britain. The final clause foreshadowed the policy
of the Orders in Council of ten years later, towards which Great
Britain, under the stress of war, was steadily gravitating. The law
of self-preservation, divined by the instinct of the state, demanded
that the United Kingdom should become, for that war, the storehouse of
the world's commerce. The more thriving that commerce, the better for
her, if it could be concentrated in her own borders. Thus France and
the whole world should become tributary to a wealth and to a power by
which, not Great Britain only, but the world should be saved. It was
a great conception, of slow growth and gradual realization; it was
disfigured in its progress by imperfections, blunders, and crimes;
but it was radically sound and in the end victorious, for upon Great
Britain and upon commerce hung the destinies of the world.

The action of France towards neutral, and especially towards American,
vessels reflected the instability and excitement of the successive
French governments, the violent passions of the time, and the
uncertainty necessarily attendant upon the course of a nation which,
having cut adrift from fixed principles and precedents, is guided
only by changing impressions of right and wrong. The decree of the
9th of May, 1793, arresting vessels laden with provisions or carrying
enemy's goods, was revoked as regards the United States on the 23d
of the same month, because contrary to the treaty of 1778. On the
28th, five days later, the revocation was revoked, and the original
order established.[313] On the first of July the decision was again
reversed and the treaty ordered to be observed; notwithstanding which
the United States minister found it impossible to obtain the release
of vessels seized contrary to its terms, and on the 27th of the month
the last decision was again repealed.[314] On the 22d of September the
American minister writes: "I understand it is still in contemplation
to repeal the decree I complained of, and that in the mean time it has
not been transmitted to the tribunals. In effect, it can do very little
harm; because the fleets of this country are confined by the enemy,
and the privateers by a decree of the Convention."[315] Here matters
rested during the Reign of Terror and until November 15, 1794, after
the fall of Robespierre, when the Directory issued its first edict on
the subject; reiterating that enemy's goods under the neutral flag
would be considered liable to seizure, until the powers, enemies of
France, should declare French property free on board neutral ships.
This made the treatment of cargoes on American vessels depend, not upon
the formal engagements of France with the United States, but upon the
conduct of Great Britain; and it was succeeded, on the 3d of January,
1795, by a decree of revocation. Enemy's goods under neutral flags
now remained exempt from capture until the 2d of July, 1796; when
proclamation was issued, notifying neutral powers that the ships of
the French Republic would be used against their merchant vessels, were
it for the purpose of confiscation, search or detention, in the same
manner that they suffered the English to act in regard to them. Great
Britain was thus made supreme arbiter of the conduct of France towards
neutrals.

This last step of the French government was directly traceable to its
dissatisfaction with Jay's treaty, the ratifications of which had
been exchanged at London on the 28th of October, 1795. On the 16th of
February, 1796, the Minister of Foreign Affairs told Mr. Monroe, the
American minister, that his government considered the alliance between
the two countries, formed by the treaty of 1778, to be terminated,
_ipso facto_, by Jay's treaty; and on the 7th of October he was further
informed that the minister to the United States had been recalled
and would not be replaced. Meanwhile President Washington, being
dissatisfied with Monroe's conduct, had summoned him home and sent out
Mr. Pinckney as his relief; but the Directory, on the 11th of December,
refused to receive any minister plenipotentiary from the United States
until the grievances it had alleged were redressed,[316] and on the
25th of January, 1797, Pinckney was ordered to leave the country as an
unauthorized foreigner.

France was now fully embarked on a course of violence toward the United
States, which arose, not from any reasonable cause of discontent given,
but from the disposition, identical with that shown toward the weaker
European nations, to compel all countries to follow the dictates of
the French policy. The utterly loose terms of the decree of July 2,
1796, authorized the seizure of any neutral vessel by a French captain,
if, in his judgment, the conduct of Great Britain toward the neutral
justified it; and left the ultimate fate of the prize to a tribunal
governed only by its own opinion upon the same subject. "You are
mistaken," said a French deputy, "if you think that a privateer sails
furnished with instructions from the Minister of Marine, who ought
to direct their action. The instructions are drawn up by his owners;
they indicate to the captain what he may seize and what release. They
compile for him his duties under all the rules, under all the laws,
contradictory or otherwise, from the year 1400 up to the law of Nivôse
29, An 6" (Jan. 18, 1798).[317]

In the West Indies the French agents, practically removed from all
control of the home government by the British command of the sea,
issued on the 27th of November, 1796, a decree for the capture of
Americans bound to, or coming from, British ports. They had already, on
the first of August, directed that all vessels having contraband goods
on board should be seized and condemned, whatever their destination,
and although the accepted law condemned only the contraband articles
themselves, not the ship nor the rest of the cargo. On the first of the
following February the same commissioners ordered the capture of all
neutrals sailing for the French islands which had surrendered to the
enemy, and declared them good prize. That these acts fairly represented
the purpose of the Directory may be inferred from the capture of
American ships in European waters under the decree of July 2, and
from the fact that the French consuls at Malaga and Cadiz interpreted
the decree to authorize seizure and condemnation for the single
circumstance of being destined for a British port.[318] Over three
hundred American vessels were thus seized, and most of them condemned.
Envoys sent from the United States to treat concerning these matters
said, in October, 1797, that France had violently taken from America
over fifteen million dollars.[319] "At no period of the war," wrote
they again, February 7, 1798, "has Britain undertaken to exercise such
a power. At no period has she asserted such a right."[320] "Was there
ever anything," said the deputy before quoted, "like the injustice of
the condemnations in the Antilles?"

These irregular and arbitrary proceedings are chiefly significant as
showing the lack of any fixed principles of action on the part of the
French government and its agents; and they were closely connected
with similar courses towards neutral vessels in French ports. At the
outbreak of hostilities in 1793, one hundred and three American ships
were embargoed at Bordeaux and detained more than a year, without
any reason given; nor had the owners been indemnified in 1796.[321]
Cargoes were forcibly taken from vessels and payment either refused
or offered in kind, and so delayed that in the West Indies alone the
American losses were calculated at two million dollars. Besides these
acts, which had the character of spoliations, the contracts and other
financial obligations of the French government and its agents with
citizens of the United States remained undischarged. The irritation
between the two governments, and on the part of American merchants,
continued to increase rapidly. The decree of July 2, the essence of
which was the formal repudiation of a clause of the treaty of 1778, at
the time when alone it became applicable, remained in force; and was
rendered more obnoxious by a further order, of March 2, 1797, making
more stringent the proofs of neutrality to be adduced before French
tribunals and requiring papers which had long been disused.

At this time the astonishing successes of Bonaparte's Italian campaigns
were approaching their triumphant conclusion. The battle of Rivoli
had been fought on the 14th of January, 1797,[322] Mantua capitulated
on the 2d of February, and the Pope had been compelled to sue for
peace. To Austria there remained only the hope of contesting the
approach to her German dominions. The confidence of the Directors
knew no bounds, and they now began to formulate the policy toward
British commerce which Napoleon inherited from them. The design was
formed of forcing the United States to recede from the obnoxious
conventions of Jay's treaty; and the government of Holland, then
entirely dependent upon that of France, was pressed to demand that
Dutch property on board American vessels should be protected against
British seizure, and to suggest the concurrence of the three republics
against Great Britain.[323] The Dutch accordingly represented "that,
when circumstances oblige our commerce to confide its interests to the
neutral flag of American vessels, it has a just right to insist that
that flag be protected with energy;"[324] in other words, that, when
the British control of the sea forced the Dutch ships from it, Dutch
trade should be carried on under the American flag, and that the United
States should fight to prevent the seizure of the Dutch property,
although it admitted that the traditional law of nations would not
justify it in so doing. On the 6th of May, 1797, Spain also, doubtless
under the dictation of France, made the same demand.[324] Similar
representations were made to the other neutral country, Denmark. Here
is seen the forerunner of Napoleon's contention that, as against Great
Britain's control of the sea, no state had a right to be neutral. Soon
afterward the idea was carried farther. Denmark was requested to close
the mouth of the Elbe to British commerce. "The French," wrote our
minister to London on the 12th of March, 1797, "assign our treaty with
England as the cause of their maritime conduct toward us, but they have
recently demanded of Hamburg and Bremen to suspend all commerce with
England. These have not complied, and the French minister has been
recalled from Hamburg. The same demand has been made at Copenhagen, and
the refusal has produced a sharp diplomatic controversy. These powers
have made no late treaty with England."[325]

Hostilities with Austria had ceased by the preliminaries of Leoben,
April 18, followed, after long negotiations, by the treaty of Campo
Formio, October 17, 1797. Of the coalition against France, Great
Britain alone remained upright and defiant. She had in 1797, after
Austria had yielded, offered to negotiate; but the terms demanded
were such that she refused to accept them, and her envoy was ordered
out of France as peremptorily as Mr. Pinckney had been a few months
before. The Directory thought that the time was now come when she could
be brought to unconditional surrender, and the weapon by which her
commerce should be annihilated was already forged to its hand. On the
31st of October, 1796 (Brumaire 10, An 5),[326] a law had been passed
by the Legislature forbidding entirely the admission of any British
manufactured goods, directing that all persons who already had such in
possession should declare them within three days, and that they should
be at once packed and stored for re-exportation. In order to insure the
execution of the statute, domiciliary visits were authorized everywhere
within three leagues of the frontiers or sea-board, and throughout
France the dwellings of all tradesmen were also open to search. Laws of
similar purpose had been passed early in the war;[327] but they either
had been found insufficient or were no longer applicable to the changed
conditions of affairs. "Now that," to use the words of a deputy, "the
flags of the Republic or those of its allies float over the sea from
Embden to Trieste, and almost all the ports of the European seas are
closed to England, we must stop the voluntary subsidies which are
paid her by the consumers of English merchandise."[328] With Belgium
annexed, with Spain and Holland vassals rather than allies, with the
greater part of Italy in military occupation, it seemed possible to
repel the entrance points of British goods to the Continent far from
the French frontier, and by strict watchfulness to close the latter
against such as worked their way to it.

The expectation, however, was deceived; the superior quality and
abundance of British manufactures created a demand which evaded all
watchfulness and enlisted all classes against the officials. The
Directory therefore determined, toward the end of 1797, to put the
law into force with all severity and to introduce another and final
rigor into its maritime prize code. On the 4th of January, 1798, a
message was sent to the council of Five Hundred, announcing that "on
that very day the municipal administrators, the justices of the peace,
the commissaries of the Directory, and the superintendents of customs,
are proceeding in all the chief places of the departments, in all
the ports, and in all the principal communes, to seize all English
merchandise now in France in contravention of the law of Brumaire 10,
An 5. Such is the _first act_ by which, now that peace is given to the
Continent, the war declared long since against England is about to
assume the real character that belongs to it." But more was needed.
Neutral vessels were in the habit of entering British ports, shipping
British goods, and carrying on British trade; they were even known,
when opportunity offered, to introduce articles of British manufacture,
directly or indirectly, into France. By so doing they aided Great
Britain and actually took part in the war. "The Directory, therefore,
thinks it urgent and necessary to pass a law declaring that the
character of vessels, relative to their quality of neutral or enemy,
shall be determined by their cargo; ... in consequence, that every
vessel found at sea, having on board English merchandise as her cargo,
in whole or in part, shall be declared lawful prize, whosoever shall be
the proprietor of this merchandise, _which shall be reputed contraband
for this cause alone_, that it comes from England or her possessions."
This decree was adopted without discussion, in the very terms of the
Directory's message, on the 18th of January, 1798. From that time
forward, to use the expression of a French deputy, speaking a year
later on the proposed repeal of the law, "if a handkerchief of English
origin is found on board a neutral ship, both the rest of the cargo
and the ship itself are subject to condemnation." It is, perhaps, well
to point out that this differed from the Rule of 1756, by forbidding
a trade which at all times had been open to neutrals, in peace as in
war. It differed from the old rule condemning enemy's property found in
neutral bottoms, by condemning also neutral property of hostile origin,
together with the whole cargo and the ship, as contaminated by the
presence of any British goods.

Nevertheless, British commerce continued to thrive, and was rather
benefited than injured by the new law. What the indomitable purpose,
unlimited power, and extraordinary mental and physical activity of
Napoleon could only partially accomplish, proved to be wholly beyond
the weak arm of the Directory. When war first shut the ports of France
to Great Britain, her trade thither passed through the Netherlands
and Holland. When the Netherlands were overrun, Amsterdam monopolized
the traffic. With the fall of Holland, it passed away to Bremen and
Hamburg. The latter port, being farther east and more remote from the
French armies, naturally drew the greater part and became the real heir
of Amsterdam.[329] It was the emporium of Northern Germany, through
which poured the colonial produce of the world and the manufactures
of the British Islands, and from which they were distributed over
the Continent. The enormous subsidies paid by the United Kingdom to
Germany found their way back, in part at least, by the increased
purchasing power of the belligerent countries,[330] which consumed
the manufactures of Great Britain and the coffee and sugar which had
passed through her ports and paid toll to her revenues.[331] The
shipping clearing for Hamburg from British ports, which was naught in
1793, rose to fifty-three thousand tons in 1795; and in 1798, the year
during which the new French law operated, increased to seventy-four
thousand. But, while Hamburg was the great centre, all the northern
German ports shared the same prosperity. After Prussia retired from the
war against France, in April, 1795, a neutral North German territory
was established, behind a line agreed upon between the two countries.
The total tonnage entering the ports of this region increased from one
hundred and twenty thousand in 1792 to two hundred and six thousand in
1795; and in 1798 reached three hundred and three thousand. The value
of merchandise imported rose from £2,200,000 in 1792, to £8,300,000 in
1795, £11,000,000 in 1798, and £13,500,000 in 1800.[332]

A similar elasticity was shown by British trade throughout the world.
Only in the Mediterranean was there a marked decrease both of exports
and imports,—a loss partly filled by the enterprise of American
merchants;[333] but only partly, for the Barbary pirates seconded
the sweeping French decrees in excluding neutrals from that sea. But
it was in the West Indies, together with the German ports, that the
commercial activity of Great Britain found its greatest resources;
and in the steady support contributed by that region to her financial
stability is to be found the justification of the much derided policy
of Pitt in capturing sugar islands. Alike as valuable pieces of
property, as possessions to be exchanged when framing a treaty, and
as bases for cruisers, which not merely seized upon British shipping
but disturbed the commercial development of the whole region, each
hostile island should at once have been seized by Great Britain. In
a contest between equal navies for the control of the sea, to waste
military effort upon the capture of small islands, as the French
did in 1778, is a preposterous misdirection of effort; but when one
navy is overwhelmingly preponderant, as the British was after 1794,
when the enemy confines himself to commerce-destroying by crowds of
small privateers, then the true military policy is to stamp out the
nests where they swarm. If, by so doing, control is also gained of
a rich commercial region, as the Caribbean Sea then was, the action
is doubly justified. The produce of the West Indies, as of the East,
figured doubly in the returns of British commerce,—as imports, and as
re-exported to the Continent.[334] Each captured island contributed
to swell the revenues by which the war was maintained.[335] The
disappearance of the merchant fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, the
ruin of San Domingo, and the general disorganization of such French
islands as were not taken, threw the greater part of the production
of tropical articles into British hands; and the practice of the day,
which confined its transport to British ships, helped to support the
shipping interest also in the strain brought upon it by the war. The
Americans alone could compete in the continental market as carriers
of such produce. Debarred from going with it direct to Europe by the
Rule of 1756, the rise in price, due to the diminished production
and decrease of transport just mentioned, allowed them to take the
sugar and coffee of the colonies at war with England to American
ports, reship it to the Continent, and yet make a good profit on the
transaction. As the British colonists were in full possession of the
home market, and their produce commanded high prices, the outcry which
caused so much trouble ten years later was not now raised. On the
contrary, their prosperous condition facilitated the British orders of
January, 1798, exempting from capture Danes, Swedes, and other neutral
ships, when carrying coffee and sugar of hostile origin to their own
country, or to England.

It was against this great system of trade that the law of Nivôse 29
was launched. British manufactured goods, rather than British gold
and silver, bought and paid for the produce of the East and West
Indies, for that of the United States and of the Levant. The Continent
consumed the manufactures of Great Britain, the sugar and coffee of her
colonies, and obtained through British merchants the spices and wares
of the East; for all which it for the most part paid back specie. The
United States took specie from France herself for the colonial produce
carried there in its vessels, and with it paid Great Britain for her
manufactures. France herself received British goods through continental
channels, and paid hard cash for them. The money thus coming to London
had flowed back as subsidies to the armies of the coalitions. Now,
thanks to Bonaparte, Great Britain stood alone. The French navy was
powerless to contend with her fleets; but, by actual possession or by
treaty, the Directory had excluded her ships from a great part of the
Continent. Nevertheless, British goods abounded in all parts through
the complicity of neutral carriers. If these could be stopped, the
market for British manufactures would be closed; therefore against them
were launched the cruisers of France, with the authority of the decree
to capture any one of them found with a bale or box of British origin
on board. The result was curious.

After the lapse of a year, on the 13th of January, 1799, the Directory
addressed a message to the lower house of the Legislature[336] on the
subject of maritime prizes, in which occurred the celebrated avowal,
already quoted, that not a single merchant ship under French colors
sailed the deep seas. But this was not all. The irregularities and
outrages of privateers had so terrified neutrals that there had been an
immense diminution in the entries of neutral tonnage, although Great
Britain had rather relaxed than increased the severe rules she had
adopted early in the war. In consequence of the smaller importations
from abroad, there were necessarily smaller sales of French goods, and
the decrease of neutral carriers impeded the export of agricultural
produce and manufactures, as well as the importation of raw materials
essential to the latter. The Directory attributed the evil to an
existing ordinance, which left the final determination of prize
cases in the hands of the courts, instead of attributing it to the
executive. It argued that if there were a right of final appeal to the
latter, it could check the arbitrary proceedings of the cruisers and
the erroneous decisions of the judges. If, as was represented by the
American consulate at Paris, the courts of first instance were chiefly
composed of merchants in the sea-ports, most of whom were, directly
or indirectly, interested in fitting out privateers,[337] there was
certainly need of some change in the existing legislation. In the
Conseil des Anciens, however, a different view prevailed. On the 17th
of January, 1799, a debate began in that body, on a resolution fixing
the date when the law of January 18, 1798, became operative.[338] The
consequent discussion took a wide range over the policy and results
of the enactment, as shown by the year it had been in force. The
disastrous commercial condition of France was freely admitted on all
sides; but in several powerful speeches it was attributed directly and
convincingly to the working of the law itself. "Neutrals repelled from
our ports; our agricultural products without any outlet abroad; our
industry and commerce annihilated; our colonies helpless; our shipping
ways deserted; a balance of twenty thousand sailors in English prisons;
our ships of war without seamen,—such are the political effects of the
law which is ruining, crushing us."[339]

In less impassioned words, other deputies showed the unfairness of
the law. If, on the land frontier, a wagon was stopped carrying a
bale of British goods, the bale was confiscated, but the rest of the
load escaped. If in a ship a like bale was found, not only it, but
all the rest of the cargo and the ship itself were condemned. Even
in the fiercest heat of the Revolution and the utmost danger to the
country, it had never been attempted, as now, to forbid neutrals
carrying British goods to their own country.[340] The step could not
be justified under the plea of reprisals; for "if the English have
seized French goods on these same neutrals, they have not confiscated
the rest of the cargo. These are, therefore, not reprisals, but new
proceedings on our part, which neutrals could neither expect nor guard
against."[341] A neutral ship came within reach of the French coast
only at her extreme peril. A small package of British goods would
justify her capture by a French privateer, whatever her destination;
nay, even if she were bringing to France articles urgently needed, and
intended to take away French produce in exchange for them. Neutrals,
allies, even French vessels themselves, carrying on the little trade
with neighboring states, were preyed on by French corsairs. This
condition reacted on the enterprise of the cruisers themselves. It was
much safer, and quite as profitable, to keep close to the home coast
and board passing vessels. The merest trifle, smuggled on board by one
of the crew, or shipped unknown to the master and owner, made them good
prize. Owing to this caution, the captures brought into French home
ports had dropped, from six hundred and sixty-two in the previous year,
to four hundred and fifty-two, notwithstanding the vast extension of
the field for seizures.[342]

The loss of prizes, however, was far from being the worst effect of
the law. Neutrals being repelled, friendly and French shipping scared
away, commerce had been seriously crippled for want of carriage. In
the year before the enactment the coasting trade employed 895,000
tons; of which 120,000 were neutrals, by whom goods were transported
from one sea frontier of France to another, as from the Bay of Biscay
to the French Mediterranean coast. In the year following, the total
fell to 746,000; but the neutrals dropped to 38,000. In the foreign
trade 860,000 tons were employed in the year before the law, of which
623,000 were neutral. In the year following, the total fell to 688,000,
of which 468,000 were neutrals. There thus resulted a total loss of
322,000 tons in a commerce of only 1,750,000. To this the speaker added
a striking comparison: "In the same year in which we lost 322,000
tons by the operation of the law, we took four hundred and fifty-two
prizes. Assuming—what is not the case—that these were all English, and
that they averaged two hundred tons burden—an excessive allowance—we
have taken from our enemy 90,400 tons against 322,000 we have lost."
"All the sufferings of ourselves and allies might be borne, if good
resulted to ourselves or harm to England; but it has not." "English
ships are insured at a premium of five per cent, while neutrals bound
to France have to pay twenty to thirty per cent. Neutrals themselves
seek English convoy.[343] French merchants would gladly charter neutral
ships to carry to San Domingo the produce that is overflowing our
storehouses, and to bring back the coffee and sugar for which we are
paying such extravagant rates; but they will not come near us. So,
instead of paying a moderate price with French goods, we are paying
exorbitant rates in specie, which goes straight to England, our most
cruel foe."[344] The policy of the law was condemned by the results.
In support of its justice, it was alleged that there were at sea only
French and British ships, whence it followed that all which were not
French could be seized,—a contention which derives its sole present
interest from being the same as that put forth by Napoleon ten years
later. It shows again—what can scarcely be too often asserted in the
interests of truth—that the emperor was but the full and perfect
incarnation of the spirit that animated the Convention and the
Directory.

The Government of the United States had not yet, in 1798, passed
into the hands of men with an undue "passion for peace." Upon the
unceremonious dismissal of Mr. Pinckney, not for personal objections
but as rejecting any minister from America, the President had called a
special meeting of Congress in May, 1797, and recommended an increase
of the naval establishment. When the news of the law of January 18,
1798, reached the United States, Congress was in session. On the 28th
of May an act was approved, authorizing the capture of any French armed
vessel which shall, upon the coast of the United States, have committed
any depredation upon her commerce.[345] On the 7th of July another act
abrogated all existing treaties between the two countries;[346] and on
the 9th was decreed the seizure of French armed vessels anywhere on the
high seas, not only by public armed ships, but by privateers, which
the President was authorized to commission.[347] Thereupon followed a
period of maritime hostilities, though without a formal declaration of
war, which lasted three years; the first prize being taken from the
French in June, 1798, and peace being restored by a treaty, signed in
Paris September 30, 1800, and ratified the following February. The
small force of the United States was principally occupied in the West
Indies, protecting their trade,—both by the patrol system directed
against the enemy's cruisers, and by convoying bodies of merchantmen
to and from the islands. As the condition of the French navy did not
allow keeping large fleets afloat, the ships of the United States,
though generally small, were able to hold their ground, capture many
of the enemy, and preserve their own commerce from molestation. The
mercantile shipping of France, however, had already been so entirely
destroyed by Great Britain, that she suffered far more from the
cessation of the carrying trade, which Americans had maintained for
her, than from the attacks of the American navy.

The year 1798, which opened with the unlucky law of January 18, was in
all respects unfortunate for France. In May Bonaparte sailed for Egypt,
the country thus parting with its ablest general, with thirty-two
thousand of its best troops, and its only available fleet, of thirteen
sail-of-the-line, which the government with the utmost difficulty had
been able to equip. On the first of August Nelson destroyed the fleet
in the Battle of the Nile; and the British navy, forced to leave the
Mediterranean in 1796, again asserted its preponderance throughout the
whole of that sea, opposing an effectual barrier to the return of the
army in Egypt. The entire face of affairs changed, not only in the
East but in Europe. The Porte, at first hesitating, declared openly
against France. A second coalition was formed between Great Britain,
Austria, and Russia, to which Naples acceded; and the armies of the
latter entered upon their campaign in November. They were, indeed,
quickly overthrown; but the very march of the French troops against
them left the armies in northern Italy hopelessly inferior to their
opponents. The year 1799 was full of reverses. In Germany and in Italy
the French were steadily driven back; in Switzerland only did they,
under Masséna, hold their ground. The British indeed were repelled in
their attack upon Holland, but they carried away with them the Dutch
navy. A Russo-Turkish fleet, entering the Mediterranean, retook the
Ionian Islands from the French; and Admiral Bruix escaped from Brest
only to find it impossible to achieve any substantial results in the
face of the British superiority on the sea. In the midst of this
confusion and disaster, and amid the commercial and internal distress
caused by the maritime legislation, Bonaparte returned. Landing on the
9th of October, he on the 9th of November overthrew the Directory.
Preparations for war were at once begun, and the successes of the
first consul in Italy and of Moreau in Germany, in 1800, combined with
the defection of the czar from the coalition, restored peace to the
Continent and internal quiet to France.

Upon this followed the renewal of the Armed Neutrality of the Baltic
powers. Great Britain found herself again without an ally, face to face
with France, now supported by the naval combination of the northern
states. Still she stood resolute, abating not a jot of her asserted
maritime rights. As before, the allies demanded that the neutral flag
should cover the enemy's property that floated under it, and that the
term "contraband of war" should apply only to articles strictly and
solely applicable to warlike purposes, which, they claimed, naval
stores and provisions were not. They proposed also to deprive Great
Britain of the belligerent right of search, by sending ships of war
with the merchant ships, and requiring that the assertion of the naval
captain should be received as establishing the lawful character of
the two or three hundred cargoes under his convoy. "The question,"
said Pitt, "is whether we are to permit the navy of our enemy to be
recruited and supplied,—whether we are to suffer blockaded ports to be
furnished with warlike stores and provisions,—whether we are to suffer
neutral nations, by hoisting a flag upon a sloop or a fishing boat,
to convey the treasures of South America to the harbors of Spain, or
the naval stores of the Baltic to Brest and Toulon. I would ask, too,
has there ever been a period, since we have been a naval country, in
which we have acted upon this principle?"[348] and he alleged not only
the unbroken practice of Great Britain, but her old treaties with the
allied states, and especially the convention with Russia in 1793. So
far as precedent and tradition went, England's case was unimpeachable.
She was called upon to surrender, not a new pretension, but an old
right important to her military position. "I have no hesitation," said
Fox, Pitt's great opponent, "in saying that, as a general proposition,
'free bottoms do not make free goods;' and that, as an axiom, it is
supported neither by the law of nations nor by common-sense."[349]

At this time the British navy was superior to the combined forces of
all Europe. A fleet, of which Nelson was the animating spirit though
not the nominal head, entered the Baltic. Denmark was struck down on
the 2d of April, 1801; and this blow, coinciding with the murder of
the Czar Paul, dissolved a coalition more menacing in appearance than
in reality. The young man who succeeded to the Russian throne met with
dignity the imposing attitude of Nelson, now left in chief command;
but he had not inherited his father's fantastic ambitions, and the
material interests of Russia in that day pointed to peace with Great
Britain. The treaty, signed June 5, 1801,[350] permitted the neutral to
trade from port to port on the coast of a nation at war; but renounced,
on the part of Russia, the claim that the neutral flag covered the
enemy's goods. On the other hand Great Britain admitted that property
of a belligerent, sold _bonâ fide_ to a neutral, became neutral in
character and as such not liable to seizure; but from the operation
of this admission obtained the special exception of produce from the
hostile colonies.[351] This, Russia conceded, could not be carried
directly from the colony to the mother country, even though it had
become neutral property by a real sale; and similarly the direct trade
from the mother country to the colony was renounced. Great Britain thus
obtained an explicit acknowledgment of the Rule of 1756 from the most
formidable of the maritime powers, and strengthened her hands for the
approaching dispute with the United States. In return, she abandoned
the claim, far more injurious to Russia, to seize naval stores as
contraband of war. Four months later, hostilities between Great Britain
and France also ceased.

The maritime commercial interests, both of belligerents and neutrals,
received convincing and conspicuous illustration from this, the first
of the two sea wars growing out of the French Revolution. It was the
interest of the neutrals to step in and take up the trade necessarily
abandoned, to a greater or less degree, by the belligerents; and
it was also useful to both parties to the war that they should do
so. But it was very much less to the advantage of the more purely
maritime state than it was to its antagonist; for not only did she
need help less, but such temporary changes in the course of trade
tend to become permanent. The immediate gain may become a final and
irretrievable loss. Hence Great Britain is seen to yield readily the
restrictions of the Navigation Act, wherever it is clearly advisable
to avail herself of neutral seamen or neutral carriers; but the
concession goes no further than immediately necessary, and is always
expressly guarded as temporary. The relaxation is a purely warlike
measure, and she is perfectly consistent in refusing to allow it to
her enemies. Every slackening of the Navigation Act was a violation
in principle of the Rule of 1756,[352] which she was quite content to
have her enemy imitate; as the big boy at school offers the small one
the opportunity of returning an injury in kind. France might employ
neutrals contrary to what Great Britain claimed as the law of nations,
as the latter herself did; but there was the difference that Great
Britain could put a stop to the operations favorable to her opponent,
while France could only partially impede those that advantaged hers.
It was, therefore, clearly the policy of the British to yield nothing
to neutrals except when they could not avoid it, and then explicitly
to assert the principle, while conceding a relaxation; they thus kept
control over the neutral trade, and impeded operations that both helped
their enemy and might also supplant their own commerce. In the latter
part of the war, as the purpose of France to cripple their trade took
shape, and the exclusion of British goods from the Continent became an
evident and avowed intention, the ministry strengthened itself with
the reflection that the measure was impracticable so long as neutral
bottoms abounded; but a few months later the denial of intercourse
between hostile nations and their colonies by neutral intermediaries
was inserted in the Russian treaty. The intention to use neutrals
to the utmost extent desirable for British interests thus coincided
with the determination to stop a traffic esteemed contrary to them.
The permission to neutrals, by the orders of January, 1798, to carry
the produce of French and Dutch colonies to Great Britain, when they
were threatened with seizure if they sailed with the same for France
or Holland, illustrates both motives of action; while it betrays the
gradual shaping of the policy—which grew up over against Bonaparte's
Continental System—of forcing neutrals to make England the storehouse
and toll-gate of the world's commerce. Superficially, Great Britain
seems rather to relax toward neutrals between 1793 and 1801; but the
appearance is only superficial. The tendencies that issued in the ever
famous Orders in Council of 1807 were alive and working in 1798.

The question for British statesmen to determine, therefore, was how
far to acquiesce in the expansion of neutral trade, and where to draw
their line,—always a difficult task, dependent upon many considerations
and liable to result in inconsistencies, real or apparent. For France
the problem was less intricate. Her commerce even before the war
was chiefly in foreign hands;[353] she had therefore little cause
to fear ultimate injury by concessions. Immediate loss by neutral
competition was impossible, for the British navy left her no ships to
lose. Hence it was her interest to avail herself of neutral carriers
to the fullest extent, to recognize that the freer their operations
the better for her, and that, even could restrictions upon their
carrying for her enemy be enforced, the result would be to compel the
British people to develop further their own merchant shipping. Every
blow at a neutral was really, even though not seemingly, a blow for
Great Britain. In a general way this was seen clearly enough, and a
policy favoring neutrals was traditional in France, but the blind
passions of the Revolution overthrew it. To use the vigorous words of
a deputy: "The French people is the victim of an ill-devised scheme,
of a too blind trust in commerce-destroying, _an auxiliary measure_,
which, to be really useful, should strike only the enemy, and not
reach the navigation of neutrals and allies, and still less paralyze
the circulation and export of our agriculture and of the national
industries."[354] Such were the results of the direct action of
successive French governments, and of the indirect embarrassment caused
by the delays and inconsistencies of the executive and the tribunals.
It was thought that neutrals could be coerced by French severities
into resisting British restrictions, whether countenanced or not by
international law. But Great Britain, though a hard taskmaster, did not
so lay her burdens as to lose services which were essential to her, nor
compel a resistance that under the military conditions was hopeless;
and the series of wild measures, which culminated in the law of January
18, 1798, only frightened neutrals from French coasts, while leaving
Great Britain in full control of the sea. The year 1797 saw the lowest
depression of British trade; coincidently with the law of January 18
began a development, which, at first gradual, soon became rapid, and in
which the neutrals driven from France bore an increasing proportion.

The short peace of Amiens lasted long enough to indicate how thoroughly
Great Britain, while using neutrals, had preserved her own maritime
advantages intact. The preliminaries were signed October 1, 1801, and
war was again declared May 16, 1803; but, notwithstanding the delays
in paying off the ships of war, and the maintenance of an unusually
large number of seamen in the peace establishment, the neutral shipping
employed fell from twenty-eight per cent, in 1801, to eighteen and a
half per cent in 1802.

On the outbreak of the second war Napoleon reverted at once to the
commercial policy of the Convention and the Directory. On the 20th
of June, 1803, a decree was issued by him directing the confiscation
of any produce of the British colonies, and of any manufactures of
Great Britain, introduced into France. Neutral vessels arriving were
required to present a certificate from the French consul at the port
of embarkation, certifying that the cargo was in no part of British
origin. The same measure was forcibly carried out in Holland, though
nominally an independent state;[355] and the occupation of Hanover,
while dictated also by the general principle of injuring Great Britain
as much as possible, had mainly in view the closure of the Elbe and
the Weser to British commerce. Beyond this, however, Bonaparte being
then engrossed with the purpose of a direct attack by armed force upon
the British islands, the indirect hostilities upon their commercial
prosperity were, for the moment, neglected.

At the same period Great Britain began to feel that neutral rivalry was
being carried too far for her own welfare, and determined to tighten
the reins previously slackened. She obtained from Sweden in July, 1803,
a special concession, allowing her to arrest Swedish vessels laden with
naval stores for France, and to purchase the cargoes at a fair price,—a
stipulation identical with that about provisions in Jay's treaty; and
when the French occupation of Hanover excluded her ships from the Elbe
and Weser, she by a blockade of the rivers shut out neutrals also.
But it was in the West Indies, so long a fruitful source of wealth,
that the pressure of neutral competition was most heavily felt. The
utter ruin of San Domingo, and the embarrassments of the other islands
hostile to Great Britain, had in the former war combined with the
dangers of the seas to raise the price of colonial produce on the
Continent,[356] and, consequently, to give a great development to the
British growth of sugar and coffee, the transport of which was confined
by law to British vessels. The planters, the shipping business, and
the British merchants dealing with the West Indies, together with the
various commercial interests and industries connected with them, all
participated in the benefits of this traffic, which supplied over one
fourth of the imports of the kingdom, and took off besides a large
amount of manufactures. As production increased, however, and prices
lowered, the West India business began to feel keenly the competition
by the produce of the hostile islands, exported by American merchants.

Of the extent of this commerce, and of its dependence upon the
interruption, by Great Britain, of the ordinary channels for French
and Dutch trade, a few figures will give an idea. In 1792, before the
war, the United States exported to Europe 1,122,000 pounds of sugar,
and 2,136,742 of coffee; in 1796, 35,000,000 of sugar and 62,000,000
of coffee; in 1800, 82,000,000 of sugar and 47,000,000 coffee. In
1803, during the short peace, the exports fell to 20,000,000 of sugar
and 10,000,000 coffee; in 1804, a year of war, they again rose to
74,000,000 sugar, and 48,000,000 coffee. The precise destination cannot
be given; but the trade between France and her West India Islands,
carried on by American ships, amounted in 1805 to over $20,000,000, of
which only $6,000,000 were United States produce. In like manner the
trade with Holland was over $17,000,000, of which $2,000,000 were of
American origin.

Upon the return of Mr. Pitt to power, in 1804, the attempt was made
to strengthen the fabric of British commercial prosperity in the
Caribbean, by an extension of the system of free ports in the different
colonies; by means of which, and of their large merchant shipping, the
British collected in their own hands, by both authorized and contraband
traffic, so much of the carrying trade of this region, extending their
operations to the mainland as well as throughout the islands. More,
however, was needed to restrain the operations of the Americans, who,
by reducing the price of coffee on the Continent, diminished the
re-exportation from Great Britain, thus affecting the revenue of the
kingdom and the profits of the planters; and who also, by acting as
carriers, interfered with the accumulations at the free ports and the
consequent employment of British ships. All the classes interested
joined in urging the government to find some relief; and the clamor was
increased by a sense of indignation at the tricks by which belligerent
rights were believed to be evaded by the Americans. The Rule of 1756
did not allow the latter to carry their cargoes direct to Europe; but,
as the trade winds compelled vessels to run to the northward until
they reached the westerly winds prevailing in the higher latitudes,
no great delay was involved in making an American port, or even in
trans-shipping the cargo to a vessel bound for Europe.[357] Great
Britain admitted that articles of hostile origin, but become neutral
property, could be carried freely to the neutral country; and, when so
imported, became part of the neutral stock and could then be freely
re-exported to a hostile state.

The question of a _bonâ fide_ importation, like all others involving
a question of intention, could be determined only by the character of
the transactions attending it; but it was held generally that actual
landing and storage, with payment of the duties, was sufficient proof,
unless rebutted by other circumstances. Early in the war following the
peace of Amiens, the British courts awoke to the fact that the duties
paid on goods so imported were simply secured by a bond, and that on
re-exportation a drawback was given, so that a very small percentage
of the nominal duties was actually paid.[358] Upon this ground a ship
was condemned in May, 1805, and great numbers of American vessels
carrying colonial produce to Europe were seized and brought into port,
as well as others proceeding from the United States to the West Indies,
with cargoes originating in the mother countries; and when, in the
opinion of the court, the duties had been only nominally paid, they
were condemned. It is hard to see the soundness of an objection to
these decisions, based on the validity of the payments; but the action
of the British government is open to severe censure in that no warning
was given of its purpose no longer to accept, as proof of importation,
the payment of duties by bond, on which drawback was given. Whether
it had known the law of the United States or not, that law had been
open to it, and ignorance of its provisions was due not to any want of
publicity, but to the carelessness of British authorities. Under the
circumstances, the first seizures were little short of robbery.

The reclamations of the United States met with little attention
during Pitt's brief second administration; but after his death, in
January, 1806, and the accession to office of Grenville and Fox,
a more conciliatory attitude was shown,—especially by the latter,
who became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Favorably inclined to the
Americans since his opposition to the policy of the Revolutionary
War, he seemed desirous of conceding their wishes; but the pressure
from without, joined to opposition within the ministry, prevented a
frank reversal of the course pursued. Instead of the Rule of 1756, Fox
obtained an Order in Council, dated May 16, 1806, placing the coast
of the Continent, from Brest to the Elbe, in a state of blockade.
The blockade, however, was only to be enforced strictly between the
mouth of the Seine and Ostend. Into ports between those two points no
neutral would be admitted on any pretext, and, if attempting to enter,
would be condemned; but on either side, neutral ships could go in and
out freely, provided they "had not been laden at any port belonging
to his Majesty's enemies, or, if departing, were not destined to any
port belonging to his Majesty's enemies." The wording of the order was
evidently framed to avoid all question as to the origin of cargoes,
upon which the Rule of 1756 hinged. Not the origin of the cargo, but
the port of lading, determined the admission of the neutral ship to the
harbors partially blockaded; and if to them, then, _a fortiori_, to all
open ports of the enemy. On the other hand, the strict blockade already
established of the Elbe and Weser was by this order partially relieved,
in the expectation that neutrals would carry British manufactures to
those northern markets. In short, the Order was a compromise, granting
something both to the mercantile interest and to the Americans, though
not conceding the full demands of either. It is at best doubtful
whether the British were able to establish an effective blockade over
the extent of coast from Brest to the Elbe, but the United States
and Napoleon had no doubts whatever about it; and it thus fell, by a
singular irony of fate, to the most liberal of the British statesmen,
the friend of the Americans and of Napoleon, as almost the last act of
his life, to fire the train which led to the Berlin and Milan decrees,
to the Orders in Council of 1807, and to the war with the United States
six years later.

Fox died on the 13th of September, 1806, and was succeeded as Minister
of Foreign Affairs by Lord Howick. On the 25th of the same month the
partial restrictions still imposed on the Elbe and the Weser were
removed; so that neutral ships, even though from the ports of an enemy
of Great Britain, were able to enter. In the mean time, war had broken
out between France and Prussia; the battle of Jena was fought October
14, and on the 26th Napoleon entered Berlin. The battle of Trafalgar,
a twelvemonth before, had shattered all his confidence in the French
navy and destroyed his hopes of directly invading Great Britain. On
the other hand the short campaign of 1805 had overthrown the Austrian
power, and that of 1806 had just laid Prussia at his feet. The dream of
reducing Great Britain by the destruction of her commercial prosperity,
long floating in his mind, now became tangible, and was formulated
into the phrase that he "would conquer the sea by the land." Two of
the great military monarchies were already prostrate. Spain, Holland,
Italy, and the smaller German states were vassals, more or less
unwilling, but completely under his control; there seemed no reason to
doubt that he could impose his will on the Continent and force it to
close every port to British trade. On the 21st of November, 1806, the
emperor issued the famous Berlin Decree; and then, having taken the
first in the series of fated steps which led to his ruin, he turned
to the eastward and plunged with his army into the rigors of a Polish
winter to fulfil his destiny.




CHAPTER XVIII.

THE WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE, 1806-1812.

THE BERLIN AND MILAN DECREES OF NAPOLEON, 1806 AND 1807.—THE BRITISH
ORDERS IN COUNCIL, 1807-1809.—ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY OF THESE MEASURES
OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS.—OUTLINE OF CONTEMPORARY LEADING EVENTS.


Napoleon's Berlin decree alleged many reasons and contained many
provisions; but the essential underlying idea was to crush the commerce
of Great Britain by closing the Continent to her products of every
kind.[359] The pretext was found in the Order in Council of May 16,
1806, issued by the ministry of Grenville and Fox, putting the coast
of the Continent from Brest to the Elbe under blockade. Napoleon
asserted that the right to blockade applied only to fortified, not
to commercial, ports, which was not true; and further, that the
united forces of Great Britain were unable to maintain so extensive
an operation, which, if not certainly true, was at least plausible.
Retaliating an abuse, if it were one, with a yet greater excess, the
Berlin decree began by declaring the British islands blockaded, at
a time when the emperor could not keep a ship at sea, except as a
fugitive from the omnipresent fleets of his enemy. From this condition
of phantom blockade it resulted that all commerce with the British
Islands was forbidden; and consequently all merchandise exported from
them, having been unlawfully carried, became good prize. Vessels from
Great Britain could not be admitted into French ports. Further, as
the British refused to surrender the old rule, by which the goods of
individual enemies at sea were liable to capture, Napoleon decreed that
not only the property of individual Englishmen on the Continent was to
be seized, but also that of individual neutrals, if of British origin.
The preamble ended with a clause defining the duration of the edict, by
which the emperor burned his ships, laying down conditions which Great
Britain would never accept until at her last gasp. "The present decree
shall be considered as a fundamental principle of the Empire, until
England has acknowledged that the law of war is one and the same on the
land as on the sea; that it cannot be extended to private property of
whatever kind, nor to the person of individuals not in the profession
of arms, and that the right of blockade must be restricted to fortified
places, actually invested by sufficient forces."

Having launched his missile, Napoleon became at once engaged in the
campaign against Russia. The bloody and doubtful battle of Eylau was
fought on the 8th of February, 1807, and for the next few months
the emperor was too busily engaged, holding on by his teeth on the
banks of the Vistula, to superintend the working of his decree.[360]
Immediately upon its promulgation in Paris, the American minister
demanded an explanation on several points from the Minister of Marine,
who replied that he did not understand it to make any alterations in
the laws respecting maritime captures, and that an American vessel
could not be taken at sea merely on the ground that she was bound to,
or coming from, a British port; this he inferred from the fact that
such vessels were, by the seventh article, denied admission to French
ports.[361] The inference, natural though it was, only showed how
elastic and slippery the terms of Napoleon's orders could be. The whole
edict, in fact, remained a dead letter until the struggle with Russia
was decided. At first, British merchants desisted from sending to the
Continent; but, as advices showed that the decree was inoperative,
shipments by neutral vessels became as brisk as at any time before,
and so continued until August or September, 1807.[362] The battle of
Friedland, resulting in the total defeat of the Russian army, was
fought on the 14th of June; on the 22d an armistice was signed; and on
the 25th Alexander and Napoleon had their first interview upon the raft
in the Niemen. On the 8th of July was concluded the remarkable and, to
Europe, threatening Treaty of Tilsit. The czar recognized all the new
states created by the emperor, and ceded to him the maritime positions
of the Ionian Islands, and the mouths of the Cattaro in the Adriatic;
in return for which Napoleon acquiesced in Russia's taking Finland from
Sweden, and also, under certain conditions, the European provinces of
the Turkish Empire as far as the Balkans. A further clause, buried in
the most profound secrecy, bound Russia and France to make common cause
in all circumstances; to unite their forces by land and sea in any war
they should have to maintain; to take arms against Great Britain, if
she would not subscribe to this treaty; and to summon, jointly, Sweden,
Denmark, Portugal, and Austria to concur in the projects of Russia and
France,—that is to say, to shut their ports to England and to declare
war against her.[363]

At the time the Berlin decree was issued, negotiations were proceeding
in London, between the United States envoys and the British ministry,
concerning the several matters in dispute between the two countries;
and on the 31st of December, 1806, a commercial treaty was signed by
the respective commissioners. The vexed question of the trade between
the hostile countries and their colonies was arranged, by a stipulation
that goods imported from the colonies to the United States might be
re-exported, provided, after deducting the drawback, they had paid
full two per cent duties, _ad valorem_, to the Treasury; and that
articles coming from the mother countries might likewise be re-shipped
to the colonies, provided they remained subject to one per cent duty,
after recovering the drawback. These, as well as other features of
the treaty, were not acceptable to the United States, and it was not
ratified by that government.

Meantime the British ministry had been considering the terms of the
Berlin decree, and, instead of waiting to see how far it would become
operative, determined to retort by a measure of retaliation. On the
7th of January, 1807, an Order in Council was issued by the Whig
ministers, which often returned to plague them in the succeeding years,
when they, in opposition, were severely criticising the better known
measures of the following November. The January Order, after quoting
Napoleon's decree, avowed his Majesty's unwillingness to carry to
extremes his undoubted right of retaliation; and therefore, for the
present, went no further than to forbid all trade by neutral vessels
"from one port to another, both of which ports shall belong to, or be
in possession of, France or her allies, or shall be so far under their
control as that British vessels may not freely trade thereat."[364]
The direct object of this step was to stop the coastwise trade in
Europe; its principle was the right of retaliation; in its effect,
it was an extension of the prohibition laid by the Rule of 1756. The
latter forbade the direct trade between hostile colonies and the mother
countries; the order of January, 1807, extended the restriction to
trade between any two hostile ports. It bore particularly hard upon
American ships, which were in the habit of going from place to place
in Europe, either seeking the best markets or gathering a cargo. Under
it, "American trade in the Mediterranean was swept away by seizures
and condemnations, and that in other seas threatened with the same
fate."[365]

Matters were in this state when Napoleon returned to Paris at the
end of July, full of his projects against Great Britain, and against
neutrals as the abettors of her prosperity. His aims were not limited
to crushing her by commercial oppression; in the not distant future
he intended to seize the navies of Europe and combine them in a
direct assault upon her maritime power. On the 19th of July, while
he was still at Dresden, Portugal was notified that she must choose
between war with France or with Great Britain; and on the 31st, from
Paris, a similar intimation was given to Denmark.[366] To constrain
the latter, a corps under Bernadotte was collecting on her frontiers;
while another, under Junot, was assembling in the south of France to
invade Portugal. But in both countries Napoleon was anticipated by
Great Britain. The ministry had received certain information[367] of
the secret articles agreed to at Tilsit, and foresaw the danger of
allowing the two navies of Denmark and Portugal to fall into the hands
of the emperor. Early in August twenty-five sail-of-the-line entered
the Baltic, convoying transports with twenty-seven thousand troops; the
island on which Copenhagen stands was invested by the ships, and the
town itself by the army. The Danish government was then summoned to
surrender its fleet into the safe keeping of Great Britain, a pledge
being offered that it, and all other maritime equipment delivered,
should be held only as a deposit and restored at a general peace. The
offer being refused, the city was bombarded from the 2d to the 5th of
September, at the expiration of which time the terms demanded were
yielded, the British took possession of eighteen sail-of-the-line
besides a number of frigates, stripped the dockyards of their stores,
and returned to England. The transaction has been visited with the most
severe, yet uncalled-for, condemnation. The British ministry knew the
intention of Napoleon to invade Denmark, to force her into war, and
that the fleet would soon pass into his hands, if not snatched away.
They avoided the mistake made by Pitt, in seizing the Spanish frigates
in 1804; for the force sent to Copenhagen was sufficient to make
opposition hopeless and to justify submission. To have receded before
the obstinacy of the Danish government would have been utter weakness.

In Portugal Great Britain had to deal with a friendly nation, instead
of the hostile prepossessions of Denmark. The French corps of invasion,
under Junot, entered Spain on its way to Portugal on the 17th of
October. Under the urgent and unsparing orders of Napoleon it made a
march of extreme suffering with great rapidity, losing most of its
numbers by the way from privation, exposure, or straggling; but when
the handful that kept together entered Lisbon on the 30th of November,
it found the Portuguese fleet gone, and that the court and its treasure
had departed with it. The British government had for some time past
expected such an attempt by Napoleon, and at the critical moment a
squadron on the spot determined the vacillating regent to withdraw to
Brazil.

Though foiled in his endeavors to seize the fleets, Napoleon had
succeeded in formally closing the ports of the two countries to the
introduction of British goods; while the bombardment at Copenhagen had
served as a colorable pretext for the declaration of hostility against
Great Britain made by Russia on the 20th of October. The mediation
proposed by the czar had already been refused by the British ministry,
unless the articles of the Treaty of Tilsit were first communicated
to it;[368] but those articles were not of a character to bear such
an exposure. Prussia, under the compulsion of the two empires, closed
her ports against Great Britain by a proclamation dated September
2d; no navigation nor trade with England or her colonies was to be
permitted, either in British or in neutral vessels.[369] Austria also
acceded to the Continental System, and excluded British goods from
her borders.[370] In Italy, the new kingdom of Etruria showed little
zeal in enforcing Napoleon's commands to co-operate in his measures;
the British carried on commerce at Leghorn, as freely as at any port
in their own country. By the emperor's orders the viceroy of Italy
therefore took possession of the city; and at the same time French
detachments entered also the Papal States, occupied their coasts, and
drove the British from them. Joseph Bonaparte being already king of
Naples, the control of Napoleon and the exclusion of his enemies were
thus extended over both coasts of Italy. Turkey being at this time
involved in hostilities with Great Britain, the emperor was able to
assert that "England sees her merchandise repelled by all Europe; and
her ships, loaded with useless wealth, seek in vain, from the Sound to
the Hellespont, a port open to receive them."[371] Decrees applying
extreme rigor to the examination of vessels entering the Elbe and the
Weser were issued on the 6th of August and 13th of November.[372]
Napoleon had a special grudge against the two Hanseatic cities,
Bremen and Hamburg, which had long mocked his efforts to prevent the
introduction of British merchandise to the Continent; for which the
commercial aptitudes of their merchants, their extensive intelligence
abroad, and their noble rivers, afforded peculiar facilities. Despite
all these efforts and the external appearances of universal submission,
there still occurred wide-spread evasions of the emperor's orders, to
which allusion must be made later. It is necessary, before doing so,
to give the contemporary measures of other nations, in order that the
whole situation, at once of public regulation and private disobedience,
together with the final results, may come distinctly before the reader.

Great as was the power of Napoleon, it ceased, like that of certain
wizards, when it reached the water. Enemies and neutrals alike bowed to
his invincible armies and his superb genius when he could reach them
by land; but beyond the water there was one enemy, Great Britain, and
one neutral, America, whom he could not directly touch. The spirit of
his course toward England and his initiatory steps have been given; it
remained now to define his action toward the United States. Weak as
the latter was, feeble to humiliation as had been the course of its
government hitherto, and although the prepossessions of the party in
power were undoubtedly strongly against Great Britain, the question
was one of immense importance; but the emperor, who respected nothing
but force, failed so to realize it. He stood just where the Directory
stood at the end of 1797, every enemy but Great Britain overthrown, but
seeing her defiant still and prosperous. Napoleon, however, had, what
the Directory had not, experimental evidence of the results of such
restrictions upon neutrals as were imposed by the law of January 18,
1798. It was possible to ascribe the disastrous effects to France of
that measure, and its total failure to achieve the object intended,
to one of two totally distinct causes. Either the law had been
inadequately enforced, owing to the feeble executive efforts of the
Directors and the comparatively limited extent of their influence, or
else it was in its nature and essence so contrary to the true interest
and policy of France that the very limitations imposed by defective
power had saved her, and the ability to carry it further would have
ended in utter ruin. Pursued somewhat further, the question became:
Will it be possible, not for France only but for all Europe,—for the
concurrence of all Europe is necessary to the effectual working of the
scheme,—to dispense with the neutral carrier (whom it is the tendency
of the Berlin decree to repel) for a length of time sufficient to ruin
Great Britain? Can Europe forego external commerce for a longer time
than Great Britain can spare the European market? Can the intercourse
between the continental nations be so facilitated, the accustomed
routes of import and export so modified, such changes introduced into
the habits of manufacture and consumption, as will render bearable the
demands made upon the patience of nations? If, as the Order in Council
of January seems to indicate, Great Britain resent the attempt to keep
neutrals from her ports, by retaliatory measures impeding their traffic
with the Continent, upon whom will these combined French and English
restrictions fall most heavily?—upon the state having a large body of
merchant ships, to which neutrals are the natural rivals; or upon the
nations whose shipping is small, and to whom therefore neutrals are
useful, if not necessary, auxiliaries?

In a commercial war, as in any other, the question must be faced
whether with ten thousand it is possible to meet him who is coming
with twenty thousand. As a matter of fact, while Napoleon was
contemplating a measure which would most injuriously affect neutrals,
already largely employed in transporting British goods, the jealousy
of British merchants and statesmen was keenly excited by the growth
of this neutral carrying trade,[373] and they were casting about for
a pretext and a means to cripple it. The Berlin decree revived the
clamor of these men, who, being then in opposition, had condemned the
Order of January, 1807, for not carrying retaliation far enough, and
for directing it upon the coasting trade, which could only partially
be reached, instead of upon the neutral carriage of colonial goods,
which lay open everywhere to the British navy. A change of ministry in
the latter part of March, 1807, brought this party again into power,
after an absence from it of fourteen months since the death of Pitt. In
the mean time, however, the decree had remained inoperative, through
the absence of Napoleon in Poland, the decisions of the Minister of
Marine as to its scope, and the connivance of the local authorities
everywhere in its neglect. No further steps therefore had been taken
by the new British ministry up to the time of the emperor's return to
Paris. The latter at first only issued some additional regulations of a
municipal character, to ensure a stricter observance, but he was soon
called upon to give a momentous decision. The opinion of the Minister
of Marine, as to the meaning of certain clauses of the decree,[374] was
submitted to him by the Minister of Justice; and he stated that the
true original intention was that French armed vessels should seize and
bring into port neutrals having on board any goods of British origin,
even though at the time neutral property. As to whether they should
also arrest neutrals for the simple reason that they were going to, or
coming from, the British Islands, his Majesty reserved his decision.
This dictum of the emperor, which threw to the winds the ruling of
the Minister of Marine, was given to the prize courts on the 18th of
September, 1807, and shortly afterward the latter acted upon it in the
case of an American ship wrecked upon the French coast; that part of
her cargo which was of British origin was ordered to be sold for the
benefit of the state.[375] The effect of Napoleon's pronouncements was
at once seen in Great Britain. The insurance of neutral ships bound to
continental ports, especially to those of Holland and Hamburg, rose
from four guineas in August to eight and twelve in October, and some
insurers refused to take risks even at twenty-five and thirty. In the
two months of September and October sixty-five permits were issued by
the Custom House to re-land and store cargoes that had actually been
shipped for the Continent.[376] The Tory ministry now had the pretext
it wanted for a far-reaching and exhaustive measure of retaliation.

Napoleon's decisions of September 18 were communicated to the Congress
of the United States on December 18 by the President; who at the
same time transmitted a proclamation from the king of Great Britain,
dated October 16, directing the impressment of British seamen found
serving on board any foreign merchant ship.[377] In view of the
dangers to which American vessels were exposed by the action of the
two belligerents, an embargo was recommended, to insure their safety
by keeping them in their own ports; the real purpose, however, being
to retaliate upon Great Britain, in pursuance of the policy of a
Non-Importation Act directed against that country, which had gone into
effect the previous July. An Act of Embargo was accordingly at once
passed, and was approved on the 22d of December.[378] All registered
vessels belonging to the United States were forbidden to depart from
the ports in which they were then lying, except upon giving bond that
their cargoes would be landed in another port of the country. This
continued in force throughout the year 1808 and until March 1, 1809,
when it was repealed; and for it was substituted a Non-Intercourse
Act,[379] which allowed the merchant ships of the United States to
go abroad in search of employment and to traffic between their own
and other countries, except Great Britain and France and the colonies
occupied by them, which were wholly forbidden to American vessels. They
not only could not clear from home for those countries, but they were
required to give bond that they would not, during the voyage, enter any
of their ports, nor be directly or indirectly engaged in any trade with
them. French or British ships entering a port of the United States were
to be seized and condemned. This act was to continue in force until the
end of the next session of Congress; and it accordingly remained the
law governing the intercourse of the United States with Great Britain
and France until May, 1810.

On the 11th of November, 1807, were published the great retaliatory
measures of Great Britain, which for the moment filled the cup of
neutrals. Setting forth the Berlin Decree as the justifying ground
for their action, the Orders in Council of that date[380] proclaimed
a paper blockade, of the barest form and most extensive scope, of all
enemies' ports. "All ports and places of France and her allies, or
of any other country at war with his Majesty, and all other ports or
places in Europe from which, although not at war with his Majesty,
the British flag is excluded, and all ports in the colonies of his
Majesty's enemies, _shall from henceforth be subject to the same
restrictions_, in point of trade and navigation, _as if the same were
actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner_." All trade
in hostile colonial produce was likewise declared unlawful for neutrals.

An actual blockade, such as is here mentioned, requires the presence
off the blockaded port of a force sufficient to make entrance or
departure manifestly dangerous; in which case a vessel attempting to
pass in either direction is, by that common consent of nations called
International Law, justly liable to capture. To place such a force
before each of the many and widely scattered harbors embraced by these
Orders, was evidently beyond the power of even the vast numbers of
the British navy. The object which could not be attained by the use
of means acknowledged to be lawful, the British ministry determined
to compass by sheer force, by that maritime supremacy which they
unquestionably wielded, and which they could make effectual to the
ends they had in view, namely: to maintain the commerce and shipping
of Great Britain, upon which her naval strength depended, to force the
enemy's trade to pass through her ports, and thus to raise her revenues
to the point necessary to her salvation in the life and death struggle
in which she was embarked.[381]

The entire suppression of trade with the restricted coasts, whether
by neutral carriers or in the articles of import or export the world
needed, was in no sense whatever the object of the British ministers.
To retaliate on their enemy was the first aim, to make him suffer
as he had meant to make them; but, withal, to turn his own measures
against him, so that while he was straitened, Great Britain should
reap some amelioration for her own troubles. Throughout this stormy
and woeful period, the instinct of the British nation recognized that
the hearts of the continental peoples were with them rather than with
Napoleon,—and for much the same reason that the United States, contrary
alike to the general interests of mankind and to her own, sided upon
the whole, though by no means unanimously, against Great Britain.
In either case the immediate oppressor was the object of hatred.
Throughout the five years or more that the Continental blockade was
in force, the Continental nations saw the British trying everywhere,
with more or less success, to come to their relief,—to break through
the iron barrier which Napoleon had established. During great part
of that time a considerable intercourse did prevail; and the mutual
intelligence thus maintained made clear to all parties the community
of interests that bound them together, notwithstanding the political
hostilities. Nothing appears more clearly, between the lines of the
British diplomatic correspondence, than the conviction that the people
were ready to further their efforts to circumvent the measures of
Napoleon.

Keeping in view the purpose of making the United Kingdom the centre
and warehouse of the world's commerce, it was evident that, provided
this end—the chief object of the Orders in Council—were attained,
the greater the commerce of the outside world was, the greater would
be the advantage, or toll, resulting to Great Britain. The Orders
therefore contained, besides the general principle of blockade, certain
exceptions, narrow in wording but wide in application. By the first,
neutrals were permitted to trade directly between their own country and
the hostile colonies. They were also allowed to trade direct between
the latter and the free ports of the British colonies, which were thus
enabled, in their degree, to become the centres of local commerce, as
Britain herself was to be the entrepôt of European and general commerce.

The second exception, which was particularly odious to neutrals,
permitted the latter to go direct from a port of the United Kingdom to
a restricted hostile port, although they might not start from their own
country for the same, nor for any other place in Europe from which the
British flag was excluded. Conversely, neutrals were at liberty to sail
from any port of his Majesty's enemies forbidden to them by the Orders,
provided they went direct to some port in Europe belonging to Great
Britain;[382] but they might not return to their own land without first
stopping at a British port.

Such, stripped of their verbiage, appears to be the gist of the Orders
in Council of November 11, 1807. Neutrals might not trade directly
with any ports in Europe not open to British ships; but they might
trade with them by going first to a British port, there landing their
cargo, reshipping it subject to certain duties,[383] and thence
proceeding to a hostile port. The same process was to be observed on
the return voyage; it might not be direct home, but must first be to
Great Britain. The commerce of the Continent thus paid toll, going and
coming; or, to repeat the words of the ministry, there was for the
enemy "no trade except through Great Britain." British cruisers were
"instructed to warn any vessel which shall have commenced her voyage
prior to any notice of this Order, to discontinue it; and to proceed
instead to some port in this kingdom, or to Gibraltar or Malta; and any
vessel which, after being so warned, shall be found in the prosecution
of a forbidden voyage, shall be captured." Vessels which in obedience
to the warning came into a British port were to be permitted, after
landing their cargo, to "report it for exportation, and allowed to
proceed to their original port of destination, or to any other port
at amity with his Majesty, upon receiving a certificate from the
collector of the port" setting forth these facts; but from this general
permission to "report," were specially excepted "sugar, coffee, wine,
brandy, snuff, and tobacco," which could be exported to a restricted
port only "under such conditions as his Majesty, by any license to
be granted for that purpose, may direct." Licenses were generally
necessary for export of any foreign produce or manufacture; while goods
of British origin could be taken to a hostile country without such
license. In the end, the export of cotton to the Continent was wholly
forbidden, the object being to cripple the foreign manufactures. Upon
the license requirements was soon built up the extraordinary licensed
traffic, which played so important a subordinate part in the workings
both of the Orders and of the Continental System.

Anything more humiliating and vexatious to neutrals than these Orders
can scarcely be conceived. They trampled upon all previously received
law, upon men's inbred ideas of their rights; and that by sheer
uncontrolled force, the law of the strongest. There was also not only
denial of right, but positive injury and loss, direct and indirect. Yet
it must not be forgotten that they were a very real and severe measure
of retaliation upon Napoleon's government; of which a contemporary
German writer had truly said it was already wound up so tight the
springs could almost be heard to crack. It must be remembered, too,
that Great Britain was fighting for her life. The additional expense
entailed upon every cargo which reached the Continent after passing
through her ports, the expenses of delay, of unloading and reloading,
wharfage, licenses, maintenance, fell chiefly upon the continental
consumer; upon the subjects of Napoleon, or upon those whom he was
holding in military bondage. Nor was this all. Although Great Britain
was not able to blockade all the individual French or continental
ports,—an inability due more to the dangers of the sea than to the
number of the harbors,—she was able to make the approach to the French
coast exceedingly dangerous, so much so that it was more to the
interest of the ordinary trader to submit to the Orders than to attempt
to evade them; especially as, upon arriving at a port under Napoleon's
control, he found the emperor possessed with every disposition to
confiscate his cargo, if a plausible pretext could be made. In the
English Channel Great Britain controlled the approaches from the
Atlantic to all the northern continental ports; and at Gibraltar those
to the Mediterranean. The Orders were therefore by no means an empty
threat. They could not but exercise a very serious influence upon the
imports to the Continent, and especially upon those exotic objects
of consumption, sugar, coffee, and other tropical growths, which had
become so essential to the comfort of people; and upon certain raw
materials, such as cotton, dye-woods and indigo. Naval stores from the
Baltic for England passed so near the French coast that they might
be slipped in by a lucky chance; but the neutral from the Atlantic,
who was found near the coast of France or Spain, had to account for
the appearances which were against him. These obstacles to direct
import tended therefore to increase prices by diminishing supplies,
and combined with the duties laid by Great Britain, upon the cargoes
forced into her ports, to raise the cost of living throughout the
Continent. The embarrassments of its unfortunate inhabitants were
further augmented by the difficulty of exporting their own products;
and nowhere was this more keenly felt than in Russia, where the
revenues of the nobility depended largely on the British demand for
naval stores, and where the French alliance and the Continental System
were proportionately detested.

The object of the Orders in Council was therefore twofold: to embarrass
France and Napoleon by the prohibition of direct import and export
trade, of all external commerce, which for them could only be carried
on by neutrals; and at the same time to force into the Continent all
the British products or manufactures that it could take. A preference
was secured for the latter over foreign products by the license
practice, which left the course of traffic to the constant manipulation
of the Board of Trade. The whole system was then, and has since been,
roundly abused as being in no sense a military measure, but merely
a gigantic exhibition of commercial greed; but this simply begs the
question. To win her fight Great Britain was obliged not only to
weaken Napoleon, but to increase her own strength. The battle between
the sea and the land was to be fought out on Commerce. England had no
army wherewith to meet Napoleon; Napoleon had no navy to cope with
that of his enemy. As in the case of an impregnable fortress, the only
alternative for either of these contestants was to reduce the other
by starvation. On the common frontier, the coast line, they met in
a deadly strife in which no weapon was drawn. The imperial soldiers
were turned into coast-guards-men to shut out Great Britain from her
markets; the British ships became revenue cutters to prohibit the
trade of France. The neutral carrier, pocketing his pride, offered
his service to either for pay, and the other then regarded him as
taking part in hostilities. The ministry, in the exigencies of
debate, betrayed some lack of definite conviction as to their precise
aim. Sometimes the Orders were justified as a military measure of
retaliation; sometimes the need of supporting British commerce as
essential to her life and to her naval strength was alleged; and
their opponents in either case taunted them with inconsistency.[384]
Napoleon, with despotic simplicity, announced clearly his purpose of
ruining England through her trade, and the ministry really needed no
other arguments than his avowals. _Salus civitatis suprema lex._ To
call the measures of either not military, is as inaccurate as it would
be to call the ancient practice of circumvallation unmilitary, because
the only weapon used for it was the spade.

Napoleon was not the man to accept silently the Orders in Council.
On the 27th of October he had signed the treaty of Fontainebleau
with Spain, arranging the partition of Portugal and taking thus the
first step in the invasion of the Peninsula. On November 16 he left
Fontainebleau to visit his kingdom of Italy. From the capital, Milan,
he issued the decree which bears its name, on the 17th of December,
1807. Alleging the Orders as its motive, the Milan Decree declared
that any ship which submitted to search by a British cruiser was
thereby "denationalized;" a word for which, at sea, "outlaw" is the
only equivalent. It lost the character of its own country, so far as
French cruisers were concerned, and was liable to arrest as a vagrant.
The decree further declared that all vessels going to, or sailing from,
Great Britain, were for that fact alone good prize,—a point which,
under the Berlin decree, had as yet been left open. French privateers
were still sufficiently numerous to make these regulations a great
additional danger to ships at sea; and the decree went on to say that,
when coming under the previous provisions, they should be seized
whenever they entered a French port.

The two belligerents had now laid down the general lines of policy on
which they intended to act. The Orders in Council received various
modifications, due largely to the importance to Great Britain of the
American market, which absorbed a great part of her manufactures;
but these modifications, though sensibly lightening the burden upon
neutrals and introducing some changes of form, in no sense departed
from the spirit of the originals. The entire series was finally
withdrawn in June, 1812, but too late to avert the war with the United
States, which was declared in the same month. Napoleon never revoked
his Berlin and Milan decrees, although by a trick he induced an
over-eager President of the United States to believe that he had done
so.

In the year 1808 the emperor's purpose to overthrow the Spanish
monarchy, and place one of his own family upon the throne, finally
matured. He left Paris on the 2d of April, and, after a long delay at
Bordeaux, on the 14th reached Bayonne. There took place his meetings
with the king and infante of Spain which resulted in the former
resigning his crown, to be disposed of as to Napoleon might seem best.
While at Bayonne, on April 17, the emperor issued an order, directing
the sequestration of all American ships which should enter the
ports of France, Italy, Holland, and the Hanse towns, as being under
suspicion of having come from Great Britain. The justification for this
step was found in the Embargo Act of December, 1807, in consequence
of which, Napoleon argued, as such ships could not lawfully have left
their own country, they came really from England, and their papers
were fabricated.[385] Under this ruling sequestrations continued to be
made until March 23, 1810; when the Decree of Rambouillet confiscated
finally the vessels and cargoes thus seized.[386] After May, 1810, the
Non-Intercourse Act, which had replaced the Embargo, was temporarily
suspended as regarded both Great Britain and France, and never renewed
as to the latter; so the plea upon which these confiscations had
proceeded was no longer valid.

Meanwhile the emperor's plans for the Peninsula met with unexpected
reverses. An insurrection on the 2d of May in Madrid was followed by
spontaneous popular risings in all parts of the country. On the 21st of
July an army corps under General Dupont was cut off by the insurgents
in Andalusia and surrendered, to the number of eighteen thousand, at
Baylen; and on the 29th the new king of Spain, Joseph Bonaparte, fled
from Madrid, which he had only entered on the 20th. On the 1st of
August a British fleet appeared off the coast of Portugal, bearing the
first division of troops destined to act in the Peninsula, under the
command of Sir Arthur Wellesley. On the 21st the battle of Vimiero was
fought, resulting in the defeat of Junot; who, by the Convention of
Cintra, signed on the 30th, was permitted to evacuate Portugal and was
conveyed to France with his army in British transports. At the same
time a division of the Russian fleet which had taken refuge in Lisbon,
on its return from the Mediterranean, was, by a separate convention,
left in the hands of Great Britain until the conclusion of the war.
The admiral had steadily refused to co-operate with Junot; in which
course he probably reflected the strong feeling of the Russian upper
classes against the French alliance. In consequence of these successive
disasters Portugal was wholly lost, and the French army in Spain fell
back to the line of the Ebro.

Napoleon realized the necessity of vigorous measures to suppress the
general uprising, before it had attained organization and consistency,
and determined to take the field in person; but, before removing to
this distant scene of action, he thought advisable to confirm and
establish his understanding with the czar, upon whose support depended
so much of his position in Central Europe. The two sovereigns met for
the second time, September 27, 1808, at Erfurt. The alliance formed
at Tilsit was renewed; France undertook not to consent to peace until
Russia obtained Finland from Sweden, Moldavia and Wallachia from
Turkey; Russia guaranteed the crown of Spain to Joseph; and it was
agreed that a formal proposition for peace should at once be made
to England, as publicly and conspicuously as possible. The czar had
already in the preceding February begun hostilities against Sweden,
giving as a pretext her leaning toward Great Britain and her refusal to
join with Russia and Denmark in shutting the Baltic to British fleets.
Denmark also had declared war against Sweden, for carrying on which the
possession of Norway then gave her facilities which she no longer has;
and Prussia, on the 6th of March, had closed her ports against Swedish
commerce "at the solicitation of the imperial courts of Paris and St.
Petersburg."

The vital importance of the Baltic to Great Britain, both as the
source whence her naval stores were drawn and as a channel whereby her
commerce might find a way into the Continent remote from the active
vigilance of Napoleon, imposed upon her the necessity of strenuously
supporting Sweden. A fleet of sixty-two sail, of which sixteen were
of the line, was accordingly sent through the Sound in April, under
Sir James Saumarez, one of the most distinguished of British admirals;
who, to an unusually brilliant reputation for seamanship, activity,
and hard fighting, joined a calm and well-balanced temper, peculiarly
fitted to deal with the delicate political situation that obtained in
the North during the four years of his Baltic command. The fleet was
shortly followed by a body of ten thousand troops under the celebrated
Sir John Moore; but the rapid progress of the Russian arms rendered
this assistance abortive, and Moore was soon transported to that scene
of action in the Peninsula in connection with which his name has been
immortalized.

A joint letter, addressed to the king of Great Britain by the allied
emperors, was forwarded through the usual channels by the foreign
ministers of both powers on the 12th of October. The British reply,
dated October 28, expressed a willingness to enter into the proposed
negotiations, provided the king of Sweden and the government acting
in the name of the king of Spain, then a prisoner in the hands of
Napoleon, were understood to be parties to any negotiation in which
Great Britain was engaged. "To Spain," said the British note, "his
Majesty is not bound by any formal instrument; but his Majesty has,
in the face of the world, contracted with that nation engagements not
less sacred, and not less binding upon his Majesty's mind, than the
most solemn treaties." This reply was, in one point at least, open
to severe criticism for uncalled-for insolence. To that part of the
letter of the two sovereigns which attributed the sufferings of the
Continent to the cessation of maritime commerce, it was retorted:
"His Majesty cannot be expected to hear with unqualified regret that
the system devised for the destruction of the commerce of his subjects
has recoiled upon its authors, or its instruments." Nevertheless, it
is impossible to withhold admiration for the undaunted attitude of
the solitary Power that ruled the sea, in the face of the two mighty
sovereigns who between them controlled the forces of the Continent, or
to refuse recognition of the fidelity with which, against overwhelming
odds, she now, as always in the time of Pitt, refused to separate her
cause from that of her allies. The decision of the British court was
made known to Europe by a public declaration, dated December 15, which,
while expressing the same firm resolve, allowed to appear plainly the
sense entertained by the ministry of the restiveness of the Continent
under the yoke it was bearing.

The proposal to include the Spanish people in the negotiations was
rejected by both France and Russia. Napoleon, having in the mean time
returned to Paris, left there on the 29th of October to take command
of the armies, which, to the number of over three hundred thousand
men of all arms, had either entered Spain or were rapidly converging
upon it. On the 8th of November he crossed the frontier, and on the
4th of December Madrid surrendered. Northern Spain being overrun and
subdued, the capital having fallen without any real resistance, and
the political prestige of the insurrection being thus seriously, if
not hopelessly, injured, the emperor now proposed to divide the mass
of soldiers that had so far acted under his own supreme direction. In
the disorganized and helpless condition of the Spanish people, with
the proved weakness and imbecility of the provisional governments,
a dispersion that might otherwise be unwise became admissible. Army
corps under his marshals were to overrun the southern provinces
of the Peninsula, while an overwhelming force under his personal
leadership was to cross the frontier, and carry the eagles to Lisbon,
in accordance with his boast made before leaving Paris. From this
determination he was turned aside by the sudden intelligence that
the small body of British troops, commanded by Sir John Moore, which
he supposed to be retreating toward Lisbon, and which he expected to
drive on board the ships there, had cut loose from their connection
with it, and, by a daring move to the north, were threatening his own
lines of communication with France. Upon the receipt of this news, on
the 21st of December, he at once postponed his previous purposes to
the necessity of dislodging and driving out of Spain the little force,
of less than twenty-five thousand men, that had dared thus to traverse
his plans. Thus was Napoleon headed from his course by an imperious
military necessity, and Spain saved at a most critical moment, by the
petty army which had come from the sea, and which had only dared to
make this move—well nigh desperate at the best—because it knew that, in
the inevitable retreat, it would find in the sea no impassable barrier,
but a hospitable host,—in truth, its own country. The Peninsula gained
the time to breathe, which, unless under stern compulsion, Napoleon
never granted to an enemy; and the opportunity thus lost to him never
again returned.

Thus opened the year 1809. Napoleon at the head of eighty thousand
men was driving before him, through the snows of northwestern Spain,
some twenty thousand British troops, with the relentless energy that
distinguished all his movements of pursuit. In the north, Russia,
having completed the conquest of Finland, was now preparing to invade
Sweden on the west of the Baltic, the king of that country was on the
point of being dethroned on account of insanity, and the policy of the
nation was tending to a peace with its gigantic enemy; which the latter
refused to grant except upon the condition of joining the alliance
against Great Britain. To this Sweden was most unwilling to accede.
Her people depended wholly upon their produce of naval stores and grain
and upon maritime commerce. Hence, to lose the freedom of their trade
was almost tantamount to destruction, and the British ministry from
the first saw that, whatever steps Sweden might be forced to take, its
real wishes must be to keep open intercourse with Great Britain. From
the anxious and delicate position of this small country, between these
opposing claims, arose the necessity of great prudence and caution on
the part of the British government, of its diplomatic representative,
and of the admiral commanding the fleet. The task ultimately devolved
upon the latter, when Sweden was at last forced into formal war; and to
his sound judgment and self-restraint was largely due that no actual
collision took place, and that, in the decisive moments of 1812, she,
despite her serious causes of complaint against the czar, sided with
Russia, instead of against her.

In Central Europe, Austria, since the peace of Presburg,[387] three
years before, had been quietly engaged in restoring her military
strength. The various changes which had taken place in Germany during
that time, the establishment and growth of the Confederation of the
Rhine, the destruction of the power of Prussia, the foundation of the
Duchy of Warsaw, combined with the great losses of territory which she
had herself undergone, had left Austria in a position that she could
not possibly accept as final; while the alliance between Russia and
France placed her in a state of isolation, which Napoleon had been
careful to emphasize during the meeting at Erfurt. The renewal of the
war between herself and France was therefore in the nature of things.
The only question to be decided was when to declare it;[388] but
this was a matter which Napoleon, who fully understood the political
situation, was not in the habit of allowing an enemy to determine.
He undertook his Spanish enterprise with the full knowledge that his
absence, and that of his Grand Army, in the Peninsula must be short; he
understood that a prolonged stay there, caused by lack of immediate and
decisive success, would give Austria the opportunity she needed; but
he had reasonable expectation of accomplishing his task, and returning
with his army to his eastern frontiers, within a safe period of time.
This hope was frustrated by the action of Sir John Moore. The year
1809 therefore opened with the prospect of war impending over the two
empires. "From the frontiers of Austria to the centre of Paris," wrote
Metternich, "I have found but one opinion accepted by the public,—that
is, that in the spring at latest, Austria will take the field against
France. This conclusion is drawn from the relative position of the two
powers."[389]

Underlying the other contentions, affecting them all with the unheeded,
quiet, but persistent action which ordinarily characterizes the
exertions of sea power, fermenting continually in the hearts of the
people, was the commercial warfare, the absence of that maritime peace
for which the nations sighed. The Berlin and Milan decrees on the one
side, the Orders in Council on the other, were still, at the opening of
1809, in full force. France, which especially needed the concurrence
of neutral carriers, had taken away even the slight chances of
reaching her ports which British cruisers might leave, by pronouncing
confiscation on any ship which had submitted to a search, though it was
powerless to resist. Great Britain, on the other hand, having shut out
all competition with her own trade to the Continent by the blockade,
which forbade direct access to neutral ships, was prepared to avail
herself of every chance to force upon Europe, at any point, and by
any means, neutral or other, any and all merchandise, manufactured
or colonial, which came from her own warehouses. For this the license
system offered a means of which neutrals were only too ready to avail
themselves. A British license could admit them to any port from which
a British blockade excluded them; and, as it was only to be obtained
legitimately in a British port, the neutral carriers, when there,
naturally filled up with the most paying cargo, whatever its origin.

In the years from 1806 to 1810, as at earlier periods of the
revolutionary wars, Holland and the Hanse towns competed for the
profits of this indirect and often contraband trade. In June, 1806,
Napoleon, in pursuance of his policy of placing members of his own
family upon the thrones of the Continent, had obtained the conversion
of Holland from a republic to a monarchy and bestowed its crown upon
his brother Louis. The latter sought from the first to identify
himself with his new subjects, and constantly withstood the commands
of Napoleon in favor of their interests. Foremost among these was
maritime commerce, for which geographical position and generations
of habit especially fitted the Dutch. With such dispositions on the
part of the king, notwithstanding the jealous watchfulness and sharp
remonstrances of the emperor, evasions were frequent, and the decrees
even openly disregarded on different pretences. The whole community
naturally engaged in undertakings at once so consonant to its habits
and so remunerative when successful. From the time the Berlin decree
was issued until after the war with Austria in 1809, Napoleon's
attention, though often angrily attracted by Holland and the neglect
of his orders, was still too much diverted to admit of the decisive
measures needed to enforce them. First, the Russian war in 1807, then
the affairs of the Peninsula extending through 1808, finally the
Austrian war in 1809 with his hazardous position between the battles of
Essling and Wagram, accompanied as the whole period was with financial
difficulties and expedients due to the straits of the empire under the
cessation of maritime commerce, occupied his mind almost wholly, and
allowed but partial attention to the Continental System.

Neutral ships therefore continued to be openly admitted into Holland,
and the emperor's demands for their confiscation to be eluded; and
there was besides much smuggling, for which the character of the coast
and its nearness to England offered ample facilities. From Holland
the goods usually found their way without great difficulty into
France, though on two occasions Napoleon, to punish Holland for her
waywardness, closed the frontier against her. "Your Majesty," wrote he
to Louis, "took advantage of the moment in which I had embarrassments
upon the Continent, to allow the relations between Holland and England
to be resumed; to violate the laws of the blockade, the only measure by
which that power can be seriously injured. I showed my dissatisfaction
by forbidding France to you, and made you feel that, without having
recourse to my armies, I could, by closing the Rhine, the Weser,
the Scheldt, and the Meuse to Holland, place her in a position more
critical than by declaring war against her. I was so isolating her
as to annihilate her. The blow resounded in Holland. Your Majesty
appealed to my generosity.... I removed the line of custom-houses; but
your Majesty returned to your former system. It is true I was then at
Vienna, and had a grievous war upon my hands. All the American ships
which entered the ports of Holland, while they were repelled from those
of France, your Majesty received. I have been obliged a second time
to close my custom-houses to Dutch commerce.... I will not conceal my
intention to re-unite Holland to France, to round off her territory, as
the most disastrous blow I can deal to England." He consented, however,
to suspend his action, upon condition that the existing stores of
colonial merchandise were confiscated, as well as the cargoes of the
American ships.[390]

The important part played in the former war by Hamburg and Bremen, as
commercial centres and warehouses for continental trade, has already
been mentioned. To a certain extent they still fulfilled the same
function, but under greatly altered conditions. The political changes
following the war of 1806 and 1807, and the presence of French troops
in Prussian fortresses and throughout Northern Germany, combined to
make them subservient, as Prussia was, to the emperor's wishes. In
point of form the continental blockade extended throughout all this
region, as in Holland; everywhere vessels and merchandise coming from
Great Britain were proscribed and should be confiscated, whenever
found.[391] All the shores of the North Sea, those of Denmark, and,
by the co-operation of the czar, the coasts of the Baltic, shared the
general prohibition. The minister of France at Hamburg found his chief
occupations in either demanding subsidies—contributions in money or
kind—for the French troops, or in insisting, much against his will,
upon increased severity against the introduction of British goods. The
distress occasioned by these stringent requirements was very great,
even while Napoleon's other preoccupations lasted; but the general
consent of all the people in passive resistance, the activity of
smugglers, and the corruption that ever hangs about custom-houses and
increases with the duties, conspired to mitigate the privations. The
coasts of the North Sea, between the mouths of the Ems, the Weser, and
the Elbe, and those of Danish Holstein, low, of difficult approach for
large vessels, and hence favorable to the multiplication of small boats
and the operations of those having local knowledge, fostered smuggling;
to which also conduced the numbers of fishermen, and the fringe of
off-lying islands, out of the reach of the ordinary custom-house
officer.

To support this contraband trade, the British, on the 5th of September,
1807, seized Heligoland and converted it into a depot for goods waiting
to be introduced into Germany or Holstein. "A garrison of six hundred
men defended the island, and ships of war cruised continually in its
neighborhood. From there contraband traders obtained merchandise, with
which they supplied the Continent. Farmers along the coast received
these smuggled goods, which were taken from them during the night and
spread far and wide. The populations of the various countries aided
the smugglers, joined them in opposing the revenue officers and in
seducing the latter from their duty."[392] Between Holstein and Hamburg
was drawn up a close line of custom-house officials; but the forbidden
goods leaked through all barriers. "More than six thousand persons
of the lower and middle classes passed their day in going more than
twenty times from Altona, in Holstein, to Hamburg. Punishments and
confiscations fell upon the guilty; but this did not put an end to the
incessant strife, sometimes by cunning, sometimes by force, against
this fiscal tyranny."[393] Between five and six hundred women were
employed by the merchants of Hamburg daily to convey into the city,
each of them, fourteen pounds of coffee and other produce, concealed
beneath their garments.[394]

In the Baltic conditions were somewhat different. Much there depended
upon the heartiness of the czar in the cause; upon whether he would
content himself with a bare perfunctory compliance with the letter of
his engagements at Tilsit and Erfurt, or would decisively enforce an
entire cessation of traffic with Great Britain. The latter course,
however, was impossible to Alexander. Impulsive and ambitious, he
yet lacked the hardness of character needed to disregard the cold
disapproval of the nobles and the distress of his subjects. Under
the influence of Napoleon's presence, of his fascination and his
promises, it had seemed possible to do that which in the isolation of
his court, and deprived of sympathy, became drearily monotonous; nor
did Napoleon, by fidelity to his word, make the task easier. Decrees
of great severity were issued,[395] and the British flag was honestly
excluded; but the quick mercantile intelligence soon detected that
no ill-timed curiosity as to ships' papers would be exercised,[396]
nor vexatious impediments thrown in the way of exporting the national
products, which, if essential to Great Britain's naval supremacy, were
no less the source of Russia's wealth. In truth, British consumption of
naval stores, and British capital invested in Russia, had been leading
elements in the prosperity of the country; and it had been no light
sacrifice to concede such advantages as the czar had already yielded.

Such was the working condition of the Continental System between
1806 and 1810. Despite the general disquietude in Great Britain and
the undoubted impediments raised to that free export upon which her
prosperity was based, the general confidence was unabated.[397]
Much was hoped from the resistance of the continental peoples, more
from their steadfast evasion of the edicts. In 1806, just before the
Berlin decree was issued, but when the system was already in force,
a commercial magazine wrote: "The regulations adopted only show the
ignorance of the French government of commercial principles. When
the blockade of the Elbe was removed, instead of finding markets
exhausted and prices enhanced, they were found overstocked."[398]
"In spite of every prohibition British goods continue (Dec. 1, 1806)
to find their way in vast quantities into France. They are exported
hence on French orders. It is easy to insure them for the whole
transit to the town in France where they are to be delivered to
the purchaser. They are introduced at almost all parts of the land
confines of the French Empire. No sooner are they received into the
French merchant's warehouse, than evidence is procured that they are
of French manufacture; the proper marks are stamped, and the goods are
in a state to be exhibited, in proof that the manufactures of France
quite outrival those of England. The writer had this information from
gentlemen who have a concern in the trade to which it relates."[399]
"Though the port of Venice is now totally shut against British
commerce, as also the peninsula of Istria from whence Italian silk
has always been obtained, yet through neutral vessels we now obtain
Piedmont silk, which is the best and finest, direct from Leghorn,
Lucca, and Genoa."[400] "From Malta a brisk trade, yielding quick
returns, is kept up with the ports of Italy. Malta is the emporium, the
storehouse. From Malta we supply Leghorn and other places in the power
of France. But the British goods are sold, even before they are landed,
for ready money; and scarcely a pound's worth of British property is at
any moment hazarded where the French might seize it."[401]

Indications of embarrassment now begin to accumulate, but still,
in January, 1808, we read: "Several ships from Holland have lately
entered our harbors, and brought over large quantities of goods
usually imported from Hamburg. This is a proof of the futility of
Bonaparte's commercial speculations."[402] Russia had by this declared
against Great Britain, causing a rise in all Russian produce; and
the Embargo Act of the United States had just gone into operation.
There is a vast falling off in the Baltic and American trade. In 1805
over eleven thousand ships had passed through the Sound, going and
coming; in 1807 barely six thousand, and British ships are excluded
from all but Swedish harbors. In August, 1808, the ports of Holland
are opened for the export of Dutch butter, and two hundred bales of
silk are allowed to be smuggled out, for which a bribe of six thousand
guineas was extorted by some person in authority.[403] In 1809 a notice
again occurs of the ports of Holland being opened by the king; and
concurrently, West India produce, which has been for some months dull,
is found more in demand and commanding good prices.[404] Malta is doing
a famous business at the same time, and has become one of the greatest
depots in the Mediterranean.[405]

The year 1809 was marked by a great, though temporary, revival of
trade, due to several causes. Napoleon himself was detained during
great part of the year in the heart of Austria, absorbed in one of his
most doubtful contests with the empire; and in his absence trade with
the North Sea ports went on almost as in time of peace. In the United
States an eager British minister, of politics opposed to the party
in power, had committed himself without due authority to an official
statement to the government that the Orders in Council would be
rescinded by June 10. The President, without waiting to hear further,
removed the restrictions of the Non-Intercourse Act on that date; and
accordingly, for some months there was free traffic and a very great
interchange of goods between the United States and Great Britain. In
South America, the withdrawal of the Portuguese court to Brazil and the
uprising of Spain against Napoleon had resulted in throwing open the
colonial ports to Great Britain; and an immense wave of speculative
shipments, heavily employing the manufactories, was setting in that
direction. In the Baltic, the czar was wearying of his engagements with
France, and of the emperor's tergiversations; wearying too, of the
opposition of his court and subjects. He adhered faithfully, indeed,
to the letter of his bargain and refused admission to British ships:
but he would not open his eyes to the fact that British commerce was
being carried on in his ports by neutrals with British licenses. He had
never promised to exclude neutrals, or forbid all export and import;
and it was none of his business to pry behind the papers that covered
transactions essential to his people. The imports to Great Britain
of naval stores, mainly from the Baltic, more than doubled from 1808
to 1809, and were even greater the following year.[406] Wool from
Spain and silk from Italy experienced a similar rise. Even West India
produce, so vigorously excluded from the Continent, shared the general
advance; and there was a great, though feverish and unsound, hope of
returning prosperity. It was evident that Napoleon's measures were
meeting only partial success, and men were willing to believe that
their failure lay in the nature of things,—in the impossibility of his
attempt. They had yet to learn that persecution fails only when it is
not, or cannot be, thorough and unrelenting.

Among the multiplied impediments to intercourse between nations, due
first of all to the narrow ideas of commercial policy prevalent at that
epoch, increased by the state of open maritime war or hostile exclusion
existing between Great Britain and most of the continental countries,
and further complicated by the continental blockade of Napoleon and the
retaliatory orders of the British government, there arose an obscure
but extensive usage of "licenses;" which served, though but partially,
and in a wholly arbitrary manner, to remove some of the difficulties
that prevented the exchange of commodities. A license, from its name,
implies a prohibition which is intended to be removed in the particular
case; and the license practice of the Napoleonic wars was for the most
part not so much a system, as an aggregation of individual permissions
to carry on a traffic forbidden by the existing laws of the authority
granting them. The licenses were issued both by the British government
and by Napoleon; and they were addressed, according to the character
of the sway borne by one party or the other, either to the police of
the seas, the armed cruisers, or to the customs authorities of the
continental ports. It was generally admitted in Great Britain that the
Board of Trade was actuated only by upright motives in its action,
though the practice was vigorously attacked on many grounds,—chiefly in
order to impugn the Orders in Council to which alone their origin was
attributed; but in France the taint of court corruption, or favoritism,
in the issue of licenses was clearly asserted.[407]

The "License System," in the peculiar and extensive form to which the
phrase was commonly applied, was adopted by the British government in
1808,[408] immediately after the Orders in Council and the alliance
of Russia with Napoleon. Licenses did not then first begin to be
issued, nor were they then for the first time necessary;[409] but
then began the development which carried their numbers from two
thousand six hundred and six in 1807, to over fifteen thousand in
1809 and over eighteen thousand in 1810. After the last year there
was a rapid falling off, due, not to a change of system, but to the
bitter experience that the license, which protected against a British
cruiser, did not save the ship and cargo upon arrival in a port under
Napoleon's control, when he had at last devoted his indomitable energy
to the thorough enforcement of his decrees. During the years in which
the practice flourished, it was principally to the Baltic ports that
the licensed vessels went, though they also made their way to those of
Holland, France, Spain, and other countries on the Continent. The trade
to the British East and West Indies was confined to British vessels, as
in time of profound peace.

The true origin of the later license trade is to be found in that
supremacy and omnipresence of the British navy, which made it
impossible for vessels under an enemy's flag to keep the sea. In order
to employ their vessels, hostile owners transferred them to a neutral
ownership, ordinarily by a fraudulent process which received the name
of "neutralization." A neutralized ship remained the property of the
hostile merchant; but, for a stipulated price, a neutral firm, who made
this their regular business, gave their name as the owners and obtained
from the authorities of the neutral country all the requisite papers
and attestations by which the British cruisers, on searching, might be
deceived. As a regular systematic business, fraudulent from beginning
to end, the practice first arose during the war of the American
Revolution, in 1780, when Holland became a party to the war, having a
large mercantile tonnage with very inadequate means of protecting it.
At that time a firm established itself in Embden, on the Prussian side
of the Ems, which divides Prussia from Holland, and within the two
years that remained of the war "neutralized," under Prussian flags,
a hundred thousand tons of foreign shipping, besides cargoes to an
immense value for those days. In the wars of Napoleon it was the fate
of Holland to be again dragged in the wake of France, and the same
practice of neutralization, supported by false oaths and false papers,
again sprang up and flourished extensively in the Prussian province of
East Friesland,—Prussia carefully maintaining her neutrality from 1795
to the unfortunate Jena campaign of 1806.

In the year 1806 it was asserted that there were upwards of three
thousand sail belonging to merchants of Holland, France, and Spain
navigating under the Prussian flag; and the practice doubtless was
not confined to Prussia. "It is notorious," wrote Lord Howick, the
British foreign minister, "that the coasting trade of the enemy is
carried on not only by neutral ships but by the shameful misconduct of
neutral merchants, who lend their names for a small percentage, not
only to cover the goods, but in numberless instances to mask the ships
of the enemy."[410] The fact becoming known, British cruisers, when
meeting a valuable ship with Prussian papers, were apt to take the
chance of her being condemned and send her in; but even in British
ports and admiralty courts the neutralizing agent was prepared to
cover his transaction. The captain and crew of the detained vessel
were all carefully instructed and prepared to swear to the falsehoods,
which were attested by equally false papers sworn to before Prussian
judges. To this trade, it was alleged, France owed the power to obtain
naval stores despite the British blockade of her arsenals. The frauds
recoiled in a curious way on the head of Prussia; for, in the later
stage of the Jena campaign, the neutralized ships supplied French
magazines in the Baltic ports, the French hospitals at Lubeck, and
the army that besieged Dantzic. The capture of vessels, the character
of whose papers was suspected, served to swell the cry against Great
Britain for violating neutral rights, induced greater severity in the
British naval measures, and so directly contributed to the Berlin
Decree and the Orders in Council.[411]

Thus had stood the neutralizing trade toward the end of 1805. After
Napoleon had finally abandoned all thought of invading England, the
victorious campaign of Austerlitz and the peace of Presburg, extending
by conquest the boundaries of the empire, extended also the sweep of
those municipal regulations, already in force, which excluded British
goods from French territory. Early in 1806, beguiling Prussia into
hostilities with Great Britain through the occupation of Hanover, the
emperor compassed also the closure of the great German rivers. Peace
was indeed soon restored; but the Jena campaign, quickly following,
delivered Prussia, bound hand and foot, to Napoleon's dictates. In the
summer of 1807 the Peace of Tilsit united the empires of the East
and West in a common exclusion of British trade, to which Prussia
could not but accede. Great Britain thus found herself face to face
with no mere municipal regulations of one or two countries, but with
a great political combination aiming at her destruction through the
commerce which was her life. Nor was this combination merely one of
those unfriendly acts which seeks its end by peaceful means, like the
Non-Intercourse Acts of America. The British cabinet was perfectly
informed that the minor states were to be coerced, by direct military
force, into concurrence with the commercial policy of France and
Russia,—a concurrence essential to its success.

It was necessary for Great Britain to meet this threatening
conjunction, with such measures as should reduce the proposed injury
to an amount possible for her to bear, until the inevitable revulsion
came. She found ready to her hand the immense unprincipled system of
neutralized vessels, and by means of them and of veritable neutrals she
proposed to maintain her trade with the Continent. To do so, without
reversing the general lines of her policy, as laid down in the Orders
in Council, it was necessary to supply each neutral employed with a
clear and unmistakable paper, which would insure beyond peradventure
the respect of British cruisers for a class of vessels they had been
accustomed to regard with suspicion. It would not do that a ship
engaged in maintaining a British trade that was in great danger of
extinction should be stopped by their own cruisers. The wording of
the licenses was therefore emphatically sweeping and forcible. They
protected against detention the vessel carrying one, whatever the
flag she flew (the French flag alone being excepted), and directed
that "the vessel shall be allowed to proceed, notwithstanding all the
documents which accompany the ship and cargo may represent the same
to be destined to any neutral or hostile port, or to whomsoever such
property may belong."[412] These broad provisions were necessary,
for the flags flown, except that of the United States, were those of
nations which had, willingly or under duress, entered the Continental
System; and the papers, having to undergo the scrutiny of hostile
agents at the ports of arrival, had to be falsified, or, as it was
euphoniously called, "simulated," to deceive the customs officer,
if zealous, or to give him, if lukewarm, fair ground for admitting
the goods. The license protected against the British cruiser, which
otherwise would have detained the vessel on the ground of her papers,
intended to deceive the port officers. "The system of licenses," said
an adverse petition, "renders it necessary for the ships employed to
be provided with sets of forged, or, as they are termed, simulated
papers."[413] Of these, two sets were commonly carried, the paper, the
wax for the seals, and other accompaniments being carefully imitated,
and signatures of foreign rulers, as of Napoleon and of the President
and Secretary of State of the United States, skilfully forged.[414] The
firms conducting this business made themselves known to the mercantile
community by circular letters.[415]

In this way large fleets of licensed vessels under the flags of
Prussia, Denmark, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Kniphausen, and other almost
unknown German principalities, as well as many American merchant ships,
went yearly to the Baltic laden with British and colonial produce,
and returned with the timber, hemp, tallow, and grain of the North.
They entered St. Petersburg and every port in the Baltic, discharged,
loaded with the return cargo, and then repaired to a common rendezvous;
whence, when collected to the number of about five hundred, they
sailed for Great Britain under convoy of ships of war, to protect them
against the privateers that swarmed in the Sound and North Sea.[416]
Crushed between England and France, the Danish seamen, who would not
come into the licensed service of the former, had lost their livelihood
and had turned in a body to privateering, in the practice of which they
fell little short of piracy;[417] and French privateers also found the
ground profitable for cruising.

It was to this disposition of the north countries, as well as to
conciliate the United States, that was probably due the Order in
Council of April 26, 1809; which, while preserving the spirit,
and probably securing the advantages of those of November, 1807,
nevertheless formally and in terms revoked the latter, except so far
as expressly stated in the new edict. The constructive, or paper,
blockade, which under the former orders extended to every port whence
the British flag was excluded, was now narrowed down to the coasts of
Holland, France, and so much of Italy as was under Napoleon's immediate
dominion. The reasons assigned for this new measure were "the divers
events which had taken place since the date of the former orders,
affecting the relations between Great Britain and the territories of
other powers." The Spanish peninsula, being now in open and general
revolt against Napoleon, was of course exempted; and southern Italy,
by its nearness to Malta and Sicily, one a possession and the other
an ally of England, might more readily be supplied from them than
by neutrals coming from a greater distance. The maintenance of the
blockade of Holland was particularly favorable to British trade. By
that means the great articles of continental consumption could reach
Holland and France, direct, only by British license, which meant that
they came from England; while, if carried from a neutral country to
the German rivers, to the Hanse towns, or to the Baltic, as the new
Order allowed them to be, they had to be brought thence to the regions
more immediately under Napoleon's government by land carriage, which
would so raise their price as not to conflict with the British licensed
trade. Thus the condition of the suffering neutral populations was
relieved, without loosening the pressure upon France; and some of the
offence given to the neutral carriers was removed. Another advantage
accrued to Great Britain from thus throwing open the trade to the
Baltic to all neutrals; for the great demand and high prices of naval
equipment would induce them to bring these to the British market and
arsenals, in preference to other countries.

This Order was issued at the moment when the British minister at
Washington was assuring the American government that the Orders in
Council would be wholly withdrawn on the 10th of June following.[418]
At the same time the French and Austrians were drawing near to each
other on the fields of Germany. On the 6th of April the Archduke
Charles issued his address to the Austrian army, and on the 10th
crossed the Inn, moving toward Bavaria. On the 12th Napoleon quitted
Paris to place himself at the head of his troops, which had already
preceded him, but were then scattered in different positions, in sore
need of his directing hand. On the 17th he was in their midst. On the
same day the first collision occurred with Davout's corps under the
walls of Ratisbon. Five days of active manœuvring and hard fighting
succeeded, ending with the battle of Eckmuhl; after which the Archduke,
outgeneralled and defeated, fell back into Bohemia. On the 12th of
May Vienna surrendered, and on the 13th Napoleon entered the Austrian
capital for the second time in his career.

In the same eventful week, and on the very day of the battle of
Eckmuhl, Sir Arthur Wellesley again landed at Lisbon to begin his
memorable four years of command in the Peninsula. Napoleon had
relinquished to Soult the pursuit of Sir John Moore, while still in
mid-career; and after the embarkation of the British army from Coruña
and the surrender of that city, January 16-26, 1809, the marshal was
ordered to invade Portugal. After a difficult series of operations,
Oporto was reached and stormed on the 29th of March; but Soult lacked
the means to push further south. Wellesley, on his arrival, at once
decided to march against him, in preference to attacking the French
forces in Spain on the line of the Tagus. On the 12th of May, the
same day that Vienna surrendered, the British troops crossed the
Douro, Soult was forced to evacuate Oporto in haste, retreated to the
northward, and re-entered Spain. The British general then returned with
his army to the Tagus, and on the 27th of June advanced along that line
into Spain. On the 28th of July he fought the battle of Talavera; but,
though victorious, the failure of the Spanish troops to support him,
their unreliable character as soldiers, and the want of provisions,
compelled him to return at the end of August into Portugal, where he
took up a position close to the frontier.

The French movements in Spain were rendered indecisive by lack of
unity in the direction of the armies, due to the military incapacity
of the king and the jealousies of the different marshals. The same
early summer months were passed by Napoleon in a desperate struggle on
the banks of the Danube, below Vienna. Though the capital had fallen,
the Austrian army still remained, chastened but not subdued, and now
confronted him on the north side of the stream under a general of a
high order of merit, if inferior to the great emperor. To cross from
the south to the north bank of the broad river, in the face of such
a foe, was no light undertaking even for Napoleon. The first attempt
began on the 20th of May; and during the two succeeding days the
French army passed slowly across the insufficient bridges which alone
could be thrown, for lack of proper material. During the 21st and 22d
continued the strife, known in history as the battle of Essling; and
on the latter day some sixty thousand French troops were in action
with the Austrians, when the great bridge, joining the south shore to
the island of Lobau in mid-stream, gave way before a freshet, which
had already raised the waters of the Danube by fourteen feet. The
supply of ammunition to the engaged troops ceased, and it therefore
became impossible to retain the positions already gained. During the
night of the 22d the corps on the north side were withdrawn into the
island; and for the next six weeks Napoleon was untiringly occupied in
providing materials for bridges which would be sure not to fail him.
At last, when all was prepared, the army again crossed, and on the 6th
of July was fought the memorable battle of Wagram. Terminating in the
defeat of the Austrians, it was followed on the 12th by an armistice;
and a definitive treaty of peace was ratified at Vienna on the 15th
of October. Austria surrendered all her remaining sea-board on the
Adriatic, besides portions of her interior territory, and again acceded
to the prohibition of British goods of all kinds within her dominions.

A month before, September 17, 1809, peace had been concluded between
Russia and Sweden; the latter ceding Finland and engaging to close her
ports to all British ships, "with the exception of the importation
of salt and colonial productions, which habit had rendered necessary
to the people of Sweden."[419] On the 6th of January Napoleon, less
merciful than the czar, exacted a convention which allowed only the
entry of salt, excluding explicitly the colonial produce permitted
by the Russian treaty; in return for which he restored Pomerania
to Sweden.[420] Thus were formally closed to Great Britain all the
northern ports through which, by the license trade, she had continued
to pour her merchandise into the Continent, though in much diminished
volume.

It now became Napoleon's great object to enforce the restrictions,
which had thus been wrested from vanquished opponents in support
of his continental policy, by increased personal vigilance and by
urgently reiterated demands, for which he had an undeniable ground in
the express terms of his treaties with the sea-board powers. Upon the
Continent, except in the Spanish peninsula, the treaty of Vienna was
followed by a peace of exhaustion, which lasted nearly three years.
The emperor returned to Fontainebleau on the 26th of October, and at
once began the dispositions from which he hoped the reduction of Great
Britain, but which irresistibly led, step by step, to his own final
overthrow. The French army was withdrawn from southern Germany, but
gradually; remaining long enough in the various conquered or allied
countries to ease the imperial treasury from the expense of their
support, according to Napoleon's invariable policy. The evacuation was
not completed until the first of June, 1810. A hundred thousand men,
chiefly new levies, were directed on Spain, together with the Imperial
Guard, the supposed precursor of the emperor himself; but the best of
the troops, the hardened corps of Davout and Masséna, were reserved for
northern Germany and the Dutch frontiers, to enforce the submission
of the people to the continental blockade. Napoleon himself did not
go to Spain, and that tedious war dragged wearily on, with greater or
less vigor here or there, according to the qualities of the different
leaders; but lacking the unity of aim, the concert of action, which
nothing but the presence of a master spirit could insure among so
many generals of equal rank, imbued with mutual jealousy, and each
taxed with a burden that demanded his utmost strength. Around Lisbon,
Wellington was preparing the lines of Torres Vedras, and thus striking
deep into the soil of the Peninsula a grip from which all the armies of
France could not shake him, so long as the navy of Great Britain stood
at his back, securing his communications and his line of retreat; but
of this Napoleon knew nothing.

It was above all things necessary to bring the Spanish war to an end,
and the emperor was heartily weary of it; but still the Continental
System constrained him. "Duroc assured me," writes Bourrienne,[421]
"that the emperor had more than once shown regret at being engaged
in the Spanish war; but since he had the English to fight there, no
consideration could have induced him to abandon it, the more so as
all that he was then doing was to defend the honor of the Continental
System.... He said to Duroc one day, 'I no longer hold to Joseph being
king of Spain, and he himself cares little about it. I would place
there the first comer, if he could close his ports to the English.'"
The military situation in Spain imperatively demanded his own presence;
without it the war was interminable. The Spanish ulcer, as he himself
aptly termed it, was draining away both men and money; and the seat
of the trouble was at Lisbon, where the British sea power had at last
found the place to set its fangs in his side and gnaw unceasingly.
But Napoleon could not resolve either to withdraw from the contest
or to superintend it in person. The Spaniards and Portuguese, in the
prevailing anarchy, could contribute little, as consumers, to British
commerce; whereas the north of Europe, from Holland to St. Petersburg,
while yielding a nominal acquiescence, everywhere evaded the blockades
with the connivance of their governments. Here, then, in his opinion,
was the quarter to strike Great Britain; the Peninsula was to her but
a drain of men and money, which the custom of northern and central
Europe alone enabled her to endure. The emperor therefore decided to
sustain both efforts, the peninsular war and the northern continental
blockade; to divide his strength between the two, instead of combining
it upon either; and to give his immediate attention to the North.
Thus it was that the Sea Power of Great Britain, defying his efforts
otherwise, forced him into the field of its own choosing, lured him,
the great exemplar of concentrated effort, to scatter his forces, and
led him along a path which at last gave no choice except retreat in
discomfiture or advance to certain ruin.

Napoleon advanced. Since the Jena campaign he had occupied with French
and Polish troops the fortresses of Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, and
Dantzic. By these he controlled the Oder and the Vistula, and kept
a constant rein upon Prussia, so as to exact the war indemnities
she still owed, to check any movement upon her part, and to enforce
the demands of his policy. Davout, the most severe and thorough of
the French marshals, took command of these fortresses, as also of
Hanover and of the Hanse towns, on which likewise imperial troops were
quartered. At the mouth of the Ems his corps was in touch with that of
Marshal Oudinot, which stretched thence along the frontiers of Holland
to Belgium and Boulogne. Thus the whole sea-board from Boulogne to
the Baltic was gripped by French divisions, which in any dispute or
doubt powerfully supported the emperor's arguments and sustained the
Continental System, both by actual interference and by the constant
threat contained in their presence. These measures "were necessary,"
says M. Thiers[422] "in order to compel the Hanse towns to renounce
commercial intercourse with Great Britain, and to coerce Holland, which
paid no more attention to the commercial blockade than if it had been
governed by an English or a German prince. Even when the governments
attempted to keep good faith the communities were little affected, and
pursued a contraband trade which the most vigorous measures failed to
prevent. Napoleon determined to conduct in person this kind of warfare."

Holland was the first victim. As has before been said, Louis Bonaparte
strove continually to thwart the operation of the system. Napoleon
now demanded a strict execution of the blockade, and for that purpose
that the guard of the Dutch coasts and of the mouths of the rivers
should be entrusted to French custom-house officers.[423] He also
required that the American vessels which had entered Dutch ports under
the king's permission should be confiscated. Louis, though willing
to concede the former conditions and to exclude Americans and other
neutrals thenceforward, could not bring himself to give up those
that had entered under his own authority; but, having been induced
to visit his brother in Paris in November, 1809, he was by threats
and persuasion brought to yield every point demanded. It was during
these interviews that Napoleon, giving way to one of those transports
of passion which increased with him as years went by, again betrayed
the fatal compulsion under which England held him, and the purposes
already forming in his mind. "It is the English," he cried, "who have
forced me to aggrandize myself unceasingly.[424] But for them I would
not have united Naples, Spain, Portugal to my empire. I have willed to
struggle and to extend my coasts, in order to increase my resources. If
they keep on, they will oblige me to join Holland to my shore lines,
then the Hanse towns, finally Pomerania, and perhaps even Dantzic."
Then he suggested that Louis should, by indirect means, convey to the
British cabinet the impending danger of Napoleon's proceeding to these
extremities, in the hopes that apprehension might induce it to offer
terms of peace, in order to avert the union of Holland to the empire.

A Dutch banker, M. Labouchère, who had extensive relations with
prominent houses, was accordingly dispatched, though without formal
credentials, and opened the matter to the ministers; but the latter
showed little interest. Whatever the nominal state of Holland, they
said, it is really only a French dependency; and as for the extension
of the Continental System, they expected no less than an increase
of tyranny with the increase of the emperor's sway. Louis was then
sent back to Holland, having further agreed to cede to France all his
provinces west of the Rhine, and to line the coasts of the remainder
with an army partly Dutch, partly French, but commanded by a French
general. Overwhelmed with mortification, he cherished at times impotent
thoughts of resistance, which issued only in insults to the French
Chargé and in impediments thrown in the way of the French army of
occupation and the customs officers. Finally, in June, 1810, a body of
French troops having presented themselves before Harlem were denied
entrance; and at about the same time a servant of the French embassy
was mobbed at the Hague. Napoleon at once ordered Oudinot to enter,
not only Harlem, but Amsterdam, with drums beating and colors flying,
while the French corps to the north and south of Holland crossed the
frontiers to support the army of occupation. On the first of July Louis
signed his abdication, which was published on the 3d; by which time he
had secretly left the kingdom for an unknown destination. On the 9th
Holland was united to the empire by an imperial decree. The coveted
American ships with their cargoes were sequestrated, and the large
accumulations of colonial produce formed under Louis's lax blockade
were made to contribute to the imperial treasury, by being admitted
into France upon payment of a duty of fifty per cent. But, for this
immediate benefit, the thrifty Hollanders were to pay by an unrelenting
exclusion of trade, by the quartering of foreign troops, and by the
conscription, both land and naval.

The empire now extended to the Ems; but still, with persevering
cunning, smugglers and neutrals contrived to introduce tropical produce
and British manufactures to some extent. Owing to the restrictions,
indeed, the goods rose from fifty to a hundred per cent over the London
prices, but still they came; and, in consequence at once of the British
blockade of the French coast and of the emperor's jealous support of
that blockade by his own decrees, the people of France had to pay far
dearer than the other continental nations.[425] Thus were Napoleon's
objects doubly thwarted; for, while he aimed at breaking down Great
Britain by exclusion from the rest of Europe, he also meant to make
France, as the corner stone of his power, the most prosperous nation,
and to secure for her the continental market which her rival was to
lose.[426] All foreign articles decreased in price in proportion as
the distance from Paris increased. Before the union, coffee and sugar
cost in his capital three and four times what they did in Holland. He
now became unremitting and threatening in his representations to the
Northern states. Exacting the last farthing of Prussia at one breath,
with the next he offered to deduct from the debt the value of all
licensed cargoes seized by her. He menaced Sweden with the reoccupation
of Pomerania, if the great fleets under British license were admitted
to Stralsund. It was indeed to the Northern and Baltic ports that four
fifths of the licensed vessels went; only a small proportion sailed
to the blockaded ports of France and Holland.[427] By dint of urgent
representations and the presence of the French troops, he contrived to
have seized the greater part of a convoy of six hundred sail, which
entered the Baltic in the summer of 1810; but which, being delayed by
head winds, had not reached their ports in time to escape the movements
of his troops. The Northern trade had taken on immense dimensions in
1809, when Napoleon was battling about Vienna and the governments
were not under his eye; but this year he could make himself felt,
and some forty million dollars' worth of British property was seized
in the northern ports.[428] The blow seriously affected the already
overstrained commercial system of Great Britain, and its results were
shown by the fall in the number of licenses issued, from eighteen
thousand in 1810 to seventy-five hundred in 1811.

The emperor went further. Deciding, after long consideration, that
fifty per cent on the London prices represented the profits of
smugglers of colonial goods, he determined to allow the introduction
of the latter upon payment of duty to that extent. Characteristically
unwilling to appear to take a step backward, he extended this
permission only to produce not coming from British colonies; but it
was understood, and officially intimated to the customs authorities,
that the inquiry should not be rigorous. In this subterfuge, says M.
Thiers, consisted the whole combination.[429] Having thus constituted
a lawful variety of colonial products in the empire and in the subject
countries, the emperor felt at liberty to execute one of those vast
confiscations, which contributed so materially to his military chest.
All collections of these goods existing within his reach were to be
seized at the same time, and, if they had not been declared, should
be condemned; if they had, should pay half their value, in money or
in kind. "Thus it was hoped to seize everywhere at the same time, and
to take for the treasury of Napoleon, or for that of his allies, the
half in case of declaration, the whole in case of dissimulation. It can
be conceived what terror would be caused to the numerous accomplices
of British commerce."[430] This measure was established by a decree
of August 5, 1810, and accepted by all the continental states, except
Russia. The latter refused to go beyond her obligations by the treaty
of Tilsit, and took the occasion to express her uneasiness at seeing
the French troops gradually extending along the northern seas, and even
as close to her own borders as Dantzic. The impossibility of cordial
co-operation in the immense sacrifices demanded by the Continental
System was clearly shown by this refusal; but by no less vigorous
means could Great Britain be reached, and Napoleon could not recede.
The decree was extended outside the boundaries of the empire, to any
depot of colonial goods within four days' march of the frontiers, in
Switzerland, in Germany, in Prussia, in the Hanse towns. Large sums of
money were realized, and the government became a dealer in groceries
when the payments were made in kind. The pressure of the French troops
extended everywhere, and French flotillas cruised along the coasts of
the North Sea, whether within the limits of the empire or not, in the
mouths and along the course of the great rivers, to seal them more
completely.

The decree of August 5 was carried out by the armed hand. "_Wherever
my troops are_," wrote Napoleon to Prussia, "I suffer no English
smuggling." On this ground French authorities executed the mandate in
the Prussian port of Stettin, which was in the military occupation
only of his troops. "All the ports of this once potent kingdom,"
says a contemporary magazine, "are filled with French soldiers, who
seize and burn every article which can possibly have passed through
British hands. Prussia is described as in a deplorable state, almost
disorganized and no employment for industry."[431] Similar action was
taken in the Hanse towns with no other justification. The king of
Westphalia was ordered to withdraw his army from the northern part of
the kingdom, that French soldiers might enter for the same purpose. In
Switzerland the native authorities were permitted to act, but a French
customs officer supervised. On the 18th of August the emperor directed
the military occupation of the territory of Lubeck, Lauenburg, Hamburg,
and all the west bank of the Elbe, for a length of fifty miles from its
mouth; thence the line extended, at about the same distance from the
sea, to Bremen, and thence to the frontiers of Holland, taking in the
little states of Arenberg and Oldenburg. This military occupation was
but the precursor of the annexation of these countries a few months
later, which led to the first overt act of displeasure on the part of
the czar. In justification of the step, one of a series which alienated
Alexander and led up to the Russian war, was alleged the purpose of
sustaining the continental blockade as the only means of destroying
Great Britain. "General Morand," so read the orders, "is charged to
take all necessary measures for the prevention of smuggling. For this
purpose he will establish a first line of troops from Holstein to
East-Frisia, and a second line in rear of the first."[432]

On the 6th of October the viceroy of Italy was directed to occupy
with Italian troops all the Italian cantons of Switzerland, and to
sequestrate at once all colonial or other contraband merchandise. The
order was accompanied with Napoleon's usual formula: "This ought to
bring in several millions." Eugene was to explain that this was only
a step similar to the occupation of northern Germany, that it did not
invade the neutrality of Switzerland; and he was to be particularly
careful that the emperor's hand did not appear. "That there should be
a quarrel between _you_ and Switzerland will do no harm."[433] On the
19th of October Prussia was notified that, if she did not efficiently
preclude the passage of British and colonial merchandise through her
states, the French army would enter them; and the French minister was
directed to leave Berlin if satisfaction was not given.[434]

Coincidently with these principal measures, the correspondence of
Napoleon teems with orders, complaints, remonstrances, reprimands,
queries, all showing how bent his mind was on the one purpose. Having
turned over the command of the army in Portugal, directed against the
British, to his ablest marshal, Masséna, he was concentrating his own
energies on the blockade. At the same time, he occupied himself with
stringent measures for protecting the industries of France in the
European market. No man ever held more thoroughly than the emperor that
element of the theory of protection, that the government can manage the
business of the people better than themselves. His kingdom of Italy
should not use Swiss nor German cottons; such goods must come only from
France.[435] Italian raw silks shall go nowhere but to France,[436]
and then only to Lyon. The whole export trade is in his hands by a
system of licenses,[437] apparently borrowed from Great Britain, and
which at this time he greatly extended. On the 25th of July an order
was given that no ship could clear from a port of the empire for abroad
without a license, signed by the emperor himself. On September 15
another decree was issued,[438] allowing licensed vessels to sail from
Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck for French ports. The license was to cost
twelve dollars per ton, and was good only for the return voyage; but
the vessel upon arriving in France was exempt from all question as
to search by British cruisers, and might even land all her cargo in
a British port,—in other words, she was excepted from the Berlin and
Milan decrees. She could not, however, enter France with any British
goods. Returning, she was to load with wines or other French produce,
except grain or flour. Under the rival license systems new and curious
methods of evasion grew up. Compelled to take French articles which
were not wanted in Great Britain, as well as those that were, the
former were put on board of so inferior a quality that they could be
thrown into the sea without loss. At either end smuggling boats met
the licensed vessel before entering port, and took from her forbidden
articles. Ships of either nation, with foreign flag, and simulated
papers, were to be seen in each other's ports.[439] The British, as a
commercial people, were naturally willing to give a larger extension to
this evasive trade; but the emperor would not grant anything that he
thought could help his enemy, even though it benefited his own people.
He believed, and rightly, that Great Britain was receiving more harm
than France; he did not realize that, from her immense wealth and
commercial aptitudes, she could endure the process longer.

The decree of August 5 admitted colonial goods, but excluded British
manufactures. On the 19th of October was issued another edict,
directing that all such manufactured goods, wherever found in the
emperor's dominions, or even in countries in the mere military
occupation of his troops, should be publicly burned. This was
remorselessly done. "Persons who at this epoch were living in the
interior of France can form no idea of the desolation which so savage a
measure spread through countries accustomed to live by commerce. What
a spectacle offered to peoples impoverished and lacking everything,
to see the burning of articles the distribution of which would have
been an alleviation to their sufferings!... What a means of attacking
conquered peoples, to irritate their privations by the destruction
of a number of articles of the first necessity!"[440] "The tampering
with the mails," says Savary, the Minister of Police, "caused me to
make some very sad reflections, and forced me to admit that we were
not advancing toward tranquillity; and that, if the party against us
were not yet formed, at least all sentiments were agreed, and that a
single reverse would be enough to ruin us.... The more we disturbed the
relations of Europe with England, the more, on all sides, men sought
to draw together; and we remained with the odious epithets given to
us by all those whom our measures thwarted."[441] "There was already
an understanding from one end of Europe to the other; every cabinet
earnestly wished the overthrow of Napoleon, as the people also wished,
with at least equal ardor, a state of things less stifling for their
industry and trade. Despite the terror inspired by Napoleon's name,
there was, side by side with that terror, that damnable Continental
System which settled the question; it was necessary either to fight or
to succumb. The people of the North were under an imperious necessity
to break that yoke of lead, which made the custom house the prime agent
of the governments of Europe."[442]

Russia had refused to accede to any steps beyond her engagements of
Tilsit; but nowhere was discontent more profound, nowhere opposition
more to be dreaded. While Napoleon was indisputably leading Great
Britain into greater and greater embarrassment, by the depreciation
of her manufactures and by the accumulations of unsalable sugars and
coffees in her warehouses, he was also ruining the agriculture of
Russia and the revenues of her nobles. Despite the relief afforded by
the great licensed fleets, the Tilsit agreements so embarrassed trade,
that hemp, which in 1802 was worth £32 the ton in London, had reached,
in 1809, £118;[443] and other products of the North rose in the same
proportion. At the same time sixty thousand tons of coffee lay in the
London warehouses, unsalable at sixpence the pound, while the price
on the Continent was from four to five shillings, and in places even
seven shillings.[444] No better proof of the efficacious co-working
of Napoleon's system and of the British Orders can be offered; but
the question was one of endurance. Which could stand such a strain
longer? In Russia matters were fast approaching a climax. The czar
felt the ground trembling under his feet;[445] and, while he renewed
his protestations of fidelity to Tilsit and Erfurt, he had to see
Napoleon, by his licenses, evading the restrictions which he at the
same time was pressing his ally to enforce more rigorously. In vain was
the explanation offered that these licenses were but in furtherance of
the restrictive system; that France was unloading her surplus products
upon England, while refusing to receive aught but specie in return; and
that in consequence the exchange was going more and more against Great
Britain. The czar knew better; and the repeated and urgent letters of
the emperor, becoming, as was the wont of Napoleon's requests, rather
peremptory than entreating, to seize and confiscate all neutral ships
entering Russian ports, fell on deaf ears. Alexander feared war; but he
remembered his father's fate, and feared assassination more.

On the 10th of December, 1810, the emperor sent a message to the Senate
announcing that he had annexed to the empire the Hanse towns, together
with the region on the North Sea intervening between them and Holland,
which had been as yet only in military occupation. In the same paper
he expressed his intention of making a canal from the Elbe to Lubeck,
by which the empire should be brought into direct water communication
with the Baltic. This assurance was not calculated to ease the anxiety
of the czar as to the eastward progress of France; but the measure
was accompanied by a circumstance of personal affront, peculiarly
dangerous to an alliance which depended chiefly upon the personal
relations of two absolute sovereigns. The Grand Duke of Oldenburg, one
of the countries thus unceremoniously annexed, was uncle to the czar;
and though Napoleon proposed to indemnify him for the material loss,
by territory taken in the interior of Germany, Alexander would not
accept such satisfaction nor name any compensation that he would think
adequate. He did not threaten war, but he refused to surrender his
grievance, and reserved his right to retaliate an injury.

Meantime very serious results were developing, both in Great Britain
and France, from the strained and abnormal conditions of commerce and
the shocks caused by Napoleon's sudden and tremendous blows at credit,
by his wide-spread confiscations, and by the Baltic seizures. The
triple array of French troops that lined the shores of the Continent,
re-enforced by the belt of British cruisers girding the coasts from the
Ems to Bayonne, and from the Pyrenees to Orbitello, created a barrier
which neither mercantile ingenuity nor popular want could longer evade
to a degree that afforded any real measure of relief. The stolid,
though as yet peaceable, measures of resistance taken by the United
States had added seriously to the embarrassments of Great Britain,
while rather furthering the policy of Napoleon, however contrary this
was to the interests of France. During the years 1808 and 1809, the
continuance of the embargo and of the non-intercourse acts, closing
the North American market, coincided with the opening of the South
American; and a great rush was made by the British mercantile community
for the latter, although it was not, by the number of the inhabitants,
nor by their wealth, nor by their habits of life, at all able to take
the place of the consumers lost in Europe and North America. The goods
sent out in great quantities were injudiciously chosen, as well as
far in excess of the possible requirements; so they remained unsold,
and for the most part uncared for and unhoused, on the beach in South
American ports. The judgment of men seemed to become unhinged amid the
gloom and perplexity of the time, and the frantic desire of each to
save himself increased the confusion. Mere movement, however aimless or
dangerous, is less intolerable than passive waiting.

The years 1809 and 1810 were consequently marked by an extensive
movement in trade, which carried with it an appearance of prosperity
in great part delusive. Immense imports were made from the Baltic, and
from Italy, at the moment that Napoleon's coils were tightening around
them; large shipments also to the North, to South America, and to the
West Indies. In the United States only was there a transient period of
solid transactions; for in May, 1810, the Non-Intercourse Act expired
by its own limitations. A proviso, however, was immediately enacted
that if, before the 3d of March, 1811, either Great Britain or France
should recall their decrees so far as they affected the United States,
the Act should, within three months of the revocation, revive against
the power that maintained its edicts. Napoleon contrived to satisfy
President Madison that his Berlin and Milan decrees were so recalled on
the first of November; but Great Britain refused to consider the terms
of the withdrawal satisfactory, as in truth they were not. The Order
in Council of April 26, 1809, remained in force; and non-intercourse
between the United States and Great Britain again obtained in February,
1811, and continued to the outbreak of the war in 1812.

Toward the end of 1810 the results of the various causes of trouble
began to be heavily felt. Very scant returns coming from South America,
the shippers were unable to discharge their debts to the manufacturers;
and the embarrassments of the latter were felt by their workmen. From
the West Indies the returns came in tropical produce, which could be
realized only on the Continent, long since partly and now effectually
closed. A succession of bad seasons had necessitated the importation
of large quantities of grain from Holland and France, especially in
1809, when an abundant harvest there, coinciding with a very bad crop
in England, induced Napoleon to enter upon his license system, and to
authorize an export which in three years drained £10,000,000 in specie
from the enemy. The freights to the licensed carriers, mostly neutrals
or hostile, at least in name, were also paid in specie, which was thus
taken out of the country; and there was a further drain of gold for
the maintenance of the fleets in distant parts of the world and for
the war in Spain, which now took the place of the former subsidies
to allies as a consumer of British treasure. Thus arose a scarcity
of specie. In November, 1810, the bankruptcies were two hundred and
seventy-three, against one hundred and thirty of the same month a
year before. Stoppages and compositions equalled in number half the
traders of the kingdom. "The general failures have wonderfully affected
manufactures, and want of confidence prevails between manufacturer
and merchant." A month later "bankruptcies continue to increase, and
confidence is nearly at an end. Neither gold nor silver is often to
be seen. The trade of the manufacturing towns is at stand; and houses
fail, not every day, but every hour. In the great sea-ports, the king's
stores are full of all kinds of colonial produce which find no sale.
Despondency is increased by the accounts from the Continent, which
represent all the sea-ports and internal depots of trade to be full of
French soldiers, who seize and burn every article which can possibly
have passed through British hands." As the shadows darkened, murmurs
grew louder and louder against the once popular[446] Orders in Council,
to which all the evil was now attributed. The press changed its tone
upon them, and a gradual agitation for their repeal grew up around the
Opposition leaders; who, from the moment they lost power, had never
ceased to inveigh against the retaliatory system framed by the ministry.

But while disaster was thus thickening about Great Britain, the case
of France was worse. It was quite true, as the emperor said, that the
people could live without sugar and coffee, and that necessity would
in time find ways to produce many articles the import of which was
denied her; but such warped applications of her industry and ingenuity,
even when finally realized, could neither replace the loss of her
natural channels of effort nor for any length of time cope with a
nation, which, however momentarily shaken by unprecedented conditions,
yet kept power continually to renew her strength by contact, through
the sea, with new sources. That Great Britain would do this, her
traditions and the habits of her people were the pledge; and the
credit of the government bore witness to it through all. In the early
part of 1811 a serious commercial crisis occurred in France, causing
great anxiety to Napoleon. It was his particular wish to keep this
corner-stone of the empire prosperous and contented under the immense
demands made upon it for men, and the bitter sufferings entailed by
the conscription. But prosperity was hard to secure with all the
sea outlets of her manufactures and agriculture closed, with only a
continental market, and that impoverished by the universal cessation
of trade and further enfeebled by the exhausting demands made upon the
peoples to support the armies quartered upon them. The British blockade
of the French, Dutch, and Italian coasts forbade absolutely, except
to the limited license trade, the water carriage of raw materials
essential to manufactures, and prevented the export of French luxuries.
"The state of France as it fell under my observation in 1807," wrote
an American traveller, "exhibited a very different perspective" from
that of Great Britain. "The effects of the loss of external trade
were everywhere visible,—in the commercial cities half-deserted, and
reduced to a state of inaction and gloom truly deplorable; in the
inland towns, in which the populace is eminently wretched, and where
I saw not one indication of improvement, but on the contrary numbers
of edifices falling to ruin; on the high roads, where the infrequency
of vehicles and travellers denoted but too strongly the decrease of
internal consumption, and the languor of internal trade; and among the
inhabitants of the country, particularly of the South, whose misery is
extreme, in consequence of the exorbitant taxes, and of the want of
outlet for their surplus produce. In 1807 the number of mendicants in
the inland towns was almost incredible.... The fields were principally
cultivated by women."[447]

All the genius of Napoleon could not create demands when there was not
means to gratify them, and the exquisite products of French taste and
skill labored under the same disadvantage as coffee and sugar, than
which they were even less necessary; men could dispense with them.
Production, stimulated by an exaggerated protection, became for a time
excessive and then ceased; even the exclusion of British manufactures
and the frequent burnings could not secure the continental market to
articles, the raw materials for which were made so dear by the sea
blockade, or by the long land carriage. Levant cotton made its weary
way on horse and mule back, from Turkey, through Illyria, to Trieste,
and thence was duly forwarded to France;[448] but even so, when made
into stuffs, found itself in competition with British cottons which
were landed in Salonica, conveyed on horses and mules through Servia
and Hungary into Vienna, and thence distributed over Germany.[449] In
the same manner was British colonial produce introduced. Despite all
Napoleon's efforts, smuggling continued to compete with and undersell
the fair trader, and his own licenses were used to evade his own
decrees.[450] Many firms in Holland went out of business altogether,
the factories of Lyon closed their doors, and several Paris houses were
in distress; although, like the British warehouses, their stores were
crowded with goods for which they could find no purchasers. Banks could
not recover their advances, internal commerce fell into confusion, and
general disaster followed.

At the same time there was in France, as in Great Britain, much
suffering from bad harvests, and this was aggravated for the former by
the interruption of the coasting trade by the British cruisers, and
by the indifferent character of the inland roads, which, except when
they served the military plans of the emperor, were neglected from the
straitened state of the finances. The government came to the rescue
with various measures of relief, necessarily partial and arbitrary;
designed rather to stave off immediate trouble than to afford a radical
cure for existing difficulties. Yet serious remedies were needed; for
the growing distress of the Continent must continue to react upon
France, which found therein its only customers. In Holland almost all
the former sources of wealth had one by one been cut off; and even
money-lending, which survived the others, became a losing business
from the wide-spread ruin in Europe.[451] In Russia the ruble had
fallen to one third of the value it had before the institution of the
Continental System; although the czar had refused to impose upon his
people and their commerce the decrees of August 5 and October 19, which
Napoleon had forced upon other states. With growing poverty in Europe,
the empire must grow poorer, and in proportion to its loss of wealth
must be the diminution of the revenue. Yet already the revenue was
insufficient to the wants of the state, despite all the extraordinary
resources which had been called up during the past year, and which
could not again be expected. It was not to be hoped that many American
ships would again place themselves within reach of the emperor's
confiscations. The enormous seizures of colonial produce, made by
surprise in the previous August, could not, to any similar extent, be
repeated. The duty of fifty per cent, levied throughout the states
occupied by his troops, on the coffee and sugar which was declared by
the owners, had fallen upon accumulations made during the years of lax
blockade and had brought in large sums; but it now served only as an
inducement to smuggling. Great ingenuity had been shown in devising
extraordinary means for extracting money from the subject peoples,
but every year saw these supplies diminishing. Like slavery, like bad
farming, Napoleon's administration, and especially his army, required
continually new soil[452] and did little to renew or develop the powers
which it taxed; beneficent plans were formed, multitudinous orders
issued, but they received rare fulfilment except when they conduced to
the military efficiency of the state.

There remained two resources. One was economy; and the correspondence
of Napoleon at this period teems with exhortations to his lieutenants,
with denials of money, and with precepts to get all they can out of
the annexed territories, and ask as little as possible from him.[453]
The emperor held in reserve, subject only to his own orders, a great
military treasure which had begun with war contributions, and into
which poured the results of the extraordinary transactions just
mentioned. Five wars had brought into this chest 805,000,000 francs;
but in 1810 there remained but 354,000,000, and he was unwilling to
trench further upon it, unless some grave emergency arose. He hoped
to spare, if not to add to it, by the confiscation of the property of
Spanish nobles who had resisted his change of dynasty, as well as by
the seizure of "false neutrals." Evidently, however, such resources are
precarious, and cannot be compared to those of a commercial state.
Contrasted with Great Britain, the financial expedients of Napoleon
resembled those of a mediæval prince or an Oriental potentate; and in
a strain of endurance, in a question of time, the very artificial, not
to say unnatural, framework of power which he had built could not hope
to outlast the highly organized, essentially modern, and above all
consistently developed society which confronted him. A state of long
standing and fixed traditions may endure the evils of a bad system,
disadvantaged by it, but not ruined; but when the system is new and
rests upon a single man, it asks in vain for the confidence inspired
by a closely knit, yet wide-spreading, body politic whose established
character guarantees the future.

This was clearly shown in the ability of either government to use
the other resource—borrowing—as a means to supplement its deficient
income. Napoleon steadfastly refused to resort to this, alleging that
it was an unjustifiable draft upon the future, and could have but one
result—bankruptcy. He proved easily that Great Britain could not go on
borrowing indefinitely at her present rate. A better reason for his own
abstinence was to be found in the condition of his credit. The public
debt of France under his rule was small, and, as he did not add to it,
it stood at a good figure in the market.[454] His military genius, the
wide flight of his arms, the war contributions, the iniquitous plan by
which he quartered his troops on foreign countries, not merely in war
but in peace, and made them responsible for their maintenance,—measures
such as these, facilitated by frequently recurrent wars and combined
with exactions like those narrated in this chapter, enabled him to meet
his expenditures, accumulate the large reserve fund mentioned, and at
the same time distribute in France an amount of coin which greatly
aided the circulation. But his success imposed upon no one. Everybody
understood that such expedients were essentially transient, that to
renew them meant renewed wars, invasions growing ever wider and wider,
and results dependent always upon military prestige, which a single
lost battle might overthrow. Compared with insecurity such as this, the
fast growing debt of Great Britain possessed a relative solidity; which
even exceeded the absolute confidence felt that the interest would be
regularly paid. Behind her stood the history and the prestige of a
Sea Power which men knew had met many a heavy reverse, yet had never
failed; and which stood before Napoleon more mighty than ever. Far and
wide, through many a sea and in many a land, stretched the roots of her
strength; never more glorious, because never more sorely tried than by
the great emperor. She had credit, he had none.

Savary, one of the most devoted of Napoleon's followers, quotes with
conviction the following words to him of a Parisian banker, in the
early part of 1811: "A humiliating fact, and one which gives the key
to many others, is the state of credit in France and in England.
The English debt amounts to about $3,500,000,000, ours only to
$250,000,000; and yet the English could borrow at need sums much more
considerable than we ourselves could, and above all at an infinitely
more favorable rate. Why this difference? Why is the credit of the
State, in France, lower than the credit of the leading merchants and
bankers; while the reverse is the permanent condition in England? A
word suffices to explain it: To restore one's credit in England, you
have only to work with the government; while to lose one's credit
in France it is only necessary _not_ to keep out of government
transactions. All England is, so to say, a single commercial house,
of which ministers are the directors, the laws the contract, which
power itself cannot infringe. Here the Council of State usurps the
powers of the tribunals, and I could almost say that nothing useful
is done, because _nothing is really guaranteed_."[455] A competent
American witness, before quoted, who had spent two years in France,
wrote, in 1809: "The French rulers, whatever may be their power, are
unable to obtain supplies at home except by _sacrifices equivalent to
the risk which is incurred by contracting with them_. Their credit
abroad may be estimated by the fact, which is so well known to us all,
that no intelligent merchant in this country can be induced, by any
consideration, to make advances in their favor, or to accept a bill on
their treasury, from their highest accredited agent."[456]

While the public credit, that touchstone of prosperity, stood thus
in the two states, the same eye-witness thus describes the relative
condition of the two peoples: "In France the extinction of all public
spirit and of the influence of public opinion, the depopulation and
decay of the great towns, the stern dominion of a military police,
incessantly checked the exultation, natural to the mind, on viewing the
profusion of the bounties bestowed by nature. The pressure of the taxes
was aggravated by the most oppressive rigor in the collection. The
condition of the peasantry as to their food, clothing, and habitations
bore no comparison with the state of the same class in England....
In England, whatever may be the representations of those who, with
little knowledge of the facts, affect to deplore her condition, it is
nevertheless true that there does not exist, and never has existed
elsewhere, so beautiful and perfect a model of public and private
prosperity.... I pay this just tribute of admiration with the more
pleasure, as it is to me in the light of an atonement for the errors
and prejudices under which I labored on this subject, before I enjoyed
the advantage of a personal experience. A residence of nearly two
years in that country—during which period I visited and studied nearly
every part of it, with no other view or purpose than that of obtaining
correct information, and I may add, with previous studies well fitted
to promote my object—convinced me I had been egregiously deceived."[457]

The writer saw England before her sorest trial came. Since 1807, and
especially after 1809, the condition of both nations had grown sensibly
worse. The commercial embarrassments of Great Britain under the
dislocation of her trade and the loss of her markets, occasioned partly
by the Continental System and partly by the American Non-Intercourse
Act, and aggravated by the wild speculations that followed the year
1808, resulted in 1811 in wide-spread disaster,—merchants failing,
manufactories closing, workmen out of employment and starving. In
France the commercial crisis of the same year, extending over the
Continent, soon became a chaos of firms crashing one upon the other and
dragging down, each the other, in its fall.[458] Soon great numbers
of workmen in all the provinces found themselves, like their English
brethren, deprived of occupation. Council upon council was held by the
emperor to ascertain how, by government interference, to remedy the
ills for which governmental interference was immediately responsible.
But, underneath the apparently similar conditions of distress in the
two countries, lay the real difference between a nation shut in, and
thrown back upon itself, and one that kept open its communications with
the world at large. In 1811 Great Britain had already begun to react
through her natural channels; the energies of her people under the load
upon them had been like a strong spring, whose tension remains, though
compressed. The South American trade revived; the Spanish Main took off
the accumulations in the West India Islands, and the latter in turn
began to call for supplies from home; Russia was visibly relenting; in
the Peninsula, Masséna, whose progress had been stopped at the lines of
Torres Vedras, was forced to retreat into Spain in the month of March,
and through a liberated Portugal were found new openings for British
commerce. For France there could be no return of prosperity until the
sea was again free to her, either through her own or through neutral
ships; but the latter could not safely repair to her ports until her
rival revoked the still existing Order in Council, blockading the
whole French and Dutch coast, and this she would not do before the
emperor recalled the decrees upon which rested his Continental System.
And while Great Britain was making appalling drafts upon the future
in her ever-mounting debt, France was exhausting a capital which no
forcing power could replace, by her anticipated conscriptions, which
led to a revolt far more menacing than the riots of English workmen.
Sixty thousand "refractory" conscripts were scattered through the
departments, and among the forests of western, central, and southern
France, refusing to join their regiments and defying the authorities.
They were pursued by flying columns of old soldiers; who, often long
strangers to their own countrymen, took with their property the same
liberties they had practised in foreign parts. In January, 1811, the
whole conscription for the year was called out, and in midsummer that
for 1812; but no legal measures could make men of the boys sent to die
before the virile age,[459] more often of exposure than by the hands of
the enemy, in the gloomy mountains and parched plains of Spain.

The great struggle of endurance, "of the highest individual genius
against the resources and institutions of a great nation"[460] who
stayed its power on the sea, was now drawing near its close; the battle
between the sea and the land was about to terminate in one of the most
impressive and gigantic military catastrophes recorded by history.
But the inevitable end was already clearly indicated before Napoleon
started for Russia, although the dim vision of weary eyes in England,
strained by long watching, saw not that which the apprehensions of
Frenchmen, troubled with the anguish of France, tremblingly felt. The
credit of France was gone; nor could her people bear any added burdens,
until the sea, over which Great Britain still moved unresisted, was
open to them. The people of the Continent had become bitterly hostile
through the sufferings caused by the blockade, and the imperial
power could only be maintained by an army which was itself filled by
borrowing upon the future; its capital, its reserve, was fast being
exhausted.[461] The question of physical endurance was settled; the
only point really left in doubt was that of moral endurance. Would
Great Britain and the British government have the nerve to hold out
till the emperor was exhausted?[462] Already the agitation for the
repeal of the Orders in Council, with which the existing ministry
was identified, was becoming ominous. The leaders of the Opposition
were opposed to the Peninsular war; and Napier has vividly shown the
doubts and hesitations of the ministry as to sustaining that great
enterprise which compelled Napoleon to such waste of life, to such a
fatal division of his force. Time was not allowed to test to the utmost
British tenacity; the darkest hour was fast passing away, the clouds
began to break and the day to dawn.

Three weeks after Napoleon's annexation of the Hanse towns and of
the Duchy of Oldenburg, on the last day of the year 1810, Alexander
put forth a commercial ukase which under all the circumstances had
the appearance of retaliatory action; and at the least drew a sharp
line between his commercial policy and the Continental System as
inculcated by Napoleon. The decree expressly permitted the entrance
of colonial produce under neutral flags; and many articles of French
manufacture were virtually denied admission, by not being included in
a list of goods which could be introduced on payment of duty. In vain
did the czar assert that his object was to develop, by protection,
Russian manufactures of the excluded articles. Napoleon rejected
the explanation. "The last ukase," he wrote in a personal letter to
Alexander, "is at bottom, but yet more in form, specially directed
against France."[463] But while the exclusion of French products was
the most open, the admission of neutral ships with colonial produce was
the most significant, feature of the edict. This was the point upon
which the emperor had been most importunate; here was the leak which,
in his judgment, was sinking the ship. "Six hundred English merchant
ships," he had written in a previous letter, October 23, 1810,[464]
"wandering in the Baltic, have been refused admission to Prussian
ports and those of Mecklenburg, and have steered for your Majesty's
states. If you admit them the war still lasts.... Your Majesty knows
that if you confiscate them we shall have peace. Whatever their papers,
under whatever names they are masked, French, German, Spanish, Danish,
Russian, your Majesty may be sure they are English."

Later, on the 4th of November,[465] Napoleon wrote through the
ordinary ministerial channels: "There are no neutrals. Whatever the
papers produced, they are false. Not a single ship enters Russia with
so-called American papers but comes really from England.[466] Peace or
war is in the hands of Russia. Let her confiscate all ships brought
in by the English, and join France in demanding of Sweden the seizure
of the immense quantity of merchandise the English have landed at
Gottenburg under various flags. If Russia wishes peace with England,
she has here the means. But Russia has followed opposite principles,
and of this but one proof need be given: that is, that the colonial
merchandise which appeared at the last Leipzig fair was brought there
by seven hundred wagons coming from Russia; that to-day all the traffic
in that merchandise is done through Russia; finally, that the twelve
hundred ships which the English have convoyed by twenty ships of war,
disguised under Swedish, Portuguese, Spanish, American flags, have in
part landed their cargoes in Russia." To these complaints Alexander
had replied that he had adhered, and would adhere, to his engagements
and exclude British ships; but that he would not, and could not, go
beyond them and forbid neutrals. The ukase of December 31 took the
matter out of diplomatic discussion, and, coming so immediately upon
the annexation of Oldenburg, had the appearance of defiance. As such
Napoleon accepted it. "This seems," he wrote in the personal letter of
February 28 above quoted, "a change of system. All Europe so regards
it; and already our alliance no longer exists, in the opinion of
England and of Europe.... If your Majesty abandons the alliance and
burns the conventions of Tilsit, it would be evident that war would
follow a few months sooner or later. The result must be, on either
side, to strain the resources of our empires in preparations.... If
your Majesty has not the purpose of reconciliation with England, you
will see the necessity, for yourself and for me, of dissipating all
these clouds." From that time both sovereigns prepared for war.

The turn of affairs in the North at this time, and during the
succeeding critical twelvemonth, was powerfully influenced by the
presence of a great British fleet in the Baltic and by the extreme
discretion of its admiral. Napoleon had compelled Sweden to follow
up her exclusion of British ships by a formal declaration of war,
which was issued November 17, 1810. The British minister had to
leave Stockholm; and, after his departure, the political as well as
military direction of affairs on the spot was under the conduct of
Sir James Saumarez. That most distinguished and admirable officer had
thoroughly appreciated, during his three summers in the Baltic, the
feelings of the Swedish rulers and people; and it was chiefly owing
to his representations to his own government, and to his steadily
conciliatory action, that the formal war never became actual. He
resisted with dignity and firmness every attempt on the part of the
Swedish authorities to carry out Napoleon's orders to confiscate; but
he did not allow himself to be moved, by such occasional yielding on
their part, to any act of retaliation. Good feeling between the two
nations centred around his attractive personality, and facilitated the
essential, but difficult, conciliation between Sweden and Russia. The
entire license trade was under the protection of his fleet, which
had charge also of the suppression of privateering, of the police
of the hostile coasts, and of the interruption of communications
between Denmark and Norway.[467] Its presence virtually insured the
independence of Sweden against France and Russia, except during the
winter months, when compelled to leave the Baltic; and its numbers
and character gave the Swedish government a sufficient excuse for not
proceeding to the extremities demanded by Napoleon. During the summer
of 1811 the flag-ship was the centre of the secret consultations which
went on between the two states, to which Russia also, having finally
rejected Napoleon's terms, soon became a party; and towards the end of
the season the negotiation, practically completed by the admiral, was
formally concluded with a British plenipotentiary. It was determined to
keep up the appearance of war, but with the understanding that Sweden
would join the alliance of Great Britain and Russia. The czar had
then no cause to fear that, in the approaching contest with the great
conqueror, he should find a hostile Sweden on his flank and rear.[468]

The preparations of Napoleon for the great Russian campaign occupied
the year 1811. It was his intention to carry on a vigorous warfare in
the Spanish peninsula, while collecting the immense forces of every
kind needed in the north of Germany. But the unsatisfactory character
of many of the soldiers gathering on the Elbe, among them being tens
of thousands of refractory conscripts and foreign nationalities,
compelled him to withdraw from Spain in the latter part of 1811 some
forty thousand veterans, whose place was to be filled by levies of
an inferior character, which, moreover, did not at once appear. The
fortune of war in the Peninsula during the year had varied in different
quarters. On the east coast General Suchet had brought Tortosa to
capitulate on the 1st of January. Thence advancing to the south he
reduced Tarragona by siege and assault on the 28th of June,—an exploit
which obtained for him his grade of Marshal of France. Still moving
forward, according to Napoleon's general plan and instructions to
him, the end of the year found him before the city of Valencia, which
surrendered on the 9th of January, 1812. But to obtain these later
successes, at the time that so many hardened warriors were removed from
the Peninsula, it had been necessary to support Suchet with divisions
taken from the centre and west, to abandon the hope entertained of
combining another great attempt against Lisbon, and also to withdraw
Marmont's corps from the valley of the Tagus to a more northern
position, around Salamanca and Valladolid. At this time Wellington
occupied a line on the frontiers of Portugal, north of the Tagus,
resting on the city of Almeida and facing Ciudad Rodrigo. The latter,
with Badajoz, on the Guadiana, constituted the two supports to the
strong barrier by which the emperor proposed to check any offensive
movements of the enemy upon Spain.

The year had been passed by the British general in patient contention
with the innumerable difficulties, political and military, of his
situation. Masséna had indeed been forced to withdraw from Portugal
in April, but since that time Wellington had been balked, in every
attempt, by superior numbers and by the strength of the positions
opposed to him. His reward was now near at hand. On the 8th of January,
1812, he suddenly appeared before Ciudad Rodrigo, favored in his
movements by the pre-occupation of Marmont, who was engaged in the
reorganization and arrangements necessitated by the withdrawal of so
many troops for the Russian war, and also deceived by the apparent
inactivity in the British lines. The siege was pushed with a vigor that
disregarded the ordinary rules of war, and the place was successfully
stormed on the 19th of January. As rapidly as the nature of the
country, the season, and other difficulties would permit, Wellington
moved to the south, intending to attack Badajoz. On the 16th of March
the place was invested, and though most ably defended by a governor of
unusual ability, it was snatched out of the hands of Marshal Soult by
the same audacity and disregard of ordinary methods that had bereft
Marmont of the sister fortress. Badajoz was stormed on the night of the
6th of April; and the Spanish frontier then lay open to the British,
to be crossed as soon as their numbers, or the mistakes of the enemy,
should justify the attempt.

Thus opened the fatal year 1812. The clouds breaking away, though
scarce yet perceptibly, for Great Britain, were gathering in
threatening masses on the horizon of Napoleon. A painful picture is
drawn by his eulogist, M. Thiers, of the internal state of the empire
at this time. An excessively dry season had caused very short crops
throughout Europe, and want had produced bread riots in England, as
well as in France and elsewhere. But such demonstrations of popular
fury were far more dangerous and significant, in a country where all
expression of opinion had been so rigorously controlled as in the
empire, and in a capital which concentrates and leads, as only Paris
does, the feelings of a nation. The discontent was heightened and
deepened by the miseries of the conscription, which ate ever deeper
and deeper, wringing the heart of every family, and becoming more and
more extreme as each succeeding enterprise became vaster than those
before it, and as the excessive demands, by reducing the quality of
the individual victims, required ever growing numbers. Six hundred
thousand men had been poured into Spain, three hundred thousand of whom
had died there.[469] Besides the immense masses carried forward to the
confines of Poland, and those destined for the Peninsula, there was to
be a powerful reserve between the Elbe and the Rhine, another behind
the Rhine in France itself, and to these Napoleon now proposed to add
yet a third, of one hundred and twenty thousand so-called national
guards, taken from the conscription of the four last years and legally
not liable to the call. Throughout the great cities there was growing
irritation, rising frequently to mutiny, with loud popular outcries,
and again the number of refractory conscripts, of whom forty thousand
had been arrested the year before, rose to fifty thousand; again flying
columns pursued them through all the departments. Caught, shut up in
the islands off the coasts, whence they could not escape, and, when
drilled, marched under strong guard to the ends of Europe, they none
the less contrived often to desert; and everywhere the people, hating
the emperor, received them with open arms and passed them back, from
hand to hand, to their homes. Thus amid starvation, misery, weeping,
and violence, the time drew near for Napoleon to complete his great
military undertaking of conquering the sea by the land.

In the North the situation had finally developed according to the
wishes of Great Britain. The secret understanding of 1811 had resulted
in January, 1812, in another commercial ukase, allowing many British
manufactures to be introduced into Russia. On the 5th of April a
secret treaty was concluded with Sweden, ceding Finland to Russia,
but assuring to the former power Norway, of which Denmark was to be
deprived. Relieved now on her northern flank, Russia soon after made
peace with Turkey under the mediation of Great Britain. Thus with both
hands freed she awaited the oncoming of Napoleon.

On the 9th of May, 1812, the emperor left Paris to take command of his
forces in Poland; and on the 24th of June the imperial army, to the
number of four hundred thousand men, crossed the Niemen and entered
Russia. Two hundred thousand more followed close behind. The preceding
day, June 23, the British Orders in Council of 1807 and 1809 were
revoked, as to the United States of America. It was too late. War
had been declared by Congress, and the declaration approved by the
President, five days before, on the 18th of June, 1812.

       *       *       *       *       *

In narrating the extraordinary, and indeed unparalleled, series of
events which reach their climax in the Berlin and Milan Decrees
and the Orders in Council, the aim has been to compress the story
within the closest limits consistent with clearness, and at the same
time to indicate the mutual connection of the links in the chain;
how one step led to another; and how throughout the whole, amid
apparent inconsistencies, there is an identity of characteristics,
not impossible to trace, from the outbreak of the Revolution to the
downfall of Napoleon. To do this it has been thought expedient to
suppress a mass of details, much of a very interesting character,
bearing upon the working of the two opposing systems. The influence of
the military element of Sea Power, the function of the British navy,
after Trafalgar, has also been passed over in silence. When that great
disaster wrecked Napoleon's naval hopes, and convinced him that not
for many years could he possibly gather the ships and train the seamen
necessary to meet his enemy in battle upon the ocean, he seized with
his usual sagacity the one only remaining means of ruining her, and
upon that concentrated his great energies. The history of Europe and
of the civilized world, after 1805, turned upon this determination
to destroy Great Britain through her commerce; and the decision was
forced upon the mighty emperor by the power of the British navy, and
the wise resolve of the government not to expose her land forces to
his blows, until peculiarly favorable circumstances should justify so
doing. The opportunity came with the Spanish uprising; and, by one of
those coincidences not uncommon in history, with the hour came the man.
The situation was indeed of the most favorable for Great Britain. The
theatre of war, surrounded on three sides by water, was for the French
a salient thrust far out into the enemy's domain on the sea, while its
interior features and the political character of the people, incapable
of cohesion and organized effort, made the struggle one eminently alien
to the emperor's genius; for it gave no opportunity for those brilliant
combinations and lightning-like blows in which he delighted. To the
British the Peninsula offered the advantage that the whole coast line
was a base of operations; while every friendly port was a bridge-head
by which to penetrate, or upon which, in case of reverse, to retire,
with a sure retreat in the sea beyond.

The course pursued by each of the two governments, in this great
enterprise of commerce-destroying, may be looked at from the two points
of view, of policy and of rightfulness.

In the matter of policy, both Napoleon's decrees and the Orders in
Council have been fiercely assailed and extensively argued. In so broad
and complicated a subject, a probable conclusion can only be reached
by disregarding the mass of details, of statistics, with which the
disputants have rather obscured than elucidated the subject, and by
seeking the underlying principle which guided, or should have guided,
either government. It is possible to form a very strong argument, for
or against either, by fastening upon the inevitable inconveniences
entailed upon each nation by the measures of its adversary and by its
own course. It is by impressions received from these incidents—or
accidents—the accompaniments rather than the essentials of the
two systems, that the debates of Parliament and the conclusions of
historians have been colored.

As the combined tendency of the two policies, fully carried out, was
to destroy neutral trade in Europe, the preponderance of injury must
fall upon the nation which most needed the concurrence of the neutral
carrier. That nation unquestionably was France.[470] Even in peace,
as before stated, much more than half her trade was done in neutral
bottoms; the war left her wholly dependent upon them. Alike to export
and to import she must have free admission of neutral ships to her
ports. Prior to the Berlin decree the British made no pretence to
stop this; but they did, by reviving in 1804 the Rule of 1756, and
by Fox's decree of May, 1806, blockading the coast from Brest to the
Elbe, betray an apprehension of the result to themselves of the neutral
trade with France. This should have put the emperor upon his guard. The
very anxieties shown by a people of such mercantile aptitudes should
have been most seriously regarded, as betraying where their immediate
danger lay. The American market was a most important benefit to them,
but American merchant ships threatened to be a yet more important
injury. These having, under the circumstances of the war, a practical
monopoly of carrying West India produce which exceeded in quality and
quantity that of the British Islands, were underselling the latter on
the Continent. The ill effect of this was partially obviated by the
Rule of 1756; but there remained the fear that they would absorb, and
be absorbed by, the commerce of the Continent; that to it, and to it
alone, they would carry both articles of consumption and raw materials
for manufacture; and that from it, and from it alone, they would take
away manufactured articles with which Great Britain up to the present
time had supplied them,—and, through them, large tracts of Spanish
America.

Up to 1804 the course of trade had been for American ships to load for
continental ports, receive there the greater part of the payment for
their cargoes in bills of exchange on the Continent, and with these
to go to British ports and pay for British manufactures, with which
they completed their lading. If, on the other hand, they went from
home direct to Great Britain, the cargoes they carried were in excess
of British consumption, and so far were profitable to Great Britain
chiefly as to a middleman, who re-exported them to the Continent. But,
when Pitt returned to power, this course of trade was being sensibly
modified. American ships were going more and more direct to the
Continent, there completing their cargoes and sailing direct for home.
Continental manufactures were supplanting British, though not in all
kinds, because the American carrier found it more profitable to take
them as his return freight; just as the produce of continental colonies
was, through the same medium, cutting under British coffees, sugars,
and other tropical products. British merchants were alarmed because,
not only their merchant shipping, but the trade it carried was being
taken away; and British statesmen saw, in the decay of their commerce,
the fall of the British navy which depended upon it.

It was plainly the policy of Napoleon to further a change which of
itself was naturally growing, and which yet depended wholly upon the
neutral carrier. The latter was the key of the position; he was, while
war lasted, essentially the enemy of Great Britain, who needed him
little, and the friend of France, who needed him much. Truth would
have justified England in saying, as she felt, that every neutral was
more or less serving France. But in so doing the neutral was protected
by the conventions of international law and precedent, which the
British mind instinctively reveres, and for violating which it must
have an excuse. This the emperor, whose genius inclined essentially
to aggressive and violent action, promptly afforded. Overlooking the
evident tendency of events, unmindful of the experience of 1798, he
chose to regard the order of blockade of May, 1806, as a challenge, and
issued the Berlin decree, which he was powerless to carry out unless
the neutral ship came into a port under his control. He thus drove the
latter away, lost its services, and gave Great Britain the excuse she
was seeking for still further limiting its sphere of action, under the
plea of retaliation upon France and her associates. And a most real
retaliation it was. Opposition orators might harp on the definition
of the word, and carp at the method as striking neutrals and not the
enemy. Like Napoleon, they blinked at the fundamental fact that, while
Great Britain ruled the sea, the neutral was the ally of her enemy.

The same simple principle vindicates the policy of the British
ministry. Folios of argument and oratory have been produced to show
the harm suffered by Great Britain in this battle over Commerce.
Undoubtedly she suffered,—perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to
say she nearly died; but when two combatants enter the lists, not for
a chivalric parade but for life and death, it is not the incidental
injuries, but the preponderance of harm done and the relative
endurance, which determine the issue. To the same test of principle
must be referred the mistakes in details charged against British
ministries. Military writers say that, when the right strategic line of
effort is chosen, mistakes of detail are comparatively harmless, and
even a lost battle is not fatal. When France decided, practically, to
suppress the concurrence of the neutral carrier, she made a strategic
blunder; and when Great Britain took advantage of the mistake, she
achieved a strategic success, which became a triumph.

As regards the rightfulness of the action of the two parties, viewed
separately from their policy, opinions will probably always differ,
according to the authority attributed by individuals to the _dicta_ of
International Law. It may be admitted at once that neither Napoleon's
decrees nor the British orders can be justified at that bar, except
by the simple plea of self-preservation,—the first law of states even
more than of men; for no government is empowered to assent to that last
sacrifice, which the individual may make for the noblest motives. The
beneficent influence of the mass of conventions known as International
Law is indisputable, nor should its authority be lightly undermined;
but it cannot prevent the interests of belligerents and neutrals from
clashing, nor speak with perfect clearness in all cases where they do.
Of this the Rule of 1756 offered, in its day, a conspicuous instance.
The belligerent claimed that the neutral, by covering with his flag a
trade previously the monopoly of the enemy, not only inflicted a grave
injury by snatching from him a lawful prey, but was guilty likewise
of a breach of neutrality; the neutral contended that the enemy had
a right to change his commercial regulations, in war as well as in
peace. To the author, though an American, the belligerent argument
seems the stronger; nor was the laudable desire of the neutral for gain
a nobler motive than the solicitude, about their national resources,
of men who rightly believed themselves engaged in a struggle for
national existence. The measure meted to Austria and Prussia was an
ominous indication of the fate Great Britain might expect, if her
strength failed her. But, whatever the decision of our older and milder
civilization on the merits of the particular question, there can be
no doubt of the passionate earnestness of the two disputants in their
day, nor of the conviction of right held by either. In such a dilemma,
the last answer of International Law has to be that every state is the
final judge as to whether it should or should not make war; to its own
self alone is it responsible for the rightfulness of this action. If,
however, the condition of injury entailed by the neutral's course is
such as to justify war, it justifies all lesser means of control. The
question of the rightfulness of these disappears, and that of policy
alone remains.

It is the business of the neutral, by his prepared condition, to make
impolitic that which he claims is also wrong. The neutral which fails
to do so, which leaves its ports defenceless and its navy stunted until
the emergency comes, will then find, as the United States found in the
early years of this century, an admirable opportunity to write State
Papers.




CHAPTER XIX.

SUMMARY—THE FUNCTION OF SEA POWER AND THE POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN IN
THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS.


The outbreak of the French Revolutionary War found Great Britain
unprepared. For nearly ten years her course had been directed by the
second Pitt, who, though inheriting the lofty spirit and indomitable
constancy of his father, yet loved peace rather than war, and sought
the greatness and prosperity of his country through the development
of her commerce and manufactures and the skilful management of her
finances. He strove also consistently for the reduction of expenditure,
including that for the military, and even for the naval establishment.
As late as February 17, 1792, when the Revolution had already been
nearly three years in progress and France was on the eve of declaring
war against Prussia and Austria, he avowed his expectation of many
years of peace for the British empire; and the estimates provided
for only sixteen thousand seamen and marines. "Unquestionably," said
he, "there never was a time in the history of this country, when,
from the situation of Europe, we might more reasonably expect fifteen
years of peace than at the present moment." When the war with Germany
began, Great Britain proclaimed and steadily maintained an attitude of
neutrality; and the Minister asserted over and over again, to France
and to her enemies, the intention not to interfere with the internal
affairs of that country. This purpose continued unshaken through
the tremendous events of the succeeding summer and autumn; through
the assaults on the Tuileries on June 20 and August 10, through the
suspension of the king which immediately followed the latter date,
through the revolting massacres of September, finally through the
deposition of the King and the proclamation of the Republic. Doubtless
these events gave a series of shocks to public opinion in Great
Britain, alienating the friends and embittering the enemies of the
Revolution; doubtless whatever sympathy with the French advance towards
freedom the ministers felt was chilled and repelled by the excesses and
anarchy which marked its steps; but, whatever their personal feelings,
no indication appears, either in their public actions or in their
private correspondence as since revealed, of any intention to depart
from a strict, even though cold, neutrality, until near the end of the
year 1792.

The leaders of the party in France, which at this time was exerting
the greatest influence upon the course of the Revolution, had long
favored war with foreign nations, as the surest means to destroy the
monarchy and unite public feeling in favor of the Republic and of the
Revolution. The course of events had justified their forecast. Prussia
and Austria had given provocation; and, although the latter at least
would not have proceeded to extremes, war had been proclaimed and the
fall of the monarchy had followed. There was, however, one nation with
which the revolutionists imagined themselves to be in sympathy, and
which they thought also as a whole sympathized with them. That nation
was the English; between England and France there was to be friendship,
and concurrence of effort to a common end. Herein the French leaders
fatally misconceived the character of English freedom, and the nature
of its successive advances to the conditions in which it then stood,
and through which Englishmen hoped for yet further enlargement.
Reverence for the past, and, in the main, for the existing order of
things; profound regard for law and for an orderly method of making
needful changes; a constant reference to the old rights and customs
of the English people; respect for vested rights, for agreements, for
treaties,—such were the checks which had modified and controlled the
actions of the English, even when most profoundly moved. The spirit
which dominated the French Revolution was that of destruction. The
standard, by which all things human were to be tried, was a declaration
of human rights put forth by its leaders, which contained indeed many
noble, true, and most essential principles; but, if aught existing did
not at once square with those principles, the forces of the Revolution
were to advance against it and sweep it from the face of the earth.
No respect for the past, no existent prescriptive rights, no treaties
that seemed contrary to natural rights, were to control the actions
of the revolutionists. They were to destroy, and to rebuild from the
foundation, according to their own interpretation of what justice
demanded.

The courses and aims, therefore, of the two nations were wholly
divergent, and, as these were but the expression in either case of the
national temper, the hope of sympathy and concurrence was delusive;
but it was a natural delusion, fostered in the hearts of the sanguine
Frenchmen by the utterances of many warm-hearted friends of freedom in
the rival nation, and by the more violent words of a limited number of
revolutionary societies. The former of these were, however, quickly
alienated by the atrocities which began to stain the progress of the
Revolution; while the latter, being supposed by the French leaders to
represent the feeling of the British nation, as distinguished from its
Government, contributed to draw them further in that path of reckless
enmity to existing institutions which led to the war with Great
Britain.

Still, so long as the exponents of French public feeling confined
themselves to violent and irregular action within their own borders,
and to declamations, which did not go beyond words, against the
governments and institutions of other nations, the British ministry
remained quiet, though watchful. There are extant private letters,
written in the early part of November, 1792, by the Prime Minister, and
by his relative, Lord Grenville, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which
indicate that they rejoiced in having maintained the neutrality of
Great Britain, and that they looked forward to its continuance, though
with anxiety. But on the 19th of that month the National Convention,
which then comprised within itself both the executive and legislative
functions of the French Government, adopted a declaration that it would
grant fraternity and succor to _all_ people who should wish to recover
their liberty;[471] and it charged administrative officers to give
republican generals the necessary orders to carry help to those people
and to defend their citizens who had been molested, or who might be
subject to molestation, on account of their devotion to the cause of
liberty. As if further to emphasize the scope of this decree, for such
in effect it was, it was ordered to be translated and printed in all
languages.

By this official action the French Government had taken a great and
important step, radically modifying its relations to all other states.
The decree did not mention the governments with which France was then
at war, limiting to their people the application of its terms. On the
contrary, when a member of the Convention, a month later, proposed
to insert words which should restrict its operation to those peoples
"against whose tyrants France was, or should hereafter be, at war,"
and gave, as his reason, to remove the uneasiness of Great Britain,
the motion found no support. The previous question was moved, and the
Convention passed on to other business.[472]

The men who then wielded the power of France had thus gone beyond a
simple inveighing against other governments, and the mere use of words
calculated to excite discontent among the people of other states, and
had announced an intention to interfere forcibly in their internal
affairs whenever called upon to do so by citizens who, in the opinion
of the French Government, were deprived of their just liberty or
molested in their efforts to recover it. The anarchist of our own
day, who contents himself with verbally attacking existing laws and
institutions, however vehemently, may remain untouched so long as he
confines himself to the expression and advocacy of his opinions; but
when he incites others to action in order to carry out his ideas, he
is held responsible for the effect of his words; and when he takes
measures leading to violence, he is open to arrest and punishment. Such
as this, among governments, was the step taken by France in November,
1792. She not only incited the citizens of other states to rebellion,
but announced her intention of supporting them, and gave to her
generals the necessary orders for carrying that purpose into effect.

Meanwhile the Austrian Netherlands was rapidly overrun and annexed
to the French Republic, which thus abandoned the lofty posture of
disinterestedness, and the disclaimers of all desire for conquest
which the leaders of the Revolution had made from the tribune of the
Convention. Soon after followed a decree declaring the navigation of
the Scheldt, the great artery of Belgium, open to the sea. This set
aside, without negotiation, the compacts of the previous owners of the
Netherlands, by which the navigation of the river from the sea was
reserved to Holland, within whose territory the mouth lay,—an agreement
consecrated by renewed treaties, and which, by long standing, had
become part of the public law of Europe. The act strikingly showed
the determination of the French leaders to disregard treaties which
conflicted with their construction of the natural rights of man; for
they were at peace with Holland, yet made no attempt to obtain their
end by negotiation.

The interests and the peace of Great Britain were now seriously
threatened. For over a century her statesmen had held, and held
rightly, that the possession of Belgium by France was incompatible
with her security. They had supported the legal, though iniquitous,
claim of the Dutch to the exclusive navigation of the Scheldt; and,
above all, the country was bound by a treaty of alliance to defend
Holland, whose rights as defined by treaty had been rudely set aside by
France. Moreover, on the 28th of November deputations from the British
revolutionary societies were received at the bar of the Convention, and
the President of the latter, in reply to their address, made a speech
strongly hostile to the British Government, affecting to distinguish
between it and the people over whom it ruled; a pretence which was
equally maintained in the United States of America, where the French
minister the following year dared to appeal openly to the people
against the policy of their government.

On the 1st of December the British Government issued a proclamation,
calling out the militia on account of seditions and insurrectionary
movements dangerous to the state, and at the same time, as required
by law, summoned Parliament to meet on the 15th. The hopes and the
patience of Pitt were alike exhausted; and although he still continued
to listen to any overtures that contained a promise of peace, he had
determined to exact guarantees, amounting to more than words, which
should assure the safety of Great Britain and her ally, Holland.
Meantime the British forces should be organized and got ready to act.
The French Government had proclaimed its intention of interfering in
the affairs and overthrowing the institutions of all states, when,
in its judgment, their citizens were molested in their efforts for
freedom. To await supinely the moment when it should please France to
act would be the decision of folly; nor was it possible, for one imbued
with English traditions, to view without distrust a government which
appeared to look for justice by disregarding law, and avowedly disowned
existing compacts and treaties in favor of a speculative somewhat
called the Rights of Man, concerning which, its own passions being the
judge, revelations as numerous might be expected as were vouchsafed to
Mahomet.

There are some who can only account for the different lines of
action followed by Pitt, before and after 1792, in both cases with
the indomitable tenacity of his race and lineage, by conceiving
two entirely different personalities in the same man,—a sudden and
portentous change, unprecedented save by miracle as in the case of
St. Paul. More truly may be seen in him the same man acting under
circumstances wholly different, and in the later instance unforeseen.
It was not given to Pitt to read the future of the French Revolution
with the prophetic eye of Burke. He had the genius, not of the seer,
but of the man of affairs; but that he had the latter in an eminent
degree is evident from the very rapidity of the change, when he was
at last forced to the conviction that external conditions were wholly
changed. He was at heart the minister of peace, the financier, the
promoter of commerce and of gradual and healthy reforms; but in a great
speech, delivered before he had begun to fear that peace would end in
his time, he impressed upon his hearers his own profound conviction
that all the blessings which England then enjoyed rested upon the union
of liberty with law. Having enumerated the material circumstances to
which the existing prosperity of the nation was to be ascribed, he
continued:—

     "But these are connected with others more important. They are
     obviously and necessarily connected with the duration of peace,
     the continuance of which, on a secure and durable footing,
     must ever be the first object of the foreign policy of this
     country. They are connected _still more_ with its internal
     tranquillity, and with the natural effects of a free but
     well-regulated government.... This is the great and governing
     cause, the operation of which has given scope to all the other
     circumstances which I have enumerated. It is the union of liberty
     with law, which, by raising a barrier equally firm against the
     encroachments of power and the violence of popular commotion,
     affords to property its just security, produces the exertion
     of genius and labor, the extent and solidity of credit, the
     circulation and increase of capital; which forms and upholds
     the national character and sets in motion all the springs which
     actuate the great mass of the community through all its various
     descriptions.... On this point, therefore, let us principally
     fix our attention; let us preserve this first and most essential
     object, and every other is in our power."[473]

It was perfectly consistent with this position that, when Pitt saw
a neighboring state in convulsions from the struggle of a turbulent
minority for liberty without law; when that state had not only
proclaimed its purpose, but taken steps to promote a similar condition
in other nations; when societies representing a small, but active and
radical, minority in England were openly fraternizing with France;
when the great leader of the English Opposition had, from his seat in
Parliament, praised the French soldiery for joining the mobs,—it was
perfectly consistent with his past that Pitt should oppose with all his
powers a course of action which not only endangered the internal peace
upon which the prosperity of England rested, but also carried into the
realm of international relations the same disorganizing principles, the
same disregard for law, covenant, and vested right that had reduced
France to her then pitiful condition. Not only Great Britain, but
the European world was threatened with subversion. That Pitt did not
bewail aloud the wreck of his hopes, the frustration of his career,
the diversion of his energies from the path that was dearest to him,
shows the strength, not the instability, of the man. That he laid aside
the reforms he had projected, and discouraged all movements towards
internal change, which, by dividing the wills of the people, might
weaken their power for external action, proves but that concentration
of purpose which, sacrificing present gratification to future good,
achieves great ends. Never does the trained seaman appear greater,
has well said the naval novelist Cooper, than when, confronted with
unexpected peril, he turns all his energies from the path in which they
were before directed, to meet the new danger. "Never," writes Lanfrey
of the critical period between Essling and Wagram, "had the maxim
of sacrificing the accessory to the principal, of which Napoleon's
military conceptions afford so many admirable examples, _and which is
true in every art_, been applied with more activity and fitness....
The complications which he most feared were to him, for the moment, as
though they did not exist. No secondary event had power to draw him
off from the great task he had primarily assigned to himself."[474]
All instinctively recognize the courage as well as the wisdom of this
conduct in the dangers which the seaman and the soldier are called to
meet; why deny its application to the no less urgent, and at times
more momentous, issues presented to the statesman? If, as may fairly
be claimed, it is to the maritime power of Great Britain that Europe
owes the arrest of a subversive revolution, if to that maritime power
is due that a great, irresistible, and beneficent movement toward the
liberty and welfare of the masses survived a convulsion that threatened
its destruction, then to Pitt, as the master spirit who directed the
movements of the British nation, the gratitude of Europe is also due.

When Parliament met on the 15th of December, the king's speech
mentioned the disturbances that had taken place in the country and the
threatening state of affairs in Europe, and recommended an increase in
the land and sea forces of the kingdom. This measure was alleged, among
other grievances by France, as indicating an unfriendly feeling toward
her on the part of the British Government; but it has been reasonably
urged that she had already manned a fleet superior to that which Great
Britain had in commission, besides keeping ready for instant service a
large number of other ships, which could have no possible enemy except
the British navy. Viewed simply as measures of precaution, of the
necessity for which every state is its own judge, it is difficult to
criticise severely either government; but the fact remains that France
had been the first to arm her fleet, and that Great Britain did not do
the same until substantial grounds of offence had been given.

By a singular coincidence, on the same day that Parliament met, the
National Convention issued a second celebrated decree, yet more
decisive in its character than that of November 19, which it was
evidently meant to emphasize and supplement. The generals of the
Republic were now directed "in every country which the armies of the
French Republic shall occupy, to announce the abolition of all existing
authorities, of nobility, of serfage, of every feudal right and every
monopoly; to proclaim the sovereignty of the people and convoke the
inhabitants in assemblies to form a provisional government, to which
no officer of a former government, no noble, nor any member of the
former privileged corporations, shall be eligible." To this was
added the singular and most significant declaration that "the French
nation will treat as enemies any people which, refusing liberty and
equality, desires to preserve its prince and privileged castes, or to
make any accommodation with them." It was impossible to announce more
clearly that this was no mere war of opinions, but, on the contrary,
one of principles and methods fraught with serious and practical
consequences; nor could any despot have worded a more contemptuous
denial of the rights of a people concerning their form of government.
The revolutionary spirit, which underlay the frequent changes of men
in the French Government, showed how fixed was its purpose to alter
forcibly the institutions of other states, regardless of the habits
and affections of their citizens, by the systems imposed upon the
smaller neighboring nations, hammered all upon the anvil of French
centralization, in defiance of the wishes and the struggles of the
people concerned. Europe thus found itself face to face with a movement
as enthusiastic in its temper and as radical in its demands as the
invasions of the Mahometans.

To this fanatical, yet lofty, and in the masses of the French people
generous and devoted spirit, continental Europe had no equal force
to oppose. It is a common remark that the eighteenth century saw the
appearance of several ruling princes who were possessed with the
liberal views of the rising school of philosophers, and who sincerely
desired to effect the improvement and elevation of their people,—to
remove grievances, to lighten burdens, to advance the general welfare.
The wisdom or strength of these men had not been equal to the task
they had assumed. There still remained unjustifiable inequalities of
conditions, grievous abuses, a depression of the lower orders, and
a stagnation among the upper, which seemed to place insurmountable
obstacles in the way of advance, and made it impossible for the
masses to feel a living, national interest in governments which
contributed so little to their happiness. This good-will among the
sovereigns of the day was indeed a most encouraging symptom. It made
it possible to effect the needed changes and to advance without a
violent break with the past,—to have reform and progress without
revolution; but to achieve these ends was beyond the power of the ruler
alone: there was needed the voice and co-operation of all classes in
the state. This Louis XVI. had sought to obtain; but unfortunately,
not only for France but for Europe, the most numerous and important
of the orders of the States-General had met the difficulties of the
situation, the outcome of centuries, not with firmness, but with
impatience. From the beginning was shown the determination to break
with the past,—to proceed at a bound to the desired goal. No regard
was had to the fitness of the people for such sudden change, to the
immense conservative force of established custom, nor to the value of
continuity in the life of a nation. Nor was this all. Law, as well
as custom, was lightly set at nought. The first Assembly threw off
the fetters imposed by its instructions, and assumed powers which
had not been confided to it. By means of these usurped faculties the
Constituent Assembly radically changed the constitution of France.

The instantaneous effect upon the French people and upon the internal
condition of the state is well known. As the far-reaching character
of the movement, and its lack of efficient elements for self-control,
became evident, the anxieties of conservative men in other nations,
however desirous of steady progress in human liberty, could not fail to
be aroused. It was notorious, long before 1792, that ill-balanced as
was the new constitutional frame of government in France, and radical
as was the temper of the leading members of the Legislative Assembly,
the deliberations of the latter were overawed by the clubs and the
populace of Paris, and that government had practically passed into
the hands of the mob which was worked by the clubs and the radical
municipality of the city. The grotesque yet terrible scenes of June 20
and August 10, the hideous massacres of September, not merely showed
the frantic excesses of which a French mob is capable, but also and
more solemnly evinced how completely governmental control was swallowed
up in anarchy. Still, all these things were internal to France, and it
might be hoped would so remain until the French people had worked their
own solution of their troubles. The decrees of November 19 and December
15 blasted this hope, and formally announced that French beliefs and
methods were to be forcibly spread throughout Europe. How was the
assault to be met?

Few statesmen of that day expected that this mighty and furious spirit
of misrule would so soon bend its neck to an uncontrolled and energetic
despotism. The coming of the one man, Napoleon, was dimly seen in the
distance by the thoughtful, who knew that anarchy clears the way for
absolute power; but the speedy appearance and tyrannous efficiency of
the Committee of Public Safety, with its handmaid the Revolutionary
Tribunal, were not foreseen. The statesmen of 1793 saw the strength,
but were more impressed by the superficial exhibition of disorder in
the popular outburst. They expected to repress it, to drive it back
within the limits of France, and impose the guarantees necessary for
the security of Europe, by meeting it with numerous, well-organized
armies of veteran troops, and by a solid, orderly financial system,
wielding plentiful resources. In short, they thought to cope with a
mighty spirit by means of elaborate and powerful machinery. The means
were insufficient. The living spirit developed the rude but efficient
organism which was needed to direct its energies and which was in
sympathy with its aims; the elaborate machinery of armies and finances
failed, because not quickened by the life of the nations by whose
rulers it was wielded.

Fortunately for Europe and for freedom, another spirit, less
demonstrative but equally powerful, was already living and animating
another great nation, peculiarly fitted by position and by the
character of its power to grapple with and exhaust that which was
vicious and destructive in the temper of the French Revolution. As
already said, the great feature of English freedom was its respect for
law, for established authority, for existing rights; its conservative
while progressive character, in which it was directly opposed to the
subversive principles of the French. But the English temper, when once
aroused, was marked also by a tenacity of purpose, a constancy of
endurance, which strongly supported the conservative tendencies of the
race and were equally foreign to the French character. Once embarked in
the strife, and definitely committed for the time to the preservation,
rather than to the progress, of society, under leaders who strongly
embodied the national traits, hatred of the enemy's principles became
more conspicuous, superficially, than the love of freedom, which yet
retained its hold deep in the hearts of both rulers and people. War
does not live on the benevolent emotions, though it may be excited
by them. The position and the maritime power of England were great
factors, great determining factors in the final issue of the French
Revolutionary wars; but these were but the machinery of the British
power. The great gain to the cause of stability in human history was
made when the spirit of order and law, embodied in the great nation
which it had created, rose against the spirit of lawlessness and
anarchy, which had now possessed a people who for long years and by
nature had been submissively subject to external authority. Two living
forces had met in a desperate struggle, which was not indeed for life
and death, for both would survive; but from which should result the
predominance of the one that was compatible with reasonable freedom,
and the subjection of the other, which knew no mean between anarchy
and servile submission. Less ebullient, but more steadfast and deeply
rooted, the former wore out the latter; it forced it back through the
stage of prostration under absolute power until it had returned to the
point whence it started, there to renew its journey under conditions
that made it no longer a danger to the whole world.

Such being the profound nature of the strife, its course may be
regarded under two aspects, not necessarily opposed, but rather
complementary. First, and obviously, there is the policy of the leaders
on either side, the objects which they proposed to themselves, the
steps by which they sought to compass those objects, and the results of
their various movements. Secondly, there is the more obscure and wider
question as to the relative influence of the great elements of power
which entered as unconscious factors in the strife,—mighty forces,
wielded or directed by statesmen, and yet after all their masters. Of
these factors Sea Power was one, and among the most important.

The circumstances of the times had placed this force wholly in the
hands of Great Britain. She wielded it as absolute mistress. Its
action, like that of all the other forces in the strife, depended
in part upon the direction given it by the British leaders for the
purposes of war. From this point of view, its structure appears to
be simple and rudimentary; the related movements of a few principal
parts are open to inspection and susceptible of criticism. But from
another point of view, in its course and influence, this wonderful and
mysterious Power is seen to be a complex organism, endued with a life
of its own, receiving and imparting countless impulses, moving in a
thousand currents which twine in and around one another in infinite
flexibility, not quite defying the investigation which they provoke,
but rendering it exceedingly laborious. This Power feels and is moved
by many interests; it has a great history in the past, it is making a
great and yet more wonderful history in the present. Grown to the size
of a colossus, which overshadows the earth without a second,—unless it
be the new rival rising in the Western hemisphere,—it is now assailed
with a fury and virulence never before displayed. Attacked in every
quarter and by every means, sought to be cut off alike from the
sources and from the issues of its enterprise, it adapts itself with
the readiness of instinct to every change. It yields here, it pushes
there; it gives ground in one quarter, it advances in another; it bears
heavy burdens, it receives heavy blows; but throughout all it lives
and it grows. It does not grow because of the war, but it does grow in
spite of the war. The war impedes and checks, but does not stop, its
progress. Drained of its seamen for the war-fleets, it modifies the
restrictions of generations, throws open its ports to neutral ships,
its decks to neutral seamen, and by means of those allies maintains
its fair proportions, until the enemy proclaims that the neutral who
carries but a bale of British goods, even to his own country, ceases
thereby to be a neutral and becomes the enemy of France; a proclamation
which but precipitated the ruin of French commerce, without markedly
injuring that of its rival.

The maritime power and commercial prosperity of Great Britain sprang
essentially from the genius and aptitudes of her people, and were
exceptionally favored and developed by the peculiar situation of
the British Islands. To these natural advantages the policy of the
government added somewhat, as at times it also ignorantly imposed
obstacles; but the actions of statesmen only modified, for good or
ill, they did not create the impulses which originated and maintained
the maritime activity of the British people. The most celebrated
measure designed to foster that activity, Cromwell's Navigation Act,
had now been in operation for a century and a quarter; but, while its
superficial effects had secured the adherence of the British people and
the envy of foreign states, shrewder economists, even a century ago,
had come to regard it as an injury to the commercial prosperity of the
country. They justified it only as a means of forcing the development
of the merchant marine, the nursery of the naval force upon which the
safety of Great Britain must depend. Whatever the fluctuations of its
fortunes or the mistakes of governments in the past, the sea power of
Great Britain had at the opening of the French Revolution attained
proportions, and shown a tenacity of life, which carried the promise
of the vast expansion of our own day. Painfully harassed during the
American Revolution, and suffering from the combined attacks of France,
Spain, and Holland, seeing then large portions of its carrying trade
pass into the hands of neutrals, and bereft by the event of the war of
its most powerful colonies, it had not only survived these strains, but
by the immediate and sustained reaction of the peace had, in 1793, more
than regained its pre-eminence. Once more it stood ready, not only to
protect its own country, but to sustain, with its well-proved vitality,
the demands of the continental war; where the armies of her allies,
long untouched by the fires which breathed in France and England, were
but a part of the machinery through which the maritime power of the
latter energized.

How far the ministers of the day understood, and how wisely they used,
the sea power of Great Britain, is a question that will demand a
separate consideration. That is the question of military policy,—of the
strategy of the war. We have first to consider the influence of the
maritime power in itself, and the functions discharged by Great Britain
simply in consequence of possessing this great and unique resource.
The existence, powers, and unconscious working of a faculty obviously
offer a subject for consideration distinct from the intelligent use of
the faculty; though a correct appreciation of the former conduces to an
accurate criticism of the latter.

Because of the decay of the French navy during the early years of
the war, the Republic, after 1795, virtually abandoned all attempt
to contest control of the sea. A necessary consequence was the
disappearance of its merchant shipping, a result accelerated by the
capture of most of its colonies, and the ruin of its colonial system
by the outbreaks of the blacks. So great was this loss, due rather to
the natural operation of Great Britain's naval supremacy than to any
particular direction by the ministry, that the Executive Directory, in
a message to the Council of Five Hundred, January 13, 1799, could use
the expression, scarcely exaggerated, "It is unhappily too true that
there is not a single merchant vessel sailing under the French flag."
Two years later the Minister of the Interior reported to the Consular
Government that the commerce with Asia, Africa, and America was almost
naught, the importations direct from all those quarters of the globe
amounting to only 1,500,000 francs, while the exports to them were
but 300,000 francs. As the advancing tide of French conquest extended
the territory and alliances of the Republic, the commerce of its new
friends was involved in the same disaster that had befallen its own.
The shipping of Spain and Holland thus also disappeared from the sea,
and a large part of their colonies likewise passed into the hands of
Great Britain, to swell the commerce and to employ the shipping of the
latter. The navy of neither of these Powers exerted any effect upon the
control of the sea, except so far as they occupied the attention of
detachments of the British navy, so marked had the numerical and moral
superiority of the latter become.

The disappearance of so large a body of merchant shipping as that of
France, Holland, and Spain, could not, of course, imply the total
loss to commerce and to the world of the traffic previously done by
it. Much less could these three countries wholly dispense with the
supplies for which, during peace, they had chiefly depended upon the
sea. On the contrary, the necessity for importing many articles by sea
was increased by the general continental war, which not only created
a long hostile frontier, prohibitory of intercourse on the land side,
but also, by drawing great numbers of workers from their ordinary
occupations to the armies of all parties, caused a material diminution
in the products of Europe at large. In France, shut in both by land
and sea, with a million of men under arms, and confronted with the
stern determination of England to reduce her by starvation, the danger
and the suffering were particularly great; and had there not been a
singularly abundant and early harvest in 1794, the aim of her enemy
might then have been in great measure reached.

Such a condition of things offered of course a great opening to neutral
maritime states. They hastened to embrace it,—among others the United
States, whose carrying trade grew very rapidly at this time; but the
naval power of Great Britain during this period was so overwhelming,
and her purpose so strong, that she succeeded in imposing severe
restraints upon neutrals as well as enemies, in matters which she
considered of prime importance. Sweden and Denmark strenuously resisted
her claim to prevent the importation into France of provisions and
naval stores; but failing, through the hostile attitude of the Czarina
towards France, to receive the powerful support of Russia, as in
1780 they had done, they were forced to succumb to the Power of the
Sea. The United States likewise were constrained by their impotence
to yield, under protest, before the same overwhelming Power. While
reserving the principle, they in practice conceded naval stores to be
contraband, and on the subject of provisions accepted a compromise
which protected their own citizens without materially injuring
France. No serious attempt was made to change the existing rule of
international law, by which enemies' property on board neutral ships
was good prize. As seizure involved sending the ship into a port of
the captor, and a possible detention there during the adjudication
of suspected goods, the inconvenience of the process was a powerful
deterrent. The English courts also held that the produce of hostile
colonies was lawful prize if found in neutral bottoms; because, the
trade of those colonies being by the mother countries interdicted to
foreigners in peace, the concession of it in war was merely a ruse to
defraud the other belligerent of his just rights of capture,—a plea
uselessly contested by American writers. All these causes operated
to the injury of both hostile and neutral commerce, and to the same
extent, in appearance at least, to the benefit of the British; and they
are cited simply as illustrative of the natural working of so great a
force as the Sea Power of Great Britain then was. The results were due,
not to the skill with which the force was used or distributed, but to
sheer preponderance of existing brute strength.

By the destruction of the enemies' own shipping and by denying neutrals
the right to carry to them many articles of the first importance,
Great Britain placed the hostile countries in a state of comparative
isolation, and created within their borders a demand for the prohibited
merchandise which raised its price and made the supplying of it
extremely profitable. When commercial intercourse is thus refused its
usual direct roads, it seeks a new path, by the nearest circuitous
course, with all the persistency of a natural force. The supply will
work its way to the demand, though in diminished volume, through all
the obstacles interposed by man. Even the contracted lines about a
beleaguered city will thus be pierced by the ingenuity of the trader
seeking gain; but when the blockade is extended over a long frontier,
total exclusion becomes hopeless. In such cases the tendency of
commerce is to seek a centre near the line which it intends to cross,
and there to accumulate the goods which are to pass the hostile
frontier and reach the belligerent. That centre will usually be in a
neutral seaport, to which trade is free, and a clearance for which will
afford no pretext for seizure or detention by the opposite belligerent.
Thus, in the American Revolution, the neutral Dutch island of St.
Eustatius became the rendezvous and depot of traders who purposed to
introduce their goods, even contraband of war, into the West India
islands of either party to that contest; and it was asserted that upon
its capture by the British, in 1781, when war began with Holland, large
amounts of property belonging to English merchants, but intended for
French customers, were found there. So, in the American Civil War, from
1861 to 1865, the town of Nassau in the British Bahamas became a centre
at which were accumulated stores of all kinds intended to break through
the blockade of the Southern coast.

So again, in the wars of the French Revolution, as long as Holland
remained in alliance with Great Britain, that country was the centre
from which foreign goods poured into France and the continent of
Europe; but when the United Provinces had been overrun by French
troops, and a revolution in their government had attached them to
the French policy, commerce, driven from their now blockaded coast,
sought another depot farther to the eastward, and found it in Bremen,
Hamburg, and some other German ports,—of which, however, Hamburg was
by far the most favored and prosperous. Through Hamburg the coffee
and sugar of the West Indies, the manufactured goods of Great Britain,
the food products of America, the luxuries of the East, poured into
Germany; and also into France, despite the prohibitive measures of
French governments. An indication of this change in the course of
commerce is found in the fact that the imports from Great Britain alone
into Germany, which amounted to £2,000,000 in 1792, had in 1796, the
year after Holland became allied to France, increased to £8,000,000,
although the purchasing power of Germany had meanwhile diminished.
In the same time the tonnage annually clearing from Great Britain to
Germany increased from 120,000 to 266,000. Similar results, on a much
smaller scale, were seen at Gibraltar when Spain attempted to prevent
British goods entering her own ports; and again at Malta, when the
possession of that island offered British commerce a foothold far
advanced in the Central Mediterranean. Somewhat similar, likewise, were
the advantages of the islands of Ceylon and Trinidad with reference
to the mainlands of India and South America, which gave to them a
particular commercial as well as strategic value, and led England to
accept them as her compensations at the Peace of Amiens.

In such cases the temporary commercial centre not only reaps the
profits of the broker, but all classes of its community benefit by
the increase of employments, of floating capital, and of floating
population. Precisely analogous to these was the office which her
geographical position and unrivalled control of the sea enabled Great
Britain to discharge toward the European world during the French
Revolution. Her maritime power and commercial spirit, the gradual
though rapid growth of past generations, enabled her at once to become
the warehouse where accumulated the products of all nations and of all
seas then open to commerce, and whence they were transshipped to the
tempest-tossed and war-torn Continent. So also her watery bulwarks,
traversed in every direction by her powerful navy, secured her peaceful
working as the great manufactory of Europe, and thus fostered an
immense development of her industries, which had become more than ever
necessary to the welfare of the world, since those of Holland and
France were either crippled for want of raw material or isolated by
their impotence at sea. Great Britain impeded the direct admission of
tropical products to the Continent; but their re-exportation from her
own ports and the export of British manufactures became the two chief
sources of her singular prosperity. The favorable reaction produced
by this concentration within her borders of so much of the commercial
machinery of the civilized world, is evident. Activities of every
kind sprang up on all sides, increasing the employment of labor and
the circulation of capital; and, while it is vain to contend that war
increases the prosperity of nations, it must be conceded that such a
state of things as we have depicted affords much compensation to the
nation concerned, and may even increase its proportionate prosperity,
when compared with that of its less fortunate enemies. To quote the
words of Lanfrey: "The English nation had never at any time shown more
reliance upon its own resources than when Pitt, in 1801, retired after
eight years of war. The people bore without difficulty the heavy taxes
which the war imposed upon them, and what was more astonishing still,
Pitt had found no opposition in Parliament to his last Budget. The
immense increase in the industrial prosperity of England triumphantly
refuted the predictions of her enemies, as well as the complaints of
alarmists. As the effect of every fresh declaration of war upon the
Continent had been to diminish competition in the great market of
the world and to throw into her hands the navies and colonies of her
adversaries, the English had begun to look upon the loan of millions
and the subsidies as so much premium paid for the development of their
own resources."[475]

It is not, therefore, merely as a weapon of war in the hands of the
ministry that the sea power of Great Britain is to be regarded; nor
yet only as the fruitful mother of subsidies, upon whose bountiful
breasts hung the impoverished and struggling nations of the Continent.
Great as were its value and importance in these respects, it had yet
a nobler and more vital function. Upon it depended the vigorous life
of the great nation which supplied the only power of motive capable
of coping with the demoniac energy that then possessed the spirit of
the French. Great Britain, though herself unconscious of the future,
was in the case of a man called upon to undergo a prolonged period
of trial, exposure, and anxiety, severely testing all his powers,
physical and mental. However sound the constitution, it is essential
that, when thus assailed by adverse external influences, all its vital
processes should be protected, nourished, and even stimulated, or else
the bodily energies will flag, fail, and collapse. This protection,
this nourishment, the maritime power ministered to the body politic of
the state. Despite the undeniable sufferings of large classes among
the people, the ministry could boast from year to year the general
prosperity of the realm, the flourishing condition of commerce, the
progressive preponderance and control of the sea exerted by the navy,
and a series of naval victories of unprecedented brilliancy, which
stimulated to the highest degree the enthusiasm of the nation. Such a
combination of encouraging circumstances maintained in full tension the
springs of self-confidence and moral energy, in the absence of which no
merely material powers or resources are capable of effective action.

By the natural and almost unaided working of its intrinsic faculties,
the sea power of Great Britain sustained the material forces of
the state and the spirit of the people. From these we turn to the
consideration of the more striking, though not more profound, effects
produced by the use made of this maritime power by the British
ministry—to the policy and naval strategy of the war—in curtailing the
resources and sapping the strength of the enemy, and in compelling
him to efforts at once inevitable, exhausting, and fruitless. In
undertaking this examination, it will be first necessary to ascertain
what were the objects the ministers proposed to achieve by the
struggle in which they had embarked the nation. If these are found to
agree, in the main, with the aim they should have kept before them,
through realizing the character of the general contest, and Great
Britain's proper part in it, the policy of the war will be justified.
It will then only remain to consider how well the general direction
given to the naval and military operations furthered the objects
proposed,—whether the strategy of the war was well adapted to bring its
policy to a successful issue.

The sudden revulsion of feeling in the British ministry, consequent
upon the decrees of November 19 and December 15, has been mentioned.
It was then realized that not only the internal quiet of Great Britain
was endangered, but that the political stability of Europe was
threatened by a Power whose volcanic energy could not be ignored. There
was not merely the fear that extreme democratic principles would be
transmitted from the masses of one country to those of another still
unprepared to receive them. To say that the British Government went to
war merely to divert the interest of the lower orders from internal
to foreign relations is not a fair statement of the case. The danger
that threatened England and Europe was the violent intervention of the
French in the internal affairs of every country to which their armies
could penetrate. This purpose was avowed by the Convention, and how
sincerely was proved by the history of many an adjoining state within
the next few years. Although the worst excesses of the Revolution had
not yet occurred, enough had been done to indicate its tendencies,
and to show that, where it prevailed, security of life, property, and
social order disappeared.

Security, therefore, was from the first alleged as the great object of
the war by the Prime Minister, who undoubtedly was the exponent of the
government, as truly as he was the foremost man then in England. In his
speech of February 12, 1793, upon the French declaration of war, he
returns again and again to this word, as the key-note to the British
policy.

     "Not only had his Majesty entered into no treaty, but no step
     even had been taken, and no engagement formed on the part of our
     Government, to interfere in the internal affairs of France, or
     attempt to dictate to them any form of constitution. I declare
     that the whole of the interference of Great Britain has been with
     the general view of seeing if it was possible, either by our own
     exertions or in concert with any other Power, to _repress this
     French system of aggrandizement and aggression_, with the view of
     seeing whether we could not re-establish the blessings of peace;
     whether we could not, either separately or jointly with other
     Powers, provide for the _security_ of our own country and _the
     general security of Europe_."

It is only fair to Pitt to compare the thought underlying this speech
of February 12, 1793, with that of February 17, 1792, already quoted,
in order that there may be realized the identity of principle and
conviction which moved him under circumstances so diverse. This
position he continually maintained from year to year; nor did he, when
taunted by the leader of the Opposition with lack of definiteness in
the objects of the war, suffer himself to be goaded into any other
statement of policy. It was in vain that the repeated jeer was uttered,
that the ministry did not know what they were driving at; and when the
constant recurrence of allied disasters and French successes on the
Continent, preceding as they did the most brilliant successes of the
British navy, made yet more poignant the exultation of the Opposition,
Pitt still refused, with all his father's proud tenacity, to give any
other account of his course than that he sought security—peace, yes,
but only a secure peace. To define precisely what success on the part
of Great Britain, or what reverses suffered by France, would constitute
the required security, was to prophesy the uncertain fortunes of war,
and the endurance of that strange madness which was impelling the
French nation. When a man finds his interests or his life threatened
by the persistent malice of a powerful enemy, he can make no reply to
the question, how long or how far he will carry his resistance, except
this: that when the enemy's power of injury is effectually curtailed,
or when his own power of resistance ends, then, and then only, will he
cease to fight. It fell to Pitt's lot, at one period of the war, to be
brought face to face with the latter alternative; but the course of the
French Government—of the Directory as well as of Napoleon—justified
fully the presentiment of the British Government in 1793, that not
until the aggressive power of France was brought within bounds, could
Europe know lasting peace. Peace could not be hoped from the temper of
the French rulers.

Whatever shape, therefore, the military operations might assume,
the object of the war in the apprehension of the British minister
was strictly defensive; just as the French invasion of the Austrian
Netherlands, though an offensive military operation, was, in its
inception, part of a strictly defensive war. To the larger and more
general motive of her own security and that of Europe, there was also
added, for Great Britain, the special treaty obligation to assist
Holland in a defensive struggle,—an obligation which was brought into
play by the French declaration of war against the United Provinces.
It is necessary to note the two causes of war, because the relation
of Great Britain to the wider conflict was different from that which
she bore to the defence of Holland, and entailed a different line
of action. The treaty called upon her to contribute a certain quota
of land forces, and the character of her particular interest, in
both the Netherlands and Holland, made it expedient and proper that
British troops should enter the field for their protection; but after
the disastrous campaign of 1794 had subdued Holland to France, and
a revolution in its government had changed its relations to Great
Britain, the troops were withdrawn, and did not again appear on the
Continent until 1799, when favorable circumstances induced a second,
but futile attempt to rescue the Provinces from French domination.

The part borne by the troops of England in the earlier continental
campaigns was therefore but an episode, depending upon her special
relations to Holland, and terminated by the subjection of that country
to France. What was the relation of Great Britain to the wider
struggle, in which, at the beginning, almost all the nations of the
Continent were engaged? What functions could she discharge towards
curtailing the power of France, and so restoring to Europe that
security without which peace is but a vain word? Upon the answers to
these questions should depend the criticism of the use made by the
British ministry of the nation's power. To condemn details without
having first considered what should be the leading outlines of a
great design, is as unsafe as it is unfair; for steps indefensible in
themselves may be justified by the exigencies of the general policy.
It is not to be expected that, in a war of such vast proportions and
involving such unprecedented conditions, serious mistakes of detail
should not be made; but, if the great measures adopted bear a due
proportion both to the powers possessed and to the end aimed at, then
the government will have fulfilled all that can be demanded of it.

The sea power which constituted the chief strength of Great Britain
furnished her with two principal weapons: naval superiority, which
the course of the war soon developed into supremacy, and money. The
traditional policy of a strong party in the state, largely represented
in the governing classes, was bitterly adverse to a standing army; and
the force actually maintained was to a great extent neutralized by
the character of the empire, which, involving possessions scattered
over all quarters of the globe, necessitated dispersion instead of
concentrated action. The embarrassment thus caused was increased
by the dangerously discontented condition of Ireland, involving
the maintenance of a considerable permanent force there, with the
possibility of having to augment it. Furthermore, the thriving
condition of the manufactures and commerce of England, protected from
the storm of war ravaging the Continent and of such vital importance
to the general welfare of Europe, made it inexpedient to withdraw her
people from the ranks of labor, at a time when the working classes of
other nations were being drained for the armies.

For these reasons great operations on land, or a conspicuous share in
the continental campaigns became, if not absolutely impossible to Great
Britain, at least clearly unadvisable. It was economically wiser, for
the purposes of the coalitions, that she should be controlling the
sea, supporting the commerce of the world, making money and managing
the finances, while other states, whose industries were exposed to
the blast of war and who had not the same commercial aptitudes, did
the fighting on land. This defines substantially the course followed
by the ministry of the day, for which the younger Pitt has been most
severely criticised. It is perhaps impossible to find any historian of
repute who will defend the general military conduct of the Cabinet at
whose head he stood; while the brilliant successes of the Seven Years'
War have offered a ready text for disparagers, from his contemporary,
Fox, to those of our own day, to draw a mortifying contrast between
his father and himself. Yet what were the military enterprises
and achievements of the justly famed Seven Years' War? They were
enterprises of exactly the same character as those undertaken in the
French Revolutionary War, and as those which, it may be added, are so
constant a feature of English history, whether during times of European
peace or of European war, that it may reasonably be suspected there is,
in the conditions of the British empire, some constant cause for their
recurrence. Like the petty wars which occur every few years in our
generation, they were mixed military and naval expeditions, based upon
the fleet and upon the control of the sea, scattered in all quarters
of the world, employing bodies of troops small when compared to the
size of continental armies, and therefore for the most part bearing,
individually, the character of secondary operations, however much they
may have conduced to a great common end.

It is an ungracious task to institute comparisons; but, if just
conclusions are to be reached, the real facts of a case must be set
forth. The elder Pitt had not to contend with such a navy as confronted
his son at the outbreak of the French Revolution. The French navy, as
is avowed by its historians, had received great and judicious care
throughout the reign of Louis XVI.; it had a large and splendid body
of ships in 1793; it enjoyed the proud confidence of the nation,
consequent upon its actions in the war of 1778; and, although its
efficiency was fatally affected by the legislation of the National
Assembly and by the emigrations, it was still an imposing force. Not
until years of neglect had passed over it, and the fatal Battle of
the Nile had been fought, did its character and weight sink to the
same relative insignificance that the elder Pitt encountered in the
Seven Years' War. The elder, like the younger, shaped his system of
war upon the control of the sea, upon the acquisition of colonies,
upon subsidizing allies upon the Continent, and, as main outlines of
policy, these were undoubtedly correct; but the former had in his favor
heavy odds in the weak condition of the French navy, and in having
on his side the great military genius of the age. On the side of the
elder Pitt fought Frederick the Great, against a coalition, numerically
overwhelming indeed, but half-hearted, ill-knit, and led by generals
far inferior to their great opponent, often mere creatures of the most
corrupt Court favor. Against the younger Pitt arose a greater than
Frederick, at the very moment of triumph, when the combined effects
of the sea power of England, of the armies of Austria, and of the
incompetency of the Directory had brought the Revolution "to bay,"—to
use the words of a distinguished French naval officer and student.[476]
In 1796 and in 1799 Bonaparte, and Bonaparte alone, rescued from
impending destruction—not France, for France was not the object of
Pitt's efforts—but that "system of aggrandizement and aggression" to
which France was then committed.

The elder Pitt saw his work completed, though by weaker hands; the
younger struggled on through disappointment after disappointment, and
died under the shadow of Austerlitz, worn out in heart and mind by the
dangers of his country. Contemporaries and men of later generations,
British and foreigners, have agreed in attributing to him the leading
part in the coalitions against Revolutionary France; but they have
failed to admit the specific difficulties under which he labored, and
how nearly he achieved success. It is easy to indulge in criticism
of details, and to set one undertaking against another; to show the
failures of expeditions landed on the French coast in the Seven Years'
War; to point out that Wolfe's conquest of Canada in 1759, by freeing
the American colonies from their fear of France, promoted their revolt
against Great Britain, while Nelson in 1798, and Abercromby in 1801,
saved Egypt, and probably India also, to England; to say that the
elder Pitt did not regain Minorca by arms, while the younger secured
both it and Malta. Martinique fell to the arms of both; the Cape of
Good Hope, Ceylon, Trinidad, prizes of the later war, may fairly be
set against Havana and Manila of the earlier. In India, Clive, the
first and greatest of British Indian heroes, served the elder Pitt;
yet before the arms of the younger fell Mysore, the realm of Hyder Ali
and Tippoo Saib, the most formidable enemies that Britain had yet met
in the Peninsula. Such comparisons and arguments are endless; partly
because there is much to be said on both sides, but chiefly because
they concern details only, and do not touch the root of the matter.

The objects of the two Pitts were different, for the circumstances of
their generations were essentially diverse. The task of the one was
to extend and establish the great colonial system, whose foundations
had been laid by previous generations, and to sustain in Europe the
balance of power between rival, but orderly, governments; that of the
other was to steady the social order and political framework of Great
Britain herself, and of Europe, against a hurricane which threatened to
tear up both by the roots. Each in his day, to strengthen his country
and to weaken the enemy, pursued the same great line of policy, which
in the one age and in the other fitted the situation of Great Britain.
To extend and consolidate her sea power; to lay the world under
contribution to her commerce; to control the sea by an all-powerful
navy; to extend her colonial empire by conquest, thereby increasing her
resources, multiplying her naval bases, and depriving her enemy alike
of revenues and of points whence he could trouble English shipping;
to embarrass the great enemy, France, by subsidizing continental
allies,—such was the policy of both the Pitts; such, alike in the
Revolution and in the Seven Years' War, was the policy imposed by a due
recognition, not only of the special strength of Great Britain, but of
her position in relation to the general struggle. Frederick in the one
case, Austria in the other, needed the money, which only the sustained
commercial prosperity of England could supply. The difference in the
actual careers run by the two statesmen is that the son had to meet
far greater obstacles than the father, and that, so far as the part of
Great Britain herself was concerned, he achieved equal, if not greater,
successes. The father had to contend, not against the mighty fury of
the French Revolution, but against the courtier generals and the merely
professional soldiery of Louis XV. and his mistresses; he had an allied
America; he met no mutiny of the British fleet; he was threatened by
no coalition of the Baltic Powers; he encountered no Bonaparte. It was
the boast of British merchants that under his rule "Commerce was united
to and made to grow by war;" but British commerce increased during the
French Revolution even more than it did in the earlier war, and the
growth of the British navy, in material strength and in military glory,
under the son, exceeded that under the father.

In history the personality of the elder statesman is far more imposing
than that of the younger. The salient characteristic of the one was
an imperious and fiery impetuosity; that of the other, reserve. The
one succeeded in power a minister inefficient as an administrator,
weak in nerve, and grotesque in personal appearance; the striking
contrast presented by the first William Pitt to the Duke of Newcastle,
his aggressive temper, the firm self-reliance of his character, his
dazzling personality, around which a dramatic halo clung even in the
hour of his death, made a vivid impression upon the imagination of
contemporaries, and have descended as a tradition to our own days.
Save to a few intimate friends, the second Pitt was known to his
fellow-countrymen only on the benches of the House of Commons. A temper
as indomitable as his father's bore in silence the vastly greater and
more prolonged strain of a most chequered struggle; only a few knew
that the strain was endured with a cheerfulness, a calmness, and a
presence of mind, which of themselves betoken a born leader of men. In
the darkest hour, when the last ally, Austria, had forsaken England
and consented to treat with France, when the seamen of the fleet
had mutinied, and British ships of war, taken violently from their
officers, were blockading the approaches to London, Pitt was awakened
during the night by a member of the Cabinet with some disastrous news.
He listened quietly, gave his directions calmly and clearly, and
dismissed the messenger. The latter, after leaving the house, thought
it necessary to return for some further instruction, and found the
minister again sleeping quietly. The incident is a drama in itself.

In considering the use made of Great Britain's powers for war by
the administration of the second Pitt, the broad outlines should be
regarded, not as a simply military question,—such as the combinations
of a general officer in a campaign,—but as efforts of statesmanship,
directing arms in an attempt to compass by force the requirements
considered to be most decisive in a political situation. The office
of the statesman is to determine, and to indicate to the military
authorities, the national interests most vital to be defended, as
well as the objects of conquest or destruction most injurious to the
enemy, in view of the political exigencies which the military power
only subserves. The methods by which the military force will proceed
to the ends thus indicated to it—the numbers, character, equipment
of the forces to be employed, and their management in campaign—are
technical matters, to be referred to the military or naval expert by
the statesman. If the latter undertakes to dictate in these, he goes
beyond his last and commonly incurs misfortune.

It is not likely that such a division of labor, between the statesman,
the soldier, and the seaman, is ever formally made. It is enough if it
be practically recognized by the due influence of the military element
in deciding details, and by its cheerful obedience in carrying out the
views of the government whose servant it is. In criticising results it
is fair to assume, where not otherwise proved, that for the general
direction of the war the government is responsible, and that in the
particular management of military movements the advice of professional
men has had just weight. A somewhat striking illustration of this is
to be found in the change of naval strategy, within the limits of the
Channel fleet, when, without any change in the government, the positive
convictions and stringent methods of Lord St. Vincent set aside, in
1800, the traditions of Lord Howe and Lord Bridport.

What then was the general direction imparted to military movements
by a government which had announced its object in the war to be
the attainment of security, by "repressing the French system of
aggrandizement and aggression"?

Owing to the distracted condition of France, many confusing
cross-lights were at first cast upon that central theatre of European
disturbance, by movements whose force it was impossible rightly to
estimate. Such were the risings in La Vendée and Brittany, the revolt
at Lyon, the delivery of Toulon to the allied fleets. Experience
justifies the opinion that such insurgent movements, involving but a
part of a nation, are best left to themselves, supported only by money
and supplies. If, thus aided, they have not the vitality to make good
their cause, the presence of foreign troops, viewed ever with jealousy
by the natives, will not insure success. It is, however, the French
Revolution itself that furnishes the surest illustrations of this
truth, shedding upon it a light which Pitt did not have to guide him.
Such embarrassments of the French Government were naturally thought to
give opportunity for powerful diversions; the more so as the amount of
disaffection was much exaggerated, and the practice of partial descents
upon the French coasts had come down unquestioned from previous wars.

To this mistake, as natural as any ever made in war, and to the
treaty obligation to support Holland, is to be attributed much of
the misdirection given to the British army in the first two years
of the war. When the illusion was over, and Holland conquered, the
military effort of Great Britain was at once concentrated on its proper
objects of ruling the sea and securing positions that contributed to
naval control and commercial development. Even in 1793 a respectable
force had been sent to the West Indies, which in 1794 reduced all the
Windward Islands. Stretching its efforts too far, reverses followed;
but in 1795 a powerful fleet was sent with sixteen thousand troops
commanded by Sir Ralph Abercromby, the best general officer revealed by
the early part of the war. From the first, Pitt had seen the necessity
of controlling the West Indies. That necessity was twofold: first, by
far the greatest fraction of British trade, over one fourth of the
whole, depended upon them; and, second, the enemy's islands were not
only valuable as producing, they were above all the homes of cruisers
that endangered all commerce, neutral as well as British. To control
the whole Caribbean region was, among those objects that lay within the
scope of the British Government, the one most essential to the success
of the general war. To sneer at the attempt as showing merely a wish
for sugar islands is to ignore the importance of the West Indies to the
financial stability of Great Britain; upon whose solvency depended,
not only the maritime war, but the coalitions whose aid was needed to
repress "the system of French aggression."

Abercromby restored England's control over the lesser Antilles, except
Guadeloupe, and added to her possessions Trinidad and the Dutch
colonies on the mainland. Although unable to retain Haïti, whose
ports were for some time occupied, the British navy ensured its loss
to France and the final success of the negro revolt; and commercial
relations were established with the new government. During the same
period the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and other Dutch and French
possessions in India were reduced by similar expeditions. These not
only extended the sphere of British commerce; they contributed yet
more to its enlargement by the security resulting from the conversion
of hostile to friendly ports, and the consequent diminution of enemy's
cruisers.

It is a singular fact that neither the extraordinary commercial
prosperity secured by these successes, nor the immense development of
the navy during Pitt's administration, is mentioned in the celebrated
denunciation of his "drivelling" war policy by Macaulay. Of naval
administration the latter speaks, in order to assign the credit to
another; on commercial and naval expansion he is silent. Yet no
factors in the war were so important. The one sustained Great Britain,
on whose shoulders was upborne the whole resistance of Europe; the
other crushed France by a process of constriction which, but for
Bonaparte, would have reduced her at an early period, and to free her
from which Napoleon himself was driven to measures that ruined him.
These important results were obtained by lengthening the cords and
strengthening the stakes of British commerce, by colonial expansion
and safe-guarding the seas, and by the growth of the navy,—none of
which objects could have been accomplished without the hearty support
of the Prime Minister. From the co-operation of these causes, and the
restrictions placed on neutral trade, the commerce of Great Britain
increased by 65[477] per cent between 1792 and 1800, while the loss by
capture was less than 2½ per cent on the annual volume of trade.

The directly offensive use of Great Britain's maritime power made by
the ministry, in order to repress the French system of aggression,
consisted in throwing back France upon herself, while at the same time
cutting off her resources. The continental armies which begirt her on
the land side were supported by subsidies; and also when practicable,
as in the Mediterranean, by the co-operation of the British fleets, to
whose influence upon his Italian campaign in 1796 Bonaparte continually
alludes. To seaward the colonial system of France was ruined, raw
material cut off from her manufactures, her merchant shipping swept
from the sea. In 1797 the chief of the Bureau of Commerce in France
wrote: "The former sources of our prosperity are either lost or
dried up. Our agricultural, manufacturing, and industrial power is
almost extinct."[478] At the same time, while not denying the right
of neutrals to trade with ports not blockaded, every restriction
that could be placed upon such trade by stringent, and even forced,
interpretations of international law was rigorously imposed by a navy
whose power was irresistible. Even provisions (and it will be well for
Great Britain of the present day to recall the fact) were claimed to be
contraband of war, on the ground that, in the then condition of France,
when there was a reasonable hope of starving her into peace, to supply
them contributed to prolong hostilities.

So severe was the suffering and poverty caused by this isolation, that
in the moment of his greatest triumph, immediately after signing the
peace of Campo Formio, which left Great Britain without an ally, in
October, 1797, Bonaparte wrote: "Either our government must destroy
the English monarchy, or must expect to be itself destroyed by the
corruption and intrigue of those active islanders. Let us concentrate
all our activity upon the navy and destroy England." The Directory,
conscious that its navy was paralyzed and that its _guerre de course_,
pursued since 1795 against British commerce, had not seriously affected
the latter, although 1797 was the year of its lowest depression, could
see no further means of injuring England except by attacking the
neutral carriers of her wares. Affecting to regard them as accomplices
in Great Britain's crimes against humanity, it procured from the
Convention, in January, 1798, a decree that "every vessel found at
sea, having on board English merchandise as her cargo, in whole or in
part, shall be declared lawful prize, whosoever shall be the proprietor
of the merchandise, which shall be reputed contraband for this cause
alone, that it comes from England or her possessions." At the same time
orders were issued to confiscate property of British origin wherever
found on shore, and domiciliary visits were authorized to insure its
discovery. Napoleon was therefore perfectly justified in declaring in
later years that the Directory outlined the policy of his Continental
System, embodied in his Berlin and Milan decrees of 1806 and 1807.

To the Directory the attempt thus to destroy British prosperity worked
disaster. To Napoleon it brought ruin, owing to the greater vigor,
wider scope, and longer duration which he was able to impart to the
process. The aim of his Berlin and Milan decrees, like that of the
Directory, was to undermine British trade by depriving it of the
necessary concurrence of neutral carriers. As this alone would not be
enough, he determined to support the decrees by excluding Great Britain
from her principal market, to close the entire Continent to all goods
coming from her or her colonies, or even passing through her ports. For
this purpose—to carry out this gigantic project—edict after edict was
issued to France and her allied countries; for this purpose annexation
after annexation to the empire was made; for this purpose a double
cordon of French troops lined the shores of the Continent from France
to the Baltic; for this purpose British goods were not only seized but
publicly burned throughout his dominions; for this purpose demands
were made upon all neutral states to exclude British manufactures and
colonial produce; for this purpose the calamitous Spanish war was
incurred;[479] and finally, for this purpose reiterated and imperious
complaints were addressed to the czar on his failure to enforce the
exclusion, and, upon his persistence, the fatal invasion of Russia
followed.

The justice or wisdom of this course is not here in question. It
is enough to say that it nearly ruined Great Britain, but entirely
ruined Napoleon. The noticeable point, bearing upon the wisdom of
Pitt's military policy, is that Napoleon was forced into it by that
policy, because England was destroying him and he had no other means
of injuring her. Great Britain's success not only followed, but was
consequent upon steady adherence to the main features of Pitt's policy.
Military writers say that success on a battle-field is of slight
avail if the strategic line of operations is ill-chosen, and that
even a great defeat may be redeemed if the position has been taken in
accordance with the strategic conditions of the campaign. This amounts
to saying, in non-military language, that hard blows are useless if not
struck on the right spot. Numerous reverses attended the coalitions
against France, although few fell upon Great Britain herself; but none
was fatal because the general policy, begun by Pitt and continued by
his successors, was strategically sound with reference to the object in
view,—namely, "the repression of that system of aggression" which was
the very spirit of the French Revolution, formulated by the Convention,
adopted by the Directory, inherited and given its full logical
development by Napoleon.

It is the fashion with the political heirs of Fox, Pitt's greatest
opponent, to draw a marked contrast between the war which preceded
and that which followed the Peace of Amiens. In the former it is
Great Britain which, in a frenzy of hatred or panic fear toward the
French Revolution, becomes the wanton aggressor, and turns a movement
that, despite some excesses, was on the whole beneficent, into the
stormy torrent of blood that poured over Europe. In the second war,
Napoleon is the great culprit, the incarnate spirit of aggression,
violence, faithlessness, and insolence; with whom peace was impossible.
It is, however, notorious, and conceded by French writers, that the
French leaders in 1791 and 1792 wanted war on the Continent;[480] the
impartial conduct of the British Cabinet was admitted by the French
Government when acknowledging the recall of the British ambassador
six months before war broke out;[481] the decrees of November 19 and
December 15 are before the reader, as is the refusal of the Convention
to give the former a construction conciliatory to Great Britain; the
treaty rights of Holland had been set aside by the high hand without an
attempt at negotiation, and there can be little doubt that the purpose
was already formed to invade her territory shortly. Despite all this,
not Great Britain, but the Republic, declared war. The treatment,
by the Convention and the Directory, of the lesser states that fell
under their power,[482] their dealings with Great Britain, their
aggressiveness, insolence, and bad faith were identical in spirit with
the worst that can be said of Napoleon; the sole difference being that
for a weak, incompetent, and many-headed government was substituted
the iron rule of a single man of incomparable genius. Scruples were
known to neither. The Berlin and Milan decrees, in which was embodied
the Continental System that led Napoleon to his ruin, were, as he
himself said, but the logical development of the Directory's decree of
January, 1798,[483] against which even the long-suffering United States
of America rebelled. Both measures struck at Great Britain through the
hearts of allies and of neutrals, for whose rights and welfare, when
conflicting with the course France wished to take, they showed equal
disregard; both were framed in the very spirit of the first National
(Constituent) Assembly, which set aside institutions and conventions
that did not square with its own ideas of right; which sought justice,
as it saw it, by overleaping law.

It is, however, far more important to note, and clearly to apprehend,
that both measures were forced upon the rulers of France by the
strategic lines of policy laid down by the ministry of Pitt. The
decree of January, 1798, followed close upon the rupture of the peace
conferences of Lille, initiated by Pitt in 1797; a rupture brought on
by a display of arrogance and insolence on the part of the Directory,
similar to that shown by it towards the United States at the same
period, that can only be realized by reading the correspondence,[484]
and which is now known to have been due, in part at least, to the hope
of a bribe from the British ministry.[485] The Berlin decree, which
formally began the Continental System, was issued in November, 1806,
when Pitt had not been a year in his grave. Both were forced upon the
French leaders by the evident hopelessness of reaching Great Britain
in any other way, and because her policy of war was hurting France
terribly, while sustaining her own strength. In other words, Great
Britain, by the strategic direction she gave to her efforts in this
war, forced the French spirit of aggression into a line of action which
could not but result fatally.[486] But for Bonaparte, the result,
nearly attained in 1795 and again in 1799, would have followed then;
not even his genius could avert it finally.

It is related that a leader of antiquity once cried to his opponent,
"If you are the great general you claim to be, why do you not come
down and fight me?" and received the pertinent reply, "If you are the
great general you say, why do you not _make_ me come down and fight
you?" This was precisely what Great Britain effected. By the mastery
of the sea, by the destruction of the French colonial system and
commerce, by her persistent enmity to the spirit of aggression which
was incarnate in the French Revolution and personified in Napoleon,
by her own sustained and unshaken strength, she drove the enemy into
the battle-field of the Continental System, where his final ruin was
certain. Under the feeble rule of the Directory that ruin came on
apace; within a year it was evident that the only gainer by the system
was the foe whom it sought to overthrow, that France herself and her
allies, as well as neutral Powers, were but being broken down to
the profit of Great Britain. Despite the first failure, there was a
plausible attraction about the measure which led Napoleon, confident
in his strength and genius, to apply it again with the relentless
thoroughness characteristic of his reign. For a time it succeeded,
owing not only to the vigor with which it was used, but also to Great
Britain being exasperated into retaliatory steps which, by forbidding
the trade of neutrals to and between all the ports thus closed to
British commerce, stopped at its source the contraband trade, which
eluded Napoleon's blockade and kept open the way for British exports to
the Continent.

The strain, however, was too great to be endured by the great
composite political system which the emperor had founded, and through
which he hoped to exclude his enemy from every continental market.
The privations of all classes, the sufferings of the poorer, turned
men's hearts from the foreign ruler, who, in the pursuit of aims
which they neither sympathized with nor understood, was causing them
daily ills which they understood but too well. All were ready to fall
away and rise in rebellion when once the colossus was shaken. The
people of Spain, at one extremity of Europe, revolted in 1808; the
Czar of Russia, at the other, threw down the gauntlet in 1810, by a
proclamation which opened his harbors to all neutral ships bringing
colonial produce, the object of Napoleon's bitterest reclamations. In
the one case the people refused the ruler put over them to insure a
more vigorous enforcement of the continental blockade; in the other the
absolute monarch declined longer to burden his subjects with exactions
which were ruining them for the same object. The Spanish outbreak gave
England a foothold upon the Continent at a point most favorable for
support by her maritime strength and most injurious to the emperor,
not only from the character of the country and the people, but also
because it compelled him to divide his forces between his most remote
frontiers. The defection of the czar made a fatal breach in the line of
the continental blockade, opening a certain though circuitous access
for British goods to all parts of Europe. Incapable of anticipating
defeat and of receding from a purpose once formed, Napoleon determined
upon war with Russia. He, the great teacher of concentration, proceeded
to divide his forces between the two extremes of Europe. The results
are well known to all.

It was not by attempting great military operations on land, but by
controlling the sea, and through the sea the world outside Europe,
that both the first and the second Pitt ensured the triumph of their
country in the two contests where either stood as the representative of
the nation. Mistakes were made by both; it was the elder who offered
to Spain to give Gibraltar for Minorca, which the younger recovered
by force of arms. Mistakes many may be charged against the conduct
of the war under the younger; but, with one possible exception, they
are mistakes of detail in purely military direction, which cannot
invalidate the fact that the general line of action chosen and followed
was correct. To recur to the simile already borrowed from military art,
the mistakes were tactical, not strategic; nor, it may be added, to any
great degree administrative.

The possible exception occurred at the beginning of the war, in the
spring and summer of 1793. It may be, as has been claimed by many, that
a march direct upon Paris at that time by the forces of the Coalition
would have crushed all opposition, and, by reducing the mob of the
capital, have insured the submission of the country. It may be so; but
in criticising the action of the British ministers, so far as it was
theirs, it must be remembered that not only did men of the highest
military reputation in Europe advise against the movement, but that the
Duke of Brunswick, then second to none in distinction as a soldier,
had tried it and failed a few months before. For unprofessional men
to insist, against the best professional opinions at their command,
is a course whose propriety or prudence can only be shown by the
event,—a test to which the advance upon Paris, now so freely prescribed
by the wisdom of after-sight, was not brought. One consideration,
generally overlooked, may here be presented. To attempt so momentous
and hazardous an enterprise, when the leaders to whom its conduct must
be intrusted regard it as unwise, is to incur a great probability of
disaster. Even Bonaparte would not force his plans upon Moreau, when
the latter, in 1800, persisted in preferring his own. Yet this must
statesmen have done, had they in 1793 ordered their generals to advance
on Paris.

Once lost, the opportunity, if such it were, did not recur. It depended
purely upon destroying the resistance of France before it had time to
organize. Thenceforward there remained to encounter, not the policy of
a court, playing its game upon the chess-board of war, with knights
and pawns, castles and armies, but a nation in arms, breathing a fury
and inspired by passions which only physical exhaustion could repress.
Towards that exhaustion Great Britain could on the land side contribute
effectually only by means of allies, and this she did. On the side of
the sea, her own sphere of action, there were two things she needed to
do. The first was to sustain her own strength, by fostering, widening,
and guarding the workings of her commercial system; the second was to
cut France off from the same sources of strength and life. Both were
most effectually accomplished,—not, as Macaulay asserts, by the able
administration of Earl Spencer (whose merit is not disputed), but by
the general policy of the ministry in the extension of the colonial
system, in the wise attention paid to the support of British commerce
in all its details, and in the extraordinary augmentation of the
navy. Between 1754 and 1760, the period embracing the most brilliant
triumphs of the elder Pitt, the British navy increased by 33 per cent.
Between 1792 and 1800, under his son, the increase was 82 per cent.
How entirely the military management and direction of this mighty
force depended upon the sea-officers, and not upon the statesman, when
a civilian was at the head of the Admiralty, will be evident to any
one studying closely the slackness of the Channel fleet immediately
under the eye of Earl Spencer, or the paltry dispositions made in
particular emergencies like the Irish invasion of 1796, and contrasting
these with the vigor manifested at that very moment under Jervis in
the Mediterranean, or later, in the admirable operations of the same
officer in command of the Channel fleet.

Few indeed are the statesmen who are not thus dependent upon
professional subordinates. Pitt was no exception. He was not a general
or an admiral, nor does he appear so to have considered himself; but he
realized perfectly where Great Britain's strength lay, and where the
sphere of her efforts. By that understanding he guided her movements;
and in the final triumph wrought by the spirit of the British nation
over the spirit of the French Revolution, the greatest share cannot
justly be denied to the chief who, in the long struggle against wind
and tide, forced often to swerve from the direct course he would have
followed by unforeseen dangers that rose around the ship in her passage
through unknown seas, never forgot the goal "Security," upon which
from the first his will was set. Fit indeed it was that he should drop
at his post just when Trafalgar had been won and Austerlitz lost. That
striking contrast of substantial and, in fact, decisive success with
bewildering but evanescent disaster, symbolized well his troubled
career, as it superficially appears. As the helm escaped his dying
hands, all seemed lost, but in truth the worst was passed. "The pilot
had weathered the storm."

The death of Pitt was followed by the formation of a ministry of
somewhat composite character, centring round his relative and former
colleague, Lord Grenville, and his life-long rival, Fox. This held
office but for fourteen months; a period long enough for it to afford
Napoleon the pretext for his Berlin decree, but not sufficient to
impress any radical change upon the main lines of policy laid down by
Pitt. Upon its fall in March, 1807, his devoted personal friends and
political followers succeeded to power. Confronted almost immediately
by the threatening union between the empires of the East and West, of
which the known, if concealed, purpose was to divide between France
and Russia the control of the Continent, and to subdue Great Britain
also by commercial exhaustion, the ministry, both necessarily and by
tradition, opposed to this combination the policy transmitted to them
by their great leader. Colonial enterprises were multiplied, until
it could be said of colonies, as the French Directory had before
sorrowfully confessed concerning shipping, that not one was left under
a flag hostile to Great Britain. The navy, expanding to its greatest
numerical force in 1808, was maintained in equal strength, if in
somewhat diminished numbers, up to the termination of the struggle.
While unable to prevent the material growth of the French navy by
ship-building carried on in its ports, Great Britain continued to
impede its progress and cut off its supplies by the close watch
maintained over the French coast, by confining its fleets to their
harbors,—and so shutting them off from the one drill ground, the
sea,—and finally by frustrating Napoleon's project of increasing his
own power by violently seizing the vessels of smaller continental
states.

The secure tenure of the great common and highway of commerce—the
sea—was thus provided for. The enemy's navy was neutralized, his bases
abroad cut off, his possessions became the markets as well as the
sources of British trade. It was not enough, however, for commerce,
that its transit should be comparatively safe. Its operations of
exchange needed both materials and markets, both producers and
consumers. From these, as is known, Napoleon sought to exclude it by
the Continental System, which through the co-operation of Russia he
thought could be rendered effective. To this again the ministry of
Perceval and Canning opposed the Orders in Council, tempered by the
license system, with the double object of prolonging the resistance
of Great Britain and sapping that of her enemy; measures which but
reproduced, on a vaster scale, the Rule of 1756, with the modifications
introduced by Pitt, in 1798, for the same ends.

The question thus resolved itself, as has before been perhaps too
often said, into a conflict of endurance,—which nation could live the
longest in this deadly grapple. This brings us back again face to face
with the great consideration: Was the struggle which began in 1793 one
to be solved by a brilliant display of generalship, shattering the
organized forces of an ordinary enemy, and with it crushing the powers
of resistance in the state? Or had it not rather its origin in the
fury of a nation, against which all coercion except that of exhaustion
is fruitless? The aims, the tendencies, the excitement of the French
people had risen to a pitch, and had made demands, which defied
repression by any mere machinery or organization, however skilfully
framed or directed. When the movement of a nation depends upon—nay, is
the simple evidence of—a profound emotion permeating each individual of
the mass, the mighty impulse, from its very diffusion, has not those
vital centres of power, the destruction of which paralyzes the whole.
Not till the period of passion—necessarily brief, but for the time
resistless—has given place to the organization to which all social
movement tends, is a people found to have, as the tyrant of antiquity
wished, a single neck to be severed by a blow.

The frenzy of the French nation had spent itself, the period of
organization had set in, when Bonaparte appeared upon the scene;
but, as the tension of popular emotion slackened, there had not been
found, in the imperfect organization which sought to replace it, the
power to bear the burden of the state. No longer able to depend upon
a homogeneous movement of the millions, but only upon the efficient
working of the ordinary machinery of civil government and armies, in
her case most imperfectly developed, France now offered to the attacks
of her enemies those vital points, with which, when crushed, resistance
ceases. Military reverses and exhaustion by bad government brought her
in 1795, and again in 1799, to her last gasp. At both epochs Bonaparte
saved her.

The great captain and organizer not only brought victory with him
and restored the machinery of government; he supplied also a centre
around which popular enthusiasm and confidence might once more rally.
He became not only the exponent of national unity, but in a very real
sense the embodiment of those aspirations and aggressive tendencies,
which in the first days of the Revolution had bound Frenchmen together
as one man, but had afterwards evaporated and frittered away for want
of that definiteness of aim and sagacious direction which only a great
leader can impart. Under his skilful manipulation the lofty sentiments
of the early revolutionists became catchwords, which assured his hold
upon the imaginations and enthusiasm of the people, again swayed as one
man to follow him in his career of aggression. Metternich well said
that Bonaparte was to him simply the incarnation of the Revolution.[487]

It was with these two phases of one and the same condition that Europe
had to deal between 1793 and 1814. In the one instance a people
unified by a common passion and common aims, in the other the same
people concentrated into a common action by submission to the will of
a sovereign, apparently resistless in the council as in the field.
It is true that the affections of his subjects soon ceased to follow
him, except in the armies by whose power he ruled, but the result is
the same. All the energies of the nation are summed up in a single
overpowering impulse,—at first spontaneous, afterwards artificial,—to
which during the first half of Napoleon's career was given a guidance
of matchless energy and wisdom.

Such a combination is for the time irresistible, as the continent of
Europe proved during long and weary years. Absolute power, concentrated
force, central position, extraordinary sagacity and energy, all united
to assure to Napoleon the dazzling successes which are matters of
history. The duration and the permanent results of this startling
career depended, however, upon the staying power of the French nation
and upon the steadfastness of the resistance. Upon the Continent, the
latter in its actuality ceased. Potentially it remained,—men's hearts
swelled to bursting under the tyranny they endured; but before the
power and the genius of the great conqueror outward rebellion shrank
away. States dared not trust each other,—they could not act together;
and so men went silently in the bitterness of their spirits.

There remained one small group of islands, close on the flank of the
would-be ruler of the world, with a population numbering little
more than half that of his immediate dominions, whose inhabitants
deeply sympathized with sufferings and oppression they were powerless
directly to relieve. The resistance they had offered to the aggressive
fury of the Revolution they continued to oppose to its successor and
representative; but it was not by direct action in the field, but
only by operations aimed to abridge the resources and endurance of
France, that they could look forward to a possibility of success. For
seven years went on this final silent strife, whose outlines have been
traced in the preceding chapter of this work. During its continuance
Great Britain herself, while escaping the political oppression and
national humiliation undergone by the continental peoples, drank deep
of the cup of suffering. Her strength wasted visibly; but the mere
fact of her endurance and persistence compelled her enemy to efforts
more exhausting, to measures more fatal, than those forced upon
herself. And, while thus subjected to a greater strain, Napoleon was
by Great Britain cut off from that greatest of all sources of renewing
vitality—the Sea.

The true function of Great Britain in this long struggle can scarcely
be recognized unless there be a clear appreciation of the fact that
a really great national movement, like the French Revolution, or a
really great military power under an incomparable general, like the
French empire under Napoleon, is not to be brought to terms by ordinary
military successes, which simply destroy the organized force opposed.

Of the latter, the protracted and not wholly hopeless resistance, which
in 1813 and 1814 succeeded even the great Russian catastrophe, is a
signal instance; while to subvert such a power, wielded by such a man,
by any reverse less tremendous than it then underwent, is hopeless. Two
Napoleons do not co-exist. In the former case, on the other hand, the
tangible something, the decisive point against which military effort
can be directed, is wanting. Of this the struggle between the North
and South in the American Civil War affords a conspicuous example.
Few, probably, would now maintain that the capture of Richmond in the
first year of the war, when the enthusiasm of the Southern people was
at its height, their fighting force undiminished, their hopes undimmed
by the bitter disappointments of a four years' struggle, would have had
any decisive effect upon the high-spirited race. Positions far more
important fell without a sign of such result. No man could then have
put his finger here, or there, and said, "This is the key-stone of
resistance;" for in the high and stern feeling of the moment resistance
was not here nor there, but everywhere.

So was it in the early flush of the French Revolution. The "On to
Paris" of 1793 would probably have had no more decisive results
than the "On to Richmond" of 1861, had it been successful. Not
till enthusiasm has waned before sorrow, and strength failed under
exhaustion, does popular impulse, when deep and universal, acquiesce
in the logic of war. To such exhaustion France was brought when
Bonaparte took the helm. By his organizing genius he restored her
military strength, the material of which still remained, economized
such resources as the wastefulness of preceding governments had left,
and above all secured for her a further power of endurance by drawing
upon the life-blood of surrounding nations. So exhaustion was for the
time postponed; but, if the course of aggression which Bonaparte had
inherited from the Revolution was to continue, there were needed, not
the resources of the Continent only, but of the world. There was needed
also a diminution of ultimate resistance below the stored-up aggressive
strength of France; otherwise, however procrastinated, the time must
come when the latter should fail.

On both these points Great Britain withstood Napoleon. She shut him
off from the world, and by the same act prolonged her own powers of
endurance beyond his power of aggression. This in the retrospect of
history was the function of Great Britain in the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic period; and that the successive ministries of Pitt and his
followers pursued the course best fitted, upon the whole, to discharge
that function, is their justification to posterity. It is the glory of
Pitt's genius that as he discovered the object, "Security," so likewise
he foresaw the means, Exhaustion, by which alone the French propaganda
of aggression would be brought to pause. The eloquent derision poured
upon his predictions of failure from financial exhaustion, from
expenditure of resources, from slackening of enthusiasm, recoils
from the apprehension of the truth. He saw clearly the line of Great
Britain's action, he foresaw the direction of events, he foretold the
issue. How long the line would be, how the course of events would be
retarded, how protracted the issue, he could not foretell, because no
man could foresee the supreme genius of Napoleon Bonaparte.




FOOTNOTES:

[1] See, for instance, his letter to Lady Hamilton, Oct. 3, 1798
(Disp., vol. iii. p. 140), which is but one of many similar expressions
in his correspondence.

[2] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 177.

[3] In an entirely open country, without natural obstacles, there are
few or none of those strategic points, by occupying which in a central
position an inferior force is able to multiply its action against
the divided masses of the enemy. On the other hand, in a very broken
country, such as Switzerland, the number of important strategic points,
passes, heads of valleys, bridges, etc., are so multiplied, that either
some must be left unoccupied, or the defenders lose, by dissemination,
the advantage which concentration upon one or two controlling centres
usually confers.

[4] See ante, vol. i. p. 313.

[5] It is said that the old marshal on receiving these orders cried:
"This is the way armies are ruined."

[6] Jomini, Guerres de la Rév. Fran., livre xv. p. 124. Martin, Hist.
de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 50. It was just at this moment
that Nelson sent a division to the Gulf of Genoa to co-operate with
Suwarrow. (Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 431.)

[7] The phrase is that of Thiers. Hist. de la Rév., vol. x. p. 353.

[8] A curious evidence of the insecurity of the highways is afforded
by an ordinance issued by Bonaparte a year after he became First
Consul (Jan. 7, 1801), that no regular diligence should travel without
carrying a corporal and four privates, with muskets and twenty rounds,
and in addition, at night, two mounted gendarmes. If specie to the
value of over 50,000 francs were carried, there must be four gendarmes
by day and night. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 697.)

[9] See _post_, Chapter XVII.

[10] Speech of February 18, 1801.

[11] Thiers, Cons. et Empire, vol. i., p. 332.

[12] See ante, p, 251.

[13] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 410.

[14] Ibid., vol. vi. p. 497.

[15] "Voyant bien," says M. Thiers, Bonaparte's panegyrist, "que Malta
ne pouvait pas tenir longtemps." (Cons. et Emp., vol. ii. p. 92.)

[16] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 498.

[17] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 520.

[18] See vol. i. pp. 249, 256.

[19] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 738, Jan. 21, 1801.

[20] Contrast Bonaparte's reliance upon the aggregate numbers of Baltic
navies with Nelson's professional opinion when about to fight them.
"During the Council of War (March 31, 1801) certain difficulties were
started by some of the members relative to each of the three Powers
we should have to engage, either in succession or united, in those
seas. The number of the Russians was in particular represented as
formidable. Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified at everything
which savored either of alarm or irresolution. When the above remark
was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, 'The more numerous the
better;' and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said, 'So much the
better; I wish they were twice as many,—the easier the victory, depend
on it.' He alluded, as he afterwards explained in private, to the total
want of tactique among the Northern fleets." (Col. Stewart's Narrative;
Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 301.)

James, who was a careful investigator, estimates the allied Russian,
Swedish, and Danish navies in the Baltic at fifty-two sail, of
which not over forty-one were in condition for service, instead of
eighty-eight as represented by some writers. "It must have been a
very happy combination of circumstances," he adds, "that could have
assembled in one spot twenty-five of those forty-one; and against that
twenty-five of three different nations, all mere novices in naval
tactics, eighteen, or, with Nelson to command, fifteen British sail
were more than a match." (Nav. Hist., vol. iii. p. 43; ed. 1878.)

[21] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 747. To Talleyrand, Jan. 27, 1801.

[22] Nelson's Letters and Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 295.

[23] While this work was going through the press, the author was
gratified to find in the life of the late distinguished admiral
Sir William Parker an anecdote of Nelson, which, as showing the
military ideas of that great sea-officer, is worth a dozen of the
"go straight at them" stories which pass current as embodying his
precepts. "Throughout the month of October, 1804, Toulon was frequently
reconnoitred, and the frigates 'Phoebe' and 'Amazon' were ordered to
cruise together. Previous to their going away Lord Nelson gave to
Captains Capel and Parker several injunctions, in case they should
get an opportunity of attacking two of the French frigates, which now
got under weigh more frequently. _The principal one was_ that they
should not each single out and attack an opponent, but 'that both
should endeavor together to take _one frigate_; if successful, chase
the other; but, if you do not take the second, still you have won a
victory and your country will gain a frigate.' Then half laughing, and
half snappishly, he said kindly to them as he wished them good-by, 'I
daresay you consider yourselves a couple of fine fellows, and when you
get away from me will do nothing of the sort, but think yourselves
wiser than I am!'" ("The Last of Nelson's Captains," by Admiral Sir
Augustus Phillimore, K. C. B., London, 1891, p. 122.)

[24] Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 355. See also a very emphatic statement
of his views on the campaign, in a letter to Mr. Vansittart, p. 367.

[25] Nelson's Disp., April 9, 1801, vol. iv. pp. 339 and 341.

[26] The Danes were moored with their heads to the southward.

[27] If Nelson had an _arrière pensée_ in sending the flag, he
never admitted it, before or after, to friend or foe. "Many of my
friends," he wrote a month after the battle, "thought it a _ruse de
guerre_ and not quite justifiable. Very few attribute it to the cause
that I felt, and which I trust in God I shall retain to the last
moment,—_humanity_." He then enlarges upon the situation, and says that
the wounded Danes in the prizes were receiving half the shot fired by
the shore batteries. (Nels. Disp., vol. iv., p. 360.)

[28] April 20, 1801. Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 355, note.

[29] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. ii. p. 43, 1st
edition.

[30] Having destroyed Copenhagen, we had done our worst, and not much
nearer being friends.—_Nels. Disp._, vol. iv. p. 361.

[31] The second embargo was laid on Nov. 7, 1800, for the sole purpose
of enforcing the surrender of Malta to Russia. (Annual Register, 1800;
State Papers, p. 253.) It antedated by six weeks the declaration of
Armed Neutrality, by which the other powers, on the plea of neutral
rights, agreed to arm. (Ibid., p. 260.) In fact, the other powers
urged upon Great Britain that the Russian sequestration being on
account of Malta, they had no share in it, and so were not subjects
for retaliation; ignoring that they had chosen that moment to come to
Russia's support.

[32] Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 246.

[33] Nels. Disp., vol. iv., pp. 349, 352.

[34] Ibid., p. 349; also see p. 379.

[35] Ibid., vol. iv. p. 416.

[36] Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 373.

[37] For the important bearings of this stipulation, which was made
as an additional and explanatory declaration to the main convention
(Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 217), see _post_, Chapter XVI.
It was a matter in which Russia, not being a carrier, had no interest.

[38] For instance, Thiers, H. Martin, and Lanfrey.

[39] Corr. de Nap. vol. vii. p. 25.

[40] Corr. de Nap. vol. vii. p. 47.

[41] For full particulars of Bonaparte's views for the ships in Brest,
which then contained the large body of Spaniards brought back by Bruix
the previous August, see Corr. de Nap. vol. vi. pp. 181, 186. It must
be remembered that there was then practically no French line-of-battle
force in the Mediterranean.

[42] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. pp. 262, 263.

[43] The advantage of the close watch is also shown by the perplexity
arising when an enemy's squadron did escape. In this case, seven
ships-of-the-line were detached from the Channel fleet in chase of
Ganteaume, but "owing to lack of information" they were sent to the
West Indies instead of the Mediterranean. (James, vol. iii. p. 73.) The
latter was sufficiently controlled by Keith with seven sail-of-the-line
in the Levant, and Warren with five before Cadiz, to which he joined
two more at Minorca.

[44] See _ante_, vol. i. p. 68, for particulars.

[45] In the above the attempt has been merely to summarize the rapid
succession of events, and the orders issuing from Bonaparte's intensely
active mind to meet the varying situations. Reference may be made by
the student to his correspondence, vol. vi. pp. 719, 729, 745; vol.
vii. pp. 4, 24-26, 69-73, 125, 144, 164, 197, 198.

[46] This ship, the "St. Antoine," was one of those ceded to France by
Spain.

[47] Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. ii. p. 21.

[48] March 2, 1801. Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 72.

[49] The treaty was signed June 6, and ratified June 16. (Ann. Reg.
1801; State Papers, p. 351.) Bonaparte received his copy June 15.
(Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 215.)

[50] Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 256.

[51] Ibid., p. 266.

[52] See ante, p. 60.

[53] Ann. Reg. 1801; State Papers, p. 257.

[54] Paul I. had particularly held to the preservation of Naples
and the restitution of Piedmont to the king of Sardinia. On April
12 the first consul heard of Paul's death, and the same day issued
an order making Piedmont a military division of France. This was
purposely antedated to April 2. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 147.)
Talleyrand was notified that this was a first, though tentative, step
to incorporation. If the Prussian minister remonstrated, he was to
reply that France had not discussed the affairs of Italy with the king
of Prussia. (Ibid., p. 153.) Alexander was civilly told that Paul's
interest in the Italian princes was considered to be personal, not
political. (Ibid., p. 169.) The Russian ambassador, however, a month
later haughtily reminded Talleyrand that his mission depended upon the
"kings of Sardinia and the Two Sicilies being again put in possession
of the states which they possessed before the irruption of the French
troops into Italy." (Ann. Reg., 1801; State Papers, pp. 340-342)
Liguria (Genoa) was also made a military division of France by order
dated April 18. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 162.)

[55] While refusing this in his instructions to the French negotiator,
the latter was informed he might yield it, if necessary. (Corr. de
Nap., vol. vii., pp. 255-258.)

[56] Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 323.

[57] Parliamentary History, vol. xxxvi. p. 47.

[58] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. p. 377.

[59] Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. i. p. 396.

[60] Speech of Nov. 3, 1801.

[61] Annual Register 1801, p. 280.

[62] See ante, p. 70.

[63] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. pp. 509, 511.

[64] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 511.

[65] The slightest delay under these circumstances is very prejudicial,
and may be of great consequence to our squadrons and naval
expeditions.—_Corr. de Nap._, March 11, 1802.

[66] Corr. de Nap., March 12, 1802, vol. vii. p. 522.

[67] Ibid., April 3, 1802, vol. vii. p. 543.

[68] Corr. de Nap., July 1, 1802, vol. vii. p. 641.

[69] Ibid., April 13, 1801, vol. vii. p. 153.

[70] Ibid., April 18, 1801, vol. vii. p. 162.

[71] Corr. de Nap., August 2, 1802, vol. vii. p. 696.

[72] Ibid., vol. vii. pp. 528, 544.

[73] Ibid., vol. vii. p. 578.

[74] Decree of Nov. 19, 1792.

[75] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xv. p. 38.

[76] Ibid., livre xv. pp. 50, 51.

[77] Ibid., xvi. p. 234.

[78] Note Verbale. Remonstrance addressed to the French government.
(Ann. Reg. 1802; State Papers, p. 675.)

[79] Lord Hawkesbury's speech; Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 971.

[80] Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1380.

[81] Annual Register, 1803, p. 681.

[82] Secret Instructions to Lord Whitworth; Yonge's Life of Lord
Liverpool, vol. i. p. 93.

[83] Adams, Hist. of the United States, 1801-1817, vol. ii. pp. 13-21.

[84] The San Domingo expedition cost the lives of over twenty-five
thousand French soldiers.

[85] The British ambassador in Paris reached the same conclusion from
the instructions sent by Talleyrand to the French envoy in London. "It
appears from this note that this government is not desirous to proceed
to extremities; that is to say, it is not prepared to do so." (March
18; Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1315.) The United States minister in
Paris also wrote, March 24, "Here there is an earnest and sincere
desire to avoid war, as well in the government as the people." (Am.
State Papers, ii. 549.)

[86] Instructions to Duroc, March 12, 1803, Corr. de Nap., vol. viii.
pp. 307-311. It is noteworthy that these instructions were issued the
same day that was received in Paris information of the king's message
to Parliament of March 8, that "in consequence of military preparations
in the ports of France and Holland he had adopted additional measures
of precaution." Two days later the militia was called out.

[87] Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. p. 308.

[88] Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1293.

[89] Speech of May 23, 1803.

[90] Naval Chronicle, vol. ix. pp. 243, 247, 329, 330, 332, 491.

[91] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 553.

[92] Ibid.

[93] In case of war, it was the purpose of the British government to
send an expedition to occupy New Orleans, as it did afterwards in 1814.
(Am. State papers, vol. ii. pp. 551, 557.)

[94] Napoleon to Talleyrand; Corr. de Nap., May 13, 1803.

[95] Thiers, Consulat et Empire, livre xx. p. 182.

[96] The French republic had devoured under the form of assignats an
immense amount of national property.—THIERS: _Cons. et Emp._, livre
xvii. p. 377.

[97] "Holland," says Thiers, "would have wished to remain neutral;
but the first consul had taken a resolution, _whose justice cannot be
denied_, to make every maritime nation aid in our strife against Great
Britain." (Cons. et Emp., livre xvii. p. 383.)

[98] Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 48, note.

[99] Chénier's Vie du Maréchal Davout, Paris, 1866.

[100] See Naval Chronicle, vol. x. pp. 508, 510; vol. xi. p. 81.
Nelson's Dispatches, vol. v. p. 438.

[101] Pellew's Life of Lord Sidmouth, vol. ii. p. 237.

[102] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 452.

[103] Parl. Debates, March 15, 1804.

[104] Mémoires du Duc de Raguse, vol. ii. p. 212.

[105] Nelson's Disp. and Letters, vol. iv pp. 444-447.

[106] Nelson's Disp., vol. iv. p 500.

[107] James, Nav. Hist., vol. iii. p. 212 (ed. 1878).

[108] See Cobbett's Reg., vol. v. pp. 442, 443, for some very sensible
remarks on Pitt's attack, written by Cobbett himself.

[109] Stanhope's Pitt, vol. iv. p. 94.

[110] Parl. Debates, 1804, p. 892.

[111] Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 283.

[112] Ibid., p. 306.

[113] Ibid., p. 174. The following references also show conditions of
Nelson's ships: vol. v. pp. 179, 211, 306, 307, 319, 334; vol. vi. pp.
38, 84, 99, 100, 103, 134, 158.

[114] Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. p. 657.

[115] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 168.

[116] Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 115, 136.

[117] "It is at best but a guess," to use his own words, "and the world
attaches wisdom to him that guesses right." (Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p.
193.)

[118] See Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 179, 185, 247, 309, 374.

[119] Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 309.

[120] Ibid., p. 374.

[121] Ibid., p. 388.

[122] Ibid., pp. 405, 411.

[123] Ibid., p. 498.

[124] Ibid., p. 411.

[125] Ibid., p. 300.

[126] Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 306.

[127] Ibid., pp. 253, 254.

[128] Ibid., p. 438.

[129] Ibid., p. 388.

[130] Ibid., p. 395.

[131] See Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 145, 162, 413; vol. vi. pp. 84, 328,
329.

[132] Corr. de. Nap., vol. ix. p. 226.

[133] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 475.

[134] Ibid., p 513.

[135] Ibid., Sept. 12, 1804.

[136] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 700, Sept. 29, 1804.

[137] The former Spanish part of the island was still in the hands of
France.

[138] Corr. de Nap., Sept. 27 and 29, 1804.

[139] For Bonaparte's attitude toward Spain, see two letters to
Talleyrand, Aug. 14 and 16, 1803; Corr. de Nap. vol. viii. pp. 580-585.

[140] Signed Oct. 19, 1803. (Combate Naval de Trafalgar, by D. José? de
Couto, p. 79.)

[141] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 70.

[142] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 72.

[143] Ibid., p. 372.

[144] Ibid., p. 81.

[145] Jan. 24, 1804. Ibid., p. 85.

[146] Ibid., p. 89.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Ibid., pp. 85, 89.

[149] For some account of the advantages to French privateers arising
from this use of Spanish ports, with interesting particulars, see Naval
Chronicle, vol. xiii. p. 76. In March, 1804, Spain prohibited the sale
of prizes in her ports.

[150] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 86.

[151] Corr. de Nap. vol. ix. p. 482.

[152] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 93.

[153] Ibid., p. 122.

[154] Ibid., pp. 95, 122.

[155] Thiers, Cons. et Emp. livre xvii. pp. 383, 384.

[156] Pitt's Speech of February 11, 1805.

[157] D. José de Couto, Combate Naval de Trafalgar (Madrid, 1851), pp.
83, 89.

[158] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 240. This letter was not sent, Nelson
soon after receiving the Admiralty's order.

[159] Jurien de la Gravière, Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct. 1887, p. 611.

[160] Correspondance de Napoléon, vol. x. pp. 79-97.

[161] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 333.

[162] After writing these words the author noted Nelson's opinion
to the same effect: "Had they not been crippled, nothing could
have hindered our meeting them on January 21, off the south end of
Sardinia." (Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 354.)

[163] For Villeneuve's opinion see Chevalier's Hist. de la Mar. Fran.
sous l'Empire, p. 134; for Nelson's, Disp. vol. vi. pp. 334, 339.

[164] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 701.

[165] Ibid., Jan. 16, 1805.

[166] Compare with Nelson's views on attacking Russian fleet, _ante_,
p. 46.

[167] Corr. de Nap., April 29, 1805, vol. x. p. 443.

[168] Letter to Pitt by Robert Francis; Castlereagh's Memoirs, vol. v.
p. 444. The whole letter is most suggestive, not to say prophetic. From
internal indications it is extremely probable that the writer of these
letters, signed Robert Francis, was Robert Fulton, though the fact is
not mentioned in any of his biographies.

[169] Mémoires du Duc de Raguse, vol. ii. p. 261.

[170] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., vol. v. p. 413.

[171] Barrow's Autobiography, p. 263.

[172] Ibid. Nav. Chron., vol. xiii. p. 328.

[173] The above account depends mainly upon the "Naval Chronicle" for
April 15, 1805; vol. xiii. pp. 365-367,—checked by James and other
sources.

[174] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 227.

[175] So in the orders, Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 232. At a later date
this rendezvous is spoken of by Napoleon as in the Cape de Verde.
(Corr. de Nap., vol. xi. p. 50.) A singular confusion in such important
orders.

[176] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 447.

[177] Ibid., 324.

[178] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. pp. 338-341.

[179] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 397.

[180] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous l'Empire, p. 142.

[181] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. pp. 410, 411, 415.

[182] See _ante_, p. 142. Missiessy sailed from the West Indies in the
same week that Villeneuve sailed for them.

[183] Corr. de Nap., April 13, 1805, vol. x. p. 390.

[184] Ibid., April 20 and 23.

[185] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 394.

[186] Ibid., p. 490.

[187] Ibid., p. 571.

[188] Ibid., p. 616.

[189] Ibid., p. 624.

[190] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 708.

[191] For example, Thiers, Cons. et Emp., liv. xx. p. 178; Jurien de la
Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. ii. p. 224 (first edition).

[192] Corr. de Nap., vol. xi. p. 162.

[193] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 401. In a former work ("The Influence
of Sea Power upon History," p. 23), the author casually spoke of this
as a false step, into which Nelson had been misled. A closer study has
convinced him that the British admiral did quite right.

[194] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 624. Compare this with Nelson's remark,
just quoted.

[195] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 624.

[196] Ibid., June 22, 1805, p. 686.

[197] Nap. to Decrès, May 10, 1805.

[198] Corr. de Nap., June 9, p. 624.

[199] Annual Register, 1805, p. 225; Naval Chronicle, vol. xiii. p. 399.

[200] Naval Chronicle, vol. xiii. p. 484. The expression "_balayer
la Manche_"—sweep the Channel—is far stronger than the Chronicle's
translation, which is preserved in the quotation.

[201] Apparently a prize. (Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 410.)

[202] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 411.

[203] Ibid., Sept. 6, 1804.

[204] Corr. de Nap., June 28, 1805, vol. x. p. 708.

[205] Ibid., p. 705.

[206] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 457.

[207] Ibid., p. 45.

[208] Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 459.

[209] On this date is the first intimation of Nelson's sailing as known
to Napoleon. June 27, he writes, "I do not clearly see where Nelson has
been." (Corr. de Nap., vol. x. p. 701.)

[210] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. April 23 and May 4, 1805, pp. 420, 465.

[211] Ibid., May 24, p. 544.

[212] Ibid., May 29, pp. 563, 624.

[213] Corr. de Nap., vol. x. June 22, p. 686.

[214] Ibid., p. 545.

[215] See, for his reasoning, letter of June 16, three days after
leaving Antigua; and also, for his uncertainty after reaching Europe,
July 18. (Nels. Disp., vol. vi. pp. 457, 473.)

[216] Naval Chronicle, vol. xiv. p. 64.

[217] Napoleon to Decrès, July 18, 1805.

[218] Naval Chronicle, vol. xiv. p. 64.

[219] Barrow's Autobiography, pp. 276-290.

[220] See _ante_, p. 162.

[221] Napoleon to Berthier, Decrès, and Ganteaume, July 20, 1805.

[222] Napoleon to Decrès, July 27, 1805.

[223] Calder's Defence, Naval Chronicle, vol. xv. p. 167. The words
quoted, frequently repeated in different terms, embody the spirit of
the whole paper.

[224] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous l'Emp., p. 171. Couto (Combate de
Trafalgar, p. 107) gives a very serious account of the injuries
suffered by the four remaining Spanish ships.

[225] Nelson's Disp., vol. vi. p. 457.

[226] Nelson's Disp., vol. vii. p. 16.

[227] Corr. de Napoléon, July 16, 1805.

[228] The harbors of Ferrol, Coruña, and a third called Betanzos, are
inlets having a common entrance from the sea.

[229] See Napoleon's letters to Decrès, Allemand, and others, July 26,
1805.

[230] Napoleon to Decrès, August 29.

[231] Napoleon to Talleyrand, Dec. 18, 1799. "Frame your reply to Genoa
in such terms as to leave us free to incorporate the Ligurian Republic
with France, within a few months."

[232] Stanhope's Pitt, vol. iv. p. 318.

[233] Napoleon to Talleyrand, July 31, 1805.

[234] Ibid., August 13.

[235] Napoleon to Villeneuve, August 13.

[236] Napoleon to Decrès, August 14.

[237] Twenty-nine only of the line.

[238] Chevalier, Marine Française sous l'Empire, p. 180.

[239] Collingwood's Correspondence, August 21, 1805.

[240] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xxii. pp. 125, 128.

[241] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xxviii. p. 233.

[242] Napoleon to St. Cyr, Sept. 2, 1805.

[243] Napoleon to Decrès, Sept. 15.

[244] Ibid., Sept. 4.

[245] Nels. Disp., vol. vii. p. 80.

[246] Fyffe's History of Modern Europe, vol. i. p. 281.

[247] To the King of Wurtemburg, April 2, 1811; Corr., vol. xxii. p. 19.

[248] Life of Sir Wm. Parker, vol. i. p. 39. Ross's Life of Lord de
Saumarez, vol. ii. p. 214. Naval Chronicle, Plymouth Report, Dec. 10,
1800.

[249] Message of Directory to Council of Five Hundred, Jan., 1799;
Moniteur, An 7, p. 482.

[250] McArthur, Financial and Political Facts of the Eighteenth
Century, London, 1801, p. 308. Norman (Corsairs of France, London,
1887, App.) gives the number of French privateers taken in the same
period as 556.

[251] Sir J. Barrow, then a Secretary to the Admiralty, mentions in
a letter to J. W. Croker, July 18, 1810, that two colliers had been
captured in sight of Ramsgate, close under the North Foreland; and on
July 27 an ordnance hoy taken close under Galloper Light, in the face
of the whole squadron in the Downs, not one of which moved. (Croker's
Diary, vol. i. p. 33)

[252] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxiv. p. 327. For further curious
particulars concerning French privateering in the narrow seas, see Nav.
Chron., vol. xxii. p. 279; vol. xxiv. pp. 327, 448, 460-462, 490; vol.
xxv. pp. 32-34, 44, 203, 293; vol. xxvii. pp. 102, 237.

[253] See, for example, the account of the privateer captain, Jean
Blackeman Nav. Chron., vol. xii. p. 454.

[254] Naval Chronicle, vol. ii. p. 535; vol. iii. p. 151.

[255] In 1806, on the Jamaica station alone, were captured by the
British forty-eight public or private armed vessels, two of which were
frigates, the rest small. (Nav. Chron., vol. xvii. pp. 255, 337.)

[256] American State Papers, vol. ii. pp. 670, 771.

[257] James (Naval Hist., ed. 1878, vol. iii. p. 249) says that though
denominated 1,200-ton ships, the registered tonnage of most exceeds
1,300, and in some cases amounts to 1,500 tons.

[258] Nav. Chronicle, vol. vi. p. 251.

[259] Brenton's Naval Hist. (first ed.) vol. i. p. 346. Low's Indian
Navy, vol. i. 204.

[260] Low's Indian Navy, vol. i. 205. Milburn's Oriental Commerce, vol.
i. 405.

[261] The premium of insurance, which had in 1782 been fifteen guineas
per cent on ships engaged in the trade with China and India, did not
exceed half that rate at any period between the spring of 1793 and the
end of the struggle. (Lindsay's Merchant Shipping, vol. ii. 265. See
also Chalmer's Historical View, pp. 308-310.)

[262] Letter of Bombay merchants to Sir Edward Pellew; Nav. Chron.,
vol. xxiii. 107.

[263] Robert Surcouf, by J. K. Laughton; Colburn's United Service
Magazine, 1883, part i. pp. 331, 332.

[264] Milburn's Oriental Commerce, vol. i. p. xci.

[265] Naval Chronicle, vol. vii. 276.

[266] Naval Chronicle, vol. iv. pp. 150, 151, 326.

[267] Registration of vessels made in all ports of France (except the
newly acquired departments) from September 1793, to September 1796:—

  Under 30 tons                 3,351 (undecked)
  Between 30 and 100 tons       1,897
     "  100 and 200 tons          532
     "  200 and 400 tons          193
  Above 400 tons                   55
                                ‒‒‒‒‒
                                6,028

It should be explained that as all ships, old as well as new, had to
register, this gives the total of French shipping without deduction for
losses.

[268] Moniteur, 26 Floréal, An 9 (May 16, 1801).

[269] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 359.

[270] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, March 15, 1804, p. 921.

[271] Naval Chronicle, vol. xvii. p. 369.

[272] Norman gives the total number of captures, 1793-1800, as 5,158
against Lloyd's 3,639. Through the kindness of Captain H. M. Hozier,
Secretary of Lloyd's, the author has received a list of British ships
taken, annually, 1793-1814. This list makes the numbers considerably
less than the earlier one used in the text. By it, between 1793 and
1800, both inclusive, only 3,466 British ships were captured.

[273] Moniteur, 16 Pluviôse, An 7 (Feb. 5, 1799), pp. 582, 583.

[274] Guérin gives the total number of captures by France from Great
Britain, from 1793 to the Peace of Amiens, March 25, 1802, including
both ships of war and merchant vessels, as 2,172; while the French
lost in all, from ships-of-the-line to fishing-boats, between 1,520
and 1,550. Of this total, 27 were ships-of-the-line and 70 frigates,—a
number considerably below that given by James, the painstaking
English naval historian. Allowing 150 as the number of smaller naval
vessels taken, there would remain, by Guérin's estimate, about 1,300
French trading vessels which fell into British hands. Of these a
large proportion must have been the chasse-marées that carried on the
coasting trade (as their expressive name implies); attacks on which
formed so frequent and lucrative a diversion from the monotony of
blockade service. (Hist. Mar de la France, vol. iii. p. 674.)

Guérin claims great carefulness, but the author owns to much distrust
of his accuracy. It is evident, however, from all the quotations, that
Fox's statement, May 24, 1795, that in the second year of the war
France had taken 860 ships, was much exaggerated. (Speeches, vol. v. p.
419. Longman's, 1815.)

[275] In this period of twenty-two years there were eighteen months of
maritime peace.

[276] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv.

[277] Thus it is told of one of the most active of French
privateersmen, sailing out of Dunkirk, that "the trade from London to
Berwick, in the smacks, was his favorite object; not only from the
value of the cargoes, but because they required few hands to man them,
and from their good sailing were almost sure to escape British cruisers
and get safely into ports of France or Holland." Between 1793 and 1801
this one man had taken thirty-four prizes. (Nav. Chron., vol. xii. p.
454.)

[278] Returns of the coasting trade were not made until 1824. Porter's
Progress of the Nation, section iii. p. 77.

[279] The merchant vessels of that day were generally small. From
Macpherson's tables it appears that those trading between Great Britain
and the United States, between 1792 and 1800, averaged from 200 to 230
tons; those to the West Indies and the Baltic about 250; to Germany,
to Italy, and the Western Mediterranean, 150; to the Levant, 250 to
300, with some of 500 tons. The East India Company's ships, as has been
said, were larger, averaging nearly 800 tons. The general average is
reduced to that above given (125) by the large number of vessels in
the Irish trade. In 1796 there were 13,558 entries and clearances from
English and Scotch ports for Ireland, being more than half the entire
number (not tonnage) of British ships employed in so-called foreign
trade. The average size of these was only 80 tons. (Macpherson.) In
1806 there were 13,939 for Ireland to 5,211 for all other parts of the
world, the average tonnage again being 80. (Porter's Progress of the
Nation, part ii. pp. 85, 174.)

Sir William Parker, an active frigate captain, who commanded the same
ship from 1801 to 1811, was in that period interested in 52 prizes. The
average tonnage of these, excluding a ship-of-the-line and a frigate,
was 126 tons. (Life, vol. i. p. 412.)

In 1798, 6,844 coasters entered or left London, their average size
being 73 tons. The colliers were larger. Of the latter 3,289 entered
or sailed, having a mean tonnage of 228. (Colquhoun's Commerce of the
Thames, p. 13.)

[280] The returns for 1813 were destroyed by fire, and so an exact
aggregate cannot be given. Two million tons are allowed for that year,
which is probably too little.

[281] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 368, 535.

[282] Porter's Progress of the Nation, part ii. p. 171.

[283] Chalmer's Historical View, p. 307.

[284] Porter, part ii. p. 173. The Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix. p.
453, gives an official tabular statement of prize-vessels admitted
to registry between 1793 and 1812. In 1792 there were but 609, total
tonnage 93,994.

[285] Chalmer's Historical View, p. 351.

[286] The amounts given are those known as the "official values,"
assigned arbitrarily to the specific articles a century before. The
advantage attaching to this system is, that, no fluctuation of price
entering as a factor, the values continue to represent from year to
year the proportion of trade done. Official values are used throughout
this chapter when not otherwise stated. The "real values," deduced from
current prices, were generally much greater than the official. Thus, in
1800, the whole volume of trade, by official value £73,723,000, was by
real value £111,231,000. The figures are taken from Macpherson's Annals
of Commerce.

[287] The French will not suffer a Power which seeks to found its
prosperity upon the misfortunes of other states, to raise its commerce
upon the ruin of that of other states, and which, aspiring to the
dominion of the seas, wishes to introduce everywhere the articles of
its own manufacture and to receive nothing from foreign industry, any
longer to enjoy the fruit of its guilty speculations.—_Message of
Directory to the Council of Five Hundred_, Jan. 4, 1798.

[288] Message of Directory to Council of Five Hundred, Jan. 4, 1798.

[289] The act imposing these duties went into effect Aug. 15, 1789.
Vessels built in the United States, and owned by her citizens, paid
an entrance duty of six cents per ton; all other vessels fifty cents.
A discount of ten per cent on the established duties was also allowed
upon articles imported in vessels built and owned in the country.
(Annals of Congress. First Congress, pp. 2131, 2132.)

[290] Am. State Papers, vol. x. 502.

[291] Ibid., p. 389.

[292] Ibid., p. 528.

[293] Ibid., p. 584.

[294] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 535.

[295] Am. State Papers, vol. i. 243.

[296] Annual Register, 1793, p. 346*.

[297] Am. State Papers, i. 240. A complete series of the orders
injuriously affecting United States commerce, issued by Great Britain
and France, from 1791 to 1808, can be found in the Am. State Papers,
vol. iii. p. 262.

[298] Am. State Papers, i. 240, 241. How probable this result was may
be seen from the letters of Gouverneur Morris, Oct. 19, 1793, and March
6, 1794. State Papers, vol. i. pp. 375, 404.

[299] Am. State Papers, vol. i. p. 679.

[300] Wheaton's International Law, p. 753.

[301] Monroe to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. Am. State
Papers, vol. ii. p. 735.

[302] Reply to "War in Disguise, or Frauds of the Neutral Flag," by
Gouverneur Morris, New York, 1806, p. 22.

[303] Russell's Life of Fox, vol. ii. p. 281.

[304] Letter to Danish Minister, March 17, 1807. Cobbett's Parl.
Debates, vol. x. p. 406.

[305] A letter from an American consul in the West Indies, dated March
7, 1794, gives 220 as the number. This was, however, only a partial
account, the orders having been recently received. (Am. State Papers,
i. p. 429.)

[306] By the ordinance of Aug. 30, 1784. See Annals of Congress, Jan.
13, 1794, p. 192.

[307] The National Convention, immediately after the outbreak of war,
on the 17th of February, 1793, gave a great extension to the existing
permission of trade between the United States and the French colonies;
but this could not affect the essential fact that the trade, under some
conditions, had been allowed in peace.

[308] In fact Monroe, in another part of the same letter, avows:
"The doctrine of Great Britain in every decision is the same....
Every departure from it is claimed as a relaxation of the principle,
gratuitously conceded by Great Britain."

[309] Mr. Jay seems to have been under some misapprehension in this
matter, for upon his return he wrote to the Secretary of State: "The
treaty does prohibit re-exportation from the United States of West
India commodities in neutral vessels; ... but we may carry them direct
from French and other West India islands to Europe." (Am. State Papers,
i. 520.) This the treaty certainly did not admit.

[310] See letter of Thos. Fitzsimmons, Am. State Papers, vol. ii. 347.

[311] The pretexts for these seizures seem usually to have been the
alleged contraband character of the cargoes.

[312] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. 345.

[313] It will be remembered that the closing days of May witnessed the
culmination of the death struggle between the Jacobins and Girondists,
and that the latter finally fell on the second of June.

[314] Am. State Papers, vol. i. pp. 284, 286, 748.

[315] Ibid., p. 372.

[316] One of these complaints was that the United States now prohibited
the sale, in her ports, of prizes taken from the British by French
cruisers. This practice, not accorded by the treaty with France, and
which had made an unfriendly distinction against Great Britain, was
forbidden by Jay's treaty.

[317] Speech of M. Dentzel in the Conseil des Anciens. Moniteur, An 7,
p. 555.

[318] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 28.

[319] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 163.

[320] Letter to Talleyrand, Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 178.

[321] Ibid., vol. i. pp. 740, 748.

[322] The day after the news of Rivoli was received, Mr. Pinckney, who
had remained in Paris, though unrecognized, was curtly directed to
leave France.

[323] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 13.

[324] Ibid., p. 14.

[325] American State Papers, vol. ii. p. 14.

[326] Moniteur, An v. pp. 164, 167.

[327] March 1, and October 8, 1793. Ibid.

[328] Speech of Lecouteulx; Moniteur, An v. p. 176.

[329] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 463.

[330] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. 413, note.

[331] Of the imports into Germany, three fifths were foreign
merchandise re-exported from Great Britain.

[332] These figures are all taken from Macpherson's Annals of Commerce,
vol. iv.

[333] See Am. State Papers, vol. x. p. 487.

[334] The importance of the West India region to the commercial system
of Great Britain in the last decade of the 18th century will be seen
from the following table, showing the distribution per cent of British
trade in 1792 and 1800:—

                               Imports from,    Exports to,
                              1792.    1800.   1792.    1800.

  British West Indies           20       28      11       10
  United States                  5        7      17       15
  Russia                         9        8       3        2
  Germany and Prussia            5       12       9       31
  France, Belgium, and Holland   8        4      15       12
  Mediterranean                  7        2       6        2
  Spain and Portugal             9        5       6        3
  Ireland                       13        7       9        9
  Asia (not Levant)             14       16      10        7
  Miscellaneous                 10       11      14        9
                               ‒‒‒      ‒‒‒     ‒‒‒      ‒‒‒
                               100      100     100      100

The significance of these figures lies not only in the amounts set
down directly to the West Indies, but also in the great increase of
exports to Germany, and the high rate maintained to France, Belgium,
and Holland, with which war existed. Of these exports 25 per cent in
1792, and 43 per cent in 1800, were foreign merchandise, chiefly West
Indian—_re-exported_.

[335] In 1800 the captured islands sent 9 per cent of the British
imports.

[336] Moniteur, An vii. pp 478, 482.

[337] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 8.

[338] Moniteur, An vii. p. 502.

[339] Ibid., p. 716; Couzard's speech.

[340] Moniteur, An vii. p. 555; Dentzel's speech.

[341] Ibid.; Lenglet's speech.

[342] Ibid., pp. 582, 583. The figures are chiefly taken from the
speech of M. Arnould. A person of the same name, who was Chef du Bureau
du Commerce, published in 1797 a book called "Système Maritime et
Politique des Européens," containing much detailed information about
French maritime affairs, and displaying bitter hatred of England. If
the deputy himself was not the author, he doubtless had access to the
best official intelligence.

[343] In consequence of the law of Jan. 18, 1798, the British
government appointed a ship-of-the-line and two frigates to convoy a
fleet of American vessels to their own coast.—_Macpherson's Annals of
Commerce_, vol. iv. p. 440.

[344] Moniteur, An vii. p. 564; Cornet's speech.

[345] Annals of Congress, 1798, p. 3733.

[346] Ibid., p. 3754.

[347] Ibid.

[348] Speech of February 2, 1801.

[349] Speech of March 25, 1801.

[350] Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 212.

[351] Ibid., p. 217.

[352] The _principle_ of the Rule of 1756, it will be remembered, was
that the neutral had no right to carry on, for a belligerent, a trade
from which the latter excluded him in peace.

[353] By a report submitted to the National Convention, July 3, 1793,
it appears that in the years 1787-1789 two tenths only of French
commerce was done in French bottoms. In 1792, the last of maritime
peace, three tenths was carried by French ships. (Moniteur, 1793, p.
804.)

[354] Moniteur, An vii. p. 582; Arnould's speech.

[355] Annual Register, 1804. State Papers, p. 286.

[356] The exports of the French West India islands in 1788 amounted to
$52,000,000, of which $40,000,000 were from San Domingo alone. (Traité
d'Économie Politique et de Commerce des Colonies, par P. F. Page.
Paris, An 9 (1800) p. 15.) This being for the time almost wholly lost,
the effect upon prices can be imagined.

[357] An American vessel arrived in Marblehead May 29, landed her
cargo on the 30th and 31st, reloaded, and cleared June 3. (Robinson's
Admiralty Reports, vol. v. p. 396.)

[358] In the case of the brig "Aurora," Mr. Madison, the Secretary of
State, wrote: "The duties were paid or secured, according to law, in
like manner as they are required to be secured on a like cargo meant
for home consumption; when re-shipped, the duties were drawn back with
a deduction of three and a half per cent (on them), as is permitted to
imported articles in all cases." (Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 732.)

In the case of the American ship "William," captured and sent in, on
duties to the amount of $1,239 the drawback was $1,211. (Robinson's
Admiralty Reports, vol. v. p. 396.) In the celebrated case of the
"Essex," with which began the seizures in 1804, on duties amounting to
$5,278, the drawback was $5,080. (Ibid., 405.)

[359] The text of the Berlin decree can be found among the series
beginning in American State Papers, vol. iii. p. 262.

[360] A curious indication of the dependence of the Continent upon
British manufactures is afforded by the fact that the French army,
during this awful winter, was clad and shod with British goods,
imported by the French minister at Hamburg, in face of the Berlin
decree. (Bourrienne's Memoirs, vol. vii. p. 292.)

[361] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 805.

[362] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xiii. Appendix, pp. xxxiv-xlv.

[363] Thiers, Consulat et Empire, vol. vii. pp. 666-669.

[364] Letter of Lord Howick to Mr. Monroe, Jan. 10, 1807; Am. State
Papers, vol. iii. p. 5.

[365] President's Message to Congress, Oct. 27, 1807; Am. State Papers,
vol. iii. p. 5.

[366] Correspondance de Napoléon.

[367] British Declaration of September 25, 1807,—a paper which ably and
completely vindicates the action of Great Britain; Annual Register,
1807, p. 735.

[368] Annual Register, 1807. State Papers, p. 771.

[369] Ibid., p. 739.

[370] Lanfrey's Napoleon (French ed.), vol. iv. p. 153.

[371] Corr. de Nap., vol. xv. p. 659.

[372] Annual Register, 1807, p. 777.

[373] See, for example, Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. viii. pp. 636
and 641-644; vol. ix. p. 87, petition of West India planters; p. 100,
speech of Mr. Hibbert, and p. 684, speech of Mr. George Rose.

[374] See _ante_, p. 273.

[375] Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 245-247.

[376] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xiii. Appendix, pp. xxxiv-xlv.

[377] Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 23, 24.

[378] Annals of Congress, 1807, p. 2814.

[379] Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, p. 1824.

[380] There were three Orders in Council published on the 11th of
November, all relating to the same general subject. They were followed
by three others, issued November 25, further explaining or modifying
the former three. The author, in his analysis, has omitted reference to
particular ones; and has tried to present simply the essential features
of the whole, suppressing details.

[381] The attention paid to sustaining the commerce of Great Britain
was shown most clearly in the second Order of November 11, which
overrode the Navigation Act by permitting _any_ friendly vessel to
import articles the produce of hostile countries; a permission extended
later (by Act of Parliament, April 14, 1808) to _any_ ship, "belonging
to _any_ country, _whether in amity with his Majesty or not_." Enemy's
merchant ships were thus accepted as carriers for British trade with
restricted ports. See Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 270, 282.

[382] Gibraltar and Malta are especially named, they being natural
depots for the Mediterranean, whence a large contraband trade was
busied in evading Napoleon's measures. The governors of those places
were authorized to license even enemy's vessels, if unarmed and not
over one hundred tons burthen, to carry on British trade, contrary to
the emperor's decrees.

[383] On March 28, 1808, an Act of Parliament was passed, fixing
the duties on exportations from Great Britain in furtherance of the
provisions of the Orders. This Act contained a clause excepting
American ships, ordered into British ports, from the tonnage duties
laid on those which entered voluntarily.

[384] In a debate on the Orders, March 3, 1812, the words of Spencer
Perceval, one among the ministers chiefly responsible for them, are
thus reported: "With respect to the principle upon which the Orders in
Council were founded, he begged to state that he had always considered
them as _strictly retaliatory_; and as far as he could understand
the matter they were most completely justified upon the principle
of retaliation.... _The object of the government was to protect and
force the trade of this country_, which had been assailed in such an
unprecedented manner by the French decrees. If the Orders in Council
had not been issued, France would have had free colonial trade by means
of neutrals, and we should have been shut out from the Continent....
_The object of the Orders in Council was, not to destroy the trade
of the Continent, but to force the Continent to trade with us._"
(Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xxi. p. 1152.)

As regards the retaliatory effect upon France, Perceval stated that the
revenue from customs in France fell from sixty million francs, in 1807,
to eighteen and a half million in 1808, and eleven and a half in 1809.
(Ibid. p. 1157.)

[385] Correspondance de Napoléon, vol. xvii. p. 19.

[386] Mr. Henry Adams (History of the United States, 1801-1817) gives
134 as the number of American ships seized between April, 1809, and
April, 1810, and estimates the value of the vessels and cargoes at
$10,000,000 (Vol. v. p. 242.) The author takes this opportunity of
acknowledging his great indebtedness to Mr. Adams's able and exhaustive
work, in threading the diplomatic intricacies of this time.

[387] December 26, 1805.

[388] Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 82.

[389] Metternich to Stadion, Jan. 11, 1809; Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 312.

[390] Letter of Napoleon to Louis, dated Trianon, Dec. 20, 1808;
Mémoires de Bourrienne, vol. viii. p. 134. Garnier's Louis Bonaparte,
p. 351. The date should be 1809. On Dec. 20, 1808, Napoleon was at
Madrid, in 1809 at Trianon; not to speak of the allusion to the
Austrian war of 1809.

[391] Napoleon issued orders to this effect in August, 1807. Cargoes
of goods such as England might furnish were sequestrated; those that
could not possibly be of British origin, as naval stores and French
wines, were admitted. All vessels were to be prevented from leaving the
Weser. No notification of this action was given to foreign agents. See
Cobbett's Political Register, 1807, pp. 857-859.

[392] Thiers, Consulate and Empire (Forbes's translation), vol. xii. p.
21.

[393] Mémoires de Bourrienne, French Minister at Hamburg, vol. viii.
pp. 193-198.

[394] Annual Register, 1809; State Papers, 747.

[395] April 1, 1808; Naval Chronicle, vol. xxi. p. 48. May 7, 1809;
Annual Register, 1809, p. 698.

[396] Napoleon saw, in 1809, that his work at Tilsit was all to be done
over, since the only war Russia could make against the English was
by commerce, which was protected nearly as before. There was sold in
Mayence sugar and coffee which came from Riga.—_Mémoires de Savary, duc
de Rovigo_ (Imperial Chief of Police), vol. iii. p. 135.

[397] D'Ivernois, Effects of the Continental blockade, London, Jan.,
1810. Lord Grenville, one of the leaders of the Opposition, expressed a
similar confidence when speaking in the House of Lords, Feb. 8, 1810.
(Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xv. p. 347.) So also the King's speech
at the opening of Parliament, Jan. 19, 1809: "The public revenues,
notwithstanding we are shut out from almost all the continent of
Europe and entirely from the United States, has increased to a degree
never expected, even by those persons who were most sanguine." (Naval
Chronicle, vol. xxi. p. 48.)

[398] Monthly Magazine, vol. xxi. p. 195.

[399] Ibid., vol. xxii. p. 514.

[400] Ibid., vol. xxi. p. 539.

[401] Monthly Magazine, vol. xxii. p. 618.

[402] Ibid., vol. xxiv. p. 611.

[403] Ibid., vol. xxvi. p. 11.

[404] Ibid., vol. xxvii. pp. 417, 641.

[405] Ibid., p. 135.

[406] Tooke's History of Prices, vol. i. pp. 300, 301.

[407] Salgues, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la France, vol.
viii. pp. 350-355. Mémoires de Marmont, due de Raguse, vol. iii. p.
365. Mémoires de Savary, due de Rovigo, vol. v. p. 115.

[408] Quarterly Review, May, 1811, p. 465.

[409] For instance, a license was necessary for a British subject to
ship any articles to an enemy's port, though in a neutral vessel. In
principle, licenses are essential to trade with an enemy. In 1805 and
1807 Orders in Council dispensed with the necessity of a license in
particular instances; but even then merchants preferred to take out a
license, because it cut short any questions raised by British cruisers,
and especially by privateers. See Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. x. p.
924.

[410] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. x. p. 406.

[411] For an interesting account of the neutralizing trade, see Naval
Chronicle, vol. xxxi. pp. 288-295, and vol. xxxii. p. 119. On the
License System, the Parliamentary Debates (table of contents), and the
Quarterly Review of May, 1811, may be consulted.

[412] Quarterly Review, May, 1811, p. 461. Lindsay's History of
Merchant Shipping, vol. ii. p 316.

[413] Petition of Hull merchants, 1812; Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol.
xxi. p. 979.

[414] Am. State Papers, vol. iii. p. 341.

[415] Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxi. p. 1113.

[416] Ross's Life of Admiral Saumarez, vol. ii. pp. 196, 241.

[417] In the years 1809 and 1810 one hundred and sixty American vessels
alone were seized by Danish privateers. Only a part, however, were
condemned. (Am. State Papers, vol. iii. p. 521.)

[418] Erskine's note to that effect was dated April 19, 1809.

[419] Annual Register, 1809, p. 726.

[420] Moniteur, Feb. 24, 1810.

[421] Mémoires, vol. ix. pp. 21-24.

[422] Cons. et Empire (Forbes's Trans.), xii. 15.

[423] Corr. de Nap., vol. xx. p. 235.

[424] Compare Metternich's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 188.

[425] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xxxviii. p. 182.

[426] Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 70: "Mon principe est, La France
avant tout." (Letter to viceroy of Italy.)

[427] Parl. Debates, vol. xxi. p. 1050; xxiii. p. 540.

[428] Cobbett's Parl. Debates, vol. xxi. pp. 1056, 1117.

[429] The decree was also shrouded in secrecy, and its existence denied
in the Moniteur (Cobbett's Pol. Register, xviii. p. 701). Napoleon
wrote to the viceroy of Italy, Aug. 6, 1810: "You will receive a decree
which I have just issued to regulate duties on colonial produce.... It
is to be executed in Italy; it is secret and to be kept in your hands.
You will therefore give orders in pursuance of this decree only by
ministerial letters." (Corr., vol. xxi. p. 28.)

[430] Thiers, Cons. et Empire, Book xxxviii. pp. 181-189.

[431] Monthly Magazine, Feb. 1811, vol. xxxi. p. 67.

[432] Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 58.

[433] Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 224.

[434] Ibid., p. 268.

[435] Ibid., p. 77.

[436] Ibid., pp. 70, 71.

[437] Ibid., pp. 61, 62.

[438] Cobbett's Pol. Register, vol. xviii. pp. 704, 722.

[439] At Bordeaux licensed vessels were known to take on board wines
and brandies for the British army in Portugal. (Mémoires du duc de
Rovigo, vol. v. p. 60.)

[440] Bourrienne, Mémoires, vol. viii. p. 261.

[441] Mémoires du duc de Rovigo, vol. v. p. 66.

[442] Mémoires de Bourrienne, vol. ix. p. 60.

[443] Porter's Progress of the Nation, sect. iii. p. 205. In 1815,
after Napoleon's overthrow, the price fell to £34.

[444] Tooke's Hist. of Prices, vol. i. p. 354.

[445] Souvenirs du duc de Vicence, vol. i. p. 88.

[446] Both Monroe and Pinkney, while ministers in London, informed the
United States government that the extreme measures taken were popular.
(Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 188, 206.)

[447] Letter on the Genius and Disposition of the French Government; by
an American lately returned from Europe, pp. 189-192. Baltimore, 1810.
See also Metternich's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 476, for the unhappiness of
France.

[448] Mémoires du due de Raguse, vol. iii. p. 423. Marmont adds: "This
was a powerful help to French industry _during that time of suffering
and misery_."

[449] Tooke's History of Prices, vol. i. p. 311.

[450] In like manner, vessels with British licenses frequently slipped
into French ports, especially with naval stores from the Baltic.

[451] "There was not a Dutchman," says M. Thiers, "who had not lost
fifty per cent by foreign loans." (Cons. et Empire (Forbes's trans.),
xii. 47.)

[452] "The emperor does desire war, because he needs more or less
virgin soil to explore, because he has need to occupy his armies and to
entertain them at the expense of others.... M. Romanzow has repeated to
me a long conversation he had had with the emperor. 'He wants money,'
said he,—'he does not hide it; he wishes war against Austria to procure
it.'" (Metternich to Stadion, Feb. 17, 1809; Memoirs, ii. 329.) The
Austrian war of 1809 brought $34,000,000 into Napoleon's military
chest. (Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xxxviii. p. 34.)

[453] Thus to Davout, commanding the Army of Germany: "I shall need
much money, which should make you feel the importance of obtaining for
me as much as you can, and asking of me as little as possible." (Corr.,
March 24, 1811.)

[454] This condition of the debt was partly factitious, Napoleon
maintaining the public funds at eighty, by the secret intervention of
the military chest. (Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xli. p. 18.)

[455] Mémoires du duc de Rovigo, vol. v. p. 116.

[456] Genius and Disposition of French Govt., p. 166. Baltimore, 1810.

[457] Genius and Disposition of French Govt., pp. 181-192.

[458] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xli. p. 22.

[459] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xli. p. 11.

[460] Arnold's History of Rome, opening of chap. xliii.

[461] It is interesting to observe in Metternich's letters, while
ambassador at Paris, how he counts upon this exhausting of the capital
of French soldiers as the ultimate solution of the subjection of
Austria. "For some time Napoleon has lived on anticipations. The
reserves are destroyed." (April 11, 1809.) Compare also his exclamation
to the emperor in 1813: "Is not your present army anticipated by
a generation? I have seen your soldiers; they are mere children."
(Memoirs, vol. i. p. 189).

[462] See Metternich's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 477.

[463] Corr. de Nap., vol. xxi. p. 497 (Feb. 28, 1811).

[464] Ibid., p. 275.

[465] Ibid., p. 296.

[466] These contentions of Napoleon were for the most part perfectly
correct. Some interesting facts, bearing upon the true character of the
so-called neutral trade in the Baltic, may be gathered from Ross's Life
of Saumarez, vol. ii. chaps. ix.-xiii. See also representations made
by a number of American ship-captains, Am. State Papers, vol. iii. pp.
329-333. On the other hand, the scrupulously upright John Quincy Adams,
U. S. minister to Russia, affirmed that he positively knew some of the
American ships to be direct from the United States. The facts, however,
only show the dependence of the world at that time upon the Sea Power
of Great Britain, which made Napoleon's Continental System impossible;
yet, on the other hand, it was his only means of reaching his enemy. If
he advanced, he was ruined; if he receded, he failed.

[467] During one year, 1809, this fleet captured 430 vessels, averaging
sixty tons each, of which 340 were Danes. Among these were between
thirty and forty armed cutters and schooners, of which Denmark had to
employ a great many to supply Norway with grain. The remaining ninety
vessels were Russian. (Naval Chronicle, vol. xxii. p. 517.)

[468] "Once more I must tell you," wrote a Swedish statesman to
Saumarez, "that you were the first cause that Russia dared to make war
against France. Had you fired one shot when we declared war against
England, all had been ended and Europe would have been enslaved."
(Ross's Saumarez, vol. ii. p. 294.)

[469] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., Book xlii. p. 383.

[470] Compare Metternich's argument with the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs, October, 1807. (Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 161.)

[471] Annual Register, 1792; State Papers, p. 355.

[472] Moniteur, Dec. 25, 1792; Proposition of M. Barailon.

[473] Pitt's Speeches, vol. ii. pp. 46, 47.

[474] Lanfrey's Napoleon, vol. iv. p. 112 (Eng. trans., ed. 1886).

[475] Lanfrey's Napoleon, vol. ii. chap. iii. p. 122 (Eng. trans., 2d
ed.).

[476] Jurien de la Gravière, Vie de l'Amiral Baudin, p. 9.

[477] That is, about 8 per cent annually. The increase during the four
years of the elder Pitt in the Seven Years' War, 1757-1761, was 29 per
cent, about 7 per cent annually.

[478] Système Maritime et Politique des Européens dans le 18me
siècle, par Arnould. Paris, 1797.

[479] For Napoleon's own assertion of this fact, see "Note pour le
Ministre des Relations Extérieures," Corr. de Nap., Oct. 7, 1810. See
also _ante_, p. 320.

[480] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. i. p. 396.

[481] Annual Register, 1793, p. 163. For the correspondence on that
occasion see A. R. 1792; State Papers, pp. 326, 327. See also letter of
Le Brun, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Moniteur of Aug.
26, 1792.

[482] The Directory tended to impose upon the smaller states,
neighboring to or allies of France, republican constitutions,
"unitaires" (centralized) in form, analogous to our own, as Bonaparte
had done for the Cisalpine Republic and for Genoa. It had just done so
in Holland, where it had raised against the government of the United
Provinces a kind of 18th of Fructidor (coup d'état). It now (1798)
aimed at revolutionizing Switzerland. Bonaparte urged it on. He had
already provoked a revolution in a republic near to and allied with the
Swiss, that of the Grisons.—MARTIN: _Hist. de France depuis_ 1789, vol.
iii. p. 7.

[483] Napoleon's remark referred to the edicts of the Directory,
confiscating British goods wherever found on land; but it applies
equally to the decree of January, 1798, which extended the edict to
the sea: "Le Directoire ébaucha le système du blocus continental; il
ordonna la saisie de toutes les marchandises Anglaises qui pouvaient
se trouver à Mayence et dans les autres pays cédés à la France."
(Commentaires de Napoléon I., Paris, 1867, vol. iii. p. 413.)

[484] This correspondence, so far as published, is to be found in the
Annual Register for 1797; State Papers, pp. 181-223.

[485] See Stanhope's Life of Pitt, vol. ii. p. 224 (ed. 1879).

[486] For a graphic description of the effects of the Berlin decree on
the Continent, see Fyffe's History of Modern Europe, vol. i. p. 328.

[487] Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 65.




INDEX.


  _Acre_, Siege of, by Bonaparte,
    i.  294-302.

  _Alexander_, Czar of Russia
    ii. succeeds to the throne, 55;
        Convention with Great Britain, June, 1801, 57;
        coolness toward Bonaparte, 69, and note;
        joint action with Bonaparte in German indemnities, 84;
        conditions required before guaranteeing status of Malta, 92;
        attitude upon the execution of the Duc d'Enghien, 129, 177;
        joins Third Coalition, 177;
        defeated at Austerlitz, 182;
        commercial policy, 200;
        campaign of Eylau and Friedland, 273;
        Treaty of Tilsit, 274, 310;
        meeting at Erfurt, 293;
        war with Sweden, 293;
        joint letter with Napoleon to king of Great Britain, 294;
        attitude toward the Continental System, 303, 324, 329;
        peace with Sweden, 316;
        uneasiness at extension of French empire, 324;
        dissatisfaction at the annexation of Oldenburg, 330;
        disagreement with Napoleon concerning the Continental System,
          344,401;
        understanding reached with Great Britain and Sweden, 347;
        peace with Turkey, 350;
        attacked by Napoleon, 351.

  _Antwerp_, commercial isolation of,
    i.  in 1780, 9;
        naval importance of, 15;
        development under Napoleon as a naval arsenal, 377.

  _Armed Neutrality_, of 1800,
    ii. signature and affirmations of,  36;
        dissolution of, 57.

  _Austria_,
    i.  natural ally of Great Britain, 12;
        quarrel with Holland about the Scheldt, 17;
        war with Turkey, 1788, 19;
        successes, 24;
        peace with Turkey, 25;
        joins in Declaration of Pilnitz, 28;
        war with France, 29;
        driven from Netherlands, 1792, 31;
        jealousy of Prussia, 80;
        holds Italian duchies, 84;
        successes in 1793, 93;
        mistakes, 94;
        reverses, 103, 168;
        forced to retire across the Rhine in 1794, 169, 171;
        strengthens alliance with Great Britain, 172;
        successes of 1795, 181-183;
        campaign in Italy, 1795, 195-198;
        reverses in Italy, 1796, 209-212, 216, 217, 233;
        signs preliminaries of Leoben, 234;
        Treaty of Campo Formio, Austrian gains and losses, 250;
        dissatisfaction at French occupation of Rome, 279;
        tumult in Vienna, 280;
        alliance with Naples and Russia, 1798, 282;
    ii. renewal of war with France, 3;
        successes in Switzerland and Italy, 4-8;
        defeat at battle of Zurich, 1799, 9;
        refusal to treat with Bonaparte, 16;
        disastrous campaigns of 1800 in Germany and Italy, 19-24;
        negotiations with Great Britain and France, 25;
        armistice with France, 25, 35;
        renewal of hostilities and defeat of Hohenlinden, 38;
        Peace of Lunéville, 39;
        loss of power by German indemnities, 84;
        joins Third Coalition, 177-179;
        disastrous campaign of Austerlitz, 181;
        Peace of Presburg, 182;
        accedes to the Continental System, 1807, 278;
        preparations to renew the war, 297;
        war with France in 1809, 314-316;
        Peace of Vienna and renewed exclusion of British goods, 316.


  _Barham_, Lord, First Lord of Admiralty,
    ii, 168;
        masterly action of, before Trafalgar, 169, 174.

  _Battles_, land,
    Aboukir, i. 322;
    Arcola, i. 233;
    Austerlitz, ii. 182;
    Badajos,ii. 349;
    Castiglione, i. 233;
    Ciudad Rodrigo, ii. 348;
    Eckmuhl, ii. 315;
    Essling, ii. 316;
    Eylau, ii. 273;
    Fleurus, i. 168;
    Friedland, ii. 274;
    Jena, ii. 270;
    Jemappes, i. 31;
    Lodi, i. 210;
    Loano, i. 198;
    Marengo, ii. 23;
    Pyramids, i. 277;
    Rivoli, i. 233, 243;
    Talavera, ii. 315;
    Valmy, i. 30;
    Wagram, ii. 316;
    Wattignies, i. 103.

  _Battles_, sea,
    Algesiras, ii. 63-66;
    Camperdown, i. 378;
    Copenhagen, ii. 47-51;
    First of June, i. 126-155;
    Hotham and Martin, i. 190-194;
    Île Groix, i. 177;
    Nile, i. 261-277;
    St. Vincent, i. 221-229;
    Trafalgar, ii. 185-195.

  _Bettesworth_, captain, British navy,
    ii. fortunate meeting with combined fleets in June, 1805,
          163, 167.

  _Bonaparte_, Napoleon,
    i.  interest in the East, 14;
        influence upon course of events, 183;
        appointed to command Army of Italy, 203;
        successful campaign of 1796, 207-211;
        designs upon Corsica, 213;
        opinion of the effect of British Mediterranean fleet upon his
          operations, 217;
        critical position in Italy, May, 1796-Feb. 1797, 233;
        fall of Mantua, 233;
        advances into Carinthia, 234;
        signs preliminaries of Leoben, 234;
        offence at action of the Council of Five Hundred, 244;
        sends Augereau to support _coup d'état_, 244;
        deep projects for maritime and Oriental expansion, 246-249;
        signs Treaty of Campo Formio, 250;
        opinion of danger to France from British Sea Power, 251;
        return to Paris and command of Army of England, 252;
        Egyptian expedition organized, 253;
        sails from Toulon, 256;
        captures Malta, and sails thence for Egypt, 257;
        lands at Alexandria, 260;
        orders concerning the disposition of the fleet, 261-263;
        criticism of Nelson's conduct, 275;
        conquest of Lower Egypt, 277;
        objects in Egyptian undertaking, 288;
        Syrian expedition, 290;
        siege of Acre, 299;
        retreat into Egypt, 302;
        criticisms upon Sir Sidney Smith, 303;
        defeats Turks at Aboukir, 322;
        return to France, 324;
        criticism upon his Oriental projects, 324-328;
        attempts to send relief to Egypt and Malta, 329-331;
        views as to condition of French in Egypt, 332;
        views as to relative importance of Brest and Antwerp, 377;
    ii. policy as first consul, 15, 20;
        campaign of Marengo, 22;
        negotiations with Austria and Great Britain, 1800, 25, 34,
          35, 38-40;
        overtures to the Czar, 29, 32, 37;
        to Prussia, 28, 31;
        efforts to form a coalition against Great Britain, 25-37;
        Mediterranean projects, 1800-1801, 59-68;
        anxiety for maritime peace, 70;
        sends expedition to Haïti, 78;
        president of Cisalpine republic, 80;
        first consul for life, 83;
        aggressions in 1802, 84-90;
        insults to Great Britain, 93-96;
        projects against Great Britain, 1803, 100;
        preparations to invade England, 102, 105, 111-117;
        invasion of Hanover and Naples, 109-111;
        first combinations to invade England, 124;
        becomes emperor, May, 1804, 130. See also Napoleon.

  _Boulogne_,
    ii. point of concentration for Bonaparte's flotilla for invasion
          of England, 113;
        preparations at, 114;
        strategic value of, 116;
        appearance in 1814, 182.

  _Brest_,
    i.  character and surroundings of the port, 304, 305, 342-344;
        methods of watching observed by Howe and Bridport, 345, 346,
         364-367;
        St. Vincent's methods, 368-376;
        paralysis as a port of equipment, 376;
        Napoleon's preference for Antwerp, 377.

  _Bridport_, Lord, British admiral,
    i.  succeeds Howe in command of Channel fleet, 165;
        action of Île Groix, 177;
        escape of the French fleet from Brest, 1799, 305;
        method of watching Brest, 345, 346;
        French expedition against Ireland, 360-367;
        anecdote of, 368;
        relieved in command by St. Vincent, 368.

  _Brueys_, French admiral,
    i.  commands French division in Adriatic, 252, 255;
        designs upon Malta in 1798, 255;
        appointed to command fleet in Egyptian expedition, 253;
        negligent conduct of, 262, 263;
        inadequate preparations for defence, 264-266;
        Battle of the Nile, 266-272;
        killed, 271.

  _Bruix_, French admiral,
    i.  escape from Brest with twenty-five ships-of-the-line, in 1799,
          305;
        enters Mediterranean, 307;
        action in Mediterranean, 312-315;
        re-enters Atlantic accompanied by sixteen Spanish ships, 315;
        reaches Brest, 316;
        comments on this cruise, 318;
    ii. instructions of Bonaparte to, in 1800, 60-63;
        connection with invasion flotilla, and death, 130.


  _Calder_, British admiral,
    ii. ordered to command a detached squadron, 168;
        action with combined fleets, 171;
        court-martial upon, 174.

  _Catharine_, Empress of Russia,
    i.  influence upon Joseph II., Emperor of Germany, 11;
        relations with Austria and France, 1784, 16, 17;
        naval undertakings, 1788, 20;
        attitude toward French Revolution, 82, 243; ii. 233;
    ii. death, 243.

  _Chauvelin_, French ambassador to Great Britain,
    i.  disputes with British ministry, 32-34;
        dismissed from Great Britain, 34.

  _Collingwood_, British admiral,
    i.  remarks of, 70, 71, 75, 309 (note);
        attention to health of crew, 71;
        distinguished share in battle of Cape St. Vincent, 227;
    ii. blockade off Rochefort, 118;
        ordered to West Indies with eight ships in 1805, 155, 157;
        blockade of Cadiz, 157, 159, 167, 175, 180;
        surmise as to Napoleon's intentions, 156;
        brilliant conduct at Trafalgar, 191;
        succeeds to command after Nelson's death, 195.

  _Commerce_, warfare against,
    ii. chaps. xvii. and xviii.

  _Commerce_-destroying,
    i.  by scattered cruisers, 179, 326-328, 335-338; ii. 199-218,
          221-228.

  _Cornwallis_, British admiral,
    i.  action with superior French fleet, 177;
        tenacity in maintaining Brest blockade, 373, 376; ii. 98, 118,
          119, 123, 128, 148, 153;
        orders to detach squadron under Calder to meet Villeneuve,
          168;
        joined by Calder and Nelson, 174;
        mistake in dividing his force, 176.

  _Corsica_,
    i.  acquired by France in 1769, 88;
        relations to France and to Great Britain, 88;
        revolt against the Convention, 88;
        French expelled by British, 187;
        union with Great Britain proclaimed, 188;
        difficulties of government by Great Britain, 188, 189;
        value of the island, 179, 186;
        Bonaparte's measures to recover, 213, 216;
        evacuated by the British, 216;
        contributes a detachment to Egyptian Expedition, 254, 257.


  _Davout_, French marshal,
    ii. battle of Eckmuhl, 314;
        charged with maintenance of Continental System, 317;
        command in Prussia and Hanse towns, 319;
        injunctions of Napoleon to, 337, note.

  _Decrees_, French,
        of Fraternity, Nov. 19, 1792, i. 31, ii. 361;
        extending French system, Dec. 15, 1792, i. 32, ii. 367;
   ii.  affecting neutral carriers, 231, 234, 242-246;
        confiscating ships carrying goods of British origin, January,
          1798, 249, 250, 254-259;
        Napoleon's Berlin, 271-273, 281;
        Milan, 290;
        Bayonne and Rambouillet, 291, 292;
        general seizure of goods of British origin, August, 1810, 324;
        public burning of British manufactures, Oct. 19, 1810, 327.

  _De Galles_, Morard, French admiral,
    i.  commands Brest fleet in 1793, 61-63;
        conduct in the mutiny of that year, 62;
        opinions as to the efficiency of the seamen, 61;
        commands naval part of Irish Expedition, 1796, 350-360.

  _Denmark_,
    i.  hostility to Sweden, 21;
        invades Sweden, 1788, 21;
        stopped by Great Britain and Prussia, 22, 25;
        seeks the commercial advantages of neutrality in French
          Revolution, 83;
        loss of West India colonies, 121;
    ii. quarrel with Great Britain about rights of convoy, 26;
        Bonaparte tries to conciliate, 30;
        joins Armed Neutrality of 1800, 36;
        British expedition against, 41-47;
        battle of Copenhagen, 47-51;
        armistice with Great Britain, 51, and convention, 58;
        Napoleon's designs against, 276;
        second British expedition and bombardment of Copenhagen, 277;
        shares in Continental System, 301;
        privateering by Danish seamen, 313;
        deprived of Norway, 350.

  _De Rions_, D'Albert, French commodore,
    i.  mobbed by the populace of Toulon, 41-44;
        commands Brest fleet in mutiny of 1790, 45;
        leaves the navy and emigrates, 46;
        Suffren's high opinion of, 46.

  _Devins_, Austrian general,
    i.  inefficiency of, in 1795 in Italy,195-198.

  _Directory_,
    i.  established as French executive government, 175, 176;
        arrogance toward foreign states, 240, 242;
    ii. disasters and incompetency of, 1-14;
        overthrown by Bonaparte, 15;
        identity of spirit with Napoleon, 258, 354, 396, 398.

  _Dumouriez_, French general,
    i.  wins battles of Valmy and Jemappes, 30, 31, 89;
        defeated at Neerwinden and driven from Holland and
          Netherlands, 89;
        treason of, 89.


  _Egypt_,
    i.  nominal dependence upon Turkey under the Mamelukes, 85;
        genesis of Bonaparte's expedition to, 246-249;
        conquest of, by the French, 260, 277, 288-290;
        Bonaparte's purpose in the enterprise, 288;
        loss of, by the French, 330-334;
        Kleber's opinion of the value of, 331;
        tenure dependent upon control of the sea, 331, 332, ii. 60-63;
    ii. restored to Turkey, 72;
        condition under Turkish rule, 94, 150;
        Nelson's apprehensions for, 124-127;
        his search for the French fleet in Alexandria, 1805, 144.

  _Elba_, island of,
    i.  seized by British, though a possession of Tuscany, 213;
        evacuated, 220;
    ii. transferred to France at Peace of Amiens, 82.

  _Elliott_, Sir Gilbert,
    i.  British Viceroy of Corsica, 187, 188, 213;
        quoted, 188, 217, 218;
        returns to England, 230.


  _Flotilla_,
    ii. for invasion of England, numbers and character of, 111-116;
        estimate of, as a fighting force by British naval officers and
        Napoleon, 120-122;
        ultimate fate of, 182.

  _Fox_, British statesman,
    ii. opinion as to "free ships, free goods," 261;
        minister of foreign affairs, 1806, 269;
        modification of Rule of 1756 by Order in Council of
          May, 1806, 270;
        death, 270;
        praise of French soldiery, 365;
        disparagement of Pitt, 387.

  _France_,
    i.  results of war of 1778 to, 3, 4;
        condition of, in 1789, 6;
        policy of, as to Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, 13;
        interest in the Levant and the Baltic, 14, 22;
        interest in Netherlands, 15, and Holland, 16-18;
        alliance with Holland, 1785, 18;
        increasing internal disorder, 18, 24;
        meeting of States General, 25;
        outline of events in the Revolution to Feb. 1, 1793, 28-33;
        declares war against Austria, 29,
          and against Great Britain and Holland, 34;
        condition of the navy in 1793, and causes thereof, 35-68;
        comparative strength of British and French fleets, 75, 110;
        acquisition and status of Corsica, 88;
        internal conflicts in 1793, 89-92;
        disasters on eastern frontiers, 93;
        energy shown by the government, 93-96;
        disasters retrieved in 1793, 103;
        internal rebellions quelled, 104, 105;
        condition and importance of West India Islands, 111, 114, 115;
        contest over West India Islands, 115-119;
        scarcity of provisions, 1793, 122;
        convoy of provisions ordered from America, 122;
        internal events, 1794, 166-168;
        military successes in 1794, 168-171;
        conquest of Belgium and Holland, 170;
        peace with Prussia, Holland, and Spain, 172;
        reaction of 1795, 173, 174;
        internal disorders, 175, 176;
        great fleets withdrawn from the sea, and policy of
          commerce-destroying adopted, 179, 201;
        military weakness in 1795, 180-183;
        loses Corsica, 1794, 187;
        successes in Italy, 1795-1796, 198, 209-211, 233, 234;
        regains Corsica, 216;
        brings Austria to peace, 234, 250;
        arrogance toward foreign governments, 240-243;
        reactionary disorders, 243;
        coup d'état of Sept. 3, 1797, 244;
        danger from Great Britain, 251;
        sends expedition to Egypt, 253;
        capture of Malta by, 257;
        naval defeat at the Nile, 263-277;
        subjugation of Egypt by, 277, 289;
        aggressions upon Holland and Switzerland, 278;
        offence given to Naples, Austria, and Russia, 280-282;
        reverses in the Mediterranean, 1798, 287;
        expectations from conquest of Egypt, 288;
        reverses in Europe, 1799, 323,
        loss of Malta and Egypt, 328-334;
        maritime impotence of, 335-338,
        expeditions against Ireland, 346-380;
    ii. conquest of Naples, 2;
        reverses in Europe, 1799, 3-11, 407;
        internal disorders, 1799, 11-15; Bonaparte first consul, 15;
        successful campaign of 1800, 19-24;
        maritime and colonial exhaustion, 1800, 25, 35;
        peace of Lunéville with Austria, 39;
        fruitless attempts to control Mediterranean, 59-68;
        preliminaries of peace with Great Britain, 71-73;
        exhaustion of national spirit of aggression, 74;
        aggressions of Bonaparte, 1801-1803, 76-97;
        cession of Louisiana by Spain, 77;
        Peace of Amiens with Great Britain, 81;
        renewal of war, 98;
        Louisiana ceded to United States, 104;
        maritime and financial weakness, 106-108;
        occupation of Hanover and heel of Italy, 109-111;
        preparations for invasion of England, 111-117;
        exactions from Spain, 133;
        Trafalgar campaign, 140-181;
        its chances of success discussed, 182-184;
        necessity of invading England, 184;
        campaign of 1805 and battle of Austerlitz, 181;
        naval defeat of Trafalgar, 187-195;
        far-reaching consequences of this battle, 196;
        succeeded by the Continental System, 197-200;
        maritime impotence of, 202;
        activity of privateers, 207-210;
        characteristics of privateering, in Europe, 208,
          in Atlantic, 210,
          in West Indies, 212,
          in East Indies, 215-218;
        destruction of French commerce, 218-220, 375;
        bitterness against Great Britain and maritime neutrals, 230;
        anger against United States, 239;
        measures directed against neutral carriers, 242-248, 250-254;
        results of these measures, 254-258;
        _quasi_ war with the United States, 258;
        true commercial policy of, 262-265, 280, 354;
        commercial measures of Napoleon, 265;
        Berlin Decree, 271;
        campaign against Russia, 273;
        Peace of Tilsit, 274;
        invasion of Portugal, 277;
        Milan Decree, 290;
        war in Spain, 292;
        war with Austria, 1809, 314;
        excessive prices in, 322;
        internal distress of, 333-337, 340-342, 349;
        want of credit, 339, 343;
        disputes with Russia, 344;
        invasion of Russia, 351;
        analysis of commercial measures of Napoleon, 351-357;
        temper and aims of leaders in French Revolution, 359-363, 367,
          384, also 74;
        decrees of November 19, 361,
          and December 15, 367;
        effect of the maritime war upon French industry, 395;
        identity of spirit in the Republic, the Directory, and in
          Napoleon, 396-399;
        the struggle with Great Britain one of endurance, 406;
        similarity of characteristics in the external action of France
          from 1793-1812, 407-411;
        continued vitality of the movement due to Bonaparte, 407, 408.


  _Ganteaume_, French admiral,
    i.  report of condition of French naval officers and seamen, 1801, 65;
        injuries received by squadron under his command, 67;
        commerce-destroying cruise in 1795, 202;
        brings Bonaparte back from Egypt to France, 323;
        escape from Brest in 1801, 376, ii. 61;
        failure to relieve Egypt, 62;
        maritime prefect at Toulon, 1803, 125;
        command of Brest fleet, 1804, and instructions from Napoleon,
          131, 147;
        modified instructions, 149;
        unable to escape from Brest, 153;
        awaits Villeneuve outside the Goulet, 154.

  _Genoa_, coasting trade with Southern France, i. 195, 200, ii. 7;
    i.  French intrigues in, 201, 213;
        preparations in, for Egyptian Expedition, 254, 257;
        organized as Republic of Liguria by Bonaparte, 278, 279;
    ii. Admiral Bruix reinforces, 313, 5, 6;
        Masséna besieged in, 20-23;
        made a military division of France, 69, note, 85;
        annexed to France, 177;
        effect of this measure upon Austria, 177.

  _Gravina_, Spanish admiral,
    ii. commands the allied rear at the battle of Trafalgar, 187,
          188, 194.

  _Great Britain_,
    i.  importance of her action against France, 1;
        results to, of War of 1778, 3, 8;
        recovery of prosperity under second Pitt, 5;
        importance to, of public confidence in Pitt, 6;
        attitude toward Russia, 1770-1790, and interest in the Levant
          and Baltic, 10-17, 20-23, 25, 27;
        relations to Holland and the Netherlands, 15-17, 19, 21, 32;
        relations to Turkey, 12, 22-24;
        alliance with Prussia and Holland, 19, 21, 22, 25;
        refuses to interfere in French Revolution, 1791, 29;
        change of feeling in, 30;
        recalls her ambassador from Paris, 32;
        dismisses French ambassador, 34;
        war declared against, by France, 34;
        influence of, 1793-1815, 68;
        condition of navy in 1793, 69-75;
        policy of, in war of French Revolution, 81;
        takes possession of Toulon, 92;
        unpreparedness of, in 1793, 96;
        military and naval policy, 97-103;
        evacuates Toulon, 105;
        effect produced by, in Peninsular War, 106 (note);
        importance of West Indies to, 109-111;
        mistaken action in Haïti, 111-113, 116;
        reduces the Lesser Antilles, 115;
        reverses and loss of Guadaloupe, 116-119;
        sufferings of West India trade, 120;
        takes Trinidad, 120;
        and other West India colonies, 121;
        takes part in Continental War as ally of Holland, 93;
        withdraws from Holland, 169, 170;
        injury to, from French conquest of Holland, 170;
        war with Holland and capture of Dutch colonies, 170;
        new treaties with Austria and Russia, 172;
        interests and policy in Mediterranean, 185, 186;
        political union of Corsica with, 188;
        abandons Corsica, 215;
        impolicy of evacuating Mediterranean, 217, 218;
        depression of, in 1797, 229;
        effect of battle of Cape St. Vincent, 231;
        security due to sea power, 236;
        negotiations for peace, 1796, 240;
          in 1797, 245;
        naval successes of 1797, 255;
        resolve again to dispute control of Mediterranean, 256;
        joins Second Coalition, 282;
        frustrates Bonaparte's Oriental projects, 324;
        dependence upon sea power, 327;
        policy of, for protection of commerce, 337, ii. 203-205;
    ii. expedition against Holland, 1799, 8-10;
        prosperity of, in 1800, 17-19, 227-231;
        collision with northern states about neutral rights, 26-37,
          260-262;
        Baltic Expedition of 1801, 41-57;
        conventions with Baltic powers, 57, 58, 261;
        influence of sea power, 69, 74;
        peace with France, 71-75, 81;
        remonstrance with Bonaparte upon his intervention in
          Switzerland, 88-90;
        strained relations with France, 90-97;
        renewal of war, 98;
        unanimity of British people, 99;
        policy of renewing the war, 105-108;
        measures for resisting invasion, 117-122;
        quarrel with Spain, 1804, 133-139;
        naval dispositions, 1805, 148;
        insight of naval authorities, 157-159, 166;
        effect upon the fortunes of Napoleon, 184, 196-201;
        control of sea by, 218;
        losses by capture, 221-227;
        dependence upon neutral carrier, 229-231;
        restrictions upon neutral trade, 233-239, 240-242;
        Jay's treaty with, 237;
        prosperity of trade, 249-254;
        general policy as to neutral trade, 262, 266-268;
        seizures of American ships, 1805, 269;
        blockade of coast of Europe, 269;
        Order in Council of January, 1807, 275;
        expedition against Denmark, 1807, 276;
        Orders in Council of November, 1807, 283-290;
        landing in Portugal, 292;
        supports Spanish revolt, 294;
        operations in Peninsula, 296, 315, 318, 343, 348,
          also i. 106-108;
        seizure of Heligoland, 302;
        conditions of trade, 1806-1812, 304-306, 329-333, 340-342, 354,
          373, 377-382;
        License System, 308-313;
        Order in Council of April, 1809, 313;
        credit of, 339;
        internal condition, 340;
        influence in Baltic, 346;
        policy and rightfulness of the Orders in Council, 351-357;
        influence upon the French Revolution and Empire, chap. xix.


  _Haïti_, French colony,
    i.  early revolutionary disorders in, 47-49, 111;
        British operations in, 111-113, 116;
        rule of Toussaint L'Ouverture, 113;
        base of privateering, 120;
    ii. Bonaparte's expedition against, 78;
        its reverses, 94;
        dependence upon American continent, 103;
        loss of, to France, 103.

  _Hamburg_,
    i.  commercial importance of, during French Revolutionary wars,
          253, ii. 28, 108-110, 250, 251, 299, 301, 378;
    ii. Cuxhaven occupied by Prussian troops, 36;
        occupied by Danish troops, 54;
        Napoleon's grudge against, 279;
        imperial troops quartered on, 319;
        confiscations of colonial produce, 324, 325;
        annexed to French empire, 330.

  _Hanover_,
    i.  commercial importance to Great Britain, 253, ii. 110, 266;
    ii. Prussian designs upon, 35, 110;
        occupied by Prussian troops, 54;
        evacuated, 68;
        occupied by Bonaparte, 109;
        offered by Bonaparte to Prussia, 179.

  _Hoche_, French general,
    i.  commanding army of Sambre and Meuse, 240, 377;
        anxiety about reactionary movements in France, 244;
        pacification of La Vendée, 347;
        commands expedition against Ireland, 347-360;
        interest in a second expedition, and death, 378.

  _Holland_,
    i.  weakness of, in 1781, 7;
        fall of barrier towns and quarrel about the Scheldt, 7, 9,
          16-18;
        relations to Great Britain and France, 1783-1793, 17-19;
        relations to Russia, 16, 20;
        occupied by Prussian troops, 1787, 19;
        defensive alliance with Great Britain and Prussia, 1788, 21,
          ii. 363, 384, 393;
        the Scheldt opened, i. 31, ii. 362;
        France declares war against, 1793, i. 34;
        condition of navy, 78;
        course of, in French Revolution, 83;
        colonies of, 83;
        invasion of, by Dumouriez, 1793, 89;
        invasion and conquest by Pichegru, 1795, 169;
        fall of stadtholder, and republic proclaimed, 170;
        war with Great Britain and loss of colonies, 170, ii. 375, 394
          (see also West Indies, pp. 109-121);
        treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with France, i. 172;
        centralized constitution imposed by France, 278;
        contemplated invasion of Ireland from, 378;
        naval defeat at Camperdown, 378;
    ii. compelled to war against Great Britain by Bonaparte in 1803,
          111;
        share in Bonaparte's projected invasion of England, 119, 131,
          133, 147, 164, 165;
        base of commerce-destroying, 207, 216;
        demands upon the United States to resist seizure of belligerent
          property, 247;
        confiscation of goods of British origin ordered by Bonaparte,
          1803, 265;
        confiscations of American ships by Bonaparte, 292, 320, 321;
        Louis Bonaparte crowned king, 299;
        withstands Napoleon's Continental System, 300, 305, 318, 320;
        continuous blockade by British navy, 313;
        Louis abdicates and Holland is annexed to French Empire, 321;
        commercial ruin of, 1811, 336.

  _Hood_, Lord, British admiral,
    i.  commands Mediterranean fleet, 96;
        receives surrender of Toulon, 92;
        forced to evacuate the port, 105;
        retires to Hyères Bay, 106;
        conquest of Corsica, 187;
        merit of, 207;
        returns to England, 189;
        succeeded by Jervis, 194, 203;
        tactical dispositions at St. Kitt's, in 1782, compared to those
          of Brueys in Aboukir Bay, 265.

  _Hotham_, British admiral,
    i.  commands in Mediterranean, 1795, 190-194;
        sluggishness of, 192, 199-202, 207.

  _Howe_, Earl, British admiral,
    i.  commands Channel fleet, 96;
        military character and naval policy of, 101;
        naval campaign of 1794 and battle of June 1, 125-160;
        admirable tactics of, 135, 149, 160;
        strategic error of, 156-159;
        retires from active service, 164;
        opinion concerning Battle of the Nile, 273;
        conduct of Brest blockade and Channel service, 162, 338-346.


  _Ionian_ islands (Corfu and others),
    i.  possessions of Venice in 1793, and subsequent transfers, 86,
          235;
        Bonaparte's desire for, 247-249 (and note);
        transferred to France by treaty of Campo Formio, 250, 251;
        indicated by Bonaparte as station for French fleet, 262;
        taken from France by Russo-Turkish fleet, 286, ii. 10;
    ii. constituted Republic of Seven Islands by peace of 1801, 71;
        transferred to France by Treaty of Tilsit, 274.

  _Ireland_,
    i.  French expedition against, 1796, 346-361; in 1798, 378-380;
    ii. Bonaparte's designs against, 124, 131;
        British anxiety about, 156, 160, 171, 386; also, i. 306.

  _Italy_,
    i.  lack of political unity in, 81, 84, 185;
        interest of Great Britain in, 185, 186;
        campaign of 1795 in, 195-198;
        part of the British fleet in the campaign, 199-201;
        Bonaparte's campaign of 1796 in, 208-211, 233-236;
    ii. French reverses in 1799, 3-10;
        campaign of Marengo, 20-23;
        Bonaparte's designs in, in 1800, 59, 80, 85, 86;
        occupation of Naples, 1803, 109, 112, 124;
        Napoleon crowned king of, 153;
        commercial orders of Napoleon, 325, 326.


  _Jay_, John,
    ii. United States envoy to Great Britain, 237;
        Treaty of Commerce and Navigation negotiated by, 237-239;
        anger of French government, 239, 240, 244.

  _Jervis_, British admiral. See St. Vincent.

  _Joseph II._, Emperor of Germany,
    i.  succeeds Maria Theresa, 1780, 7;
        raises the question of the Scheldt, 9, 17, 18;
        attempts to exchange the Netherlands for Bavaria, 18;
        declares war against Turkey, 19;
        dies, 1790, 25.

  _Jourdan_, French general,
    i.  commands army of Sambre and Meuse, 1794, 168;
        wins battle of Fleurus, 168;
        pursuit of Austrians, 169;
        operations of, 1795, 180-182;
        disasters in 1796, 213, 216;
    ii. command in Germany in 1799, 3;
        defeated at Stokach, 3;
        resigns command, 4.


  _Keith_, British admiral,
    i.  commands naval division watching Cadiz, 286;
        unexpected appearance of French fleet under Bruix, 1799, 307;
        recalled to Gibraltar, 310;
        sails in pursuit of Bruix, 312;
        left in command of fleet by St. Vincent, 312;
        further pursuit of French fleet, 312-316;
        returns to Torbay, 316;
        returns to Mediterranean as commander-in-chief, 316, 329;
        conduct of pursuit examined, 320, 321;
        letter to Kleber, 333;
    ii. operations against French in Egypt, 1801, 60, 62;
        commands squadron in the Downs, 1803-1805, 120, 148;
        report of captures in Mediterranean, 219.

  _Kleber_, French general,
    i.  left by Bonaparte in command in Egypt, 331;
        opinion as to dependence of Egypt upon the navy, 331;
        Convention of El Arish, 332;
        letter from Admiral Keith, 333;
        assassinated, 334.


  _Leopold_, Emperor of Germany,
    i.  succeeds Joseph II.,  25;
        makes peace with Turkey, 26;
        joins Prussia in Declaration of Pilnitz, 28.

  _Levant_, the,
    i.  advance of Russia in, 10-12;
        commercial and political importance of, 11;
        interest of France in, 12, 14;
        interest of Great Britain in, 23;
        interest of Bonaparte in, 247-253, ii. 95.

  _License System_,
    ii. of Great Britain, 307-313;
        of Napoleon, 307, 326, 327, 329.

  _Linois_, French admiral,
    ii. repels British fleet at battle of Algesiras, 63-66;
        deceived by a body of East India ships, 214, 215.

  _Louis XVI._, King of France,
    i.  interferes between Austria and Holland, 17, 18;
        brought from Versailles to Paris by the mob, 25;
        flight from Paris and capture of, 1791, 28;
        scenes of June 20 and August 10, 1792, 30;
        suspended, 30;
        and deposed, 31;
        tried and executed, 32;
        interest in the navy, 50, 67.

  _Louisiana_,
    ii. cession by Spain to France, 67, 77;
        apprehensions of Great Britain, 77;
        anger of the United States people, 103;
        sold to the United States by Bonaparte, 104.


  _Malta_, Island of,
    i.  belongs to Knights of St. John in 1793, 87;
        its dependence upon the fleet, 87;
        importance of, 87, 247;
        Bonaparte's designs upon, 255;
        seized by Bonaparte, 257;
        Nelson's opinion of, 258;
        interest of the Czar, Paul I., in, 281, 282, ii. 32-34, 53;
        blockaded by British and Portuguese squadron, and summoned to
          surrender by Sir James Saumarez, i. 285;
        isolation of, 285, 329;
        surrendered to British, 330;
    ii. stipulations of the preliminaries of peace in 1801, 72;
        provisions of the Treaty of Amiens, 81;
        disputes between England and France concerning, 91-98;
        Orders in Council of 1807, 286, 287;
        commercial importance, 1807-1812, 305.

  _Mann_, British admiral,
    i.  joins Mediterranean fleet, 194;
        detached to blockade Richery in Cadiz, 202;
        ordered to rejoin by Jervis, 213;
        mistaken action of, 214, 215.

  _Marmont_, French marshal,
    i.  opinion concerning Sir Sidney Smith, 295 (note);
    ii. commands corps in Holland for invasion of England, 117, 120,
          131, 165; quoted, i. 259 (note), ii. 102, 335.

  _Martin_, French admiral,
    i.  commands Toulon fleet in actions with British in 1795, 189-194.

  _Masséna_, French marshal,
    ii. commander-in-chief in Switzerland and Germany, 1799, 3-5;
        wins battle of Zurich, 9;
        sent by Bonaparte to Italy, 15;
        operations in Italy, 1800, 21;
        besieged in Genoa, 22;
        reverses in Portugal, 342, 348.

  _Missiessy_, French admiral,
    ii. commands Rochefort division, 132;
        escapes to the West Indies, 142, 144;
        returns thence to Rochefort, 152, 166;
        Napoleon's further purposes for, 165.

  _Montagu_, British admiral,
    i.  commands division under Lord Howe, May and June, 1794, 125,
          126, 156-161.

  _Moreau_, French general,
    i.  commands in Holland, 1795, 180;
        advance into Germany, 1796, 216;
        command in Italy, 1799, 313,
    ii. and retreat before Suwarrow, 5-8;
        appointed by Bonaparte to command in Germany, 15;
        successful campaign of 1800, 21-24;
        wins battle of Hohenlinden, 38;
        arrest upon charge of royalist conspiracy, 129.


  _Naples_, see Two Sicilies.

  _Napoleon_ (see also Bonaparte),
    ii. Emperor of the French, 130;
        plans for invading England modified by the death of Admiral
          Latouche Tréville, 130;
        second combination, 131;
        his dealings with Spain, 1803-1804, 133-139;
        failure to realize maritime conditions, 141;
        instructions to Admirals Villeneuve and Missiessy, 142;
        final combination, 146-150;
        surmises as to British movements, 153-158, 162, 166, 170;
        crowned King of Italy, 153;
        suspicious of Austria, 1805, 176-179;
        campaign of Austerlitz, 181;
        constant embarrassment from the closure of the sea by the
          British navy, 184;
        anger against Admiral Villeneuve, 185;
        effect of Trafalgar upon policy, 197, 223, 351;
        miscalculation in his attempt to crush British commerce, 201;
        vigor displayed in the attempt, 202;
        measures at outbreak of war, 1803, 265;
        Jena campaign, 270;
        Berlin Decree, 271-273;
        campaign against Russia, 1807, 274;
        Treaty of Tilsit, 274;
        projects against Portugal and Denmark, 276;
        enforcement of his Continental System, 277-279, 310, 396;
        additional vigor in Berlin Decree, 281;
        character of the commercial warfare, 289;
        Milan Decree, 290;
        usurpation in Spain, 291;
        meeting with the Czar at Erfurt, 293;
        joint letter to George III., 294;
        campaign in Spain, 1808, 295;
        anger with Holland, 299;
        war with Austria, 1809, 314-316;
        exactions from Sweden, 316, 322;
        increased severity of warfare on commerce, 317-328;
        Holland annexed to the Empire, 321;
        annexation of Oldenburg and the Hanse towns, 330;
        license system, 332;
        failing resources, 336;
        military treasure, 337;
        condition of credit, 338-340;
        sufferings in France, 1811, 340-343, 349;
        altercations with Russia, 344-346;
        preparations for war, 347;
        invades Russia, 351;
        essential error of his Continental System, 351-355, 401, 402;
        concentration of purpose, 366;
        his services to the Revolution, 388, 400, 407;
        Continental System inherited from Directory, 396, 399;
        greatness of his power, 408;
        effect upon it of the British sea-power, 409;
        prolongation of the Revolution due to his genius, 411.

  _Navy, British_,
    i.  condition in 1793, 69-72;
        mutinies in, 72, 73, 232, 236-239;
        condition of material, 73-75;
        force compared with French navy, 1793, 75;
        in 1801, ii. 73;
        tardy mobilization in 1793, i. 96, 97;
        preponderance of, 110, 287, 290, 291, 324, 325, 328-338;
        inefficient action in the Atlantic, i. 162, 338, 339;
    ii. deficient strength in 1803, 122-124, 128, 148, 184;
        effect on the French Revolution, 395, 405, 406;
        increase under Pitt, 404,
        and under his successors, 405.

  _Navy, Dutch_,
    i.  numbers and importance, i. 78;
        inaction of, 171;
        defeat at Camperdown, 255, 378.

  _Navy, French_,
    i.  deterioration after 1789, 35-41;
        disorders in, 41-50, 60-63;
        legislation by National Assemblies, 51-59;
        effects of legislation, 59, 60, 122;
        condition of officers and seamen, 64-66, 189, 193, 201;
        condition of material, 66-68, 163, 179, 253, 338 (note);
        force compared with British, 1793, 75;
        in 1801, ii. 73;
        inferiority in Mediterranean, 1798-1801, i. 287, 290, 291, 324,
          325, 328-334; ii. 25, 59-63;
        inferiority and operations in Atlantic, i. 335-338;
    ii. peace essential to restore, 69, 81, 107, 184.

  _Navy, Spanish_,
    i.  numbers of, 75;
        inefficiency of, 76-78, 81, 213, 222, 231;
        defeat at Cape St. Vincent, 221-228.

  _Nelson_, British Admiral,
    i.  significance of his services in the Baltic and the Levant,
          14, 22;
        services in Corsica, 187;
        early actions in the Mediterranean, 191-194;
        services on Italian coast, 194-201, 208-212;
        professional characteristics, 196, 205, 274, ii. 43-45, 52, 55,
          139, 156, 162, 163, 172;
        takes possession of Elba, i. 213;
        brilliant conduct at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 226-228;
        wounded in expedition against Teneriffe, and returns to
          England, 1797, 249;
        rejoins fleet off Cadiz, April, 1798, 256;
        sent to watch armaments in Toulon, May, 1798, 256;
        pursuit of French fleet to Egypt, 258-261;
        battle of the Nile, 266-272;
        wounded, 272;
        merits of, in this battle, 273-277;
        sends word to India, 283;
        goes to Naples, 284;
        blockades Malta, 285;
        distrust of Russia, 286, ii. 126;
        relations with Sir Sidney Smith, i. 297;
        incident of Bruix's incursion into the Mediterranean, 308-321;
        return to England, 1800, 330, ii. 37;
        views as to the French in Egypt, i. 331;
        reasons for refusing chief command in Baltic to, 373, ii. 42;
    ii. responsibility for action of Naples in 1798, 1;
        detailed as second in command of the Baltic expedition, 37;
        his letter to Parker on the political and military situation,
          43-47;
        battle of Copenhagen, 48-51;
        negotiates an armistice with Denmark, 51;
        merit of his conduct, 52;
        left in chief command and takes fleet to Revel, 56;
        rebuked by the Czar, 57;
        appointed to Mediterranean command on renewal of war in
          1803, 98;
        difficulties and perplexities, 123-129;
        opinion as to the dispositions of Spain in 1804, 139;
        goes to Egypt in search of French at Villeneuve's first
          sailing, 144;
        return off Toulon, 150;
        Villeneuve's second sailing, 151;
        pursues to West Indies, 152, 159-161;
        insight of, 156, 162;
        return to Europe, 163, 167, 169, 174;
        joins Brest fleet, 174, and returns to England, 175;
        joins fleet off Cadiz, 181, 186;
        battle of Trafalgar, 187;
        death, 192.

  _Nielly_, French rear-admiral,
    i.  mentioned, 123, 126, 135, 155, 157.

  _Notables_, Assembly of,
    i.  in France, 1787, 7, 19;
        meeting of, in 1788, 24.


  _Orders_ in Council, British, June 8, 1793,
    ii. arresting vessels carrying provisions to France, 233;
        Nov. 6, 1793, seizing vessels laden with produce from enemy's
          colonies, 234;
        partial revocation of this, Jan. 8, 1794, 237;
        further relaxation, January, 1798, 242;
        Fox's, of May 16, 1806, establishing constructive blockade of
          hostile coasts, 269;
        Jan. 7, 1807, forbidding neutral trade between hostile
          ports, 275;
        Nov. 7, 1807, establishing constructive blockade of all ports
          whence British flag was excluded, 283-290;
        April 26, 1809, modifying those of Nov., 1807, 313;
        final revocation of Orders of 1807 and 1809, 351;
        analysis of their policy, 351-355.


  _Paoli_, Corsican leader,
    i.  relations with Great Britain and France, 88;
        promotes union of island to Great Britain, 187;
        subsequent discontent, 188.

  _Parker_, Sir Hyde, British admiral,
    i.  command of Brest Blockade, 373;
    ii. of expedition to Baltic, 42-56;
        relieved of command, 56;
        Nelson's censure of, 56.

  _Paul I._, Czar of Russia,
    i.  succeeds to the throne, 243;
        becomes hostile to French Republic, 281;
        interest in Malta, 281, ii. 32;
        alliance with Austria, i. 282;
        sends squadron to Mediterranean, 286;
    ii. Russian army enters Italy, 5;
        successes in Italy and reverses in Switzerland, 5-9;
        dissatisfaction with his allies, 11, 26;
        Bonaparte's advances to, 29-33;
        hostile measures toward Great Britain, 33;
        formation of Armed Neutrality, 36;
        sends ambassador to Bonaparte, 38;
        importance to the northern league, 46;
        murdered, 51.

  _Peace_, Treaties of,
        Amiens, 1802, ii. 81
        (see also preliminaries, 71),
        Basle, 1795, i. 172;
        Campo Formio, 1797, i. 250;
        Lunéville, 1801, ii. 39, 40;
        Presburg, 1805, ii. 182;
        Vienna, 1809, ii. 316.
          Preliminaries of Leoben, 1797, i. 234;
          of London, 1801, ii. 71.

  _Pellew_, British admiral,
    i.  commanding frigate off Brest, 351-354;
        action with the "Droits de l'Homme," 357;
        commands blockading force off Ferrol, ii. 118;
    ii. opinion of the invasion flotilla, 120,
        and of the condition of British navy, 123;
        able measures for protection of trade in India, 217.

  _Perceval_, British statesman,
    ii. statement as to the object of the Orders in Council of
          November, 1807, 290, note.

  _Pilnitz_, declaration of,
    i.  by Austria and Prussia, 28;
        effect upon the French people, 29.

  _Pitt_, British statesman,
    i.  prime minister of Great Britain, 5;
        power in the nation, 6;
        opposition to Russian advance in the East, 20-24;
        attitude toward the French Revolution, 29, 32-34,
          ii. 358-367, 382;
        treats with France, 1796 and 1797, i. 240, 245;
    ii. resigns office, 1801, 70;
        supports preliminaries of peace negotiated by Addington
          ministry, 72;
        statement of object of British government in the war, 74, 75,
          383-385;
        speech upon renewal of war in 1803, 99;
        attack upon St. Vincent's administration of the navy, 123;
        returns to office, and forms Third Coalition, 177, 267;
        policy in seizing enemy's colonies defended, 217, 252, 386,
          393-395;
        modifies Rule of 1756 and originates commercial war policy of
          Great Britain, 242, 263;
        speech on the Armed Neutrality of 1800, 260;
        measures to restrain American trade with hostile colonies,
          267, 354;
        death, 269;
        prosperity of Great Britain under his war administration,
          380-382, 394, also 17-19;
        comparison between himself and his father, 387-391;
        general war policy of, 391-405;
        growth of navy under, 404;
        success practically attained at his death, 405;
        his policy adopted by his successors, 405;
        accurate forecast of course of French Revolution, 411.

  _Portugal_, Navy of,
    i.  in 1793, 78;
        traditional alliance with Great Britain, 84;
        co-operation with British navy, 162, 285;
        French designs against, 219 (and note);
        Bonaparte's designs upon, ii. 59, 67, 276, 296;
        treaty with France, 77, 81;
        Lisbon occupied by Junot's corps, 277;
        flight of the Court to Brazil, 277;
        ports closed to British trade, 277;
        British land and expel Junot, 292;
        Wellesley lands in 1809, 315;
        British operations in, 318, 348;
        Masséna invades, 326;
        but forced to retreat, 342, 348.

  _Privateering_,
    II. French, number of privateers captured, 1793-1800, 206;
        their activity, 207;
        privateering in the Channel and North Sea, 207-210;
        in the Atlantic, 210-211;
        in the West Indies, 211-214;
        in the East Indies, 214-218.

  _Prussia_,
    i.  death of Frederic the Great, 1786, 19;
        interference in Holland, 1787, 19;
        defensive alliance with Great Britain and Holland, 1788, 21, 22,
          King joins in Declaration of Pilnitz, 28;
        takes arms against France, 30;
        jealousy of Austria, 80, 94;
        advance into France, 93;
        retreat from France, 103;
        inaction in 1794, 103, 171;
        makes peace with France, 1795, 172;
        guarantee of North German Neutrality, 172;
        refusal to join Second Coalition, 282;
    ii. rigorous neutrality after 1795, 28;
        ambitions of, 31;
        hostile attitude toward Great Britain in 1800, 34;
        joins Armed Neutrality, 36;
        opportunism of, 40;
        closes the German rivers against British trade, 54;
        subsequent coolness toward Bonaparte, 68;
        rebuff from Bonaparte, 69, note;
        favored by Bonaparte in apportioning German indemnities, 84;
        Bonaparte's pressure upon, 95;
        annoyance at Bonaparte's occupation of Hanover, 110;
        indignation at murder of the Duc d'Enghien, 177;
        Hanover offered to, by Bonaparte, upon conditions, 179;
        commercial advantages through neutrality, 251;
        war with France, and defeat of Jena, 270;
        tyranny of Napoleon over, 301, 311, 319, 322, 324, 325;
        share in "neutralizing" traffic, 309.


  _Richery_, French admiral,
    i.  commerce-destroying expedition, 202, 214;
        shares in expedition against Ireland, 214, 348-353.

  _Rule_ of 1756,
    ii.  conceded by Russia and the Baltic States, 57, 58, 261, 262;
        statement of, 234-236;
        seizure of American vessels under, 236-239;
        modifications of, by British government, 237, 242, 262, 263,
          269;
        evasion of, by American vessels, 253, 266-269;
        extension of, by Orders in Council of January, 1807, 275;
        tendency and importance of, 353-355,
        arguments for and against, 356, also 235, 236.

  _Russia_,
    i.  relations with Austria, 1780-1790, 9, 11, 16, 17, 19, 24, 25;
        advance of, since 1713, 10;
        relations to Great Britain in 1770, 11, 12,
          and in 1785, 13, 22, 23;
        relations with France in 1785, 17;
        war with Turkey, 1787, 19;
        attempt to send fleet from Baltic to Mediterranean, 20;
        war with Sweden, 1788, 21;
        successes on Black Sea, 24-27;
        peace with Turkey and Sweden, 27;
        unfriendly attitude toward French Revolution, 34, 82, ii. 233;
        partition of Poland, i. 82;
        defensive alliance with Great Britain, 1795, 172;
        death of Catharine and accession of Paul I., 243;
        difficulties with France, 1798, 281;
        joins Second Coalition, 282;
        conjointly with Turkey sends fleet against the Ionian
          Islands, 286;
    ii. Russian army enters Italy, 5;
        battles of the Trebia, 6,
          and of Novi, 8,
          won from the French, 1799;
        Russian army marches into Switzerland, 9,
          and retires into Bavaria, 11;
        reduction of the Ionian Islands, 10;
        abandons the Coalition, 11, 19;
        dissatisfaction of the Czar, 26;
        interest in peace with England, 28, 29, 289, 293, 306, 329;
        measures of Paul I. against Great Britain, 32-34;
        Armed Neutrality renewed, 36, 260;
        admiration of Paul for Bonaparte, 32, 38;
        assassination of Paul and accession of Alexander, 51, 56;
        convention with Great Britain, 1801, 57, 261;
        attitude concerning Malta, 92;
        breach with France caused by murder of Duc d'Enghien, 177;
        mission to Great Britain and formation of Third Coalition, 177;
        effect of Russia upon the struggle between Great Britain and
          Napoleon, 200, 401, 409;
        war with France, 1807, 273;
        conventions of Tilsit between Russia and France, 274, 276, 278,
          310, 329, 405;
        war declared against Great Britain, 278, 305;
        conventions of Erfurt with Napoleon, 293;
        war with Sweden, 1808, 293;
        joint letter of Czar and Napoleon to George III., 294;
        enforcement of the Continental System, 301, 303, 306, 329, 336,
          406;
        peace with Sweden, 1809, 316;
        causes leading to war with France in 1812, 325, 330, 336,
          344-346, 397, 401;
        alliance with Great Britain and Sweden, 347, 350;
        peace with Turkey, 350;
        Napoleon's invasion, 351.


  _Sardinia_, Island of,
    i.  gives name to Italian Kingdom, 87;
    ii. strategic importance of, 87, 128.

  _Sardinia_, Kingdom of,
    i.  at war with France in 1793, 34;
        extent of, 84, 87;
        operations of, in 1793, and 1794, 93, 171;
        in 1795, 195-198;
        defeats by Bonaparte, 1796, 209;
        concludes separate peace with France, 209;
        cedes islands of Sardinia and San Pietro to France, 246, 248;
    ii. Piedmont annexed to France and the Court retires to island of
          Sardinia, 2;
        interest of the Czars in, 69, note;
        British intercession for, 97.

  _Saumarez_, British admiral,
    i.  commands a ship at Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 233;
        commands "Orion" at the Battle of the Nile, 265;
        criticism of Nelson's plan, 273;
        sails for Gibraltar with the prizes, 284;
        summons French garrison at Malta, 285;
        commands inshore squadron off Brest, 375;
    ii. commands fleet at Battle of Algesiras, 63-66;
        commendations of by St. Vincent and Nelson, 65, 66;
        commands Baltic fleet, 1808-1812, 294, 297, 313;
        eminent services of, 346, 347 (note).

  _Scheldt_, River,
    i.  question of the, 9, 16, 18;
        importance of, 10, 20;
        opened to commerce by the French, 31.

  _Schérer_, French general,
    i.  wins battle of Loano, 198;
        relieved by Bonaparte, 203;
    ii. inefficiency in 1799, in Italy, 3-5.

  _Sébastiani_, French colonel,
    ii. mission to the Levant and report, 93;
        Bonaparte's object in publishing, 94, 106;
        exasperation in Great Britain, 94;
        effect upon British policy, 96, 97.

  _Smith_, Sir Sidney, British naval captain,
    i.  reputation and character of, 294, 295;
        mission to the Mediterranean, 1799, 296;
        annoyance of St. Vincent and Nelson, 297;
        supports the besieged garrison at Acre, 298-302;
        conduct on this occasion considered, 302-304;
        accompanies Turkish Expedition against Egypt, 321;
        countenances Convention of El Arish in disregard of his orders,
          331-334.

  _Spain_,
    i.  results of war of 1778 to, 3, 4;
        defensive alliance with Russia and Austria, 1789, 25;
        Nootka Sound trouble with Great Britain, 44, 45;
        condition of navy, 1793, 75-78, 82, 229, 231;
        France declares war against, 79;
        strategic position and inefficient administration of, 80;
        fleet enters Toulon with Hood, 92;
        war in Pyrenees, 1793, 104;
        evacuation of Toulon, 105;
        loss of Trinidad, 120;
        disasters on French frontier, 1794, 171;
        peace of Basle with France, 1795, 172;
        changed relations with Great Britain, 213;
        defensive and offensive alliance with France, 214;
        naval co-operation with France, 214-216, 348;
        naval defeat off Cape St. Vincent, 219-229;
        share in Admiral Bruix's Expedition, 307-316;
        internal weakness of, in 1799, 311;
    ii. Bonaparte's use of, to further his continental policy, 59,
          62, 67;
        naval defeat near Cadiz, 1801, 64;
        cession of Louisiana to France, 77;
        Peace of Amiens with Great Britain, 81;
        renewal of war with Great Britain, 1804, 133;
        subserviency to Bonaparte's control, 134-136;
        subsidies paid to France, 133, 138;
        renewed alliance with France, 140;
        share in Trafalgar campaign, 151, 154, 162-180;
        naval defeat off Cape Finisterre, 169-171;
        naval defeat at Trafalgar, 187-195;
        revolt against Napoleon, 195, 292, 401;
        weakness of colonial administration, 79, 213;
        Napoleon's usurpation, 291;
        Great Britain assumes Spanish cause, 294;
        Napoleon's campaign in, 1808, 295, 298, 315;
        Wellesley in, 315, 348, 349;
        drain of Spanish war upon Napoleon, 317, 318, 319, 342, 343,
          348, 397, 401, 402.

  _St. André_, Jean Bon, French representative and commissioner,
    i.  opinions on naval efficiency, 37, 58, 66.

  _States General_,
    i.  meeting of the, in France, May, 1789, 24, 25.

  _Strategy_, naval,
    i.  strategic position of Spain, i. 80-82;
        of Portugal, 84;
        particular importance of Mediterranean islands, 85, 247, 248;
        importance of Malta, 87, 258, 319, ii. 92;
        Maddalena Bay in Sardinia, 88, ii. 128, 143;
        Corsica, i. 88, 186;
        general dispositions of British fleet, 1793, 96;
        its tardy mobilization, 97, 100;
        necessity to Great Britain of forcing French fleets to sea,
          97-100;
        Lord Howe's strategic dispositions, 101-103, 125, 162-166, 338,
          339;
        strategic value of Toulon, 105;
        analogy between British operations in Peninsula and Napoleon's
          intended invasion of England, 106-108;
        strategic conditions in West Indies, 109-115;
        mistakes of the British in West Indies, 116-120;
        criticism of naval campaign of May, 1794, 155-160;
        faulty dispositions of the Channel fleet, 1793-1800, 165,
          361-366;
        policy of an inferior navy deduced from Napoleon's practice,
          179, 180, 304, 305;
        strategic influence of the British Mediterranean fleet, 185,
          195-197, 207, 216-218, 233, 254, 255, 277, 280, 282, 287,
          290-292, 324, 325, 328-334, ii. 25, 59-68, 123-125, 129, 159;
        Hotham's campaign of 1795 criticised, 198-201;
        French commerce-destroying policy, 201-203, 335-337,
          ii. 203-210, 221-227;
        effects of the Battle of the Nile, 277, 282-284, 287, 291, 325;
        strategic importance of Acre, 293, 298, 299, 324;
        strategic significance of Bruix's incursion into the
          Mediterranean, 304, 318;
        St. Vincent's strategic action at this time, 309-312, 314,
          318-321;
        contrast between his point of view and that of Lord Keith, 313,
          320, 321;
        coincidence of his views with Nelson's, 319, 321;
        Nelson's action, 310;
        discussion of Bruix's conduct, 316-318;
        of the British admirals', 318-321;
        policy of evasion entailed by French naval weakness, 335;
        strategic problem before Great Britain in the Revolutionary
          wars, 338;
        its true solution, 339-342;
        strategic interest of Ushant, 344;
        the winds as strategic factors, 344;
        faulty dispositions of the Channel fleet, 1793-1800, 345;
        analysis of the effects upon Irish expedition, 1796, 360-366;
        changes made by St. Vincent in 1800, 368-371, 374, 375;
        their efficacy, 375, 376, ii. 60-66, 106, 118-121, 126, 153,
        166, 183;
        Napoleon's estimate of Antwerp, i. 377;
        Nelson in the Baltic, ii. 43-47, 51-53;
        Napoleon's object in concentrating at Cadiz, 63;
        strategic significance of battle of Algesiras, 64-66;
        defensive and offensive gain to Great Britain in forcing war,
          1803, 106-108;
        Napoleon's combinations for invasion of England, 111-117, 124,
          131-133, 140-142, 145-150;
        British measures for thwarting them, 118-122, 126, 148;
        Nelson's strategy, 127, 142-144, 150-152, 156, 159-163, 167,
          172, 174, 186, 187;
        various surmises and measures of Napoleon during the Trafalgar
          campaign, 153-159, 162, 165, 170, 173, 178, 181;
        generally accurate strategy of the British authorities,
          157-159, 166, 176, 183;
        masterly combination of Lord Barham, 168-170, 184;
        mistake of Admiral Calder, 171, 174;
        mistake of Cornwallis, 176;
        analysis of the strategic chances in the Trafalgar campaign,
          182-185;
        character of Villeneuve's error, 196;
        strategic effect of the campaign upon the remainder of the
          war, 197;
        general naval strategy of the British, 1793-1812, 392-411.

   _St. Vincent_, Earl, British admiral (Jervis),
    i.  expedition to West Indies, 115;
        assumes command of Mediterranean fleet, 203;
        perfection of fleet under, 206;
        professional character, 203-206;
        blockade of Toulon, 212;
        seizes Elba with a squadron, 213;
        ordered to evacuate Corsica, 215;
        retires to Gibraltar, 216; firmness of, 217;
        ordered to rendezvous at Lisbon, 219;
        disasters to fleet, 219;
        meeting with Spanish fleet, 221;
        battle of Cape St. Vincent, 222-228;
        merit of, 228;
        created Earl St. Vincent, 229;
        establishes blockade of Cadiz, 232;
        incident of mutiny, 236 (note);
        sends Nelson to Teneriffe, 249;
        sends Nelson into the Mediterranean, May, 1798, 256-258;
        residence at Gibraltar, 285;
        seizes Minorca, 287;
        relations with Sir Sidney Smith, 294-297;
        conduct during Bruix's incursion into the Mediterranean, 306-321;
        health fails, 312;
        returns to England, 321;
        commands Channel fleet, 368;
        methods of watching Brest, 368-375;
        becomes First Lord of the Admiralty, 375, ii. 42;
        merit of his strategic dispositions, i. 375, 376, ii. 126, 183.
    ii. encomium upon Nelson, 53;
        upon Saumarez, 65;
        his naval dispositions in second war, 119-122, 126;
        his inopportune economy, 122, 124, 127, 128, 166;
        leaves office, 129;

  _Suwarrow_, Russian marshal,
    i.  storming of Ismail, 26;
        commands corps sent to support Austrians in Italy, 282, 284, ii. 5;
    ii. commander-in-chief of allied forces, 5;
        victorious campaign in Italy, 5-8;
        disastrous march into Switzerland, 9;
        declines further co-operation with Austrians, 10.

  _Sweden_,
    i.  loss of Baltic provinces to Russia, 10;
        hostility to Russia, 17;
        troops enter Russia, 1788, 21;
        supported by Great Britain and Prussia, 21, 25;
        interest of western powers in, 22;
        subsidized by Turkey, 24;
        peace with Russia, 1790, 27;
        even balance of naval strength in Baltic, 27;
        unfriendly to French Revolution in 1793, 34;
        seeks the commercial advantages of neutrality, 83, ii. 233;
        loss of West India islands, 1801, i. 121;
    ii. joins Armed Neutrality of 1800, 36;
        embargo of merchant ships by Great Britain, 53;
        convention with Great Britain, 58, 266;
        quarrel with France and joins Third Coalition, 177;
        Napoleon's exactions from, 231, 317, 322, 345;
        summoned by France and Russia to close ports against Great
          Britain, 274;
        hostilities with Russia, 1808, 293;
        British relations with, 1808-1812, 294, 296, 297, 305, 317;
        cedes Finland and makes peace with Russia, 316;
        formal war with Great Britain, 346.

  _Switzerland_,
    i.  disturbances in, 1797, 278;
        France intervenes by force and changes constitution, 279;
        French operations in, 1799, ii. 3-9;
        strategic importance in Bonaparte's campaign of 1800, 20, 22;
        independence guaranteed at Lunéville, 40;
        Bonaparte's intervention in, 1802, 86-88;
        action of British ministry thereupon, 88-90;
        effect upon course of events, 90-93;
        enforcement by Napoleon of his commercial war measures,
          324-326.


  _Tactics_, Naval,
    i.  French and British on May 28, 1794, 127-129;
        on May 29, 129-134;
        June 1, 136-147;
        merits of Howe's, 135, 150, 160;
        analysis of the results of the battle of June 1, with
          deductions, 149-155;
        Sir John Jervis at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 224, 225;
        Nelson's tactical move on that occasion, 226-228;
        dispositions of the French admiral in Aboukir Bay, 263, 264;
        contrasted with Hood's at St. Kitts in 1782, 265;
        Nelson's tactics at the Nile, concentration on enemy's
          van, 266;
        arrival of the British reserve, and concentration on
          centre, 270;
        analysis of Nelson's claim to credit, 273-277;
        tactical dispositions before Brest of Bridport, 351, 366,
          and of St. Vincent, 371;
    ii. tactical anecdotes of Nelson, 39, 45;
        tactical surroundings at Copenhagen, 1801, 44;
        Nelson's dispositions in consequence, 47, 48;
        his tactics at Trafalgar, 188;
        analysis of them, 189;
        the result, 192-194.

  _Trafalgar_, battle of,
    ii. decisive effect upon the course of the war, 196-198.

  _Treaty_, Holland and France, 1795,
      offensive and defensive alliance, i. 172, ii. 133;
      Jay's, of commerce and navigation, between Great Britain and
        United States, 1794, ii. 237-239;
      San Ildefouso, offensive and defensive between France and Spain,
        1796, i. 213, ii. 133,
        and renewed in 1805, ii. 140;
      Tilsit, between France and Russia, 1807, ii. 274;
      conventions, of El Arish between Turkey and French
        commander-in-chief in Egypt, 1799, i. 332-334;
      of Great Britain and Russia concerning neutral navigation, 1801,
        ii. 57, 261.

    See also "Peace" and "Armed Neutrality."

  _Troubridge_, British captain,
    i.  Nelson's praise of, 75;
        leads the fleet at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 224, 227;
        misfortune at the Battle of the Nile, 269;
        bombardment of Alexandria, 297;
        services at Naples, 308.

  _Turkey_, Empire of,
    i.  encroachments of Russia upon, 10;
        natural ally of France, 12, 22;
        treaty of Kainardji, 1774, 13;
        declares war against Russia, 1787, 19;
        war with Austria, 19;
        relations to Great Britain in 1790, 23;
        military reverses, 24, 26;
        peace with Austria and Russia, 25, 27;
        disorganized condition in 1793, 85;
        territorial limits, 85;
        Bonaparte's estimate of strength of, 248;
        effect of battle of the Nile upon, 277;
        war declared against France, 278;
        Russo-Turkish fleet enters Mediterranean, 286;
        troops sent to Acre, 301;
        unfortunate landing in Aboukir Bay, 322;
        convention for the evacuation of Egypt, 332;
    ii. capture of the Ionian Islands, 10;
        peace with France, 77;
        misrule in Egypt, 150;
        hostilities with Great Britain, 278.

  _Two Sicilies_, The,
    i.  navy of, in 1793, 78;
        attitude toward French Revolution, 84;
        effect of Bonaparte's victories upon, 1796, 211;
        abandons the Coalition, 211;
        strategic importance of, 218;
        dissatisfaction at French advance in Italy, 279;
        defensive alliance with Austria, 282;
        Nelson's arrival in Naples, 285;
    ii. premature hostilities with France, 1;
        the Court flies to Palermo, 2;
        Naples occupied by French troops, 2;
        French forced to evacuate the Kingdom, 6;
        French division occupies the heel of Italy after Marengo, 59;
        evacuates after Peace of Amiens 71;
        reoccupation after renewal of war in 1803, 109;
        part played in Napoleon's combinations, 110, 124, 185;
        Joseph Bonaparte, King of, 278.


  _United States_,
        difficulties with France, 1793-1797, i. 241, ii 242-248;
    ii. cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, 78;
        jealousy of political interference on the American continent by
          European nations, 103;
        uneasiness at cession of Louisiana, 104;
        buys Louisiana of France, 105;
        sufferings from privateers in the West Indies, 1805, 213;
        importance of American carrying trade, 231;
        growth of merchant shipping, 232;
        injuries under Rule of 1756, 233-237;
        Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain, 1794,
          237-239;
        difficulties with France arising thence, 239;
        relations with Great Britain, 1794-1804, 241;
        French aggressions upon American shipping, 242-246;
        demands of Spain and Holland, 247;
        course of trade with Europe, 1793-1804, 253, 254, 354;
        hostilities with France, 1798-1800, 258;
        trade with belligerent colonies, 266-268, 353;
        British seizures of American ships, 1804, 269;
        commercial treaty of 1806 with Great Britain rejected by
          Senate, 275;
        effect upon American trade of British Order of January,
          1807, 276;
        Embargo Act of December, 1807, 282,
          succeeded by Non-Intercourse Act, 1809, 283;
        importance of American market to Great Britain, 291;
        losses by Napoleon's decrees of Bayonne and Rambouillet, 292;
        American ships in Dutch ports confiscated by Napoleon, 320,
          321;
        expiration of Non-Intercourse Act, and proviso succeeding it,
          331;
        American trade in Baltic, 1809-1812, 345, and note;
        declaration of war against Great Britain, 351.


  _Van Stabel_, French rear-admiral,
    i.  escape of, from Lord Howe, 66;
        protects large convoy from America, 123;
        brings it safely to Brest, 161.

  "_Vengeur_," French ship-of-the-line,
    i.  desperate action with the British ship "Brunswick," 140-143;
        sinks, 144.

  _Venice_, Republic of,
    i.  deprived of possessions on Italian mainland, also Istria and
          Dalmatia, 235;
        insurrection against French, 246;
        conduct of Bonaparte toward, 247-249;
        annihilation of, 250.

  _Villaret-Joyeuse_, French admiral,
    i.  letters of, 56;
        position before Revolution, 57;
        sails in command of Brest fleet, 124;
        meeting with British fleet, 126;
        manœuvres of, May 28 and 29, 1794, 126-134;
        conduct in battle of June 1, 136-139, 144-147;
        strategy of, 159, 160;
        anecdote, 160 (note);
        winter cruise of, January, 1795, 163, 164;
        action with Lord Bridport, 177-178;
        appointed to command fleet in Irish Expedition, 1796, 349;
        views as to the expedition, 349;
        detached from it at Hoche's request, 350.

  _Villeneuve_, French admiral,
    i.  sent with a division from Toulon to Brest, 220;
        commands the rear division at battle of the Nile, 271;
        conduct of, 272;
    ii. appointed to command the Toulon squadron in 1804, 130;
        Napoleon's instructions to, 142, 149, 164;
        first sortie from Toulon, 143;
        return to port, 144;
        second sailing and arrival in West Indies, 151;
        inaction there, 161,
          and return to Europe, 162;
        meeting with Calder's fleet, 169, 171;
        anchors in Vigo Bay and thence goes to Ferrol, 173;
        sails from Ferrol for Brest, 179,
          but bears up for Cadiz, 180;
        Napoleon's charges against, 185;
        battle of Trafalgar, 187-195;
        criticism of, 196.


  _Wellesley_, British general,
    ii. landing in Portugal, 1808, and victory of Vimiero, 292;
        landing in Lisbon, 1809, beginning of Peninsular command, and
          operations in Portugal, 315;
        lines of Torres Vedras, 318;
        capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, 348, 349.

  _West Indies_, commercial importance of,
        in the French Revolution, i. 109, 110;
        character of military control required, 110-112, ii. 252;
        military importance of Lesser Antilles, i. 114, 117, 119;
        military and naval operations in, 115-121;
    ii. French Expedition to, 1801, ii. 78, 94, 103;
        Nelson's estimate of, 160;
        American trade with, 232, 236-238, 245, 253, 266-269;
        importance to British commercial system, 252, and note, 393.




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  | Transcriber's Note:                                               |
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  | Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note.      |
  |                                                                   |
  | Italicized words are surrounded by underline characters,  _like   |
  | this_.                                                            |
  |                                                                   |
  | Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant  |
  |  form was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.    |
  |                                                                   |
  | Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.             |
  |                                                                   |
  | Word combinations that appeared with and without hyphens were     |
  | changed to the predominant form if it could be determined.        |
  |                                                                   |
  | Footnotes were moved to the end of the book and numbered in one   |
  | continuous sequence.                                              |
  |                                                                   |
  | In the index the numbers i. and ii. refer to volumes i. and ii.   |
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