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                                 TRIAL
                                   OF
                        THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

                                 BEFORE

                           THE INTERNATIONAL
                           MILITARY TRIBUNAL

                           N U R E M B E R G
                    14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946

                             [Illustration]


     P U B L I S H E D   A T   N U R E M B E R G ,   G E R M A N Y
                                1 9 4 7




        This volume is published in accordance with the
        direction of the International Military Tribunal by
        the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
        of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.




                               VOLUME II



                       O F F I C I A L   T E X T

                              I N   T H E

                            ENGLISH LANGUAGE




                         P R O C E E D I N G S

                   14 November 1945-30 November 1945




                                CONTENTS

      Preliminary Hearing, Wednesday, 14 November 1945            1

      Preliminary Hearing, Thursday, 15 November 1945            18

      Preliminary Hearing, Saturday, 17 November 1945            26

      First Day,     Tuesday, 20 November 1945,
                     Morning Session                             29
                     Afternoon Session                           57

      Second Day,    Wednesday, 21 November 1945,
                     Morning Session                             95
                     Afternoon Session                          118

      Third Day,     Thursday, 22 November 1945,
                     Morning Session                            156
                     Afternoon Session                          178

      Fourth Day,    Friday, 23 November 1945,
                     Morning Session                            203
                     Afternoon Session                          226

      Fifth Day,     Monday, 26 November 1945,
                     Morning Session                            254
                     Afternoon Session                          277

      Sixth Day,     Tuesday, 27 November 1945,
                     Morning Session                            302
                     Afternoon Session                          323

      Seventh Day,   Wednesday, 28 November 1945,
                     Morning Session                            348
                     Afternoon Session                          375

      Eighth Day,    Thursday, 29 November 1945,
                     Morning Session                            394
                     Afternoon Session                          417

      Ninth Day,     Friday, 30 November 1945,
                     Morning Session                            435
                     Afternoon Session                          456




                          PRELIMINARY HEARING
                       Wednesday, 14 November 1945


THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Lawrence): Is Counsel for Gustav Krupp von
Bohlen in Court?

DR. THEODOR KLEFISCH (Counsel for Defendant Krupp von Bohlen): Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to make your motion now?

DR. KLEFISCH: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you make your motion?

DR. KLEFISCH: Mr. President, gentlemen: As defense counsel for Krupp von
Bohlen und Halbach, I repeat the request which has already been made in
writing, to suspend the proceedings against this defendant, at any rate,
not to carry out the Trial against this defendant. I leave it to this
High Court to decide whether it should suspend proceedings against Krupp
for the time being or altogether.

According to the opinion of the specialists, who were appointed by this
Court for the investigation of the illness of Krupp, Krupp von Bohlen
und Halbach is not able, on account of his serious illness, to appear at
this Trial without danger to his life. Their opinion is that he is
suffering from an organic disturbance of the brain and that mental
decline makes the defendant incapable of reacting normally to his
surroundings.

From that it follows that Krupp is not capable of informing his defense.
Furthermore, the report states that the deterioration of his physical
and mental powers has already been going on for several years and that
since Krupp was involved in an auto accident on 4 December 1944, he can
only speak a few disconnected words now and again, and during the last
two months has not even been able to recognize his relatives and
friends. On the basis of these facts one can only establish that Krupp
has no knowledge of the serving of the Indictment of 19 October. Thus he
does not know that he is accused and why.

The question now arises whether, in spite of this permanent inability to
appear for trial, in spite of this inability to inform his defense, and
in spite of his not knowing of the Indictment and its contents, Krupp
can be tried in absentia. Article 12 of the Charter gives the right to
the Tribunal to take proceedings against people who are absent, under
two conditions: First, if the accused cannot be found; second, if the
Tribunal, for other reasons, thinks it is necessary in the interests of
justice, to try him _in absentia_. Since the first condition,
impossibility of finding the defendant, is immediately eliminated, it
must be examined whether the second condition can be applied, that is,
whether it is necessary, in the interests of justice, to try Krupp.

The Defense is of the opinion that justice does not demand a trial
against Krupp _in absentia_, that this would even be contrary to
justice. I want to quote the following reasons: The decision on this
question must come from the concept of justice in the sense of Article
12 of the Charter. We must take into account here that the 12th Article
is purely a regulation concerning procedure. The question arises,
however, whether the Trial against Krupp in his absence would be a just
procedure. In my opinion, a just procedure is only then given if it is,
as a whole or in its particular regulations, fashioned in such a way
that an equitable judgment is guaranteed. That is a judgment whereby the
convicted defendant will be punished accordingly and the innocent
exonerated from guilt and punishment.

Is it possible that a just judgment can be guaranteed if a defendant is
tried _in absentia_, who through no fault of his own, cannot appear and
defend himself, who cannot inform his defense counsel, and who does not
even know that he is accused and for what reason? To ask this question
is to deny it. Even the regulations of the Charter concerning the rights
of the defendant in the preliminary procedure and in the main Trial,
oblige us to answer this question with “no”.

The following regulations are applicable here:

According to Article 16 (a), the accused shall receive a copy of the
Indictment before the Trial.

According to Article 16 (b), the defendant in the preliminary procedure,
and in the main Trial, has the right to declare his own position in the
face of each accusation.

According to Article 16 (c), a preliminary interrogation of the
defendant should take place.

According to Article 16 (d), the defendant shall decide whether he
wishes to defend himself or to have somebody else defend him.

According to Article 16 (e), the defendant has the right to submit
evidence himself and to cross-examine each witness.

The Defendant Krupp could not make use of any of these rights.

According to Article 24 the same also applies to the special rights,
which have been accorded the defendants for the main Trial: The
defendant should declare his position in the main Trial, that is,
whether he pleads guilty or not.

In my opinion, this is a declaration which is extremely significant for
the course of the Trial and of the decision, and the defendant can only
do this in persona. I do not know whether it is admissible that Defense
Counsel may make this declaration of “guilty” or “not guilty” for the
defendant, and even if this were admissible, Defense Counsel would not
be able to make this declaration because he had no opportunity to come
to any understanding with the defendant.

Finally, the accused, who is not present, cannot exercise his right of a
final plea.

The Charter, which has decreed so many and such decisive regulations for
the rights of the defendant, thereby recognizes that the personal
exercise of these rights which were granted to the accused is an
important source of knowledge for the finding of an equitable judgment,
and that a trial against such a defendant, who is incapable of
exercising these rights through no fault of his own, cannot be
recognized as a just procedure in the sense of Article 12.

I should like to go further, however, by saying that the procedure _in
absentia_ against Krupp, would be contrary to justice, not only
according to the provisions of the Charter but also according to the
generally recognized principles of the law of procedure of civilized
states.

So far as I am informed, no law of procedure of a continental state
permits a court procedure against somebody who is absent, mentally
deranged, and completely incapable of arguing his case. According to the
German Law of Procedure, the trial must be postponed in such a case
(Paragraph 205 of the German Code of Criminal Law). If prohibiting the
trial of a defendant, who is incapable of being tried, is a generally
recognized principle of procedure (_principe général de droit reconnu
par des nations civilisées_) in the sense of Paragraph 38 (c) of the
Statute of the International Court in The Hague, then a tribunal upon
which the attention of the whole world is, and the attention of future
generations will be directed, cannot ignore this prohibition.

The foreign press, which in the last days and weeks has repeatedly been
concerned with the law of the Charter, almost unanimously stresses that
the formal penal procedure must not deviate from the customs and
regulations of a fair trial, as is customary in civilized countries; but
it does not object, as far as the penal code is concerned, to a
departure from the principles recognized heretofore, because justice and
high political considerations demand the establishment of a new
international criminal code with retroactive effect in order to be able
to punish war criminals.

I wish to add another point here, which may be important for the
decision on the question discussed. This High Court would naturally not
be able to acquire an impression of the personality of Krupp, an
impression which in such an extraordinarily significant trial is a
valuable means of perception, which cannot be underestimated for the
judgment of the incriminating evidence. If, in the Charter, trial _in
absentia_ is permitted on principle against defendants who cannot be
located, then corresponding laws of procedure of all states, and even of
the German Code of Criminal Procedure agree to that.

A defendant who has escaped is absolutely different from a defendant who
cannot argue his case, because in contrast to the latter, he has the
possibility of appearing in court and thus, of defending himself. If he
deliberately avoids this possibility, then he arbitrarily makes himself
responsible for the disadvantages and dangers entailed by his absence.
In this case, naturally, there would be no question of an unjust trial.

The view has been expressed in recent days and weeks that world opinion
demands a trial against the Defendant Krupp under all circumstances, and
even _in absentia_, because Krupp is the owner of the greatest German
armament works and also one of the principal war criminals. So far as
this demand of world opinion is based on the assumption that Krupp is
one of the principal war criminals, it must be replied that this
accusation is as yet only a thesis of the Prosecution, which must first
be proved in the Trial.

The essential thing, however, in my opinion, is that it is not important
whether world opinion or, perhaps, to use an expression forged in the
Nazi work-shop, “the healthy instincts of the people,” or even political
considerations play a part in the decision of this question, but that
the question (Article 12) must be decided uniquely from the point of
view of whether justice demands the trial against Krupp. I do not want
to deny that the cries of justice may be the same as the cries echoing
world opinion. However, the demands of world opinion and the demands of
justice may be in contradiction to each other.

In the present case, however, a contradiction between the demands of
world opinion for a trial against Krupp _in absentia_ and the demands of
justice exists because, as I just related, it would violate the
recognized principles of the legal procedures of all states and
especially Article 12 of the Charter, to try a mentally deranged man who
cannot defend himself in a trial in which everything is at stake for the
defendant,—his honor, his existence, and above all, the question of
whether he belongs to the accursed circle of the arch-war criminals who
brought such frightful misery to humanity and to their own Fatherland. I
do not even wish, however, to put the disadvantages and dangers for the
man and the interests of the defendant into the foreground. Much more
significant are the dangers and disadvantages of such an unusual
procedure for basic justice, because the procedure against such a
defendant, who is unfit for trial due to his total inability to conduct
his defense properly, cannot guarantee a just and right decision. This
danger for basic justice, must, in my opinion, be avoided by a court of
such unequalled world historical importance, which has assumed the noble
and holy task, by punishment of the war criminals, of preventing the
repetition of such a horrible war as the second World War and of opening
the gates to permanent peace for all peoples of the earth.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, do you oppose the motion?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States):
Appearing in opposition to this motion, I should, perhaps, first file
with the Tribunal my commission from President Truman to represent the
United States in this proceeding. I will exhibit the original commission
and hand a photostat to the Secretary.

I also speak in opposition to this motion on behalf of the Soviet Union
and with the concurrence of the French Delegation which is present. I
fully appreciate the difficulties which have been presented to this
Tribunal in a very loyal fashion by the distinguished representative of
the German legal profession who has appeared to protect the interests of
Krupp, and nothing that I say in opposing this motion is to imply any
criticism of Counsel for Krupp who is endeavoring to protect the
interest of his client, as it is his duty to do, but he has a client
whose interests are very clear.

We represent three nations of the earth, one of which has been invaded
three times with Krupp armaments, one of which has suffered in this war
in the East as no people have ever suffered under the impact of war, and
one of which has twice crossed the Atlantic to put at rest controversies
insofar as its contribution could do so, which were stirred by German
militarism. The channel by which this Tribunal is to interpret the
Charter in reference to this matter is the interest of justice, and it
cannot ignore the interests that are engaged in the Prosecution any more
than it should ignore the interests of Krupp.

Of course, trial _in absentia_ has great disadvantages. It would not
comply with the constitutional standard for citizens of the United
States in prosecutions conducted in our country. It presents grave
difficulties to counsel under the circumstances of this case. Yet, in
framing the Charter, we had to take into account that all manner of
avoidances of trial would be in the interests of the defendants, and
therefore, the Charter authorized trial _in absentia_ when in the
interests of justice, leaving this broad generality as the only guide to
the Court’s discretion.

I do not suggest that Counsel has overstated his difficulties, but the
Court should not overlook the fact that of all the defendants at this
Bar, Krupp is unquestionably in the best position, from the point of
view of resources and assistance, to be defended. The sources of
evidence are not secret. The great Krupp organization is the source of
most of the evidence that we have against him and would be the source of
any justification. When all has been said that can be said, trial _in
absentia_ still remains a difficult and an unsatisfactory method of
trial, but the question is whether it is so unsatisfactory that the
interests of these nations in arraigning before your Bar the armament
and munitions industry through its most eminent and persistent
representative should be defeated. In a written answer, with which I
assume the members of the Tribunal are familiar, the United States has
set forth the history of the background of the Defendant Krupp, which
indicates the nature of the public interest that pleads for a hearing in
this case.

I will not repeat what is contained beyond summarizing that for over 130
years the Krupp enterprise has flourished by furnishing the German
military machine its implements of war. During the interval between the
two world wars, the present defendant, Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, was
the responsible manager, and during that time his son, his eldest son,
Alfried, was initiated into the business in the expectation that he
would carry on this tradition. The activities were not confined to
filling orders by the Government. The activities included the active
participation in the incitement to war, the active breaking up through
Germany’s withdrawal of a disarmament conference and the League of
Nations; the active political campaigning in support of the Nazi program
of aggression in its entirety.

It was not without profit to the Krupp enterprises, and we have recited
the spectacular rise of its profits through aiding to prepare Germany
for aggressive war. So outstanding were these services that this
enterprise was made an exception to the nationalization policy and was
perpetuated by Nazi decrees as a family enterprise in the hands of the
eldest son, Alfried.

Now it seems to us that in a trial in which we seek to establish the
principle juridically, as it has been established by treaties,
conventions, and international custom, that the incitement of an
aggressive war is a crime, it would be unbelievable that the enterprise
which I have outlined to you should be omitted from consideration.

Three of the prosecuting nations ask the permission of this Tribunal
immediately to file an amendment to the Indictment, which will add the
name of Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach at each point in the
Indictment after the name of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, and that the
Tribunal make immediate service of the Indictment on son Alfried, now
reported to be in the hands of the British Army of the Rhine.

I have to face the problem whether this will cause delay. All of the
nations at your Bar deplore delay. None deplore it more than I, who have
long been active in this task, but if the task in which we are engaged
is worth doing at all, it is worth doing well; and I do not see how we
can justify the placing of our convenience or a response to an
uninformed demand for haste ahead of doing this task thoroughly. I know
there is impatience to be on with the trial, but I venture to say that
very few litigations in the United States involving one plaintiff and
one defendant under local transactions in a regularly established court
come to trial in 8 months after the event, and 8 months ago the German
Army was in possession of this room and in possession of the evidence
that we have now. So we make no apology for the time that has been taken
in getting together a case which covers a continent, a decade of time,
and the affairs of most of the nations of the earth.

We do not think the addition of Alfried Krupp need delay this Trial by
the usual allowance of time to the defendant. The work already done on
behalf of Krupp von Bohlen would no doubt be available to Alfried. The
organization Krupp is the source of the documents and of most of the
evidence on which the Defense will depend. If this request of the United
States of America, the Soviet Union, and the French Republic is granted,
and Alfried Krupp is joined, we would then have no Objection to the
dismissal, which is the real substance of the motion, of the elder
Krupp, whose condition doubtless precludes his being brought to trial in
person.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, may I draw your attention to Page 5
of the written statement of the United States? At the bottom of Page 5
you say, “the prosecutors representing the Soviet Union, the French
Republic, and the United Kingdom unanimously oppose inclusion of Alfried
Krupp”, and then you go on to say on the fourth line of Page 6,
“immediately upon service of the Indictment, learning the serious
condition of Krupp, the United States again called a meeting of
prosecutors and proposed an amendment to include Alfried Krupp. Again
the proposal of the United States was defeated by a vote of three to
one.” Are you now telling the Tribunal that there has been another
meeting at which the prosecutors have reversed their two previous
decisions?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, I understand the French Delegation has
filed a statement with the Secretary of the Tribunal, which joins in the
position of the United States. I have just been called, on behalf of the
Soviet Prosecutor, General Rudenko, who is now in Moscow, to advise us
that the Soviet Delegation now joins, and I was this morning authorized
to speak in their behalf. Both those delegations desire to reduce, as,
of course, do we, any possible delay to a minimum.

I may say that the disagreement at the outset over the inclusion of
Alfried was due not to any difference of opinion as to whether this
industry should be represented in this Trial, but it was not understood
that the condition of the elder Krupp was such as would preclude his
trial. It was believed that it was. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, forgive my interrupting you, but the
words that I have just read show that the condition of Krupp was
comprehended at the time. The words are: “Immediately upon service of
the Indictment, learning of the serious condition of Krupp, the United
States again called a meeting of Prosecutors, and again the proposal of
the United States was defeated by a vote of three to one.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor is referring to the meeting which was
held after the Indictment had been served. I am referring to the
original framing of the Indictment, so we are speaking of two different
points of time.

THE PRESIDENT: I see.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It was felt that it would be very difficult to
manage a trial which included too many defendants, and that inasmuch as
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen was in, it was unnecessary to have others. When
the Indictment was served, the information came to us of his condition,
and we called the meeting. It was not then anticipated with certainty
that the Trial could not proceed. His condition was then, we knew,
serious, but the extent of it was not known to us as definitely as it is
now; and it was felt by the other three prosecuting nations at that time
that it would not be necessary to make this substitution.

In the light of what has now happened, both the Soviet Union and the
French Republic join in the position of the United States.

THE PRESIDENT: Then may I ask you how long [a] delay you suggest should
be given, if your motion for the addition of Alfried Krupp were granted?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Of course I hesitate to say what might be
reasonable from the point of view of the defendants, but it would seem
to me that in the first place, he might be willing to step into his
father’s place without delay; but in any case that the delay should not
postpone the commencement of this trial beyond the 2d day of December,
which I think is Monday, which would enable him, it seems to me, with
the work that has been done, to prepare adequately, and would enable us
to serve immediately. If permission is granted, we can immediately make
the service; and, of course, they have already had full information of
the charges, and access to the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Is he not entitled under the Charter and the rules of
procedure to 30 days from the service of the Indictment upon him?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think the Charter makes no such requirement, and
I understand that the rules of the Court are within the control of the
Court itself.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you suggest that he should be given less time than
the other defendants?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have no hesitation in sponsoring that suggestion,
for the reason that the work that has already been done presumably would
be available to him; and as I have suggested, of all the defendants, the
Krupp family is in the best position to defend, from the point of view
of resources, from the point of view of the reach of their organization;
and, I am sure you will agree, they are not at all handicapped in the
ability of counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: I have one last question to put to you: Can it be in the
interest of justice to find a man guilty, who, owing to illness, is
unable to make his defense properly?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Assuming the hypothesis that Your Honor states, I
should have no hesitation in saying that it would not be in the
interests of justice to find a man guilty who cannot properly be
defended. I do not think it follows that the character of charges that
we have made in this case against Krupp, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, cannot
be properly tried _in absentia_. That is an arguable question; but it
can be assumed that all of the acts which we charge him with are either
documentary, or they were public acts. We are not charging him with the
sort of thing for which one resorts to private sources. The one serious
thing that seems to me, is that he would not be able to take the stand
himself in his defense, and I am not altogether sure that he would want
to do that, even if he were present.

THE PRESIDENT: But you have stated, have you not, and you would agree,
that according to the Municipal Law of the United States of America, a
man in the physical and mental condition of Krupp could not be tried.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that would be true in most of the
jurisdictions.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

Mr. Attorney General.

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): May it
please you, Mr. President: The matters which I desire to submit to the
Tribunal can be shortly stated, and first amongst them I should say
this: There is no kind of difference of principle between myself and my
colleagues, representing the other three prosecution Powers, none
whatsoever. Our difference is as to method and as to procedure. In the
view of the British Government, this Trial has been enough delayed, and
matters ought now to proceed without further postponement.

Before I say anything in regard to the application which is before the
Tribunal, on behalf of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, may I say just one word
about our position in regard to industrialists generally. Representing,
as I do, the present British Government, it may be safely assumed by the
Tribunal that I am certainly not less anxious than the representatives
of any other state the part played by industrialists in the preparation
and conduct of the war should be fully exposed to the Tribunal and to
the world. That will be done, and that will be done in the course of
this Trial, whether Gustav Krupp von Bohlen or Alfried Krupp are parties
to the proceedings or not. The defendants who are at present before the
Tribunal, are indicted for conspiring not only with each other, but with
divers other persons; and if it should be the decision of the Tribunal
that Gustav Krupp von Bohlen should be dismissed from the present
proceedings, the evidence as to the part which he, his firm, his
associates, and other industrialists played in the preparation and
conduct of the war, would still be given to this Tribunal, as forming
part of the general conspiracy in which these defendants were involved
with divers other persons, not now before the Court.

Now, then, in regard to the application which is before the Court on
behalf of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, the matter is, as it seems to me,
entirely one for the Tribunal; and I would only wish to say this about
it: It is an application which, in my submission, must be treated on its
own merits. This is a court of justice, not a game in which you can play
a substitute, if one member of a team falls sick. If this defendant is
unfit to stand his trial before this Tribunal, and whether he is fit or
unfit is a matter for the Tribunal, he will be none the less unfit
because the Tribunal decides not to join some other person, not at
present a party to the proceedings.

There is provision under the Charter for trial _in absentia_. I do not
wish to add anything which has been said in regard to that aspect of the
matter by my friend, Mr. Justice Jackson, but I ask the Tribunal to deal
with the application, made on behalf of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, quite
independently of any considerations as to the joinder of some other
person, considerations which, in my submission, are relevant to that
application. There is, however, before the Tribunal, an independent
application to permit the joinder of a new defendant at this late state.
I think I should perhaps say this: That as you, Mr. President, pointed
out, at the last meeting of the Chief Prosecutors, at which this
possibility was discussed, not for the first time, the representatives
of the Provisional Government of France and of the Soviet Government
were, like ourselves, as representing the British Government, opposed to
the addition of any defendant involving any delay in the commencement of
these proceedings. I take no technical point upon that at all. I am
content that you should deal with the matter now, as if the Chief
Prosecutors had had a further meeting, and as a committee, in the way
that they are required to act under the Charter, had by majority decided
to make this application. I mention the matter only to explain the
position in which I find myself, as the representative of the British
Government, in regard to it. At the last meeting of Chief Prosecutors,
there was agreement with the British view. The representatives of the
other two States, as they were quite entitled to do, have since that
meeting come to a different conclusion. Well, now, Sir, so far as that
application is concerned, I would say only this: The case against the
existing defendants, whether Gustav Krupp von Bohlen is included amongst
them or not, can be fully established without the joinder of any
additional person, whoever he might be. The general part played by the
industrialists can be fully established without the joinder of any
particular industrialist, whoever he might be. That case will indeed be
developed, and will be made clear in the course of this Trial. That is
not to say that Alfried Krupp should not be brought to justice. There is
provision under the Charter for the holding of further trials, and it
may be according to the result of the present proceedings, that
hereafter other proceedings ought to be taken, possibly against Alfried
Krupp, possibly against other industrialists, possibly against other
people as well. At present, we are concerned with the existing
defendants. For our part, the case against them has been ready for some
time, and it can be shortly and succinctly stated; and in my submission
to the Tribunal, the interests of justice demand, and world opinion
expects, that these men should be put upon their defense without further
delay.

And I respectfully remind the Tribunal of what was said at the opening
session in Berlin by General Nikitchenko, in these terms:

    “The individual defendants in custody will be notified that they
    must be ready for trial within 30 days after the service of the
    Indictment upon them. Promptly thereafter, the Tribunal shall
    fix and announce the date of the Trial in Nuremberg, to take
    place not less than 30 days after the service of the Indictment;
    and the defendants shall be advised of such date as soon as it
    is fixed.”

And then these words:

    “It must be understood that the Tribunal, which is directed by
    the Charter to secure an expeditious hearing of the issues
    raised by the charges will not permit any delay, either in the
    preparation of the defense, or of the Trial.”

Of course, if it happened that Alfried Krupp were prepared to step into
his father’s shoes in this matter, without any delay in the proceedings,
the British Prosecutors would welcome that procedure, but if his joinder
involves any further delay in the Trial of the existing defendants, we
are opposed to it.

THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you: Do you agree that according to the
Municipal Law of Great Britain, in the same way that I understood it to
be the law of the United States of America, a man in the mental and
physical condition of Gustav Krupp could not be tried?

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: I do, Sir. I take the same view, if I may say so,
with respect, as Mr. Justice Jackson took upon the question you
addressed to him.

THE PRESIDENT: And in such circumstances, the prosecution against him
would not be dismissed, but he would be detained during the pleasure of
the sovereign power concerned.

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: That is one question that I wanted to put to you.

Do you then suggest that, in the present circumstances, Gustav Krupp
ought to be tried in his absence, in view of the medical reports that we
have before us?

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, it is a matter which is entirely in the
discretion of the Tribunal, and which I do not wish to press in any way;
but as the evidence involving his firm will in any event be laid before
the Tribunal, it might be convenient that he should be represented by
counsel, and that the Tribunal, in arriving at its decision, should take
account, as it necessarily would, of his then condition.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any precedent for such a course as that, to hold
that he could not be tried and found guilty or not guilty and yet to
retain counsel to appear for him before the Tribunal?

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: No, Sir, I was not suggesting that he should not
be treated as being an existing defendant before the Tribunal and held
guilty or not. I was dealing with the subsequent course which the
Tribunal might adopt in regard to him if they held him guilty of some or
all of these offenses.

THE PRESIDENT: But I thought you agreed that according to, at any rate,
Municipal Law, a man in his physical condition ought not be tried.

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: I am not agreed that according to English
Municipal Law he could not be tried.

THE PRESIDENT: And that law is based upon the interests of justice?

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Mr. President, I cannot dispute that, but our law
of course contains no provision at all for trial _in absentia_. Express
provision is made for such trials in the Charter constituting this
Tribunal, provided that the Tribunal considers it in the interests of
justice.

THE PRESIDENT: What exactly is it you are suggesting to us, that he
should be tried in absence or that he should not be tried in absence?

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Mr. President, we have suggested that advantage
should be taken of the provision for trial _in absentia_, but as I said
at the beginning, it is, as it appears to me, entirely a matter for the
discretion of the Tribunal, not one in which I wish to press any
particular view.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet Union desire to
speak? You were authorized, I think, Mr. Justice Jackson, to speak on
behalf of the Chief Prosecutor of the Soviet Union.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I was authorized to state that they take the same
position as the United States. I don’t know that in answering their
questions I would have always given the answers that they would have
given. I understand, for example, that they do try cases _in absentia_,
and I think their position on that would be somewhat different from the
position I have given.

THE PRESIDENT: This question I asked you, of course, was directed solely
to the Municipal Law of the United States. Does the Chief Prosecutor of
the Soviet Union wish to address the Tribunal?

COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): No.

THE PRESIDENT: Then does the Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic
wish to address the Tribunal?

M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): It
would be easy to justify the position taken today by the French
Delegation by merely reminding oneself that on numerous occasions the
French Delegation has advocated the immediate preparation of a second
trial in order that it might be possible to proceed with it as soon as
the first trial was completed. We could in this way have prosecuted the
German industrialists without any interruption. This point of view has
never been adopted. We have rallied to the point of view of the United
States as being the most expedient and most susceptible of giving
complete satisfaction to French interests. We are anxious that Krupp the
son should be tried. There are serious charges against him, and no one
could possibly understand that there should be no representative in this
trial of the greatest German industrial enterprise, as being one of the
principal guilty parties in this war. We should have preferred that a
second trial be made against the industrialists, but since this second
trial is not to take place, we consider the presence of Alfried Krupp to
be absolutely necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the position, which you take up if the
substitution of Alfried Krupp would necessarily lead to delay?

M. DUBOST: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, but I believe you have in
your hand a second note which I submitted this morning to the Court
after having received a telephone call from Paris.

THE PRESIDENT: I have in my hand a document of 13 November 1945, signed
by you, I think.

M. DUBOST: That is right. There is, however, a supplementary note, which
I submitted this morning, according to which I adopt the same viewpoint
as that expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson. I was in fact able to find out
between the document of last night and that of this morning the
consequences that would be brought about. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the best course would be to read this document
which has now been put before us.

    M. DUBOST: “We consider that the trial of Krupp’s father is not
    possible at the present time. The trial of a dying old man who
    is unable to attend is out of the question. We are anxious that
    Krupp’s son should be prosecuted for there are very serious
    charges against him. We had asked up to this point that he
    should be prosecuted without any delay in the trial, but for
    reasons of expediency which led us to adopt this point of view,
    this has ceased to be a pressing problem since the Soviet
    Delegation has adopted the point of view of Mr. Justice Jackson.
    Consequently we no longer raise any objection, and we likewise
    have come to this point of view.”

THE PRESIDENT: Does what you say now mean that you wish Alfried Krupp to
be substituted notwithstanding the fact that it must cause delay?

M. DUBOST: Yes, that’s right.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you suggesting on behalf of France that Gustav should
be tried in his absence or not?

M. DUBOST: No, no, not that, no.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Volchkov): What does the French prosecutor and the
French Republic offer so far as Gustav Krupp is concerned?

M. DUBOST: As to Krupp, the father, we consider it is not possible to
prosecute him because of the state of his health; he will not be able to
appear before the Court. He will not be able to defend himself. He will
not be able to tell us about his acts. It is necessary to drop his case
or to postpone the Trial to a time when he shall be cured, unless before
that he appears before the judgment of God. We also believe, since we
cannot obtain a second trial against the industrialists, that it is
necessary to substitute Krupp, the son, against whom serious charges
exist, for Krupp, the father, who cannot be tried.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you agree or disagree with the Attorney General for
Great Britain that in the course of the Trial, whether Gustav Krupp or
Alfried Krupp are included as defendants, the evidence against the
industrialists of Germany must be exposed?

M. DUBOST: We have been anxious, Mr. President, that a second trial
should be prepared immediately to follow the first trial in which the
question of the industrialists would be thoroughly examined. Since it is
not possible to have a second trial, we are anxious that one of the
representatives of the Krupp firm, who is personally responsible and
against whom there are charges, shall be called upon to appear before
this Tribunal to defend himself against the charges that we shall bring
against the Krupp firm, and in a more general manner also against the
industrialists who were associated with the Krupp firm and who
participated in the conspiracy which is presented in the Indictment, who
supported the seizure of power by the Nazis, supported the Nazi
Government and propaganda, financed the Nazis and finally helped the
rearmament of Germany in order that it might continue its war of
aggression.

THE PRESIDENT: Forgive me. I don’t think you have answered the question
which I put to you. Do you agree with the Attorney General that whether
Gustav Krupp or Alfried Krupp are or are not defendants in this Trial,
the evidence against the German industrialists will necessarily be
thoroughly exposed in the course of bringing forward the evidence of the
conspiracy charged?

M. DUBOST: I agree that it is possible to bring the proof of a
conspiracy without this or that member of the Krupp family being brought
before the Court, but it will only be fragmentary proof and evidence,
because there are personal responsibilities which go beyond the general
responsibilities of the authors of the conspiracy, and these personal
responsibilities are particularly attributable to Krupp the son and
Krupp the father.

THE TRIBUNAL (M. De Vabres): You said just now that it was your opinion
that the name of Krupp the son should be substituted for that of Krupp
the father? Do you really mean the word “substitute”? Did you use this
word intentionally or do you not rather wish to say that it was your
opinion that there should be an amendment to the Indictment and that we
should apply a supplement to the Indictment? Do you consider that you
can propose to the Court to substitute one name for another in the
Indictment or do you suggest on the contrary a supplement be added to
the Indictment?

M. DUBOST: I have thought for a long time that it was necessary to
propose an amendment to the Indictment. It is still my opinion, but it
is not legally possible to modify the Indictment by a supplement.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Does counsel for the Defendant Gustav Krupp
wish to address the Tribunal again?

DR. KLEFISCH: I deduce from the explanation of the Prosecution that the
principal objection against our point of view is that it would not be in
accordance with justice if the Trial were to be carried out in absence
of Krupp senior. When, in representing the opposite point of view, it is
pointed out that the public opinion of the entire world demands the
trial against the defendant, Mr. Krupp, then the main reason offered is
that Krupp senior is to be regarded as one of the principal war
criminals. I have already pointed out that this reasoning would be an
anticipation of the final judgment of the Court. It is my opinion, that
this is not the place and the time to discuss these questions and I wish
to limit myself to what I already said before: Namely, that all that has
been said in this direction is for the moment only a thesis of the
Prosecution, which, in the course of the Trial, will be confronted with
an antithesis of the Defense, so that then the High Court can arrive at
a synthesis of this thesis and antithesis and make a fair judgment.

One more point regarding this question:

It has also been pointed out that Krupp senior, could be tried _in
absentia_ for the reason that the entire evidence regarding the question
of guilt has already been presented and was no secret. In view of the
facts this is not correct.

So far we have seen only a part of the evidence, that is, that which is
contained in the bundle of documents. But may I point out that from the
firm of Krupp and the private quarters of the Krupp family, the entire
written material which consisted of whole truck-loads was confiscated,
and we did not see any of this material. Thus, the defense is difficult
to undertake, since, due to the confiscation of this entire material,
only the Defendant Krupp senior would be in a position to describe at
least to a certain extent the documents necessary for his defense, so
that they could be submitted in the regular form of application for
evidence to this High Court.

As far as the question of an additional indictment against the son,
Alfried Krupp, is concerned I wish to state first of all that I have not
officially been charged with the defense of this defendant. I suppose,
however, that I will be charged with the defense and that is why, with
the permission of the Court, I wish to say a few words here about this
motion, perhaps as a representative without commission. I do not know
whether it is possible, that is, legally possible, subsequently to put
Mr. Alfried Krupp on the list of the principal war criminals. However,
even if I were to let this legal possibility open to discussion, I
should like to call attention to the following:

In view of the changed situation, it seems to me to be a bit strange, to
say the least, if Alfried Krupp were to be put on the list as a
principal war criminal now, not because he was marked as one from the
beginning, but because his father cannot be tried. I see in that a
certain game played by the representative of the United States which
cannot be sanctioned by the Court in my opinion.

In addition, I wish to make the following brief remark:

In case a supplementary indictment should be made against Alfried Krupp,
and if I were definitely charged with his defense, my conscience would
oblige me to request that the period of 30 days between the serving of
the Indictment and the main Trial as provided in Rule 2 (a), would have
to be kept under all circumstances.

Finally, I should like to point out the following:

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize that, so far as I am informed,
the circumstances and facts regarding the person of Alfried Krupp are
basically different from the circumstances concerning the person of the
present defendant, Krupp senior. In the documents that have been put at
our disposal so far, and which are bound in one volume, I have hardly
found a single word about any complicity or participation of Alfried
Krupp in the crimes with which Krupp senior is charged. I should also
like to emphasize that, as has already been discussed, Alfried Krupp
became the owner of the Krupp firm, I believe, only in November 1943 and
that previously, from 1937 to 1943, he was merely director of one
department of the entire concern, but in this capacity he did not have
the slightest influence on the management of the firm, nor did he have
anything to do with orders for the production and delivery of war
materials.

For the reasons stated, I believe I am justified in expressing the wish
to refrain from introducing Alfried Krupp into this Trial of the
principal war criminals.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now and announce its decision
on this application later.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 15 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]




                          PRELIMINARY HEARING
                       Thursday, 15 November 1945


THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has invited the Defense Counsel to be
present here today as it desires that they shall thoroughly understand
the course which the Tribunal proposes the proceedings at trial should
take.

The Tribunal is aware that the procedure provided for by the Charter is
in some respects different from the procedure to which Defense Counsel
are accustomed. They therefore desire that Defense Counsel should be
under no misapprehension as to course which must be followed.

Article 24 of the Charter provides for the reading of the Indictment in
Court, but in view of its length, and the fact that its contents are now
probably well known, it may be that Defense Counsel will not think it
necessary that it should be read in full.

The opening of cases for the Prosecution will necessarily take a long
time, and during that time Defense Counsel will have an opportunity to
complete their preparations for defense.

When witnesses for the Prosecution are called, it must be understood
that it is the function of Counsel for the Defense to cross-examine the
witnesses, and that it is not the intention of the Tribunal to
cross-examine the witnesses themselves.

The Tribunal will not call upon the Defense Counsel to state what
evidence they wish to submit until the case for the Prosecution has been
closed.

As Defense Counsel already know, the General Secretary of the Tribunal
makes every effort to obtain such evidence, both witnesses and
documents, as the Defense wish to adduce and the Tribunal approves.

The General Secretary is providing, and will provide, lodging, food, and
transportation for Defense Counsel and witnesses while in Nuremberg. And
though the living conditions provided may not be all that can be
desired, Defense Counsel will understand that there are great
difficulties in the present circumstances and efforts will be made to
meet any reasonable request.

Defense Counsel have been provided with a Document Room and an
Information Center where documents translated into German are available
for the Defense, subject to the necessary security regulations. It is
important that Defense Counsel should notify the General Secretary as
long as possible, and at least 3 weeks in ordinary cases, in advance, of
witnesses or documents they require.

The services which Defense Counsel are performing are important public
services for the interests of justice, and they will have the protection
of the Tribunal in the performance of their duties.

In order that the Trial should proceed with due expedition, it would
seem desirable that Defense Counsel should settle among themselves the
order in which they wish to cross-examine the Prosecution witnesses and
propose to present their defenses, and that they should communicate
their wishes in this regard to the General Secretary.

I hope that what I have said will be of assistance to Defense Counsel in
the preparation of their defenses. If there are any questions in
connection with what I have said which they wish to ask, I will endeavor
to answer them.

DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you come to the desk please, if you wish to speak.
Will you state your name and for whom you appear here?

DR. THOMA: Dr. Thoma, defense counsel for the Defendant Rosenberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. THOMA: I should like to ask whether the Defense will immediately get
copies of the interrogation of witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: Copies of the Indictment? Those have been served upon
each defendant. Do I understand that you want further copies for the use
of defendants’ counsel?

DR. THOMA: May I put my question more precisely? I presume that all the
statements of the defendants are to be taken down in shorthand, and I
would like to ask whether these will then be translated into German and
given to the Defense Counsel as soon as possible.

THE PRESIDENT: If you mean a transcript of the evidence which is given
before the Tribunal, that will be taken down, and if it is given in a
language other than German it will be translated into German and copies
furnished to defendants’ counsel. If it is in German it will be
furnished to them in German.

DR. THOMA: Will we get copies of the interrogation of all witnesses?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; that is what I meant by a transcript of the evidence
given before the Tribunal. That will be a copy, in German, of the
evidence of each witness.

DR. THOMA: Thank you.

DR. RUDOLPH DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Your Lordship,
gentlemen of the Tribunal, my colleagues of the Defense have entrusted
me with the honorable task of expressing our thanks for the words you
have addressed to the Defense Counsel. We members of the Defense
consider ourselves the associates of the Tribunal in reaching a just
verdict and we have full confidence in Your Lordship’s wise and
experienced conduct of the Trial proceedings.

Your Lordship may be convinced that in this spirit we shall participate
in the difficult task of reaching a just decision, in the case before
the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: I assume that there are no further questions at the
present stage which Counsel for the Defense wish to ask. They will
understand that if at any stage in the future they have inquiries which
they wish to make, they should address them to the General Secretary and
they will then be considered by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal will now adjourn until 2 o’clock, when the application on
behalf of the Defendant Streicher will be heard.

              [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours._]

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that there are some counsel for the
defendants present here today, who were not here yesterday and who may
not understand the use of these earphones and dials. Therefore, I
explain to them that Number 1 on the dial will enable them to hear the
evidence in the language in which it is given, Number 2 will be in
English, Number 3 in Russian, Number 4 in French, and Number 5 in
German.

I will now read the judgment of the Tribunal in the matter of the
application of counsel for Gustav Krupp von Bohlen for postponement of
the proceedings against the defendant.

Counsel for Gustav Krupp von Bohlen has applied to the Tribunal for
postponement of the proceedings against this defendant on the ground
that his physical and mental condition are such that he is incapable of
understanding the proceedings against him and of presenting any defense
that he may have.

On November 5 the Tribunal appointed a medical commission composed of
the following physicians:

R. E. Tunbridge, Brigadier, O.B.E., M.D., M.Sc., F.R.C.P., Consulting
Physician, British Army of the Rhine.

René Piedelièvre, M.D., Professor on the Faculty of Medicine of Paris;
Expert for the Tribunal.

Nicholas Kurshakov, M.D., Professor of Medicine, Medical Institute of
Moscow; Chief Internist, Commissariat of Public Health, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.

Eugene Sepp, M.D., Emeritus Professor of Neurology, Medical Institute of
Moscow; Member, Academy of Medical Science, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.

Eugene Krasnushkin, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Medical Institute of
Moscow.

Bertram Schaffner, Major, Medical Corps, Neuropsychiatrist, Army of the
United States.

The commission has reported to the Tribunal that it is unanimously of
the opinion that Gustav Krupp von Bohlen suffers from senile softening
of the brain; that his mental condition is such that he is incapable of
understanding court procedure and of understanding or cooperating in
interrogations; that his physical state is such that he cannot be moved
without endangering his life; and that his condition is unlikely to
improve but rather will deteriorate further.

The Tribunal accepts the findings of the medical commission, to which
exception is taken neither by the Prosecution nor by the Defense.

Article 12 of the Charter authorizes the trial of a defendant _in
absentia_ if found by the Tribunal to be “necessary in the interests of
justice.” It is contended on behalf of the Chief Prosecutors that in the
interest of justice, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen should be tried _in
absentia_, despite his physical and mental condition.

It is the decision of the Tribunal that upon the facts presented the
interests of justice do not require that Gustav Krupp von Bohlen be
tried _in absentia._ The Charter of the Tribunal envisages a fair trial,
in which the Chief Prosecutors may present the evidence in support of an
indictment and the defendants may present such defense as they may
believe themselves to have. Where nature rather than flight or contumacy
has rendered such a trial impossible, it is not in accordance with
justice that the case should proceed in the absence of a defendant.

For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal orders that:

1. The application for postponement of the proceedings against Gustav
Krupp von Bohlen is granted.

2. The charges in the Indictment against Gustav Krupp von Bohlen shall
be retained upon the docket of the Tribunal for trial hereafter, if the
physical and mental condition of the defendant should permit.

Further questions raised by the Chief Prosecutors, including the
question of adding another name to the Indictment, will be considered
later.

The Tribunal will now hear the application on behalf of the Defendant
Streicher.

Will the Counsel state his name?

DR. HANS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): Your Honors, as Counsel
for the Defendant Julius Streicher, I took the liberty some time ago of
requesting a postponement in the opening date of the Trial, because the
time at my disposal for making preparations appeared to me insufficient,
in view of the importance of the case.

This morning, however, the President of the Court outlined the course of
the proceedings of the Trial and his explanations have made it quite
clear that the Defense will have adequate time at its disposal to
continue preparations for the case of each client even after the opening
of the Trial. Any objections on my part are thereby removed, and
accordingly I withdraw my application as unsubstantiated.

Your Honors, may I use this opportunity to make a suggestion with regard
to the case of the Defendant Streicher.

In view of the exceptional nature of the case and of the difficulties
facing the Defense in handling it, may I suggest that the Tribunal
consider whether a psychiatric examination of the Defendant Streicher
would not be proper. Defense Counsel should have at his disposal all the
evidence on the nature, personality, and motives of the defendant which
appears necessary to enable him to form a clear picture of his client.

And this, of course, is also true of the Tribunal.

In my own interests I consider it essential that such an examination be
authorized by the Tribunal. I emphasize particularly that this is not a
formal motion: “It is not a motion but a proposal.” [_Note: These words
were spoken in English._] I deem it necessary as a precaution in my own
interests, since my client does not desire an examination of this sort,
and is of the opinion that he is mentally completely normal. I myself
cannot determine that; it must be decided by a psychiatrist.

I, therefore, ask the Tribunal to consider this proposal, and, if the
suggestion, under the circumstances, appears both requisite and
necessary, to choose and appoint a competent expert to conduct the
examination.

That is what I wished to say before the opening of the proceedings.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. It appears to the Tribunal that such
suggestions as you have now made, ought to be in the form of a formal
motion or application and that it ought to be in writing and that if, as
you say, the Defendant Streicher does not wish it or is unwilling that
such an examination should be made, then your application ought to state
in writing that the Defendant Streicher refuses to sign the application.

If you wish to make such a motion you are at liberty to make it, in
writing.

DR. MARX: Mr. President, may I be allowed to say briefly that it is
precisely because the defendant does object to my submitting such an
application that I feel obliged to make this request here publicly, and
inform the Tribunal that I am bound by my client’s attitude and
therefore not in a position to submit this suggestion in writing.
Without my client’s permission I cannot make this suggestion in writing,
and I am consequently forced to convey it to the Tribunal verbally,
since I myself consider it necessary as a precaution in my own interest.

THE PRESIDENT: But you understand from what I say to you, that if you
wish to make this suggestion, you must make the motion in writing and
you can, on that writing, state that the Defendant Streicher is not
prepared to sign the application.

DR. MARX: Thank you, Mr. President, for your statement; I shall not fail
to act, as you suggest.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the Chief Prosecutors wish to make any statement?

COLONEL ROBERT G. STOREY (Executive Trial Counsel for the United
States): May it please the Court:

The position of Counsel for Defendant Streicher emphasizes a suggestion
made by the Prosecutors this morning, namely, that all motions and all
requests from Counsel be reduced to writing, prior to submission to the
Court and the suggestions, in writing, were filed with the General
Secretary since the meeting this morning.

While I am on my feet, if it may please the Court, may I make a brief
statement in connection with the efforts of the Prosecutors to furnish
to the Defense Counsel evidence and documents in which they may be
interested, if that meets with the approval of the Court.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

COL. STOREY: With reference to Defendant Streicher’s second point in his
motion, namely, that the Prosecutors be required to furnish certain
documents, they are being furnished, and will be furnished in the
future.

Secondly, with reference to the film on concentration camps, which he
requests be shown to Defense Counsel in advance of the time of
presenting the film, this request will also be complied with by the
Prosecutors.

Also, for the information of the Defense Counsel, there has been
established in Room 54, in this Courthouse, what is known as the
Defendants’ Information Center, operated jointly by the four Chief
Prosecutors. In that room there has been deposited a list of documents
upon which the Prosecution relies. Secondly, if further documents are
relied upon by the prosecutors, lists will be furnished to Defense
Counsel before they are introduced into evidence or offered to the
Court, and also, they will have the opportunity to examine copies of
those documents in their own language.

May I also suggest that most Defense Counsel have availed themselves of
that privilege and those who had not, have been notified and they are
now, as of this date, all of them, making use of the facilities
provided, which include rooms for conferences, typewriters, when
necessary, and other assistance.

I want to make that statement for the information of the Defense
Counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: I understand the Soviet Chief Prosecutor wishes to
address the Tribunal.

COL. POKROVSKY: In connection with the evidence just submitted to the
Tribunal by Counsel representing the interests of Defendant Streicher, I
consider it my duty to inform the Tribunal that during the last
interrogation made by the Delegation of the Soviet Union, the Defendant
Streicher, about whom it is specifically said in the Indictment, Counts
One and Four, that he had incited to the persecution of the Jews, stated
that he had been speaking from a Zionist point of view.

This declaration or, more precisely, this testimony, immediately
produced certain doubts as to the mental stability of the defendant.

It is not the first time that persons, now standing their trial, have
attempted to delude us about their mental condition. I refer in
particular to the Defendant Hess. In the case of Hess the Tribunal, to
my knowledge already possesses. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. We are not hearing any application with
reference to Streicher’s sanity now, nor any application with reference
to Hess. We have simply informed Counsel for Streicher that if he wishes
to make an application in respect of his defendant’s sanity or mental
condition, he must make that application in writing. If he does make
such an application in writing you will have full opportunity of
opposing the application.

COL. POKROVSKY: What I have in mind is not to offer an opinion on the
deductions and the petition of the Defense, but to inform the Tribunal
of a fact which may cause much complication if we do not act on it
immediately. Seeing that the Tribunal has at its disposal a number of
competent medical personnel, it would appear to me most expedient that
the Tribunal should entrust these specialists with the examination of
the Defendant Streicher in order to establish definitely whether he is
or is not in full possession of his mental capacities.

If we do not do so now, the necessity may arise in the course of the
Trial and if the question of Streicher’s sanity arises after the
beginning of the Trial, then it may delay the proceedings and impede our
work. If the Tribunal deems my suggestion in order, we would, before the
Trial starts, have sufficient time to request from this commission of
specialists a statement on his mental condition.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. If I rightly understand what the Chief Soviet
Prosecutor says, it is this: That if any question of the sanity of the
Defendant Streicher arises it will be convenient that he should be
examined now at once whilst the medical officers of the Soviet Union are
in Nuremberg. If that is so, then if you think it is more convenient
that Streicher should be examined by doctors at the present moment on
account of the presence of the distinguished doctors from the Soviet
Union being in Nuremberg, you are at liberty to make a written motion to
that effect to the Tribunal at any time.

Do any of the other Chief Prosecutors wish to address the Tribunal?

(There was no response.)

Then the Tribunal will deal with the application of the Defendant
Streicher as follows:

His application for postponement, which is numbered 1 on his written
application, has been withdrawn. His other two applications, numbered 2
and 3, which are agreed to by the Chief Prosecutors, are granted.

The Tribunal will now adjourn.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]




                          PRELIMINARY HEARING
                       Saturday, 17 November 1945


THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know whether the Chief
Prosecutors wish to make a statement with reference to the Defendant
Bormann.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
May it please the Tribunal, as the Tribunal are aware, the Defendant
Bormann was included in the Indictment, which was filed before the
Tribunal. There has been no change in the position with regard to the
Defendant Bormann; nor has any further information come to the notice of
the Chief Prosecutors. I think that the Tribunal are aware of the state
of our information when the Indictment was filed, but it might be as
well, if the Tribunal approves, if I explained what was the state of our
information at the time of the filing of the Indictment, which is also
the state of our information today.

There is evidence that Hitler and Bormann were together, with a number
of Nazi officials, in the Chancellery area in Berlin on 30 April 1945,
and were, at one stage on that day, together in Hitler’s underground air
raid shelter in the Chancellery gardens.

On 1 May Bormann and other Germans tried to break out of the Chancellery
area in a tank. They got as far as the river Spree and tried to cross a
bridge over it. A hand grenade was thrown into the tank by Russian
soldiers. Three members of the party who were with Bormann in this tank
have been interrogated. Two think that Bormann was killed, and the third
that he was wounded. The position is, therefore, that the Prosecution
cannot say that the matter is beyond probability that Bormann is dead.
There is still the clear possibility that he is alive.

In these circumstances I should submit that he comes within the exact
words of Article 12 of the Charter:

    “The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a
    person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this Charter
    in his absence, if he has not been found.”

In other words, it is not necessary to hold the man in these
circumstances. The Tribunal laid down in its Rules of Procedure in Rule
2 (b) the procedure applicable to this situation:

    “Any individual Defendant not in custody shall be informed of
    the Indictment against him and of his right to receive the
    documents specified in sub-paragraph (a) above, by notice in
    such form and manner as the Tribunal may prescribe.”

The Tribunal prescribed that notice to the Defendant Bormann should be
given in the following manner:

The notice should be read over the radio once a week for 4 weeks, the
first reading to be during the week of 22 October. It should also be
published in four separate issues of a newspaper circulated in the home
city of Martin Bormann.

The broadcast was given in the weeks after 22 October, as ordered, over
Radio Hamburg and Radio Langenberg, that is, Cologne. The Defendant
Bormann’s last place of residence was in Berlin. The notice was,
therefore, published in four Berlin papers: The _Tägliche Rundschau_,
the _Berliner Zeitung_, _Der Berliner_, and the _Allgemeine Zeitung_ for
the 4 weeks which the Tribunal had ordered.

In my respectful submission, the Charter and Rules of Procedure have
been complied with. The Tribunal, therefore, has the right to take
proceedings _in absentia_ under Article 12. It is, of course, a matter
for the Tribunal to decide whether it will exercise that right.

The Chief Prosecutors submit, however, that there is no change in the
position since they indicted Bormann and that, unless the Tribunal has
any different view, this is a proper case for trial _in absentia_.

I am authorized to make this statement not only on behalf of the British
Delegation, but on behalf of the United States and the French Republic.
I consulted my friend and colleague, Colonel Pokrovsky, yesterday and he
had to take instructions on the matter, and I notice he is here today. I
haven’t had the opportunity of speaking to him this morning and no doubt
he will be able to tell the Tribunal any thing if he so desires.

I hope that that explains the basis of the matter to the Tribunal. If
there are any other facts, I should be only too happy to answer any
point.

THE PRESIDENT: It is suggested to me that you should file with the
General Secretary proof of the publication to which you have referred.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With proof of the publication! If it please My
Lord, that will be done.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir David. Then I will ask the Chief
Prosecutor for the Soviet Union if he wishes to address the Tribunal.

COL. POKROVSKY: I thank the Tribunal for their wish to hear the opinion
of the Soviet Delegation. I shall avail myself of the privilege granted
by the Tribunal to express the complete concurrence of the Soviet
Delegation, and to inform you of the attitude adopted by my colleagues
where Bormann is concerned. We consider that the Tribunal has every
justification, under Article 12 of the Charter, to accept in evidence
all the material relative to Bormann’s case and to start proceedings
against him in his absence.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for a short time and hopes it
will be able to give its decision shortly.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has decided that in pursuance of Article 12
of the Charter, it will try the Defendant Bormann in his absence, and it
announces that Counsel will be appointed to defend the Defendant
Bormann.

The Tribunal will now adjourn.

              [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1500 hours._]

THE PRESIDENT: The motion to amend the indictment by adding the name of
Alfried Krupp has been considered by the Tribunal in all its aspects and
the application is rejected.

The Tribunal will now adjourn.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 20 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]




                               FIRST DAY
                        Tuesday, 20 November 1945


                           _Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Before the defendants in this case are called upon to
make their pleas to the Indictment which has been lodged against them,
and in which they are charged with Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and
Crimes against Humanity, and with a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit
those crimes, it is the wish of the Tribunal that I should make a very
brief statement on behalf of the Tribunal.

This International Military Tribunal has been established pursuant to
the Agreement of London, dated the 8th of August 1945, and the Charter
of the Tribunal as annexed thereto, and the purpose for which the
Tribunal has been established is stated in Article 1 of the Charter to
be the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals
of the European Axis.

The Signatories to the Agreement and Charter are the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of
the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Committee of the Chief Prosecutors, appointed by the four
Signatories, have settled the final designation of the war criminals to
be tried by the Tribunal, and have approved the Indictment on which the
present defendants stand charged here today.

On Thursday, the 18th of October 1945, in Berlin, the Indictment was
lodged with the Tribunal and a copy of that Indictment in the German
language has been furnished to each defendant, and has been in his
possession for more than 30 days.

All the defendants are represented by counsel. In almost all cases the
counsel appearing for the defendants have been chosen by the defendants
themselves, but in cases where counsel could not be obtained the
Tribunal has itself selected suitable counsel agreeable to the
defendant.

The Tribunal has heard with great satisfaction of the steps which have
been taken by the Chief Prosecutors to make available to defending
counsel the numerous documents upon which the Prosecution rely, with the
aim of giving to the defendants every possibility for a just defense.

The Trial which is now about to begin is unique in the history of the
jurisprudence of the world and it is of supreme importance to millions
of people all over the globe. For these reasons, there is laid upon
everybody who takes any part in this Trial a solemn responsibility to
discharge their duties without fear or favor, in accordance with the
sacred principles of law and justice.

The four Signatories having invoked the judicial process, it is the duty
of all concerned to see that the Trial in no way departs from those
principles and traditions which alone give justice its authority and the
place it ought to occupy in the affairs of all civilized states.

This Trial is a public Trial in the fullest sense of those words, and I
must, therefore, remind the public that the Tribunal will insist upon
the complete maintenance of order and decorum, and will take the
strictest measures to enforce it. It only remains for me to direct, in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter, that the Indictment shall
now be read.

MR. SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States):
May it please the Tribunal:

I. The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics by the undersigned, Robert H. Jackson, François de Menthon,
Hartley Shawcross, and R. A. Rudenko, duly appointed to represent their
respective governments in the investigation of the charges against and
the prosecution of the major war criminals, pursuant to the Agreement of
London dated 8 August 1945, and the Charter of this Tribunal annexed
thereto, hereby accuse as guilty, in the respects hereinafter set forth,
of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, and of
a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those Crimes, all as defined in
the Charter of the Tribunal, and accordingly name as defendants in this
cause and as indicted on the Counts hereinafter set out:

Hermann Wilhelm Göring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Robert Ley,
Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank,
Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav
Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Karl Dönitz, Erich Raeder, Baldur von
Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen,
Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath and Hans
Fritzsche, individually and as members of any of the groups or
organizations next hereinafter named.

II. The following are named as groups or organizations (since dissolved)
which should be declared criminal by reason of their aims and the means
used for the accomplishment thereof, and in connection with the
conviction of such of the named defendants as were members thereof:

Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); das Korps der Politischen Leiter
der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps
of the Nazi Party); die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen
Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the “SS”) and including the
Sicherheitsdienst (commonly known as the “SD”); die Geheime
Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, commonly known as the “Gestapo”);
die Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP (commonly known as the “SA”); and the
General Staff and the High Command of the German Armed Forces. The
identity and membership of the groups or organizations referred to in
the foregoing titles are hereinafter in Appendix B more particularly
defined.

COUNT ONE—THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY. Reference: the Charter,
Article 6, especially Article 6 (a).

III. _Statement of the Offense._

All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period of years
preceding 8 May 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, instigators,
or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or
Conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, Crimes
against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in
the Charter of this Tribunal, and, in accordance with the provisions of
the Charter, are individually responsible for their own acts and for all
acts committed by any persons in the execution of such plan and
conspiracy. The Common Plan or Conspiracy embraced the commission of
Crimes against Peace, in that the defendants planned, prepared,
initiated, and waged wars of aggression, which were also wars in
violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances. In the
development and course of the Common Plan or Conspiracy it came to
embrace the commission of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the
defendants determined upon and carried out, ruthless wars against
countries and populations, in violation of the rules and customs of war,
including as typical and systematic means by which the wars were
prosecuted, murder, ill-treatment, deportation for slave labor and for
other purposes of civilian populations of occupied territories, murder
and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of persons on the High Seas,
the taking and killing of hostages, the plunder of public and private
property, the wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, and
devastation not justified by military necessity. The Common Plan or
Conspiracy contemplated and came to embrace as typical and systematic
means, and the defendants determined upon and committed, Crimes against
Humanity, both within Germany and within occupied territories, including
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against civilian populations before and during the war, and
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, in execution of
the plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal wars, many
of such acts and persecutions being violations of the domestic laws of
the countries where perpetrated.

IV. _Particulars of the Nature and Development of the Common Plan or
Conspiracy._

(A) The Nazi Party as the central core of the Common Plan or Conspiracy.

In 1921 Adolf Hitler became the supreme leader or Führer of the
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist
German Workers Party), also known as the Nazi Party, which had been
founded in Germany in 1920. He continued as such throughout the period
covered by this Indictment. The Nazi Party, together with certain of its
subsidiary organizations, became the instrument of cohesion among the
defendants and their co-conspirators and an instrument for the carrying
out of the aims and purposes of their conspiracy. Each defendant became
a member of the Nazi Party and of the conspiracy, with knowledge of
their aims and purposes, or, with such knowledge, became an accessory to
their aims and purposes at some stage of the development of the
conspiracy.

(B) Common objectives and methods of conspiracy.

The aims and purposes of the Nazi Party and of the defendants and divers
other persons from time to time associated as leaders, members,
supporters, or adherents of the Nazi Party (hereinafter called
collectively the “Nazi conspirators”) were, or came to be, to accomplish
the following by any means deemed opportune, including unlawful means,
and contemplating ultimate resort to threat of force, force, and
aggressive war: (1) to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles
and its restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany;
(2) to acquire the territories lost by Germany as the result of the
World War of 1914-18 and other territories in Europe asserted by the
Nazi conspirators to be occupied principally by so-called “racial
Germans”; (3) to acquire still further territories in continental Europe
and elsewhere claimed by the Nazi conspirators to be required by the
“racial Germans” as “Lebensraum,” or living space, all at the expense of
neighboring and other countries. The aims and purposes of the Nazi
conspirators were not fixed or static, but evolved and expanded as they
acquired progressively greater power and became able to make more
effective application of threats of force and threats of aggressive war.
When their expanding aims and purposes became finally so great as to
provoke such strength of resistance as could be overthrown only by armed
force and aggressive war, and not simply by the opportunistic methods
theretofore used, such as fraud, deceit, threats, intimidation,
fifth-column activities, and propaganda, the Nazi conspirators
deliberately planned, determined upon and launched their aggressive wars
and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and
assurances by the phases and steps hereinafter more particularly
described.

(C) Doctrinal techniques of the Common Plan or Conspiracy.

To incite others to join in the Common Plan or Conspiracy, and as a
means of securing for the Nazi conspirators their highest degree of
control over the German community, they put forth, disseminated, and
exploited certain doctrines, among others, as follows:

1. That persons of so-called “German blood” (as specified by the Nazi
conspirators) were a “master race” and were accordingly entitled to
subjugate, dominate, or exterminate other “races” and peoples;

2. That the German people should be ruled under the Führerprinzip
(Leadership Principle) according to which power was to reside in a
Führer from whom sub-leaders were to derive authority in a hierarchical
order, each sub-leader to owe unconditional obedience to his immediate
superior but to be absolute in his own sphere of jurisdiction; and the
power of the leadership was to be unlimited, extending to all phases of
public and private life;

3. That war was a noble and necessary activity of Germans;

4. That the leadership of the Nazi Party, as the sole bearer of the
foregoing and other doctrines of the Nazi Party, was entitled to shape
the structure, policies, and practices of the German State and all
related institutions, to direct and supervise the activities of all
individuals within the State, and to destroy all opponents.

(D) The acquiring of totalitarian control of Germany: political.

1. First steps in acquisition of control of State machinery:

In order to accomplish their aims and purposes, the Nazi conspirators
prepared to seize totalitarian control over Germany to assure that no
effective resistance against them could arise within Germany itself.
After the failure of the Munich Putsch of 1923 aimed at the overthrow of
the Weimar Republic by direct action, the Nazi conspirators set out
through the Nazi Party to undermine and capture the German Government by
“legal” forms supported by terrorism. They created and utilized, as a
Party formation, Die Sturmabteilungen (SA), a semi-military, voluntary
organization of young men trained for and committed to the use of
violence, whose mission was to make the Party the master of the streets.

2. Control acquired:

On 30 January 1933 Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic.
After the Reichstag fire of 28 February 1933, clauses of the Weimar
constitution guaranteeing personal liberty, freedom of speech, of the
press, of association, and assembly were suspended. The Nazi
conspirators secured the passage by the Reichstag of a “Law for the
Protection of the People and the Reich” giving Hitler and the members of
his then cabinet plenary powers of legislation. The Nazi conspirators
retained such powers after having changed the members of the cabinet.
The conspirators caused all political parties except the Nazi Party to
be prohibited. They caused the Nazi Party to be established as a
para-governmental organization with extensive and extraordinary
privileges.

3. Consolidation of control:

Thus possessed of the machinery of the German State, the Nazi
conspirators set about the consolidation of their position of power
within Germany, the extermination of potential internal resistance, and
the placing of the German nation on a military footing,

(a) The Nazi conspirators reduced the Reichstag to a body of their own
nominees and curtailed the freedom of popular elections throughout the
country. They transformed the several states, provinces, and
municipalities, which had formerly exercised semi-autonomous powers,
into hardly more than administrative organs of the central Government.
They united the offices of the President and the Chancellor in the
person of Hitler, instituted a widespread purge of civil servants, and
severely restricted the independence of the judiciary and rendered it
subservient to Nazi ends. The conspirators greatly enlarged existing
State and Party organizations, established a network of new State and
Party organizations, and “co-ordinated” State agencies with the Nazi
Party and its branches and affiliates, with the result that German life
was dominated by Nazi doctrine and practice and progressively mobilized
for the accomplishment of their aims.

(b) In order to make their rule secure from attack and to instill fear
in the hearts of the German people, the Nazi conspirators established
and extended a system of terror against opponents and supposed or
suspected opponents of the regime. They imprisoned such persons without
judicial process, holding them in “protective custody” and concentration
camps, and subjected them to persecution, degradation, despoilment,
enslavement, torture, and murder. These concentration camps were
established early in 1933 under the direction of the Defendant Göring
and expanded as a fixed part of the terroristic policy and method of the
conspirators and used by them for the commission of the Crimes against
Humanity hereinafter alleged. Among the principal agencies utilized in
the perpetration of these crimes were the SS and the Gestapo, which,
together with other favored branches or agencies of the State and Party,
were permitted to operate without restraint of law.

(c) The Nazi conspirators conceived that, in addition to the suppression
of distinctively political opposition, it was necessary to suppress or
exterminate certain other movements or groups which they regarded as
obstacles to their retention of total control in Germany and to the
aggressive aims of the conspiracy abroad. Accordingly:

(1) The Nazi conspirators destroyed the free trade unions in Germany by
confiscating their funds and properties, persecuting their leaders,
prohibiting their activities, and supplanting them by an affiliated
Party organization. The Leadership Principle was introduced into
industrial relations, the entrepreneur becoming the leader and the
workers becoming his followers. Thus any potential resistance of the
workers was frustrated and the productive labor capacity of the German
nation was brought under the effective control of the conspirators.

(2) The Nazi conspirators, by promoting beliefs and practices
incompatible with Christian teaching, sought to subvert the influence of
the churches over the people and in particular over the youth of
Germany. They avowed their aim to eliminate the Christian churches in
Germany and sought to substitute therefore Nazi institutions and Nazi
beliefs and pursued a program of persecution of priests, clergy, and
members of monastic orders whom they deemed opposed to their purposes,
and confiscated church property.

(3) The persecution by the Nazi conspirators of pacifist groups,
including religious movements dedicated to pacifism, was particularly
relentless and cruel.

(d) Implementing their “master race” policy, the conspirators joined in
a program of relentless persecution of the Jews, designed to exterminate
them. Annihilation of the Jews became an official State policy, carried
out both by official action and by incitements to mob and individual
violence. The conspirators openly avowed their purpose. For example, the
Defendant Rosenberg stated: “Anti-Semitism is the unifying element of
the reconstruction of Germany.” On another occasion he also stated:

    “Germany will regard the Jewish question as solved only after
    the very last Jew has left the greater German living
    space. . . . Europe will have its Jewish question solved only
    after the very last Jew has left the continent.”

The Defendant Ley declared:

    “We swear we are not going to abandon the struggle until the
    last Jew in Europe has been exterminated and is actually dead.
    It is not enough to isolate the Jewish enemy of mankind—the Jew
    has got to be exterminated.”

On another occasion he also declared:

    “The second German secret weapon is anti-Semitism, because if it
    is consistently pursued by Germany, it will become a universal
    problem which all nations will be forced to consider.”

The Defendant Streicher declared:

    “The sun will not shine on the nations of the earth until the
    last Jew is dead.”

These avowals and incitements were typical of the declarations of the
Nazi conspirators throughout the course of their conspiracy. The program
of action against the Jews included disfranchisement, stigmatization,
denial of civil liberties, subjecting their persons and property to
violence, deportation, enslavement, enforced labor, starvation, murder
and mass extermination. The extent to which the conspirators succeeded
in their purpose can only be estimated, but the annihilation was
substantially complete in many localities of Europe. Of the 9,600,000
Jews who lived in the parts of Europe under Nazi domination, it is
conservatively estimated that 5,700,000 have disappeared, most of them
deliberately put to death by the Nazi conspirators. Only remnants of the
Jewish population of Europe remain.

(e) In order to make the German people amenable to their will, and to
prepare them psychologically for war, the Nazi conspirators reshaped the
educational system and particularly the education and training of the
German youth. The Leadership Principle was introduced into the schools,
and the Party and affiliated organizations were given wide supervisory
powers over education. The Nazi conspirators imposed a supervision of
all cultural activities, controlled the dissemination of information and
the expression of opinion within Germany as well as the movement of
intelligence of all kinds from and into Germany, and created a vast
propaganda machine.

(f) The Nazi conspirators placed a considerable number of their
dominated organizations on a progressively militarized footing with a
view to the rapid transformation and use of such organizations whenever
necessary as instruments of war.

(E) The acquiring of totalitarian control in Germany: economic; and the
economic planning and mobilization for aggressive war.

Having gained political power, the conspirators organized Germany’s
economy to give effect to their political aims.

1. In order to eliminate the possibility of resistance in the economic
sphere, they deprived labor of its rights of free industrial and
political association as particularized in paragraph (D) 3 (c) (1)
herein.

2. They used organizations of German business as instruments of economic
mobilization for war.

3. They directed Germany’s economy towards preparation and equipment of
the military machine. To this end they directed finance, capital
investment, and foreign trade.

4. The Nazi conspirators, and in particular the industrialists among
them, embarked upon a huge re-armament program and set out to produce
and develop huge quantities of materials of war and to create a powerful
military potential.

5. With the object of carrying through the preparation for war the Nazi
conspirators set up a series of administrative agencies and authorities.
For example, in 1936 they established for this purpose the office of the
Four Year Plan with the Defendant Göring as Plenipotentiary, vesting it
with overriding control over Germany’s economy. Furthermore, on 28
August 1939, immediately before launching their aggression against
Poland, they appointed the Defendant Funk Plenipotentiary for Economics;
and on 30 August 1939 they set up the Ministerial Council for the
Defense of the Reich to act as a War Cabinet.

(F) Utilization of Nazi control for foreign aggression.

1. Status of the conspiracy by the middle of 1933 and projected plans.

By the middle of the year 1933 the Nazi conspirators, having acquired
governmental control over Germany, were in a position to enter upon
further and more detailed planning with particular relationship to
foreign policy. Their plan was to re-arm and to reoccupy and fortify the
Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties,
in order to acquire military strength and political bargaining power to
be used against other nations.

2. The Nazi conspirators decided that for their purpose the Treaty of
Versailles must definitely be abrogated and specific plans were made by
them and put into operation by 7 March 1936, all of which opened the way
for the major aggressive steps to follow, as hereinafter set forth. In
the execution of this phase of the conspiracy the Nazi conspirators did
the following acts:

(a) They led Germany to enter upon a course of secret rearmament from
1933 to March 1935, including the training of military personnel and the
production of munitions of war, and the building of an air force.

(b) On 14 October 1933 they led Germany to leave the International
Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.

(c) On 10 March 1935 the Defendant Göring announced that Germany was
building a military air force.

(d) On 16 March 1935 the Nazi conspirators promulgated a law for
universal military service, in which they stated the peace time strength
of the German Army would be fixed at 500,000 men.

(e) On 21 May 1935 they falsely announced to the world, with intent to
deceive and allay fears of aggressive intentions, that they would
respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles Treaty and comply
with the Locarno Pacts.

(f) On 7 March 1936 they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland, in
violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of Locarno of
16 October 1925, and falsely announced to the world that “we have no
territorial demands to make in Europe.”

3. Aggressive action against Austria and Czechoslovakia.

(a) The 1936-38 phase of the plan: planning for the assault on Austria
and Czechoslovakia.

The Nazi conspirators next entered upon the specific planning for the
acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, realizing it would be
necessary, for military reasons, first to seize Austria before
assaulting Czechoslovakia. On 21 May 1935 in a speech to the Reichstag,
Hitler stated that:

    “Germany neither intends, nor wishes to interfere in the
    internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an
    Anschluss.”

On 1 May 1936, within 2 months after the re-occupation of the Rhineland,
Hitler stated:

    “The lie goes forth again that Germany tomorrow or the day after
    will fall upon Austria or Czechoslovakia.”

Thereafter, the Nazi conspirators caused a treaty to be entered into
between Austria and Germany on 11 July 1936, Article I of which stated
that:

    “The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the
    Federated State of Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements
    of the German Führer and Chancellor of 21 May 1935.”

Meanwhile, plans for aggression in violation of that treaty were being
made. By the autumn of 1937 all noteworthy opposition within the Reich
had been crushed. Military preparation for the Austrian action was
virtually concluded. An influential group of the Nazi conspirators met
with Hitler on 5 November 1937, to review the situation. It was
reaffirmed that Nazi Germany must have “Lebensraum” in Central Europe.
It was recognized that such conquest would probably meet resistance
which would have to be crushed by force and that their decision might
lead to a general war, but this prospect was discounted as a risk worth
taking. There emerged from this meeting three possible plans for the
conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. Which of the three was to be
used was to depend upon the developments in the political and military
situation in Europe. It was contemplated during this meeting that the
conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia would, through compulsory
emigration of 2 million persons from Czechoslovakia and 1 million
persons from Austria, provide additional food to the Reich for 5 million
to 6 million people, strengthen it militarily by providing shorter and
better frontiers, and make possible the constituting of new armies up to
about twelve divisions. Thus, the aim of the plan against Austria and
Czechoslovakia was conceived of not as an end in itself but as a
preparatory measure toward the next aggressive steps in the Nazi
conspiracy.

(b) The execution of the plan to invade Austria: November 1937 to March
1938.

Hitler, on 8 February 1938, called Chancellor Schuschnigg to a
conference at Berchtesgaden. At the meeting of 12 February 1938, under
threat of invasion, Schuschnigg yielded a promise of amnesty to
imprisoned Nazis and appointment of Nazis to ministerial posts—meaning
in Austria. He agreed to remain silent until Hitler’s next speech in
which Austria’s independence was to be re-affirmed, but Hitler in that
speech, instead of affirming Austrian independence, declared himself
protector of all Germans. Meanwhile, subversive activities of Nazis in
Austria increased. Schuschnigg, on 9 March 1938, announced a plebiscite
for the following Sunday on the question of Austrian independence. On 11
March Hitler sent an ultimatum, demanding that the plebiscite be called
off or that Germany would invade Austria. Later the same day a second
ultimatum threatened invasion unless Schuschnigg should resign in 3
hours. Schuschnigg resigned. The Defendant Seyss-Inquart, who was
appointed Chancellor, immediately invited Hitler to send German troops
into Austria to “preserve order.” The invasion began on 12 March 1938.
On 13 March Hitler by proclamation assumed office as Chief of State of
Austria and took command of its armed forces. By a law of the same date
Austria was annexed to Germany.

(c) The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia: April 1938 to
March 1939.

(1) Simultaneously with their annexation of Austria, the Nazi
conspirators gave false assurances to the Czechoslovak Government that
they would not attack that country. But within a month they met to plan
specific ways and means of attacking Czechoslovakia, and to revise, in
the light of the acquisition of Austria, the previous plans for
aggression against Czechoslovakia.

(2) On 21 April 1938 the Nazi conspirators met and prepared to launch an
attack on Czechoslovakia not later than 1 October 1938. They planned to
create an “incident” to “justify” the attack. They decided to launch a
military attack only after a period of diplomatic squabbling which,
growing more serious, would lead to an excuse for war, or, in the
alternative, to unleash a lightning attack as a result of an “incident”
of their own creation. Consideration was given to assassinating the
German Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident. From and
after 21 April 1938, the Nazi conspirators caused to be prepared
detailed and precise military plans designed to carry out such an attack
at any opportune moment and calculated to overthrow all Czech resistance
within 4 days, thus presenting the world with a _fait accompli_, and so
forestalling outside resistance. Throughout the months of May, June,
July, August, and September, these plans were made more specific and
detailed, and by 3 September 1938 it was decided that all troops were to
be ready for action on 28 September 1938.

(3) Throughout this same period, the Nazi conspirators were agitating
the minorities question in Czechoslovakia, and particularly in the
Sudetenland, leading to a diplomatic crisis in August and September
1938. After the Nazi conspirators threatened war, the United Kingdom and
France concluded a pact with Germany and Italy at Munich on 29 September
1938, involving the cession of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to
Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. On 1 October 1938
German troops occupied the Sudetenland.

(4) On 15 March 1939, contrary to the provisions of the Munich Pact
itself, the Nazi conspirators caused the completion of their plan by
seizing and occupying the major part of Czechoslovakia, i.e. Bohemia and
Moravia, not ceded to Germany by the Munich Pact.

4. Formulation of the plan to attack Poland: preparation and initiation
of aggressive war: March 1939 to September 1939.

(a) With these aggressions successfully consummated, the conspirators
had obtained much desired resources and bases and were ready to
undertake further aggressions by means of war. Following the assurances
to the world of peaceful intentions, an influential group of the
conspirators met on 23 May 1939 to consider the further implementation
of their plan. The situation was reviewed, and it was observed that “the
past six years have been put to good use and all measures have been
taken in correct sequence and in accordance with our aims,” that the
national-political unity of the Germans had been substantially achieved,
and that further successes could not be achieved without war and
bloodshed. It was decided nevertheless next to attack Poland at the
first suitable opportunity. It was admitted that the questions
concerning Danzig which they had agitated with Poland were not true
questions, but rather that the question was one of aggressive expansion
for food and “Lebensraum.” It was recognized that Poland would fight if
attacked and that a repetition of the Nazi success against
Czechoslovakia without war could not be expected. Accordingly, it was
determined that the problem was to isolate Poland and, if possible,
prevent a simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers. Nevertheless,
it was agreed that England was an enemy to their aspirations, and that
war with England and her ally France must eventually result, and
therefore that in that war every attempt must be made to overwhelm
England with a “Blitzkrieg”, or lightning war. It was thereupon
determined immediately to prepare detailed plans for an attack on Poland
at the first suitable opportunity and thereafter for an attack on
England and France, together with plans for the simultaneous occupation
by armed force of air bases in the Netherlands and Belgium.

(b) Accordingly, after having denounced the German-Polish Pact of 1934
on false grounds, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to stir up the Danzig
issue, to prepare frontier “incidents” to “justify” the attack, and to
make demands for the cession of Polish territory. Upon refusal by Poland
to yield, they caused German Armed Forces to invade Poland on 1
September 1939, thus precipitating war also with the United Kingdom and
France.

5. Expansion of the war into a general war of aggression: planning and
execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece: 1939 to April 1941.

Thus the aggressive war prepared for by the Nazi conspirators through
their attacks on Austria and Czechoslovakia was actively launched by
their attack on Poland, in violation of the terms of the Briand-Kellogg
Pact, 1928. After the total defeat of Poland, in order to facilitate the
carrying out of their military operations against France and the United
Kingdom, the Nazi conspirators made active preparations for an extension
of the war in Europe. In accordance with these plans, they caused the
German Armed Forces to invade Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940;
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg on 10 May 1940; Yugoslavia and
Greece on 6 April 1941. All these invasions had been specifically
planned in advance.

6. German invasion on 22 June 1941 of the U.S.S.R. territory in
violation of the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939.

On 22 June 1941 the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the
Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and without any
declaration of war invaded Soviet territory, thereby beginning a war of
aggression against the U.S.S.R.

From the first day of launching their attack on Soviet territory the
Nazi conspirators, in accordance with their detailed plans, began to
carry out the destruction of cities, towns, and villages, the demolition
of factories, collective farms, electric stations, and railroads, the
robbery and barbaric devastation of the natural cultural institutions of
the peoples of the U.S.S.R., the devastation of museums, churches,
historic monuments, the mass deportation of the Soviet citizens for
slave labor to Germany, as well as the annihilation of old people,
women, and children, especially Bielorussians and Ukrainians. The
extermination of Jews was committed throughout the territory of the
Soviet Union.

The above-mentioned criminal offenses were perpetrated by the German
troops in accordance with the orders of the Nazi Government and the
General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.

7. Collaboration with Italy and Japan and aggressive war against the
United States: November 1936 to December 1941.

After the initiation of the Nazi wars of aggression the Nazi
conspirators brought about a German-Italian-Japanese 10-year
military-economic alliance signed at Berlin on 27 September 1940. This
agreement, representing a strengthening of the bonds among those three
nations established by the earlier but more limited pact of 25 November
1936, stated: “The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan, considering
it as a condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the
world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and
co-operate with one another in regard of their efforts in Greater East
Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime
purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to
promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.” The
Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would weaken and
handicap those nations with which they were at war, and those with whom
they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators exhorted Japan
to seek “a new order of things.” Taking advantage of the wars of
aggression then being waged by the Nazi conspirators, Japan commenced an
attack on 7 December 1941 against the United States of America at Pearl
Harbor and the Philippines, and against the British Commonwealth of
Nations, French Indo-China, and the Netherlands in the Southwest
Pacific. Germany declared war against the United States on 11 December
1941.

(G) War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity committed in the course of
executing the conspiracy for which the conspirators are responsible.

1. Beginning with the initiation of the aggressive war on 1 September
1939, and throughout its extension into wars involving almost the entire
world, the Nazi conspirators carried out their Common Plan or Conspiracy
to wage war in ruthless and complete disregard and violation of the laws
and customs of war. In the course of executing the Common Plan or
Conspiracy, there were committed the War Crimes detailed hereinafter in
Count Three of this Indictment.

2. Beginning with the initiation of their plan to seize and retain total
control of the German State, and thereafter throughout their utilization
of that control for foreign aggression, the Nazi conspirators carried
out their Common Plan or Conspiracy in ruthless and complete disregard
and violation of the laws of humanity. In the course of executing the
Common Plan or Conspiracy there were committed the Crimes against
Humanity detailed hereinafter in Count Four of this Indictment.

3. By reason of all the foregoing, the defendants with divers other
persons are guilty of a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment
of Crimes against Peace; of a conspiracy to commit Crimes against
Humanity in the course of preparation for war and in the course of
prosecution of war, and of a conspiracy to commit War Crimes not only
against the armed forces of their enemies but also against
non-belligerent civilian populations.

(H) Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense
stated in Count One.

Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a
statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the
offense set forth in this Count One of the Indictment. Reference is
hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the
responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal
groups and organizations for the offenses set forth in this Count One of
the Indictment.

If the Tribunal please, that ends Count One, which is America’s
responsibility. Great Britain will present Count Two.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordships please:

COUNT TWO—CRIMES AGAINST PEACE. Charter, Article 6 (a).

V. _Statement of the Offense._

All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period of years
preceding 8 May 1945, participated in the planning, preparation,
initiation, and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in
violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances.

VI. _Particulars of the Wars Planned, Prepared, Initiated, and Waged._

(A) The wars referred to in the statement of offense in this Count Two
of the Indictment and the dates of their initiation were the following:
against Poland, 1 September 1939; against the United Kingdom and France,
3 September 1939; against Denmark and Norway, 9 April 1940; against
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, 10 May 1940; against
Yugoslavia and Greece, 6 April 1941; against the U.S.S.R., 22 June 1941;
and against the United States of America, 11 December 1941.

(B) Reference is hereby made to Count One of the Indictment for the
allegations charging that these wars were wars of aggression on the part
of the defendants.

(C) Reference is hereby made to Appendix C annexed to this Indictment
for a statement of particulars of the charges of violations of
international treaties, agreements, and assurances caused by the
defendants in the course of planning, preparing, and initiating these
wars.

VII. _Individual, Group and Organization Responsibility for the Offense
Stated in Count Two._

Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a
statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the
offense set forth in this Count Two of the Indictment. Reference is
hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the
responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal
groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Two of
the Indictment.

That finishes, Mr. President, Count Two of the Indictment.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn for 15 minutes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases, the reading will be
resumed by a representative of the French Republic.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal understands that the Defendant Ernst
Kaltenbrunner is temporarily ill. The Trial will continue in his
absence. I call upon the Chief Prosecutor for the Provisional Government
of the French Republic.

M. PIERRE MOUNIER (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic):

COUNT THREE—WAR CRIMES. Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (b).

VIII. _Statement of the Offense._

All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1 September 1939 and 8
May 1945, in Germany and in all those countries and territories occupied
by the German Armed Forces since 1 September 1939, and in Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on the High Seas.

All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and
executed a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit War Crimes as defined in
Article 6 (b) of the Charter. This plan involved, among other things,
the practice of “total war” including methods of combat and of military
occupation in direct conflict with the laws and customs of war, and the
perpetration of crimes committed on the field of battle during
encounters with enemy armies, against prisoners of war, and in occupied
territories against the civilian population of such territories.

The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and by other
persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under Article 6
of the Charter) as such other persons when committing the said War
Crimes performed their acts in execution of a Common Plan and Conspiracy
to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which
plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated as leaders,
organizers, instigators, and accomplices.

These methods and crimes constituted violations of international
conventions, of internal penal laws, and of the general principles of
criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations,
and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct.

(A) Murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations of or in occupied
territory and on the High Seas.

Throughout the period of their occupation of territories overrun by
their armed forces, the defendants, for the purpose of systematically
terrorizing the inhabitants, ill-treated civilians, imprisoned them
without legal process, tortured, and murdered them.

The murders and ill-treatment were carried out by divers means, such as
shooting, hanging, gassing, starvation, gross overcrowding, systematic
undernutrition, systematic imposition of labor tasks beyond the strength
of those ordered to carry them out, inadequate provision of surgical and
medical services, kickings, beatings, brutality and torture of all
kinds, including the use of hot irons and pulling out of fingernails and
the performance of experiments by means of operations and otherwise on
living human subjects. In some occupied territories the defendants
interfered with religious services, persecuted members of the clergy and
monastic orders, and expropriated church property. They conducted
deliberate and systematic genocide; viz., the extermination of racial
and national groups, against the civilian population of certain occupied
territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people,
and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and
Gypsies.

Civilians were systematically subjected to tortures of all kinds, with
the object of obtaining information.

Civilians of occupied countries were subjected systematically to
“protective arrests”, that is to say they were arrested and imprisoned
without any trial and any of the ordinary protections of the law, and
they were imprisoned under the most unhealthy and inhumane conditions.

In the concentration camps were many prisoners who were classified
“Nacht und Nebel”. These were entirely cut off from the world and were
allowed neither to receive nor to send letters. They disappeared without
trace and no announcement of their fate was ever made by the German
authorities.

Such crimes and ill-treatment are contrary to international conventions,
in particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and
customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from
the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of
the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b)
of the Charter.

The following particulars and all the particulars appearing later in
this Count are set out herein by way of example only, are not exclusive
of other particular cases, and are stated without prejudice to the right
of the Prosecution to adduce evidence of other cases of murder and
ill-treatment of civilians.

1. In France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Italy, and
the Channel Islands, (hereinafter called the “Western Countries”), and
in that part of Germany which lies west of a line drawn due north and
south through the center of Berlin (hereinafter called “Western
Germany”).

Such murder and ill-treatment took place in concentration camps and
similar establishments set up by the defendants, and particularly in the
concentration camps set up at Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Breendonck,
Grini, Natzweiler, Ravensbrück, Vught, and Amersfoort, and in numerous
cities, towns, and villages, including Oradour sur Glane, Trondheim, and
Oslo.

Crimes committed in France or against French citizens took the following
forms:

Arbitrary arrests were carried out under political or racial pretexts;
they were either individual or collective; notably in Paris (round-up of
the 18th Arrondissement by the Field Gendarmerie, round-up of the Jewish
population of the 11th Arrondissement in August 1941, round-up in July
1942); at Clermont-Ferrand (round-up of professors and students of the
University of Strasbourg, which had been evacuated to Clermont-Ferrand,
on 25 November 1943); at Lyons; at Marseilles (round-up of 40,000
persons in January 1943); at Grenoble (round-up of 24 December 1943); at
Cluny (round-up on 24 December 1943); at Figeac (round-up in May 1944);
at Saint Pol de Léon (round-up in July 1944); at Locminé (round-up on 3
July 1944); at Eysieux (round-up in May 1944); and at Meaux-Moussey
(round-up in September 1944). These arrests were followed by brutal
treatment and tortures carried out by the most diverse methods, such as
immersion in icy water, asphyxiation, torture of the limbs, and the use
of instruments of torture, such as the iron helmet and electric current,
and practiced in all the prisons of France, notably in Paris, Lyons,
Marseilles, Rennes, Metz, Clermont-Ferrand, Toulouse, Nice, Grenoble,
Annecy, Arras, Béthune, Lille, Loos, Valenciennes, Nancy, Troyes, and
Caen, and in the torture chambers fitted up at the Gestapo centers.

In the concentration camps, the health regime and the labor regime were
such that the rate of mortality (alleged to be from natural causes)
attained enormous proportions, for instance:

1. Out of a convoy of 250 French women deported from Compiègne to
Auschwitz in January 1943, 180 had died of exhaustion at the end of 4
months.

2. 143 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 23 March and 6 May 1943 in
Block 8 at Dachau.

3. 1,797 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 21 November 1943 and 15
March 1945 in the block at Dora.

4. 465 Frenchmen died of general debility in November 1944 at Dora.

5. 22,761 deportees died of exhaustion at Buchenwald between 1 January
1943 and 15 April 1945.

6. 11,560 detainees died of exhaustion at Dachau Camp (most of them in
Block 30 reserved for the sick and the infirm) between 1 January and 15
April 1945.

7. 780 priests died of exhaustion at Mauthausen.

8. Out of 2,200 Frenchmen registered at Flossenburg Camp, 1,600 died
from supposedly natural causes.

Methods used for the work of extermination in concentration camps were:

Bad treatment, pseudo-scientific experiments (sterilization of women at
Auschwitz and at Ravensbrück, study of the evolution of cancer of the
womb at Auschwitz, of typhus at Buchenwald, anatomical research at
Natzweiler, heart injections at Buchenwald, bone grafting and muscular
excisions at Ravensbrück, _et cetera_), and by gas chambers, gas wagons,
and crematory ovens. Of 228,000 French political and racial deportees in
concentration camps, only 28,000 survived.

In France also systematic extermination was practised, notably at Asq on
1 April 1944, at Colpo on 22 July 1944, at Buzet sur Tarn on 6 July 1944
and on 17 August 1944, at Pluvignier on 8 July 1944, at Rennes on 8 June
1944, at Grenoble on 8 July 1944, at Saint Flour on 10 June 1944, at
Ruisnes on 10 June 1944, at Nimes, at Tulle, and at Nice, where, in July
1944, the victims of torture were exposed to the population, and at
Oradour sur Glane where the entire village population was shot or burned
alive in the church.

The many charnel pits give proof of anonymous massacres. Most notable of
these are the charnel pits of Paris (Cascade du Bois de Boulogne),
Lyons, Saint Genis-Laval, Besançon, Petit Saint Bernard, Aulnat, Caen,
Port Louis, Charleval, Fontainebleau, Bouconne, Gabaudet, L’hermitage
Lorges, Morlaas, Bordelongue, Signe.

In the course of a premeditated campaign of terrorism, initiated in
Denmark by the Germans in the latter part of 1943, 600 Danish subjects
were murdered and, in addition, throughout the German occupation of
Denmark large numbers of Danish subjects were subjected to torture and
ill-treatment of all sorts. In addition, approximately five hundred
Danish subjects were murdered, by torture and otherwise, in German
prisons and concentration camps.

In Belgium, between 1940 and 1944, torture by various means, but
identical in each place, was carried out at Brussels, Liége, Mons,
Ghent, Namur, Antwerp, Tournai, Arlon, Charleroi, and Dinant.

At Vught, in Holland, when the camp was evacuated, about four hundred
persons were shot.

In Luxembourg, during the German occupation, 500 persons were murdered
and, in addition, another 521 were illegally executed, by order of such
special tribunals as the so-called “Sondergericht”. Many more persons in
Luxembourg were subjected to torture and ill-treatment by the Gestapo.
At least 4,000 Luxembourg nationals were imprisoned during the period of
German occupation, and of these at least 400 were murdered.

Between March 1944 and April 1945, in Italy, at least 7,500 men, women,
and children, ranging in years from infancy to extreme old age were
murdered by the German soldiery at Civitella, in the Ardeatine Caves in
Rome, and at other places.

(B) Deportation, for slave labor and for other purposes, of the civilian
populations of and in occupied territories.

During the whole period of the occupation by Germany of both the Western
and the Eastern Countries, it was the policy of the German Government
and of the German High Command to deport able-bodied citizens from such
occupied countries to Germany and to other occupied countries to force
them to work on fortifications, in factories, and in other tasks
connected with the German war effort.

In pursuance of such policy there were mass deportations from all the
Western and Eastern Countries for such purposes during the whole period
of the occupation.

These deportations were contrary to the international conventions, in
particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and
customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from
the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of
the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b)
of the Charter.

Particulars of deportations, by way of example only and without
prejudice to the production of evidence of other cases, are as follows:

1. From the Western Countries:

From France the following “deportations” of persons for political and
racial reasons took place—each of which consisted of from 1,500 to
2,500 deportees:

1940, 3 transports; 1941, 14 transports; 1942, 104 transports; 1943, 257
transports; 1944, 326 transports.

These deportees were subjected to the most barbarous conditions of
overcrowding; they were provided with wholly insufficient clothing and
were given little or no food for several days.

The conditions of transport were such that many deportees died in the
course of the voyage, for example:

In one of the wagons of the train which left Compiègne for Buchenwald,
on the 17th of September 1943, 80 men died out of 130.

On 4 June 1944, 484 bodies were taken out of a train at Sarrebourg.

In a train which left Compiègne on 2 July 1944 for Dachau, more than 600
dead were found on arrival, i.e. one-third of the total number.

In a train which left Compiègne on 16th of January 1944 for Buchenwald,
more than 100 persons were confined in each wagon, the dead and the
wounded being heaped in the last wagon during the voyage.

In April 1945, of 12,000 internees evacuated from Buchenwald 4,000 only
were still alive when the marching column arrived near Regensburg.

During the German occupation of Denmark, 5,200 Danish subjects were
deported to Germany and there imprisoned in concentration camps and
other places.

In 1942 and thereafter, 6,000 nationals of Luxembourg were deported from
their country under deplorable conditions and many of them perished.

From Belgium, between 1940 and 1944, at least 190,000 civilians were
deported to Germany and used as slave labor. Such deportees were
subjected to ill-treatment and many of them were compelled to work in
armament factories.

From Holland, between 1940 and 1944, nearly half a million civilians
were deported to Germany and to other occupied countries.

(C) Murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and of other members
of the armed forces of the countries with whom Germany was at war, and
of persons on the High Seas.

The defendants ill-treated and murdered prisoners of war by denying them
suitable food, shelter, clothing, and medical care and other attention;
by forcing them to labor in inhumane conditions; by humiliating them,
torturing them, and by killing them. The German Government and the
German High Command imprisoned prisoners of war in various concentration
camps, where they were killed or subjected to inhuman treatment by the
various methods set forth in Paragraph VIII (A).

Members of the armed forces of the countries with whom Germany was at
war were frequently murdered while in the act of surrendering.

These murders and ill-treatment were contrary to international
conventions, particularly Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907, and to Articles 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the Prisoners of
War Convention, Geneva, 1929, the laws and customs of war, the general
principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all
civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which
such crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the production of
evidence of other cases, are as follows:

In the Western Countries:

French officers who escaped from Oflag X C were handed over to the
Gestapo and disappeared; others were murdered by their guards; others
sent to concentration camps and exterminated. Among others, the men of
Stalag VI C were sent to Buchenwald.

Frequently prisoners captured on the Western Front were obliged to march
to the camps until they completely collapsed. Some of them walked more
than 600 kilometers with hardly any food; they marched on for 48 hours
running, without being fed; among them a certain number died of
exhaustion or of hunger; stragglers were systematically murdered.

The same crimes were committed in 1943, 1944, and 1945, when the
occupants of the camps were withdrawn before the Allied advance,
particularly during the withdrawal of the prisoners from Sagan on
February 8th, 1945.

Bodily punishments were inflicted upon non-commissioned officers and
cadets who refused to work. On December 24th, 1943, three French
non-commissioned officers were murdered for that motive in Stalag IV A.
Much ill-treatment was inflicted without motive on other ranks; stabbing
with bayonets, striking with rifle-butts, and whipping; in Stalag XX B
the sick themselves were beaten many times by sentries; in Stalag III B
and Stalag III C worn-out prisoners were murdered or grievously wounded.
In military jails, in Graudenz for instance, in reprisal camps, as in
Rava-Ruska, the food was so insufficient that the men lost more than 15
kilograms in a few weeks. In May 1942, one loaf of bread only was
distributed in Rava-Ruska to each group of 35 men.

Orders were given to transfer French officers in chains to the camp of
Mauthausen after they had tried to escape. At their arrival in camp they
were murdered, either by shooting or by gas, and their bodies destroyed
in the crematorium.

American prisoners, officers and men, were murdered in Normandy during
the summer of 1944 and in the Ardennes in December 1944. American
prisoners were starved, beaten, and mutilated in various ways in
numerous Stalags in Germany or in the occupied countries, particularly
in 1943, 1944, and 1945.

(D) Killing of hostages.

Throughout the territories occupied by the German Armed Forces in the
course of waging their aggressive wars, the defendants adopted and put
into effect on a wide scale the practice of taking and killing hostages
from the civilian population. These acts were contrary to international
conventions, particularly Article 50 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the
laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as
derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal
penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to
Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

Particulars, by way of example and without prejudice to the production
of evidence of other cases, are as follows:

In the Western Countries:

In France hostages were executed either individually or collectively;
these executions took place in all the big cities of France, among
others in Paris, Bordeaux, and Nantes, as well as at Chateaubriant.

In Holland many hundreds of hostages were shot at the following among
other places: Rotterdam, Apeldoorn, Amsterdam, Benshop, and Haarlem.

In Belgium many hundreds of hostages were shot during the period 1940 to
1944.

M. CHARLES GERTHOFFER (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic)
[_Continuing the reading of the Indictment_]:

(E) Plunder of public and private property.

The defendants ruthlessly exploited the people and the material
resources of the countries they occupied, in order to strengthen the
Nazi war machine, to depopulate and impoverish the rest of Europe, to
enrich themselves and their adherents, and to promote German economic
supremacy over Europe.

The defendants engaged in the following acts and practices, among
others:

1. They degraded the standard of life of the people of occupied
countries and caused starvation by stripping occupied countries of
foodstuffs for removal to Germany.

2. They seized raw materials and industrial machinery in all of the
occupied countries, removed them to Germany and used them in the
interest of the German war effort and the German economy.

3. In all the occupied countries, in varying degrees, they confiscated
businesses, plants, and other property.

4. In an attempt to give color of legality to illegal acquisitions of
property, they forced owners of property to go through the forms of
“voluntary” and “legal” transfers.

5. They established comprehensive controls over the economies of all of
the occupied countries and directed their resources, their production,
and their labor in the interests of the German war economy, depriving
the local populations of the products of essential industries.

6. By a variety of financial mechanisms, they despoiled all of the
occupied countries of essential commodities and accumulated wealth,
debased the local currency systems and disrupted the local economies.
They financed extensive purchases in occupied countries through clearing
arrangements by which they exacted loans from the occupied countries.
They imposed occupation levies, exacted financial contributions, and
issued occupation currency, far in excess of occupation costs. They used
these excess funds to finance the purchase of business properties and
supplies in the occupied countries.

7. They abrogated the rights of the local populations in the occupied
portions of the U.S.S.R. and in Poland and in other countries to develop
or manage agricultural and industrial properties, and reserved this area
for exclusive settlement, development, and ownership by Germans and
their so-called racial brethren.

8. In further development of their plan of criminal exploitation, they
destroyed industrial cities, cultural monuments, scientific
institutions, and property of all types in the occupied territories to
eliminate the possibility of competition with Germany.

9. From their program of terror, slavery, spoliation, and organized
outrage, the Nazi conspirators created an instrument for the personal
profit and aggrandizement of themselves and their adherents. They
secured for themselves and their adherents:

(a) Positions in administration of business involving power, influence,
and lucrative prerequisites;

(b) The use of cheap forced labor;

(c) The acquisition on advantageous terms of foreign properties, raw
materials, and business interests;

(d) The basis for the industrial supremacy of Germany.

These acts were contrary to international conventions, particularly
Articles 46 to 56 inclusive of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and
customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from
the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of
the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b)
of the Charter.

Particulars, by way of example and without prejudice to the production
of evidence of other cases, are as follows:

1. Western Countries:

There was plundered from the Western Countries from 1940 to 1944, works
of art, artistic objects, pictures, plastics, furniture, textiles,
antique pieces, and similar articles of enormous value to the number of
21,903.

In France statistics show the following:

Removal of raw materials:

Coal, 63,000,000 tons; electric energy, 20,976 Mkwh; petrol and fuel,
1,943,750 tons; iron ore, 74,848,000 tons; siderurgical products,
3,822,000 tons; bauxite, 1,211,800 tons; cement, 5,984,000 tons; lime,
1,888,000 tons; quarry products, 25,872,000 tons; and various other
products to a total value of 79,961,423,000 francs.

Removal of industrial equipment: total—9,759,861,000 francs, of which
2,626,479,000 francs of machine tools.

Removal of agricultural produce: total—126,655,852,000 francs; i.e. for
the principal products:

Wheat, 2,947,337 tons; oats, 2,354,080 tons; milk, 790,000 hectolitres,
(concentrated and in powder, 460,000 hectolitres); butter, 76,000 tons,
cheese, 49,000 tons; potatoes, 725,975 tons; various vegetables, 575,000
tons; wine, 7,647,000 hectolitres; champagne, 87,000,000 bottles; beer
3,821,520 hectolitres; various kinds of alcohol, 1,830,000 hectolitres.

Removal of manufactured products to a total of 184,640,000,000 francs.

Plundering: Francs 257,020,024,000 from private enterprise, Francs
55,000,100,000 from the State.

Financial exploitation: From June 1940 to September 1944 the French
Treasury was compelled to pay to Germany 631,866,000,000 francs.

Looting and destruction of works of art: The museums of Nantes, Nancy,
Old-Marseilles were looted.

Private collections of great value were stolen. In this way, Raphaels,
Vermeers, Van Dycks, and works of Rubens, Holbein, Rembrandt, Watteau,
Boucher disappeared. Germany compelled France to deliver up “The Mystic
Lamb” by Van Eyck, which Belgium had entrusted to her.

In Norway and other occupied countries decrees were made by which the
property of many civilians, societies, _et cetera_, was confiscated. An
immense amount of property of every kind was plundered from France,
Belgium, Norway, Holland, and Luxembourg.

As a result of the economic plundering of Belgium between 1940 and 1944
the damage suffered amounted to 175 billions of Belgian francs.

(F) The exaction of collective penalties.

The Germans pursued a systematic policy of inflicting, in all the
occupied countries, collective penalties, pecuniary and otherwise, upon
the population for acts of individuals for which it could not be
regarded as collectively responsible; this was done at many places,
including Oslo, Stavanger, Trondheim, and Rogaland.

Similar instances occurred in France, among others in Dijon, Nantes, and
as regards the Jewish population in the occupied territories. The total
amount of fines imposed on French communities adds up to 1,157,179,484
francs made up as follows: A fine on the Jewish population,
1,000,000,000; various fines, 157,179,484.

These acts violated Article 50, Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and
customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from
the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of
the countries in which such crimes were committed, and Article 6 (b) of
the Charter.

(G) Wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, and devastation
not justified by military necessity.

The defendants wantonly destroyed cities, towns, and villages, and
committed other acts of devastation without military justification or
necessity. These acts violated Articles 46 and 50 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles
of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized
nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes
were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

Particulars, by way of example only and without prejudice to the
production of evidence of other cases, are as follows:

1. Western Countries:

In March 1941 part of Lofoten in Norway was destroyed. In April 1942 the
town of Telerag in Norway was destroyed.

Entire villages were destroyed in France, among others, Oradour sur
Glane, Saint Nizier in Gascogne, La Mure, Vassieu, La Chappelle en
Vercors. The town of Saint Dié was burnt down and destroyed. The Old
Port District of Marseilles was dynamited in the beginning of 1943 and
resorts along the Atlantic and the Mediterranean coasts, particularly
the town of Sanary, were demolished.

In Holland there was most widespread and extensive destruction, not
justified by military necessity, including the destruction of harbors,
locks, dykes, and bridges; immense devastation was also caused by
inundations which equally were not justified by military necessity.

(H) Conscription of civilian labor.

Throughout the occupied territories the defendants conscripted and
forced the inhabitants to labor and requisitioned their services for
purposes other than meeting the needs of the armies of occupation and to
an extent far out of proportion to the resources of the countries
involved. All the civilians so conscripted were forced to work for the
German war effort. Civilians were required to register and many of those
who registered were forced to join the Todt Organization and the Speer
Legion, both of which were semi-military organizations involving some
military training. These acts violated Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles
of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized
nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes
were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

Particulars, by way of example only and without prejudice to the
production of evidence of other cases, are as follows:

1. Western Countries:

In France, from 1942 to 1944, 963,813 persons were compelled to work in
Germany and 737,000 to work in France for the German Army.

In Luxembourg, in 1944 alone, 2,500 men and 500 girls were conscripted
for forced labor.

(I) Forcing civilians of occupied territories to swear allegiance to a
hostile power.

Civilians who joined the Speer Legion, as set forth in Paragraph (H)
were required, under threat of depriving them of food, money, and
identity papers, to swear a solemn oath acknowledging unconditional
obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Führer of Germany, which was to them a
hostile power.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 2 o’clock.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Will the Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic
continue the reading of the Indictment.

M. MOUNIER: In Lorraine, civil servants were obliged, in order to retain
their positions, to sign a declaration by which they acknowledged the
“return of their country to the Reich”, pledged themselves to obey
without reservation the orders of their chiefs and put themselves “at
the active service of the Führer and of National Socialist greater
Germany.”

A similar pledge was imposed on Alsatian civil servants, by threat of
deportation or internment.

These acts violated Article 45 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws
and customs of war, the general principles of international law, and
Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

(J) Germanization of occupied territories.

In certain occupied territories purportedly annexed to Germany the
defendants methodically and pursuant to plan endeavoured to assimilate
those territories politically, culturally, socially, and economically
into the German Reich. They endeavoured to obliterate the former
national character of these territories. In pursuance of these plans,
the defendants forcibly deported inhabitants who were predominantly
non-German and replaced them by thousands of German colonists.

Their plan included economic domination, physical conquest, installation
of puppet governments, purported _de jure_ annexation and enforced
conscription into the German Armed Forces.

This was carried out in most of the occupied countries especially in
Norway, France (particularly in the Departments of Upper Rhine, Lower
Rhine, Moselle, Ardennes, Aisne, Nord, Meurthe and Moselle), in
Luxembourg, the Soviet Union, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland.

In France in the Departments of Aisne, Nord, Meurthe and Moselle, and
especially in that of the Ardennes, rural properties were confiscated by
a German state organization which tried to work them under German
management.

The landowners of these holdings were dispossessed and turned into
agricultural laborers. In the Departments of Upper Rhine, Lower Rhine,
and Moselle the methods of Germanization were those of annexation
followed by conscription.

1. From the month of August 1940 officials who refused to take the oath
of allegiance to the Reich were expelled. On September 21st the
expulsion and deportation of population began, and on November 22d, 1940
more than 70,000 Lorrainers or Alsatians were driven into the south zone
of France. From July 31, 1941 onwards, more than 100,000 persons were
deported into the eastern regions of the Reich or to Poland. All the
property of the deportees or expelled persons was confiscated. At the
same time, 80,000 Germans coming from the Saar or from Westphalia were
installed in Lorraine and 2,000 farms belonging to French people were
transferred to Germans.

2. From 2 January 1942 all the young people of the Departments of Upper
Rhine and Lower Rhine, aged from 10 to 18 years, were incorporated in
the Hitler Youth. The same measures were taken in the Moselle from 4
August 1942. From 1940 all the French schools were closed, their staffs
expelled, and the German school system was introduced in the three
departments.

3. On the 28th of September 1940 an order applicable to the Department
of the Moselle ordained the Germanization of all the surnames and
Christian names which were French in form. The same measure was taken on
the 15th January 1943 in the Departments of Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine.

4. Two orders of the 23rd and 24th August 1942 imposed by force German
nationality on French citizens.

5. On the 8th May 1941 for Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine, and on the 23rd
April 1941 for the Moselle, orders were promulgated enforcing compulsory
labor service on all French citizens of either sex aged from 17 to 25
years. From the 1st January 1942 for young men, and from the 26th
January 1942 for young women, national labor service was effectively
organized in the Moselle. This measure came into force on the 27th
August 1942 in Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine, but for young men only. The
classes of 1940, 1941, 1942 were called up.

6. These contingents were drafted into the Wehrmacht on the expiration
of their time in the labor service.

On the 19th August 1942 an order instituted compulsory military service
in the Moselle, and on the 25th August 1942 the contingents of 1940 to
1944 were called up in the three Departments.

Conscription was enforced by the German authorities in conformity with
the provisions of German legislation. The first induction board took
place on the 3rd September 1942. Later, in the Upper Rhine and Lower
Rhine new levies were effected everywhere of the contingents from 1928
to 1939 inclusive. The French men who refused to obey these laws were
considered as deserters and their families were deported, while their
property was confiscated.

These acts violated Articles 43, 46, 55, and 56 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles
of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized
nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes
were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

IX. _Individual, Group and Organization Responsibility for the Crimes
Stated in Count Three._

Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a
statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the
charge set forth in Count Three of the Indictment.

Reference is hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a
statement of the responsibility of the groups and organizations named
herein as criminal groups and organizations for the crime set forth in
this part three of the Indictment.

THE PRESIDENT: I will now call upon the Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet
Union.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. A. OZOL (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.):
COUNT THREE—WAR CRIMES.

All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1 September 1939 and 8
May 1945 in Germany and in all those countries and territories occupied
by the German Armed Forces since 1 September 1939, and in Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Italy, and on the High Seas.

All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and
executed a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit War Crimes as defined in
Article 6 (b) of the Charter. This plan involved, among other things,
the practice of “total war” including methods of combat and of military
occupation in direct conflict with the laws and customs of war, and the
commission of crimes perpetrated on the field of battle during
encounters with enemy armies, and against prisoners of war, and in
occupied territories against the civilian population of such
territories.

The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and by other
persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under Article 6
of the Charter) as such other persons when committing the said War
Crimes performed their acts in execution of a common plan and conspiracy
to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which
plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated as leaders,
organizers, instigators, and accomplices.

These methods and crimes constituted violations of international
conventions, of internal penal laws, and of the general principles of
criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations,
and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct.

(A) Murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations of or in occupied
territory and on the High Seas.

Throughout the period of their occupation of territories overrun by
their armed forces the defendants, for the purpose of systematically
terrorizing the inhabitants, murdered and tortured civilians, and
ill-treated them, and imprisoned them without legal process.

The murders and ill-treatment were carried out by divers means,
including shooting, hanging, gassing, starvation, gross overcrowding,
systematic undernutrition, systematic imposition of labor tasks beyond
the strength of those ordered to carry them out, inadequate provision of
surgical and medical services, kickings, beatings, brutality, and
torture of all kinds, including the use of hot irons and pulling out of
fingernails and the performance of experiments by means of operations
and otherwise on living human subjects. In some occupied territories the
defendants interfered with religious services, persecuted members of the
clergy and monastic orders, and expropriated church property. They
conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz. the extermination of
racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain
occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of
people, and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews,
Poles, and Gypsies and others.

Civilians were systematically subjected to tortures of all kinds, with
the object of obtaining information.

Civilians of occupied countries were subjected systematically to
“protective arrests” whereby they were arrested and imprisoned without
any trial and any of the ordinary protections of the law, and they were
imprisoned under the most unhealthy and inhumane conditions.

In the concentration camps were many prisoners who were classified
“Nacht und Nebel”. These were entirely cut off from the world and were
allowed neither to receive nor to send letters. They disappeared without
trace and no announcement of their fate was ever made by the German
authorities.

Such murders and ill-treatment were contrary to international
conventions, in particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907,
the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as
derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal
penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to
Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

The following particulars and all the particulars appearing later in
this Count are set out herein by way of example only, are not exclusive
of other particular cases, and are stated without prejudice to the right
of the Prosecution to adduce evidence of other cases of murder and
ill-treatment of civilians.

[2.] In the U.S.S.R., i.e. in the Bielorussian, Ukrainian, Estonian,
Latvian, Lithuanian, Karelo-Finnish, and Moldavian Soviet Socialist
Republics, in 19 regions of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic, and in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the
Balkans (hereinafter called the “Eastern Countries”).

From the 1st September 1939, when the German Armed Forces invaded
Poland, and from the 22nd June 1941, when they invaded the U.S.S.R., the
German Government and the German High Command adopted a systematic
policy of murder and ill-treatment of the civilian populations of and in
the Eastern Countries as they were successively occupied by the German
Armed Forces. These murders and ill-treatments were carried on
continuously until the German Armed Forces were driven out of the said
countries.

Such murders and ill-treatments included:

(a) Murders and ill-treatments at concentration camps and similar
establishments set up by the Germans in the Eastern Countries and in
Eastern Germany including those set up at Maidanek and Auschwitz.

The said murders and ill-treatments were carried out by divers means
including all those set out above, as follows:

About 1½ million persons were, exterminated in Maidanek and about 4
million persons were exterminated in Auschwitz, among whom were citizens
of Poland, the U.S.S.R., the United States of America, Great Britain,
Czechoslovakia, France, and other countries.

In the Lwow region and in the city of Lwow the Germans exterminated
about 700,000 Soviet people, including 70 persons in the field of the
arts, science, and technology, and also citizens of the U.S.A., Great
Britain, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Holland, brought to this region
from other concentration camps.

In the Jewish ghetto from 7 September 1941 to 6 July 1943 over 133,000
persons were tortured and shot.

Mass shooting of the population occurred in the suburbs of the city and
in the Livenitz forest.

In the Ganov camp 200,000 citizens were exterminated. The most refined
methods of cruelty were employed in this extermination, such as
disembowelling and the freezing of human beings in tubs of water. Mass
shootings took place to the accompaniment of the music of an orchestra
recruited from the persons interned.

Beginning with June 1943 the Germans carried out measures to hide the
evidence of their crimes. They exhumed and burned corpses, and they
crushed the bones with machines and used them for fertilizer.

At the beginning of 1944, in the Ozarichi region of the Bielorussian
S.S.R., before liberation by the Red Army, the Germans established three
concentration camps without shelters, to which they committed tens of
thousands of persons from the neighbouring territories. They
intentionally brought many people to these camps from typhus hospitals,
for the purpose of infecting the other persons interned and for
spreading the disease in territories from which the Germans were driven
by the Red Army. In these camps there were many murders and crimes.

In the Estonian S.S.R. they shot tens of thousands of persons and in one
day alone, 19 September 1944, in Camp Kloga, the Germans shot 2,000
peaceful citizens. They burned the bodies on bonfires.

In the Lithuanian S.S.R. there were mass killings of Soviet citizens,
namely: in Panerai at least 100,000; in Kaunas more than 70,000; in
Alitus about 60,000; at Prenai more than 3,000; in Villiampol about
8,000; in Mariampol about 7,000; in Trakai and neighbouring towns
37,640.

In the Latvian S.S.R. 577,000 persons were murdered.

As a result of the whole system of internal order maintained in all
camps, the interned persons were doomed to die.

In a secret instruction entitled “The Internal Regime in Concentration
Camps”, signed personally by Himmler in 1941 severe measures of
punishment were set forth for the internees. Masses of prisoners of war
were shot, or died from the cold and torture.

(b) Murders and ill-treatments at places in the Eastern Countries and in
the Soviet Union, other than in the camps referred to in (a) above,
included, on various dates during the occupation by the German Armed
Forces:

The destruction in the Smolensk region of over 135,000 Soviet citizens.

Among these, near the village of Kholmetz of the Sychev region, when the
military authorities were required to remove the mines from an area, on
the order of the commander of the 101st German Infantry Division, Major
General Fisler, the German soldiers gathered the inhabitants of the
village of Kholmetz and forced them to remove mines from the road. All
of these people lost their lives as a result of exploding mines.

In the Leningrad region there were shot and tortured over 172,000
persons, including 20,000 persons who were killed in the city of
Leningrad by the barbarous artillery barrage and the bombings.

In the Stavropol region in an anti-tank trench close to the station of
Mineralniye Vodi, and in other cities, tens of thousands of persons were
exterminated.

In Pyatigorsk many were subjected to torture and criminal treatment,
including suspension from the ceiling and other methods. Many of the
victims of these tortures were then shot.

In Krasnodar some 6,700 civilians were murdered by poison gas in gas
vans, or were shot and tortured.

In the Stalingrad region more than 40,000 persons were killed and
tortured. After the Germans were expelled from Stalingrad, more than a
thousand mutilated bodies of local inhabitants were found with marks of
torture. One hundred and thirty-nine women had their arms painfully bent
backward and held by wires. From some their breasts had been cut off and
their ears, fingers, and toes had been amputated. The bodies bore the
marks of burns. On the bodies of the men the five-pointed star was
burned with an iron or cut with a knife. Some were disembowelled.

In Orel over 5,000 persons were murdered.

In Novgorod and in the Novgorod region many thousands of Soviet citizens
were killed by shooting, starvation, and torture. In Minsk tens of
thousands of citizens were similarly killed.

In the Crimea peaceful citizens were gathered on barges, taken out to
sea and drowned, over 144,000 persons being exterminated in this manner.

In the Soviet Ukraine there were monstrous criminal acts of the Nazi
conspirators. In Babi Yar, near Kiev, they shot over 100,000 men, women,
children, and old people. In this city in January 1941, after the
explosion in German headquarters on Dzerzhinsky Street the Germans
arrested as hostages 1,250 persons—old men, minors, women with nursing
infants. In Kiev they killed over 195,000 persons.

In Rovno and the Rovno region they killed and tortured over 100,000
peaceful citizens.

In Dnepropetrovsk, near the Transport Institute, they shot or threw
alive into a great ravine 11,000 women, old men, and children.

In Kamenetz-Podolsk region 31,000 Jews were shot and exterminated,
including 13,000 persons brought there from Hungary.

In the Odessa region at least 200,000 Soviet citizens were killed.

In Kharkov about 195,000 persons were either tortured to death, shot, or
gassed in gas vans.

In Gomel the Germans rounded up the population in prison, and tortured
and tormented them, and then took them to the center of the city and
shot them in public.

In the city of Lyda in the Grodnen region, on 8 May 1942, 5,670 persons
were completely undressed, driven into pens in groups of 100, and then
shot by machine guns. Many were thrown in the graves while they were
still alive.

Along with adults the Nazi conspirators mercilessly destroyed even
children. They killed them with their parents, in groups and alone. They
killed them in children’s homes and hospitals, burying the living in the
graves, throwing them into flames, stabbing them with bayonets,
poisoning them, conducting experiments upon them, extracting their blood
for the use of the German Army, throwing them into prison and Gestapo
torture chambers and concentration camps, where the children died from
hunger, torture, and epidemic diseases.

From 6 September to 24 November 1942, in the region of Brest, Pinsk,
Kobren, Dyvina, Malority, and Berezy-Kartuzsky about 400 children were
shot by German punitive units.

In the Yanov camp in the city of Lwow the Germans killed 8,000 children
in two months.

In the resort of Tiberda the Germans annihilated 500 children suffering
from tuberculosis of the bone, who were in the sanatorium for the cure.

On the territory of the Latvian S.S.R. the German usurpers killed
thousands of children, which they had brought there with their parents
from the Bielorussian S.S.R., and from the Kalinin, Kaluga, and other
regions of the R.S.F.S.R.

In Czechoslovakia as a result of torture, beating, hanging, and
shooting, there were annihilated in Gestapo prisons in Brno, Seim, and
other places over 20,000 persons. Moreover many thousands of internees
were subjected to criminal treatment, beatings, and torture.

Both before the war as well as during the war thousands of Czech
patriots, in particular Catholics and Protestants, lawyers, doctors,
teachers, et cetera, were arrested as hostages and imprisoned. A large
number of these hostages were killed by the Germans.

In Greece in October 1941 the male populations between 16 and 60 years
of age of the Greek villages Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia Mesovunos,
Selli, Ano-Kerzilion, and Kato-Kerzilion were shot—in all 416 persons.

In Yugoslavia many thousands of civilians were murdered. Other examples
are given under Paragraph (D), “Killing of Hostages”, below.

THE PRESIDENT: Paragraph (B) on Page 16 was read by the Chief Prosecutor
for the French Republic. Paragraph 2 on Page 17 was omitted by him. So
had you better not go on at Paragraph 2 at Page 17?

LT. COL. OZOL: 2. From the Eastern Countries:

The German occupying authorities deported from the Soviet Union to
slavery about 4,978,000 Soviet citizens.

Seven hundred fifty thousand Czechoslovakian citizens were taken away
from Czechoslovakia and forced to work in the German war machine in the
interior of Germany.

On June 4, 1941 in the city of Zagreb, Yugoslavia, a meeting of German
representatives was called with the Councillor Von Troll presiding. The
purpose was to set up the means of deporting the Yugoslav population
from Slovenia. Tens of thousands of persons were deported in carrying
out this plan.

Murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and of other. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Will you read Paragraph 2 at page 18?

LT. COL. OZOL: 2. In the Eastern Countries:

At Orel prisoners of war were exterminated by starvation, shooting,
exposure, and poisoning.

Soviet prisoners of war were murdered _en masse_ on orders from the High
Command and the headquarters of the SIPO and SD. Tens of thousands of
Soviet prisoners of war were tortured and murdered at the “Gross
Lazaret” at Slavuta.

In addition, many thousands of the persons referred to in Paragraph VIII
(A) 2, above, were Soviet prisoners of war.

Prisoners of war who escaped and were recaptured were handed over to
SIPO and SD for shooting.

Frenchmen fighting with the Soviet Army who were captured were handed
over to the Vichy Government for “proceedings.”

In March 1944, 50 R.A.F. officers who escaped from Stalag Luft III at
Sagan were murdered when captured.

In September 1941, 11,000 Polish officers who were prisoners of war were
killed in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk.

In Yugoslavia the German Command and the occupying authorities in the
person of the chief officials of the police, the SS troops (Police
Lieutenant General Rosener) and the Divisional Group Command (General
Kubler and others) in the period 1941-43 ordered the shooting of
prisoners of war.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Paragraph 2 of (D).

CAPTAIN V. V. KUCHIN (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.)
[_Continuing the reading of the Indictment_]: 2. In the Eastern
Countries:

At Kragnevatz in Yugoslavia 2,300 hostages were shot in October 1941. At
Kraljero in Yugoslavia 5,000 hostages were shot.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you turn now to (E), Paragraph 2, page 21?

CAPT. KUCHIN: 2. Eastern Countries:

During the occupation of the Eastern Countries the German Government and
the German High Command carried out, as a systematic policy, a
continuous course of plunder and destruction including:

On the territory of the Soviet Union the Nazi conspirators destroyed or
severely damaged 1,710 cities and more than 70,000 villages and hamlets,
more than 6 million buildings and rendered homeless about 25 million
persons.

Among the cities which suffered most destruction are Stalingrad,
Sevastopol, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Novgorod, Pskov, Orel,
Kharkov, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don, Stalino, and Leningrad.

As is evident from an official memorandum of the German Command, the
Nazi conspirators planned the complete annihilation of entire Soviet
cities. In a completely secret order of the Chief of the Naval Staff
(SKL Ia No. 1601/41, dated 29 September 1941) addressed only to Staff
officers, it was said:

    “The Führer has decided to erase Petersburg from the face of the
    earth. The existence of this large city will have no further
    interest after Soviet Russia is destroyed. Finland has also said
    that the existence of this city on her new border is not
    desirable from her point of view. The original request of the
    Navy that docks, harbor, et cetera, necessary for the fleet be
    preserved is known to the Supreme Command of the German Armed
    Forces, but the basic principles of carrying out operations
    against Petersburg do not make it possible to satisfy this
    request.

    “It is proposed to approach near to the city and to destroy it
    with the aid of an artillery barrage from weapons of different
    calibers and with long air attacks. . . .

    “The problem of the lives of the population and of their
    provisioning is a problem which cannot and must not be decided
    by us.

    “In this war . . . we are not interested in preserving even a
    part of the population of this large city.”

The Germans destroyed 427 museums, among them the wealthy museums of
Leningrad, Smolensk, Stalingrad, Novgorod, Poltava, and others.

In Pyatigorsk the art objects brought there from the Rostov museum were
seized.

The losses suffered by the coal mining industry alone in the Stalin
region amount to 2 billion rubles. There was colossal destruction of
industrial establishments in Makerevka, Carlovka, Yenakievo,
Konstantinovka, Mariupol, from which most of the machinery and factories
were removed.

Stealing of huge dimensions and the destruction of industrial, cultural,
and other property was typified in Kiev. More than 4 million books,
magazines, and manuscripts (many of which were very valuable and even
unique) and a large number of artistic productions and divers valuables
were stolen and carried away.

Many valuable art productions were taken away from Riga.

The extent of the plunder of cultural valuables is evidenced by the fact
that 100,000 valuable volumes and 70 cases of ancient periodicals and
precious monographs were carried away by Rosenberg’s staff alone.

Among further examples of these crimes are:

Wanton devastation of the city of Novgorod and of many historical and
artistic monuments there; wanton devastation and plunder of the city of
Rovno and of its province; the destruction of the industrial, cultural,
and other property in Odessa; the destruction of cities and villages in
Soviet Karelia; the destruction in Estonia of cultural, industrial, and
other buildings; the destruction of medical and prophylactic institutes;
the destruction of agriculture and industry in Lithuania; the
destruction of cities in Latvia.

The Germans approached monuments of culture, dear to the Soviet people,
with special hatred. They broke up the estate of the poet Pushkin in
Mikhailovskoye, desecrated his grave, and destroyed the neighboring
villages and the Svyatogor monastery.

They destroyed the estate and museum of Leo Tolstoy, “Yasnaya Polyana”
and desecrated the grave of the great writer. They destroyed, in Klin,
the museum of Tchaikovsky and, in Penaty, the museum of the painter
Repin and many others.

The Nazi conspirators destroyed 1,670 Greek Orthodox churches, 237 Roman
Catholic churches, 67 chapels, 532 synagogues, _et cetera_.

They also broke up, desecrated and senselessly destroyed the most
valuable monuments of the Christian Church, such as the
Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, Novy Jerusalem in the Istrin region, and the
most ancient monasteries and churches.

Destruction in Estonia of cultural, industrial, and other premises;
burning down of many thousands of residential buildings; removal of
10,000 works of art; destruction of medical and prophylactic
institutions; plunder and removal to Germany of immense quantities of
agricultural stock including horses, cows, pigs, poultry, beehives, and
agricultural machines of all kinds.

Destruction of agriculture, enslavement of peasants, and looting of
stock and produce in Lithuania.

In the Latvian Republic destruction of the agriculture by the looting of
all stock, machinery, and produce.

Carrying away by Rosenberg’s headquarters of 100,000 valuable volumes
and 70 cases of ancient periodicals and precious monographs; wanton
destruction of libraries and other cultural buildings.

The result of this policy of plunder and destruction was to lay waste
the land and cause utter desolation.

The over-all value of the material loss which the U.S.S.R. has borne, is
computed to be 679 billion rubles, in State prices of 1941.

Following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 the
defendants seized and stole large stocks of raw materials, copper, tin,
iron, cotton, and food; caused to be taken to Germany large amounts of
railway rolling stock, and many engines, carriages, steam vessels and
trolley buses; robbed libraries, laboratories, and art museums of books,
pictures, objects of art, scientific apparatus, and furniture; stole all
gold reserves and foreign exchange of Czechoslovakia, including 23,000
kilograms of gold, of a nominal value of 5,265,000 Pounds; fraudulently
acquired control and thereafter looted the Czech banks and many Czech
industrial enterprises; and otherwise stole, looted, and misappropriated
Czechoslovak public and private property. The total sum of defendants’
economic spoliation of Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1945 is estimated at
200 billion Czechoslovak crowns.

(G) Wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, and devastation
not justified by military necessity.

The defendants wantonly destroyed cities. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Will you go to Paragraph 2 of (G)? The French read the
first paragraph. Do you want to go to Paragraph 2 of (G)?

CAPT. KUCHIN: I have begun. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I thought we had read Paragraph 1. We might take up at
Paragraph 2, beginning “In the Eastern Countries the defendants
pursued. . . .”

CAPT. KUCHIN: 2. Eastern Countries:

In the Eastern Countries the defendants pursued a policy of wanton
destruction and devastation; some particulars of this, without prejudice
to the production of evidence of other cases, are set out above under
the heading “Plunder of Public and Private Property”.

In Greece in 1941 the villages of Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia,
Messovunos, Selli, Ano-Kerzilion, and Kato-Kerzilion were utterly
destroyed.

In Yugoslavia on 15 August 1941 the German military command officially
announced that the village of Skela was burned to the ground and the
inhabitants killed on the order of the command.

On the order of the Field Commander Hoersterberg a punitive expedition
from the SS troops and the field police destroyed the villages of
Machkovats and Kriva Reka in Serbia and all the inhabitants were killed.

General Fritz Neidhold (369 Infantry Division), on 11 September 1944,
gave an order to destroy the villages of Zagniezde and Udora, hanging
all the men and driving away all the women and children.

In Czechoslovakia the Nazi conspirators also practiced the senseless
destruction of populated places. Lezaky and Lidice were burnt to the
ground and the inhabitants killed.

(H) Conscription of civilian labor.

Throughout the occupied territories the defendants conscripted and
forced the inhabitants to labor and requisitioned their services. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I think Paragraph (H) has been read, the first paragraph
of it. There only remains for you to read Paragraph 2 of (H).

CAPT. KUCHIN: 2. Eastern Countries:

Of the large number of citizens of the Soviet Union and of
Czechoslovakia, referred to under Count Three VIII (B) 2 above, many
were so conscripted for forced labor.

IX. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense
stated in Count Three.

Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a
statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the
offense set forth in this Count Three of the Indictment. Reference is
hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the
responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal
groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Three
of the Indictment.

COUNT FOUR—CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, Charter, Article 6, especially 6
(c).

X. Statement of the offense.

All the defendants committed Crimes against Humanity during a period of
years preceding 8 May 1945, in Germany and in all those countries and
territories occupied by the German Armed Forces since 1 September 1939,
and in Austria and Czechoslovakia and in Italy and on the High Seas.

All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and
executed a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit Crimes against Humanity
as defined in Article 6 (c) of the Charter. This plan involved, among
other things, the murder and persecution of all who were or who were
suspected of being hostile to the Nazi Party and all who were or who
were suspected of being opposed to the common plan alleged in Count One.

The said Crimes against Humanity were committed by the defendants, and
by other persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under
Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons, when committing the
said War Crimes, performed their acts in execution of a Common Plan and
Conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and
execution of which plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated
as leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices.

These methods and crimes constituted violations of international
conventions, of internal penal laws, of the general principles of
criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations,
and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct. The
said acts were contrary to Article 6 of the Charter.

The Prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count Three as
also constituting Crimes against Humanity.

(A) Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against civilian populations before and during the war.

For the purposes set out above, the defendants adopted a policy of
persecution, repression, and extermination of all civilians in Germany
who were, or who were believed to, or who were believed likely to
become, hostile to the Nazi Government and the Common Plan or Conspiracy
described in Count One. They imprisoned such persons without judicial
process, holding them in “protective custody” and concentration camps,
and subjected them to persecution, degradation, despoilment,
enslavement, torture, and murder.

Special courts were established to carry out the will of the
conspirators; favored branches or agencies of the State and Party were
permitted to operate outside the range even of nazified law and to crush
all tendencies and elements which were considered “undesirable”. The
various concentration camps included Buchenwald, which was established
in 1933, and Dachau, which was established in 1934. At these and other
camps the civilians were put to slave labor and murdered and ill-treated
by divers means, including those set out in Count Three above, and these
acts and policies were continued and extended to the occupied countries
after the 1st September 1939 and until 8th May 1945.

(B) Persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds in execution
of and in connection with the common plan mentioned in Count One.

As above stated, in execution of and in connection with the common plan
mentioned in Count One, opponents of the German Government were
exterminated and persecuted. These persecutions were directed against
Jews. They were also directed against persons whose political belief or
spiritual aspirations were deemed to be in conflict with the aims of the
Nazis.

Jews were systematically persecuted since 1933; they were deprived of
liberty, thrown into concentration camps where they were murdered and
ill-treated. Their property was confiscated. Hundreds of thousands of
Jews were so treated before the 1st September 1939.

Since the 1st September 1939 the persecution of the Jews was redoubled;
millions of Jews from Germany and from the occupied Western Countries
were sent to the Eastern Countries for extermination.

Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the production of
evidence of other cases are as follows:

The Nazis murdered amongst others Chancellor Dollfuss, the Social
Democrat Breitscheid, and the Communist Thälmann. They imprisoned in
concentration camps numerous political and religious personages, for
example, Chancellor Schuschnigg and Pastor Niemöller.

In November 1938, by orders of the Chief of the Gestapo, anti-Jewish
demonstrations all over Germany took place. Jewish property was
destroyed; 30,000 Jews were arrested and sent to concentration camps and
their property confiscated.

Under paragraph VIII (A), above, millions of the persons there mentioned
as having been murdered and ill-treated were Jews.

Among other mass murders of Jews were the following:

At Kislovodsk all Jews were made to give up their property; 2,000 were
shot in an anti-tank ditch at Mineralniye Vodi; 4,300 other Jews were
shot in the same ditch; 60,000 Jews were shot on an island on the Dvina
near Riga; 20,000 Jews were shot at Lutsk; 32,000 Jews were shot at
Sarny; 60,000 Jews were shot at Kiev and Dniepropetrovsk.

Thousands of Jews were gassed weekly by means of gas-wagons which broke
down from overwork.

As the Germans retreated before the Soviet Army they exterminated Jews
rather than allow them to be liberated. Many concentration camps and
ghettos were set up in which Jews were incarcerated and tortured,
starved, subjected to merciless atrocities, and finally exterminated.

About 70,000 Jews were exterminated in Yugoslavia.

XI. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense
stated in Count Four.

Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a
statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the
offense set forth in this Count Four of the Indictment. Reference is
hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the
responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal
groups and organizations for the offense set forth in the Count Four of
the Indictment.

Wherefore, this Indictment is lodged with the Tribunal in English,
French, and Russian, each text having equal authenticity, and the
charges herein made against the above-named defendants are hereby
presented to the Tribunal.

Hartley Shawcross, acting on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland; Robert H. Jackson, acting on behalf of the
United States of America; François de Menthon, acting on behalf of the
French Republic; R. Rudenko, acting on behalf of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. Berlin, 6th October 1945.

THE PRESIDENT: Has anybody been designated to read the appendices?

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I shall read Appendix A and
Appendix B, and the British Delegation will read Appendix C. One word of
explanation as to Appendix A. The Court will have observed that the
defendants are seated in the dock in the same order in which they are
named in the Indictment. By a mechanical slip-up they are not named in
Appendix A in exactly the same order. I think it would be too much
difficulty for the interpreters or for me to arrange them in the same
order, and if the Court will permit I will read Appendix A as it is
printed.

APPENDIX A—STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMES SET OUT IN
COUNTS ONE, TWO, THREE, AND FOUR.

The statements hereinafter set forth following the name of each
individual defendant constitute matters upon which the Prosecution will
rely _inter alia_ as pursuant to Article 6 establishing the individual
responsibility of the defendant:

GÖRING. The Defendant Göring between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the
Nazi Party, Supreme Leader of the SA, general in the SS, a member and
President of the Reichstag, Minister of the Interior of Prussia, Chief
of the Prussian Police and Prussian Secret State Police, Chief of the
Prussian State Council, Trustee of the Four Year Plan, Reich Minister
for Air, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, President of the Council
of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet
Council, head of the Hermann Göring Industrial Combine, and Successor
Designate to Hitler. The Defendant Göring used the foregoing positions,
his personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in
such a manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the military and economic preparation for
war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the
planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression
and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and
assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in
Count Three of the Indictment, and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes
against persons and property.

RIBBENTROP. The Defendant Ribbentrop between 1932 and 1945 was a member
of the Nazi Party, a member of the Nazi Reichstag, advisor to the Führer
on matters of foreign policy, representative of the Nazi Party for
matters of foreign policy, special German delegate for disarmament
questions, Ambassador extraordinary, Ambassador in London, organizer and
director of Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs,
member of the Secret Cabinet Council, member of the Führer’s political
staff at general headquarters, and general in the SS. The Defendant
Ribbentrop used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his
intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators as set forth
in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set
forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the political
planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression
and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and
assurances as set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; in
accordance with the Führer Principle he executed and assumed
responsibility for the execution of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi
conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in
Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment, including more particularly the crimes
against persons and property in occupied territories.

HESS. The Defendant Hess between 1921 and 1941 was a member of the Nazi
Party, Deputy to the Führer, Reich Minister without Portfolio, member of
the Reichstag, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the
Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet Council, Successor Designate to the
Führer after the Defendant Göring, a general in the SS and a general in
the SA. The Defendant Hess used the foregoing positions, his personal
influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner
that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the military, economic, and psychological
preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
participated in the political planning and preparation for wars of
aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements,
and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he
participated in the preparation and planning of foreign policy plans of
the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in
Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes
against persons and property.

KALTENBRUNNER. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner between 1932 and 1945 was a
member of the Nazi Party, a general in the SS, a member of the
Reichstag, a general of the Police, State Secretary for Security in
Austria in charge of the Austrian Police, Police Leader of Vienna, Lower
and Upper Austria, Head of the Reich Main Security Office and Chief of
the Security Police and Security Service. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner
used the foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a manner
that:

He promoted the consolidation of control over Austria seized by the Nazi
conspirators as set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in
Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment including particularly the Crimes
against Humanity involved in the system of concentration camps.

ROSENBERG. The Defendant Rosenberg between 1920 and 1945 was a member of
the Nazi Party, Nazi member of the Reichstag, Reichsleiter in the Nazi
Party for Ideology and Foreign Policy, the editor of the Nazi newspaper
_Völkischer Beobachter_, or “People’s Observer”, and the _NS
Monatshefte_, head of the Foreign Political Office of the Nazi Party,
Special Delegate for the entire Spiritual and Ideological Training of
the Nazi Party, Reich Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories,
organizer of the “Einsatzstab Rosenberg”, a general in the SS and a
general in the SA. The Defendant Rosenberg used the foregoing positions,
his personal influence and his intimate connection with the Führer in
such a manner that:

He developed, disseminated, and exploited the doctrinal techniques of
the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the psychological preparations for war set
forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the political
planning and preparation for wars of aggression and wars in violation of
international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and
participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of
the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and
property.

FRANK. The Defendant Frank between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the
Nazi Party, a general in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, Reich
Minister without Portfolio, Reich Commissar for the Coordination of
Justice, President of the International Chamber of Law and Academy of
German Law, Chief of the Civil Administration of Lodz, Supreme
Administrative Chief of the military district of West Prussia, Poznan,
Lodz, and Krakow, and Governor General of the occupied Polish
territories. The Defendant Frank used the foregoing positions, his
personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in such
a manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the War
Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against
Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including
particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved in the
administration of occupied territories.

BORMANN. The Defendant Bormann between 1925 and 1945 was a member of the
Nazi Party, member of the Reichstag, a member of the Staff of the
Supreme Command of the SA, founder and head of “Hilfskasse der NSDAP”,
Reichsleiter, Chief of Staff Office of the Führer’s Deputy, head of the
Party Chancery, Secretary of the Führer, member of the Council of
Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, organizer and head of the
Volkssturm, a general in the SS, and a general in the SA. The Defendant
Bormann used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his
intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and participated in
the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes
against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including a
wide variety of crimes against persons and property.

FRICK. The Defendant Frick between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the
Nazi Party, Reichsleiter, general in the SS, member of the Reichstag,
Reich Minister of the Interior, Prussian Minister of the Interior, Reich
Director of Elections, General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of
the Reich, head of the Central Office for the Reunification of Austria
and the German Reich, Director of the Central Office for the
Incorporation of Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig, the Eastern Occupied
Territories, Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnet, Director of the Central
Office for the Protectorate of Bohemia, Moravia, the Government General,
Lower Styria, Upper Carinthia, Norway, Alsace, Lorraine, and all other
occupied territories, and Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. The
Defendant Frick used the foregoing positions, his personal influence,
and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he participated in the planning and preparation of the
Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of
international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and
participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of
the Indictment, including more particularly the crimes against persons
and property in occupied territories.

LEY. The Defendant Ley between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the Nazi
Party, Reichsleiter, Nazi Party Organization Manager, member of the
Reichstag, leader of the German Labor Front, a general in the SA, and
Joint Organizer of the Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign
Workers. The Defendant Ley used the foregoing positions, his personal
influence and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner
that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany as set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the preparation for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the
War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and in the Crimes
against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including
particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity relating to the
abuse of human beings for labor in the conduct of the aggressive wars.

SAUCKEL. The Defendant Sauckel between 1921 and 1945 was a member of the
Nazi Party, Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Thuringia, a member of
the Reichstag, General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor under
the Four Year Plan, Joint Organizer with the Defendant Ley of the
Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers, a general in the SS,
and a general in the SA. The Defendant Sauckel used the foregoing
positions and his personal influence in such manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in
Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the economic
preparations for wars of aggression and wars in violation of treaties,
agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the
Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes
set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and the Crimes against
Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including
particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved in
forcing the inhabitants of occupied countries to work as slave laborers
in occupied countries and in Germany.

SPEER. The Defendant Speer between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the
Nazi Party, Reichsleiter, member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister for
Armament and Munitions, Chief of the Organization Todt, General
Plenipotentiary for Armaments in the Office of the Four Year Plan, and
Chairman of the Armaments Council. The Defendant Speer used the
foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a manner that:

He participated in the military and economic planning and preparation of
the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of
international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and
participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of
the Indictment, including more particularly the abuse and exploitation
of human beings for forced labor in the conduct of aggressive war.

FUNK. The Defendant Funk between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the Nazi
Party, Economic Adviser of Hitler, National Socialist Deputy to the
Reichstag, Press Chief of the Reich Government, State Secretary of the
Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Reich Minister of
Economics, Prussian Minister of Economics, President of the German
Reichsbank, Plenipotentiary for Economy, and member of the Ministerial
Council for the Defense of the Reich. The Defendant Funk used the
foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his close connection
with the Führer in such a manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; he participated in the military and economic
planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression
and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and
assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in
Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment, including more particularly crimes
against persons and property in connection with the economic
exploitation of occupied territories.

SCHACHT. The Defendant Schacht between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the
Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister of Economics,
Reich Minister without Portfolio and President of the German Reichsbank.
The Defendant Schacht used the foregoing positions, his personal
influence, and his connection with the Führer in such a manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; and he participated in the military and economic
plans and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression,
and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and
assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment.

PAPEN. The Defendant Papen between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the
Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Chancellor under Hitler,
special Plenipotentiary for the Saar, negotiator of the Concordat with
the Vatican, Ambassador in Vienna, and Ambassador in Turkey. The
Defendant Papen used the foregoing positions, his personal influence,
and his close connection with the Führer in such a manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and
participated in the consolidation of their control over Germany set
forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for
war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he participated in the
political planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of
aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements,
and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment.

KRUPP. The Defendant Krupp between 1932 and 1945 was head of Friedrich
KRUPP A. G., a member of the General Economic Council, President of the
Reich Union of German Industry, and head of the Group for Mining and
Production of Iron and Metals under the Reich Ministry of Economics. The
Defendant Krupp used the foregoing positions, his personal influence,
and his connection with the Führer in such a manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the preparation for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; he participated in the military and economic
planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression
and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and
assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in
Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment, including more particularly the
exploitation and abuse of human beings for labor in the conduct of
aggressive wars.

NEURATH. The Defendant Neurath between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the
Nazi Party, a general in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, Reich
Minister, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, President of the Secret
Cabinet Council, and Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. The
Defendant Neurath used the foregoing positions, his personal influence,
and his close connection with the Führer in such a manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in
Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set
forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the political
planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression
and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and
assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; in
accordance with the Führer Principle he executed, and assumed
responsibility for the execution of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi
conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in
Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment, including particularly the crimes
against persons and property in the occupied territories.

SCHIRACH. The Defendant Schirach between 1924 and 1945 was a member of
the Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Youth Leader on the
Staff of the SA Supreme Command, Reichsleiter in the Nazi Party for
Youth Education, Leader of Youth of the German Reich, head of the Hitler
Jugend, Reich Defense Commissioner, and Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter
of Vienna. The Defendant Schirach used the foregoing positions, his
personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in such
a manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the psychological and educational
preparations for war and the militarization of Nazi-dominated
organizations set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed, and participated in the Crimes against Humanity
set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including, particularly,
anti-Jewish measures.

SEYSS-INQUART. The Defendant Seyss-Inquart between 1932 and 1945 was a
member of the Nazi Party, a general in the SS, State Councillor of
Austria, Minister of the Interior and Security of Austria, Chancellor of
Austria, a member of the Reichstag, a member of the Reich Cabinet, Reich
Minister without Portfolio, Chief of the Civil Administration in South
Poland, Deputy Governor-General of the Polish occupied territory, and
Reich Commissar for the occupied Netherlands. The Defendant
Seyss-Inquart used the foregoing positions and his personal influence in
such a manner that:

He promoted the seizure and the consolidation of control over Austria by
the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
participated in the political planning and preparation of the Nazi
conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of
international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and
participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of
the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and
property.

STREICHER. The Defendant Streicher between 1932 and 1945 was a member of
the Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, a general in the SA,
Gauleiter of Franconia, editor in chief of the anti-Semitic newspaper
_Der Stürmer_. The Defendant Streicher used the foregoing positions, his
personal influence, and his close connection with the Führer in such a
manner that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the Crimes
against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including
particularly the incitement of the persecution of the Jews set forth in
Count One and Count Four of the Indictment.

KEITEL. The Defendant Keitel between 1938 and 1945 was Chief of the High
Command of the German Armed Forces, member of the Secret Cabinet
Council, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the
Reich, and Field Marshal. The Defendant Keitel used the foregoing
positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connection with the
Führer in such a manner that:

He promoted the military preparations for war set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in
violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances set
forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he executed and assumed
responsibility for the execution of the plans of the Nazi conspirators
for wars of aggression and wars in violation, of international treaties,
agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the
Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes
set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against
Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including
particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved in the
ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of the civilian population of
occupied territories.

JODL. The Defendant Jodl between 1932 and 1945 was lieutenant colonel,
Army Operations Department of the Wehrmacht, Colonel, Chief of OKW
Operations Department, major general and Chief of Staff OKW and colonel
general. The Defendant Jodl used, the foregoing positions, his personal
influence, and his close connection with the Führer in such a manner
that:

He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation, of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; he participated in the military planning and
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in
violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances set
forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized,
directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of
the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four
of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons
and property.

RAEDER. The Defendant Raeder between 1928 and 1945 was
Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, Generaladmiral, Grossadmiral,
Admiralinspekteur of the German Navy, and a member of the Secret Cabinet
Council. The Defendant Raeder used the foregoing positions and his
personal influence in such a manner that:

He promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the
Indictment; he participated in the political planning and preparation of
the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of
international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment; he executed, and assumed responsibility
for the execution of the plans of the Nazi conspirators for wars of
aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements,
and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in
Count Three of the Indictment, including particularly War Crimes arising
out of sea warfare.

DÖNITZ. The Defendant Dönitz between 1932 and 1945 was Commanding
Officer of the Weddigen U-boat Flotilla, Commander-in-Chief of the
U-boat arm, Vice-Admiral, Admiral, Grossadmiral, and Commander-in-Chief
of the German Navy, advisor to Hitler, and successor to Hitler as head
of the German Government. The Defendant Dönitz used the foregoing
positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connection with the
Führer in such a manner that:

He promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the
Indictment; he participated in the military planning and preparation of
the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of
international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and
participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment, including particularly the crimes against persons and
property on the High Seas.

FRITZSCHE. The Defendant Fritzsche between 1933 and 1945 was a member of
the Nazi Party, editor-in-chief of the official German news agency,
“Deutsches Nachrichten Büro”, head of the Wireless News Service and of
the Home Press Division of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda,
Ministerialdirektor of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, Head of the
Radio Division of the Propaganda Department of the Nazi Party, and
Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of the Greater German
Radio. The Defendant Fritzsche used the foregoing positions and his
personal influence to disseminate and exploit the principal doctrines of
the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment, and to
advocate, encourage, and incite the commission of the War Crimes set
forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity
set forth in Count Four of the Indictment including, particularly,
anti-Jewish measures and the ruthless exploitation of occupied
territories.

APPENDIX B—STATEMENT OF CRIMINALITY OF GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS.

The statements hereinafter set forth, following the name of each group
or organization named in the Indictment as one which should be declared
criminal, constitute matters upon which the Prosecution will rely _inter
alia_ as establishing the criminality of the group or organization:

“Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet)” referred to in the Indictment
consists of persons who were:

(i) Members of the ordinary cabinet after 30 January 1933, the date on
which Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic. The term
“ordinary cabinet” as used herein means the Reich Ministers, i.e., heads
of departments of the central Government; Reich Ministers without
portfolio; State Ministers acting as Reich Ministers; and other
officials entitled to take part in meetings of this cabinet.

(ii) Members of Der Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung (Council of
Ministers for the Defense of the Reich).

(iii) Members of Der Geheime Kabinettsrat (Secret Cabinet Council).
Under the Führer, these persons functioning in the foregoing capacities
and in association as a group, possessed and exercised legislative,
executive, administrative, and political powers and functions of a very
high order in the system of German Government. Accordingly, they are
charged with responsibility for the policies adopted and put into effect
by the Government including those which comprehended and involved the
commission of the crimes referred to in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four
of the Indictment.

“Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen
Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party)” referred to in the
Indictment consists of persons who were at any time, according to common
Nazi terminology, “Politische Leiter” (Political Leaders) of any grade
or rank.

The Politischen Leiter comprised the leaders of the various functional
offices of the Party (for example, the Reichsleitung or Party Reich
Directorate, and the Gauleitung, or Party Gau Directorate), as well as
the territorial leaders of the Party (for example, the Gauleiter).

The Politischen Leiter were a distinctive and elite group within the
Nazi Party proper and as such were vested with special prerogatives.
They were organized according to the Leadership Principle and were
charged with planning, developing, and imposing upon their followers the
policies of the Nazi Party. Thus the territorial leaders among them were
called Hoheitsträger, or bearers of sovereignty, and were entitled to
call upon and utilize the various Party formations when necessary for
the execution of Party policies.

Reference is hereby made to the allegations in Count One of the
Indictment showing that the Nazi Party was the central core of the
Common Plan or Conspiracy therein set forth. The Politischen Leiter, as
a major power within the Nazi Party proper, and functioning in the
capacities above described and in association as a group, joined in the
Common Plan or Conspiracy, and accordingly share responsibility for the
crimes set forth in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment.

The Prosecution expressly reserves the right to request, at any time
before sentence is pronounced, that Politischer Leiter of subordinate
grades or ranks or of other types or classes, to be specified by the
prosecution, be excepted from further proceedings in this Case Number 1,
but without prejudice to other proceedings or actions against them.

“Die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei
(commonly known as the SS) including Der Sicherheitsdienst (commonly
known as the SD)” referred to in the Indictment consists of the entire
corps of the SS and all offices, departments, services, agencies,
branches, formations, organizations, and groups of which it was at any
time comprised or which were at any time integrated in it, including but
not limited to, the Allgemeine SS, the Waffen SS, the SS Totenkopf
Verbände, SS Polizei Regimenter, and the Sicherheitsdienst des
Reichsführers SS (commonly known as the SD).

The SS, originally established by Hitler in 1925 as an elite section of
the SA to furnish a protective guard for the Führer and Nazi Party
leaders, became an independent formation of the Nazi Party in 1934 under
the leadership of the Reichsführer SS, Heinrich Himmler. It was composed
of voluntary members, selected in accordance with Nazi biological,
racial, and political theories, completely indoctrinated in Nazi
ideology and pledged to uncompromising obedience to the Führer. After
the accession of the Nazi conspirators to power, it developed many
departments, agencies, formations, and branches and extended its
influence and control over numerous fields of governmental and Party
activity. Through Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsführer SS and Chief of the
German Police, agencies and units of the SS and of the Reich were joined
in operation to form a unified repressive police force. The
Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers SS (commonly known as the SD), a
department of the SS, was developed into a vast espionage and
counter-intelligence system which operated in conjunction with the
Gestapo and criminal police in detecting, suppressing, and eliminating
tendencies, groups, and individuals deemed hostile or potentially
hostile to the Nazi Party, its leaders, principles, and objectives, and
eventually was combined with the Gestapo and criminal police in a single
security police department, the Reich Main Security Office.

Other branches of the SS developed into an armed force and served in the
wars of aggression referred to in Counts One and Two of the Indictment.
Through other departments and branches the SS controlled the
administration of concentration camps and the execution of Nazi racial,
biological, and resettlement policies. Through its numerous functions
and activities it served as the instrument for insuring the domination
of Nazi ideology and protecting and extending the Nazi regime over
Germany and occupied territories. It thus participated in and is
responsible for the crimes referred to in Counts One, Two, Three, and
Four of the Indictment.

“Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, commonly known as the
Gestapo)” referred to in the Indictment consists of the headquarters,
departments, offices, branches, and all the forces and personnel of the
Geheime Staatspolizei organized or existing at any time after 30 January
1933, including the Geheime Staatspolizei of Prussia and equivalent
secret or political police forces of the Reich and the components
thereof.

The Gestapo was created by the Nazi conspirators immediately after their
accession to power, first in Prussia by the Defendant Göring and shortly
thereafter in all other states in the Reich. These separate secret and
political police forces were developed into a centralized, uniform
organization operating through a central headquarters and through a
network of regional offices in Germany and in occupied territories. Its
officials and operatives were selected on the basis of unconditional
acceptance of Nazi ideology, were largely drawn from members of the SS,
and were trained in SS and SD schools. It acted to suppress and
eliminate tendencies, groups, and individuals deemed hostile or
potentially hostile to the Nazi Party, its leaders, principles, and
objectives, and to repress resistance and potential resistance to German
control in occupied territories. In performing these functions it
operated free from legal control, taking any measures it deemed
necessary for the accomplishment of its missions.

Through its purposes, activities and the means it used, it participated
in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes set forth in
Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment.

“Die Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen
Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the SA).” That organization referred
to in the Indictment was a formation of the Nazi Party under the
immediate jurisdiction of the Führer, organized on military lines, whose
membership was composed of volunteers serving as political soldiers of
the Party. It was one of the earliest formations of the Nazi Party and
the original guardian of the National Socialist movement. Founded in
1921 as a voluntary military formation, it was developed by the Nazi
conspirators before their accession to power into a vast private army
and utilized for the purpose of creating disorder, and terrorizing and
eliminating political opponents. It continued to serve as an instrument
for the physical, ideological, and military training of Party members
and as a reserve for the German Armed Forces. After the launching of the
wars of aggression, referred to in Counts One and Two of the Indictment,
the SA not only operated as an organization for military training but
provided auxiliary police and security forces in occupied territories,
guarded prisoner-of-war camps and concentration camps and supervised and
controlled persons forced to labor in Germany and occupied territories.

Through its purposes and activities and the means it used it
participated in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes set
forth in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment.

The “General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces” referred
to in the Indictment consists of those individuals who between February
1938 and May 1945 were the highest commanders of the Wehrmacht, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces. The individuals comprising this
group are the persons who held the following appointments:

Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander in Chief of the Navy); Chef
(and, formerly, Chef des Stabes) der Seekriegsleitung (Chief of Naval
War Staff); Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres (Commander in Chief of the
Army); Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres (Chief of the General Staff of
the Army); Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Commander in Chief of the Air
Force); Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe (Chief of the General Staff
of the Air Force); Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the
High Command of the Armed Forces); Chef des Führungsstabes des
Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the Operations Staff of the High
Command of the Armed Forces); Stellvertretender Chef des Führungsstabes
des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of
the High Command of the Armed Forces); Commanders-in-Chief in the field,
with the status of Oberbefehlshaber, of the Wehrmacht, Navy, Army, Air
Force.

Functioning in such capacities and in association as a group at the
highest level in the German Armed Forces organization, these persons had
a major responsibility for the planning, preparation, initiation, and
waging of illegal war as set forth in Counts One and Two of the
Indictment and for the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved
in the execution of the Common Plan or Conspiracy set forth in Counts
Three and Four of the Indictment.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Continuing the reading of the Indictment):

APPENDIX C—CHARGES AND PARTICULARS OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND ASSURANCES CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANTS IN THE
COURSE OF PLANNING, PREPARING AND INITIATING THE WARS.

I. Charge:

Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes signed at The Hague, 29 July 1899.

Particulars: In that Germany did, by force and arms, on the dates
specified in Column 1, invade the territory of the Sovereigns specified
in Column 2, respectively, without first having attempted to settle its
disputes with the said Sovereigns by pacific means.

              (Column 1)               (Column 2)
            6 April 1941           Kingdom of Greece
            6 April 1941           Kingdom of Yugoslavia

II. Charge:

Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907.

Particulars: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in
Column 1, by force of arms invade the territory of the Sovereigns
specified in Column 2, respectively, without having first attempted to
settle its disputes with the said Sovereigns by pacific means.

              (Column 1)               (Column 2)
            1 September 1939       Republic of Poland
            9 April 1940           Kingdom of Norway
            9 April 1940           Kingdom of Denmark
           10 May 1940             Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg
           10 May 1940             Kingdom of Belgium
           10 May 1940             Kingdom of the Netherlands
           22 June 1941            Union of Soviet Socialist
                                   Republics

III. Charge:

Violation of Hague Convention III, Relative to the Opening of
Hostilities, signed 18 October 1907.

Particulars: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in
Column 1, commence hostilities against the countries specified in Column
2, respectively, without previous warning in the form of a reasoned
declaration of war or an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.

              (Column 1)               (Column 2)
            1 September 1939       Republic of Poland
            9 April 1940           Kingdom of Norway
            9 April 1940           Kingdom of Denmark
           10 May 1940             Kingdom of Belgium
           10 May 1940             Kingdom of the Netherlands
           10 May 1940             Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg
           22 June 1941            Union of Soviet Socialist
                                   Republics

IV. Charge:

Violation of Hague Convention V, Respecting the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, signed 18 October
1907.

Particulars:

In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in Column 1, by
force and arms of its military forces, cross into, invade, and occupy
the territories of the Sovereigns specified in Column 2, respectively,
then and thereby violating the neutrality of said Sovereigns.

              (Column 1)               (Column 2)
            9 April 1940           Kingdom of Norway
            9 April 1940           Kingdom of Denmark
           10 May 1940             Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg
           10 May 1940             Kingdom of Belgium
           10 May 1940             Kingdom of the Netherlands
           22 June 1941            Union of Soviet Socialist
                                   Republics

V. Charge:

Violation of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated
Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles, 28 June 1919, known as the
Versailles Treaty.

Particulars:

(1) In that Germany did, on and after 7 March 1936, maintain and
assemble armed forces and maintain and construct military fortifications
in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland in violation of the
provisions of Articles 42 to 44 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(2) In that Germany did, on or about 13 March 1938, annex Austria into
the German Reich in violation of the provisions of Article 80 of the
Treaty of Versailles.

(3) In that Germany did, on or about 22 March 1939, incorporate the
District of Memel into the German Reich in violation of the provisions
of Article 99 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(4) In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939, incorporate the
Free City of Danzig into the German Reich in violation of the provisions
of Article 100 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(5) In that Germany did, on or about 16 March 1939, incorporate the
provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, formerly part of Czechoslovakia, into
the German Reich in violation of the provisions of Article 81 of the
Treaty of Versailles.

(6) In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and thereafter,
repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval, and Air Clauses of
the Treaty of Versailles, by creating an air force, by use of compulsory
military service, by increasing the size of the army beyond treaty
limits, and by increasing the size of the navy beyond treaty limits.

VI. Charge:

Violation of the Treaty between the United States and Germany Restoring
Friendly Relations, signed at Berlin, 25 August 1921.

Particulars:

In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and thereafter,
repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval, and Air Clauses of
the Treaty between the United States and Germany Restoring Friendly
Relations by creating an air force, by use of compulsory military
service, by increasing the size of the army beyond treaty limits, and by
increasing the size of the navy beyond treaty limits.

VII. Charge:

Violation of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium,
France, Great Britain and Italy, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925.

Particulars:

(1) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936, unlawfully send armed
forces into the Rhineland demilitarized zone of Germany, in violation of
Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

(2) In that Germany did, in or about March 1936, and thereafter,
unlawfully maintain armed forces in the Rhineland demilitarized zone of
Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

(3) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936, and thereafter,
unlawfully construct and maintain fortifications in the Rhineland
demilitarized zone of Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty
of Mutual Guarantee.

(4) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully attack and
invade Belgium, in violation of Article 2 of the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee.

(5) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully attack and
invade Belgium, without first having attempted to settle its dispute
with Belgium by peaceful means, in violation of Article 3 of the Treaty
of Mutual Guarantee.

VIII. Charge:

Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia,
done at Locarno, 16 October 1925.

Particulars:

In that Germany did, on or about 15 March 1939, unlawfully by duress and
threats of military might force Czechoslovakia to deliver the destiny of
Czechoslovakia and its inhabitants into the hands of the Führer and
Reichschancellor of Germany without having attempted to settle its
dispute with Czechoslovakia by peaceful means.

IX. Charge:

Violation of the Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium,
done at Locarno, 16 October 1925.

Particulars:

In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully attack and
invade Belgium without first having attempted to settle its dispute with
Belgium by peaceful means.

X. Charge:

Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland, done at
Locarno, 16 October 1925.

Particulars:

In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939, unlawfully attack and
invade Poland without first having attempted to settle its dispute with
Poland by peaceful means.

XI. Charge:

Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation entered into
between Germany and the Netherlands on 20 May 1926.

Particulars:

In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its solemn
covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature whatever
which might arise between it and the Netherlands which were not capable
of settlement by diplomacy and which had not been referred by mutual
agreement to the Permanent Court of International Justice, did, on or
about 10 May 1940, with a military force, attack, invade, and occupy the
Netherlands, thereby violating its neutrality and territorial integrity
and destroying its sovereign independence.

XII. Charge:

Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation entered into
between Germany and Denmark on 2 June 1926.

Particulars:

In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its solemn
covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature whatever
which might arise between it and Denmark which were not capable of
settlement by diplomacy and which had not been referred by mutual
agreement to the Permanent Court of International Justice, did, on or
about 9 April 1940, with a military force, attack, invade, and occupy
Denmark, thereby violating its neutrality and territorial integrity and
destroying its sovereign independence.

XIII. Charge:

Violation of Treaty between Germany and other Powers Providing for
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, signed at Paris
27 August 1928, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

Particulars:

In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in Column 1, with a
military force, attack the Sovereigns specified in Column 2,
respectively, and resort to war against such Sovereigns, in violation of
its solemn declaration condemning recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies, its solemn renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy in its relations with such Sovereigns, and
its solemn covenant that settlement or solution of all disputes or
conflicts of whatever nature or origin arising between it and such
Sovereigns should never be sought except by pacific means

              (Column 1)               (Column 2)
            1 September 1939       Republic of Poland
            9 April 1940           Kingdom of Norway
            9 April 1940           Kingdom of Denmark
           10 May 1940             Kingdom of Belgium
           10 May 1940             Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg
           10 May 1940             Kingdom of the Netherlands
            6 April 1941           Kingdom of Greece
            6 April 1941           Kingdom of Yugoslavia
           22 June 1941            Union of Soviet Socialist
                                   Republics
           11 December 1941        United States of America

XIV. Charge:

Violation of Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation entered into between
Germany and Luxembourg on 11 September 1929.

Particulars:

In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its solemn
covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes which might arise
between it and Luxembourg which were not capable of settlement by
diplomacy, did, on or about 10 May 1940, with a military force, attack,
invade, and occupy Luxembourg, thereby violating its neutrality and
territorial integrity and destroying its sovereign independence.

XV. Charge:

Violation of the Declaration of Non-Aggression entered into between
Germany and Poland on 26 January 1934.

Particulars:

In that Germany proceeding to the application of force for the purpose
of reaching a decision did, on or about 1 September 1939, at various
places along the German-Polish frontier employ military forces to
attack, invade, and commit other acts of aggression against Poland.

XVI. Charge:

Violation of German assurance given on 21 May 1935 that the
inviolability and integrity of the Federal State of Austria would be
recognized.

Particulars:

In that Germany did, on or about 12 March 1938, at various points and
places along the German-Austria frontier, with a military force and in
violation of its solemn declaration and assurance, invade and annex to
Germany the territory of the Federal State of Austria.

XVII. Charge:

Violation of Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936.

Particulars:

In that Germany during the period from 12 February 1938 to 13 March 1938
did by duress and various aggressive acts, including the use of military
force, cause the Federal State of Austria to yield up its sovereignty to
the German State in violation of Germany’s agreement to recognize the
full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria.

XVIII. Charge:

Violation of German assurances given on 30 January 1937, 28 April 1939,
26 August 1939, and 6 October 1939 to respect the neutrality and
territorial inviolability of the Netherlands.

Particulars:

In that Germany, without warning, and without recourse to peaceful means
of settling any considered differences did, on or about 10 May 1940,
with a military force and in violation of its solemn assurances, invade,
occupy, and attempt to subjugate the sovereign territory of the
Netherlands.

XIX. Charge:

Violation of German assurances given on 30 January 1937, 13 October
1937, 28 April 1939, 26 August 1939 and 6 October 1939, to respect the
neutrality and territorial integrity and inviolability of Belgium.

Particulars:

In that Germany, without warning, did on or about 10 May 1940, with a
military force and in violation of its solemn assurances and
declarations, attack, invade, and occupy the sovereign territory of
Belgium.

XX. Charge:

Violation of assurances given on 11 March 1938 and 26 September 1938 to
Czechoslovakia.

Particulars:

In that Germany, on or about 15 March 1939 did, by establishing a
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia under duress and by the threat of
force, violate the assurance given on 11 March 1938 to respect the
territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic and the assurance
given on 26 September 1938 that, if the so-called Sudeten territories
were ceded to Germany, no further German territorial claims on
Czechoslovakia would be made.

XXI. Charge:

Violation of the Munich Agreement and Annexes of 29 September 1938.

Particulars:

(1) In that Germany, on or about 15 March 1939, did by duress and the
threat of military intervention force the Republic of Czechoslovakia to
deliver the destiny of the Czech people and country into the hands of
the Führer of the German Reich.

(2) In that Germany refused and failed to join in an international
guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovakian State as provided
for in Annex No. 1 to the Munich Agreement.

XXII. Charge:

Violation of the solemn assurances of Germany given on 3 September 1939,
28 April 1939, and 6 October 1939 that they would not violate the
independence or sovereignty of the Kingdom of Norway.

Particulars:

In that Germany, without warning did, on or about 9 April 1940, with its
military and naval forces attack, invade, and commit other acts of
aggression against the Kingdom of Norway.

XXIII. Charge:

Violation of German assurances given on 28 April 1939 and 26 August 1939
to respect the neutrality and territorial inviolability of Luxembourg.

Particulars:

In that Germany, without warning, and without recourse to peaceful means
of settling any considered differences, did, on or about 10 May 1940,
with a military force and in violation of the solemn assurances, invade,
occupy, and absorb into Germany the sovereign territory of Luxembourg.

XXIV. Charge:

Violation of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and Denmark
signed at Berlin 31 May 1939.

Particulars:

In that Germany without prior warning, did, on or about 9 April 1940,
with its military forces, attack, invade, and commit other acts of
aggression against the Kingdom of Denmark.

XXV. Charge:

Violation of Treaty of Non-Aggression entered into between Germany and
U.S.S.R. on 23 August 1939.

Particulars:

(1) In that Germany did, on or about 22 June 1941, employ military
forces to attack and commit acts of aggression against the U.S.S.R.

(2) In that Germany without warning or recourse to a friendly exchange
of views or arbitration did, on or about 22 June 1941, employ military
forces to attack and commit acts of aggression against the U.S.S.R.

XXVI. Charge:

Violation of German assurance given on 6 October 1939 to respect the
neutrality and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

Particulars:

In that Germany without prior warning did, on or about 6 April 1941,
with its military forces attack, invade and commit other acts of
aggression against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow
morning.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 21 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]




                               SECOND DAY
                       Wednesday, 21 November 1945


                           _Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: A motion has been filed with the Tribunal and the
Tribunal has given it consideration, and insofar as it may be a plea to
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it conflicts with Article 3 of the
Charter and will not be entertained. Insofar as it may contain other
arguments which may be open to the defendants, they may be heard at a
later stage.

And now, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, which provides
that, after the Indictment has been read in court, the defendants shall
be called upon to plead guilty or not guilty, I now direct the
defendants to plead either guilty or not guilty.

DR. DIX: May I speak to Your Lordship for just a moment?

THE PRESIDENT: You may not speak to me in support of the motion with
which I have just dealt on behalf of the Tribunal. I have told you that
so far as that motion is a plea to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it
conflicts with Article 3 of the Charter and will not be entertained.
Insofar as it contains or may contain arguments which may be open to the
defendants, those arguments may be heard hereafter.

DR. DIX: I do not wish to speak on the subject of a motion. As speaker
for the Defense I should like to broach a technical question and voice a
question to this effect on behalf of the Defense. May I do so? The
Defense Counsel were forbidden to talk to the defendants this morning.
It is absolutely necessary that the Defense Counsel should be able to
speak to the defendants before the session. It often happens that after
the session one cannot reach one’s client at night. It is quite possible
that counsel may have prepared something overnight which he wishes to
discuss with the defendant before the session. According to our
experience it is always permissible for the Defense Counsel to speak to
the defendant before the session. The question of conferring between
Defense Counsel and clients during sessions could be dealt with at a
later date.

At present I request, on behalf of the entire Defense, that we be
allowed to confer with our clients in the courtroom, into which they
usually are brought at a very early hour. Otherwise, we shall not be in
a position to conduct the defense in an efficient and appropriate
manner.

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that you cannot consult with your clients in
the courtroom except by written communication. When you are out of the
courtroom, security regulations can be carried out and, so far as those
security regulations go, you have full opportunity to consult with your
clients. In the courtroom we must confine you to written communications
to your clients. At the end of each day’s sitting, you will have full
opportunity to consult with them in private.

DR. DIX: I shall discuss this with my colleagues of the Defense and we
should like if possible to return to this question.

DR. THOMA: May I have the floor?

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name please.

DR. THOMA: Dr. Ralph Thoma. I represent the Defendant Rosenberg.
Yesterday my client gave me a statement as regards the question of guilt
or innocence. I took this statement and promised him to talk with him
about it. Neither last night nor this morning have I had an opportunity
to talk with him; and, consequently, neither I nor my client are in a
position to make a statement today as to whether he is guilty or not
guilty. I therefore request that the proceedings be interrupted so that
I may speak with my client.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal will be prepared to adjourn for
15 minutes in order that you may have an opportunity of consulting with
your clients.

DR. THOMA: Thank you. I should like to make another statement. Some of
my colleagues have just told me that they are in the same position as I,
particularly Dr. Sauter. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I meant that all defendants’ counsel should have an
opportunity of consulting with their clients; but I would point out to
the defendants’ counsel that they have had several weeks’ preparation
for this Trial, and that they must have anticipated that the provisions
of Article 24 would be followed. But now we will adjourn for 15 minutes
in which all of you may consult with your clients.

DR. THOMA: May I say something further in that respect, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. THOMA: The Defense asked whether the question of guilty or not
guilty could only be answered with “yes”, or “no” or whether a more
extensive and longer statement could be made. We obtained information on
this point only the day before yesterday. We therefore have had no
opportunity to confer at length with our clients on this matter.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. The question will have to be answered in the
words of Article 24 of the Charter, and those words are printed in
italics: “The Tribunal shall ask each defendant whether he pleads guilty
or not guilty.” That is what they have got to do at that stage. Of
course, the defendants will have a full opportunity themselves, if they
are called as witnesses, and by their counsel, to make their defense
fully at a later stage.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: I will now call upon the defendants to plead guilty or
not guilty to the charges against them. They will proceed in turn to a
point in the dock opposite to the microphone.

Hermann Wilhelm Göring.

HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING: Before I answer the question of the Tribunal
whether or not I am guilty. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I informed the Court that defendants were not entitled to
make a statement. You must plead guilty or not guilty.

GÖRING: I declare myself in the sense of the Indictment not guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Rudolf Hess.

RUDOLF HESS: No.

THE PRESIDENT: That will be entered as a plea of not guilty. [Laughter.]

THE PRESIDENT: If there is any disturbance in court, those who make it
will have to leave the court.

Joachim von Ribbentrop.

JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP: I declare myself in the sense of the Indictment
not guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Wilhelm Keitel.

WILHELM KEITEL: I declare myself not guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the Trial will
proceed against him, but he will have an opportunity of pleading when he
is sufficiently well to be brought back into court.

Alfred Rosenberg.

ALFRED ROSENBERG: I declare myself in the sense of the Indictment not
guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Hans Frank.

HANS FRANK: I declare myself not guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Wilhelm Frick.

WILHELM FRICK: Not guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Julius Streicher.

JULIUS STREICHER: Not guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Walter Funk.

WALTER FUNK: I declare myself not guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Hjalmar Schacht.

HJALMAR SCHACHT: I am not guilty in any respect.

THE PRESIDENT: Karl Dönitz.

KARL DÖNITZ: Not guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Erich Raeder.

ERICH RAEDER: I declare myself not guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Baldur von Schirach.

BALDUR VON SCHIRACH: I declare myself in the sense of the Indictment not
guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Fritz Sauckel.

FRITZ SAUCKEL: I declare myself in the sense of the Indictment, before
God and the world and particularly before my people, not guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Alfred Jodl.

ALFRED JODL: Not guilty. For what I have done or had to do, I have a
pure conscience before God, before history and my people.

THE PRESIDENT: Franz von Papen.

FRANZ VON PAPEN: I declare myself in no way guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Arthur Seyss-Inquart.

ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART: I declare myself not guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Albert Speer.

ALBERT SPEER: Not guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Constantin von Neurath.

CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH: I answer the question in the negative.

THE PRESIDENT: Hans Fritzsche.

HANS FRITZSCHE: As regards this Indictment, not guilty.

[_At this point Defendant Göring stood up in the prisoner’s dock and
attempted to address the Tribunal._]

THE PRESIDENT: You are not entitled to address the Tribunal except
through your counsel, at the present time.

I will now call upon the Chief Prosecutor for the United States of
America.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please Your Honors:

The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against
the peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs which
we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and
so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored,
because it cannot survive their being repeated. That four great nations,
flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance
and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law
is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to
Reason.

This Tribunal, while it is novel and experimental, is not the product of
abstract speculations nor is it created to vindicate legalistic
theories. This inquest represents the practical effort of four of the
most mighty of nations, with the support of 17 more, to utilize
international law to meet the greatest menace of our times—aggressive
war. The common sense of mankind demands that law shall not stop with
the punishment of petty crimes by little people. It must also reach men
who possess themselves of great power and make deliberate and concerted
use of it to set in motion evils which leave no home in the world
untouched. It is a cause of that magnitude that the United Nations will
lay before Your Honors.

In the prisoners’ dock sit twenty-odd broken men. Reproached by the
humiliation of those they have led almost as bitterly as by the
desolation of those they have attacked, their personal capacity for evil
is forever past. It is hard now to perceive in these men as captives the
power by which as Nazi leaders they once dominated much of the world and
terrified most of it. Merely as individuals their fate is of little
consequence to the world.

What makes this inquest significant is that these prisoners represent
sinister influences that will lurk in the world long after their bodies
have returned to dust. We will show them to be living symbols of racial
hatreds, of terrorism and violence, and of the arrogance and cruelty of
power. They are symbols of fierce nationalisms and of militarism, of
intrigue and war-making which have embroiled Europe generation after
generation, crushing its manhood, destroying its homes, and
impoverishing its life. They have so identified themselves with the
philosophies they conceived and with the forces they directed that any
tenderness to them is a victory and an encouragement to all the evils
which are attached to their names. Civilization can afford no compromise
with the social forces which would gain renewed strength if we deal
ambiguously or indecisively with the men in whom those forces now
precariously survive.

What these men stand for we will patiently and temperately disclose. We
will give you undeniable proofs of incredible events. The catalog of
crimes will omit nothing that could be conceived by a pathological
pride, cruelty, and lust for power. These men created in Germany, under
the “Führerprinzip”, a National Socialist despotism equalled only by the
dynasties of the ancient East. They took from the German people all
those dignities and freedoms that we hold natural and inalienable rights
in every human being. The people were compensated by inflaming and
gratifying hatreds towards those who were marked as “scapegoats”.
Against their opponents, including Jews, Catholics, and free labor, the
Nazis directed such a campaign of arrogance, brutality, and annihilation
as the world has not witnessed since the pre-Christian ages. They
excited the German ambition to be a “master race”, which of course
implies serfdom for others. They led their people on a mad gamble for
domination. They diverted social energies and resources to the creation
of what they thought to be an invincible war machine. They overran their
neighbors. To sustain the “master race” in its war-making, they enslaved
millions of human beings and brought them into Germany, where these
hapless creatures now wander as “displaced persons”. At length
bestiality and bad faith reached such excess that they aroused the
sleeping strength of imperiled Civilization. Its united efforts have
ground the German war machine to fragments. But the struggle has left
Europe a liberated yet prostrate land where a demoralized society
struggles to survive. These are the fruits of the sinister forces that
sit with these defendants in the prisoners’ dock.

In justice to the nations and the men associated in this prosecution, I
must remind you of certain difficulties which may leave their mark on
this case. Never before in legal history has an effort been made to
bring within the scope of a single litigation the developments of a
decade, covering a whole continent, and involving a score of nations,
countless individuals, and innumerable events. Despite the magnitude of
the task, the world has demanded immediate action. This demand has had
to be met, though perhaps at the cost of finished craftsmanship. In my
country, established courts, following familiar procedures, applying
well-thumbed precedents, and dealing with the legal consequences of
local and limited events seldom commence a trial within a year of the
event in litigation. Yet less than 8 months ago today the courtroom in
which you sit was an enemy fortress in the hands of German SS troops.
Less than 8 months ago nearly all our witnesses and documents were in
enemy hands. The law had not been codified, no procedures had been
established, no tribunal was in existence, no usable courthouse stood
here, none of the hundreds of tons of official German documents had been
examined, no prosecuting staff had been assembled, nearly all of the
present defendants were at large, and the four prosecuting powers had
not yet joined in common cause to try them. I should be the last to deny
that the case may well suffer from incomplete researches and quite
likely will not be the example of professional work which any of the
prosecuting nations would normally wish to sponsor. It is, however, a
completely adequate case to the judgment we shall ask you to render, and
its full development we shall be obliged to leave to historians.

Before I discuss particulars of evidence, some general considerations
which may affect the credit of this trial in the eyes of the world
should be candidly faced. There is a dramatic disparity between the
circumstances of the accusers and of the accused that might discredit
our work if we should falter, in even minor matters, in being fair and
temperate.

Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both prosecution
and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished foes. The
worldwide scope of the aggressions carried out by these men has left but
few real neutrals. Either the victors must judge the vanquished or we
must leave the defeated to judge themselves. After the first World War,
we learned the futility of the latter course. The former high station of
these defendants, the notoriety of their acts, and the adaptability of
their conduct to provoke retaliation make it hard to distinguish between
the demand for a just and measured retribution, and the unthinking cry
for vengeance which arises from the anguish of war. It is our task, so
far as humanly possible, to draw the line between the two. We must never
forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the
record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants
a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon
such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this Trial
will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity’s aspirations to
do justice.

At the very outset, let us dispose of the contention that to put these
men to trial is to do them an injustice entitling them to some special
consideration. These defendants may be hard pressed but they are not ill
used. Let us see what alternative they would have to being tried.

More than a majority of these prisoners surrendered to or were tracked
down by the forces of the United States. Could they expect us to make
American custody a shelter for our enemies against the just wrath of our
Allies? Did we spend American lives to capture them only to save them
from punishment? Under the principles of the Moscow Declaration, those
suspected war criminals who are not to be tried internationally must be
turned over to individual governments for trial at the scene of their
outrages. Many less responsible and less culpable American-held
prisoners have been and will continue to be turned over to other United
Nations for local trial. If these defendants should succeed, for any
reason, in escaping the condemnation of this Tribunal, or if they
obstruct or abort this trial, those who are American-held prisoners will
be delivered up to our continental Allies. For these defendants,
however, we have set up an International Tribunal and have undertaken
the burden of participating in a complicated effort to give them fair
and dispassionate hearings. That is the best-known protection to any man
with a defense worthy of being heard.

If these men are the first war leaders of a defeated nation to be
prosecuted in the name of the law, they are also the first to be given a
chance to plead for their lives in the name of the law. Realistically,
the Charter of this Tribunal, which gives them a hearing, is also the
source of their only hope. It may be that these men of troubled
conscience, whose only wish is that the world forget them, do not regard
a trial as a favor. But they do have a fair opportunity to defend
themselves—a favor which these men, when in power, rarely extended to
their fellow countrymen. Despite the fact that public opinion already
condemns their acts, we agree that here they must be given a presumption
of innocence, and we accept the burden of proving criminal acts and the
responsibility of these defendants for their commission.

When I say that we do not ask for convictions unless we prove crime, I
do not mean mere technical or incidental transgression of international
conventions. We charge guilt on planned and intended conduct that
involves moral as well as legal wrong. And we do not mean conduct that
is a natural and human, even if illegal, cutting of corners, such as
many of us might well have committed had we been in the defendants’
positions. It is not because they yielded to the normal frailties of
human beings that we accuse them. It is their abnormal and inhuman
conduct which brings them to this bar.

We will not ask you to convict these men on the testimony of their foes.
There is no count in the Indictment that cannot be proved by books and
records. The Germans were always meticulous record keepers, and these
defendants had their share of the Teutonic passion for thoroughness in
putting things on paper. Nor were they without vanity. They arranged
frequently to be photographed in action. We will show you their own
films. You will see their own conduct and hear their own voices as these
defendants re-enact for you, from the screen, some of the events in the
course of the conspiracy.

We would also make clear that we have no purpose to incriminate the
whole German people. We know that the Nazi Party was not put in power by
a majority of the German vote. We know it came to power by an evil
alliance between the most extreme of the Nazi revolutionists, the most
unrestrained of the German reactionaries, and the most aggressive of the
German militarists. If the German populace had willingly accepted the
Nazi program, no Storm-troopers would have been needed in the early days
of the Party and there would have been no need for concentration camps
or the Gestapo, both of which institutions were inaugurated as soon as
the Nazis gained control of the German State. Only after these lawless
innovations proved successful at home were they taken abroad.

The German people should know by now that the people of the United
States hold them in no fear, and in no hate. It is true that the Germans
have taught us the horrors of modern warfare, but the ruin that lies
from the Rhine to the Danube shows that we, like our Allies, have not
been dull pupils. If we are not awed by German fortitude and proficiency
in war, and if we are not persuaded of their political maturity, we do
respect their skill in the arts of peace, their technical competence,
and the sober, industrious, and self-disciplined character of the masses
of the German people. In 1933 we saw the German people recovering
prestige in the commercial, industrial, and artistic world after the
set-back of the last war. We beheld their progress neither with envy nor
malice. The Nazi regime interrupted this advance. The recoil of the Nazi
aggression has left Germany in ruins. The Nazi readiness to pledge the
German word without hesitation and to break it without shame has
fastened upon German diplomacy a reputation for duplicity that will
handicap it for years. Nazi arrogance has made the boast of the “master
race” a taunt that will be thrown at Germans the world over for
generations. The Nazi nightmare has given the German name a new and
sinister significance throughout the world which will retard Germany a
century. The German, no less than the non-German world, has accounts to
settle with these defendants.

The fact of the war and the course of the war, which is the central
theme of our case, is history. From September 1st, 1939, when the German
armies crossed the Polish frontier, until September 1942, when they met
epic resistance at Stalingrad, German arms seemed invincible. Denmark
and Norway, the Netherlands and France, Belgium and Luxembourg, the
Balkans and Africa, Poland and the Baltic States, and parts of Russia,
all had been overrun and conquered by swift, powerful, well-aimed blows.
That attack on the peace of the world is the crime against international
society which brings into international cognizance crimes in its aid and
preparation which otherwise might be only internal concerns. It was
aggressive war, which the nations of the world had renounced. It was war
in violation of treaties, by which the peace of the world was sought to
be safe-guarded.

This war did not just happen—it was planned and prepared for over a
long period of time and with no small skill and cunning. The world has
perhaps never seen such a concentration and stimulation of the energies
of any people as that which enabled Germany 20 years after it was
defeated, disarmed, and dismembered to come so near carrying out its
plan to dominate Europe. Whatever else we may say of those who were the
authors of this war, they did achieve a stupendous work in organization,
and our first task is to examine the means by which these defendants and
their fellow conspirators prepared and incited Germany to go to war.

In general, our case will disclose these defendants all uniting at some
time with the Nazi Party in a plan which they well knew could be
accomplished only by an outbreak of war in Europe. Their seizure of the
German State, their subjugation of the German people, their terrorism
and extermination of dissident elements, their planning and waging of
war, their calculated and planned ruthlessness in the conduct of
warfare, their deliberate and planned criminality toward conquered
peoples,—all these are ends for which they acted in concert; and all
these are phases of the conspiracy, a conspiracy which reached one goal
only to set out for another and more ambitious one. We shall also trace
for you the intricate web of organizations which these men formed and
utilized to accomplish these ends. We will show how the entire structure
of offices and officials was dedicated to the criminal purposes and
committed to the use of the criminal methods planned by these defendants
and their co-conspirators, many of whom war and suicide have put beyond
reach.

It is my purpose to open the case, particularly under Count One of the
Indictment, and to deal with the Common Plan or Conspiracy to achieve
ends possible only by resort to Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and
Crimes against Humanity. My emphasis will not be on individual
barbarities and perversions which may have occurred independently of any
central plan. One of the dangers ever present is that this Trial may be
protracted by details of particular wrongs and that we will become lost
in a “wilderness of single instances”. Nor will I now dwell on the
activity of individual defendants except as it may contribute to
exposition of the common plan.

The case as presented by the United States will be concerned with the
brains and authority back of all the crimes. These defendants were men
of a station and rank which does not soil its own hands with blood. They
were men who knew how to use lesser folk as tools. We want to reach the
planners and designers, the inciters and leaders without whose evil
architecture the world would not have been for so long scourged with the
violence and lawlessness, and wracked with the agonies and convulsions,
of this terrible war.

_The Lawless Road to Power_:

The chief instrumentality of cohesion in plan and action was the
National Socialist German Workers Party, known as the Nazi Party. Some
of the defendants were with it from the beginning. Others joined only
after success seemed to have validated its lawlessness or power had
invested it with immunity from the processes of the law. Adolf Hitler
became its supreme leader or “Führer” in 1921.

On the 24th of February 1920, at Munich, it publicly had proclaimed its
program (1708-PS). Some of its purposes would commend themselves to many
good citizens, such as the demands for “profit-sharing in the great
industries,” “generous development of provision for old age,” “creation
and maintenance of a healthy middle class,” “a land reform suitable to
our national requirements,” and “raising the standard of health.” It
also made a strong appeal to that sort of nationalism which in ourselves
we call patriotism and in our rivals chauvinism. It demanded “equality
of rights for the German people in its dealing with other nations, and
the abolition of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.” It
demanded the “union of all Germans on the basis of the right of
self-determination of peoples to form a Great Germany.” It demanded
“land and territory (colonies) for the enrichment of our people and the
settlement of our surplus population.” All of these, of course, were
legitimate objectives if they were to be attained without resort to
aggressive warfare.

The Nazi Party from its inception, however, contemplated war. It
demanded the “abolition of mercenary troops and the formation of a
national army.” It proclaimed that:

    “In view of the enormous sacrifice of life and property demanded
    of a nation by every war, personal enrichment through war must
    be regarded as a crime against the nation. We demand, therefore,
    ruthless confiscation of all war profits.”

I do not criticize this policy. Indeed, I wish it were universal. I
merely wish to point out that in a time of peace, war was a
preoccupation of the Party, and it started the work of making war less
offensive to the masses of the people. With this it combined a program
of physical training and sports for youth that became, as we shall see,
the cloak for a secret program of military training.

The Nazi Party declaration also committed its members to an anti-Semitic
program. It declared that no Jew or any person of non-German blood could
be a member of the nation. Such persons were to be disfranchised,
disqualified for office, subject to the alien laws, and entitled to
nourishment only after the German population had first been provided
for. All who had entered Germany after August 2, 1914 were to be
required forthwith to depart, and all non-German immigration was to be
prohibited.

The Party also avowed, even in those early days, an authoritarian and
totalitarian program for Germany. It demanded creation of a strong
central power with unconditional authority, nationalization of all
businesses which had been “amalgamated,” and a “reconstruction” of the
national system of education which “must aim at teaching the pupil to
understand the idea of the State (state sociology).” Its hostility to
civil liberties and freedom of the press was distinctly announced in
these words:

    “It must be forbidden to publish newspapers which do not conduce
    to the national welfare. We demand the legal prosecution of all
    tendencies in art or literature of a kind likely to disintegrate
    our life as a nation and the suppression of institutions which
    might militate against the above requirements.”

The forecast of religious persecution was clothed in the language of
religious liberty, for the Nazi program stated, “We demand liberty for
all religious denominations in the State.” But, it continues with the
limitation, “so far as they are not a danger to it and do not militate
against the morality and moral sense of the German race.”

The Party program foreshadowed the campaign of terrorism. It announced,
“We demand ruthless war upon those whose activities are injurious to the
common interests”, and it demanded that such offenses be punished with
death.

It is significant that the leaders of this Party interpreted this
program as a belligerent one, certain to precipitate conflict. The Party
platform concluded, “The leaders of the Party swear to proceed
regardless of consequences—if necessary, at the sacrifice of their
lives—toward the fulfillment of the foregoing points.” It is this
Leadership Corps of the Party, not its entire membership, that stands
accused before you as a criminal organization.

Let us now see how the leaders of the Party fulfilled their pledge to
proceed regardless of consequences. Obviously, their foreign objectives,
which were nothing less than to undo international treaties and to wrest
territory from foreign control, as well as most of their internal
program, could be accomplished only by possession of the machinery of
the German State. The first effort, accordingly, was to subvert the
Weimar Republic by violent revolution. An abortive putsch at Munich in
1923 landed many of them in jail. A period of meditation which followed
produced _Mein Kampf_, henceforth the source of law for the Party
workers and a source of considerable revenue to its supreme leader. The
Nazi plans for the violent overthrow of the feeble Republic then turned
to plans for its capture.

No greater mistake could be made than to think of the Nazi Party in
terms of the loose organizations which we of the western world call
“political parties”. In discipline, structure, and method the Nazi Party
was not adapted to the democratic process of persuasion. It was an
instrument of conspiracy and of coercion. The Party was not organized to
take over power in the German State by winning support of a majority of
the German people; it was organized to seize power in defiance of the
will of the people.

The Nazi Party, under the “Führerprinzip,” was bound by an iron
discipline into a pyramid, with the Führer, Adolf Hitler, at the top and
broadening into a numerous Leadership Corps, composed of overlords of a
very extensive Party membership at the base. By no means all of those
who may have supported the movement in one way or another were actual
Party members. The membership took the Party oath which in effect
amounted to an abdication of personal intelligence and moral
responsibility. This was the oath: “I vow inviolable fidelity to Adolf
Hitler; I vow absolute obedience to him and to the leaders he designates
for me.” The membership in daily practice followed its leaders with an
idolatry and self-surrender more Oriental than Western.

We will not be obliged to guess as to the motives or goal of the Nazi
Party. The immediate aim was to undermine the Weimar Republic. The order
to all Party members to work to that end was given in a letter from
Hitler of August 24, 1931 to Rosenberg, of which we will produce the
original. Hitler wrote:

    “I am just reading in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, edition
    235/236, page 1, an article entitled “Does Wirth Intend To Come
    over?” The tendency of the article is to prevent on our part a
    crumbling away from the present form of government. I myself am
    travelling all over Germany to achieve exactly the opposite. May
    I therefore ask that my own paper will not stab me in the back
    with tactically unwise articles. . . .” (047-PS)

Captured film enables us to present the Defendant Alfred Rosenberg, who
from the screen will himself tell you the story. The SA practiced
violent interference with elections. We have the reports of the SD
describing in detail how its members later violated the secrecy of
elections in order to identify those who opposed them. One of the
reports makes this explanation:

    “. . . . The control was effected in the following way: some
    members of the election committee marked all the ballot papers
    with numbers. During the ballot itself, a voters’ list was made
    up. The ballot-papers were handed out in numerical order,
    therefore it was possible afterwards with the aid of this list
    to find out the persons who cast ‘No’—votes or invalid votes.
    One sample of these marked ballot-papers is enclosed. The
    marking was done on the back of the ballot-papers with skimmed
    milk. . . .” (R-142)

The Party activity, in addition to all the familiar forms of political
contest, took on the aspect of a rehearsal for warfare. It utilized a
Party formation, “Die Sturmabteilungen”, commonly known as the SA. This
was a voluntary organization of youthful and fanatical Nazis trained for
the use of violence under semi-military discipline. Its members began by
acting as bodyguards for the Nazi leaders and rapidly expanded from
defensive to offensive tactics. They became disciplined ruffians for the
breaking up of opposition meetings and the terrorization of adversaries.
They boasted that their task was to make the Nazi Party “master of the
streets”. The SA was the parent organization of a number of others. Its
offspring include “Die Schutzstaffeln”, commonly known as the SS, formed
in 1925 and distinguished for the fanaticism and cruelty of its members;
“Der Sicherheitsdienst”, known as the SD; and “Die Geheime
Staatspolizei”, the Secret State Police, the infamous Gestapo formed in
1934 after Nazi accession to power.

A glance at a chart of the Party organization is enough to show how
completely it differed from the political parties we know. It had its
own source of law in the Führer and sub-Führer. It had its own courts
and its own police. The conspirators set up a government within the
Party to exercise outside the law every sanction that any legitimate
state could exercise and many that it could not. Its chain of command
was military, and its formations were martial in name as well as in
function. They were composed of battalions set up to bear arms under
military discipline, motorized corps, flying corps, and the infamous
“Death Head Corps”, which was not misnamed. The Party had its own secret
police, its security units, its intelligence and espionage division, its
raiding forces, and its youth forces. It established elaborate
administrative mechanisms to identify and liquidate spies and informers,
to manage concentration camps, to operate death vans, and to finance the
whole movement. Through concentric circles of authority, the Nazi Party,
as its leadership later boasted, eventually organized and dominated
every phase of German life—but not until they had waged a bitter
internal struggle characterized by brutal criminality we charge here. In
preparation for this phase of their struggle, they created a Party
police system. This became the pattern and the instrument of the police
state, which was the first goal in their plan.

The Party formations, including the Leadership Corps of the Party, the
SD, the SS, the SA, and the infamous Secret State Police, or
Gestapo,—all these stand accused before you as criminal organizations;
organizations which, as we will prove from their own documents, were
recruited only from recklessly devoted Nazis, ready in conviction and
temperament to do the most violent of deeds to advance the common
program. They terrorized and silenced democratic opposition and were
able at length to combine with political opportunists, militarists,
industrialists, monarchists, and political reactionaries.

On January 30, 1933 Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the German
Republic. An evil combination, represented in the prisoners’ dock by its
most eminent survivors, had succeeded in possessing itself of the
machinery of the German Government, a facade behind which they
thenceforth would operate to make a reality of the war of conquest they
so long had plotted. The conspiracy had passed into its second phase.

_The Consolidation of Nazi Power_:

We shall now consider the steps, which embraced the most hideous of
Crimes against Humanity, to which the conspirators resorted in
perfecting control of the German State and in preparing Germany for the
aggressive war indispensable to their ends.

The Germans of the 1920’s were a frustrated and baffled people as a
result of defeat and the disintegration of their traditional government.
The democratic elements, which were trying to govern Germany through the
new and feeble machinery of the Weimar Republic, got inadequate support
from the democratic forces of the rest of the world, including my
country. It is not to be denied that Germany, when worldwide depression
was added to her other problems, was faced with urgent and intricate
pressures in her economic and political life which necessitated bold
measures.

The internal measures by which a nation attempts to solve its problems
are ordinarily of no concern to other nations. But the Nazi program from
the first was recognized as a desperate program for a people still
suffering the effects of an unsuccessful war. The Nazi policy embraced
ends recognized as attainable only by a renewal and a more successful
outcome of war, in Europe. The conspirators’ answer to Germany’s
problems was nothing less than to plot the regaining of territories lost
in the First World War and the acquisition of other fertile lands of
Central Europe by dispossessing or exterminating those who inhabited
them. They also contemplated destroying or permanently weakening all
other neighboring peoples so as to win virtual domination over Europe
and probably of the world. The precise limits of their ambition we need
not define for it was and is as illegal to wage aggressive war for small
stakes as for large ones.

We find at this period two governments in Germany—the real and the
ostensible. The forms of the German Republic were maintained for a time,
and it was the outward and visible government. But the real authority in
the State was outside and above the law and rested in the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party.

On February 27, 1933, less than a month after Hitler became Chancellor,
the Reichstag building was set on fire. The burning of this symbol of
free parliamentary government was so providential for the Nazis that it
was believed they staged the fire themselves. Certainly when we
contemplate their known crimes, we cannot believe they would shrink from
mere arson. It is not necessary, however, to resolve the controversy as
to who set the fire. The significant point is in the use that was made
of the fire and of the state of public mind it produced. The Nazis
immediately accused the Communist Party of instigating and committing
the crime, and turned every effort to portray this single act of arson
as the beginning of a communist revolution. Then, taking advantage of
the hysteria, the Nazis met this phantom revolution with a real one. In
the following December the German Supreme Court with commendable courage
and independence acquitted the accused Communists, but it was too late
to influence the tragic course of events which the Nazi conspirators had
set rushing forward.

Hitler, on the morning after the fire, obtained from the aged and ailing
President Von Hindenburg a presidential decree suspending the extensive
guarantees of individual liberty contained in the constitution of the
Weimar Republic. The decree provided that:

    “Sections 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the
    Constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further
    notice. Thus, restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of
    free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, on
    the right of assembly and the right of association, and
    violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic
    communications, and warrants for house-searches, orders for
    confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also
    permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.”
    (1390-PS)

The extent of the restriction on personal liberty under the decree of
February 28, 1933 may be understood by reference to the rights under the
Weimar constitution which were suspended:

    “_Article 114._ The freedom of the person is inviolable.
    Curtailment or deprivation of personal freedom by a public
    authority is only permissible on a legal basis.

    “Persons who have been deprived of their freedom must be
    informed at the latest on the following day by whose authority
    and for what reasons the deprivation of freedom was ordered;
    opportunity shall be afforded them without delay of submitting
    objections to their deprivation of freedom.

    “_Article 115._ Every German’s home is his sanctuary and is
    inviolable. Exceptions may only be made as provided by law.

    “_Article 117._ The secrecy of letters and all postal,
    telegraphic, and telephone communications is inviolable.
    Exceptions are inadmissible except by Reich law.

    “_Article 118._ Every German has the right, within the limits of
    the general laws, to express his opinions freely in speech, in
    writing, in print, in picture form, or in any other way. No
    conditions of work or employment may detract from this right and
    no disadvantage may accrue to him from any person for making use
    of this right. . . .

    “_Article 123._ All Germans have the right to assemble
    peacefully and unarmed without giving notice and without special
    permission.

    “A Reich law may make previous notification obligatory for
    assemblies in the open air, and may prohibit them in case of
    immediate danger to the public safety.

    “_Article 124._ All the Germans have the right to form
    associations or societies for purposes not contrary to criminal
    law. This right may not be curtailed by preventive measures. The
    same provisions apply to religious associations and societies.

    “Every association may become incorporated (Erwerb der
    Rechtsfähigkeit) according to the provisions of the civil law.
    The right may not be refused to any association on the grounds
    that its aims are political, social-political, or religious.

    “_Article 153._ Property is guaranteed by the Constitution. Its
    content and limits are defined by the laws.

    “Expropriation can only take place for the public benefit and on
    a legal basis. Adequate compensation shall be granted, unless a
    Reich law orders otherwise. In the case of dispute concerning
    the amount of compensation, it shall be possible to submit the
    matter to the ordinary civil courts, unless Reich laws determine
    otherwise. Compensation must be paid if the Reich expropriates
    property belonging to the Lands, Communes, or public utility
    associations.

    “Property carries obligations. Its use shall also serve the
    common good.” (2050-PS)

It must be said in fairness to Von Hindenburg that the constitution
itself authorized him temporarily to suspend these fundamental rights
“if the public safety and order in the German Reich are considerably
disturbed or endangered.” It must also be acknowledged that President
Ebert previously had invoked this power.

But the National Socialist coup was made possible because the terms of
the Hitler-Hindenburg decree departed from all previous ones in which
the power of suspension had been invoked. Whenever Ebert had suspended
constitutional guarantees of individual rights, his decree had expressly
revived the Protective Custody Act adopted by the Reichstag in 1916
during the previous war. This act guaranteed a judicial hearing within
24 hours of arrest, gave a right to have counsel and to inspect all
relevant records, provided for appeal, and authorized compensation from
Treasury funds for erroneous arrests.

The Hitler-Hindenburg decree of February 28, 1933 contained no such
safeguards. The omission may not have been noted by Von Hindenburg.
Certainly he did not appreciate its effect. It left the Nazi police and
party formations, already existing and functioning under Hitler,
completely unrestrained and irresponsible. Secret arrest and indefinite
detention, without charges, without evidence, without hearing, without
counsel, became the method of inflicting inhuman punishment on any whom
the Nazi police suspected or disliked. No court could issue an
injunction, or writ of _habeas corpus_, or _certiorari_. The German
people were in the hands of the police, the police were in the hands of
the Nazi Party, and the Party was in the hands of a ring of evil men, of
whom the defendants here before you are surviving and representative
leaders.

The Nazi conspiracy, as we shall show, always contemplated not merely
overcoming current opposition but exterminating elements which could not
be reconciled with its philosophy of the state. It not only sought to
establish the Nazi “new order” but to secure its sway, as Hitler
predicted, “for a thousand years.” Nazis were never in doubt or
disagreement as to what these dissident elements were. They were
concisely described by one of them, Colonel General Von Fritsch, on
December 11, 1938 in these words:

    “Shortly after the first war I came to the conclusion that we
    should have to be victorious in three battles if Germany were to
    become powerful again: 1. The battle against the working
    class—Hitler has won this. 2. Against the Catholic Church,
    perhaps better expressed against Ultramontanism. 3. Against the
    Jews.” (1947-PS)

The warfare against these elements was continuous. The battle in Germany
was but a practice skirmish for the worldwide drive against them. We
have in point of geography and of time two groups of Crimes against
Humanity—one within Germany before and during the war, the other in
occupied territory during the war. But the two are not separated in Nazi
planning. They are a continuous unfolding of the Nazi plan to
exterminate peoples and institutions which might serve as a focus or
instrument for overturning their “new world order” at any time. We
consider these crimes against humanity in this address as manifestations
of the one Nazi plan and discuss them according to General Von Fritsch’s
classification.

_1. The Battle against the Working Class_:

When Hitler came to power, there were in Germany three groups of trade
unions. The General German Trade Union Confederation (ADGB) with 28
affiliated unions, and the General Independent Employees Confederation
(AFA) with 13 federated unions together numbered more than 4,500,000
members. The Christian Trade Union had over 1,250,000 members.

The working people of Germany, like the working people of other nations,
had little to gain personally by war. While labor is usually brought
around to the support of the nation at war, labor by and large is a
pacific, though by no means a pacifist force in the world. The working
people of Germany had not forgotten in 1933 how heavy the yoke of the
war lord can be. It was the workingmen who had joined the sailors and
soldiers in the revolt of 1918 to end the first World War. The Nazis had
neither forgiven nor forgotten. The Nazi program required that this part
of the German population not only be stripped of power to resist
diversion of its scanty comforts to armament, but also be wheedled or
whipped into new and unheard of sacrifices as a part of the Nazi war
preparation. Labor must be cowed, and that meant its organizations and
means of cohesion and defense must be destroyed.

The purpose to regiment labor for the Nazi Party was avowed by Ley in a
speech to workers on May 2, 1933 as follows:

    “You may say what else do you want, you have the absolute power.
    True we have the power, but we do not have the whole people, we
    do not have you workers 100 per cent, and it is you whom we
    want; we will not let you be until you stand with us in
    complete, genuine acknowledgment.” (614-PS)

The first Nazi attack was upon the two larger unions. On April 21, 1933
an order not even in the name of the Government, but of the Nazi Party
was issued by the conspirator Robert Ley as “Chief of Staff of the
political organization of the NSDAP,” applicable to the Trade Union
Confederation and the Independent Employees Confederation. It directed
seizure of their properties and arrest of their principal leaders. The
Party order directed Party organs which we here denounce as criminal
associations, the SA and SS “to be employed for the occupation of the
trade union properties, and for the taking into custody of personalities
who come into question.” And it directed the taking into “protective
custody” of all chairmen and district secretaries of such unions and
branch directors of the labor bank. (392-PS)

These orders were carried out on May 2, 1933. All funds of the labor
unions, including pension and benefit funds, were seized. Union leaders
were sent to concentration camps. A few days later, on May 10, 1933,
Hitler appointed Ley leader of the German Labor Front (Deutsche
Arbeitsfront) which succeeded to the confiscated union funds. The German
Labor Front, a Nazi controlled labor bureau, was set up under Ley to
teach the Nazi philosophy to German workers and to weed out from
industrial employment all who were backward in their lessons. (1940-PS)
“Factory troops” were organized as an “ideological shock squad within
the factory” (1817-PS). The Party order provided that “outside of the
German Labor Front, no other organization (whether of workers or of
employees) is to exist.” On June 24, 1933 the remaining Christian Trade
Unions were seized, pursuant to an order of the Nazi Party signed by
Ley.

On May 19, 1933, this time by a government decree, it was provided that
“trustees” of labor appointed by Hitler, should regulate the conditions
of all labor contracts, replacing the former process of collective
bargaining (405-PS). On November 30, 1934 a decree “regulating national
labor” introduced the Führer Principle into industrial relations. It
provided that the owners of enterprises should be the “Führer” and the
workers should be the followers. The “enterprise-Führer” should “make
decisions for employees and laborers in all matters concerning the
enterprise” (1861-PS). It was by such bait that the great German
industrialists were induced to support the Nazi cause, to their own
ultimate ruin.

Not only did the Nazis dominate and regiment German labor, but they
forced the youth into the ranks of the laboring people they had thus led
into chains. Under a compulsory labor service decree on 26 June 1935
young men and women between the ages of 18 and 25 were conscripted for
labor (1654-PS). Thus was the purpose to subjugate German labor
accomplished. In the words of Ley, this accomplishment consisted “in
eliminating the association character of the trade union and employees’
associations, and in its place we have substituted the conception
‘soldiers of work’.” The productive manpower of the German nation was in
Nazi control. By these steps the defendants won the battle to liquidate
labor unions as potential opposition and were enabled to impose upon the
working class the burdens of preparing for aggressive warfare.

Robert Ley, the field marshal of the battle against labor, answered our
Indictment with suicide. Apparently he knew no better answer.

_2. The Battle against the Churches_:

The Nazi Party always was predominantly anti-Christian in its ideology.
But we who believe in freedom of conscience and of religion base no
charge of criminality on anybody’s ideology. It is not because the Nazi
themselves were irreligious or pagan, but because they persecuted others
of the Christian faith that they become guilty of crime, and it is
because the persecution was a step in the preparation for aggressive
warfare that the offense becomes one of international consequence. To
remove every moderating influence among the German people and to put its
population on a total war footing, the conspirators devised and carried
out a systematic and relentless repression of all Christian sects and
churches.

We will ask you to convict the Nazis on their own evidence. Martin
Bormann, in June 1941, issued a secret decree on the relation of
Christianity and National Socialism. The decree provided:

    “For the first time in German history the Führer consciously and
    completely has the leadership of the people in his own hand.
    With the Party, its components, and attached units the Führer
    has created for himself and thereby the German Reich leadership
    an instrument which makes him independent of the church. All
    influences which might impair or damage the leadership of the
    people exercised by the Führer with help of the NSDAP, must be
    eliminated. More and more the people must be separated from the
    churches and their organs, the pastors. Of course, the churches
    must and will, seen from their viewpoint, defend themselves
    against this loss of power. But never again must an influence on
    leadership of the people be yielded to the churches. This
    (influence) must be broken completely and finally.

    “Only the Reich Government and by its direction the Party, its
    components, and attached units have a right to leadership of the
    people. Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers,
    seers, and other fakers are eliminated and suppressed by the
    State, so must the possibility of church influence also be
    totally removed. Not until this has happened, does the State
    leadership have influence on the individual citizens. Not until
    then are people and Reich secure in their existence for all the
    future.” (D-75)

And how the Party had been securing the Reich from Christian influence,
will be proved by such items as this teletype from the Gestapo, Berlin,
to the Gestapo, Nuremberg, on July 24, 1938. Let us hear their own
account of events in Rottenburg.

    “The Party on 23 July 1939 from 2100 on carried out the third
    demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants about
    2500-3000 were brought in from outside by bus, etc. The
    Rottenburg populace again did not participate in the
    demonstration. This town took rather a hostile attitude to the
    demonstrations. The action got completely out of hand of the
    Party member responsible for it. The demonstrators stormed the
    palace, beat in the gates and doors. About 150 to 200 people
    forced their way into the palace, searched the rooms, threw
    files out of the windows and rummaged through the beds in the
    rooms of the palace. One bed was ignited. Before the fire got to
    the other objects of equipment in the rooms and the palace, the
    flaming bed could be thrown from the window and the fire
    extinguished. The Bishop was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg
    and the ladies and gentlemen of his menage in the chapel at
    prayer. About 25 to 30 people pressed into this chapel and
    molested those present. Bishop Groeber was taken for Bishop
    Sproll. He was grabbed by the robe and dragged back and forth.
    Finally the intruders realized that Bishop Groeber is not the
    one they are seeking. They could then be persuaded to leave the
    building. After the evacuation of the palace by the
    demonstrators I had an interview with Archbishop Groeber who
    left Rottenburg in the night. Groeber wants to turn to the
    Führer and Reich Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick, anew. On
    the course of the action, the damage done as well as the homage
    of the Rottenburg populace beginning today for the Bishop I
    shall immediately hand in a full report, after I am in the act
    of suppressing counter mass meetings. . . .

    “In case the Führer has instructions to give in this matter, I
    request that these be transmitted most quickly. . . .” (848-PS)

Later, Defendant Rosenberg wrote to Bormann reviewing the proposal of
Kerrl as Church Minister to place the Protestant Church under State
tutelage and proclaim Hitler its supreme head. Rosenberg was opposed,
hinting that nazism was to suppress the Christian Church completely
after the war (See also 098-PS).

The persecution of all pacifist and dissenting sects, such as Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Pentecostal Association, was peculiarly relentless and
cruel. The policy toward the Evangelical Churches, however, was to use
their influence for the Nazis’ own purposes. In September 1933 Mueller
was appointed the Führer’s representative with power to deal with the
“affairs of the Evangelical Church” in its relations to the State.
Eventually, steps were taken to create a Reich Bishop vested with power
to control this Church. A long conflict followed, Pastor Niemöller was
sent to concentration camp, and extended interference with the internal
discipline and administration of the churches occurred.

A most intense drive was directed against the Roman Catholic Church.
After a strategic concordat with the Holy See, signed in July 1933 in
Rome, which never was observed by the Nazi Party, a long and persistent
persecution of the Catholic Church, its priesthood, and its members, was
carried out. Church schools and educational institutions were suppressed
or subjected to requirements of Nazi teaching inconsistent with the
Christian faith. The property of the Church was confiscated and inspired
vandalism directed against Church property was left unpunished.
Religious instruction was impeded and the exercise of religion made
difficult. Priests and bishops were laid upon, riots were stimulated to
harass them, and many were sent to concentration camps.

After occupation of foreign soil, these persecutions went on with
greater vigor than ever. We will present to you from the files of the
Vatican the earnest protests made by the Vatican to Ribbentrop
summarizing the persecutions to which the priesthood and the Church had
been subjected in this twentieth century under the Nazi regime.
Ribbentrop never answered them. He could not deny. He dared not justify.

I now come to “Crimes against the Jews.”

THE PRESIDENT: We shall now take our noon recess.

                [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 15 minutes at half past 3
and will then continue until half past 4.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I was about to take up the “Crimes Committed
against the Jews.”

_3. Crimes against the Jews_:

The most savage and numerous crimes planned and committed by the Nazis
were those against the Jews. Those in Germany in 1933 numbered about
500,000. In the aggregate, they had made for themselves positions which
excited envy, and had accumulated properties which excited the avarice
of the Nazis. They were few enough to be helpless and numerous enough to
be held up as a menace.

Let there be no misunderstanding about the charge of persecuting Jews.
What we charge against these defendants is not those arrogances and
pretensions which frequently accompany the intermingling of different
peoples and which are likely, despite the honest efforts of government,
to produce regrettable crimes and convulsions. It is my purpose to show
a plan and design, to which all Nazis were fanatically committed, to
annihilate all Jewish people. These crimes were organized and promoted
by the Party leadership, executed and protected by the Nazi officials,
as we shall convince you by written orders of the Secret State Police
itself.

The persecution of the Jews was a continuous and deliberate policy. It
was a policy directed against other nations as well as against the Jews
themselves. Anti-Semitism was promoted to divide and embitter the
democratic peoples and to soften their resistance to the Nazi
aggression. As Robert Ley declared in _Der Angriff_ on 14 May 1944: “The
second German secret weapon is Anti-Semitism because if it is constantly
pursued by Germany, it will become a universal problem which all nations
will be forced to consider.”

Anti-Semitism also has been aptly credited with being a “spearhead of
terror.” The ghetto was the laboratory for testing repressive measures.
Jewish property was the first to be expropriated, but the custom grew
and included similar measures against anti-Nazi Germans, Poles, Czechs,
Frenchmen, and Belgians. Extermination of the Jews enabled the Nazis to
bring a practiced hand to similar measures against Poles, Serbs, and
Greeks. The plight of the Jew was a constant threat to opposition or
discontent among other elements of Europe’s population—pacifists,
conservatives, Communists, Catholics, Protestants, Socialists. It was in
fact, a threat to every dissenting opinion and to every non-Nazi’s life.

The persecution policy against the Jews commenced with non-violent
measures, such as disfranchisement and discriminations against their
religion, and the placing of impediments in the way of success in
economic life. It moved rapidly to organized mass violence against them,
physical isolation in ghettos, deportation, forced labor, mass
starvation, and extermination. The Government, the Party formations
indicted before you as criminal organizations, the Secret State Police,
the Army, private and semi-public associations, and “spontaneous” mobs
that were carefully inspired from official sources, were all agencies
that were concerned in this persecution. Nor was it directed against
individual Jews for personal bad citizenship or unpopularity. The avowed
purpose was the destruction of the Jewish people as a whole, as an end
in itself, as a measure of preparation for war, and as a discipline of
conquered peoples.

The conspiracy or common plan to exterminate the Jew was so methodically
and thoroughly pursued, that despite the German defeat and Nazi
prostration this Nazi aim largely has succeeded. Only remnants of the
European Jewish population remain in Germany, in the countries which
Germany occupied, and in those which were her satellites or
collaborators. Of the 9,600,000 Jews who lived in Nazi-dominated Europe,
60 percent are authoritatively estimated to have perished. Five million
seven hundred thousand Jews are missing from the countries in which they
formerly lived, and over 4,500,000 cannot be accounted for by the normal
death rate nor by immigration; nor are they included among displaced
persons. History does not record a crime ever perpetrated against so
many victims or one ever carried out with such calculated cruelty.

You will have difficulty, as I have, to look into the faces of these
defendants and believe that in this twentieth century human beings could
inflict such sufferings as will be proved here on their own countrymen
as well as upon their so-called “inferior” enemies. Particular crimes,
and the responsibility of defendants for them, are to be dealt with by
the Soviet Government’s counsel, when committed in the East, and by
counsel for the Republic of France when committed in the West. I advert
to them only to show their magnitude as evidence of a purpose and a
knowledge common to all defendants, of an official plan rather than of a
capricious policy of some individual commander, and to show such a
continuity of Jewish persecution from the rise of the Nazi conspiracy to
its collapse as forbids us to believe that any person could be
identified with any part of Nazi action without approving this most
conspicuous item in their program.

The Indictment itself recites many evidences of the anti-Semitic
persecutions. The Defendant Streicher led the Nazis in anti-Semitic
bitterness and extremism. In an article appearing in _Der Stürmer_ on 19
March 1942 he complained that Christian teachings have stood in the way
of “racial solution of the Jewish question in Europe”, and quoted
enthusiastically as the twentieth century solution the Führer’s
proclamation of February 24, 1942 that “the Jew will be exterminated.”
And on November 4, 1943 Streicher declared in _Der Stürmer_ that the
Jews “have disappeared from Europe and that the Jewish ‘Reservoir of the
East’ from which the Jewish plague has for centuries beset the people of
Europe, has ceased to exist.” Streicher now has the effrontery to tell
us he is “only a Zionist”—he says he wants only to return the Jews to
Palestine. But on May 7, 1942 his newspaper, _Der Stürmer_, had this to
say:

    “It is also not only a European problem! _The Jewish question is
    a world question!_ Not only is Germany not safe in the face of
    the Jews as long as one Jew lives in Europe, but also the Jewish
    question is hardly solved in Europe so long as Jews live in the
    rest of the world.”

And the Defendant Hans Frank, a lawyer by profession, I say with shame,
summarized in his diary in 1944 the Nazi policy thus: “The Jews are a
race which has to be eliminated; whenever we catch one, it is his end”
(2233-PS, 4 March 1944, P. 26). And earlier, speaking of his function as
Governor General of Poland, he confided to his diary this sentiment: “Of
course I cannot eliminate all lice and Jews in only a year’s time”
(2233-PS, Vol. IV, 1940, P. 1158). I could multiply endlessly this kind
of Nazi ranting but I will leave it to the evidence and turn to the
fruit of this perverted thinking.

The most serious of the actions against Jews were outside of any law,
but the law itself was employed to some extent. There were the infamous
Nuremberg decrees of September 15, 1935 (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1935, Part.
I, P. 1146). The Jews were segregated into ghettos and put into forced
labor; they were expelled from their professions; their property was
expropriated; all cultural life, the press, the theater, and schools
were prohibited them; and the SD was made responsible for them (212-PS,
069-PS). This was an ominous, guardianship, as the following order for
“The Handling of the Jewish Question” shows:

    “The competency of the Chief of the Security Police and Security
    Service, who is charged with the mission of solving the European
    Jewish question, extends even to the Occupied Eastern
    Provinces. . . .

    “An eventual act by the civilian population against the Jews is
    not to be prevented as long as this is compatible with the
    maintenance of order and security in the rear of the fighting
    troops. . . .

    “The first main goal of the German measures must be strict
    segregation of Jewry from the rest of the population. In the
    execution of this, first of all is the seizing of the Jewish
    populace by the introduction of a registration order and similar
    appropriate measures. . . .

    “Then immediately, the wearing of the recognition sign
    consisting of a yellow Jewish star is to be brought about and
    all rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. They are to
    be placed in ghettos and at the same time are to be separated
    according to sexes. The presence of many more or less closed
    Jewish settlements in White Ruthenia and in the Ukraine makes
    this mission easier. Moreover, places are to be chosen which
    make possible the full use of the Jewish manpower in case labor
    needs are present. . . .

    “The entire Jewish property is to be seized and confiscated with
    exception of that which is necessary for a bare existence. As
    far as the economical situation permits, the power of disposal
    of their property is to be taken from the Jews as soon as
    possible through orders and other measures given by the
    commissariat, so that the moving of property will quickly cease.

    “Any cultural activity will be completely forbidden, to the Jew.
    This includes the outlawing of the Jewish press, the Jewish
    theaters, and schools.

    “The slaughtering of animals according to Jewish rites is also
    to be prohibited. . . .” (212-PS)

The anti-Jewish campaign became furious in Germany following the
assassination in Paris of the German Legation Councillor Von Rath.
Heydrich, Gestapo head, sent a teletype to all Gestapo and SD offices
with directions for handling “spontaneous” uprising anticipated for the
nights of November 9 and 10, 1938 so as to aid in destruction of
Jewish-owned property and protect only that of Germans. No more cynical
document ever came into evidence. Then there is a report by an SS
brigade leader, Dr. Stahlecker, to Himmler, which recites that:

    “. . . Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to
    start pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture,
    though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following
    out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the
    Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But
    it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an
    immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the
    extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German
    circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native
    population itself took the first action by way of natural
    reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades
    and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the
    preceding period. . . .”

    “. . . In view of the extension of the area of operations and
    the great number of duties which had to be performed by the
    Security Police, it was intended from the very beginning to
    obtain the co-operation of the reliable population for the fight
    against vermin—that is mainly the Jews and Communists. Beyond
    our directing of the first spontaneous actions of
    self-cleansing, which will be reported elsewhere, care had to be
    taken that reliable people should be put to the cleansing job
    and that they were appointed auxiliary members of the Security
    Police. . . .”

    “. . . Kovno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in
    motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. Klimatis, the leader of
    the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this
    purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis
    of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in
    Kovno, and in such a way that no German order or German
    instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first
    pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June the Lithuanian partisans
    did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several
    synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a
    Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During
    the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a
    similar way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions
    followed the example of Kovno, though smaller and extending to
    the Communists who had been left behind.

    “These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army
    authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this
    procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first
    days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for
    carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the
    self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.

    “It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar
    cleansing actions in Latvia. . . .” (L-180)

Of course, it is self-evident that these “uprisings” were managed by the
Government and the Nazi Party. If we were in doubt, we could resort to
Streicher’s memorandum of April 14, 1939 which says:

    “The anti-Jewish action of November 1938 did not arise
    spontaneously from the people. . . . Part of the Party formation
    have been charged with the execution of the anti-Jewish action.”
    (406-PS)

Jews as a whole were fined a billion Reichsmarks. They were excluded
from all businesses, and claims against insurance companies for their
burned properties were confiscated, all by decree of the Defendant
Göring. (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, Part I, Pp. 1579-82)

Synagogues were the objects of a special vengeance. On November 10, 1938
the following order was given:

    “By order of the Group Commander:

    All Jewish synagogues in the area of Brigade 50 have to be blown
    up or set afire. . . . The operation will be carried out in
    civilian clothing. . . . Execution of the order will be
    reported. . . .” (1721-PS)

Some 40 teletype messages from various police headquarters will tell the
fury with which all Jews were pursued in Germany on those awful November
nights. The SS troops were turned loose and the Gestapo supervised.
Jewish-owned property was authorized to be destroyed. The Gestapo
ordered twenty to thirty thousand “well-to-do-Jews” to be arrested.
Concentration camps were to receive them. Healthy Jews, fit for labor,
were to be taken. (3051-PS)

As the German frontiers were expanded by war, so the campaign against
the Jews expanded. The Nazi plan never was limited to extermination in
Germany; always it contemplated extinguishing the Jew in Europe and
often in the world. In the West, the Jews were killed and their property
taken over. But the campaign achieved its zenith of savagery in the
East. The eastern Jew has suffered as no people ever suffered. Their
sufferings were carefully reported to the Nazi authorities to show
faithful adherence to the Nazi design. I shall refer only to enough of
the evidence of these to show the extent of the Nazi design for killing
Jews.

If I should recite these horrors in words of my own, you would think me
intemperate and unreliable. Fortunately, we need not take the word of
any witness but the Germans themselves. I invite you now to look at a
few of the vast number of captured German orders and reports that will
be offered in evidence, to see what a Nazi invasion meant. We will
present such evidence as the report of “Einsatzgruppe (Action Group) A”
of October 15, 1941 which boasts that in overrunning the Baltic States,
“Native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against the
Jews during the first hours after occupation. . . .” The report
continues:

    “From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish
    problem in the East could not be solved by pogroms alone. In
    accordance with the basic orders received, however, the
    cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim at a
    complete annihilation of the Jews. Special detachments
    reinforced by selected units—in Lithuania partisan detachments,
    in Latvia units of the Latvian auxiliary police—therefore
    performed extensive executions both in the towns and in rural
    areas. The actions of the execution detachments were performed
    smoothly.”

    “The sum total of the Jews liquidated in Lithuania amounts to
    71,105. During the pogroms in Kovno 3,800 Jews were eliminated,
    in the smaller towns about 1,200 Jews.”

    “In Latvia, up to now a total of 30,000 Jews were executed. Five
    hundred were eliminated by pogroms in Riga.” (L-180)

This is a captured report from the Commissioner of Sluzk on October 30,
1941 which describes the scene in more detail. It says:

    “. . . The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion
    had received the assignment to effect the liquidation of all
    Jews here in the town of Sluzk, within two days. . . . Then I
    requested him to postpone the action one day. However, he
    rejected this with the remark that he had to carry out this
    action everywhere and in all towns and that only two days were
    allotted for Sluzk. Within these two days, the town of Sluzk had
    to be cleared of Jews by all means. . . . All Jews without
    exception were taken out of the factories and shops and deported
    in spite of our agreement. It is true that part of the Jews was
    moved by way of the ghetto where many of them were processed and
    still segregated by me, but a large part was loaded directly on
    trucks and liquidated without further delay outside of the
    town. . . . For the rest, as regards the execution of the
    action, I must point out to my deepest regret that the latter
    bordered already on sadism. The town itself offered a picture of
    horror during the action. With indescribable brutality on the
    part of both the German police officers and particularly the
    Lithuanian partisans, the Jewish people, but also among them
    White Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded
    together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in
    different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The
    White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves
    from the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish
    people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a
    terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian
    people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also worked over
    with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an
    action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like a
    revolution. . . .”

There are reports which merely tabulate the numbers slaughtered. An
example is an account of the work of Einsatzgruppen of SIPO and SD in
the East, which relates that:

In Estonia, all Jews were arrested immediately upon the arrival of the
Wehrmacht. Jewish men and women above the age of 16 and capable of work
were drafted for forced labor. Jews were subjected to all sorts of
restrictions and all Jewish property was confiscated. All Jewish males
above the age of 16 were executed, with the exception of doctors and
elders. Only 500 of an original 4,500 Jews remained. Thirty-seven
thousand, one hundred eighty persons have been liquidated by the SIPO
and SD in White Ruthenia during October. In one town, 337 Jewish women
were executed for demonstrating a ‘provocative attitude.’ In another,
380 Jews were shot for spreading vicious propaganda.

And so the report continues, listing town after town, where hundreds of
Jews were murdered:

In Vitebsk 3,000 Jews were liquidated because of the danger of
epidemics. In Kiev 33,771 Jews were executed on September 29 and 30 in
retaliation for some fires which were set off there. In Shitomir 3,145
Jews ‘had to be shot’ because, judging from experience they had to be
considered as the carriers of Bolshevik propaganda. In Cherson 410 Jews
were executed in reprisal against acts of sabotage. In the territory
east of the Dnieper, the Jewish problem was ’solved’ by the liquidation
of 4,891 Jews and by putting the remainder into labor battalions of up
to 1,000 persons. (R-102)

Other accounts tell not of the slaughter so much as of the depths of
degradation to which the tormentors stooped. For example, we will show
the report made to Defendant Rosenberg about the army and the SS in the
area under Rosenberg’s jurisdiction, which recited the following:

“Details: In presence of SS man, a Jewish dentist has to break all gold
teeth and fillings out of mouth of German and Russian Jews _before_ they
are executed.”

Men, women and children are locked into barns and burned alive.

Peasants, women and children are shot on the pretext that they are
suspected of belonging to bands. (R-135)

We of the Western World heard of gas wagons in which Jews and political
opponents were asphyxiated. We could not believe it. But here we have
the report of May 16, 1942 from the German SS Officer Becker to his
supervisor in Berlin which tells this story:

Gas vans in C group can be driven to execution spot, which is generally
stationed 10 to 15 kms. from main road, only in dry weather. Since those
to be executed become frantic if conducted to this place, such vans
become immobilized in wet weather.

Gas vans in D group were camouflaged as cabin trailers, but vehicles
well known to authorities and civilian population which calls them
‘death vans’.

Writer of letter (Becker) ordered all men to keep as far away as
possible during gassing. Unloading van has ‘atrocious spiritual and
physical effect’ on men and they should be ordered not to participate in
such work. (501-PS)

I shall not dwell on this subject longer than to quote one more
sickening document which evidences the planned and systematic character
of the Jewish persecutions. I hold a report written with Teutonic
devotion to detail, illustrated with photographs to authenticate its
almost incredible text, and beautifully bound in leather with the loving
care bestowed on a proud work. It is the original report of the SS
Brigadier General Stroop in charge of the destruction of the Warsaw
Ghetto, and its title page carries the inscription, “The Jewish ghetto
in Warsaw no longer exists.” It is characteristic that one of the
captions explains that the photograph concerned shows the driving out of
Jewish “bandits”; those whom the photograph shows being driven out are
almost entirely women and little children. It contains a day-by-day
account of the killings mainly carried out by the SS organization, too
long to relate, but let me quote General Stroop’s summary:

    “The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could only be
    suppressed by energetic actions of our troops day and night.
    _The Reichsführer SS ordered, therefore, on 23 April 1943, the
    cleaning out of the ghetto with utter ruthlessness and merciless
    tenacity._ I, therefore, decided to destroy and burn down the
    entire ghetto without regard to the armament factories. These
    factories were systematically dismantled and then burned. Jews
    usually left their hideouts, but frequently remained in the
    burning buildings and jumped out of the windows only when the
    heat became unbearable. They then tried to crawl with broken
    bones across the street into buildings which were not afire.
    Sometimes they changed their hideouts during the night into the
    ruins of burned buildings. Life in the sewers was not pleasant
    after the first week. Many times we could hear loud voices in
    the sewers. SS men or policemen climbed bravely through the
    manholes to capture these Jews. Sometimes they stumbled over
    Jewish corpses; sometimes they were shot at. Tear gas bombs were
    thrown into the manholes and the Jews driven out of the sewers
    and captured. Countless numbers of Jews were liquidated in
    sewers and bunkers through blasting. The longer the resistance
    continued the tougher became the members of the Waffen SS,
    Police and Wehrmacht who always discharged their duties in an
    exemplary manner. Frequently Jews who tried to replenish their
    food supplies during the night or to communicate with
    neighboring groups were exterminated.

    “This action eliminated,” says the SS commander, “a proved total
    of 56,065. To that, we have to add the number killed through
    blasting, fire, etc., which cannot be counted.” (1061-PS)

We charge that all atrocities against Jews were the manifestation and
culmination of the Nazi plan to which every defendant here was a party.
I know very well that some of these men did take steps to spare some
particular Jew for some personal reason from the horrors that awaited
the unrescued Jew. Some protested that particular atrocities were
excessive, and discredited the general policy. While a few defendants
may show efforts to make specific exceptions to the policy of Jewish
extermination, I have found no instance in which any defendant opposed
the policy itself or sought to revoke or even modify it.

Determination to destroy the Jews was a binding force which at all times
cemented the elements of this conspiracy. On many internal policies
there were differences among the defendants. But there is not one of
them who has not echoed the rallying cry of nazism: “Deutschland
erwache, Juda verrecke!” (Germany awake, Jewry perish!).

_Terrorism and Preparation for War_:

How a government treats its own inhabitants generally is thought to be
no concern of other governments or of international society. Certainly
few oppressions or cruelties would warrant the intervention of foreign
powers. But the German mistreatment of Germans is now known to pass in
magnitude and savagery any limits of what is tolerable by modern
civilization. Other nations, by silence, would take a consenting part in
such crimes. These Nazi persecutions, moreover, take character as
international crimes because of the purpose for which they were
undertaken.

The purpose, as we have seen, of getting rid of the influence of free
labor, the churches, and the Jews was to clear their obstruction to the
precipitation of aggressive war. If aggressive warfare in violation of
treaty obligation is a matter of international cognizance the
preparations for it must also be of concern to the international
community. Terrorism was the chief instrument for securing the cohesion
of the German people in war purposes. Moreover, these cruelties in
Germany served as atrocity practice to discipline the membership of the
criminal organization to follow the pattern later in occupied countries.

Through the police formations that are before you accused as criminal
organizations, the Nazi Party leaders, aided at some point in their
basic and notorious purpose by each of the individual defendants,
instituted a reign of terror. These espionage and police organizations
were utilized to hunt down every form of opposition and to penalize
every nonconformity. These organizations early founded and administered
concentration camps—Buchenwald in 1933, Dachau in 1934. But these
notorious names were not alone. Concentration camps came to dot the
German map and to number scores. At first they met with resistance from
some Germans. We have a captured letter from Minister of Justice Gürtner
to Hitler which is revealing. A Gestapo official had been prosecuted for
crimes committed in the camp at Hohnstein, and the Nazi Governor of
Saxony had promptly asked that the proceeding be quashed. The Minister
of Justice in June of 1935 protested because, as he said:

    “In this camp unusually grave mistreatments of prisoners have
    occurred at least since summer 1933. The prisoners not only were
    beaten with whips without cause, similarly as in the
    Concentration Camp Bredow near Stettin till they lost
    consciousness, but they were also tortured in other manners,
    e.g. with the help of a dripping apparatus constructed
    exclusively for this purpose, under which prisoners had to stand
    until they were suffering from serious purulent wounds of the
    scalp. . . .” (787-PS)

I shall not take time to detail the ghastly proceedings in these
concentration camps. Beatings, starvings, tortures, and killings were
routine—so routine that the tormentors became blasé and careless. We
have a report of discovery that in Plötzensee one night, 186 persons
were executed while there were orders for only 180. Another report
describes how the family of one victim received two urns of ashes by
mistake.

Inmates were compelled to execute each other. In 1942 they were paid
five Reichsmarks per execution, but on June 27, 1942 SS General Glücks
ordered commandants of all concentration camps to reduce this honorarium
to three cigarettes. In 1943 the Reich leader of the SS and Chief of
German Police ordered the corporal punishments on Russian women to be
applied by Polish women and vice versa, but the price was not frozen. He
said that as reward, a few cigarettes was authorized. Under the Nazis,
human life had been progressively devalued, until it finally became
worth less than a handful of tobacco—ersatz tobacco. There were,
however, some traces of the milk of human kindness. On August 11, 1942
an order went from Himmler to the commanders of 14 concentration camps
that only German prisoners are allowed to beat other German prisoners
(2189-PS).

Mystery and suspense was added to cruelty in order to spread torture
from the inmate to his family and friends. Men and women disappeared
from their homes or business or from the streets, and no word came of
them. The omission of notice was not due to overworked staff; it was due
to policy. The Chief of the SD and SIPO reported that in accordance with
orders from the Führer anxiety should be created in the minds of the
family of the arrested person. (668-PS) Deportations and secret arrests
were labeled, with a Nazi wit which seems a little ghoulish, “Nacht und
Nebel” (Night and Fog) (L-90, 833-PS). One of the many orders for these
actions gave this explanation:

    “The decree carries a basic innovation. The Führer and
    Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces commands that crimes of
    the specified sort committed by civilians of the occupied
    territories are to be punished by the pertinent courts-martial
    in the occupied territories _only_ when (a) the sentence calls
    for the death penalty, and (b) the sentence is pronounced within
    eight days after the arrest.

    “Only when both conditions are met does the Führer and
    Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces hope for the desired
    deterrent effect from the conduct of punitive proceedings in the
    occupied territories.

    “In other cases, in the future, the accused are to be secretly
    brought to Germany, and the further conduct of the trial carried
    on here. The deterrent effect of these measures lies (a) in
    allowing the disappearance of the accused without a trace, (b)
    therein that no information whatsoever may be given about their
    whereabouts and their fate.” (833-PS)

To clumsy cruelty, scientific skill was added. “Undesirables” were
exterminated by injection of drugs into the bloodstream, by asphyxiation
in gas chambers. They were shot with poison bullets, to study the
effects. (L-103)

Then, to cruel experiments the Nazi added obscene ones. These were not
the work of underling-degenerates but of master-minds high in the Nazi
conspiracy. On May 20, 1942 General Field Marshal Milch authorized SS
General Wolff to go ahead at Dachau Camp with so-called “cold
experiments”; and four female gypsies were supplied for the purpose.
Himmler gave permission to carry on these “experiments” also in other
camps. (1617-PS) At Dachau, the reports of the “doctor” in charge show
that victims were immersed in cold water until their body temperature
was reduced to 28 degrees centigrade (82.4 degrees Farenheit), when they
all died immediately (1618-PS). This was in August 1942. But the
“doctor’s” technique improved. By February 1943 he was able to report
that 30 persons were chilled to 27 to 29 degrees, their hands and feet
frozen white, and their bodies “rewarmed” by a hot bath. But the Nazi
scientific triumph was “rewarming with animal heat.” The victim, all but
frozen to death, was surrounded with bodies of living women until he
revived and responded to his environment by having sexual intercourse.
(1616-PS) Here Nazi degeneracy reached its nadir.

I dislike to encumber the record with such morbid tales, but we are in
the grim business of trying men as criminals, and these are the things
that their own agents say happened. We will show you these concentration
camps in motion pictures, just as the Allied armies found them when they
arrived, and the measures General Eisenhower had to take to clean them
up. Our proof will be disgusting and you will say I have robbed you of
your sleep. But these are the things which have turned the stomach of
the world and set every civilized hand against Nazi Germany.

Germany became one vast torture chamber. Cries of its victims were heard
round the world and brought shudders to civilized people everywhere. I
am one who received during this war most atrocity tales with suspicion
and scepticism. But the proof here will be so overwhelming that I
venture to predict not one word I have spoken will be denied. These
defendants will only deny personal responsibility or knowledge.

Under the clutch of the most intricate web of espionage and intrigue
that any modern state has endured, and persecution and torture of a kind
that has not been visited upon the world in many centuries, the elements
of the German population which were both decent and courageous were
annihilated. Those which were decent but weak were intimidated. Open
resistance, which had never been more than feeble and irresolute,
disappeared. But resistance, I am happy to say, always remained,
although it was manifest in only such events as the abortive effort to
assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944. With resistance driven underground,
the Nazi had the German State in his own hands.

But the Nazis not only silenced discordant voices. They created positive
controls as effective as their negative ones. Propaganda organs, on a
scale never before known, stimulated the Party and Party formations with
a permanent enthusiasm and abandon such as we, democratic people, can
work up only for a few days before a general election. They inculcated
and practiced the Führerprinzip which centralized control of the Party
and of the Party-controlled State over the lives and thought of the
German people, who are accustomed to look upon the German State, by
whomever controlled, with a mysticism that is incomprehensible to my
people.

All these controls from their inception were exerted with unparalleled
energy and single-mindedness to put Germany on a war footing. We will
show from the Nazis’ own documents their secret training of military
personnel, their secret creation of a military air force. Finally, a
conscript army was brought into being. Financiers, economists,
industrialists joined in the plan and promoted elaborate alterations in
industry and finance to support an unprecedented concentration of
resources and energies upon preparations for war. Germany’s rearmament
so outstripped the strength of her neighbors that in about a year she
was able to crush the whole military force of continental Europe,
exclusive of that of Soviet Russia, and then to push the Russian armies
back to the Volga. These preparations were of a magnitude which
surpassed all need of defense, and every defendant, and every
intelligent German, well understood them to be for aggressive purposes.

_Experiments in Aggression_:

Before resorting to open aggressive warfare, the Nazis undertook some
rather cautious experiments to test the spirit of resistance of those
who lay across their path. They advanced, but only as others yielded,
and kept in a position to draw back if they found a temperament that
made persistence dangerous.

On 7 March 1936 the Nazis reoccupied the Rhineland and then proceeded to
fortify it in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Pact of
Locarno. They encountered no substantial resistance and were emboldened
to take the next step, which was the acquisition of Austria. Despite
repeated assurances that Germany had no designs on Austria, invasion was
perfected. Threat of attack forced Schuschnigg to resign as Chancellor
of Austria and put the Nazi Defendant Seyss-Inquart in his place. The
latter immediately opened the frontier and invited Hitler to invade
Austria “to preserve order”. On March 12th invasion began. The next day,
Hitler proclaimed himself Chief of the Austrian State, took command of
its armed forces, and a law was enacted annexing Austria to Germany.

Threats of aggression had succeeded without arousing resistance. Fears
nevertheless had been stirred. They were lulled by an assurance to the
Czechoslovak Government that there would be no attack on that country.
We will show that the Nazi Government already had detailed plans for the
attack. We will lay before you the documents in which these conspirators
planned to create an incident to justify their attack. They even gave
consideration to assassinating their own Ambassador at Prague in order
to create a sufficiently dramatic incident. They did precipitate a
diplomatic crisis which endured throughout the summer. Hitler set
September 30th as the day when troops should be ready for action. Under
the threat of immediate war, the United Kingdom and France concluded a
pact with Germany and Italy at Munich on September 29, 1938, which
required Czechoslovakia to acquiesce in the cession of the Sudetenland
to Germany. It was consummated by German occupation on October 1, 1938.

The Munich Pact pledged no further aggression against Czechoslovakia,
but the Nazi pledge was lightly given and quickly broken. On the 15th of
March 1939, in defiance of the treaty of Munich itself, the Nazis seized
and occupied Bohemia and Moravia, which constituted the major part of
Czechoslovakia not already ceded to Germany. Once again the West stood
aghast, but it dreaded war, it saw no remedy except war, and it hoped
against hope that the Nazi fever for expansion had run its course. But
the Nazi world was intoxicated by these unresisted successes in open
alliance with Mussolini and in covert alliance with Franco. Then, having
made a deceitful, delaying peace with Russia, the conspirators entered
upon the final phase of the plan to renew war.

_War of Aggression_:

I will not prolong this address by detailing the steps leading to the
war of aggression which began with the invasion of Poland on September
1, 1939. The further story will be unfolded to you from documents
including those of the German High Command itself. The plans had been
laid long in advance. As early as 1935 Hitler appointed the Defendant
Schacht to the position of General Deputy for the War Economy (2261-PS).
We have the diary of General Jodl (1780-PS); the “Plan Otto,” Hitler’s
own order for attack on Austria in case trickery failed (C-102); the
“Plan Green” which was the blueprint for attack on Czechoslovakia
(388-PS); plans for the war in the West (375-PS, 376-PS); Funk’s letter
to Hitler dated August 25, 1939 detailing the long course of economic
preparation (699-PS); Keitel’s top-secret mobilization order for 1939-40
prescribing secret steps to be taken during a “period of tension” during
which no “‘state of war’ will be publicly declared even if open war
measures against the foreign enemy will be taken.” This letter order
(1639A-PS) is in our possession despite a secret order issued on March
16, 1945, when Allied troops were advancing into the heart of Germany,
to burn these plans. We have also Hitler’s directive, dated December 18,
1940, for the “Barbarossa Contingency” outlining the strategy of the
attack upon Russia (446-PS). That plan in the original bears the
initials of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. They were planning the
attack and planning it long in advance of the declaration of war. We
have detailed information concerning “Case White,” the plan for attack
on Poland (C-120). That attack began the war. The plan was issued by
Keitel on April 3rd, 1939. The attack did not come until September.
Steps in preparation for the attack were taken by subordinate
commanders, one of whom issued an order on June 14, providing that:

    “The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has ordered the working out
    of a _plan of deployment against Poland_ which takes in account
    the demands of the political leadership _for the opening of war
    by surprise and for quick success_. . . .

    “I declare it the duty of the commanding generals, the
    divisional commanders, and the commandants to limit as much as
    possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to
    limit the extent of the information, and ask that all suitable
    measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting
    information. . . .

    “The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish
    mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with
    forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed
    on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial
    superiority over the Polish frontier guards and surprise that
    can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly
    bringing up other parts of the Army as well to counteract the
    marching up of the Polish Army. . . .

    “If the development of the political situation should show that
    a surprise at the beginning of the war is out of question,
    because of well-advanced defense preparations on the part of the
    Polish Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army will order the
    opening of the hostilities only after the assembling of
    sufficient additional forces. The basis of all preparations will
    be to surprise the enemy. . . .” (2327-PS)

We have also the order for the invasion of England, signed by Hitler and
initialed by Keitel and Jodl. It is interesting that it commences with a
recognition that although the British military position is “hopeless,”
they show not the slightest sign of giving in. (442-PS)

Not the least incriminating are the minutes of Hitler’s meeting with his
high advisers. As early as November 5, 1937 Hitler told Defendants
Göring, Raeder, and Neurath, among others, that German rearmament was
practically accomplished and that he had decided to secure by force,
starting with a lightning attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria, greater
living space for Germans in Europe no later than 1943-45 and perhaps as
early as 1938 (386-PS). On the 23rd of May, 1939 the Führer advised his
staff that:

    “It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and
    of securing our food supplies. . . . Over and above the natural
    fertility, thorough-going German exploitation will enormously
    increase the surplus.

    “There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are
    left with the decision: _To attack Poland at the first suitable
    opportunity_. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair.
    There will be war.” (L-79)

On August 22nd, 1939 Hitler again addressed members of the High Command,
telling them when the start of military operations would be ordered. He
disclosed that for propaganda purposes, he would provocate a good
reason. “It will make no difference,” he announced, “whether this reason
will sound convincing or not. After all, the victor will not be asked
whether he talked the truth or not. We have to proceed brutally. The
stronger is always right.” (1014-PS) On 23 November 1939, after the
Germans had invaded Poland, Hitler made this explanation:

    “. . . For the first time in history we have to fight on only
    one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can
    know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long
    time whether I should strike in the East and then in the West.
    Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to
    strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or
    later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was
    decided that the East was to be attacked first. . . .” (789-PS)

We know the bloody sequel. Frontier incidents were staged. Demands were
made for cession of territory. When Poland refused, the German forces
invaded on September 1st, 1939. Warsaw was destroyed; Poland fell. The
Nazis, in accordance with plan, moved swiftly to extend their aggression
throughout Europe and to gain the advantage of surprise over their
unprepared neighbors. Despite repeated and solemn assurances of peaceful
intentions, they invaded Denmark and Norway on 9th April 1940; Belgium,
The Netherlands, and Luxembourg on 10th May 1940; Yugoslavia and Greece
on 6th April 1941.

As part of the Nazi preparation for aggression against Poland and her
allies, Germany, on 23rd August 1939, had entered into a non-aggression
pact with Soviet Russia. It was only a delaying treaty intended to be
kept no longer than necessary to prepare for its violation. On June 22,
1941, pursuant to long-matured plans, the Nazis hurled troops into
Soviet territory without any declaration of war. The entire European
world was aflame.

_Conspiracy with Japan_:

The Nazi plans of aggression called for use of Asiatic allies and they
found among the Japanese men of kindred mind and purpose. They were
brothers, under the skin.

Himmler records a conversation he had on January 31, 1939 with General
Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. He wrote:

    “Furthermore, he (Oshima) had succeeded up to now to send 10
    Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These
    Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional
    Russians, whom he had also sent across, had been shot at the
    frontier.” (2195-PS)

On September 27th, 1940 the Nazis concluded a German-Italian-Japanese
10-year military and economic alliance by which those powers agreed “to
stand by and cooperate with one another in regard to their efforts in
Greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their
prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things.”

On March 5, 1941 a top-secret directive was issued by Defendant Keitel.
It stated that the Führer had ordered instigation of Japan’s active
participation in the war and directed that Japan’s military power has to
be strengthened by the disclosure of German war experiences and support
of a military, economic, and technical nature has to be given. The aim
was stated to be to crush England quickly thereby keeping the United
States out of the war. (C-75)

On March 29, 1941 Ribbentrop told Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign
Minister, that the German Army was ready to strike against Russia.
Matsuoka reassured Ribbentrop about the Far East. Japan, he reported,
was acting at the moment as though she had no interest whatever in
Singapore, but intends to strike when the right moment comes. (1877-PS)

On April 5, 1941 Ribbentrop urged Matsuoka that entry of Japan into the
war would “hasten the victory” and would be more in the interest of
Japan than of Germany since it would give Japan a unique chance to
fulfill her national aims and to play a leading part in Eastern Asia
(1882-PS).

The proofs in this case will also show that the leaders of Germany were
planning war against the United States from its Atlantic as well as
instigating it from its Pacific approaches. A captured memorandum from
the Führer’s headquarters, dated October 29, 1940, asks certain
information as to air bases and supply and reports further that:

    “The Führer is at present occupied with the question of the
    occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the
    prosecution of war against America at a later date.
    Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here.”
    (376-PS)

On December 7th, 1941, a day which the late President Roosevelt declared
“will live in infamy,” victory for German aggression seemed certain. The
Wehrmacht was at the gates of Moscow. Taking advantage of the situation,
and while her plenipotentiaries were creating a diplomatic diversion in
Washington, Japan without declaration of war treacherously attacked the
United States at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. Attacks followed
swiftly on the British Commonwealth, and The Netherlands in the
Southwest Pacific. These aggressions were met in the only way that they
could be met, with instant declarations of war and with armed resistance
which mounted slowly through many long months of reverse until finally
the Axis was crushed to earth and deliverance for its victims was won.

Your Honor, I am about to take up “Crimes in the Conduct of War”, which
is quite a separate subject. We are within 5 minutes of the recessing
time. It will be very convenient for me if it will be agreeable to you.

THE PRESIDENT: We will sit again in 15 minutes’ time.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1550 hours._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal must request that if it adjourns for 15
minutes members of the bar and others are back in their seats after an
interval of 15 minutes. Mr. Justice Jackson, I understand that you wish
to continue to 5:15, when you may be able to conclude your speech?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that would be the most orderly way.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal will be glad to do so.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please your Honor, I will now take up the
subject of “Crimes in the Conduct of War”.

Even the most warlike of peoples have recognized in the name of humanity
some limitations on the savagery of warfare. Rules to that end have been
embodied in international conventions to which Germany became a party.
This code had prescribed certain restraints as to the treatment of
belligerents. The enemy was entitled to surrender and to receive quarter
and good treatment as a prisoner of war. We will show by German
documents that these rights were denied, that prisoners of war were
given brutal treatment and often murdered. This was particularly true in
the case of captured airmen, often my countrymen.

It was ordered that captured English and American airmen should no
longer be granted the status of prisoners of war. They were to be
treated as criminals and the Army was ordered to refrain from protecting
them against lynching by the populace. (R-118) The Nazi Government,
through its police and propaganda agencies, took pains to incite the
civilian population to attack and kill airmen who crash-landed. The
order, given by the Reichsführer SS Himmler on 10 August 1943, directed
that: “It is not the task of the police to interfere in clashes between
German and English and American flyers who have bailed out”. This order
was transmitted on the same day by SS Obersturmbannführer Brand of
Himmler’s personal staff to all senior executive SS and Police officers,
with these directions:

    “I am sending you the inclosed order with the request that the
    Chief of the Regular Police and of the Security Police be
    informed. They are to make this instruction known to their
    subordinate officers verbally.” (R-110)

Similarly, we will show Hitler’s top secret order, dated 18 October
1942, that Commandos, regardless of condition, were “to be slaughtered
to the last man” after capture (498-PS). We will show the circulation of
secret orders, one of which was signed by Hess, to be passed orally to
civilians, that enemy fliers or parachutists were to be arrested or
liquidated (062-PS). By such means were murders incited and directed.

This Nazi campaign of ruthless treatment of enemy forces assumed its
greatest proportions in the fight against Russia. Eventually all
prisoners of war were taken out of control of the Army and put in the
hands of Himmler and the SS (058-PS). In the East, the German fury spent
itself. Russian prisoners were ordered to be branded. They were starved.
I shall quote passages from a letter written February 28, 1942 by
Defendant Rosenberg to Defendant Keitel:

    “The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on the
    contrary a tragedy of the greatest extent. Of 3,600,000
    prisoners of war, only several hundred thousand are still able
    to work fully. A large part of them has starved, or died,
    because of the hazards of the weather. Thousands also died from
    spotted fever. . . .

    “The camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population to
    put food at the disposal of the prisoners, and they have rather
    let them starve to death. . . .

    “In many cases, when prisoners of war could no longer keep up on
    the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they were shot
    before the eyes of the horrified population, and the corpses
    were left.

    “In numerous camps, no shelter for the prisoners of war was
    provided at all. They lay under the open sky during rain or
    snow. Even tools were not made available to dig holes or
    caves. . . .

    “Finally, the shooting of prisoners of war must be mentioned;
    for instance, in various camps, all the ‘Asiatics’ were shot”.
    (081-PS)

Civilized usage and conventions to which Germany was a party had
prescribed certain immunities for civilian populations unfortunate
enough to dwell in lands overrun by hostile armies. The German
occupation forces, controlled or commanded by men on trial before you,
committed a long series of outrages against the inhabitants of occupied
territory that would be incredible except for captured orders and
captured reports which show the fidelity with which those orders were
executed.

We deal here with a phase of common criminality designed by the
conspirators as part of the common plan. We can appreciate why these
crimes against their European enemies were not of a casual character but
were planned and disciplined crimes when we get at the reason for them.
Hitler told his officers on August 22, 1939 that: “The main objective in
Poland is the destruction of the enemy and not the reaching of a certain
geographical line” (1014-PS). The project of deporting promising youth
from occupied territories was approved by Rosenberg on the theory that
“a desired weakening of the biological force” of the conquered people is
being achieved (031-PS). To Germanize or to destroy was the program.
Himmler announced, “Either we win over any good blood that we can use
for ourselves and give it a place in our people or, gentlemen—you may
call this cruel, but nature is cruel,—we destroy this blood.” As to
“racially good types” Himmler further advised, “Therefore, I think that
it is our duty to take their children with us, to remove them from their
environment, if necessary by robbing or stealing them” (L-70). He urged
deportation of Slavic children to deprive potential enemies of future
soldiers.

The Nazi purpose was to leave Germany’s neighbors so weakened that even
if she should eventually lose the war, she would still be the most
powerful nation in Europe. Against this background, we must view the
plan for ruthless warfare, which means a plan for the commission of War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

Hostages in large numbers were demanded and killed. Mass punishments
were inflicted, so savage that whole communities were extinguished.
Rosenberg was advised of the annihilation of three unidentified villages
in Slovakia. (970-PS) In May of 1943 another village of about 40 farms
and 220 inhabitants was ordered wiped out. The entire population was
ordered shot, the cattle and property impounded, and the order required
that “the village will be destroyed totally by fire.” (163-PS) A secret
report from Rosenberg’s Reich Ministry of Eastern Territory reveals
that:

    “Food rations allowed the Russian population are so low that
    they fail to secure their existence and provide only for minimum
    subsistence of limited duration. The population does not know if
    they will still live tomorrow. They are faced with death by
    starvation. . . .

    “The roads are clogged by hundreds of thousands of people,
    sometimes as many as one million according to the estimate of
    experts, who wander around in search of nourishment. . . .

    “Sauckel’s action has caused unrest among the civilians. . . .
    Russian girls were deloused by men, nude photos in forced
    positions were taken, women doctors were locked into freight
    cars for the pleasure of the transport commanders, women in
    night shirts were fettered and forced through the Russian towns
    to the railroad station, etc. All this material has been sent to
    the OKH.” (1381-PS)

Perhaps the deportation to slave labor was the most horrible and
extensive slaving operation in history. On few other subjects is our
evidence so abundant or so damaging. In a speech made on January 25,
1944 the Defendant Frank, Governor General of Poland, boasted, “I have
sent 1,300,000 Polish workers into the Reich” (059-PS, P. 2). The
Defendant Sauckel reported that “out of the 5 million foreign workers
who arrived in Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily.” This fact was
reported to the Führer and Defendants Speer, Göring, and Keitel. (R-24)
Children of 10 to 14 years were impressed into service by telegraphic
order of Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories:

    “The Command is further charged with the transferring of
    worthwhile Russian youth between 10-14 years of age, to the
    Reich. The authority is not affected by the changes connected
    with the evacuation and transportation to the reception camps of
    Bialystok, Krajewo, and Olitei. The Führer wishes that this
    activity be increased even more.” (200-PS)

When enough labor was not forthcoming, prisoners of war were forced into
war work in flagrant violation of international conventions (016-PS).
Slave labor came from France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and the East.
Methods of recruitment were violent (R-124, 018-PS, 204-PS). The
treatment of these slave laborers was stated in general terms, not
difficult to translate into concrete deprivations, in a letter to the
Defendant Rosenberg from the Defendant Sauckel, which stated:

    “All _prisoners of war_, from the _territories_ of the West as
    well as of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely
    incorporated into the German armament and munition industries.
    Their production must be brought to the highest possible
    level. . . .

    “The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the
    use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men
    and women, has become an indisputable necessity for the solution
    of the mobilization of labor program in this war.

    “All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way
    as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest
    conceivable degrees of expenditure. . . .” (016-PS)

In pursuance of the Nazi plan permanently to reduce the living standards
of their neighbors and to weaken them physically and economically, a
long series of crimes were committed. There was extensive destruction,
serving no military purpose, of the property of civilians. Dikes were
thrown open in Holland almost at the close of the war not to achieve
military ends but to destroy the resources and retard the economy of the
thrifty Netherlanders.

There was carefully planned economic syphoning off of the assets of
occupied countries. An example of the planning is shown by a report on
France dated December 7, 1942 made by the Economic Research Department
of the Reichsbank. The question arose whether French occupation costs
should be increased from 15 million Reichsmarks per day to 25 million
Reichsmarks per day. The Reichsbank analyzed French economy to determine
whether it could bear the burden. It pointed out that the armistice had
burdened France to that date to the extent of 18½ billion Reichsmarks,
equalling 370 billion francs. It pointed out that the burden of these
payments within 2½ years equalled the aggregate French national income
in the year 1940, and that the amount of payments handed over to Germany
in the first 6 months of 1942 corresponded to the estimate for the total
French revenue for that whole year. The report concluded:

    “In any case, the conclusion is inescapable that relatively
    heavier tributes have been imposed on France since the armistice
    in June 1940 than upon Germany after the World War. In this
    connection, it must be noted that the economic powers of France
    never equalled those of the German Reich and that the vanquished
    France could not draw on foreign economic and financial
    resources in the same degree as Germany after the last World
    War.”

The Defendant Funk was the Reich Minister of Economics and President of
the Reichsbank; the Defendant Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister; the
Defendant Göring was Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan; and all of
them participated in the exchange of views of which this captured
document is a part. (2149-PS) Notwithstanding this analysis by the
Reichsbank, they proceeded to increase the imposition on France from 15
million Reichsmarks daily to 25 million per day.

It is small wonder that the bottom has been knocked out of French
economy. The plan and purpose of the thing appears in a letter from
General Stülpnagel, head of the German Armistice Commission, to the
Defendant Jodl as early as 14 September 1940 when he wrote, “The slogan
‘Systematic weakening of France’ has already been surpassed by far in
reality” (1756-PS).

Not only was there a purpose to debilitate and demoralize the economy of
Germany’s neighbors for the purpose of destroying their competitive
position, but there was looting and pilfering on an unprecedented scale.
We need not be hypocritical about this business of looting. I recognize
that no army moves through occupied territory without some pilfering as
it goes. Usually the amount of pilfering increases as discipline wanes.
If the evidence in this case showed no looting except of that sort, I
certainly would ask no conviction of these defendants for it.

But we will show you that looting was not due to the lack of discipline
or to the ordinary weaknesses of human nature. The German organized
plundering, planned it, disciplined it, and made it official just as he
organized everything else, and then he compiled the most meticulous
records to show that he had done the best job of looting that was
possible under the circumstances. And we have those records.

The Defendant Rosenberg was put in charge of a systematic plundering of
the art objects of Europe by direct order of Hitler dated 29 January
1940 (136-PS). On the 16th of April 1943 Rosenberg reported that up to
the 7th of April, 92 railway cars with 2,775 cases containing art
objects had been sent to Germany; and that 53 pieces of art had been
shipped to Hitler direct, and 594 to the Defendant Göring. The report
mentioned something like 20,000 pieces of seized art and the main
locations where they were stored. (015-PS)

Moreover this looting was glorified by Rosenberg. Here we have 39
leather-bound tabulated volumes of his inventory, which in due time we
will offer in evidence. One cannot but admire the artistry of this
Rosenberg report. The Nazi taste was cosmopolitan. Of the 9,455 articles
inventoried, there were included 5,255 paintings, 297 sculptures, 1,372
pieces of antique furniture, 307 textiles, and 2,224 small objects of
art. Rosenberg observed that there were approximately 10,000 more
objects still to be inventoried. (015-PS) Rosenberg himself estimated
that the values involved would come close to a billion dollars (090-PS).

I shall not go into further details of the War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity committed by the gangster ring whose leaders are before you. It
is not the purpose in my part of this case to deal with the individual
crimes. I am dealing with the Common Plan or design for crime and will
not dwell upon individual offenses. My task is to show the scale on
which these crimes occurred, and to show that these are the men who were
in the responsible positions and who conceived the plan and design which
renders them answerable, regardless of the fact that the plan was
actually executed by others.

At length, this reckless and lawless course outraged the world. It
recovered from the demoralization of surprise attack, assembled its
forces and stopped these men in their tracks. Once success deserted
their banners, one by one the Nazi satellites fell away. Sawdust Caesar
collapsed. Resistance forces in every occupied country arose to harry
the invader. Even at home, Germans saw that Germany was being led to
ruin by these mad men, and the attempt on July 20, 1944 to assassinate
Hitler, an attempt fostered by men of highest station, was a desperate
effort by internal forces in Germany to stop short of ruin. Quarrels
broke out among the failing conspirators, and the decline of the Nazi
power was more swift than its ascendancy. German Armed Forces
surrendered, its Government disintegrated, its leaders committed suicide
by the dozen, and by the fortunes of war these defendants fell into our
hands. Although they are not, by any means, all the guilty ones, they
are survivors among the most responsible. Their names appear over and
over in the documents and their faces grace the photographic evidence.
We have here the surviving top politicians, militarists, financiers,
diplomats, administrators, and propagandists, of the Nazi movement. Who
was responsible for these crimes if they were not?

_The Law of the Case_:

The end of the war and capture of these prisoners presented the
victorious Allies with the question whether there is any legal
responsibility on high-ranking men for acts which I have described. Must
such wrongs either be ignored or redressed in hot blood? Is there no
standard in the law for a deliberate and reasoned judgment on such
conduct?

The Charter of this Tribunal evidences a faith that the law is not only
to govern the conduct of little men, but that even rulers are, as Lord
Chief Justice Coke put it to King James, “under God and the law.” The
United States believed that the law long has afforded standards by which
a juridical hearing could be conducted to make sure that we punish only
the right men and for the right reasons. Following the instructions of
the late President Roosevelt and the decision of the Yalta conference
President Truman directed representatives of the United States to
formulate a proposed International Agreement, which was submitted during
the San Francisco Conference to Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom,
the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of France. With many
modifications, that proposal has become the Charter of this Tribunal.

But the Agreement which sets up the standards by which these prisoners
are to be judged does not express the views of the signatory nations
alone. Other nations with diverse but highly respected systems of
jurisprudence also have signified adherence to it. These are Belgium,
The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Poland,
Greece, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Australia, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, New
Zealand, Venezuela, and India. You judge, therefore, under an organic
act which represents the wisdom, the sense of justice, and the will of
21 governments, representing an overwhelming majority of all civilized
people.

The Charter by which this Tribunal has its being, embodies certain legal
concepts which are inseparable from its jurisdiction and which must
govern its decision. These, as I have said, also are conditions attached
to the grant of any hearing to defendants. The validity of the
provisions of the Charter is conclusive upon us all, whether we have
accepted the duty of judging or of prosecuting under it, as well as upon
the defendants, who can point to no other law which gives them a right
to be heard at all. My able and experienced colleagues believe, as do I,
that it will contribute to the expedition and clarity of this Trial if I
expound briefly the application of the legal philosophy of the Charter
to the facts I have recited.

While this declaration of the law by the Charter is final, it may be
contended that the prisoners on trial are entitled to have it applied to
their conduct only most charitably if at all. It may be said that this
is new law, not authoritatively declared at the time they did the acts
it condemns, and that this declaration of the law has taken them by
surprise.

I cannot, of course, deny that these men are surprised that this is the
law; they really are surprised that there is any such thing as law.
These defendants did not rely on any law at all. Their program ignored
and defied all law. That this is so will appear from many acts and
statements, of which I cite but a few.

In the Führer’s speech to all military commanders on November 23, 1939
he reminded them that at the moment Germany had a pact with Russia, but
declared: “Agreements are to be kept only as long as they serve a
certain purpose.” Later in the same speech he announced: “A violation of
the neutrality of Holland and Belgium will be of no importance”
(789-PS). A top secret document, entitled “Warfare as a Problem of
Organization,” dispatched by the Chief of the High Command to all
commanders on April 19, 1938 declared that “the normal rules of war
towards neutrals may be considered to apply on the basis whether
operation of rules will create greater advantages or disadvantages for
the belligerents” (L-211). And from the files of the German Navy Staff,
we have a “Memorandum on Intensified Naval War,” dated October 15, 1939,
which begins by stating a desire to comply with International Law.
“However,” it continues, “if decisive successes are expected from any
measure considered as a war necessity, it must be carried through even
if it is not in agreement with international law.” (L-184) International
law, natural law, German law, any law at all was to these men simply a
propaganda device to be invoked when it helped and to be ignored when it
would condemn what they wanted to do. That men may be protected in
relying upon the law at the time they act is the reason we find laws of
retrospective operations unjust. But these men cannot bring themselves
within the reason of the rule which in some systems of jurisprudence
prohibits _ex post facto_ laws. They cannot show that they ever relied
upon international law in any state or paid it the slightest regard.

The third Count of the Indictment is based on the definition of War
Crimes contained in the Charter. I have outlined to you the systematic
course of conduct toward civilian populations and combat forces which
violates international conventions to which Germany was a party. Of the
criminal nature of these acts at least, the defendants had, as we shall
show, clear knowledge. Accordingly, they took pains to conceal their
violations. It will appear that the Defendants Keitel and Jodl were
informed by official legal advisors that the orders to brand Russian
prisoners of war, to shackle British prisoners of war, and to execute
commando prisoners were clear violations of international law.
Nevertheless, these orders were put into effect. The same is true of
orders issued for the assassination of General Giraud and General
Weygand, which failed to be executed only because of a ruse on the part
of Admiral Canaris, who was himself later executed for his part in the
plot to take Hitler’s life on July 20, 1944.

The fourth Count of the Indictment is based on Crimes against Humanity.
Chief among these are mass killings of countless human beings in cold
blood. Does it take these men by surprise that murder is treated as a
crime?

The first and second Counts of the Indictment add to these crimes the
crime of plotting and waging wars of aggression and wars in violation of
nine treaties to which Germany was a party. There was a time, in fact, I
think the time of the first World War, when it could not have been said
that war-inciting or war making was a crime in law, however
reprehensible in morals.

Of course, it was, under the law of all civilized peoples, a crime for
one man with his bare knuckles to assault another. How did it come that
multiplying this crime by a million, and adding fire arms to bare
knuckles, made it a legally innocent act? The doctrine was that one
could not be regarded as criminal for committing the usual violent acts
in the conduct of legitimate warfare. The age of imperialistic expansion
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries added the foul doctrine,
contrary to the teachings of early Christian and international law
scholars such as Grotius, that all wars are to be regarded as legitimate
wars. The sum of these two doctrines was to give war-making a complete
immunity from accountability to law.

This was intolerable for an age that called itself civilized. Plain
people with their earthy common sense, revolted at such fictions and
legalisms so contrary to ethical principles and demanded checks on war
immunities. Statesmen and international lawyers at first cautiously
responded by adopting rules of warfare designed to make the conduct of
war more civilized. The effort was to set legal limits to the violence
that could be done to civilian populations and to combatants as well.

The common sense of men after the first World War demanded, however,
that the law’s condemnation of war reach deeper, and that the law
condemn not merely uncivilized ways of waging war, but also the waging
in any way of uncivilized wars—wars of aggression. The world’s
statesmen again went only as far as they were forced to go. Their
efforts were timid and cautious and often less explicit than we might
have hoped. But the 1920’s did outlaw aggressive war.

The re-establishment of the principle that there are unjust wars and
that unjust wars are illegal is traceable in many steps. One of the most
significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, by which Germany, Italy,
and Japan, in common with practically all nations of the world,
renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to
seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies. This
pact altered the legal status of a war of aggression. As Mr. Stimson,
the United States Secretary of State put it in 1932, such a war:

    “. . . is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It
    is no longer to be the principle around which the duties, the
    conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal
    thing. . . . By that very act, we have made obsolete many legal
    precedents and have given the legal profession the task of
    re-examining many of its codes and treaties.”

The Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, signed by the representatives of 48 governments, declared that
“a war of aggression constitutes . . . an international crime.” The
Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous
resolution of the representatives of 48 member nations, including
Germany, declared that a war of aggression constitutes an international
crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, the 21 American
Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that “war of
aggression constitutes an international crime against the human
species.”

A failure of these Nazis to heed, or to understand the force and meaning
of this evolution in the legal thought of the world, is not a defense or
a mitigation. If anything, it aggravates their offense and makes it the
more mandatory that the law they have flouted be vindicated by juridical
application to their lawless conduct. Indeed, by their own law—had they
heeded any law—these principles were binding on these defendants.
Article 4 of the Weimar constitution provided that: “The generally
accepted rules of international law are to be considered as binding
integral parts of the law of the German Reich” (2050-PS). Can there be
any doubt that the outlawry of aggressive war was one of the “generally
accepted rules of international law” in 1939?

Any resort to war—to any kind of a war—is a resort to means that are
inherently criminal. War inevitably is a course of killings, assaults,
deprivations of liberty, and destruction of property. An honestly
defensive war is, of course, legal and saves those lawfully conducting
it from criminality. But inherently criminal acts cannot be defended by
showing that those who committed them were engaged in a war, when war
itself is illegal. The very minimum legal consequence of the treaties
making aggressive wars illegal is to strip those who incite or wage them
of every defense the law ever gave, and to leave war-makers subject to
judgment by the usually accepted principles of the law of crimes.

But if it be thought that the Charter, whose declarations concededly
bind us all, does contain new law I still do not shrink from demanding
its strict application by this Tribunal. The rule of law in the world,
flouted by the lawlessness incited by these defendants, had to be
restored at the cost to my country of over a million casualties, not to
mention those of other nations. I cannot subscribe to the perverted
reasoning that society may advance and strengthen the rule of law by the
expenditure of morally innocent lives but that progress in the law may
never be made at the price of morally guilty lives.

It is true of course, that we have no judicial precedent for the
Charter. But international law is more than a scholarly collection of
abstract and immutable principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties and
agreements between nations and of accepted customs. Yet every custom has
its origin in some single act, and every agreement has to be initiated
by the action of some state. Unless we are prepared to abandon every
principle of growth for international law, we cannot deny that our own
day has the right to institute customs and to conclude agreements that
will themselves become sources of a newer and strengthened international
law. International law is not capable of development by the normal
processes of legislation, for there is no continuing international
legislative authority. Innovations and revisions in international law
are brought about by the action of governments such as those I have
cited, designed to meet a change in circumstances. It grows, as did the
common law, through decisions reached from time to time in adapting
settled principles to new situations. The fact is that when the law
evolves by the case method, as did the common law and as international
law must do if it is to advance at all, it advances at the expense of
those who wrongly guessed the law and learned too late their error. The
law, so far as international law can be decreed, had been clearly
pronounced when these acts took place. Hence, I am not disturbed by the
lack of judicial precedent for the inquiry it is proposed to conduct.

The events I have earlier recited clearly fall within the standards of
crimes, set out in the Charter, whose perpetrators this Tribunal is
convened to judge and punish fittingly. The standards for War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity are too familiar to need comment. There are,
however, certain novel problems in applying other precepts of the
Charter which I should call to your attention.

_The Crime against Peace_:

A basic provision of the Charter is that to plan, prepare, initiate, or
wage a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements, and assurances, or to conspire or participate in a
common plan to do so, is a crime.

It is perhaps a weakness in this Charter that it fails itself to define
a war of aggression. Abstractly, the subject is full of difficulty and
all kinds of troublesome hypothetical cases can be conjured up. It is a
subject which, if the defense should be permitted to go afield beyond
the very narrow charge in the Indictment, would prolong the Trial and
involve the Tribunal in insoluble political issues. But so far as the
question can properly be involved in this case, the issue is one of no
novelty and is one on which legal opinion has well crystallized.

One of the most authoritative sources of international law on this
subject is the Convention for the Definition of Aggression signed at
London on July 3, 1933 by Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Turkey, the
Soviet Union, Persia, and Afghanistan. The subject has also been
considered by international committees and by commentators whose views
are entitled to the greatest respect. It had been little discussed prior
to the first World War but has received much attention as international
law has evolved its outlawry of aggressive war. In the light of these
materials of international law, and so far as relevant to the evidence
in this case, I suggest that an “aggressor” is generally held to be that
state which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

(1) Declaration of war upon another state;

(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war,
of the territory of another state;

(3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a
declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another
state; and

(4) Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory of
another state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded
state, to take in its own territory, all the measures in its power to
deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

And I further suggest that it is the general view that no political,
military, economic, or other considerations shall serve as an excuse or
justification for such actions; but exercise of the right of legitimate
self-defense, that is to say, resistance to an act of aggression, or
action to assist a state which has been subjected to aggression, shall
not constitute a war of aggression.

It is upon such an understanding of the law that our evidence of a
conspiracy to provoke and wage an aggressive war is prepared and
presented. By this test each of the series of wars begun by these Nazi
leaders was unambiguously aggressive.

It is important to the duration and scope of this Trial that we bear in
mind the difference between our charge that this war was one of
aggression and a position that Germany had no grievances. We are not
inquiring into the conditions which contributed to causing this war.
They are for history to unravel. It is no part of our task to vindicate
the European _status quo_ as of 1933, or as of any other date. The
United States does not desire to enter into discussion of the
complicated pre-war currents of European politics, and it hopes this
trial will not be protracted by their consideration. The remote
causations avowed are too insincere and inconsistent, too complicated
and doctrinaire to be the subject of profitable inquiry in this trial. A
familiar example is to be found in the “Lebensraum” slogan, which
summarized the contention that Germany needed more living space as a
justification for expansion. At the same time that the Nazis were
demanding more space for the German people, they were demanding more
German people to occupy space. Every known means to increase the birth
rate, legitimate and illegitimate, was utilized. “Lebensraum”
represented a vicious circle of demand—from neighbors more space, and
from Germans more progeny. We do not need to investigate the verity of
doctrines which led to constantly expanding circles of aggression. It is
the plot and the act of aggression which we charge to be crimes.

Our position is that whatever grievances a nation may have, however
objectionable it finds the _status quo_, aggressive warfare is an
illegal means for settling those grievances or for altering those
conditions. It may be that the Germany of the 1920’s and 1930’s faced
desperate problems, problems that would have warranted the boldest
measures short of war. All other methods—persuasion, propaganda,
economic competition, diplomacy—were open to an aggrieved country, but
aggressive warfare was outlawed. These defendants did make aggressive
war, a war in violation of treaties. They did attack and invade their
neighbors in order to effectuate a foreign policy which they knew could
not be accomplished by measures short of war. And that is as far as we
accuse or propose to inquire.

_The Law of Individual Responsibility_:

The Charter also recognizes individual responsibility on the part of
those who commit acts defined as crimes, or who incite others to do so,
or who join a common plan with other persons, groups or organizations to
bring about their commission. The principle of individual responsibility
for piracy and brigandage, which have long been recognized as crimes
punishable under international law, is old and well established. That is
what illegal warfare is. This principle of personal liability is a
necessary as well as logical one if international law is to render real
help to the maintenance of peace. An international law which operates
only on states can be enforced only by war because the most practicable
method of coercing a state is warfare. Those familiar with American
history know that one of the compelling reasons for adoption of our
constitution was that the laws of the Confederation, which operated only
on constituent states, were found ineffective to maintain order among
them. The only answer to recalcitrance was impotence or war. Only
sanctions which reach individuals can peacefully and effectively be
enforced. Hence, the principle of the criminality of aggressive war is
implemented by the Charter with the principle of personal
responsibility.

Of course, the idea that a state, any more than a corporation, commits
crimes, is a fiction. Crimes always are committed only by persons. While
it is quite proper to employ the fiction of responsibility of a state or
corporation for the purpose of imposing a collective liability, it is
quite intolerable to let such a legalism become the basis of personal
immunity.

The Charter recognizes that one who has committed criminal acts may not
take refuge in superior orders nor in the doctrine that his crimes were
acts of states. These twin principles working together have heretofore
resulted in immunity for practically everyone concerned in the really
great crimes against peace and mankind. Those in lower ranks were
protected against liability by the orders of their superiors. The
superiors were protected because their orders were called acts of state.
Under the Charter, no defense based on either of these doctrines can be
entertained. Modern civilization puts unlimited weapons of destruction
in the hands of men. It cannot tolerate so vast an area of legal
irresponsibility.

Even the German Military Code provides that:

    “If the execution of a military order in the course of duty
    violates the criminal law, then the superior officer giving the
    order will bear the sole responsibility therefor. However, the
    obeying subordinate will share the punishment of the
    participant: (1) if he has exceeded the order given to him, or
    (2) if it was within his knowledge that the order of his
    superior officer concerned an act by which it was intended to
    commit a civil or military crime or transgression.”
    (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1926 No. 37, P. 278, Art. 47)

Of course, we do not argue that the circumstances under which one
commits an act should be disregarded in judging its legal effect. A
conscripted private on a firing squad cannot expect to hold an inquest
on the validity of the execution. The Charter implies common sense
limits to liability just as it places common sense limits upon immunity.
But none of these men before you acted in minor parts. Each of them was
entrusted with broad discretion and exercised great power. Their
responsibility is correspondingly great and may not be shifted to that
fictional being, “the State”, which cannot be produced for trial, cannot
testify, and cannot be sentenced.

The Charter also recognizes a vicarious liability, which responsibility
is recognized by most modern systems of law, for acts committed by
others in carrying out a common plan or conspiracy to which a defendant
has become a party. I need not discuss the familiar principles of such
liability. Every day in the courts of countries associated in this
prosecution, men are convicted for acts that they did not personally
commit, but for which they were held responsible because of membership
in illegal combinations or plans or conspiracies.

_The Political, Police, and Military Organizations_:

Accused before this Tribunal as criminal organizations are certain
political and police organizations which the evidence will show to have
been instruments of cohesion in planning and executing the crimes I have
detailed. Perhaps the worst of the movement were the Leadership Corps of
the NSDAP, the Schutzstaffeln or “SS”, and the Sturmabteilungen or “SA”,
and the subsidiary formations which these include. These were the Nazi
Party leadership, espionage, and policing groups. They were the real
government, above and outside of any law. Also accused as organizations
are the Reich Cabinet and the Secret Police, or Gestapo, which were
fixtures of the Government but animated solely by the Party.

Except for a late period when some compulsory recruiting was done in the
SS, membership in all these militarized organizations was voluntary. The
police organizations were recruited from ardent partisans who enlisted
blindly to do the dirty work the leaders planned. The Reich Cabinet was
the governmental facade for Nazi Party Government and in its members
legal, as well as actual responsibility was vested for the entire
program. Collectively they were responsible for the program in general,
individually they were especially responsible for segments of it. The
finding which we ask you to make, that these are criminal organizations,
will subject members to punishment to be hereafter determined by
appropriate tribunals, unless some personal defense—such as becoming a
member under threat to person, to family, or inducement by false
representation, or the like—be established. Every member will have a
chance to be heard in the subsequent forum on his personal relation to
the organization, but your finding in this trial will conclusively
establish the criminal character of the organization as a whole.

We have also accused as criminal organizations the High Command and the
General Staff of the German Armed Forces. We recognize that to plan
warfare is the business of professional soldiers in all countries. But
it is one thing to plan strategic moves in the event war comes, and it
is another thing to plot and intrigue to bring on that war. We will
prove the leaders of the German General Staff and of the High Command to
have been guilty of just that. Military men are not before you because
they served their country. They are here because they mastered it, along
with these others, and drove it to war. They are not here because they
lost the war, but because they started it. Politicians may have thought
of them as soldiers, but soldiers know they were politicians. We ask
that the General Staff and the High Command, as defined in the
Indictment, be condemned as a criminal group whose existence and
tradition constitute a standing menace to the peace of the world.

These individual defendants did not stand alone in crime and will not
stand alone in punishment. Your verdict of “guilty” against these
organizations will render _prima facie_ guilty, as nearly as we can
learn, thousands upon thousands of members now in custody of United
States forces and of other armies.

_The responsibility of this Tribunal_:

To apply the sanctions of the law to those whose conduct is found
criminal by the standards I have outlined, is the responsibility
committed to this Tribunal. It is the first court ever to undertake the
difficult task of overcoming the confusion of many tongues and the
conflicting concepts of just procedure among divers systems of law, so
as to reach a common judgment. The tasks of all of us are such as to
make heavy demands on patience and good will. Although the need for
prompt action has admittedly resulted in imperfect work on the part of
the Prosecution, four great nations bring you their hurriedly assembled
contributions of evidence. What remains undiscovered we can only guess.
We could, with witnesses’ testimony, prolong the recitals of crime for
years—but to what avail. We shall rest the case when we have offered
what seems convincing and adequate proof of the crimes charged without
unnecessary cumulation of evidence. We doubt very much whether it will
be seriously denied that the crimes I have outlined took place. The
effort will undoubtedly be to mitigate or escape personal
responsibility.

Among the nations which unite in accusing these defendants the United
States is perhaps in a position to be the most dispassionate, for,
having sustained the least injury, it is perhaps the least animated by
vengeance. Our American cities have not been bombed by day and by night,
by humans, and by robots. It is not our temples that had been laid in
ruins. Our countrymen have not had their homes destroyed over their
heads. The menace of Nazi aggression, except to those in actual service,
has seemed less personal and immediate to us than to European peoples.
But while the United States is not first in rancor, it is not second in
determination that the forces of law and order be made equal to the task
of dealing with such international lawlessness as I have recited here.

Twice in my lifetime, the United States has sent its young manhood
across the Atlantic, drained its resources, and burdened itself with
debt to help defeat Germany. But the real hope and faith that has
sustained the American people in these great efforts was that victory
for ourselves and our Allies would lay the basis for an ordered
international relationship in Europe and would end the centuries of
strife on this embattled continent.

Twice we have held back in the early stages of European conflict in the
belief that it might be confined to a purely European affair. In the
United States, we have tried to build an economy without armament, a
system of government without militarism, and a society where men are not
regimented for war. This purpose, we know now, can never be realized if
the world periodically is to be embroiled in war. The United States
cannot, generation after generation, throw its youth or its resources on
to the battlefields of Europe to redress the lack of balance between
Germany’s strength and that of her enemies, and to keep the battles from
our shores.

The American dream of a peace-and-plenty economy, as well as the hopes
of other nations, can never be fulfilled if those nations are involved
in a war every generation so vast and devastating as to crush the
generation that fights and burden the generation that follows. But
experience has shown that wars are no longer local. All modern wars
become world wars eventually. And none of the big nations at least can
stay out. If we cannot stay out of wars, our only hope is to prevent
wars.

I am too well aware of the weaknesses of juridical action alone to
contend that in itself your decision under this Charter can prevent
future wars. Judicial action always comes after the event. Wars are
started only on the theory and in the confidence that they can be won.
Personal punishment, to be suffered only in the event the war is lost,
will probably not be a sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where the
warmakers feel the chances of defeat to be negligible.

But the ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable in
a system of international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible
to law. And let me make clear that while this law is first applied
against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a
useful purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations,
including those which sit here now in judgment. We are able to do away
with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression by those in power
against the rights of their own people only when we make all men
answerable to the law. This trial represents mankind’s desperate effort
to apply the discipline of the law to statesmen who have used their
powers of state to attack the foundations of the world’s peace and to
commit aggressions against the rights of their neighbors.

The usefulness of this effort to do justice is not to be measured by
considering the law or your judgment in isolation. This trial is part of
the great effort to make the peace more secure. One step in this
direction is the United Nations organization, which may take joint
political action to prevent war if possible, and joint military action
to insure that any nation which starts a war will lose it. This Charter
and this Trial, implementing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, constitute another
step in the same direction—juridical action of a kind to ensure that
those who start a war will pay for it personally.

While the defendants and the prosecutors stand before you as
individuals, it is not the triumph of either group alone that is
committed to your judgment. Above all personalities there are anonymous
and impersonal forces whose conflict makes up much of human history. It
is yours to throw the strength of the law back of either the one or the
other of these forces for at least another generation. What are the real
forces that are contending before you?

No charity can disguise the fact that the forces which these defendants
represent, the forces that would advantage and delight in their
acquittal, are the darkest and most sinister forces in
society—dictatorship and oppression, malevolence and passion,
militarism and lawlessness. By their fruits we best know them. Their
acts have bathed the world in blood and set civilization back a century.
They have subjected their European neighbors to every outrage and
torture, every spoliation and deprivation that insolence, cruelty, and
greed could inflict. They have brought the German people to the lowest
pitch of wretchedness, from which they can entertain no hope of early
deliverance. They have stirred hatreds and incited domestic violence on
every continent. These are the things that stand in the dock shoulder to
shoulder with these prisoners.

The real complaining party at your bar is Civilization. In all our
countries it is still a struggling and imperfect thing. It does not
plead that the United States, or any other country, has been blameless
of the conditions which made the German people easy victims to the
blandishments and intimidations of the Nazi conspirators.

But it points to the dreadful sequence of aggressions and crimes I have
recited, it points to the weariness of flesh, the exhaustion of
resources, and the destruction of all that was beautiful or useful in so
much of the world, and to greater potentialities for destruction in the
days to come. It is not necessary among the ruins of this ancient and
beautiful city with untold members of its civilian inhabitants still
buried in its rubble, to argue the proposition that to start or wage an
aggressive war has the moral qualities of the worst of crimes. The
refuge of the defendants can be only their hope that international law
will lag so far behind the moral sense of mankind that conduct which is
crime in the moral sense must be regarded as innocent in law.

Civilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to
deal with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this order of
importance. It does not expect that you can make war impossible. It does
expect that your juridical action will put the forces of international
law, its precepts, its prohibitions and, most of all, its sanctions, on
the side of peace, so that men and women of good will, in all countries,
may have “leave to live by no man’s leave, underneath the law.”

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow
morning.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 22 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]




                               THIRD DAY
                       Thursday, 22 November 1945


                           _Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Before the Chief Prosecutor for the United States
proceeds to present the evidence on Count One, the Tribunal wishes me to
announce the decision on the application made on behalf of the Defendant
Julius Streicher by his counsel that his condition should be examined.
It has been examined by three medical experts on behalf of the Tribunal
and their report has been submitted to and considered by the Tribunal;
and it is as follows:

    “1. The Defendant Julius Streicher is sane.

    “2. The Defendant Julius Streicher is fit to appear before the
    Tribunal, and to present his defense.

    “3. It being the unanimous conclusion of the examiners that
    Julius Streicher is sane, he is for that reason capable of
    understanding the nature and policy of his acts during the
    period of time covered by the Indictment.”

The Tribunal accepts the report of the medical experts and the trial
against Julius Streicher will, therefore, proceed.

The other matter to which I have to refer is a motion on behalf of
counsel for Bormann, whom the Tribunal have decided to try in his
absence in pursuance of Article 12 of the Charter. Counsel for Bormann
has made a motion that the trial against him should be postponed, but,
in view of the fact that the provisions of the Charter and the
Tribunal’s rules of procedure have been strictly carried out in the
notices which have been given, and the fact that counsel for Bormann
will have ample time before he is called upon to present defense on his
behalf, the motion is denied.

I will now call upon counsel for the United States to present the
evidence on Count One.

COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, as the first order of business
concerning the evidence, it shall be my purpose to outline the method of
capturing, assembling, processing, and authenticating documents to be
presented in evidence by the United States. I shall also describe and
illustrate the plan of presenting documents and briefs relating to the
United States’ case-in-chief.

As the United States Army advanced into German territory, there were
attached to each Army and subordinate organization specialized military
personnel whose duties were to capture and preserve enemy information in
the form of documents, records, reports, and other files. The Germans
kept accurate and voluminous records. They were found in Army
headquarters, Government buildings, and elsewhere. During the later
stages of the war, particularly, such documents were found in salt
mines, buried in the ground, behind false walls, and many other places
believed secure by the Germans. For example, the personal correspondence
and diaries of the Defendant Rosenberg, including his Nazi
correspondence, were found behind a false wall in an old castle in
eastern Bavaria. The records of the OKL, or Luftwaffe, of which the
Defendant Göring was Commander-in-Chief—equivalent to the records of
the Headquarters of the Air Staff of the United States Army Air
Forces—were found in various places in the Bavarian Alps. Most of such
Luftwaffe records were assembled and processed by the Army at
Berchtesgaden.

When the Army first captured documents and records, they immediately
placed the materials under guard and later assembled them in temporary
document centers. Many times the records were so voluminous that they
were hauled by fleets of Army trucks to document centers. Finally, as
the territory seized was made secure, Army zones were established and
each Army established a fixed document center to which were transported
the assembled documents and records. Later this material was indexed and
cataloged, which was a slow process.

Beginning last June, Mr. Justice Jackson requested me to direct the
assembling of documentary evidence on the continent for the United
States case. Field teams from our office were organized under the
direction of Major William H. Coogan, who established United States
liaison officers at the main Army document centers. Such officers were
directed to screen and analyze the mass of captured documents, and
select those having evidentiary value for our case. Literally hundreds
of tons of enemy documents and records were screened and examined and
those selected were forwarded to Nuremberg for processing. I now offer
in evidence an affidavit by Major Coogan, dated November 19, 1945,
attached hereto, describing the method of procedure, capture, screening
and delivery of such documents to Nuremberg. (Document Number 001 A-PS,
Exhibit USA-1)

At this time, if Your Honors please, and in order to present this matter
to the Tribunal, I believe it wise to read at least substantial portions
of this affidavit. It is dated November 19, 1945.

    “I, Major William H. Coogan, 0-455814, Q.M.C., a commissioned
    officer of the United States of America, do hereby certify as
    follows:

    “1. The United States Chief of Counsel in July 1945 charged the
    Field Branch of the Documentation Division with the
    responsibility of collecting, evaluating, and assembling
    documentary evidence in the European Theater for use in the
    prosecution of the major Axis War Criminals before the
    International Military Tribunal. I was appointed Chief of the
    Field Branch on 20 July 1945. I am now the Chief of the
    Documentation Division, Office of United States Chief of
    Counsel.

    “2. I have served in the United States Army for more than 4
    years and am a practicing attorney by profession. Based upon my
    experience as an attorney and as a United States Army officer, I
    am familiar with the operation of the United States Army in
    connection with seizing and processing captured enemy documents.
    In my capacity as Chief of the Documentation Division, Office of
    the United States Chief of Counsel, I am familiar with and have
    supervised the processing, filing, translating, and photostating
    of all documentary evidence for the United States Chief of
    Counsel.”

    I skip to paragraph 4.

    “4. The Field Branch of the Documentation Division was staffed
    by personnel thoroughly conversant with the German language.
    Their task was to search for and select captured enemy documents
    in the European Theater which disclosed information relating to
    the prosecution of the major Axis war criminals. Officers under
    my command were placed on duty at various document centers and
    also dispatched on individual missions to obtain original
    documents. When the documents were located, my representatives
    made a record of the circumstances under which they were found
    and all information available concerning their authenticity was
    recorded. Such documents were further identified by Field Branch
    pre-trial serial numbers, assigned by my representatives who
    would then periodically dispatch the original documents by
    courier to the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel.

    “5. Upon receipt of these documents they were duly recorded and
    indexed. After this operation, they were delivered to the
    Screening and Analysis Branch of the Documentation Division of
    the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, which Branch
    re-examined the documents in order to finally determine whether
    or not they should be retained as evidence for the prosecutors.
    This final screening was done by German-speaking analysts on the
    staff of the United States Chief of Counsel. When the document
    passed the screeners, it was then transmitted to the Document
    Room of the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, with a
    covering sheet prepared by the screeners showing the title or
    nature of the document, the personalities involved, and its
    importance. In the Document Room, a trial identification number
    was given to each document and to each group of documents, in
    cases where it was desirable for the sake of clarity to file
    several documents together.

    “6. United States documents were given trial identification
    numbers in one of five series designated by the letters: “PS”,
    “L”, “R”, “C”, and “EC”, indicating the means of acquisition of
    the documents. Within each series documents were listed
    numerically.

    “7. After a document was so numbered, it was then sent to a
    German-speaking analyst who prepared a summary of the document
    with appropriate references to personalities involved, index
    headings, information as to the source of the document as
    indicated by the Field Branch, and the importance of the
    document to a particular phase of the case. Next, the original
    document was returned to the Document Room and then checked out
    to the Photostating Department, where photostatic copies were
    made. Upon return from photostating, it was placed in an
    envelope in one of the several fireproof safes in the rear of
    the Document Room. One of the photostatic copies of the document
    was sent to the translators, thereafter leaving the original
    itself in the safe. A commissioned officer has been, and is,
    responsible for the documents in the safe. At all times when he
    is not present the safe is locked and a military guard is on
    duty outside the only door. If the officers preparing the
    certified translation, or one of the officers working on the
    briefs, found it necessary to examine the original document,
    this was done within the Document Room in the section set aside
    for that purpose. The only exception to this strict rule has
    been where it has been occasionally necessary to present the
    original document to Defense Counsel for examination. In this
    case, the document was entrusted to a responsible officer of the
    Prosecution staff.

    “8. All original documents are now located in safes in the
    Document Room, where they will be secured until they are
    presented by the Prosecution to the court during the progress of
    this Trial.

    “9. Some of the documents which will be offered in evidence by
    the United States were seized and processed by the British Army.
    Also, personnel from the Office of the United States Chief of
    Counsel and the British War Crimes Executive have acted jointly
    in locating, seizing and processing such documents.

    “10. Substantially the same system of acquiring documentary
    evidence was utilized by the British Army and the British War
    Crimes Executive as above set forth with respect to the United
    States Army and the Office of the United States Chief of
    Counsel.

    “11. Therefore, I certify in my official capacity as hereinabove
    stated, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the
    documents captured in the British Zone of Operations and
    Occupation, which will be offered in evidence by the United
    States Chief of Counsel, have been authenticated, translated,
    and processed in substantially the same manner as hereinabove
    set forth with respect to the operations of the United States
    Chief of Counsel.

    “12. Finally, I certify that all documentary evidence offered by
    the United States Chief of Counsel, including those documents
    from British Army sources, are in the same condition as captured
    by the United States and British Armies; that they have been
    translated by competent and qualified translators; that all
    photostatic copies are true and correct copies of the originals
    and that they have been correctly filed, numbered, and processed
    as above outlined.”

    Signed by: “William H. Coogan, Major, QMC, 0-455814.”

After the documents selected by the screening process outlined reached
our office, they were again examined, re-screened, and translated by
expert U.S. Army personnel, as outlined by Major Coogan.

Finally, more than 2,500 documents were selected and filed here in this
Court House. At least several hundred will be offered in evidence. They
have been photographed, translated into English, filed, indexed, and
processed. The same general procedure was followed by the British War
Crimes Executive with regard to documents captured by the British Army,
and there has been complete integration and cooperation of activities
with the British in that regard.

In order to present our case and to assist the Tribunal, we have
prepared written briefs on each phase of our case which cite the
documents by appropriate numbers. Legal propositions of the United
States will also be presented in such briefs. The briefs and documents
will cover each allegation of the Indictment which is the United States’
responsibility. I hold in my hand one of the trial briefs entitled
“Reshaping of Education, Training of Youth,” which will be offered later
on this day. Accompanying each brief is a document book containing true
copies in English of all documents referred to in the brief. I hold in
my hand the document book that will be submitted to this Tribunal in
support of the brief which I have just exhibited to your Honors.
Likewise, copies in German have been, or will be, furnished to Defense
counsel at the time such documents are offered in evidence. Upon
conclusion of the presentation of each phase or section of our case by
counsel, the entire book of documents will be offered in evidence, such
as this book. At the same time, Lieutenant Barrett who will sit right
here all during the Trial and who is on our staff, will hand to the
clerk of this Tribunal the original documents that may be offered in
evidence in this form. It will have the seal of the Tribunal, will be
Exhibit USA, 2836-PS, and in turn Lieutenant Barrett will hand that
original document to the Tribunal. In the same manner, the document book
will be passed by Lieutenant Barrett to the clerk of the Court, and
these trial briefs for the assistance of the Tribunal will be made
available to the Court and to Defense Counsel. Likewise, copies of
documents actually introduced in evidence will be made available to the
press. Thus, may Your Honors please, it is hoped that by this procedure
the usual laborious and tedious method of introducing documentary
evidence may be expedited.

May I, therefore, respectfully inquire of the Tribunal and of Defense
counsel if there is any objection to the procedure outlined? If not, the
United States will proceed with the presentation of the documentary and
trial briefs as outlined herein.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has no objection to the course that you
propose.

COL. STOREY: If Your Honors please, may I now announce what will be
presented immediately following by the United States?

THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps that I ought to say to counsel for the
defendants that their silence will be taken as their assent to the
course proposed. In the absence of any objection by them to the course
proposed by Colonel Storey on behalf of the Chief Prosecutor for the
United States, the Tribunal will take it that they agree that the course
is convenient.

Thank you, gentlemen.

COL. STOREY: If Your Honors please, the next presentation will be the
briefs and documents on the Common Plan or Conspiracy up to 1939. We
will open by presentation of charts of the Nazi Party and Reich
Government with exhibits and explanation by Mr. Albrecht. That will be
followed by a presentation of the trial briefs and documents on the
other phases of the Common Plan or Conspiracy up to 1939.

RALPH G. ALBRECHT (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): May
it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution will now allude briefly to
certain facts, which may well be considered to be within judicial
purview, the consideration of which the Prosecution has found useful in
understanding and evaluating the evidence that will be presented in the
course of the Trial, in support of the allegations of the Indictment.

In the opinion of the Prosecution, some preliminary references must be
made to the National Socialist German Labor Party, the NSDAP, which in
itself is not one of the defendant organizations in this proceeding, but
which is represented among the defendant organizations by its most
important formations, namely the Leadership Corps of the NSDAP, which
you will hear referred to as Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der NSDAP,
the SS (Die Schutzstaffeln der NSDAP), and the SA (Die Sturmabteilungen)
of the Party.

With the permission of the Tribunal the Prosecution will offer at this
point, as its first exhibit, a chart showing the structure and
organization of the NSDAP, substantially as it existed at the peak of
its development in March 1945. This chart has been prepared by the
Prosecution on the basis of information contained in important and
well-known official publications of the National Socialist Party with
which the defendants must be presumed to have been well acquainted. We
refer particularly to the _Organization Book of the Party_, (_Das
Organisationsbuch der NSDAP_), and to the _National Socialist Year
Book_, (_Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch_), of both of which, be it
noted, the late Defendant Robert Ley was the chief editor or publisher.
Both books appeared, in the course of time, in many editions and in
hundreds of thousands of copies, throughout the period when the National
Socialist Party was in control of the German Reich and of the German
people. The chart, furthermore, which we are offering has been certified
on its face as correct by a high official of the Nazi Party, namely
Franz Xaver Schwarz, its treasurer (Reichsschatzmeister der NSDAP) and
its official in charge of Party administration; and his affidavit is
being submitted with the chart, and I now wish to offer this chart in
evidence. (Document Number 2903-PS, Exhibit USA-2.)

We have been able to have this chart duplicated, and, with the
permission of the Tribunal, we are making it available to all concerned.

Before I offer some remarks of explanation concerning the organization
of the National Socialist German Labor Party, which, we believe, will be
found useful in connection with the Prosecution’s case, I would just
like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the larger
chart which now appears is a simplification of the duplicated chart
which Your Honors have been furnished. For if it had been reproduced in
the same detail, I am afraid many of the boxes would not have appeared
intelligible from this point.

I would like to call your attention first of all to an organization with
which we will have to become very familiar: the Leadership Corps of the
NSDAP, (the Reichsleiter), which has been named as a defendant
organization and which comprises the sum of the officials and leaders of
the Nazi Party. If Your Honors will be good enough to follow me down the
center line of the chart, we come to the main horizontal line of
division where the word “Reichsleiter” appears. That is the first
category of the Leadership Corps, I should say, the main category,
perhaps, of the Leadership Corps.

The Führer, of course, stands above it. As we follow the vertical line
of division to the lower part of the chart, we reach five additional
boxes, which may be referred to collectively as the Hoheitsträger, the
bearers of the sovereignty of the Party, and those, are the Gauleiter,
the Kreisleiter, the Ortsgruppenleiter, the Zellenleiter, and the
Blockleiter.

The Führer at the top of our chart is the supreme and the only leader in
the Nazi hierarchy. His successor-designate was first the Defendant Hess
and subsequently the Defendant Göring.

The Reichsleiter, of whom 16 are shown on this chart, comprise
collectively the Party Directorate (Reichsleitung). Through them,
coordination of the Party and State machinery was achieved. A number of
these Reichsleiter, each of whom, at some time, was in charge of at
least one office within the Party Directorate, were also the heads of
other Party formations and affiliated and supervised organizations of
the Party and also of agencies of the State, and they even held
ministerial positions. The Reichsleitung may be said to represent the
horizontal organization of the Party according to functions, within
which all threads controlling the varied life of the German people met.
Each office within the Reichsleitung of the NSDAP executed definite
tasks assigned to it by the Führer, or by the leader of the Party
Chancellery (Chef der Parteikanzlei), who on the chart before you
appears directly under the Führer.

In 1945 the chief of the Party Chancellery was Martin Bormann, the
defendant in this proceeding, and before him, and until his flight to
England in 1941, the Defendant Rudolf Hess. It was the duty of the
Reichsleitung to make certain that these tasks assigned to it by the
Führer were carried out with expedition and without interruption, in
order that the will of the Führer quickly and rapidly was communicated
to the lowest Party echelon, the lowliest Zelle or Block. The individual
offices of the Reichsleitung had the mission to remain in constant and
closest contact with the life of the people through the agency of the
subdivisions of the component Party organizations in the Gaue, within
the Kreis, or the Ort or the lower group. These leaders had been taught
that the right to organize human beings accrued through the appreciation
of the fact that a people must be educated ideologically;
“weltanschaulich”, the Germans call it, that is to say, according to the
philosophy of National Socialism.

Among the Reichsleiter, on trial in this cause, may be included the
following defendants:

If Your Honors will follow me to this broad, horizontal line, we start
at the extreme left at the box marked with the Defendant Frank’s name.
At one time, although not in March 1945, he was the head of the Legal
Office of the Party. He was the Reichsleiter des Reichsrechtsamtes.

In the third square appears the Defendant Rosenberg, the delegate of the
Führer for Ideological Training and Education of the Party. He was
called “Der Beauftragte des Führers für die Überwachung der gesamten
geistigen und weltanschaulichen Schulung der NSDAP.” Next to him, to the
right, is the Defendant Von Schirach, leader of youth education, (Leiter
für die Jugenderziehung). Next to him, appears the late Defendant Robert
Ley, at one time head of the Party Organization
(Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP) and also the leader of the German
Labor Front, the DAF (Leiter der Deutschen Arbeitsfront).

Then, if we cross the vertical line, and proceed to the right—in
passing I might allude to the box marked with the name of Schwarz. He
was the Party official and Reichsleiter, who certified to the chart
before the Tribunal.

As we proceed further to the right, next to the last box, we find the
name of the Defendant Frick, who was the leader of the Reichstag
fraction (Leiter der NS Reichstagsfraktion).

The next categories to be considered are the Hoheitsträger, at the
bottom of the vertical line, in the center of the chart. The National
Socialists called them the bearers of sovereignty. To them was assigned
the political sovereignty over specially designated subdivisions of the
State, of which they were the appointed leaders. The Hoheitsträger may
be said to represent the vertical organization of the Party.

These leaders, these Hoheitsträger included all Gauleiter, of whom there
were 42 within the Reich in 1945. A Gauleiter was a political leader of
the largest subdivision of the State. He was charged by the Führer with
the political, cultural, and economic control over all forms and
manifestations of the life of the people and the coordination of the
same with National Socialist philosophy and ideology.

A number of the defendants before the bar of this Tribunal were former
Gauleiter of the NSDAP. I mention, in this connection, the Defendant
Streicher, Gauleiter of Franconia, “Franken-Führer” they called him,
whose seat was in the city of Nuremberg. Von Schirach was Gauleiter of
Vienna and the Defendant Sauckel was Gauleiter of Thuringia.

The next lower category on the chart were the Kreisleiter, the political
leaders of the largest subdivision within a Gau. Then follow the
Ortsgruppenleiter, the political leaders of the largest subdivision
within the Kreis. And a Kreis consisted perhaps of several towns or
villages or, in the case of a larger city, anywhere from 1,500 to 3,000
households.

The next Hoheitsträger were the Zellenleiter, the political leaders of a
group from four to eight city blocks, or of a corresponding group within
country districts, and then follow the Blockleiter, the political
leaders of from 40 to 60 households.

Now, each of these political leaders, of these Hoheitsträger, or bearers
of sovereignty, was directly responsible to the next highest leader in
the Nazi hierarchy. The Gauleiter was directly responsible to the Führer
himself; the Kreisleiter was directly responsible to the Gauleiter, the
Ortsgruppenleiter to the Kreisleiter, and so on.

The Führer himself reserved to himself, in accordance with the
philosophy that runs through the Party, the right to name all Führer. It
was he, personally, that named the Reichsleiter, all members of the
Party Directorate. It was he that appointed all Gauleiter and
Kreisleiter and all political leaders, down to the grade of
Gauamtsleiter, which was a lower classification of political leader
within the Party organization of the Gau.

These Hoheitsträger, together with the Reichsleitung, constituted the
all-powerful group of leaders by means of which the Nazi Party reached
right down into the lives of the people, consolidated its control of
them and compelled them to conform to the National Socialist pattern.
For this purpose broad powers were given to them, including the right to
call upon all Party formations to effectuate their plans. They could
requisition the services of the SA and of the SS, as well as of the HJ
and of the NSKK. If I may direct your attention, for the moment, to the
Party organizations that appear at the extreme left of the chart, I
would just like to say that structurally these organizations were
organized regionally to accord with the offices and regions controlled
by the Hoheitsträger. If I might be more explicit, let us take the SA.
The subsidiary formations of the SA came down and corresponded, in its
lower organizations, to the Gau, so that we have a Gauleitung in the SA,
and further down, to the Kreis, so that we have a Kreisleitung in the
SA, so that the Gauleiter and the Kreisleiter, to cite two examples,
charged with a particular duty by the Führer, could call on these
organizations for assistance in carrying out their tasks.

These sinister implications of the use of this power will become more
apparent as the Prosecution’s case develops, and as the wealth of
evidentiary material is introduced into evidence to prove the
criminality of the defendant organizations.

The component Party-organizations, called “Gliederungen” within the
Party, are shown at the extreme left of the chart, and are the
organizations to which I directed the attention of Your Honors a moment
ago. These organizations actually constitute the Party itself, and
substantially the entire Party-membership is contained within these
organizations. The four principal organizations are sometimes referred
to as “para-military” organizations. They were uniformed organizations
and they were armed. These organizations were the notorious SA and SS,
which are named as party-defendants in this case, the HJ (Hitler Youth),
and the NSKK—the Motor Corps of the Party (Kraftfahrkorps). Then there
were also the National Socialist Women’s Organization, the National
Socialist German Students’ Bund (Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher
Studentenbund), and the National Socialist University Teachers’
Organization (Nationalsozialistischer Dozentenbund).

There are additional organizations that were officially designated
within the Party, as affiliated organizations, not Gliederungen or
controlled organizations, but affiliated organizations (Angeschlossene
Verbände der NSDAP). Among those organizations we have the German Labor
Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront)—the DAF; we have an organization that
controlled the civil service (Reichsbund der Deutschen Beamten). There
were the physicians within the National Socialist Deutscher Ärztebund;
there were the teachers in the National Socialist Lehrerbund; there were
the lawyers within the National Socialist Rechtswahrerbund, of which, at
one time, the Defendant Frank was the head.

There is another group of organizations which was officially known as
supervised organizations (Betreute Organisationen der NSDAP),
organizations that included certain specialized women’s organizations
(Deutsches Frauenwerk), certain student societies
(Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentenschaft), former university
students (Altherrenbund der Deutschen Studenten). There was a group that
had reference to the German communes (Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher
Gemeindetag), and there was a Reichsbund für Leibesübungen that
interested itself in controlling all those interested in physical
exercise.

According to the official Party designations applicable to the various
organizations and associations that controlled German life there was a
fourth category, which is the last organization that appears to the
right on the chart before Your Honors, which is sometimes simply called
“Weitere Nationalsozialistische Organisationen”, and here, in some
respects, we are in “No man’s land”, because the Party was not static,
it was dynamic and our latest information is now to the effect that the
organizations that ordinarily came within this category, well-known
organizations like the RAD (Reich Labor Service) and the NSFK (the
National Socialist Fliegerkorps) or Flying Corps may no longer be
included there. At least that was the opinion of the Party treasurer,
who certified to this chart.

I think with these few remarks, I have given some general impression of
the structure of the Party, with which we are dealing in this proceeding
before Your Honors.

Before leaving the chart, perhaps I would just like to point out several
other instances where some of the defendants appear in this set-up.

At the very top, to the left of the Führer, as marked on the chart
before Your Honors, are the successors-designate of the Führer. First is
the Defendant Hess, until 1941, and followed by the Defendant Göring.
Under the Führer appears the chief of the Party Chancellery, the
Defendant Martin Bormann, and then, if we come to the level of the
Reichsleiter, and go to the left, opposite Rosenberg’s name, we find
that somewhat below that his name is repeated as the head of an office
on a lower level, namely, the Foreign Relations Office of the Party,
which played such a sinister influence in the early work of the Party,
as will later appear in the documentary evidence to be presented to Your
Honors.

We then come to the late Defendant Ley’s name, on the main horizontal
division, and follow the dotted line to a lower level, and we will find
he was the chief of the German Labor Front, and if we come closer to the
vertical line, to a lower level, below the Reichsleitung, we find the
Defendant Speer in the Hauptamt für Technik (the Office of Technical
Affairs), and below that as the chief of the Bund Deutscher Technik
(German Technological League).

With the permission of the Tribunal, the Prosecution will now pass to
the consideration of the governmental machinery of the German State,
which, like the organization of the Nazi Party, requires some brief
observations before the Prosecution proceeds with the submission of
proof on the Common Plan of Conspiracy, with which the defendants have
been charged.

If the Tribunal will allow, the Prosecution will offer as its second
exhibit, another chart, delineating substantially the governmental
structure of the Reich Government as it existed in March 1945, and also
the chief Leadership Corps of the Reich Government and the Reich
Administration during those years. (Document Number 2905-PS, Exhibit
USA-3)

This chart has been prepared by the Prosecution on the basis of
information contained in two official publications, _Das Taschenbuch für
Verwaltungsbeamte_, (_the Manual for Administrative Officers_) and the
_National Sozialistisches Jahrbuch_, to which I have already alluded,
edited by the Defendant Ley.

This chart has been examined, corrected, and certified by the Defendant
Wilhelm Frick, whose affidavit is submitted with the chart. In fact, it
is reproduced directly on the copies of the charts before Your Honors.

It seems plain that the Defendant Frick, a former Minister of Interior
of the Reich from January 1933 to August 1943, was well qualified, by
reason of his position and long service in public office during the
National Socialist regime, to certify to the substantial accuracy of the
facts disclosed in this chart.

Now, with the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to make some
brief comments on this chart.

First of all, we refer to the Reichsregierung, which is the big box in
the center of the chart on the vertical line, directly below Hitler. The
Reichsregierung is a word that may not be translated literally as
“government of the Reich.” The word “Reichsregierung” is a word of art
and is applied collectively to the ministers who composed the German
Cabinet.

The Reichsregierung has been named as a defendant in this proceeding,
and as used in the Indictment the expression “Reichsregierung”
identifies a group which, we will urge, should be declared to have been
a criminal organization.

This group includes all the men named in that center box, who were
members of the Cabinet after 30 January 1933, that is, Reich ministers
with and without portfolio, and all other officials entitled to
participate in the deliberations of the Cabinet.

Secondly, it includes members of the Counsel of Ministers for the
Defense of the Reich. It is called “Ministerrat für die
Reichsverteidigung”, which is the large box to the right of the vertical
line.

Then, it includes the members of the Secret Cabinet Council, which is
the small box to the left of the vertical line, the Geheimer
Kabinettsrat, of which the Defendant Von Neurath was the President.

Unlike the Cabinets and Ministerial Councils in countries that were not
within the orbit of the Axis, the Reichsregierung, after 30 January,
1933 when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the German Reich, did not
remain merely the executive branch of the Government. In short order it
also came to be possessed, and it exercised legislative, and other
functions as well, in the governmental system into which the German
Government developed while under the domination of the National
Socialist Party.

It is proper to observe here that unlike such Party organizations as the
SA and SS, the Reichsregierung, before 1933, certainly, was not a body
created exclusively or even predominantly for the purpose of committing
illegal acts. The Reichsregierung was an instrument of government
provided for by the Weimar constitution. Under the Nazi regime, however,
the Reichsregierung gradually became a primary agent of the Party, with
functions formulated in accordance with the objectives and methods of
the Party itself. The Party to all intents and purposes, was intended to
be a Führerorden, an order of Führer, a pool of political leaders. And
while the Party was, in the words of a German law, “the bearer of the
concept of the German State,” it was not identical with the State.

Thus, in order to realize its ideological and political objectives and
to reach the German people, the Party had to avail itself of official
state channels.

The Reichsregierung, and such agencies and offices established by it,
were the chosen instruments, by means of which the Party policies were
converted into legislative and administrative acts, binding upon the
German people as a whole.

In order to accomplish this result, the Reichsregierung was thoroughly
remodelled by the Party. Some of the steps may be here recorded, by
which the coordination of Party and State machinery was assured in order
to impose the will of the Führer on the German people.

On January 30, 1933, the date that the Führer became Reich Chancellor,
there were few National Socialists that were Cabinet members. But, as
the power of the Party in the Reich grew, the Cabinet came to include an
ever increasing number of Nazis, until by January 1937 no non-Party
member remained in the Reichsregierung. New cabinet-posts were created
and Nazis appointed to them. Many of these cabinet members were also in
the Reichsleitung of the Party.

To give but a few examples:

The Defendant Rosenberg, whose name Your Honors will find in that
central box on the vertical line, the delegate of the Führer for
Ideological Training and Education of the Party, was a member of the
Reichsregierung in his capacity as Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Areas, the Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete.

And if Your Honors will follow me on the vertical line to the main
horizontal line and proceed to the very end, you will find a box marked
“Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories”, of which the head was
the Defendant Rosenberg.

The Defendant Frick, the leader of the National Socialist fraction in
the Reichstag, was also Minister of the Interior.

If Your Honors will follow me down to the main horizontal line and two
boxes over you will find the Ministry presided over by the Defendant
Frick. Goebbels, the Reichsleiter für Propaganda, also sat in the
Cabinet as Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
(Reichsminister für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda). He is in the next
box to the right from the Ministry of the Interior.

After the 25th of July 1934 Party participation in the work of the
Cabinet was at all times achieved through the person of the Defendant
Rudolf Hess, the deputy of the Führer. By a decree of Hitler the
Defendant Hess was invested with the power to take part in the editing
of legislative bills with all the departments of the Reich. Later this
power of the Führer’s deputy was expanded to include all executive
decisions and orders that were published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, the
official volume in which are contained the decrees of the State. After
Hess’s flight to England in 1941, the Defendant Martin Bormann, as his
successor, took over the same functions, and in addition he was given
the authority of a Reichsminister so that he could sit in the Cabinet.

Now, another item of importance:

On the 30th of January 1937, four years after Hitler became Chancellor,
the Führer executed the acceptances into the Party of those last few
Cabinet members who still remained out of the Party. Only one Cabinet
member had the strength of character to reject membership in the Party.
That was the Minister of Transportation and Minister of Posts, Mr.
Eltz-Rübenach. His example was not followed by the Defendant Von
Neurath. His example was not followed by the Defendant Raeder. And if
the Defendant Schacht was not yet at that time a member of the Party, I
might say that his example was not followed by the Defendant Schacht.

The chart shows many other instances where Party members on the highest,
as well as subordinate levels, occupied corresponding or other positions
in the organization of the State. Take Hitler himself. The Führer of the
NSDAP was also the Chancellor of the Reich, with which office,
furthermore, the office of President of the Reich was joined and merged
after the death of President Von Hindenburg in 1934.

Take the Defendant Göring, the successor-designate of Hitler. As Führer
of the SA, he sat in the Cabinet as Air Minister (Luftfahrtminister) and
he also held many other important positions, including that of
Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe (the German Air Force) and that of
Delegate for the Four Year Plan.

Himmler, the notorious head of the SS, the Reichsführer SS, was also the
chief of the German Police, reporting to the Defendant Frick. He himself
later became Minister of the Interior after the attempted assassination
of Hitler on June 20, 1944, which event also catapulted him into the
position of Commander-in-Chief of the German Reserve Army.

Now, at the extreme upper left of the chart is a small box that is
labeled “Reichstag” (the former German parliament).

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes, and 10 minutes
only.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALBRECHT: The Reichstag presents an anomaly in this picture. Under
the republic it had been the supreme law-making body of the Reich,
subject only to a limited check by the Reichsrat (the Council of the
Reich), by the President, and by the people themselves by way of
initiative and referendum.

Putting their opposition to all forms of Parliamentarianism into effect
at once, the Nazis proceeded to curtail the powers of the Reichstag, to
eliminate the Reichsrat, and to merge the Presidency with the Office of
Chancellor occupied by the Führer. By the Act of 24th of March 1933 the
Cabinet was given unlimited legislative powers, including the right to
deviate from the constitution. Subsequently, as I stated, the Reichsrat
was abolished, and with that act the residuum of the power to legislate
in the Reichstag was reduced to a minimum. I say the power was reduced
to a minimum because the actual power to legislate was never taken away
from the Reichstag, but certainly after the advent of the Party to power
it was never permitted to exercise as a legislature.

The Reichsregierung retained its legislative powers throughout, even
though from time to time other agencies of the Reichsregierung, such as
the Plenipotentiary for Administration, in the upper right of the chart,
(the Generalbevollmächtigter für die Reichsverwaltung), the
Plenipotentiary for Economy, also in the right-hand corner of the chart,
(the Generalbevollmächtigter für die Wirtschaft), and the Council of
Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, were created. That is the big
box to the right of the vertical line. And these agencies of the
Reichsregierung received certain concurrent legislative powers.

The development of the Reichstag into an emasculated legislative body
was, however, only an intermediate step on the road to rule by Führer
decrees. That was the ultimate goal of the Party, and a goal which they
achieved.

The Nazis then proceeded to delegate some of the powers of the Reich
Cabinet to all sorts of newly created agencies, some of which I have
already mentioned. Cabinet functions were delegated first of all to the
Reich Defense Council, the Reichsverteidigungsrat, possibly as early as
the 4th of April 1933, but we believe certainly not later than 1935. I
might say in this connection that with respect to a number of these
agencies of the Reichsregierung which received delegated powers, we are
moving in a somewhat shadowy land, because in developing this
organization we are dealing—to some extent, at least—with decrees and
actions that were secret, or secretive, in character.

A number of these decrees were never definitely fixed in time. A number
of them were never published and the German people themselves never
became acquainted with them. And that is why I say that the Reich
Defense Council may possibly have been created as early as two and
one-half months after the advent of Hitler to power but we believe that
we will be able to show to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that that
important body in the Government of the Reich was created certainly not
later than May 1935.

I say it is an important body. This was the war-planning group, of which
Hitler himself was chairman and the Defendant Göring the alternate. It
was a large war-planning body, as Your Honors will note, that included
many Cabinet members, and there was also a working committee—the true
numerical size of which does not appear from the chart—which was
presided over by the Defendant Keitel. That also was composed of Cabinet
members and of Reich defense officials, the majority of whom were
appointed by Cabinet officers and subject to their control. Other powers
were delegated to the Plenipotentiary, whom I have named before, for
Administration, appearing at the extreme right of the chart. That was
the Defendant Frick, and later the notorious Himmler.

Subordinate to Frick in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for
Administration were complete ministries, the Ministry of the Interior
(Frick’s old ministry), Ministry of Justice, Education, Church Affairs,
and Raumordnung (the Ministry for Special Planning).

Other powers went to the delegate for the Four Year Plan, again the
Defendant Göring, whose box appears to the left of the median line, half
way to the edge.

There were certain other powers that went to an organization within the
shadow-land I mentioned, and which, unfortunately, does not have its
name appear on this chart, the Dreierkollegium (the College of Three),
which title should really be imposed over the last three boxes in the
upper right hand corner; because the Dreierkollegium consisted not alone
of the Plenipotentiary for Administration, but also the Plenipotentiary
for War Economy, and the chairman of that group who, I believe, was the
Defendant Keitel, as the head of the OKW, the Wehrmacht, all the armed
forces. The duties of the Dreierkollegium would seem to have included
the drafting of decrees in preparation of and for use during war. To the
Secret Cabinet Council, the Geheimer Kabinettsrat, of which the
Defendant Von Neurath was chairman,—or President, I believe was his
title, went other powers. That Secret Cabinet Council was created by a
decree of the Führer in 1938.

Certain other delegation of power took place to the Ministerrat für die
Reichsverteidigung (the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the
Realm), which is the smallest box appearing under the large box of the
Reich Defense Council, to the right of the vertical line.

The Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich was responsible to
the Führer alone. Its membership, as would seem to be indicated on the
chart, was taken from the Reich Defense Council. It had broad powers to
issue decrees with the force of law in so far as the Reichsregierung
itself had not legislated on the subject.

It should be stressed that this delegation of Cabinet functions to
various groups, composed largely of its own members, helped to conceal
some of the important policies of the Reichsregierung, namely, those
relating to the preparation of war, which delegated the necessary
authority to secret and semi-secret agencies. Thus in a general way, as
I have outlined, did the National Socialist Party succeed in putting
Nazi policies into effect through its dummy, through the machinery of
the State, the Reichsregierung, in its revised form.

I think it might be helpful if Your Honors will permit me to point out
on this chart the large number of instances in which the defendants’
names reappear in connection with the functions of the Government of the
Reich.

Now, first of all, the Reichsregierung itself—I am sorry to say in that
connection that there is one omission, a very important omission. It is
the name of the Vice Chancellor under Hitler, Von Papen, who was Vice
Chancellor from the seizure of power until some time around the purge in
June 1934.

Your Honors will see a grouping of Reich Ministers with portfolio, and
under it of Ministers without portfolio, in which mostly the names of
the defendants in court are listed. There are State Ministers listed
acting as Reich Ministers, and you will note the name of the Defendant
Frank. There are other participants in Cabinet meetings, among which you
will notice the name of the Defendant Von Schirach.

Now, this whole line on which the Cabinet hangs is the level of the
Reich Cabinet, and as I have stated, organizations that grew out of this
maternal organism, the Reichsregierung.

To the left the Secret Cabinet Council includes the names of the
defendants. Still further to the left is the delegate for the Four Year
Plan. And over to the very end is the Reichstag, of which the President
was the Defendant Göring, and the leader of the Reichstagsfraktion, the
Defendant Frick.

If we proceed to the right of the median line, we have the Reich Defense
Council, with Hitler himself as chairman, the Reich Defense Committee
under it, and the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Realm,
which grew out of the Reich Defense Council. And we see mostly the names
of Cabinet ministers, including, if I may advert to that fact,
particularly the names of purely military leaders, such as the Defendant
Raeder and the Defendant Keitel.

And farther to the right, all names mentioned as defendants in these
proceedings, Schacht, the first Plenipotentiary for War Economy, later
succeeded by Funk; Field Marshal Keitel as the Chief of the OKW, and the
Defendant Frick again as Plenipotentiary for Administration, in the
triangle which became known as the “Dreierkollegium.”

If we descend the vertical line to the horizontal line in the middle, we
have the various ministries over which these Cabinet ministers, this
Reichsregierung, presided. We have also at the extreme left and the
extreme right, very important and special offices that were set up at
the instigation of the Party, and those offices reported directly to the
Führer himself.

If I may start at the extreme left, I will point out that as the civil
government moved after the military machine into the lowlands, the
Defendant Seyss-Inquart became the Reichskommissar for the Netherlands.

A few names below that of Seyss-Inquart is the name of the Defendant Von
Neurath, the Reichsprotektor for Bohemia and Moravia, who was later
succeeded by the Defendant Frick; and under those names, the name of the
Defendant Frank, the General-gouverneur of Poland.

Adjoining the box of these administrators who reported directly to the
Reich Chancellor and President was the Foreign Office, presided over
first by the Defendant Von Neurath, and subsequently by the Defendant
Von Ribbentrop.

If we proceed down below the elongation under the smaller box dealing
with German legations, there should, of course, in any itemized,
detailed treatment of that box appear the name of the Defendant Von
Papen, the representative of the Reich in Austria for a time, and later
in Turkey.

The next box on the horizontal line is the Ministry of Economics, (the
Reichswirtschaftsministerium). First is the name of the Defendant
Schacht, followed by the name of the Defendant Göring, and by the name
of the Defendant Funk.

The next box, the Ministry for Armament and War Production (the
Reichsministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion), was presided over
by the Defendant Speer. And out of this organization, and subordinate to
it, in the box devoted to the Organization Todt, again the name of the
Defendant Speer, who succeeded Todt to the leadership of that
organization upon the death of Todt.

Two boxes over, the Ministry of Justice, if Your Honors will follow me,
down close to the bottom of the page to the last left-hand box,
appearing under the Ministry of Justice, is the
Reichsrechtsanwaltskammer—I am sorry, the box next to the bottom at the
left which is devoted to the Academy for German Law (Die Akademie für
deutsches Recht), over which the Defendant Frank presided for a time.

Almost at the vertical line, the Air Ministry, of which the Defendant
Göring was Oberkommandant; and next to it again the Ministry of the
Interior, presided over by the Defendant Frick.

If Your Honors will follow me again to the bottom of all the squares to
the small horizontal line at the bottom of the Ministry of the Interior,
we come to certain state officials, called “Reich Governors”
(Reichsstatthalter). And if those boxes were sufficiently detailed there
would appear thereon the names, among others, of the Defendant Sauckel,
who besides being the Gauleiter of Thuringia, was also the
Reichsstatthalter or Governor there. There would also appear the name of
the Defendant Von Schirach, who was not only the Gauleiter of Vienna,
but also the State representative there—the Governor—the
Reichsstatthalter of Vienna.

And springing out of the Ministry of the Interior is the box or boxes
devoted to the German police, and in the first sub-division appearing to
the right, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, the name of the
Defendant Kaltenbrunner.

In the Ministry of Propaganda, about midway down in this box, appears
the name of the Defendant Fritzsche, who, although as the chart is
drawn, would not appear in the position of one of the chief directing
heads of the Ministry, actually was very much more important than his
position there will indicate; and proof will be submitted to Your Honors
in support of that contention.

At the end of the horizontal line is the Ministry for the Occupied
Eastern Territories (the Reichsministerium für die Besetzten Ostgebiete)
of which the Defendant Rosenberg was the head.

And to the right of that box, among the agencies immediately subordinate
to Hitler as Reichskanzler and President, there is the office of General
Inspector for Highways, with the name of the Defendant Speer associated
with it; the General Inspector for Water and Energy, again with the name
of the Defendant Speer associated with it.

There follows the Reich Office for Forestry (the Reichsforstamt) under
the Defendant Göring; the Reichsjugendführer (the leader of the Reich
Youth), the Defendant Von Schirach; the Reich Housing Commissioner
(Reichswohnungskommissar), the late Defendant Robert Ley; and among the
subsequent agencies, that of the important Reichsbank, over which the
Defendant Schacht presided, to be succeeded subsequently by the
Defendant Funk; the General Inspector for the Reich Capital
(Generalbauinspekteur für die Reichshauptstadt), the Defendant Speer.

I think I have named all of the defendants as they appear on this chart,
and of those now before Your Honors in this cause I think they all
appear on this chart in one capacity or another, in one or more
capacities,—all, I might add, except the Defendant Jodl. Jodl was the
Chief of Staff of all the Armed Forces. He was the head of the Wehrmacht
Führungsstab, and in the chart as evidential material which will be
subsequently brought before Your Honors, the name Jodl will figure
prominently in connection with the organization of the Armed Forces.

If I may make one correction at this point, a slip of the tongue that
was called to my attention, in discussing the chart of the Party, in the
small box to the left containing the designates of the Führer to succeed
him to the Party leadership, I made the statement that Göring succeeded
Hess as Führer-designate. Actually, when the designations were announced
by the Führer, Göring was always the first designate, and the Defendant
Hess the second.

In Annex A of the Indictment the various offices, Party functions, and
State offices which these defendants held in the course of the period
under discussion, these various offices are mentioned. And we would like
to submit at this time and offer into evidence as exhibits proof of the
offices that were occupied by these defendants. This proof consists of
17 statements, more or less, signed by the defendants themselves and/or
their counsel, certifying to the Party and State offices that they have
held from time to time. Some of these statements were not as complete as
we desired to have them, and we have appended thereto a statement
showing such additional offices or proof of Party membership as was
available to us. I would like to offer those into evidence.

MR. ALBRECHT: And now, if Your Honors please, I offer into evidence the
two charts to which my remarks have been addressed in the course of the
morning.

THE PRESIDENT: Will counsel for the United States continue the evidence
until half past 12?

COL. STOREY: If Your Honor please, it lacks 2 minutes until half past
12. Mr. Albrecht has finished, and will it be convenient for Your Honors
for Major Wallis to start at 2 o’clock?

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, Major Frank Wallis will now present
the briefs and documents supporting the briefs in behalf of the phase of
the case known as the Common Plan or Conspiracy, up through 1939.

Major Wallis.

MAJOR FRANK B. WALLIS (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States):
Mr. President, members of the Tribunal:

It will be my purpose to establish most of the material allegations of
the Indictment running from Paragraph IV on Page 3, to Subparagraph E on
Page 6. The subjects involved are:

The aims of the Nazi Party, their doctrinal techniques, their rise to
power, and the consolidation of control over Germany between 1933 and
1939 in preparation for aggressive war.

This story has already been sketched by the American Chief Prosecutor.
Moreover, it is history, beyond challenge by the defendants. For the
most part, we rely upon the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. What
we offer is merely illustrative material—including statements by the
defendants and other Nazi leaders—laws, decrees, and the like. We do
not need to rest upon captured documents or other special sources,
although some have been used.

For the convenience of the court and Defense counsel, the illustrative
material has been put together in document books, and the arguments
derived from them have been set out in trial briefs.

I intend only to comment briefly on some of the materials and to
summarize the main lines of the briefs.

What is the charge in Count One?

The charge in Count One is that the defendants, with divers other
persons, participated in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan
or Conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of Crimes
against Humanity (both within and without Germany), War Crimes, and
Crimes against Peace.

The charge is, further, that the instrument of cohesion among the
defendants, as well as an instrument for the execution of the purposes
of the conspiracy, was the Nazi Party, of which each defendant was a
member or to which he became an adherent.

The scope of the proof which I shall offer is:

First, that the Nazi Party set for itself certain aims and objectives,
involving basically the acquisition of “Lebensraum”, or living space,
for all “racial” Germans.

Second, that it was committed to the use of any methods, whether or not
legal, in attaining these objectives, and that it did in fact use
illegal methods.

Third, that it put forward and disseminated various lines of propaganda,
and used various propaganda techniques to assist it in its unprincipled
rise to power.

Fourth, that it ultimately did seize all governmental power in Germany.

Fifth, that it used this power to complete the political conquest of the
State, to crush all opposition, and to prepare the nation
psychologically and otherwise for the foreign aggression upon which it
was bent from the outset.

In general we undertake to outline, so far as relevant to the charge,
what happened in Germany during the pre-war period, leaving it to others
to carry the story and proof through the war years.

The aims of this conspiracy were open and notorious. It was far
different from any other conspiracy ever unfolded before a court of
justice, not only because of the gigantic number of people involved, the
period of time covered, the magnitude and audacity of it, but because,
unlike other criminal conspirators, these conspirators often boastfully
proclaimed to the world what they planned to do, before they did it.

As an illustration, Hitler, in his speech of 30 January 1941, said:

    “My program was to abolish the Versailles Treaty. It is futile
    nonsense for the rest of the world to pretend today that I did
    not reveal this program until 1933 or 1935 or 1937. Instead of
    listening to the foolish chatter of emigres, these gentlemen
    would have been wiser to read what I have written thousands of
    times. No human being has declared or recorded what he wanted
    more than I. Again and again I wrote these words, ‘The abolition
    of the Treaty of Versailles’.”

First, a brief reference to the history of the Nazi Party.

The Court will no doubt recollect that the National Socialist Party had
its origin in the German Labor Party, which was founded on 5 January
1919 in Munich. It was this organization which Hitler joined as seventh
member on 12 September 1919. At a meeting of the German Labor Party held
on 24 February 1920, Hitler announced to the world the “25 Theses” that
subsequently became known as the “unalterable” program of the National
Socialist German Workers Party.

A few days later, on 4 March 1920, the name of the German Labor Party
was changed to the “National Socialist German Workers Party,” frequently
referred to as the NSDAP, or Nazi Party. It is under that name that the
Nazi Party continued to exist until its dissolution after the collapse
and unconditional surrender of Germany in 1945.

The disagreements and intrigues within the Party between Hitler’s
followers and those who opposed him were finally resolved on 29 July
1921, when Hitler became “First Chairman” and was invested with
extraordinary powers. Hitler immediately reorganized the Party and
imposed upon it the Führerprinzip—the leadership principle—of which
you will hear more later. Thereafter Hitler, the Führer, determined all
questions and made all decisions for the Party.

The main objectives of the Party, which are fastened upon the defendants
and their co-conspirators by reason of their membership in, or knowing
adherence to the Party, were openly and notoriously avowed. They were
set out in the Party program of 1920, were publicized in _Mein Kampf_
and in Nazi literature generally, and were obvious from the continuous
pattern of public action of the Party from the date of its founding.

Now two consequences, of importance in the Trial of this case, derive
from the fact that the major objectives of the Party were publicly and
repeatedly proclaimed:

First, the Court may take judicial notice of them.

Second, the defendants and their co-conspirators cannot be heard to deny
them or to assert that they were ignorant of them.

The Prosecution offers proof of the major objectives of the Party—and
hence of the objectives of the conspiracy—only to refresh or implement
judicial recollection. The main objectives were:

First, to overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions on
military armament and activity in Germany;

Second, to acquire territories lost by Germany in World War I;

Third, to acquire other territories inhabited by so-called “racial
Germans”;

and

Fourth, to acquire still further territories said to be needed as living
space by the racial Germans so incorporated—all at the expense of
neighboring and other countries.

In speaking of the first aim, Hitler made an admission which applied
equally to the other aims, namely, that he had stated and written a
thousand times or more that he demanded the abolition of the Versailles
Treaty.

These aims are fully documented in the evidence offered by the
Prosecution on this phase of the case, and it is not my purpose at this
time to recite to the Court numerous declarations made by the defendants
and others with respect to these aims.

Moreover, these conspirators again and again publicly announced to the
still unbelieving world that they proposed to accomplish these
objectives by any means found opportune, including illegal means and
resort to threat of force, force, and aggressive war. The use of force
was distinctly sanctioned, in fact guaranteed, by official statements
and directives of the conspirators which made activism and
aggressiveness a political quality obligatory for Party members. As
Hitler stated in _Mein Kampf_:

    “What we needed and still need are not a hundred or two hundred
    reckless conspirators, but a hundred thousand and a second
    hundred thousand fighters for our philosophy of life.”

In 1929 Hitler stated:

    “We confess further that we will tear anyone to pieces who would
    dare hinder us in this undertaking. Our rights will be protected
    only when the German Reich is again supported by the point of
    the German dagger.”

Hitler, in 1934, addressing the Party Congress at Nuremberg, stated the
duties of Party members in the following terms:

    “Only a part of the people will consist of really active
    fighters. It is they who were fighters of the National Socialist
    revolution. Of them, more is demanded than of the millions among
    the rest of the population. For them it is not sufficient to
    confess, ‘I believe’, but to swear, ‘I fight’.”

In proof of the fact that the Party was committed to the use of any
means, whether or not legal or honorable, it is only necessary to remind
the Court that the Party virtually opened its public career by staging a
revolution—the Munich Putsch of 1923.

Now let us consider for a moment the doctrinal techniques of the Common
Plan or Conspiracy which are alleged in the Indictment.

To incite others to join in the Common Plan, or Conspiracy and as a
means of securing for the Nazi conspirators the highest degree of
control over the German community, they disseminated and exploited
certain doctrines.

The first of these was the “master race” doctrine—that persons of
so-called “German blood” were a master race. This doctrine of racial
supremacy was incorporated as Point 4 in the Party program, which
provided:

    “Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the
    race can only be one who is of German blood without
    consideration of confession. Consequently, no Jew can be a
    member of the race.”

They outlined this master race doctrine as a new religion—the faith of
the blood—superseding in individual allegiance all other religions and
institutions. The Defendant Rosenberg and the Defendant Streicher were
particularly prominent in disseminating this doctrine. Much of the
evidence to be offered in this case will illustrate the Nazi
conspirators’ continued espousal and exploitation of this master race
doctrine.

This doctrine had an eliminatory purpose. Call anything “non-German” or
Jewish, and you have a clear right, indeed a duty, to cast it out. In
fact purges did not stop at so-called racial lines, but went far beyond.

The second important doctrine which permeates the entire conspiracy and
is one of the important links in establishing the guilt of each of these
defendants is the doctrine or concept of the Führerprinzip, or
leadership principle.

This doctrine permeated the Nazi Party and all its formations and allied
organizations and eventually permeated the Nazi State and all
institutions, and is of such importance that I would like to dwell upon
it for a few moments and attempt to explain the concepts which it
embraces.

The Führerprinzip embodies two major political concepts:

1. Authoritarianism;

2. Totalitarianism.

Authoritarianism implies the following: All authority is concentrated at
the top and is vested in one person only, the Führer. It further implies
that the Führer is infallible as well as omnipotent. The Party manual
states:

“Under the Commandments of the National Socialists: The Führer is always
right. . . .”

Also, there are no legal or political limits to the authority of the
Führer. Whatever authority is wielded by others is derived from the
authority of the Führer. Moreover, within the sphere of jurisdiction
allotted to him, each appointee of the Führer manipulates his power in
equally unrestricted fashion, subordinate only to the command of those
above him. Each appointee owes unconditional obedience to the Führer and
to the superior Party leaders in the hierarchy.

Each Political Leader was sworn in yearly. According to the Party
manual, which will be introduced in evidence, the wording of the oath
was as follows:

    “I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge
    unconditional obedience to him and the Führer appointed by him.”

The Party manual also provides that:

    “The Political Leader is inseparably tied to the ideology and
    the organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his death
    or with his expulsion from the National Socialist Community.”

As the Defendant Hans Frank stated in one of his publications:

    “Leadership principle in the administration means:

    “Always to replace decision by majority, by decision on the part
    of a specific person with clear jurisdiction and with sole
    responsibility to those above, and to entrust to his authority
    the realization of the decision to those below.”

And finally the concept of authoritarianism contained in the
Führerprinzip implies: The authority of the Führer extends into all
spheres of public and private life.

The second main concept of the Führerprinzip is totalitarianism which
implies the following:

The authority of the Führer, his appointees, and through them, of the
Party as a whole, extends into all spheres of public and private life.

The Party dominates the State.

The Party dominates the Armed Forces.

The Party dominates all individuals within the State.

The Party eliminates all institutions, groups, and individuals unwilling
to accept the leadership of its Führer.

As the Party manual states:

    “Only those organizations can lay claim to the institution of
    the leadership principle and to the National Socialist meaning
    of the State and people in the National Socialist meaning of the
    term, which . . . have been integrated into, supervised and
    formed by the Party and which, in the future, will continue to
    do so.”

The manual goes on to state:

    “All others which conduct an organizational life of their own
    are to be rejected as outsiders and will either have to adjust
    themselves or disappear from public life.”

Illustrations of the Führerprinzip and its application to the Party, the
State and allied organizations are fully set forth in the brief and
accompanying documents, which will be offered in evidence.

The third doctrine or technique employed by the Nazi conspirators to
make the German people amenable to their will and aims was the doctrine
that war was a noble and necessary activity of Germans. The purpose of
this doctrine was well expressed by Hitler in _Mein Kampf_ when he said:

    “The question of restoration of German power is not a question
    of how to fabricate arms, but a question of how to create the
    spirit which makes a people capable of bearing arms. If this
    spirit dominates a people, the will finds a thousand ways to
    secure weapons.”

Hitler’s writings and public utterances are replete with declarations
rationalizing the use of force and glorifying war. The following is
typical, when he said:

    “Always before God and the world, the stronger has the right to
    carry through his will. History proves it! He who has no might
    has no use for right.”

As will be shown in subsequent proof, this doctrine of the glorification
of war played a major part in the education of the German youth of the
pre-war era.

I now offer the documents which establish the aims of the Nazi Party and
their doctrinal techniques. I also have for the assistance of the Court
and Defense Counsel, briefs which make the argument from these
documents.

I now direct your attention to the rise to power of the Nazi Party.

The first attempt to acquire political control was by force. In fact at
no time during this period did the Party participate in any electoral
campaigns, nor did it see fit to collaborate with other political. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Major Wallis, have you got copies of these for
defendants’ counsel?

MAJOR WALLIS: In Room 54, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, they will be wanting to follow them now.

MAJOR WALLIS: Mr. President, my remarks, which I am proceeding toward,
will cover an entirely different subject than in the briefs before you.
The briefs cover what I have already said, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you depositing a copy of these briefs for each of the
defendants’ counsel?

MAJOR WALLIS: I am informed, if Your Honor pleases, that the same
procedure has been followed with respect to these briefs as has been
followed with respect to the documents, namely, a total of six has been
made available to the defendants in Room 54. If Your Honor does not deem
that number sufficient, I feel sure that I can give assurance, on behalf
of the Chief Prosecutor of the United States, that before the close of
the day an ample supply of copies will be there for use.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the Defense Counsel should each
have a copy of these briefs.

MAJOR WALLIS: That will be done, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Members of the Defense Counsel: You will understand that
I have directed on behalf of the Tribunal that you should each have a
copy of this brief.

DR. DIX: We are very grateful for this directive, but none of us has
seen any of these documents so far. I assume and hope that these
documents will be given to the Defense in the German translation.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Major Wallis.

MAJOR WALLIS: I now direct your attention to the rise to power of the
Nazi Party.

The 9th of November 1923 warranted the end as well as the beginning of
an era. On the 9th of November occurred the historical fact popularly
known as the Hitler Putsch. During the night of November 8th to 9th
Hitler, supported by the SA under the Defendant Göring, at a meeting in
Munich, proclaimed the National Revolution and his dictatorship of
Germany, and announced himself as the Chancellor of the Reich. On the
following morning the duly constituted authorities of the State, after
some bloodshed in Munich, put an end to this illegal attempt to seize
the Government. Hitler and some of his followers were arrested and
tried, and sentenced to imprisonment.

The new era in the National Socialist movement commences with Hitler’s
parole from prison in December 1924. With the return of its leader, the
Party took up its fight for power once again. The prohibitions invoked
by the Government against the Nazi Party at the time of the Munich
Putsch gradually were removed and Hitler the Führer of the Party,
formally announced that in seeking to achieve its aims to overthrow the
Weimar Government, the Party would resort only to “legal” means. A valid
inference from these facts may well be suggested, namely that the
Party’s resort to “legality” was in reality only a condition on which it
was permitted to carry on its activities in a democratically organized
state. But consistent with its professed resort to “legality”, the Party
now participated in the popular elections of the German people and
generally took part in political activity. At the same time it engaged
in feverish activity to expand the Party membership, its organizational
structure and activities. The SA and the SS recruited numerous new
members. Hitler’s _Mein Kampf_ appeared in 1925. The Hitler Youth was
founded. Newspapers were published, among them the _Völkischer
Beobachter_ of which the Defendant Rosenberg was editor, and _Der
Angriff_ published by Goebbels, later the notorious Minister of
Propaganda and Public Enlightenment. Meetings of other political parties
were interfered with and broken up, and there was much street brawling.

The results of the Party’s attempt to win political power made little
headway for a number of years, despite the strenuous efforts exerted to
that end. In 30 elections in which the National Socialists participated
from 1925 to 1930 for seats in the Reichstag and in the Landtage or
Provincial Diets of the various German states, the Nazis received
mandates in but 16 and gained no seats at all in 14 elections. The
National Socialist vote in the 1927 elections did not exceed 4 per cent
of the total number of votes cast. The year 1929 marks the first modest
success at the polls in the State of Thuringia. The Nazi received over
11 per cent of the popular vote, elected 6 representatives out of the
total of 53 to the Diet, and the Defendant Frick became Minister of
Interior of Thuringia, the first National Socialist chosen to
ministerial rank.

With such encouragement and proof of the success of its methods to win
support, the Nazi Party redoubled its traditional efforts (by means of
terror and coercion). These met with some rebuff on the part of the
Reich and various German states. Prussia required its civil servants to
terminate their membership in the Party and forbade the wearing of brown
shirts, which were worn by the SA of the Party. Baden likewise ruled
against the wearing of brown shirts, and Bavaria prohibited the wearing
of uniforms by political organizations. New National Socialist writings
appeared in Germany. The new _National Socialist Monthly_ appeared under
the editorship of the Defendant Rosenberg, and shortly thereafter, in
June 1930, Rosenberg’s _Myth of the 20th Century_ was published.

Against this background—President Von Hindenburg having meanwhile
dissolved the Reichstag when Chancellor Brüning failed to obtain a vote
of confidence—Germany moved to the polls once more on the 14th
September 1930. By this election their representation in the Reichstag
was increased from 12 seats to 107 seats out of a total of 577.

The new Reichstag met and 107 Nazis marched into the session dressed in
brown shirts. Rowdy opposition at once developed, intent on causing the
fall of the Brüning Cabinet. Taking advantage of the issues caused by
the then prevailing general economic distress, the Nazis sought a vote
of non-confidence and dissolution of the Reichstag. Failing in these
obstructionary tactics, the Nazis walked out on the Reichstag.

With 107 members in the Reichstag the Nazi propaganda increased in
violence. The obstruction by the Nazi deputies of the Reichstag
continued with the same pattern of conduct. Repeatedly motions of
non-confidence in Brüning and for dissolution of the Reichstag were
offered and were lost. And after every failure the Nazi members stalked
out of the chamber anew.

By spring of 1932, Brüning’s position became untenable and the Defendant
Von Papen was appointed Chancellor. The Reichstag was dissolved and new
elections held in which the Nazis increased the number of their seats to
230 out of a total of 608. The Nazi Party was becoming a strong party in
Germany, but it had failed to become the majority party. The obstructive
tactics of the Nazi deputies in the Reichstag continued, and by the fall
of 1932 Von Papen’s Government was no longer able to continue. President
Von Hindenburg again dissolved the Reichstag, and in the new elections
of November the Nazi representation in the Reichstag actually decreased
to 196 seats. The short-lived Von Schleicher Government then came into
being—it was the 3rd December 1932—and by the end of January 1933 it
went out of existence. With the support of the Nationalist Party under
Hugenberg and other political assistance, Hitler became Chancellor of
Germany by designation of Von Hindenburg.

That is the end of the prologue, as it were, to the dramatic and
sinister story that will be developed by the Prosecution in the course
of this Trial. Let it be noted here, however, and remembered, as the
story of the misdeeds and crimes of these defendants and their fellow
conspirators are exposed, that at no time in the course of their alleged
“legal” efforts to gain possession of the State, did the conspirators
represent a majority of the people.

Now it is commonly said that the Nazi conspirators “seized control” when
Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic on 30 January 1933. It
may be more truly said that they seized control upon securing the
passage of the Law for the Protection of the People and the State on 24
March 1933. The steps leading to this actual seizure of power are worthy
of recital. The Nazi conspirators were fully cognizant of their lack of
control over the legislative powers of the republic. They needed, if
they were to carry out the first steps of their grand conspiracy under
the cloak of law, an enabling act which, would vest supreme legislative
power in Hitler’s Cabinet, free from all restraints of the Weimar
constitution. Such an enabling act however required a change in the
constitution which, in turn, required two-thirds of the regular members
of the Reichstag to be present, and at least two-thirds of the votes of
those present.

The time-table of events leading up to the passage of this enabling act,
known as the Law for the Protection of the People and the State, is as
follows:

1. On January 30th, 1933 Hitler held his first Cabinet meeting and we
have the original minutes of that meeting, which will be offered in
evidence. The Defendants Von Papen, Von Neurath, Frick, Göring, and Funk
were present. According to the minutes of this meeting, Hitler pointed
out that the adjournment of the Reichstag would be impossible without
the collaboration of the Center Party. He went on to say:

    “We might, however, consider suppressing the Communist Party to
    eliminate its votes in the Reichstag and by this measure achieve
    a majority in the Reichstag.”

He expressed the fear, however, that this might result in a general
strike. The Reich Minister of Economy, according to these official
minutes, stated that in his opinion, it was impossible to avoid the
suppression of the Communist Party of Germany, for, if that were not
done they could not achieve a majority in the Reichstag, certainly not a
majority of two-thirds; that, after the suppression of the Communist
Party, the passage of an enabling act through the Reichstag would be
possible. The Defendant Frick suggested that it would be best initially
to request an enabling law from the Reichstag. At this meeting Hitler
agreed to contact representatives of the Center Party the next morning
to see what could be done by way of making a deal with them.

2. The next event in this time-table was the Reichstag fire on the 28th
of February 1933.

3. Taking advantage of the uncertainty and unrest created by the
Reichstag fire, and the disturbances being created by the SA, the
provisions of the Weimar constitution guaranteeing personal freedom, and
other personal liberties were suspended by a decree of the Reich
President on February 28, 1933.

Then on 5th of March 1933, elections to the Reichstag were held. The
Nazis acquired 288 seats out of a total of 647.

On the 15th of March 1933, another meeting of the Reich Cabinet was
held, and we also have the original official minutes of that meeting
which bears the initials, opposite their names, of the defendants who
were present at that meeting, signifying that they have read—I contend
that it is a reasonable inference to state that it signifies that they
read these minutes and approved them. The following defendants were
present at this meeting: Von Papen, Von Neurath, Frick, Göring, and
Funk. At this meeting, according to these official minutes Hitler stated
that the putting over of the enabling act in the Reichstag by a
two-thirds vote would, in his opinion, meet with no opposition. The
Defendant Frick pointed out that the Reichstag had to ratify the
enabling act with a constitutional majority within three days, and that
the Center Party had not expressed itself negatively. He went on to say
that the enabling act would have to be broadly conceived in a manner to
allow for deviation from the provisions of the Constitution of the
Reich. He further stated that as far as the constitutional requirements
of a two-thirds majority was concerned, a total of 432 delegates would
have to be present for the ratification of the enabling act. The
Defendant Göring expressed his conviction at this meeting that the
enabling act would be ratified with the required two-thirds vote for, if
necessary, the majority could be obtained by refusing admittance to the
Reichstag of some Social Democrats.

Now on the 20th of March another Cabinet meeting was held, and we also
have the official, original records of this meeting which will be
offered in evidence. The Defendants Frick, Von Papen, Von Neurath,
Göring, and Funk were present. The proposed enabling act was again the
subject of a discussion. Hitler reported on the conference he had
completed with the representatives of the Center Party. The Defendant
Neurath proposed a note concerning the arrangement to be agreed to by
the representatives of the Center Party. The Defendant Frick expounded
to the meeting the contents of the draft of the proposed law, and
further stated that changes in the standing orders or rules of the
Reichstag were also necessary, that an explicit rule must be made that
unexcused absent delegates be considered present, and if that was done
it would probably be possible to ratify the enabling act on the
following Thursday in all three readings.

It is interesting to note that among the things recorded in the official
minutes of this Cabinet meeting was the Defendant Göring’s announcement
that he had ordered SA troops on the Polish border to be cautious and
not to show themselves in uniform, and that the Defendant Neurath
recommended also that the SA be cautious, especially in Danzig. In
addition, the Defendant Neurath pointed out that Communists in SA
uniforms were being caught continuously. These stool pigeons had to be
hanged. Justice had to find means and ways to make possible such
punishment for Communist stool pigeons, according to the Defendant
Neurath.

On 14th March 1933 the Defendant Frick announced:

    “When the Reichstag meets the 21st of March, the Communists will
    be prevented by urgent labor elsewhere from participation in the
    session. In concentration camps they will be re-educated for
    productive work. We will know how to render harmless
    permanently, sub-humans who don’t want to be re-educated.”

During this period, taking advantage of the decree suspending
constitutional guarantees of freedom, a large number of Communists,
including Party officials and Reichstag deputies, and a smaller number
of Social Democrat officials and deputies, were placed in protective
custody. On 23 March 1933, in urging the passage of the enabling act,
Hitler stated before the Reichstag:

    “It is up to you gentlemen, to make the decision now. It will be
    for peace or war.”

On 24 March 1933 only 535 out of the regular 747 deputies of the
Reichstag were present. The absence of some was unexcused; they were in
protective custody in concentration camps. Subject to the full weight of
the Nazi pressure and terror, the Reichstag passed an enabling act known
as the “Law for the Protection of the People and State,” with a vote of
441 in favor. This law marks the real seizure of political control by
the conspirators. Article 1 provided: that the Reich laws can be enacted
by the Reich Cabinet. Article 2 provided: the National laws enacted by
the Reich Cabinet may deviate from the constitution. Article 3 provided:
National Laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet are prepared by the
Chancellor and published in the Reichsgesetzblatt. Article 4 provided:
Treaties of the Reich with foreign states, which concern matters of
national legislation, do not require the consent of the parties
participating in legislation. The Reich Cabinet is empowered to issue
the necessary provisions for the execution of these treaties.

Thus the Nazis acquired full political control, completely unrestrained
by any provision of the Weimar constitution.

I now offer the documents which establish the facts which I have just
stated, and I also present, for the assistance of the Court and the
Defense Counsel, the briefs covering this portion of the case.

THE PRESIDENT: I wish to speak to Major Wallis. Would it be possible for
the Prosecution to let defendants’ counsel have at least one copy
between each two of them here in court? If not today, then tomorrow?

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, there has been some
misunderstanding and the briefs were delivered to the Defendants’
Document Room. We have sent for some of them and they should be here
shortly. However, Sir, in all fairness the briefs themselves are not in
the German language, because we had intended to take the trial brief and
the lawyers follow it over the translating system and thus, when it was
finished, it would be translated into all languages.

However, in order to shorten the proceeding, Major Wallis has made a
summary, and he is giving the summary and will offer the documents in
evidence and later the briefs, as needed, to the Tribunal, and to
Defense Counsel, and unfortunately, in the rush of time, they have been
put down in the Defendants’ Document Room and we have sent for some of
them. We understand, also, if the Tribunal please, that Dr. Kempner
approached some of the distinguished counsel for the Defense, and
learned that a great many of them not only speak English, but understand
it when they read it, and to save the tremendous physical burden on
facilities, the briefs have not, as yet, been translated into German. If
there is objection, the only thing we can do is to withhold them at this
time, but we understood it would be agreeable to pass them to them in
English, and that is what we propose to do at the present moment, and
have German speaking officers in the Document Room who will translate
for any of them who may not be able to read German—pardon me, to read
English.

DR. DIX: I have one request. We are here, as German Defense Counsel, and
in face of great difficulties. These proceedings are conducted according
to Anglo-American customs. We are doing our best to make our way through
these principles, and would be very grateful if the President would take
into consideration our difficult situation.

I have heard—I am not quite sure if it was right—that according to
these Anglo-American principles, it is necessary to prepare objections
immediately, if one has any objections to the contents of a document,
and that this is not possible unless one does it at once. This is a
point on which I would like to make my request. I am convinced that both
the trial brief and the documents will be made available to us, and we
will see if we can have a German translation of one or the other. If
this trouble can be spared, if the Defense Counsel needs a translation,
we shall have it, but I should like—I have one request—that we have
leisure to raise an objection later when we have had a chance to discuss
it. I think in that way we shall easily overcome the difficulties raised
by the present situation, and we are trying to cooperate in order to
overcome any difficulties.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is glad that defendants’ counsel are making
efforts to cooperate in the Trial. After the adjournment, the Tribunal
will consider the best method of providing defendants’ counsel with as
many translations as possible, and you are right in thinking that you
will be able to make objections to any document after you have had time
to consider it.

DR. DIX: Thank you, Sir.

MAJOR WALLIS: Having acquired full political control, the Nazi
conspirators now proceeded to consolidate their power, and at this point
I would like to impress upon the Tribunal once again that with the
exception of a very few documents, the subject matter of my remarks is
within the purview of judicial notice of the Court, a matter of history
well known to these defendants and their counsel. Their first step in
the consolidation of power was ruthlessly to purge their political
opponents by confining them to concentration camps or by murder.
Concentration camps made their first appearance in 1933 and were first
used as means of putting political opponents out of circulation by
confining them to a so-called “protective custody.” This system of
concentration camps grew and expanded within Germany. At a subsequent
stage in these proceedings full and complete evidence of the
concentration camp system and the atrocities committed therein will be
presented to the Court, both by documents and films.

Illustrative documentary evidence of the arrest, mistreatment, and
murder by the Nazi conspirators of their political opponents is
contained in the documentary evidence offered by the United States.

As an illustration, affidavit of Raymond H. Geist, former American
Consul and First Secretary of the Embassy in Berlin from 1929 to 1938,
states (which will be offered):

    “Immediately in 1933, the concentration camps were established
    and put under charge of the Gestapo. Only political prisoners
    were held in concentration camps.

    “The first wave of terroristic acts began in March 1933, more
    particularly from March 6 to 13, 1933, accompanied by unusual
    mob violence. When the Nazi Party won the elections in March
    1933, the accumulated passion blew off in wholesale attacks on
    the Communists, Jews, and others suspected of being either. Mobs
    of SA men roamed the streets, beating up, looting and even
    killing persons.

    “For Germans taken into custody by the Gestapo there was a
    regular pattern of brutality and terror. All over Germany
    victims were numbered by the hundred thousand.”

On the 30th of June and 1 and 2 July 1934 the conspirators proceeded to
destroy opposition within their own ranks by wholesale murder. In
discussing this purge, the Defendant Frick stated, in an affidavit under
oath, signed on the 19th day of November 1945, in the presence of his
Defense Counsel, as follows. This is document number 2950-PS. It has not
yet been introduced in evidence, Sir:

    “Himmler, in June of 1934, was able to convince Hitler that Röhm
    wanted to start a Putsch. The Führer ordered Himmler to suppress
    the Putsch which was supposed to take place at the Tegernsee,
    where all of the SA leaders were coming together. For northern
    Germany, the Führer gave the order to suppress the Putsch to
    Göring.”

Frick goes on to say:

    “Pursuant to this order, a great many people were arrested and
    something like a hundred, and possibly more, were even put to
    death, accused of high treason; all this was done without
    judicial process.” They were just killed on the spot. Many
    people were killed—I don’t know how many—who actually did not
    have anything to do with the Putsch. People who just weren’t
    liked very well as, for instance, Schleicher, the former Reich
    Chancellor, were killed. Schleicher’s wife was also killed. Also
    Gregor Strasser, who had been the Reich Organization Leader and
    second man in the Party after Hitler. Strasser, at the time he
    was murdered, was not active in political affairs any more; he
    had however separated himself from the Führer in November or
    December of 1932”.

Frick goes on to say:

    “The SS was used by Himmler for the execution of these orders to
    suppress the Putsch.”

During this period the conspirators created, by a series of decrees of
the Reich Cabinet, a number of new political crimes. Any act or
statement contrary to the Nazi Party was deemed to be treason and
punished accordingly. The formations of the Party, the SA, SS, as well
as the SD and the Gestapo, were the vicious tools used in the
extermination of all opposition, real or potential. As the Defendant
Göring said on July 24th, 1933—I refer to Document Number 2494-PS,
which will be introduced in evidence:

    “Whoever in the future raises a hand against a representative of
    the National Socialist movement or of the State, must know that
    he will lose his life in a very short while. Furthermore, it
    will be entirely sufficient, if he is proven to have intended
    the act, or, if the act results not in a death, but only in an
    injury.”

The Defendant Frank stated, in a magazine of the Academy for German Law,
1936, which will be introduced as Document Number 2533-PS, as follows:

    “By the world we are blamed again and again because of the
    concentration camps. We are asked, ‘Why do you arrest without a
    warrant of arrest?’ I say, ‘Put yourself into the position of
    our nation.’ Don’t forget that the very great and still
    untouched world of Bolshevism cannot forget that we have made
    final victory for them impossible in Europe, right here on
    German soil.”

And Raymond Geist, whose affidavit I previously referred to, being
Document Number 1759-PS, states:

    “The German people were well-acquainted with what was happening
    in concentration camps, and it was well known that the fate of
    anyone too actively opposed to any part of the Nazi program was
    liable to be one of great suffering. Indeed, before the Hitler
    regime was many months old, almost every family in Germany had
    received first-hand accounts of the brutalities inflicted in the
    concentration camps from someone, either in the family circle or
    in the circle of friends who had served a sentence, and
    consequently the fear of such camps was a very effective brake
    on any possible opposition.”

And as the Defendant Göring said in 1934,—and I refer to Document
Number 2344-PS, which will be offered in evidence:

    “Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly
    . . . therefore the concentration camps have been created, where
    we have first confined thousands of Communist and Socialist
    Democrat functionaries.”

In addition to ruthlessly purging all political opponents, the Nazi
conspirators further consolidated their position by promptly proceeding
to eliminate all other political parties. On 21 March 1933, the
Defendant Frick announced that the Communists would be prevented from
taking part in the Reichstag proceedings. This was accomplished, as has
been pointed out, by placing them in “protective custody in
concentration camps.” On the 26th May 1933 a Reich Cabinet decree,
signed by Hitler and the Defendant Frick, provided for the confiscation
of the Communist property. On 22 June 1933 the Social Democratic Party
was suppressed in Prussia, it previously having been seriously weakened
by placing a number of its members in concentration camps. On the 7th of
July 1933 a Reich decree eliminated Social Democrats from the Reichstag
and from the governing bodies of the provinces and municipalities. On
the 14 of July 1933, by a decree of the Reich Cabinet, the property of
the Social Democrats was confiscated, and the Nazi Party was constituted
as the sole political party in Germany, and thereupon it became illegal
to maintain or to form any other political party. Thus, Hitler was able
to say within hardly more than 5 months after becoming Chancellor, I
quote: “The Party has become the State.”

The Nazi conspirators immediately proceeded to make that statement a
recorded fact, for on the 1st of December 1933 the Reich Cabinet issued
a law for “Securing the Unity of Party and State.” This law was signed
by Hitler and the Defendant Frick.

Article 1 provided that the Nazi Party:

    “. . . is the bearer of the concept of the State and is
    inseparably the State. It will be a part of the public law. Its
    organization will be determined by the Führer.”

Article 2 provided:

    “The Deputy of the Führer and the Chief of Staff of the SA will
    become members of the Reich Cabinet in order to insure close
    cooperation of the offices of the Party and SA with public
    authorities.”

Article 3 provided:

    “The members of the National Socialist German Workers Party and
    the SA (including their subordinate organizations) as the
    leading and driving force of the National Socialist State will
    bear greater responsibility toward Führer, People, and State.”

                        [_A recess was taken._]

COL. STOREY: During the recess defendants’ counsel and the Prosecution
arrived at an agreement for the furnishing of briefs to the defendants,
which I understand to be this:

Copies of the documents offered in evidence in German will be delivered
in the Defendants’ Information Center, with the understanding that if
any Defense Counsel needs to show the German photostatic copy to his
client he may do so in the defendants’ counsel room adjacent thereto;
that the briefs which we are passing to the Tribunal as an aid will
likewise be passed to defendants’ counsel in English, and that if any of
them have trouble in the translation of any portion of the briefs, we
have German-speaking officers in the Defendants’ Information Center who
will assist counsel. I understand that all of these defendants’ counsel
have so agreed.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Now, Major Wallis.

MAJOR WALLIS: May it please the Court, at the moment of recess I was
referring to the law which was passed on 1 December 1933, for securing
the unity of Party and State.

Article 6 of that law provided:

    “The public authorities have to grant legal and administrative
    assistance to the offices of the Party and the SA which are
    entrusted with the execution of the jurisdiction of the Party
    and SA.”

Article 8 provided:

    “The Reich Chancellor as Führer of the National Socialistic
    German Workers Party and, as the supreme commander of the SA,
    will issue the regulations necessary for the execution and
    augmentation of this law, particularly with respect to the
    organization and procedure of the jurisdiction of the Party and
    SA.”

Thus by this law the Nazi Party became a para-governmental organization
in Germany.

The further merger of the Party and State occurred on the death of
Hindenburg. Instead of holding an election to fill the office of
President, the merger of the offices of President and Chancellor, in the
person of Hitler, was accomplished by the law of 1 August 1934, signed
by the entire Reich Cabinet. One of the significant consequences of this
law was to give to Hitler the supreme command of the German Armed
Forces, always a prerequisite of the presidency, and every soldier was
immediately required to take an oath of loyalty and unconditional
obedience to Hitler. On 4 February 1938 Hitler issued a decree which
stated in part—and I quote from Document Number 1915-PS, which will be
offered in the document book at the close of my remarks—as follows:
“From now on, I take over directly the command of the whole Armed
Forces.”

As a further step in the consolidation of their political control, the
Nazi conspirators reduced national elections to mere formalities devoid
of the element of freedom of choice. Elections, properly speaking, could
not take place under the Nazi system. In the first place, the basic
doctrine of the Führerprinzip dictated that all subordinates must be
appointed by their superiors in the Government hierarchy. Although it
had already become the practice, in 1938 it was specifically provided by
law that only one list of candidates was to be submitted to the people.
By the end of this pre-war period little of substance remained in the
election law. The majority of the substantive provisions had become
obsolete.

By a series of laws and decrees the Nazi conspirators reduced the powers
of regional and local governments and substantially transformed them
into territorial subdivisions of the Reich Government. With the
abolition of representative assemblies and elective officials in the
Länder and the municipalities, regional and local elections ceased to
exist. On 31 January 1934 the last vestiges of Land independence was
destroyed by the Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich. The Defendant
Frick, Minister of the Interior throughout this period, has written of
this Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich as follows:

    “The reconstruction law abolished the sovereign rights and
    executive powers of the Länder and made the Reich the sole
    bearer of the rights of sovereignty. The supreme powers of the
    Länder do not exist any longer. The natural result of this was
    the subordination of the Land government to the Reich Government
    and the Land ministers to the corresponding Reich ministers. On
    30 January, 1934 the German Reich became one state.”

Another step taken by the Nazi conspirators in consolidating their
political power was the purge of civil servants on racial and political
grounds and their replacement by Party members and supporters. This
purge was accomplished through a series of Nazi laws and decrees. The
first was on 7 April 1933, entitled: “Law for the Restoration of the
Professional Civil Service.” Article 3 of the law applied the Nazi blood
and master race theories in providing that officials who were not of
Aryan descent were to be retired. The political purge provision of the
law is contained in Article 4, and I quote:

    “Officials who, because of their previous political activities,
    do not offer security that they will assert themselves for the
    National State without reservations may be dismissed.”

The effect of this law and the decrees and regulations issued thereunder
was to fill every responsible position in the Government with a Nazi and
to prevent the appointment of any applicant opposed, or suspected of
being opposed, to the Nazi program and policy.

Even the judiciary did not escape the purge of the Nazi conspirators.
All judges who failed to fulfill the racial and political requirements
of the conspirators were quickly removed. In addition, the Nazis set up
a new system of special criminal courts independent of the regular
judiciary and directly subservient to the Party program. Moreover, the
Nazis controlled all judges through special directives and orders from
the central Government, their aim being, as expressed by one Gerland,
one of the leading Nazi lawyers of that time: “. . . to make the word
‘terrorization’ in the penal law respectable again.”

As their control was consolidated, the conspirators greatly enlarged
existing State and Party organizations and established an elaborate
network of new formations and agencies. The Party spread octopus-like
throughout all of Germany. This process of growth was summed up late in
1937 in an official statement of the Party Chancellery, as follows:

    “In order to control the whole German nation in all spheres of
    life”—and I repeat, in order to control the whole German nation
    in all spheres of life—“the NSDAP, after assuming power, set up
    under its leadership, the new Party formations and affiliated
    organizations.”

At this point I would like to offer to the Court the document book which
contains the laws and conditions which I have referred to in this part
of my presentation together with the briefs covering this part of it.

Labor unions:

I would like to direct the Tribunal’s attention to some case histories
in the consolidation of control by the conspirators.

The first case history in the consolidation of the Nazi conspirators’
control of Germany is the destruction of the free trade unions and the
obtaining of control over the productive labor capacity of the German
nation.

The position of organized labor in Germany, at the time of the Nazi
seizure of power, the obstacles they afforded to the Nazi plans, the
speed with which they were destroyed, the terror and maltreatment
ranging from assault to murder of union leaders, were fully outlined in
the opening address of the Chief Prosecutor of the United States, and
are fully set forth in the document book which I will present to the
Court on this phase of the case.

The result achieved by the Nazi conspirators is best expressed in the
Words of Robert Ley. Ley’s confidence in the Nazis’ effective control
over the productive labor capacity of Germany in peace or in war was
declared as early as 1936 to the Nuremberg Party Congress. I refer to
Document 2283-PS which is included in the document book which will be
presented on this phase of the case. He stated:

    “The idea of the factory troops is making good progress in the
    plants, and I am able to report to you, my Führer, that security
    and peace in the factories has been guaranteed, not only in
    normal times, but also in times of the most serious crisis.
    Disturbances, such as the munitions strikes of the traitor Ebert
    and confederates, are out of the question. National Socialism
    has conquered the factories. Factory troops are the National
    Socialist shock troops within the factory, and their motto is:
    The Führer is always right.”

At this time I would like to offer to the Court the document book
containing the documents on this phase of the case, namely, “The
destruction of labor unions and the gaining of control of all productive
labor in Germany,” together with the brief on that subject. At the same
time, if it please the Court, I would like to offer the document book
concerning the consolidation of control with respect to the utilization
and molding of political machinery, which is, in law, a decree which I
referred to just prior to my discussion of the destruction of labor
unions.

I would now direct your attention to the second case history in the
consolidation of control.

The Nazi conspirators early realized that the influence of the Christian
churches in Germany was an obstacle to their complete domination of the
German people and contrary to their master race dogma. As the Defendant
Martin Bormann stated in a secret decree of the Party Chancellery signed
by him and distributed to all Gauleiter on 7 June 1941—it is identified
as Document Number D-75 and will be included in the document book which
will be presented to the Court—he stated as follows:

    “More and more must the people be separated from the churches
    and their organizations and pastors .... Not until this has
    happened does the State leadership have influence on the
    individual citizens.”

Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators, seeking to subvert the influence of
the churches over the people of Germany, proceeded to attempt to
eliminate these churches:

1. By promoting beliefs and practices incompatible with Christian
teachings.

2. By persecuting priests, clergy, and members of monastic orders. This
persecution, as the documentary evidence will show, ran the gauntlet of
insults and indignities, physical assault, confinement in concentration
camps, and murder.

3. By the confiscation of church properties.

4. By suppressing religious publications.

5. By the suppression of religious organizations. In addition, they also
suppressed religious education. This is illustrated by the secret decree
of the Party Chancellery which I just referred to in Document D-75, when
the Defendant Bormann stated:

    “No human being would know anything of Christianity if it had
    not been drilled into him in his childhood by his pastors. The
    so-called “dear God” in no wise gives knowledge of His existence
    to young people in advance, but in an astonishing manner, in
    spite of His omnipotence, leaves this to the efforts of the
    pastors. If, therefore, in the future our youth learns nothing
    more of this Christianity, whose doctrines are far below ours,
    Christianity will disappear by itself.”

At a subsequent stage in these proceedings, additional documentary
evidence of the acts of the conspirators in their attempt to subvert the
influence of the Christian churches will be offered. At this time I
offer the document book in support of this phase of the case together
with the accompanying brief.

We now come to what might be called the third case history, the
persecution of the Jews. The Nazi conspirators adopted and publicized a
program of ruthless persecution of Jews.

It is not our purpose at this time to present to the Court a full and
complete story, in all its sickening details, of the Nazi conspirators’
plans and acts for the elimination and liquidation of the Jewish
population of Europe. This will be done in due course, at a subsequent
stage of these proceedings, but it is our purpose at this time to bring
before you, as one of the elements in the Nazi scheme for the
consolidation of their control of Germany, the action which was planned
and taken with respect to the Jews within Germany during the pre-war
period.

As a means of implementing their master race policy and as a means of
rallying otherwise discordant elements behind the Nazi banner, the
conspirators adopted and publicized a program of relentless persecution
of Jews. This program was contained in the official, unalterable 25
points of the Nazi Party, of which 6 were devoted to the master race
doctrine. The Defendants Göring, Hess, Rosenberg, Frank, Frick,
Streicher, Funk, Schirach, Bormann, and others, all took prominent parts
in publicizing this program. Upon the Nazis coming into power, this
Party program became the official State program.

The first organized act was the boycott of Jewish enterprises on 1 April
1933. The Defendant Streicher, in a signed statement, admits that he was
in charge of this program only for one day. We, of course, reserve the
right to show additional evidence with respect to that fact. The Nazi
conspirators then embarked upon a legislative program which was gradual
and which dates from 7 April 1933 until September 1935. During this
period a series of laws was passed removing the Jews from civil service,
from the professions and from the schools and military service.

It was clear, however, that the Nazi conspirators had a far more
ambitious program for the Jewish problem and only put off its
realization for reasons of expediency. After the usual propaganda
barrage, in which the speeches and writings of the Defendant Streicher
were most prominent, the Nazi conspirators initiated the second period
of anti-Jewish legislation, namely, from 15 September 1935 to September
1938. In this period the infamous Nuremberg Laws were passed, depriving
the Jews of their rights as citizens, forbidding them to marry Aryans,
and eliminating them from additional professions. In the autumn of 1938
the Nazi conspirators began to put into effect a program of complete
elimination of the Jews from German life. The measures taken were partly
presented as a retaliation against world Jewry in connection with the
killing of a German embassy official in Paris. Unlike the boycott action
in April 1933, when care was taken to avoid extensive violence, an
allegedly spontaneous pogrom was staged and carried out all over
Germany. The legislative measures which followed were discussed and
approved in their final form at a meeting on 12 November 1938 under the
chairmanship of the Defendant Göring, with the participation of the
Defendants Frick and Funk and others. I refer to Document 1816-PS, which
will appear in the document book. The meeting was called following
Hitler’s orders “requesting that the Jewish question be now, once and
for all, coordinated and solved one way or the other.” The participants
agreed on measures to be taken for the elimination of the Jew from
German economy. The laws issued in this period were signed mostly by the
Defendant Göring in his capacity as Deputy of the Four Year Plan, and
were thus strictly connected with the consolidation of control of the
German economy and preparation for aggressive war. These laws obliged
all German Jews to pay a collective fine of 1 billion Reichsmarks;
barred the Jews from trades and crafts; limited movement of Jews to
certain localities and hours; limited the time for the sale or
liquidation of Jewish enterprises; forced Jews to deposit shares and
securities held by them; forbade the sale or acquisition of gold or
precious stones by a Jew; granted landlords the right to give notice to
Jewish tenants before legal expiration of the leases; and forced all
Jews over 6 years of age to wear the Star of David.

In the final period of the anti-Jewish crusade of the Nazi conspirators
within Germany, very few legislative measures were passed. The Jews were
just delivered to the SS, Gestapo, and the various extermination staffs.
The last law dealing with Jews in Germany put them entirely outside the
law and ordered the confiscation by the State of the property of dead
Jews. This law was a weak reflection of a factual situation already in
existence. As Dr. Stuckart, assistant to the Defendant Frick, stated, at
the time:

    “The aim of the racial legislation may be regarded as already
    achieved and consequently the racial legislation as essentially
    closed. It led to the temporary solution of the Jewish problem
    and at the same time essentially prepared for the final
    solution. Many regulations will lose their practical importance
    as Germany approaches the achievement of the final goal on the
    Jewish problem.”

Hitler, on January 30, 1939, in a speech before the Reichstag, made the
following prophesy: “The result (of a war) will be the annihilation of
the Jewish race in Europe.”

I will leave to others in this case the task of presenting to the Court
the evidence as to how well that prophesy was fulfilled.

I would now offer to the Court the document book which contains the laws
referred to, with respect to the persecution of the Jews, and the brief
outlining that subject.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow
morning.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 23 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]




                               FOURTH DAY
                        Friday, 23 November 1945


                           _Morning Session_

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, you
advised the Defense in yesterday’s session that the Defense should
already at this stage of the Trial raise objections if they believe they
have any against the documentary evidence introduced by the Prosecution.

The Chief Prosecutor introduced in Court yesterday a graphic
presentation concerning the Reich Ministries and other bureaus and
offices at the highest level of the German Government. My client is of
the opinion that this presentation is erroneous in the following
respects which concern his own person:

1. A Reich Defense Council has never existed. The Reich Defense Law,
which provided for a Reich Defense Council in the event of war, has
never been published; a session of a Reich Defense Council has never
taken place. For this reason, the Defendant Keitel was never a member of
a Reich Defense Council.

2. The Secret Cabinet Council which was to be created in accordance with
the law of February 4, 1938, never came into existence. It was never
constituted; it never held a session.

3. The Defendant Keitel never was Reich Minister. Like the
Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy, he merely had the rank of
a Reich Minister. Consequently, he never was a Minister without
portfolio either. He did not participate in any advisory Cabinet
session.

I should like to ask the Court for its opinion as to whether these
objections may be made the object of an examination at this stage of the
Trial or whether they are to be reserved for a later stage?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the documents are admissible, but
the defendants can prove at a later stage any matters which are relevant
to the documents. It is not necessary for the defendants to make
objections at this stage. At a later stage they can prove any matters
which are relevant to the weight of the documents.

DR. DIX: May I ask the Tribunal a question?

We have now been able to see, in part, the briefs and documents which
were introduced in court yesterday. In that connection we have
established that some of the documents submitted by the Prosecution
yesterday were not quoted in their entirety, nor were they presented in
substance. My question now is: Shall the contents, the entire contents,
of all the documents which were presented to Court form the basis for
the Court’s decision, even in cases where the Prosecutor who presented
the documents did not refer to their contents?

In other words, must we consider all of the documents presented in
Court—including those the contents of which were not verbally referred
to—as a basis for the judgment and, consequently, should they be
examined with a view to determining whether the defendants wish to raise
any objections?

Finally I wish to ask the Tribunal whether the entire contents of all
the documents which were submitted to the Court yesterday, and which may
possibly be submitted in the future, are to be understood by us as a
basis for judgment even if the Prosecution does not present them word
for word or in substance or refer to them in any other way.

THE PRESIDENT: Every document, when it is put in, becomes a part of the
record and is in evidence before the Tribunal, but it is open to the
defendants to criticize and comment upon any part of the document when
their case is presented.

DR. DIX: Thank you. The question is clarified herewith.

THE PRESIDENT: There are three announcements which I have to make on
behalf of the Tribunal; and the first is this:

That we propose that the Tribunal shall not sit on Saturday morning in
this week, in order that defendants’ counsel may have more time for the
consideration of the documents and arguments, which have been made up to
that time. That is the first matter.

The second matter is that the Tribunal desires that all motions and
applications shall, as far as practicable, be made in writing, both by
the Prosecution and by the Defense. There are occasions, of course, such
as this morning when motions and applications for the purposes of
explanation, are more conveniently made orally, but as far as
practicable, it is the desire of the Tribunal that they shall be made in
writing, both by the Prosecution and by the Defense.

And the other matter is an observation, which the Tribunal desires me to
make to the Prosecution, and to suggest to them that it would be more
convenient to the Tribunal and possibly also to the Defense, that their
briefs and volumes of documents should be presented to the Tribunal
before Counsel speaking begins that branch of the case, so that the
brief and volume of documents should be before the Tribunal whilst
Counsel is addressing the Tribunal upon that branch of the case; and
also that it would be convenient to the Tribunal—if it is convenient to
Counsel for the Prosecution—that he should give a short
explanation—not a prolonged explanation—of the documents, which he is
presenting to the Court, drawing their attention to any passages in the
documents, which he particularly wishes to draw attention to.

I will call upon the Chief Prosecutor for the United States to continue
his address.

COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday afternoon it appeared
that there was some question about the identification of documents
formally offered in evidence yesterday. Therefore, with the Tribunal’s
permission I should like to offer them by number, formally, so that the
Clerk can get them on his record and may be identified, with Your
Honors’ permission.

The United States—and may I say, Sir, that we offer each one of these
exhibits in evidence, requesting that they be received and filed as
evidence for the United States of America, with the understanding that
Defense Council may later interpose objections. If that is agreeable,
Sir, the first is United States Exhibit Number 1, the affidavit of Major
William H. Coogan, concerning the capture, processing and authentication
of documents, together with Robert G. Storey’s accompanying statement:

United States Exhibit Number 2, being 2903-PS, being the Nazi Party
chart, together with authentication certificates;

United States Exhibit Number 3, 2905-PS, the Nazi State chart, together
with authentication certificates;

United States Exhibit Number 4, 2836-PS, the original statement of
Defendant Göring as to positions held;

United States Exhibit Number 5, Document 2829-PS, the same, concerning
Defendant Ribbentrop. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Could not all this be done by the General Secretary . . .
the numbering of these documents?

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, that is correct. That is agreeable with us, Sir,
but the General Secretary raised the question that it was not in the
record. We have the complete tabulation describing each document by
number, and if it is agreeable with Your Honors, I will offer the
description on this page, correctly describing, by exhibit number, each
one that was offered in evidence yesterday.

THE PRESIDENT: We will authorize the General Secretary to accept the
documents so numbered.

COL. STOREY: Thank you, Sir. The tabulation referred to is set forth in
the following words and figures:

  USA-1, Major Coogan’s affidavit with Colonel Storey’s statement;
  USA-2, 2903-PS, Nazi Party chart and authenticating papers;
  USA-3, 2905-PS, Nazi State chart and authenticating papers;
  USA-4, 2836-PS, original statement of Göring’s positions;
  USA-5, 2829-PS, original statement of Ribbentrop’s positions;
  USA-6, 2851-PS, original statement of Rosenberg’s positions;
  USA-7, 2979-PS, original statement of Frank’s positions;
  USA-8, 2978-PS, original statement of Frick’s positions;
  USA-9, 2975-PS, original statement of Streicher’s positions;
  USA-10, 2977-PS, original statement of Funk’s positions;
  USA-11, 3021-PS, original statement of Schacht’s positions;
  USA-12, 2887-PS, original statement of Dönitz’s positions;
  USA-13, 2888-PS, original statement of Raeder’s positions;
  USA-14, 2973-PS, original statement of Von Schirach’s positions;
  USA-15, 2974-PS, original statement of Sauckel’s positions;
  USA-16, 2965-PS, original statement of Jodl’s positions;
  USA-17, 2910-PS, original statement of Seyss-Inquart’s positions;
  USA-18, 2980-PS, original statement of Speer’s positions;
  USA-19, 2972-PS, original statement of Von Neurath’s positions;
  USA-20, 2976-PS, original statement of Fritzsche’s positions.

Document books:

USA-A, Common Objectives, Methods, and Doctrines of Conspiracy;

USA-B, The Acquiring of Totalitarian Control over Germany; Political;
First Steps; Control Acquired;

USA-C, Consolidation of Control; (Utilization and Molding of Political
Machinery);

USA-F, Purge of Political Opponents; Terrorization;

USA-G, Destruction of Trade Unions and Acquisition of Control over
Productive Labor Capacity in Germany;

USA-H, Suppression of the Christian Churches in Germany;

USA-I, Adoption and Publication of the Program for Persecution of the
Jews.

May it please the Tribunal, Mr. Justice Jackson called my
attention—while we are offering all of these on behalf of the United
States, naturally they are for the benefit and on the behalf of all the
other nations who are cooperating in this case.

THE PRESIDENT: That is understood.

MAJOR WALLIS: May it please the Court, when we adjourned yesterday
afternoon, I was in the process of developing the various means by which
these conspirators acquired a totalitarian control of Germany. I wish to
continue on that subject this morning, and I will first discuss the
reshaping of education and the training of youth; and in accordance with
Your Honors’ suggestion, I offer the document book, United States
Exhibit D, and would call to the Court’s attention that this book
contains translations of the documents which we rely upon with respect
to this portion of the case. These documents consist of German writings,
German speeches of the defendants and other Nazi leaders, and are
matters that we suggest are clearly within the purview of judicial
notice of the Court. And in the brief which is offered for the
assistance of the Court in connection with this subject, the exact
portions of the documents which are desired to be brought to the
attention of the Tribunal are set forth either by quotation from the
documents, or by reference to the specific page number of the documents.

Meanwhile, during this entire pre-war period, the nation was being
prepared psychologically for war, and one of the most important steps
was the reshaping of the educational system so as to educate the German
youth to be amenable to their will. Hitler publicly announced this
purpose in November 1933, and I am quoting from Document 2455-PS. He
said:

    “When an opponent declares, ‘I will not come over to your side,
    and you will not get me on your side’, I calmly say, ‘Your child
    belongs to me already. A people lives forever. What are you? You
    will pass on. Your descendants, however, now stand in the new
    camps. In a short time they will know nothing else but this new
    community’.”

He further said in May 1937, and I refer to Document Number 2454-PS:

    “This new Reich will give its youth to no one, but will itself
    take youth and give to youth its education and its own
    upbringing.”

The first steps taken in making the German schools the tools of the Nazi
educational system were two decrees in May 1934, whereby the Reich
Ministry of Education was established and the control of education by
local authorities was replaced by the absolute authority of the Reich in
all educational matters. These decrees are set out in Documents 2078-PS,
2088-PS, 2392-PS. Thereafter, the curricula and organization of the
German schools and universities were modified by a series of decrees in
order to make these schools effective instruments for the teaching of
Nazi doctrines.

The Civil Service Law of 1933, which was presented in evidence
yesterday, made it possible for the Nazi conspirators to re-examine
thoroughly all German teachers and to remove all “harmful and unworthy
elements”, harmful and unworthy in the Nazi opinion. Many teachers and
professors, mostly Jews, were dismissed and were replaced with
State-spirited teachers. All teachers were required to belong to the
National Socialist Teachers’ League, which organization was charged with
the training of all teachers in the theories and doctrines of the NSDAP.
This is set forth in Document 2452-PS. The Führerprinzip was introduced
into the schools and universities. I refer to Document 2393-PS.

In addition, the Nazi conspirators supplemented the school system by
training the youth through the Hitler Jugend. The law of the Hitler
Jugend, which is set forth in Document 1392-PS, states:

    “The German youth, besides being reared within the family and
    school, shall be educated physically, intellectually, and
    morally in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people
    and community through the Hitler Youth.”

In 1925 the Hitler Youth was officially recognized by the Nazi Party and
became a junior branch of the SA. In 1931 the Defendant Schirach was
appointed Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP with the rank of SA
Gruppenführer. I refer to Document 1458-PS. In June 1933 the Defendant
Schirach was appointed Youth Leader of the German Reich. I refer to the
same document, 1458-PS. In that same month, on orders of the Defendant
Schirach, the Nazi conspirators destroyed or took over all other youth
organizations. This was accomplished by force in the first instance. The
Defendant Schirach, by decree dated 22 June, 1933—I refer to Document
2229-PS—dissolved the Reich Committee of the German Youth Associations
and took over their property. By similar decrees, all of which are set
forth in the document book, all the youth organizations of Germany were
destroyed. Then the Nazi conspirators made membership in the Hitler
Jugend compulsory. I refer to Document 1392-PS.

The Hitler Jugend from its inception had been a formation of the Nazi
Party. By virtue of the 1936 Youth Law, making membership compulsory, it
became an agency of the Reich Government while still retaining its
position as a formation of the Nazi Party. This is set forth in Document
1392-PS. By 1940 membership in the Hitler Jugend was over seven million.
I refer you to Document 2435-PS. Through the Hitler Jugend the Nazi
conspirators imbued the youth with Nazi ideology. The master race
doctrine and anti-Semitism, including physical attack on the Jews, were
systematically taught in the training program. I refer you to Document
2436-PS. The Hitler Jugend indoctrinated the youth with the idea that
war is a noble activity. I refer to Document 1458-PS. One of the most
important functions of the Hitler Jugend was to prepare the youth for
membership in the Party and its formations. The Hitler Jugend was the
agency used for extensive pre-military and military training of youth. I
refer to Document 1850-PS. In addition to general military training,
special training was given in special formations. These included flying
units, naval units, motorized units, signal units, et cetera.

The full details with the accompanying documents of the methods used by
the Nazi conspirators in reshaping the educational system and
supplementing it with the Hitler Jugend so as to educate the German
youth to be amenable to the Nazi will and prepare youth for war are set
forth in the document book which has been offered, and in the
accompanying briefs.

Now I would like to direct your attention to the weapon of propaganda
that was used during this period, and for this purpose I offer United
States Exhibit Number E with the accompanying brief. This document book
and the briefs which accompany it. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Have any copies of these documents been provided for the
Defense Counsel?

COL. STOREY: I understand, Sir, they have been sent to the Defendants’
Information Center. I may say, Sir, that with tomorrow we will have them
in advance to everybody, including the Court and the Defense Counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MAJOR WALLIS: This document book and the accompanying brief is entitled
“Propaganda Censorship and Supervision of Cultural Activities.”

During this period one of the strongest weapons of the conspirators was
propaganda. From the outset they appreciated the urgency of the task of
inculcating the German masses with the National Socialist principles and
ideology. The early utterances of Hitler and his fellow conspirators
evidenced full recognition of the fact that their power could endure
only if it rested on general acceptance of their political and social
views.

Immediately following their accession to power, the Nazi conspirators
instituted a determined program for wholesale organization of the masses
by seizing control of all vehicles of public expression. The wide-spread
use of propaganda by the powerful machine thus created became a key
device in establishing control over all phases of the German economy,
public and private. They conceived that the proper function of
propaganda was to prepare the ground psychologically for political
action and military aggression and to guarantee popular support of a
system which was based on a permanent and steadily intensified
application of terror and aggression both in the sphere of domestic
politics and foreign relations.

To attain these objectives, propaganda was used to create specific
thought patterns designed to make the people amenable to the aims and
program of the Nazis and to foster their active participation therein to
the greatest extent possible. The nature of this propaganda is within
the judicial purview of the Court. As Goebbels put it, it was aimed at
“the conquest of the masses.” Its intended effect was the elimination of
all serious resistance in the masses. To achieve this result, as will be
shown later in the evidence, the Nazi conspirators were utterly
unscrupulous in their choice of means, a total disregard of veracity
that presented their case purely from the standpoint of political
expediency and their conception of national self-interest. Inasmuch as
propaganda was the means to an end, “the conquest of the masses,” it
required different strategy at different times, depending on the
objectives issued and pursued by the Nazi conspirators at any given
moment. According to Hitler: “the first task of propaganda is the
gaining of people for the future organization.”

The recruiting of people for enlistment in the Party and supervised
organizations was the primary objective in the years preceding and
immediately following the seizure of power. After the rise to power,
this task was broadened to include the enlistment of the people as a
whole for the active support of the regime and its policies. As the
Reich Propaganda Leader of the Party and Reich Minister for Propaganda,
Goebbels stated:

“Propaganda, the strongest weapon in the conquest of the State, remains
the strongest weapon in the consolidation and building up of the State.”

The methods which they used to control this strongest weapon in the
power of the State are set forth in a chart which I would like to call
to the Court’s attention at this time, and would like to introduce in
evidence as USA Exhibit Number 21.

As you will note from the chart, there were three separate levels of
control within the German Reich. The first level was the Party controls,
which are represented on the chart by the top block. And you will see
that the Party through its Examining Commission controlled the books and
magazines, and issued books and magazines setting forth the ideology of
the Party.

The second block, the Press Leader Division, supervised all publishers,
headed Party newspapers and book publishers.

The third block, Press Chief,—this office controlled the Press
Political Office, the Press Personnel Office, and supervised Party
treatment of the press and treatment of Party affairs in the press.

The center block, the Office of Propaganda Leader, had under its control
not only the press, but exhibits and fairs, speakers’ bureaus, films,
radio, culture, and other means of expression and dissemination of the
ideology of the Party and its purposes.

The next block, Ideology, was devoted exclusively to the ideology of the
Party headed by the Defendant Rosenberg. It supplied all the training
materials, prepared the curricula for the schools, and the
indoctrination of the people into the ideology of the Party. On that
same level is Youth Education, presided over by the Defendant Schirach,
who had under his control the Hitler Jugend; and then there were the
University Students and Teachers Division of the Party controls.

On the next level you have the controls that were exercised by the
State, and reading from left to right you have the Propaganda
Coordination, Foreign Coordination and Cooperation, the radio, which was
under the control of the Defendant Fritzsche, film, literature, the
German press, periodicals, theater, arts, other cultural things, and the
Ministry for Education.

Then, in the last tier, what is known as the corporate controls. These
were under a semi-official control of both the Party and the State.
These are the so-called cultural chambers. Their purpose was to have
full control over the personnel engaged in the various arts and
cultures, and engaged in the preparation and dissemination of news.
First was the press—all reporters and writers belonged to that section.
The next section is the fine arts, music, theater, film, literature,
radio,—then going over into the Educational Branch the organization
which the University teachers, the students and former corps members of
the universities had to belong to.

By means of this vast network of propaganda machinery, the Nazi
conspirators had full control over the expression and dissemination of
all thought, cultural activities, and dissemination of news within the
Reich. Nothing was or could be published in Germany that did not have
the approval, express or implied, of the Party and State. The Defendant
Schacht in his personal notes explains the effect of the killing of a
piece of news in a totalitarian dictatorship. As he states it, it has
never become publicly known that there have been thousands of martyrs in
the Hitler regime. They have all disappeared in the cells or graves of
the concentration camps, without ever having been heard of again; and he
goes on to say, “what is the use of martyrdom in the fight against
terror if it has no chance of becoming known and thus serving as an
example for others.”

THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this subject, there is a docket on
the documents which shows that certain documents are missing. What does
that mean? 1708, 2030.

MAJOR WALLIS: Those documents are in the process of being reproduced and
will be furnished to the Court, I hope, before the close of the day,
Sir. They have been added to that book and, as yet, have not been
completed in their process of reproduction.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Have they been translated?

MAJOR WALLIS: Yes, Sir, they have been translated, and the translations
are in the process of being reproduced.

THE PRESIDENT: Are the documents in their original form in German?

MAJOR WALLIS: Yes, I believe they are, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MAJOR WALLIS: I would now like to direct the Court’s attention to the
militarization of Nazi-dominated organizations during this pre-war
period and for that purpose I offer United States Exhibit Number J,
which consists of a document book with English translations, and I
present to the Court also a brief which accompanies this portion of the
case.

Throughout this pre-war period, and while the Nazi conspirators were
achieving and consolidating their totalitarian control of Germany, they
did not lose sight of their main objective—aggressive war. Accordingly,
they placed a considerable number of their dominated organizations on a
progressively militarized footing, with a view to the rapid
transformation of these organizations whenever necessary, as instruments
of war. These organizations were the SS, the SA, the Hitler Jugend, the
NSKK (or National Socialist Motor Corps), the NSFK (which is the
National Socialist Aviation Corps), the RAD (which is the Reich Labor
Service), and the OT (which is the Todt Organization).

The manner in which the militarization was accomplished is detailed in
part in the documents, which have been presented to the Court and will
be detailed further when the particular organizations are taken up and
discussed and their criminality established at subsequent stages in the
case. At this time, I would like to call the Court’s attention to a
chart, and while the chart is physically being placed on the board, I
would offer United States Exhibit Number 22, which is Document 2833-PS
and is a reproduction of Page 15 of the book entitled, _History of the
Nazi Party_. You will note that on the left lower corner of the chart
placed on the board, there are some papers attached. The top paper is an
affidavit which reads as follows: “I certify that the above enlargement
is a true and correct copy prepared under my direct supervision, of
Document Number 2833-PS, Page 15 of the book entitled _History of the
Party_,” and you will note that underneath is a second paper and this
affidavit states it is a correct photographic copy, which appears in the
left-hand corner of the panel. This affidavit is signed by David
Zablodowsky, sworn to and subscribed the 23rd day of November 1945 at
Nuremberg, Germany, before James H. Johnson, First Lieutenant, Office of
the United States Chief of Counsel.

This chart visualizes, as vividly as possible, just how this
militarization took place in Germany. The chart is entitled, “The
Organic Incorporation of German Nationals into the National Socialist
System, and the Way to Political Leadership.”

Starting at the bottom of the chart, you see the young folk, between the
ages of 10 and 14. The arrows point both right and left. The arrow to
the right is the Adolf Hitler School, for youth between the ages of 12
and 18. Both from the school and from the young folk, they proceed to
the Hitler Jugend. At 18 years of age, they graduate from the Hitler
Jugend into the various Party formations, the SA, the SS, the NSKK, the
NSFK. At the age of 20, they continue from these Party formations into
the Labor Front, and from the Labor Front, after they have served their
period of time there, back again to the Party formations, of the SA, the
SS, NSKK, NSFK, until they reach the age of 21. Then they proceed into
the Army, serve in the Army from the ages of 21 to 23, and then back
again into the Party formations of SA, SS, et cetera.

And then from that group, the select move up to be Political Leaders
(Leiter) of the Nazi Party, and from that group are selected the cream
of the crop who go to the Nazi Party Special Schools and from these
schools, as is represented on the top of the chart, graduate the
political Führer of the people.

I would emphasize again to the Court that this chart is not anything
that was prepared by Counsel in this case. It was prepared by the Nazi
Party people and it comes from their own history.

Thus, by the end of the pre-war period, the Nazi conspirators had
achieved one of the first major steps in their grand conspiracy. All
phases of German life were dominated by Nazi doctrine and practice and
mobilized for the accomplishment of their militant aims. The extent to
which this was accomplished can be no better expressed than in the words
of Hitler when he spoke to the Reichstag on 20 February 1938. I refer to
Document 2715-PS. He said:

    “Only now have we succeeded in setting before us the great tasks
    and in possessing the material things which are the
    prerequisites for the realization of great creative plans in all
    fields of our national existence. Thus, National Socialism has
    made up with a few years for what centuries before it had
    omitted. . . . National Socialism has given the German people
    that leadership which as Party not only mobilizes the nation but
    also organizes it, so that on the basis of the natural principle
    of selection, the continuance of a stable political leadership
    is safeguarded forever. . . . National Socialism possesses
    Germany entirely and completely since the day when, 5 years ago,
    I left the house in Wilhelmsplatz as Reich Chancellor. There is
    no institution in this state which is not National Socialist.
    Above all, however, the National Socialist Party in these 5
    years not only has made the nation National Socialist, but also
    has given itself the perfect organizational structure which
    guarantees its permanence for all future. The greatest guarantee
    of the National Socialist revolution lies in the complete
    domination of the Reich and all its institutions and
    organizations, internally and externally, by the National
    Socialist Party. Its protection against the world abroad,
    however, lies in its new National Socialist armed forces. . . .

    “In this Reich, anybody who has a responsible position is a
    National Socialist. . . . Every institution of this Reich is
    under the orders of the supreme political leadership. . . . The
    Party leads the Reich politically, the Armed Forces defend it
    militarily. . . . There is nobody in any responsible position in
    this state who doubts that I am the authorized leader of the
    Reich.”

Thus spoke Adolf Hitler at the end of this period on the 20th of
February 1938.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please. . . .

DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Frank): Mr. President, may I
make a few short remarks in this connection? The defendants were given,
along with the Indictment, a list of the documents. This list contains
the following preamble:

    “Each of the defendants is hereby informed that the Prosecution
    will use some or all of the documents listed in the appendix in
    order to corroborate the points enumerated in the Indictment.”

Now, the Chief Prosecutor introduced in court this morning about 12
documents and a scrutiny of that list revealed that not a single one of
the documents is mentioned. Thus, already now, at the very beginning of
the Trial, we are confronted with the fact that not only are documents
presented to the Court without the defendant being acquainted with their
contents, but that documents are being used as documentary evidence
which are not even listed.

Not a single one of these documents is mentioned in the list and I must
confess that an adequate defense is altogether impossible under these
circumstances. I therefore move:

1. That the Tribunal direct the Prosecution to submit a list of all
documents which will be placed before the Court during examination;

2. To instruct the Prosecution to make available to the defendants and
their counsel—at the latest on the day when documents are being
presented to the Court—a copy of the German text; and

3. That the main proceedings be suspended until the Prosecution is in a
position to comply with these requests. Otherwise, I, at least, will not
be able to proceed with the defense.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, or Counsel for the Prosecution, will you
say what answer you have to make to this objection?

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, in the first place practically
every document referred to by Major Wallis is a document of which the
Court would take judicial knowledge. In the second place, a list of
documents was filed in the Defense Information Center on November 1st. I
am not sure as to whether all of these or a part of them were included.
In the third place each attorney presenting each segment of the case
sends down to the Defense Information Center a list of the documents
which he proposes to offer in evidence upon his presentation. In the
fourth place, I wonder if the Tribunal and Defense Counsel realize the
physical problems that are imposed? I am informed that copies of these
documents in English, as well as copies of the briefs, were delivered
either last night or this morning in defendants’ Information Center.
Lastly, other presentations that follow—we will abide by the Tribunal’s
request: namely, that prior to the presentation the Court will be
furnished with these document books, with these briefs, and Defense
Counsel will also be furnished with them in advance. The weekend will
permit us to do that.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the Trial must now continue
without any adjournment, but that in future as soon as possible the
Defendants’ Counsel will be furnished with copies of the documents which
are to be put in evidence.

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): I should like to
present the following: The documents are presented to the Court also in
an English translation. An examination of these translations should be
made available to the Defense. I point out particularly that the
translation of technical terms could possibly lead to misunderstandings.
Moreover, the documents are provided with an introductory remark and a
table of contents. The Defense should also have opportunity to read
through this table of contents and examine it.

I make the motion that these English translations and their preliminary
remarks be made available to the Defense.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I understood from you that you proposed
to make available to the defendants the trial briefs which contain
certain observations upon the documents put in.

COL. STOREY: That is right, Sir. They have been, are now, and will be
completed during the weekend, and, as I understood Defense Counsel were
willing for the briefs to be furnished in English, and if they want a
translation, there will be German speaking officers in defendants’
Information Center at their service. I understood that was agreeable
yesterday.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

COL. STOREY: Now sir, while I am on my feet, and in order to obviate
some misapprehension, for the benefit of Defense Counsel, when we refer
to document numbers as, say, 1850-PS, in many instances that is a
document which is a copy of a citation or a decree in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, and, therefore, is not a separate document of ours,
and we have placed in the defendants’ Information Center ample copies
and sets of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, and I dare say that one-half of the
documents referred to in Major Wallis’ presentation will be found in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, and I assure Your Honors that over the weekend we
will do the utmost to explain to Defense Counsel and to make available
to them all information that we have and will do so in the future in
advance.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Colonel Storey. The Tribunal will now adjourn
for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

COL. STOREY: If Your Honors please, the next subject to be presented is
the economic preparation for aggressive war, by Mr. Dodd.

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): May
it please the Tribunal, Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal:

In view of the discussions which took place just before the recess
period, I believe it proper for me to inform the Tribunal that the
documents to which I shall make reference,—a list of those documents
has been lodged in the defendants’ Information Center, and, as well,
photostatic copies of the originals have been placed there this morning.

It is my responsibility on behalf of the Chief Prosecutor for the United
States of America to present the proof with reference to the allegations
of the Indictment under Section IV (E), on [A]Page 6 of the English
version of the Indictment, and particularly beginning with the second
paragraph under (E), which is entitled, “The Acquiring of Totalitarian
Control in Germany, Economic, and the Economic Planning and Mobilization
for Aggressive War.”

-----

[A] Page numbers used in references throughout the Proceedings are to
the original documents and do not apply to pagination used in the
present volumes.

-----

The second paragraph:

    “2. They used organizations of German business as instruments of
    economic mobilization for war.

    “3. They directed Germany’s economy towards preparation and
    equipment of the military machine. To this end they directed
    finance, capital investment, and foreign trade.

    “4. The Nazi conspirators, and in particular the industrialists
    among them, embarked upon a huge rearmament program, and set out
    to produce and develop huge quantities of materials of war and
    to create a powerful military potential.”

The fifth paragraph under that same heading (E), and the final one in so
far as my responsibility goes this morning, is that which reads:

    “With the object of carrying through the preparation for war the
    Nazi conspirators set up a series of administrative agencies and
    authorities. For example, in 1936 they established for this
    purpose the office of the Four Year Plan with the Defendant
    Göring as Plenipotentiary, vesting it with overriding control
    over Germany’s economy. Furthermore, on the 28th of August 1939,
    immediately before launching their aggression against Poland,
    they appointed the Defendant Funk Plenipotentiary for Economics;
    and on the 30th of August 1939 they set up the Ministerial
    Council for the Defense of the Reich to act as a War Cabinet.”

I will not take the time of this Tribunal to prove what the world
already knows: that the Nazi conspirators rearmed Germany on a vast
scale. I propose to place in evidence the secret records of the plans
and deliberations of the inner councils of the Nazis, which prove that
the reorganization of the German Government, the financial wizardry of
the Defendant Schacht, and the total mobilization of the German economy
largely under the Defendant Schacht, Göring, and Funk, were directed at
a single goal: aggressive war.

I should like to hand to the Court at this point the so-called document
book, which contains the English translation of the original German
document. I do not make an offer at this time of these documents in
evidence, but hand them to the Court for the purpose of easing the task
of the Court in following the discussion concerning these documents. I
might say at this point also that I should like to submit at a little
later date a brief for the assistance of the Court after I have
concluded my remarks before it this morning.

The significance of the economic measures adopted and applied by the
conspirators can, of course, be properly appraised only if they are
placed in the larger social and political context of Nazi Germany. The
economic measures were adopted while the conspirators were, as has
already been shown, directing their vast propaganda apparatus to the
glorification of war. They were adopted while the conspirators were
perverting physical training into training for war. They were adopted
while, as my colleagues will show, these conspirators were threatening
to use force and were planning to use force to achieve their territorial
and political objects. In short, if Your Honors please, these measures
constitute in the field of economics and government administration the
same preparation for aggressive war which dominated every aspect of the
Nazi State.

In 1939 and 1940 after the Nazi aggression upon Poland, Holland,
Belgium, and France it became perfectly clear to the world that the Nazi
conspirators had created probably the greatest instrument of aggression
in history.

That machine was built up almost in its entirety in a period of less
than one decade. In May of 1939 Major General George Thomas, former
Chief of the Military-Economic Staff in the Reich War Ministry, reported
that the German Army had grown from seven Infantry divisions in 1933 to
thirty-nine Infantry divisions, among them four fully motorized and
three mountain divisions, eighteen Corps Headquarters, five Panzer
divisions, twenty-two machine gun battalions. Moreover, General Thomas
stated that the German Navy had greatly expanded by the launching, among
other vessels, of two battleships of 35,000 tons, four heavy cruisers of
10,000 tons, and other warships; further, that the Luftwaffe had grown
to a point where it had a strength of 260,000 men, 21 squadrons,
consisting of 240 echelons, and 33 anti-aircraft batteries.

He likewise reported that out of the few factories permitted by the
Versailles Treaty there had arisen, and I am quoting, if Your Honors
please, from the document bearing our number EC-28, which consists of a
lecture delivered by Major General Thomas on the 24th of May 1939 in the
Nazi Foreign Office. General Thomas said in part—or rather he
reported—that out of the few factories permitted by the Versailles
Treaty there had arisen:

    “. . . the mightiest armament industry now existing in the
    world. It has attained the performances which in part equal the
    German wartime performances and in part even surpass them.
    Germany’s crude steel production is today the largest in the
    world after America’s. The aluminum production exceeds that of
    America and of the other countries of the world very
    considerably. The output of our rifle, machine gun, and
    artillery factories is at present larger than that of any other
    state.”

That quotation, I repeat, was from a document bearing the lettering “EC”
and the number after the dash “28”. It is United States of America
Exhibit 23.

These results—the results which General Thomas spoke about in his
lecture in May of 1939—were achieved only by making preparation for war
the dominating objective of German economy. And, to quote General Thomas
again, he stated:

    “History will know only a few examples of cases where a country
    has directed, even in peace time, all its economic forces so
    deliberately and systematically towards the requirements of war,
    as Germany was compelled to do in the period between the two
    World Wars.”

That quotation from General Thomas will be found in the document bearing
our Number 2353-PS. It is another quotation from General Thomas, but
from another writing of his.

The task of mobilizing the German economy for aggressive war began
promptly after the Nazi conspirators’ seizure of power. It was entrusted
principally to the Defendants Schacht, Göring, and Funk.

The Defendant Schacht, as is well known, was appointed President of the
Reichsbank in March of 1933 and Minister of Economics in August of 1934.
The world did not know, however, that the responsibility for the
execution of this program was entrusted to the office of the Four Year
Plan under the Defendant Göring.

I should now like to call to Your Honors’ attention a document bearing
the number EC-408, and I should also like to refer at this time to
another document for Your Honors’ attention while I discuss the
material—Number 2261-PS.

And I continue to say that the world did not know, as well, that the
Defendant Schacht was designated Plenipotentiary for the War Economy on
May 21, 1935, with complete control over the German civilian economy for
war production in the Reich Defense Council, established by a top-secret
Hitler decree.

I invite Your Honors’ attention to the Document 2261-PS, which I
referred to a few minutes ago.

The Defendant Schacht recognized that the preparation for war came
before all else for, in a memorandum concerning the problems of
financing rearmament, written on the 3rd of May 1935, he stated that his
comments were based on the assumption that the accomplishment of the
armament program. . . .

THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: Pardon me, but you referred us to Document
2261.

MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: But you haven’t read anything from it.

MR. DODD: I did not; I merely referred the Court to it since it. . . .

THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: It would help us, I think, if, when you
refer to a document, you refer to some particular passage in it.

MR. DODD: Very well.

THE PRESIDENT: I think it must be the middle paragraph in the document:
“The Führer has nominated the President of the Directorate of the
Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht. . . .”

MR. DODD: Yes, that is the paragraph to which I wish to make reference.
If Your Honors please, I refer to the second paragraph, or the middle
paragraph, which states, in a letter dated June 24, 1935 at Berlin:

    “The Führer and Reich Chancellor has nominated the President of
    the Directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, to be
    Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy.”

I might point out, in addition to the second paragraph, the last
paragraph of that letter or the last sentence of the letter, which
reads: “I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more”—the
letter being signed, “Von Blomberg.”

Through Schacht’s financial genius monetary measures were devised to
restore German industry to full production; and through the control of
imports and exports, which he devised under his plan of 1934, German
production was channeled in accordance with the requirements of the
German war machine.

I shall, with the Court’s permission, later discuss the details of
documentary proof of this assertion.

In 1936, with an eye to the experience in the first World War, the Nazi
conspirators embarked on an ambitious plan to make Germany completely
self-sufficient in strategic war materials such as rubber, gasoline, and
steel, in a period of 4 years, so that the Nazi conspirators would be
fully prepared for aggressive war. The responsibility for the execution
of this program was entrusted to the office of the Four Year Plan under
the Defendant Göring—and at this point I should like to refer to the
document bearing the number and the lettering EC-408. It is dated the
30th day of December 1936, marked “Secret Command Matter”, and entitled
the “Report Memorandum on the Four Year Plan and Preparation of the War
Economy.”

It sets out that the Führer and Reich Chancellor has conferred powers in
regard to mobilization preparations in the economic field that need
further definition, and in the third paragraph it refers specifically to
Minister President, Generaloberst Göring as Commissioner of the Four
Year Plan, by authority of the Führer and Reich Chancellor granted the
18th day of October 1936. The existence of this program involved the
reorganization and control of the whole German economy for war.

Again referring to Major General Thomas—and specifically to our
document marked EC-27—General Thomas, in a lecture on the 28th of
February 1939, made at the Staff instructor’s course, stated:

    “The National Socialist State, soon after taking over power,
    reorganized the German economy in all sections and directed it
    towards a military viewpoint, which had been requested by the
    Army for years. Due to the reorganization, agriculture, commerce
    and professions become those powerful instruments the Führer
    needs for his extensive plans, and we can say today that
    Hitler’s mobile politics, as well as the powerful efforts of the
    Army and economy, would not have been possible without the
    necessary reorganization by the National Socialist Government.
    We can now say that the economic organization as a whole
    corresponds with the needs, although slight adjustments will
    have to be made yet. Those reorganizations made a new system of
    economics possible which was necessary in view of our internal
    and foreign political situation as well as our financial
    problems. The directed economy, as we have it today concerning
    agriculture, commerce, and industry, is not only the expression
    of the present State principles, but at the same time also the
    economy of the country’s defense.”

If Your Honors please, this program was not undertaken in a vacuum; it
was deliberately designed and executed to provide the necessary
instrument of the Nazi conspirators’ plans for aggressive war.

In September of 1934 the Defendant Schacht frankly acknowledged to the
American Ambassador in Berlin that the Hitler Party was absolutely
committed to war, and the people too were ready and willing; and that
quotation is found in Ambassador Dodd’s diary and is document bearing
our Number 2832-PS and United States Exhibit Number 29, particularly on
page 176 of Ambassador Dodd’s diary.

At the same time, the Defendant Schacht promulgated his new plan for the
control of imports and exports in the interest of rearmament. A year
later he was appointed Plenipotentiary for the War Economy by the
top-secret decree referred to a few minutes ago.

In September 1936 the Defendant Göring announced—at a meeting attended
by the Defendant Schacht and others—that Hitler had issued instructions
to the Reich War Minister on the basis that the show-down with Russia is
inevitable, and added that “all measures have to be taken just as if we
were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war.”

I refer the Court to the document bearing the letters EC-416 and
particularly. . . . Before I discuss the quotation I might indicate that
this document is also marked a secret Reich matter in the minutes of the
Cabinet meeting of the 4th of September 1936, at 12 o’clock noon. It
tells who was present: the Defendant Göring, Von Blomberg, the Defendant
Schacht, and others.

And on the second page of that document, in the second paragraph, is
found the quotation by the Defendant Göring. It starts from the basic
thought that:

    “The show-down with Russia is inevitable. What Russia has done
    in the field of reconstruction we too can do.”

On the third page of that document, in the second paragraph, the
Defendant Göring stated: “All measures have to be taken just as if we
were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war.”

In the same month the office of the Four Year Plan was created with the
mission of making Germany self-sufficient for war in 4 years. I refer
back, at this point, to the Document Number EC-408, and particularly
refer Your Honors to the third paragraph, again, of that document, where
the statement is made as regards the war economy:

    “Minister President Generaloberst Göring sees it as his task,
    within 4 years, to put the entire economy in a state of
    readiness for war.”

The Nazi Government officials provided the leadership in preparing
Germany for war. They received, however, the enthusiastic cooperation of
the German industrialists, and the role played by industrialists in
converting Germany to a war economy is an important one, and I turn
briefly to that aspect of the economic picture.

On the invitation of the Defendant Göring, approximately 25 of the
leading industrialists of Germany, and the Defendant Schacht, attended a
meeting in Berlin on the 20th day of February, 1933. This was shortly
before the election of March 5, 1933 in Germany. At this meeting Hitler
announced the conspirators’ aim to seize totalitarian control over
Germany, to destroy the parliamentary system, to crush all opposition by
force, and to restore the power of the Wehrmacht.

Among those present on that day, in February of 1933 in Berlin, were
Gustav Krupp, head of the huge munitions firm Friedrich Krupp, A.G.;
four leading officials of the I.G. Farben, one of the world’s largest
chemical concerns; present, I repeat, was also the Defendant Schacht,
and Albert Vögler was also there, the head of the huge steel trusts, the
United Steel Works of Germany, and there were other leading
industrialists there.

In support of the assertion with respect to that meeting at that time
and in that place, I refer Your Honors to the document bearing the
number EC-439, it being an affidavit of George von Schnitzler, and it
reads as follows:

    “I George von Schnitzler, a member of the Vorstand of I.G.
    Farben, make the following deposition under oath:

    “At the end of February 1933 four members of the Vorstand of
    I.G. Farben, including Dr. Bosch, the head of the Vorstand, and
    myself, were asked by the office of the President of the
    Reichstag to attend a meeting in his house, the purpose of which
    was not given. I do not remember the two other colleagues of
    mine who were also invited. I believe the invitation reached me
    during one of my business trips to Berlin. I went to the meeting
    which was attended by about twenty persons, who I believe were
    mostly leading industrialists from the Ruhr.

    “Among those present I remember:

    “Dr. Schacht, who at that time was not yet head of the
    Reichsbank again and not yet Minister of Economics;

    “Krupp von Bohlen, who in the beginning of 1933 presided the
    Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie, which later on was
    changed in the semi-official organization ‘Reichsgruppe
    Industrie’;

    “Dr. Albert Vögler, the leading man of the Vereinigte
    Stahlwerke;

    “Von Loewenfeld from an industrial work in Essen;

    “Dr. Stein, head of the Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria, a mine
    which belongs to the I.G. Dr. Stein was an active member of the
    Deutsche Volkspartei.

    “I remember that Dr. Schacht acted as a kind of host.

    “While I had expected the appearance of Göring, Hitler entered
    the room, shook hands with everybody and took a seat at the
    table. In a long speech he talked mainly about the danger of
    communism over which he pretended that he just had won a
    decisive victory.

    “He then talked about the Bündnis (alliance) into which his
    party and the Deutschnationale Volkspartei had entered. This
    latter party, in the meantime, had been reorganized by Herr Von
    Papen. At the end he came to the point which seemed to me the
    purpose of the meeting. Hitler stressed the importance that the
    two aforementioned parties should gain the majority in the
    coming Reichstag election. Krupp von Bohlen thanked Hitler for
    his speech. After Hitler had left the room, Dr. Schacht proposed
    to the meeting the raising of an election fund of, as far as I
    remember, RM 3 million. The fund should be distributed between
    the two ‘allies’ according to their relative strength at the
    time being. Dr. Stein suggested that the Deutsche Volkspartei
    should be included. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: Mr. Dodd, it seems to me that really all
that that document shows is that there was a meeting at which Mr.
Schacht was present, and at which it was determined to subscribe an
election fund in 1933.

MR. DODD: That is quite so, Your Honor. I will not labor the Court by
reading all of it. There were some other references, but not of major
importance, in the last paragraph, to a division of the election fund. I
just call Your Honors’ attention to it in passing.

I should like, at this point, to call Your Honors’ attention to the
document bearing the Number D-203. It is three-page document: D-203.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. DODD: I wish to read only excerpts from it very briefly. It is the
speech delivered to the industrialists by Hitler, and I refer
particularly to the second paragraph of that document: “Private
enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of democracy. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: What is the date of that?

MR. DODD: It is the speech made at the meeting on the 20th of February
1933 at Berlin.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. DODD:

    “Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of
    democracy; it is conceivable only if the people have a sound
    idea of authority and personality.”

I refer to Page 2 of the document, and I should like to read an excerpt
from that first paragraph on Page 2, about 13 sentences down, beginning
with the words:

    “I recognized even while in the hospital that one had to search
    for new ideas conducive to reconstruction. I found them in
    Nationalism, in the value of . . . strength and power of
    individual personality.”

And, a little further down, the next to the last and the last sentence
of that same paragraph, Hitler said:

    “If one rejects pacifism, one must put a new idea in its place
    immediately. Everything must be pushed aside, must be replaced
    by something better.”

And, in the third paragraph, the last sentence beginning:

    “We must not forget that all the benefits of culture must be
    introduced more or less with an iron fist, just as once upon a
    time the farmers were forced to plant potatoes.”

Then finally, on that page, in the fourth paragraph—nearly at the end
of it:

    “With the very same courage with which we go to work to make up
    for what had been sinned during the last 14 years, we have
    withstood all attempts to move us off the right way.”

Then, on the top of the next page, the second paragraph, these words:

    “Now we stand before the last election. Regardless of the
    outcome there will be no retreat, even if the coming election
    does not bring about a decision.”

THE PRESIDENT: Why did you not read the last line on Page 2?

MR. DODD: Beginning with the words “while still gaining power”?

THE PRESIDENT: The sentence before:

    “We must first gain complete power if we want to crush the other
    side completely. While still gaining power, one should not start
    the struggle against the opponent. Only when one knows that one
    has readied the pinnacle of power, that there is no further
    possible development, shall one strike.”

MR. DODD: I was going to refer to that, if Your Honor pleases, in a
minute. However, I think it is quite proper to have it inserted here.

Before starting to read this last paragraph, I suggest that it is nearly
the accustomed recess time, as I understand it, and it is a rather
lengthy paragraph. . . .

THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: Yes, we will adjourn until 2 o’clock.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, if I may go back for just a very little
bit to take up the train of thought where I left off at the noon recess.

We were discussing the document, bearing the number D-203, and I had
referred particularly to the third page of that document, and even more
particularly to the second paragraph on that page; and I wish to read
from a sentence approximately 8 or 10 lines down in that second
paragraph, which reads as follows:

    “The question of restoration of the Wehrmacht will not be
    decided at Geneva but in Germany, when we have gained internal
    strength through internal peace.”

I wish to refer again to the same page of the same document, and to the
last paragraph and the last sentence, with reference to the Defendant
Göring, who was present at that same meeting to which this document
refers, the meeting of February 20, 1933 in Berlin. Göring said that the
sacrifices asked for surely would be so much easier for industry to bear
if it realized that the election of March 5th will surely be the last
one for the next 10 years, probably even for the next 100 years.

In a memorandum dated the 22d day of February 1933, and for the
information of the Court, in the document book bearing the number D-204,
Gustav Krupp described this meeting briefly, and in the memorandum wrote
that he had expressed to Hitler the gratitude of the 25 industrialists
present at the meeting on February 20, 1933.

There are other expressions in that memorandum, which we do not deem to
be particularly pertinent to the allegations of the Indictment with
which we are now concerned. It is also to establish the corroboration of
the affidavit of Puhl that the meeting was held.

I might point out to the Court that this memorandum, together with the
report of the speech of Hitler, were found by the British and the United
States armies in the personal files of the Defendant Krupp.

I am aware, if Your Honors please, that the method I am pursuing here is
a little tedious, because I am trying to refer specifically to the
documents, and particularly to the excerpts referred to in my remarks,
and therefore this presentation differs very considerably from that
which has gone before. I trust, however, that you will bear with me,
because this part of the case requires some rather careful and detailed
explanations.

In April of 1933, after Hitler had entrenched himself in power, Gustav
Krupp, as chairman of the Reich Association of German Industry, which
was the largest association of German industrialists, submitted to
Hitler the plan of that Association for the reorganization of German
industry, and in connection therewith, undertook to bring the
Association into line with the aims of the conspirators, and to make it
an effective instrument for the execution of their policies.

In a letter of transmittal, Krupp stated that the plan of reorganization
which he submitted on behalf of the Association of industrialists, was
characterized by the desire to coordinate economic measures and
political necessity, adopting the Führer conception of the new German
State. A copy of that letter of transmittal is set out in the document
book under the Number D-157.

In the plan of reorganization itself, Krupp stated:

    “The turn of political events is in line with the wishes which I
    myself and the board of directors have cherished for a long
    time. . . . In reorganizing the Reich Association of German
    Industry, I shall be guided by the idea of bringing the new
    organization into agreement with the political aims of the Reich
    Government.”

The ideas expressed by Krupp on behalf of the members of the Reich
Association of German Industry for introducing the Leadership Principle
into industry, were subsequently adopted.

I respectfully refer the Court to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ of 1934, Part
I, Page 1194, Sections 11, 12, and 16.

Under the decree introducing the Leadership Principle into industry,
each group of industry was required to have a leader who was to serve
without compensation. The leaders were to be appointed and could be
removed at the discretion of the Minister of Economics. The charter of
each group was to be decreed by the leader, who was obligated to lead
his group in accordance with the principles of the National Socialist
State.

I think it is fair to argue that the introduction of the Leadership
Principle into the organizations of business permitted the
centralization of authority, and guaranteed the efficient execution of
orders, which the Government issued to business, in the interest of a
promotion of a war economy. And the overwhelming support given by German
industrialists to the Nazi war program is very vividly described in a
speech prepared by Gustav Krupp in January of 1944, for delivery at the
University of Berlin; and I must again respectfully refer Your Honors to
the document in your book bearing the identification Number D-317.

I shall not, of course, bore this court with a reading of that whole
document, but I should like to quote from it without wrenching any of
the material from its true context.

And this statement is found beginning in the third and the fourth
paragraphs, being the first large paragraph on the first page:

    “War material is lifesaving for one’s own people, and whoever
    works and performs in those spheres can be proud of it. Here,
    enterprise as a whole finds its highest justification of
    existence. This justification, I may inject this here,
    crystallized especially during the time of interregnum between
    1919 and 1933, when Germany was dying down disarmed. . . .”

And further on:

    “It is the one great merit of the entire German war economy that
    it did not remain idle during those bad years, even though its
    activity could not be brought to light for obvious reasons.
    Through years of secret work, scientific and basic groundwork
    was laid in order to be ready again to work for the German Armed
    Forces at the appointed hour without loss of time or
    experience.”

And further quoting from that same speech, and the last paragraph,
particularly on the first page:

    “Only through this secret activity of German enterprise,
    together with the experience gained meanwhile through production
    of peacetime goods, was it possible, after 1933, to fall into
    step with the new tasks arrived at, restoring Germany’s military
    power. Only through all that could the entirely new and various
    problems, brought up by the Führer’s Four Year Plan for German
    enterprise, be mastered. It was necessary to exploit new raw
    materials, to explore and experiment, to invest capital in order
    to make German economy independent and strong—in short, to make
    it war-worthy.”

Quoting even further from this same speech:

    “I think I may state here that the German enterprises followed
    the new ways enthusiastically, that they made the great
    intentions of the Führer their own, by fair competition and
    conscious gratitude, and became his faithful followers. How else
    could the tasks between 1933 and 1939, and especially those
    after 1939, have been overcome?”

It must be emphasized that this secret rearmament program was launched
immediately upon the seizure of power by the Nazi conspirators. On April
4, 1933 the Reich Cabinet passed a resolution establishing a Reich
Defense Council. The function of this Council was secretly to mobilize
for war; and at the second meeting of the working committee of the
Councillors for Reich Defense, which was, by the way, the predecessor of
the Reich Defense Council,—at that second meeting which was held on May
22nd of 1933, the chairman was the Defendant Keitel, then Colonel
Keitel; and he stated that the Reich Defense Council would immediately
undertake to prepare for war emergency. He stressed the urgency of the
task of organizing a war economy, and announced that the Council stood
ready to brush aside all of their obstacles. Fully aware of the fact
that their action was in flagrant violation of the Treaty of Versailles,
the Defendant Keitel emphasized the extreme importance of absolute
secrecy when he said, and I quote from the document bearing the number
EC-177, on Page 5 of that document. Colonel Keitel is speaking, and he
said:

    “No document ought to be lost, since otherwise it may fall into
    the hands of the enemies’ intelligence service. Orally
    transmitted matters are not provable; they can be denied by us
    in Geneva.”

The singleness of purpose with which the Nazi conspirators geared the
German economy to the forging of a war machine is even further shown by
the secret minutes of the sixth meeting of the working committee of the
so-called Reich Defense Council, held on the 7th of February 1934, as
shown in the document bearing the number EC-404, marked “Secret Command
Matter”, and dated the 7th of February 1934. At this meeting, Lieutenant
General Beck pointed out that: “The actual state of preparation is the
purpose of this session.”

Parenthetically, I might say that on the first page of that document it
appears that besides Lieutenant General Beck, the Defendant Jodl was
present, then Lieutenant Colonel Jodl. There was a Captain Schmundt; and
there was a Colonel Guderian there; and there was a Major General Von
Reichenau; there was a Major Warlimont; and these are names that Your
Honors will hear more of in the course of the presentation of this case.

Detailed measures of financing a future war were discussed and it was
pointed out that the financial aspects of the war economy would be
regulated by the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank, which was
headed by the Defendant Schacht.

On May 31st of 1935—as stated earlier in this morning’s discussion—the
Defendant Schacht was secretly appointed plenipotentiary-general of the
war economy, and he had the express function of placing all economic
forces of the nation in the services of the Nazi war machine.

By the secret defense law of May 21, 1935, under which Schacht received
this secret appointment, he was in effect, given charge of the entire
war economy. In case of war, he was to be virtual economic dictator of
Germany. His task was to place all economic forces into the service for
the conduct of the war and to secure economically the life of the German
people. The Ministers of Economy, of Food, Agriculture, Labor, Forestry,
as well as all Reich agencies directly under the Führer, were
subordinated to him. He was to be responsible for the financing as well
as for the conduct of the war; and he was even authorized to issue
ordinances within his sphere of responsibility, even if these deviated
from the existing laws.

The rearmament of Germany proceeded at an amazingly rapid pace. By the
summer of 1935, the Nazi conspirators were emboldened to make plans for
the reoccupation of the Rhineland; and at the tenth meeting of this same
working committee of the Council, the question of measures to be taken
in connection with the proposed reoccupation of the Rhineland were
discussed.

I refer to the document bearing the number EC-405.

At that meeting, held on the 26th day of June 1935, it was said that the
Rhineland required special treatment, because of the assurances given by
Hitler to the French that no military action was being undertaken in the
de-militarized zone. Among the matters requiring special treatment was
the preparation of economic mobilization, a task specifically entrusted
to the Defendant Schacht, as secret Plenipotentiary for the War Economy.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you reading from this document?

MR. DODD: I am quoting in part from it, Your Honor, and it is upon the
document that I base my statements which can be found therein on Pages 4
and 5. I dislike annoying the Court with constant references to these
documents, but I thought it would be the best way to proceed so as fully
to inform the Court.

THE PRESIDENT: Well if you tell us where it is in the document we can
follow it in the document.

MR. DODD: On Page 4, the middle of the page, the fifth paragraph, the
first sentence: “The de-militarized zone requires special treatment.”
And on Page 5, (j), under “the preparations,” “Preparation of economic
mobilization.” On Page 4, the last paragraph just before the setting-out
of the (a), (b), (c), and (d), it is said. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I think you ought to read on Page 4, the last paragraph
but one: “Since political entanglements. . . .”

MR. DODD:

    “Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present
    under all circumstances . . . only those preparatory measures
    that are urgently necessary may be carried out. The existence of
    such preparations, or the intention of them must be kept in
    strictest secrecy in the zone itself as well as in the rest of
    the Reich.”

The preparations are then set out, and they include, as I have indicated
a few minutes ago, as the last one in the list, the preparations for
economic mobilization.

There are many others, of course. The preliminary mustering of
horse-drawn and motor vehicles, preparation for evacuation measures, and
so forth. We say—passing now from that document—we say the rapid
success of the German re-armament is attributable to the greatest extent
to the work of the Defendant Schacht. In the fall of 1934, the Nazi
conspirators announced the so-called “New Plan,” aiming at the control
of imports and exports in order to obtain the raw materials which were
needed for armaments and the foreign currency which was required to
sustain the armament program. This new plan was the creation of the
Defendant Schacht, and under the plan, the Defendant Schacht controlled
imports by extending the system of supervisory boards for import
control, which was previously limited to the main groups of raw
materials, to all goods imported into Germany, whether raw materials,
semi-manufactured goods, or finished products. The requirement of
licenses for imports enabled the Nazi conspirators to restrict imports
to those commodities which served their war aims.

Subsequently, in February of 1935, the “Devisen” Law was passed which
can be found by reference in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ of 1935, Part I,
Page 105; and under it, all transactions involving foreign exchange were
subject to the approval of Devisenstellen (the Foreign Exchange Control
Offices). By thus controlling the disposition of foreign exchange, the
conspirators were able to manipulate foreign trade so as to serve their
needs and desires.

Thus every aspect of the German economy was being geared to war under
the guidance particularly of the Defendant Schacht. In a study of the
economic mobilization for war as of 30 September 1934, it was stated
that steps had already been taken to build up stock piles, to construct
new facilities for the production of scarce goods, and to redeploy
industry, to secure areas and to control fiscal and trade policies.
References were made to the fact that the task of stock piling had been
hampered by the requirement of secrecy and camouflage. Reserves of
automobile fuels and stocks of coal were being accumulated and the
production of synthetic oil was accelerated. Civilian supply was
purposely organized so that most plants would be working for the German
Armed Forces. Studies were made of the possibility of barter trade with
supposedly neutral countries in case of war.

The matter of financing the armament program presented a difficult
problem for the conspirators. In 1934 and 1935 the German economy could
by no possibility have raised funds for their extensive rearmament
program through taxes and public loans. From the outset, the armament
program involved “the engagement of the last reserves.”

Apart from the problem of raising the huge sums required to sustain this
program, the Nazi conspirators were exceedingly anxious, in the early
stages, to conceal the extent of their feverish armament activities.

After considering various techniques of financing the armament program,
the Defendant Schacht proposed the use of so-called “mefo” bills. One of
the primary advantages of this method was the fact that figures
indicating the extent of rearmament that would have become public
through the use of other methods could be kept secret through the use of
mefo bills, and mefo bills were used exclusively for armament financing.

Transactions in mefo bills worked as follows:

Mefo bills were drawn by armament contractors and accepted by a limited
liability company, [_The Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft m. b.
H._], the initials of which spell mefo from whence the transaction takes
its name. This company had a nominal capital of 1 million Reichsmarks
and was therefore merely a dummy organization. The bills were received
by all German banks for possible rediscounting with the Reichsbank, and
the bills were guaranteed by the Reich. Their secrecy was assured by the
fact that they appeared neither in the published statements of the
Reichsbank nor in the budget figures.

The mefo bill system continued to be used until April 1 of 1938. To that
date, 12 billion Reichsmarks of mefo bills for the financing of
rearmament had been issued. Since it was no longer deemed necessary in
April of 1938 to conceal the vast progress of German rearmament, mefo
financing was discontinued at that time.

A further source of funds which the Defendant Schacht drew upon to
finance the Secret Armament Program were the funds of political
opponents of the Nazi regime, and marks of foreigners on deposit in the
Reichsbank. As Schacht stated—and I am quoting: “Our armaments are also
financed partly with the credits of our political opponents.”

That statement may be found in a memorandum from the Defendant Schacht
to Hitler, dated 3 May 1935, and it bears the number in the document
book of 1168-PS, and the specific sentence is found in the second
paragraph.

The outstanding mefo bills at all times represented a threat to the
stability of the currency because they could be tendered to the
Reichsbank for discount, in which case the currency circulation would
automatically have to be increased. Thus, there was an ever-present
threat of inflation. The Defendant Schacht continued on his course,
because he stands, he said, “with unswerving loyalty to the Führer
because he fully recognizes the basic ideas of National Socialism and
because at the end, the disturbances, compared to the great task, can be
considered irrelevant.”

High-ranking military officers paid tribute to the Defendant Schacht’s
contrivances on behalf of the Nazi war machine. In an article written
for the _Military Weekly Gazette_ in January of 1937, it is said:

    “The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht today as one
    of the men who have done imperishable things for it and its
    development in accordance with the directions from the Führer
    and Reich Chancellor. The Defense Force owes it to Schacht’s
    skill and great ability that, in defiance of all currency
    difficulties, it, according to plan, has been able to grow up to
    its present strength from an army of 100,000 men.”

After the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Nazi conspirators
re-doubled their efforts to prepare Germany for a major war. The Four
Year Plan, as we have indicated earlier, was proclaimed by Hitler in his
address at the Nuremberg Party convention on the 9th day of September in
1936, and it was given a statutory foundation by the decree concerning
the execution of the Four Year Plan dated the 18th day of October, 1936,
which is found in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ of 1936, in the first part, on
Page 887. By this decree the Defendant Göring was put in charge of the
plan. He was authorized to enact any legal and administrative measures
deemed necessary by him for the accomplishment of his task, and to issue
orders and instructions to all Government agencies, including the
highest Reich authorities.

The purpose of the plan was to enable Nazi Germany to attain complete
self-sufficiency in essential raw materials, notably motor fuel, rubber,
textile fiber, and non-ferrous metals, and to intensify preparations for
war. The development of synthetic products was greatly accelerated
despite their high costs.

Apart from the self-sufficiency program, however, the Nazi conspirators
required foreign exchange to finance propaganda and espionage activities
abroad; Thus, in a speech on November 1 of 1937, before the
Wehrmachtakademie, General Thomas stated:

    “If you consider that one will need during the war considerable
    means in order to organize the necessary propaganda in order to
    pay for the espionage service and for similar purposes, then one
    should be clear that our internal mark would be of no use
    therefore, and that foreign exchange will be needed.”

This particular need for foreign exchange was reduced in part by the
virtue of the espionage and propaganda services rendered free of charge
to the Nazi State by some leading German industrial concerns.

I hold in my hand a document bearing the number D-206. It is dated at
Essen the 12th day of October 1935. It was found in the files of the
Krupp Company by representatives of the United States and the British
armies. I shall not read all of it unless Your Honors require it, but
I’ll start at the beginning by way of establishing its purpose and the
information contained therein. It is entitled “Memorandum.” There is a
subheading: “Concerns: Distribution of official propaganda literature
abroad with the help of our foreign connections.” It goes on to say
that:

    “On the morning of October 11 the district representative of
    Ribbentrop’s private foreign office (Dienststelle Ribbentrop)
    made an appointment for a conference by telephone.”—and
    that—“A Mr. Lackmann arrived at the appointed time. . . . “In
    answer to my question with whom I was dealing, and which
    official bureau he represented, he informed me that he was not
    himself the district representative of Ribbentrop’s private
    foreign office, that a Mr. Landrat Bollmann was such, and that
    he himself had come at Mr. Bollmann’s order.”

The next paragraph states:

    “. . . that there exists a great mixup in the field of foreign
    propaganda, and that Ribbentrop’s private foreign office wants
    to create a tighter organization for foreign propaganda. For
    this purpose the support of our firm and above all an index of
    addresses . . . were needed.”

In the next sentence, of the third paragraph, I would like to read:

    “I informed Mr. L that our firm had put itself years ago at the
    disposal of official bureaus for purposes of foreign propaganda,
    and that we had supported all requests addressed to us to the
    utmost.”

I now hold in my hand the document bearing the number D-167, which is
also a copy of a document found in the files of the Krupp Company by
representatives of the American and the British Armies. It is dated the
14th day of October 1937, and states that it is a memorandum of Herr
Sonnenberg on the meeting at Essen on the 12th day of October 1937 and
it indicates that one Menzel representing the intelligence of the
Combined Services Ministry, his department coming under the Defense
Office, asked for intelligence on foreign armaments, but not including
matters published in newspapers, intelligence received by Krupp from
their agents abroad and through other channels to be passed on to the
Combined Services Intelligence.

Finally, the third paragraph states that: “On our part we undertook to
supply information to the Combined Services Ministry . . . as required.”

I have concluded reading from that document, and I pass now to discuss
the conspirators’ program, which proceeded, as I have said so many times
here today, with amazing—really amazing speed. The production of steel,
for example, as shown in official German publications, rose as follows:

In the year of 1933, 74,000 tons were produced; in 1934, 105,000 tons;
1935, 145,000 tons; 1936, 186,000 tons; 1937, 217,000 tons; and in 1938,
477,000 tons. The production of gasoline increased at even a greater
tempo: from 370,000 tons in 1934 to 1,494,000 tons in 1938.

The Nazi conspirators pressed the completion of the armament program
with a sense of urgency which clearly indicated their awareness of the
imminence of war. At a 4th of September meeting in 1936 Göring pointed
out that “all measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in
the state of imminent danger of war.” He pointed out that “if war should
break out tomorrow we would be forced to take measures from which we
might . . . shy away at the present moment. They are therefore to be
taken.” The extreme urgency was manifested by Göring’s remark that
“Existing reserves will have to be touched for the purpose of carrying
us over this difficulty until the goal ordered by the Führer has been
reached . . . in case of war,” he added, “they are not a reliable
backing in any case.”

By a letter marked “Top Secret”, on the 21 of August of 1936, the
Defendant Schacht was advised that Hitler had ordered that all
formations of the Air Force be ready by April 1 of 1937. This served to
accentuate the urgent sense of immediacy that had pervaded the Nazi war
economy from the outset. Flushed with their successes in the Rhineland,
the Nazi conspirators were laying the groundwork for further aggressive
action.

THE PRESIDENT: Insofar as I understand you, you have not referred us to
any document since Document 167.

MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, the figures on the production of steel and of
oil are from the statistical year book for the German Reich of 1939 and
1940 and the statistical year book for the German Reich of 1941 and
’42—that is, with respect to the steel figures. And the figures which I
quoted with respect to the production of gasoline are from the
statistical year book for the German Reich in 1941 and 1942. The
statements of the Defendant Göring are based upon the document marked
EC-416, in the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: That is the document you have already referred to, isn’t
it?

MR. DODD: Yes, it has been referred to heretofore, I believe. Some of
these documents contain references to more than one part of the
presentation, and I have to refer to them at different times in the
presentation. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: All right. Go on, if you want to refer to it.

MR. DODD: The sixth paragraph on the first page:

    “Existing reserves will have to be touched for the purpose of
    carrying us over this difficulty until the goal ordered by the
    Führer has been reached, and then in case of war, they are not a
    reliable backing in any case.”

And on the second page, the eighth paragraph down:

    “If war should break out tomorrow, we would be forced to take
    measures from which we might possibly still shy away at the
    present moment. They are therefore to be taken.”

With reference to the assertion that the Defendant Schacht was advised
that Hitler had ordered that all formations of the Air Force be ready by
April 1, 1937, I respectfully refer to Document 1301-PS, dated 31 August
1936. I am advised that that document should bear an additional number.
It should read 1301-PS-7. On the first page, if Your Honor pleases, the
third paragraph, or the paragraph marked “3” and after the words “air
force” . . . states that according to an order of the Führer, the
setting up of all Air Force units had to be completed on April 1, 1937;
and if Your Honors will turn the page to Page 20, about midway in the
page, you will observe that a copy of this document was sent to the
president of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht.

After their successes in Austria and in the Sudetenland, the Nazi
conspirators redoubled their efforts to equip themselves for a war of
aggression, and in a conference on October 14, 1938, shortly before the
Nazi conspirators made their first demands on Poland, the Defendant
Göring stated that the Führer had instructed him to carry out a gigantic
program, by comparison with which the performances thus far were
insignificant. This faced difficulties which he would overcome with the
greatest energy and ruthlessness. And that statement may be found in the
Document 1301-PS, on Page 25 of that document, and particularly the
second sentence of the opening paragraph:

    “Everybody knows from the press what the world situation looks
    like, and therefore the Führer has issued an order to him to
    carry out a gigantic program compared to which previous
    achievements are insignificant. There are difficulties in the
    way which he will overcome with the utmost energy and
    ruthlessness.”

The supply of foreign currency had shrunk because of preparations for
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and it was considered necessary to
replenish it. “These”—and I am now referring to the third paragraph of
that same Page 25 of Document 1301-PS:

    “These gains made through the export are to be used for an
    increased armament. The armament should not be curtailed by the
    export activities. He received the order from the Führer to
    increase the armament to an abnormal extent, the Air Force
    having first priority. Within the shortest time, the Air Force
    is to be increased fivefold; also the Navy should get on more
    rapidly, and the Army should procure large amounts of offensive
    weapons at a faster rate, particularly heavy artillery pieces
    and heavy tanks. Along with this manufactured armaments must go,
    especially fuel, powder and explosives are to be moved into the
    foreground. It should be coupled with the accelerated
    construction of highways, canals, and particularly of the
    railroads.”

In the course of these preparations for war, a clash of wills ensued
between two men, the Defendant Göring and the Defendant Schacht, as a
result of which the Defendant Schacht resigned his position as head of
the Ministry of Economics and plenipotentiary for the war economy in
November of 1937 and was removed from the presidency of the Reichsbank
in January of 1939. I do not propose, at this moment, to go into the
details of this controversy. There will be more said on that subject at
a later stage in these proceedings, but for the present, I should like
to have it noted that it is our contention that Schacht’s departure in
no way implied any disagreement with the major war aims of the Nazis.
The Defendant Schacht took particular pride in his vast attainments in
the financial and economic fields in aid of the Nazi war machine. And in
the document bearing the number EC-257, which is a copy of a letter from
the Defendant Schacht to General Thomas, in the first paragraph of the
letter:

    “I think back with much satisfaction to the work in the Ministry
    of Economics which afforded me the opportunity to assist in the
    rearmament of the German people in the most critical period, not
    only in the financial but also in the economic sphere. I have
    always considered a rearmament of the German people as _conditio
    sine qua non_ of the establishment of a new German nation.”

The second paragraph is of a more personal nature and has no real
bearing on the issues before us at this time.

In the document labeled EC-252, a letter written to General Von
Blomberg, dated the 8th day of July 1937, the Defendant Schacht wrote:

    “The direction of the war economy by the plenipotentiary would
    in that event never take place entirely independent from the
    rest of the war mechanism, but would be aimed at accomplishment
    of the political war purpose with the assistance of all economic
    forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this
    way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to
    the Defense Act.”

In the spring of 1937, the Defendant Schacht participated with
representatives of the three branches of the Armed Forces in war games
in war economy which was something new by way of military exercises. The
war games in war economy were held at Godesberg, Germany. And I refer to
the document bearing the label EC-174. It has as a heading, or
subheading, under the summary: “War economy trip to Godesberg undertaken
by General Staff between the 25th of May and the 2d of June,” and it
goes on to outline in some slight detail that there was a welcome to the
General Staff war economy trip. It tells something in a rather vague and
not altogether clear way of just how a war game in war economy was
conducted but it leaves no doubt in the mind that such a war game in war
economy had been conducted at Godesberg at that time. And on the second
page of this document, the last paragraph is the translation of Part 1
of the speech welcoming Dr. Schacht. It says:

    “Before I start with the discussion of the war game in war
    economy, I have to express how grateful we all are that you,
    President Dr. Schacht, have gone to the trouble to personally
    participate in our final discussion today despite all your other
    activities. This proves to us your deep interest in war economy
    tasks shown at all times and your presence here is renewed proof
    that you are willing to facilitate for us soldiers the difficult
    war-economic preparations and to strengthen a harmonious
    cooperation with your offices.”

I should also like to call the Court’s attention to the next to the last
paragraph on the first page. It is a one-sentence paragraph, and it
simply says, “I want to point out, however, that all material and all
information received has to be kept in strict secrecy,” and it refers to
the preceding paragraph concerning the war games in war economy.

It appears that the annexation of Austria was a goal which the Defendant
Schacht had long sought, for in a speech to the employees of the former
Austrian National Bank, as set out in the document bearing the label
EC-297, and particularly the second paragraph of the first page of that
document, nearly at the end, four or five lines from the end of that
paragraph, we find these words immediately after “large applause”:

    “Austria has certainly a great mission, namely, to be the bearer
    of German culture, to insure respect and regard for the German
    name, especially in the direction of the southeast. Such a
    mission can only be performed within the Great German Reich and
    based on the power of a nation of 75 millions, which, regardless
    of the wish of the opponents, forms the heart and the soul of
    Europe.”

Dr. Schacht goes on to say:

    “We have read a lot in the foreign press during the last few
    days that this aim, the union of both countries, is to a certain
    degree justified, but that the method of effecting this union
    was terrible. . . . This method, which certainly did not suit
    one or another foreigner, is nothing but the consequence of
    countless perfidies and brutal acts of violence which foreign
    countries have practiced against us.”

And I refer now to Page 3 of this same document and to the fourth
paragraph, about the center of the page, and reading from it:

    “I am known for sometimes expressing thoughts which give offense
    and there I would not like to depart from this custom. I know
    that there are even here, in this country a few people—I
    believe they are not too numerous—who find fault with the
    events of the last few days; but nobody, I believe, doubts the
    goal, and it should be said to all grumblers that you can’t
    satisfy everybody. One person says he would have done it maybe
    in one way, but the remarkable thing is that they did not do it,
    and that it was only done by our Adolf Hitler; and if there is
    still something left to be improved, then those grumblers should
    try to bring about these improvements from the German Reich, and
    within the German community, but not to disturb it from
    without.”

In the memorandum of the 7th of January 1939, written by the Defendant
Schacht and other directors of the Reichsbank to Hitler, urging a
balancing of the budget in view of the threatening danger of inflation,
it was stated—and I now refer to the document bearing the label EC-369
and particularly to the paragraph at the bottom of the first page of
that document:

    “From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact
    that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the
    reconstruction of the German Armed Forces. It (the Reichsbank)
    therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility to
    finance the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the
    currency. The justification thereof was the necessity, which
    pushed all other considerations into the background, to carry
    through the armament at once, out of nothing, and furthermore
    under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy
    possible.”

The Reichsbank directors, as experts on money, believed that a point had
been reached where greater production of armaments was no longer
possible. We say that was merely a judgment on the situation and not a
moral principle, for there was no opposition to Hitler’s policy of
aggression. Doubts were ascertained only as to whether he could finance
that policy. Hitler’s letter to Schacht on the occasion of Schacht’s
departure from the Reichsbank, as contained in Document EC-397, pays
high tribute to Schacht’s great efforts in furthering the program of the
Nazi conspirators. The Armed Forces by now had enabled Hitler to take
Austria and the Sudetenland. We say Schacht’s task up to that point had
been well done. And to quote from Document EC-397 in the words of
Hitler, in a letter which he wrote to the Defendant Schacht, “Your name,
above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of the national
rearmament.”

Even though dismissed from the presidency of the Reichsbank, Schacht was
retained as a Minister without portfolio and special confidential
adviser to Hitler. The Defendant Funk stepped into Schacht’s position as
President of the Reichsbank. And I ask at this point that the Court
might take judicial notice of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of January 21,
1939. The Defendant Funk was completely uninhibited by fears of
inflation, for like Göring, under whom he had served in the Four Year
Plan, he recognized no obstacles to the plan to attack Poland.

In Document 699-PS, in a letter from the Defendant Funk to Hitler,
written on August 25 of 1939, only a few days before the attack on
Poland, the Defendant Funk reported to Hitler that the Reichsbank was
prepared to withstand any disturbances of the international currency and
credit system occasioned by a large-scale war. He said that he had
secretly transferred all available funds of the Reichsbank abroad into
gold, and that Germany stood ready to meet the financial and economic
tasks which lay ahead.

And so it seems plain and clear from the writings, from the acts, from
the speeches of the Nazi conspirators themselves, that they did in fact
direct the whole of the German economy toward preparation for aggressive
war. To paraphrase the words that the Defendant Göring once used, these
conspirators gave the German people “guns instead of butter,” and we say
they also gave history its most striking example of a nation gearing
itself in time of peace to the single purpose of aggressive war. Their
economic preparations, formulated and applied with the ruthless energy
of the Defendant Göring, with the cynical financial wizardry of the
Defendant Schacht, and the willing complicity of Funk, among others,
were the indispensable first act in the heart-breaking tragedy which
their aggression inflicted upon the world.

I should like to offer, if I may at this time, Your Honor, those
documents which I have referred to in the course of this discussion. We
have here the original documents in the folders, and they compare with
the translations which have been submitted to the Court.

THE PRESIDENT: Have the defendants had the opportunity of inspecting
these documents?

MR. DODD: I doubt that they have had full opportunity to inspect them,
Your Honor. The photostats are there, but I don’t think they have had
time to inspect them because they haven’t been there long enough for
that.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that they should have full opportunity of
inspecting them and comparing with the copies which have been submitted
to us before the originals are put in.

MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. We may offer them at a later date, as I
understand, Your Honor?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

COLONEL STOREY: May it please the Tribunal: The U. S. Prosecution now
passes into the aggressive war phase of the case and it will be
presented by Mr. Alderman.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal: I rise to present on behalf of
the United States Chief of Counsel, evidence to support the allegation
of Count One of the Indictment relating to the planning, preparation,
initiation, and waging of illegal and aggressive war, and relating to
the conspiracy to commit that crime.

The aggressive war phase of the case, the aggressive war phase of the
conspiracy case under Count One, and the aggressive war phase of the
entire case is really, we think, the heart of the case. If we did not
reach it in our presentation we would not reach the heart of the case.
If we did not present it to the Tribunal in the necessary detail, we
would fail to present what is necessary to the heart of the case.

After all, everything else in this case, however dramatic, however
sordid, however shocking and revolting to the common instincts of
civilized peoples, is incidental to, or subordinate to, the aggressive
war aspect of the case.

All the dramatic story of what went on in Germany in the early phases of
the conspiracy—the ideologies used, the techniques of terror used, the
suppressions of human freedom employed in the seizure of power, and even
the concentration camps and the Crimes against Humanity, the
persecutions, tortures, and murders committed—all these things would
have little juridical international significance except for the fact
that they were the preparation for the commission of aggressions against
peaceful neighboring peoples.

Even the aspects of the case involving War Crimes in the strict sense
are aspects which are merely the inevitable, proximate result of the
wars of aggression launched and waged by these conspirators, and of the
kind of warfare they waged—that is—total war, the natural result of
the totalitarian party-dominated state that waged it, and atrocious war,
the natural result of the atrocious doctrines, designs, and purposes of
these war-makers.

For these reasons, I repeat that in our view the phases of the case
dealing with territorial gains acquired by threats of force and with
actual aggressions and aggressive wars constitute the real heart of the
case. Accordingly, we ask the indulgence of the Tribunal if for these
reasons we make the presentation of this part of the case as detailed as
seems to us necessary in view of the outstanding importance of the
subject matter.

The general scope of the case to be presented by the American
Prosecution has been stated in the opening address by Mr. Justice
Jackson. That address indicated to the Tribunal the general nature and
character of the evidence to be offered by the American Prosecution in
support of the allegations with which I shall deal. However, before
approaching the actual presentation of that evidence, it seems to us
that it would be helpful to an orderly presentation of the case, to
address the Tribunal in an introductory way concerning this specific
segment of the Prosecution’s case. In doing so, I shall not attempt to
retrace the ground so ably covered by Mr. Justice Jackson. On the
contrary, I shall confine my introductory remarks to matters
specifically and peculiarly applicable to that part of the American case
relating to the crime of illegal warfare, and the Common Plan or
Conspiracy to commit that crime.

The substantive rule of law which must guide the considerations of the
Tribunal on this aspect of the case, and the rule of law which must be
controlling in the final judgment of the Tribunal on this part of the
case, is stated in Article 6 of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal. Article 6, so far as pertinent here, reads as
follows:

    “_Article_ 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred
    to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major
    war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the
    power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of
    the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as
    members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes.

    “The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within
    the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be
    individual responsibility:

    “(a) _CRIMES AGAINST PEACE_: namely, planning, preparation,
    initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in
    violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances,
    or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the
    accomplishment of any of the foregoing. . . .”

Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Article 6 are not pertinent to this aspect
of the case. However, the unnumbered final paragraph of Article 6 is of
controlling importance on this aspect of the case. That paragraph reads:

    “Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating
    in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy
    to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all
    acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”

In receiving evidence on this aspect of the case I would request the
Tribunal to have in mind five principles derived from the portions of
the Charter I have just read:

(1) The Charter imposes “individual responsibility” for acts
constituting “Crimes against Peace”;

(2) The term “Crimes against Peace” embraces planning, preparation,
initiation, or waging of illegal war;

(3) The term “Crimes against Peace” also embraces participation in a
Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit illegal war;

(4) An illegal war consists of either a war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances. These
two kinds of illegal war might not necessarily be the same. It will be
sufficient for the Prosecution to show that the war was aggressive
irrespective of breach of international treaties, agreements, or
assurances. On the other hand it would be sufficient for the Prosecution
to show that the war was in violation of international treaties,
agreements, or assurances irrespective of whether or not it was a war of
aggression. We think the evidence in this case will establish
conclusively that the wars planned, prepared, initiated, and waged by
these defendants, and the wars which were the object of their common
plan and conspiracy, were illegal for both reasons.

The fifth principle which I ask you to bear in mind, is that individual
criminal responsibility of a defendant is imposed by the Charter not
merely by reason of direct, immediate participation in the crime. It is
sufficient for the Prosecution to show that a defendant was a leader, an
organizer, instigator, or accomplice who participated either in the
formulation or in the execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit
Crimes against Peace. In the case of many of the defendants the evidence
will show direct and immediate personal participation in the substantive
crime itself. In the case of some of the defendants the evidence goes to
their participation in the formulation and execution of a Common Plan or
Conspiracy. In the case of each defendant, we think, the evidence will
establish full individual responsibility for Crimes against Peace, as
defined in the Charter of this Tribunal. In this connection I wish to
emphasize that the Charter declares that the responsibility of
conspirators extends not only to their own acts, but also to all acts
performed by any persons in execution of the conspiracy.

It is familiar law in my country that if two or more persons set out to
rob a bank, in accordance with a criminal scheme to that end, and in the
course of carrying out their scheme one of the conspirators commits the
crime of murder, all of the participants in the planning and execution
of the bank robbery are guilty of murder, whether or not they had any
other personal participation in the killing. This is a simple rule of
law declared in the Charter. All the parties to a Common Plan or
Conspiracy are the agents of each other and each is responsible as
principal for the acts of all the others as his agents.

So much for the terms of the Charter having a bearing on this aspect of
the case.

I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the portions of the Indictment
lodged against the defendants on trial which relate to the crimes of
illegal war or war of aggression. Particularly I ask the Tribunal to
advert to the statements of offense under Count One and Count Two of the
Indictment in this case.

The statement of offense under Count One of the Indictment is contained
in Paragraph III. The offense there stated, so far as pertinent to the
present discussion, is:

    “All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period
    of years preceding 8th May 1945, participated as leaders,
    organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or
    execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit, or which
    involved the commission of, Crimes against Peace, as defined in
    the Charter of this Tribunal. . . . The Common Plan or
    Conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes against Peace, in
    that the defendants planned, prepared, initiated, and waged wars
    of aggression, which were also wars in violation of
    international treaties, agreements, or assurances.”

The statement of offense under Count Two of the Indictment is also
relevant at this point. It must be obvious that essentially Counts One
and Two interlock in this Indictment. The substance of the offense
stated under Count Two, Paragraph V of the Indictment is this:

    “All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period
    of years preceding 8 May 1945, participated in the planning,
    preparation, incitation, and waging of wars of aggression which
    were also wars in violation of international treaties,
    agreements, and assurances.”

The emphasis in the statement of offense under Count One of the
Indictment is on the Common Plan or Conspiracy. The emphasis under Count
Two of the Indictment is on the substantive crimes to which the
conspiracy related and which were committed in the course of and
pursuant to that conspiracy.

I should hasten to add at this point that in the division of the case as
between the Chief Prosecutors of the four Prosecuting Governments,
primary responsibility for the presentation of evidence supporting Count
One has been placed on the American prosecutor, and primary
responsibility for the presentation of the evidence supporting Count Two
of the Indictment has been placed on the British prosecutor.

But as we shall show somewhat later, there will to some extent be a
cooperative effort as between the two prosecutors to present certain
phases of both counts together. In addition to the statement of offense
relating to illegal war in Paragraph III under Count One of the
Indictment, Count One also contains what amounts to a bill of
particulars of that offense. In so far as those particulars relate to
illegal war, they are contained in Paragraph IV (F) of the Indictment
which is set out in the English text on Page 7 through the top of Page
10 under the general heading “Utilization of Nazi Control for Foreign
Aggression.” The allegations of this bill of particulars have been read
in open court, in the presence of the defendants, and the Tribunal, as
well as the defendants, are certainly familiar with the contents of
those allegations. I call attention to them now, however, in order to
focus attention on the parts of the Indictment which are relevant in
consideration of the evidence which I intend to bring before the
Tribunal.

My introduction to the presentation of evidence in this matter would be
faulty if I did not invite the Tribunal to consider with me the
relationship between history and the evidence in this case. Neither
counsel nor Tribunal can orient themselves to the problem at
hand—neither counsel nor Tribunal can present or consider the evidence
in this case in its proper context, neither can argue or evaluate the
staggering implications of the evidence to be presented—without reading
that history, reading that evidence against the background of recorded
history. And by recorded history, I mean the history merely of the last
12 years.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, of the U. S. Supreme Court, found in his
judicial experience that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”
My recollection is that he stated it perhaps better, earlier in the
preface to his book on the common law where he said, I think, “The life
of the law has been not logic but experience.” I submit that in the
present case a page of history is worth a hundred tons of evidence. As
lawyers and judges we cannot blind ourselves to what we know as men. The
history of the past 12 years is a burning, living thing in our immediate
memory. The facts of history crowd themselves upon us and demand our
attention.

It is common ground among all systems of jurisprudence that matters of
common knowledge need not be proved, but may receive the judicial notice
of courts without other evidence. The Charter of this Tribunal, drawing
on this uniformly recognized principle, declares in Article 21:

    “The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common
    knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof.”

The facts of recorded history are the prime example of facts of common
knowledge which require no proof. No court would require evidence to
prove that the Battle of Hastings occurred in the year 1066, or that the
Bastille fell on the 14th of July 1789, or that Czar Alexander I freed
the serfs in 1863, or that George Washington was the first President of
the United States or that George III was the reigning King of England at
that time.

If I may be allowed to interpolate, an old law professor of mine used to
present the curiosity of the law: that a judge is held to responsibility
for no knowledge of the law whatsoever, that a lawyer is held to a
reasonable knowledge of the law, and a layman is held to an absolute
knowledge of all the laws. It works inversely as to facts, or facts of
common knowledge. There, the judge is imputed to know all of those
facts, however many of them he may have forgotten as an individual man.
So one of the purposes of this presentation will be to implement the
judicial knowledge which by hypothesis exists, and which probably
actually exists.

It is not our purpose however, to convert the record of these
proceedings into a history book. The evidence which we offer in this
case is evidence which for the moment has been concealed from
historians. It will fill in recorded history, but it must be read
against the background which common knowledge provides. The evidence in
this case consists primarily of captured documents. These documents fill
in the inside story underlying the historical record which we all
already knew. This evidence which we will offer constitutes an
illustrative spot check on history—on the history of the recent times
as the world knows it. The evidence to be offered is not a substitute
for history. We hope the Tribunal will find it to be an authentication
of history. The evidence which we have drawn from captured documents
establishes the validity of the recent history of the past 12 years—a
history of many aggressions by the Nazi conspirators accused in this
case.

As I offer to the Tribunal document after document, I ask the Court to
see in those documents definite additions to history, the addition of
new elements long suspected and now proved. The elements which the
captured documents on this particular aspect of the case will add to
recorded history are the following:

(1) The conspiratorial nature of the planning and preparation which
underlay the Nazi aggressions already known to history;

(2) The deliberate premeditation which preceded those acts of
aggression;

(3) The evil motives which led to the crimes;

(4) The individual participation of named persons in the Nazi conspiracy
for aggression;

(5) The deliberate falsification of the pretexts claimed by the Nazi
aggressors as the reasons for their criminal activities.

These elements the captured documents will demonstrate beyond possible
doubt, and these elements, in the context of historical facts, we think
are all that need to be shown.

The critical period between the Nazi seizure of power and the initiation
of the first war of aggression was a very short period. This critical
period of a lawless preparation and illegal scheming which ultimately
set the whole world aflame was unbelievably short. It covered only 6
years, 1933 to 1939. The speed with which all this was accomplished
evidences at once the fanatical intensity of the conspirators and their
diabolical efficiency. Crowded into these 6 short years is the making of
the greatest tragedy that has ever befallen mankind.

A full understanding of these 6 years, and of the vibrant 6 years of war
that followed, demands that we see this period of time divided into
rather definite phases, phases that reflect the development and
execution of the Nazi master plan. I suggest that the Tribunal as it
receives evidence, fit it into five phases. The first was primarily
preparatory, although it did involve overt acts. That phase covers
roughly the period from 1933 to 1936. In that period the Nazi
conspirators, having acquired governmental control of Germany by the
middle of 1933, turned their attention toward utilization of that
control for foreign aggression. Their plan at this stage was to acquire
military strength and political bargaining power to be used against
other nations. In this they succeeded. The second phase of their
aggression was shorter. It is rather interesting to see that as the
conspiracy gained strength it gained speed. During each phase the
conspirators succeeded in accomplishing more and more in less and less
time until, toward the end of the period, the rate of acceleration of
their conspiratorial movement was enormous. The second phase of their
utilization of control for foreign aggression involved the actual
seizure and absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia in that order. By
March, the third month of 1939, they had succeeded in that phase. The
third phase may be measured in months rather than years: from March 1939
to September 1939. The previous aggression being successful, having been
consummated without the necessity of resorting to actual war, the
conspirators had obtained much desired resources and bases and were
ready to undertake further aggressions, by means of war if necessary. By
September 1939 war was upon the world. The fourth phase of the
aggression consisted of expanding the war into a general European war of
aggression. By April 1941 the war which had theretofore involved Poland,
the United Kingdom, and France, had been expanded by invasions into
Scandinavia and into the Low Countries and into the Balkans. In the next
phase the Nazi conspirators carried the war eastward by invasion of the
territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and finally,
through their Pacific ally, Japan, precipitated the attack on the United
States at Pearl Harbor.

The final result of these aggressions is fresh in the minds of all of
us.

I turn now to certain outstanding evidence at hand. While on this phase
of the case we shall not rest exclusively on them alone; the essential
elements of the crime which I have already pointed out can be made out
by a mere handful of captured documents. My order of presentation of
these will be first to present one by one this handful of documents,
documents which prove the essential elements of the case on aggressive
war up to the hilt. These documents will leave no reasonable doubt
concerning the aggressive character of the Nazi war or concerning the
conspiratorial premeditation of that war. Some of this group of
documents are the specific basis for particular allegations in the
Indictment. As I reach those documents, I shall invite the attention of
the Tribunal to the allegations of the Indictment which are specifically
supported by them. Having proved the corpus of the crime in this way, I
will follow the presentation of this evidence with a more or less
chronological presentation of the details of the case on aggressive war
producing more detailed evidence of the relevant activities of the
conspirators from 1933 to 1941.

The documents which we have selected for single presentation at this
point, before developing the case in detail, are 10 in number. The
documents have been selected to establish the basic facts concerning
each phase of the development of the Nazi conspiracy for aggression.
Each document is conspiratorial in nature. Each document is one, I
believe, heretofore unknown to history and each document is
self-contained and tells its own story. Those are the three standards of
selection which we have sought to apply.

I turn to the period of 1933 to 1936, a period characterized by an
orderly, planned sequence of preparations for war. This is the period
covered by Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, to be
found at Page 7 of the printed English text. The essential character of
this period was the formulation and execution of the plan to re-arm and
to re-occupy and fortify the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of
Versailles and other treaties, in order to acquire military strength and
political bargaining power to be used against other nations.

If the Tribunal please, we have what have been referred to as document
books. They are English translations of German documents, in some cases
German versions. I shall ask that they be handed up and we will hand one
copy at the moment to counsel for the defendants. It has been physically
impossible to prepare 21 sets of them. If possible we shall try to
furnish further copies to the defendants, the original German
documents. . . .

DR. DIX: I would be very much obliged. In order that there should be no
misunderstanding we have arranged that tomorrow we will discuss with the
Prosecution in what way the whole of the evidence may be made available
to all the Defense Counsel. It is, of course, necessary that no one
should have the advantage over the other. For this reason, while I
appreciate the good will of the Prosecution to overcome the
difficulties, I must refuse their kind offer of a copy of the book,
because I feel that in so doing I would have an unfair advantage over
the others. I am not in a position during the proceedings to hand the
evidentiary document to my colleagues. I ask you therefore to appreciate
the reasons why I have refused this document. I am convinced that
tomorrow we shall be able to agree about the way in which we can receive
evidence, and I suggest that today we try to continue as we have done up
to now.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, can you inform the Tribunal how many copies
of these documents you will be able to furnish to the Tribunal by
Monday?

MR. ALDERMAN: I cannot at the moment. If Your Honor pleases: may I make
this suggestion in connection with it, which I think may be of help to
all concerned? I think many of us have underestimated the contribution
of this interpreting system to this Trial. We all see how it has speeded
the proceeding, but in so far as my presentation of German documents is
concerned, I shall let the documents speak. I expect to read the
pertinent parts of the documents into the system so that they will go
into the transcript of record. Counsel for the German defendants will
get their transcripts in German; our French and Russian Allies will get
their transcripts in their language, and it seems to me that that is the
most helpful way to overcome this language barrier. I can recognize that
for Dr. Dix to receive a volume of documents which are English
translations of German documents might not seem very helpful to him.
Further, as an aid, we will have original German documents in court—one
copy; and if the Court will allow, I would ask that the original German
document, from which I shall read, would be passed to the German
interpreter under Colonel Dostert, so that instead of undertaking to
translate an English translation back into perhaps a bad German, he will
have the original German document before him and in that way, the exact
German text will be delivered in the daily transcript to all of the
counsel for the defendants. I hope that may be a helpful suggestion.

THE PRESIDENT: That to some extent depends, does it not, upon how much
of the document you omit?

MR. ALDERMAN: That is quite true, Sir. As to these 10 documents with
which I propose to deal immediately, I expect to read into the
transcript practically the whole of the documents, because the whole of
them is significant, much more significant than anything I could say.
Also all of these 10 documents were listed in the list of documents
which we furnished counsel for the defendants, I believe, the 1st of
November.

THE PRESIDENT: You say that they were. . . .

MR. ALDERMAN: In the list. But of course I recognize that a list of
documents is very different from the documents themselves.

THE PRESIDENT: Are the documents very long?

MR. ALDERMAN: Some of them are very long and some of them are very
short; you can’t generalize. Whenever it is a speech of Adolf Hitler you
can count it is fairly long.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you not by Monday have in the hands of every member
of the Defense Counsel copies of these 10 documents? It is suggested to
me that photostating could be done quite easily.

MR. ALDERMAN: I understand that both our photostatic facilities and our
mimeographing facilities are right up to the hilt with work. It is a
very difficult mechanical problem.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please: In further explanation, the
documents which Mr. Alderman intends to offer were on the defendants’
list filed in the Document Center on the 1st day of November 1945.
Lieutenant Barrett had 23 copies of each one photostated as far as he
could on that list. Six copies went into the defendants’ Information
Center. Now, we can’t say at this time whether six copies—that, is
photostatic copies of each one—have been furnished to the defendants,
but whenever they wanted copies of any particular one, either the
original was exhibited to them or photostatic copies were made.

Again, Sir, I call attention to the physical problems that are almost
insurmountable: to make 23 photostatic copies which are required of
every document. Now then, Sir. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: If I may interrupt you, I imagine that the list which was
deposited on the 1st of November didn’t contain only these 10 documents
but contained a great number of other documents.

COL. STOREY: That is correct, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: So that the defendants’ counsel wouldn’t know which out
of that list of documents were going to be relied upon.

COL. STOREY: Except, Sir, they were notified that the Prosecution would
use all or some of those documents if necessary, and if the copies were
not furnished upon request, they have been made and delivered to them.

May I say, Sir, that working 24 hours a day, we are trying to furnish 10
sets of all of these to defendants’ counsel, and they will be. . . . One
complete set was delivered to defendants’ counsel here now as a
convenience to follow. The other sets, I feel certain, will be in their
hands sometime Sunday, but one complete list we now turn over to
them—not a list, complete copies.

DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): I should like to
point out one fact. The Prosecution declared this morning that the
documents that will be put before us today are contained in the list
which was submitted on the 1st of November, that is—in the list which
was submitted this morning. This morning a list was made available to us
in room 54. I have it in my hand. This morning nine documents were
named. Of these nine documents, only one, contrary to what the
Prosecution said, was found in the old list; the other eight documents
were neither in the old list nor in the new list. The eight other
documents are, as I ascertained at lunch time today, not in the document
room. Neither are they available in photostatic copies, so they could
not be made available to me. I think, gentlemen, that it will not be
possible for us to work on this basis. I therefore request that we
should be allowed to wait until we know the result of the discussion
which we are told will take place tomorrow with the Prosecution, so that
we may then. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal proposes to adjourn now and to give Defense
Counsel the opportunity of meeting Counsel for the Prosecution tomorrow
morning. Both Counsel for the Prosecution and Defense Counsel appear to
be perfectly ready to make every possible effort to deal with the case
in the most reasonable way, and at that meeting you will be able to
discuss these documents which you say have been omitted and the Counsel
for the Prosecution will try to satisfy you with reference to the other
documents.

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I have one more request. The Prosecution has just said
that it will hardly be possible to make 23 photostatic copies. I
believe, gentlemen, that if these documents are as important as the
Prosecution said today, it is a _conditio sine qua non_ that every
defense counsel and every defendant should have a photostatic copy of
these documents.

As we all know it is easy to produce a photostat in a few hours. With
the excellent apparatus here available to the Prosecution it should, in
my opinion, be easy to produce 20 or 40 photostats of these 10 documents
in 48 hours.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you will meet the Counsel for the Prosecution
tomorrow and attempt to come to some satisfactory arrangement with them
then; and now the Tribunal will adjourn.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]




                               FIFTH DAY
                        Monday, 26 November 1945


                           _Morning Session_

DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): May it please
the Court, I should like to make an application. I am Dr. Sauter,
counsel for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. On 30 October the Defendant
Von Ribbentrop requested that his former secretary, Margareta Blank, at
that time in the Remand Prison in Nuremberg, be placed at his disposal
in order that he might dictate his reply to the Indictment, as well as a
description of the manner in which he performed his official duties in
the last 7 or 8 years.

On 11 November 1945 the Tribunal allowed this request. The Defendant Von
Ribbentrop was therefore able to dictate for a few hours, but this was
stopped for reasons unknown to him. Neither has the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop had returned to him the shorthand notes or the typed
transcript. He has not been able to dictate any more to Fräulein Blank.

On 15 November Ribbentrop repeated his request regarding the witness
Blank, but up to the present she has not been placed again at his
disposal. The Defendant Ribbentrop therefore requests the President to
give instructions that his former secretary, Margareta Blank, again be
placed at his disposal in order to take down the necessary notes from
dictation. Such permission appears to be absolutely essential to enable
the Defendant Ribbentrop properly to prepare his own testimony and the
testimony of the defense witnesses.

Particularly in the case of Von Ribbentrop, the material to be treated
is so voluminous, that no other way of treating it appears feasible to
us. The Defendant Von Ribbentrop has a further request to make. He has
repeatedly asked that some of his former colleagues, in particular
Ambassador Gauss, Ambassador Von Rintelen, Minister Von Sonnleitner,
Professor Fritz Berber, and Under State Secretary Henke, be brought to
Nuremberg as witnesses, and that he be permitted to speak to these
witnesses in the presence of his counsel. This request had in part been
refused by the Court on 10 November. The remaining part has not yet been
decided.

It is quite impossible for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop to give a clear
and exhaustive account of the entire foreign policy for the last 7 or 8
years if nothing is placed at his disposal except a pencil and a block
of writing paper. Even the White Books of the Foreign Office, for which
he has asked, could not be placed at his disposal. In view of the fact
that the data concerning Germany’s foreign policy during the last 7 or 8
years is so extensive, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop cannot possibly
recall every single date, every event, every document, _et cetera_,
unless his memory is refreshed by his being able to speak with his
former colleagues.

Apart from this the Defendant Von Ribbentrop has been in the habit of
taking a great many soporifics during the last 4 years, especially
bromides, and his memory has suffered in consequence. It would not be
very helpful to the investigation of historical truth in a field which
interests not only this Court, but also, to an even greater extent, the
outside world, if Von Ribbentrop during his examination, might have to
state at every turn that he could no longer recollect these details.

Defendant Von Ribbentrop therefore applies to the Court and begs that
his above-mentioned colleagues be brought here and that he receive
permission to discuss with them matters pertaining to the Trial, in
order that he may prepare for further proceedings.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already intimated to defendant’s counsel
that all applications should, as far as practicable, be made in writing,
and they consider that the applications which have how been made orally
should have been made in writing. They will consider the facts with
reference to the applications in respect of the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop’s secretary. The other applications as to witnesses and
documents, which have been made in writing, have been considered, or
will be considered by the Tribunal.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I say in this connection that the
applications which I have today submitted have been repeatedly lodged
with the Court in writing, but my client is anxious lest he experience
difficulties in preparing for his own hearing and the hearing of the
defense witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: As was announced at the sitting on Friday, Counsel for
the Prosecution were to try to arrange with defendants’ counsel some
satisfactory arrangement with reference to the production of documents
in the German language. In accordance with that announcement, Counsel
for the Prosecution saw Counsel for the Defense, and representatives of
the Prosecution and the Defense appeared before the Tribunal and the
Tribunal has provisionally made the following arrangement:

1. That in the future, only such parts of documents as are read in court
by the Prosecution shall in the first instance be part of the record. In
that way those parts of the documents will be conveyed to defendants’
counsel through the earphones in German.

2. In order that defendants and their counsel may have an opportunity of
inspecting such documents in their entirety in German, a photostatic
copy of the original and one copy thereof shall be deposited in the
defendants’ counsel room at the same time that they are produced in
court.

3. The defendants’ counsel may at any time refer to any other part of
such documents.

4. Prosecuting counsel will furnish defendants’ counsel with 10 copies
of their trial briefs in English and five copies of their books of
documents in English, at the time such briefs and books are furnished to
the Tribunal.

5. Defendants’ counsel will be furnished with one copy of each of the
transcripts of the proceedings.

That is all. I call upon the prosecuting counsel for the United States.

MR. ALDERMAN: If it pleases the Tribunal, may I make, Mr. President, one
inquiry with regard to your reference to trial briefs? On my section of
the case I shall not expect to hand up trial briefs to the Court.
Whatever I have in the nature of trial briefs will be put over the
microphone. I wonder if that is satisfactory?

THE PRESIDENT: I think what I said meets that case.

MR. ALDERMAN: I thought so, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Because what I said was that the defendants’ counsel
would be furnished with 10 copies of the trial briefs in English at the
same time that they are furnished to the Tribunal. Therefore, if you
don’t furnish the trial briefs to the Tribunal, none will be furnished
to the defendants’ counsel.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. When the Tribunal rose on Friday last, I had just
completed an introductory statement preliminary to the presentation of
evidence on the aggressive war aspect of the case. In that introductory
statement I had invited attention to the parts of the Charter and to the
parts of the Indictment which are pertinent to this aspect of the case.
I had also discussed the relationship between recorded history and the
evidence to be presented, indicating what sort of additions to recorded
history would be made by the evidence contained in the captured
documents.

I then indicated to the Court that I would first proceed by presenting
singly a handful of captured documents, which, in our opinion, prove the
corpus of the crime of aggressive war, leaving no reasonable doubt
concerning the aggressive character of the Nazi war, or concerning the
conspiratorial premeditation of that war. I indicated to the Tribunal
that after proving the corpus of the crime in this way I would follow
the presentation of this evidence with a more or less chronological
presentation of the case on aggressive war, producing evidence in
greater detail of the relevant activities of the conspirators from 1933
to 1941.

As the members of the Tribunal may understand, it is easier to make
plans about presentation than to keep them. There have been, by
necessity, some changes in our plans. I indicated on Friday that to a
certain extent the American case under Count One and the British case
under Count Two would interlock. The British Chief Prosecutor, Sir
Hartley Shawcross, is by force of circumstances, required to be in
London this week. He expects to be back next week. The intention now is
that when he returns Monday he will make his opening statement covering
Count Two of the Indictment and such interrelated parts of Count One of
the Indictment as have not by then been presented. So that what is at
the moment planned, if it meets with the Court’s views, is that I shall
continue, as far as I may within 2 days of this week, on the detailed
story as to aggressive war; that thereupon we shall alter the
presentation and present some other matters coming under Count One.
Then, following the British Chief Prosecutor’s opening statement on
Monday of next week, we shall continue jointly with the chapters on
Poland, Russia, and Japan, as parts of both Count One and Two. While
that may not be strictly logical, it seems to us the best method with
which to proceed under the circumstances.

I turn now to the period of 1933 to 1936, a period characterized by an
orderly, planned sequence of preparations for war. This is the period
covered by Paragraphs 1 and 2 of IV (F) of the Indictment. This may be
found at Page 7 of the printed English text of the Indictment.

The essential character of this period was the formulation and execution
of the plan to rearm and to reoccupy and fortify the Rhineland in
violation of the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties, in order to
acquire military strength and political bargaining power to be used
against other nations.

Hitler’s own eloquence in a secret speech delivered to all Supreme
Commanders on 23 November 1939, at 1200 hours, is sufficient to
characterize this phase of the Nazi conspiracy. This document comes to
hand as a captured document found in the OKW files—OKW is Ober Kommando
der Wehrmacht (the High Command of the Army, Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces)—and was captured at Flensburg. The document is
numbered 789-PS in our numbered series of documents.

I have in my hand, if the Court please, the German original of this
document in the condition in which it was captured, and I wish to offer
the document in evidence and have it given the proper serial number as
the United States prosecutor’s exhibit. The serial number, I understand,
is United States Exhibit 23. I would ask that the German text of the
original be handed to the German interpreters.

If the Court please, understanding the ruling just made by the presiding
justice, although I have offered the entire document, as it is a very
long speech, I shall not read into the record the entire speech. Of
course the presiding judge said defense counsel may insert any other
parts of it as they wish.

I shall begin reading at the beginning, and read a little more than half
of the first page in the English text. I am advised that the German
original is marked with a blue pencil at the point where I shall stop
reading. I will read the English translation:

    “November 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Führer, to
    which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Führer gives the
    following speech:

    “The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the
    world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of
    future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of
    our Armed Forces was only possible in connection with the
    ideological”—the German word is “weltanschaulich”—“education
    of the German people by the Party.”

If I may interpolate just to comment on that interesting German word
“weltanschaulich”, I take it that ideological is about as close a
translation as we can get, but the word means more than that. It means a
whole attitude towards the world, a way of looking on the world.

    “When I started my political task”—I am quoting again—“in
    1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough
    observation of the events of the day and the study of the
    reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief
    in the midst of setbacks which were not spared me during my
    period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought
    me success. Moreover, I had a clear recognition of the probable
    course of historical events and the firm will to make brutal
    decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I, after long
    internal conflict, became a politician and took up the struggle
    against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I
    had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal.
    First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to
    educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After
    15 years I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and
    many setbacks. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the
    most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing
    before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything,
    beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the
    Armed Forces. First, reorganization of the interior, abolishment
    of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to
    heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second
    task: To release Germany from its international ties. Two
    particular characteristics are to be pointed out: Secession from
    the League of Nations and denunciation of the Disarmament
    Conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who
    predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland
    was large, the number of believers was very small. I was
    supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I
    carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament.
    Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted
    misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction
    of compulsory armed service. After that, militarization of the
    Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that
    time. The number of people who put trust in me was very small.
    Then, beginning of the fortification of the whole country,
    especially in the west.

    “One year later, Austria came.”—I suppose he meant Austria
    went.—“This step also was considered doubtful. It brought about
    a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was
    Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step also was not possible to
    accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western
    fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach
    the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment
    that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory.
    That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into
    Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the
    Protectorate, and with that the basis for the action against
    Poland was laid, but I wasn’t quite clear at that time whether I
    should start first against the East and then in the West, or
    vice versa.”

There are some curious antitheses of thought in that speech, as in most
of Adolf Hitler’s speeches. In one sentence he combines guidance by
Providence with the making of brutal decisions. He constantly speaks of
how very few people were with him, and yet the mass of the German people
were with him. But he does give a brief summary of the gist of what is
contained in the allegations of the Indictment, to which I have invited
your attention:

The organization of the mass of the people, then extending to the Armed
Forces, and the various brutal decisions that he did make, about which
history knows.

That long document contains other material of great interest. It may be
that we shall advert to other portions of it later. At this point,
however, I have simply asked the Court to focus attention on the matter
I have just read and its bearing on the development of the conspiracy
during the period 1933 to 1936.

Another captured document is sufficient to demonstrate the preparations
for war in which the Nazi conspirators were engaged during this period.
I refer to a top-secret letter dated 24 June 1935 from General Von
Brauchitsch to the Supreme Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces.
Attached to that letter is a copy of a secret Reich Defense Law of 21
May 1935 and a copy of a decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on
the Council for the Defense of the Reich.

These documents were captured in the OKW files at Fechenheim. This group
of documents is numbered 2261-PS in our numbered series of documents. It
seems to us one of the most significant evidences of secret and direct
preparations for aggressive war.

I gave expression to a typographical error. That was General Von
Blomberg instead of Brauchitsch.

I have the original of these documents. I ask that they be admitted into
evidence as Exhibit USA-24.

The top page of that document, which I shall read in full, is the letter
signed “Von Blomberg, Berlin, 21 June 1935, Top Secret”; headed “The
Reich Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, No.
1820/35 Top Secret L II a.”

    “To: The Supreme Commander of the Army, the Supreme Commander of
    the Navy, the Supreme Commander of the Air Forces.

    “In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law for the
    defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935, and of a decision of the
    Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich Defense
    Council. The publication of the Reich Defense Law is temporarily
    suspended by order of the Führer and Reich Chancellor.

    “The Führer and Reich Chancellor has nominated the President of
    the Directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, to be
    ‘Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy.’

    “I request that the copies of the Reich Defense Law needed
    within the units of the Armed Forces, be ordered before 1 July
    1935 at Armed Forces Office (L) where it is to be established
    with the request that the law should only be distributed down to
    corps headquarters outside of the Reich Ministry of War.

    “I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.”

    Signed by “Von Blomberg.” Underneath that is an indorsement:

    “Berlin, 3 September 1935; No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a. To
    Defense-Economic Group G-3, copy transmitted (signed) Jodl.”

“There is attached thereto, if the Tribunal please, the statute referred
to as the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, or rather it was enacted by
the Reich Cabinet, and it starts with the statement: “The Reich Cabinet
has enacted the following law that is hereby made public.”

There follows a law in detail covering preparations for state of
defense, mobilization, appointment of this Plenipotentiary-General for
War Economy, with plenipotentiary authority for the economic preparation
of the war, and a Part III providing for setting of penalties.

The law is signed:

“The Führer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler; the Reich Minister of
War, Von Blomberg; the Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick,” one of
the defendants. And at the bottom of it there is this note—that is on
Sheet 4 of the original German, I think:

    “Note on the Law for the Defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935.
    The publication of the Law for the Defense of the Reich of 21
    May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May
    1935. The Führer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler.”

So that although the law itself stated that it was made public, the
publication was suspended by Adolf Hitler; although the law became
immediately effective.

There is further attached a copy of the decision of the Reich Cabinet of
21 May 1935 on the council for the defense of the realm which deals
largely with organization for economic preparation for the war and which
I think was discussed by my colleague, Mr. Dodd, last week.

There can be no question that this law of May 21, 1935 was the
cornerstone of war preparations of the Nazi conspirators. The
relationship of the Defendant Schacht to this preparation is made
transparently clear by this captured document.

So much, for the time being, on the preparatory phase of the conspiracy,
1933 to 1936.

As indicated earlier, the next phase of aggression was the formulation
and execution of plans to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, in that
order.

This is the phase of the aggression covered by Paragraphs 3 (a), (b),
and (c) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing at Pages 7 to 8
of the printed English text.

One of the most striking and revealing of all the captured documents
which have come to hand is a document which we have come to know as the
Hossbach notes of a conference in the Reich Chancellery on 5 November
1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours, in the course of which Hitler outlined to
those present the possibilities and necessities of expanding their
foreign policy, and requested—I quote: “That his statements be looked
upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.” And so
with this document we shall present to the Tribunal and to the public
the last will and testament of Adolf Hitler as he contemplated that last
will and testament on 5 November 1937. The document comes to hand
through the United States Department of State and it is authenticated by
the seal of the Secretary of State of the United States. It is Document
Number 386-PS in our series of numbered documents. I offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-25.

Before reading it, I note at the start that the recorder of the minutes
of this meeting, then Colonel Hossbach, was the Führer’s adjutant. I
note also the presence at this conspiratorial meeting of the Defendant
Erich Raeder. The Defendant Constantin von Neurath was present. The
Defendant Hermann Wilhelm Göring was present. The minutes of this
meeting reveal a crystalization towards the end of 1937 in the policy of
the Nazi regime. Austria and Czechoslovakia were to be acquired by
force. They would provide Lebensraum (living space) and improve
Germany’s military position for further operations. While it is true
that actual events unfolded themselves in a somewhat different manner
than that outlined at this meeting, in essence the purposes stated at
the meeting were carried out. The document destroys any possible doubt
concerning the Nazis’ premeditation of their Crimes against Peace. This
document is of such tremendous importance that I feel obliged to read it
in full into the record:

    “Berlin, 10 November 1937. Notes on the conference in the
    Reichskanzlei on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours.

    “Present: The Führer and Reich Chancellor; the Reich Minister
    for War, Generalfeldmarschall Von Blomberg; the C-in-C Army,
    Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch; the C-in-C Navy,
    Generaladmiral Dr. H. C. Raeder; the C-in-C Luftwaffe,
    Generaloberst Göring; the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs,
    Freiherr Von Neurath; Oberst Hossbach” (the adjutant who took
    the minutes).

    “The Führer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s
    conference was of such high importance that its detailed
    discussion would certainly in other states take place before the
    Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Führer, had decided
    not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich
    Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements
    were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences
    of his 4½ years in government; he desired to explain to those
    present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and
    necessities of expanding our foreign policy, and in the
    interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his
    statements be looked upon, in the case of his death, as his last
    will and testament.

    “The Führer then stated: The aim of German policy is the
    security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation.
    This is consequently a problem of space. The German nation
    comprises 85 million people, which, because of the number of
    individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a
    homogeneous European racial body, the like of which cannot be
    found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the
    demand for larger living space more than for any other nation.
    If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands
    of this racial body for living space, then that is the result of
    historical development spread over several centuries and should
    this political condition continue to exist, it will represent
    the greatest danger to the preservation of the German
    nation”—The German word used there, is not “nation”; it is
    “Volkstum”—“at its present high level. An arrest of the
    decrease of the German element in Austria and in Czechoslovakia
    is just as little possible as the preservation of the present
    state in Germany itself.”

I interpolate that I can but think that this is not a good translation
of the German because to me the sentence seems meaningless.

    “Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a
    consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a
    number, of years, because political and philosophical ideas are
    of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce
    the basis for the realization of the actual claim of the
    existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent
    exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a
    solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period,
    about one to three generations.

    “Before touching upon the question of solving the need for
    living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the
    German position with a good future can be attained, either by
    way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal
    commerce and industry.

    “Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National
    Socialist State policy, which is the basis”—that is the basis
    of autarchy—“Assuming this can be achieved the results are as
    follows:

    “A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but not total
    autarchy can be attained:

    “1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw
    materials, autarchy is feasible.

    “2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult.
    Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by
    ourselves. Copper and tin, however, cannot.

    “3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as
    sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not
    possible.

    “4. Edible fats—possible.

    “B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be
    answered with a definite capital NO.

    “The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 to
    40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the
    demand and an increase of personal consumption among the
    producers, the farmers themselves. The proceeds from the
    production increase in agriculture have been used for covering
    the increased demand, therefore they represent no actual
    increase in production. A further increase in production by
    making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it
    already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of
    artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even
    with the greatest possible increase in production, participation
    in the world market could not be avoided.”

I interpolate, that if I understand him he means by that, “no autarchy;
we must participate in world trade and commerce.”

    “The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food
    by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases
    catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The
    possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the
    increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births
    would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the
    child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

    “Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by
    lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is
    impossible in a continent which has developed an approximately
    equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the
    unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power
    of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home
    production will be possible, but not a wholesale alteration of
    the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes
    impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies, as well
    as generally.

    “Participation in world economy: There are limits to this which
    we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuation would be an
    obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position;
    international commercial agreements do not offer any guarantee
    for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that
    since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has taken
    place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a
    period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies,
    again approaches the condition which originally motivated
    colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis
    of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive
    Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have
    special difficulties in expanding economically.

    “The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy,
    due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis
    for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by
    the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a
    pronounced military weakness in those states which base their
    existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out
    over those sea lanes which are dominated by Britain, it is more
    a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign
    currency and this explains the great weakness of our food
    situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear
    imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor
    which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states
    and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency
    finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied states. Should the
    security of our food situation be our foremost thought, then the
    space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we
    will not copy liberal capitalistic policies which rely on
    exploiting colonies. It is not a case of conquering people, but
    of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more
    to the purpose to seek raw material-producing territory in
    Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this
    solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two
    generations. What would be required at a later date over and
    above this must be left to subsequent generations. The
    development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a
    slow process and the German people, with its strong racial
    root”—I interpolate, there is that German word “Rassekern”
    again (the racial root)—“has for this purpose the most
    favorable foundations in the heart of the European continent.
    The history of all times—Roman Empire, British Empire—has
    proved that, every space, expansion can only be effected by
    breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
    unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found
    without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the
    proprietor.”

                        [_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, after the somewhat jumbled
discussion which I have just read of geopolitical economic theory and of
the need for expansion and Lebensraum, Adolf Hitler, in these Hossbach
notes, posed this question—and I quote:

    “The question for Germany is where the greatest possible
    conquest could be made at lowest cost.

    “German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies,
    England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the
    center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would
    oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and
    overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of
    all parties. Both countries would view the building of German
    military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas
    communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and
    retroactively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.

    “England is not in a position to cede any of her colonial
    possessions to us, owing to the resistance which she experiences
    in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has
    suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian
    ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected.
    Any resistance on England’s part would at best consist in the
    readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies
    which at the present moment are not in British hands, for
    example, Angola. French favors would probably be of the same
    nature.

    “A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us
    could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of
    emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The
    Führer does not share the opinion that the Empire is
    unshakeable.”—Meaning, I take it, the British Empire.—

    “Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered
    territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and
    the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard
    to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a
    serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which
    originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into
    all states, made it possible for the ancient Germans to
    subjugate ancient Rome.

    “Alongside the British Empire today a number of states exist
    which are stronger than it. The British mother country is able
    to defend its colonial possession only allied with other states
    and not by its own power. How could England alone, for example,
    defend Canada against attack by America, or its Far Eastern
    interests against an attack by Japan?

    “The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire
    unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot
    be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are
    significant pointers in this respect:

    “(a) Ireland’s struggle for independence.

    “(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her half
    measures, left the door open for Indians, at a later date, to
    utilize the non-fulfilment of constitutional promises as a
    weapon against Britain.

    “(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far East by
    Japan.

    “(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which—by
    virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a
    genius—expands its power position and must consequently
    infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome
    of the Abyssinian war is a loss of prestige for Britain which
    Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in
    the Mohammedan world.

    “It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be
    held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in
    spite of all the solidity of their ideals. The proportion of the
    populations in the Empire, compared with that of the motherland,
    is nine to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we
    expand in space, we must not allow the level of our population
    to become too low.”

I take it he meant by that: “Keep the population of occupied territories
low in comparison with ours.”

    “France’s position is more favorable than that of England. The
    French Empire is better placed geographically; the population of
    its colonial possessions represents a potential military
    increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal
    politics. In the life of the nations, parliamentary governments
    ruled only 10 per cent of the time, approximately; whereas,
    totalitarian governments ruled 90 per cent of the time.
    Nevertheless, we have to take the following into our political
    consideration as power factors:

    “Britain, France, Russia, and the adjoining smaller states.

    “The German question can be solved only by way of force, and
    this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great
    for Silesia, and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had
    been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870
    had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place
    the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the
    following expositions, then we are left to reply to the
    questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In this regard we have to decide
    upon three different cases.”

I interpolate: The Tribunal will recall the specific allegation in the
Indictment that at this meeting there emerged three different plans, any
of which might be utilized.

    “Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a change
    for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the Navy, and the Air
    Force, as well as the formation of the Officers’ Corps, are
    practically concluded.”

I remind the Tribunal that this meeting was on 5 November 1937, but he
is contemplating the period 1943-45.

    “Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with further
    delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In
    particular, the secrecy of ‘special weapons’ cannot always be
    safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the
    current recruiting age groups and an addition from older
    untrained groups would be no longer available.

    “In comparison with the rearmament, which will have been carried
    out at that time by other nations, we shall decrease in relative
    power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, dependent on the
    absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis,
    for the countering of which we do not possess the necessary
    foreign currency. This must be considered a point of weakness in
    the regime. Over and above that, the world will anticipate our
    action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other
    nations isolate themselves, we should be forced on the
    offensive.

    “What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45, no one
    knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

    “On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for
    securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its
    leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the
    standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no
    other choice but to act. If the Führer is still living, then it
    will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space
    problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before
    1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

    “Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an
    internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the
    French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war
    against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia
    has come.

    “Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against
    Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against
    another state that it cannot proceed against Germany.

    “For the improvement of our military political position it must
    be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to
    conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria, simultaneously, in order to
    remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance
    westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly
    be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on
    the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia’s desire to
    participate in the war will increase proportionally to the
    degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation
    could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards
    the north or the west.

    “Once Czechoslovakia is conquered—and a mutual frontier,
    Germany-Hungary is obtained—then a neutral attitude by Poland
    in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon.
    Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as
    Germany’s strength remains unshakable; should Germany have any
    setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps
    also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account.

    “Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a
    planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then the
    behavior of France, England, Poland, and Russia would probably
    have to be judged in the following manner:

    “The Führer believes personally, that in all probability England
    and perhaps also France, have already silently written off
    Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that
    this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The
    difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being
    entangled in another long, drawn-out European war, would be
    decisive factors in the non-participation of England in a war
    against Germany. The British attitude would certainly not remain
    without influence on France’s attitude. An attack by France,
    without British support, is hardly probable, assuming that its
    offensive would stagnate along our western fortifications.
    Without England’s support it would also not be necessary to take
    into consideration a march by France through Belgium and
    Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us
    in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would
    have, as a consequence, the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally,
    we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the
    operation of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It
    must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia’s
    defense measures will increase in strength from year to year and
    that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian Army
    will also be effected in the course of years. Although the
    population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin
    one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would
    nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5 to 6 million
    people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million
    from Czechoslovakia, and of 1 million from Austria could be
    carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany,
    militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable
    relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of
    fighting personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of
    reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about 12
    divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

    “No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on
    the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would
    be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would depend
    largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.

    “The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland’s
    attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war
    against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear.

    “Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed
    of our operations; it is a question whether this needs to be
    taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan’s attitude.

    “Should case 2 occur—paralyzation of France by a civil
    war—then the situation should be utilized at any time for
    operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany’s most dangerous
    enemy would be eliminated.

    “The Führer sees case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from
    the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur,
    he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even
    as early as 1938.

    “Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the
    war in Spain, the Führer does not see an early end to
    hostilities there.

    “Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives
    by Franco,”—the English text says “France”; it means
    “Franco”—“a further 3 years’ duration of war is within the
    bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point
    of view, a 100 per cent victory by Franco is not desirable; we
    are more interested in a continuation of the war and
    preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco
    be in sole possession of the Spanish peninsula, it would mean
    the end of Italian intervention and of the presence of Italy in
    the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards
    continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future
    policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the
    Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions
    in the Balearic Isles cannot be tolerated either by France or by
    England and could lead to a war by France and England against
    Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in White (that is,
    Franco’s) hands, could participate on the side of Italy’s
    enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very
    unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via
    Germany. The Führer believes that Italy’s military strategy
    would be to remain on the defensive against France on the
    western frontier and carry out operations against France from
    Libya, against the North African French colonial possessions.

    “As a landing of French and British troops on the Italian coast
    can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to
    upper Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably
    stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines
    of communication by the Italian fleet will, to a great extent,
    paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa
    to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany,
    France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan
    fighting forces.”

There again I think that must be a defective English translation.
“French lines of communication by the Italian fleet,” must mean “fresh
lines,” or something in that connection.

    “If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the
    Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must
    be assumed that England, being at war with Italy, would not
    decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British
    support, a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be
    anticipated.

    “The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be
    made depending upon the course of the Italian-French-English war
    and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military
    operations by these three States. The Führer was also not
    thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete
    independence and by exploiting this unique favorable
    opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against
    Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take
    place with the speed of lightning.”—The German words are
    “blitzartig schnell.”

    “Feldmarschall Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Von Fritsch, in
    giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out
    that we should not run the risk that England and France become
    our enemies:

    “They stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French
    Army to such an extent that it would not be in a position to
    commence operations on our western frontier with superior
    forces. Generaloberst Von Fritsch estimated the French forces
    which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier
    against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a
    strong French superiority would still remain on our western
    frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning,
    attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the
    lead which France has in mobilization and, quite apart from the
    very small value of our then-existing fortifications, which was
    pointed out particularly by General Feldmarschall Von Blomberg;
    the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the
    West would be more or less incapable of movement.

    “With regard to our offensive in a southeasterly direction,
    Feldmarschall Von Blomberg drew special attention to the
    strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of
    which had assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which
    would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

    “Generaloberst Von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of
    a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the
    possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia,
    with special consideration of the conquest of the
    Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also
    stated that, owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have
    to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on 10
    November. This intention was countermanded by the Führer, who
    gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to
    be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by
    General Feldmarschall Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Von Fritsch
    regarding England and France’s attitude, the Führer repeated his
    previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain’s
    non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in
    military action by France against Germany. Should the
    Mediterranean conflict, already mentioned, lead to a general
    mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence
    operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the
    powers who are not participating in the war should declare their
    disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have
    to side with this attitude.

    “In view of the information given by the Führer, Generaloberst
    Göring considered it imperative to think of a reduction of our
    military undertaking in Spain. The Führer agreed to this,
    insofar as he believed this decision should be postponed for a
    suitable date.

    “The second part of the discussion concerned material armament
    questions. (Signed) Hossbach.”—There are other notations.

In this connection I invite the Court’s attention to the allegation in
Paragraph 3 (a) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment; Page 7 of the
printed English text, relating to a meeting of an influential group of
Nazi conspirators on 5 November 1937. The document just introduced and
read in evidence gives the specific evidentiary support for that
allegation.

The record of what happened thereafter is well known to history. The
Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure from the Nazis, occurred
in March 1938. We shall give you detailed evidence concerning that in
due course. So will we as to details of the aggression against
Czechoslovakia, including the pressure on Czechoslovakia that resulted
in the Munich Pact of September 1938, and the violation of that Pact
itself by Germany, on 15 March 1939. There is much of interest in the
secret documents relating to those aggressions.

At this point, however, I desire to bring to the attention of the
Tribunal one more captured document, which reveals in all its nakedness
the truth concerning the deliberateness of the aggression against
Czechoslovakia. This document consists of a file, a file kept by Colonel
Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant. The file was found by one of the units of
the 327th Glider Infantry, in a cellar of the Platterhof, Obersalzberg,
near Berchtesgaden. The file represents a work-file of originals and
duplicates, incidental to the preparations for the annexation of
Czechoslovakia. I should like to ask the Tribunal to examine
particularly the photostat of the original German of this file. We have
copies of those photostats. Something in physical form is lost in
transcribing a translation. The picture of the original file, including
photographs of the telegrams, gives a sense of the reality of the
evidence that is lost in the transcribed translation. The file is
Document Number 388-PS, in our numbered series of documents. I have here
the original file, as found.

I thought perhaps I might read the German title. It is “Chefsache Fall
Grün,” that is the main plan for “Case Green,” “Green” being a code word
for the aggression against Czechoslovakia.

I offer the entire file in evidence as Exhibit USA-26 and will ask that
photostats be passed to the Court. I offer the file, if the Tribunal
please, with, of course, the understanding and realization that only
such parts of it as I read will immediately go into evidence; but we
shall refer to other parts from time to time later, in the presentation
of the case. The material in this file will be dealt with in greater
detail at a later point in my presentation. However, at this point, I
desire to call attention to item number 2 in the file.

Item number 2 is dated 22 April 1938. It is the second sheet of the
English translation. It is a summary, prepared by Schmundt, the
adjutant, of a discussion on 21 April 1938 between Hitler and the
Defendant Wilhelm Keitel. This item, like the other items in the file,
relates to Fall Grün, or Case Green. As I said, Case Green was a secret
code word for the planned operations against Czechoslovakia. This
meeting occurred within approximately 1 month following the successful
annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of the conspiracy, it became
necessary to revise the Plan Grün to take into account the changed
attitude, as a result of the bloodless success against Austria. I shall
now read item number 2 of this file:

    “Berlin, 22 April 1938. Bases of the Dissertation on ‘Grün.’

    “Summary of discussion between Führer and General Keitel of 21
    April:

    “A. Political aspect.

    “1. Strategic surprise attack, out of a clear sky without any
    cause or possibility of justification, has been turned down. As
    result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a
    critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the
    elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.

    “2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually
    come to a crisis and lead to war.

    “3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for
    example, the assassination of German Ambassador in connection
    with an anti-German demonstration.)

    “B. Military conclusions.

    “1. The preparations are to be made for the political
    possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since Grün
    will have taken security measures.

    “2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the
    divisions by rail—which is unavoidable, but should be cut down
    as far as possible—must not impede a lightning-swift blow at
    the time of the action.

    “3. ‘Separate thrusts’ are to be carried out immediately with a
    view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous
    points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts
    are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads,
    of targets, composition of the columns according to their
    individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air
    Force.

    “The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example
    dive-bombers; sealing of installations at penetration points,
    hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal
    communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons).

    “4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the
    decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a
    European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must
    prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw
    Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize
    ‘Grün.’

    “Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and
    employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and
    ruthless thrust by a motorized army (for example via Pilsen,
    Prague).

    “5. If possible, separation of transport movement ‘Rot’ from
    ‘Grün’.”

‘Rot’ was the code name for their then plan against the West.

    “A simultaneous strategic concentration ‘Rot’ can lead ‘Rot’ to
    undesired measures. On the other hand, it must be possible to
    put ‘Fall Rot’ (Case Red) into operation at any time.

    “C. Propaganda.

    “1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia
    (Grünland).

    “2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs
    (Grünen).”

This is initialled by Schmundt.

In the reading of this document, the Tribunal doubtless noted
particularly Paragraph 3, under the heading “Political Aspect,” which
reads as follows: “Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident
(example: Assassination of German Ambassador as an upshot of an
anti-German demonstration).” The document as a whole, establishes that
the conspirators were planning the creation of an incident to justify to
the world their own aggression against Czechoslovakia. It establishes, I
submit, that consideration was being given to assassinating the German
Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident. This is alleged
in Paragraph 3 (c) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing at
Page 8 of the printed English text.

As the Indictment was being read, at the opening of the case, when this
particular allegation was reached, the Defendant Göring shook his head
slowly and solemnly in the negative. I can well understand that he would
have shaken his head, if he believed the allegation of the Indictments
to be untrue. In the course of Mr. Justice Jackson’s opening address,
when this same matter was referred to, the Defendant Göring again
solemnly shook his head. On this allegation the Prosecution stands on
the evidence just submitted, the denials of the Defendant Göring,
notwithstanding.

If the Court please, would this be a convenient time to recess?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, as I suggested earlier, the
next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of the
plan to attack Poland and with it the resulting initiation of aggressive
war in Poland in September 1939. This is covered by Paragraphs 4 (a) and
(b) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment appearing on Page 9 of the
printed English text.

Here again the careful and meticulous record-keeping of the Adjutant
Schmundt has provided us with a document in his own handwriting, which
lets the cat out of the bag. That may be a troublesome colloquialism to
translate. I do not know. The document consists of minutes of a
conference held on 23 May 1939. The place of the conference was the
Führer’s study in the New Reich Chancellery. The Defendant Göring was
present.

[_The Defendant Frick interrupted at this point and said: “This year is
surely not correct.” This statement in German was not translated._]

MR. ALDERMAN: I think one of the defendants indicated I had referred to
the wrong year. My notes show 23 May 1939. That is shown by the original
document.

THE PRESIDENT: Which is the document to which you are referring?

MR. ALDERMAN: That is Document. L-79. As I said, the Defendant Göring
was present. The Defendant Raeder was present. The Defendant Keitel was
present. The subject of the meeting was, I quote: “Indoctrination on the
Political Situation and Future Aims.” This document is of historical
importance, second not even to the political will and testament of the
Führer, recorded by Adjutant Hossbach.

The original of this document when captured, found its way through the
complicated channels across the Atlantic to the United States. There, it
was found by members of the staff of the American Prosecution, by them
taken to London, and thence to Nuremberg. The “L” on the identifying
number indicates that it is one of the documents which was assembled in
London and brought here from there. We think the document is of
unquestioned validity. Its authenticity and its accuracy, as a record of
what transpired at the meeting of 23 May 1939, stands admitted by the
Defendant Keitel in one of his interrogations. As I say, the number is
Document L-79 in our numbered series. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit
USA-27.

This document also is of such great importance historically and as
bearing on the issues now presented to the Tribunal, that I feel obliged
to read most of it. At the top:

    “Top Secret (Geheime Reichssache). To be transmitted by officer
    only.

    “Minutes of a conference on 23 May 1939. Place: The Führer’s
    study, New Reich Chancellery. Adjutant on duty: Lieutenant
    Colonel (G. S.) Schmundt.

    “Present: The Führer, Field Marshal Göring, Grand Admiral
    Raeder, Colonel General Von Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel,
    Colonel General Milch, General (of Artillery) Halder, General
    Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewindt, Colonel (G. S.)
    Jeschonnek, Colonel (G. S.) Warlimont, Lieutenant Colonel (G.
    S.) Schmundt, Captain Engel (Army), Lieutenant Commander
    Albrecht, Captain V. Below (Army).

    “Subject: Indoctrination on the Political Situation and Future
    Aims.

    “The Führer defined as the purpose of the conference:

    “1. Analysis of the situation;

    “2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from
    that situation;

    “3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks;

    “4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting
    from those consequences. Secrecy is the first essential for
    success.

    “The Führer’s observations are given in accordance with their
    meaning. Our present situation must be considered from two
    points of view: 1) The actual development of events between 1933
    and 1939; 2) the permanent and unchanging situation in which
    Germany lies.

    “In the period 1933-39, progress was made in all fields. Our
    military situation improved enormously.

    “Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained
    the same.

    “Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The
    balance of power had been effected without the participation of
    Germany.

    “This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the
    necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges
    as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as ‘encroachments’.
    The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere
    than of the simple threat of force.

    “A mass of 80 million people has solved the problems of ideals.
    So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can
    evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for
    this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The
    principle by which one evades solving the problem by adapting
    oneself to circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must
    rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion
    of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

    “Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is
    the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the
    problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The
    choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’
    time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German
    statesman can evade the question longer than that.

    “We are at present in a state of patriotic fervor, which is
    shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

    “The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good
    use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in
    harmony with our aims.

    “After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:

    “The national political unity of the Germans has been achieved,
    apart from minor exceptions.”—I suppose they were those in the
    concentration camps.—“Further successes cannot be attained
    without the shedding of blood.

    “The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.

    “The Pole is no ‘supplementary enemy’. Poland will always be on
    the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship,
    Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every
    opportunity to do us harm.

    “Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a
    question of expanding our living space in the East and of
    securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic
    problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly
    populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility,
    thoroughgoing German exploitation will enormously increase the
    surplus.

    “There is no other possibility for Europe.

    “Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not
    solve the food problem. Remember: blockade.

    “If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession
    of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be
    able to rely upon record harvests even less in time of war than
    in peace.

    “The population of non-German areas will perform no military
    service, and will be available as a source of labor.

    “The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

    “Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is
    doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against
    Russia.

    “It is questionable whether military success in the West can be
    achieved by a quick decision; questionable too is the attitude
    of Poland.

    “The Polish Government will not resist pressure from Russia.
    Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will
    attempt to rob us of the victory.

    “There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are
    left with the decision: _To attack Poland at the first suitable
    opportunity_”.—That, if the Court please, is underscored in the
    original German text.—

    “We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will
    be fighting. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the
    isolation will be decisive.

    “Therefore, the Führer must reserve the right to give the final
    order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the
    Western Powers (France and England).

    “If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not
    lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily
    against England and France.

    “Fundamentally, therefore: Conflict with Poland, beginning with
    an attack on Poland, will only be successful if the Western
    Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be
    better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same
    time.

    “The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.

    “Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first, for various
    reasons, her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool
    and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan’s own interest to
    take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

    “Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political
    relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in press
    comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to
    be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia
    take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become
    closer.

    “If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia
    against Germany, Italy, and Japan, I would be constrained to
    attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The
    Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with
    England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England
    sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would
    weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict
    with England will be a life-and-death struggle.

    “_What will this struggle be like?_”—Underscored in the German
    original.—

    “England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few
    powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should
    be brought as near to the Ruhr Basin as possible. French blood
    will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr Basin
    will determine the duration of our resistance.

    “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
    forces. Declarations of neutrality cannot be relied upon. If
    England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to
    lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in
    their neutrality and make them build fortifications in order
    finally to force them into cooperation.

    “Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to
    pressure.

    “Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war,
    we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at
    securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.

    “The war with England and France will be a life-and-death
    struggle.

    “The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no
    such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a
    question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80
    million human beings.

    “Question: Short or long war?

    “Every country’s armed forces or government must aim at a short
    war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of
    10 to 15 years’ duration.

    “History has always shown that people have believed that wars
    would be short. In 1914 the opinion still prevailed that it was
    impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still
    persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will
    hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some
    grave weakening (for example Ruhr Basin). England has similar
    weaknesses.

    “England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world
    power.

“England is the driving force against Germany.”—which translated
literally means: “England is the motor driving against Germany.” I
suppose that is the French “force motrice.”

    “Her strength lies in the following:

    “1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious,
    firm in resistance, and gifted as organizers. They know how to
    exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure
    and the bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by
    dispersal. The German average is higher.

    “2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years.
    Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely
    something concrete, but must also be considered as a
    psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this
    immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.

    “3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a
    courageous air force.

    “England’s weakness:

    “If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two
    cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had been begun in
    the morning, the British Fleet would have been defeated and
    England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of
    this war.”—that war, I take it—“It was formerly not sufficient
    to defeat the Fleet. Landings had to be made in order to defeat
    England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that
    is no longer possible.

    “The moment England’s food supply routes are cut, she is forced
    to capitulate. The import of food and oil depends on the Fleet’s
    protection.

    “If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will
    not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the Fleet is
    destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.

    “There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick
    decision. It would be criminal, however, for the Government to
    rely entirely on the element of surprise.

    “Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by:

    “1. Disclosure coming from a large circle of military experts
    concerned;

    “2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole
    enterprise;

    “3. Human failings;

    “4. Weather conditions.

    “The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance.
    Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. It must
    be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise
    intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

    “This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.

    “1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or
    the final decisive blow. Considerations of right and wrong or
    treaties do not enter into the matter. This will only be
    possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account
    of Poland.

    “2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long
    war must be made, while opportunities on the continent for
    England are eliminated.

    “The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and
    Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and
    held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions
    for a successful war against England will have been secured.

    “England can then be blockaded from western France at close
    quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines
    can extend the range of the blockade.

    “Consequences:

    “England will not be able to fight on the continent; daily
    attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines;
    time will not be on England’s side; Germany will not bleed to
    death on land.

    “Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and
    subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for
    the following strategic considerations which are imperative:

    “1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a
    wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end
    would have been different.

    “2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is
    impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the
    lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense counter
    measures.

    “3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

    “4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy,
    has taken the most important positions, industrial production
    will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army’s
    battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.

    “The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions.
    Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

    “Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

    “The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

    “A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning
    battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

    “This applies to gas, submarines, and air force. It would be
    true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet
    had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the case
    in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be
    effective, as the Polish Army possesses no countermeasures.

    “Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be
    decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise
    and by masterly handling.”

The rest of the document, if the Tribunal please, deals more in detail
with military plans and preparations. I think it unnecessary to read
further.

The document just read is the evidence which specifically supports the
allegations in Paragraph 4 (a) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment,
appearing on Page 9 of the printed English text, relating to the meeting
of 23 May 1939. We think it leaves nothing unproved in those
allegations.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps you ought to read the last page and
the last five lines, because they refer in terms to one of the
defendants.

MR. ALDERMAN: I didn’t read these, Mr. President, simply because I am
convinced that they are mistranslated in the English. I will be glad to
have them read in the original German.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you are of that opinion.

MR. ALDERMAN: We could get it from the original German.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the English translation is wrong?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You had better inform us then if it is wrong.

MR. ALDERMAN: Did you have reference to the last paragraph headed
“Working principles”?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the one after that.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Might I ask that the German interpreter read that, as
it can be translated into the other languages. It is on Page 16 of the
original.

BY THE INTERPRETER: “Page 16. Purpose:

    “1. Study of the entire problem;

    “2. Study of the events;

    “3. Study of the means needed;

    “4. Study of the necessary training.

    “Men with great powers of imagination and high technical
    training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with
    sober sceptic powers of understanding.

    “Working principles:

    “1. No one is to take part in this, who does not have to know of
    it.

    “2. No one can find out more than he must know.

    “3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest?
    No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it.

    “On Göring’s question, the Führer decided that:

    a) The armed forces determine what shall be built;

    b) In the shipbuilding program nothing is to be changed;

    c) The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943 or
    1944.”—Schmundt certified this text.

MR. ALDERMAN: Mr. President, the translation was closer than I had
anticipated.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ALDERMAN: We think, as I have just said, that this document leaves
nothing unproved in those allegations in the Indictment. It demonstrates
that the Nazi conspirators were proceeding in accordance with a plan. It
demonstrates the cold-blooded premeditation of the assault on Poland. It
demonstrates that the questions concerning Danzig, which the Nazis had
agitated with Poland as a political pretext, were not true questions,
but were false issues, issues agitated to conceal their motive of
aggressive expansion for food and “Lebensraum.”

In this presentation of condemning documents, concerning the initiation
of war in September 1939, I must bring to the attention of the Tribunal
a group of documents concerning an address by Hitler to his chief
military commanders, at Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939, just one week
prior to the launching of the attack on Poland.

We have three of these documents, related and constituting a single
group. The first one I do not intend to offer as evidence. The other two
I shall offer.

The reason for that is this: The first of the three documents came into
our possession through the medium of an American newspaperman and
purported to be original minutes of this meeting at Obersalzberg,
transmitted to this American newspaperman by some other person; and we
had no proof of the actual delivery to the intermediary by the person
who took the notes. That document, therefore, merely served to alert our
Prosecution to see if it could find something better. Fortunately, we
did get the other two documents, which indicate that Hitler on that day
made two speeches, perhaps one in the morning, one in the afternoon, as
indicated by the original minutes, which we captured. By comparison of
those two documents with the first document, we concluded that the first
document was a slightly garbled merger of the two speeches.

On 22 August 1939 Hitler had called together at Obersalzberg the three
Supreme Commanders of the three branches of the Armed Forces, as well as
the commanding generals bearing the title Commanders-in-Chief
(Oberbefehlshaber).

I have indicated how, upon discovering this first document, the
Prosecution set out to find better evidence of what happened on this
day. In this the Prosecution succeeded. In the files of the OKW at
Flensburg, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High Command of
the Armed Forces), there were uncovered two speeches delivered by Hitler
at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939. These are Documents Numbers 798-PS
and 1014-PS, in our series of documents.

In order to keep serial numbers consecutive, if the Tribunal please, we
have had the first document, which I do not intend to offer, marked for
identification Exhibit USA-28. Accordingly, I offer the second document,
798-PS, in evidence as Exhibit USA-29, and the third document, 1014-PS,
as Exhibit USA-30.

These are again, especially the first one, rather lengthy speeches, and
I shall not necessarily read the entire speech.

Reading from 798-PS, which is Exhibit USA-29, the Führer speaks to the
Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939: “I have called you
together. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything to show where the speech took place?

MR. ALDERMAN: Obersalzberg.

THE PRESIDENT: How do you show that?

MR. ALDERMAN: You mean on the document?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ALDERMAN: I am afraid the indication “Obersalzberg” came from the
first document which I have not offered in evidence. I have no doubt
that the defendants will admit that Obersalzberg was the place of this
speech.

The place is not very significant; it is the time.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. ALDERMAN [Reading]:

    “I have called you together to give you a picture of the
    political situation, in order that you may have insight into the
    individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in
    order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss
    military details.

    “It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come
    sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the
    spring.”—I interpolate, I think he is there referring to the
    May document, which I have already read, L-79.—“But I thought I
    would first turn against the West in a few years, and only
    afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed.
    One cannot close one’s eyes even before a threatening situation.
    I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland, in
    order to fight first against the West, but this plan, which was
    agreeable to me, could not be executed, since the essential
    points have changed.

    “It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a
    conflict with the West.

    “Poland wants access to the sea.

    “The further development became obvious after the occupation of
    the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the
    circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an
    inopportune moment.

    “I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two
    personal constitutions”—I suppose he means “personalities”;
    that probably is an inapt translation—“my own personality, and
    that of Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence,
    because of my political ability.”

I interpolate to comment on the tremendous significance of the fact of a
war, which engulfed almost the whole world, depending upon one man’s
personality.

    “Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have
    the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will
    probably never again be a man in the future with more authority
    than I have. My existence is, therefore, a factor of great
    value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an
    idiot.

    “The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also
    decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the
    Alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the
    Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in
    the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with
    the strongest nerves in Italy.

    “The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask only
    benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco’s
    personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness
    of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the
    fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our
    internal unity.

    “On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive
    personalities are concerned: There is no outstanding personality
    in England or France.”—I interpolate: I think Adolf Hitler must
    have overlooked one in England, perhaps many.—

    “For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to
    lose—we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because
    of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few
    years. Göring can confirm this. We have no other choice; we must
    act. Our opponents risk much and can gain only a little.
    England’s stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have
    men who are below average. No personalities, no masters, no men
    of action.”

I interpolate again. Perhaps that last sentence explains what he meant
by no personalities—no masters having the authority that he had over
his nation.

    “Besides the personal factor, the political situation is
    favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry between Italy,
    France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to the
    alarming of the Mohammedan world.

    “The English empire did not emerge from the last war
    strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was
    achieved; conflict between England and Ireland, the South
    African Union became more independent, concessions had to be
    made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy industries.
    A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.

    “France’s position has also deteriorated, particularly in the
    Mediterranean.

    “Further favorable factors for us are these:

    “Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans.
    Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal
    situation.

    “Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and
    vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since
    Kemal’s death Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady
    weak men.

    “All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2
    or 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore
    conflict better now.

    “The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement
    politically, but militarily it was questionable, since it was
    achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is
    necessary to test the military, if at all possible, not by
    general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.

    “The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy
    hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My
    propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed by
    England’s intervention. Poland changed her tune towards us. The
    initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the others. This moment
    is more favorable than in 2 to 3 years. An attempt on my life or
    Mussolini’s would change the situation to our disadvantage. One
    cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A
    suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our
    convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again
    in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing
    prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will
    not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution.
    A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We
    are facing the alternative to strike or be destroyed with
    certainty sooner or later.”—We skip two paragraphs.—

    “Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron
    resolution. . . .”

A long discussion follows which I think it is unnecessary to read, and
then towards the end, four paragraphs from the bottom, I resume:

    “We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us
    with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim, which
    demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute
    some ‘Schweinehund’ will make a proposal for mediation.”—And
    then the last paragraph of one sentence—“Göring answers with
    thanks to the Führer and the assurance that the Armed Forces
    will do their duty.”

I believe I have already offered Exhibit 30, which is a shorter note
entitled: “Second Speech of the Führer on 22 August 1939.” Reading then
from United States Exhibit 30, headed “Second Speech by the Führer on 22
August 1939:

    “It may also turn out differently regarding England and France.
    One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade
    barrier, not on blockade, and with severance of relations. Most
    iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing.
    Everybody shall have to make a point of it, that we were
    determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers. A
    struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as
    she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors,
    greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by
    getting used to the heaviest strain. A long period of peace
    would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect
    everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each
    other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental
    factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In
    1918 the Nation fell down because the mental pre-requisites were
    not sufficient. Frederick the Great secured final success only
    through his mental power.

    “Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is the
    elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line.
    Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of
    Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of
    the season.

    “I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never
    mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
    asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting
    and making a war, not the Right is what matters, but Victory.

    “Have no pity. Brutal attitude. Eighty million people shall get
    what is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The
    strongest has the right. Greatest severity.

    “Quick decision necessary. Unshakeable faith in the German
    soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders
    give way.

    “First aim: Advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical
    superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly
    created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war
    of attrition.

    “New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a
    protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be
    influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland
    is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until
    complete elimination.

    “Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements.
    The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.”

That ends the quotation. The Tribunal will recall that in fact the start
was actually postponed until September 1.

DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr. President, may I
make a short statement on the two documents which have just been read.
Both the documents which were read and also the third which was not read
but to which reference was made, are not recognized by the Defense. I do
not wish this objection to appear unjustified; may I therefore give this
explanation:

Both the documents which were read contain a number of factual errors.
They are not signed. Moreover, only one meeting took place, and that is
the cause for the inaccuracy of these documents. No one present at that
meeting was charged with taking down the events in the meeting
stenographically, and since there are no signatures, it cannot be
determined who wrote the documents and who is responsible for their
reliability. The third document which was not read is, according to the
photostatic copy in the Defense’s document room, simply typewritten.
There is no indication of place or time of execution.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have got nothing to do with the third document,
because it has not been read.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, this document has nevertheless been
published in the press and was apparently given to the press by the
Prosecution. Consequently both the Defense and the defendants have a
lively interest in giving a short explanation of the facts concerning
these documents.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is trying this case in accordance with the
evidence and not in accordance with what is in the press, and the third
document is not in evidence before us.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize that counsel
wonder how these two documents which I have just read are in our hands.
They come to us from an authentic source. They are German documents.
They were found in the OKW files. If they aren’t correct records of what
occurred, it surprises us that with the great thoroughness with which
the Germans kept accurate records, they would have had these records
that didn’t represent the truth in their OKW files.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal will of course hear what
evidence the defendants choose to give with reference to the documents.

MR. ALDERMAN: It has occurred to me in that connection that if any of
these defendants have in their possession what is a more correct
transcription of the Führer’s words on this occasion, the Court should
consider that. On the other question referred to by counsel, I feel
somewhat guilty. It is quite true that, by a mechanical slip, the press
got the first document, which we never at all intended them to have. I
feel somewhat responsible. It happened to be included in the document
books that were handed up to the Court on Friday, because we had only
intended to refer to it and give it an identification mark and not to
offer it. I had thought that no documents would be released to the press
until they were actually offered in evidence. With as large an
organization as we have, it is very difficult to police all those
matters.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal would like to know how many of
these documents are given to the press.

MR. ALDERMAN: I can’t answer that.

COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, it is my understanding that as
and when documents are introduced in evidence, then they are made
available to the press.

THE PRESIDENT: In what numbers?

COL. STOREY: I think about 250 copies of each one, about 200 or 250
mimeographed copies.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the defendants’ counsel should
have copies of these documents before any of them are handed to the
press. I mean to say that in preference to gentlemen of the press the
defendants’ counsel should have the documents.

COL. STOREY: Your Honor, if it please the Court, I understand that these
gentlemen had the 10 documents on Saturday morning or Sunday morning.
They had them for 24 hours, copies of the originals of these documents
that have been read today, down in the Information Center.

THE PRESIDENT: I stated, in accordance with the provisional arrangement
which was made, and which was made upon your representations, that 10
copies of the trial briefs and five copies of the volumes of documents
should be given to the defendants’ counsel.

COL. STOREY: Sir, I had the receipts that they were deposited in the
room.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I am pointing out to you, Colonel Storey,
is that if 250 copies of the documents can be given to the press, then
the defendants’ counsel should not be limited to five copies.

COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, the 250 copies are the mimeographed
copies in English when they are introduced in evidence. I hold in my
hands, or in my briefcase here, a receipt that the document books and
the briefs were delivered 24 hours in advance.

THE PRESIDENT: You don’t seem to understand what I am putting to you,
which is this: That if you can afford to give 250 copies of the
documents in English to the press, you can afford to give more than five
copies to the defendants’ counsel—one each. Well, we do not need to
discuss it further. In the future that will be done.

DR. DIX: May I say, then, that of every document in evidence each
defense counsel will receive one copy; it will not be just one for
several members of the Defense.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Mr. Alderman.

MR. ALDERMAN: The aggressive war having been initiated in September
1939, and Poland having been totally defeated shortly after the initial
assaults, the Nazi aggressors converted the war into a general war of
aggression extending into Scandinavia, into the Low Countries, and into
the Balkans. Under the division of the case between the Four Chief
Prosecutors, this aspect of the matter is left to presentation by the
British Chief Prosecutor.

Another change that we have made in our plan, which I perhaps should
mention, is that following the opening statement by the British Chief
Prosecutor on Count Two, we expect to resume the detailed handling of
the later phases of the aggressive war phase of the case. The British,
instead of the Americans, will deal with the details of aggression
against Poland. Then with this expansion of the war in Europe and then,
as a joint part of the American case under Count One and the British
case under Count Two, I shall take up the aggression against Russia and
the Japanese aggression in detail. So that the remaining two subjects,
with which I shall ultimately deal in more detail, and now by
presentation of specifically significant documents, are the case of the
attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 22nd of June
1941 and the case on collaboration between Italy and Japan and Germany
and the resulting attack on the United States on the 7th of December
1941.

As to the case on aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall at this
point present two documents. The first of these two documents
establishes the premeditation and deliberation which preceded the
attack. Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the
Nazis had a code name for the secret operation “Case Green”, so in the
case of aggression against the Soviet Union, they had a code name “Case
Barbarossa.”

THE PRESIDENT: How do you spell that?

MR. ALDERMAN: B-a-r-b-a-r-o-s-s-a, after Barbarossa of Kaiser
Friederich. From the files of the OKW at Flensburg we have a secret
directive, Number 21, issued from the Führer’s headquarters on 18
December 1940, relating to Case Barbarossa. This directive is more than
six months in advance of the attack. Other evidence will show that the
planning occurred even earlier. The document is signed by Hitler and is
initialled by the Defendant Jodl and the Defendant Keitel. This secret
order was issued in nine copies. The captured document is the fourth of
these nine copies. It is Document Number 446-PS in our numbered series.

I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-31.

If the Tribunal please, I think it will be sufficient for me to read the
first page of that directive, the first page of the English translation.
The paging may differ in the German original.

It is headed “The Führer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed
Forces,” with a number of initials, the meaning of which I don’t know,
except OKW. It seems to be indicated to go to GK chiefs, which I suppose
to be General Kommando chiefs:

    “The Führer’s headquarters, 18 December 1940. Secret. Only
    through officer. Nine copies. 4th copy. Directive Number 21,
    Case Barbarossa.

    “The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia
    in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England.
    (Case Barbarossa.)

    “For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available
    units with the reservation that the occupied territories will
    have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.

    “For the Eastern campaign the Air Force will have to free such
    strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick
    completion of the ground operations may be expected and that
    damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much
    as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East
    is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle
    and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently
    protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on
    England, and especially the supply for them, must not be
    permitted to break down.

    “Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains
    unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.

    “If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for
    action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended
    beginning of operations.

    “Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not
    yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15
    May 1941.

    “Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an
    attack will not be recognized.

    “The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the
    following basis:

    “1. General Purpose:

    “The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be
    destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges
    with tanks, and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into
    the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.

    “In quick pursuit, a line is to be reached from where the
    Russian Air Force will no longer be able to attack German Reich
    territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from
    Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangel. In case of
    necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia
    could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.

    “In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet
    will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to
    fight.

    “Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force is to be
    prevented through powerful blows at the beginning of the
    operations.”

Another secret document, captured from the OKW files. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps that would be a convenient time to
adjourn for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: If it pleases the Tribunal, another secret document
captured from the OKW files, we think establishes the motive for the
attack on the Soviet Union. It also establishes the full awareness of
the Nazi conspirators of the Crimes against Humanity which would result
from their attack. The document is a memorandum of 2 May 1941,
concerning the result of a discussion on that day with the state
secretaries concerning the Case Barbarossa. The document is initialled
by a Major Von Gusovius, a member of the staff of General Thomas set up
to handle the economic exploitations of the territory occupied by the
Germans during the course of the aggression against Russia. The document
is numbered 2718-PS in our numbered series of documents. I offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-32.

I shall simply read the first two paragraphs of this document, including
the introductory matter:

    “Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files 1a. Second copy
    to General Schubert, May 2, 1941.”

    “Memorandum about the result of today’s discussion with the
    state secretaries about Barbarossa.

    “1. The War can only be continued if all Armed Forces are fed by
    Russia in the third year of war.

    “2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people
    will be starved to death if we take out of the country the
    things necessary for us.”

That document has already been commented on and quoted from in Mr.
Justice Jackson’s opening statement. The staggering implications of that
document are hard to realize. In the words of the document, the motive
for the attack was that the war which the Nazi conspirators had launched
in September 1939 “can only be continued if all Armed Forces are fed by
Russia in the third year of the war.” Perhaps, there never was a more
sinister sentence written than the sentence in this document which
reads:

    “There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will
    be starved to death if we take out of the country the things
    necessary for us.”

The result is known to all of us.

I turn now to the Nazi collaboration with Italy and Japan and the
resulting attack on the United States on 7 December 1941. With the
unleashing of the German aggressive war against the Soviet Union in June
1941, the Nazi conspirators, and in particular, the Defendant
Ribbentrop, called upon the eastern co-architect of the New Order,
Japan, to attack in the rear. Our evidence will show that they incited
and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result in an attack
on the United States. For a time, they maintained their preference that
the United States not be involved in the conflict, realizing the
military implication of an entry of the United States into the war.
However, their incitement did result in the attack on Pearl Harbor, and
long prior to that attack, they had assured the Japanese that they would
declare war on the United States should a United States-Japanese
conflict break out. It was in reliance on those assurances that the
Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.

On the present discussion of this phase of the case, I shall offer only
one document to prove this point. The document was captured from the
files of the German Foreign Office. It consists of notes dated 4 April
1941, signed by “Schmidt,” regarding discussions between the Führer and
the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Defendant
Ribbentrop. The document is numbered 1881-PS in our numbered series, and
I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-33. In the original, it is in very
large, typewritten form in German. I shall read what I deem to be the
pertinent parts of this document, beginning with the four paragraphs;
first reading the heading, the heading being:

    “Notes regarding the discussion between the Führer and the
    Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Reich
    Foreign Minister and the Reich Minister of State Meissner, in
    Berlin, on 4 April 1941.

    “Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the Führer should
    instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as
    broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military
    Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly
    concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making
    available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as
    the latest technical improvements and inventions.”—For the
    record, I am reading on what is page 6 of the German original.—

    “Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United
    States. In case that country should decide to attack Singapore,
    the Japanese Navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight
    with the United States, because in that case America probably
    would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed
    that the United States could be restrained, by diplomatic
    exertions, from entering the war at the side of Great Britain.
    Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst
    situation,—that is, with war against America. They were of the
    opinion that such a war would extend for 5 years or longer, and
    would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific, and
    would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German
    experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to
    Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted
    and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all
    details such as periscopes and such like, could best be
    exploited by Japan.

    “To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Führer should see to it
    that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal
    of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning
    navy and army which were needed by the Japanese.

    “The Führer promised this and pointed out that Germany, too,
    considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but
    that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In
    Germany one was of the opinion that America’s contributions
    depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this
    again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany’s war
    against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening, not merely
    against England, but also against America. Germany has made her
    preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would
    conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats
    and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which
    would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would
    be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the
    German soldiers naturally rank high above the Americans.

    “In the further course of the discussion, the Führer pointed out
    that Germany, on her part, would immediately take the
    consequences if Japan would get involved with the United States.
    It did not matter with whom the United States would first get
    involved, whether with Germany or with Japan. They would always
    try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an
    understanding with the other country subsequently, but to
    liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would
    strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a
    conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the
    tripartite powers lies in their joint action; their weakness
    would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

    “Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Führer might
    give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German
    authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the
    latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to
    them because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a
    conflict with the United States.

    “As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained
    further that he has always declared in his country that sooner
    or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if
    Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion
    this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His
    argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not
    decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon
    herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps
    avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained
    predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan,
    many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka
    was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous
    thoughts. He, however, stated that if Japan continued to walk
    along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway
    and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances
    than at present.

    “The Führer replied that he could well understand the situation
    of Matsuoka, because he himself had been in similar situations
    (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of
    Armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit
    favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow
    unavoidable fight, at a time when he himself was still young and
    full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by
    events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to
    reply instantly to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be
    it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers
    come to them, but who will bravely face them.

    “Matsuoka replied that the United States, or rather their ruling
    politicians, had recently still attempted a last maneuver
    towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan
    on account of China or the South Seas, provided that Japan gave
    free passage to the consignment of rubber and tin to America to
    their place of destination. However, America would war against
    Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the
    intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an
    argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the
    Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines
    which many had received.

    “The Führer commented on this, that this attitude of America did
    not mean anything, but that the United States had the hope that,
    as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could
    advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in
    case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally
    isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

    “The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans
    precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the
    powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other
    hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a
    joint action of Japan and Germany.

    “Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give
    to the Führer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude
    inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him
    regretfully of the fact that he, Matsuoka, in his capacity as
    Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, could not utter in Japan
    a single word of all that he had expounded before the Führer and
    the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause
    him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once
    before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese
    Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close friend something
    about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these
    things, and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he, as
    Foreign Minister, had to oppose energetically, though as a rule
    he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also
    could not indicate how soon he could report on the questions
    discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would
    have to study exactly and carefully, in the first place, the
    development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable
    moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the
    Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to
    be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be
    spoiled by talk.

    “Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that
    would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of
    conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he
    succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He
    himself felt confident that he would succeed.

    “On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the
    Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the
    Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however,
    state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

    “Besides this, Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in
    the matter of Singapore, because he had reason to fear that by
    cabling, something might leak out. If necessary, he would send a
    courier.

    “The Führer agreed and assured, after all, that he could rest
    entirely assured of German reticence.

    “Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but
    unfortunately could not say the same for Japan.

    “The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some
    personal parting words.

    “Berlin, the 4th of April 1941. (Signed) Schmidt.”

This completes the presentation of what I have called the “handful of
selected documents,” offered not as a detailed treatment of any of these
wars of aggression, but merely to prove the deliberate planning, the
deliberate premeditation with which each of these aggressions was
carried out.

I turn to a more detailed and more or less chronological presentation of
the various stages of the aggression.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 27 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]




                               SIXTH DAY
                        Tuesday, 27 November 1945


                           _Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States. Mr.
Alderman, before you begin, I think it would be better, for the purpose
of the Tribunal, when citing documents, if you would refer to them not
only by the United States exhibit number and the PS document number, but
also by the document book identification. Each document book, as I
understand it, has either a letter or a number. They are numbered
alphabetically, I think. If that is not done, when we have got a great
number of document books before us, it is very difficult to find where
the particular exhibit is.

MR. ALDERMAN: I can see that, yes.

May it please the Tribunal, the handful of selected documents which I
presented yesterday constitute a cross section of the aggressive war
case, as a whole. They do not purport to cover the details of any of the
phases of the aggressive war case. In effect they do amount to a running
account of the entire matter.

Before moving ahead with more detailed evidence, I think it might be
helpful to pause at this point, to present to the Tribunal a chart. This
chart presents visually some of the key points in the development of the
Nazi aggression. The Tribunal may find it helpful as a kind of visual
summary of some of the evidence received yesterday and also as a
background for some of the evidence which remains to be introduced. I am
quite certain that, as your minds go back to those days, you remember
the maps that appeared from time to time in the public press, as these
tremendous movements developed in Europe. I am quite certain that you
must have formed the concept, as I did in those days, of the gradually
developing head of a wolf.

In that first chart you only have an incipient wolf. He lacks a lower
jaw, the part shown in red, but when that wolf moved forward and took
over Austria—the Anschluss—that red portion became solid black. It
became the jaw of the wolf, and when that lower jaw was acquired,
Czechoslovakia was already, with its head and the main part of its body,
in the mouth of the wolf.

Then on chart two you see the mountainous portions, the fortified
portions of Czechoslovakia. In red, you see the Sudetenland territories
which were first taken over by the Pact of Munich, whereupon
Czechoslovakia’s head became diminutive in the mouth of the wolf.

And in chart three you see the diminishing head in red, with its neck
practically broken, and all that was necessary was the taking over of
Bohemia and Moravia and the wolf’s head became a solid, black blot on
the map of Europe, with arrows indicating incipient further aggressions,
which, of course, occurred.

That is the visual picture that I have never been able to wipe out of my
mind, because it seems to demonstrate the inevitability of everything
that went along after the taking over of Austria.

The detailed more or less chronological presentation of the aggressive
war case will be divided into seven distinct sections. The first section
is that concerning preparation for aggression during the period of 1933
to 1936, roughly. The second section deals with aggression against
Austria. The third section deals with aggression against Czechoslovakia.
The fourth section deals with aggression against Poland and the
initiation of actual war. For reasons of convenience, the details of the
Polish section will be presented after the British Chief Prosecutor
presents his opening statement to the Tribunal. The fifth section deals
with the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression, by
invasions into Scandinavia, the Lowlands, and the Balkans. The details
on this section of the case will be presented by the British Chief
Prosecutor. The sixth section deals with aggression against the Soviet
Union, which I shall expect to present. For reasons of convenience
again, the details on this section, like the details on aggression
against Poland, will be presented after the British Prosecutor has made
his opening statement to the Tribunal. The seventh section will deal
with collaboration with Italy and Japan and the aggression against the
United States.

I turn now to the first of these sections, the part of the case
concerning preparation for aggression during the period 1933 to 1936.
The particular section of the Indictment to which this discussion
addresses itself is paragraph IV (F) and sub-paragraph 2 (a), (b), (c),
(d), (e), and (f), which I need not read at a glance, as the Tribunal
will recall the allegation. It will be necessary, as I proceed, to make
reference to certain provisions of the Charter, and to certain
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Treaty between the
United States and Germany restoring friendly relations, 25 August 1921,
which incorporates certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and
certain provisions of the Rhine Treaty of Locarno of 16 October 1925.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, is it not intended that this document book
should have some identifying letter or number?

MR. ALDERMAN: “M”, I am informed. I do not offer those treaties in
evidence at this time, because the British will offer all the pertinent
treaties in their aspect of the case.

The Nazi plans for aggressive war started very soon after World War I.
Their modest origin and rather fantastic nature, and the fact that they
could have been interrupted at numerous points, do not detract from the
continuity of the planning. The focus of this part of the Indictment on
the period from 1933 to 1945, does not disassociate these events from
what occurred in the entire preceding period. Thus, the ascendancy of
Hitler and the Nazis to political power in 1933, was already a
well-advanced milestone on the German road to progress.

By 1933 the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, had reached very substantial
proportions. At that time, their plans called for the acquisition of
political control of Germany. This was indispensable for the
consolidation within the country of all the internal resources and
potentialities.

As soon as there was sufficient indication of successful progress along
this line of internal consolidation, the next step was to become
disengaged from some of the external disadvantages of existing
international limitations and obligations. The restrictions of the
Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development of strength in all the
fields necessary, if one were to make war. Although there had been an
increasing amount of circumvention and violation from the very time that
Versailles came into effect, such operations under disguise and
subterfuge could not attain proportions adequate for the objectives of
the Nazis. To get the Treaty of Versailles out of the way was
indispensable to the development of the extensive military power which
they had to have for their purposes. Similarly, as part of the same plan
and for the same reasons, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament
Conference and from the League of Nations. It was impossible to carry
out their plans on the basis of existing international obligations or of
the orthodox kind of future commitments.

The points mentioned in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the indictment are
now historical facts of which we expect the Tribunal to take judicial
notice.

It goes without saying that every military and diplomatic operation was
preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all
participating forces. At the same time each point was part of a
long-prepared plan of aggression. Each represents a necessary step in
the direction of the specific aggression which was subsequently
committed.

To develop an extensive argument would, perhaps, be the unnecessary
laboring of the obvious. What I intend to say is largely the bringing to
light of information disclosed in illustrative documents which were
hitherto unavailable.

The three things of immediate international significance referred to in
this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the Indictment are:

First, the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of
Nations; second, the institution of compulsory military service; and,
third, the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Each
of these steps was progressively more serious than the matter of
international relations. In each of these steps Germany anticipated the
possibility of sanction being applied by other countries and, in
particular, a strong military action from France, with the possible
assistance of England. However, the conspirators were determined that
nothing less than a preventive war would stop them, and they also
estimated correctly, that no one or combination of Big Powers would
undertake the responsibility of such a war. The withdrawal from the
Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations was, of course,
action that did not violate any international obligation. The League
Covenant provided the procedure for withdrawal. However, in this case
and as part of the bigger plan, the significance of these actions cannot
be disassociated from the general conspiracy and the plans for
aggression. The announcement of the institution of universal military
service was a more daring action with a more overt significance. It was
a violation of Versailles, but they got away with it. Then, came the
outright military defiance, the occupation of the demilitarized zone of
the Rhineland.

Still on the Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2, which alleges the
determination of the Nazi conspirators to remove the restrictions of
Versailles, the fact that the Nazi plans in this respect started very
early is not only confirmed by their own statements, but they boasted
about their long planning and careful execution.

I read to you yesterday at length from our Exhibit 789-PS, Exhibit
USA-23, Hitler’s speech to all Supreme Commanders, 23 November 1939. I
need not read it again. He stated there that his primary goal was to
wipe out Versailles. After 4 years of actual war, the Defendant Jodl, as
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered an address to
the Reich and to the Gauleiter in which he traced the development of
German strength. The seizure of power to him meant the restoration of
fighting sovereignty, including conscription, occupation of the
Rhineland, and rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armor and air
forces.

I have, if the Tribunal please, our Document Number L-172. It is a
photostat of a microfilm of a speech by General Jodl, and I offer that
photostat as Exhibit USA-34. I shall read, if the Tribunal please, only
a part of that, but starting at the beginning.

The speech is entitled “The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the
Fifth Year of War.” It is a kind of retrospective summary by the
Defendant General Jodl. “A lecture by the Chief of the General Staff of
the Armed Forces to the Reich- and Gauleiter, delivered in Munich on 7
November 1943.” I am reading from the English translation:

    “Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you
    a review today of the strategic position at the beginning of the
    fifth year of war.

    “I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I
    undertook this none-too-easy task. It is not possible to do it
    justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to talk
    about what will come but one must say frankly what the situation
    is. No one, the Führer has ordered, may know more or be told
    more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no
    doubt at all in my mind, gentlemen, but that you need a great
    deal, in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your
    Gaue, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the
    widespread enemy propaganda, defeatism, and malicious rumors are
    concentrated. Up and down the country the devil of subversion
    strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or—as they call
    it—a political solution. They say we must negotiate while there
    is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use
    of to attack the natural feeling of the people, that in this war
    there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of
    the nation; the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy
    propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to
    know the true situation, and for this reason I believe that I am
    justified in giving you a perfectly open and unvarnished account
    of the present state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure
    of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify
    the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided
    by force of arms, but by the will to resist of the entire
    people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home.
    Italy suffered not military defeat but moral defeat. She broke
    down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected
    but—through the cowardice of these criminal traitors—a fate a
    thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side
    would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you,
    gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data
    concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as
    your secret; all the rest is at your disposal, without
    restriction, for application in your activities as leaders of
    the people.

    “The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and
    everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of
    Liberation of Greater Germany and, by attacking, parried the
    danger which menaced us . . . both from Poland and from the
    Western Powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the
    direction of the Mediterranean and into Russia—these also
    aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war, so
    long as we were successful. It was not until more serious
    set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to
    become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask
    themselves whether, perhaps, we had not undertaken more than we
    could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this
    questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for
    use in your own work of enlightenment, is one of the main points
    of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:

    “I. A review of the most important questions of past
    developments;

    “II. Consideration of the present situation;

    “III. The foundations of our confidence in victory.

    “In view of my position as Military Advisor to the Führer, I
    shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own
    personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time,
    that in view of the Protean nature of this war, I shall in this
    way, be giving expression to only one aspect of the events.

    “I. The review:

    “1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and its
    struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the
    outer liberation from the bonds of the dictate of Versailles, is
    not one on which I need expatiate, in this circle. I should
    like, however, to mention at this point how clearly all
    thoughtful professional soldiers realize what an important part
    has been played by the National Socialist movement in
    reawakening the military spirit (the Wehrwille), in nurturing
    fighting strength (the Wehrkraft), and in rearming the German
    people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the
    numerically small Reichswehr would never have been able to cope
    with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of
    action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at—and has so happily
    been successful in bringing about—was the fusion of these two
    forces.

    “2. The seizure of power . . .”—I invite the Tribunal’s
    attention to the frequency with which that expression occurs in
    all of these documents.—“The seizure of power by the Nazi Party
    in its turn had meant, in the first place, the restoration of
    military sovereignty.”

That is the German word “Wehrhoheit”—a kind of euphemism there—“the
highness of defense.” I think it really means “fighting sovereignty.”
Wehrhoheit also meant conscription, occupation of the Rhineland and
rearmament, with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern
armored and air arm.

    “3. The Austrian Anschluss . . .”—Anschluss means “locking on
    to,” I think. They latched on to Austria and—“The Austrian
    Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfillment
    of an old national aim, but also had the effect both of
    reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving
    our strategic position. Whereas, up until then, the territory of
    Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into
    Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base
    for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself
    was now enclosed by pincers.”

I wish the Tribunal would contemplate the chart a moment and see that
worm-like form of Czechoslovakia, which General Jodl calls a “wasp waist
in the direction of France,” and then he very accurately described what
happened when Austria was taken by the Anschluss, that the “wasp waist”
was “enclosed in the pincers.”

I resume reading:

    “Her own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that
    she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with
    vigor before effective aid from the West could be expected to
    arrive.

    “This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by
    the construction of the West Wall, which, in contradistinction
    to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and
    resignation but one intended to afford rear coverage for an
    active policy in the East.

    “4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn
    of 1938 and spring of 1939”—that is—the two phases in
    Czechoslovakia—“and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the
    territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became
    possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or
    less favorable strategic premises.”—I think it needs nothing
    more than a glance at the progressive chart to see what those
    favorable strategic premises were.—

    “5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war,
    and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the
    struggle with Poland, in itself unavoidable, was favorably
    selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in
    doubt, because the relatively strong opponent collapsed more
    quickly than expected, and the Western Powers who were Poland’s
    friends, although they did declare war on us and form a second
    front, nevertheless made no use of the possibilities open to
    them of wresting the initiative from our hands. Concerning the
    course taken by the Polish campaign, nothing further need be
    said but that it proved to an extent which surprised the whole
    world a fact which until then had not been certain by any means,
    namely, the high state of efficiency of the young armed forces
    of Greater Germany.”

If the Court please, there is a long review by General Jodl in this
document. I could read on with interest and some enthusiasm, but I
believe I have read enough to show that General Jodl by this document
identifies himself fully with the Nazi movement. This document shows
that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as he is concerned, it
identifies the military with the political, and the immediate point on
which I had offered the document was to show the deliberation with which
the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized
zone of the Rhineland was militarized and fortified.

In one of Adolf Hitler’s reviews of the 6-year period between his
ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only
admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range
planning. I bring up again, if the Tribunal please, the Document L-79,
which was offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit USA-27. That is the
minutes of a conference of the Führer by Schmundt, his adjutant. In as
large a staff as ours we inevitably fall into a kind of patois or lingo,
as Americans say. We also refer to this as “Little Schmundt.” The large
file that I offered yesterday, we call “Big Schmundt.”

At this point, I merely wish to read two sentences from Page 1 of that
document which we call “Little Schmundt.”

    “In the period 1933 to 1939 progress was made in all fields. Our
    military system improved enormously.”

And then, just above the middle of the second page of the English
translation:

    “The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good
    use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in
    harmony with our aims.”

One of the most significant direct preparations for aggressive war is
found in the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, which I offered in
evidence yesterday as Exhibit USA-24 and commented on then. I need not
repeat that comment. The law went into effect upon its passage. It
stated at the outset that it was to be made public instantly, but at the
end of it Adolf Hitler signed the decree ordering that it be kept
secret. I commented on that sufficiently yesterday.

General Thomas, Thomas, as we call him, who was in charge of War and
Armament Economy and for some time a high ranking member of the German
High Council, refers to this law as “the cornerstone of war
preparations.” He points out that, although the law was not made public
until the outbreak of war, it was put into immediate execution as a
program of preparation.

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of General Thomas’ work, _A
History of the German War- and Armament-Economy, 1923-1944_, Page 25. We
have the volume here, in German, so that anyone who wishes may examine
it. I don’t care to offer the entire volume in evidence unless the Court
think I should. We do give it an exhibit number, Exhibit USA-35, but I
simply should like to place it in the files as a reference work
implementing judicial notice, if that is practicable.

THE PRESIDENT: You want it simply for the purpose of showing that
General Thomas said that that law was the cornerstone of war? That has
already been passed into the record.

MR. ALDERMAN: I want to say to counsel for the defendants that it is
here if they care to consult it at any time.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. ALDERMAN: I should have identified it by our number, 2353-PS.

This secret law remained in effect until 4 September 1938, at which time
it was replaced by another secret Defense Law, revising the system of
defense organization and directing more detailed preparations for the
approaching status of mobilization, which I think was the euphemism for
war.

These laws will be discussed more extensively in connection with other
sections of our presentation. They have been discussed by Mr. Dodd in
connection with the economic preparations for the war.

The second secret Defense Law I offer in evidence, as our serial number
2194-PS. I offer it as Exhibit USA-36.

As to that document I only intend to read the two covering letters:

    “Reich Defense Law; the Ministry for Economy and Labor, Saxony;
    Dresden 6; 4 September 1939; Telephone: 52.151, long distance;
    Top Secret.

    “Transportation Section, attention of Construction Chief
    Counsellor Hirche or representative in the office; stamp of
    receipt of the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia; received
    Prague, 5 September 1939, No. 274.

    “Enclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4
    September 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reich
    Minister of Transportation, dated 7 October 1938, RL/W/
    10.2212/38, Top Secret, and 17 July 1939, RL/LV 1.2173/39, Top
    Secret, for your information and observance.

    “By order, signed Kretschmar. 3 inclosures. Stamp: complete to
    Dresden, 4 September 1939, signed Schneider.

    “Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, with 3 inclosures,
    signed 5 September 1939, and returned to Construction Counsellor
    Kretschmar.”

The whole point being that it was enclosing a second secret Reich
Defense Law under top-secret cover.

Now, next I refer to Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2 (a). That paragraph
of the Indictment refers to four points:

(1) Secret rearmament from 1933 to March 1935; (2) the training of
military personnel (that includes secret or camouflage training); (3)
production of munitions of war; and, (4) the building of an air force.

All four of these points are included in the general plan for the breach
of the Treaty of Versailles and for the ensuing aggressions. The facts
of rearmament and of its secrecy are self-evident from the events that
followed. The significant phase of this activity insofar as the
Indictment is concerned, lies in the fact that all this was necessary in
order to break the barriers of the Versailles Treaty and of the Locarno
Pact, and necessary to the aggressive wars which were to follow. The
extent and nature of those activities could only have been for
aggressive purposes, and the highest importance which the Government
attached to the secrecy of the program is emphasized by the disguised
financing, both before and after the announcement of conscription and
the rebuilding of the Army, 16 March 1935.

I have, if the Court please, an unsigned memorandum by the Defendant
Schacht dated 3 May 1935 entitled “The Financing of the Armament
Program” (Finanzierung der Rüstung). As I say, it is not signed by the
Defendant Schacht, but he identified it as being his memorandum in an
interrogation on the 16th of October 1945. I would assume that he would
still admit that it is his memorandum. That memorandum has been referred
to but I believe not introduced or accepted in evidence. I identify it
by our Number 1168-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-37.

I think it is quite significant, and with the permission of the Court I
shall read the entire memorandum, reminding you that the German
interpreter has the original German before him to read into the
transcript. “Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler” identified by Schacht as
Exhibit A, interrogation 16 October 1945, Page 40. May 3, 1935 is the
date of the memorandum.

    “Financing of Armament. The following explanations are based
    upon the thought that the accomplishment of the armament program
    with speed and in quantity is the problem of German politics;
    that everything else therefore should be subordinated to this
    purpose as long as the main purpose is not imperiled by
    neglecting all other questions. Even after March 16, 1935 the
    difficulty remains that one cannot undertake the open
    propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of
    armament without endangering our position internationally
    (without loss to our foreign trade). The already nearly
    impossible financing of the armament program is rendered hereby
    exceptionally difficult.

    “Another supposition must also be emphasized. The printing press
    can be used only for the financing of armament to such a degree
    as permitted by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation
    increases the prices of foreign raw materials and increases the
    domestic prices and is therefore like a snake biting its own
    tail. The circumstance that our armament had to be camouflaged
    completely till 16 March 1935, and since this date the
    camouflage had to be continued to an even larger extent, made it
    necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already at
    the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have
    been natural to start it (i.e., the printing press) at the final
    point of finance. In the portfolio of the Reichsbank are
    segregated bills of exchange for this purpose (that is,
    armament) of 3,775 millions and 866 millions, altogether 4,641
    millions, out of which bills of exchange for armament amount to
    2,374 million Reichsmark, that is of April 30, 1935. The
    Reichsbank has invested the amount of marks under its
    jurisdiction, but belonging to foreigners, in bank notes of
    armament.

    “Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our
    political opponents. Furthermore, 500 million Reichsmark were
    used for financing of armaments which originated out of the
    federal loans which were invested in the saving banks in the
    year 1935. In the regular budget the following amounts were
    provided for the Armed Forces:

    “For the budget period 1933 to 1934—750 million Reichsmark; for
    the budget period 1934 to 1935—1,100 million Reichsmark; and
    for the budget period 1935 to 1936—2,500 million Reichsmark.

    “The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after
    the budget 1935 to 1936 to 5 to 6 billion Reichsmark. This total
    deficit is already financed at the present time by short-term
    credits of the money market. It therefore reduces in advance the
    possibilities of utilization of the public market for the
    armament. The Reichsfinanzminister”—Minister of
    Finance—“correctly points out at the defense of the budget:

    “‘As a permanent yearly deficit is an impossibility, as we
    cannot figure with security increased tax revenues in an amount
    balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, as on the
    other hand a balanced budget is the only secure basis for the
    impending great task of military policy,’”—I interpolate that
    evidently the Defendant Schacht knew about the impending great
    military task to be faced by Germany.—“‘for all these reasons
    we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious budget
    policy, which solves the problem of armament financing by
    organic and planned reduction of other expenditures, not only
    from the point of receipt, but also from the point of
    expenditure, that is, by saving.’

    “How urgent this question is, can be deduced from the following,
    that very many tasks have been undertaken by the State and
    Party”—it isn’t ever just the State; it is the State and the
    Party—“and are now in process, all of which are not covered by
    the budget, but from contributions and credits, which have to be
    raised by industry in addition to the regular taxes. The
    existence of various budgets side by side, which serve more or
    less public tasks, is the greatest impediment for gaining a
    clear view of the possibilities of financing the armaments. A
    large number of ministries and various branches of the Party
    have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities
    of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of
    finance of the State, but not subject to the control of the
    Finanzminister”—Minister of Finance—“and therefore also not
    subject to the control of the Cabinet. Just as in the sphere of
    politics the much too far-reaching delegation of legislative
    powers to individuals brought about various states within the
    State, exactly in the same way the condition of various branches
    of State and Party, working side by side and against each other,
    has a devastating effect on the possibility of finance. If, in
    this territory, concentration and unified control is not
    introduced very soon, the solution of the already impossible
    task of armament finance is endangered.

    “We have the following tasks:

    “(1) A deputy is entrusted with, I suppose, finding all sources
    and revenues, which have origin in contributions to the Federal
    Government, to the State and Party, and in profits of public and
    Party enterprises.

    “(2) Furthermore experts entrusted by the Führer have to examine
    how these amounts were used and which of these amounts in the
    future can be withdrawn from their previous purpose.

    “(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all
    public and Party organizations, to what extent this property can
    be used for the purpose of armament financing.

    “(4) The federal Ministry of Finances is to be entrusted to
    examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of new
    taxes or the increasing of existing taxes.

    “The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank, under
    existing political conditions, was a necessity, and the
    political success proved the correctness of this action. The
    other possibilities of armament financing have to be started now
    under any circumstance. For this purpose all absolutely
    nonessential expenditures for other purposes must not take
    place, and the total financial strength of Germany, limited as
    it is, has to be concentrated for the one purpose of armament
    financing. Whether the problem of financing as outlined in this
    program succeeds remains to be seen, but without such
    concentration it will fail with absolute certainty.”

Being sort of a hand in finance myself, I can feel some sympathy with
the Defendant Schacht as he was wrestling with these problems.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn for 10
minutes?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: 21 May 1935 was a very important date in the Nazi
calendar. As I have already indicated, it was on that date that they
passed the secret Reich Defense Law, which is our Document 2261-PS. The
secrecy of their armament operations had already reached the point
beyond which they could no longer maintain successful camouflage and,
since their program called for still further expansion, they made a
unilateral renunciation of the armament provisions of the Versailles
Treaty on the same date, 21 May 1935.

I refer to Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on 21 May 1935; our Document
Number 2288-PS. We have here the original volume of the _Völkische
Beobachter_ (the “Popular Observer”, I suppose, is the correct
translation), Volume 48, 1935, 122-151, May, and the date 22 May 1935,
which gave his speech under the heading (if I may translate, perhaps):
“The Führer Notifies the World of the Way to Real Peace.”

I offer that part of that volume identified as our Number 2288-PS, as
Exhibit USA-38, and from that I shall read, beginning with the fifth
paragraph in the English translation. I am sorry, I said the fifth
paragraph—this indicates on Page 3. It is after he discusses some
general conclusions and then there is a paragraph numbered 1, that says:

    “1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva
    Resolution of 17 March. . . .

    “The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany
    unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the Dictate of
    Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated by those
    powers who could not make up their minds to follow the
    disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as
    agreed upon by the Treaty.

    “2. Because the other powers did not live up to their
    obligations under the disarmament program, the Government of the
    German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles,
    which are nothing but a discrimination of the German nation”—I
    suppose “against the German nation”—“for an unlimited period of
    time, since through them, Germany is being nailed down in a
    unilateral manner, contrary to the spirit of the agreement.”

If the Tribunal please, needless to say, when I cite Adolf Hitler, I
don’t necessarily vouch for the absolute truth of everything that he
presents. This is a public speech he made before the world, and it is
for the Tribunal to judge whether he is presenting a pretext or whether
he is presenting the truth.

In conjunction with other phases of planning and preparation for
aggressive war, there were various programs for direct and indirect
training of a military nature. This included not only the training of
military personnel, but also the establishment and training of other
para-military organizations, such as the police force, which could be,
and were absorbed by, the Army.

These are shown in other parts of the case presented by the Prosecution.
However, the extent of this program for military training is indicated
by Hitler’s boast of the expenditure of 90 billion Reichsmark during the
period of 1933 to 1939 in the building up of the Armed Forces.

I have another volume of the _Völkischer Beobachter_, Volume 52, 1939—I
think the issue of 2 and 3 September 1939—which I offer in evidence as
Exhibit USA-39; and there appears a speech by Adolf Hitler, with his
picture, under the heading which, if I may be permitted to try to
translate, reads: “The Führer Announces the Battle for the Justice and
Security of the Reich.”

That is a speech, if the Court please, by Adolf Hitler, on 1 September
1939, the date of the attack on Poland, identified by our number
2322-PS, and I read from the bottom of Page 3, the last paragraph
starting on the page:

    “For more than 6 years now, I have been engaged in building up
    the German Armed Forces. During this period more than 90 billion
    Reichsmark were spent building up the Wehrmacht. Today, ours are
    the best-equipped armed forces in the world, and they are
    superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can never be
    shaken.”

The secret nature of this training program and the fact of its early
development is illustrated by a reference to the secret training of
flying personnel, back in 1932, as well as the early plans to build a
military air force. A report was sent to the Defendant Hess in a letter
from one Schickedantz to the Defendant Rosenberg for delivery to Hess. I
suppose that Schickedantz was very anxious that no one but Hess should
get this letter, and therefore sent it to Rosenberg for personal
delivery.

This document points out that the civilian pilots should be so organized
as to enable their transfer into the military air force organization.

This letter is our Document 1143-PS, dated 20 October 1932, and I now
offer it in evidence as U. S. Exhibit 40. It starts: “Lieber Alfred”
(referring to Alfred Rosenberg), and is signed: “Mit bestem Gruss, Dein
Amo.” Amo, I think, was the first name of Schickedantz.

    “Dear Alfred: I am sending you enclosed a communication from the
    RWM forwarded to me by our confidential
    man”—Vertrauensmann—“which indeed is very interesting. I
    believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will
    not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report is not
    known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our
    long friend.”

I suppose that means “our tall friend.” I may interpolate that the
Defendant Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945, identified
this “big friend” or “tall friend” as being one Von Alvensleben.

    “I am enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to
    transmit the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to
    write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere.
    Mit bestem Gruss, Dein Amo.”

Then enclosed with that is “Air Force Organization”:

    “Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to
    provide for the case of the armament of the Air Force.

    “Entire management as a civilian organization will be
    transferred to Colonel Von Willberg, at present Commander of
    Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichswehr, is going
    on leave of absence.

    “(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air-lines in such a way
    as to enable their transfer to the air force organization.

    “(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to
    be done within the organization for military flying of the
    Stahlhelm”—I believe that means the “steel helmet”—“which is
    being turned over to Colonel Hänel, retired.

    “All existing organizations for sport-flying are to be used for
    military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military
    flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The
    Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks per
    hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he
    himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided in case
    of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization,
    proprietor, and crew, in the proportion of 10-20-20. . . .
    Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement
    (40). We therefore have to expect that most proprietors of
    planes or flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm
    organization. It must be achieved that equal conditions will be
    granted by the RWM, also the NSDAP organization.”

The program of rearmament and the objectives of circumventing and
breaching the Versailles Treaty are forcefully shown by a number of Navy
documents, showing the participation and cooperation of the German Navy
in this rearmament program, secret at first.

When they deemed it safe to say so, they openly acknowledged that it had
always been their objective to break Versailles.

In 1937 the Navy High Command published a secret book entitled _The
Fight of the Navy Against Versailles, 1919 to 1935_. The preface refers
to the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace
Treaty of Versailles. The table of contents includes a variety of Navy
activities, such as saving of coastal guns from destruction as required
by Versailles; independent armament measures behind the back of the
Government and behind the back of the legislative bodies; resurrection
of the U-boat arm; economic rearmament and camouflage rearmament from
1933 to the freedom from the restrictions in 1935.

This document points out the significant effect of the seizure of power
by the Nazis in 1933 on increasing the size and determining the nature
of the rearmament program. It also refers to the far-reaching
independence in the building and development of the Navy, which was only
hampered in so far as concealment of rearmament had to be considered in
compliance with the Versailles Treaty.

With the restoration of what was called the military sovereignty of the
Reich in 1935 and the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the
Rhineland, the external camouflage of rearmament was eliminated.

We have, if the Court please, a photostat of the German printed book to
which I have referred, entitled _Der Kampf der Marine gegen Versailles_
(The Fight of the Navy against Versailles) _1919 to 1935_, written by
Sea Captain Schüssler. It has the symbol of the Nazi Party with the
swastika in the spread eagle on the cover sheet, and it is headed
“_Secret_”, underscored. It is our Document C-156. It is a book of 76
pages of text, followed by index lists and charts. I offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-41. I may say that the Defendant Raeder
identified this book in a recent interrogation and explained that the
Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the Versailles Treaty and at the
same time to make progress in naval development. I should like to read
from this book, if the Court please, the preface and one or two other
portions of the book:

    “The object and aim of this memorandum, under the heading
    ‘Preface’, is to draw a technically reliable picture based on
    documentary records and the evidence of those who took part in
    the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the
    Peace Treaty of Versailles. It shows that the Reich Navy, after
    the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow,
    did not rest but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable
    enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man
    Navy, the basis for a greater development in the future, and so
    create, by the work of soldiers and technicians, the primary
    condition for a later rearmament. It must also distinguish more
    clearly the services of these men, who, without being known in
    wide circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal and
    responsibility in the service of the fight against the Peace
    Treaty. Thereby stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they
    risked, particularly in the early days of their fight,
    themselves and their positions unrestrainedly in the partially
    self-ordained tasks. This compilation makes it clearer, however,
    that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to
    a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the
    whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the
    soldier. Only when the Führer had created the second and even
    more important condition for an effective rearmament in the
    coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the
    political, financial, and spiritual power, could the work of the
    soldier find its fulfillment. The framework of this Peace
    Treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed
    under the driving power of this united will.

    “Signed, the Compiler.”

Now I wish to invite the Court’s attention merely to the summary of
contents because the chapter titles are sufficiently significant for my
present purpose.

    “I. Defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of
    Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the
    Ruhr, 1923).

    “1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction.

    “2. Removal of artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and
    machine weapons.

    “3. Limitation of destruction in Helgoland.

    “II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich
    Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to the Lohmann
    case in 1927).

    “1. Attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich
    Navy.

    “2. Contribution to the strengthening of patriotism among the
    people.

    “3. Activities of Captain Lohmann.

I am ashamed to say, if the Court please, that I am not familiar with
the story about Captain Lohmann.

    “4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat arm.

    “5. Building up of the Air Force.

    “6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm.

    “7. Economic rearmament.

    “8. Miscellaneous measures: a. The N. V. Aerogeodetic; b. Secret
    reconnaissance.

    “III. Planned armament works countenanced by the Reich
    Government but behind the back of the legislative body from 1928
    to the seizure of power in 1933.

    “IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in
    camouflaged form (from 1933 to the freedom from restrictions,
    1935).”

Now if the interpreter who has the original German volume will turn to
Chapter IV, Page 75—“Aufrüstung”—Concealed rearmament under the
leadership of the Government of the Reich (from 1933 until military
freedom in 1935):

    “The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the
    taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of decisive
    influence on the size and shape of further rearmament.

    “While the Reichsrat approached its dissolution and withdrew as
    a legislative body, the Reichstag assumed a composition which
    could only take a decisive attitude toward the rearmament of the
    Armed Forces. The Government took over the management of the
    rearmament program upon this foundation. . . .”

Then a heading—“Development of the Armed Forces”:

    “This taking over of the management by the Reich Government
    developed for the Armed Forces in such a manner that the War
    Minister, General Von Blomberg, and through him the three
    branches of the Armed Forces, received far-reaching powers from
    the Reich Cabinet for the development of the Armed Forces. The
    whole organization of the Reich was included in this work. In
    view of these powers, the collaboration of the former inspecting
    body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then
    on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duties of
    the accounting office of the German Reich.”

Another heading—“Independence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy”:

    “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, honorary
    doctor, had received thereby a far-reaching independence in the
    building and development of the Navy. This was only hampered in
    so far as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be
    continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the
    ordinary budget there remained the previous special budget,
    which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credit
    for the provision of labor, which was made available by the
    Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given
    to the Director of the Budget Department of the Navy, up to 1934
    Commodore Schüssler, afterwards Commodore Foerste. These took
    into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of
    the Budget.”

Another heading—“Declaration of Military Freedom”:

    “When the Führer, relying upon the strengthening of the Armed
    Forces, executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of
    the military sovereignty of the German Reich, the last-mentioned
    limitation on rearmament works, namely, the external camouflage,
    was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered
    our ability to move freely on and under water, on land, and in
    the air, for one and a half decades, and carried by the
    newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the Armed
    Forces, and as a part of it, the Navy, can lead with full
    strength towards its completion, the rearmament already under
    way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful
    position in the world.”

If the Tribunal please, at this moment I have a new problem about proof
which I believe we have not discussed. I have in my hand an English
translation of an interrogation of the Defendant Erich Raeder. Of course
he knows he was interrogated; he knows what he said. I don’t believe we
have furnished copies of this interrogation to defendants’ counsel. I
don’t know whether under the circumstances I am at liberty to read from
it or not. If I do read from it I suggest that the defendants’ counsel
will all get the complete text of it—I mean of what I read into the
transcript.

THE PRESIDENT: Has the counsel for the Defendant Raeder any objection to
this interrogation being read?

DR. SIEMERS: As far as I have understood the proceedings to date, I
believe that it is a question of a procedure in which either proof by
way of documents or proof by way of witnesses will be furnished. I am
surprised that the Prosecution wishes to furnish proof by way of records
of interrogations, taken at a time when the Defense was not present. I
should be obliged to the Court if I could be told whether, in principle,
I, as a defense counsel, may resort to producing evidence in this form,
i.e. present documents of the interrogation of witnesses; that is to
say, documents in which I myself interrogated witnesses the same as the
Prosecution without putting witnesses on the stand.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if interrogations of defendants
are to be used, copies of such interrogations should be furnished to
defendant’s counsel beforehand. The question which the Tribunal wished
to ask you was whether on this occasion you objected to this
interrogation being used without such a copy having been furnished to
you. With regard to your observation as to your own rights with
reference to interrogating your defendants, the Tribunal considers that
you must call them as witnesses upon the witness stand and cannot
interrogate them and put in the interrogations. The question for you now
is whether you object to this interrogation being laid before the
Tribunal at this stage.

DR. SIEMERS: I should like first of all to have an opportunity of seeing
every record before it is submitted in Court. Only then shall I be able
to decide whether interrogations can be read, the contents of which I as
a defense counsel am not familiar with.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn now and it
anticipates that the interrogation can be handed to you during the
adjournment and then can be used afterwards.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal. I should like to ask
the Tribunal to note the presence and appearance, on behalf of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, of Mr. A. I. Vishinsky of the Foreign
Office, and General K. P. Gorshenin, Chief Prosecutor of the Soviet
Republic who has been able to join us in the Prosecution only now.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal notes what Mr. Justice Jackson has said, and
observes that Mr. Vishinsky has taken his seat with the Soviet
Delegation of Chief Prosecutors.

DR. SIEMERS: In the meanwhile during the lunch hour I have seen the
minutes. I should like to observe that I don’t think it is very
agreeable that the Prosecution should not depart from their point that
the Defense should only receive the documents during the proceedings, or
just before the proceedings, or at times, even after the proceedings. I
should be grateful if the Prosecution could see to it in the future that
we are informed in good time.

Yesterday a list of the documents which were to be presented today was
made in our room, number 54. I find that the documents presented today
are not included in yesterday’s list. You will understand that the task
of the Defense is thereby rendered comparatively difficult. On
principle, I cannot in my statement of today, give my agreement to the
reading of minutes of interrogations. In order to facilitate matters, I
should like to follow the Court’s suggestion, and declare that I am
agreeable to the minutes presented here being read. I request,
however—and I believe I have already been assured by the Prosecution to
that effect—that only the part be read which refers to Document C-156,
as I had no time to discuss the remaining points with the defendants.

As to the remaining points, five other documents are cited. Moreover I
request that the part which refers to the book by Kapitän zur See
Schüssler, should be read in full, and I believe that the prosecutor
agrees with this.

THE PRESIDENT: I understood from the counsel for Raeder that you were
substantially in agreement as to what parts of this interrogation you
should read. Is that right, Mr. Alderman?

MR. ALDERMAN: If I understood the counsel correctly, he asked that I
read the entire part of the interrogation which deals with Document
C-156, but I understood that he did not agree for me to read other parts
that referred to other documents. I handed counsel the original of my
copy of the interrogation before the lunch hour, and when he returned it
to me after the lunch hour, I substituted in his hands a carbon copy. I
didn’t quite understand his statement about documents being introduced
which hadn’t been furnished to the defendant. We did file the document
book.

THE PRESIDENT: Is this document in the document book?

MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is that the document book contains all
the documents except these interrogations. They did not contain the
interrogation.

THE PRESIDENT: Then he is right in saying that.

MR. ALDERMAN: He is right as to the interrogation, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you in agreement with him then, that you can read
what you want to read now, and that it is not necessary for you to read
the parts to which he objects.

MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. I understand he objects to my reading anything
other than the part concerned with C-156. I would anticipate that he
might be willing for me to read the other parts tomorrow.

This deals with the book which I offered in evidence this morning,
Document C-156, Exhibit USA-41. The Defendant Raeder identified that
book, and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the
Versailles Treaty and at the same time make progress in naval
development. I refer to the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder at the
part we had under discussion:

    “Q. I have here a Document C-156, which is a photostatic copy of
    a work prepared by the High Command of the Navy and covers the
    struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919 to
    1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the
    work.

    “A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.

    “Q. Was that an official publication of the German Navy?

    “A. This Captain Schüssler (indicating the author) was a
    commander in the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, it was an idea
    of this officer to put all these things together.

    “Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the
    authorization to prepare such a work was given to him?

    “A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he
    tells here in the foreword.

    “Q. And in the preparation of this work he had access to the
    official Navy files and based his work on the items contained
    therein?

    “A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons,
    and he would have had the files which were necessary.

    “Q. Do you know whether, before the work was published, a draft
    of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for
    comment?

    “A. No, I don’t think so. Not before it was published. I saw it
    only when it was published.

    “Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication?

    “A. It was a secret object. I think all upper commands in the
    Navy had knowledge of it.

    “Q. It was not circulated outside of Navy circles?

    “A. No.

    “Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained
    in the work, regarding the circumventing of the provisions of
    Versailles?

    “A. I don’t remember very exactly what is in here. I can only
    remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word
    of the Versailles Treaty, but in order to have some advantages.
    But the flying men were exercised 1 year before they went into
    the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of
    Versailles was filled. They did not belong to the Navy, as long
    as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were
    developed, but not in Germany and not in the Navy, but in
    Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an
    industrialist; in Finland, too, and they were built only much
    later, when we began to act with the English Government about
    the Treaty of 35 to 100, because we could see that then the
    Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a treaty with
    England, and so, in order to keep the word of Versailles, we
    tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but we tried to have
    advantages.

    “Q. Would a fair statement be that the Navy High Command was
    interested in avoiding the limiting provisions of the Treaty of
    Versailles regarding personnel and the limits of armaments, but
    would attempt to fulfill the letter of the Treaty, although
    actually avoiding it?

    “A. That was our endeavor.”

MR. ALDERMAN: Now the rest of this is the portion that counsel for the
defendant asked me to read:

    “Q. Why was such a policy adopted?

    “A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war
    by the danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia, and so
    we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in
    this way; and so all our efforts were directed to the aim of
    having a little more strength against the Poles should they
    attack us. It was nonsense to think of attacking Poland in this
    stage by the Navy. A second aim was to have some defense against
    the entering of French forces into the Ostsee (East Sea),
    because we knew that the French had the intention to sustain the
    Poles. Their ships came into the Ostsee, Gdynia, and so the Navy
    was a defense against an attack of Poland and against the
    entrance of French ships into the East Sea; quite defensive
    aims.

    “Q. When did this fear of an attack from Poland first show
    itself in official circles in Germany, would you say?

    “A. In all the first years. They took Vilna; in the same minute
    we thought they would come to East Prussia. I don’t know exactly
    the year, because those judgments were the judgments of the
    German Government Ministers, the Army and Navy Ministers—Gröner
    and Noske.

    “Q. Then those views, in your opinion, were generally held and
    existed perhaps as early as 1919-1920, after the end of the
    first World War?

    “A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and
    about those years in the beginning I cannot give you a very
    exact picture, because I was then 2 years in the Navy Archives
    to write a book about the War and the fighting capacity of
    cruisers. For 2 years I was not with those things.”

MR. ALDERMAN: Likewise the same kind of planning and purposes are
reflected in the table of contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919
to 1939, found in captured official files of the German Navy. Although a
copy of the book has not been found by us, the project was to have been
written by Oberst Scherff, Hitler’s personal military historian. We have
found the table of contents; it refers by numbers to groups of documents
and notes of documents, which evidently were intended as the working
materials for the basis of chapters, to be written in accordance with
the table of contents. The titles in this table of contents clearly
establish the Navy planning and preparation to get the Versailles Treaty
out of the way and to rebuild the naval strength necessary for
aggressive war.

We have here the original captured document which is, as I say, the
German typewritten table of contents of this projected work, with a
German cover, typewritten, entitled _Geschichte der Deutschen Marine,
1919-1939_ (_History of the German Navy, 1919-1939_). We identify it as
our series C-17 and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-42. This table
of contents includes such general headings—perhaps I had better read
some of the actual headings:

    “Part A, 1919—The Year of Transition. Chapter VII: First
    efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its
    effects.

    “(a) Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of
    naval offices in Civil Ministries _et cetera_. (For example:
    Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime
    observation station and the sea-mark system in Helgoland and
    Kiel, of the Ems-Jade Canal _et cetera_ into the Reich Transport
    Ministry up to 1934: Noske’s proposal of 11. 8. 1919 to
    incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical
    High School, Berlin; formation of the Naval Arsenal
    Kiel.)”—With a reference to a group of documents numbered
    75.—”

    “(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and
    guns.

    “(1) North Sea (strengthening of fortifications with new
    batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking
    effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control
    Commission—information, drawings, visits of inspection, result
    of efforts.)”—referring to the group of documents numbered
    85.—

    “(2) Baltic (taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pillau and
    Swinemünde; salvage for the Army of 185 movable guns and mortars
    there.)”—I may interpolate that when the British offer in
    evidence the Treaty of Versailles, you will see the detailed
    limitations which this document indicates an effort to avoid.—

    “(3) The beginnings of coastal air defense.

    “Part B, 1920-1924—The Organizational New Order. Chapter V: The
    Navy. Fulfillment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty.
    Foreign countries.

    “(a) The Interallied Control Commissions.

    “(b) Defense measures against the fulfillment of the Versailles
    Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich
    Government and the legislative bodies.

    “(1) Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and
    automatic weapons.

    “(2) Limitation of demolition work in Helgoland.

    “(3) Attempt to strengthen personnel of the Navy, from 1923.

    “(4) The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous
    associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of
    ‘sports’ unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in
    naval recruitment).

    “(5) Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since
    1920 (projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey,
    Argentina, and Finland; torpedo testing).

    “(6) Participation in the preparation for building of the
    Luftwaffe (preservation of airdromes, aircraft construction,
    teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air-raid
    defense, training of pilots).

    “(7) Attempt to strengthen the mining branch.

    “Part C (1925-1932—Replacement of tonnage). Chapter IV: The
    Navy, the Versailles Treaty, foreign countries.

    “(a) The activities of the Interallied Control Commission (up to
    31. 1. 27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace
    Commission).

    “(b) Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich
    Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case.

    “(1) The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation) their
    significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work
    from 1935.

    “(2) Preparation for the restrengthening of the German U-boat
    arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection
    with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925,
    relationship to Spain, Argentina, Turkey; the first post-war
    U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927 . . .
    250-ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly;
    electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain
    and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an
    anti-U-boat school.

    “(3) Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of
    the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparation for a Naval Air Arm,
    Finance Aircraft Company Severa, later Luftdienst”—or Air
    Service—“GMBH; Naval Flying School Warnemünde; air station
    list, training of sea cadet candidates, military tactical
    questions ‘Air Defense Journeys,’ technical development,
    experimental station planning, trials, flying boat development
    Do X _et cetera_, catapult aircraft, arming, engines, ground
    organization, aircraft torpedoes, the Deutschland flight 1925,
    and the seaplane race 1926.

    “(4) Economic rearmament (‘The Tebeg’—Technical Advice and
    Supply Company as a disguised naval office abroad for
    investigating the position of raw materials for industrial
    capacity and other war economic questions).

    “(5) Various measures (the NV Aerogeodetic Company—secret
    investigations).

    “(c) Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich
    Government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies (1928
    to the taking over of power).

    “(1) The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations;
    winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and
    carrying on of other work.

    “(2) Finance question (‘Black Funds’ and the ‘Special Budget’).

    “(3) The Labor Committee and its objectives.

    “(d) The question of Marine attachés (the continuation under
    disguise; open reappointment 1932-1933).

    “(e) The question of disarmament of the fleet abroad and in
    Germany (the Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London
    Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931;
    the League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932).

    “Part D (1933-1939—The German Navy during the military freedom
    period).”

—which goes beyond the period with which I am at the moment dealing. A
glance at the chapter headings following that will indicate the scope of
this proposed work. Whether the history was ever actually written by
Scherff, I do not know.

I would like to call attention just to the first two or three headings,
under this “Part D—The German Navy during the military freedom period”:

    “I. National Socialism and the question of the fleet and of
    prestige at sea.

    “II. Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist
    State.”—The main heading III in the middle of the page—“The
    Rearmament of the Navy under the direction of the Reich
    Government in a disguised way.”

The policy development of the Navy is also reflected from the financial
side. The planned organization of the Navy budget for armament measures
was based on a co-ordination of military developments and political
objectives. Military political development was accelerated after the
withdrawal from the League of Nations.

I have here, if the Court please, a captured document, in German, headed
“Der Chef der Marineleitung, Berlin, 12 May 1934,” and marked in large
blue printing “Geheime Kommandosache” (Secret Commando Matter), which is
identified as our C-153. It has the facsimile signature of Raeder at the
end. I assume it is the facsimile; it may have been written with a
stylus on a stencil; I can’t tell. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit
USA-43. It is headed with the title: “Armament Plan (R. P.) for the 3rd
Armament Phase.” This document of 12 May 1934 speaks of war tasks, war
and operational plans, armament targets, _et cetera_, and shows that it
was distributed to many of the High Command of the Navy. It shows that a
primary objective was readiness for a war without any alert period.

I quote from the third numbered paragraph:

    “The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for
    the realization of this target; this again requires a
    co-ordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This
    organization of financial measures over a number of years,
    according to the military viewpoint, is found in the armament
    program and provides: (a) for the military leader a sound basis
    for his operational considerations, and (b) for the political
    leader a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military
    means available at a given time.”

One other sentence from Paragraph 7 of that document:

    “All theoretical and practical R-preparations”—I assume that
    means armament preparations—“are to be drawn up with a primary
    view to readiness for a war _without any alert period_.”—And
    “without any alert period” is underscored in the original.

The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations long
before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways.
Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-boat
construction program; also the actual displacement and speed of certain
ships. Work on U-boats had been going on, as already indicated, in
Holland and Spain.

The Nazi theory was rather clever on that. The Versailles Treaty forbade
rearming by the Germans in Germany, but they said it didn’t forbid them
to rearm in Holland, Spain, and Finland.

Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval
negotiations with England. We have a captured document, which is a
manuscript in German script, of a conversation between the Defendant
Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. It is not signed by the Defendant
Raeder. I might ask his counsel if he objects to my stating that the
Defendant Raeder, in an interrogation on 8 November 1945, admitted that
this was a record of this conversation and that it was in his
handwriting, though he did not sign his name at the end.

That document is identified in our series as C-189, and I offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-44.

It is headed: “Conversation with the Führer in June 1934 on the occasion
of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the ‘Karlsruhe.’”

    “1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning increased displacement
    of D. and E. (defensive weapons).

    “Führer’s instructions: No mention must be made of a
    displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton
    ships. Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may not be stated.

    “2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on, the Fleet
    must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from
    1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35-centimeter
    guns (like the King George class.)

    “3. The Führer demands to keep the construction of the U-boats
    secret, in consideration of the Saar plebiscite.”

In order to continue the vital increase of the Navy, as planned, the
Navy needed more funds than it had available; so Hitler proposed to put
funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy.

We have another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between Raeder and
Hitler on 2 November 1934. Of this I have a photostatic copy of the
German typed memorandum, identified as our C-190. This one, again, is
not signed, but it was found in Raeder’s personal file and I think he
will not deny that it is his memorandum. I offer it in evidence as
Exhibit USA-45.

It is headed: “Conversation with the Führer on 2. 11. 34 at the time of
the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the ‘Emden’.

    “1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available
    for the Armed Forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a
    fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible
    that the Navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he
    did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He
    considered it necessary that the Navy be speedily increased by
    1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need he will get
    Dr. Ley to put 120 to 150 million from the Labor Front at the
    disposal of the Navy, as the money would still benefit the
    workers. Later, in a conversation with Minister Göring and
    myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the
    Navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if
    the Navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from
    Scandinavia.

    “2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have
    six U-boats assembled at the time of the critical political
    situation in the first quarter of 1935,”—that’s the following
    year, foreseeing—“he stated that he would keep this point in
    mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the
    assembling should commence.”

Then, there is an apostrophe and a note at the bottom:

    “The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in
    the middle of June ’35 according to plan.”

The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign markets
was a program encouraged by the Navy, so that this industry would be
able to supply the requirements of the Navy in case of need.

We have an original German document, again headed “Geheime
Kommandosache” (secret commando matter)—a directive of 31 January 1933
by the Defendant Raeder for the German industry to support the armament
of the Navy.

It is identified in our series as C-29. I offer it in evidence as
Exhibit USA-46:

    “Top Secret.

    “General directions for support given by the German Navy to the
    German armament industry.

    “The effects of the present economic depression have led here
    and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an
    active participation of the German armament industry abroad,
    even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no
    profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting.
    Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing
    ‘self-sufficiency’ would in any case make such participation
    superfluous.

    “However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the
    situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the
    following contradictory corrective points:

    “a) The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be
    overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war
    politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the
    assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to
    a certain extent.

    “b) The consequent estimation of the duties of the German
    armament industry lies mainly in the military-political sphere.
    It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and
    economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the
    deliveries to our Armed Forces. Its capacity must therefore be
    increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over
    and above our own requirements.

    “c) Almost every country is working to the same end today, even
    those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions.
    Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy, are
    making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament
    industries. The use of their diplomatic representations, of the
    propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of
    sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and
    insurance against deficits, are not merely to gain commercially
    advantageous orders for their armament industries, but first and
    foremost, to expand their output from the point of view of
    military policy.

    “d) It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions
    imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy has an ever
    increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German
    armament industry and preparing the way for it in every
    direction in the competitive battle against the rest of the
    world.

    “e) If, however, the German armament industry is to be able to
    compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the confidence of
    its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our
    own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to be
    kept secret under all circumstances, in the interest of the
    defense of the country, is comparatively small. I would like to
    issue a warning against the assumption that at the present stage
    of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem
    of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has
    not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may
    become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always
    possible indiscretion, have often been already superseded by new
    better solutions on our part, even at that time or at any rate
    after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that
    we should be technically well to the fore in any really
    fundamental matters, than that less important points should be
    kept secret unnecessarily and excessively.

    “f) To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing
    the continuous support of the industry concerned by the Navy,
    even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the
    purchasers are not made confident that something better is being
    offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the
    competitive battle and therefore will not be able to supply the
    requirements of the German Navy in case of need.”

This Navy program of surreptitious rearmament, in violation of the
Treaty obligations, starting even before the Nazis came into power, is
illustrated by a 1932 order of the Defendant Raeder, Chief of the Naval
Command, addressed to the main Naval Command, regarding the concealed
construction of torpedo-tubes for S-boats. He ordered that torpedo-tubes
be removed and stored in the Naval Arsenal, but be kept ready for
immediate refitting. By using only the permitted number—that is,
permitted under the Treaty—at a given time, and storing them after
satisfactory testing, the actual number of operationally effective
S-boats was constantly increased.

We have this German order, with the facsimile signature of Raeder, with
the heading: “Der Chef der Marine Leitung, Berlin, 10 February 1932.”
Our series number is C-141. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-47,
the order for concealed armament of S-boats. That is C-141. I read from
the first paragraph of the text:

    “In view of our Treaty obligations and the Disarmament
    Conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first S-boat
    half-flotilla, which in a few months will consist of exactly
    similar, newly built S-boats, from appearing openly as a
    formation of torpedo-carrying boats”—the German word being
    “Torpedoträger”—“and it is not intended to count these S-boats
    against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed to us.

    “I therefore order:

    “1. S2-S5 will be commissioned in the shipyard Lürssen,
    Vegesack, without armament and will be fitted with easily
    removable cover-sheetmetal on the spaces necessary for
    torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I.”—a
    translator’s note at the bottom says with reference to T.M.I.
    (Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining)—“In agreement with the
    Naval Arsenal, for the Boat S-1 which will dismantle its
    torpedo-tubes on completion of the practice shooting, for
    fitting on another boat.

    “2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-boats will be stored in the Naval
    Arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the
    torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a
    short time to be fitted and for practice shooting, so that only
    one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public
    consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of
    temporary trials by the T.V.A.”

—I suppose that is not the Tennessee Valley Authority; the translator’s
note calls it the Technical Research Establishment.—

    “It should not anchor together with the other unarmed boats of
    the half-flotilla because of the obvious similarity of the type.
    The duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the
    torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible.

    “3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all S-boats is intended as soon
    as the situation of the political control allows it.”

Interestingly enough, that memorandum by the Defendant Raeder, written
in 1932, was talking about “as soon as the situation of the political
control allows it.” The seizure of power was the following year.

Along similar lines the Navy was also carrying on the concealed
preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation of
‘Transport Ships 0’. The preparations under this order were to be
completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of these
ships as commercial ships, plans were made for their conversion.

We have the original German document, again top secret, identified by
our Number C-166, order from the Command Office of the Navy, dated 12
March 1934, and signed in draft by Groos. It has the seal of the
Reichswehrministerium, Marineleitung, over the draft signature. I offer
it in evidence as Exhibit USA-48. I think the Defendant Raeder will
admit, or at least will not deny, that this is an official document.

    “Subject: Preparation of auxiliary cruisers.

    “It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35
    (AG Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary
    cruisers which are intended for use in operations in foreign
    waters.

    “In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations,
    the ships will be referred to as ‘Transport Ships 0’. It is
    requested that in future this designation only be used.”

The short paragraph says: “The preparations are to be arranged, so that
they can be completed by 1. 4. 35.”

Among official Navy files, OKM files, which we have, there are notes
kept year by year, from 1927 to 1940, on the reconstruction of the
German Navy, and in these notes are numerous examples of the Navy’s
activities and policies of which I should like to point out some
illustrations.

One of these documents discloses that the displacement of the
battleships “Scharnhorst-Gneisenau” and “F/G”—whatever that is—was
actually greater than the tonnages which had been notified to the
British under the Treaty. This document, our C-23, I offer in evidence
as Exhibit USA-49. That is a set really of three separate documents
joined together. I read from that document:

    “The true displacement of the battleships
    ‘Scharnhorst-Gneisenau’ and the ‘F/G’ exceeds by 20 percent, in
    both cases, the displacement reported to the British.”

And then there is a table with reference to different ships, and two
columns headed “Displacement by Type”: one column “Actual Displacement”
and the other column “Notified Displacement.”

On the “Scharnhorst” the actual was 31,300 tons; the notified was 26,000
tons. On the “F”—actual 41,700 tons, the notified 35,000. On the
“HI”—actual 56,200 tons, notified 46,850, and so down the list. I need
not read them all.

On the second document in that group towards the end, Page 2 on the
English version, is the statement:

    “In a clear cut program for the construction, the Führer and
    Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task of carrying out the
    aims of his foreign policy.”

The German Navy constantly planned and committed violations of armament
limitation and with characteristic German thoroughness had prepared
superficial explanations or pretexts to explain away these violations.

Following a conference with the chief of “A” section, an elaborate
survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a careful list of the
quantity and type of German naval armament and ammunition on hand under
manufacture or construction, and in many instances proposed together
with a statement of the justification or defense that might be used in
those instances where the Versailles Treaty was violated or its
allotment has been exceeded.

The list contained 30 items under “Material Measures” and 14 items under
“Measures of Organization.” The variety of details covered necessarily
involved several sources within the Navy, which must have realized their
significance. As I understand it, the “A” section was the military
department of the Navy.

We have this very interesting document among the captured documents
identified by our Number C-32. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-50.
It again is Geheime Kommandosache and it is headed “A Survey Report of
German Naval Armament after Conference with Chief of ‘A’ Section”, dated
9 September 1933, and captured among official German Navy files.

This is a long document, if the Tribunal please, but I should like to
call attention to a few of the more interesting items.

There are three columns, one headed “Measure”, one headed “Material
Measures, Details,” and the most interesting one is headed “Remarks.”
The remarks contain the pretext or justification for explaining away the
violations of the Treaty. They are numbered, so I can conveniently refer
to the numbers:

    “Number 1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines.”—Then
    figures are given. Remarks—“Further mines are in part ordered,
    in part being delivered.”

    “Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area
    for Baltic artillery batteries.”—In the remarks
    column—“Justification: Necessity for overhauling. Cheaper
    repairs.”

    “Number 6. Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area.” Remarks: “The
    offense over and above that in Serial Number 3 lies in the fact
    that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This
    justification will make it less severe; pure defense measures.”

    “Number 7. Exceeding the caliber permitted for coastal
    batteries.” The explanation: “Possible justification is that,
    though the caliber is larger, the number of guns is less.”

    “Number 8. Arming of minesweepers. The reply to any remonstrance
    against this breach: the guns are taken from the Fleet reserve
    stores, have been temporarily installed only for training
    purposes. All nations arm their mine sweeping forces (equality
    of rights).”

—Here is one that is rather amusing—“Number 13. Exceeding the number
of machine guns _et cetera_, permitted.” Remarks: “Can be made light
of.”

    “Number 18. Construction of U-boat parts.” This remark is quite
    characteristic: “Difficult to detect. If necessary can be
    denied.”

    “Number 20. Arming of fishing vessels.” Remarks: “For warning
    shots. Make little of it.”—And so on throughout the list.

I think quite obviously that must have been used as a guide for
negotiators who were attending the Disarmament Conference as to the
position that they might take.

Now to Paragraph IV (F) 2 (b) of the Indictment: the allegation that “On
14 October 1933 they led Germany to leave the International Disarmament
Conference and the League of Nations.”

That is an historical fact of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial
notice. The Nazis took this opportunity to break away from the
international negotiations and to take an aggressive position on an
issue which would not be serious enough to provoke reprisal from other
countries. At the same time Germany attached so much importance to this
action, that they considered the possibility of the application of
sanctions by other countries. Anticipating the probable nature of such
sanctions and the countries which might apply them, plans were made for
military preparations for armed resistance on land, at sea, and in the
air, in a directive from the Reichsminister for Defense Blomberg, to the
Head of the Army High Command Fritsch, the Head of the Navy High Command
Raeder, and the Reichsminister of Air Göring.

We have this captured document in our series C-140, which I offer in
evidence as Exhibit USA-151. It is a directive dated 25 October 1933, 11
days after the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League
of Nations.

    “1) The enclosed directive gives the basis for preparations of
    the Armed Forces in the case of sanctions being applied against
    Germany.

    “2) I request the Chiefs of the Army and Navy High Commands and
    the Reichsminister for Air to carry out the preparations in
    accordance with the following points:

    “(a) Strictest secrecy. It is of the utmost importance that no
    facts become known to the outside world from which preparation
    for resistance against sanctions can be inferred or which is
    incompatible with Germany’s existing obligations in the sphere
    of foreign policy regarding the demilitarized zone. If
    necessary, the preparations must take second place to this
    necessity.”

I think that makes the point without further reading. One of the
immediate consequences of the action was that following the withdrawal
from the League of Nations, Germany’s armament program was still further
increased.

I introduced this morning document C-153, as Exhibit USA-43, so that is
already in. From that, at this point, I wish to read Paragraph 5. That,
as you recall, was a document dated 12 May 1934.

    “5) Owing to the speed of military political development, since
    Germany quitted Geneva, and based on the progress of the Army,
    the new R-plan will only be drawn up for a period of 2 years.
    The third ‘A’ phase lasts accordingly from 1. 4. 34 to 31. 3.
    36.”

Then the next allegation of the Indictment, if the Tribunal please: “On
10 March 1935 the Defendant Göring announced that Germany was building a
military air force.”

That is an historical fact of which I ask the Court to take judicial
notice, and I am quite certain that the Defendant Göring would not
dispute it.

We have a copy of the German publication known as _Das Archiv_—the
number of March 1935; and it is Page 1830 to which I refer, and I would
offer that in evidence, identifying it as our number 2292-PS; I offer it
as Exhibit USA-52. It is an announcement concerning the German Air
Force:

    “The Reich Minister for Aviation, General of the Airmen, Göring,
    in his talk with the special correspondent of the _Daily Mail_,
    Ward Price, expressed himself on the subject of the German Air
    Force.

    “General Göring said:

    “‘In the extension of our national defenses’”—Sicherheit—“‘it
    was necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of
    defense in the air. As far as that is concerned, I restricted
    myself to those measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line
    of my actions was, not the creation of an aggressive force which
    would threaten other nations, but merely the completion of a
    military aviation which would be strong enough to repel, at any
    time, attacks on Germany.’”

Then, at the end of that section of the article in _Das Archiv_:

    “In conclusion, the correspondent asks whether the German Air
    Force will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany.

General Göring replied to that exactly as follows:

    “‘The German Air Force is just as passionately permeated with
    the will to defend the Fatherland to the last as it is
    convinced, on the other hand, that it will never be employed to
    threaten the peace of other nations.’”

As I said; I believe, this morning, when we cite assurances of that kind
from Nazi leaders, we take it that we are not foreclosed from showing
that they had different intentions from those announced.

The next allegation of the Indictment is the promulgating of the law for
compulsory military service, universal military service.

Having gone as far as they could on rearmament and the secret training
of personnel, the next step necessary to the program for aggressive war
was a large-scale increase in military strength. This could no longer be
done under disguise and camouflage, and would have to be known to the
world. Accordingly, on 16 March 1935, there was promulgated a law for
universal military service, in violation of Article 173 of the
Versailles Treaty.

I ask the Court to take judicial notice of that law as it appears in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, which is the official compilation of laws, in the
Title I of Volume I, yearly volume 1935, or Jahrgang, at Page 369 and I
think I need not offer the book or the law in evidence.

The text of the law itself is very brief and I might read that. It is
right at the end of the article. I should refer to that as our Document
Number 1654-PS, so as to identify it:

    “In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the
    following law:

    “Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935.

    “The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is
    herewith promulgated:

    “Paragraph 1. Service in the Armed Forces is based upon
    compulsory military duty.

    “Paragraph 2. In peace time, the German Army, including the
    police troops transferred to it, is organized into 12 corps and
    36 divisions.”—There is a typographical error in the English
    version of that. It says “16 divisions”, but the original German
    says 36 divisions.—

    “Paragraph 3. The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty
    of submitting immediately to the Reich Ministry detailed laws on
    compulsory military duty.”

    Signed: “Berlin, 16 March 1935.”

It is signed first by the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, and
then many other officials, including the following defendants in this
case:

Von Neurath, Frick, Schacht, Göring, Hess, Frank.

Does the Court contemplate a short recess?

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the Prosecution expects, on
tomorrow, to offer in evidence some captured enemy moving pictures and
in order to give Defense Counsel an opportunity to see them before they
are offered in evidence—and in response to their request made to the
Tribunal some time ago—the showing of these films for Defense Counsel
will be held in this court room this evening at 8 o’clock, for the
Defense Counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Colonel Storey.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I have reached now Paragraph
IV, F, 2 (e) of the Indictment, which alleges:

    “On 21 May 1935 they falsely announced to the world, with intent
    to deceive and allay fears of aggressive intentions, that they
    would respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles
    Treaty and comply with the Locarno Pact.”

As a part of their program to weaken resistance in possible enemy
states, the Nazis followed a policy of making false assurances, thereby
tending to create confusion and a false sense of security. Thus on the
same date on which Germany renounced the armament provisions of the
Versailles Treaty, Hitler announced the intent of the German Government
to respect the territorial limitations of Versailles and Locarno.

I offered in evidence this morning, as Exhibit USA-38, our Document
2288-PS, the pertinent volume of the issue of the _Völkischer
Beobachter_ of 21 May 1935, containing Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag
on that date. In that speech he said:

    “Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely
    respect all other articles pertaining to the
    cooperation”—Zusammenleben, really meaning the living together
    in harmony—“of the various nations, including territorial
    agreements. Revisions which will be unavoidable as time goes by
    it will carry out by way of a friendly understanding only.

    “The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to
    sign any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill.
    However, it will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even
    if it was composed before this Government took over. Therefore,
    it will in particular adhere to all the obligations under the
    Locarno Pact, as long as the other partners of the Pact also
    adhere to it.”

For convenient reference, the territorial limitations in the Locarno and
Versailles Treaties include the following: The Rhine Pact of Locarno, 16
October 1925, Article 1:

    “The High Contracting Parties, collectively and severally,
    guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles: the
    maintenance of the territorial _status quo_, resulting from the
    frontiers between Germany and Belgium, and between Germany and
    France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers, as fixed
    by, or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace, signed at
    Versailles, on June 28, 1919, and also the observance of the
    stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty,
    concerning the demilitarized zone.”

That has reference, of course, to the demilitarized zone of the
Rhineland.

Then from the Versailles Treaty, 28 June 1919, Article 42:

    “Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any
    fortifications, either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the
    right bank, to the West of the line drawn 50 kilometers to the
    East of the Rhine.

    “Article 43: In the area defined above, the maintenance and the
    assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily and
    military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all
    permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way
    forbidden.”

The next allegation of the Indictment (f):

    “On 7 March 1936, they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland,
    in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of
    Locarno of 16 October 1925, and falsely announced to the world
    that ‘we have no territorial demands to make in Europe.’”

The demilitarized zone of the Rhineland obviously was a sore wound with
the Nazis ever since its establishment, after World War I. Not only was
this a blow to their increasing pride, but it was a bar to any effective
strong position which Germany might want to take on any vital issues. In
the event of any sanctions against Germany, in the form of military
action, the French and other powers would get well into Germany, east of
the Rhine, before any German resistance could even be put up. Therefore,
any German plans to threaten or breach international obligations or for
any kind of aggression, required the preliminary reoccupation and
refortification of this open Rhineland territory. Plans and preparations
for the reoccupation of the Rhineland started very early.

We have a document, a German captured document, in German script, which
we identify as C-139, and which appears to be signed by the handwriting
of Blomberg. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-53.

The document deals with what is called “Operation Schulung”, which means
schooling, or training. It is dated 2 May 1935 and even refers to prior
Staff discussions on the subject dealt with. It is addressed to the
Chief of the Army Command, who at that time, I believe, was Fritsch, the
Chief of the Navy High Command, Raeder, and the Reich Minister for Air,
Göring.

It does not use the name “Rhineland” and does not, in terms, refer to
it. It is our view that it was a military plan for the military
reoccupation of the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles
and the Rhine Pact of Locarno.

I read from the first part of the document which is headed “top secret”:

    “For the operation suggested in the last Staff talks of the
    Armed Forces, I lay down the code name ‘Schulung’”—training.—

    “The supreme direction of Operation Schulung rests with the
    Reich Minister of Defense as this is a joint undertaking of the
    three services.

    “Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according
    to the following directives:

    “1. General.

    “(1) The operation must, on issue of the code words ‘Carry out
    Schulung’, be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed.
    Strictest secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only the
    very smallest number of officers should be informed and employed
    in the drafting of reports, drawings, _et cetera_, and these
    officers only in person.

    “(2) There is no time for mobilization of the forces taking
    part. These will be employed in their peacetime strength and
    with their peacetime equipment.

    “(3) The preparation for the operation will be made without
    regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every
    improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a
    greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better
    prospects of success.”

The rest of the order deals with military details and I think it is
unnecessary to read it.

There are certain points, in the face of this order, which are
inconsistent with any theory that it was merely a training order, or
that it might have been defensive in nature. The operation was to be
carried out as a surprise blow at lightning speed (Schlagartig als
Überfall).

The air forces were to provide support for the attack. There was to be
reinforcement by the East Prussian division. Furthermore, this document
is dated 2 May 1935, which is about 6 weeks after the promulgation of
the Conscription Law on 16 March 1935, and so it could hardly have been
planned as a defensive measure against any expected sanctions which
might have been applied by reason of the passage of the Conscription
Law.

Of course the actual reoccupation of the Rhineland did not take place
until 7 March 1936, so that this early plan would necessarily have been
totally revised to suit the existing conditions and specific objectives.
As I say, although the plan does not mention the Rhineland, it has all
of the indications of a Rhineland operation plan. That the details of
this particular plan were not ultimately the ones that were carried out
in reoccupying the Rhineland does not at all detract from the vital fact
that as early as 2 May 1935 the Germans had already planned that
operation, not merely as a Staff plan but as a definite operation. It
was evidently not on their timetable to carry out the operation so soon
if it could be avoided. But they were prepared to do so, if necessary,
to resist French sanctions against their Conscription Law.

It is significant to note the date of this document is the same as the
date of the signature of the Franco-Russian Pact, which the Nazis later
asserted as their excuse for the Rhineland reoccupation.

The military orders on the basis of which the Rhineland reoccupation was
actually carried into execution, on 7 March 1936, were issued on 2 March
1936 by the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
Blomberg, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Fritsch,
the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Raeder, and Air Minister and
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Göring. We have that order signed by
Blomberg, headed, as usual, “top secret,” identified by us as C-159. I
offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-54.

The German copy of that document bears the Defendant Raeder’s initial in
green pencil, with a red pencil note: “To be submitted to the C-in-C of
the Navy.”

The first part of the order reads:

    “Supreme Command of the Navy:

    “1. The Führer and Reich Chancellor has made the following
    decision:

    “By reason of the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact, the
    obligations accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, as far as
    they apply to Articles 42 and 43, of the Treaty of Versailles
    which referred to the demilitarized zone, are to be regarded as
    obsolete.

    “2. Sections of the Army and Air Force will therefore be
    transferred simultaneously in a surprise move to garrisons of
    the demilitarized zone. In this connection, I issue the
    following orders. . . .”

There follow the detailed orders for the military operation.

We also have the orders for naval cooperation. The original German
document, which we identify as C-194, was issued on 6 March 1936, in the
form of an order on behalf of the Reich Minister for War, Blomberg,
signed by Keitel, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy
Raeder, setting out detailed instructions for the Commander-in-Chief of
the fleet and the admirals commanding the Baltic and North Sea. I offer
the document in evidence as Exhibit USA-55.

The short covering letter is as follows:

    “To: C-in-C Navy.

    “The Minister has decided the following after the meeting:

    “1. The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German bay, not
    over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-Day onward, has
    been approved. C-in-C Air Force will instruct the Air Command VI
    from midday 7 March to hold in readiness single reconnaissance
    aircraft to be at the disposal of the C-in-C fleet.

    “2. The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-boat
    reconnaissance line until the evening of 7 March. The immediate
    transfer of U-boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshafen has been
    approved.

    “3. The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed
    Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as
    the first countermeasures to be taken against military
    preparations of neighboring states. It is far more essential to
    examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A,
    to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous
    measures could not be omitted.”

That is signed “Keitel”.

The rest of the documents are detailed naval orders—operational
orders—and I think I need not read further.

For the historical emphasis of this occasion, Hitler made a momentous
speech on 7 March 1936. I have the volume of the _Völkischer
Beobachter_, Berlin, Sunday, 8 March 1936, our Document 2289-PS, which I
offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-56.

This is a long speech which the world remembers and of which I shall
only read a short portion:

    “Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the repeated
    friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by
    infringing the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the
    Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany. In this
    manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner
    meaning and ceased in practice to exist. Consequently, Germany
    regards herself, for her part, as no longer bound by this
    dissolved treaty. The German Government is now constrained to
    face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation
    which is rendered more acute by the fact that the Franco-Soviet
    treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance between
    Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in form. In
    accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its
    frontiers and ensure its possibilities of defense, the German
    Government has today restored the full and unrestricted
    sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the
    Rhineland.”

The whole matter of the German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of
the Rhineland caused extensive international repercussions and study. As
a result of the protests lodged with the League of Nations, the Council
of the League made an investigation and announced the following finding,
of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, as being carried in
the _League of Nations Monthly Summary_, March 1936, Volume 16, Page 78;
and it is also quoted in an article by Quincy Wright, in the _American
Journal of International Law_, Page 487, 1936.

The finding is this:

    “That the German Government has committed a breach of Article 43
    of the Treaty of Versailles by causing, on March 7, 1936,
    military forces to enter and establish themselves in the
    demilitarized zone referred to, in Article 42 and the following
    articles of that Treaty, and in the Treaty of Locarno.”

At the same time, on 7 March 1936, as the Germans reoccupied the
Rhineland in flagrant violation of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties,
they again tried to allay the fears of other European powers and lead
them into a false sense of security by announcing to the world: “We have
no territorial demands to make in Europe.”

That appears in this same speech of Hitler’s, which I have offered in
evidence as Exhibit USA-56, which is Document 2289-PS. The language will
be found on Page 6, Column 1:

    “We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above
    all that all the tensions resulting either from false
    territorial settlements or from the disproportion of the numbers
    of inhabitants to their living spaces cannot, in Europe, be
    solved by war.”

Most of the acts set forth in the paragraph of the Indictment which I
have been discussing, I think do not need judicial proof because they
are historical facts. We have been able to bring you a number of
interesting documents illuminating that history. The existence of prior
plans and preparations is indisputable from the very nature of things.
The method and sequence of these plans and their accomplishment are
clearly indicative of the progressing and increasingly aggressive
character of the Nazi objectives, international obligations and
considerations of humanity notwithstanding.

The detailed presentation of the violations of treaties and
international law will be presented by our British colleagues, in
support of Count Two of the Indictment.

In clear relief, there is shown the determination of the Nazi
conspirators to use whatever means were necessary to abrogate and
overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions upon the
military armament and activity of Germany. In this process, they
conspired and engaged in secret rearmament and training, the secret
production of munitions of war, and they built up an air force. They
withdrew from the International Disarmament Conference and the League of
Nations on October 14, 1933. They instituted universal military service
on March 16, 1935. On May 21, 1935 they falsely announced that they
would respect the territorial limitations of Versailles and Locarno. On
March 7, 1936 they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland and at the
same time, falsely announced that they had no territorial demands in
Europe.

The objectives of the conspirators were vast and mighty, requiring long
and extensive preparations. The process involved the evasion,
circumvention, and violation of international obligations and treaties.
They stopped at nothing.

The accomplishment of all those things, together with getting Versailles
out of the way, constituted an opening of the gates toward the specific
aggressions which followed.

I pass next, if the Tribunal please, to the presentation of the story of
the aggression against Austria. I do not know whether Your Honor desires
me to start on that or not. I am perfectly willing to do so.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to use this volume of documents marked “M”
tomorrow?

MR. ALDERMAN: There will be a new one marked “N”.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow
morning.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 28 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]




                              SEVENTH DAY
                       Wednesday, 28 November 1945


                           _Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I call upon counsel for the United States.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point we distribute
document book lettered “N”, which will cover the next phase of the case,
as I will now undertake to present it. Of the five large phases of
aggressive warfare, which I undertake to present to the Tribunal, I have
now completed the presentation of the documents on the first phase, the
phase lasting from 1933 to 1936, consisting of the preparation for
aggression.

The second large phase of the program of the conspirators for aggression
lasted from approximately 1936 to March 1939, when they had completed
the absorption of Austria and the occupation of all of Czechoslovakia. I
again invite the Court’s attention to the chart on the wall. You may be
interested in glancing at it from time to time as the presentation
progresses.

The relevant portions of the Indictment to the present subject are set
forth in Subsection 3, under Section IV (F), appearing on Pages 7 and 8
of the printed English text. This portion of the Indictment is divided
into three parts: First, the 1936 to 1938 phase of the plan, planning
for the assault on Austria and Czechoslovakia; second, the execution of
the plan to invade Austria, November 1937 to March 1938; third, the
execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia, April 1938 to March
1939.

As I previously indicated to the Tribunal, the portion of the Indictment
headed “(a) Planning for the assault on Austria and Czechoslovakia” is
proved for the most part by Document Number 386-PS, which I introduced
on Monday. That is Exhibit USA-25. That was one of the handful of
documents with which I began my presentation of this part of the case.
The minutes taken by Colonel Hossbach of the meeting in the Reich
Chancellery on 5 November 1937, when Hitler developed his political last
will and testament, reviewed the desire of Nazi Germany for more room in
central Europe, and made preparations for the conquest of Austria and
Czechoslovakia as a means of strengthening Germany for the general
pattern of the Nazi conspiracy for aggression.

I shall present the material on this second, or Austrian phase of
aggression, in two separate parts. I shall first present the materials
and documents relating to the aggression against Austria. They have been
gathered together in the document book which has just been distributed.
Later I shall present the material relating to the aggression against
Czechoslovakia. They will be gathered in a separate document book.

First, we have the events leading up to the autumn of 1937, and the
strategic position of the National Socialists in Austria. I suggest at
this point, if the Tribunal please, that in this phase we see the first
full flowering of what has come to be known as Fifth Column infiltration
techniques in another country, and first under that, the National
Socialist aim of absorption of Austria.

In order to understand more clearly how the Nazi conspirators proceeded,
after the meeting of 5 November 1937, covered by the Hossbach minutes,
it is advisable to review the steps which had already been taken in
Austria by the Nazi Socialists of both Germany and Austria. The position
which the Nazis had reached by the fall of 1937 made it possible for
them to complete their absorption of Austria much sooner and with much
less cost than had been contemplated at the time of the meeting covered
by the Hossbach minutes.

The acquisition of Austria had long been a central aim of the German
National Socialists. On the first page of _Mein Kampf_ Hitler said:
“German Austria must return to the Great German Motherland.” He
continued by stating that this purpose of having common blood in a
common Reich could not be satisfied by a mere economic union. Moreover,
this aim of absorption of Austria was an aim from 1933 on and was
regarded as a serious program which the Nazis were determined to carry
out.

At this point, I should like to offer in evidence our Document Number
1760-PS, which, if admitted, would be Exhibit USA-57. This document is
an affidavit executed in Mexico City on 28 August of this year by George
S. Messersmith, United States Ambassador, now in Mexico City. Before I
quote from Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, I should like to point out
briefly that Mr. Messersmith was Consul General of the United States of
America in Berlin from 1930 to late spring of 1934. He was then made
American Minister in Vienna where he stayed until 1937.

In this affidavit he states that the nature of his work brought him into
frequent contact with German Government officials, and he reports in
this affidavit that the Nazi Government officials, with whom he had
contact, were on most occasions amazingly frank in their conversation
and concealed none of their aims.

If the Court please, this affidavit, which is quite long, presents a
somewhat novel problem of treatment in the presentation of this case. In
lieu of reading this entire affidavit into the record, I should like, if
it might be done in that way, to offer in evidence, not merely the
English original of the affidavit, but also a translation into German,
which has been mimeographed. This translation of the affidavit into
German has been distributed to counsel for the defendants.

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): An affidavit of a
witness who is obtainable has just been turned over to the Court. The
content of the affidavit offers so many subjective opinions of the
witness, that it is imperative we hear the witness personally in this
matter.

I should like to take this occasion to ask that it be decided as a
matter of principle, whether that which a witness can testify from his
own knowledge may, without further ado, be presented in the form of an
affidavit; or whether if a witness is living and can be reached the
principle of oral proceedings should be applied, that is, the witness
should be heard directly.

MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should like to be heard briefly
on the matter.

THE PRESIDENT: You have finished what you had to say, I understand?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will hear Mr. Alderman.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize, of course, the
inherent weakness of an affidavit as evidence where the witness is not
present and subject to cross-examination. Mr. Messersmith is an elderly
gentleman. He is not in good health. It was entirely impracticable to
try to bring him here; otherwise, we should have done so.

I remind the Court of Article 19 of the Charter:

    “The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence.
    It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent
    expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any
    evidence, which it deems to have probative value.”

Of course, the Court would not treat anything in an affidavit such as
this as having probative value unless the Court deemed it to have
probative value; and if the defendants have countering evidence, which
is strong enough to overcome whatever is probative in this affidavit, of
course the Court will treat the probative value of all the evidence in
accordance with this provision of the Charter.

By and large, this affidavit and another affidavit by Mr. Messersmith
which we shall undertake to present cover background material which is a
matter of historical knowledge, of which the Court could take judicial
notice. Where he does quote these amazingly frank expressions by Nazi
leaders, it is entirely open to any of them, who may be quoted, to
challenge what is said, or to tell Your Honors what they believe was
said. In any event, it seems to me that the Court can accept an
affidavit of this character, made by a well-known American diplomat, and
give it whatever probative value the Court thinks it has.

As to the question of reading the entire affidavit, I understand the
ruling of the Court to be that only those parts of documents, which are
quoted in the record, will be considered to be in the record. It will be
based upon the necessity of giving the German counsel knowledge of what
was being used. As to these affidavits, we have furnished them complete
German translations. It seems to us that a different rule might obtain
where that has been done.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, have you finished what you had to say?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The representative of the Prosecution takes the point of
view that the age and state of health of the witness makes it impossible
to summon him as a witness. I do not know the witness personally.
Consequently, I am not in a position to state to what extent he is
actually incapacitated. Nevertheless, I have profound doubts regarding
the presentation of evidence of such an old and incapacitated person. I
am not speaking specifically now about Mr. Messersmith. I do not think
the Court can judge to what extent old age and infirmity can possibly
influence memory and reasoning powers; so, personal presence would seem
absolutely indispensable.

Furthermore, it is important to know what questions, _in toto_, were put
to the witness. An affidavit only reiterates the answers to questions
which were put to the person. Very often conclusions can be drawn from
unanswered questions. It is here a question of evidence solely on the
basis of an affidavit. For that reason we are not in a position to
assume, with absolute certainty, that the evidence of the witness is
complete.

I cannot sanction the intention of the Prosecution in this case to
introduce two methods of giving evidence of different value; namely, a
fully valid one through direct evidence of a witness, and a less
complete one through evidence laid down in an affidavit. The situation
is this: Either the evidence is sufficient, or it is not. I think the
Tribunal should confine itself to complete and fully valid evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, did you wish to add anything?

MR. ALDERMAN: I wish to make this correction, perhaps of what I said. I
did not mean to leave the implication that Mr. Messersmith is in any way
incapacitated. He is an elderly man, about 70 years old. He is on active
duty in Mexico City; the main difficulty is that we did not feel we
could take him away from his duties in that post, combined with a long
trip and his age.

THE PRESIDENT: That is all, is it?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the objection which has been
raised. In view of the powers which the Tribunal has under Article 19 of
the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by
technical rules of evidence, but shall adopt and apply to the greatest
possible extent expeditious and nontechnical procedure and shall admit
any evidence which it deems to have probative value, the Tribunal holds
that affidavits can be presented, and that in the present case it is a
proper course.

The question of the probative value of an affidavit as compared with a
witness who has been cross-examined would, of course, be considered by
the Tribunal. If, at a later stage, the Tribunal thinks the presence of
a witness is of extreme importance, the matter can be reconsidered. I
add this: If the defense wish to put interrogatories to the witness,
they will be at liberty to do so.

MR. ALDERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I offer then our Document 1760-PS
as Exhibit USA-57, affidavit by George S. Messersmith. Rather than
reading the entire affidavit, unless the Court wishes me to do so, I
intend to paraphrase and state the substance of what is covered in
various parts of the affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think it would be better to adhere to the
rule which we have laid down: That only what is read in the court will
form part of the record.

MR. ALDERMAN: I shall read then, if the Tribunal please, from the fourth
paragraph on the third page of the English copy, the following list of
names, headed by President Miklas of Austria and Chancellor Dollfuss:

    “From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was told by
    both high and secondary government officials in Germany that
    incorporation of Austria into Germany was a political and
    economic necessity and that this incorporation was going to be
    accomplished ‘by whatever means were necessary.’ Although I
    cannot assign definite times and places, I am sure that at
    various times and places, every one of the German officials whom
    I have listed earlier in this statement told me this, with the
    exception of Schacht, Von Krosigk and Krupp von Bohlen. I can
    assert that it was fully understood by everyone in Germany who
    had any knowledge whatever of what was going on that Hitler and
    the Nazi Government were irrevocably committed to this end, and
    the only doubt which ever existed in conversations or statements
    to me was how and when.”

In connection with that paragraph, I invite your attention to the list
of German officials to whom he refers on Page 2 of the affidavit. They
are listed as Hermann Göring, General Milch, Hjalmar Schacht, Hans
Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Joseph Goebbels,
Richard Walter Darré, Robert Ley, Hans Heinrich Lammers, Otto Meissner,
Franz von Papen, Walter Funk, General Wilhelm Keitel, Admiral Erich von
Raeder, Admiral Karl Dönitz, Dr. Bohle, Dr. Stuckert, Dr. Krupp von
Bohlen, and Dr. Davidson. The affiant states he was sure that at various
times and places, everyone of those listed German officials had made
these statements to him, with the exception of Schacht, Von Krosigk, and
Krupp von Bohlen. I shall continue with the next paragraph:

    “At the beginning of the Nazi regime in 1933, Germany was, of
    course, far too weak to permit any open threats of force against
    any country, such as the threats which the Nazis made in 1938.
    Instead it was the avowed and declared policy of the Nazi
    Government to accomplish the same results which they later
    accomplished through force, through the methods which had proved
    so successful for them in Germany: Obtain a foothold in the
    Cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of the Interior, which
    controlled the police, and then quickly eliminate opposition
    elements. During my stay in Austria, I was told on any number of
    occasions by Chancellor Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg,
    President Miklas, and other high officials of the Austrian
    Government that the German Government kept up constant and
    unceasing pressure upon the Austrian Government to agree to the
    inclusion of a number of ministers with Nazi orientation. The
    English and French ministers in Vienna, with whom I was in
    constant and close contact, confirmed this information through
    statements which they made to me of conversations which they had
    with high Austrian officials.”

I shall read other portions of the affidavit as the presentation
proceeds, on the question of pressure used against Austria, including
terror and intimidation, culminating in the unsuccessful Putsch of July
26, 1934. To achieve their ends the Nazis used various kinds of
pressure. In the first place, they used economic pressure. A law of 24
March 1933, a German law, imposed a prohibitive 1,000 Reichsmark penalty
on trips to Austria. It brought great hardship to this country which
relied very heavily on its tourist trade. For that I cite the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1933, Part I, Page 311, and ask the Court to take
judicial notice of that German law.

The Nazis used propaganda and they used terroristic acts, primarily
bombings. Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, Document 1760-PS, from which I
have already read, goes into some detail with respect to these outrages.
I read again from Page 4 of the affidavit, the English version:

    “The outrages were an almost constant occurrence, but there were
    three distinct periods during which they rose to a peak. During
    the first two of these periods, in mid-1933 and in early 1934, I
    was still in Berlin. However, during that period I was told by
    high Nazi officials in conversation with them, that these waves
    of terror were being instigated and directed by them. I found no
    concealment in my conversations with high Nazi officials of the
    fact that they were responsible for these activities in Austria.
    These admissions were entirely consistent with the Nazi thesis
    that terror is necessary and must be used to impose the will of
    the Party not only in Germany but in other countries. I recall
    specifically that General Milch was one of those who spoke
    frankly that these outrages in Austria were being directed by
    the Nazi Party, and expressed his concern with respect thereto
    and his disagreement with this definite policy of the Party.

    “During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, I had
    already assumed my duties as American Minister in Vienna. The
    bomb outrages during this period were directed primarily at
    railways, tourist centers, and the Catholic Church, which
    latter, in the eyes of the Nazis, was one of the strongest
    organizations opposing them. I recall, however, that these
    outrages diminished markedly for a few days during the meeting
    of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June 1934. At that time
    Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and
    was strongly and deeply interested in maintaining Austrian
    independence and sovereignty, and in keeping down Nazi influence
    and activity in Austria. At that time also Hitler could not
    afford an open break with Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to
    the short cessation of these bomb outrages on the insistence of
    Mussolini because he, Hitler, wished to achieve as favorable an
    atmosphere for the meeting between him and Mussolini as
    possible. The cessation of the bomb outrages during the
    Hitler-Mussolini conversations was considered by me and by the
    Austrian authorities and by all observers at that time as an
    open admission on the part of Hitler and the German Government
    that the outrages were systematically and completely instigated
    and controlled from Germany.”

Turning to Page 7 of the English version, following the line which
reads, “Official dispatch from Vienna” dated July 26, 1934, I quote the
following paragraph:

    “In addition to these outrages, the Nazis attempted to bring
    pressure upon Austria by means of the ‘Austrian Legion’. This
    organization, a para-military force of several thousand men, was
    stationed near the Austrian border in Germany as a constant and
    direct threat of violent action against Austria. It was without
    any question sanctioned by the Nazi Government of Germany, as it
    could otherwise not have existed, and it was armed by them. It
    was made up of Austrian Nazis who had fled from Austria after
    committing various crimes in Austria, and by Austrians in
    Germany who were attracted by the idle life and pay given by the
    German authorities.”

These terroristic activities of the Nazis in Austria continued until
July 25, 1934. It is a well-known historical fact of which I ask the
Court to take judicial notice that on that day members of the NSDAP, the
Nazi Party, attempted a revolutionary Putsch in Austria and killed
Chancellor Dollfuss.

At this point I should like to invite your attention to the fact that
the Indictment alleges in Count Four, Crimes against Humanity, Paragraph
B on Page 26 of the English printed text, that the Nazis murdered
amongst others Chancellor Dollfuss. I do not have available an official
authenticated account of the details of that Putsch but I think that it
will suffice if I briefly recall to the Court what is, after all, a
well-known matter of history.

On July 25, 1934, about noon, 100 men dressed in the uniform of the
Austrian Army seized the Federal Chancellery. Chancellor Dollfuss was
wounded trying to escape, being shot twice at close quarters. The radio
building in the center of the town was overwhelmed, and the announcer
was compelled to broadcast the news that Dollfuss had resigned and that
Dr. Rintelen had taken his place as Chancellor. Although the Putsch
failed, the insurgents kept control of the Chancellery building, and
agreed to give it up only after they had a safe conduct to the German
border. The insurgents contacted the German Minister Dr. Rieth by
telephone and subsequently had private negotiations with him in the
building. At about 7 p.m. they yielded the building, but Chancellor
Dollfuss breathed his last about 6 p.m., not having had the services of
a doctor.

It is also a well-known historical fact that the German Government
denied all complicity in this Putsch and in this assassination. Hitler
removed Dr. Rieth as Minister on the ground that he had offered a safe
conduct to the rebels without making inquiry of the German Government,
and had thus without reason dragged the German Reich into an internal
Austrian affair in public sight.

This statement appears in a letter which Hitler sent to Defendant Papen
on July 26, 1934. I shall offer that letter a little later.

Although the German Government denied any knowledge or complicity in
this Putsch, we think there is ample basis for the conclusion that the
German Nazis bear responsibility for these events. It is not my purpose,
with respect to this somewhat minor consideration, to review the
extensive record in the trial of the Austrian Nazi Planetta and others
who were convicted for the murder of Dollfuss. Similarly I have no
intention of presenting to the Court the contents of the Austrian
_Braunbuch_, issued after July 25. The Court will, I think, take
judicial notice.

I should like, instead, to mention a few brief items which seem to us
sufficient for the purpose. I quote again from our Exhibit Number
1760-PS, from the Messersmith affidavit, USA-57, on Page 7, the
paragraph in the middle of the page:

    “The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known
    for me to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only
    that there can be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and
    organized by the Nazi officials from Germany through their
    organization in Austria made up of German Nazis and Austrian
    Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna, was fully
    familiar with all that was going to happen and that was being
    planned. The German Legation was located directly across the
    street from the British Legation, and the Austrian secret police
    kept close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation.

    “The British had their own secret service in Vienna at the time,
    and they also kept a discreet surveillance over the people
    entering the German Legation. I was told by both British and
    Austrian officials that a number of men who were later found
    guilty by the Austrian courts of having been implicated in the
    Putsch had frequented the German Legation. In addition, I
    personally followed very closely the activities of Dr. Rieth,
    and I never doubted, on the basis of all my information, that
    Dr. Rieth was in close touch and constant touch with the Nazi
    agents in Austria, these agents being both German and Austrian.
    Dr. Rieth could not have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the
    details in connection therewith. I recall, too, very definitely
    from my conversations with the highest officials of the Austrian
    Government after the Putsch their informing me that Dr. Rieth
    had been in touch with Von Rintelen, who, it had been planned by
    the Nazis, was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss, had the Putsch
    been successful.

    “It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic
    with the plans for the Putsch, but there is no question that he
    was fully familiar with all these plans and must have given his
    assent thereto and connived therein.

    “As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to
    overthrow the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of
    the Chancellor of Austria, I took occasion to verify at the time
    for myself various other items of evidence indicating that the
    Putsch was not only made with the knowledge of the German
    Government but engineered by it. I found and verified that
    almost a month before the Putsch Goebbels told Signor Cerruti,
    the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a Nazi
    government in Vienna in a month.”

I should also like to offer in evidence Ambassador Dodd’s diary,
1933-38, a book published in 1941, our Document 2832-PS, and
particularly the entry for July 26, 1934. We have the book with the two
pages to which I have reference. I should like to offer that portion of
the book in evidence as Exhibit USA-58, further identified as our
Document 2832-PS.

Mr. Dodd, then Ambassador to Berlin, made the following observations in
that entry. First he noted that in February 1934 Ernst Hanfstaengl
advised Mr. Dodd that he brought what was virtually an order from
Mussolini to Hitler to leave Austria alone and to dismiss and silence
Theodor Habicht, the German agent in Munich, who had been agitating for
annexation of Austria. On June 18 in Venice, Hitler was reported to have
promised Mussolini to leave Austria alone. Mr. Dodd further states, and
I quote from his entry of July 26, 1934:

    “On Monday, July 23, after repeated bombings in Austria by
    Nazis, a boat loaded with explosives was seized on Lake
    Constance by the Swiss police. It was a shipment of German bombs
    and shells to Austria from some arms plant. That looked ominous
    to me, but events of that kind had been so common that I did not
    report it to Washington.

    “Today evidence came to my desk that last night, as late as 11
    o’clock, the Government issued formal statements to the
    newspapers rejoicing at the fall of Dollfuss and proclaiming the
    Greater Germany that must follow. The German Minister in Vienna
    had actually helped to form the new cabinet. He had, as we now
    know, exacted a promise that the gang of Austrian Nazi murderers
    should be allowed to go into Germany undisturbed, but it was
    realized about 12 o’clock that although Dollfuss was dead the
    Loyal Austrians had surrounded the Government Palace and
    prevented the organization of a new Nazi regime. They held the
    murderers prisoners. The German Propaganda Ministry therefore
    forbade publication of the news sent out an hour before and
    tried to collect all the releases that had been distributed. A
    copy was brought to me today by a friend.

    “All the German papers this morning lamented the cruel murder
    and declared that it was simply an attack of discontented
    Austrians, not Nazis. News from Bavaria shows that thousands of
    Austrian Nazis living for a year in Bavaria on German support
    had been active for 10 days before, some getting across the
    border contrary to law, all drilling and making ready to return
    to Austria. The German propagandist Habicht was still making
    radio speeches about the necessity of annexing the ancient realm
    of the Hapsburgs to the Third Reich, in spite of all the
    promises of Hitler to silence him. But now that the drive has
    failed and the assassins are in prison in Vienna, the German
    Government denounces all who say there was any support from
    Berlin.

    “I think it will be clear one day that millions of dollars and
    many arms have been pouring into Austria since the spring of
    1933. Once more, the whole world is condemning the Hitler
    regime. No people in all modern history has been quite so
    unpopular as Nazi Germany. This stroke completes the picture. I
    expect to read a series of bitter denunciations in the American
    papers when they arrive about 10 days from now.”

As I stated before, the German Government denied any connection with the
Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss. In this connection, I should like to
invite attention to the letter of appointment which Hitler wrote to the
Defendant Von Papen on 26 July 1934. This letter appears in a standard
German reference work _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 2, Page
83. For convenience we have identified it as Document 2799-PS, and a
copy translated into English is included in the document book. The
defendants may examine the German text in the _Dokumente der Deutschen
Politik_, a copy of which is present in my hand, Page 83 of Volume 2.

I ask the Court if it will take judicial notice of this original German
typing.

I should like to read this letter which Chancellor Hitler sent to Vice
Chancellor Von Papen. I think it will provide us with a little
historical perspective and perhaps freshen our recollection of the ways
in which the Nazi conspirators worked. In considering Hitler’s letter to
the Defendant Von Papen on July 26, we might bear in mind as an
interesting sidelight, the widespread report at that time, and I mention
this only as a widespread report, that the Defendant Von Papen narrowly
missed being purged on June 30, 1934, along with the Nazi Ernst Roehm
and others. The letter from Hitler to Von Papen is as follows:

    “Dear Herr Von Papen:

    “As a result of the events in Vienna, I am compelled to suggest
    to the Reich President the removal of the German Minister to
    Vienna, Dr. Rieth, from his post, because he, at the suggestion
    of Austrian Federal Ministers and the Austrian rebels,
    respectively consented to an agreement made by both these
    parties concerning the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels to
    Germany without making inquiry of the German Reich Government.
    Thus, the Minister has dragged the German Reich into an internal
    Austrian affair without any reason.

    “The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor which was
    strictly condemned and regretted by the German Government has
    made the situation in Europe, already fluid, more acute, without
    any fault of ours. Therefore, it is my desire to bring about, if
    possible, an easing of the general situation, and especially to
    direct the relations with the German Austrian State, which have
    been so strained for a long time, again into normal and friendly
    channels.

    “For this reason, I request you, dear Herr Von Papen, to take
    over this important task, just because you have possessed, and
    continue to possess, my most complete and unlimited confidence
    ever since we have worked together in the Cabinet.

    “Therefore, I have suggested to the Reich President that you,
    upon leaving the Reich Cabinet and upon release from the office
    of Commissioner for the Saar, be called on a special mission to
    the post of the German Minister in Vienna for a limited period
    of time. In this position you will be directly subordinated to
    me.

    “Thanking once more for all that you have at one time done for
    the co-ordination of the Government of the National Revolution,
    and since then together with us for Germany, I remain, yours
    very sincerely, Adolf Hitler.”

Now let us look at the situation 4 years later, on July 25, 1938, after
the Anschluss with Austria. At that time the German officials no longer
expressed regrets over the death of Dollfuss. They were eager and
willing to reveal what the world already knew, that they were identified
with and sponsors of the murder of the former Chancellor.

I offer in evidence at this point Document L-273, which I offer as
Exhibit USA-59. That document is a dispatch from the American Consul
General, Vienna, to the Secretary of State, dated July 26, 1938.
Unfortunately, through a mechanical slip, this document which is in
English in the original, was not mimeographed in English and is not in
your document book. However, it was translated into German, and is in
the document book which counsel for the defendants have. I read from a
photostatic copy of the dispatch:

    “The two high points of the celebration”—here was a
    celebration—“were the memorial assembly on the 24th at
    Klagenfurt, capital of the Province of Carinthia, where in 1934
    the Vienna Nazi revolt found its widest response and the march
    on the 25th to the former Federal Chancellery in Vienna by the
    surviving members of the SS Standarte 89, which made the attack
    on the Chancellery in 1934.”—a reconstitution of the crime, so
    to say.

    “The assembled thousands at Klagenfurt were addressed by the
    Führer’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, in the presence of the families of
    the 13 National Socialists who were hanged for their part in the
    July Putsch. The Klagenfurt memorial celebration was also made
    the occasion for the solemn swearing in of the seven recently
    appointed Gauleiter of the Ostmark. From the point of view of
    the outside world, this speech of Reich Minister Hess was
    chiefly remarkable for the fact that after devoting the first
    half of his speech to the expected praise of the sacrifices of
    the men, women, and youths of Austria in the struggle for
    Greater Germany, he then launched into a defense of the
    occupation of Austria, an attack on the ‘lying foreign press’
    and on those who spread the idea of a new war. The world was
    fortunate, declared Hess, that Germany’s leader was a man who
    would not allow himself to be provoked. The Führer does what is
    necessary for his people in sovereign calm and labors for the
    peace of Europe, even though provocators ‘completely ignoring
    the deliberate threat of the peace of certain small states,’
    deceitfully claim that he is a menace to the peace of Europe.

    “The march on the former Federal Chancellery,”—referring back
    to the Putsch of 4 years before—“now the Reichsstatthalterei,
    followed the exact route and time schedule of the original
    attack. The marchers were met at the Chancellery by
    Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart, who addressed them and unveiled
    a memorial tablet. From the Reichsstatthalterei the
    Standarte”—that is the SS organization which made the original
    attack and which marched on this occasion 4 years
    later—“marched from the old Ravag broadcasting center, from
    which false news of the resignation of Dollfuss had been
    broadcast, and there unveiled a second memorial tablet.
    Steinhaeusel, the present Police President of Vienna, is a
    member of the SS Standarte 89.”

Today that original memorial plaque, if the Court please, is rubble,
like so much of Nuremberg; but we found a photograph of it in the
National Library in Vienna. I should like to offer this photograph in
evidence. It was taken on this occasion 4 years later. The Nazi wreath
encircles the memorial tablet. A large wreath of flowers with a very
distinct swastika Nazi symbol was laid before the wreath. I offer that
photograph identified as 2968-PS in evidence. I offer it as Exhibit
USA-60. You will find that in the document book. I know of no more
interesting or shocking document at which you could look. We call
celebrating a murder 4 years later, “Murder by ratification.”

As that photograph shows, this plaque which was erected to celebrate
this sinister occasion reads: “One hundred and fifty-four German men of
the 89th SS Standarte stood up here for Germany on July 25, 1934. Seven
found death in the hands of the hangman.”

The Tribunal may notice that the number “154” at the top of the plaque
is concealed in the photograph by the Nazi wreath surrounding the
plaque. I must confess that I find myself curiously interested in this
tablet and in the photograph which was taken and carefully filed. The
words chosen for this marble tablet, and surely we can presume that they
were words chosen carefully, tell us clearly that the men involved were
not mere malcontent Austrian revolutionaries, but were regarded as
German men, were members of a para-military organization, and stood up
here for Germany.

In 1934 Hitler repudiated Doctor Rieth because he dragged the German
Reich into an internal Austrian affair without any reason. In 1938 Nazi
Germany proudly identified itself with this murder, took credit for it,
and took responsibility for it. Further proof in the conventional sense,
it seems to us, is hardly necessary.

Next we refer to the program culminating in the Pact of July 11, 1936.
In considering the activities of the Nazi conspirators in Austria
between July 25, 1934 and November 1937 there is a distinct intermediate
point, the Pact of July 11, 1936. Accordingly, I shall first review
developments in the 2-year period, July 1934-36.

First, we must consider the continued aim of eliminating Austria’s
independence, with particular relation to the Defendant Von Papen’s
conversation and activity. The first point that should be mentioned is
this: The Nazi conspirators pretended to respect the independence and
sovereignty of Austria, notwithstanding the aim of Anschluss stated in
_Mein Kampf_. But in truth and in fact they were working from the very
beginning to destroy the Austrian State.

A dramatic recital of the position of Defendant Von Papen in this regard
is provided in Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, from which I have already
quoted. I quote now from Page 9 of the English copy, the second
paragraph, 1760-PS, Exhibit USA-57:

    “That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was
    confirmed to me by Franz von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as
    German Minister. It will be recalled that he accepted this
    assignment as German Minister even though he knew that he had
    been marked for execution in the St. Bartholomew’s massacre of
    30 June 1934. When, in accordance with protocol, he paid me a
    visit shortly after his arrival in Vienna, I determined that
    during this call there would be no reference to anything of
    importance, and I limited the conversation strictly to
    platitudes which I was able to do as he was calling on me in my
    office. I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for
    several weeks in order to make it clear to Von Papen that I had
    no sympathy with, and on the other hand was familiar with the
    objectives of his mission in Austria. When I did call on Von
    Papen in the German Legation, he greeted me with ‘Now you are in
    my Legation and I can control the conversation.’

    “In the boldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded to
    tell me that all of southeastern Europe, to the borders of
    Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he had been
    charged with the mission of facilitating German economic and
    political control over all this region for Germany. He blandly
    and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the
    first step. He definitely stated that he was in Austria to
    undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to
    work towards the weakening of the Governments in the other
    states to the south and southeast. He said that he intended to
    use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with
    certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end.
    He said that he was telling me this because the German
    Government was bound on this objective of getting this control
    of southeastern Europe and that there was nothing which could
    stop it, and that our own policy and that of France and England
    was not realistic.

    “The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the
    German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and
    of course, I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I
    already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless
    shocked to have him speak so boldly to me, and when he finished
    I got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited
    representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit
    that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and
    destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely
    smiled and said of course this conversation was between us, and
    that he would of course not be talking to others so clearly
    about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard
    to this conversation, as it is characteristic of the absolute
    frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of
    their objectives.”

And again, reading from the same document on Page 10, beginning at the
last paragraph at the bottom of the page:

    “On the surface, however, German activities consisted
    principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and
    influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds,
    including the use of the German diplomatic mission in Vienna and
    its facilities and personnel.

    “Von Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a
    lavish scale. He approached almost every member of the Austrian
    Cabinet, telling them, as several of them later informed me,
    that Germany was bound to prevail in the long run, and that they
    should join the winning side if they wished to enjoy positions
    of power and influence under German control. Of course, openly
    and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that Germany would
    respect Austrian independence and that all that she wished to do
    was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like the
    Chancellor Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr,
    and others, and replace them by a few ‘nationally-minded’
    Austrians, which of course meant the Nazis. The whole basic
    effort of Von Papen was to bring about the Anschluss.

    “In early 1935 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg,
    informed me that in the course of a conversation with Von Papen,
    the latter had remarked, ‘Yes, you have your French and English
    friends now, and you can have your independence a little
    longer.’ The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in
    German, but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The
    Foreign Minister told me that he had replied to Von Papen, ‘I am
    glad to have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees
    with what your Chief has just said in the Saar and which you
    have taken such pains to deny.’ Von Papen appeared to be
    terribly upset when he realized just what he had said and tried
    to cover his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept
    constantly getting into deeper water.

    “Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some success, particularly with
    men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored the
    Grossdeutschtum idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly
    disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience
    or scruple, Von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his
    wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of
    these Austrians in this respect.”

May I inquire if the Court expect to take a short recess?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wishes to make it clear, if I did not make
it clear when I spoke before, that if Defense Counsel wish to put
interrogatories to Mr. Messersmith upon his affidavit they may submit
such interrogatories to the Tribunal in writing for them to be sent to
Mr. Messersmith to answer.

FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): I do not
know whether my question has yet been answered, or by what it has been
made known by the President of the Court.

In the testimony of Mr. Messersmith, Dönitz’ name was mentioned. It
appears on Page 4 of the German version. I should like to read the whole
paragraph:

    “Admiral Karl Dönitz was not always in an amicable frame of
    mind. He was not a National Socialist when the National
    Socialists came to power”. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: This passage was not read in evidence, was it?

DR. KRANZBÜHLER: No, only the name was mentioned.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think the name was mentioned, because this part
of the affidavit was not read.

DR. KRANZBÜHLER: The name was read, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.

DR. KRANZBÜHLER: [_Continuing._]

    “Nevertheless, he became one of the first high officers in the
    Army and fleet and was in complete agreement with the concepts
    and aims of National Socialism.”

As an introduction to this paragraph, Mr. Messersmith said, in Document
Number 1760, on Page 2, the last sentence before the Number 1:

    “Among those whom I saw frequently and to whom I have reference
    in many of my statements were the following. . . .”

Then after Number 16 Dönitz’ name appears. My client has informed me
that he has heard the name “Messersmith” today for the first time; that
he does not know the witness Messersmith, has never seen him, nor has he
ever spoken to him.

I therefore request that the witness Messersmith be brought before the
Court to state when and where he spoke to the Defendant Dönitz.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that the affidavit is
admissible; that its probative value will of course be considered by the
Tribunal, and the defendants’ counsel have the right, if they wish, to
submit interrogatories for the examination of Messersmith. Of course
defendants will have the opportunity of giving evidence when their turn
comes, then Admiral Dönitz, if he thinks it right, will be able to deny
the statements of the affidavit.

DR. KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.

MR. ALDERMAN: I want to call the Court’s attention to a slight
mistranslation into German of one sentence of the Messersmith affidavit.
In the German translation the word “nicht” crept in when the negative
was not in the English.

The English statement was:

    “I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several weeks
    in order to make it clear to Von Papen that I had no sympathy
    with and on the other hand was familiar with the objectives of
    his mission in Austria.”

The German text contains the negative: “Und dass ich anderseits nicht
mit den Zielen seiner Berufung in Österreich vertraut war.” The “nicht”
should not be in the German text.

The continued existence of Nazi organizations was a program of armed
preparedness. The wiles of the Defendant Von Papen represented only one
part of the total program of Nazi conspiracy. At the same time Nazi
activities in Austria, forced underground during this period, were
carried on.

Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit on Pages 9 and 10, the English text,
discloses the following. Reading from the last main paragraph on Page 9:

    “Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no
    means neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a
    result of the energetic measures taken against the Putsch and as
    a result of public indignation. Reorganization work was soon
    begun. In October 1934 the Austrian Foreign Minister,
    Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me the following memorandum, which
    he told me had been supplied to the Austrian Government by a
    person who participated in the meeting under reference.”

I quote the first paragraph of the memorandum:

    “A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist
    Party was held on 29 and 30 September 1934, at Bad Aibling in
    Bavaria.”

Then, skipping four paragraphs and resuming on the fifth one:

    “The Agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received
    orders in every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those
    persons who are known to support actively the present Government
    and who are prepared closely to cooperate with it.

    “When the next action against the Government takes place those
    persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against
    all those other persons, without distinction of party, who are
    known to be adversaries of National Socialism.

    “In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following
    principles have been emphasized:

    “A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the
    principal duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria
    has for the German Reich a much greater significance and value
    than the Saar. The Austrian problem is the problem. All combat
    methods are consecrated by the end which they are to serve.

    “B. We must, on every occasion which presents itself, appear to
    be disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for the
    struggle. The new phase of the struggle will be particularly
    serious and there will be this time two centers of terror, one
    along the German frontier and the other along the Yugoslav
    frontier.”

That ends the quotation from the memorandum. I proceed with the next
paragraph of the affidavit:

    “The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although
    it was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier,
    it remained undissolved in spite of the engagement which had
    been taken to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received
    positive information to this effect from time to time which it
    passed on to me and I had direct information to the same effect
    from reliable persons coming from Germany to Vienna who actually
    saw the Legion.”

The fact of the reorganization of the Nazi Party in Austria is
corroborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis.

I offer in evidence our Document Number 812-PS, as Exhibit USA-61. It
contains three parts. First, there is a letter dated August 22, 1939
from Mr. Rainer, then Gauleiter at Salzburg, to the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart, then Austrian Reich Minister. That letter encloses a
letter dated July 6, 1939 written by Rainer to Reich Commissioner and
Gauleiter Josef Bürckel.

DR. HANS LATERNSER: (Co-counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): I object
to the presentation of the letters contained in Document Number 812. Of
course, I cannot object to the presentation of this evidence to the
extent that this evidence is to prove that these letters were actually
written. However, if these letters are to serve as proof for the
correctness of their contents, then I must object to the use of these
letters, for the following reason: Particularly, the third document: It
is a letter which, as is manifest from its contents, has a certain bias,
for this reason, that in this letter it is explained to what extent the
Austrian Nazi Party participated in the Anschluss.

It purports, further, to expose the leading role played by the Party
group Rainer-Klausner.

From the bias that is manifest in the contents of this letter, this
letter cannot serve as proof for the facts brought forth in it,
particularly since the witness Rainer, who wrote this letter, is
available as a witness. I have discovered he is at present in Nuremberg.

I object to the use of this letter to the extent that it is to be used
to prove the correctness of its contents, because the witness who can
testify to that is at our disposal in Nuremberg.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will hear Mr. Alderman in answer to what has
been said. The Tribunal has not yet read the letter.

MR. ALDERMAN: I think perhaps it would be better to read the letter
before we argue about the significance of its contents.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you relying upon the letter as evidence of the facts
stated in it?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: From whom is the letter, and to whom is it addressed?

MR. ALDERMAN: The first letter is from Mr. Rainer who was at that time
Gauleiter at Salzburg, to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, then Reich
Minister of Austria.

That letter encloses a letter dated July 6, 1939, written by Rainer to
Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef Bürckel. In that letter, in turn,
Rainer enclosed a report on the events in the NSDAP of Austria from 1933
to March 11, 1938, the day before the invasion of Austria.

I had some other matters in connection with this that I did want to
bring to the attention of the Tribunal before it passes upon the
admissibility.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think that the defendant’s counsel is really
challenging the admissibility of the document; he challenges the
contents of the document.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. On that, in the first place, we are advised by
defendant’s counsel that this man Rainer is in Nuremberg. I would assume
he is there.

We have also an affidavit by Rainer stating that what is stated in these
communications is the truth. However, it seems to us that the
communications themselves, as contemporaneous reports by a Party officer
at the time, are much more probative evidence than anything that he
might testify to before you today.

DR. LATERNSER: I have already said that this letter has these
characteristics, that it is biased, that it tends to emphasize and
exaggerate the participation of the Austrian Nazi Party on the
Anschluss. Therefore, I must object to the use of this letter as
objective evidence. It was not written with the thought in mind that the
letter would be used as evidence before a court. If the writer had known
that, the letter undoubtedly would have been formulated differently,
considering his political activity.

I believe, although I am not sure, that the witness is in Nuremberg. In
that case, according to a principle which is basic for all trial
procedure, the witness should be presented to the Court personally,
particularly since, in this case, the difficulties inherent in the
question of Messersmith do not here pertain.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that the letters are
admissible. They were written to and received by the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart. The defendant can challenge the contents of the letters
by his evidence.

If it is true that Rainer is in Nuremberg, it is open to the defendant
to apply to the Tribunal for leave to call Rainer in due course. He can
then challenge the contents of these letters, both by the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart’s evidence and by Rainer’s evidence. The letters
themselves are admitted.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I agree quite fully with the
statement that if it had been known that these letters were to be
offered in evidence in a court of justice, they very probably would have
been differently written. That applies to a great part of the evidence
that we shall offer in this case. And I would say that if the
photographer who took the photograph of the Memorial Plaque had known
that his photographs would be introduced in evidence in a conspiracy
case, he probably never would have snapped the shutter.

The letter from Rainer to Bürckel indicates that he was asked to prepare
a short history of the role of the Party. Perhaps I had better read the
covering letter, addressed to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart:

    “Dear Dr. Seyss:

    “I have received your letter of 19 August 1939, in which you
    asked me to inform you what I know of those matters which, among
    others, are the subject of your correspondence with Bürckel.

    “I do not wish to discuss sundry talks and all that which has
    been brought to my notice in the course of time by different
    people. I wish to clarify essentially my own attitude.

    “On 5 July 1939 I was asked by telephone by the Reich
    Commissioner Gauleiter Bürckel if I was in possession of the
    memorandum of Globus regarding the events of March. I told him
    that I did not have this memorandum, that I never possessed a
    single part of it; that I, furthermore, did not then participate
    in the matter and do not know its content. Because of official
    requests by Bürckel, I have entrusted him with a report
    accompanied by a letter written on 6 July.

    “If Bürckel now writes to you that certain statements were
    confirmed by me, I feel obliged to entrust you with a copy each
    of my copies of those two documents, which were only written in
    single originals. I shall specially inform Bürckel of this,
    adding that I have given—apart from, those written
    explanations—no confirmations, declarations, or criticisms
    whatsoever regarding you and your attitude and that I have
    authorized nobody to refer to any statements of mine.

    “Since the beginning of our collaboration, I have always
    expressed and represented forcefully my ideas regarding yourself
    and my opinion of your personality. This conception of mine was
    the very basis of our collaboration. The events of February and
    March have not changed this, especially since I considered the
    political success of 11 March merely as a confirmation of the
    intentions and convictions which have equally induced both of us
    to collaborate.

    “As far as Globus is concerned, you are fully, aware of his
    nature, which I judged always and in every situation only by its
    good side. I believe that you have already talked to Globus
    about the occurrences between the 11 March 1938 and today, and I
    am convinced that he will tell you everything that is bothering
    him, if you will speak to him about this matter, as is your
    intention.

    “With best regards and Heil Hitler!

                                             Yours, Friedl Rainer.”

And so Rainer writes his report, which is enclosed with this letter, to
show that the Party as a whole is entitled to the glory which was
excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart.

I refer to the third paragraph of the first enclosure, the report to
Reich Commissioner Gauleiter Josef Bürckel:

    “We saw in March and April how a false picture about the actual
    leadership conditions developed from this fact which could not
    be corrected in spite of our attempts to that effect. This was
    an important factor for the varying moods of Globocnik who hoped
    especially from you that you would emphasize for Hitler, and
    also for the public, the role of the Party during the events
    preceding 12 March 1938. I limited myself to address this verbal
    and written declaration to Party member Hess, and furthermore to
    secure the documents from the March days. In addition, I spoke
    at every available opportunity about the fight of the Party. I
    did not undertake steps to give just credit to other persons for
    the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr.
    Seyss-Inquart, and I would not do that, primarily because I
    appear as a beneficiary, and furthermore, because I believe that
    I would not gladden Hitler by doing so.

    “I am also convinced that Dr. Seyss-Inquart did not act
    crookedly, and furthermore, that Hitler does not want to commit
    an act of historical justice by special preference of his
    person, but rather that he is attracted to him personally. It
    really is of no great account to Hitler if this or that person
    were more or less meritorious in this sector of the great fight
    of the movement. Because, in the last analysis, by far the
    greatest part is to be ascribed only to him; he alone will be
    considered by history as the liberator of Austria. I, therefore,
    considered it best to accept existing conditions and look for
    new fertile fields of endeavor in the Party.

    “If I should be asked to describe—without personal
    interest—the role of the Party according to my best conviction,
    I am ready to do so at any time. For this reason I promised
    yesterday to submit to you again a short summary, and to make it
    available for your confidential use. Of this letter and of this
    abbreviated description I retain the sole copy.

    “Heil Hitler!      Rainer.”

Now, of course, all of these enclosures went to the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart, and he had knowledge of the contents of all of them.

It is an historical fact of which the Court will take judicial notice,
that Seyss-Inquart was the original Quisling. It so happened that the
Norwegian Seyss-Inquart gave his name to posterity as a meaningful name,
but all Quislings are alike.

The Tribunal will observe from this that the Rainer report is hardly
likely to be tendentious, as counsel says, or to be prejudiced in favor
of Defendant Seyss-Inquart’s contribution to the Anschluss. It tends, on
the contrary, to show that Seyss-Inquart was not quite so important as
he might have thought he was. Even so, Rainer gives Seyss-Inquart credit
enough.

The Rainer report further tells of the disorganization of the Nazi Party
in Austria and of its reconstitution. I now quote the second and third
paragraphs of the report, appearing on Pages 3 and 4 of the English text
of 812-PS, which is Exhibit USA-61; and I believe it is on Pages 1 and 2
of the original German of the report or Bericht, which is the third part
of the document:

    “Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the
    July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right,
    the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete
    destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of
    fighters through imprisonment or flight into the Alt-Reich, and
    with regard to the political relationship of Germany to Austria,
    a formal acknowledgment of the existence of the Austrian State
    by the German Government. With the telegram to Papen,
    instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the
    two States, the Führer had liquidated the first stage of the
    battle, and a new method of political penetration was to begin.
    By order of the Führer the Landesleitung Munich was dissolved,
    and the Party in Austria was left to its own resources.

    “There was no acknowledged leader for the entire Party in
    Austria. New leaderships were forming in the new Gaue. The
    process was again and again interrupted by the interference of
    the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and
    frequently there were two, three, or more rival leaderships. The
    first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaue in
    Autumn 1934 was Engineer Reinthaler (already appointed
    Landesbauernführer, leader of the country’s farmers, by Hess).
    He endeavored to bring about a political appeasement by
    negotiations with the Government with the purpose of giving the
    NSDAP legal status again, thus permitting its political
    activities. Simultaneously, Reinthaler started the
    reconstruction of the illegal political organization at the head
    of which he had placed Engineer Neubacher.”

Next we have secret contacts between German officials, including the
Defendant Von Papen, and the Austrian Nazis; the use by the Austrian
Nazis of front personalities.

There are two cardinal factors concerning the Nazi organization in
Austria which should be borne in mind.

First, although the Führer had, on the surface, cast the Austrian Nazis
adrift—as indicated in the document I have just read—in fact, as we
shall show, German officials, including Von Papen, maintained secret
contact with the Austrian Nazis in line with Hitler’s desires. German
officials consulted and gave advice and support to the organization of
the Austrian Nazis.

In the second place, the Austrian Nazis remained an illegal organization
in Austria, organizing for the eventual use of force in a so-called
emergency. But in the meantime they deemed it expedient to act behind
front personalities, such as the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, who had no
apparent taint of illegality in his status in Austria.

Mr. Messersmith relates, in his affidavit, that he got hold of a copy of
a document outlining this Nazi program. I quote from Page 8 of Document
1760-PS, USA-57, the following:

    “For 2 years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the
    Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic
    acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and, as I recall, in
    1935 and most of 1936, this inactivity was in accordance with
    directives from Berlin, as direct evidence to that effect which
    came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January the
    Austrian Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a
    document which I considered accurate in all respects, and which
    stated:

    “‘The German Minister here, Von Papen, on the occasion of his
    last visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor
    Hitler for fairly long conversations and he also took this
    opportunity to call on Schacht and Von Neurath. In these
    conversations the following instructions were given to him:

    “‘During the next 2 years nothing can be undertaken which will
    give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground,
    everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of
    Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria.
    Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason, not
    endeavor to intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis
    in the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is
    convinced that order could be brought into the Party at once
    through a word from him. This word, however, he will not give
    for foreign political reasons, being convinced that ends desired
    by him may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor
    Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does not
    indicate any disinterestedness in Austria’s independence. Also,
    before everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party
    members in Austria, and must therefore, in spite of the very
    real exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help to
    the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria.

    “‘As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave the
    authorization that from then on, 200,000 marks a month were to
    be set aside for this end (support of National Socialists in
    Austria). The control and supervision of this monthly sum was to
    be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, through the fact that
    he alone had control over the money, would have a definite
    influence on the Party followers. In this way it would be
    possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing
    difficulties and divisions in the Austrian National Socialist
    Party.

    “‘The hope was also expressed to Herr Von Papen that the
    recently authorized foundation of German Ortsgruppen of the
    National Socialist Party in Austria, made up of German citizens
    in Austria, would be so arranged as not to give the appearance
    that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian internal
    affairs.’”

The report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissar Bürckel in July 1939
outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership squabbles
following the retirement of Reinthaler.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this would be a convenient time to break off
until 2 o’clock?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

              [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just referred again to
the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Bürckel in July
1939, which outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership
problem following the retirement of Reinthaler.

In referring to the situation in 1935, he mentioned some of the contacts
with the Reich Government, that is, the German Government, in the
following terms. I quote from Page 4 of the English text of that report,
and I believe from Page 4 of the German text of the Rainer report, which
is 812-PS, that is Exhibit USA-61:

    “In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which
    were, apart from the Gauleiter”—Gau leaders—“also Globocnik
    and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed, because of an instruction
    received from the imprisoned Leopold, to have been made deputy
    country leader. A group led by engineer Raffelsberger had at
    this time also established connection with departments of the
    Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German racial agency, _et
    cetera_), and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in
    the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria.”

And, again, the Rainer report sets forth the situation a little later in
1936. I quote from Page 6 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the
German text:

    “The principles of the construction were:

    “The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the
    trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple
    manner and without compromise, according to the principle of
    organizing an elite to be available to the illegal Land Party
    Council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political
    opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal
    chances should be used without revealing any ties with the
    illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal
    Party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at
    the top of the Party leadership. All connections with the Party
    in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the
    Führer. These said that the German State should officially be
    omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP and that
    auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, _et
    cetera_, should be established in the foreign countries
    bordering Austria.

    “Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who
    had connection with Dr. Waechter which originated from
    Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising. On the other side,
    Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and
    especially well-established relations with Christian Social
    politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the
    Styrian Heimatschutz”—home defense—“and became a Party member
    when the entire Styrian Heimatschutz was incorporated into the
    NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal
    field was Colonel Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both
    sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by
    the activities of these two persons of whom Glaise-Horstenau was
    designed as trustee to the Führer.”

The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the Austrian Nazis
during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting developments. They were
maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, and using native
personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart. The Nazis made
good use of such figures, who were more discreet in their activities and
could be referred to as nationalists. They presented, supported, and
obtained consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by other
Nazis like Captain Leopold.

Seyss-Inquart did not hold any public office until January 1937, when he
was made Counsellor of State. But Rainer, describing him as a
trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of this Styrian
Heimatschutz, points him out as one who strongly influenced the
agreement of July 11, 1936. The strategic importance of that agreement
will be considered a little later. Rainer’s report, as I have said
before, was hardly likely to over emphasize the significance of
Seyss-Inquart’s contribution.

That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to trust
Seyss-Inquart is indicated by the next document. I propose to offer in
evidence Document 2219-PS as Exhibit USA-62. This is a letter dated 14
July 1939, addressed to Field Marshal Göring. The document is a typed
carbon of the letter. It ends with the “Heil Hitler” termination, and it
is not signed, but we think it was undoubtedly written by Defendant
Seyss-Inquart. It was the carbon copy found among Seyss-Inquart’s
personal files, and such carbon copies kept by authors of letters
usually are not signed. On the first page of the letter there appears a
note in ink, not indicated in the partial English translation, reading,
“Air Mail, 15 July, 1515 hours, Berlin, brought to Göring’s office.” The
main text of the letter consists of a plea for intercession on behalf of
one Mühlmann, whose name we shall meet later, and who, unfortunately,
got into Bürckel’s bad graces. I shall quote the extract part of the
document which has been translated into English, and which starts, I
believe, on Page 7 of the German text:

    “At present in Vienna, 14 July 1939;

    “To the General Field Marshal

    “Sir:

    “If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I
    know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final
    decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced
    activism”—Aktivismus—“this will certainly be regarded as a
    fault of my personality. Yet I know that I cling with
    unconquerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe, that is
    Greater Germany”—Grossdeutschland—“and the Führer. And if some
    people are already tired out from the struggle and some have
    been killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready
    to go into action. This, after all, was also the development
    until the year 1938. Until July 1934, I conducted myself as a
    regular member of the Party. And if I had quietly, in whatever
    form, paid my membership dues (the first one, according to a
    receipt, I paid in December 1931) I probably would have been an
    undisputed, comparatively old fighter and Party member of
    Austria, but I would not have done any more for the union. I
    told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime
    on its own ground in order to give the Führer a chance to use
    whatever method he desired.”—I would like to call particular
    attention to that sentence.—“I told myself that this Austria
    was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron
    determination because I and my friends had to fight against the
    whole political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short,
    against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we
    might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political
    annihilation; it would have deprived the Führer of the means and
    tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria,
    as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully
    conscious of the fact that I am following a path which is not
    comprehensible to the masses and also not to my Party comrades.
    I followed it calmly and would without hesitation follow it
    again, because I am satisfied that at one point I could serve
    the Führer as a tool in his work, even though my former attitude
    even now gives occasion to very worthy and honorable Party
    comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid
    attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion
    which the Führer and the men close to him have of me.”

That letter was written to one of the men close to him—Field Marshal
Göring. I think that suffices to demonstrate Seyss-Inquart as one whose
loyalty to Hitler, a foreign dictator, and to the aims of the Nazi
conspiracy, led him to fight for the Anschluss with all the means at his
disposal.

It is appropriate at this time to offer in evidence a document from the
Defendant Von Papen, and to see how he thought the doctrines of National
Socialism could be used to effect the aim of the Anschluss. I offer
Document 2248-PS as Exhibit USA-63. This document is a letter from Von
Papen to Hitler, dated July 27, 1935. It consists of a report entitled,
“Review and Outlook 1 Year after the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss.”
After reviewing the success that the Austrian Government had had in
establishing Dollfuss as a martyr, and his principles as the patriotic
principles of Austria, Von Papen stated—and I quote the last paragraph
of the letter, beginning on Page 1 (Page 146 of the German text):

    “National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian
    ideology. If today it is contended in Austria that the NSDAP is
    only a centralized Reich German Party and therefore unable to
    transfer the spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups
    of people of a different political makeup, the answer must
    rightly be that the national revolution in Germany could not
    have been brought about in a different way. But when the
    creation of the people’s community in the Reich will be
    completed, National Socialism could, in a much wider sense than
    this is possible through the present Party organization—at
    least apparently—certainly become the rallying point for all
    racially German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in
    regard to Austria cannot be achieved today with any centralized
    tendency. If this recognition would once and for all be stated
    clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily become
    possible to effect a break-through into the front of the New
    Austria. A Nuremberg Party Day designated as ‘The German Day’ as
    in old times and the proclamation of a National Socialistic
    peoples’ front would be a stirring event for all beyond the
    borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the
    particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the
    legitimistic Count Dubsky, wrote in his pamphlet about the
    Anschluss: ‘The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not
    be at all. National Socialism must win it or perish if it is
    unable to solve this task.’”

We have other reports from Von Papen to Hitler which I shall offer in
evidence presently, showing that he maintained covert contact with the
National Socialist groups in Austria. It is certainly interesting that
from the very start of his mission, Defendant Von Papen was thinking of
ways and means of using the principle of National Socialism for national
Germans outside the border of Germany. Papen was working for the
Anschluss, although he preferred to use the principles of National
Socialism rather than rely on the Party organization as a necessary
means of establishing those principles in the German Reich.

Next we have some assurance and reassurance to Austria. The German
Government did no more than keep up a pretense of non-interference with
Austrian groups. It employed the psychological inducement of providing
assurances that it had no designs on Austrian independence. If Austria
could find hope for the execution of those assurances, she could find
her way clear to the granting of concessions and obtain relief from the
economic and internal pressure.

I offer Document 2247-PS in evidence as Exhibit USA-64. It is a letter
from Von Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated May 17, 1935.

Von Papen’s letter indicated to Hitler that a forthright credible
statement by Germany reassuring Austria, would be most useful for German
diplomatic purposes and for the improvement of relationship between
Austria and German groups in Austria.

He had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his Christian Social forces
against Starhemberg, the Vice Chancellor of Austria, who was backed by
Mussolini. Von Papen hoped to persuade Schuschnigg to ally his forces
with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious over Starhemberg. Von Papen
indicates that he obtained this idea from Captain Leopold, leader of the
illegal National Socialists in Austria.

I quote from his letter, starting at the second paragraph of the second
page. This is Von Papen writing to “Mein Führer” Hitler:

    “I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The
    fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his Christian
    Social forces, who are opposed to a home-front dictatorship,
    against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting the measures
    arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to
    him in such a way that he would submit the offer to the
    Government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of
    interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of
    the NSDAP in Austria, Captain Leopold, the totalitarian
    principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the
    beginning by a combination of that part of the Christian Social
    elements which favors the Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If
    Germany recognizes the national independence of Austria and
    guarantees full freedom to the Austrian national opposition,
    then, as a result of such a compromise, the Austrian Government
    would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these
    forces. . . . A further consequence of this step would be the
    possibility of the participation of Germany in the Danube Pact,
    which would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the
    settlement of relations between Germany and Austria. Such a
    measure would have a most beneficial influence on the European
    situation, and especially on our relationship with England.

    “One may object that Schuschnigg will hardly be determined to
    follow such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability
    immediately communicate our offer to our opponents.

    “Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of
    setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through the use of
    go-betweens. The possibility exists. If Herr Schuschnigg finally
    says ‘no’ and makes our offer known in Rome, then the situation
    would not be any worse, but on the contrary, the efforts of the
    Reich Government to make peace with Austria would be revealed,
    without prejudice to other interests. Therefore, even in the
    case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I consider
    it completely possible, that in view of the farspread dislike in
    the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian course, and in view of
    the sharp tensions between the Federal
    Government”—Bundesregierung—“Herr Schuschnigg will grasp this
    last straw, always under the supposition that the offer could
    not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears
    all the marks of an actually honest compromise with Austria.

    “Assuming success of this step we would again establish our
    active intervention in central European politics, which, as
    opposed to the French, Czech, and Russian political maneuvers,
    would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically.

    “Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in
    the way of explorations and conferences, an immediate decision
    is necessary.

    “The Reich Army Minister”—Reichswehrminister—“shares the
    opinion presented above, and the Reich Foreign
    Minister”—Reichsaussenminister—“wants to discuss it with you,
    my Führer.”—Signed—“Papen.”

In other words, Von Papen wanted a strong assurance and a credible
assurance of the preservation of Austria’s independence. As he put it,
Germany had nothing to lose with what it could always call a mere effort
at peace, and she might be able to convince Schuschnigg to establish an
Austrian coalition government with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would
vastly strengthen her position in Europe. Finally Von Papen urged haste.

Exactly 4 days later, in a Reichstag address, Hitler responded to Von
Papen’s suggestion, and asserted:

    “Germany neither intends nor wishes, to interfere in the
    internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an
    Anschluss.”

The British will present a document covering that speech. I merely
wanted to use one sentence at this point. It is a sentence quite well
known to history.

It is appropriate to take notice of this assurance at this point, and to
note that for a complexity of reasons Von Papen suggested, and Hitler
announced, a policy completely at variance with their intentions, which
had been, and continued to be, to interfere in Austria’s internal
affairs and to conclude an Anschluss.

There was then a temporary continuance of a quiet pressure policy.

On May 1, 1936, Hitler blandly in a public speech branded as a lie any
statement that “tomorrow or the day after” Germany would fall upon
Austria. I invite the Court’s attention to the version of the speech
appearing in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, SD—that is South Germany—2
to 3 May 1936, Page 2, and translated in our Document 2367-PS.

Without offering that document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice
of that statement in that well-known speech.

If Hitler meant what he said, it was only in the most literal and
misleading sense, that is, that he would not actually fall upon Austria
“tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.” For the conspirators well knew
that the successful execution of their purpose required for a little
while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing in Austria.

I now offer in evidence our Document L-150, “Memorandum of Conversation
between Ambassador Bullitt and the Defendant Von Neurath, on 18 May
1936” as Exhibit USA-65. This document unfortunately again appears in
your document books in German. Due to an error, it has not been
mimeographed in English. German counsel have the German copies.

I shall read from it and at the same time, hand to the interpreter
reading the German, a marked copy of a German translation. I might read
one sentence from the first paragraph:

    “I called on Von Neurath, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on May 18
    and had a long talk on the general European situation.

    “Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German
    Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until the
    Rhineland had been ‘digested.’

    “He explained that he meant until the German fortifications had
    been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German
    Government would do everything possible to prevent, rather than
    encourage, an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue
    a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our
    fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central
    Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory, all
    these countries will begin to feel very differently about their
    foreign policies and a new constellation will develop.’”

I skip then two paragraphs.

    “Von Neurath then stated that no understanding had been reached
    between Germany and Italy, and admitted that the demonstrations
    of friendship between Germany and Italy were mere demonstrations
    without basis in reality. He went on to say that at the present
    time he could see no way to reconcile the conflicting interests
    of Germany and Italy in Austria. He said that there were three
    chief reasons why the German Government was urging the Austrian
    Nazis to remain quiet at the present time:

    “The first was that Mussolini had today the greater part of his
    army mobilized on the Austrian border, ready to strike, and that
    he would certainly strike if he should have a good excuse.

    “The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain quiet for
    the present was that the Nazi movement was growing stronger
    daily in Austria. The youth of Austria was turning more and more
    towards the Nazis, and the dominance of the Nazi Party in
    Austria was inevitable and only a question of time.”

The third reason was that until the German fortifications had been
constructed on the French border, an involvement of Germany in war with
Italy might lead to a French attack on Germany.

But if Germany was not yet ready for open conflict in Austria, her
diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which
influenced Austria’s willingness to make concessions to Germany and to
come to terms.

I quote again from the Messersmith affidavit, Page 11 of the English
text. That is Document 1760-PS.

    “Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave
    Germany an opportunity to take more positive steps in the
    direction of the nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given
    Austria assurance of support of the most definite character
    against external German aggression and on one occasion, by
    mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive
    action which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her
    Abyssinian adventure. This and the re-occupation of the
    Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. It is
    quite obvious that after Italy had launched her Abyssinian
    adventure, she was no longer in any position to counter German
    aggressive moves against Austria.”

This weakening of Austria helped to pave the way for the pact of July
11, 1936. On July 11, 1936 the Governments of Austria and Germany
concluded an accord. That will be offered in evidence also by the
British Delegation.

I merely ask at this point, that the Tribunal take judicial notice of
the fact that such an accord was entered into. The formal part of the
agreement of July 11, 1936 will also be proved by our British
colleagues. For convenient reference, it will be found in the Document
which the British will offer, TC-22, and the substance of it is also
contained on Pages 11 and 12 of Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, 1760-PS.

Upon the basis of this fight alone, the agreement looked like a great
triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to the effect
that Austria in her policy, especially with regard to Germany, would
regard herself as a German state, but the other two provisions clearly
state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Austria and
regards the inner political order of Austria, including the question of
Austria and National Socialism, as an internal concern of Austria upon
which Germany will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence. But
there was much more substance to the day’s events than appears in the
text of the accord. I refer to Mr. Messersmith’s summary as set forth on
Page 12 of his affidavit, 1760-PS, as follows:

    “Even more important than the terms of the agreement published
    in the official communiqué, was the contemporaneous informal
    understanding, the most important provisions of which were that
    Austria would:

    “(1) Appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor’s
    confidence but friendly to Germany, to positions in the Cabinet;
    (2) with the devised means to give the national opposition a
    role in the political life of Austria within the framework of
    the Patriotic Front; and (3) with amnesty for all Nazis, save
    those convicted of the most serious offenses.”

This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and thousands
of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of Deutsch-National
into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Dr.
Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Dr. Edmund
Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio.

I now offer in evidence Document 2994-PS, which is an affidavit by Kurt
von Schuschnigg, Foreign Chancellor of Austria, executed at Nuremberg,
Germany, on 19 November 1945. I offer this as Exhibit USA-66. The
defendants have received German translations of that evidence.

DR. LATERNSER: In the name of the accused, Seyss-Inquart, I wish to
protest against the presentation of written evidence by the witness Von
Schuschnigg for the following reasons: Today, when a resolution was
announced, with respect to the use to be made of the written evidence of
Mr. Messersmith, the Court was of the opinion that in a case of very
great importance it might possibly take a different view of the matter.
With respect to the Austrian conflict this is the case, since
Schuschnigg is the most important witness, the witness who was affected
at the time in his position as Federal Chancellor. In the case of such
an important witness, the principle of direct evidence must be adhered
to, in order that the Court be in a position to ascertain the actual
truth in this case. The accused and his defense counsel would feel
prejudiced in his rights granted by the Charter, should direct evidence
be circumvented. I must, therefore, uphold my viewpoint since it can be
assumed that the witness Von Schuschnigg will be able to confirm certain
facts which are in favor of the accused Seyss-Inquart.

I therefore make the motion to the Court that the written evidence of
the witness Von Schuschnigg be not admitted.

THE PRESIDENT: If you have finished, the Tribunal will hear Mr.
Alderman.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point I am simply
proposing to offer this affidavit for the purpose of showing the terms
of the secret understanding between the German and Austrian Governments
in connection with this accord. It is not for any purpose to incriminate
the Defendant Seyss-Inquart that it is being offered at this point.

DR. LATERNSER: May I add to my motion that the witness, Von Schuschnigg,
on 19 November 1945, was questioned in Nuremberg, and that if an
interrogation on 19 November was possible, then a short time later—that
is now—it ought to be possible to call him before the Court, especially
as the interrogation before this court is of special importance.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess now to consider this question.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the objection to the
affidavit of Von Schuschnigg and upholds the objection.

If the Prosecution desires to call Von Schuschnigg as a witness, it can
apply to do so. Equally if the Defense wishes to call Von Schuschnigg as
a witness, it can apply to do so. In the event Von Schuschnigg is not
able to be produced, the question of affidavit-evidence by Von
Schuschnigg being given will be reconsidered.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, in view of the strategy and
tactics of the Nazis’ concessions as indicated in the portion of the
Messersmith affidavit that I read, substantial concessions were made by
Austria to obtain Germany’s diplomatic formal assurance of Austrian
independence and non-intervention in Austrian internal affairs.

The release of imprisoned Nazis presented potential police problems, and
as Mr. Messersmith pointed out in a 1934 dispatch to the United States
State Department quoted on Pages 12 to 13 of his affidavit:

    “Any prospect that the National Socialists might come to power
    would make it more difficult to obtain effective police and
    judicial action against the Nazis for fear of reprisals by the
    future Nazi Government against those taking action against Nazis
    even in the line of duty. The preservation of internal peace in
    Austria was less dependent upon Germany’s living up to her
    obligations under the accord.”

Next, Germany’s continuing program of weakening the Austrian Government.
In the pact of 11 July 1936 Germany agreed not to influence directly or
indirectly the internal affairs of Austria, including the matter of
Austrian National Socialism.

On 16 July 1936, just 5 days later, Hitler violated that provision. I
quote from Document 812-PS, which is Exhibit USA-61, the reports of
Gauleiter Rainer to Commissioner Bürckel, all of which were forwarded to
the Defendant Seyss-Inquart—Page 6 of the English, and I believe, also
Page 6 of the German version.

    “At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party
    in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian
    National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner was
    arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of the
    Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936 Doctor Rainer and Globocnik
    visited the Führer at the Obersalzberg where they received a
    clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Führer.
    On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiter met in Anif near Salzburg,
    where they received a complete report from Rainer on the
    statement of the Führer and his political instructions for
    carrying out the fight. At this same conference the Gauleiter
    received organizational instructions from Globocnik and
    Hiedler.”

Then skipping a paragraph I quote further from this report—in the
English that paragraph which I am skipping is omitted, so I am skipping
a paragraph in the German version:

    “Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Führer named Lieutenant
    General”—Gruppenführer—“Keppler as chief of the mixed
    commission which was appointed, in accordance with the State
    Treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct execution of
    the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority
    by the Führer for the Party in Austria. After Keppler was
    unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked
    together with Doctor Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaler as leader of
    the peasants, Kaltenbrunner”—that is the Defendant
    Kaltenbrunner in this case—“as leader of the SS, and Doctor
    Jury as deputy leader of the Austrian Party, as well as with
    Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart.”

A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr. Messersmith
describes it briefly, and I quote from Page 13 of his affidavit,
1760-PS:

    “The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have
    been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded
    happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under
    the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold who, as was known
    definitely, was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program
    was now to form an organization through which the Nazis could
    carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in
    Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations
    which had a legal basis, but which were simply a device by which
    the Nazis in Austria could organize and later seek inclusion as
    a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was
    the Union of the East Mark,”—Ostmärkische Verein—“the sponsor
    of which was the Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau.
    Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and pro-Nazi
    Neustädter-Stürmer, this organization was declared legal by the
    courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because it
    shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had
    disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi
    activities directed from Germany.”

At this point I offer in evidence Document 2246-PS as Exhibit USA-67, a
captured German document which is a report from Von Papen to Hitler
dated September 1, 1936. This document is most interesting because it
indicates Von Papen’s strategy after July 11, 1936 for destroying
Austria’s independence. Von Papen had taken a substantial step forward
with the agreement of July 11. It should be noted incidentally, that
after that agreement he was promoted from Minister to Ambassador. Now
his tactics were developed in the following terms—I quote the last
three paragraphs of his letter of September 1, 1936 to the Führer and
Reich Chancellor. Those three paragraphs are all joined as one paragraph
in the English text:

    “The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the
    present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the
    Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti National
    Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of
    utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected
    prior to the conference on the abolishing of the control of
    finances at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed
    Minister Von Glaise-Horstenau of his intention to offer him the
    portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding
    principle”—Marschroute (a German word meaning the route of
    march)—“I recommend on the tactical side, continued, patient,
    psychological treatment, with slowly intensified pressure
    directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on
    economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be
    a very useful tool for the realization of some of our projects.
    In discussion with Government officials as well as with leaders
    of the illegal Party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform
    completely with the agreement of 11 July I am trying to direct
    the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative
    representation of the movement in the Fatherland Front, but
    nevertheless refraining from putting National Socialists in
    important positions for the time being. However, such positions
    are to be occupied only by personalities having the support and
    the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in
    this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau.”—Signature—“Papen.”

To recapitulate, this report by Von Papen to Hitler discloses the
following plan:

(a) Obtaining a change in personnel in the Austrian Ministry of Security
in due course;

(b) Obtaining corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the
Fatherland Front;

(c) Not putting avowed National Socialists in important positions yet,
but using nationalist personalities;

(d) Using economic pressure and patient psychological treatment with
slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime.

My next subject is Germany’s diplomatic preparations for the conquest of
Austria.

The program of the Nazi conspiracy with respect to Austria consisted of
weakening that country externally and internally by removing its support
from without, as well as by penetrating within. This program was of the
utmost significance, especially since, as the Court will remember, the
events of 25 July 1934 inside Austria were overshadowed in the news of
the day by the fact that Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner
Pass and posed there as a strong protector of his northern neighbor,
Austria.

Accordingly, interference in the affairs of Austria and steady increase
in the pressure needed to acquire control over that country, required
removal of the possibility that Italy or any other country would come to
its aid. But the foreign policy program of the conspiracy for the
weakening and isolation of Austria was integrated with their foreign
policy program in Europe generally.

I should like, therefore, at this juncture, to digress for a moment from
the presentation of evidence bearing on Austria alone and to consider
with the Tribunal the general foreign policy program of the Nazis. It is
not my intention to examine this subject in any detail. Historians and
scholars exhausting the archives will have many years of probing all the
details and ramifications of European diplomacy during this fateful
decade.

It is instead my purpose to mention very briefly the highlights of the
Nazis’ diplomatic preparation for war.

In this connection I should like to offer to the Tribunal Document
Number 2385-PS, a second affidavit of George S. Messersmith executed on
30 August 1945 at Mexico City. This has been made available to the
defendants in German, as well as in English.

This is a different affidavit from Document Number 1760-PS which was
executed August 28. This second affidavit, which I offer as Exhibit
USA-68, consists of a presentation of the diplomatic portion of the
program of the Nazi Party. To a considerable extent it merely states
facts of common knowledge, facts that many people who are generally well
informed already know. It also gives us facts which are common knowledge
in the circle of diplomats or of students of foreign affairs. It
consists of some 11 mimeographed pages, single-spaced. I read first from
the third paragraph in the affidavit:

    “As early as 1933, while I served in Germany, the German and
    Nazi contacts which I had in the highest and secondary
    categories openly acknowledged Germany’s ambitions to dominate
    southeastern Europe from Czechoslovakia down to Turkey. As they
    freely stated, the objective was territorial expansion in the
    case of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The professed objectives in
    the earlier stages of the Nazi regime, in the remainder of
    southeastern Europe, were political and economic control and
    they did not, at that time, speak so definitely of actual
    absorption and destruction of sovereignty. Their ambitions,
    however, were not limited to southeastern Europe. From the very
    beginnings of 1933, and even before the Nazis came into power,
    important Nazis speaking of the Ukraine freely said that ‘it
    must be our granary’ and that ‘even with southeastern Europe
    under our control, Germany needs and must have the greater part
    of the Ukraine in order to be able to feed the people of greater
    Germany.’ After I left Germany in the middle of 1934 for my post
    in Austria, I continued to receive information as to the German
    designs in southeastern Europe. In a conversation with Von Papen
    shortly after his appointment as German Minister to Austria in
    1934, Von Papen frankly stated to me that ‘southeastern Europe
    to Turkey is Germany’s hinterland and I have been designated to
    carry through the task of bringing it within the fold. Austria
    is first on the program.’

    “As I learned through my diplomatic colleagues, Von Papen in
    Vienna and his colleague Von Mackensen in Budapest were openly
    propagating the idea of the dismemberment and final absorption
    of Czechoslovakia as early as 1935.”

Then, skipping a short paragraph, I resume:

    “Immediately after the Nazis came into power, they started a
    vast rearmament program. This was one of the primary immediate
    objectives of the Nazi regime. As a matter of fact the two
    immediate objectives of the Nazi regime when it came into power,
    had to be and were, according to their own statements frequently
    made to me: First, to bring about the complete and absolute
    establishment of their power over Germany and the German people,
    so that they would become in every respect willing and capable
    instruments of the regime to carry through its ends; Second, the
    establishment of a tremendous armed power within Germany in
    order that the political and economic program in southeastern
    Europe and in Europe could be carried through by force if
    necessary, but probably by a threat of force. It was
    characteristic that in carrying through this second aim, they
    emphasized from the very outset the building of an overpowering
    air force. Göring and Milch often said to me or in my presence
    that the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the
    weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position
    and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in
    the shortest time.”

Skipping to the end of that paragraph, and resuming at the next:

    “At the same time that this rearmament was in progress, the Nazi
    regime took all possible measures to prepare the German people
    for war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany, for
    example, one saw everywhere German youth of all ages engaged in
    military exercises, drilling, field maneuvers, practicing the
    throwing of hand grenades, et cetera. In this connection I wrote
    in an official communication in November 1933, from Berlin as
    follows:

    “‘ . . . Everything that is being done in the country today has
    for its object to make the people believe that Germany is being
    threatened vitally in every aspect of its life by outside
    influences and by other countries. Everything is being done to
    use this feeling to stimulate military training and exercises,
    and innumerable measures are being taken to develop the German
    people into a hardy, sturdy race which will be able to meet all
    comers. The military spirit is constantly growing. It cannot be
    otherwise. The leaders of Germany today have no desire for peace
    unless it is a peace which the world makes at the expense of
    complete compliance with German desires and ambitions. Hitler
    and his associates really and sincerely want peace for the
    moment, but only to have a chance to get ready to use force if
    it is found finally essential. They are preparing their way so
    carefully that there is not in my mind any question but that the
    German people will be with them when they want to use force and
    when they feel that they have the necessary means to carry
    through their objects. . . .’”

One further sentence following that I quote:

    “Military preparation and psychological preparation were coupled
    with diplomatic preparation designed so to disunite and isolate
    their intended victims as to render them defenseless against
    German aggression.”

In 1933 the difficulties facing Germany in the political and diplomatic
field loomed large. France was the dominant military power on the
continent. She had a system of mutual assistance in the West and in the
East.

    “The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented by the Franco-Belgian
    Alliance, guaranteed the territorial _status quo_ in the West.
    Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were allied in the
    Little Entente and each, in turn, was united with France by
    mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922 France and Poland had
    likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had made
    plain her special interest in Austrian independence.”

Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up the
existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions among the
members of the Little Entente and the other eastern European powers.

Specifically, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with promises of
economic gain for cooperating with Germany. To some of these countries
she offered extravagant promises of territorial and economic rewards.
She offered Carinthia in Austria to Yugoslavia. She offered part of
Czechoslovakia to Hungary and part to Poland. She offered Yugoslav
territory to Hungary at the same time that she was offering land in
Hungary to Yugoslavia.

As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit—that is 2385-PS, on Page 5:

    “Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program
    of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors
    of these countries with the promises of a share in the loot. To
    Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the
    Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time:

    “‘The major factor in the internal situation in the last week
    has been the increase in tension with respect to the Austrian
    Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. . . . There is very little doubt
    but that Göring, when he made his trip to various capitals in
    southeastern Europe about 6 months ago, told the Yugoslavs that
    they would get a part of Carinthia when a National Socialist
    Government came into power in Austria. . . . The Nazi seed sown
    in Yugoslavia had been sufficient to cause trouble and there are
    undoubtedly a good many people there who look with a great deal
    of benevolence on those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in
    the days following July 25.’

    “Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and
    to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their
    acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As
    I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, Von Papen and
    Von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935 were spreading
    the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division
    Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland
    the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they
    knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.

    “The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make
    inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objective. I
    recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or
    1935 that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav
    territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions
    of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later
    gave me the same information.

    “I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made
    these promises were not only the ‘dyed in the wool’ Nazis but
    more conservative Germans who already had begun willingly to
    lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official dispatch to
    the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I
    wrote as follows:

    “‘Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen,
    and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are
    “diplomats of the old school.” They are in fact servile
    instruments of the regime and just because the outside world
    looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more
    effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they
    propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the
    regime.’”

I find that last paragraph very important and worthy of emphasis. In
other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these divisions and
increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making
these promises men who on outward appearances were merely conservative
diplomats. It is true that the Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of
international obligations, as I shall show in a moment. It is true that
the real trump in Germany’s hand was its rearmament and more than that,
its willingness to go to war. And yet the attitude of the various
countries was not influenced by those considerations alone.

With all those countries, and I suppose with all persons, we are not
always completely rational, we tend to believe what we want to believe,
and if an apparently substantial and conservative person like the
Defendant Von Neurath, for example, is saying these things, one might be
apt to believe them, or at least to act upon that hypothesis. And it
would be the more impressive if one were also under the impression that
the person involved was not a Nazi and would not stoop to go along with
the designs of the Nazis.

Germany’s approach toward Great Britain and France was in terms of
limited expansion as the price of peace. They signed a naval limitations
treaty with England and discussed a Locarno air pact. In the case of
both France and England, they limited their statement of intentions and
harped on fears of communism and war.

In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled by notions of
the sanctity of international obligations. High ranking Nazis, including
Göring, Frick, and Frank, openly stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany
would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited
Germany’s interest to do so.

I quote from the affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Page 4, beginning on the
10th line:

    “High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official
    contact, particularly men such as Göring, Goebbels, Ley, Frick,
    Frank, Darré, and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as
    to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me
    that Germany would observe her international undertakings only
    so long as it suited Germany’s interest to do so. Although these
    statements were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made
    to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any
    secret, for on many occasions they expressed the same idea
    publicly.”

France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to counter
Germany’s moves.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]




                               EIGHTH DAY
                       Thursday, 29 November 1945


                           _Morning Session_

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal. Before I resume the
consideration of Mr. Messersmith’s second affidavit, Document 2385-PS,
Exhibit USA-68, I should like to consider briefly the status of the
proof before this Tribunal of the matter stated in the first Messersmith
affidavit, introduced by the United States, Document 1760-PS, Exhibit
USA-57. You will recall that Mr. Messersmith in that affidavit made the
following general statements:

First, that although Nazi Germany stated that she would respect the
independence of Austria, in fact she intended from the very beginning to
conclude an Anschluss, and that Defendant Von Papen was working toward
that end.

Second, that although Nazi Germany pretended, on the surface, to have
nothing to do with the Austrian Nazis, in fact she kept up contact with
them and gave them support and instruction.

Third, that while they were getting ready for their eventual use of
force in Austria, if necessary, the Nazis were using quiet infiltrating
tactics to weaken Austria internally, through the use of Christian-front
personalities who were not flagrantly Nazi and could be called what they
referred to as Nationalist Opposition, and through the device of
developing new names for Nazi organizations, so that they could be
brought into the Fatherland Front of Austria corporatively—that is as
an entire group.

Now let us see briefly what some of our German documents proved, in
support of these general statements in the Messersmith affidavit. The
excerpts I have already read out of the report from Rainer to Bürckel,
enclosed in the letter to Seyss-Inquart, Document 812-PS, Exhibit
USA-61, showed:

First, that the Austrian Nazi groups kept up contacts with the Reich
although they did it secretly in accordance with instructions from the
Führer.

Second, that they continued their organization on a secret basis so as
to be ready in what they referred to as an emergency.

Third, that they used persons like Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau,
who had what they called good legal positions, but who could be trusted
by the Nazis; and that 5 days after the Pact of July 11, 1936 between
Germany and Austria, a pact which specifically pledged the German
Government not to interfere either directly or indirectly in the
internal affairs of Austria, including the question of Austrian National
Socialism, the Austrian Nazis met with Hitler at Obersalzberg and
received new instructions; and finally, that Hitler then used Keppler,
whose name we shall again meet in a short while in a significant manner
as his “contact man” with the Austrian Nazis, with full authority to act
for the Führer in Austria and to work with the leaders of the Austrian
Nazis.

Then we offered Document 2247-PS, Exhibit USA-64, Von Papen’s letter to
Hitler of May 17, 1935 that showed that Von Papen had been in contact
with Captain Leopold and it showed how Von Papen got Hitler to make a
solemn promise of Austria’s independence in order to further Papen’s
internal political gain in Austria.

Then we offered Document 2248-PS, Exhibit USA-63, Von Papen’s letter of
July 27, 1935, which reviewed the situation 1 year after Dollfuss’
death, and pointed out how National Socialism could be made the link for
the Anschluss and how National Socialism could overcome the Austrian
ideologies, and in which he identified himself completely with the
National Socialist goal.

We offered Document 2246-PS, Exhibit USA-67, Von Papen’s letter to
Hitler of September 1, 1936, which showed how Von Papen advised using
both economic and continuing psychological pressure; that he had
conferences with the leaders of the illegal Austrian Party; that he was
trying to direct the next developments in such a way as to get
corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the Fatherland Front,
and that meanwhile he was not ready to urge that avowed National
Socialists be put in prominent positions, but was quite satisfied with
collaborators like Glaise-Horstenau.

I think that practically all of the statements in Mr. Messersmith’s
affidavits have been fully supported by these documents, German
documents, which we have introduced. Certain parts of the affidavits
cannot be corroborated by documents, in the very nature of things, and I
refer specifically to Mr. Messersmith’s conversation with the Defendant
Von Papen in 1934, which I read to the Tribunal yesterday. But I think
those matters are manifestly just as true and just as clear of the
defendant’s guilt and complicity.

Yesterday I was reading to the Tribunal selected excerpts from Mr.
Messersmith’s second affidavit, 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, relating to the
diplomatic preparations for war. Prior to adjournment, I had read to the
Tribunal excerpts which established the following propositions:

First, Nazi Germany undertook a vigorous campaign to break up the
diplomatic agreements existing in 1933; first—in the West the Locarno
Pact supplemented by the French-Belgium Agreement; second—in the East
the Little Entente, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and their
respective mutual assistance pacts with France, and the French-Polish
Pact; third—as for Austria, the special concern of Italy for her
independence, that is for Austrian independence.

In the second place, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with
extravagant and sometimes inconsistent promises of territorial gain to
countries in southeastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland.

In the third place, Mr. Messersmith wrote an official communication to
the State Department, pointing out that persons like Von Neurath and Von
Papen were able to work more effectively in making these promises and in
doing their other work, just because they, and I quote: “propagated the
myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime.”

In the fourth place, in fact, high-ranking Nazis openly stated that
Germany would honor her international obligations only so long as it
suited her to do so.

There are two more excerpts which I wish to read from this affidavit:

France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to counter
German moves, as I said yesterday. France made attempts to promote an
east Locarno pact and to foster an economic accord between Austria and
the other Danubian powers. Italy’s effort was to organize an economic
bloc of Austria, Hungary, and Italy. But Germany foiled these efforts by
redoubling her promises of loot, by continuing her armament, and by
another very significant strategy, that is the Fifth-Column strategy;
that the Nazis stirred up internal dissensions within neighboring
countries to disunite and weaken their intended victims.

I read now from Page 7 of the English copy of the second Messersmith
affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the paragraph beginning in
the middle of the page:

    “At the same time that Germany held out such promises of reward
    for cooperation in her program, she stirred up internal
    dissensions within these countries themselves, and in Austria
    and Czechoslovakia in particular, all of which was designed so
    to weaken all opposition and strengthen the pro-Nazi and Fascist
    groups as to insure peaceful acquiescence in the German program.
    Her machinations in Austria I have related in detail, as they
    came under my direct observation, in a separate affidavit. In
    Czechoslovakia they followed the same tactics with the Sudeten
    Germans. I was reliably informed that the Nazi Party spent over
    6,000,000 marks in financing the Henlein Party in the elections
    in the spring of 1935 alone. In Yugoslavia she played on the old
    differences between the Croats and the Serbs and the fear of the
    restoration of the Hapsburg in Austria. It may be remarked here
    that this latter was one of the principal instruments, and a
    most effective one, which Nazi Germany used, as the fear in
    Yugoslavia in particular of a restoration of the Hapsburg was
    very real. In Hungary she played upon the agrarian difficulties
    and at the same time so openly encouraged the Nazi German
    elements in Hungary as to provoke the Government of Hungary to
    demand the recall of Von Mackensen in 1936. In Hungary and in
    Poland she played on the fear of communism and communist Russia.
    In Romania she aggravated the existing anti-Semitism,
    emphasizing the important role of the Jews in Romanian industry
    and the Jewish ancestry of Lupescu. Germany undoubtedly also
    financed the fascist Iron Guard through Codreanou.

    “Such ‘diplomatic’ measures reinforced by Germany’s vast
    rearmament program had a considerable effect, particularly in
    Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary, and sufficient at least to
    deter these countries from joining any combination opposed to
    German designs, even if not enough to persuade them actively to
    ally themselves with Nazi Germany.

    “Important political leaders of Yugoslavia began to become
    convinced that the Nazi regime would remain in power and would
    gain its ends, and that the course of safety for Yugoslavia was
    to play along with Germany.”

I shall not take the time of the Tribunal to read into evidence the
detailed official dispatches which Mr. Messersmith sent to the American
State Department, showing that Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland were
beginning to follow the German line.

As for Italy, Germany’s initial objective was to sow discord between
Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia Italian territory,
particularly Trieste. This was to prevent France from reaching agreement
with them and to block an east Locarno pact. On that I quote again from
Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the second Messersmith affidavit, in
the middle of Page 21 of the English version:

    “While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in
    1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the
    opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England,
    and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany’s program in
    exchange for German support of Italy’s plans in Abyssinia.”

That, if the Tribunal please, paved the way for the Austro-German
Declaration or Pact of 11 July 1936; and in the fall of 1936 Germany
extended the hand of friendship and common purpose to Italy, in an
alliance which they called the “Rome-Berlin Axis.” This, together with
Germany’s alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure on England and
greatly increased the relative strength of Germany.

And so by means of careful preparation in the diplomatic field, among
others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for themselves, so
that they could seriously consider plans for war and begin to outline
time tables, not binding time tables and not specific ones in terms of
months and days, but still general time tables, in terms of years, which
were the necessary foundation for further aggressive planning, and a
spur to more specific planning. And that time table was developed, as
the Tribunal has already seen, in the conference of 5 November 1937,
contained in our Document Number 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25, the Hossbach
minutes of that conference, which I adverted to in detail on Monday
last.

In those minutes, we see the crystallization of the plan to wage
aggressive war in Europe, and to seize both Austria and Czechoslovakia,
and in that order.

In connection with the exposition of the aggression on Austria, I have
shown first the purpose of the Nazi conspiracy, with respect to the
absorption of Austria, and then the steps taken by them in Austria up to
this period, that is, November 1937.

I have also outlined for the Tribunal the general diplomatic
preparations of the Nazi conspirators, with respect to their program in
Europe generally, and with respect to Austria in particular.

It may now be profitable to reconsider the minutes of the meeting of 5
November 1937, in the light of this more-detailed background. It will be
recalled that in that meeting, the Führer insisted that Germany must
have more space in Europe. He concluded that the space required must be
taken by force; and three different possible cases were outlined for
different eventualities but all reaching the conclusion that the problem
would certainly have to be solved before 1943 to 1945.

Then there was envisaged the nature of a war in the near future,
specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler said that for
the improvement of Germany’s military and political positions, it must
be the first aim of the Nazis, in every case of entanglement by war, to
conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove any
threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance westward.

Hitler then considered that the embodiment into Germany of
Czechoslovakia and Austria would constitute the conquest of food for
from 5 to 6 million people, including the assumption that the
comprehensive forced emigration of 1 million people from Austria could
be carried out. And he further pointed out that the annexation of the
two States to Germany, both militarily and politically, would constitute
a considerable relief since they would provide shorter and better
frontiers, would free fighting personnel for other purposes, and would
make possible the reconstitution of large new German armies.

Insofar as Austria is concerned, those minutes reveal a crystallization
in the policy of the Nazi conspirators. It had always been their aim to
acquire Austria. At the outset a revolutionary Putsch was attempted, but
that failed. The next period was one of surface recognition of the
independence of Austria and the use of devious means to strengthen the
position of Nazis internally in Austria.

Now, however, it became clear that the need, or the greed, for Austria,
in the light of the larger aggressive purpose of the Nazi conspirators
was sufficiently great to warrant the use of force in order to obtain
Austria with the speed that was designed. In fact, as we shall see
later, the Nazis were actually able to secure Austria, after having
weakened it internally and removed from it the support of other nations,
merely by setting the German military machine into motion and making a
threat of force.

The German armies were able to cross the border and secure the country
without the necessity of firing a shot. Their careful planning for war
and their readiness to use war as an instrument of political action made
it possible, in the end, for them to pluck this plum without having to
fight a blow for it.

The German High Command had, of course, previously considered
preparation against Austria.

I offer in evidence another German document, C-175, as Exhibit USA-69.
It, again, is “top secret”, with the added legend in German: “Chefsache
nur durch Offizier” (matter for the chief only to be delivered through
an officer).

This was a top-secret directive of 24 June 1937 of the Reichsminister
for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Von
Blomberg. The importance of this top-secret directive is indicated by
the fact that the carbon copy, received by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy, was one of only four copies establishing the directive for a
unified preparation for war of all the Armed Forces.

This directive from General Von Blomberg states that although the
political situation indicates that Germany need not consider an attack
from any side it also states that Germany does not intend to unleash a
European war. It then states in Part 1, and I quote from Page 2 of the
English text, which, I believe, is Page 4, third paragraph, of the
German text:

    “The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little
    by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation,
    which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a
    continued preparedness for war by the German Armed Forces: (a)
    To counter attacks at any time; (b) To enable the military
    exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they
    occur.”

The directive then indicates that there will be certain preparations for
war of a general nature. I quote the first two portions of Paragraph 2,
on Page 2 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the German text:

    “(2) The preparations of a general nature include:

    “(a) The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the German
    Armed Forces, even before the completion of rearmament, and full
    preparedness for war.

    “(b) The further working on ‘mobilization without public
    announcement’ in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to
    begin a war suddenly and by surprise, both as regards strength
    and time.”

And the directive finally indicates that there might be special
preparations for war against Austria. I quote from Part 3, (1) Special
Case Otto, Page 4 of the English text, and Page 19 of the German text.
“Case Otto”, as you will repeatedly see, was the standing code name for
aggressive war against Austria. I quote:

    “Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the
    monarchy.

    “The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed
    force to give up a restoration.

    “Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian
    people, the march in will be made in the general direction of
    Vienna, and will break any resistance.”

I should now like to call attention to two conversations, held by United
States Ambassador Bullitt with the Defendants Schacht and Göring, in
November 1937.

PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): I should like to
state my objection to the manner in which Document C-175 has been
treated. This document is a study made by the General Staff, which was
conceived to meet many different eventualities of war. It even mentions
the possibility that Germany might have to go to war with Spain, and
might have to carry out a military attack on her.

Only part of this document was read, the part relating to Austria; and
thus the impression was given that a plan had been made to march against
Austria, whereas it actually says the German Reich had no intention to
attack at that time, but was merely preparing for all eventualities.

I should like to request that the reading of this document be
supplemented by reading at least the headings of the paragraphs of this
document. If these paragraphs of the document are placed before the
Court, it will be seen that this was not a plan to march against
Austria, but simply a document preparing for all eventualities.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, your objection does not appear to be to the
admissibility of the document, but to the weight of the document. The
Tribunal has already informed defendants’ counsel that they will have an
opportunity at the appropriate time, when they come to prepare their
defense, to refer to any documents, parts of which have been put in by
the Prosecution, and to read such parts as they think necessary then,
and to make what criticism they think necessary then.

Your objection is therefore premature, because it does not go to the
admissibility of the document. It simply indicates a wish that more of
it should be read. You will have the opportunity later to read any parts
of the documents which you wish.

MR. ALDERMAN: I suppose, if the Tribunal please, that the fundamental
basis of the objection just stated by the distinguished counsel, must
have been his theory that Germany never made any plans to invade
Austria, and if so, it would seem to follow that Germany never invaded
Austria, and perhaps history is mistaken.

I had adverted to two conversations, held by United States Ambassador
Bullitt with the Defendant Schacht and the Defendant Göring, in November
1937.

For this purpose, I offer in evidence our Document L-151, offered as
Exhibit USA-70. It is a dispatch from Mr. Bullitt, American Ambassador
in Paris, to the American Secretary of State on 23 November 1937.

Now, again, if the Tribunal please, we are embarrassed because that
document is not in the document book before the members of the Tribunal.
It has been furnished in German translation to the Defense Counsel.

If the Tribunal will permit, I will read from the original exhibit. On
top is a letter from Ambassador Bullitt to the Secretary of State,
November 23, 1937, stating that he visited Warsaw, stopped in Berlin en
route, where he had conversations with Schacht and Göring, among others.

On the conversation with Schacht, I read from Page 2 of the report:

    “Schacht said that in his opinion, the best way to begin to deal
    with Hitler was not through political discussion but through
    economic discussion. Hitler was not in the least interested in
    economic matters. He regarded money as filth. It was therefore
    possible to enter into negotiations with him in the economic
    domain without arousing his emotional antipathy, and it might be
    possible through the conversations thus begun to lead him into
    arrangements in the political and military field, in which he
    was intensely interested. Hitler was determined to have Austria
    eventually attached to Germany, and to obtain at least autonomy
    for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment he was not
    vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor and in his”—that is
    Schacht’s—“opinion, it might be possible to maintain the
    Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia,
    and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the
    Corridor, uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.”

And for the Defendant Göring’s statements to Ambassador Bullitt, I read
from the second memorandum, “Memorandum of Conversation between
Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann Göring,” on Page 2 of that
document, following a part of a sentence which is underlined, just below
the middle of the page:

    “The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the
    refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital
    national necessities.

    “If France, instead of accepting collaboration with Germany,
    should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in
    Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her
    legitimate aims, it was obvious that there would be conflict
    between France and Germany.

    “I asked Göring what aims especially he had in mind. He replied:

    “‘We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who
    are contiguous to the Reich and are divided from the great body
    of the German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by
    the Treaty of Versailles.’

    “I asked Göring if he meant that Germany was absolutely
    determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this
    was an absolute determination of the German Government. The
    German Government, at the present time, was not pressing this
    matter because of certain momentary political considerations,
    especially in their relations with Italy. But Germany would
    tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the
    consolidation of Austria in the German Reich.

    “He then added a statement which went further than any I have
    heard on this subject. He said:

    “‘There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria,
    Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg
    at the head of the union. Such a solution is absolutely
    unacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an
    agreement would be an immediate _casus belli_.’ Göring used the
    Latin expression _casus belli_; it is not a translation from the
    German, in which that conversation was carried on.

    “I asked Göring if the German Government was as decided in its
    views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia, as it was with
    regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final
    solution of this question. The Sudeten Germans must enter the
    German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the
    Reich.”

These, if the Tribunal please, are official reports made by the
accredited representative of the United States in the regular course of
business. They carry with them the guarantee of truthfulness of a report
made by a responsible official to his own government, recording
contemporaneous conversations and events.

My next subject is pressure and threats resulting in further concessions
by Austria: a meeting at Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938.

As I have stated before, the Austrian Government was laboring under
great difficulties imposed by its neighbor. There was economic pressure,
including the curtailment of the important tourist trade; and there was
what the Defendant Von Papen called “slowly intensified psychological
pressure.” There were increasing demonstrations, plots, and
conspiracies. Demands were being presented by Captain Leopold and
approval of the Nazis was being espoused by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart,
the new Councillor of the State of Austria. In this situation,
Chancellor Schuschnigg decided to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden.

The official communiqué of this conference is quite calm; I invite the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is Document 2461-PS, the
official German communiqué of the meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg at
Obersalzberg, 12 February 1938, taken from the official _Dokumente der
Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 124, Number 21-a.

The communiqué states that the unofficial meeting was caused by the
mutual desire to clarify by personal conversation the questions relating
to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria.

The communiqué lists among those present:

Schuschnigg and his Foreign Minister Schmidt, Hitler and his Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop, and the Defendant Von Papen.

The communiqué concludes on a rather bright note saying, and I quote:

    “Both statesmen are convinced that the measures taken by them
    constitute at the same time an effective contribution toward the
    peaceful development of the European situation.”

A similar communiqué was issued by the Austrian Government. But in fact,
and as I think history well knows, the conference was a very unusual and
a very harsh one. Great concessions were obtained by the German
Government from Austria. The principal concessions are contained in the
official Austrian communiqué of the reorganization of the Cabinet and
the general political amnesty, dated 16 February 1938.

That communiqué, as taken from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_,
Volume 6, Page 125, Number 21-b, is translated in our Document 2464-PS
and I invite the Court’s judicial notice of that communiqué.

That communiqué announced a reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet,
including, most significantly, the appointment of the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart to the position of Minister of Security and Interior,
where he would have control of the police. In addition, announcement was
made of a general political amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes.

Two days later another concession was divulged.

I invite the Court’s judicial notice to our Document 2469-PS, a
translation of the official German and Austrian communiqué concerning
the so-called equal rights of Austrian National Socialists in Austria,
18 February 1938, _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page
128; Number 21-d.

That communiqué announced that pursuant to the Berchtesgaden conference,
the Austrian National Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland
Front, the single legal political party of Austria.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you tell us what exhibit numbers those two documents
were?

MR. ALDERMAN: I am sorry, Sir; Document 2469-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t had that yet. We have had 2461-PS, which is
exhibit what?

MR. ALDERMAN: Well, I hadn’t read it in. I was asking the Tribunal to
take judicial notice of this as an official communiqué.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not going to give it an exhibit number?

MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Nor 2469?

MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.

In actual fact, great pressure was put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden.
The fact that pressure was exerted, and pressure of a military nature
involving the threat of the use of troops, can be sufficiently
established from captured German documents.

I have our Document 1544-PS, a captured German document, which I offer
in evidence as Exhibit USA-71.

This document consists of the Defendant Von Papen’s own notes on his
last meeting with Schuschnigg, on February 26, 1938. I quote the last
two paragraphs of these notes. This is Von Papen speaking, in his own
notes:

    “I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion
    that he”—that is, Schuschnigg—“had acted under ‘brutal
    pressure’ in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been
    able to state that he had always and at every point had complete
    freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied that he had actually
    been under considerable moral pressure; he could not deny that.
    He had made notes on the talk which, bore that out. I reminded
    him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make
    any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he
    would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in
    the evening. He answered: ‘To be honest, no.’”

And then Von Papen says:

    “It appears to me of importance to record this statement.

    “In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that
    Austria could have maintained her status with the help of
    non-German, European combinations. This question could be
    decided only according to the interests of the German people. He
    asserted that he held the same conviction and would act
    accordingly.”

Thus we have, through the words of Von Papen, Schuschnigg’s contemporary
statement to Papen of the pressure which had been exerted upon him as
recorded by Von Papen in an original, contemporaneous entry.

For diplomatic purposes, Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, kept up
the pretense that there had been no pressure applied.

But the Defendant General Jodl, writing the account of current events in
his diary, was much more candid. We are fortunate in having General
Jodl’s handwritten diary in German script which I can’t read. It is our
Document 1780-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-72.

I may say that General Jodl, in interrogations, has admitted that this
is his genuine diary in his handwriting.

This diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden, but also
the fact that for some days thereafter Defendant Keitel and Admiral
Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure in order,
obviously, to coerce President Miklas of Austria into ratifying the
agreement. It started from Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. It will be
noted that the approval of President Miklas was needed to ratify the
Berchtesgaden agreement; that is, with respect to naming Seyss-Inquart
as Minister of the Interior and Security.

And so the Nazi conspirators kept up the military pressure with threats
of invasion for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference in order to
produce the desired effect on President Miklas.

I quote from General Jodl’s diary, the entries for February 11, February
13, and February 14, 1938. The entry of 11 February:

    “In the evening and on 12 February General K.”—Keitel—“with
    General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg.
    Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are being put under
    heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours
    Schuschnigg signs protocol.

    “13 February: In the afternoon General K.”—Keitel—“asks
    Admiral C.”—Canaris—“and myself to come to his apartment. He
    tells us that the Führer’s order is to the effect that military
    pressure, by shamming military action, should be kept up until
    the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted
    and submitted to the Führer by telephone for approval.

    “14 February: At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Führer
    arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence
    Office VII and initiates the different measures.

    “The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
    created that Germany is undertaking serious military
    preparations.”

The proposal for deceptive maneuvers reported on by Defendant Jodl are
set forth in Document 1775-PS, a captured German document, which I offer
in evidence as Exhibit USA-73.

The proposals are signed by the Defendant Keitel. Underneath his
signature appears a note that the Führer approved the proposal. In the
original document that note is handwritten in pencil.

The rumors which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of Austria make
very interesting reading. I quote the first three paragraphs of the
suggested order:

    “1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or
    Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

    “2. Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the
    conclusion of military preparations against Austria:

    “(a) Through V-men”—V-Männer—“in Austria.

    “(b) Through our customs personnel”—staff—“at the frontier.

    “(c) Through travelling agents.

    “3. Such news could be:

    “(a) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the sector of
    the VII A.K.

    “(b) Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and
    Regensburg.

    “(c) Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna, has
    been called for a conference to Berlin. As a matter of fact,
    this is the case.”

—That reminds me of a lawyer from my own home town who used to argue a
matter at great length, and then he would end up by saying, “and,
incidentally, it is the truth.”

    “(d) The police stations located at the frontier of Austria have
    called up reinforcements.

    “(e) Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the
    Mountain Brigade”—Gebirgsbrigade—“in the region of
    Freilassing, Reichenhall, and Berchtesgaden.”

The total pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in due
course, as, we have already seen from the communiqués referred to,
President Miklas verified the Berchtesgaden Agreement which foreshadowed
National Socialist Austria and then the events culminating in the actual
German invasion on 12 March 1938.

Mr. President, would this be a convenient moment for a recess?

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had reached the subject of
the events culminating in the German invasion of Austria on 12 March
1938, and first under that, the plebiscite and the preparations for both
German and Austrian National Socialists.

The day after his appointment as Minister of the Interior of Austria,
Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. I invite the
Court to take judicial notice of the official German communiqué covering
that visit of Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, as it appears in the _Dokumente
der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 128, Number 21-c, a copy of
which will be found in our Document 2484-PS.

On March 9, 1938, 3 weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been put in charge of
the police of Austria and was in a position to direct their handling of
the National Socialists in Austria—3 weeks after the Nazis began to
exploit their new prestige and position with their quota of further
victories—Schuschnigg made an important announcement.

On March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg announced that he would hold a plebiscite
throughout Austria the following Sunday, March 13, 1938. The question to
be submitted in the plebiscite was: “Are you for an independent and
social, a Christian, German, and united Austria?” A “yes” answer to this
question was certainly compatible with the agreement made by the German
Government on 11 July 1936 and carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12
February 1938. Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a
plebiscite on the question of Anschluss, but the Nazis apparently
appreciated the likelihood of a strong “yes” vote on the question put by
Schuschnigg in the plebiscite, and they could not tolerate the
possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg Government.

In any case, as events showed, they took this occasion to overturn the
Austrian Government. Although the plebiscite was not announced until the
evening of 9 March, the Nazi organization received word about it earlier
in that day. It was determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler
what to do about the situation (that is, the Austrian Nazis), and that
they would prepare a letter of protest against the plebiscite from
Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and that, pending Hitler’s approval,
Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg about details
of the plebiscite.

This information is all contained in the report of Gauleiter Rainer to
Reich Commissioner Bürckel, transmitted as I have already pointed out to
Seyss-Inquart, and which has already been received in evidence—our
Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61.

I quote briefly from Page 7 of the English text, the paragraph beginning
on Page 11 of the German original:

    “The Landesleitung received word about the planned plebiscite
    through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m.
    At the session which was called immediately afterwards,
    Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a
    few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had
    given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the
    talks he made us understand that the illegal information we
    received was based on truth, and that in view of the new
    situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung from
    the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik, and
    Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at
    10 a.m. There it was decided that:

    “First, the Führer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the
    opportunity for the Führer to intervene must be given to him by
    way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to
    Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the
    Government until clear instructions and orders were received
    from the Führer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a
    letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to
    the Führer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9
    March 1938.

    “Negotiations with the Government were not successful.
    Therefore, they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with
    the instructions he received from the Führer. . . . On 10 March
    all the preparations for future revolutionary actions already
    had been made . . . and the necessary orders given to all unit
    leaders . . . . During the night of the 10 to 11, Globocnik
    returned from the Führer with the announcement that the Führer
    gave the Party freedom of action . . . and that he would back it
    in everything it did.”

—That means the Austrian Nazi Party.

Next, Germany’s actual preparations for the invasion and the use of
force.

When news of the plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous
amount of activity. Hitler, as history knows, was determined not to
tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers
and ordered the preparation of the march into Austria.

On the diplomatic side he started a letter to Mussolini indicating why
he was going to march into Austria, and in the absence of the Defendant
Ribbentrop (who was temporarily detained in London), the Defendant Von
Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again.

The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl’s diary give a
vivid account of the activities in Berlin. I quote from the entry of 10
March:

    “By surprise and without consulting his Ministers, Schuschnigg
    ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring
    strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or
    preparation. The Führer is determined not to tolerate it.

    “This same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Göring. General
    Von Reichenau is called back from the Cairo Olympic Committee.
    General Von Schobert is ordered to come as well as Minister
    Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the district leader, Gauleiter
    Bürckel, in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the
    facts at 9:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I
    follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General Von Viebahn,
    to give him all drafts. ‘Prepare Case Otto.’

    “1300 hours, General K.”—which I think plainly means
    Keitel—“informs Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris,
    Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the
    Foreign Office. Führer wants to transmit ultimatum to the
    Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini
    and the reasons are developed which forced the Führer to take
    action.

    “1830 hours, mobilization order is given to the Commander of the
    8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps, without
    Reserve Army.” (Document Number 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72).

Now, it is to be noted that Defendant Von Neurath was at this critical
hour acting as Foreign Minister. The previous February the Defendant
Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and Von Neurath had become
President of the Secret Cabinet Council. But in this critical hour of
foreign policy the Defendant Ribbentrop was in London handling the
diplomatic consequences of the Austrian transaction. As Foreign Minister
in this hour of aggression, involving mobilization and movement of
troops, use of force and threats to eliminate the independence of a
neighboring country, the Defendant Von Neurath resumed his former
position in the Nazi conspiracy.

I now offer in evidence our Document C-102 as Exhibit USA-74, a captured
German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme High Command
of the Armed Forces, 11 March 1938. This directive by Hitler, initialed
by the Defendants Jodl and Keitel, stated Hitler’s mixed political and
military intentions. I quote Paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 of the directive.
First the caption, “The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces” with some
initials; “referring to Operation Otto; 30 copies.” This is the 11th
copy; top secret:

    “1. If other measures prove unsuccessful I intend to invade
    Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions
    and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German
    population.

    “4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this
    operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on
    12 March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the right
    to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier and
    to decide the actual moment for invasion.

    “5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we
    do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it is in
    our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out
    without any violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry
    welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be
    avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken
    ruthlessly by force of arms.”

I also offer in evidence captured German Document C-103 as Exhibit
USA-75. This was an implementing directive issued by the Defendant Jodl,
and it provided as follows:

    “Top secret; 11 March 1938; 40 copies, sixth copy.

    “Special Instruction Number 1 to the Supreme Commander of the
    Armed Forces Number 427/38,”—with some symbols.—

    “Directive for policy toward Czechoslovakian and Italian troops
    or militia units on Austrian soil.

    “1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered
    in Austria they are to be regarded as hostile.

    “2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends,
    especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in
    the solution of the Austrian question. The Chief of the Supreme
    Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl.”

Next, the actual events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available to us
in two separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in some minor
details, such as precise words used and precise times when they were
used, they afford each other almost complete corroboration. We think it
appropriate for this Tribunal to have before it a relatively full
account of the way in which the German Government on 11 March 1938
deprived Austria of her sovereignty. First I shall give the report of
the day’s events in Austria as given by the Austrian Nazis. I refer to
Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, a report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reich
Commissioner Bürckel, and I shall read from Page 8 of the English
version. For the benefit of the German interpreter I am starting
following a tabulation: First case, second case, third case, and
following the sentence, “Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with
the Gauleiter.”

    “On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in
    Vienna after a visit with the Führer. After talks with
    Seyss-Inquart he went to see the Chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the
    Landesleitung had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer,
    Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fischböck, and
    Mühlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks
    with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the
    proposal of the two ministers.

    “In regard to Rainer’s proposal, Von Klausner ordered that the
    Government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400
    hours, signed by legal political ‘front’ men, including both
    Ministers and also State Councillors Fishböck and Jury, for the
    establishment of a voting date in 3 weeks and a free and secret
    ballot in accordance with the constitution.

    “On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had
    brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of
    copies, and a telegram to the Führer calling for help were
    prepared.

    “Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions
    in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a
    session of all ministers for 2 p.m. Rainer agreed with
    Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Führer
    and the statement to the population at 3 p.m. and at the same
    time he would start all necessary actions to take over power
    unless he received news from the session of the Ministers’
    Council before that time. During this time all measures had been
    prepared. At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart telephoned Rainer and informed
    him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and
    had recalled the plebiscite but that he refused to call a new
    plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for
    maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two Ministers had
    resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered, ‘No.’ Rainer informed the
    Reichskanzlei through the German Embassy, and received an answer
    from Göring through the same channels, that the Führer will not
    consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign.
    Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and Mühlmann.
    Talks were held between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg.
    Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures
    the Party wished taken. Rainer’s answer: Reestablishment of the
    Government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the Party, and
    calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force.
    Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but
    very soon the announcement followed that everything might be
    threatened by the resistance of Miklas, the President. Meanwhile
    word arrived from the German Embassy that the Führer expected
    the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a
    national majority, the legalization of the Party, and permission
    for the Legion”—that is the Austrian Legion in Germany—“to
    return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise
    German troops would cross the border at 8 p.m. At 5 p.m. Rainer
    and Globocnik, accompanied by Mühlmann, went to the Chancellor’s
    office to carry out this errand.

    “Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a
    government which included Blacks, Reds, and National Socialists,
    and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The
    latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to
    negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and
    therefore a weak and unfavorable political situation for the
    cause might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernatto. Director of
    the Cabinet Hüber, Guido Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation
    Councillor Stein, Military Attaché General Muff, and the
    Gruppenführer Keppler,”—whose name I told you would reappear
    significantly—“who had arrived in the meantime, were already
    negotiating. At 7 p.m. Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations
    again. Situation at 7:30 p.m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to
    appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case
    of a German invasion.

    “Gruppenführer Keppler explained that the Führer did not yet
    have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first
    be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most
    dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any
    moment because Rainer ordered the entire Party to demonstrate at
    3 o’clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the Chancellor’s
    palace in order to force the reconstruction of the Government.
    The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by
    Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8 p.m. the SA
    and the SS marched in and occupied the Government buildings and
    all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p.m.
    Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiter of
    Austria to take over power in all eight gaue of Austria, with
    the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all
    Government representatives who try to resist, should be told
    that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.

    “With this the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the
    complete occupation of Austria within 3 hours and the taking
    over of all important posts by the Party.

    “The seizure of power was the work of the Party supported by the
    Führer’s threat of invasion and the legal standing of
    Seyss-Inquart in the Government. The national result in the form
    of the taking over of the Government by Seyss-Inquart was due to
    the actual seizure of power by the Party on one hand, and the
    political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on
    the other; but both factors may be considered only in relation
    to the Führer’s decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian
    problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently
    issued by the Führer.”

We have at hand another document which permits us virtually to live
again through the events of March 11, 1938, and to live through them in
most lively and interesting fashion. Thanks to the efficiency of the
Defendant Göring and his Luftwaffe organization we have a highly
interesting document, obviously an official document from the Luftwaffe
headquarters headed as usual “Geheime Reichssache” (top secret). The
letterhead is stamped “Reichsluftfahrtministerium Forschungsamt”. If I
can get the significance of the German, Forschungsamt means the Research
Department of Göring’s Air Ministry. The document is in a characteristic
German folder and on the back it says, “Gespräche Fall Österreich”
(Conversations about the Austria Case) and the paper cover on the inside
has German script writing, which in time, I will ask the interpreter to
read; but it looks to me as if it is “Privat, Geheime Archive,” which is
Secret Archive, Berlin, “Gespräche Fall Österreich” (Case Austria). I
offer that set of documents in the original file as they were found in
the Air Ministry, identified as our 2949-PS. I offer them as Exhibit
USA-76, and, offering them, I am reminded of Job’s outcry, “Oh, that
mine enemy would write a book!”

The covering letter in that file, signed by some member of this research
organization within the Air Ministry, and addressed to the Defendant
Göring, states in substance—well, I will read the English translation.
It starts; “To the General Field Marshal. Enclosed I submit, as ordered,
the copies of your telephone conversations.”

Evidently the defendant wanted to keep a record of important telephone
conversations which he had with important persons regarding the Case
Austria, and had the transcriptions provided by his Research Department.
Most of the conversations transcribed and recorded in the volume I have
offered, were conducted by the Defendant Göring, although at least one
interesting one was conducted by Hitler. For purposes of convenience our
staff has marked these telephone calls in pencil with an identifying
letter running from “A” through “Z” and then to “AA.” Eleven of these
conversations have been determined by a screening process to be relevant
to the evidence of this particular time. All the conversations which
have been translated have been mimeographed and are included in the
document books handed to the defendants. The original binder contains,
of course, the complete set of conversations. A very extensive and
interesting account of events with which we are much concerned can be
developed from quotations from these translated conversations.

I turn now to copies of the telephone conversations. The first group in
Part A of the binder took place between Field Marshal Göring, who was
identified by the letter “F” for Field Marshal, and Seyss-Inquart, who
was identified as “S”. The transcript prepared by the Research Institute
of the Air Ministry is in part in the language of these two persons and
is in part a summary of the actual conversations. I quote from Part A of
this binder, and because of the corroborated nature of this transcript
and its obvious authenticity, I propose to quote this conversation in
full.

“F”—hereafter I shall use Göring and Seyss-Inquart—

    “F: ‘How do you do, doctor? My brother-in-law, is he with you?’

    “Seyss-Inquart: ‘No.’”

Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:

    “Göring: ‘How are things with you? Have you resigned or do you
    have any news?’

    “Seyss-Inquart: ‘The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for
    Sunday, and therefore he has put S’”—Seyss-Inquart—“‘and the
    other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called
    off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being
    ordered; among others, curfew at 8 p.m.’

    “Göring replied that in his opinion the measures taken by
    Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At
    this moment he could not commit himself officially. Göring will
    take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections he
    could see a postponement only, not a change of the present
    situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the
    Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.

    “Thereafter a conversation took place between Göring and the
    Führer. Afterwards Göring again telephoned Seyss-Inquart. This
    conversation was held at 15:05.

    “Göring told Seyss-Inquart that Berlin did not agree whatsoever
    with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did
    not enjoy any more the confidence of our Government because he
    had broken the Berchtesgaden Agreement, and therefore further
    confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently the
    national Ministers, Seyss-Inquart, and the others are being
    requested immediately to hand in their resignations to the
    Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. Göring
    added that if after a period of 1 hour no report had come
    through, the assumption would be made that Seyss-Inquart would
    no more be in a position to telephone. That would mean that the
    gentlemen had handed in their resignations. Seyss-Inquart was
    then told to send the telegram to the Führer as agreed upon. As
    a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal
    President for Seyss-Inquart to form a new cabinet would follow
    Schuschnigg’s resignation.”

Thus you see that at 2:45 p.m. Göring told Seyss-Inquart over the
telephone that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the
elections; and 20 minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state
that Schuschnigg must resign. That is your second ultimatum. When
informed about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned he pointed
out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head
of the Cabinet. Shall I go into another one of these?

THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn now until 2 o’clock.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, an hour later, following the
conversation between Göring and Seyss-Inquart with which I dealt this
morning, the Defendant Göring telephoned to Dombrowski in the German
Legation in Vienna. I have reference to the telephone conversation
marked “TT” on Page 2, Part C, of Document 2949-PS. In that
conversation, in the first place, the Defendant Göring showed concern
that the Nazi Party and all of its organizations should be definitely
legalized promptly. I quote from Page 2 of the transcript:

    “Göring: ‘Now to go on, the Party has definitely been
    legalized?’

    “Dombrowski: ‘But that is—it is not necessary even to discuss
    that?’

    “Göring: ‘With all of its organizations.’

    “Dombrowski: ‘With all of its organizations within this
    country.’

    “Göring: ‘In uniform?’

    “Dombrowski: ‘In uniform.’

    “Göring: ‘Good.’

    “Dombrowski calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have
    already been on duty for one-half hour, which means everything
    is all right.”

In addition, Göring stated that the Cabinet—the Austrian Cabinet—must
be formed by 7:30 p.m. and he transmitted instructions to be delivered
to Seyss-Inquart as to who should be appointed to the Cabinet. I quote
from Page 3 of the English text of the transcript of the conversation:

    “Göring: ‘Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Führer,
    and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One
    thing I have forgotten: Fischböck must have the Department of
    Economy and Commerce.’

    “Dombrowski: ‘That is understood.’

    “Göring: ‘Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security
    and Bahr is to have the Armed Forces. The Austrian Army is to be
    taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the
    Justice Department.’

    “Dombrowski: ‘Yes, yes.’

    “Göring: ‘Give me the name.’

    “Dombrowski: ‘Well, your brother-in-law, isn’t that right?’”

    —That is Hüber, the brother-in-law of the Defendant Göring.—

    “Göring: ‘Yes.’

    “Dombrowski: ‘Yes.’

    “Göring: ‘That’s right, and then also Fischböck.’”

And about 20 minutes later, at 5:26 p.m., Göring was faced with the news
that Miklas, the President, was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as
Chancellor, and he issued instructions as to the ultimatum that was to
be delivered to Miklas. I quote from the telephone conversation between
Göring and Seyss-Inquart, in Part E of the folder, the part marked with
capital R, Pages 1 and 2:

    “Göring: ‘Now remember the following: You go immediately,
    together with Lieutenant General Muff, and tell the Federal
    President that if the conditions which are known to you are not
    accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at
    and advancing to the frontier, will march in tonight along the
    whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lieutenant General
    Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference
    immediately. Please inform us immediately about Miklas’
    position. Tell him there is no time now for any joke. Just
    through the false report we received before, action was delayed,
    but now the situation is such that tonight the invasion will
    begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be
    stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are
    informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal
    Chancellorship.’”

    —There follows in the transcript a sentence which is broken
    up.—“‘M.’”—I suppose that means Lieutenant General
    Muff.—“‘does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate
    restoration of the Party with all its organizations.’”

    —There is again an interruption in the transcript.—“‘And then
    call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They
    should now be in the streets; so remember, report must be given
    by 7:30. Lieutenant General Muff is supposed to come along with
    you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not
    understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in
    4 minutes.’”

An hour later, at 6:28 p.m., Göring had an extensively interrupted
telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When he
told Keppler that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Göring
said—I read from Part H, about a third of the way down on the page:

    “Göring: ‘Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him. Just go
    upstairs again and just tell him plainly that S.
    I.’”—Seyss-Inquart—“‘shall call on the National Socialist
    guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order.’”

After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed
the Defendant Göring that Miklas was still sticking to his old
viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to him, and there
might be definite word in about 10 minutes. The conversation proceeded
as follows—I quote from Page 2 of Part H, beginning about the middle of
the page:

    “Göring: ‘Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he
    comes back; then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the
    Reich Chancery as usual, but it has to be done fast. I can
    hardly justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do
    so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power.
    All right?’

    “Seyss-Inquart: ‘But if he threatens?’

    “Göring: ‘Yes.’

    “Seyss-Inquart: ‘Well, I see; then we shall be ready.’

    “Göring: ‘Call me via Blitz.’”

In other words, Göring and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for
Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan
which was already discussed involved the use of both the National
Socialist forces in Austria and the German troops who had been crossing
the borders. Later that night Göring and Seyss-Inquart had another
conversation at about 11 o’clock. This was after the ultimatum had
expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Göring that Miklas was still refusing to
name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as
follows, and I quote from Part I of this folder:

    “Göring: ‘OK’”—What’s the German word for OK? Schön.—“‘I shall
    give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get
    the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I
    shall tell you now. Everyone who offers resistance or organizes
    resistance will immediately be subjected to our court martial,
    the court martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?’

    “Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

    “Göring: ‘Including leading personalities; it does not make any
    difference.’

    “Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes, they have given the order not to offer any
    resistance.’

    “Göring: ‘Yes, it does not matter; the Federal President did not
    authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.’

    “Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

    “Göring: ‘Well, now you are officially authorized.’

    “Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

    “Göring: ‘Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.’”

I am sorry; that conversation took place at 8 o’clock, instead of 11. I
meant to say 8 o’clock. It is quite interesting to me that when the
Defendant Göring was planning to invade a peaceful neighboring state, he
planned to try what he referred to as major war criminals before German
court martial, the leading personalities.

So much for the conversation with respect to the plan of action for
taking over power. Something else very significant was sent on that
subject over the telephone, at least so far as those transcripts
indicate. But there was another historical event which was discussed
over the telephone. I refer to the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart
sent to the German Government requesting the German Government to send
troops into Austria to help Seyss-Inquart put down disorder. A
conversation held at 8:48 that night between Göring and Keppler
proceeded as follows—I read from Page 1 of Part L:

    “Göring: ‘Well, I do not know yet. Listen, the main thing is
    that if Inquart takes over all powers of Government he keeps the
    radio stations occupied.’

    “Keppler: ‘Well, we represent the Government now.’

    “Göring: ‘Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen
    carefully. The following telegram should be sent here by
    Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes: The provisional Austrian
    Government which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg
    Government, considered it its task to establish peace and order
    in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request
    for support in its task of preventing bloodshed. For this
    purpose, it asks the German Government to send German troops as
    soon as possible.’

    “Keppler: ‘Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets but
    everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the
    professional groups.’”

Now let us talk about sending German troops to put down disorder. The SA
and the SS were marching in the streets, but everything was quiet. And a
few minutes later, the conversation continued thus, reading from Page 2
of Part L:

    “Göring: ‘Then our troops will cross the border today.’

    “Keppler: ‘Yes.’

    “Göring: ‘Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as
    possible.’

    “Keppler: ‘Well, send the telegram to Seyss-Inquart in the
    office of the Federal Chancellor.’

    “Göring: ‘Please show him the text of the telegram and do tell
    him that we are asking him—well, he does not even need to send
    the telegram. All he needs to do is to say, “Agreed.”’

    “Keppler: ‘Yes.’

    “Göring: ‘He should call me at the Führer’s or at my place.
    Well, good luck. Heil Hitler.’”

Well, of course, he did not need to send the telegram because Göring
wrote the telegram. He already had it. It must be recalled that in the
first conversation, Part A, held at 3:05 p.m., Göring had requested
Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon, but now the matter was
so urgent that Göring dictated the exact wording of the telegram over
the telephone. And an hour later, at 9:54 p.m. a conversation between
Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went on as follows, reading
from Part M:

    “Dietrich: ‘I need the telegram urgently.’

    “Keppler: ‘Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart
    agrees.’

    “Dietrich: ‘This is marvelous. Thank you.’

    “Keppler: ‘Listen to the radio. News will be given.’

    “Dietrich: ‘Where?’

    “Keppler: ‘From Vienna.’

    “Dietrich: ‘So Seyss-Inquart agrees?’

    “Keppler: ‘Jawohl.’”

Next the actual order to invade Austria. Communications with Austria
were now suspended but the German military machine had been set in
motion. To demonstrate that, I now offer in evidence captured Document
C-182, offered as Exhibit USA-77, a directive of 11 March 1938 at 2045
hours, from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This directive,
initialed by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, orders the invasion of
Austria in view of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The
directive reads:

    “Top secret; Berlin, 11 March 1938, 2045 hours; Supreme
    Commander of the Armed Forces, OKW,”—with other symbols—“35
    copies, 6th copy. C-in-C Navy”—pencil note—“has been informed.
    Re: Operation Otto. Directive No. 2.

    “1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian
    Government have not been fulfilled.

    “2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw
    before the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting. The
    Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.

    “3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of
    the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to
    Directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

    “I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all
    forces to the full as quickly as possible.”

Signed Adolf Hitler; initialed by Jodl and by a name that looks like
Warlimont.

And then some interesting communications with Rome to avoid possibility
of disaster from that source. At the very time that Hitler and Göring
had embarked on this military undertaking, they still had a question
mark in their minds, and that was Italy. Italy had massed on the Italian
border in 1934 on the occasion of July 25, 1934—the Putsch. Italy had
traditionally been the political protector of Austria.

With what a sigh of relief did Hitler hear at 10:25 p.m. that night from
Prince Phillipp von Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just
come back from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole
thing in a very friendly manner. The situation can really be grasped by
the rereading of the conversation. The record of the conversation shows
the excitement under which Hitler was operating when he spoke over the
telephone. It is a short conversation, and I shall read the first half
of it from Part N of the transcript of 2949-PS. I am afraid your title
Part N may be blurred on the mimeographed copy. “H” is Hessen and “F” is
the Führer.

    “Hessen: ‘I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. Il Duce
    accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. He sends you
    his regards. He had been informed from Austria; Schuschnigg gave
    him the news. He had then said it would be a complete
    impossibility; it would be a bluff; such a thing could not be
    done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus,
    and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that
    Austria would be immaterial to him.’

    “Hitler: ‘Then please tell Mussolini I will never forget him for
    this.’

    “Hessen: ‘Yes.’

    “Hitler: ‘Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still
    ready to make a quite different agreement with him.’

    “Hessen: ‘Yes, I told him that, too.’

    “Hitler: ‘As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I
    shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin; nothing
    matters.’

    “Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

    “Hitler: ‘Listen, I shall make any agreement, I am no longer in
    fear of the terrible position which would have existed
    militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell
    him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I
    forget that.’

    “Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

    “Hitler: ‘I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he
    should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be
    convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even
    if the whole world were against him.’

    “Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

The Tribunal will recall the reference in Jodl’s diary to the letter
which Hitler had sent to Mussolini. It is dated March 11. It may be
found in the official publication _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_,
Volume 6, I, Page 135, Number 24-a. I ask the Court to take judicial
notice of it, and you will find a translation of it appearing in our
Document 2510-PS. In this letter, after stating that Austria had been
declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote—and I quote:

    “I have decided to re-establish order in my fatherland—order
    and tranquility—and to give to the popular will the possibility
    of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by
    its own decision.”

He stated that this was an act of self-defense; that he had no hostile
intentions towards Italy. And after the invasion, when Hitler was at
Linz, Austria, he communicated his gratitude to Mussolini once more in
the famous telegram which the world so well remembers. I again cite
_Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, Page 156, Number 29, the
translation of the telegram being in our Document 2467-PS, and the
document reads: “Mussolini, I will never forget you for this.”

We now shift our scene from Vienna to Berlin. We have shifted our scene,
I meant, from Vienna to Berlin. It may now be appropriate to come back
to Vienna just long enough to recall that late in the evening of March
11, President Miklas did appoint Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor.
The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart’s appointment was made at 11:15
p.m. This is noted in _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I,
Page 137, Number 25-a, and a translation of the announcement is in our
Document 2465-PS.

Then something had to be done in London to smooth things over there and,
accordingly, one more act played on the international scene is set down
in the Air Ministry telephone transcript. On Sunday, March 13, 1938, the
day after the invasion, Defendant Göring who had been left in Berlin in
charge of the Reich by Hitler, who had gone to his fatherland, phoned
Defendant Ribbentrop in London. I find this conversation very
illuminating as to the way in which these defendants operated, using, if
I may employ American vernacular, a kind of international “double talk”
to soothe and mislead other nations. I quote from Part 1 of item W of
Document 2949-PS:

    “Göring:”—speaking to Ribbentrop in London:—“‘As you know, the
    Führer has entrusted me with the administration of the current
    government procedures (Führung der Regierungsgeschäfte), and
    therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in
    Austria, that you can hear over the radio.’

    “Ribbentrop: ‘Yes, it is fantastic, is it not?’

    “Göring: ‘Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely
    overshadowed. The Führer was deeply moved, when he talked to me
    last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw
    his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political
    things. Well, this story that we had given an ultimatum is just
    foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist
    Ministers and the representatives of the people
    (Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum. Later on more
    and more prominent people of the movement participated, and as a
    natural result, the Austrian National Socialist Ministers asked
    us to back them up so that they would not be completely beaten
    up again and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told
    them we would not allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war,
    under any circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg’s direct order
    or with his consent, the communists and the Reds had been armed
    and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed
    with “Heil Moskau” and so on. Naturally, all these facts caused
    some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that
    Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Vaterländische
    Front would fight to the last man. One could not know that they
    would capitulate like that, and therefore Seyss-Inquart, who
    already had taken over the Government, asked us to march in
    immediately. We had already marched up to the frontier before
    this, since we could not know whether or not there would be a
    civil war. These are the actual facts which can be proved by
    documents.’”

There the Defendant Göring was giving to the Defendant Ribbentrop the
proper line that he should take in London as to how to explain what had
happened in Austria. Of course, when the Defendant Göring said that his
story about this matter could be proved by documents, I don’t think he
had in mind that his own telephone calls might constitute documents.

Another rather interesting item begins on Page 3 of the English text of
this Part W—still Göring talking to Ribbentrop in London. This is at
the bottom of the page:

    “Göring: ‘No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you
    had spoken already to these people. I want you once more,—but
    no, not at all once more, but generally speaking—tell the
    following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that
    Germany has given an ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg,
    because the ultimatum was presented to him by Seyss-Inquart,
    Glaise-Horstenau, and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we
    have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but that
    it also was given by the others, and as far as I know, just a
    military attaché came along, asked by Seyss-Inquart, because of
    a technical question.’”—you will recall that he was a
    lieutenant general directed by Göring to go along—“‘He was
    supposed to ask whether, in case Seyss-Inquart would ask for the
    support of German troops, Germany would grant this request.
    Furthermore, I want to state that Seyss-Inquart asked us
    expressly, by phone and by telegram, to send troops because he
    did not know about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and
    so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he
    could not know how the Fatherland Front might react since they
    always had had such a big mouth.’

    “Ribbentrop: ‘Herr Göring, tell me, how is the situation in
    Vienna; is everything settled yet?’

    “Göring: ‘Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with
    some companies, in order to secure the airfields, and they were
    received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17th division
    marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also, I want to
    point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw, but that
    they got together and fraternized immediately with the German
    troops, wherever they were stationed.’”

These are quite interesting explanations that the ultimatum was by
Seyss-Inquart alone and not by Göring; that Lieutenant General Muff, the
military attaché, was along just to answer a technical question, and
that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and telegram for troops.
But, perhaps to understand this conversation, we must try to create
again the actual physical scene of the time and place as Göring talked
over the phone. I quote eight lines from Page 11 of the English text,
about in the middle, Part W:

    “Göring: ‘Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.’

    “Ribbentrop: ‘I shall see you this afternoon.’

    “Göring: ‘The weather is wonderful here—blue sky. I am sitting
    here on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in the fresh air,
    drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in. I have to make
    the speech. And the birds are twittering, and here and there I
    can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful
    over there.’”—that is, Vienna.

    “Ribbentrop: ‘That is marvelous.’”

May it please the Tribunal, I have practically come to the end of the
material relating to the aggression against Austria. In a moment I shall
take up quite briefly the effects of the Anschluss, some of the
developments which took place after the German troops marched across the
border. What is to come after that is an epilogue, but before developing
the epilogue, it may be appropriate to pause briefly for just a moment.
I think that the facts which I have related to the Tribunal today show
plainly certain things about the defendants involved in the conspiracy,
and among the conspirators who particularly took action in the Austrian
matter were Von Papen, Seyss-Inquart, Ribbentrop, Von Neurath, and
Göring.

First, I think it is plain that these men were dangerous men. They used
their power without a bridle. They used their power to override the
independence and freedom of others. And they were more than bullies
squeezing a smaller foe. They were very sly bullies. They compounded
their force with fraud. They coupled threats with legal technicalities
and devious maneuvers, wearing a sanctimonious mask to cover their
duplicity. I think they are dangerous men.

In accordance with the directive of March 11, our Document C-182,
Exhibit USA-77, the German Army crossed the Austrian border at daybreak,
12 March 1938. Hitler issued a proclamation to the German people
announcing the invasion, and purporting to justify it. I refer again to
_Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, Page 140, Number 27,
“Proclamation of Hitler.” The British Government and the French
Government filed protests. The German Government and the Austrian
National Socialists swiftly secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart
welcomed Hitler at Linz, and they both expressed their joy over the
events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in his speech declared Article 88 of
the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative. I refer to the speech of
Seyss-Inquart at Linz on 12 March 1938, as contained in the _Dokumente
der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 144, Number 28-a, of which I
ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and which you will find
translated in our Document 2485-PS.

For a view of what was happening in Vienna, I offer in evidence our
Document L-292, telegram 70, American Legation, Vienna, to the American
Secretary of State, 12 March 1938, and I offer it as Exhibit USA-78. I
quote it in full:

    “Secretary of State, Washington; March 12, noon.

    “Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets
    ‘National Socialist Germany greets its possession, National
    Socialist Austria and her new Government in true indivisible
    Union.’

    “Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and
    impending arrival Austrian Legion. SS and SA in undisputed
    control in Vienna. Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg
    and Schmidt rumored arrested. Himmler and Hess
    here.”—Signed—“Wiley.”

The law-making machine was put to work immediately on the task of
consolidation. For all of this material I shall merely refer the
Tribunal to the German sources and to the document number of the English
translation, but I think I need not offer these legislative acts in
evidence but shall merely invite the Court to take judicial notice of
them.

First, Miklas was forced to resign as President. I refer to _Dokumente
der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 147, Number 30-b. Our
translation is in our Document 2466-PS.

In this connection the Court will no doubt recall Göring’s telephone
conversation as shown in Document 2949-PS, that in view of Miklas’ delay
in appointing Seyss-Inquart, Miklas would be dismissed. Seyss-Inquart
became both Chancellor and President.

He then signed a Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938 for the
reunion of Austria with the German Reich, which in turn was incorporated
into the Reich Statute of Reunion, passed the same day, German law. I
cite for that the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 237, Number
21, a translation of which will be found in our Document 2307-PS.

This Federal Constitutional Law declared Austria to be a province of the
German Reich. By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany
violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provided (by the
way, on the Constitutional Law to which I just referred there appear as
signatories the following names:

Adolf Hitler, Führer and Reich Chancellor; Göring, General Field
Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; Frick, Reich Minister of the
Interior; Von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. Hess,
Deputy Führer.)

By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80
of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides, and I quote:

    “Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of
    Austria within the frontier, which may be fixed in a treaty
    between that state and the principal Allied and Associated
    Powers. She agrees that this independence shall be inalienable.”
    (JN-2)

Similarly, the Austrian action violated Article 88 of the Treaty of St.
Germain, which provides:

    “The independence of Austria is inalienable, otherwise than with
    the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.
    Consequently, Austria undertakes, in the absence of the consent
    of the said Council, to abstain from any act which might
    directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her
    independence, particularly until her admission to membership of
    the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of
    another power.” (JN-3)

This basic Constitutional Law provided for a plebiscite to be held on 10
April 1938 on the question of reunion, but this was a mere formality.
The plebiscite could only confirm the union declared in the law. It
could not undo Germany’s union with, and control over, Austria.

To illustrate the way in which legal consolidation was swiftly assured
under conditions of occupation of Austria by troops, it is not necessary
to do more than review some of the acts passed within the month.

Hitler placed the Austrian Federal Army under his own command and
required all members of the Army to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler
as their Supreme Commander. A translation of the pertinent document will
be found in our 2936-PS, and I refer to the instruction of the Führer
and Reich Chancellor, concerning the Austrian Federal Army, March 13,
1938, _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 150.

Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take an
oath of office swearing allegiance to Hitler, Führer of the German Reich
and people. Jewish officials as defined were not permitted to take the
oath.

I refer to a decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning the
administration of oath to the officials of the Province of Austria,
March 15, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 245, Number 24,
the translation being in our Document 2311-PS.

Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich Laws,
including the law of 1933 against the formation of new political
parties, and the 1933 Law for the Preservation of Unity of Party and
State.

I refer to the first decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor
concerning the introduction of German Reich Law into Austria, 15 March
1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 247, Number 25, the
translation being in our Document 2310-PS.

Hitler, Frick, and Göring ordered that the Reich Minister of the
Interior be the central authority for carrying out the reunion of
Austria with the German Reich. I cite the order pursuant to the law
concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, March 16, 1938,
_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 249, Number 25, translated in
our 1060-PS.

In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign to insure
acceptability of the German regime, it may be noted that Goebbels
established a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna.

I cite the order concerning the establishment of a Reich Propaganda
Office in Vienna, March 31, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1,
Page 350, Number 46, translated in our Document 2935-PS.

The ballot addressed to soldiers of the former Austrian Army as “German
soldiers” asked the voters whether they agreed with the accomplishment
and ratification on March 13, 1938 of the reuniting of Austria with
Germany.

I cite the second order concerning plebiscite and election for the
Greater German Reichstag of March 24, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938,
Volume 1, Page 303, translated in our Document 1659-PS.

The ground work was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite “for
German men and women of Austria” promised in the basic law of March 13.

Then, the importance of Austria in further aggression. Could we run that
screen up, or is the chart still behind it? Well, the Court will
remember the chart.

The seizure of Austria had now formed that lower jaw to the head of the
wolf around the head of Czechoslovakia. Germany’s desire to consummate
the Anschluss with Austria and her determination to execute that aim in
the way and at the time that she did—that is, with threat of military
force, quickly, and despite political risk—was due to the importance of
Austria in her further plans of aggression.

The conference held November 5, 1937, planning for aggressive war in
Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest of food through
expulsion of a million people and the effective increase in fighting
strength, in part through the improvement in the frontier.

I cite again Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25. Austria was to yield to
Germany material resources, and moreover, she provided ready cash taken
from the Jews and from the Austrian Government.

One of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed
by Hitler, Frick, Schwerin von Krosigk and Schacht for the transfer to
the Reich of the assets of the Austrian National Bank. I refer to the
order for the transfer of the Austrian National Bank to the Reichsbank,
March 17, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 254, Number 27,
translated in our 2313-PS.

Austria also yielded human resources. Three months after the Anschluss
there was enacted a decree requiring the 21-year-old men, Austrian men,
to report for active military service. I refer to the decree regarding
registration for active military service in Austria during 1938,
_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 634, translated in our 1660-PS.

And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic position
of the German Army. I invite the Court’s attention to a document which I
introduced in the case on preparation for aggression, L-172, Exhibit
USA-34, which was a lecture delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the
German Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the
Gauleiter. Only one page of that lecture appears in this particular
document book, and I quote from one paragraph on Page 5 of the English
text, which is Page 7 of Jodl’s lecture, which reviewed the situation in
1938:

    “The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only
    the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect
    both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially
    improving our strategic position. Whereas, until then the
    territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way
    right into Germany—a wasp waist in the direction of France and
    an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia—Czechoslovakia
    herself was now enclosed by pincers. Her own strategic position
    had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a
    victim to any attack pressed home with vigor before effective
    aid from the west could be expected to arrive.”

The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second part of
this second phase of their aggression and to take over Czechoslovakia.

Logically, if the Tribunal please, we should proceed at this point with
the story about Czechoslovakia. For reasons that I explained earlier in
the week we have had to change our plans somewhat from a strictly
logical order, and the plan at present is that on Monday I shall go
forward with the Czechoslovakian part of the aggressive war case.

At this point it is planned by our staff to show a motion picture, and
it will take some few minutes to make the physical arrangements in the
courtroom, so that if the Court should feel like recessing, those
arrangements could be made.

THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell me how long the showing of the picture
will take?

MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is about an hour.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes then, shall we now, or
until the picture is ready?

                        [_A recess was taken._]

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, Sir, supplementing what Mr.
Alderman has said, we have had to readjust our presentation to some
extent. Tomorrow morning, a witness will be offered for interrogation.
Then Mr. Alderman on Monday; and Sir Hartley Shawcross will make the
opening statement for the British Empire on Tuesday morning.

The film this afternoon, at the request of defendants’ counsel, made in
writing to the Court, has been exhibited to defendants’ counsel on day
before yesterday evening in this courtroom. I personally requested Dr.
Dix to convey the invitation to Defense Counsel to witness the film.
Eight of them came. Dr. Dix advised me kindly that he would not come
unless he was forced to come.

I now present Mr. Dodd, who will have charge of the presentation.

MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution for the United
States will at this time present to the Tribunal, with its permission, a
documentary film on concentration camps. This is by no means the entire
proof which the prosecution will offer with respect to the subject of
concentration camps, but this film which we offer represents in a brief
and unforgettable form an explanation of what the words “concentration
camp” imply.

This subject arises appropriately in the narrative of events leading up
to the actual outbreak of aggressive war, which, as Mr. Alderman’s
presentation shows, was planned and prepared by the Nazi conspirators.
We propose to show that concentration camps were not an end in
themselves but rather they were an integral part of the Nazi system of
government. As we shall show, the black-shirted guards of the SS and the
Gestapo stood ranged behind the official pages of the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_.

We intend to prove that each and every one of these defendants knew of
the existence of these concentration camps; that fear and terror and
nameless horror of the concentration camps were instruments by which the
defendants retained power and suppressed opposition to any of their
policies, including, of course, their plans for aggressive war. By this
means they enforced the controls imposed upon the German people, as
required to execute these plans, and obliterated freedom in Germany and
in the countries invaded and occupied by the armies of the Third Reich.

Finally, we ask the Tribunal in viewing this film to bear in mind the
fact that the proof to be offered at a later stage of this Trial will
show that on some of the organizations charged in this Indictment lies
the responsibility for the origination, the control, and the maintenance
of the whole concentration camp system: Upon the SS, the SD—a part of
the SS which tracked down the victims—upon the Gestapo, which committed
the victims to the camps, and upon other branches of the SS which were
in charge of the atrocities committed therein.

Commander James Donovan will introduce the film with a statement
explaining its source and its authenticity.

COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN, USNR. (Prosecution Counsel for the United
States): May it please the Tribunal, I refer to Document Number 2430-PS,
concerning the motion picture entitled “Nazi Concentration Camps” and to
the affidavits of Commander James B. Donovan, Lieutenant Colonel George
C. Stevens, Lieutenant E. R. Kellogg and Colonel Erik Tiebold contained
therein. The affidavits of Colonel Stevens and of Lieutenant Kellogg are
also contained in the motion picture, and thus will be in the record of
the Tribunal. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now, however,
read into the record those affidavits not appearing in the film.

THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of any objection by the Defense Counsel,
we don’t think it is necessary to read these formal affidavits.

COMMANDER DONOVAN: Yes, Sir. The United States now offers in evidence an
official documentary motion picture report on Nazi concentration camps.
This report has been compiled from motion pictures taken by Allied
military photographers as the Allied armies in the West liberated the
areas in which these camps were located. The accompanying narration is
taken directly from the reports of the military photographers who filmed
the camps.

While these motion pictures speak for themselves in evidencing life and
death in Nazi concentration camps, proper authentication of the films is
contained in the affidavits of the United States Army and Navy officers
to which I have referred.

As has been stated, this motion picture has been made available to all
defense counsel and they possess copies in their Information Room of the
supporting affidavits duly translated.

If the Tribunal please, we shall proceed with the projection of the
film, Document 2430-PS, Exhibit USA-79.

[_Photographs were then projected on the screen showing the following
affidavits while at the same time the voices of the respective affiants
were reproduced reading them._]

    “I, George C. Stevens, Lieutenant Colonel, Army of the United
    States, hereby certify:

    “1. From 1 March 1945 to 8 May 1945 I was on active duty with
    the United States Army Signal Corps attached to the Supreme
    Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and among my official
    duties was direction of the photographing of the Nazi
    concentration camps and prison camps as liberated by Allied
    Forces.

    “2. The motion pictures which will be shown following this
    affidavit were taken by official Allied photographic teams in
    the course of their military duties, each team being composed of
    military personnel under the direction of a commissioned
    officer.

    “3. To the best of my knowledge and belief, these motion
    pictures constitute a true representation of the individuals and
    scenes photographed. They have not been altered in any respect
    since the exposures were made. The accompanying narration is a
    true statement of the facts and circumstances under which these
    pictures were made.

    “(Signed) George C. Stevens, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS.

    “Sworn to before me this 2nd day of October 1945.

    “(Signed) James B. Donovan, Commander, United States Naval
    Reserve.”

    “I, E. R. Kellogg, Lieutenant, United States Navy, hereby
    certify that:

    “1. From 1929 to 1941 I was employed at the Twentieth Century
    Fox Studios in Hollywood, California, as a director of film
    effects, and am familiar with all photographic techniques. Since
    6 September 1941 to the present date of 27 August 1945, I have
    been on active duty with the United States Navy.

    “2. I have carefully examined the motion picture film to be
    shown following this affidavit and I certify that the images of
    these excerpts from the original negative have not been
    retouched, distorted or otherwise altered in any respect and are
    true copies of the originals held in the vaults of the United
    States Army Signal Corps. These excerpts comprise 6,000 feet of
    film selected from 80,000 feet, all of which I have reviewed and
    all of which is similar in character to these excerpts.

    “(Signed) E. R. Kellogg, Lieutenant, United States Navy.

    “Sworn to before me this 27 day of August 1945.

    “(Signed) John Ford, Captain, United States Navy.”

[_The film was then shown._]

COL. STOREY: That concludes the presentation.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]




                               NINTH DAY
                        Friday, 30 November 1945


                           _Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the Prosecutor for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Colonel Amen will represent the United States this
morning.

COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United
States): May it please the Tribunal, I propose to call as the first
witness for the Prosecution, Major General Erwin Lahousen.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish me to state that the evidence of the
witness whom you propose to call must be strictly confined to the count
with which the United States are dealing, Count One.

COL. AMEN: May I have a moment to discuss that with the Chief Counsel of
the United States?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, so far as
I know the Prosecution . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Would you state for whom you appear? Do you appear for
the Defendant Keitel?

DR. NELTE: Yes. As far as I know, an agreement was reached between the
Prosecution and the Defense, to the effect that whenever possible,
questions to be brought up in the proceedings on the following day
should be announced beforehand. The obvious purpose of this very
reasonable understanding was to enable Defense Counsel to discuss
forthcoming questions with their clients, and thus to assure a rapid and
even progress of the Trial.

I was not informed that the witness Lahousen was to be called by the
Prosecution today, nor was I told on what questions he was to be heard.

It was particularly important to know this, because today, I believe,
the witness Lahousen was not to be heard on questions connected with the
Prosecution’s case as presented during the past days.

THE PRESIDENT: That is the contrary of what I said. What I said was that
the witness was to be confined to evidence relating to Count One, which
is the Count that has been solely discussed up to the present date.

DR. NELTE: Do you mean, Mr. President, that in order to enable the
Defense to cross-examine the witness, there will be a recess after the
interrogation by the Prosecution during which Counsel may discuss the
questions with their clients? The witness Lahousen, as far as I recall,
has never until now been mentioned by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?

DR. NELTE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to hear Counsel for the
United States upon the agreement which counsel for the Defendant Keitel
alleges, namely, an agreement that what was to be discussed on the
following day should be communicated to defendants’ counsel beforehand.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of no agreement to inform defendants’
counsel of any witness, nor of his testimony; nor would I want to make
such. There are security reasons involved in disclosing to Defense
Counsel the names of witnesses, which I don’t need to enlarge upon, I am
quite sure.

We did advise them that they would be given information as to the
documentary matters, and I think that has been kept.

As to witnesses, however, a matter of policy arises. These witnesses are
not always prisoners. They have to be treated in somewhat different
fashion than prisoners; and the protection of their security is a very
important consideration where we are trying this case, in the very
hotbed of the Nazi organization with which some of Defense Counsel were
identified.

THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Justice Jackson, that that is sufficient. If
you tell the Tribunal that there was no such agreement, the Tribunal
will, of course, accept that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of nothing of that character, relating to
witnesses. That does apply to documents.

We find it very difficult to know just the meaning of the ruling which
the Court has just announced. Count One of the Indictment is a
conspiracy count, covering the entire substantive part of the
Indictment. There are problems, of course, of overlapping, which I had
supposed had been worked out between the prosecutors until this morning.
It is impossible, trying a conspiracy case, to keep from mentioning the
fact that the act, which was the object of the conspiracy, was
performed. In fact, that is a part of the evidence of the conspiracy.

I know I don’t need to enlarge upon the wide scope of evidence in a
conspiracy case. I think, perhaps, the best way to do is to swear the
witness, and that the other prosecutors, if they feel their field is
being trespassed upon, or the judges, if they feel that we are
exceeding, raise the objection specifically; because I don’t know how we
can separate, particularly on a moment’s notice, Count One from the
other Counts.

We have tried our best to work out an arrangement that would be fair, as
between ourselves and the other prosecutors, but we find it impossible
always to please everybody.

With the greatest deference to the ruling of the Court, I would like to
suggest that we proceed. I don’t know just what the bounds of the ruling
might be, but I think the only way we can find out is to proceed, and
have specific objections to the specific things which anyone feels have
been transgressed; and in doing that, I want to say that we do it with
the greatest respect to the ruling, but that we may find ourselves in
conflict with it, because of the difficulty of any boundary on the
subject.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer?

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I must return to the matter raised by Doctor
Nelte, namely his statement that before the beginning of the Trial the
Defense and the Prosecution reached an agreement to the effect that the
next day’s program should always be made known to the Defense on the
previous day. Such an agreement was actually reached, and I cannot
understand why the Prosecution was not informed of it. We considered the
possibility and then reached this agreement in a conference with Doctor
Kempner, who was acting as our liaison man. I should like further to
point out the following:

The Prosecution stated that for security reasons the Defense could not
be furnished with the names of witnesses to be called during the next
day’s proceedings. The press however received, as early as yesterday,
information on the witnesses to be called today. We heard of this
through representatives of the press this morning and, as far as I know,
the information also appeared in today’s papers. I cannot understand,
therefore, why it was withheld from us, and why we were told that for
security reasons, it could not be communicated to us. I think this
amounts to a mistrust of the Defense’s discretion that is quite
unjustified. It is, furthermore, incorrect that we are now receiving
documents in good time; they still reach us belatedly. For instance, a
document which is to be dealt with in court today was put on our desks
only this morning, moreover, in a language which many of the defending
counsel cannot understand, since they do not have complete mastery of
English.

As I have already submitted this complaint to the Prosecution in
writing, may I ask the Tribunal to reach a decision in this matter as
soon as possible.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished?

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is quite correct that the name of the witness
who is to be used today was given to the press. The question of our
policy as to giving witnesses’ names was submitted to me last night
after Court recessed, because we had not been using witnesses
heretofore; and I then stated to Colonel Storey that witnesses’ names
must not be given to the Defense Counsel for security reasons.

He communicated that, I believe, to Doctor Dix. I found that later it
had been given to the press. They, of course, have had adequate
information therefore as to this witness. However, I am speaking about
the policy. We cannot be under an obligation to inform these counsel of
the names of witnesses who will be called, who are here in Nuremberg,
but not in prison; the situation does not permit that. Neither can we
furnish transcripts of testimony or that sort of thing of witnesses in
advance.

Now we want to give the Defense Counsel everything that, in the fair
conduct of the Trial, they ought to have. They are now receiving much
more than any citizen of the United States gets on trial in the courts
of the United States, in some respects, as to advance information and
copies and help and service, and I do think that to ask us to disclose
to them in advance either the names or substance of
testimony—oftentimes the substance would disclose the witness—would
not be proper. It was stated yesterday that we would take up a witness
today.

THE PRESIDENT: We have already heard two of the counsel on behalf of the
Defense. Have you anything to add which is different to what they have
said?

DR. DIX: Yes, I believe I can explain a misunderstanding and clarify the
whole problem.

Mr. President, as far as I am informed—I do not know what was discussed
in my absence—the situation is this:

Though discussions took place, no agreement was reached between the
Prosecution and the Defense. There is, as Your Lordship knows, only a
decision of the Tribunal regarding documents; that decision is known and
I need not repeat. As far as witnesses are concerned I think I may
assume that we are all agreed that the desire of the Defense to know the
names of witnesses ahead of time is justified.

The Tribunal must decide to what extent security reasons interfere with
this desire, which is in itself justified. That is a matter which the
Defense cannot determine. I think I understand Mr. Justice Jackson
correctly in saying that if the press is being told what witnesses will
appear on the next day, then it is a matter of course that the same
information should be given to Defense Counsel at the same time. This
was only a series of unhappy circumstances, which can be overcome by
mutual understanding and good will.

As I said, I do not know what was agreed upon before I was present here.
I cannot therefore contradict my colleague, Dr. Stahmer, in this matter.
I think it possible, however, that the misunderstanding arose as a
result of the decision of the Court to have documents submitted to us 48
hours in advance and to have the film shown to us beforehand, a decision
which led my colleague to the conclusion—and I consider it a justified
conclusion—that all matters of this sort were to be submitted to us in
advance. We do not, of course, expect to be informed of the contents of
the witness’ testimony.

After this elucidation I should like to state my request that in the
future we be informed as soon as possible which witness is to be called;
and I should also like to ask that the security considerations be guided
by the knowledge that the Defense as a body is reliable, determined and
capable of assisting the Court in reaching its verdict by submitting to
the discipline of the proceedings. I ask, therefore, that the cases in
which the security officer believes that he should not communicate the
name of the witness beforehand, should be reduced to an absolute
minimum.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the submissions which have
been made to them on behalf of Defense Counsel with reference to what
shall or what shall not be communicated to them. With reference to the
witness whom the United States desire to call, they will now be
permitted to call him. With reference to what I said about confining his
evidence to the first count, the Tribunal thinks that the best course
would be for the other prosecutors to have the opportunity now to ask
any questions which they think right, and that they may have the
opportunity, if they wish, of calling the witness later upon their own
counts.

As to cross-examination by the defendants’ counsel, that will be allowed
to them in the most convenient way possible, so that if they wish to
have an opportunity of communicating with their clients before they
cross-examine, they may have the opportunity of doing so. Now we will
continue.

COL. AMEN: May we have General Lahousen brought before the Tribunal?
What is your name?

ERWIN LAHOUSEN (Witness): Erwin Lahousen.

COL. AMEN: Will you please spell it?

LAHOUSEN: L-a-h-o-u-s-e-n.

COL. AMEN: Will you say this oath after me: “I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think the witness had better sit down?

COL. AMEN: I think he should be allowed to sit down, particularly since
he has a heart condition which may be aggravated.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you may sit down.

COL. AMEN: Where were you born?

LAHOUSEN: I was born in Vienna.

COL. AMEN: On what date?

LAHOUSEN: On 25 October 1897.

COL. AMEN: What has been your occupation?

LAHOUSEN: I was a professional soldier.

COL. AMEN: Where were you trained?

LAHOUSEN: I was trained in Austria, in the Military Academy in
Wiener-Neustadt.

COL. AMEN: Were you immediately commissioned as an officer?

LAHOUSEN: In 1915 I was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the
infantry.

COL. AMEN: Did you serve in the first World War?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, as second and first lieutenant in the infantry.

COL. AMEN: Were you promoted from time to time thereafter?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I was promoted under the normal regulations valid in
Austria at the time.

COL. AMEN: By 1930 what rank had you attained?

LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I was a captain.

COL. AMEN: And commencing in 1930 did you take any additional training?

LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I entered the Austrian War School, which corresponds
to the Military Academy in the German Army. There I received the
training of an officer of the General Staff.

COL. AMEN: How long did this training last?

LAHOUSEN: This training lasted 3 years.

COL. AMEN: In 1933 to what regular army unit were you assigned?

LAHOUSEN: In 1933 I was serving in the Second Austrian Division, that
was the Vienna Division.

COL. AMEN: What type of work did you do there?

LAHOUSEN: I was an intelligence officer; that branch of the service for
which I was already destined at the end of my training.

COL. AMEN: Did you then receive a further promotion?

LAHOUSEN: I was promoted normally in accordance with the regulations
valid in Austria, and roughly at the end of 1933 I became a major. About
1935 or the beginning of 1936 I was transferred to the General Staff,
and in June, or at any rate, in the summer of 1936, I became a
lieutenant colonel of the Austrian General Staff.

COL. AMEN: And were you assigned to the Intelligence Division at or
about that time?

LAHOUSEN: I entered the Austrian Intelligence Division which corresponds
technically to the Abwehr in the German Army. I must add that an
Intelligence Division was only added to the Austrian Army about this
time, i.e. 1936; before that year it did not exist. Since it was planned
to re-establish within the framework of the Austrian Federal Army the
military Intelligence Division which had ceased to exist after the
collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, I was trained to assist in
organizing this division within the framework of the Austrian Army.

COL. AMEN: After being assigned to the Intelligence Division, how were
your activities principally directed?

LAHOUSEN: My responsible chief, or more exactly, the responsible chief
at that time, was Colonel of the General Staff Böhme. He was the
division chief to whom I was subordinate, the Chief of the Intelligence
Division, the man to whom I was responsible, from whom I received my
orders and instructions; later on it was the Chief of the Austrian
General Staff.

THE PRESIDENT: Can’t you shorten this, Colonel Amen? We really need not
have all this detail.

COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. It is, however, I think important for the
Tribunal to understand more of this information than you ordinarily
would by virtue of the fact that he was taken over subsequently to a
corresponding position in the German Army, which I did want the Tribunal
to appreciate.

Now, will you state to the Tribunal what your principal activities were
after being assigned to the Intelligence Division? What information were
you interested in and seeking to obtain?

LAHOUSEN: May I repeat—I don’t know if I understood you correctly—I
was a member of the Austrian Intelligence Division, and not of the
German Abwehr.

COL. AMEN: After the Anschluss, what position did you assume?

LAHOUSEN: After the Anschluss I was automatically taken into the High
Command of the German Armed Forces, where I did the same work. In that
position I was then a member of the Abwehr and my chief was Admiral
Canaris.

COL. AMEN: And what was the position of Admiral Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris was at that time Chief of the German Abwehr, the
German Intelligence.

COL. AMEN: And will you explain briefly the responsibility of the
principal departments of the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: When, after the Anschluss in 1938, I entered the Amt
Ausland-Abwehr there were three Abwehr divisions, and the division
called “Ausland,” and together they formed the organization known as
“Ausland-Abwehr.” That was the set-up of the organization in my time.
How it was composed before I became a member of it, I cannot say
exactly.

COL. AMEN: And what were your duties?

LAHOUSEN: First, I automatically came into Abwehr Division I. That was
the division concerned with collecting information. It was also called
the Secret Information Service. I worked under a divisional chief, the
then Colonel in the General Staff Pieckenbrock, whom I knew already from
my Austrian past. I also knew Canaris from my time in Austria.

COL. AMEN: Admiral Canaris was your immediate superior?

LAHOUSEN: Admiral Canaris was my immediate superior.

COL. AMEN: From time to time did you act as his personal representative?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, in all cases and on all occasions when his actual
deputy—namely, Colonel Pieckenbrock—was not present, or when Canaris,
for one reason or another, considered it necessary or advisable to have
me appear as his representative.

COL. AMEN: And in this capacity did you have any contact with Field
Marshal Keitel?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you also have contact with Jodl?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, occasionally, but to a much lesser extent.

COL. AMEN: And did you occasionally attend conferences at which Herr
Hitler was also present?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I attended a few of the sessions or discussions at which
Hitler was present and which he conducted.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal whether the leaders of the Abwehr
were in sympathy with Hitler’s war program?

LAHOUSEN: I have to make clear in this connection that, at that time, we
chiefs in the Abwehr were deeply influenced and captivated by the
personality of Canaris, his inner bearing was perfectly clear and
unequivocal to a small group of us.

COL. AMEN: And was there a particular group or groups in the Abwehr who
worked against the Nazis?

LAHOUSEN: Within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr there were two groups which in
their aims and actions were closely connected, but which, nevertheless,
must somehow be kept apart.

COL. AMEN: And what were those two groups?

LAHOUSEN: Before I answer this question, I must briefly picture the
personality of Canaris, who was the spiritual leader and focus of this
group.

COL. AMEN: Please make it as brief as you can.

LAHOUSEN: Canaris was a pure intellect, an interesting, highly
individual, and complicated personality, who hated violence as such and
therefore hated and abominated war, Hitler, his system, and particularly
his methods. In whatever way one may look on him, Canaris was a human
being.

COL. AMEN: Now, will you refer back to the two groups of which you spoke
and tell me about each of those two groups and their respective
memberships?

LAHOUSEN: One might characterize the first of the groups as Canaris’
circle. It included the heads of the Amt Ausland-Abwehr:

Canaris himself as its spiritual leader; General Oster, Chief of the
Central Division (the head of the Abwehr); my predecessor, Lieutenant
Colonel Grosscurth, who had introduced me into the circle of Canaris in
Vienna in 1938; the Chief of Abwehr Division I, Colonel Pieckenbrock,
who was a close friend of Canaris; Pieckenbrock’s successor, Colonel
Hansen, who was executed after July; my successor, Colonel Von Freytag
Loringhoven, who committed suicide on 26 July 1944, before arrest; also,
in a somewhat different way, what applies to all these persons, the
Chief of Abwehr Division III, Colonel Von Bentivegni, and then various
people in all these divisions, most of whom were executed or imprisoned
in connection with the events of July 20, 1944.

I must also name here a man who did not belong to this group but who
knew of the actions designed to prevent the execution or issuing of
orders for murder and other atrocities, namely, Admiral Bürckner who was
Chief of the Ausland Division at that time. Those, in the main, are the
leaders of the first group called the Canaris circle.

The second and much smaller group was centered around General Oster as
its spiritual leader. This group included members of the Ausland-Abwehr
who, as early as 1938—I recognized this clearly by 1939-40 and later
on—were actively concerned with schemes and plans designed to remove
the originator of this catastrophe, Hitler, by force.

COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of the group to which you belonged; that
is, Canaris’ inner circle?

LAHOUSEN: On its political motives or aims, I was not informed. I can
only reiterate the thoughts and considerations which I, since I was one
of Canaris’ most intimate confidants, knew well. His inner attitude,
which influenced and moulded not only my own actions but also those of
the other men whom I mentioned, can be described as follows:

We did not succeed in preventing this war of aggression. The war implies
the end of Germany and of ourselves, a misfortune and a catastrophe of
very great extent. However, a misfortune even greater than this
catastrophe would be a triumph of this system. To prevent this by all
possible means was the ultimate aim and purpose of our struggle.

The sense of what I have just said was often expressed by Canaris among
the group of which I am speaking.

COL. AMEN: Now, did this group of which you and Canaris were members
meet frequently?

LAHOUSEN: I must explain that his group or circle was not to be regarded
as an organization in the technical sense, or as a sort of conspirators’
club. That would have been quite contradictory to Canaris’ nature. It
was rather, a spiritual organization of men holding the same
convictions, of men who had vision and knowledge—their official
functions provided them with knowledge—of men who understood each other
and acted, but each in his own way and in accordance with his own
individuality.

This is also the reason for the differentiation of which I spoke
earlier. The same demands were not made on each individual, but Canaris
always approached the person whose attitude he knew from personal
knowledge to be the most suitable to carry out a certain task.

COL. AMEN: Did you have conversations at these official meetings, at
which Canaris expressed his views with respect to the use of force in
Poland, for example?

LAHOUSEN: These and similar methods were repeatedly, I may say always,
discussed in our circle and they were naturally repudiated by all of us.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall what Canaris said about the Polish war at the
time of its commencement?

LAHOUSEN: I very clearly recall the hour at which Canaris entered,
completely shattered, to tell us that the situation had after all become
serious, although it had earlier appeared as if the matter might still
be postponed. He told us then: “This is the end.”

COL. AMEN: Did you have conversations with Canaris and the other members
of your group with respect to eliminating Nazis from your staff?

LAHOUSEN: While I was still in Vienna, before I took up my post in the
OKW, I received instructions from Canaris not to bring any National
Socialists with me to his department in Berlin. I was also instructed,
whenever possible not to employ Party members or officers sympathizing
with the Party in my division, especially in high positions. Thus the
actual organization. . . .

COL. AMEN: Did Canaris keep a diary?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, Canaris kept a diary. He did so even before the beginning
of the war—a diary to which I personally had to contribute and did
contribute much.

COL. AMEN: Was it a part of your duties to make entries in that diary?

LAHOUSEN: No, it was not a part of my actual duties, but it naturally
fell to me to write entries on the conferences which I attended with
Canaris or as his representative.

COL. AMEN: And did you keep copies of the entries which you made in
Canaris’ diary?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I kept copies, with Canaris’ knowledge and approval.

COL. AMEN: Do you have the original of some of those copies with you
here today?

LAHOUSEN: I do not have them on me, but they are available here.

COL. AMEN: And you have refreshed your recollection in reference to
those entries?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of Canaris in keeping such a diary?

LAHOUSEN: As a truthful answer to this question I must repeat what
Canaris himself said to me on this subject:

    “The purpose and intention of this diary is to portray to the
    German people and to the world, at some future date, the leaders
    who are now guiding the fate of their nation.”

COL. AMEN: Now, do you recall attending conferences with Canaris at the
Führer’s headquarters, just prior to the fall of Warsaw?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris and I took part in discussions not in the Führer’s
headquarters, but in the Führer’s special train, shortly before the fall
of Warsaw.

COL. AMEN: And having refreshed your recollection from reference to the
entries in Canaris’ diary, can you tell the Tribunal the date of those
conferences?

LAHOUSEN: According to the notes and documents at my disposal it was on
September 12, 1939.

COL. AMEN: Did each of these conferences take place on the same day?

LAHOUSEN: The discussions in the Führer’s train took place on the same
day: September 12, 1939.

COL. AMEN: And was there more than one conference on that day? Were they
split into several conferences?

LAHOUSEN: One cannot really call them conferences; they were
discussions, conversations, of varying duration.

COL. AMEN: And who was present on this occasion?

LAHOUSEN: Present, regardless of location and time, were the following:
Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop; Keitel, the Chief of the OKW; Jodl,
head of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff; Canaris; and myself.

COL. AMEN: Do you see Ribbentrop in this courtroom?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you indicate for the record where he is sitting?

LAHOUSEN: Over there. [_Indicating._] In the first row, third from the
left.

COL. AMEN: Do you also see Keitel in the courtroom?

LAHOUSEN: Yes; he is next to Ribbentrop.

COL. AMEN: Do you also see Jodl in the courtroom?

LAHOUSEN: Yes; he is in the second row, next to Herr Von Papen.

COL. AMEN: Now, to the best of your knowledge and recollection, will you
please explain, in as much detail as possible, to the Tribunal, exactly
what was said and what took place at this conference in the Führer’s
train?

LAHOUSEN: First of all, Canaris had a short talk with Ribbentrop, in
which the latter explained the general political aims with regard to
Poland and in connection with the Ukrainian question. The Chief of the
OKW took up the Ukrainian question in subsequent discussions which took
place in his private carriage. These are recorded in the files which I
immediately prepared on Canaris’ order. While we were still in the
carriage of the Chief of the OKW, Canaris expressed his serious
misgivings regarding the proposed bombardment of Warsaw, of which he
knew. Canaris stressed the devastating repercussions which this
bombardment would have in the foreign political field. The Chief of the
OKW, Keitel, replied that these measures had been agreed upon directly
by the Führer and Göring, and that he, Keitel, had had no influence on
these decisions. I quote Keitel’s own words here—naturally only after
re-reading my notes. Keitel said: “The Führer and Göring are in frequent
telephone communication; sometimes I also hear something of what was
said, but not always.”

Secondly, Canaris very urgently warned against the measures which had
come to his knowledge, namely the proposed shootings and extermination
measures directed particularly against the Polish intelligentsia, the
nobility, the clergy, and in fact all elements which could be regarded
as leaders of a national resistance. Canaris said at that time—I am
quoting his approximate words: “One day the world will also hold the
Wehrmacht, under whose eyes these events occurred, responsible for such
methods.”

The Chief of the OKW replied—and this is also based on my notes, which
I re-read a few days ago—that these things had been decided upon by the
Führer, and that the Führer, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, had let
it be known that, should the Armed Forces be unwilling to carry through
these measures, or should they not agree with them, they would have to
accept the presence at their side of the SS, the SIPO and similar units
who would carry them through. A civilian official would then be
appointed to function with each military commander. This, in outlines,
was our discussion on the proposed shooting and extermination measures
in Poland.

COL. AMEN: Was anything said about a so-called “political
housecleaning”?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, the Chief of the OKW used an expression which was
certainly derived from Hitler and which characterized these measures as
“political housecleaning”. I recall this expression very clearly, even
without the aid of my notes.

COL. AMEN: In order that the record may be perfectly clear, exactly what
measures did Keitel say had already been agreed upon?

LAHOUSEN: According to the Chief of the OKW, the bombardment of Warsaw
and the shooting of the categories of people which I mentioned before
had been agreed upon already.

COL. AMEN: And what were they?

LAHOUSEN: Mainly the Polish intelligentsia, the nobility, the clergy,
and, of course, the Jews.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was said about possible cooperation with a
Ukrainian group?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris was ordered by the Chief of the OKW, who stated that
he was transmitting a directive which he had apparently received from
Ribbentrop since he spoke of it in connection with the political plans
of the Foreign Minister, to instigate in the Galician Ukraine an
uprising aimed at the extermination of Jews and Poles.

COL. AMEN: At what point did Hitler and Jodl enter this meeting?

LAHOUSEN: Hitler and Jodl entered either after the discussions I have
just described or towards the conclusion of the whole discussion of this
subject, when Canaris had already begun his report on the situation in
the West; that is, on the news which had meanwhile come in on the
reaction of the French Army at the West Wall.

COL. AMEN: And what further discussions took place then?

LAHOUSEN: After this discussion in the private carriage of the Chief of
the OKW, Canaris left the coach and had another short talk with
Ribbentrop, who, returning to the subject of the Ukraine, told him once
more that the uprising should be so staged that all farms and dwellings
of the Poles should go up in flames, and all Jews be killed.

COL. AMEN: Who said that?

LAHOUSEN: The Foreign Minister of that time, Ribbentrop, said that to
Canaris. I was standing next to him.

COL. AMEN: Is there any slightest doubt in your mind about that?

LAHOUSEN: No. I have not the slightest doubt about that. I remember with
particular clarity the somewhat new phrasing that “all farms and
dwellings should go up in flames”. Previously there had only been talk
of “liquidation” and “elimination.”

COL. AMEN: Was there any note in Canaris’ diary which helped to refresh
your recollection on that point also?

LAHOUSEN: No.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was said on the subject of France?

LAHOUSEN: On the subject of France a discussion took place in the
carriage of the Chief of the OKW, in which Canaris described the
situation in the West on the basis of Abwehr reports, and said that in
his opinion a great attack was being prepared by the French in the
sector of Saarbrücken. Hitler, who had entered the room in the meantime,
intervened, took charge of the discussion, rejected in a lively manner
the opinion which Canaris had just expressed, and put forward arguments
which, looking back now, I must recognize as factually correct.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall whether, in the course of this conference,
Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews?

LAHOUSEN: During the conversation, which was taking place in the private
coach of the Chief of the OKW, Ribbentrop was not present.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall whether at any time in the course of the
conferences Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews?

LAHOUSEN: I repeat, in this discussion, which took place in the coach,
no.

COL. AMEN: For purposes of keeping the record straight, whenever you
have referred to the Chief of the OKW, you were referring to Keitel?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Was the Wehrmacht ever asked to furnish any assistance for
the Polish campaign?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did that undertaking have any special name?

LAHOUSEN: As is recorded in the diary of my division the name of this
undertaking which took place just before the Polish campaign, was
“Undertaking Himmler”.

COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal the nature of the assistance
required?

LAHOUSEN: The affair on which I am now giving testimony is one of the
most mysterious actions which took place within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr.
A few days, or sometime before—I believe it was the middle of
August—the precise date can be found in the diary of the
division—Abwehr Division I, as well as my division, Abwehr Division II,
were given the task of providing Polish uniforms and equipment, such as
identification cards and so on, for an Undertaking Himmler. This
request, according to an entry in the diary of the division which was
kept not by me, but by my adjutant, was received by Canaris from the
Wehrmacht Operations Staff or from the National Defense Department. I
believe the name of General Warlimont is mentioned.

COL. AMEN: Do you know where this request originated?

LAHOUSEN: Where the request originated I cannot say, I can only say that
it reached us in the form of an order. It was, to be sure, an order on
which we, the divisional chiefs concerned, already had some misgivings
without knowing what, in the last analysis, it meant. The name Himmler,
however, spoke for itself, and that is also evident from entries of the
diary which record my question why Herr Himmler should come to receive
uniforms from us.

COL. AMEN: To whom was the Polish material to be furnished by the
Abwehr?

LAHOUSEN: These articles of equipment had to be kept in readiness, and
one day some man from the SS or the SD—the name is given in the
official war diary of the division—collected them.

COL. AMEN: At what time was the Abwehr informed as to how this Polish
material was to be used?

LAHOUSEN: The real purpose was unknown to us then; we do not know its
details even today. All of us, however, had the reasonable suspicion
that something entirely crooked was being planned; the name of the
undertaking was sufficient guarantee for that.

COL. AMEN: Did you subsequently find out from Canaris what in fact had
happened?

LAHOUSEN: The actual course of events was the following: When the first
Wehrmacht communiqué spoke of the attack of Polish units on German
territory, Pieckenbrock, holding the communiqué in his hand, and reading
it aloud, observed that now we knew why our uniforms had been needed. On
the same day or a few days later, I cannot say exactly, Canaris informed
us that people from concentration camps had been disguised in these
uniforms and had been ordered to make a military attack on the radio
station at Gleiwitz. I cannot recall whether any other locality was
mentioned. Although we were extremely interested, particularly General
Oster, to know details of this action, that is, where it had occurred
and what had happened—actually we could well imagine it, but we did not
know how it was carried out—I cannot even today say exactly what
happened.

COL. AMEN: Did you ever find out what happened to the men from the
concentration camps who wore the Polish uniforms and created the
incident?

LAHOUSEN: It is strange. This matter has always held my interest, and
even after the capitulation I spoke about these matters with an SS
Hauptsturmführer—he was a Viennese—in the hospital in which both of us
were staying, and I asked him for details on what had taken place. The
man—his name was Birckel—told me: “It is odd, that even our circles
heard of this matter only very much later, and then only by intimation.”
He added: “So far as I know, even all members of the SD who took part in
that action were put out of the way, that is, killed.” That was the last
I heard of this matter.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall attending a meeting in 1940 at which the name
of Weygand was under discussion?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Do you happen to recall the particular month in which this
discussion took place?

LAHOUSEN: The discussion took place in the winter of 1940, either in
November or December, as far as I recall. I have recorded the precise
date in my personal notes, with the knowledge and desire of Canaris.

COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, who was
present?

LAHOUSEN: The three divisional chiefs and the Chief of the Ausland
Division, Admiral Bürckner, were present nearly every day during the
daily conference on the situation.

COL. AMEN: What were you told at this meeting by Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: In this discussion Canaris revealed to us that already for
some considerable time Keitel had put pressure on him to arrange for the
elimination of the French Marshal, Weygand; and that naturally I—that
is my division—would be charged with the execution of this task.

COL. AMEN: When you say “elimination”, what do you mean?

LAHOUSEN: Killing.

COL. AMEN: What was Weygand doing at this time?

LAHOUSEN: Weygand was, so far as I recall, in North Africa at that time.

COL. AMEN: What was the reason given for attempting to kill Weygand?

LAHOUSEN: The reason given was the fear that Weygand together with the
unconquered part of the French Army might form a center of resistance in
North Africa. That, in the main, was the reason, as far as I remember
today; it may be that there were other contributing factors.

COL. AMEN: After you were so informed by Canaris, what else was said at
this meeting?

LAHOUSEN: This request which was first put to the military Abwehr so
openly and in such an undisguised form by a representative of the Armed
Forces, was decidedly and indignantly rejected by all those present. I,
myself, as the person most involved, since my division was expected to
carry out this task, indicated flatly before all present that I had not
the slightest intention of executing this order. My division and my
officers are prepared to fight but they are neither a murderers’
organization nor murderers.

COL. AMEN: What then did Canaris say?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris said: “Calm down. We’ll have a word together later,”
or something to that effect.

COL. AMEN: Did you then talk it over later with Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: When the other gentlemen had left the room, I spoke with
Canaris alone and he told me immediately: “It is quite obvious that this
order will not only not be carried out, but it will not even be
communicated to anybody else,” and that, in fact, happened.

COL. AMEN: Were you subsequently questioned as to whether you had
carried out this order?

LAHOUSEN: On one occasion when Canaris was reporting to Keitel, and I
was present, Keitel mentioned the subject to me, and asked me what had
happened or what had been done in this matter up to now. The date of
this incident was recorded in my notes, on Canaris’ suggestion and with
his knowledge.

COL. AMEN: What reply did you make to Keitel?

LAHOUSEN: I cannot, of course, recall my precise words, but one thing is
certain; I did not answer that I had no intention of carrying out this
order. That I could not tell him, and did not tell him; otherwise, I
would not be sitting here today. Probably, as in many similar cases, I
replied that it was very difficult but everything possible would be
done, or something of that sort. Naturally, I cannot recall my precise
words.

COL. AMEN: Incidentally, are you the only one of this intimate Canaris
group who is still alive today?

LAHOUSEN: I believe I am at least one of the very few. Possibly
Pieckenbrock is still alive; perhaps Bentivegni, who, however, did not
belong to the inner circle. Most of the others were liquidated as a
result of the events on July 20.

COL. AMEN: I have another subject to take up now. In 1941 did you attend
a conference at which General Reinecke was present?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Who was General Reinecke?

LAHOUSEN: General Reinecke was at that time Chief of the General
Wehrmacht Department, which was part of the OKW.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall the approximate date of that meeting?

LAHOUSEN: It was roughly in the summer of 1941, shortly after the
beginning of the Russian campaign; approximately in July.

COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, will you
state exactly who was present at that conference?

LAHOUSEN: At this conference, which is also recorded in the notes taken
for Canaris, and in which I participated as his representative, the
following were present:

General Reinecke as the presiding officer, Obergruppenführer Müller of
the RSHA, Colonel Breuer representing the Prisoners of War Department,
and I, as the representative of Canaris, of Ausland-Abwehr.

COL. AMEN: Will you explain who Müller was and why he was at this
meeting?

LAHOUSEN: Müller was a division chief in the Reich Central Office of
Security (RSHA), and took part in the session because he was responsible
for putting into practice the measures for the treatment of Russian
prisoners of war, that is, responsible for carrying out the executions.

COL. AMEN: Will you explain who Colonel Breuer was and why he was there?

LAHOUSEN: Colonel Breuer was the representative of the Prisoners of War
Department. I do not know of which organization this department was a
part at that time. At any rate, he was responsible in the OKW for
questions relating to prisoners of war.

COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of this conference?

LAHOUSEN: The purpose of this conference was to examine the orders
issued for the treatment of Russian prisoners of war, to comment on
them, to explain and account for them on reasonable grounds.

COL. AMEN: Did you learn from the conversation at this conference what
the substance of these orders under discussion was?

LAHOUSEN: These orders dealt with two groups of measures which were to
be taken. Firstly, the killing of Russian commissars, and secondly, the
killing of all those elements among the Russian prisoners of war who,
under a special selection program of the SD, could be identified as
thoroughly bolshevized or as active representatives of the Bolshevist
ideology.

COL. AMEN: Did you also learn from the conversation what the basis for
these orders was?

LAHOUSEN: The basis for these orders was explained by General Reinecke
in its outlines as follows:

The war between Germany and Russia is not a war between two states or
two armies, but between two ideologies—namely, the National Socialist
and the Bolshevist ideology. The Red Army soldier must not be looked
upon as a soldier in the sense of the word applying to our western
opponents, but as an ideological enemy. He must be regarded as the
archenemy of National Socialism, and must be treated accordingly.

COL. AMEN: Did Canaris tell you why he was selecting you to go to this
conference?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris gave me two or perhaps three reasons and motives for
ordering me to this conference although he himself was in Berlin.
Firstly, he wanted to avoid a meeting with Reinecke, for whom, as the
prototype of the ever-compliant National Socialist general, he possessed
strong personal dislike. Secondly, he told and directed me to attempt
through factual argument—that is, through appeals to reason—to have
this brutal and completely senseless order rescinded or at least
mitigated in its effects as far as possible. He also selected me for
tactical reasons since he, as department chief, could by no means be as
outspoken as I, who, thanks to my subordinate position, could use much
stronger language. Thirdly, he was well acquainted with my personal
attitude, especially in this question, an attitude which I manifested
wherever possible during my many journeys and trips to the front where I
witnessed ill-treatment of prisoners of war. This is also clearly
recorded in my notes.

COL. AMEN: Did Canaris and the other members of your group have a
particular name for Reinecke?

LAHOUSEN: Not only among our group but also in other circles, he was
known as the “little Keitel” or the “other Keitel”.

COL. AMEN: Prior to your going to this conference, did Canaris make any
other comment on these orders?

LAHOUSEN: Even at the time when these orders were issued, Canaris
expressed strong opposition to them in our circles—when I say our
circles, I mean mainly the divisional chiefs—and had a protest made
through the Ausland Division, that is, through Bürckner. I no longer
remember whether it was made in writing or whether Bürckner made it
orally to Keitel directly; I think it was done in both ways. Bürckner
should be well informed about this.

COL. AMEN: When you say “protested through Bürckner,” what do you mean?

LAHOUSEN: When I say Bürckner, I mean his division, or a group, or
perhaps even a representative in his office, where questions of
international law were dealt with by Count Moltke who, incidentally,
also among the circle. . . .

COL. AMEN: Will you repeat that?

LAHOUSEN: This protest or this counter-argument on the question of the
treatment of Russian prisoners of war was forwarded by Canaris through
the Ausland Division, that is, through Bürckner. The Ausland Division
included a section which dealt with questions of international law, and
the competent authority in that section was Count Moltke who was a
member of Oster’s inner circle, and who was executed after the 20th of
July.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?

COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Until 2 o’clock.

                [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Amen.

[_Witness Lahousen resumed the stand._]

COL. AMEN: Prior to the luncheon recess you were testifying about a
conference in 1941 with Reinecke and others. Prior to that conference
did Canaris tell you what kind of appeal to make to those present at the
meeting?

LAHOUSEN: Before the discussion Canaris said, as I have already pointed
out, that I should use factual arguments in order to have this order
withdrawn or at least to weaken its effects, but that otherwise I should
not take it into my head to use arguments of a humanitarian nature lest
I make a fool of myself.

COL. AMEN: And now will you explain to the Tribunal, to the best of your
recollection, exactly what happened and what was said in the course of
that conference?

LAHOUSEN: The discussion was opened by General Reinecke, and he
explained these orders in the manner in which I described them before
the recess. He said that these measures were necessary and that it was
essential that this idea should also be made clear to the Wehrmacht, and
particularly to the officers’ corps, since they apparently were still
entertaining ideas which belonged to the Ice Age and not to the present
age of National Socialism.

COL. AMEN: What views did you present at this conference?

LAHOUSEN: According to instructions I held the view of the Amt Ausland
Abwehr—that is of Canaris—and in the main I pointed out, first of all,
the most unfavorable effect of such measures on the troops, namely on
the front troops, that they would never understand such orders,
particularly not the simple soldier. Besides, we had reports that the
executions were sometimes carried out before their eyes.

Secondly, I brought forward the objections of my office in regard to
activities of the office itself, the unfavorable effect of these
measures on the enemy, that is, the virtual hindering of Russians, who
were surrendering to the last man without resistance, from deserting;
and furthermore, the great difficulties which beset the Abwehr Division
in acquiring agents, that is, people who, for various reasons, had
voluntarily declared themselves ready to help the Germans.

COL. AMEN: In order that this may be clear on the record, because I
think there was quite a bit of confusion in the translation, I want to
point out one or two of those arguments again. What did you say at this
conference about the effect of the execution of these orders on Russian
soldiers?

LAHOUSEN: I pointed out, first of all, that through these orders some
elements among the Russian soldiers who were inclined to surrender were
prevented from doing so. Secondly, that people who for any reason would
have offered their services to the Abwehr would also be hindered by
these measures. And that, _in summa_, an effect opposite to that which
they had desired would result and the resistance of the Red Army
soldiers would be increased to the utmost.

COL. AMEN: And in order that we may be perfectly clear, what did you say
about the effect of the execution of these orders on the German troops?

LAHOUSEN: I said, that from several reports we had from the front, the
effect on the morale and on the discipline of the troops was
devastating.

COL. AMEN: Was there any discussion about international law at this
conference?

LAHOUSEN: No. In this connection there was no discussion of
international law. The manner of selection of the prisoners of war was
particularly stressed. It was completely arbitrary apart from the
general order in itself.

COL. AMEN: We will get to that in a moment. Were your views accepted at
this conference?

LAHOUSEN: My views which were the views of the Amt Abwehr, which I was
representing, were opposed in the sharpest possible manner by Müller,
who with the usual cliches rejected the arguments that I had produced,
and who made the sole concession that the executions, out of
consideration for the feelings of the troops, should not take place
before them but at a place some distance apart. He also made a few
concessions in the question of the selection, which was completely
arbitrary, and was just left to the Kommando leaders or to the prejudice
of the Kommando leaders.

COL. AMEN: And subsequent to this conference did you learn whether an
order was issued with respect to having these killings take place
outside the sight of the German troops?

LAHOUSEN: Except for Müller’s promise, which I have just mentioned, I
heard no more about it at the time. I found a confirmation of the
results of this conference and the promises then made to me in an order
which was submitted to me only now.

COL. AMEN: Was there a conversation at this conference about the manner
in which these orders for the killings were being executed?

LAHOUSEN: Yes. In the course of discussions the entire problem was under
discussion including the manner in which these orders were carried
out—according to my recollection—by the Einsatzkommandos of the SD.
These SD squads were in charge both of singling out of persons in camps
and in assembly centers for prisoners of war, and of carrying out the
executions.

Reinecke also discussed measures regarding the treatment of Russian
prisoners of war in the camps. Reinecke emphatically accepted the
arguments put forth, not by me but by Müller, and voiced his conviction
in very decisive and excessively sharp manner.

COL. AMEN: Now, will you explain to the Tribunal from what you learned
at this conference the exact manner in which the sorting of these
prisoners was made and in what way it was determined which of the
prisoners should be killed?

LAHOUSEN: The prisoners were sorted out by Kommandos of the SD and
according to peculiar and utterly arbitrary ways of procedure. Some of
the leaders of these Einsatzkommandos were guided by racial
considerations; particularly, of course, if someone were a Jew or of
Jewish type or could otherwise be classified as racially inferior, he
was picked for execution. Other leaders of the Einsatzkommando selected
people according to their intelligence. Some had views all of their own
and usually most peculiar, so that I felt compelled to ask Müller, “Tell
me, according to what principles does this selection take place? Do you
determine it by the height of a person or the size of his shoes?”

Müller was very emphatic in rejecting these and any other objections,
and Reinecke adopted rigidly the same point of view as Müller, instead
of accepting my opinions, that is, those of the Amt Ausland Abwehr,
which were offered him as a “golden bridge” for his acceptance. That was
essentially the contents of the discussion in which I participated.

COL. AMEN: And had you received knowledge about the manner in which
these orders were executed through official reports which you received?

LAHOUSEN: We were currently informed of all happenings by our officials
at the front or in the camps. Officers of the Abwehr Division III were
active in these camps, and in this way, that is, through the normal
service channels, we were informed by reports and oral presentation of
all these measures and of their effects.

COL. AMEN: Was the information which you received secret and
confidential information not open to others?

LAHOUSEN: The information was confidential in accordance with the manner
in which our offices were run. _De facto_, however, the happenings in
the camps and the occurrences taking place at the selections were known
to large groups of the Wehrmacht.

COL. AMEN: Now, at this conference did you learn anything from Reinecke
with respect to the treatment of Russian prisoners in prison camps?

LAHOUSEN: In this discussion the treatment of Russian prisoners in the
camps was discussed by Reinecke, and Reinecke was of the opinion that in
the camps their treatment must not be the same as the treatment of other
allied prisoners of war, but that here, too, appropriate and
discriminating measures must be applied. The camp guards, at all events,
had to be furnished with whips, and at the slightest sign of an
attempted escape or other undesirable act, the guards should have the
right to resort to arms.

COL. AMEN: Besides the whips, what other equipment were the Stalag
guards given?

LAHOUSEN: Those are details which I do not remember for the moment. I
can only say what was mentioned in this discussion.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, did Reinecke say about the whips?

LAHOUSEN: Reinecke said that the guards, that is, the guard details,
should make use of their whips or sticks or whatever instruments they
had.

COL. AMEN: Now, through official channels did you learn of an order for
the branding of Russian prisoners of war?

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I think you should refer to them as
“Soviet”, not “Russian” prisoners.

COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Honor.

[_Continuing the interrogation._] Did you learn of such an order?

LAHOUSEN: I have heard about it in one of the discussions at which most
of the previously mentioned divisional chiefs were usually present. At
least a majority of them must have been present.

COL. AMEN: Do you know whether any protests were made with respect to
that order?

LAHOUSEN: When the intention of branding these Soviet prisoners was made
known, a very sharp protest was voiced at once by Canaris through the
Amt Ausland, that is, by Bürckner himself.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, did Canaris tell you with regard to this
order?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris told us that the question had already been expounded
in a medical opinion by some physicians; and that there were actually
people to lend themselves to treating such a mad subject in a written
medical opinion. That was the main topic of this discussion.

COL. Amen: What information, if any, did you receive through official
channels regarding plans to bring Soviet prisoners back to German
territory?

LAHOUSEN: In the same context and in the same circle—I must always
repeat it—that is, in discussions between Canaris and the chiefs of his
divisions I learned that the General Staff had prepared to bring Soviet
prisoners into Germany, but that their transportation was suddenly
abandoned. I remember that this was by direct order of Hitler—which
resulted in the conditions developing in camps in the theater of
operations where prisoners were crowded together, could not be fed, and
could not be adequately clothed or housed, so that epidemics and
cannibalism resulted in these camps.

COL. AMEN: I am not sure but what we missed some of your previous
answer. Will you start again to tell us about the change which was made
in these orders?

LAHOUSEN: Will you please repeat the question?

COL. AMEN: You referred to a change in the plans to take the Soviet
prisoners back to German territory. Is that correct?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, they were not brought back into Germany.

COL. AMEN: And what was the result of this action, namely of their not
being brought back at the direct order of Hitler?

LAHOUSEN: The result was as described just now.

COL. AMEN: But I want you to repeat it because we lost some of the
answer in the interpreting process. Please just repeat it again.

LAHOUSEN: The enormous crowds of prisoners of war remained in the
theater of operation, without proper care—care in the sense of prisoner
of war conventions—with regard to housing, food, medical care; and many
of them died on the bare floor. Epidemics broke out, and
cannibalism—human beings driven by hunger devouring one
another—manifested itself.

COL. AMEN: Were you personally at the front to observe these conditions?

LAHOUSEN: I made several trips with Canaris and I saw some of these
things which I have just described, with my own eyes. At the time I made
notes of my impressions which were found amongst my papers.

COL. AMEN: Did you also obtain information as to these matters through
official channels of the Abwehr?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I received this information through the office
subordinate to me and through the Amt Ausland.

COL. AMEN: From your official information, to what extent was the
Wehrmacht involved in the mistreatment of these prisoners?

LAHOUSEN: According to my information, the Wehrmacht was involved in all
matters which referred to prisoners of war, except the executions, which
were the concern of the Kommandos of the SD and the
Reichssicherheitshauptamt.

COL. AMEN: But is it not a fact that the prisoner-of-war camps were
entirely under the jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, prisoners of war were under the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.

COL. AMEN: But before they were placed in these camps, the Special
Purpose Kommandos of the SS were responsible primarily for the
executions and the selection of the people to be executed, is that
correct?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you receive through official channels information
regarding the existence of an order for the killing of British
Commandos?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: What action, if any, did Canaris or yourself take with
respect to this order?

LAHOUSEN: The order, and as far as I remember, even the mere intention
that such an order was to be issued, was discussed in our circle, that
is between Canaris and his section chiefs. We all, of course,
unanimously agreed on its rejection. The reasons, apart from the aspects
of international law, were that the Amt Ausland had under its command a
formation, which was attached to our section named “Regiment
Brandenburg” which had a task similar to the Commandos. As the head of
the section to which this regiment was attached and for which I
considered myself responsible, I immediately and most emphatically
protested against it in view of the retaliation measures which were to
be expected as a result of this order.

COL. AMEN: Did you personally assist in the drafting of these protests?

LAHOUSEN: I know that twice a protest was lodged against this order by
Canaris, and by Amt Ausland, through Bürckner. The first time orally, or
in writing as soon as the order was issued, and the second time after
the first executions had been carried out in pursuance of this order. I
myself helped to draft one of these written protests—I do not know
whether the first or the second—making a contribution in the interest
of my section, and the Regiment Brandenburg, whose functions were
similar, very similar, to those of the Commandos.

COL. AMEN: To whom in the ordinary course did these protests go?

LAHOUSEN: The protests were addressed to Canaris’ superior officer, that
is to say, to the Chief of the OKW.

COL. AMEN: Who was that?

LAHOUSEN: It was Keitel, at that time.

COL. AMEN: Did these protests in the ordinary course go also to Jodl?

LAHOUSEN: That I cannot say, but it is possible.

COL. AMEN: Now, will you tell the Tribunal what were the grounds of the
protests which you made?

LAHOUSEN: The grounds were above all, that it was contrary to the
interpretation of international law that soldiers, that is to say, not
agents or spies, but soldiers clearly recognizable as such, should be
killed after they had been taken prisoner. That was the main point which
was also of concern to my section since it also comprised soldiers who
had to carry out such or similar tasks in their capacity as soldiers.

COL. AMEN: Were there any other grounds urged in protest against these
orders?

LAHOUSEN: Certainly. Other reasons were also mentioned in accordance
with the interests of the different sections affected by these orders.
For the Amt Ausland, it was the point of view of international law. The
Abwehr Division III was particularly interested in the interrogation of
soldiers captured in commando raids, but never in seeing them killed.

COL. AMEN: Were there any other chiefs of the Abwehr Department who
assisted in the preparation of these protests?

LAHOUSEN: As far as I remember today, no.

COL. AMEN: You mentioned Admiral Bürckner, did you not?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, Bürckner was not the chief of the Amt Ausland Abwehr, but
only of the Amt Ausland.

COL. AMEN: Now, have you ever heard of an operation known as “Gustav”?

LAHOUSEN: The name “Gustav” was applied not to an operation but to an
undertaking similar to the one which was demanded for the elimination of
Marshal Weygand.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what was the meaning of “Gustav”?

LAHOUSEN: “Gustav” was the expression used by the Chief of the OKW as a
cover name to be used in conversations on the question of General
Giraud.

COL. AMEN: When you say the Chief of the OKW, are you referring to
Keitel?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And are you referring to General Giraud of the French Army?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, General Giraud of the French Army, who, according to my
recollection, fled from Königstein in 1942.

COL. AMEN: Do you know of any order issued with respect to General
Giraud?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Who issued such an order?

LAHOUSEN: The Chief of the OKW, Keitel, gave an order of this kind to
Canaris, not in writing but an oral order.

COL. AMEN: How did you come to know about this order?

LAHOUSEN: I knew of this order in the same way as certain other chiefs
of the sections, that is Bentivegni, Chief of Abwehr Section I,
Pieckenbrock and a few other officers. We all heard it at a discussion
with Canaris.

COL. AMEN: What was the substance of the order?

LAHOUSEN: The essential part of this order was to eliminate Giraud, in a
fashion similar to Weygand.

COL. AMEN: When you say “eliminate” what do you mean?

LAHOUSEN: I mean the same as in the case of Marshal Weygand, that is, it
was intended and ordered that he was to be killed.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall the approximate date when this order was given
by Keitel to Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: This order was given to Canaris several times. I cannot say
for certain when it was given for the first time as I was not present in
person. It was probably after the flight of Giraud from Königstein and
prior to the attempt on the life of Heydrich, in Prague. According to my
notes, this subject was discussed with me by Keitel in July of the same
year, in the presence of Canaris.

COL. AMEN: Well now, what did Keitel first say to you personally about
this affair?

LAHOUSEN: I cannot repeat his exact words, but the meaning was that he
proclaimed the intention of having Giraud killed, and asked me, as in
the case of Weygand, how the matter was progressing or had progressed so
far.

COL. AMEN: And what did you say to him on that occasion?

LAHOUSEN: I cannot remember the exact words. I probably gave some
evasive answer, or one that would permit gaining time.

COL. AMEN: Now, was this question later discussed by you at any time?

LAHOUSEN: According to my recollection, this question was once more
discussed in August. The exact date can be found in my notes. Canaris
telephoned me in my private apartment one evening and said impatiently
that Keitel was urging him again about Giraud, and the section chiefs
were to meet the next day on this question.

The next day the conference was held and Canaris repeated in this larger
circle what he had said to me over the phone the night before. That is,
he was being continually pressed by Keitel that something must at last
be done in this matter. Our attitude was the same as in the matter of
Weygand. All those present rejected flatly this new demand to initiate
and to carry out a murder. We mentioned our decision to Canaris, who
also was of the same opinion and Canaris thereupon went down to Keitel
in order to induce him to leave the Military Abwehr out of all such
matters and requested that, as agreed prior to this, such matters should
be left entirely to the SD.

In the meantime, while we were all there, I remember Pieckenbrock spoke,
and I remember every word he said. He said it was about time that Keitel
was told clearly that he should tell his Herr Hitler that we, the
Military Abwehr, were no murder organization like the SD or the SS.
After a short time, Canaris came back and said it was now quite clear
that he had convinced Keitel that we, the Military Abwehr, were to be
left out of such matters and further measures were to be left to the SD.

I must observe here and recall that Canaris had said to me, once this
order had been given, that the execution must be prevented at any cost.
He would take care of that and I was to support him.

COL. AMEN: I don’t think you have yet told us just who was present at
this conference.

LAHOUSEN: The three Abwehr chiefs were present, Colonel Pieckenbrock,
whom I have already mentioned, Colonel General Bentivegni, and I.
Probably, also General Oster, and possibly Bürckner, but I cannot
remember clearly. In my notes only those three chiefs are mentioned who
all strictly rejected the proposal.

COL. AMEN: What was the next occasion when this matter was again brought
to your attention?

LAHOUSEN: A little later, it must have been September, the exact date
has been recorded, Keitel, then chief of the OKW, rang me up in my
private apartment. He asked me, “What about ‘Gustav’? You know what I
mean by ‘Gustav’?” I said, “Yes, I know.” “How is the matter
progressing? I must know, it is very urgent.” I answered, “I have no
information on the subject. Canaris has reserved this matter for
himself, and Canaris is not here, he is in Paris.” Then came the order
from Keitel, or rather, before he gave the order, he put one more
question: “You know that the others are to carry out the order?” By “the
others,” he meant the SS and SD. I answered, “Yes, I know.” Then came an
order from Keitel to immediately inquire of Müller how the whole matter
was progressing. “I must know it immediately,” he said. I said, “Yes,”
but went at once to the office of the Ausland Abwehr, General Oster, and
informed him what had happened, and asked for his advice as to what was
to be done in this matter which was so extremely critical and difficult
for Canaris and me. I told him—Oster already knew as it was—that
Canaris so far had not breathed a word to the SD concerning what it was
to do, that is, murder Giraud. General Oster advised me to fly to Paris
immediately and to inform Canaris and to warn him. I flew the next day
to Paris and met Canaris at a hotel at dinner in a small circle, which
included Admiral Bürckner, and I told Canaris what had happened. Canaris
was horrified and amazed, and for a moment he saw no way out.

During the dinner Canaris asked me in the presence of Bürckner and two
other officers, that is, Colonel Rudolph, and another officer whose name
I have forgotten, as to the date when Giraud had fled from Königstein
and when the Abwehr III conference had been held in Prague and at what
time the assassination of Heydrich had taken place. I gave these dates,
which I did not know by memory, to Canaris. When he had the three dates,
he was visibly relieved, and his saddened countenance took on new life.
He was certainly relieved in every way. I must add that—at this
important conference of the Abwehr III Heydrich was present. It was a
meeting between Abwehr III and SD officials who were collaborating with
it—officials who were also in the counter-intelligence.

Canaris then based his whole plan on these three dates. His plan was to
attempt to show that at this conference he had passed on the order to
Heydrich, to carry out the action. That is to say, his plan was to
exploit Heydrich’s death to wreck the whole affair. The next day we flew
to Berlin, and Canaris reported to Keitel that the matter was taking its
course, and that Canaris had given Heydrich the necessary instructions
at the Abwehr III conference in Prague, and that Heydrich had prepared
everything, that is, a special purpose action had been started in order
to have Giraud murdered, and with that the matter was settled and
brought to ruin.

COL. AMEN: There was a mistake I think in the translation back a little
way. So if you don’t mind, will you please go back to where you first
referred to Heydrich in the conversation with Canaris, and repeat the
story, because I think that the translation was incorrect. In other
words, go back to the point where Canaris suddenly seemed relieved, and
started to tell you what the apparent solution might be.

LAHOUSEN: All those present saw that Canaris was much relieved, as he
heard the three dates from me. His whole plan or his maneuvering—and
that was typical of his personality—was a purely intellectual or
spiritual combination, built up on these three dates, essential being
the date of the escape of Giraud, and the Abwehr III conference, for if
the Abwehr III conference had taken place prior to Giraud’s escape, then
this combination would probably not have stood the test.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, what is the reason for the repetition?

COL. AMEN: There was a mistake in the record. If it is the wish of the
Tribunal, I shall not have him repeat it any further.

THE PRESIDENT: It seems clear to the Tribunal what was said.

COL. AMEN: Very well.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, happened next insofar as the affair Giraud
was concerned?

LAHOUSEN: Nothing more happened. Giraud fled to North Africa, and much
later only I heard that Hitler was very indignant about this escape, and
said that the SD had failed miserably—so it is said to be written in
shorthand notes in the records of the Hauptquartier of the Führer. The
man who told me this is in the American zone.

COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Colonel Rowehl?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Who was he?

LAHOUSEN: He was an officer. He was a colonel of the Luftwaffe.

COL. AMEN: What was the work of the special squadron to which he was
attached?

LAHOUSEN: Rowehl had a special squadron for altitude flying which
operated together with the Ausland Abwehr for the reconnaissance of
certain territories or states.

COL. AMEN: Were you ever present when he reported to Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: I was present occasionally.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall what Rowehl told Canaris on those occasions?

LAHOUSEN: He reported on the results of the reconnaissance flights and
submitted his photographs, I believe, to Abwehr I, Section Luft which,
competent for this work, made some evaluation of them.

COL. AMEN: Did you know over what territories these reconnaissance
flights had been made?

LAHOUSEN: They were taken over Poland, England and in southeastern
Europe; I cannot be more explicit as I do not know the specific
territories or countries of southeastern Europe. All I know is that this
squadron was stationed in Budapest for the purpose of making such
reconnoitering flights.

COL. AMEN: Did you personally see some of these photographs?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Now will you tell the Tribunal the dates when you know that
these reconnaissance flights over London and Leningrad were being made?

LAHOUSEN: I cannot give the exact dates. I only remember, being present
at discussions between Rowehl and Canaris—sometimes Pieckenbrock was
there too—that these reconnaissance flights did take place in the
aforementioned areas, that photographic material was furnished and that
the squadron operated from Hungarian air fields in the vicinity of
Budapest. I know this because once I myself flew back from Budapest to
Berlin in such a plane, and also from knowing some of the pilots and
their activities.

COL. AMEN: What I am going to ask you about now is the year, or years we
will say, when these reconnaissance flights were being made.

LAHOUSEN: They were undertaken in 1939 before the beginning of the
Polish campaign.

COL. AMEN: Were these flights kept secret?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course they were secret.

COL. AMEN: And why were these flights being made from Hungary, if you
know?

LAHOUSEN: A Luftwaffe expert would have to give this information.

COL. AMEN: Do you have in your possession a report of the treatment of
the Jews in certain territories?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have a report which probably came to us through Abwehr
Department III, and I made several copies for Canaris and one for
myself. This report deals with the shooting of Jews in Borrisov.

COL. AMEN: Is that an official report?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, it is. The report came by way of the Abwehr. The files
would show from what office it came to us. In connection with these
shootings of Jews in Borrisov the name of a counter-intelligence
officer, whom I knew quite well and who was an Austrian like me, was
mentioned.

COL. AMEN: Now, may it please the Tribunal, I should like to offer in
evidence a photostatic copy, or copies, of the entries made by the
witness in every detail, together with a photostatic copy of the report.
The originals are here in court, but cannot be lifted out of the box in
which they are contained. They are so much damaged by a bomb explosion
that if they were to be lifted out of the box, they would be destroyed
beyond use, but we have had them photostated, and the photostatic copies
are now available. That letter would be Exhibit USA-80, 3047-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand, Colonel Amen, that only such portions of
these documents as are read in Court will be in evidence?

COL. AMEN: Well, these have been used by the witness to refresh his
recollection.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know they have.

COL. AMEN: And none of them have been read in full in court, but they
may be so read at any time, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: If you want them to go into evidence as documents, you
must read them, of course. Colonel Amen, do you want to use the
documents any more than you already used them for the purpose of
refreshing the witness’ memory?

COL. AMEN: I do not, Sir, except having used them in this fashion, I now
think it is only fair to offer them in evidence for the information and
scrutiny of the Tribunal; as far as I’m concerned they have served their
purpose.

THE PRESIDENT: If the Defense wants to see them for the purpose of
cross-examination, of course, they may do so.

COL. AMEN: Oh, yes, Sir. I have offered them already Sir, to be Exhibit
USA-80, 3047-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: But otherwise they may not be put in evidence.

COL. AMEN: Correct.

THE PRESIDENT: From this damaged paper, it seems to contain a report on
the execution of Jews in Borrisov.

COL. AMEN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: That again will not be in evidence unless you read it.

COL. AMEN: Correct, Sir. We will include that in the offer which I just
made to you, that unless what we are offering is desired by the Court I
will not offer it in evidence or read it.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Court does not desire it.

COL. AMEN: Very well. [_Turning to witness._] As a member of the Abwehr,
were you generally well informed on the plans of the German Reich for
the waging of war?

LAHOUSEN: Insofar as the effects of the plans concerned the preparatory
activities or co-operation of the Amt Ausland Abwehr.

COL. AMEN: Did any intelligence information ever come to your attention
which was not available to an ordinary person, or to an ordinary officer
in the Army?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, certainly. That was in the nature of my office.

COL. AMEN: And, on the basis of the knowledge which you so obtained, did
you in your group come to any decisions as to whether or not the attack
on Poland, for example, was an unprovoked act of aggression?

THE PRESIDENT: Well. . . .

LAHOUSEN: Would you be kind enough to repeat the question?

THE PRESIDENT: That is one principal question which this Court has to
decide. You cannot produce evidence upon a question which is within the
province of the Court to decide.

COL. AMEN: Very well, Sir. The witness is now available for
cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it the Soviet Prosecutor’s wish to ask any questions
of this witness? General Rudenko?

GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Witness
Lahousen, you have made definite replies to questions by Colonel Amen
and I should like to have certain details. Am I to understand you
rightly that the insurgent units of the Ukrainian nationalists were
organized under the direction of the German High Command?

LAHOUSEN: They were Ukrainian immigrants from Galicia.

GEN. RUDENKO: And from these immigrants were formed Commandos?

LAHOUSEN: Yes. “Commando” perhaps is not quite the right expression.
They were people who were brought together in camps and were given a
military or a semi-military training.

GEN. RUDENKO: What was the function of these Commandos?

LAHOUSEN: They were organizations of immigrants from the Galicia
Ukraine, as I already previously stated, who worked together with the
Amt Ausland Abwehr.

GEN. RUDENKO: What were these troops supposed actually to accomplish?

LAHOUSEN: Tasks were assigned to them before each combat by the office
in charge of the command, that is, in the case of orders originating
from the office to which I belonged, they were determined by the OKW.

GEN. RUDENKO: What functions did these groups have?

LAHOUSEN: These Commandos were to carry out sabotage of all kinds behind
the enemy’s front line.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is to say in what territory?

LAHOUSEN: In those territories with which Germany had entered into war,
or speaking of the concrete case here in question, with Poland, or to be
more correct in Poland.

GEN. RUDENKO: Of course in Poland. Well, sabotage and what else?

LAHOUSEN: Sabotage, such as wrecking of bridges and other objectives of
military importance. The Wehrmacht operational staff determined what was
of military importance; details of that activity I have just described,
namely, destruction of militarily important objectives or objectives
important for a particular operation.

GEN. RUDENKO: But what about terroristic activities? I am asking you
about the terroristic activities of these units.

LAHOUSEN: Political tasks were not assigned to them by us, that is, by
the Amt Ausland Abwehr. Political assignments were made by the
respective Reich offices responsible, where it should be said, often as
a result of erroneous. . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: You have misunderstood me. You are speaking about sabotage
and I was asking you concerning terroristic acts of these organizations.
Do you understand me? Was terror one of their tasks? Let me repeat
again, as well as the sabotage acts, were there any terror acts assigned
to them?

LAHOUSEN: On our part never.

GEN. RUDENKO: You have told me that from your side there was no question
of terrorism; from whose side was the question put, who worked on this
aspect?

LAHOUSEN: Well, that was the whole point all the time. Each one of these
military Abwehr units was asked again and again to combine our purely
military tasks which were determined by the needs of the Wehrmacht
leadership with political or terroristic measures, as is clearly shown
by the memorandum on our files concerning preparation of the campaign
against Poland.

GEN. RUDENKO: Answering the question of Colonel Amen as to whether the
Red Army man was looked upon as an ideological enemy and was subjected
to corresponding measures, what do you mean by corresponding measures? I
repeat the question. You have said that the Red Army man was looked upon
by you, I mean by the German High Command as an ideological enemy and
was to be subjected to corresponding measures. What does it mean? What
do you mean by saying corresponding measures?

LAHOUSEN: By special measures I mean quite clearly all those brutal
methods which were actually used and which I have already mentioned and
of which I am convinced there were many more, more than I could possibly
have seen in my restricted field and more than was known to me.

GEN. RUDENKO: You already told the Tribunal that there were special
Commandos for the screening of prisoners of war. I understand that they
were screened in the following way: Into those who were to be killed and
the others who were to be interned in camps, is that right?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, these special Commandos of the SD were concerned,
however, solely with the execution of those selected amongst the
prisoners of war.

GEN. RUDENKO: That of course makes the chief of the Commandos
responsible and decisive for the question as to who was to die and who
was not to die.

LAHOUSEN: Yes, in the course of a discussion with Reinecke, the question
was raised whether to give to the head of one such Commando unit the
right to decide who, in view of the order, was to be looked upon as
Bolshevistically tainted or not.

GEN. RUDENKO: And the chief of the Commando unit decided upon his own
authority, what to do with them.

LAHOUSEN: Yes, at least up to the date of the discussion in which I
participated, upon an order from Canaris. This point was one of the most
important ones of this discussion.

GEN. RUDENKO: You have told us about your protest and the protest of
Canaris against these atrocities, killings, and so forth. What were the
results of these protests?

LAHOUSEN: As I have already stated, there were some very modest results,
so modest that, you can hardly call them results at all. For the fact
that executions were not to take place in sight of the troops but only
at a distance of 500 meters can in no way be called a good result.

GEN. RUDENKO: What conversation did you have with Müller on this
subject, concerning concessions he had made? You told us when you were
asked by General Alexandrov. . . .

LAHOUSEN: Who was Alexandrov?

GEN. RUDENKO: You were questioned by Colonel Rosenblith, a
representative of the Soviet Delegation. I am sorry I made a mistake.
Perhaps you will remember your communication to Colonel Rosenblith
regarding the conversation and the concessions that Müller made. I shall
ask you to tell us that part again.

LAHOUSEN: The name of Alexandrov does not mean anything to me. What has
the name Alexandrov to do in this connection?

GEN. RUDENKO: Alexandrov was a mistake on my part. Forget it. I am
interested in the question of Müller, concerning the shootings,
torturings, and so forth.

LAHOUSEN: I had a long conversation with Müller, especially with regard
to making the selections. I cited, to be concrete, as an example of the
methods used, the case of the Crimean Tartars, Soviet Russian soldiers
who, according to their nationality, originated from the Crimea; and
cases where, for certain reasons, Mohammedan people were declared Jews,
and were then executed. Thus, aside from the brutality of these and all
other similar measures, this proved the entirely irrational point of
view, incomprehensible to any normal person, which characterized the
handling of the entire matter. To that, among other things, I made
reference.

GEN. RUDENKO: You told us how these measures were carried out.

THE PRESIDENT: He doesn’t hear you, carry on but go a little bit more
slowly.

GEN. RUDENKO: Have you finished your report concerning the conversation
with Müller?

LAHOUSEN: No, I didn’t quite finish, I had many discussions with Müller
on the subject—it was the central point of all these conversations. All
the subjects about which I have given evidence were discussed first with
Müller, who was the competent man, at least in his sector. As for
Reinecke, he then merely decided according to his ideas, which were
contrary to those held by me and my office. I would be grateful if you
would tell me what particular points you would like to have me explain
and I would gladly repeat anything.

GEN. RUDENKO: Your usual topic of discussion was murders, shootings, and
so forth, especially shootings. I am interested in all that. What did
Müller say about it? How were shootings to take place, especially in
relation to your protests?

LAHOUSEN: He told me in a rather cynical way, that if the troops were so
terribly disturbed by these shootings, as you claim, and their morale is
suffering therefrom the shootings would simply take place at some
distance, et cetera. That was the main meaning of what he said.

GEN. RUDENKO: That was the result of your protests?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, that was the very poor result of the protest, and then
still a certain concession. . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: And one last question. The conditions of the concentration
camps where Soviet prisoners were taken and where mass destruction of
prisoners was committed was all this dependent on directives of the
German High Command?

LAHOUSEN: In some sort of cooperation with the competent authorities,
the Reich Main Security Office. In addition to all I have stated, I must
point out that at the time, I myself did not read the orders and that I
learned of the collaboration, or the coordination in this question
mainly from the conversation with Reinecke, who came to me as a
representative of the OKW and with the aforementioned Müller.

GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me, did you get that information in private or
official sessions or conversations?

LAHOUSEN: It was a strictly official meeting called by General Reinecke
as chairman. I was not there as “Lahousen,” but as a representative of
the Amt Ausland Abwehr.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did the orders which were passed on in these sessions come
to you directly from the German High Command?

LAHOUSEN: They came from the German High Command and from one of the
highest offices of the RSHA according to what Reinecke said. I have
never seen or read them with my own eyes, therefore this is all I can
state.

GEN. RUDENKO: But you have heard during these meetings where they were
discussed and when they were discussed.

LAHOUSEN: Yes, during the discussion, the course of which I have already
described, or at least its essential aspects, of course.

GEN. RUDENKO: And during these sessions which you mentioned were the
questions raised about murders and burning of cities?

LAHOUSEN: There was no talk at these discussions about setting on fire,
but mention was made of the orders which had been issued with respect to
the prisoners.

GEN. RUDENKO: About the murders only.

LAHOUSEN: About the executions.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is all.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Prosecutor wish to ask any questions?

MR. DUBOST: One single question. Who gave the orders for the liquidation
of the Commandos?

LAHOUSEN: What was it exactly that you meant? Presumably the killing of
members of the Commando troops?

MR. DUBOST: Who gave the orders for the execution?

LAHOUSEN: I did not read the order myself, but according to what was
said in our circles about this subject, the idea came from Hitler
himself; but who was responsible for transforming this idea into an
order, I do not know.

MR. DUBOST: The Defendants Keitel, Jodl—what orders did they handle;
what orders did they give?

LAHOUSEN: I cannot say that because I do not know it.

MR. DUBOST: What were the reasons for these orders, as far as you know?

LAHOUSEN: Not merely was it my opinion, but it was common knowledge,
that the reasons for these orders were to cause an intimidating effect
and thus to prevent and paralyze the activity of the Commandos.

MR. DUBOST: Who gave the order to have General Giraud executed or
murdered?

LAHOUSEN: I did not hear the first part of the question.

MR. DUBOST: Who gave the order to kill Weygand and Giraud?

LAHOUSEN: The order to liquidate, that is, to be explicit, to murder
Weygand and Giraud, was given to me by Canaris, who received it from
Keitel. This order and this intention regarding the matter Weygand, were
furthermore transmitted to me through direct speech with Keitel. Keitel
asked me after Canaris had read to him a report in my presence, on
December 23, 1940, according to my notes, about the progress in the case
Weygand.

As regards the second case, that is the case Giraud, I had it from
Canaris himself that the order was sent to him by Keitel—as did also
the other chiefs who were present. I further heard of it a second time
during a report from Canaris to Keitel, in my presence, in July 1942,
when this order was communicated to me in a manner similar to that of
the case Weygand, and, finally, I received it in a direct manner from
Keitel through telephone conversation which I described here, and
transmitted as urgent intelligence.

     [_The British Prosecutor indicated that he had no questions._]

THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to ask any questions, Dr. Nelte?

DR. NELTE: The witness, Lahousen, has given very important evidence,
particularly charging in a grave manner the Defendant Keitel,
represented by me. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to make a speech now?

DR. NELTE: My client, the Defendant Keitel, would like to put numerous
questions to the witness after he has had a discussion with me. I
therefore ask the Tribunal to allow either that there may be a
considerable adjournment now or that at the next session these questions
may be discussed in cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. You shall have an opportunity to cross-examine
at 10 o’clock tomorrow. Does any member of the Tribunal wish to ask any
questions of the witness now?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I should like to ask the witness whether the
orders to kill the Russians and in connection therewith the treatment of
the prisoners were in writing.

LAHOUSEN: As far as I know, yes, but I did not see or read these orders
myself.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they official orders?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, they were official orders, of course, though the facts
were brought out in a roundabout way. It was these orders which Reinecke
and the others discussed and this is how I learned about the essential
points of these orders. I did not read them myself at that time. But I
knew that they were not oral agreements because they were commented
upon; consequently I knew that something existed in writing. Only I
could not and cannot say whether there were one or more orders, and who
signed them. This I did not claim to know. I submitted my knowledge
which is based solely on discussions and reports from which I quite
clearly could deduct the existence of orders.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know to whom or to what organizations
such orders were usually addressed?

LAHOUSEN: Orders of this kind, involving the question of principle, went
to the OKW, because things relating to prisoners of war were and had to
be the concern of the OKW, and in particular of Reinecke, which also
explains the discussions with Reinecke.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So usually the members or some of the members
of the General Staff would have known of such orders, would they not?

LAHOUSEN: Certainly, many members of the Wehrmacht knew of the essential
contents of this order, for the reaction of the Wehrmacht against this
order was tremendous. Apart from official discussions which I have
reported here, these orders were discussed a great deal in casino clubs
and elsewhere, because all these matters became manifest in the most
undesirable form and had a most undesirable effect on the troops. As a
matter of fact, officers, and high-ranking officers at the front, either
did not transmit these orders or sought to evade them in some way and
this was discussed a great deal. I have named some of these officers;
some are listed in the notes, diary, _et cetera_. It was not an everyday
occurrence, and it was then the topic of the day.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And were the orders known to the leaders of
the SA and SD?

LAHOUSEN: They must have been known to them, for the ordinary soldiers
who watched all these proceedings knew and spoke about them. To a
certain extent they were even known to the civilian populace; civilians
learned far more details about these matters from wounded soldiers
returning from the front than I could tell here.

THE PRESIDENT: General Nikitchenko wants to ask a question.

THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I. T. Nikitchenko): You have told us that
you received instructions about the murder of prisoners of war and
brutal treatment. You received these orders from Reinecke?

LAHOUSEN: Well, I must correct something that I said. It is not I and
not the Amt Ausland Abwehr who got the order, because we had nothing to
do with it, but I knew about it, as I was present at this conference as
a representative of the Amt Ausland Abwehr. But we ourselves had nothing
to do with the treatment of prisoners of war, and certainly not in this
negative sense.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Apart from these meetings, the meetings
of the High Command, were such instructions ever given? Were there any
meetings of the High Command headquarters about killings and
ill-treatment of prisoners of war?

LAHOUSEN: There certainly must have been a number of discussions on this
subject, but I was present at only one of them, which I have already
described, so I cannot say anything more about it.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At headquarters?

LAHOUSEN: In the OKW—at headquarters.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At the headquarters of the German Army?

LAHOUSEN: Certainly in the OKW where Amt Ausland Abwehr had sent a
delegate in my person, if for no other reason than to enter protest. As
a matter of fact our Amt had nothing to do with prisoners of war in this
sense. But contrarywise we were, because of technical and easily
understandable reasons, interested in proper treatment of the prisoners.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): The meetings were not about good
treatment of prisoners, but rather about ill-treatment and killing them?
Was Ribbentrop also present at these meetings?

LAHOUSEN: No! On no account. This discussion—I mean the one conference
about which I have given testimony—took place after the accomplished
fact. Everything had already happened; executions had taken place, and
now effects began to make themselves felt. Protests of all kinds, from
the front and from other places, such as, for example, our own office,
Amt Ausland Abwehr, followed. This conference was intended to show the
necessity for the orders which had already been given, and to justify
measures already taken. These discussions took place after the beginning
of the operations, after the orders which had been given had already
been carried out, and all that I have touched upon or stated had already
happened and produced its evil effects. The accomplished fact had been
thoroughly discussed with the idea of making one more attempt, a last
attempt on our part, to put to an end, and break off, the matter.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did all these conversations bring about
results?

LAHOUSEN: That is what I talked about, and that was the subject of the
discussions with Reinecke in which I took part. I did not take part in
the other discussions and therefore can say nothing about them.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At which other meetings had orders been
given about killings of Ukrainians and burning of towns and villages in
Galicia?

LAHOUSEN: I would like to achieve clarity relative to what the General
has in mind. Am I being asked about the conference in the Führer’s train
in 1939 prior to the fall of Warsaw? According to the entries in
Canaris’ diary, it took place on 12 September 1939. This order or
directive which Ribbentrop issued and which Keitel transmitted to
Canaris, Ribbentrop also giving it to Canaris during a brief discussion,
was in reference to the organizations of National Ukrainians with which
Amt Abwehr cooperated along military lines, and which were to bring
about an uprising in Poland, an uprising which aimed to exterminate the
Poles and the Jews; that is to say, above all, such elements as were
always being discussed in these conferences. When Poles are mentioned,
the intelligentsia especially are meant, and all those persons who
embodied the national will of resistance. This was the order given to
Canaris in the connection I have already described and as it has already
been noted in the memorandum. The idea was not to kill Ukrainians but,
on the contrary, to carry out this task of a purely political and
terroristic nature together with the Ukrainians. The cooperation between
Amt Ausland Abwehr and these people who numbered only about 500 or 1000,
and what actually occurred can be clearly seen from the diary. This was
simply a preparation for military sabotage.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): These instructions were received from
Ribbentrop and Keitel?

LAHOUSEN: They came from Ribbentrop. Such orders which concerned
political aims couldn’t possibly come from Amt Ausland Abwehr because
any. . . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not asking you whether they could
or could not. I am asking you where they came from.

LAHOUSEN: They came from Ribbentrop, as is seen from the memorandum.
This is the memorandum that I made for Canaris.

DR. DIX: I have three short questions. May I put them?

THE PRESIDENT: It is now past 4, and we have to hear the requests of the
Defendant Hess, and the Court has to be cleared for them. So I think you
had better postpone them until tomorrow.

[_A recess was taken and all defendants except Hess were removed from the
                              courtroom._]

THE PRESIDENT: I call upon counsel for the Defendant Hess.

DR. GÜNTHER VON ROHRSCHEIDT (Counsel for Defendant Hess): May it please
the Tribunal, I am speaking as counsel for the Defendant Rudolf Hess.

In the proceedings which have already been opened against Hess, the
Court is to decide solely the question whether the defendant is fit or
unfit to be heard, and further, whether he might even be considered
entirely irresponsible.

The Court itself has posed this question affecting the proceedings
against Hess by asking the experts to state their opinion, firstly, on
whether the defendant is in a position to plead on the charge; secondly,
on his state of mind, whether he is mentally sound or not.

With regard to question 1 (Is the defendant in a position to plead?) the
Tribunal asked the experts specifically whether the defendant is
sufficiently in possession of his mental faculties to understand the
proceedings and to conduct his defense adequately—that is, to repudiate
a witness to whom he has objections and to understand details of the
evidence.

The experts to whom this task was entrusted have, in separate groups,
examined Hess for a few days and have stated their expert opinion on
these questions in writing. As the defendant’s counsel I consider it my
duty, after studying the reports of these experts, which unfortunately,
I could not do as carefully as I desired since time was short, and in
view of my knowledge of the defendant and my experience in almost daily
contact with him, to state my opinion that the defendant Hess is not in
a position to plead in the case against him.

I am therefore obliged to file the following applications on behalf of
the Defendant Hess:

Firstly, I request a ruling to suspend the proceedings against Hess
temporarily. Secondly, if his inability to plead is recognized by the
Tribunal, I request that the proceedings against the defendant be not
conducted in his absence. Thirdly, if the Tribunal rules that Hess is
fit to plead, I request that in addition other competent psychiatrists
be consulted for an authoritative opinion.

Before I come to the reasons for my applications, I should like to say,
at the request of the defendant, that he himself considers he is fit to
plead and would himself like to inform the Court to that effect.

May I now state the reasons for my application:

In regard to my first application: If the defendant is not fit to plead,
I request that the proceedings against Hess be temporarily suspended.

In this connection may I refer to the opinions already submitted to the
Tribunal.

After examining the questions placed before them by the Tribunal, the
experts have come to the conclusion which is embodied in what I may call
the main report signed by a mixed delegation consisting as far as I
could determine of English, Soviet, and American experts, and dated 14
November 1945.

This report states, I quote: “The ability of the Defendant Hess is
impaired”—that is—“the ability to defend himself, to face a witness,
and to understand details of the evidence.” I have cited this part of
the report because it is closest to the questions put to the experts by
the Tribunal.

Another opinion says that “. . . even if Hess’ amnesia does not prevent
the defendant from understanding what happens around him and to follow
the proceedings in Court. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT [_Interposing_]: Would you speak a little more slowly? The
interpreters are not able to interpret so fast.

Would you also refer us expressly to those parts of the medical reports
to which you wish to draw our attention?

Do you understand what I said?

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes. I am sorry I cannot refer to the pages of the
original or English text, as I only have the German translation; so I
can only say that the first quotation. . . .

THE PRESIDENT [_Interposing_]: You can read the words in German, and
they will be translated into English.

Which report are you referring to?

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: I was referring to the report of 14 November as far
as I can see from my German translation. This report seems to have been
drawn up by a delegation of English, Soviet, and American experts, and
accompanied the report of 17 November 1945. What I quoted was the
following—may I repeat:

    “The ability of the Defendant Hess to defend himself, to face a
    witness, and to understand details of the evidence is impaired.”

I ask the Tribunal to tell me. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Can you say which of the doctors you are quoting?

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: It is the report which, in my copy, is dated 14
November 1945, and, as I said, was presumably signed by Soviet,
American, and English doctors.

Unfortunately, when returning the material yesterday evening after
translation into German I could not get the original text, and my
attempt to obtain it now failed through lack of time.

THE PRESIDENT: Have the English prosecutors got a copy, and can you tell
us which it is?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m sorry, My Lord, I think I am in the same
difficulties as your Lordship. On the order that I have, I have copies
of four medical reports. Your Lordship will see at the end of the
document headed “Order,” it says, “Copies of four medical reports are
attached.”

The first one of these is signed by three English doctors on the 19th of
November. The second is signed by three American doctors and a French
doctor, dated the 20th of November 1945. And then there is a report
signed by three Soviet doctors, dated the 17th of November. And one is
signed by three Soviet doctors and the French doctor dated the 16th of
November. These are the only ones which I have with the Court’s order.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

I don’t know what this report is that you are referring to.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dr. Von Rohrscheidt seems to have an unsigned
report of the 14th.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Rohrscheidt, have you got the four reports which
are really before us? I will read them out to you.

The first one I have got in my hand is the 19th of November 1945, by
Lord Moran, Dr. Rees, and Dr. Riddoch. Have you got that? That is the
English report.

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: I only have this report in the German translation
and not in the original.

THE PRESIDENT: But if you have got it in the German translation, that is
quite good enough.

Then the next one is dated the 20th of November 1945, by Dr. Jean Delay,
Dr. Nolan Lewis, Dr. Cameron, and Colonel Paul Schroeder. Have you got
that?

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes, I have that.

THE PRESIDENT: That is two.

Then, the next one is dated the 16th of November, and is signed by three
Soviet doctors and one French doctor, Dr. Jean Delay, dated the 16th of
November. Have you got that?

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Then there is another report of the 17th, signed by the
three Soviet doctors alone, without the French doctor.

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes, I have that one.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, will you refer us to the passages in those reports
upon which you rely?

There is another report by two English doctors which is practically the
same. That is the one I have already referred to, that does not contain
the name of Lord Moran on it, dated the 19th of November.

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes, I think I can shorten the proceedings by
saying that in my opinion all the reports surely agree—even if not in
the same words—that the ability of the accused Hess to defend himself,
to face a witness, and to understand details of the evidence is
impaired. And under this assumption that all the medical opinions agree
on this point I, as the defendant’s counsel, must come to the conclusion
that the defendant is unable to plead. The reduced capacity of the
defendant to defend himself, which is caused by his mental defect,
recognized by all experts as amnesia and described as a mental condition
of a mixed character, but more than mere mental abnormality, must be
accepted as meaning that he is unfit to plead.

I am of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the medical experts
implies that, in the way the question was formulated, the Defendant Hess
cannot adequately defend himself on account of this mental defect,
namely, amnesia. The medical reports also state that the defendant is
not insane. That is not the important point at the moment because in my
view it can already be convincingly stated, on the basis of the reports
as such that on account of his reduced mental ability the defendant is
not in a condition to understand the entire proceedings.

I myself believe—and I think that my opinion on this agrees with the
medical opinion—that the defendant is completely incapable of making
himself understood in a manner expected from a mentally normal
defendant.

In view of my own experience with him I consider that the defendant is
incapable of grasping the charges which the Prosecution will bring
against him to the extent required for his defense, since his memory is
completely impaired. On account of his loss of memory he neither
remembers events of the past nor the persons with whom he associated in
the past. I am, therefore, of the opinion that defendant’s own claim
that he is fit to plead is irrelevant. And since, as the medical report
says, his condition cannot be rectified within appreciable time, I think
that the proceedings against him should be suspended.

Whether the narco-synthesis treatment suggested by the medical experts
will bring about the desired effect is uncertain. It is also uncertain
within what period of time this treatment would result in the complete
recovery of the defendant’s health. The medical reports accuse the
defendant of deliberately refusing to undergo such medical treatment.
The defendant himself, however, tells me that, on the contrary, he would
readily undergo treatment but that he refuses the suggested cure because
firstly, he believes that he is completely sound and fit to plead, that
therefore this cure is unnecessary; secondly, because he disapproves on
principle of such violent intervention, and finally because he thinks
that such an intervention at this time might render him unfit to plead
and to take part in the proceedings—and that is the very thing he
wishes to avoid.

If, however, the defendant is incapable of pleading, or of defending
himself, as is stated in the medical report, and if this condition is
likely to last for a long time, then in my opinion, a basis exists for
the temporary suspension of the proceedings against him.

Coming now to my second application:

If the Tribunal accepts my arguments and declares the Defendant Hess
unfit to plead, then, according to Article 12 of the Charter, it would
be possible to proceed against the defendant _in absentia_. Article 12
provides that the Tribunal has the right to proceed against a defendant
in his absence if he cannot be found, or if for other reasons the
Tribunal deems it necessary in the interests of justice. The question
then is whether it is in the interest of justice to proceed against the
defendant _in absentia_. In my opinion it is incompatible with real
justice to proceed against the defendant if he is prevented by his
impaired condition—namely, amnesia which is recognized by all the
medical experts—from personally safeguarding his rights by attending
the proceedings.

In a trial in which charges being brought against the defendant are so
grave that they might entail the death penalty, it seems to me
incompatible with real justice that the defendant should on account of
his impaired condition, be deprived of the rights granted him under
Article 16 of the Charter. This Article of the Charter makes provisions
for the defendant’s own defense, for the opportunity of giving evidence
personally, and for the possibility of cross-examining every witness
called by the Prosecution. All this is of such great importance for the
Defense, that exclusion from any of these rights would, in my opinion,
constitute a grave injustice to the defendant. A trial _in absentia_
could therefore not be regarded as a fair trial.

If as I have stated the defendant’s capacity to defend himself is
reduced for the reasons agreed on and to the extent established in the
reports of the experts, then he is also not in a position to give his
counsel the information necessary for a defense conducted in the
defendant’s absence.

Since the Charter has clearly laid down these rights of the defendant’s,
it seems unjust to me as defense counsel, that the defendant should be
deprived of them because his illness prevents him from personally
safeguarding them by attending the proceedings.

The provisions in Article 12 of the Charter for trying a defendant in
his absence must surely be looked upon as applying in an exceptional
case of a defendant who endeavors to evade the proceedings although able
to plead. But the Defendant Hess has told me, and he will probably
emphasize it to the Tribunal, that he wishes to attend the proceedings;
that he will therefore consider it particularly unjust if the
proceedings are conducted in his absence, despite his good will, despite
the fact that he wishes to attend them.

I therefore request the Tribunal, if it declares the defendant unfit to
plead, that it will not proceed against him in his absence.

And now my third application:

If the Tribunal considers the Defendant Hess fit to plead, thereby
overruling my opinion and what I think is also the conclusion of the
medical reports, I request that additional medical experts be consulted
to re-examine this question since as far as I saw from the reports, each
of the doctors examined and talked to the defendant for only a few hours
on one day, one of them on two days. In a case of such outstanding
importance as this one I think it would be necessary to place the
defendant into a suitable hospital to obtain a reliable picture based on
several weeks of examination and observation. The experts themselves
are, obviously, not quite sure whether Defendant Hess beyond his
inability to plead, is insane or at least not of sound mind. That is
clear from the fact that all the medical statements end by emphasizing
that if the Tribunal does not consider the defendant unfit to plead, he
should again be subjected to a psychiatric examination.

I think therefore that this suggestion of the psychiatrists who have
already examined him should be followed, and I request, that if the
Tribunal considers the defendant fit to plead another exhaustive medical
examination be authorized.

THE PRESIDENT: I want to ask you one question: Is it not consistent with
all the medical opinions that the defendant is capable of understanding
the course of the proceedings, and that the only defect from which he is
suffering is forgetfulness about what happened before he flew to
England?

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Mr. President, it is true that the experts consider
the Defendant Hess capable of following the proceedings. But, on the
other hand, in answer to the questions put to them, they emphasize that
the defendant is not capable of defending himself. The Tribunal asked
the experts to give their opinion on the question—may I read it again,
under the second point: “Is the defendant sane or not?” The question was
answered in the affirmative by all experts, but that does not exclude
the fact that the defendant might, at this moment, be incapable of
pleading. The Tribunal’s question was this: “. . . the Tribunal wishes
to be advised whether the defendant is of sufficient intellect to
comprehend the course of the proceedings of the Trial so as to make a
proper defense, to challenge a witness, to whom he might wish to object,
and to understand the details of the evidence.” This is the wording of
the translation in my possession. In my view this question is answered
by the experts to the effect that the defendant is incapable of
adequately defending himself, of rejecting the testimony of a witness
and of comprehending evidence submitted. That, as I see it, is the
conclusion of all the experts’ reports with the exception of the one
signed by the Russians.

May I refer to the report signed by the American Delegation, dated 20
November 1945, it is stated there under Number 1:

    “We find as a result of our examinations and investigations,
    that Rudolf Hess is suffering from hysteria characterized in
    part by loss of memory.”

Now comes the passage to which I should like to draw the Tribunal’s
attention:

    “The loss of memory is such that it will not interfere with his
    comprehension of the proceedings, but it will interfere with his
    response to questions relating to his past and will interfere
    with his undertaking his defense.”

This report thus establishes that Hess’ defense will be impaired. And I
believe that if the experts go so far as to admit that his memory is
affected, then one may assume that to a great degree he is not fit to
plead. The report of the Soviet-French representatives, signed by the
Russian professors and by Professor Jean Delay goes even further in
stating that, although the defendant is able to comprehend all that
happens around him, the amnesia affects his capacity to defend himself
and to understand details of the past and that it must be considered an
impediment. As I see it, the report clearly means that, although the
defendant is not insane, and although he can follow the proceedings as
such, he cannot defend himself as he is suffering from a form of amnesia
which is based on hysteria and which can be believed.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you accept the opinion of the experts?

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I should like to draw the attention of
Defense Counsel to the fact that he has referred inaccurately to the
decision reached by the Soviet and French experts. He has rendered this
decision in a free translation which does not correspond to the original
contents.

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: May I ask whether the report of November 16 is
meant? May I once more read what my translation says? I can only refer
to the translation of the English text that was given to me; this
translation was made in the Translation Division of the Secretariat and
handed to me.

May I repeat that the translation in my possession refers to the report
of November 16, 1945 signed by members of the Soviet Delegation and by
Professor Delay of Paris.

Under point 3 of this report the following is stated:

    “At present he is not insane in the strict sense of the word.
    His amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding
    what is going on around him but it will interfere with his
    ability to conduct his defense and to understand details of the
    past which would appear as factual data.”

That is the text which I have here before me in the authentic German
version.

THE PRESIDENT: That is all we wish to ask you. Does the Chief Prosecutor
for the United States wish to address the Tribunal?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think General Rudenko would like to open
discussion, if that is agreeable.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Are you going on?

GEN. RUDENKO: In connection with the statement made by counsel for the
defendant, on the results of the evidence of Hess’ certified
psychological condition, I consider it essential to make the following
declaration:

The defendant’s psychological condition was confirmed by experts
appointed by the Tribunal. These experts came to the unanimous
conclusion that he is sane and responsible for his actions. The Chief
Prosecutors, after discussing the results of the decision and acting in
accordance with the order of the Tribunal, make the following reply to
the inquiry of the Tribunal:

First of all, we do not question or doubt the findings of the
commission. We consider that the Defendant, Rudolf Hess, is perfectly
able to stand his trial. This is the unanimous opinion of the Chief
Prosecutors. I consider that the findings of the examinations by the
experts are quite sufficient to declare Hess sane and able to stand his
trial. We therefore request the Tribunal to make the requisite decision
this very day.

In stating his reasons for the postponement of the proceedings or for
the settlement of the defendant’s case, defense counsel referred to the
decision of the experts. I must state, however, that this decision—and
I do not know on what principle it was reached—was quoted quite
inaccurately. In the summary submitted by defense counsel, it is pointed
out that the mental condition of the Defendant Hess does not permit him
to defend himself, to reply to the witnesses or to understand all the
details of the evidence. This is contrary to the decision submitted by
the experts in their statement. The final conclusion of the experts
definitely states that his loss of memory would not entirely prevent him
from understanding the trial; it would, however, make it impossible for
him to defend himself and to remember particulars of the past. I
consider that these particulars, which Hess is unable to remember, would
not unduly interest the Tribunal. The most important point is that
emphasized by the experts in their decision, a point which they
themselves never doubted and which, incidentally, was never doubted by
Hess’ defense counsel, namely—that Hess is sane; and in that case Hess
comes under the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal. On the basis
of these facts I consider that the application of the Defense should be
denied as being unsubstantiated.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, it has been
suggested that I might say just a word, and as shortly as the Tribunal
desires, as to the legal conceptions which govern the position with
which the Tribunal and this defendant are placed at the present time.

The question before the Tribunal is whether this defendant is able to
plead to the Indictment and should be tried at the present time.

If I might very briefly refer the Tribunal to the short passages in the
report, which I submit are relevant, it might be useful at the present
time. According to the attachments to the order, which I have, the first
report is that signed by the British doctors on the 19th November 1945.
And in that report I beg the Tribunal to refer to Paragraph 3, in which
the signatories say that at the moment he is not insane in the strict
sense. His loss of memory will not entirely interfere with his
comprehension of the proceedings, but it will interfere with his ability
to make his defense and to understand details of the past, which arise
in evidence.

The next report is that signed by the American and French doctors, and
in Paragraph 1, the Tribunal will see:

    “We find, as a result of our examinations and investigations,
    that Rudolf Hess is suffering from hysteria characterized in
    part by loss of memory. The nature of this loss of memory is
    such that it will not interfere with his comprehension of the
    proceedings, but it will interfere with his response to
    questions relating to his past and will interfere with his
    undertaking his defense.”

If the Tribunal will proceed to the third report, signed by the Soviet
doctors, at the foot of Page 1 of the copy that I have there is a
paragraph beginning “Psychologically . . .” which I submit is of
importance:

    “Psychologically, Hess is in a state of clear consciousness;
    knows that he is in prison at Nuremberg, under indictment as a
    war criminal; has read, and, according to his own words, is
    acquainted with the charges against him. He answers questions
    rapidly and to the point. His speech is coherent, his thoughts
    formed with precision and correctness and they are accompanied
    by sufficient emotionally expressive movements. Also, there is
    no kind of evidence of paralogism.

    “It should also be noted here, that the present psychological
    examination, which was conducted by Lieutenant Gilbert, Ph. D.,
    bears out the testimony, that the intelligence of Hess is normal
    and in some instances, above the average. His movements are
    natural and not forced.”

Now, if I may come to the next report, I am sorry—the report which is
signed by the three Soviet doctors and Professor Delay of Paris, dated
the 16th, which is the last in my bundle, that says in Paragraph 3:

    “At present, he is not insane in the strict sense of the word.
    His amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding
    what is going on around him, but it will interfere with his
    ability to conduct his defense and to understand details of the
    past, which would appear as factual data.”

I refer, without quoting, because I do not consider that they are of
such importance on this point, to the explanation of the kind and reason
of the amnesia which appeared in the Soviet report, dated 17 November,
under the numbers 1, 2, and 3 at the end of the report. But I remind the
Tribunal that all these reports unite in saying that there is no form of
insanity.

In these circumstances, the question in English law—and I respectfully
submit that to the consideration of the Tribunal as being representative
of natural justice in this regard—is, in deciding whether the defendant
is fit to plead, whether the defendant be insane or not, and the time
which is relevant for the deciding of that issue is at the date of the
arraignment and not at any prior time.

Different views have been expressed as to the party on whom the onus of
proof lies in that issue, but the later, and logically the better view,
is that the onus is on the Defense, because it is always presumed that a
person is sane until the contrary is proved.

Now, if I might refer the Court to one case which I suspect, if I may so
use my mind, has not been absent from the Court’s mind, because of the
wording of the notice which we are discussing today, it is the case of
Pritchard in 7 Carrington and Pike, which is referred to in Archibolds’
_Criminal Pleading_ in the 1943 edition, at Page 147.

In Pritchard’s case, where a prisoner arraigned on an indictment for
felony appeared to be deaf, dumb, and also of non-sane mind, Baron
Alderson put three distinct issues to the jury, directing the jury to be
sworn separately on each: Whether the prisoner was mute of malice, or by
the visitation of God; (2) whether he was able to plead; (3) whether he
was sane or not. And on the last issue they were directed to inquire
whether the prisoner was of sufficient intellect to comprehend the
course of the proceedings of the trial so as to make a proper defense,
to challenge a juror, that is, a member of the jury, to whom he might
wish to object and to understand the details of the evidence; and he
directed the jury that if there was no certain mode of communicating to
the prisoner the details of the evidence so that he could clearly
understand them, and be able properly to make his defense to the charge
against him, the jury ought to find that he was not of sane mind.

I submit to the Tribunal that the words there quoted, “to comprehend the
course of the proceedings of the trial so as to make a proper defense,”
emphasize that the material time, the only time which should be
considered, is whether at the moment of plea and of trial the defendant
understands what is charged against him and the evidence by which it is
supported.

THE PRESIDENT: And does not relate to his memory at that time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is, I respectfully agree with Your
Lordship, it does not relate to his memory. It has never, in English
jurisprudence, to my knowledge, been held to be a bar either to trial or
punishment, that a person who comprehends the charge and the evidence
has not got a memory as to what happened at the time. That, of course,
is entirely a different question which does not arise either on these
reports or on this application as to what was the defendant’s state of
mind when the acts were committed. No one here suggests that the
defendant’s state of mind when the action charged was committed was
abnormal, and it does not come into this case.

THE PRESIDENT: He will, it seems to me, be able to put forward his
amnesia as part of his defense.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: And to say, “I should have been able to make a better
defense if I had been able to remember what took place at the time.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. If I might compare a very simple
case within my experience, and I am sure within the experience of
members of the Court where this has arisen scores of times in English
courts, after a motor accident when a man is charged with manslaughter
or doing grievous bodily harm, he is often in the position of saying,
“Because of the accident my memory is not good or fails as to the acts
charged.” That should not, and no one has ever suggested that it could,
be a matter of relief from criminal responsibility. I hope that the
Tribunal will not think that I have occupied too much of their time, but
I thought it was useful just to present the matter on the basis of the
English law as I understand it.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Sir David, so I can understand you, one of
the tests under the Pritchard case is whether or not the defendant can
make a proper defense, is it not?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With the greatest respect, you have got to read
that with the preceding words, which limit it. They say, “Whether a
prisoner was of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the
proceedings of the trial so as to make a proper defense.”

THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): And would you interpret that to mean that
this defendant could make a proper defense under the procedure of the
trial if you also find as a fact, which you, I think, do not dispute,
and which you quoted in fact, that although not insane—now I quote that
he did not understand, or rather:

    “His amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding
    what is going on around him, but it will interfere with his
    ability to conduct his defense, and understand details of the
    past. . . .”

You don’t think that is inconsistent with that finding?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I am submitting it is not. It is part of his
defense, and it may well be, “I don’t remember anything about that at
all.” And he could actually add to that, “From my general behavior or
from other acts which I undoubtedly have done, it is extremely unlikely
that I should do it.” That is the defense which is left to him. And he
must take that defense. That is my submission.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So even if we assume, for the purpose of
argument, that his amnesia is complete, and that he remembers nothing
that occurred before the indictment though now understanding the
proceedings, you think he should be tried?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I submit he should be tried. That is my
submission as to the legal position. I especially didn’t discuss, of
course, as the Tribunal will appreciate—I didn’t discuss the quantum of
amnesia here because I am putting that to the Tribunal. I wanted to put
before the Tribunal the legal basis on which this application is
opposed. Therefore I accept readily the extreme case which the learned
American judge has put to me.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Donnedieu de Vabres would like to ask a question.

THE TRIBUNAL (M. De Vabres): I would like to know in what period the
real amnesia of Hess applies. He pretends to have forgotten facts which
occurred more than 15 days ago. It may be simulation or, as they say in
the report, it may be real simulation. I would like to know if according
to the reports Hess has really lost his memory of facts which are
referred to in the Indictment, facts which pertain to the past covered
by the Indictment.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The facts which are included in the Indictment,
the explanation that the doctors give as to his amnesia, is most clearly
set out in these paragraphs of the Soviet report. That is the third
report dated the 17th of November 1945, Page 2, and the numbered
paragraphs 1 to 3. They say first:

    “In the psychological personality of Hess there are no changes
    typical of the progressive schizophrenic disease”—that is,
    there are no changes typical of a progressive double personality
    developing.—“and therefore, the delusions, from which he
    suffered periodically while in England, cannot be considered as
    manifestations of a schizophrenic paranoia, and must be
    recognized as the expression of a psychogenic paranoic reaction,
    that is, the psychologically comprehensible reaction”—now I ask
    the learned French judge to note the next sentence—“of an
    unstable personality to the situation (the failure of his
    mission, arrest, and incarceration). Such is the interpretation
    of the delirious statements of Hess in England as is bespoken by
    their disappearance, appearance, and repeated disappearance
    depending on external circumstances which affected the mental
    state of Hess.”

Paragraph 2:

    “The loss of memory by Hess is not the result of some kind of
    mental disease but represents hysterical amnesia, the basis of
    which is a subconscious inclination towards self-defense”—now I
    ask the learned French judge to note again the next words—“as
    well as a deliberate and conscious tendency towards it. Such
    behavior often terminates when the hysterical person is faced
    with an unavoidable necessity of conducting himself correctly.
    Therefore the amnesia of Hess may end upon his being brought to
    trial.”

Paragraph 3:

    “Rudolf Hess, prior to his flight to England, did not suffer
    from any kind of insanity, nor is he now suffering from it. At
    the present time he exhibits hysterical behavior with signs
    of”—and again I ask the learned French judge to note this
    point—“with signs of a conscious-intentional (simulated)
    character, which does not exonerate him from his responsibility
    under the Indictment.”

The last sentence is a matter for the Tribunal. But in these
circumstances it would be impossible to say that the amnesia may
continue to be complete or is entirely unconscious. That is deliberately
avoided by the learned doctors. Therefore the Prosecution do not say
that that is the case, but they do say that even if it were complete,
the legal basis which I have suggested to the Court is a correct one for
action in this matter.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir David. Would Dr. Rohrscheidt like to add
anything by way of reply? One moment. Mr. Justice Jackson, I gathered
from what Sir David said that he was speaking on behalf of you and of
the French Prosecution, is that correct?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I intend to adopt all that he said. I would only
add a few more words, if I may.

THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Rohrscheidt, Mr. Justice Jackson has something to
say first of all.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I adopt all that has been said, and will not
repeat. We have three applications before the Tribunal. One is for
another examination. I will spend very little time on that. I think that
we have made, up to this point with this examination, medical history in
having seven psychiatrists from five nations who are completely in
agreement. An achievement of that kind is not likely to be risked.

The only reason suggested here is that a relatively short time has been
devoted to the examination, but I suggest to Your Honors that that is
not the situation, because there have been available the examinations
and observations and medical history during the incarceration of Hess in
England, extending from 1941, and the reports of the psychiatrists of
the American forces since he was brought to Nuremberg, and they all
agree. So that there is a more complete medical history in this case
than in most cases.

The next application was as to trial in absentia. I shall spend no time
on that, for there seems to be no occasion for trying Hess _in absentia_
if he shouldn’t be tried in his presence. If he is unable to be tried,
why, he simply shouldn’t be tried at all. That is all I can see to it.

I would like to call your attention to the one thing in all this, the
one statement on which any case can be made here for postponement. That
is the statement with which we all agree: That Hess’ condition will
interfere with his response to questions relating to his past and will
interfere with his undertaking his defense. Now, I think it will
interfere with his defense if he persists in it, and I am sure that
counsel has a very difficult task. But Hess has refused the treatment,
and I have filed with the court the report of Major Kelly, the American
psychiatrist, in whose care he was placed immediately after he was
brought here.

He has refused every simple treatment that has been suggested. He has
refused to submit to the ordinary things that we submit to every
day—blood tests, examinations—and says he will submit to nothing until
after the trial. The medication which was suggested to bring him out of
this hysterical situation—every psychiatrist agrees that this is simply
an hysterical situation if it is genuine at all—was the use of
intravenous drugs of the barbital series, either sodium amytal or sodium
phenotal, the ordinary sort of sedative that you perhaps take on a
sleepless night. We did not dare administer that, to be perfectly
candid, against his objection, because we felt if that, however
harmless—and in over a thousand cases observed by Major Kelly there
have been no ill effects although some cases are reported where there
have—we felt that if should he be struck by lightning a month afterward
it would still be charged that something that we had done had caused his
death; and we did not desire to impose any such treatment upon him.

But I respectfully suggest that a man cannot stand at the bar of the
Court and assert that his amnesia is a defense to his being tried, and
at the same time refuse the simple medical expedients which all agree
might be useful.

He is in the volunteer class with his amnesia. When he was in England,
as the reports show, he is reported to have made the statement that his
earlier amnesia was simulated. He came out of this state during a period
in England, and went back into it. It is now highly selective. That is
to say, you can’t be sure what Hess will remember and what he will not
remember. His amnesia is not of the type which is a complete blotting
out of the personality, of the type that would be fatal to his defense.

So we feel that so long as Hess refuses the ordinary, simple expedients,
even if his amnesia is genuine, that he is not in a position to continue
to assert that he must not be brought to trial. We think he should be
tried, not in absentia, but that this trial should proceed.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Isn’t Hess asserting that he wants to be
tried?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I don’t know about that. He has been
interrogated and interrogated by us, interrogated by his co-defendants,
and I wouldn’t attempt to say what he would now say he wants. I haven’t
observed that it is causing him any great distress. Frankly, I doubt
very much if he would like to be absent, but I wouldn’t attempt to speak
for him.

THE PRESIDENT: Does M. Dubost wish to add anything?

[_M. Dubost indicated that he did not._]

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: May I just say a few words to the Tribunal to
explain my point of view once more?

Firstly, it is a fact that the Defendant Hess, according to the
unanimous reports of the doctors, is not insane, that his mental
faculties are not impaired.

Secondly, as all reports agree, the Defendant Hess is suffering from
amnesia. The reports vary on whether this amnesia is founded on a
pathological, a psychogenic, or hysterical basis, but they agree that it
exists as an unsound mental condition. The defendant is therefore, not
insane, but has a mental defect. Legally, therefore, he cannot claim
that he is not to be held responsible for his actions; for at the time
when the actions with which he is charged were committed, he was
certainly not insane, and consequently can be held responsible. It is a
different question, however, at least according to German law, whether
the defendant is at this moment in a position to follow the proceedings
of a trial, that is, whether he is fit to plead. And on the basis of the
medical reports which I quoted, I think this question should be answered
negatively. He is not fit to plead.

I admit that doubts are possible, that the Tribunal may have doubts
whether the answers of the experts are sufficient to establish that the
defendant’s ability to plead is actually impaired, that he cannot, as
the Tribunal perhaps deliberately phrased it, defend himself adequately.
I think that perhaps the emphasis should be on this last point. It is my
opinion that the amnesia—this loss of memory confirmed by all
experts—is such that the defendant is unable to make an adequate
defense. It may be, of course, that he can defend himself on one point
or another, that he can raise objections on some points, and that he may
be able to follow the proceedings as such. But his defense could not be
termed adequate in the sense in which the defense of a person in full
possession of his mental faculties would be adequate.

May I add one word. I already mentioned that the defendant told me that
he would like to attend the proceedings, as he does not consider himself
unfit to plead, but that, in the opinion of the Defense, is quite
irrelevant. It is a question which the Tribunal must examine, and in
which the personal opinion of the defendant is of no account.

With regard to the conclusion which the American prosecutor draws from
the defendant’s refusal to undergo the narco-synthesis treatment
suggested by the doctors—that _is_ not a question of truculence. He
refused it only because, as he assured me, he was afraid that the
intravenous injections at this particular moment might incapacitate him
in his weakened condition and make it impossible for him to follow the
proceedings; he wants, however, to attend the trial. He refused also
because, as I have already mentioned, he himself thinks that he is sound
and therefore says, “I do not need any intravenous injections, I shall
recover in the course of time.” The defendant also told me that he has
an abhorrence of such treatments. I know that to be true, because in the
unhappy times of the National Socialist regime, he was always in favor
of natural remedies. He even founded the Rudolf Hess Hospital in
Dresden, which uses natural and not medical remedies.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I make one observation, Your Honors?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The argument illustrates the selectivity of the
memory of which I spoke to you. Hess apparently can inform his counsel
about his attitude toward this particular matter during the National
Socialist regime. His counsel is able to tell us how he felt about
medical things during the National Socialist regime, but when we ask him
about anything in which he participated that might have a criminal
aspect, the memory becomes bad. I hope that the Court has not overlooked
the statement of the matters that he does well recollect.

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: May I make a correction?

THE PRESIDENT: It is unusual to hear counsel in a second reply, but as
Mr. Justice Jackson has spoken again we will hear what you have to say.

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: I merely want to say that I was misunderstood. It
was not the defendant who told me that he always favored natural
remedies; I said that from my own knowledge. I said it from my own
experience to show that he has an instinctive aversion for medical
interference. My remark was not based on the memory of the defendant,
but on knowledge of my own.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Rohrscheidt, the Tribunal would like, if you consider
it proper, that the Defendant Hess should state what his views on this
question are.

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: As his defense counsel, I have certainly no
objection, and in my opinion it is the defendant’s own wish to be heard.
The Tribunal would then be able to gain a personal impression of his
condition.

THE PRESIDENT: He can state whether he considers himself fit to plead
from where he is.

HESS: Mr. President, I would like to say this. At the beginning of the
proceedings this afternoon I gave my defense counsel a note saying that
I thought the proceedings could be shortened if I would be allowed to
speak. I wish to say the following:

In order to forestall the possibility of my being pronounced incapable
of pleading, in spite of my willingness to take part in the proceedings
and to hear the verdict alongside my comrades, I would like to make the
following declaration before the Tribunal, although, originally, I
intended to make it during a later stage of the trial:

Henceforth my memory will again respond to the outside world. The
reasons for simulating loss of memory were of a tactical nature. Only my
ability to concentrate is, in fact, somewhat reduced. But my capacity to
follow the trial, to defend myself, to put questions to witnesses, or to
answer questions myself is not affected thereby.

I emphasize that I bear full responsibility for everything that I did,
signed or co-signed. My fundamental attitude that the Tribunal is not
competent, is not affected by the statement I have just made. I also
simulated loss of memory in consultations with my officially appointed
defense counsel. He has, therefore, represented it in good faith.

THE PRESIDENT: The trial is adjourned.

    [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]




                           TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for
periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document
depending on the author. Multiple occurrences of the following spellings
which differ and are found throughout this volume are as follows:

                           cooperate co-operate
                        coordidnated co-ordinated
                          gas wagons gas-wagons
                          peace time peacetime
                      Ausland Abwehr Ausland-Abwehr
                    Governor General Governor-General

Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the
tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations
between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in
the trial(s).

An attempt has been made to produce this ebook in a format as close as
possible to the original document's presentation and layout.

[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal: Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 2)_,
by Various.]