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                              The History
                                _of the_
                       33rd DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY
                               in the War
                               1914-1918.


                                  _By_
                         J. MACARTNEY-FILGATE,
                        Late Major R.F.A. [S.R.]

                          _With a Foreword by_
                           GENERAL LORD HORNE
                        G.C.B., K.C.M.G., A.D.C.

                                LONDON:
                          VACHER & SONS, LTD.,
                GREAT SMITH STREET, WESTMINSTER, S.W.1.




                               To our Men

                Who in this, as in all other units,
                bore the full fury and sacrifice of War,
                      this book is dedicated.




                               FOREWORD.


"Yet the record of their actions is their best memorial." Field-Marshal
Earl Haig wrote the above words in his foreword to the Royal Artillery
War Commemoration Book. When it is recalled that during the Great War
some three-quarters of a million of men fought guns of all calibres in
every quarter of the globe, it may be realised that to write the history
of the part taken by the Royal Regiment of Artillery as a whole must
prove an impossible task.

All the more important therefore that each unit should take steps to
place on record its own doings.

The 33rd Divisional Artillery fought in many important battles and
engagements, and always fought with distinction and with the devotion
worthy of the tradition of the Royal Regiment. This record bears witness
of the high stage of efficiency attained by the Brigades and Batteries
of the New Army, and we may say with our great Commander-in-Chief "The
record of their actions is their best memorial."

                                              HORNE OF STIRKOKE,
                                                              _General_.

 H.Q., EASTERN COMMAND.
     _May 31st, 1921._




                               CONTENTS.


                                                                  PAGE
 FOREWORD                                                            v
 LIST OF MAPS                                                       ix
 INTRODUCTION                                                       xi
 CHAP.
          I.— EARLY DAYS                                             1
         II.— FIRST EXPERIENCES OF WAR IN THE LA BASSÉE SECTOR       6
        III.— THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME, 1916                         24
         IV.— DAINVILLE, HEBUTERNE AND THE BATTLE OF THE ANCRE      52
          V.— WINTER ON THE SOMME, 1916-1917                        62
         VI.— THE BATTLE OF ARRAS AND VIMY RIDGE, 1917              78
        VII.— THE HINDENBURG LINE AND THE OPERATIONS ON THE COAST  100
       VIII.— THE AUTUMN BATTLES OF YPRES AND PASSCHENDAELE, 1917  112
         IX.— WINTER IN THE SALIENT, 1917-1918                     135
          X.— PART I. THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN FLANDERS, 1918       147
              PART II. HOLDING THE ENEMY IN THE NORTH              168
         XI.— THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE ON THE THIRD ARMY FRONT, 1918  174
        XII.— FINALE                                               194
              APPENDIX I.                                          199
              APPENDIX II.                                         202
              APPENDIX III.                                        203
              INDEX                                                205




                             LIST OF MAPS.


                                                              PAGE
      CUINCHY, CAMBRIN AND THE LA BASSÉE SECTOR                 12
      THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME                                   28
      HEBUTERNE, DAINVILLE AND GOMMECOURT                       56
      ARRAS, MONCHY AND THE SCARPE                              84
      ZILLEBEKE, MAPLE COPSE AND THE PASSCHENDAELE BATTLES     114
      PASSCHENDAELE, GRAVENSTAFEL AND ZONNEBEKE                138
      KEMMEL AND THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE                          150
      THE FINAL BRITISH OFFENSIVE—PEIZIÈRE—VILLERS OUTREAUX    176
                                       CLARY—FOREST            182
                                       OVILLERS—ENGLEFONTAINE  186




                             INTRODUCTION.


To write the history of a unit in the war must, even to the most able
pen, prove a mighty task, for it is not given to many to be able in
words to describe deeds greater almost than human intellect can grasp.
But when the task falls to the lot of one who, himself neither author
nor historian, can claim as a sole reason the fact that it was his
humble privilege to serve with the unit in question, the work becomes
doubly and trebly difficult. In a book of this nature it is probably
desirable that personal experience should have preference to powers of
rhetoric, and a knowledge of facts to fluency with the pen, and for this
reason, after much hesitation, the work was undertaken. No skilful
framing of words can portray in any way adequately a war history; far
better is it that in simple language should be recounted the story of
the batteries, so that each man may judge of it according to his lights.

This History has been written primarily as a permanent record for all
those who served with the 33rd Divisional Artillery, a record which they
may keep for the benefit of themselves and their descendants when, in
years to come, the intervening space becomes blurred by the mist of
forgetfulness, and the story of those mighty days in France lies in
danger of being relegated to the shadowy past. Secondly, it has been
published in order that all those who were in any way connected with the
gunners of this Division may learn something of their doings in France,
may gain a little insight into the daily lives of those whose deeds they
can but dimly comprehend. Moreover, although many regimental histories
have already been published, this is one of the first to devote itself
to the doings of a Divisional Artillery, and, throwing much light as it
does upon the daily life of a field gunner in France, it must be of
considerable interest to all those who wish to know something of the
work of an artillery unit in the war. Lastly, since it deals in detail
with every battle in which the 33rd Divisional Artillery was concerned,
it will be found to contain records of minor incidents and operations
into which the wider histories of the war cannot enter, but which were
of vital importance to the actual troops concerned.

The expense of publishing the History has been borne entirely by old
members of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, and in this respect I must
express my deep gratitude to Captain Leonard Vestey, Major D. M. Coffin
and Colonel Sir Frederick Hall, by whose generosity, combined with that
of several others, the publication of this book has been rendered
possible. For personal help in collecting information and facts,
checking dates and generally verifying the accuracy of the work I am
also indebted to Brigadier-General C. G. Stewart, Lieut.-Col. O. M.
Harris, Lieut.-Col. E. J. Skinner, Major M. A. Studd, Major D. M.
Coffin, Major R. D. Russell and Major S. G. Taylor.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the courtesy of the War Office in
permitting the reproduction in this volume of the official maps used in
France during the war.

                                                 JOHN MACARTNEY-FILGATE.

 LONDON,
   _May, 1921_.




                               CHAPTER I.
                               EARLY DAYS


August 1914 and its succeeding months will ever recall to the minds of
that generation which was privileged to live through those epic days
memories of a great turmoil, a chaos, a shattering of that normal—and in
many cases humdrum—existence which to the majority represented Life. The
outstanding impression will depend upon the character of the person who
looks back—to some it will be a sense of overwhelming surprise, to some
a rending and shattering of all their dreams of a long-awaited happy
future, while to some it will be the promise of Great Adventure, the
chance of seeing Life face to face and stripped of all its petty
adornments and falsities, a sight vouchsafed to few and one which of
necessity brings with it the presence of that companion Death, so
closely allied to Life in its fierce and primitive state. Yet whatever
the recollection and whatever may be the impressions retained, to one
and all remains that proud memory of the wild enthusiasm which greeted
the call to arms, the readiness to fight, to leave comfortable homes, to
give up everything because the Country called for men; because the
Country, whatever the cause of the war might be, was in peril.

The 33rd Divisional Artillery, as its number implies, was not one of the
first to be formed. So great was the early rush to the recruiting
stations that the machinery to deal with the enlistment of men was
unable to cope with it, and it was not until January 14th, 1915, that a
War Office letter addressed to the Mayor of Camberwell authorised the
recruiting of the 156th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, by Major
Frederick Hall M.P. in the Borough of Camberwell. So prompt was the
response to this call that in March further authority was granted for
the recruitment of the 162nd Brigade R.F.A. in the same neighbourhood,
the formation of this Brigade being completed by the middle of May, when
it was placed under the command of Major Duncan. It was then brought to
the attention of the authorities that there still remained masses of
excellent material in Camberwell, that the district was overflowing with
would-be recruits not yet enlisted, and that the whole of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery might well be raised from there—a scheme which was
received by the Borough with the greatest enthusiasm. The required
authority was obtained; the 166th and 167th Brigades R.F.A., the 126th
Battery of Heavy Artillery and the attendant Ammunition Column were
formed, and on June 1st 1915 the 33rd Divisional Artillery, as such, was
complete, manned to its full strength, and manned by the men of
Camberwell and Dulwich.

Meantime, from the day on which the first recruits had arrived, training
was carried on with the utmost vigour. N.C.O. instructors were scarce,
very few officers had been posted to the Division, and any kind of
uniform was noticeable by its absence. The early training of recruits in
those days was not calculated to enhance in their minds the glamour of
war; clad in the roughest and, in many cases, most tattered of civilian
clothes, shod in the boots which they had brought with them, they were
taught—day in, day out—that there were many accomplishments which they
must learn before they would be fit for service in the field; that
personal gallantry, a feeling of complete superiority over the enemy,
and a fixed intention of "sticking it with the best" would not alone
take them to France. They must learn to indulge in that strange form of
recreation known as "knees bending with arms raising," and all its
accompanying acrobatics; they must be initiated into the mysteries of
knotting and lashing, of horse management, of dismounted drill and a
hundred and one other matters which go to form the training of a
soldier. And then, when their knees ached with bending and stretching,
when their brains whirled in trying to fashion some especially important
and therefore, to their minds, difficult knot, when some of the most
tender portions of their anatomy felt as though one more minute in the
saddle would cut right through to the bone, Gunnery descended upon them.
Gunnery, with its drill and its intricate and complicated mechanism,
opened out a completely new item of training, a hitherto untrodden part
of the long and tedious road which led from Camberwell and Dulwich to
the battlefields of France. Yet to the weary mind of the recruit there
was one great consolation. Here at last was something tangible; here was
something which spoke of War, which brought him much nearer to the goal
of his endeavours. "Physical jerks" and the lurid remarks of riding
masters were all very well in their way, but the average recruit had no
intention of lying on his back outside a trench in France and of
solemnly raising his feet in the air to let them have a look, as it
were, at fresh surroundings; he had no desire to trot along a road
behind the Line without stirrups or reins, although he was quite
prepared to recognise that it was a useful feat to be able to perform.
No, he wanted to fling shells at the enemy, to be able to inflict upon
the "other side" all that extreme discomfort which artillery is capable
of administering; he wanted, in short, a gun, and at last he saw one
before him.

It was this shortage of guns for drill and instructional purposes which
of necessity delayed the training of the batteries. During the time the
brigades were at Dulwich there were only dummy loaders and three
15-pounders available, nor was it until July that four 18-pounders
arrived to be divided up amongst the whole Division. Training, however,
in other essentials was briskly carried on in and around Dulwich. Cold
shoers were sent to Herold's Institute at Bermondsey, cooks to St.
John's Wood, artificers to Woolwich, while every officer on joining was
sent on a course of instruction to either Larkhill or Shoeburyness.
Map-reading classes were conducted by Army-Schoolmaster Wilmot, and Lady
Bathurst, with the assistance of ladies of the district, gave lessons in
French and German twice a week. As far as billeting was concerned, the
men of the 156th Brigade and the Divisional Ammunition Column were
allowed to live at their own homes; the 162nd Brigade was housed at
Gordon's Brewery, the 166th Brigade at the Tramway Depôt, Peckham, while
the 167th Brigade was partly billeted at home and partly at the East
Dulwich Baths. Such an arrangement of scattered billets could hardly be
hoped to succeed, especially when it is remembered that in the earlier
days the men were without uniform—a red, blue or white armlet alone
denoting the exalted presence of a Sergeant, Corporal or Bombardier
respectively. Yet gradually and steadily a change became visible; slowly
there appeared from out of the disorganised and shapeless mass of men a
clear-cut, firm formation, a sense of discipline and orderliness, the
beginnings of a unit of the British Army.

Inspections were numerous at this time; during the months from March to
July the Divisional Artillery was, in fact, inspected no fewer than
seven times by Major-General Sir Francis Lloyd, Major-General Sir T.
Perrott, and Colonel M. Peake. At the earlier inspections the men were
still in civilian clothes, as was the 167th Brigade at the recruiting
march on Peckham Rye which took place on May 1st, but shortly after that
date a full supply of uniform was received, and the men were properly
and thoroughly equipped in every way. Much could be related,
incidentally, with regard to the recruiting march just mentioned; it was
the march of the men of a district through that district, and aimed at
getting more recruits for the men's own unit. Suffice it to say that
those recruits were obtained, and if the enthusiasm of the proceedings
gave rise to some curious and amusing situations, if there rode upon the
ammunition wagons (with which the batteries were now fully equipped)
some whose right to ride there might well be questioned, who could
object? The war was still young, enthusiasm was still high, men were
still wanted.

It was probably in the first two weeks of August that Camberwell really
grasped what the 33rd Divisional Artillery meant to it, for in those
days it lost it. It is a curious irony of life that few things are
really appreciated until they are gone, and then appreciation comes too
late. Through all these earlier days of training the men had been living
in or near their homes, but now there came a change, Adventure became
Reality, for the batteries were moved for the rest of their training
from London to Bulford. Night after night, from August 4th till August
10th, there crept out of Waterloo station trains bound for Bulford,
packed with horses, men and wagons, setting out on the second stage of
their work; night after night there were left in Camberwell homes very
empty, hearts very dreary at the arrival of that time which all had
known must come, but the coming of which was in no wise softened by this
fore-knowledge.

Bulford wrought a tremendous change in the Divisional Artillery, which
was now under the command of its own C.R.A. Brigadier-General Stuart.
Here there was room to move; there was different country to work over
each day; there were schemes on a far more elaborate scale than had been
possible at Dulwich. The official syllabus of training was steadily
worked through, and gradually this training became more interesting,
more attractive as dull routine was left behind and sham warfare put
into practice. The batteries were fully equipped with guns, even the
167th Brigade, which was a 4·5 in. howitzer brigade and had been greatly
handicapped by a total inability to get howitzers from anywhere, being
finally fitted out, and at last, in the early part of November, the
batteries were given a chance of putting into effect on the practice
ranges all that they had been learning by tedious and hard work during
the period of training. One hundred rounds per battery were fired, and
in most cases the results were very satisfactory when the shortness of
training and the utter lack of previous experience were taken into
account. The batteries were complimented by General Drake on the good
service and drill at the guns, and returned to camp more anxious than
ever to get to France, more keen than ever to fire a shot in anger now
that they had fired one in cold blood. Rumour, already in high activity
throughout the camp, became trebly busy since there appeared no further
obstacle to keep the Division in England, and rumour was strengthened by
the granting to the men of that last leave—overseas leave—which was
given prior to departure for France.

It was in December that it came, December 6th to be quite accurate. Just
a bald official order to proceed overseas, accompanied by a mass of
typewritten time-tables, march tables and all the paraphernalia
inevitable in a move of such dimensions. The great moment had arrived at
last, the moment for which all had waited so long, so eagerly and with
such excitement, and any pangs which might naturally have been felt at a
parting such as this, any dark forebodings which a look into the future
might have called up, were mercifully and naturally effaced by the
bustle, the excitement, the "fever," if you like, of the whole affair.

On December 10th, at 4 P.M., the entraining of the batteries began at
Amesbury and continued at intervals throughout the night. Fifty-one
trains in all it took to move the batteries and their attendant
ammunition columns, the last train leaving Amesbury at 4.5 P.M. on
December 12th. Two days of bustle and excitement, two days of movement
and stir around Amesbury, two days during which the station was crowded
and packed with horses, guns and men sweating, heaving, swearing—and
then silence. As though by a magic hand the 33rd Divisional Artillery
was picked up and disappeared, and for a space it was hidden from the
sight of man.




                              CHAPTER II.
           FIRST EXPERIENCES OF WAR IN THE LA BASSÉE SECTOR.
                       (DECEMBER 1915—JULY 1916).


On a foggy afternoon, typical of Flanders in December, there crept into
Aire station a long and heavy train obvious even to the lay mind as a
troop train, consisting as it did not only of ordinary passenger
coaches, but also of innumerable horse boxes and a line of long open
trucks crammed with guns and wagons. Every window was crowded with
faces—the faces of British soldiers surveying with interest this, to
most of them, new and strange land, listening with a thrill to the
distant mutter of guns, looking with eagerness for signs of war and for
a first view of the billets in which, for the next few days at any rate,
they were to live. At Hazebrouck and at Lillers similar trains were
pulling in, disgorging on to the track men, horses and guns in what
might appear to be indescribable confusion, but which had in it all a
method and a certain order. To the inhabitants there was nothing new in
this sight; scores of times had they seen the arrival of fresh units
from England in just this manner, but to the men themselves the affair
was one of the utmost significance. As a unit they were making their
first appearance within actual reach of the scene of war, and the unit
was that one whose history the ensuing pages will endeavour to record;
it was the 33rd Divisional Artillery once more, the batteries of which
for days had been swallowed up, not exactly in the fog of actual war,
but in the impenetrable maze of Lines of Communication. For days they
had been just a memory, a rumour, an entry on the time-tables of various
R.T.O.s, scattered about the railway line between Havre and Aire; for
days they had indulged in wanderings which at times made them wonder
exactly where the war was to be found, and at last in their estimation
they had found it.

It must not be supposed that the journey of the Division from Amesbury
to its billets in the "rest" area was one long, smooth, perfectly run
affair. Far from it! On arrival at Southampton it was found that two of
the transports were in the wrong berths, while the engines of a third
had broken down; as a result, one brigade had to disembark and be broken
up into small parties, each party going on to a different ship. On
arrival at Havre mistakes had been made with regard to the accommodation
of the men, and one wretched party which marched seven miles out to
Harfleur had to return again over the same weary road before a shelter
could be found. In fact, the journey in trucks marked "Hommes 40,
chevaux 8" (a phrase no less sinister in practice than in meaning)
marked the termination of a period of discomfort and homelessness which
few who shared therein will ever forget. When one remembers, however,
the mighty forces which during these months were moved from England to
France, the actual fresh units which came over railways overloaded with
ammunition and supplies for troops already in the Line, one cannot help
recognising the ability and organisation which enabled such work to be
carried out, and which moved a division of artillery to scheduled time
across a railway system already strained to breaking point.

It was on December 10th, it will be remembered, that the Divisional
Artillery disappeared so mysteriously from England; on December 16th, at
2.30 P.M., the concentration of the same Divisional Artillery was
reported to be complete in the Aire-Thiennes area. The cloud of mystery
was once more lifted: the batteries were known to be "somewhere in
France." Actually, the area in which they were billeted was the rest
area of the First Corps; they were attached to the division in reserve,
and were billeted in the villages of Mazinghem, Berguette, Guarbecque
and Mt. Bernanchon.

The first few days in France proved rather a disappointment. Everybody
(other than those who had been "out" before) had come full of ideas
about the war, mostly taken from picture papers and so-called war
stories; most of the men had somehow expected to find themselves well
within sight and hearing of the battle itself, with all the accompanying
thrills of aeroplane fights, shelling in the distance, ambulances and
what not, and what did they find? An ordinary village, rather dirty and
very muddy; a flat, uninteresting country and the usual routine of
stables, watering, exercise and gun drill—just a continuation of the
training which they had carried out at Bulford, with the difference that
away on the horizon there was that continuous giant thudding, that heavy
sullen muttering which betokened artillery at work, not now in mere
practice but in grim earnest.

However, it was not of much good being in France unless use was made of
the proximity of the war for instructional purposes, and so, two days
after the completed concentration, parties were sent from each of the
brigades to be attached to the 2nd Divisional Artillery, then holding
the line on the La Bassée front from Givenchy on the north nearly to
Fosse 8, the scene of such fierce fighting in the Loos offensive, on the
south. These parties were conveyed by motor-bus to Cambrin, Annequin and
Gorre, whence they were led on foot by guides to the positions of the
batteries to which they were attached. Six parties in all went up from
the brigades between December 18th and January 11th, the duration of
stay in the line being usually four days, so that by the end of the
second week in January all the officers, N.C.O.s, and gunners had had
their first look at the war, had seen their first glimpse of the enemy
lines, had had their first experience of shell fire.

About the middle of January the batteries were considered to have gained
sufficient experience to merit their taking a more strenuous part in the
war, and complete batteries were accordingly sent up in turn to take
over the positions of the 12th Divisional Artillery (63rd and 64th
Brigades R.F.A.) and of the 2nd Divisional Artillery (9th, 17th, 48th,
56th and 71st batteries), stretching from Givenchy down to Vermelles. As
a rule three batteries were sent up at a time for six days, the wagon
line work and ammunition supply being carried out by the batteries to
which they were attached, while those not in the line continued
training, with a few inspections and sudden wild rumours to help pass
the time. Of inspections there were two:—on January 20th C/166 was
reviewed by General Joffre, while on January 26th the 162nd, 166th and
167th Brigades were inspected by Lieut.-General Sir Hubert Gough, then
commanding the 1st Corps. As, prior to this, the 156th Brigade had lined
the route in December to bid farewell to Field-Marshal Lord French, the
whole Division in its early days had an opportunity of seeing three
great men whose names were to be connected so closely with the history
of the war.

The demon Rumour held widespread popularity at this time; rumours of
sudden moves to a different part of the line; rumours of a sudden
advance to support our infantry—anything, in fact, which billet gossip
could evolve on a quiet evening. Nor was this gossip entirely to blame
if it gave rise to so many rumours, for official orders and
counter-orders themselves gave plenty of scope for wonder to the average
brain. As an example of the continual uncertainty which prevailed
regarding future movements, the case of the Divisional Ammunition Column
might well be taken. On January 26th it was ordered to stand by, ready
for a sudden move; this order was cancelled at 1.30 A.M. on January
27th, was revived again at 5.30 the same evening with the additional
information that it must be ready to move at two hours' notice, and was
finally cancelled at 11.35 P.M. that night. Nothing immediate came of
these rumours, and all through February the same training, now grown
very tedious after the interest of a first visit to the Line, was
carried on. A somewhat ambitious plan of two-day manœuvres was carried
out in the First Army area around Estrée-Blanche and Therouane on the
last days of January by those batteries which were not at the time
undergoing training in the Line, but February 1st saw a resumption of
the old billet life again.

                            ORDER OF BATTLE.

                        DECEMBER 1915—MAY 1916.

                                H.Q.R.A.

               C.R.A.                 Brigade Major.    Staff Captain.

   Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G.     Major Sheppard.   Capt. T. Usher.

                             156th Brigade.

    Lieut.-Colonel F. Hall, M.P.        Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd,
         (_till February_).                        D.S.O.

     Adjutant: Lieut. W. Holden             Lieut. W. G. Pringle.
         (_till February_).

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

   Major Alcard       Capt. R. D.     Capt. G. Lomer.  Capt. S. Talbot.
 (_till January_).     Russell.

 Capt. L. R. Hill
      (_after
    January_).

                             162nd Brigade.

                      Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Duncan.

                   Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.

                    Adjutant: Lieut. T. D. Shepherd.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Capt. F. C.     Major R. G. M.     Capt. A. van    Major D. Stewart.
     Packham.          Johnston.       Straubenzee.

                             166th Brigade.

                         Colonel A. H. S. Goff.

                     Adjutant: Lieut. E. G. Lutyens.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Capt. D. M.       Major T. E.    Capt. H. Freeman.     Capt. G.
      Coffin.           Durie.                            Fetherston.

                             167th Brigade.

                     Lieut.-Colonel Du Plat Taylor.

                         Lieut.-Colonel Harpur.

                       Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff.

    Adjutant: Lieut. W. D. Watson            Lieut. H. C. Cory.
          (_till January_).

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Capt. M. A.    Major Barkworth.     Major W. P.     Capt. W. A. T.
      Studd.                             Bennett.          Barstow.

Three units, however, escaped the general air of boredom which was now
gradually pervading the Divisional Artillery—one at an early stage and
the others later. C/167 (Major Bennett), as far back as December 30th,
marched up to the Line and came permanently into action in a disused
battery position about 150 yards south of the La Bassée Canal, midway
between Vauxhall Bridge and Pont Fixe. It was attached to the 1st Corps
Heavy Artillery for counter-battery work, and, covering as it did the
wide front from Violaines on the north to Auchy on the south, with
observation stations in Givenchy ("N"), Cambrin, "King's Clere" and
"Mountain House," it had an excellent opportunity of learning accurately
the whole of the front which the Divisional Artillery was at a later
date to cover. The wagon lines were bad, but the battery position,
despite the fact that it had to be built while the guns were actually
there, was not too uncomfortable. An occasional shelling with
whizz-bangs at that early stage did nothing more than arouse interest
and teach a few healthy lessons, while the daily shelling of Pont Fixe,
about 300 yards away, by a 5·9 in. howitzer was regarded as a free
entertainment of great attraction.

A/162 (Captain Packham) and A/166 (Captain Coffin), the other two
batteries to go into action independently, were rather later than C/167;
they did not move into action until February 13th, when they were
attached to the 1st Corps Heavy Artillery for counter-battery work and,
having marched up through Béthune, Beuvry and Annequin, took up
positions covering, with C/167, the same wide front.

At last orders came, on February 15th, for the whole of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery to take over the line from the 12th Divisional
Artillery. The relief began on February 23rd, when the first sections of
the batteries relieved their opposite numbers in action; three batteries
(C/156, C/162, A/166) which were already in the line for training stayed
there, and on February 25th the remaining sections of the batteries came
into action. C/167 vacated its position at Cuinchy, marched to the wagon
line on the night of the 23rd/24th and was split up, the right section
going to D/167 (Captain Barstow) and the left to A/167 (Captain Studd)
to form six-gun batteries. B/167 (Major Barkworth) had on February 14th
been posted to the 1/4th London Brigade R.F.A. (T.F.), and was
permanently struck off the strength of the Division.

At noon on Saturday, February 26th, the relief was reported complete,
the 33rd Divisional Artillery under its C.R.A., Brig.-General C. F.
Blane, assumed responsibility for the artillery support of the front
covered by the 33rd infantry, and for the first time held the line
entirely on its own. The front extended from Boyau 1 to Boyau 53, that
is from Mad Point to just south of Givenchy. The four brigades,
commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, Lieut.-Colonel Duncan,
Colonel A. H. S. Goff and Lieut.-Colonel Harpur, were divided into two
groups, "Z," the Northern Group, being commanded by Colonel Goff, "A,"
the Auchy Group, by Colonel Harpur; the batteries of both groups were
dispersed all along the front from the La Bassée Canal to as far south
as Vermelles.

Here a slight digression may well be permitted. It will be noticed that
Lieut.-Colonel F. Hall is not mentioned above as one of the Brigade
Commanders. To the regret of all ranks he returned to England on
February 15th, handing over the command of the 156th Brigade to
Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd. It would be impossible to over-estimate
the work which Lieut.-Colonel Hall did in organising the recruitment of
the 33rd Divisional Artillery in Camberwell; without his work, and the
work of Lieut.-Colonel Duncan who was also lost to the Division in March
when he handed over the command of the 162nd Brigade to Lieut.-Colonel
O. M. Harris, the brigades could never have been formed so rapidly as
they were. In these pages, which perpetuate the history of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery, it is essential that there should also be recorded
the great effort made by Lieut.-Colonel Hall in raising the four
brigades, an effort which was appreciated by His Majesty the King at a
later date, when he bestowed upon him a Knighthood of the Order of the
British Empire.

To return, however, to the war. The trench system here, as everywhere on
the Flanders front, was situated in very flat ground, and O.P.'s in the
front line were of little use except for shooting on the enemy fire
trench. Providentially, along the rising ground a few hundred yards
behind the front line there were a number of ruined houses dotted about
at odd intervals, sometimes singly, sometimes in groups; all of these
were practically destroyed by shell fire, but had just enough left
standing to offer a precarious perch to anyone wishing to observe
therefrom, and to provide a screen for such sandbagging, strengthening
and revetting as an ingenious mind, coupled with no small influence with
the Sappers and a desire for greater comfort, might devise. "N" and
Artillery House in Givenchy were but little used as they were rather too
far to the north, but King's Clere and Mountain House (in Cambrin),
Braddell Castle, The Ruin and the Four Hundred on either side of the La
Bassée road, with Dead Man's House, Wilson's House, Ridge View and
Maison Rouge stretching along the line just south of the road, made
excellent spots from which, perched usually in the wreckage of the roof,
one could direct fire on to every spot in the zone. The Ruin and, before
it was rebuilt, the Four Hundred were trying in the extreme to the
nerves, for they hung together in a manner which might have appeared
impossible even to the ingenious mind of a Heath Robinson; moreover,
they were almost daily attended to by an ever-persistent German gunner
with an unlimited supply of 5·9 in. ammunition and a nice taste in house
removing, but King's Clere, a little further to the north, provided an
excellent view of all the front and back areas, and had been thoroughly
and effectively secured by means of cement and iron girders. This part
of the front was, indeed, a most fascinating one for shooting over,
provided a good O.P. was available. North of the canal had little of
interest, save the ruins of Violaines and Canteleux, but to the south,
and just on the bank, was the Railway Triangle with its mysterious tower
and mound. Auchy offered several moderately undamaged houses whence, in
the early morning, smoke could be seen issuing, while loopholes appeared
and disappeared, or were camouflaged, with extraordinary frequency. Les
Briques, with its dead trees and ruined house, struck a grim and
forbidding note, but, just south of it, the green fields around Lone
Farm were always full of possibilities. Many and varied were the ideas
as to the use which was made of Lone Farm; as a farm it had totally
disappeared and suggested nothing more than a few dead trees and a mound
of bricks, but underneath those bricks there must have been some
splendid cellars. Every morning, just as day broke, parties of twenty or
thirty Germans could be seen there, and every morning some battery or
other, with an unexpected burst of shrapnel, used to lengthen the German
casualty list in no small manner. It took the Germans an extraordinary
time to learn the lesson of Lone Farm, and for quite a considerable
period it was there that the newly-arrived battery officer from England
saw the first grey-clad figures of the enemy; there, as like as not,
that he first saw his shells actually bring death. South of Lone Farm
again came the Corons de Maron and the "Dump," or, to give it its
correct title, Fosse 8 de Béthune, but both of these were out of the
zone of the batteries and had, therefore, to be left undisturbed.

[Illustration:

  Scale 1:20,000.
]

Behind Auchy and Lone Farm could be seen Indian Well House, Haisnes,
Douvrin and the road running up to La Bassée. For normal purposes this
area was out of range, but was none the less interesting in that it
afforded all manner of unexpected sights. A train, a lorry going along
the road, a couple of horsemen trotting down a bridle path are
commonplace sights in England, but when you are separated from that
train or lorry by a network of ditches containing death in a hundred
forms, when that train or lorry is carrying men who will probably
to-morrow be trying their best to kill you, and whom you may, with
considerable fortune, kill first, then the matter appears in a different
light, and you feel an intense interest in the objects visible.

Up to the present this chapter has been devoted to a description of the
front on which the Division was operating. It may be that too much space
has been given to what is, after all, merely of personal interest, but
it should be remembered that this was the first front upon which the
Divisional Artillery served as a unit, and therefore the memory of it
has been impressed upon the minds of both officers and men probably to a
far greater extent than has any other portion of the British Front in
France. Now, however, regard must be had for the tactical situation as
it presented itself in the winter of 1915-16.

It will be remembered that, since the battle of Loos in September and
October 1915, no attack on any large scale had been carried out by the
British troops. Heavy fighting continued throughout the winter along the
newly-formed salient at Loos, and this in itself proved such a drain
upon the forces of both sides that the remainder of the 1st Army front
was comparatively quiet. On December 19th the Germans launched a heavy
gas attack in the Ypres salient, and on February 13th, in the same area,
occurred the famous attack on the Bluff. The end of February saw the
beginning of the great battle of Verdun, and it was therefore a natural
result that the La Bassée front, situated as it was outside the zone of
these different operations, remained in a state of comparative quiet,
and was disturbed solely by the raids, mine explosions and artillery
activity which were the invariable régime of trench warfare.

This period of the campaign saw the arrival in France of a great number
of New Army divisions, and as far as possible these divisions, with one
or two noteworthy exceptions, were placed in a part of the line which
was not likely to be subjected to any large scale operations but which,
by the opportunities it offered of raiding, patrolling and the like,
formed an excellent training ground for troops not yet experienced in
modern warfare. No better part of the firing line could, in fact, have
been chosen than the La Bassée sector. The famous Brickstack area was a
centre of great mining activities; raids were the order rather than the
exception, and big trench minenwerfer were daily in action. The back
areas of the German zone were in full view of the artillery observation
stations whence practice could be obtained, day in day out, on every
possible type of target. Salient features presented themselves for
registration and calibration of the guns, and during these shoots the
accuracy and drill of the gun detachments could be fully and carefully
noted. Numerous houses, in a more or less advanced state of
dilapidation, gave all ranks a good idea of the effect of modern
artillery fire on fortifications, while working parties and moving
targets of all descriptions taught observing officers and gun
detachments the essential lesson of quick shooting without loss of
accuracy, and the absolute necessity of a familiarity with every inch of
the ground covered.

It has already been stated that the mining activities of both sides were
very marked. Although this would appear to concern the infantry rather
than the artillery, the effect on the latter was of great importance.
The explosion of a mine was in many cases followed by an infantry raid,
and for this reason gun detachments and officers on duty with the
infantry were kept up to a high pitch of speed and smartness in putting
down an immediate barrage. Moreover, this barrage shooting was most
effective in instilling confidence in the accuracy and good shooting of
gun detachments. It was a very strong but utterly fatal temptation to a
battery commander to add twenty-five or even fifty yards to the range of
his guns, to ensure that no shell fell short and inflicted casualties on
our own infantry. To withstand this temptation needed the most complete
confidence in the guns of the battery, but, on the other hand, to add
the margin of safety almost invariably meant that the barrage dropped
beyond its mark and inflicted no damage whatever upon the raiding party
or trench for which it was intended. Gradually did the infantry learn
completely to trust their gunners in barrage firing, and once and for
all did the battery officers realise that there was only one range which
would hit their target, and that any addition to that range, although
satisfying their own peace of mind, would effectually wipe out any good
which their efforts might have done, and would leave the infantry to the
mercies of a hand to hand encounter with the enemy.

On March 8th an important alteration was made in the disposition of
troops along the Divisional front. From this date two infantry brigades
were kept in the line, each brigade maintaining two battalions in the
front line. Each artillery section was divided into two sub-sections
composed of two 18-pdr. batteries apiece, and it therefore worked out
that each battalion of infantry in the front line had two 18-pdr.
batteries to provide it with direct artillery support. This system
appeared on paper excellent, and indeed from the point of view of
establishing close co-operation between the Divisional Artillery and its
own Infantry no fault in the plan could be found, but there was one
tremendous handicap which every day made itself felt more vitally
amongst gunners and infantry alike. Throughout this period the supply of
ammunition for daily firing was most closely limited, and on March 18th
the allowance was restricted to sixteen rounds per battery per day. It
is not intended here to enter into the great ammunition controversy.
Such a matter would be out of place in what is meant to be an historical
record of an artillery unit throughout the war, but it is mentioned in
view of certain remarks which will later be made concerning the mutual
relations of the infantry with the artillery, and is one of the chief
difficulties with which the artillery had to contend at this time.

March 18th saw the first attack of any dimensions which had so far taken
place in the neighbourhood of the 33rd Divisional zone. After a short
but very heavy artillery bombardment and the explosion of three mines,
the Germans made an attack upon the 12th Division which was at that time
on the right of the 33rd Division and was confronting the Hohenzollern
redoubt. Apart from a heavy bombardment of Annequin with gas shells and
the general searching with long range fire of all the roads leading up
to the front, no material effect was felt by the 33rd Divisional
Artillery. It gave the batteries, however, some idea of what would be
expected of them in the event of a hostile attack on their own front,
and, although conducted at a distance, enabled them by sight and hearing
to realise the weight of shell fire to which they would be subjected if
they were themselves attacked.

April 27th saw a much larger attack by the Germans, once again upon the
right of the 33rd Division, and this time on the 16th Division in the
Hulluch sector. Early in the morning of that day a very heavy
bombardment began on the Division's right, and shortly afterwards a call
for mutual support was received. A heavy mist lay upon the ground, but
through it could be heard the throb and roar of a battle in progress,
mingling with the nearer and more persistent thunder of our own guns and
of the German retaliation. Gradually the mist thickened instead of
clearing, and gradually did the firing become more intense; suddenly in
the distance was heard the wail of a siren which was taken up by one
closer at hand. The Division had never before been subjected to a gas
attack, and at first the true meaning of these sirens was only suspected
and not fully realised, but a certain pungency soon made itself felt in
the morning air. The men began coughing and sneezing, the atmosphere
became thick and unbreathable, and in a very few minutes all batteries
were working under the protection of their gas helmets. The battle was
over by the middle of the morning, and the batteries were able to return
to the ordinary routine of the day, but a lesson and a valuable lesson
at that had been learnt, and it was brought home even more clearly than
before that the detachments must be prepared to work under more
difficult conditions than they had as yet experienced. Whilst on the
subject of this gas attack it is important to note that, on the occasion
in question, so dense were the gas clouds that they were even felt at
the wagon lines as far back as Beuvry.

After this attack followed renewed trench activity and mutual
retaliation. On April 28th the wagon lines of the 166th Brigade at
Beuvry were heavily shelled by a long range gun, and numerous casualties
were suffered by horses and men. The shelling of wagon lines is at all
times most unsettling and likely to do great damage, but this particular
case, being the first of its kind of which the batteries of the Division
had had experience, created a great impression.

About this time a somewhat curious incident occurred between the German
Air Service and our Artillery. On April 28th a German aeroplane flew
over the battery position of A/167 (Captain Studd) and dropped a long
streamer to which was attached a message. This message stated that
German headquarters were aware that No. 1 Harley Street (a big building
used as a dressing station and situated in a road which derived its name
from the number of aid posts which lay along it) was a dressing station,
but that, owing to the great damage which was being done by the battery
of howitzers in action behind this particular house, they were
reluctantly compelled to destroy it by shell fire. Apart from anything
else, this was a considerable compliment to the work of A/167, the
battery referred to, but it did not say much for the observation powers
of the German aircraft. A/167 was then in action on the eastern end of
Tourbiers loop, and was at least 600 yds. from the dressing station in
question. Next day the bombardment of No. 1 Harley Street by aeroplane
observation began; a great number of direct hits were obtained, and,
although the Red Cross was clearly visible, the building was entirely
destroyed. It is pleasant to note, however, that this incident did not
pass unavenged. Early one morning a short time afterwards, the battery
commander of A/166 (Captain Coffin) saw a large convoy of German
ambulances proceeding along the road near Haisnes. A burst of high
explosive blocked the front and rear of the convoy, a steady and
destructive fire of high explosive and shrapnel swept the length and
breadth of the road, and in a short time the debt owing to the Germans
by the destruction of the dressing station in Harley Street was more
than wiped out. The shelling of dressing stations and ambulances was
not, at this time, a practice usually indulged in by our guns, but of
late the enemy had been consistently shelling all our aid posts, our
dressing stations and our field ambulances, and it was hoped that a
short sharp lesson such as that detailed above might tend to lessen in
the future the sufferings of our own wounded.

Quite soon after this incident another opportunity very fortunately
presented itself of impressing upon the Germans our intention of brisk
and immediate retaliation for any attacks on their part. Three big
minenwerfers had, of late, been harassing our infantry to an undue
extent every night from the vicinity of the Railway Triangle, Spotted
Dog and Ryan's Keep, and it was decided to organise a really efficient
shell storm to try and discourage the enemy from this particular form of
attack. Accordingly it was arranged that, at 3.25 on a certain morning,
a sudden and concentrated bombardment by 9·2 in., 6 in., 4·5 in.
howitzers and 18-pdrs. should take place on the area from which the
"Minnie" worked. By a great stroke of fortune, ten minutes before the
bombardment was due to begin, the minenwerfer in question started its
nightly bombardment. Hardly had it begun than from all sides there
poured down shells of every description, trench mortar bombs and rifle
grenades, and for upwards of twenty minutes the German trench system was
one vast mass of smoke, flame and dust. Not for many days afterwards did
that minenwerfer worry our troops, and the Germans must indeed have been
impressed by the organisation which in the space of a few minutes
brought down upon them such a concentrated and well-timed barrage.

On May 19th an important reorganisation of the Divisional Artillery took
place. When the 33rd Division embarked for France its artillery
consisted of four brigades:—the 156th, 162nd, 166th and 167th. Of these,
the first three brigades were made up of 18-pdr. batteries, while the
167th was a 4·5 in. howitzer brigade. By an order which now was issued,
the brigades were reconstituted to consist each of three 18-pdr.
batteries and one 4·5 in. howitzer battery. The effect of such an
organisation was that each Brigade Commander had a small but complete
tactical force under his direct command, and, in the event of open
warfare and a moving battle, was so disposed that he had a percentage of
both types of artillery under his control. Everything, in fact, was now
clearly indicating the early resumption of active operations, and June
18th might be considered to mark the first step in this direction in the
La Bassée sector.

On June 18th the 39th Division, then holding the line on the left of the
33rd, was withdrawn, and the 33rd extended its front northward as far as
Grenadier Road in Givenchy. For one division this was an extraordinarily
wide front, and necessitated the alteration and widening of gun pits,
the establishing of new observation stations in Givenchy, with the
consequent laying of telephone lines—a very heavy strain on the
batteries who were responsible for the support and protection of such a
widely spread body of infantry. The group system of batteries was
reorganised into two new groups—Givenchy and Cuinchy—and the late Auchy
group became a subsection of Cuinchy group. As an example of the width
of front to be guarded by the batteries, it may be stated that the
howitzers had to cover a front of 120°. In addition to the extension of
the front, preparations for operations on a large scale were ordered to
be taken. Every battery had to make accommodation for keeping around the
guns four times the amount of ammunition to what had previously been the
rule; all ranks were made acquainted with the forward zone and the best
lines of advance in case of a German withdrawal, advance positions were
selected and the whole front began to seethe with an undercurrent of
preparation and anticipation. To the inexperienced minds of the troops
this appeared to indicate an offensive on the La Bassée front. Never
before had the batteries been in a big battle; they did not know that,
had an attack been contemplated on their front, the activity would have
been multiplied tenfold. They did not know that, far away in the south,
preparations on a vast and unprecedented scale were being made; that
there were in the Somme area concentrations of artillery, infantry,
ammunition and material which exceeded anything yet seen in war. They
only saw their own preparations and formed their opinions accordingly.

                            ORDER OF BATTLE.

                          MAY 1916—JUNE 1916.

                                H.Q.R.A.

               C.R.A.                 Brigade Major.    Staff Captain.

   Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G.       Major H. K.     Capt. T. Usher.
                                       Sadler, M.C.

                             156th Brigade.

                  Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, D.S.O.

                     Adjutant: Lieut. W. G. Pringle.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

 Capt. L. R. Hill.    Capt. R. D.     Capt. G. Lomer.     Capt. M. A.
                       Russell.                             Studd.

  Capt. Lutyens.

                             162nd Brigade.

                   Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.

                    Adjutant: Lieut. T. D. Shepherd.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Capt. F. C.     Major R. G. M.     Capt. A. van       Major W. P.
     Packham.          Johnston        Straubenzee.        Bennett.

                             166th Brigade.

                      Colonel A. H. S. Goff, C.M.G.

                     Adjutant: Lieut. E. G. Lutyens.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Capt. D. M.       Major T. E.    Capt. H. Freeman.  Capt. W. A. T.
      Coffin.           Durie.                           Barstow, M.C.

                             167th Brigade.

                       Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff.

                      Adjutant: Lieut. H. C. Cory.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.

 Capt. S. Talbot.  Major D. Stewart.     Capt. G.
                                        Fetherston.

On June 24th these suspicions, already fostered by the Higher Command in
order to cover operations elsewhere, were more than doubled. On that day
the whole of the British line burst into flame. From Ypres to the Somme
a steady bombardment of the German trench system began, wire was cut and
kept open, repairs to damaged trenches were prevented by persistent
bursts of fire, and in every sector did it appear that an attack was
imminent; unless the German Headquarters could discover where the main
concentration was taking place it was impossible for them to gauge the
most probable place of assault. That they did discover it was realised,
and realised bitterly, on July 1st and the succeeding days, but there is
no doubt that the artillery activity along the whole front kept them in
a considerable state of apprehension, nor did they dare to dispatch
troops to the Somme in such a whole-hearted way as would otherwise have
been possible.

Naturally, with both sides in such a state of activity, it was
inevitable that a great deal of raiding should go on—raids by the
Germans to try and discover in what strength we were holding the line,
raids by our troops to determine the German order of battle and to
follow, by identification, the arrival or departure of troops to and
from the zone. On June 22nd, at 2 A.M., a tremendous mine was exploded
by the Germans near the Duck's Bill in Givenchy. So great was the mine,
which had been dug right underneath Company Headquarters of the 2nd
Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, that a complete company was almost
annihilated. Following the explosion, the Germans raided the trenches
under cover of a heavy barrage, and for several hours hand to hand
fighting of the fiercest nature was carried on. Every gun which could be
brought to bear upon that area gave such support to our harassed troops
as was possible, and eventually the position was more or less restored.
It is doubtful whether this raid had any connection with the forthcoming
Somme offensive. It was conducted on such a large scale, and the mine
shaft itself extended for such a distance, that preparations must have
been begun some long time previously.

On June 27th it was our turn to harass the enemy by one of the swiftest
and best planned raids which had yet been carried out. Two parties of
the 9th Battalion Highland Light Infantry went across No Man's Land at
Mad Point and, under cover of a barrage, entered the German front line
at two spots some 250 yards apart. The barrage in this case was a most
difficult one for the batteries to carry out, as not only had the two
parties to be covered on their front and flanks, but the reserve
trenches behind the gap which lay between the two parties had also to be
blocked. This, however, was only the beginning of the affair. Gradually
the Highlanders, having destroyed all the dug-outs, mine shafts and
hostile troops within their reach, began to bomb their way along the
trench inwards towards each other. Gradually such Germans as were not
bombed retreated before the hostile raiders and congregated in a herd in
the middle, with the raiding parties closing in on both sides and the
barrage roaring over their heads to cut off all retreat. And then, when
the Germans were crowded and wedged into one section of the front line,
unable to move either way and awaiting a bombing attack from both
flanks, the raiding parties suddenly ceased pressing on, a mine was
exploded right underneath the spot where the Germans were assembled, and
the raiding parties returned to our own trenches, all further work on
their part being unnecessary. It was a triumph of organisation and
accuracy, and fully merited the results it achieved.

On July 2nd the 2nd Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment raided the
enemy lines for one hour and a half, and inflicted numerous casualties
on the enemy, and on July 5th the 2nd Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers
raided the enemy opposite the Duck's Bill and remained in their trench
system for over two hours. By now the German infantry were in an
advanced state of nerves. Although the news of the offensive on the
Somme had reached them and they realised that the main attack was to the
south, the continued bombardment on their own front and the nightly
raids gave them not one moment's peace of mind, nor dared they
materially weaken this part of the line. The raid by the Royal Welsh
Fusiliers on July 5th deserves rather more than a passing word. It will
be remembered that, on June 22nd, they had suffered heavily at the hands
of a German raid. On July 5th they were given a chance of retaliation,
and never has a raiding party gone over the top with such a thirst for
blood and revenge. Not only did the infantry attack, but with them went
a party of the Tunnelling Company who were sore at the thought that the
German miners had evaded their counter-mining and had managed to carry a
shaft so far beneath the British trenches. It was not their fault—in
that marshy ground the most up-to-date and scientific apparatus was
necessary to carry a shaft to any depth beneath the ground. That
apparatus the Germans possessed and we did not, and as a result they
carried their shaft far deeper than we could reach, and blew up a
company of British infantry with one touch of an electric contact. July
5th, however, proved an adequate revenge. For upwards of two hours the
infantry bombed and bayoneted, the sappers blew up all the mine shafts,
whilst the Cuinchy group of artillery alone fired 6,000 rounds, relays
of detachments keeping the guns firing at "gun fire" practically all the
time.

That operation proved to be the last carried out by the 33rd Divisional
Artillery on the La Bassée sector. No hint had been received by the
batteries of a move, no word of warning was given of an early departure,
but suddenly, at about five o'clock on the afternoon of Thursday, July
6th, there came a bolt from the blue. Orders were received that the 33rd
Divisional Artillery was to move down to the Somme, that it would be
relieved forthwith by the 39th, and that the first half-batteries would
march to the wagon lines at 2 A.M. on the 7th, _i.e._, in eleven hours'
time. Now the batteries had been in action in the same positions for
nearly five months, and a few hours was but scanty notice to give in
which to move out from long-inhabited trench positions, ready and
equipped for fighting of any sort. Yet the order was complied with, and,
when dawn broke the following day, all traces of the departure had
disappeared, and away in the wagon lines were to be found the guns and
men who, the previous evening, had been in action within, in some cases,
1,700 yards of the enemy.

Before the further activities of the batteries are followed, a word must
be spoken in summary of the doings of the Divisional Artillery on this
front during the five months in which they were in action. It may be
complained that the foregoing chapter deals too fully with the action of
the Division as a whole, and that not enough detailed information has
been given concerning the daily life of the batteries. The answer is,
that what concerned the Division vitally concerned the batteries, and
that it has been considered more desirable to give a general _résumé_ of
the work carried out by the Division, for in that work the Artillery
played a most active part. It would have been easy, and to a few people
interesting, to have recorded the shelling to which the batteries were
subjected, the difficulties and trials they had to undergo, and
individual cases in which particularly brilliant or destructive shoots
were carried out, but in so doing the general picture would have been
lost and the value of this record greatly reduced. The period spent on
the La Bassée front was a period of stationary warfare during which the
batteries were hardened and experienced, and, as such, lacked the
interest which the ensuing part of the campaign supplies. The
description which has been given of the type of fighting carried out
during this time will enable an idea to be gained of the work of the
batteries, but two points in particular are worthy of record.

When the batteries arrived in France they were raw and untrained as far
as actual fighting was concerned. The resulting strain upon all battery
commanders was tremendous, for no man knows, until he has been under
shell fire, the actual sensations of that experience, and no battery
commander knew exactly how his men would bear the very great trial to
which they were going to be put. In those five months every battery had
to suffer such shelling and bombardment, had to carry out such accurate
and wearying shooting, and to work under conditions of such difficulty
as to satisfy commanding officers that the 33rd Divisional Artillery was
indeed one of which to be proud, and that the men could be relied upon
to undergo any trial, to meet danger and death in any form without
deviating one inch from the work put before them. When the batteries
moved south to the Somme there was but one feeling which pervaded
officers and men alike, a feeling of complete confidence, of complete
determination and of keenness to take part in real active operations
which they fully realised, from the previous five months' experience,
they were well qualified to take.

And the other lesson learnt—what was that? It was the most valuable one
of co-operation and even of personal intimacy with the infantry. During
the whole of the La Bassée period, with one short exception, the 33rd
Divisional Infantry were holding the line. Day in day out, officers from
every battery were attached to battalion and company headquarters, and
the friendship of the infantry for the gunners and _vice versa_ became
very real. Even the N.C.O.s got to know each other by name, and the
resulting feeling of confidence and friendship was of the greatest
value. It was difficult to maintain this practice in later days when
casualties in the infantry and gunners increased by leaps and bounds,
when old friends were lost and new faces were ever appearing, and when
the batteries were continually being attached to strange divisions and
were covering infantry other than their own; but the lesson had been
learnt, and throughout the war the Divisional Artillery made it an aim
and object to get to know the infantry it was covering, to live and
fight with them, and to perfect that liaison which was so important, not
only by the teachings of the cold official text books, but by the
invariable lesson of human nature.

                  *       *       *       *       *

From the wagon lines to which they had marched on the night of July
6th-7th, the batteries moved to Mt. Bernanchon and Guarbecque, and there
the Divisional Artillery concentrated. One day it spent in overhauling,
refitting and inspecting, and on the 9th it entrained at Fouquereuil,
Chocques and Lillers, and moved to the Somme, a unit no longer raw,
inexperienced and untried, but a unit trained and hardened by five
months' trench fighting, now setting off to take part for the first time
in large scale operations, in pitched battle, open fighting and all the
trials and sufferings attendant thereto.




                              CHAPTER III.
                        THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME.
                    (JULY 14th—SEPTEMBER 6th 1916).


Early on the morning of July 10th the long troop trains carrying the
batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery drew into the stations of
Longueau and Sallieux, in the neighbourhood of Amiens, and began to
unload with every due speed. All ranks fully expected to march into
action forthwith, and therefore with something akin to dismay it was
learnt that the destination of the batteries was the area around Soues,
Arouves and Le Mesge, villages some miles _west_ of Amiens, and far away
from the battle lines. The 156th Brigade and half of the 162nd Brigade
marched first to Cardonette, but their stay there was only temporary,
and on the evening of the 10th, after a long and exceedingly dusty march
in great heat through Amiens, Ailly and Picquigny, the Divisional
Artillery was reported concentrated in the area allotted to it. There it
stayed during the whole of the 11th, resting, overhauling after the long
journey and generally making preparations for the great battle which all
realised was very near indeed at hand.

This was different country to the late surroundings of the batteries.
Hills and valleys, pleasant little villages with orchards and pastures
proved an agreeable change to the flat monotony of Flanders, and, keen
as the men were to prove their mettle in the great struggle being waged
over the far horizon, a day of rest in this quiet country proved very
welcome. On the 12th, however, all was hustle and stir once again, and
the four brigades marched together as a Divisional Artillery to the
Vecquemont-Daours area. The heat was tremendous, and several inches of
fine dust lay on the roads; the result of a column, many miles in
length, of horses and guns on the march under these conditions may well
be imagined, and on their arrival—the 156th Brigade at Corbie, the 162nd
Brigade at Daours, with the 166th and 167th Brigades at Vecquemont—all
were covered and half choked with a mixture of dust and perspiration
which nothing short of a dip in the neighbouring stream could remove.
Here the batteries bivouacked for the night, while battery commanders
were detached from the column to ride on at daybreak to reconnoitre the
front and generally to learn the tactical position into which they must
shortly lead their batteries; and from here at 8.0 A.M. on the 13th the
column, after the previous night's halt, continued the march to Treux
and the neighbouring Marette Wood, where the brigades waited and gained
such rest as was possible in view of the fact that they were ordered to
be prepared to move at thirty minutes' notice.

Not until 1.30 A.M. on the 14th were the expected orders to move
received, and even then for one and a half hours the batteries stood
tense and expectant, gunners by their guns, drivers at the horses'
heads, while in the distance the throb and roar of the great attack on
the second German line of defence came down to them. At last, at 3.0
A.M. in the half-light the 162nd, 166th and 167th Brigades moved off to
Becordel-Becourt, the 162nd Brigade proceeding in the first place to
Méaulte for a few hours, while the 156th Brigade moved off in the
afternoon of the same day to Méaulte, bivouacking on the spot which the
162nd Brigade had just vacated on completing the march to Becordel. Now
was the battle very close at hand indeed; the roads were choked with
infantry, guns and transport moving up, always moving up, with their
faces set towards the east where lay a mighty, seething cauldron, the
melting pot of two great armies in mortal conflict. Against this
never-ending stream came down, in a slowly moving column, the
fruits—fruits indeed, though often very bitter—of victory. Ambulances,
walking wounded, shattered guns, depleted and exhausted infantry
battalions coming out to rest, and, a sight more cheering to the
up-going troops, long lines of German prisoners. The appearance of this
highway, one of the main arteries to the actual front line, brought home
to the batteries, who were drawn up off the side of the road awaiting
orders, a very grim realisation of the ordeal they were about to
undergo, but detracted not one whit of eagerness from the minds of the
men to plunge into that struggle just as soon as circumstances should
permit.

At 4.30 P.M. on the 14th the brigade commanders of the three brigades at
Becordel rode on to reconnoitre positions; it was generally understood
that no move into action would take place until shortly before dawn of
the following morning, and preparations were accordingly made for a
night bivouac. It was a disturbed night; the road hummed and buzzed with
traffic unceasingly, the battery horse lines were twice shelled by a
4-in. high velocity gun—once so heavily that the horses had temporarily
to be withdrawn—and at 1.0 A.M. on the morning of Saturday, the 15th,
two brigades, the 162nd and the 166th, received orders to march into
action at dawn.

Independently at 3.0 A.M. the batteries of these two brigades moved off
in full fighting order, and, passing over the old front line system near
Fricourt, headed for the positions which had been reconnoitred on the
previous day on the slopes of the valleys running from Caterpillar Wood
to Montauban and Bazentin. Gas hung thickly in the valley east of
Fricourt and necessitated the wearing of P.H. helmets, while a thick fog
rendered progress of the utmost difficulty, but gradually the batteries
pushed their way up past the ruins of Mametz and, topping the ridge,
moved down the slopes into the ill-famed and deadly Caterpillar Valley
which, in the next few days, was destined to be subjected to the most
ruthless of shell-storms. Here certain of the batteries in their
innocence halted and prepared for action, and Providence for once smiled
upon them. A few stray shells pitched over Mametz Wood, a few fell on
the road ahead, but Caterpillar Valley at that particular hour remained
untouched, and the batteries, after a short halt, continued unharmed.
Signs of battle were now to be found everywhere; the dead, friend and
foe alike, lay all around, broken and twisted guns and transport,
discarded equipment, rifles, bombs, all the disorder of battle were
strewn about, while the shell-pocked ground offered that dead and
forbidding appearance which is a characteristic only to be found in
ground recently fought over.

Through the now clearing mist the batteries advanced and, as in open
fighting, manœuvred in the manner so often taught in the plains around
Bulford. A, B and C/162 took up positions on the northern slopes of the
Caterpillar Wood-Montauban valley several hundred yards north of
Montauban, as previously reconnoitred, but D/162, by an unfortunate
misunderstanding, dropped into action just short of the crest of the
slope four hundred yards north of Caterpillar Wood and about a mile to
the left of the 18-pdrs., instead of falling in practically alongside
them. This alteration was very regrettable, for, although for tactical
purposes the range was the same in either position, D Battery and its
teams almost immediately came under heavy fire directed at the cavalry
in the valley between it and Caterpillar Wood, and lost its battery
commander, Major W. P. Bennett, who was killed by a shell within the
first few minutes. The 166th Brigade at the same time came into action
two hundred yards east of Mametz Wood, and by 8.30 A.M. both brigades
were heavily bombarding that portion of Switch Trench which ran west
from High Wood. Of the remaining brigades the 156th marched through
Fricourt during the morning in rear of the 19th Infantry Brigade (33rd
Division), halted in reserve and reconnoitred the whole position, while
the 167th Brigade moved to a position of assembly midway between
Caterpillar and Bazentin-le-Grand Woods, experiencing great difficulty
_en route_ in getting past our heavy batteries which, in many cases,
were in action off the side of the road and firing directly across it.
These two brigades came into action on the night of the 15th/16th, with
the exception of A/167 which was not in action till 7.0 P.M. on the
16th, and took up positions at 1.0 A.M., the 156th Brigade just north of
Bazentin-le-Grand village, the 167th Brigade close together in line half
a mile north of Caterpillar Wood. The wagon lines of all batteries lay
immediately west of Becordel. Thus, by dawn on the 15th, two brigades
were in action, while at dawn on the 16th the whole of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery was in the very midst of the Battle of the Somme,
and was bombarding the enemy to the utmost of its ability.

                            ORDER OF BATTLE.

                           JULY—AUGUST 1916.

                                H.Q.R.A.

               C.R.A.                 Brigade Major.    Staff Captain.

   Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G.       Major H. K.       Capt. T. C.
                                       Sadler, M.C.         Usher.

                             156th Brigade.

                  Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, D.S.O.

                      Adjutant: Lieut. E. H. Prior.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

  Capt. Lutyens.      Capt. R. D.     Capt. G. Lomer.     Capt. M. A.
                        Russell                             Studd.
                     (_wounded_).

                     Lieut. W. G.
                        Pringle
                   (_temporarily_).

                    Capt. Mansell.

                             162nd Brigade.

                   Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.

                         Adjutant: Lieut. Hill.

                           Lieut. B. R. Heape.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Capt. F. C.     Major R. G. M.     Capt. A. van       Major W. P.
     Packham.          Johnston        Straubenzee.         Bennett
                      (_killed_).                         (_killed_).

    Capt. Hill.        Capt. V.                         Capt. T. St. P.
                   Benett-Stanford.                        Bunbury.

                             166th Brigade.

                      Colonel A. H. S. Goff, C.M.G.

                         Lieut.-Colonel Murray.

                      Adjutant: Lieut. S. M. Wood.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Capt. H. A.       Major T. E.    Capt. H. Freeman.  Capt. W. A. T.
    Littlejohn.         Durie.                           Barstow, M.C.
                                                         (_wounded_).

                                                        Capt. Maxwell.

                             167th Brigade.

                       Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff.

              Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O.

                      Adjutant: Lieut. H. C. Cory.

                         Lieut. J. S. Campbell.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.

 Capt. S. Talbot.  Major D. Stewart.     Capt. G.
                                        Fetherston.

It is now necessary, in order to understand what follows, to turn our
attention from the affairs of the batteries, and to endeavour to grasp
the tactical situation as it presented itself at 4.0 A.M. on July 15th
1916. At dawn on July 14th the great attack had been launched on the
German Second Line from Contalmaison on the left to Longueval on the
right. This line covered the important villages of Bazentin-le-Petit,
Bazentin-le-Grand and Longueval, while to the rear of it lay the
sinister woods of Bazentin, High Wood and Delville Wood. The actual
assault was carried out by the 23rd, 7th, 3rd and 9th Divisions, the
23rd being on the left opposite the northern end of Bazentin-le-Petit,
while the 9th Division on the right faced the village of Longueval. At
3.25 A.M. the great attack began, and the German Second Line on a front
of three miles was broken; the flanks remained firm, however, and before
the advance could be carried further it was considered essential that
the gap should be widened by an attack towards Pozières on the left, and
against Ginchy and Guillemont on the right. In addition to this, certain
local operations had to be carried out upon the front from
Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval, which embraced the zone covered by the
33rd Divisional Artillery, and it is with these operations that we must
necessarily concern ourselves.

[Illustration:

  Scale 1:20,000.
]

By nightfall on the 14th the whole of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, village
and windmill, Bazentin-le-Grand and the southern portion of Longueval
were in our hands, our line running just to the north of these places;
but High Wood, although reached and captured by a gallant charge of
cavalry supported by infantry, proved too tough a nut to crack, and
remained in German hands together with the still uncaptured Delville
Wood and the northern end of Longueval Village which was under the fire
of enemy machine guns in High Wood. To clear these two woods and the
remainder of Longueval was essential, and therefore, on the morning of
July 15th, an advance was ordered by the 98th and 100th infantry
brigades of the 33rd Division upon that portion of Switch Trench which
ran westwards from High Wood, while a South African brigade was ordered
up from Montauban to capture Delville Wood and the northern part of
Longueval which still lay in German hands. With the latter attack, which
indeed culminated into a battle of assaults and counter-assaults spread
over several days, we cannot concern ourselves now. This history aims at
perpetuating the deeds solely of one unit, and, to preserve the sequence
of events, it is manifest that the operations upon that unit's immediate
front must receive the closest attention; for this purpose we shall turn
to the attack on Switch Trench launched on the morning of the 15th by
the 98th and 100th infantry brigades covered by the guns of, amongst
others, the 162nd and 166th Brigades of the 33rd Divisional Artillery,
the first big attack in which these brigades took part.

From 8.30 A.M. for one hour the guns of both brigades bombarded Switch
Trench where it ran west from High Wood, and at the end of the hour
lifted on to Martinpuich, while the infantry assaulted the objectives
which had just undergone this short but intense shelling. On the left
the 98th infantry brigade reached its objective, but the 100th brigade
was held up by machine-gun fire on the flanks and, after suffering some
casualties, returned to its original line; the 98th brigade, with its
right flank left thus in the air, had to follow suit, and by ten o'clock
in the morning the battle had died down, leaving the guns free, apart
from the usual day firing and registration, to get slightly more settled
in their new surroundings. It should be remembered that the batteries
had been marching, travelling by train and marching, day in day out,
since the early morning of the 9th, and now, plunged into a great
battle, it might have been hoped that at least a few hours' rest could
have been obtained. This was not to be, however; no sooner had the
batteries ceased co-operating in the infantry operation above referred
to than they set to digging rough shelter trenches for the men in case
of bombardment, digging pits for ammunition, camouflaging the guns as
far as possible, getting up from the wagon lines heavy dumps of
ammunition, and generally trying to get the battery positions into such
a condition as would enable the guns to inflict the maximum of damage
upon the enemy with the minimum of casualties to themselves. Open
warfare was still the order of the day, and at any moment orders might
be received for a further advance by the batteries, but on the other
hand those orders might never come, and all ranks had already seen
sufficient of the fierceness of the enemy's barrage to give them will to
urge their already tired limbs to further efforts at self-protection.

As events turned out, no further assaults were made by the infantry on
the zone covered by the 33rd Division batteries till the 20th; for five
days the batteries were able to register accurately every outstanding
feature and point of importance on their zones, while communications
were elaborated and perfected from the somewhat rough and ready open
warfare methods which had been set up when first the brigades came into
action. O.P.'s were established in the old German second line between
Longueval and Bazentin, from which points very clear observation upon
High Wood and the ground lying to right and left thereof could be
obtained, although the ground, consisting as it did of open undulating
downs, offered but few salient objects upon which to register; there
were, however, one or two points—the corner of High Wood, the orchards
north of Longueval and the mysterious iron gate standing on the sky line
between High Wood and Delville Wood—which enabled every battery
commander to divide his zone up into areas each containing at least one
fairly clear reference point, while to the left of High Wood an odd bush
or tree and an occasional view of Switch Trench served the same purpose.

It must not be supposed, however, that because there was no infantry
assault the guns had little to do. From the 15th until the night of the
19th/20th every battery kept Switch Trench under continual fire, cutting
wire, bombarding the trench itself and generally rendering that line of
defence as difficult and as uninhabitable as possible to the enemy. By
night Switch Trench and Martinpuich were kept under intermittent bursts
of fire, and it is safe to say that at no moment between the dates given
above were all four batteries of any one brigade silent. This was no
trench fighting position; the enemy had been got on the move, he must be
kept on the move, and to do this every battery was firing more
ammunition in twenty-four hours than had been normally fired by a whole
brigade in a week on its late front opposite to La Bassée. On the 17th
C/156 (Captain Lomer) was forced to withdraw to Flatiron Copse, 800
yards south of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, as part of High Wood was still in
German hands, and the battery, being under direct observation, was not
only subject to a galling fire but was in serious danger of being rushed
by a counter-attack on the part of the enemy. B (Captain Russell) and D
(Captain Studd) batteries of the same brigade stuck it out until the
early morning of the 21st, and then, the operations of the 20th which we
shall shortly describe being over, withdrew to south of
Bazentin-le-Petit Wood and Flatiron Copse respectively. As A/156
(Captain Lutyens) had in the first place dropped into action at the
northern end of the valley running from Caterpillar Wood to Bazentin,
the result of this movement was that the whole of the 156th Brigade was
now behind, that is south of, Bazentin-le-Grand Wood, and no longer in
the exposed position north of the village which it had hitherto
occupied.

It has already been stated that, from the O.P.'s in the old German
second line, a very fair view of the ground to the right and left of
High Wood could be obtained; this was indeed a fact, but with such skill
had the Germans sited their main front line—the ill-omened Switch
Trench—that it was exceedingly difficult to observe the actual effect
upon it of the shelling to which it had been subjected, nor was the
condition of the wire visible even through powerful field-glasses.
Accordingly it was ordered that one officer per artillery brigade should
advance from the outpost line of our infantry and make such examination
of the German wire by daylight as was possible at close range. The
opposing infantry were still in a condition of open fighting—sentry
groups and outposts being the order of the day, with the main front line
some distance behind them; shortly before dawn on July 19th, therefore,
the officers in question crawled out from our sentry groups and, passing
in some cases right through the line of German outposts, made an
examination, as careful and thorough as the proximity of the enemy in
broad daylight would permit, of the condition of the Switch Trench wire.
The examination was not reassuring; in many cases the wire stood firm
and untouched, and it was realised that further and strenuous efforts by
the batteries would be essential that day if the coming attack was to
have any chance of success. It is a regrettable duty to relate that one
of the officers (Lieut. Elliott) who made this reconnaissance never
returned; having passed beyond a German sentry group he was severely
wounded, and, although his orderly dragged him into a shell-hole and
left him in such shelter as it offered while he went for help to bring
him back into our lines, his body was never again found. The whole of
the day was, indeed, a bad one for the 33rd Divisional Artillery.
Colonel A. H. S. Goff (166th Brigade) was wounded and evacuated; all the
batteries were heavily shelled, in particular the batteries of 162nd
Brigade which wilted beneath a storm of shrapnel during the entire day,
while the headquarters of the same brigade received a three-hour
bombardment of lachrymose gas shell, making the carrying on of the
administration extremely difficult. None of this, however, was allowed
to cause any interruption of the day's work, and by nightfall all
batteries of the Division had received orders for the following day's
assault upon High Wood, and had made the necessary preparations.

At 3.25 A.M. on Thursday, July 20th, the first infantry operation took
place in this zone since the attack on the morning of the 15th.
Following on a half-hour bombardment by the 33rd and 21st Divisional
Artilleries (XV. Corps) which began at 2.55 A.M., the 19th infantry
brigade advanced to the assault of High Wood. Two thousand rounds of
18-pdr. and 500 rounds of 4·5 in. howitzer ammunition per brigade were
fired in support of the infantry, the target of the batteries being High
Wood until "zero" hour (3.25 A.M.), when the batteries lifted to the
northern or enemy edge of the wood, bombarding it for half an hour until
3.55 A.M. and then making the final lift to the far side of the wood.
The assault was successful, the wood was carried, but during the whole
day the infantry were subjected to the most intense and galling
artillery fire by the enemy guns, light and heavy. All day long our
batteries searched the roads and approaches from Flers, and the hollows
north of the wood—anywhere whence an enemy counter-attack might
develop—and, with the exception of one which was launched at 12.30 P.M.
and beaten back by artillery and infantry combined, this fire was
successful in keeping the enemy at bay.

The hostile artillery fire, however, was terrible; not one inch of the
wood but was torn and swept by high explosive shell, rent by shrapnel
and rendered completely uninhabitable to any human being. At 6 P.M. the
effect of this shell-storm came to a head, and for half an hour our
batteries put down a heavy barrage along the northern edge of the wood,
under cover of which the infantry retired to the southern half; it was
no hostile counter-attack which thus drove them back—it was the sheer
weight and force of the thousands of shells which, from all around, the
enemy poured into the wood, and which smashed and shattered the
unfortunate troops who were trying to hold what they had so gallantly
won. At first the report came through that the whole of the wood had
been evacuated and that the infantry were back in their original line in
front of Bazentin, but this was proved to be erroneous, and the southern
half of High Wood at any rate was retained in our grasp. At 9.30 P.M.
the enemy opened a vicious gas shell barrage on the ridge in front of
D/162 and on the batteries of the 167th Brigade, and at 11 P.M. followed
this up by a counter-attack on the scene of the morning's fight. After
three hours' firing the situation became quieter, and in the morning the
position on the whole had not changed since dusk the previous evening.

For the next two days there ensued another period of comparative
inactivity as far as infantry assaults were concerned. Both sides
paused, as it were, to draw breath, but not for one moment did this
cause a lull in artillery activity. The enemy, as well as our own Higher
Command, was beginning to realise more and more the immense importance
of counter-battery work, and these intervals between the attacks were,
from the gunners' point of view, almost more to be feared than the
attacks themselves. Morning, noon and night first one battery and then
another would be subjected to a sudden burst of intense fire, while at
other times a ponderous and deliberate bombardment of a fixed area in
which a number of batteries were in position would be carried out—a
system which had the most harassing effect upon the men, and to the
success of which an ever-lengthening casualty list of guns and gunners
bore eloquent testimony. July 21st was a typical day of this sort;
starting at 10 A.M., a prolonged and widespread enemy bombardment was
carried out during the whole day with 4·2 in. and 5·9 in. upon the
valley running from Longueval to Montauban, and its adjacent slopes. The
18-pdr. batteries of the 162nd Brigade, together with the headquarters
of the brigade itself, came heavily under fire, and a long casualty list
was only averted by the use of the shelter trenches which by this time
had been dug in all the battery positions. While this was in progress
the 167th Brigade, farther to the left, was also undergoing a severe
bombardment by 5·9 in. howitzers. Direct hits were obtained upon B/167
(Major Stewart), and in all the batteries, including D/162 which lay
just behind the 167th Brigade, a number of casualties were sustained.
Murderous fire was, at the same time, opened upon Caterpillar Valley,
from the fork between Mametz and Caterpillar Woods down the entire
length of the valley nearly to Mametz village itself, and at times
during the day it was almost impossible to see a single battery position
from which the smoke, flame and dust of bursting shells were not flying.
Nothing could be done; it was a case of "wait and see"—the hardest test
to which troops can be put—and to the eternal credit of the men it may
be said that they waited on this, as on all other similar occasions,
with quiet philosophy and with a stoicism which it would be hard to
equal.

Meanwhile, what of our friends the infantry? On the morning of the 21st
the hard-pressed 33rd Division was withdrawn from the line and was
succeeded by the infantry of the 51st Division (153rd, 154th, and 155th
infantry brigades). At the same time the zones of the 33rd Divisional
batteries side-slipped to the right and, coming under the 51st
Divisional Artillery for tactical purposes, covered the line to the
right (_i.e._ east) of High Wood. Day firing was carried out upon Switch
Trench, the new zones were registered and night firing, consisting of
500 18-pdr. and 75 4·5 in. howitzer rounds per brigade, was directed
upon the hollows in rear of and approaches to the divisional zone. At
10.15 P.M. Caterpillar Wood and the neighbouring localities were heavily
bombarded by gas shell and high explosive, and all communications of the
167th Brigade were cut; lamp signalling was immediately taken up,
however, and proved itself entirely reliable as a means of
communication, despite the gun flashes all around and in the sky.

The morning of July 22nd was devoted to further registration and short
bombardments. From 3.0 A.M. until 3.30 a general bombardment of Switch
Trench was ordered at the rate of 2 rounds per minute from the 18-pdrs.
and one round per minute from the howitzers, totalling upwards of three
thousand rounds fired by the fifteen batteries. At the end of the
bombardment the 162nd Brigade stood by to carry out a registration by
aeroplane, but no machine ever appeared and soon afterwards normal
firing for the day was continued, D/162 shortly after one o'clock
carrying out a destructive shoot on some machine guns and dug-outs to
the west of High Wood which were, by their enfilade fire, holding up the
whole situation and preventing an advance in the neighbourhood. Their
destruction was essential, for an advance had been ordered for the
following day, and at 7 P.M. in the evening the whole of the front burst
into flame in preliminary bombardment for the assault. At the rate of 80
rounds per battery per hour the guns of the XIII., XV. and III. Corps
bombarded the positions which troops of the 5th (on the right), 51st and
19th (on the left) divisions were to attack next day, the objective of
the 51st division, which was covered by the guns of the 33rd Divisional
Artillery, being the N.E. and N.W. edges of High Wood, together with a
portion of Switch Trench running E. and W. therefrom.

"Zero" was 1.30 A.M. on July 23rd, and seven minutes previous to that
hour the fire of the batteries was increased to intense rate. At
half-past one to the second the infantry went over the top, and the
batteries searched back by short lifts to a line 200 yards beyond the
objective. For half an hour was this searching fire continued, and at
two o'clock the batteries slowed down and set up a protective barrage
200 yards beyond the late German trench, under cover of which it was
hoped the infantry would be able to consolidate their position. Such,
however, was not the case. Although in places the attacking troops had
gained their objectives, at many points our men had been held up by
machine gun fire and, by their failure to advance, had compelled their
more successful comrades to retire to their starting place. All along
the line the assault failed, and when at 5 A.M. the enemy
counter-attacked fiercely the guns shortened their range and bombarded
Switch Trench once more. By 8.30 A.M. all was quiet again, the attack
was over—and our infantry were back holding the same line from which
they had advanced earlier in the morning.

From July 23rd-27th there ensued another of those lulls which have
already been described; for the moment our advance was checked and held
up while the Higher Command appeared to be seeking a solution to the
very determined and successful opposition which the enemy showed to our
troops in this sector, and during the interval which elapsed the usual
harassing was carried out night and day by the now rapidly wearying
batteries. Two thousand rounds by day and 700 by night were poured on to
the German defences by each brigade, and in return the German batteries
gave no peace to our guns, daily subjecting the area in which the
batteries were located to a vicious and effective bombardment. Mametz
and Caterpillar Woods, the valleys running from Caterpillar Wood to
Bazentin on the one hand and Montauban on the other were daily ploughed
from end to end by shells varying in calibre from 77 mm. to 12 in.,
while the valley running from Longueval to Montauban, together with the
ridge to the west thereof, became a veritable death trap. It was of no
use seeking to move the battery positions; one place was as bad as
another, and there was nothing to do but to sit tight and trust that,
before our batteries were completely wiped out, a further advance might
check the ever-increasing storm of German shells.

There was another, and a very serious, difficulty to be faced at this
time also; owing to the enormous strain placed upon the guns by the
incessant day and night firing, the running-out springs began to give
way and to fail, and great difficulty was found in obtaining new ones.
Previous to the war almost all these springs had come from Germany, and,
with this source of supply cut off, British manufacturers at home had
found it impossible as yet so to organise their output as to meet the
ever-increasing and insistent demands from the various theatres of war.
As an instance of the seriousness of this trouble it may be mentioned
that on July 26th only five guns of the 162nd Brigade were in action,
the remainder having no serviceable springs left, whilst of these five
two had to be pushed up by hand after the firing of each round. Such a
state of affairs, which cut down the volume of fire of the brigade by
over one half, was bound to reflect seriously upon the preliminary
bombardments and barrages in any attack, nor was the trouble confined to
the 162nd Brigade alone.

On July 24th the 33rd Divisional Artillery ceased to work in contact
with the infantry, and was put under direct orders of the XV. Corps to
carry out counter-battery work on the whole Corps front, searching
hostile battery positions, hollows and approaches, and in addition
answering any S.O.S. call when required upon all portions of the Corps
front. Such duties naturally incurred still more firing and work; two
batteries (A and B) of the 162nd Brigade were unable to get sufficient
right switch to cover the now wider front, and were forced to move
further up the slope, new O.P.'s in front of Longueval had to be
reconnoitred and linked up with the batteries by telephone, while the
new zone which stretched from the south of Martinpuich to Delville Wood
had to be registered before dusk. Hardly had this been done than, at
8.30 P.M., a report was received that the enemy were leaving their
trenches between High Wood and Delville Wood, and the batteries
immediately opened a rapid rate of fire to break up the expected
counter-attack which, surely enough, was launched at 8.45 P.M. under a
very heavy barrage. Both sides bombarded with the utmost fury, and
ultimately the counter-attack melted under our fire, but not till
midnight were the tired batteries able to report "all quiet," and even
then night firing was carried on in the usual way. The 51st Divisional
Artillery was at this time responsible for the direct support of the
infantry, and it was by way of co-operation that this bombardment of the
hostile trenches was carried out.

It has been previously stated that from the 23rd to the 27th a lull
occurred in the infantry operations. This, broadly speaking, is a fact,
but it must not be supposed that during that time our front line troops
were entirely inactive. Bit by bit each day they had been bombing their
way through Longueval, sometimes without artillery support, sometimes
assisted by the guns, as on the 26th when for one hour from dawn the
guns poured shells into the northern end of the village. It was slow
work, this gradual penetration, but by the evening of the 26th a very
appreciable advance had been made, and, when orders were received at 4
P.M. that a general assault on Delville Wood and the orchards north of
Longueval would take place next day (27th), our troops were in a far
more favourable position for "taking off" than they had been a week
earlier.

The assault was delivered at 7.10 A.M. on the morning of Thursday, the
27th, and was preceded by an artillery bombardment beginning at 5.30
A.M. For this bombardment 1,500 18-pdr. and 400 4·5 in. howitzer rounds
were fired by each brigade, and were directed mainly upon the trenches
to be assaulted and the back areas thereof. To the 5th Division was
entrusted the capture of the objectives on the front directly under the
guns of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, and the line of this ran from the
north-west edge of Delville Wood through the enclosures 150 yards north
of Longueval village, along the sunken road running west from these
enclosures to the High Wood-Longueval road. The chief interest of the
attack, however, lay in the fact that the creeping barrage, as already
practised in the opening days of the Somme battle, was now being more
and more carefully elaborated. It had not yet reached that high stage of
perfection which, in the offensives of Arras and Passchendaele in 1917,
enabled the gunners to provide what was almost an ever-moving curtain of
fire advancing yard by yard in front of the infantry, but it did even
now remain upon one point until the very last moment and then lift off,
but scarcely creep, to the next point to be attacked while the infantry
stormed the first.

All day long fierce fighting continued but, although on the right of the
line the 2nd Division gained their objectives, on the left the men of
the 5th Division were held up at points. The climax of the day was
reached at six o'clock in the evening, when a heavy counter-attack was
launched all along the line by the enemy, but this counter-attack, in
common with a similar one launched at 10.30 P.M. on the following night
(28th), broke up under the fire of our guns. During this attack green
flares were lighted all along the front by our foremost infantry at
specified times, and although it was difficult to persuade them to do
this, inasmuch as they considered that the flares would be equally
useful to the enemy as well as to our guns in showing up their position,
the information thus obtained of the progress of the assault was of very
great value.

During the 28th and 29th the batteries busied themselves in preparing
for future operations. Casualties in men and guns had been severe
throughout the fighting, vast quantities of ammunition had been
expended, and all this had now to be replaced. On the morning of the
27th a 5·9 in. shell had exploded directly in the pit where the men of
B/162 (Major Johnston) were getting their breakfasts, killing and
wounding every man in the pit, while on the afternoon of the 29th D/162
(Captain Bunbury) was heavily shelled and lost one and a half
detachments who were practically blown to pieces. A 5·9 in. shell burst
right upon a pile of ammunition beside one of its guns and exploded a
number of rounds; in addition to the wiping out of the detachments, the
gun itself was completely destroyed by the explosion, and only the piece
and a portion of the spade were ever found afterwards. It is curious to
note that the force of the explosion, which made a huge crater in the
ground, threw a complete wagon of ammunition so high into the air that
it came down some 150 yards from the battery, yet not a single round in
the wagon exploded. As, in addition to this, all the guns of C/167
(Captain Fetherston) were out of action and the other batteries had
suffered the usual daily casualties which now had become inevitable, it
will be seen that the Divisional Artillery was in a fairly serious
plight. However, the work had to be carried on, and on the afternoon of
the 29th the batteries set themselves to the now familiar task of
bombarding Switch Trench with 45 rounds per gun, in preparation for
another attack which was due to take place on the morrow.

The bombardment proper for this attack began at 4.45 P.M. on the 30th,
but previous to this there had been the short burst already referred to
and another similar effort in the early morning from 3.15 to 5.15. At
the same time our heavy artillery carried out a series of
destructive—or, at least, would-be destructive—shoots on the enemy
batteries; this was a most essential procedure, for the work of the
batteries had been greatly impeded all the morning by an intense hostile
gas shelling of the positions while, during the whole of the afternoon,
the batteries on the ridge north of Caterpillar Wood were raked from end
to end by high explosive. At last, however, the final bombardment
opened, and from 4.45 P.M. till 6.10 P.M. the German defences between
High Wood and Delville Wood were subjected to 800 rounds per 18-pdr.
battery and 400 rounds per 4·5 in. howitzer battery all along the front.
Seven minutes before zero, which was at 6.10 P.M., fire was quickened to
intense rate, and at zero hour troops of the XIII. and XV. Corps
advanced to the attack, having for their objectives the sunken road
running from the N.W. face of Delville Wood to the east corner of High
Wood. The XIII. Corps, who were on the right, reached their objectives
successfully, but the XV. Corps, advancing on the left of the XIII.,
were not so fortunate; enfilade machine gun fire from strong points near
the orchards north of Longueval held them up, while their left, although
successful in reaching the sunken road near the corner of High Wood, was
subjected to such a perfect hell of high explosive that it was shelled
out and forced to retire. Thus at 8 P.M., when firing was reduced to
normal, the situation was but little different to what it had been
before the attack.

The attack of the 30th was very typical of the tactics in practice at
this time in the Somme battle. The same thing had been seen in the
previous assaults of the 20th and 23rd, and the same thing was to be
seen in subsequent operations; small attacks on limited areas—perhaps
only on a two division front—were launched and, nine times out of ten,
were doomed to failure by their narrow scope. There is no doubt that
individual strong points were holding up the general advance and had to
be overwhelmed before any more ambitious plans were undertaken, but
there is also no doubt that, when these unfortunate battalions went over
the parapet upon some purely local undertaking, they were immediately
subjected to machine gun fire in enfilade from the flanks, where no
attack was taking place, and to overwhelming shell fire from batteries
on neighbouring zones, which, owing to the undisturbed state of their
own zone, were able to add to the already heavy volume of fire on the
front attacked. It may be that the Higher Command was right in its
handling of the situation, but for the men on the spot it was
heart-breaking to see battalions of the finest material launched to
certain death on an attack which, by the narrowness of its front, was
doomed to failure before it ever began.

July 30th and 31st contained nothing more of importance than three
S.O.S. calls from Delville Wood, and on Tuesday, August 1st, at 5.30
A.M. orders were received with dramatic suddenness for the 162nd and
166th Brigades to be relieved by the 78th and 79th Brigades of the 17th
Divisional Artillery. In a fever-heat of expectation the batteries of
the two brigades waited all day long for the orders to take effect; at
last, between four and seven o'clock in the afternoon, the incoming
units arrived, and with heartfelt thanks the batteries, taking their
guns with them, marched back to the wagon lines. It was unfortunate that
D/78 should have chosen the moment to relieve D/162 when four low-flying
German aeroplanes were right overhead, but choose it they did, and the
price had to be paid. The incoming battery was a little ahead of its
time, and, as a result, when the teams and limbers of D/162 appeared on
the scene the shell storm for which the aeroplanes had called was just
beginning. Whizz bangs, 4·2 in. and 5·9 in. shell poured down upon the
battery position and horses for over half an hour, and how the battery
escaped with such light casualties as it did, was a marvel. One gun and
one ammunition dump were destroyed, several drivers and horses were hit,
but in no way was the relief disorganised, and D/162, after manœuvring
under a hail of shells, ultimately withdrew towards the Montauban flank.
For the rest of the evening Caterpillar Valley all around and south-west
of Mametz Wood was deluged with shells, and the batteries who chose that
route for their outgoing march had an extremely unpleasant time. All got
away in the end, however, and after a short halt at the wagon lines
continued the march. Dernancourt, which was the destination of the
batteries, was reached at 2.30 A.M., and here they remained till the
11th resting, refitting and generally cleaning up after the ordeal of
the past eighteen days.

Only two brigades were now left in the line—the 156th and the 167th—and,
as Headquarters staff of the 33rd Divisional Artillery had gone into
rest at Dernancourt, these two were put under the command of the 51st
Division. The zone covered by the 156th Brigade extended along the High
Wood—Bazentin-le-Petit road southwards from the north-west corner of the
wood, while the 167th Brigade looked after the road running south-east
from the eastern edge of High Wood; D/156 (Captain Studd) carried out
counter-battery duties. From August 1st to August 11th little of
importance in the way of operations occurred. Hostile attacks on
Bazentin-le-Petit on the 2nd and against High Wood on the 10th were
repulsed by our fire, while on the 4th and the 7th minor infantry
engagements were carried out by our troops on the orchards and houses
along the north-west edge of Delville Wood and on High Wood
respectively.

Very heavy firing took place throughout this period, and during the week
ending August 17th the 156th Brigade fired no less than twelve thousand
rounds, while the German artillery must have flung something like the
same amount into our positions. B/167 (Major Stewart) was shelled out
and had to move on the 3rd to a position six hundred yards east of
Caterpillar Wood, where it was joined next day by Captain Fetherston's
battery (C/167) which had also undergone a severe gruelling at the hands
of the enemy. A/167 (Captain Talbot) proved no less unfortunate than the
other two batteries, and on the 5th, after a very heavy shelling which
lasted all day, it was compelled to move to a position alongside "B" and
"C," where it went to form two six-gun batteries instead of three
consisting of four guns each. At the same time the brigade was
temporarily handed over to the command of Major Stewart, for
Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff had on the previous day been evacuated sick to
England. Thus the two brigades remained shelling and being shelled, day
in day out, until August 11th, when the other two brigades (162nd and
166th) came up into the line from the Dernancourt rest area and relieved
them. The 156th and 167th had been in action continuously since July
16th under the most trying and harassing of conditions. They had been
subjected to shelling more severe than any yet experienced in the war,
and, when they marched out to rest on the evening of the 11th, they were
utterly exhausted, utterly worn out, a party of very tired and weary
men.

On returning to the line on the 11th the batteries of the 162nd Brigade
did not reoccupy their old positions but, after reconnaissance by
Lieut.-Colonel Harris, formed two six-gun 18-pdr. batteries under the
command of Major Johnston and Captain van Straubenzee, and took up
positions on the southern slopes bordering Caterpillar Valley, at a
point about three hundred yards N.N.W. of Montauban. At the same time
D/162, which from the 8th onwards had been sending parties up from
Dernancourt to dig gun-pits and prepare the place for occupation, came
into action under the northern bank of Caterpillar Valley about five
hundred yards to the right front of the other two batteries, which was
the position it had originally been intended to occupy on July 15th. The
166th Brigade took up positions 500 yards north of Caterpillar Wood.

While these two brigades had been out at rest a change had taken place
amongst the infantry, and the guns now covered the 33rd Division
(forming part of the XV. Corps), with the 14th Division on the right and
the 1st Division on the left, the tactical command of the batteries
being in the hands of the 14th Divisional Artillery. From the 11th until
the 18th the lull in infantry fighting, which had been noticeable in
this sector since the beginning of the month, continued, but the work of
the guns was as usual very heavy. In addition to counter-battery work
and minor bombardments, four hundred and fifteen 18-pdr. rounds by day
and five hundred by night had to be expended by each brigade on
searching and sweeping roads and hollows behind the brigade zone, while
the 4·5 in. howitzers carried out the same work to the extent of two
hundred and thirty-three rounds by day and one hundred and sixty-six by
night. The zone in question was the extreme right of the 33rd Divisional
front, along the enemy front line known as Wood Lane. Fortunately for
the batteries, hostile shelling upon the gun positions was far less
violent than had been the case before the two brigades went into rest,
and it was now possible to get through a very fair amount of
registration without interference from enemy shell fire; this was
important, for the guns had to be ranged upon a number of new points
owing to the change in position, while a wireless set which had been
installed at Brigade Headquarters enabled numerous "N.F." calls to be
picked up from our aeroplanes, all of which were acted upon by the
howitzer batteries of the respective brigades.

On the 16th orders were received for an attack to be delivered on
Friday, the 18th, and in preparation for this the ammunition allotted
for night firing was doubled on the nights of the 16th and 17th, while
by day the guns bombarded Wood Lane, cutting the wire and shelling not
only the trench but also No Man's Land in front thereof, lest the German
machine-gunners should creep out forward and thereby escape our barrage.
At 2.45 P.M. on the 18th the attack was launched by the 33rd Division,
with the 14th Division on its right. In addition to the preceding
two-days shelling, the whole of the morning of the attack, with two
short forty-minute intervals, was devoted to barrage firing on the enemy
trenches, the barrage of 18-pdrs. lifting at three given times to
suggest an impending assault, whereupon the 4·5 in. howitzers, a few
minutes after the "lift," dropped back on to Wood Lane (the enemy front
line) to catch such of the enemy as had manned the parapet to withstand
an attack. Immediately prior to zero hour there was no bombardment; it
was hoped to start the attack simultaneously along the whole front, and
the best means of achieving this was considered to be an opening of the
barrage at zero itself, without any bombardment during the preceding
five minutes.

The order of battle in this attack showed the XIII. Corps on the right,
the III. Corps on the left and the XV. Corps in the centre. The two
flank Corps successfully gained their objectives, as did also the right
of the XV. Corps, but the 33rd Division was held up partly by flank
machine-gun fire and partly by hostile machine guns which had, after
all, succeeded in pushing forward into shell holes in No Man's Land, and
had thus avoided our barrage. The objective of the 33rd had been Wood
Lane Trench, from about 150 yards north-west of its junction with
Orchard Trench to the cross-roads just outside the western corner of
High Wood; at 3.15 P.M., when the failure of the infantry to gain the
objectives was realised, the batteries of the 162nd and 166th brigades
dropped their range from the protective barrage they had established
four hundred yards beyond Wood Lane Trench, and put down a heavy barrage
along a line two hundred yards north-east of the trench. This was
maintained throughout the afternoon until, the position on the right
being somewhat obscure, the batteries were requested by the 14th
Division to lengthen their range by one hundred yards. A situation
report was received shortly afterwards, however, which entirely
justified the original shortening of the range, and this was resumed
till half-past seven in the evening when normal night firing was begun.
Once again the attack had been beaten off by the deadly and ubiquitous
machine guns, and once again our infantry looked at the grim and
forbidding Wood Lane Trench across a No Man's Land thick with dead and
wounded.

On the 19th the zones of the batteries side-slipped two hundred yards to
the right, and for two days registration, in addition to the usual
harassing fire, was carried out on the new zones. Teams were at work day
and night to replenish ammunition which the past few days had seen so
lavishly expended, and, thus reinforced, a further effort was made on
the 21st to advance our line in the neighbourhood of Wood Lane and Tea
Trench (running N.E. from Wood Lane), while the 14th Division advanced
to the capture of the last line of enemy defences in Delville Wood.

Once again we were defeated; after a short preliminary bombardment Wood
Lane was assaulted at 3.30 P.M., while at 1.30 A.M. on the following
morning (22nd) the attack on Tea Trench was carried out, but in neither
case were we able to advance. The enemy front line was stiff with men
and machine guns, and our troops were swept away by a blast of fire
before they were even able to get to grips with the enemy. Thus ended a
tragic series of short attacks on portions of the enemy trenches,
attacks which failed in their objects, which wore out our
troops—infantry and gunners alike—and which cost us many thousands of
lives that we could ill spare.

On the afternoon of August 22nd signs and portents were not lacking of a
new and great effort all along the line to continue the advance which
latterly had been so severely held up. The previous day Lieut.-Colonel
Harris (162nd Brigade) had been ordered to reconnoitre a position for a
forward gun which should be able, at a range of not more than 2,000
yards, to enfilade the new German trench running north-east from Wood
Lane, and such a position had, after taking bearings from various
O.P.'s, been chosen. Now, at 4 P.M. on the 22nd, the gun was ordered
into action, and was accordingly brought into position in a shell-hole
on the southern edge of the road which ran east and west due north of
Bazentin-le-Grand. Three hundred rounds were dumped alongside it, the
whole was placed under command of Lieutenant V. Benett-Stanford (C/162),
and a most satisfactory registration was obtained with seventy rounds
burst immediately over and into the enemy trench in true enfilade at a
range of 1,600 yards. Following on this, on the morning of the 23rd, the
156th Brigade came out of rest and went into action about half a mile
south-west of Montauban, as a group under Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd;
to this group was added A/167 which took up a position in the same area,
and later B/167 which, on the 25th, joined the 156th Brigade group in a
position near A/167. The 167th Brigade, now under the command of
Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, did not come into action as a unit, but
kept its remaining battery out at rest to replace casualties as they
might occur.

On the 23rd the orders for the attack were received. This time it was to
be the biggest operation since July 14th, the order of battle showing
the French to attack on the right from the Somme itself to Maurepas, the
XIV. Corps from south of Guillemont to the western edge of Ginchy
Village, the XV. Corps from a point in the Longueval-Flers road north of
Delville Wood to the western edge of High Wood, and the III. Corps from
that point westwards to the extreme left of the attack.

On the immediate front of the batteries (of which the 156th group was
attached to the 7th Division, the 162nd and 166th to the 14th Division),
the right infantry brigade (100th) of the 33rd Division was to establish
itself in Wood Lane, while the 14th Division was to advance the right of
its line so as to connect up with the left of the XIV. Corps, to clear
the remainder of Delville Wood, to establish a line outside the wood
from the position already held by the Division in Beer Trench to the
Longueval-Flers road, and there to connect up with the right of the 33rd
Division. The bombardment began at 3.45 P.M. on Thursday, the 24th, and,
so far as the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery were concerned,
consisted in shelling New Trench (behind Wood Lane) and the ground in
rear thereof, Tea Trench, Tea Lane and Tea Support (west of the
Longueval-Flers road), but chiefly Tea Trench, while the advanced
enfilade gun of the 162nd Brigade was ordered to sweep New Trench in
enfilade from 5.45 P.M. until the moment of attack. The average rate of
fire was one round per gun per minute, but towards the close of the
bombardment the rate gradually quickened up until, at zero, the rate of
fire became intense.

Zero hour was at 6.45 P.M. on the 24th, and, two minutes after the
infantry had gone over the top, a general lift was started by the guns.
The howitzers lengthened their range straight away and bombarded the
Flers-Longueval road, while the 18-pdr. barrage gradually crept forward
by 25 yards at a time, until it finally came to rest along a line about
200 yards north-east of the infantry objective. At a quarter-past six
the rate of fire dropped to the original one round per gun per minute,
while at half-past ten the close barrage was terminated and intermittent
searching and sweeping of the enemy zone was adopted in its stead.

Meanwhile, how had the day gone with the infantry? On the extreme right
the French had won a great victory and had swept all before them; the
XV. Corps had gained all its objectives save the extreme eastern corner
of Delville Wood and a small portion of Beer Trench, while on our own
immediate zone the infantry had at last swept over the objectives they
had for so long striven to capture; the enfilade gun in particular did
tremendous damage, the infantry reporting numbers of the enemy found
dead in New Trench and thereby testifying to the great effects which may
be expected of field guns firing in true enfilade. All night long till
7.30 A.M. on the 25th the batteries stood by to answer S.O.S. calls, and
kept a slow rate of fire on their zones whilst the infantry consolidated
the position, but no counter-attack materialised, and in the morning we
still held firmly the ground we had captured the previous day. Great
praise accrued to infantry and gunners for the success of these
operations; in particular the G.O.C. R.A. 14th Division sent personal
congratulations to Lieut.-Colonel Harris (162nd Brigade) who, from his
observation station near Longueval whence all the battle could clearly
be viewed, sent back situation reports which reached the General Officer
commanding the 33rd Division before reports came in from any other
source, thereby enabling him to deal quickly with every new point as it
arose. There was only one disappointing feature in the whole of the
attack, and that was the enormous number of "dud" shells fired by our
heavy artillery. Not more than 40 per cent. of their shells burst
properly, whilst the German heavies obtained at least 95 per cent.
detonations which caused the most appalling destruction wherever they
occurred. It was a sidelight—but an important one—of the battle, nor,
for many months, did this serious state of affairs right itself.

Hitherto the enemy had not shown many signs of retaliation for the
operations of the past few days, but at 8 o'clock on the morning of
Friday, the 25th, the storm broke. Every battery position was heavily
bombarded throughout the day with shells of every calibre up to 8 in.,
and this at a time when it was essential that ammunition wagons should
be able to reach the guns to refill their depleted stocks. All day long
the storm raged so severely that in certain cases the detachments had to
be withdrawn from the guns. Major Johnston of B/162 was killed whilst
sending his men into cover—a loss which the brigade ill could suffer—and
many of the detachments were killed and wounded; so violent, indeed, was
the shell fire that the 18-pdr. battery positions of the 162nd Brigade,
churned up from end to end, were rendered quite uninhabitable, and
during that night and the following day new positions were taken up
about 500 yards further to the north-east.

While this was going on, the batteries of the 156th Brigade group were
also changing positions, but this time for tactical purposes. In order
to be able to bombard Ginchy, new positions 1,500 yards south-east of
Longueval and along the sunken road running from that village to
Bernafay Wood had been reconnoitred, and were now taken up, while the
zones of the other brigades at the same time side-slipped 800 yards to
the right and covered the ground immediately north-east of Delville
Wood. Fearful weather, moreover, broke over the whole battlefield. Rain
and wind in endless storms turned the countryside into a vast sea of
mud, and, catching the batteries of the 156th and 162nd Brigades in
their new and only partially prepared positions, caused them not merely
extreme discomfort but real difficulty in being able to fight their guns
at all. No roads led to the batteries, but merely dry weather tracks
across roughly beaten-down shell holes and trenches, and for a time it
seemed as though they must be cut off from all sources of ammunition
supply. Nevertheless, during the 27th and 28th the wagons of the
batteries, aided by our own D.A.C. and the Column of the 7th Division,
struggled through the mud with load after load, gunners and passing
infantry helping the teams to reach the positions, and by the evening of
the 27th not only had all the batteries refilled their normal gun-line
dumps, but the 156th Brigade had gone even further and had brought up
6,000 rounds per battery in conformation with an order they had only
received 24 hours previously! It had been intended on the 29th to resume
the offensive with the French and Fourth Armies, and indeed the 156th
Brigade group did actually carry out a seven-hour bombardment of Ginchy
before the order to stop reached them; the weather was too bad, no
infantry could have attacked with any hope of success, and accordingly
the operations were postponed until finer weather should supervene.

This lull was very welcome, for it gave the batteries an opportunity of
digging in and of draining their positions so as to render them slightly
more habitable. The infantry of the 14th Division had, on the 26th and
27th, bombed their way with only minor artillery support right through
the remaining corner of Delville Wood, and now held the entire wood
together with a portion of Beer Trench which hitherto had successfully
resisted capture. The position therefore seemed entirely favourable for
a renewal of the attack if only the weather would clear, but this it
showed no signs of doing.

As a matter of fact, the first renewal of hostilities came from the
German side. On the 30th the 33rd Division infantry had been relieved by
the 24th Division, and hardly had the latter settled into their trenches
when, at 1 P.M. on the 31st, the Germans launched a big attack along the
whole line from High Wood to east and south-east of Delville Wood. A
heavy barrage was immediately opened upon them, while Captain van
Straubenzee and Lieut. Body, who were at the O.P. at the time, got all
the guns of the 162nd Brigade to bear with tremendous effect upon a
large force of the enemy in Cocoa Lane, and the infantry on the front of
the 33rd Divisional batteries held their ground. For a long time the
situation was obscure and, indeed, extremely anxious; the final report,
however, showed that the part of Tea Trench lying west of the Flers Road
and a portion of Wood Lane had been evacuated by our infantry, but that
elsewhere no serious encroachment had occurred on our front, although
serious reports were heard of the state of affairs to the east of
Delville Wood.

So ended the month of August, and with September there came an
improvement in the weather, and a consequent promise of further
operations. On the afternoon of the 1st the expected orders were
received; once again the French and the Fourth Army were to attack, once
again was an attempt to be made to beat down the stubborn German
resistance. The bombardment was due to begin on the 2nd, but before this
could be done a slight rearrangement of the batteries had to be carried
out. On the night of August 31st, from 11 P.M. till 4 P.M. on the
morning of the 1st, thousands of lethal and lachrymose shells had been
poured down upon the batteries of the 156th Brigade group, and
especially upon A and B/167. Casualties from gas poisoning were
fortunately slight owing to the immunity offered by P.H. helmets, but
B/167 proved an exception and suffered so many casualties, including its
battery commander, that it had to be withdrawn immediately from the
line, its place being taken by C/167 which, it will be remembered, was
still out at rest. At the same time Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart took
over the command of the 166th Brigade in place of Lieut.-Colonel Murray,
who was evacuated also suffering from gas poisoning.

The bombardment for this new attack began at 8 A.M. on the 2nd,
operation orders showing that it was to be on a great scale, extending
along the whole of the Fourth Army front from Thiepval on the left to
Guillemont on the right, and from there being carried on by the French
to as far south as the Somme. The Fourth Army attack was to be carried
out by the XIV. Corps (on the right), the XV. (centre) and the III.
Corps (on the left), the objectives of the XIV. Corps being Falfemont
Farm and Guillemont, and from there to advance and establish a line
along the Wedge Wood-Ginchy road to as far north as the right of the XV.
Corps. The XV. Corps aimed at capturing Ginchy and its surrounding
trenches, also Vat Alley, Pint Trench to its junction with Ale Alley,
and Ale Alley itself. Further to the left the 24th Division were ordered
to capture Beer Trench from its junction with Ale Alley, or such
portions as had not been previously captured, to retake the portion of
Wood Lane which they had lost during the previous two days and to link
up with the 1st Division on their left, the objective of which was the
north-east half of Wood Lane and the German intermediate line both to
High Wood and to a point 200 yards west thereof. The 162nd and 166th
Brigades were supporting the 24th Division, while the 156th Brigade
group bombarded Ginchy.

All the day and night of the 2nd and during the morning of the 3rd the
guns bombarded their allotted targets—the enemy front and support line
and the hollows in which his reserves might congregate. Very special
injunctions had been issued by the Commander-in-Chief for every possible
step to be taken which would lead to success, and all ranks were to be
fully impressed with the necessity of knowing what was expected of them.
In addition, every care was to be taken to nurse guns and howitzers
during the bombardment, so that as many as possible might be in action
when the infantry assault took place.

Zero hour was noon on Sunday, September 3rd, and it is most satisfactory
to note that, as the infantry went over the top, every gun and howitzer
in the brigades was in action, firing at intense rate and none the
worse, owing to careful attention, for the heavy work of the previous
days. Lieut.-Colonel Harris observed and reported upon the battle during
the entire day from his observation station in an old German trench west
of Delville Wood, and from his position informed Divisional Headquarters
of the somewhat sensational events of the day, sensational in victory
upon most parts, in unexpected reverses around High Wood.

At first the attack swept forward unchecked; at 12.15 P.M. Cameron
Highlanders of the 1st Division were seen to advance into Wood Lane
almost without opposition; parties proceeded round the east corner and
along the north-east face of the trench[1] and reached, towards the
east, a point fifty yards beyond the enemy trench. At the same time
parties crossed Wood Lane and were seen to jump into the trench running
eastwards along the crest. At 12.30 P.M. a second infantry battalion
left Black Watch Trench, about three hundred yards south-west of Wood
Lane, and advanced towards the latter under heavy machine-gun fire from
the right flank; the Camerons were still seen to be advancing over the
sky-line east of High Wood, and seemed to be working towards New Trench
which ran at right angles to Wood Lane. At 1.25 P.M. these troops
appeared to be held up by parties of the enemy, but the Camerons
surrounded the latter to the north and bombing encounters took place;
the whole of the remainder of the Camerons then disappeared over the
sky-line towards Switch Trench, where they were stopped and suffered
heavy casualties. During all this time there was very little hostile
artillery activity except for a medium barrage of 5·9 in.'s upon
Delville Wood, and the infantry attack continued successfully and
uninterrupted, the depth of assault being small.

Footnote 1:

  _The front-line here ran north-west and south-east._

At two o'clock in the afternoon, however, came the first hint of the
turn of the tide. A report was received that large numbers of the enemy
were collecting in Switch Trench along two hundred yards of its length
east of the Flers-Longueval road, and the howitzers opened a fifteen
minutes' intense bombardment for their dispersal. At twenty-five minutes
past three the enemy were seen to advance on Wood Lane, our infantry
retiring about two hundred yards in front of them. The Germans came from
a north-easterly direction, entered the east corner of High Wood, the
north-west portion of Wood Lane and the trench running east along the
crest; we still held the southern portion of Wood Lane. As soon as this
was seen, nine guns of the 162nd Brigade were pulled out and switched
round on to the enemy counter-attack which, however, did not advance
over the crest but halted on reaching the trench running along the
crest. At the same time small parties of the enemy were seen advancing
westwards from the gate which stood out on the sky-line midway between
High Wood and Delville Wood. By 3.35 P.M. the enemy were occupying the
whole of the sky-line from High Wood for three hundred yards eastwards,
and appeared to be unmolested by any artillery fire except that of the
nine guns already referred to. No other battery or brigade appeared to
get on to them or even to observe them, and this extraordinary and quite
inexplicable state of affairs lasted for a considerable time. Not till
very late was any sort of barrage put down upon them, and even then it
was a long way over the crest and very meagre in quality. In the
meantime the enemy dug themselves in again, and at ten minutes to six
about one hundred of our men were seen actually retiring from the
direction of Switch Trench.

Thus, on this front, the whole attack was rendered utterly fruitless by
the assaulting troops being apparently ignorant of the nature and
locality of their objective; consequently, finding little resistance,
they overran the points to be taken, and were cut up on retiring. The
attack itself in its initial stages was as fine as there ever has been,
and had the promise of a great victory, but the final result of the
whole day's operation was that our line at seven o'clock in the evening
between High Wood and Delville Wood was the same as before the attack,
while the sacrifice and loss of life had been appalling. It was all the
more difficult to bear this disappointment, moreover, when news of the
battle on the rest of the front was received. All along the line great
successes had been achieved both by our troops and by the French; the
roll of prisoners and captured guns was appreciably swelled, and a
considerable and important advance had been made. Only on the High
Wood-Delville Wood sector did the front remain unchanged; there the two
woods, black, forbidding and grim, shattered by shells and burnt by both
sides to clear the appalling stench of the dead, stood like two
sentinels barring all further progress, obstacles of the most deadly
type.

It was not granted to the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery to
see these two woods completely and permanently in our hands. On the
morning of the 5th the battery commanders of the 1st and 2nd New Zealand
Field Artillery Brigades came up with one section apiece, and began to
take over from the 33rd battery commanders. Next day, Wednesday the 6th,
the relief was complete; New Zealanders took over our positions together
with the support of the front, and the batteries wound their way wearily
back to the wagon lines, whence, after a short halt, they continued the
march to Bonnay (156th and 162nd Brigades) and to Neuville (166th and
167th Brigades).

Thus closed a chapter in the life of the 33rd Divisional Artillery. For
eight continuous weeks—with one rest of ten days in the middle—they had
been in action in the Battle of the Somme, the greatest offensive
undertaken up to that date. For eight weeks they had continuously
bombarded the enemy and had, as continuously, been raked by hostile
shell fire in return. It would be impossible to estimate the number of
shells—which ran into tens of thousands—which the batteries had fired in
that period; suffice it to say that in spite of nervous and physical
exhaustion, in spite of the fact that seldom could more than two hours'
sleep in twenty-four be obtained, that food was oft-times short, that
daily the men saw their comrades maimed, shattered, blown to pieces
before their eyes, and daily waited for their own turn to come; despite
all these trials and horrors not one single order was ever issued to the
batteries, not one single request was ever made by the infantry which
was not immediately acted upon by the guns. Eight different divisions
were covered by the batteries during the period July 15th to September
6th; fourteen separate attacks were carried out during that time and,
whether acting under the orders of their own C.R.A. or of the C.R.A. of
a strange division, the part allotted to the batteries was invariably
carried out to the letter.

From August 1st onwards the headquarters of the 33rd Divisional
Artillery had remained out at rest, and the tactical handling of the
brigades had, during all the remainder of the time and in all the
succeeding battles, been under the control of other and strange
divisions. In view of this, it would be impossible to praise too highly
the Brigade commanders who throughout the operations were responsible
for the handling of the batteries; to the battery commanders there was
always—even in the worst of times—the supreme comfort of knowing that
behind them was their own brigade headquarters, and that whatever
happened they were amongst friends; but to the brigade commanders there
was the great responsibility, the great burden of knowing, during the
final five weeks, that above them, watching them, relying upon them, was
a strange division with whom they had never co-operated before, whose
officers were, in many cases, unknown to them.

Yet the real and full measure of praise was due and was agreed by all to
be due entirely to—the men. No words can aptly describe their splendid
courage and endurance maintained right up to the end of these eight
weeks of continual battle; those men who, some of them twelve months
before, had been ordinary civilians, who in the early days of July had
marched from Cuinchy and Cambrin, full of enthusiasm and eagerness, up
to this their first battle, _they_ were the real victors. As they
marched back now to the wagon lines, a body of tired and weary men with
the strain of the past weeks writ deeply in their faces and in their
eyes; as they turned their backs upon the battery positions, where the
torn and shell-strewn ground held many a rough cross and many a mound to
bear silent but eloquent testimony to the sacrifices which had been
made, they presented a spectacle to silence for ever the pessimists and
pacifists at home who, by their whining and selfishness, were
undermining the morale of the nation. If the men of England,
half-trained, inexperienced, civilians of twelve months ago can perform
such deeds as these, then must England indeed live!




                              CHAPTER IV.
           DAINVILLE, HEBUTERNE AND THE BATTLE OF THE ANCRE.
                     (SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER 1916.)


In the foregoing chapter the doings of the Divisional Artillery in the
Battle of the Somme have been chronicled, and, in view of the very heavy
strain undergone by all ranks, it might be expected that at least a
short rest would have been granted before the batteries went into action
again. This, however, was not to be, for the wastage of men was
tremendous at the moment, and so great was the necessary concentration
of guns for any attack that every available battery was kept in the
line. The nearest approach to a rest that could be hoped for was the
taking over of some part of the line which was quiet—changing places, in
fact, with batteries on some other portion of the front, and this is
practically what was done by the artillery whose doings we are
following.

On September 6th, as already noted, the brigades moved out of action and
spent the night around Bonnay and La Neuville (just north of Corbie). On
the 7th the whole Divisional Artillery, under orders to go into action
on the Arras front, marched northwards and, passing through La Houssoye,
Behincourt, Molliens-au-Bois and Villiers Bocage, spent the night at
Havernas (156th Brigade), Wargnies (162nd Brigade) and Flesselles (166th
and 167th Brigades). Next morning the march was resumed, and the night
of the 8th was passed at Le Meillard (156th and 162nd Brigades),
Outrebois (166th Brigade) and Occoches-le-Petit (167th Brigade). On and
on they went, stopping on the 9th at Grouches, Lucheux, Bout-des-Pres
and Le Marais Sec, and on the 10th at Hauteville, Wanquetin and
Montenescourt, the day's march as a rule beginning about 9.30 A.M. and
finishing shortly after two o'clock in the afternoon. A short halt was
called in the Wanquetin-Montenescourt area on the 10th, nor was any
further move made till the 13th, the time being occupied in a
reorganisation of the Divisional Artillery.

                            ORDER OF BATTLE.

                        SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER 1916.

                                H.Q.R.A.

               C.R.A.                 Brigade Major.    Staff Captain.

   Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G.       Major H. K.       Capt. T. C.
                                      Sadler, D.S.O.        Usher.

                             156th Brigade.

                      Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd.

                      Adjutant: Lieut. E. H. Prior.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

 Major S. Talbot.     Major M. A.     Major G. Lomer,     Capt. W. G.
                      Studd, M.C.         D.S.O.       Pringle (4-gun).

                             162nd Brigade.

                   Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.

                    Adjutant: Lieut. T. D. Shepherd.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Major Hill.        Major V.        Major A. van     Capt. T. St. P.
                   Benett-Stanford,  Straubenzee, M.C.     Bunbury.
                         M.C.

                             166th Brigade.

              Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O.

                      Adjutant: Lieut. S. M. Wood.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Capt. H. A.    Capt. Hon. T. P.   Capt. Freeman.       Capt. B.
    Littlejohn.       P. Butler.                        McCallum, M.C.

                      Capt. Dust.

                             167th Brigade.

                               Broken up.

It will be remembered that just before the Battle of the Somme a change
had been made in the formation of the brigades, and that the 167th
Brigade (until then a 4·5 in. Howitzer Brigade) was so split up that the
four brigades each had three 18-pdr. batteries and one 4·5 in. howitzer
battery, each battery consisting of four guns. Very early in 1916,
however, B/167 had been posted away to another division, and therefore,
after the reorganisation of the brigades before the Battle of the Somme,
the 167th Brigade consisted only of the three 18-pdr. batteries which it
had received from each of the brigades in return for the 4·5 in.
howitzer battery it had sent to them. It was now ordered that all
18-pdr. batteries should consist of six guns, and therefore from
September 11th the 167th Brigade ceased to exist. Sections of each of
its batteries were sent to the 156th and 162nd Brigades, Lieut.-Colonel
C. G. Stewart assumed command of the 166th Brigade, and on September
13th, with six-gun batteries of 18-pdrs. (except for the 166th Brigade),
but with the 4·5 in. howitzer batteries still consisting of only four
pieces each, the Divisional Artillery resumed its march and moved into
action once more on the Arras front near Dainville. One section per
battery went up on the first night and began taking over from the 37th
Divisional Artillery, and on the night of the 14th/15th the remaining
sections of the batteries moved in, assuming, from 6 A.M. on the morning
of Friday the 15th, responsibility for the artillery support of the
infantry on their front; the 156th Brigade covered the 35th Division,
the 162nd and 166th Brigades the 12th Division, each brigade for
fighting being under the control of the C.R.A. of the Division behind
whose infantry it lay. In addition, the artillery on the front was
divided up into groups, and Lieut.-Colonel Harris, from his headquarters
in the white house on the Arras-Doullens road, controlled not only his
own batteries but also C/63 and D/64 which, together with the 162nd
Brigade, went to form "G" group. "H" group was administered by
Lieut.-Colonel Stewart.

At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that, owing to the huge
concentration of artillery on the "live" sectors of the front, no
batteries could be spared to go into the rest area, and that therefore
the best which could be hoped for was a comparatively quiet time on a
peaceful part of the line. This was what the batteries at Dainville were
hoping for, and this was what they badly needed after the strenuous days
of the Somme fighting; it is therefore interesting to note what happened
to them in the following few days, for it will give a good idea of the
worry and hardship which thoroughly bad staff work can give, and which
it did give, to men already tired by fighting.

By their northward march the batteries had left the XV. Corps of the
Fourth Army and were now under the orders of the XVII. Corps, Third
Army. On the night of September 14th/15th, after six weeks' heavy
fighting and four days' marching to follow, the batteries moved into
action; at seven o'clock on the evening of the 15th, just eleven hours
after the batteries had assumed responsibility for the defence of the
front, orders were received to move out of action and to march south to
the VII. Corps area to cover the infantry of the 33rd Division, the 12th
Divisional Artillery taking over the Dainville sector. This in itself
was not so very bad; it is true that, as a result of the orders, leave
which had just reopened both for England and for the Boulogne rest camp
was stopped, and it was generally felt that the batteries might equally
as well have marched to the VII. Corps area in the first case. There was
the consolation of knowing, however, that once again the batteries were
to cover their own infantry, and occasional mistakes of this kind were
not altogether unusual.

This, unfortunately, was not all. On the night of the 15th/16th one
section per battery withdrew from action and moved to the
Coullemont-Warlincourt-Couturelle area, the remainder of the batteries,
except those of the 156th Brigade, following on twenty-four hours later.
The next night the leading sections marched into action as ordered on
the Gommecourt front, relieving the batteries of the 17th Divisional
Artillery, and twenty-four hours later, on the night of the 17th/18th,
they were joined by the remaining sections who had left the Dainville
positions vacant; at the same time the 156th Brigade marched to
Gaudiempré and came into action, on the morning of the 19th, north-east
of Sailly-au-Bois. Thus on September 19th all the batteries were in
action on the Gommecourt front, and wagon-lines had been established
around Gaudiempré and Pas.

So far, so good, but now chaos set in. On the 20th, after the batteries
had been in action just twenty-four hours, orders were received for the
162nd Brigade to sideslip and relieve the batteries of the 78th Brigade,
forming the northern group. This was done by one section per battery and
was to have been completed on the 21st, but was cancelled late on that
evening; instead of sideslipping, the batteries were ordered to return
to their old positions on the Arras front which they had quitted five
days previously, were relieved by the 46th Divisional Artillery and
retired to their wagon-lines at Pas, while at the same time
half-batteries of the 156th Brigade moved out of the line to wagon-lines
around Wanquetin and Montenescourt. At noon on the 22nd the remaining
sections of the 46th Divisional Artillery relieved what had been left in
the line of the 33rd, and the batteries of the latter returned to their
old wagon-lines around Wanquetin and Sombrin. Two sections per battery
(156th and 162nd Brigades) moved into action the same night (22nd/23rd)
in the Dainville sector and were joined by the remaining sections next
day, while on the 24th the 166th Brigade came into action between
Dainville and Arras, forming once again "H" Group of Artillery in the
Dainville sector. Thus after a general shuffle, numerous orders and
counter orders, general disturbance and three days' marching, the
batteries were in exactly the same positions which they had occupied ten
days before. They had marched all the way to Gommecourt for
nothing—merely to inhabit positions for twelve hours and then to return
to Arras and Dainville again. Yet these were tired men who ached for
rest and a little comfort.

It may be thought that at this stage the Higher Authority would have
been able to sort matters out and to run their administration on
slightly more efficient lines, but nothing of the sort was experienced.
On October 1st, six days later, the good game of battledore and
shuttlecock between XVII. and VII. Corps was continued, and orders were
again received to march to the VII. Corps area, the scene of the
previous excursion. On the 3rd the leading sections of the batteries set
out over the now well-known road and, after establishing themselves once
more in wagon-lines around Gaudiempré on the 4th, came into action on
the Gommecourt front on the 5th, where they were joined 48 hours later
by the remaining sections which had stayed behind at Arras to cover the
move. Thus, in order to carry out the apparently simple work of
transferring a Divisional Artillery from the Arras to the Gommecourt
front, somebody amongst the Higher Command had forced the unfortunate
batteries to march down from one front to the other, sideslip, return
along the road to their original Arras front, and then march all the way
down again to the zone they had been in after the very first march!

Strange to say, the batteries really did remain now on the Gommecourt
front, and, as they took part from there in operations connected with
the Battle of the Ancre, it will be well to examine their positions
carefully.

The 156th Brigade established itself around Sailly, the 162nd just south
of Fonquevillers, and the 166th Brigade north of the same village, the
advantage of these positions being that the hostile trenches west of
Gommecourt could be barraged in enfilade—the deadly effect of which had
already been proved in the Battle of the Somme—while the batteries could
also cut wire on various parts of the front east of Hebuterne to as far
as Rossignol Wood. This wire-cutting was, indeed, the main occupation of
the batteries, and every moment of good visibility was utilised to carry
out the tedious and extremely difficult work.

[Illustration:

  Scale 1:40.000.
]

The 49th Division was holding the line at the time, and the batteries
working under 33rd Divisional Artillery Headquarters (who in its turn
was controlled by the 49th Division) covered the front from "The Z" to
the south-west corner of Gommecourt Park, wire-cutting being carried out
mainly just below and south of the Gommecourt-Fonquevillers road. From
the 7th till the 11th, when the wire-cutting was finished, the work went
on daily without interruption; on the 8th D/162 (Major Belgrave) had
exchanged positions with a battery of the 48th Division and had moved
into Hebuterne itself, while on the 9th the batteries were placed under
control of VII. Corps direct, and were relieved of the responsibility of
covering the 49th Divisional front as far as infantry support was
concerned, but apart from these small interruptions no distraction of
any importance was suffered. Hostile artillery was sufficiently active
to be rather troublesome—the tactics employed being occasional short
bursts of shelling and sniping rounds into the battery positions, a
procedure which kept all ranks unpleasantly on the _qui vive_, and it
was with a feeling of satisfaction that the report was made on the 11th
that wire-cutting was complete.

Here the batteries had a slight rest from the continual firing of the
previous days, but not so the brigade commanders. On the 12th orders
were received that the brigade commanders of the 33rd Divisional
Artillery should supervise the wire-cutting of the 79th Brigade, and no
sooner was this done than positions had to be reconnoitred for the
batteries on the neighbouring Serre front. The reconnaissance was
carried out on September 18th, and the following day the batteries moved
into positions from which they were destined to take part in the Battle
of the Ancre. The move in this case was of no magnitude whatever; the
batteries of the 156th Brigade lay east of Sailly-au-Bois, the 162nd
Brigade took up positions south of Hebuterne, with the exception of "D"
battery which was in Hebuterne itself, while the 166th Brigade shifted
to the north of the same village. Once again wire-cutting was the order
of the day. The front covered by the batteries, held at this time by
infantry of the 31st Division, extended from west of Puisieux to as far
south as Serre, and wire-cutting was concentrated on the zone stretching
from the cross roads south-east of The Point to 300 yards north-east of
John Copse, the batteries being under direct control of the XIII. Corps.

From October 20th until November 13th the batteries were kept in a state
of high activity. Every day wire-cutting was continued, and bursts of
fire were directed day and night upon the gaps cut in the wire to
prevent the repair thereof. At the same time all the hostile approaches,
communication trenches and trench junctions were constantly bombarded,
and here again every endeavour was made to prevent the enemy from
putting right such damage as had been done. These tactics naturally used
up a large amount of ammunition, and as naturally evoked swift
retaliation from the enemy. Every night, as the ammunition wagons toiled
up from the wagon-lines around Couin and St. Leger with supplies for the
guns, they met the blast of the German shells searching the approaches
around Sailly, Colincamps and Hebuterne. Nightly did the Germans take
their toll of men and horses engaged upon the work of ammunition supply,
while an ever-lengthening casualty list in the battery positions showed
that the enemy, provoked to wrath and apprehension by the obviously
deliberate and premeditated cutting of his wire, was not replying in
vain. He knew, from the destruction of his wire, that an attack was
imminent, and realising this he turned the full blast of his attention
upon the batteries; they were the chief danger at the moment, whereas
the infantry could be attended to later when the day of assault grew
nearer at hand.

The tactics of the enemy were as before; not usually long bombardments,
but sudden short bursts of fire upon the battery positions, catching men
unawares and making them dread even the narrow open spaces between the
guns. Every day these bursts—sometimes only a few sniping rounds—cut
down the effectives at the gun positions, until Hebuterne became a word
of ill omen to all. Still the work continued; the back areas of the
enemy system began to receive attention, Puisieux was bombarded on the
22nd in conjunction with the heavy artillery, and on the 26th the first
infantry raiding party went over to obtain identification of the troops
opposite and to examine the effect of the previous six days'
wire-cutting. After two half-hour bombardments, with an interval of two
hours between, a party of the 93rd Infantry Brigade set out to enter the
hostile lines, but an enemy better known almost than the Germans and in
its way equally deadly, the enemy Mud, prevented them from even reaching
the German parapet. So heavy was the going in No Man's Land that it
became a physical impossibility to get across, and after many efforts
the infantry returned to our own trenches.

Once again wire-cutting and trench bombardment were resumed, and now the
enemy became more violent still in his reply. Nightly did he pour
thousands of gas shells into the battery positions, forcing the men to
wear their box-respirators during what little rest they could achieve
and depriving them of their badly-needed sleep. Practically every day
the villages of Sailly and Hebuterne were shelled by 15 cm. and 10 cm.
howitzers, while a deliberate bombardment of batteries and brigade
headquarters was carried out during the last three days of the month. On
November 2nd another attempt was made by the 31st Division to raid the
enemy trenches east of Hebuterne, and throughout the night of the
2nd/3rd a heavy flank and covering barrage was kept up by the batteries
to support the infantry in their hazardous task. Once again, however,
failure had to be confessed. The utter impassability of No Man's Land,
owing to mud and water-filled shell-holes, combined with very brisk
enemy opposition forced the raiding parties back to their trenches
again, and once more were the batteries left in ignorance of the effect
of their work.

It was essential, however, that the enemy lines should be penetrated,
for the non-success of the previous two raids had led to a lack of
knowledge of the hostile troops opposite, and had prevented an
examination being made of the German wire. Accordingly, on November 6th,
a third and this time in part successful attempt was made. After a
20-minute bombardment during which three raiding parties crept into No
Man's Land, a hurricane barrage for six minutes was carried out, under
cover of which the raiders set out for the enemy trenches between The
Point and the Sunken Road. Heavy machine-gun fire was encountered and
the two raiding parties on the left were held up, but on the right the
party covered by the 162nd Brigade forced its way into the enemy line,
bombed dug-outs, examined the wire and returned safely to its own
trenches bringing with it, for purposes of identification, five
prisoners, of whom one died on arrival.

Matters now began to move rapidly. From the 7th to the 10th the enemy
bombarded Sailly and Hebuterne heavily, and on the night of the 9th
fired 4,000 gas shells into our battery positions; on the 10th also
began the final three-day bombardment by our batteries before the
launching of the assault to be known in history as the Battle of the
Ancre. The 10th, 11th and 12th, designated in the secret operation
orders as W, X and Y days, marked a doubling and trebling intensity of
bombardment on the enemy trenches; the German front and support lines
were pounded and flung in all directions, wire was cut, gaps and
breaches were kept under constant bursts of fire to prevent repair, and
when November 13th dawned it seemed that no more could be done, and
that, in view of the bad visibility and weather existing during these
days, every possible preparation had been made.

Zero hour on Monday, the 13th, was a quarter to six in the morning;
sharp to the second the guns roared forth the barrage, the infantry
advanced to the assault and the Battle of the Ancre, which for so long
had been fomenting, burst out in all its fury. The 33rd Divisional
Artillery was covering the extreme left of the battle line, its zone
extending from John Copse on the right through the Touvert Farm-La
Louverie Farm road to the left of the line of assault, and was
supporting the infantry of the 31st Division by whom the attack was to
be made. On the front of the batteries the wire was found to be
completely and successfully cut, the barrage proved entirely
satisfactory and the infantry, assaulting and passing over the German
front line, advanced to their next objective—the German second
line—along the whole of the front from Puisieux to as far south as
Serre.

On the whole the hostile barrage was not severe until noon, when No
Man's Land and our front system were very heavily bombarded. Every
morning from 5.45 till 6 A.M. for the previous three days a heavy
barrage had been fired on the German trenches so that, after the first
two occasions, the enemy grew used to these barrages and could not tell
whether an attack was coming or not. During the assault itself, which
was helped by a heavy fog, the chief casualties were suffered from rifle
and machine-gun fire coming from the German second line, while heavy mud
in No Man's Land made the advance extremely tedious. The German front
line, as already noted, was successfully captured in spite of these
difficulties, the enemy in most cases being caught by surprise and
surrendering on close fighting, and it was not until the advance on the
second line began that real trouble was met.

The 3rd Division, to whom had been allotted the capture of Serre, was
unable, owing to the mud and heavy enemy opposition, to reach its
objective, and the 31st Division found itself with its right flank in
the air. All day long fighting continued, our casualties being terribly
heavy, while the batteries barraged with all their might in the hope of
protecting the 31st Division until such time as the 3rd Division, by
advancing on the right, should secure the flank. It was all of no avail,
however; after twelve hours of raging battle orders were received from
Corps Headquarters to evacuate the captured ground, and this was done in
the evening under a protective barrage from the guns of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery. Thus on this particular front no advance was made,
while the casualties were so heavy that strong patrols had to be sent
out during the night to cover the bringing in of the wounded. It should
be remembered, however, that the operations described formed only the
extreme left of a great battle, and that, although the flank was held
up, the centre advanced with such success that Beaumont-Hamel was
captured together with 3,000 prisoners, while an advance was made on to
the outskirts of Beaumont village itself. Therefore, in considering the
results of the Battle of the Ancre, the foregoing narrative which
concerns only the batteries on the extreme flank must not be taken
alone, but in connection with the history of the rest of that day along
the whole front of assault.

Next day, after firing a dummy barrage in the early morning in
co-operation with an attack further to the south, the batteries of the
33rd Divisional Artillery gave up their part in the Battle of the Ancre
and began to retire to their wagon-lines. Two batteries per brigade—"C"
and D/156 with "B" and "D" of 162nd and 166th—moved out on the night of
the 14th/15th to the area around Couin and St. Leger, and on the
following night were joined by the rest of the brigades. Here they
remained till the 22nd, cleaning, reorganising and resting, with
occasional very unwelcome returns to their old battery positions to
remove ammunition; here with the most profound regret they bade farewell
to Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, whose gallantry and personality had won
for him a firm affection and friendship in the hearts of all ranks, and
who now, on handing the command of the 156th Brigade to Major Bridges,
went to take over a Horse Artillery Brigade with the 1st Indian Cavalry
Division (there to meet his death while directing the batteries in the
Cambrai offensive of 1917); and from here they marched on November 22nd
through Villers Bocage and Talmas to Airaines, to enjoy in this, the
middle of November 1916, the first rest which they had been granted,
with the exception of ten days during the Battle of the Somme, since
they had gone into action nine months previously.

At Airaines they remained till December 5th, when they set out once more
with their faces turned towards the east to relieve the French and to
hold, throughout the winter, the ground wrested from the Germans in the
Battle of the Somme. The story of that long and trying winter in bitter
cold and deep mud, the tale of how the Germans were so continually
harassed by artillery fire that they were forced to carry out the
retreat of February 1917 to the famous Hindenburg line, belongs to
another chapter in the life-story of the batteries, and as such must be
relegated thereto.




                               CHAPTER V.
                       WINTER ON THE SOMME 1916.


From November 23rd, the date of arrival at Airaines, until December 5th
when the first units began the march back to the line again, a complete
rest was enjoyed by the batteries, and badly was it needed. Clothing,
harness and equipment had to be overhauled carefully, casualties amongst
men and horses replaced, while many of the reinforcements lately arrived
from England were not fit to take their place in the gun detachments or
teams, and needed a thorough drilling to change them from the half-raw
condition in which they had left England to something more nearly
approaching the necessary smartness and accuracy required in the field.
Moreover a certain staleness, the inevitable result of a long period of
continuous fighting, had descended upon the batteries as a whole, and it
needed a period of brisk training interspersed with half-holidays,
concerts and games of every description to bring back the old spring and
confidence.

On November 29th the first hint was received of the destination of the
batteries when fighting should once more become the order of the day,
for on that date Brig.-Gen. Blane set off for Maurepas—the extreme left
of the French on the Somme—there to hold a conference with the French
General commanding the artillery of the French XX. Corps. On December
1st the full facts were known, and a warning order was received that the
33rd Division was to take over the line from the French from
Sailly-Saillisel to a point opposite Bouchavesnes, the batteries
occupying the positions of the 127th French Regiment of Artillery.
Further it was learnt that the artillery support of the line was to be
carried out by the combined brigades of the 33rd and 40th Divisions,
each Division keeping two artillery brigades in the line and one in
rest.

On Tuesday, December 5th, the move began. A/162 and C/156 with No. 2
Section of the Divisional Ammunition Column set off early in the morning
on what was to be a three-day march, and passing through Picquigny and
Ailly-sur-Somme, halted for the first night at St. Sauveur. The second
day saw them leave Vecquemont and Corbie behind them, and on the third
day, after spending the previous night at Vaux-sur-Somme, they arrived
at Camp 14 on the Corbie-Bray road some few miles west of Bray itself.
So the move went on; on December 8th B/156 and C/162 shook the dust—or
rather mud—of Airaines from off their feet and followed the first two
batteries by the same stages; next day A/156 and B/162 followed suit,
and on December 10th the two remaining batteries—D/156 and D/162—turned
their backs upon the rest area, arriving at Camp 14 two days later.

                            ORDER OF BATTLE.

                      OCTOBER 1916—FEBRUARY 1917.

                                H.Q.R.A.

               C.R.A.                 Brigade Major.    Staff Captain.

   Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G.       Major H. K.       Capt. W. E.
                                      Sadler, D.S.O.,      Bownass.
                                           M.C.

                             156th Brigade.

                         Lieut.-Colonel Bridges.

             Adjutant: Lieut. E. H. Prior (_until January_).

                            Lieut. F. L. Lee.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

 Major S. Talbot.     Major M. A.     Major G. Lomer,     Capt. W. G.
                      Studd, M.C.         D.S.O.            Pringle
                                                       (_till January_).

                                                        Major W. A. T.
                                                         Barstow, M.C.

                             162nd Brigade.

                      Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris.

                     Adjutant: Lieut. R. H. Pavitt.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

     Major G.          Major V.        Major A. van       Major J. D.
 Fetherston, M.C.  Benett-Stanford,  Straubenzee, M.C. Belgrave, D.S.O.
                         M.C.

                             166th Brigade.

              Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O.

                      Adjutant: Lieut. S. M. Wood.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Capt. H. A.       Capt. Dust.    Capt. H. Freeman.     Capt. B.
 Littlejohn, M.C.                                       McCallum, M.C.

While this march was in progress matters had been moving up in front,
for on December 8th the 156th and 162nd Brigade commanders (166th
Brigade had been left in rest at Airaines) went up to take over from the
French the headquarters and battery positions of the 127th Regiment of
Artillery. Taking over from the army of another nation was a somewhat
more lengthy business than an ordinary relief on the British front; the
trouble of language was not insuperable, but the difficulty of
reconciling their methods of communication and control with our own, and
of making the alterations necessary to fall in with the usual practice
of brigade and battery administration was by no means light, nor were
matters simplified by the oft-recurring phrase "ça ne marche pas" when
discussing some important telephone line from brigade to battery or O.P.

However, by December 12th all was ready for the arrival of the
batteries, and on that day there marched into action two sections each
of C/156, A/162 and C/162 who had left Camp 14 on the previous day and
had established wagon-lines at Camp 21, one mile south of Maricourt, on
the Suzanne-Maricourt road. They were followed on December 13th by
A/156, B/156 and B/162, while the 15th saw the arrival of the "D"
batteries, so that exactly ten days before Christmas the whole of the
Divisional Artillery was "back to work" again. Camp 14 had only been
used as a very brief halting place in the scheme; it acted, in fact,
merely as a place for the partial concentration of the batteries, and it
was well that this was the case, for a worse spot and a more unsuitable
artillery camp it would be difficult to find. Some distance from the
road, approached only by the roughest of tracks, it lay in a valley and
quickly showed itself to be a veritable mud-trap. The horse-lines were
bad, the men's quarters were worse, and the effort of pulling into the
camp off the road, and of struggling back on to the road again when the
march was resumed, more than counteracted any benefit which might
otherwise have accrued from the two days spent there in rest. It was
with a feeling of relief, therefore, that the batteries turned their
backs upon this much-hated spot and set out for Camp 21, their permanent
wagon-lines whilst in action. Nothing could be worse than Camp 14;
perhaps Camp 21 might be better. Perhaps!

As events turned out, Camp 21 between Suzanne and Maricourt was a slight
improvement, but very slight. It was on ground which had been the scene
of the summer and autumn offensive, and nothing could solidify the earth
which had been so torn and shattered by high explosives. The least
suspicion of rain—even of damp—turned everything into mud, while the
neighbourhood of the water-troughs, unless built up from a timber
foundation, became absolutely and completely impassable. Certain of the
batteries, in fact, which were forced to establish their wagon-lines on
the west of the road struck such fearful conditions that a number of
horses were actually drowned in the mud. It was not the fault of the
batteries or brigades—they were ordered to establish wagon-lines in a
certain spot and perforce they had to do it, nor could the most
strenuous of efforts put things right in a few days. To whomever the
fault was due, it was heart-breaking to battery commanders to see the
effects of a three weeks' rest being wiped out almost in as many days by
the impossible conditions in which some of them found themselves.

To return, however, to the tactical situation. By December 16th all the
batteries, less one section in some cases, were in action in the
Maurepas-Bouchavesnes area. Only two brigades—the 156th and the 162nd—of
the 33rd Divisional Artillery were in the line, for the 166th Brigade
had been left behind at Airaines, but to General Blane's command were
added two brigades of the 40th Divisional Artillery—the 178th and
181st—in action in Anderlu and Marrières Woods respectively, and with
these four brigades it was considered that sufficient artillery support
for the divisional front would be forthcoming. The batteries of the
162nd Brigade, with the exception of "D" Battery, lay just west of the
Clery-Le Forest road and about half-way between the two villages; "D"
battery, for reasons to be discussed presently, took up a position two
hundred yards east of Hospital Wood, while the battery positions of the
156th Brigade were congregated in the area around and east of Le Forest.

In taking over from the French a portion of the line, as was done in
this case, very considerable difficulties had to be faced from the
brigade and battery commanders' point of view. The French field
batteries consisted almost always of four guns, and to relieve them with
six-gun batteries involved either the digging of further gun-pits and
shelters for the men or the splitting up of the batteries into two
portions. In this case the 33rd Divisional Artillery was relieving three
groups (the 3rd, 4th and 5th) of French artillery, each group consisting
of three four-gun batteries, and accordingly it was resolved to take one
section each from "B" and C/156 and to combine them into a third
four-gun battery, while "A" and B/162 carried out the same procedure in
the other brigade; two guns of C/162 relieved on their own a French
battery, and A/156 was fortunate enough to take up a position in which
it was possible to keep all six guns in action together. Thus it will be
seen that the brigades were thrown into rather a disorganised condition,
but this was not all. The French Army did not maintain any batteries of
field howitzers, and therefore the 4·5 in. howitzer batteries of the two
brigades found themselves nobody's children, left out in the cold with
nobody to relieve, no battery position to take over. They were forced on
this, as on another later occasion, to buckle to and dig their own
position, and for this reason D/162, as already stated, came to the edge
of Hospital Wood and dug itself in under a small bank.

By the 16th and 17th of December the main work of establishing the
positions had been overcome, and, preliminary registration being
completed, the batteries had a chance of looking around them. The
surroundings were not inspiring; they had been wrested from the enemy
during the Somme offensive and, in common with the rest of the
battlefield, were torn and pitted with shell-holes in all directions.
The autumn and winter rains had turned the whole countryside into a vast
sea of mud, mud so deep, so thick and of such peculiar consistency that
it was altogether impossible to remove it, drain or even dig through it.
Conditions were, indeed, pitiable; every yard walked was an effort
involving absolute wading; thigh gum-boots were powerless to keep the
men dry; ammunition, rations and mail had to be brought to the battery
positions by pack-horse, for no wagon could approach, and on top of all
this it rained, rained continuously and steadfastly during the whole
period. It was indeed a wretched place, rendered more wretched by the
knowledge that Christmas—a season usually associated with comfort and
merrymaking—was fast approaching.

For some time after the arrival of the batteries on this part of the
front there was no war, for the simple reason that war was impossible.
The battery positions consisted merely of six semi-dry platforms for the
guns, separated and surrounded by apparently bottomless mud; the men
lived in wet and muddy shelters and dug-outs, and were scarcely ever
dry; telephone lines forward ran through mud which made the repair of
breaks a clumsy, maddening business, while up with the infantry there
were no trenches, no dug-outs, nothing but mud and water. Along the
whole of the divisional front there were only about four places where
anything approaching the semblance of a communication trench could be
found, and these were so bad as to be rather deeper of mud than the
surrounding ground. There was only one way to reach the front line—a
ditch full of water with a little wire in front—and that was to walk
straight over the open up to the fire trench itself, and there, if a new
arrival, drop in; if an old hand, sit on the parados.

This state of affairs may sound fantastic and even an exaggeration, but
it is only too true an account. The French, finding conditions were
well-nigh impossible for fighting, decided philosophically not to fight,
and arranged with the enemy accordingly. It was muddy for them, but just
as muddy for the enemy; it was a beastly business wading up
communication trenches which were practically non-existent to a front
line which was scarcely habitable, but it was just as beastly for the
Germans; therefore, forward observing officers going up to visit the
infantry had the strange experience of walking up to our front line over
the open, of sitting on the parapet in full view of the enemy one
hundred yards away, and of seeing the enemy doing exactly the same thing
themselves. So extraordinary were the conditions, in fact, that a
battery commander of the 162nd Brigade walked over the open with one of
his subalterns not only up to the front line but over it at a spot where
it was deserted, and had got well into No Man's Land before a sentry in
one of the adjoining bays called him back.

Whether the French method of thus maintaining an unofficial truce was a
good one need not be debated in these pages. It certainly led them to
give up making any effort to dig communication trenches at all, even in
spots where with trouble it would have been possible, and it by no means
helped to foster the "cultivation of the fighting spirit," the
importance of which was being impressed so busily upon all ranks at the
time. On the other hand it gave them a tiny measure of comfort which
made life just endurable, and by resuming active operations and reducing
the enemy to a state of misery they would have let themselves in for
similar wretchedness.

When the 33rd Division took over the line, however, the question was
left in doubt no longer. Where there was war there was to be real war
and no unofficial truce; the French protested, they tried in vain to
prevent the infantry sniping, but it was of no avail. One morning a
whole platoon of Germans marched calmly down to the front line over the
open, following the custom of bygone days; the temptation was too great,
and a Lewis gunner, hastily putting together the gun he had been
cleaning, raised it on to the parapet and browned the lot! From that
moment onwards not a head dared show above the parapet, and everybody
living in the front line or visiting it endured discomfort and hardship
beyond imagination.

Gradually, as the 33rd Division settled in, hostilities increased and
boiled up. Even so the majority of the firing was upon the back areas,
for the forward trench system—engulfed in a sea of mud—offered no target
whatever. Duckboard tracks, valleys hidden from infantry and artillery
observers where the enemy might walk about in the open, suspected
battery positions, cross-roads and other similar targets received as a
rule the attention of our guns, while the enemy administered the same
treatment to corresponding features behind our lines. The actual front
covered by the batteries extended from the enemy trenches on the
Bouchavesnes ridge northwards through Moislains Wood to the great wood
of St. Pierre Vaast. From observation stations along the ridge east of
Aiguille Ravine (in which was the artillery forward telephone exchange)
a very good view of all the enemy system could be seen except in the
extreme north of the zone, though the trenches behind the support line
were hidden owing to the steep valley which ran down towards Moislains.

Thus the year drew slowly to a close. On Christmas Day the brigades took
part in an artillery bombardment carried out along the whole Corps front
to show that "Peace on Earth, Goodwill toward Men" was not considered to
apply to Germans. In reply, the enemy increased in violence his sniping
with whizz-bangs of any portion of duckboard track and road where he
might catch ration parties or artillery teams toiling up with ammunition
from Plateau Siding, and then, on December 31st, the 166th Brigade
arrived from Airaines and relieved the batteries of the 156th. By the
system already outlined one brigade of each Divisional Artillery was
kept in rest, and beneath the envious eyes of the 162nd Brigade, whose
turn was not yet, the 156th turned their backs to the mud and marched
away to the rest and comparative comfort of G.H.Q. reserve.

The first fortnight of January proved uneventful. The same harassing
fire was continued, the same mud prevailed everywhere and the greatest
problem of all to be contended with at the time was not the enemy, but
the weather. An alarming increase in the number of cases of trench-feet
and frost-bite began to show itself, not only in the infantry but in the
artillery. For the infantry special drying rooms were erected and dry
socks were issued to every man on leaving the trenches, but the gunners
were thought to be better off, and for them there were no such
arrangements. Consequently there fell upon brigade and battery
commanders a very great strain, a strain which had to be withstood at
the time when more work began to show itself in the offing.

More work there certainly was. On January 2nd General Blane, on the
relief of the 33rd Division by the 40th, had handed over control of the
brigades to the C.R.A. 40th Division and had gone with headquarters into
rest at Belloy-sur-Somme. On January 10th there came a warning order
from his headquarters that a sideslip of the division to the right was
about to take place, and that brigade commanders were to visit the
French positions along the actual borders of the Somme next day. Close
on the heels of this came directions for the batteries to withdraw from
the line, the 166th getting away first on January 12th, followed by the
162nd Brigade four days later, and January 16th found both brigades in
rest at their wagon-lines—Camp 21, west of Maricourt.

The following six days were spent at these wagon-lines, and during the
period yet another reorganisation of the Divisional Artillery took
place. Since September 1916 there had been three brigades, the full
establishment of a brigade being three six-gun 18-pdr. batteries and one
four-gun 4·5 in. howitzer battery. It was now decreed that a Divisional
Artillery should consist of two brigades, each brigade to be of the same
composition as before but with six-gun howitzer batteries, and not four
as previously. To bring this about the 166th Brigade was broken up. One
section of D/166 went to D/156, the other to D/162; A/166 (Captain
Littlejohn) marched to Mirvaux and became part of the 26th Brigade,
while B/166 (Captain Dust) joined the 93rd Brigade at Morlancourt and
was merged in that unit. The Divisional Artillery did not lose all its
old friends, however, by this breaking up. Major Barstow was transferred
to the 156th Brigade, as was also Lieut.-Colonel Stewart who, with the
whole of the staff of the 166th Brigade H.Q., came to 156th H.Q.; the
late headquarter staff of that brigade took over the nominal command of
166th Brigade—now a brigade in name only and not in substance—and
awaited orders at Belloy as to future movements.

While this change-about had been going on, the batteries at Camp 21 had
been busy in other respects as well. Cold, dry weather had set in, and,
remembering the mud of Bouchavesnes and realising that similar
conditions existed in the positions which were shortly to be occupied on
the banks of the Somme itself, teams had been out every day making use
of the good going occasioned by the hard weather, and filling up the
ammunition pits at the battery positions which by now had been
reconnoitred by battery commanders themselves. It was the only advantage
which the 162nd Brigade, deprived by this move of the rest for which it
was nearly due, managed to gain over the 156th Brigade who were now
marching up from the rest area to the new wagon-lines around Vaux Wood
and Eclusier.

On January 22nd the move into action began. From the wagon-lines west of
Frise the batteries marched up to take over the defence of the line from
the River Somme itself on the right to the junction with the 4th
Division, some three-quarters of a mile south of Bouchavesnes, on the
left. The infantry had relieved the French 17th Division two days
previously and had been supported temporarily by the French batteries,
but now on the 24th the guns came up and, taking over from the groups of
Commandants de St. Paule, Le Gros and Rouziers of the 30th, 29th and
49th Regiments of Artillery, assumed responsibility for the support of
the line from eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Under the
control of General Blane at P.C. Jean the batteries were split up into
two groups; the left group, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Stewart,
consisted of the 156th and the 14th Brigades, while the 162nd and the
33rd Brigades, at first under the control of Lieut.-Colonel Nevinson but
ultimately, from the 31st, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Harris, went to
form the right group, each group covering one brigade of infantry in the
front line.

Battery positions on the south of the Somme had been very difficult to
find, for on clear days Mt. St. Quentin, which was in German hands,
commanded the whole of the countryside, and the concealment of flashes
was a practical impossibility. After a certain amount of debating Major
Fetherston's battery (A/162) took up a position just south of Buscourt
Cemetery, with D/162 (Major Belgrave) two hundred yards in front under
the shelter of a bank; C/162 (Major van Straubenzee) lay between
Buscourt Cemetery and the river, while Major Benett-Stanford established
his battery (B/162) with four guns to the south-east of these positions,
the remaining section being detached for enfilade work about seven
hundred yards south of Feuillières. With Brigade headquarters situated
in an old German second-line trench one hundred yards behind "C"
battery, the whole of the 162nd was thoroughly compact and well together
and, from the point of view of administration, excellently placed.

The 162nd was the only brigade of the 33rd Division lying south of the
Somme. The batteries were, in fact, the first British guns to return
there since the very early days of the war, and it fell to them now to
occupy the extreme right of the British line in France, just as they
also occupied the extreme left of that same line on the beach at
Nieuport some six months later. The batteries of the 156th Brigade all
lay to the north of the river, "A" and C/156 (Major Talbot and Major
Lomer) to the east of Howitzer Wood and 2,000 yards N.W. of
Clery-sur-Somme, "B" and D/156 (Major Studd and Major Barstow) south of
the same wood, and from here they continued the good work of harassing
the enemy in the position to which he had been forced back by the
offensive of the foregoing months.

On January 25th battery commanders studied and registered their new
zones. The German line here ran from the river Somme to the west corner
of Limberlost Wood, and on through Freckles Wood in a north-easterly
direction. Observation stations north of the river were situated on the
high ground west of Hersfeld Trench, while to the south of the river,
from a high hill running sheer down to the water about 1,200 yards due
west of Halle, a magnificent enfilade view right down on to the front
covered could be obtained, and also an extensive back area view of the
country round Péronne, Mont St. Quentin, Feuillaucourt, Allaines and
along the Paris-Lille road in the direction of Nurlu. The line just here
offered an extraordinary feature which was to be found in very few other
places along the front; owing to a big "hair-pin bend" of the river and
to the fact that the two arms of the bend enclosed a marsh, the trenches
ran straight down to the river on the north side and there ceased
altogether, reappearing on the southern bend again some 2,500 yards
further down. It was impossible to dig trenches or to keep men in the
marshes enclosed by the bend of the river, and similarly it was
practically impossible for men to get across to raid our lines, but a
danger—and a very serious one—now presented itself, for a spell of
intensely cold weather set in; the river, the canal and the marshes were
all frozen solid, and the situation suddenly arose that between the
batteries and the German lines there lay nothing but two isolated
machine-gun posts. Our old ally, the marsh, which had hitherto proved a
safe defence against hostile raids on the guns, now offered a perfectly
secure passage. So feasible in fact did a raid appear, that plans were
actually being formulated for a descent upon the German batteries
opposite this bend by our people—plans which in the end had to be
abandoned, as two howitzer batteries, at the request of the infantry,
shelled the frozen river and with sixteen rounds cut a channel thirty
yards wide across the ice.

The weather had indeed turned intensely cold. Every night some thirty
degrees of frost were registered, and the ground was deeply covered, in
snow. It was, of course, exceedingly healthy, but involved a great deal
of suffering, while the handling of guns and ammunition, the cold metal
of which seemed to bite right into the flesh, was a matter to be taken
by no means lightly. Fortunately there was but little activity at the
time. Hostile minenwerfers and rifle-grenades worried our infantry to a
large extent, but prompt retaliation, coupled with the arrival into
action of X, V and Y/33 trench mortar batteries, reduced this source of
trouble to a minimum. Apart from this the batteries were more or less
left to themselves to register such targets as they chose until February
arrived, bringing with it a more definite sequence of events.

February heralded the commencement of more active operations, but before
these started the period in the rest area, for which the 162nd Brigade
was due, began to be granted to certain of the batteries. On February
1st A/162 stored its guns in the northern part of Marrières Wood,
leaving them there under a guard and eventually handing them over to the
33rd Brigade. At the same time orders were received to build positions
east of Marrières Wood for the guns stored there, while the 8th Division
got positions ready south-west of Rancourt to be taken up at a later
date by "A" and B/156. A/162, with its guns stored away, marched out to
rest at Vaux-sur-Somme, to be followed on the 7th by D/162 which went
into billets at Sailly-le-Sec; in the latter case, however, two guns
were handed over _in situ_ to the 55th Battery to be served by them from
there, while the remaining four were left under a guard until such time
as the battery should return to man them once more.

With two batteries out at rest, the remainder found themselves engaged
in rapidly increasing work. On February 2nd a lengthy bombardment of the
enemy trenches was carried out by field and heavy artillery, and the
next day began the deliberate cutting of the enemy wire by the 18-pdrs.,
which was to extend over a very considerable period. To carry this out
more effectively the enfilade section of B/162 (which had been in action
south of Feuillières) moved to a point on the south side of the Somme
east of Clery, where the canal lock adjoined the river; the old position
south of Feuillières was taken over by a section of C/162 which moved
thither from east of Chapter Wood. At first hostile retaliation was
slight, and until about the 8th, with the exception of a severe
lachrymose shelling endured by B/162, the work went on more or less
unhindered. Gradually, however, the enemy grew apprehensive over the
continued cutting of his wire, and his anger was brought to a
culminating point on the 7th when the 9th H.L.I. raided the trenches
and, after killing ten machine gunners and bombing two dug-outs full of
men, returned to their own lines with two prisoners and a machine-gun as
proof of their exploit. For their assistance in this raid the batteries
received the thanks of General Baird (100th Infantry Brigade) who was
especially pleased with the way in which the wire had been cut.

                            ORDER OF BATTLE.

                          FEBRUARY—MARCH 1917.

                                H.Q.R.A.

               C.R.A.                 Brigade Major.    Staff Captain.

   Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G.       Major H. K.       Capt. W. E.
                                      Sadler, D.S.O.,      Bownass.
                                           M.C.

                             156th Brigade.

              Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O.

                       Adjutant: Lieut. F. L. Lee.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

 Capt. S. Talbot.     Major M. A.     Major G. Lomer,   Major W. A. T.
                      Studd, M.C.         D.S.O.         Barstow, M.C.

                             162nd Brigade.

                   Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.

                     Adjutant: Lieut. R. H. Pavitt.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

     Major G.          Major V.        Major A. van       Major J. D.
 Fetherston, M.C.  Benett-Stanford,  Straubenzee, M.C. Belgrave, D.S.O.
                         M.C.

                                                        Capt. A. E. G.
                                                           Champion.

                             166th Brigade.

                               Broken up.

On February 10th, after a further interval of wire-cutting, another
bombardment of the enemy trenches took place. From 1.0 P.M. on that day
until 6.15 A.M. the following morning a long and deliberate artillery
attack was carried out, finishing with a fifteen-minute intense
bombardment which crept over the enemy front line as though to be
followed by an assault, and then suddenly dropped back on to the fire
trench again to catch such infantry as might have manned the parapet.
The enemy was now fully aroused; all day he bombarded the right brigade
zone and especially 162nd Brigade Headquarters, and from this day
onwards he was always ready to retaliate heavily for any operations
carried out against him.

A raid on the 14th by the 4th Suffolks round Pekly Bulge (south of the
Clery-Feuillaucourt road) did not tend to calm the increasing activity
which was now becoming general, and, although no prisoners were brought
to our trenches (four, with their escort, were killed by a heavy German
trench mortar while crossing No Man's Land), a great deal of damage and
many casualties were inflicted upon the enemy in their dug-outs. On the
19th, however, matters ought to have reached their climax, for on that
day should have taken place the attack on Hersfeld Trench, in
preparation for which all the previous bombardments and wire-cutting had
been carried out. It was postponed, however; postponed until the 22nd
because foggy weather had prevented any full examination of the
condition of the wire after its bombardment, and because the mud in No
Man's Land was so bad as to prevent the infantry from reaching the gaps.
In point of fact this attack was again postponed on the 22nd, and
finally, after being fixed for March 2nd, was abandoned altogether.

The work now resolved itself into a slow but ever-persistent harassing
of the enemy. "A" and D/162 returned into action on February 20th and
joined in the general artillery attack which was in progress all along
this portion of the front—an attack the result of which ultimately
showed itself in the great German retreat to the Hindenburg Line early
in March. The operation on Hersfeld Trench had been abandoned, but a new
assault by the 8th Division further to the north had been in course of
preparation for some time, and now definite steps were taken to carry it
out. It will be remembered that at the beginning of the month the 8th
Division were preparing battery positions for "A" and B/156 south-west
of Rancourt; on the morning of the 21st the leading sections of the two
batteries moved up to these positions, and at the same time the right
group, temporarily under the command of Major J. D. Belgrave while
Colonel Harris was on leave, pushed forward an advance gun of A/162 to a
position two hundred yards east of Clery, whence wire-cutting on the
group zone could more effectively be carried out. Although no attack on
the 33rd Divisional front was to be launched it was essential to employ
tactics which would mislead the enemy, and by continual harassing to
prevent him from concentrating all his attention upon the 8th Division.

There was, however, another reason for this continual bombardment.
Rumours began to circulate that the German Higher Command, finding the
present positions if not untenable at least strategically unsound,
intended to withdraw to the great trench system known as the Hindenburg
Line which for a long time past had been in preparation well to the
rear, and which was supposed to be a model of siting and fortified
field-work. At first rumours were vague and of doubtful origin; but
gradually it became evident, from the explosions which every day could
be seen behind the enemy lines, that a great deal of destructive and
demolition work was being carried out, all of which pointed to the fact
that the area was shortly to be evacuated.

Under these circumstances it was necessary that information should be
obtained as to the strength in which the enemy was holding the line, and
for this purpose a series of raids was carried out. On the night of
February 27th/28th the 2nd Worcesters raided the enemy trenches around
Pekly Bulge in two parties, the first party going over at 8.40 P.M. and
remaining in the trenches for half an hour, while the second raid
started at 1.0 A.M. and lasted for sixty-five minutes. Rumour had it
that many of the first party—who were nearly all old hands, and for
whose benefit the first raid was said to have been organised—went over
again with the second party to complete a few odd jobs which they had
not had time to finish thoroughly earlier in the night! Whatever the
truth of this story may be, the raid was eminently successful.
Twenty-two prisoners were taken, thirty-six of the enemy were killed in
hand-to-hand fighting and six dug-outs full of men were bombed.
Moreover, the prisoners proved to be men of the 2nd Guards Grenadier
Regiment, and this identification, together with the discovery that the
German line was still strongly held, was of the greatest value to
Headquarters.

On March 1st the hostile trenches were again raided, this time by the
2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and on March 3rd the attack by
the 8th Division was carried out on the left with the object of securing
a jutting-out portion of the enemy front and support lines. The attack
was too far to the north to permit of the 33rd Divisional Artillery
batteries taking any share therein, except for "A" and B/156 who had on
the 1st completed their move to the left to reinforce the artillery
supporting the assault. The 33rd Division did, however, carry out a
feint bombardment synchronising with the barrage of the 8th Division,
and this in itself was of considerable value since once again
information was obtained concerning the strength of the enemy. The
infantry in and on the left of Limberlost Wood not only let off smoke
during the feint attack, but also fired rockets of every conceivable
colour and variety, and the effect of this upon the enemy was
surprising. Completely mystified, very nervous and on edge, he bombarded
the trenches held by the 33rd Division with all his might and main, and
disclosed the strength of artillery which he still held upon the front.
This strength was, indeed, quite normal and seemed to belie any ideas of
an early retreat on his part, but one feature stood out prominently.
Artillery officers from each of the brigades, who were sent down to the
infantry to report on the hostile artillery strength, pointed out that
the entire retaliation was carried out by field-guns and 10 cm.
howitzers; of heavy guns and even 15 cm. howitzers there were none.
Perhaps, after all, this supposed retirement was near at hand. Whether
it was or was not, from the 4th until the 9th a steady bombardment was
kept up upon the enemy communications. Infantry patrols reported the
line lightly held, and the sniping and movement going on was suspected
of being carried out by a few picked men moving from place to place in
the trenches and utilising fixed and automatically-fired rifles to the
full. Even a raid by the enemy in the early morning of the 8th did not
wipe out this idea; the opinion was formed that it was sheer bluff, and
that only a very few machine-guns and individual gunners, making a
lavish use of Very lights, were maintaining the appearance of strength
on the enemy's part.

The 33rd Divisional Artillery never saw the climax of this affair. On
the morning of Friday the 9th, half batteries of the 156th and 162nd
Brigades were relieved by the 178th and 181st Brigades respectively of
the 40th Division. The remaining half batteries withdrew on the 11th,
and the two brigades, turning their backs upon the battlefields of the
Somme, marched into rest at Vaux-sur-Somme and Sailly-le-Sec. Rumour had
it that they were to go into training for some great battle shortly to
take place, a battle in which the line was to be broken, open fighting
was to be the order of the day, the German line was to be turned and
British arms were to be victorious over the enemy once and for all.
Rumour, as on all such occasions, ran wild amongst the men, but where
the attack was to be and when, whether it was in connection with the
expected German retreat or elsewhere was kept from all except a favoured
few. Officially it was said that there was to be fighting, and open
fighting at that, and that the batteries must train accordingly; more
than that they were not to know.

From the 11th until the 25th the batteries trained hard in every form of
exercise; gun drill, driving drill, flag and lamp signalling, battery
staff work and movement into action over open ground were carried out
day by day, while in the evening concerts and sing-songs were
interspersed with lectures to build up the fighting spirit of the men,
to raise their morale to the highest and to give them that quiet
confidence and assuredness of being the better man which is so essential
to troops who have a battle lying before them.

Moreover, the fighting spirit of the men was raised in other ways than
by lectures. The batteries, drawn up in hollow square at church parade,
saw the Corps Commander decorate officers and men for gallantry; heard
the citation which accompanied the Order of the Crown of Italy awarded
to Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris; heard the Corps Commander tell them how,
shortly after they had been withdrawn from the line, infantry patrols
had discovered the enemy trenches to be unoccupied; learnt how, with the
enemy in general retreat, the whole of our line southwards from Arras
was pressing forward on the heels of the enemy, and even as he spoke was
occupying and advancing east from Péronne. It was no concern of the
men's that the enemy was relinquishing very bad ground merely in order
to take up a vastly superior and stronger position which he had, under
the most favourable circumstances, been preparing for some time. They
returned to their billets feeling that the enemy really was the
under-dog, that his tail was down and consequently that theirs was
decidedly up.

Only one incident of this period marred the pleasure of the rest which
was being enjoyed. Before the batteries moved northward they lost their
C.R.A., Brigadier-General C. F. Blane who, on undertaking new duties,
left the Divisional Artillery with whom he was so closely connected.
General Blane brought out the (then) four artillery brigades to France
in their early raw state in 1915. He helped to mould and to shape them,
and, after leading them through all the hazardous times of the Battle of
the Somme and through the dreary and trying conditions of the winter, he
now handed them over, a splendid fighting unit, to his successor.
General Blane did a tremendous amount towards building up the 33rd
Divisional Artillery, and in its future history the name of the man who
did so much for it in its earlier stages must always be remembered.

The orders to move were ultimately received in the fourth week of March.
On the 24th the C.R.A., Brigadier-General Stewart, who had succeeded
General Blane in the command of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, set out
in a motor bus with his brigade and battery commanders to make a
preliminary reconnaissance of the new front on which the batteries were
to operate. Next day the latter in full fighting order moved off towards
the north on the four-day march which was to terminate at Arras, and was
to bring them to the positions from which they would assist in the great
offensive of April 9th—the battle of Arras and Vimy Ridge.




                              CHAPTER VI.
                  THE BATTLE OF ARRAS AND VIMY RIDGE.
                           (APRIL-JUNE 1917.)


The march of the batteries from the Somme to Arras proved very exacting;
not only were the weather conditions rather more than bad—intense cold
and wet being experienced the whole time—but also the batteries, already
deprived of their commanders, were further depleted on the second day of
the march, when an order was received for one officer and twenty men
from every battery to go forward by motor lorry to work upon the
positions which had been allotted for occupation. A measure of praise is
due to those, in many cases, junior officers who under difficult
conditions, short of personnel and in foul weather led the batteries
over the long road through Talmas and Bealcourt towards Arras, now at
last disclosed as the goal of the 33rd Divisional Artillery.

All along the line of that march the direction of the coming battle was
clearly indicated. Vast columns filled the road, columns of infantry,
guns and transport, columns of motor-lorries and ambulances, all with
their faces set towards the north, all forming part of a great moving
stream inexorable in its progress. Even to the inexperienced the sight
of these masses moving up, with scarcely a single vehicle passing in the
opposite direction, indicated a great concentration in progress, a
mighty gathering of the storm clouds, and only two questions remained
unanswered; exactly where, and how soon?

While the batteries were marching steadily along, pondering over these
questions, the brigade and battery commanders, who had covered the whole
distance on the 24th, were busily engaged in examining the positions
they were to occupy and the zones to be covered. The 15th Divisional
Artillery, who were in the line at the time, had already in part
prepared the positions to be occupied by the 33rd, and the work and
trouble they had expended thereon won for them a very deep feeling of
gratitude amongst the officers and men who were to benefit by their
labours. Until the arrival of the working parties who had been detached
from the batteries on the line of march, however, no material work could
be done, and accordingly the time was spent in studying the zone to be
covered and in reconnoitring the best O.P.'s from which to shoot.

                            ORDER OF BATTLE.

                            APRIL—MAY 1917.

                                H.Q.R.A.

               C.R.A.                 Brigade Major.    Staff Captain.

  Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G.,     Major T. E.       Capt. W. E.
               D.S.O.                   Durie, M.C.        Bownass.

                             156th Brigade.

                     Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler.

                      Adjutant: Capt. B. L. Oxley.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

  Major Lutyens.      Major M. A.     Major G. Lomer,   Major W. A. T.
                      Studd, M.C.         D.S.O.         Barstow, M.C.

   Major H. McA.                       Major Barker.
  Richards, M.C.

                             162nd Brigade.

                      Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris.

                      Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

     Major G.          Major V.        Major A. van       Major W. P.
 Fetherston, M.C.  Benett-Stanford,  Straubenzee, M.C.      Colfox.
                         M.C.          (_wounded_).
                     (_wounded_).

                   Major H. C. Cory,    Capt. W. G.
                         M.C.            Pringle.

                                      Major L. Hill.

The strategical cat was now well out of the bag. A great attack, it was
learnt, was to be launched upon the whole German system from and
including Vimy Ridge on the left to a point well south of Arras on the
right. The 33rd Divisional Artillery was to be responsible for the zone
immediately south of the river Scarpe, and, after taking part in the
preliminary bombardment, was to advance in support of the assaulting
infantry so as to keep in touch with the foremost troops throughout the
battle. With this knowledge the importance of a thorough acquaintance
with the enemy lines was realised, and many hours were spent in front
line and observation station studying the hostile wire, trenches and all
the back areas. For wire-cutting and bombardment of the German front
line our own fire-trench was the best place, and from it a very clear
view of the objectives could, in certain parts, be obtained. In order to
see the opposing support lines and back areas, however, a higher view
point was necessary, and for this purpose certain ruined houses were
utilised in the Faubourg St. Sauveur—an outskirt of Arras on the Cambrai
road—together with the ruins of Blangy and some tall factory chimneys on
the eastern edge of Arras.

The latter offered the most hair-raising experiences at times. On normal
occasions the top of a tall chimney sways in a most noticeable manner
with every gust of wind; when, as was often the case here, a deliberate
shoot was carried out upon it by the enemy, and 5·9 in. shells were
bursting around its base, it really seemed to the wretched observer,
perched on an iron cross-bar at the top, that the chimney must sooner or
later sway right over and break in two, even if a well-aimed shell did
not by a direct hit effect the same result. Moreover the inhabitants of
these chimneys, being quite near to the enemy trenches, had often the
pleasure of hearing a shell, aimed at some object behind them, whisk
past their ears in the course of its flight so close that it seemed
inevitable that ultimately the chimney must be hit.

With the arrival of the working parties on March 27th real activity set
in. Not only did the pits, platforms and dug-outs begun by the 15th
Division require to be completed, but also accommodation for twelve
thousand rounds of ammunition in every battery position had to be made
ready, while the ammunition which was already there needed sorting.
Moreover, the word was passed round to hurry—time was short, and the day
of attack was not far off. Hurry, indeed, was the watchword, and for
four days the men toiled unceasingly; on the 30th work was redoubled,
for on that day the remainder of the gunners of each battery, which had
arrived at Duisans the previous night, came up into billets at Arras and
continued the work of preparation. In addition to making ready the
battery positions in Arras, advanced positions were ordered to be dug
and ammunition dumped just behind our own front line, whither the
batteries would advance as soon as the first objective in the attack had
been secured. This work was of necessity slow, for detection was easy
and by day hostile aeroplanes caused a maddening series of
interruptions.

On the 30th/31st the first guns of the Divisional Artillery came into
action. "A" and B/156 (Major Lutyens and Major Studd) placed advanced
wire-cutting guns five hundred yards behind Arras Cemetery, while Major
Fetherston (A/162) put a forward section in the garden of a house on the
eastern outskirts of Arras, with the task of cutting wire just south of
the river Scarpe on the enemy second and third lines. Wire-cutting was
immediately begun, and from this date the 33rd Divisional Artillery
started to take its active share in the forthcoming battle.

By April 1st the remaining guns of the brigades which had been left at
the wagon lines were brought into action. From their headquarters in 6,
Rue Jeanne d'Arc and 34, Rue des Capucins, Lieut.-Colonel Butler, who
had just been posted to the 156th Brigade, and Lieut.-Colonel Harris
directed the work of the batteries, which was now exceedingly heavy.
Work on the positions was still in progress, wire-cutting—always a slow
business—was continued day in day out, ammunition needed constant
replenishing, registrations had to be checked and renewed, and gunners
and drivers were being instructed in the route by which the advance to
the forward positions would be made. The brigades lay between the
Baudimont Gate and St. Nicholas, and the advance from there must
inevitably take the batteries over a canal bridge and through narrow
winding streets before they could reach Blangy. Whether that bridge
would be intact when the time came and whether the streets would not be
blocked by shell-torn houses remained to be seen; the route was laid
down for the batteries, and that route had to be known by all ranks.

On Wednesday, April 4th, began the bombardment proper, the five-day
bombardment which was to precede the launching of the Spring offensive.
In secret orders it was known as "V" day, the succeeding days being
designated "W," "X," "Y" and "Z"—"Z" representing zero. From this it
will be seen that originally April 8th was fixed for the attack; on the
6th, however, orders were received that between "X" and "Y" days there
should be a "Q" day, for the attack was postponed for twenty-four hours
and it was necessary that the code system should be continued. Each day
had its own special programme with targets, rates of fire and hours of
bombardment fixed. One day was devoted to the destruction of all woods,
another to trench-junctions, a third to villages and cross-roads, and so
on; the enemy front and support line and his wire were at the same time
kept under continual bombardment by day and night, and every night
prolonged gas-shelling of known and suspected battery positions was
carried out.

The "village" day was a wonderful sight; all around behind the enemy
lines great clouds of smoke and brick-dust hung heavily, in which every
now and then further explosions took place. From Tilloy on the
right—handed over to the mercies of a 15 in. howitzer—from Athies,
Feuchy, Fampoux and numberless others these mighty columns of
destruction could be seen rising, and the casualties amongst the enemy
in the villages, which until now had been left more or less untouched,
must have been tremendous. The enemy retaliation was not heavy; in fact,
its weakness gave rise to the rumour that he, knowing what was coming,
had filled his trenches with wire and had retired to a rear position.
Patrols, however, proved the falsity of this, as did also the harassing
fire which was intermittently directed upon the 33rd Divisional
batteries, and which, although not heavy, was sufficient to cause
casualties and give rise to great worry lest some of the vast piles of
ammunition in the positions should be exploded.

Gradually the day of attack—now definitely fixed for the 9th—drew near.
On the 5th the last armoured telephone cable was laid to the batteries
through the wonderful sewers of Arras, those sewers which, converted
into underground passages and lit with electric light, acted as routes
to the front line and afforded underground shelter for all the reserve
troops when the attack was launched. On the 8th the wagon-lines were
advanced from Duisans to a position just west of Arras; on the 8th also
took place the final reconnaissance of the routes forward which were
carefully marked out with flags—one colour for infantry, another for
guns and a third for cavalry. On the evening of the 8th tanks, lumbering
across country, passed the batteries en route for their position of
assembly, and early on the morning of Easter Monday, April 9th, the
tired detachments, after shelling the enemy battery positions with gas
all night long, set dial sight and range drum for the opening rounds of
the barrage. Huddled under shelter of the gun shields from the cold
drizzle which was falling, they peered out through the gradually
thinning darkness, listening for the blast of the whistle which would
herald the opening burst. All around hung a strange silence; in every
battery position sights were being set and checked, ammunition prepared,
the last necessary arrangements made. In every gun pit along the whole
of that long front Nos. 1 stood waiting for the signal which would turn
the countryside into a roaring volcano.

Sharp to the second at 5.30 A.M. the thin blast of countless whistles
cut the air, long sheets of orange flame stabbed the darkness, and with
a roar and a crash the hundreds of guns burst out, lighting up the
countryside, drowning all other sound and putting down a furious barrage
to protect the infantry who, at the same moment, advanced in long lines
to the assault. Standing in the eastern outskirts of St. Nicholas, the
scene was wonderful. Dark night was of a sudden converted into day by
the flashes of countless guns; with a vast eruption the mine prepared
under the enemy trenches opposite Blangy flung skywards what once had
been solid ground, while to the flashes and tumult were now added
countless rockets and Very lights, fired despairingly by the enemy when
he realised that the expected attack had indeed been launched. At the
same time the ominous rattle and clatter of machine-guns broke out with
increasing intensity as the enemy strove to avoid the hand-to-hand
fighting which, above all others, he dreaded the most.

The front covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery ran southwards from
the river Scarpe and was assaulted by the 44th and 45th Infantry
Brigades of the 15th Division. To the right of this Division the 12th
and 3rd were advancing to the assault, while the left of the 15th
Division kept in touch with the attacking troops of the 9th to the north
of the Scarpe. The 15th Division formed part of the VI. Corps, with the
VII. Corps on the right and the XVII. on the left. The attacking troops
of the 15th Division were faced by the 10th Grenadier Regiment of the
11th German Division, and it was estimated that six German battalions
were in the actual front line between the river Scarpe and the village
of Tilloy.

The first objective to be taken was the German forward system, and this
was quickly overrun, our troops capturing many prisoners and
establishing themselves along the so-called "Black Line" as arranged,
which ran from the Scarpe, through Fred's Wood and southwards to Tilloy.
Here they halted for a space while our protective barrage roared over
their heads, and then at 7.30 A.M., the scheduled time, they advanced
once more with their ranks reorganised to assault the German Second
Line, known as the "Blue Line," which ran down between the Railway
Triangle and Watery Wood, and was continued along Observatory Ridge to
the Cambrai Road. This line was known to be more strongly held than the
first objective, and here it was feared that our troops would be held
up, for there were many formidable obstacles, such as the Railway
Triangle, to be overcome before the objectives could be secured.

As events turned out, these expectations were in part realised. When the
infantry went over the top at the beginning of the day a subaltern from
each of the artillery brigades accompanied the foremost assaulting line,
while a Captain from the same brigades was attached to each battalion
headquarters. In addition to this, from every battery of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery one subaltern was sent with the attacking troops,
to advance with them and to act as a duplicate source of information
with the other F.O.O.'s; as all these officers were accompanied by
telephonists, signallers and linesmen it was expected that at least some
of them would be able to keep their telephone lines uncut, and would
thereby be able to supply first-hand information of the immediate
tactical situation. It was from this source that information now
arrived.

The Railway Triangle just south of the river had proved, as was
expected, the first serious obstacle to the 15th Division. Here stiff
opposition was met, for the enemy machine gunners in their dug-outs in
the embankment escaped unscathed from the barrage, and succeeded in
bringing heavy fire to bear upon the attacking troops before the latter
were able to get to grips with them. What followed was one of the
inevitable results of a creeping barrage, but also gave occasion for a
very fine feat of arms on the part of the batteries. The barrage
automatically crept on towards the German second line, leaving the
infantry, held up by machine-gun fire, farther and farther behind it.
The forward observing officers, however, seeing the crisis which had
arisen, got news back to the batteries; urgent orders were sent to all
the guns concerned, and the barrage, moving away towards Feuchy,
suddenly halted and returned to the Railway Triangle. Back it came to
drop mightily, inexorably upon the embankment itself, pounding and
blasting away at the hostile machine gunners who had been the cause of
all the trouble, until at a given moment, hastily arranged with the
infantry, it lifted and crept forward again, and the programme from
there onwards was continued once more. As a result of the operation the
capture of this very important strategical position was effected at the
second assault with the loss by our infantry of only three men wounded;
every living soul on the embankment had been wiped out by the second
visit of the barrage, and the advance was resumed unchecked! It was a
very fine example of the tactical handling of guns, and fully deserved
the long accounts given of it in the newspapers two days later.

[Illustration:

  Scale 1:40,000.
]

With the fall of the Railway Triangle the German second line was quickly
captured, and here, on the immediate front covered by the 33rd
Divisional Artillery, the weary men of the 44th and 45th Infantry
Brigades halted. The assault upon the third German line, the "Brown
Line," had been entrusted to the 46th Infantry Brigade who, during the
attack on the first two systems of defence, had issued forth from the
cellars and sewers of Arras into a position of assembly in the German
front line, and this brigade now advanced to the attack.

As soon as the German second system had fallen, the batteries began to
advance so as to keep touch with the infantry. The delay occasioned by
the holding up of the latter at the Railway Triangle had until now
rendered any move of the guns impossible, for it was essential that
every piece should be brought to bear upon the obstacle which was
stopping the progress of the infantry. Now, however, the move forward
began; one section at a time, the guns advanced to the positions already
prepared for them in Blangy just behind our original front line, battery
commanders going forward to register the guns immediately the trails
were dropped. As soon as the first sections were registered and in
action, the second sections began to advance; directly they were in
action and firing, the third sections joined them, and thus every
battery maintained four guns in action throughout the move forward, and
was able to keep a barrage in front of the infantry who now, in the
afternoon, were advancing to the assault on the German third line.

Strange to relate, the advance of the batteries, which of necessity was
carried out through the outskirts of Arras, was not greatly hampered by
shell fire. It was generally anticipated that the enemy would bombard
the eastern exits of the town as soon as ever the attack was launched,
for he must have known that troops would be issuing forth from there,
and, as the route of the batteries lay over a bridge and through some
very narrow streets, it was fully expected that casualties would be
suffered in this operation. It was therefore with a feeling of relief
that battery commanders saw the whole of their batteries in action in
the new positions around the eastern edge of Blangy, bombarding
throughout the afternoon the defences between Orange Hill and the river
Scarpe.

Throughout that afternoon it did indeed seem as though British arms were
winning the day. All around troops appeared to be pressing forward; up
the road from Arras there suddenly came squadron after squadron of
cavalry which wheeled into a big field in Blangy, dismounted, halted for
a space while reconnoitring parties pushed on ahead, then mounted and
pressed away on over the captured ground for some advanced objective.
Long columns of infantry, transport, ammunition columns and all the
necessary material of war poured steadily out of Arras and moved on ever
towards the east, until it seemed as though the whole of the front were
pushing forward. The batteries in Blangy, firing though they were upon
the enemy as hard as they could, felt somehow that they were being left
behind, and longed to receive the order to limber up and join more
closely in the pursuit which was now going on.

Orders were not long in coming for the 162nd Brigade at any rate.
Leaving the other brigade still in action around the eastern outskirts
of Arras, it threw forward reconnoitring detachments in the middle
afternoon, and by evening had begun to advance to new positions—the
third occupied that day—around the Railway Triangle which, a few hours
before, had been the scene of such close infantry fighting. All day it
had been raining on and off; now it started to snow, and for the
batteries of the 162nd Brigade there began a night of real
heart-breaking work.

Ground which has been barraged, captured and counter-barraged a few
hours previously, rained upon all day, trampled by cavalry and countless
advancing reserves; ground which consists of shell-torn earth hastily
shovelled down by a pioneer battalion to make a rough track, and carried
over trenches by arched wooden bridges or not at all; ground of this
nature churned up into deep sticky mud is, for tired horses and men, a
difficult obstacle over which to drag guns and ammunition on a rapidly
darkening night. Yet it had to be done; the infantry were thought to be
still advancing, and unless they were covered by the guns they must,
sooner or later, meet with disaster. All that evening the four batteries
of the brigade struggled and fought their way through the rapidly
increasing throng on the track; pushed their way past the inevitable
broken-down wagons they met; manhandled each gun in turn through and
over trenches which were not bridged, and ultimately, soaked with mud
and perspiration, utterly worn out but victoriously aware of the fact
that they were still the most advanced batteries and that there were
none ahead of them, they arrived at the Railway Triangle and dropped
into action, A/162 on the eastern side of the embankment, "B," "C" and
"D" on the western. Here they remained throughout the night of the
9th/10th waiting for daylight to come for the advance to be resumed.

Thus ended the first day of the great Spring offensive. The infantry,
pushing on all the evening towards the German third line, had
established posts on the northern slopes of Orange Hill (N.W. of
Monchy); the guns were still keeping touch with them despite the
rapidity of the advance and the appalling weather conditions; many
prisoners and guns had been taken, a considerable number of the enemy
lay dead on the captured ground, and nothing, so far, seemed to be
holding up the advance of our troops.

On the morning of Tuesday, the 10th, the infantry occupied the remainder
of Orange Hill. They had, in the first day of battle, engaged in very
heavy fighting; they had made a rapid advance and now, tired out, were
unwilling to continue until all the batteries were not only in a
position to give them close support, but were in better communication
with them. For this purpose the 156th Brigade advanced up to the Railway
Triangle, while the 162nd pushed forward once again, this time bound for
positions on the western slopes of Orange Hill.

Fortunately there was very little fighting during the 10th; the infantry
were busy consolidating, reorganising themselves and carrying out
reliefs, and therefore it was possible to spend the day in getting all
the guns well forward, replenishing ammunition and making arrangements
for thorough support of the infantry in their next advance.

It was well that the whole of the day was available for this, or rather
it was inevitable that it should be. So fearful was the mud east of the
Railway Triangle, where the Scarpe had helped the rain and snow to form
a bog, that the batteries had to make their way across country to the
outskirts of Arras once again, and, crossing the railway, worked up
towards Monchy along the Cambrai road. The congestion was terrible
everywhere, and movement along the road, which was double-banked by
traffic in both directions, proved maddeningly slow. Not till the early
morning of the 11th did the batteries arrive in their new positions
after a night of bogging and digging-out guns, of marching along chaotic
roads, of urging tired men and tired horses to further work; but now,
grouped on both sides of the road which ran from Feuchy to Feuchy Chapel
cross-roads on the Arras-Cambrai road, they were right up close behind
the advancing infantry on the western slopes of Orange Hill itself, and
were in the best of positions for observation and close artillery
support.

On Wednesday, the 11th, the battle broke out again. The 37th Division,
who had been in reserve hitherto, took up the attack and assaulted
Monchy-le-Preux from the north; at the same time the cavalry advanced on
the village from Orange Hill, and after severe fighting Monchy was
captured. This cavalry action was much criticized at a later date; it
was an attempt to get through a supposed gap in the enemy line, and
consisted of a mounted advance across some seven hundred yards of
perfectly smooth and open ground dipping slightly and then rising again.
In this advance fairly heavy casualties were suffered both from machine
gun and shell fire—the latter being mainly time high-explosive burst the
height of a man's head in the saddle—and the operation ended in a
dismounted action around Monchy; it certainly proved a valuable
distraction from the 37th Division attacking on foot, and, had not the
cavalry put their horses in the village itself when they adopted
dismounted action, it is probable that their losses would not have been
so severe. While this operation, which advanced our line four hundred
yards east of Monchy and up to the river Scarpe, was in progress, the
flanks also tried to advance, but were held up and were forced to return
to the trenches they had left.

During the 11th the 156th Brigade came on from the Railway Triangle and
dropped into action slightly to the north of the 162nd Brigade, and
between it and Feuchy. At the same time the wagon-lines of the brigades
were brought forward and were kept right up close (in the case of the
162nd Brigade, 500 yards) behind the battery positions, for it was
expected that the advance would soon be resumed. Although the Army on
the right, which had captured Bullecourt and Riencourt, had been driven
out again to its original positions, the Army on the left had taken and
held the Vimy Ridge, and it seemed that, with the fall of this important
feature, further progress must very soon be made.

Now, however, the advance, which for three days had been so brilliant,
began to be checked. On April 12th the 29th Division on the right and
the 9th on the left tried to advance their line, but were beaten back.
Hostile artillery, so comparatively silent since the 9th, began to show
increasing activity in barraging our troops and in carrying out
counter-battery work. It was manifest that the enemy, after two days of
disaster, was pulling himself together, and after losing the majority of
his artillery on April 9th and 10th, had now rushed up fresh guns to
stiffen the support of the front.

This opinion was strengthened on the 13th, when every battery and
wagon-line was heavily shelled, the enemy fire being directed not upon
any particular unit, but in a great shell storm over different areas in
which the guns and horses were congregated. It was clear that a
determined resistance was going to be offered to any further attack, and
accordingly the order was circulated that on this part of the front the
line should be held until the flanks had made further progress. Since
this course removed the possibility of any sudden need of teams for a
quick advance, the wagon-lines were ordered to return immediately to the
eastern outskirts of Arras, only a small number of animals for pack-work
being maintained by each battery in forward wagon-lines at the Railway
Triangle. With a sigh of relief battery commanders saw their teams wind
their way down Battery Valley to Arras again; the neighbourhood of
Orange Hill was no place for horses.

The wisdom of thus removing the horses was very soon put beyond all
manner of doubt. All through the early morning and day of the 14th the
batteries were heavily bombarded with gas shell and high explosive,
especially heavy punishment descending upon the area where the horses
had been. Serious casualties would inevitably have been suffered if they
had remained there, but as matters stood the only casualties sustained
were those in the gun positions themselves, and even these did not
prevent the batteries from opening a smashing fire upon the enemy when
in the evening he delivered a violent counter-attack upon Monchy, a
counter-attack which was broken up under our fire, melted away and
failed completely.

The batteries now settled down to what was to be temporarily a "holding"
job, and from the 12th until the 23rd nothing more than the usual
harassing fire and registration was carried out. The brigades were
placed under the administration of the 17th Divisional Artillery and
were ordered to dig themselves in, for heavy casualties had of late been
suffered amongst the detachments, and it was vital that no more wastage
should occur. Digging in was, in the present surroundings, extremely
difficult; two feet below the surface thick solid chalk was met with,
and every shovelful thrown up offered an unmistakable mark to the keen
eyes of the enemy aeroplanes which were now actively patrolling the
front. Not to dig in meant casualties from the usual shell-fire to which
the batteries were inevitably subjected; digging in meant increased
safety for the men but also, despite the fullest use of camouflage, the
attracting of further bombardment by the enemy. Surely a choice between
the devil and the deep sea!

In front of the batteries, on the forward slopes of Orange Hill and in
Monchy, excellent O.P.'s were obtainable and were made full use of. The
weather—hitherto bitterly cold with snow and icy blizzards—began to
improve, and visibility got consequently better. Greenland Hill, Roeux,
the Chemical Works and the Scarpe were clear targets on the left, while
on the right Pelves Mill on the cross-roads, with the ruins of the
little cottage beneath it, showed up clearly as a datum line for the
enemy trench system south of the river. Jigsaw Wood, Hatchet Wood and
Bois du Sars, all on the sky-line, blocked further view, but sufficient
was visible west of them to enable accurate registration to be carried
out on all the enemy forward zone; his actual fire trench could always
be observed from our own front line or even, in the case of the trenches
near the river, from the commanding slopes of Orange Hill.

On Monday, April 23rd, a fresh attack was made by the 17th Division,
with the 29th and 15th on the right and the 51st on the left, the
objectives on the batteries' zone being Bayonet Trench north-east of
Monchy, together with a small enemy salient which had been formed on
this part of the front. Three attacks in all were made, and all failed;
enfilade machine-gun fire from Roeux and from both sides of the river
cut down our men, and eventually the operation had to be called off. On
the 24th the attack was renewed and this time slight progress was made,
but no advance of any account was effected and the losses amongst our
troops were enormous. The battle was indeed becoming costly, and the
gunners, as well as the infantry, were showing the effects of it. Every
day the usual harassing fire took its toll of the detachments, and on
the days when heavy bombardments were carried out on the battery
positions (as on the 22nd when B/162 lost Major Benett-Stanford and
Captain Body wounded, with two out of the three subalterns, Bostock and
Neate, killed) numbers were cut down to an alarming minimum.

On April 28th the battle was again resumed on a grand scale. The 12th
Division assaulted on the front of the batteries, this time with the 3rd
Division on the right and the 34th on the left; at 4.25 A.M. the
infantry attack was launched under cover of a very heavy artillery
barrage, the objectives being those portions of Bayonet and Rifle
trenches which still lay in the hands of the enemy. Three minutes after
the attack began the enemy put down a light barrage of 10·5 cm. and 77
mm. shells, which became heavier on Bayonet Trench itself at about 7.30
A.M., but generally speaking the hostile artillery fire was slight. In
the main the enemy appeared to depend upon his machine guns to ward off
attacks, and in this he was fairly successful. Mist and smoke shell
rendered observation very difficult, but by six o'clock the objective
was reported to have been gained; from here, however, machine-gun fire
began to tell and, although the right battalion of the brigade covered
by the 33rd Divisional Artillery advanced according to plan, and was
reported to have reached the second objective, the left battalion was
held up by machine guns and could not advance.

At half-past six in the morning a smoke barrage was put down along the
south bank of the Scarpe to try and help the left battalion, while at
the same time the field howitzers turned on to the troublesome machine
guns. All day long the batteries kept up a protective barrage in front
of the infantry, increasing at times to intense rate when an enemy
counter-attack showed signs of being launched. At 11.30 A.M. the
infantry endeavoured to consolidate their positions under a now heavy
enemy barrage which had been increasing in intensity upon Bayonet Trench
since ten o'clock, but it was of no avail. Heavy machine-gun fire from
across the river Scarpe prevented them from achieving anything, and not
until nightfall was the position clear.

It was then found that Bayonet Trench had been captured in its entirety,
but that only a portion of Rifle Trench had been wrested from the enemy;
all along the infantry had been greatly impeded by machine-gun fire from
which they suffered heavy casualties. From observation and reports
received it would appear that the enemy had concentrated in considerable
force upon this front, and it was probably due to the work of Forward
Observing Officers from the batteries that the many hostile
counter-attacks attempted had been smashed before they came to fruition.
On the early morning of the 29th the infantry established a line of
posts and generally consolidated the ground captured on the previous
day, but no further gains were possible. A final effort at 3.0 A.M. on
the 30th to capture the remainder of Rifle Trench from the enemy proved
a failure, and the infantry, suffering heavy losses, were forced to
return once more to their trenches.

Thus ended April, which had opened so brilliantly, and with the arrival
of May a less cheering period was destined to begin. Thursday, May 3rd,
in fact, marked the last great effort which was made to continue the
advance along the whole of the front; on the 1st an unsuccessful attempt
to capture the remainder of Rifle Trench had been tried, but this was
purely a local operation, and on the 3rd all three Armies pulled
themselves together and launched a combined assault stretching from
Arleux-en-Gohelle on the left to east of Bullecourt on the right. On the
immediate front of the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, with
whom were also the 12th Divisional batteries and the VIth Corps Heavy
Artillery, an intense barrage was put down on the enemy front line for
three minutes before zero. At 3.45 A.M. the infantry assaulted, while
the barrage crept on at the rate of thirty-three yards per minute;
intense machine-gun fire was immediately encountered, together with a
heavy barrage which fell upon infantry and gunners alike, but the front
wave of assaulting infantry by keeping close up to our curtain-fire
succeeded in reaching the line Pelves Mill-Gun Trench. Here the
situation became very obscure; owing to the fact that zero hour had been
fixed for an hour of darkness, all communication between the front and
succeeding waves was lost, while a heavy machine-gun barrage put down by
the enemy prevented our second wave from getting beyond Scabbard Trench.
At ten o'clock a party of Germans entered Scabbard Trench and bombed our
men out as far as the junction with New Trench, with the result that the
infantry forming the first wave were left entirely cut off.

All this time the 18-pdrs. had been keeping up a protective barrage
beyond the first objective, in the hopes of saving such of the leading
troops as had got there. At 12.10 P.M. a new bombardment was organised
and two hours later a fresh attack was launched, this time under a very
novel barrage. The enemy, strongly dug in in Scabbard Trench, could not
be reached by the flat trajectory of the 18-pdrs., and accordingly it
was decided to organise a creeping barrage of 4·5 in. howitzers. For a
quarter of an hour four batteries of field howitzers poured high
explosive into Scabbard Trench, our own men lying not only close up to
the trench but also all round it, and at 2.10 P.M. the howitzers lifted
off and ceased firing, whereupon the infantry, keeping close to the
barrage, rushed the trench. It was a desperate measure, this howitzer
barrage, for it was like firing into the centre of a circle with our own
men all round, and, with the infantry lying right up to and following so
closely on the heels of the barrage, it seemed inevitable that a few
rounds should fall short—and only a few short rounds of 4·5 in. H.E. are
sufficient to do inestimable havoc and wreck the confidence of attacking
troops. Like many desperate measures, however, it succeeded; some fifty
Germans, unable to stand the appalling weight of fire (about 80 rounds
of H.E. per minute in a confined space), fled from Scabbard Trench and
rushed down the bank running east towards Pelves Mill, while
simultaneously a party of about one hundred of the enemy left the same
bank and made for the cross-roads just west of the mill. Immediately
they broke cover the 18-pdrs. switched on to the parties with excellent
results, and two companies of the 17th Royal Sussex Regiment, profiting
by the distraction, rushed Scabbard Trench in its entirety; this they
captured almost without casualties, and found seventy dead Germans, the
victims of the howitzer bombardment.

The enemy now opened a furious bombardment upon Scabbard Trench,
realising that it had at last fallen, and at 2.20 P.M. launched a heavy
counter-attack which was beaten off after hand-to-hand fighting, in
which we captured one officer, twenty-five men and two machine guns. All
the afternoon the batteries were busy on various targets, especially
upon enemy infantry who kept massing behind Keeling Copse and running in
small batches to Cartridge Trench. At the same time a good view of the
hostile counter-attacks on Greenland Hill, north of the Scarpe, was
obtained, and on several occasions the guns were switched round to the
left and dealt smashing blows to the enemy every time he attempted to
leave his trenches.

The total result of the battle was that on the extreme right the 5th
Army advanced beyond Bullecourt, but was forced back again by the enemy
who reoccupied the village; around Cherisy all objectives were gained,
but here again the enemy counter-attacked and drove out our troops; on
the immediate front of the batteries a partial success with enormous
loss of life was obtained; on the north of the river the attack on Roeux
failed also, and only on the extreme left was any real success achieved.
Here the 1st Army took Fresnoy and all the objectives north of Oppy.
Oppy itself, however, proved too difficult for the attacking troops, nor
were any of the objectives between it and the river captured. In short,
the attack began well, almost brilliantly, but finished badly; it was
not a defeat—the operations north of Oppy saved it from being called
that—but it was at least a partial failure which had cost many thousands
of lives.

May, then, did not begin very well, and, after spending the whole of the
4th in consolidating the ground of the previous day's battle, a lull set
in—a lull which was not broken until the 11th. At 7.30 P.M. on that day
the 4th Division just north of the river carried out an attack upon
Roeux Chemical Works and Cemetery, the 33rd Divisional Artillery
supporting the operation on the flank. Covered by a barrage, the density
of which was one 18-pdr. for every seven yards of front, the infantry
rushed all the objectives and held them, together with 300 prisoners; to
this gain was added a further advance along the river's edge at 6.0 A.M.
next morning, which was covered by a barrage put down on the
north-western end of Roeux, and by midday on the 12th the infantry were
secure in their newly-won positions. The ominous Chemical Works, from
which such deadly machine-gun fire had been directed on our attacks
south of the river, was now in our hands, and there seemed every chance
of an advance being possible on the front of the batteries.

Orders for this advance were not long in coming. At 6.45 P.M. on that
same evening (12th) the 12th Division, which was covered by the 33rd
Divisional batteries, advanced to the assault on Devil's Trench, while
the 3rd Division prolonged the attack to the right. After a three-minute
bombardment with a density of one 18-pdr. to every ten yards of front,
the 36th and 37th infantry brigades advanced upon the portion of Devil's
Trench which ran northwards from Bit Lane to Harness Lane.
Simultaneously with the attack, however, very heavy rifle and
machine-gun fire was opened by the enemy from both flanks—Gun and Devil
Trenches—which were held in force, and fifty yards short of the trench
our infantry were stopped, unable to advance any farther. Lieut.
Wingfield, the forward observing officer of the 156th Brigade who was
with the attacking company commander, got through to the guns and
reported that the infantry intended to assault again at 10.45 P.M.
Accordingly, for fifteen minutes prior to that time the batteries put
down a heavy barrage and then lifted on to the enemy support trenches.
Close on the heels of the barrage the infantry rose to the attack, but
circumstances were against them; darkness supervened everywhere, the
infantry were scattered all over the place owing to the non-success of
the first attempt, and Devil's Trench was only assaulted here and there.
By midnight it was reported that the remnants of the attacking company
were back in their own original front line again. The operation had
failed completely.

The operations of May 3rd, costly enough by themselves, had now been
followed by the two attacks on the 11th and 12th, and so heavy were the
casualties amongst the infantry that, for a time at any rate, the
infantry battle was broken off, and to the guns was given the task of
wearing down the enemy and of destroying his morale. This new period was
ushered in on the 14th by a Chinese bombardment of the enemy trenches; a
bombardment, that is to say, which bore all the signs of a barrage
covering assaulting troops but which, in reality, crept forward
unfollowed by any infantry, and then dropped back suddenly on to the
hostile fire-trench to catch such of the enemy as had manned the parapet
to meet the expected assault. In this case our guns pounded Devil's
Trench for a short time, and then crept on by lifts of one hundred yards
every minute. After three lifts the barrage suddenly dropped without
warning on to the fire-trench again and blasted it with high explosives
and shrapnel, while the Division on the left swept the area with
enfilade machine-gun fire. No movement was seen, but the enemy doubtless
expected that another attack on Devil's Trench was being launched and
would therefore have manned the parapet; if he did so, his losses must
have been severe.

Having thus attacked his forward infantry, the guns now turned their
attention to enemy ration parties and back areas. Every night, for the
past week or so, a part of the night firing programme (which was carried
out every night by each battery mainly on back areas) had been to keep
up intermittent shell fire upon the road running east from Pelves
towards Hamblain. Aeroplane photographs now received, however, showed
tracks running parallel to this road and about 150 yards south of it,
tracks which became clearer every day. It was manifest that the enemy
had given up using the road and was cutting across country; on the night
of the 15th, therefore, the guns directed their fire in intermittent
bursts on to the original road up till 9.0 P.M., and then at that hour,
by which time all traffic would have been diverted on to the
cross-country tracks, swept up and down those tracks with H.E. and
shrapnel for ten minutes at an intense rate of fire. That this fire was
effective in its object was clearly proved next day, when the enemy
retaliated strongly upon our own lines of communication—sure sign that
we had done something seriously to annoy him.

The batteries now began to have a bad time. Free from infantry attacks
and suffering most of his casualties from the guns, the enemy turned the
full fury of his attention upon the gunners. "B" and C/162 were engaged
by a 5·9 in. high velocity gun, their positions being badly damaged;
D/162 was registered by an enemy aeroplane which carried out an all-day
bombardment upon it in co-operation with an 8 in. howitzer battery. Both
brigades suffered severely from bombardment by 5·9 in. howitzers, while
a couple of whizz-bang batteries devoted themselves to putting
intermittent bursts and sniping rounds into all the battery positions,
and especially those of the 156th Brigade, causing many casualties by
the unexpectedness of their attacks. As a rule, in fact, these sudden
bursts did far more damage to personnel than the long all-day
bombardments, and it was just such a burst which killed Captain Heape of
A/162 and so wounded Lieut. Tucker that he died next day—a loss
grievously felt, for both officers were of the very finest type which
the brigade contained. From day to day each battery in turn underwent a
severe shelling, and the casualties in men and guns mounted, ever
mounted.

On May 16th the lull in infantry fighting was broken, this time by the
enemy. After bombarding our front trenches immediately north of the
Scarpe, together with the village of Feuchy and the back areas in
general, during the whole of the 15th, a big hostile attack was launched
at 3.0 A.M. on the 16th and drove our troops out of Roeux Cemetery and
Chemical Works. By 7.30 A.M. we had counter-attacked and recaptured the
lost ground, and at 9.50 A.M. a hostile counter-attack was driven off.
Shortly after ten o'clock our men were seen advancing north-west from
the Chemical Works, but a furious hostile barrage was put down on them
and they were forced to retire. All day long the batteries poured shell
into Roeux and the adjoining trenches, and all day long fighting
continued; by evening the situation had calmed down, and little change
showed itself on the front as a result of the twenty-four hours'
fighting. It was clear, however, that the enemy was not only going to
offer a stubborn resistance but was even assuming an offensive attitude
in places, and a bitter struggle was anticipated when orders were
received for another attack on Devil's Trench.

On the 19th our troops were once again flung upon this deadly little
objective—flung, as they had so often been before, on a narrow limited
front with the knowledge that flank machine-gun fire must inevitably be
met with.

Major Colfox (D/162) had, on the previous night, run a forward gun right
up to Chinstrap Lane, twelve hundred yards west of Roeux, and had
registered it over open sights in the early morning, in the hope that
enfilade fire from here might assist the infantry in their oft-tried
task. Under a heavy barrage the infantry rushed to grips with the enemy,
but no sooner had our guns started than the enemy opened a heavy
concentrated machine-gun fire all along the front, while his guns put
down a dense barrage within thirty seconds of the beginning of the
attack. A footing was gained in the part of Tool Trench still held by
the enemy, but strong bombing attacks were delivered from both flanks,
and our troops under the pressure of these attacks were forced to
withdraw. Devil's Trench once more had proved a death-trap.

This venture was followed up at 11.30 P.M. on May 30th by an assault on
Hook and Tool Trenches, but the attack only added one more item to the
now growing list of local failures. Our troops were evidently seen
leaving their trenches, and this enabled the enemy to open heavy
machine-gun and artillery fire on them. In spite of this, and of the mud
and water caused by a thunderstorm during the afternoon, the attacking
troops reached their objectives, but so heavy had been the casualties
suffered whilst crossing No Man's Land that the remnants were not strong
enough to deal with the garrison of the trench. Most of the attackers
were driven out by a counter-attack following immediately on the
assault, but a party of the Manchester Regiment established itself in
Hook Trench and managed to hold on till noon next day. The guns poured
shell over their heads and put down barrage after barrage for their
protection, but it was of no avail. Shortly after midday a superior
force of the enemy counter-attacked with fury, and this gallant little
party was overcome.

The advent of June brought with it a further succession of local
attacks—efforts to straighten our line, to remove important points held
by the enemy and generally to improve our tactical position. It was
evident, from the non-success of the French offensive in the south, that
no more operations on a large scale would be carried out here, but it
was also clear that Higher Command had decided in its mind that our line
must embrace certain tactical features now in the hands of the enemy,
and to this end further local undertakings had to be effected. Following
on two Chinese bombardments on June 3rd and 4th, in which the 33rd
Divisional Artillery took part to the south of the river, the 9th
Division carried out a short and successful attack around Greenland Hill
on the night of the 5th, and consolidated all its gains. Soon
afterwards, on the 13th, a very successful attack upon Hook and Long
Trenches was made by the 76th Infantry Brigade. During the previous week
a systematic bombardment had been carried out night and day upon the
enemy defences to obliterate his trenches and to weaken his morale. Each
day, however, there had been no firing between 5.0 A.M. and 9.0 A.M.,
and the enemy had grown accustomed to a period of quiet at this time.
When, therefore, the infantry rushed across at 7.20 A.M., our barrage
not starting till 7.21 by which time they were in the hostile trenches,
they caught the enemy quite unprepared and showing little resistance.
All gains were held and, under cover of a protective barrage, the ground
was consolidated.

At 7.15 A.M. next day (14th) a further attack under cover of a barrage
resulted in the capture of Infantry Hill by our troops, and the morale
of the latter, somewhat shaken by the continued reverses at Roeux and
Devil's Trench during the previous weeks, began now to rise again to the
pitch of confidence and assuredness so badly needed. So greatly did it
improve, in fact, that when the enemy counter-attacked at 2.15 A.M. on
the 16th, in an endeavour to regain Infantry Hill, he was severely
punished and beaten off—except for the loss of two southern posts in
front of Long Trench—despite the fact that the attack had been delivered
with a strength of some seven hundred bayonets under cover of an intense
artillery bombardment. A second hostile attempt at 2.30 A.M. on the
17th, although preceded by a two-hour bombardment, only resulted in our
losing a small portion of Long Trench, and it now seemed as though
Infantry Hill were securely in our hands.

Just prior to these attacks the 33rd Divisional Artillery had received
orders to move out to the wagon-lines and to take over part of the line
further south. The enemy's attitude, however, appeared threatening, and
accordingly the departure of the batteries was postponed until the
activity had died down. By June 20th all appeared to be quiet, and at
6.0 P.M., after twelve weeks of continuous battle on this front, the
march to the wagon-lines was effected. Taking their guns with them, the
batteries topped the ridge west of Battery Valley and marched back to
the peace and rest of Arras once more.

The three months' fighting in this offensive had marked a brilliant
chapter in the doings of the 33rd Divisional batteries. Under all
conditions, in blizzards, in snow and mud, under intense shell-fire from
the enemy they had maintained their reputation for straight shooting and
complete reliability; moreover, and this was above all the most valued,
they had won the entire confidence of the infantry. When the 3rd
Division, which had carried out the operations of June 14th-19th under
cover of the guns of 33rd Divisional Artillery, was withdrawn from the
line, its G.O.C. Major-General Deverell wrote to General Stewart and
asked that the personal thanks of the infantry might be conveyed to the
batteries. "We wish them" he concluded in his letter, "all good fortune
in the future and hope that we may again fight together with that close
co-operation which has been so conspicuously marked whilst we have been
together." High praise, that, and praise dearly won, for there were many
gaps in the ranks as the brigades turned westwards. On each and every
battery the offensive had left a heavy mark, and the faces of new
arrivals bore witness to the many blanks which had had to be filled, but
the greatest loss which the Divisional Artillery as a whole had suffered
was borne especially by the 162nd Brigade. On May 23rd Lieut.-Colonel O.
M. Harris was carried away on a stretcher in the advanced stages of
para-typhoid. To the officers and men of his brigade his name seemed
inextricably interwoven with the brigade itself, for he had "made" it,
working it up from its early raw stage at La Bassée to the fine fighting
instrument it now was. With his going a certain gloom fell upon the
brigade, for all ranks realised that they had lost not only a very
gallant leader but a very true friend.

Before he left, however, Colonel Harris had one great satisfaction.
Throughout the battle of Arras the 162nd Brigade had made it its object
always to be the furthest forward, always to be the nearest to the
infantry. Its batteries were the first across No Man's Land on April
9th, the first to advance as each enemy line fell, the closest up behind
the infantry throughout the operations, and early in May this
achievement was officially recognised. There came one day from
Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig a message saying that a captured German
5·9 in. howitzer would be presented to the 162nd Brigade in recognition
of the work it had carried out during the advance, and of the very fine
manner in which it had on all occasions pushed up so close behind the
infantry. Such a distinction has rarely, if ever before, been conferred
upon a brigade of artillery, and to its commanding officer was due a
full measure of praise in that he had worked it up to a pitch of
efficiency which made such deeds possible.

                  *       *       *       *       *

One night the brigades spent in their wagon-lines at Arras, and early on
the morning of the 21st they hooked in and moved off through Beaurains
down the long road which led to Bapaume, to pit their strength this time
against the fortifications of the Hindenburg Line.




                              CHAPTER VII.
          THE HINDENBURG LINE AND THE OPERATIONS ON THE COAST.
                          (JUNE-AUGUST 1917).


When the batteries marched back to the wagon-lines on June 20th they
knew that they were to set off next day to go into action immediately on
another portion of the front, but their actual destination remained
somewhat of a mystery. There was a rumour that they were going a
considerable distance northwards, even to the Coast it was suggested,
and therefore, when they set out in a southerly direction on the morning
of the 21st, a certain amount of surprise prevailed amongst the rank and
file. Southwards they headed, passing through Beaurains along the great
road running down to Bapaume, and gradually they penetrated more and
more deeply into the wilderness created by the enemy when he retreated
to the Hindenburg Line in February and early March.

As events turned out, the march was to be a short one. After leaving the
Bapaume road a few miles south of Arras, wagon-lines were established
around Hamelincourt, Boyelles and Boiry St. Rictrude in the VII. Corps
area, and one section per battery moved up into action the very same
afternoon; the march had represented nothing more than a sideslip of
some three miles to the right, but even this short distance brought the
batteries into totally different surroundings. They were now moving
through the country over which the enemy right had retired in his
withdrawal earlier in the year, and on all sides they saw proof positive
of the stories of destruction which had been related to them. Every
tree, every bush, even the slender apple trees lay cut down and
destroyed; roads had been blown up, houses demolished, and the country
had the appearance of a great wilderness with every natural feature
shaved off as though by a giant razor. The Bapaume road, no longer a
stately route bordered by trees, lay like a piece of tape across the
naked ground; houses gaped and tottered, blown up not by the shells of
the pursuing army but by the prearranged handiwork of the retreating
foe. It was a case of wanton destruction, wrath vented upon the
countryside by a bitter and chagrined enemy, and, although it has been
suggested that all this work was carried out in order to open the
country for the great and last German drive westwards which was destined
to begin some nine months later, there can be little doubt but that it
was merely a continuance of that policy of frightfulness and destruction
which marked all his doings.

                            ORDER OF BATTLE.

                            MAY—AUGUST 1917.

                                H.Q.R.A.

               C.R.A.                 Brigade Major.    Staff Captain.

  Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G.,     Major T. E.       Capt. W. E.
               D.S.O.                   Durie, M.C.      Bownass, M.C.

                             156th Brigade.

                     Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler.

                    Adjutant: Capt. B. L. Oxley, M.C.

                          Capt. W. G. Sheeres.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

   Major H. McA.      Major M. A.      Major Barker,    Major W. A. T.
  Richards, M.C.      Studd, M.C.          M.C.          Barstow, M.C.

                             162nd Brigade.

                         Lieut.-Colonel Conolly.

                      Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

     Major G.      Major H. C. Cory.  Major L. Hill.      Major W. P.
 Fetherston, M.C.                                           Colfox.

    Major W. G.      Major Walker,
     Pringle.           D.S.O.

Despite this, very fair wagon-lines were obtainable around the ruins of
the villages aforementioned, for the ground was dry and rolling and,
there being no inhabitants in this area of desolation, there were no
restrictions as to the setting up of horse-lines. Quickly the brigades
settled down in their new surroundings, and as quickly the first
sections moved up into action, to be followed next day by the remainder
of the batteries.

Ever since May 12th General Stewart and his staff had been near
Hamelincourt, controlling the artillery covering the infantry of the
33rd Division in the Bullecourt sector (at that time the 21st and 37th
Divisional Artilleries, together with the 150th, 293rd and 79th Field
Artillery Brigades), and on going into the line now the batteries came
under the administration of the 50th Divisional Artillery. The 156th
Brigade occupied the positions vacated by the 123rd Brigade of the 37th
Division, situated east-south-east of Henin-sur-Cojeul and just west of
the Hindenburg Line. The batteries of the 162nd Brigade were distributed
at first amongst the 82nd, 83rd and 250th Brigade groups; ultimately, on
the 23rd, they were placed under the control of the 250th (C and D/162)
and the 251st (A and B/162) Brigade Groups, and supported the infantry
from positions in Heninel (C/162) and east of Henin, all batteries
except A/162 being just to the left of the 156th Brigade. The front
covered by the brigades was roughly the line running southwards from
Fontaine-lez-Croisilles nearly to Bullecourt.

This part of the front was of intense interest to the batteries. To
begin with, they were in touch with the infantry of their own Division
for the first time since February; the 162nd Brigade, it is true, was
shooting over the trenches north of that part of the Hindenburg Line
garrisoned by the 19th and 98th Infantry Brigades, but the 156th Brigade
was actually covering the 33rd Divisional Infantry, and to the men there
was a feeling almost of being home once more when they thus found
themselves amongst their own. Added interest, moreover, was gained from
the fact that the much-talked-of Hindenburg Line could here be examined,
for the fall of Monchy had outflanked this part of the system, and the
enemy with much reluctance but of dire necessity had had to retreat from
it, leaving it to be occupied by our troops.

It was a mighty piece of fortification; in front of the fire-trench were
three thick belts of wire thirty yards apart, each belt some fifteen
yards deep; between the belts, which were so thick that hardly a mouse
could get through them, lay concrete emplacements for machine guns or
trench-mortars, reached from the front line by underground shafts. The
fire-trench itself, about twelve feet in depth, contained concrete
pill-boxes at every turn and on every tactical point, while the
communication trenches running back to the support line were so wired as
to form a defensive flank should any portion of the front be penetrated.
On reaching the support line an exact replica of the fire-trench was met
with; three belts of wire and the accompanying pill-boxes and
machine-gun emplacements lay in front of the trench, but this time a
further feature was added. Throughout the entire length of the
Hindenburg support, from Beaurains right down to Bullecourt, there ran
an underground tunnel seven feet high, three and a half feet wide and
thirty feet below the surface. Shafts ran down to it at intervals of
twenty yards, and to all intents and purposes it formed a vast dug-out
exactly under the parapet of the trench and running beneath it
throughout all the miles of its length. Its existence could only be
proved as far as Bullecourt, for from that point onwards it was held by
the enemy, but doubtless it continued southwards with the Hindenburg
Line itself since, offering as it did a perfect refuge for the garrison,
it formed an integral part of the defences of this great system. For
that portion of the passage which lay in British hands a "Town Major"
even had been appointed, and from him could be obtained so many yards of
the dug-out as the lawful habitation of the unit on the spot!

The batteries were not slow to get to work here. June 22nd and 23rd were
spent in registration of the zone and in careful study of the front to
be covered. On the 23rd the 156th Brigade bombarded Tunnel Trench at
11.35 A.M. and 7.30 P.M., and at midnight on the 23rd/24th supported an
attack on it by the 19th Infantry Brigade from Lump Lane. The attack
proved unsuccessful, and throughout the 24th the bombardment was
continued, while the 162nd Brigade took up the running on the left in an
attack on York, Bush and Wood Trenches. The 5th E. Yorkshire Regiment
(50th Div.) carried out this assault at 12.30 A.M. on the 26th, and at
first were successful. All the objectives except for the cross-roads
north-west of Fontaine-lez-Croisilles were gained, thirty prisoners were
captured and two hostile counter-attacks driven off. There followed,
however, such a deluge of hostile shell fire that the newly-gained
trenches were entirely demolished, and a large part of the ground gained
had to be relinquished.

After this outburst the brigades settled themselves down to "artillery
activity," searching for the opposing batteries and shelling all tracks
and approaches to the enemy front line. The two brigades each fired some
six hundred rounds every twenty-four hours on targets of this nature,
and by so doing aroused the ire of the enemy to no small extent. Hostile
counter-battery work increased rapidly in activity, but very few
casualties were suffered. A/162 (Major Pringle) were much damaged by
hostile bombardments on the 22nd and 24th, while Major Richards' guns
(A/156) on July 2nd were so heavily shelled that they had to shift their
position, having lost three sergeants killed and a number of men
wounded. But if the batteries suffered in this manner, at least they
gave as good as they took; nightly activity was more than ever directed
upon the hostile back areas and gun positions rather than upon the
infantry, and to this was added a chemical shell bombardment carried on
throughout the night of the 28th/29th which must have worried the enemy
to a considerable extent, if the weight of his retaliation on the 29th
were to be taken as a guide!

When the batteries came out of action prior to moving down to this part
of the front a rumour was circulated, as already mentioned, that their
destination was to be the Coast, and surprise prevailed that their route
should take them southwards. Battery commanders were told by their Group
Commanders on arrival, however, that the Cherisy-Fontaine sector was
nothing more than a sorting-area, and that they, like the batteries
before them, would probably remain in action only some ten days or so
before moving elsewhere. Therefore, when orders were received on July
9th to move out of action in a couple of days' time, the news was not
altogether unexpected. The preceding period had been spent in the usual
artillery activity with no infantry action of any sort, but
unfortunately the enemy, by this continued harassing of his battery
positions and roads, had been roused to an extreme pitch of retaliation.
He had of late taken to subjecting the valley from Heninel through St.
Martin-sur-Cojeul down to Henin to a miniature shell storm, and as
certain of the batteries had to utilise this route for their move out it
seemed as though his efforts, hitherto fruitless, might meet for once
with some success.

As matters turned out, however, the nightly searching took place some
thirty minutes before the batteries moved, and the actual march away was
carried out undisturbed on the night of July 11th/12th. A/162,
nevertheless, and one or two other batteries were very heavily shelled
by 5·9 in. howitzers just as the teams and limbers arrived, and only by
the greatest good fortune, coupled with some very marked gallantry
amongst the men, did the guns get away without serious casualties.

On arrival at the wagon-lines it was found that no further destination
had been determined, and that here for the present the batteries were to
remain. There was no reason, indeed, for a move to any more distant
area, for the horse-lines here were good and dry, tents had been pitched
to shelter the men, harness "rooms" had been erected while the batteries
were in action, and a very fair degree of comfort offered itself to all
ranks. True, the horse-lines were in view of enemy territory at points,
but they were a long way back—some five miles from the line—and no
trouble from long-range fire was expected; on the other hand the
uninhabited state of the area, due to the destructive march by the
Germans early in the year, offered an excellent training ground for work
of every description.

Refitting, overhauling and training began immediately after the arrival
of the batteries at their horse-lines. From the 13th to the 15th a
Divisional Artillery scheme with skeleton batteries was carried out
around Adinfer Wood; this was followed by days of battery training, gun
drill, driving and riding drill, battery staff work, training the
detachments to cut gaps through wire entanglements and rush their guns
over trenches, and every conceivable form of preparation for more open
fighting.

All was not work, however; the weather was glorious and every
opportunity was taken of giving the men a holiday, a rest from fighting
and preparation for fighting, a chance of enjoying themselves. Five or
six jumps were put up near each battery, and the respective wheelers
knocked together gates for exhibition driving; the Divisional band came
down and gave a concert one afternoon, while another half-day was spent
in a cricket match between the two Brigades. Batteries arranged mule
races for their own edification or ran off heats for the forthcoming
sports, and altogether managed to make the time very pleasant.

As a final flourish, two days were allotted for a Horse Show and sports.
On the 18th the Divisional Artillery Horse Show was held near Boiry St.
Martin, and produced an excellent programme. Events were ushered in by
the somewhat precipitous arrival on the course of a six-in-hand
emanating from D/162; a six-in-hand which, although only hooked in to a
G.S. wagon and consisting of horses quite unused to this form of
equitation, was driven up the course by Major Colfox in true coaching
style, the battery trumpeter rendering weird noises from the back, while
General Stewart's A.D.C. took a prominent seat "to add tone to the
picture!" Followed a series of jumping, driving and "turnout"
competitions, mule races and the like, till at last a very cheerful day
and one producing some fine horses and horsemanship came to an end.
Major Studd won the officers' jumping event. A/156 gathered up many of
the other prizes, and the remainder were scattered amongst all the
batteries.

Four days later a day was given up to Divisional Artillery Sports, the
programme consisting not only of the usual flat race, jumping and
obstacle items but also of one or two mounted events, and then the
batteries packed their wagons, hooked in the teams and turned their
backs sadly on this pleasant spot. They were off to the war once more,
and rumour had at last been verified—the Coast was their destination.

The knowledge of this destination had been obtained by the batteries
some time back. As early as July 4th General Stewart and his
Brigade-Major (Major Durie), who had been relieved in the line by the
C.R.A. of the 21st Divisional Artillery three days previously, set out
for XV. Corps Headquarters to attend a conference, and did not return
until the 8th. On the 13th orders had been received for one officer and
fourteen men per battery to move ahead of the main body and report at
headquarters of the 1st Division at Coxyde Bains, to prepare the
positions which the guns were to take up, and with the name of the
destination now disclosed an immediate rush had been made for maps to
discover its locality. "Bains" certainly suggested the Coast, and surely
enough it was ultimately found there—a small village some four miles
west of Nieuport and right on the sea front. It was therefore with the
knowledge of great events impending that the batteries marched off on
July 23rd, glistening in the new paint and added burnish which eleven
days in the rest area had made possible. Authieule and Amplier, both in
the neighbourhood of Doullens, were their destinations that night, and
these they reached in the evening after a march through very fine
country under a glorious sky.

From 6.0 P.M. and throughout the night of Tuesday, the 24th, the
batteries entrained at Doullens North and South and at Authieule. Eight
horses in each van, guns and wagons lashed to long trucks by French
porters, men crowded into big cattle trucks, they journeyed throughout
the night and early morning past Hazebrouck and Bergues, and finally
arrived in the forenoon of the 25th, the 156th Brigade at Adinkerke, the
162nd Brigade at Dunkirk. A rapid detrainment, water and feed for the
horses and a hasty meal for the men, and the batteries set out in long
columns for their wagon-lines. The 156th Brigade went right up to Coxyde
Bains and established wagon-lines in the dunes behind the village; the
162nd Brigade marched to Ghyvelde, a village two miles from the Belgian
frontier and some distance behind the line, and sent up one section of
horses from each battery to be attached to the 156th Brigade at Coxyde
for use as a forward wagon-line.

The next morning battery and brigade commanders rode up to the line to
reconnoitre the positions they were to occupy, and to inspect the work
done by the advance parties, while on the 27th and 28th the guns of
every battery were calibrated at the Coxyde Bains range, firing out to
sea through electric screens, by which process the muzzle velocities of
the guns were measured. On the night of the 28th/29th the 156th Brigade,
with "A," "B" and C/162, moved up into action in the positions already
prepared, and next night were followed by D/162. Considerable difficulty
was experienced on both occasions owing to an enemy bombardment of the
neighbourhood with gas shell throughout the night; respirators were worn
for two and a half hours and casualties were thereby averted, but the
difficulty of finding the way in the darkness on an unknown road was
naturally greatly increased.

On July 30th, when the batteries had opportunity to review their new
positions, they found themselves in surroundings totally different from
any yet experienced. On their left lay the sea, all around them was sand
broken up by huge dunes, and practically nowhere could any shell holes
be seen. This did not, unfortunately, mean that there was no hostile
artillery activity; on the contrary the enemy artillery, and in
particular his high-velocity guns, showed the most amazing persistence
in raking our battery positions. The reason for the absence of
shell-holes was that the sand, continually kept shifting by the wind,
silted up and filled in any hole within a few hours of its being made,
leaving all the shell splinters lying on the surface like pebbles on a
sandy beach. There arose from this the disadvantage of not being able to
tell from the nature of the ground whether it was subject to enemy
shelling or not, but on the other hand it offered real relief to eyes
now physically wearied by the continual sight of torn and desolated
country.

These coastal positions, indeed, offered many new and hitherto
unexperienced features, but for every advantage there was at least one
disadvantage. The sand, kept moving by the wind, removed the depressing
sight of shell-holes; but the same sand blew into men's eyes, blinding
them, and jammed the guns at almost every other round fired. The view of
Ostend—visible on a clear day from the Grand Dune—with the German
destroyers occasionally entering and leaving its harbour, offered an
object of great interest; but the proximity of Ostend involved the
presence of an infinite host of high velocity naval guns on land
mountings, which blasted impartially infantry, batteries and roads right
back to and beyond the wagon-lines. The sand was excellent in the
wagon-lines for harness cleaning, and ensured dry standings for the
horses; but it offered a constant threat to any animal which should eat
of it, and necessitated the setting up of double picket-ropes for the
horses, to prevent them from getting their heads down and contracting
sand colic.

There was only one real consolation, and that was the presence of the
sea. The sea, with its submerged wire entanglements, offered a zone free
from the enemy; the sea occasionally provided the thrills of destroyers
passing and of monitors bombarding Ostend and Westende. The sea, on a
fine evening, somehow brought Home very near as it stretched in a glory
of shimmering gold, unconcerned and utterly oblivious of warfare, back
to and beyond the far horizon whither lay England. The land could be
smashed, the land could be blasted and torn, but the sea remained ever
the same, stronger and mightier than any war, the connecting link
between Hell and the peace of an English home.

The batteries were very close to the sea, for they were on the extreme
left of the whole of the line. Headquarters of the 162nd Brigade were
established in the West Sand Dunes about 700 yards south of Groenendyk
Plage. "A" and B/162 lay some 150 yards in rear of headquarters; D/162
was almost on the beach, for it took up a position in the East Dunes 150
yards from the water's edge, with C/162 not far off in the West Dunes
about three hundred yards from the shore; both these batteries lay in
front of headquarters and south of the Groenendyk Plage-Nieuport Bains
road. The 156th Brigade was farther inland but still quite close to the
coast, B/156, the southernmost battery, being 300 yards south of the
Yser. Both brigades, since they were situated on the extreme left of the
line, covered the left or Nieuport Bains sector, which ran from the
Coast along the south side of the Yser and along New Trench to Barnes
Bridge. In addition to the 33rd Divisional Artillery, the infantry of
the 66th Division, who held this front with one infantry brigade (two
battalions in the line), were also covered by the 66th Divisional
Artillery and three Army Field Artillery Brigades, the whole being under
the command of Brigadier-General D. B. Stewart, C.R.A. 66th Division.

It may seem strange that such a great mass of guns should cover a
one-brigade front, and in the ordinary course of trench fighting this
weight of artillery would far have out-reached requirements. The coastal
zone, however, was not an ordinary part of the line; there was a great
deal of mystery hanging around it, a great deal of "hush-hush" talk and,
to give a hint as to the truth of this talk, a vast concentration of
artillery. Ever since the batteries had detrained at Adinkerke and
Dunkirk the men at the wagon-lines had seen, day after day and hour
after hour, heavily laden trains pull in, disgorge batteries and
battalions, shunt out and be replaced by more trains. Every day fresh
batteries marched up the pavé road long the Nieuport canal to occupy
positions amongst the sandhills; every day an inspection of the dunes
around Nieuport discovered fresh batteries congregated in every hollow,
in every depression of the ground, until there seemed to be no room for
more.

It was, indeed, a mighty concentration; close up to Nieuport the field
guns lay in tier upon tier; behind them the six-inch howitzers occupied
every possible position and many that were almost impossible;
eight-inch, sixty-pounders and 9·2 in. jostled each other for room
further back, while over their heads rushed the shells of the long-range
guns in action near Coxyde Bains. Clearly an offensive was impending,
but how and where? The area immediately in front of the 66th Division
was flooded and impassable, and on the left lay the sea. Was it from
there that the blow was to fall, or was the right to attack and,
piercing the German lines, force the enemy troops facing Nieuport to
retire? Rumour held orgy.

Meantime the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery to all outward
appearances cared for none of these things. They were in action, there
was certain destructive work to be done, and the enemy was making the
doing of it very uncomfortable. From Dune 18 and the neighbouring O.P.'s
targets were registered and bombarded, destructive and harassing fire
was maintained on selected "sore" spots, and the front was kept in
continual turmoil. On August 2nd the 49th Division on the right carried
out a daylight raid with the assistance of the batteries, and on the
night of the 7th/8th the guns supported two raids on the Lombardzyde and
St. Georges sectors, both of which were successful. There followed, on
the night after this raid, a projector gas attack which was launched on
the enemy in the Nieuport Bains sector in conjunction with a barrage
fired by all batteries, and it is scarcely surprising to record that the
enemy's temper now became extremely frayed. Every battery was shelled by
high-velocity guns, 5·9 in. howitzers and innumerable gas shells; the
roads and approaches—especially the Coast road—were under continual
bombardment, and the strain upon the detachments grew increasingly
heavy. 162nd Brigade wagon-lines, in order to cope with the
ever-increasing demand for ammunition, had moved up on July 31st to St.
Idesbalde, and the 156th Brigade, which on August 1st had sent its
horses back to La Panne, now, on the 5th, brought them up to Coxyde
Bains once more.

The night of the 15th/16th saw another projector gas attack on the
Nieuport Bains sector, during which the batteries fired on the areas
around Golf Road and Polder Trench, and which was followed by increased
enemy artillery activity. Nieuport and the batteries around it, Pelican
Ridge and the roads running inland from the coast were all raked by
enemy fire which increased in violence on the 18th, when a practice
barrage on the right divisional front was carried out. There followed
four more days of practice barrages and then, on the night of the
24th/25th, the 19th Infantry Brigade, supported by the guns, attacked
and captured Geleide Post. It was only a small operation, however, and
the batteries covering it merely fired on their S.O.S. lines; moreover
it was a short-lived success, for the following night the enemy won it
back again.

For four weeks now the batteries had carried out continual bombardments
of the enemy; practice barrages had been fired, and an immense
concentration of artillery had gathered together. An attack was clearly
impending and it was evident that the enemy realised the fact, for his
guns had shown the very greatest activity for some weeks; they were
forever bombarding battery positions, roads and communications, usually
with high-velocity naval guns on land mountings, but also with 5·9 in.
and 8 in. howitzers, while of late a 17 in. howitzer had been in the
habit of blasting the field batteries around Nieuport. Therefore the
news came like a bombshell when, on the night of August 27th/28th, the
batteries were ordered to withdraw to their wagon-lines. It seemed
incredible that this great concentration of artillery should be broken
up without being used for any offensive operations, and at first it was
thought that the 33rd Divisional Artillery might be an isolated case.
But no! Every day battery after battery—some heavy, some of field
guns—pulled out from the sand dunes and headed for the rest area, their
work over, their object unfulfilled. The mighty hosts of batteries,
which for weeks now had been lying in every hollow and valley amongst
the dunes, melted away and disappeared without ever learning the object
of their coming.

Many and varied have been the reasons put forward for the breaking off
of this attack. Some say that the advance of the enemy at Lombardzyde
early in July put a check to our plans; some attribute it to the long
spell of wet weather and to the non-success of the great attacks at
Ypres on July 31st and August 16th, while many assert, not without
truth, that the enemy obtained our entire operation orders for the
battle and took counter-preparations accordingly. Undoubtedly an attack
had been planned, and an attack on some entirely novel lines. The 1st
Division had, for weeks past, been kept isolated from all other troops
while it practised unusual offensive operations. Some of the batteries
had received orders that on a certain date they were to embark on a
certain ship at a certain port—all at present described in code—and the
general belief was that an offensive by land was to be launched in
conjunction with an attack somewhere near Ostend from the sea.
Imagination, running riot, spread the report that large rafts were to be
towed inshore on which there would be field-batteries firing as they
floated in, while other rafts were to carry infantry and tanks. The
whole idea sounded fantastic and a desperate adventure in view of the
manner in which the Belgian coast bristled with enemy guns and submerged
wire-entanglements; and, with the memory of Gallipoli fresh in the minds
of all, it is surprising how any such operation could have been
considered worth the gamble and the inevitable cost.

Whatever had been planned, however, nothing was carried out. The
batteries were left to reorganise in their wagon-lines for two days—a
period which the enemy utilised by bombarding with long-range
high-velocity guns the horse-lines of both brigades, and especially
those of the D.A.C. which suffered severe casualties—and on Saturday,
September 1st, under sudden orders they marched out, battery by battery,
on a three-day trek which brought them in glorious weather through
Ghyvelde and Cassel to the back areas of the Ypres Salient. At
Reninghelst and at Dickebusch their march terminated, and wagon-lines
were there established while parties went up to the line to prepare
positions for the guns to occupy. At last, after nearly two years'
fighting, they were to experience the desolation and horror of the
Salient, the deadliest portion of the whole line for gunners, and were
to take part in the autumn battles for the Passchendaele Ridge; had they
known it, few of the men who, early in September, marched up past
Dickebusch and Shrapnel Corner to the battery positions beyond Zillebeke
Lake were ever destined to return, while the majority of those who did
came down on stretchers, the wreckage of modern war.




                             CHAPTER VIII.
             THE AUTUMN BATTLES OF YPRES AND PASSCHENDAELE.
                       (SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER 1917.)


In and around the Salient of Ypres there are to be found the graves of
more gunners than in any portion of the line, and even those graves
represent a mere particle only of the many thousands to whom Ypres
brought death. That much discussed, much described and oft-portrayed
area will never and can never be properly comprehended by any man who
has not fought there, for, before the real meaning of the Salient can be
understood, the picture of destruction which it offered must be
accompanied by the realisation of the dread, the feeling of utter
desolation and misery, the terrible haunting horror which seized all men
as they stepped out through the Lille or Menin Gates with their faces
set towards the east. No man, be he ever so brave, was without fear in
that place, while the majority were in constant terror, a terror so
rending, so utterly shattering that death came often as a merciful
release. Yet of that fear no man need be ashamed; it was a terror
entirely within and invisible, and to outward appearances there were no
signs thereof; in the which there is not shame but honour.

The 33rd Divisional Artillery had yet to undergo these trials, but their
beginning was not long delayed. On the night of September 5th/6th,
twenty-four hours after the conclusion of the march, one section of each
of the 18-pdr. batteries of the 156th Brigade went into action and
relieved portions of the 11th, 12th and A/298 batteries; "A" and B/156
occupied positions south-west of Fosse Wood, C/156 lay north of Maple
Copse, and on the two succeeding nights, one section at a time, the
remainder of the batteries came up. The 162nd Brigade was not so rushed
as it had no "opposite numbers" to relieve, but on the other hand the
batteries had to prepare the positions they were to inhabit, and this,
in view of the appalling state of the ground, was extremely difficult.
To begin with, the finding of any patch of ground which guns could
possibly reach, and from which they would be able to fire more than two
or three rounds without sinking into the mud, proved an arduous task,
while the work of preparing platforms and shelters on the positions,
when chosen, involved not only great labour but a still greater
patience.

                            ORDER OF BATTLE.

                        SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER 1917.

                                H.Q.R.A.

               C.R.A.                 Brigade Major.    Staff Captain.

  Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G.,     Major T. E.       Capt. W. E.
               D.S.O.                   Durie, M.C.      Bownass, M.C.

                             156th Brigade.

                     Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler.

                      Adjutant: Capt. W. G. Sheeres

                           Capt. H. W. Smail.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

   Major H. McA.      Major M. A.      Major Barker,    Major W. A. T.
  Richards, M.C.      Studd, M.C.          M.C.          Barstow, M.C.
                                                         (_wounded_).

                                                          Capt. W. G.
                                                         Sheeres, M.C.

                             162nd Brigade.

                  Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner, D.S.O.

                      Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Major W. G.      Major Walker,    Major L. Hill,      Major W. P.
     Pringle.           D.S.O.             M.C.          Colfox, M.C.
                      (_gassed in                        (_wounded_).
                     September_).

                   Major H. C. Cory,                    Major Beerbohm
                         M.C.                             (_killed_).

                                                       Major F. L. Lee.

The enemy, fully alive to the indications of a renewed offensive on our
part, swept the whole of the battery positions with shell storms of
increasing density, inflicting casualties amongst the working parties
and wrecking the work they had done, so that at times it appeared as
though nothing would be ready for the remaining guns of the division
when they were ordered up into action. No sooner was one platform in a
position prepared, with a few sandbags thrown up around it for the
protection of the detachments, than a 5·9 in. shell would blow the whole
thing to pieces, and the work had to be begun all over again. Day after
day the working parties, reinforced by men from the D.A.C. and from the
Trench Mortar batteries, toiled unceasingly not only at their own
positions but at the two positions they had been ordered to prepare for
the 23rd Divisional Artillery, for they saw, after a very few hours of
the Salient, that without protection of some sort or other no detachment
could possibly survive a single barrage.

At length, after eight days' work, some reward for the labours of the
working parties showed itself, and it was well that this was so for now
the remaining batteries were ordered to move up into action. On the
night of the 13th/14th "A," "B" and C/162 took up the positions marked
out for them, to be followed on the next night by D/162, and by the
early morning of Saturday the 15th the whole of the Divisional Artillery
was in action and registered on the zones to be covered.

Already severe casualties had been suffered by the 156th Brigade
south-east of Zillebeke, who since September 5th had been in action
under the 24th Divisional Artillery, while the 162nd Brigade working
parties had also borne the weight of the hostile fire. From the 15th
onwards, however, conditions became far more severe, for on that day
began the organised bombardment by our guns prior to the forthcoming
attack, and the resulting increase of counter-battery work by the enemy.
On September 13th the 156th was put under the control of the 23rd
Divisional Artillery on the relief by the latter of the 24th, and with
A/103 formed part of the right group under Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B.
Butler (O.C. 156th Brigade) whose headquarters were at Tor Top. On its
arrival in the line on the 14th the 162nd Brigade was also controlled by
the 23rd Divisional Artillery, but, with the exception of C/162 which
was placed in the right group, the batteries went to form part of the
left group, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Groves (O.C. 103rd Brigade)
whose own batteries less A/103 made up the rest of the group. "A," "B"
and D/162 lay on the northern, southern and western edges of Maple Copse
(due east of Zillebeke) while C/162 was in action just south of Fosse
Wood; the positions of the 156th Brigade have already been noted.

[Illustration:

  Scale 1:20,000.
]

It will be remembered that throughout July and August, 1917, a
succession of big attacks was carried out by the British troops in the
Ypres Sector, with the object of driving the enemy back from the
semi-circle of low-lying hills which overlooked our trenches in the
Salient. The proposed coastal operations of the foregoing chapter had,
indeed, been planned in connection with the Ypres offensive, and with
the breaking off of the former the batteries were sent down to take part
in further undertakings against the Passchendaele-Gheluvelt ridge. The
ill-omened autumn offensive against the Passchendaele ridge was, in
fact, about to begin, and the first battle of the series was fixed for
September 20th. For this, the limits of the zone covered by the
Divisional Artillery were Clapham Junction on the north and Dumbarton
Lakes on the south, the 162nd taking the left portion of the zone, that
is from the northern limit for 700 yards southwards to Polderhoek
Château, the 156th the right portion of the zone from Dumbarton Lakes
700 yards northwards; the middle gap was covered by the centre group of
which the 33rd Divisional Artillery formed no part. It had been
extraordinarily hard to find any marked feature upon which to range the
guns, but Gheluvelt Mill, situated as it was upon a small mound, offered
a tolerably clear feature for registration purposes, and this was
utilised by the majority of the battery commanders prior to the barrages
which now began.

The whole barrage table for the forthcoming attack had, by the 15th,
been issued to the batteries, and the practice barrages which now began
to be carried out consisted sometimes of portions of this table,
sometimes of the complete barrage fired in its entirety. As a rule these
"rehearsals" were fired at half the rate which would be used on the day
of the attack, but the same proportions of shrapnel, H.E. and smoke
shell were adhered to, and therefore if only a part even of the barrage
were fired—such as the portion behind which the infantry would advance
from the first to the second objective—the curtain of fire as it
appeared on the ground would offer an exact model of the real attack
barrage, except for a certain diminution of density. This fact was
important, for it was realised that the bad state of the ground to be
attacked over would force the infantry to advance very slowly, and that
therefore a great deal depended upon the barrage to keep enemy
machine-gun fire down until our infantry could get to grips with their
assailants. Every day one and sometimes two practice barrages were
fired, and on each occasion one officer of considerable experience was
sent up from every artillery group to observe the effect thereof. In
particular, reports were rendered dealing with the density of the
barrage, whether all batteries opened fire simultaneously, whether there
were any gaps or rounds falling short, whether the average height of the
shrapnel bursts was correct and whether the barrage crept forward
uniformly. After every barrage these reports were examined and
collected, and before the next practice was carried out the necessary
alterations had been made.

The first practice barrage began at 4.0 P.M. on September 15th and was
carried out along the whole Corps front; followed certain minor
adjustments, and at 5.30 A.M. on the 16th it was fired again. At 10.0
A.M. on the same day an "Army barrage," _i.e._, a barrage on the whole
of the Army front, was fired, to be followed on the afternoon of the
17th by another Corps barrage. On September 18th the last two Army
barrages were fired, one at 6.0 A.M. and one at 8.30 P.M., and at 11.0
A.M. on the 19th the Corps had its last rehearsal. It was a relief when
these practices were over; they invariably called down heavy retaliation
from the enemy who, as soon as he saw an infantry attack was not
pending, turned the full blast of his guns on to our batteries. It was
impossible to cease firing and put the detachments under cover, for this
action would have resulted in gaps appearing in the barrage and
confusing the observers who, unaware of what was happening, would have
reported that the barrage was uneven and full of "holes." The programme
had to be carried out from start to finish whatever the enemy did, and
if the batteries lost heavily in these days it was all that was to be
expected of the Salient. Lose heavily they did, both in officers and
men, and as the latter stood around their guns in the small hours of the
20th, ready to begin this time the real barrage covering the assault,
there was not one detachment which had not already been seriously
depleted in numbers, which had not been compelled to call up
considerable reinforcements from the wagon-lines.

It was on September 18th that the orders had been received which fixed
the 20th as the day of attack, and on the last two nights, the 18th/19th
and 19th/20th, the howitzers of both brigades busied themselves with
prolonged gas bombardments of the enemy batteries. The only hope of
salvation for the guns lay in silencing some of those batteries, and
they knew that their chances of surviving the long all-day barrage which
they were to carry out on the day of the attack rested almost entirely
on the efforts of the two preceding nights, and on the work of the heavy
artillery which, by intense counter-battery work on the 20th, would try
to keep down the enemy fire.

Twenty minutes to six in the morning of Thursday, the 20th, had been
fixed for the delivery of the assault, and some thirty minutes before
this the detachments of all batteries manned their guns and stood by,
ready for the signal to go. Very feverish were those last few minutes of
waiting, for nearly every battery was being heavily shelled, and it was
probable that, as soon as the attack was launched, the enemy guns which
were causing all the trouble would come under the counter-fire of our
own "heavies," and would at any rate diminish the now alarmingly heavy
fire which they were directing upon the wretched detachments.

With terrible slowness and deliberation the minutes passed; 5·9 in. and
4·2 in. shell were crashing every moment into the battery positions,
ammunition was exploding, men were being knocked out and a number of
direct hits were destroying the guns, killing and wounding every single
man of the detachments. In some of the batteries a few more minutes of
this would have put every gun out of action, but mercifully zero hour
was at last reached, a sheet of flame lit up the entire countryside and
with a great roar the barrage began. The batteries of the 33rd Division
poured forth a curtain of fire in front of the advancing infantry, the
heavy artillery bombarded the enemy batteries and roads, and, whatever
happened all round them, whatever bombardment they suffered, the
detachments were now fully occupied and took heed of nothing but their
work. The assault had begun!

The infantry who were even now advancing under cover of the guns of,
amongst others, the 156th and 162nd Brigades were, as already stated,
troops of the 23rd Division. On the right the attack was continued by
the 41st Division, on the left by the 2nd Australian Division, and
together the long line advanced slowly through the mud towards the enemy
trenches. The ground was very bad; it was estimated that the infantry
advancing across No Man's Land could not cover one hundred yards in less
than six minutes, and accordingly the barrage was so timed as to move
forward twenty-five yards every minute and a half. Even at this slow
pace the infantry were hard put to keep up with it, while the work of
the gunners was rendered exceedingly heavy; for the ultimate objectives
were fairly deep within the enemy lines, and with the barrage moving so
slowly the infantry were not due to reach their farthest goal till a
late hour, while an intense rate of fire had to be maintained over their
heads the whole time. Moreover, there was not one battery which by now
had not had some of its guns knocked out, and the speed of the remainder
had, of necessity, to be increased in order to keep up the full volume
of fire.

From 5.40 A.M. onwards the batteries roared forth at intense rate;
slowly the barrage crept on ahead of the infantry till it reached and
covered the first objective; halted there for fifty minutes while the
assaulting troops reorganised themselves, and at 7.8 A.M. moved off to
the second objective, now at the slower rate of one hundred yards in
eight minutes. At 7.40 A.M. the second objective was reached and
covered, and for two hours and thirteen minutes a protective barrage was
maintained what time both infantry brigades in the forward line brought
up their reserve battalions for the attack on the 3rd and last
objective. At 9.53 A.M. the last phase of the attack began and, moving
forward now at only ten yards per minute, the barrage started to creep
towards the third objective, reached it at twenty-five minutes past ten
and, passing over it, put up a protective curtain of fire beyond while
the infantry established themselves in the newly won trenches. This
protective barrage, covering as it did the ultimate objective of the
day's fighting, had to be maintained until well on in the afternoon;
since it was fired at a slower rate, however, it now became possible to
relieve some of the detachments at the guns and to set about clearing up
the battery positions.

As already described, nearly all the batteries were heavily shelled just
before the launching of the attack early in the morning. Shortly after
the earlier phases of the barrage this hostile bombardment had eased off
under the counter-battery work of our own heavy artillery, but
throughout the morning—and, in fact, during the whole of that day and
night—every one of the battery positions was searched and swept at
intervals by 5·9 in. and 4·2 in. howitzers, the resulting damage to
personnel and equipment being very great. With gun muzzles pointed now
to a high elevation, small detachments maintained a protective barrage
at a slow rate of fire while the remainder of the men—after eating a
hasty meal—began to repair and reorganise the positions.

Yawning holes gaped everywhere; guns had been knocked out and had to be
dragged from the pits on to the road; ammunition, buried or scattered by
hostile fire, was dug up; the dead were removed and placed away near the
road, whither presently a wagon would come for them, while the gun pits
themselves required to be rebuilt so as to be fit for the new guns which
the wagon-lines had already been ordered to bring up. It was gloomy
work, this, and was rendered all the more depressing by the certain
knowledge that presently the enemy would open fire and would wreak the
same havoc all over again, but the outstanding necessity presented
itself of keeping every gun and every battery fully ready at a moment's
notice to support the infantry and prepared to open fire on any target
within range.

All this time news at the batteries had been scarce. A Captain from the
right and left artillery groups had been attached to the two infantry
brigades (68th and 69th) covered by the guns, and, in addition,
subalterns from the same artillery groups had accompanied the two
assaulting battalions in the attack on the third objective. Their duty,
however, was to report straight to Group headquarters, and therefore it
was left to the batteries only to surmise from the continuity of the
progress of the barrage that the attack must have, at any rate at first,
succeeded. The primary objective—the "Red Line"—ran from Fitzclarence
Farm through Herenthage Château to the eastern edge of Dumbarton Wood,
while the second objective—the "Blue Line"—extended from a point midway
between Black Watch Corner and Cameron House down east of Veldhoek to
the eastern edge of Bass Wood, and, as the weight of artillery forming
the barrage on the divisional front alone consisted of 84 18-pdrs., 30
4·5 in. howitzers and 42 heavier guns and howitzers, not counting the
batteries detailed for special work, it was hoped that these two
objectives at least might be overrun with comparative ease. It was in
the advance to the "Green Line," the final objective of the day's
battle, which ran from Carlisle Farm due south for eleven hundred yards,
bending back slightly to the west of Gheluvelt Wood but embracing Tower
Hamlets, that trouble might be forthcoming, for by then the enemy should
have recovered from his first surprise and might offer very considerable
resistance.

At last news was received. A short message stated that all objectives
had been taken but that very heavy fighting had occurred in the advance
upon the last objective, and only the excellence of the creeping barrage
had made success possible. The official report written later by the 23rd
Division stated: "The barrages were very punctual and effective.
Prisoners seemed dazed and utterly demoralised. The creeping barrage
from the second to the third objective and the protective barrage beyond
the latter are deserving of special mention. Replies to S.O.S. were both
prompt and effective, rapidly dispersing any attempts at concentration
or counter-attack. This instilled great confidence into our infantry."
These last remarks were not received till a later date; at the time
there came only the bare news that all objectives had been taken and
that a large part of the success gained was owed to the excellence of
the barrage. It was good to learn that the day was won, that success had
been achieved, and it offered some slight comfort to know that the
service of the guns, which had involved such heavy losses amongst the
detachments, had been of avail. Only on the right had non-success been
met with, and there the left brigade of the 41st Division had been
unable to advance beyond the second objective. The troops covered by the
33rd Divisional Artillery, however, threw out a protective flank; the
S.O.S. barrage was so arranged as especially to protect the right of the
23rd Division which was in the air except for the thin defensive flank
already referred to, and gunners and infantry set themselves to watch
for the inevitable counter-attacks.

All through the afternoon the batteries had been busy breaking up
concentrations of the enemy, and hitherto had been successful in keeping
them at bay. The valley of the Reutelbeek and the area around Reutel
Village offered some cover, and continued calls from the infantry kept
the guns at work on these areas. A determined counter-attack launched
shortly after 7.0 P.M. was beaten off under our artillery fire; all
night intermittent bursts from every battery swept the enemy hollows and
approaches, and at 4.30 A.M. on the 21st a special barrage was fired
with the object of breaking up any enemy operation which might have been
planned for daybreak. By these means, and by continuing these methods
throughout the day of the 21st, the infantry were able to maintain all
their gains, and by the evening of the 21st were assured of their
position. Two furious counter-attacks by the enemy, delivered after an
artillery bombardment lasting one and a half hours in each case, were
broken up at 3.0 P.M. and at 7.0 P.M. by our artillery fire, and gunners
and infantry alike now set themselves to try and repair the wreckage of
their positions before offensive operations should break out anew.

The heavy firing which preceded the attack, the all-day barrage which
had been maintained on the 20th and the wastage of ammunition incurred
through enemy shells blowing up the dumps around the guns necessitated
very heavy work all through the 21st and 22nd in bringing up ammunition
from the wagon-lines. The lines of the 162nd Brigade were a great deal
too far back for carrying out so much gun-line work, and, as early as
the 15th, forward wagon-lines composed of one section per battery had at
first been maintained on the eastern outskirts of Dickebusch; later,
after being heavily shelled on the night following the attack, they had
been moved across the road to the neighbourhood of Dickebusch church.
From here, and from the 156th Brigade lines a little farther back,
parties of pack horses came up on the 21st to carry ammunition from the
nearest dumps to the battery positions, for it was impossible in the
majority of cases to bring ammunition wagons and teams anywhere near the
guns. Light railway tracks had been run as far forward as possible, and,
from the termini at Valley Cottages, Verbrandenmolen and other points
which the little petrol-driven trucks were able to reach about once in
four days, the pack animals carried the ammunition to the batteries.
During the whole of the two days following the attack this transport of
ammunition was carried out, although continually interrupted by hostile
shell storms which inflicted many casualties amongst men and horses, and
by the 23rd not only were dumps at the guns completely up to strength
again, but further new guns had come up from the Corps gun "pool" on the
Reninghelst-Steenvoorde Road, and had in the majority of cases replaced
all the guns knocked out during the previous week's fighting.

It was well that the guns had succeeded in replenishing their ammunition
on the 21st and 22nd, for on the 23rd began preparations for a fresh
attack. Throughout the two preceding days the enemy had pounded and
smashed every battery position in the attempt to prevent as far as
possible any further operations, but as fast as the guns were damaged
repairs were executed, and at seven o'clock in the morning of the 23rd
every battery was able to take part in the Corps practice barrage which
had been fixed for that hour. Like its predecessors it was fired at a
reduced rate to that at which the real attack barrage was to be fired,
and like its predecessors it called down severe hostile retaliation.
C/162 (Major Hill) was so heavily shelled that it was compelled to move
out to a fresh position three hundred yards to the left flank, and every
battery received the usual searching which now had come to be regarded
as inevitable, while the rest of the day saw shell storms of increasing
violence delivered upon every area where any of our batteries were to be
found.

On the night of September 24th/25th the infantry of the 33rd Division
relieved the 23rd Division, and General Stewart, moving up to
Burgomaster Farm in Dickebusch, assumed command of the artillery
covering the front. The whole of the 25th marked a day of intense
activity amongst the guns. At 5.40 A.M., while the infantry relief was
still in progress, a strong counter-attack was launched by the enemy,
preceded by a heavy barrage. For one and a half hours our batteries
maintained a rapid rate of fire on their S.O.S. lines, but were unable
to prevent the right of the 100th Infantry Brigade astride the Menin
Road and the whole of the 98th Brigade from being driven back to the
support line. At 11.35 A.M. the S.O.S. signal was again sent up by the
100th Brigade, and again the guns burst forth in their support—this time
with success.

At 2.15 P.M. a Corps practice barrage was fired, and at 3.30 P.M.,
before the practice was over, devastating bombardment by guns of all
calibres was opened upon our battery positions. For upwards of half an
hour this bombardment continued, inflicting considerable damage upon the
battery positions, and then for a short time the weary detachments had a
rest. Not for long, however! At 5.30 P.M. the storm broke out afresh,
this time upon gunners and infantry alike, and once again, now under
heavy shell fire, the batteries responded to the S.O.S. signal sent up
an hour later by the left brigade and by the Australians further to the
left. This counter-attack was also repulsed, and by midnight it was
found that the right brigade held their line intact except for a small
portion of trench north of Menin Road, but that the left brigade north
of the Reutelbeek had been beaten back three hundred yards, though
possibly some posts were still held 150 yards in front.

Such a day as the 25th was not very favourable for preceding an attack,
yet when Wednesday, the 26th, dawned it found the infantry of the 33rd
Division assembling for the assault which had been fixed for 5.50 A.M.
It will be remembered that just prior to the attack on the 20th the
field batteries were all subjected to an intense bombardment, while the
infantry were allowed to assemble in the front line almost untouched.
Now the positions were reversed; at 5.0 A.M. the enemy put down an
intense barrage on the infantry, just as the latter were forming up for
the attack, and inflicted very heavy casualties upon them. For fifty
minutes the hostile bombardment tore them and shook them, and it was in
greatly diminished numbers that the infantry advanced across No Man's
Land when, at 5.50 A.M., the guns blazed out in the assault barrage.

For this attack one hundred and two 18-pdrs., thirty-six 4·5 in.
howitzers and a large number of heavy guns were covering the divisional
front, which stretched from the southern edge of the Polygon de
Zonnebeke on the north to a point three hundred yards short of Gheluvelt
on the south. Dumps of eight hundred and thirty rounds per 18-pdr. gun
and seven hundred and fifty rounds per 4·5 in. howitzer were maintained
at the guns for, as previously, the barrage was to move at the very slow
rate of one hundred yards in six minutes to the first objective, and one
hundred yards in eight minutes to the final line to be taken. Moreover,
a protective barrage was to be maintained beyond the final objective for
half an hour after its capture (8.40 A.M.), and from then until 2.15
P.M. was to continue at a reduced rate searching all the ground beyond
the infantry to a depth of one thousand yards. From this it will be seen
that allowance had to be made for a very heavy expenditure of
ammunition.

At 5.50 A.M. the infantry went over the top, and at 7.45 A.M. came the
first news. A captain from the right and left artillery groups (between
which two groups the 33rd Divisional Artillery was split up) had been
attached to the headquarters of the two infantry brigades delivering the
attack, while a subaltern from each group accompanied the battalions
assaulting the final objective, and from them came the information. The
39th Division on the right and the 5th Australian Division on the left
had captured the Red Line—the first objective—but the 33rd Division had
been held up. The first objective on the front of the latter ran from
Joist Farm past Jut Farm and through Polderhoek to the northern edge of
Gheluvelt Wood, and had proved too strong for the troops who, during the
previous twenty-four hours, had been fighting hand to hand in numberless
counter-attacks and had endured the most intense bombardments. At 8.40
A.M. the trench which had been lost in the previous day's fighting just
north of the Menin Road was recaptured, and at 11.55 A.M., after calling
back the barrage, a fresh attack under the creeping fire of the
batteries was launched upon the first objective. For twenty minutes the
guns carried out this new programme, but at 12.15 P.M. a message was
received asking the batteries to keep up a protective barrage beyond the
Red Line until further notice, as a heavy barrage was being maintained
by the enemy upon our assaulting troops. This protective barrage was
continued for upwards of an hour, which fact indicated that no further
progress had been made by the infantry, and throughout the afternoon
intermittent fire was directed upon the enemy beyond the first objective
until such time as orders should be received for a fresh attack.

In the middle of the afternoon a severe enemy shell storm descended upon
all the batteries and inflicted serious casualties. At the same time a
heavy bombardment of our infantry was reported, and at 5.0 P.M. our
guns, themselves heavily shelled by the enemy, opened fire on their
S.O.S. lines until 6.30 P.M. when they slowed down. At 6.40 P.M. the
S.O.S. signal was again sent up, and again for one and a quarter hours
the batteries put down a barrage. Scarcely had they stopped than the
enemy launched yet another counter-attack, and not till nine o'clock at
night did the gun detachments cease the barrage firing which they had
begun shortly before 6.0 A.M. that morning. With the arrival of night
matters became quieter and no further operations were attempted. From
information received it was gathered that the infantry of the 33rd
Division held the original line from which they had been driven on the
preceding day, and had established advanced posts in the first objective
although not occupying it in force. The casualties were reported to have
been terribly heavy.

On the morning of the 27th a resumption of the advance was carried out.
Ammunition was running low but, with pack horses hard at work bringing
up fresh supplies, the batteries kept a covering fire over the infantry,
and by 9.45 A.M. the latter had established themselves in force in the
first objective of the previous day's fighting and had pushed out posts
beyond. At midday the left brigade were very heavily shelled and asked
for covering fire from the batteries, and half an hour later the 5th
Australian Division on the left reported that they could see the enemy
massing in Polderhoek Château Wood. On hearing this the guns of the
156th and 162nd Brigades were immediately turned on to this area,
searching and sweeping it for upwards of three-quarters of an hour, and
the threatened counter-attack was broken up. At 2.15 P.M., however, it
developed again, and for an hour the guns of the 162nd Brigade
maintained a medium rate of fire on their S.O.S. lines, at the end of
which time all was reported quiet.

So the day wore on; the guns in continual action, the detachments,
depleted by hostile shell fire and weary almost to death, seizing what
opportunities they could of getting a few moments' rest. At a quarter to
seven in the evening the never-ending S.O.S. call was sent out again,
and for another hour the batteries fired on the lines indicated,
breaking up the attempted counter-attack and assisting our troops to
advance slightly upon the Blue Line—the final objective of the previous
day's battle—towards which they had been working gradually the whole day
long. When this barrage was finished night firing began and was
continued throughout the night, two calls for support from the infantry
being responded to at 1.15 A.M. and 5.10 A.M. respectively, and at
twenty minutes past five on the morning of the 28th such gunners as
still survived pulled themselves together to fire a Corps practice
barrage.

This practice barrage had a threefold object. In addition to further
shattering the enemy's defences and upsetting his morale, it was so
timed as to coincide with any enemy counter-attack which might have been
fixed for dawn, and which would therefore be dispersed by the fire of
our guns before it could come to a head. Moreover, it also helped our
front line troops under cover of its fire further to improve their
position, and so well did it succeed in this respect that, at 8.0 A.M.,
the infantry reported that they had consolidated their front only one
hundred yards short of the Blue Line. This operation, apart from an Army
barrage at 5.15 A.M. on the 29th which coincided with and broke up a
pending enemy counter-attack, proved the last combined operation between
infantry and gunners to take place in the month of September; with the
two brigades now engaged in the usual harassing fire which was the order
of the day on this front, we must turn our attention to the life of the
batteries and, leaving their tactical operations alone for a few
moments, see how they had fared during the previous four days' battle.

The losses amongst the detachments had been cruel. In all the fighting a
very heavy portion of the enemy's fire had been directed in
counter-battery work upon the gun positions, and the batteries, being
almost continually engaged with S.O.S. calls and unable to take any form
of cover, had been shot down time and again. Moreover, the work had been
desperate; with weakened detachments an incessant fire had had to be
kept up almost without a break, and such intervals as offered themselves
were necessarily utilised in rebuilding damaged gun platforms and in
restocking with ammunition. The men were in an advanced stage of
fatigue, and as yet no signs were forthcoming of any possibility of a
rest. On September 27th B/162 (Major Cory) was relieved by B/102 and
marched down to St. Hubertshoek, near Hallebast Corner, whither the
162nd Brigade wagon-lines had moved on September 25th, and here this one
battery remained in rest until October 7th, but for the remainder there
was no relief. With men from the D.A.C. and from the Trench Mortar
batteries the guns were kept in action, but this course involved the use
of many unskilled numbers, and few detachments had more than one man who
could safely be trusted to lay the piece in a barrage.

On September 28th two moves took place which brought home to the
batteries the fact that, for the present at any rate, they were not to
be relieved. On that day General Stewart and his Staff, on the relief of
the 33rd Division infantry by the 23rd Division, handed over control of
the artillery to the incoming C.R.A. and moved out to rest at Boeschepe,
where the headquarter staff remained until the batteries themselves at a
later date were ultimately relieved. Simultaneously, Lieut.-Colonel E.
J. Skinner, commanding the 162nd Brigade, came up and took over the
control of the Left Group from Lieut.-Colonel Groves (103rd Brigade) and
set up his headquarters first at Dormy House but later, on October 1st,
at Bedford House, one thousand yards south of Shrapnel Corner. The zone
covered by the two brigades was very slightly altered and now ran from
Gheluvelt on the Ypres-Menin road to a point about 1,700 yards
northwards, but the battery positions remained the same, and October
came in to find them preparing for offensive operations again.

On October 1st an Army practice barrage had been fixed to begin at 5.15
A.M., and, just as the gunners were assembling to fire the opening
rounds, a furious shell-storm was opened by the enemy upon our own front
line and the whole area up to one thousand yards in rear of it. It was
manifest, from hostile aeroplane activity and the weight of artillery
fire which was being brought to bear, that a big counter-attack was
impending, and the Army barrage accordingly came down at a very
opportune moment. At 5.50 A.M., while it was at its height, the enemy
were seen advancing in a series of waves upon our front line, and with
that action there began a day of the most intense fighting. All
communications with the front line were cut, not even pigeons succeeded
in finding a way through the dense hostile barrage, and until the
evening every battery was kept in almost continuous action answering the
numerous S.O.S. rockets which appeared, and replying to the enemy
bombardment which, even without the evidence of rockets, called by its
weight for active reply. Not until midnight did the situation ease, and
then it was found that the infantry had maintained their whole front
except for the left which had been bent back very slightly. To the
extraordinary heroism of the infantry the G.O.C. 23rd Division ascribed
the defeat of the hostile attack—and with this the gunners very heartily
agreed—but he added in his report that the field batteries had
maintained such splendid protective fire that the enemy had, on frequent
occasions, been broken up before they could get to grips with the
garrison of our front line.

Although the Army barrage on October 1st had coincided with and had
helped to defeat an enemy counter-attack, its primary object was to
prepare for a renewed offensive on our part, and this offensive now took
definite shape. After firing another practice barrage on October 2nd and
maintaining throughout the 2nd and 3rd a destructive fire upon the enemy
system—the while long strings of pack horses refilled the
ever-diminishing dumps of ammunition around the guns—the batteries in
the early morning of October 4th set range-drum and dial sight to the
opening elevation of yet another barrage, this time no practice but as a
definite and vital protection to infantry moving forward to the assault.
Despite the rain and the ever deepening mud the offensive was ordered to
be continued.

At 6.0 A.M. on Thursday, October 4th, on the zone covered by the 33rd
Divisional Artillery the infantry of the 5th Division advanced to the
attack, supported by one hundred and eight 18-pdrs., thirty-six 4·5 in.
howitzers, sixteen 6 in. howitzers and an assortment of heavier
howitzers and 60-pdrs. Their right lay upon the northern edge of
Gheluvelt Wood and their left upon Juniper Cottages, and, with the
barrage moving ahead of them at the rate of one hundred yards in six
minutes, they essayed the capture of the high ground south-west of
Reutel together with the eastern slopes of the Polderhoek spur. The
actual line of their one and final objective ran from a point 500 yards
south of Reutel, past the south-west corner of Juniper Wood and east of
Polderhoek Château to the northern edge of Gheluvelt Wood, the holding
of which line would cover the communications of the 21st Division across
Polygon Beek on the left in their attempt to capture Reutel; the
objective of the 5th Division, in fact, was the southward continuation
of the first objective of the 21st Division, and formed the right flank
of an attack which, further north, was intended to penetrate deeply into
the enemy lines. On the right of the troops covered by the 33rd
Divisional Artillery the infantry of the 37th Division were to advance
their left slightly to conform with the line of attack.

Throughout the night of the 3rd/4th the enemy had carried out an intense
bombardment of our front line system and had, from time to time, swept
the battery positions with shell-storms from 5·9 in. and 4·2 in.
howitzers. To this hostile bombardment the batteries had, at the request
of the infantry, energetically replied at intervals during the night,
but the opening rounds of the barrage at six o'clock in the morning
smashed their way into the beginnings of an enemy counter-attack which
was concentrating on the front of our own attack. Fortunately the
barrage dropped before the enemy concentration was complete, and the
fire of our guns at zero broke up the enemy attempt before it could come
to a head. Notwithstanding this, however, very considerable opposition
was met with, and only on those parts of the front where the infantry
managed to keep right close under the barrage fire of the batteries was
complete success achieved.

The barrage, as already stated, had been arranged to move forward at the
rate of sixteen yards per minute until it should reach a line two
hundred yards beyond the objective. Here it was to halt, fire a round of
smoke shell from every alternate gun as a warning that the protective
line had been reached, and be maintained at a slow rate to cover the
infantry while they were digging in. In addition, moreover, to this
standing barrage, it was arranged that every now and then the batteries
should search by short lifts for one thousand yards beyond the line of
the protective barrage; while at 8.10 A.M., by which time the objective
of the 5th Division should have been fully secured, the barrage was to
move on towards Gheluvelt in conformation with the fire covering the
21st Division further north in their advance on the second objective,
thereby suggesting a resumption of the advance on the 5th Division
front. In point of fact, however, no further advance beyond the first
objective on the front covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery was
intended; the batteries, when they reached the extreme limit of their
range, were to drop back to the protective barrage line again, their
work of drawing attention away from the 21st Divisional front being
finished.

As events turned out, the operations of the 5th Division were not
entirely successful. The 13th Infantry Brigade, under the guns of
Lieut.-Colonel Butler's Group (the right group), reached the final
objective with the right battalion in the afternoon, after being held up
for a time by a strong point north of Lewis House. The left battalion of
the same brigade, however, encountered strong opposition at Polderhoek
Château and was unable to keep up with the barrage. Survivors of the
assaulting troops actually reached Polderhoek Château and even
penetrated beyond it, but after severe hand to hand fighting a line was
taken up two hundred yards west of the Château. The left infantry
brigade (95th), covered by the guns of Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's Group,
was also unable in places to keep up with the barrage. The right
battalion found that the ground between the Reutelbeek and the company
on the southern edge of Cameron Covert was so sodden as to be absolutely
impassable; a detour to the right and left was accordingly made, and a
line consolidated in the 13th Brigade area and between Cameron Covert
and the stream. The left battalion of this brigade at the same time did
actually reach its final objective, but so heavy was the hostile fire
coming from the high ground around Poezelhoek that the position became
untenable, and a line was taken up in the area of the 21st Division on
the left, running from Reutel westward and facing south, while the 21st
Division formed a defensive flank by continuing this line to Cameron
Covert.

By three o'clock in the afternoon the right brigade disentangled the
muddle and formed a general line running from the northern edge of
Gheluvelt Wood north-north-east to the Scherriabeek and then on to a
point fifty yards short of Polderhoek Château; here there was a gap of
some 150 yards, and the line then continued due north for another
hundred yards, to be carried on northwards through Polderhoek Wood to
Cameron Covert by the left brigade. It was well that even this rough
line was organised, for throughout the afternoon infantry and gunners
alike were hotly engaged by the enemy in numerous counter-attacks. In
all, five attacks were launched by the enemy on the right brigade front
during the afternoon, and three more in the evening, and in each case
every gun which could be brought to bear was switched round to help the
exhausted infantry. After the most severe fighting, and after continuous
firing by the batteries throughout the remainder of the day, the
infantry were able to report that all gains were held; rifle and
artillery fire had smashed every enemy attempt to advance, and our new
line was securely held. During the night of October 4th/5th the left
battalion of the left brigade, under cover of the guns, withdrew from
the 21st Divisional area and took up a line through the middle of
Cameron Covert, and so on the morning of the 5th the line stood solid.
On this part of the front the objective had not been captured except
upon the extreme right, and the casualties had been tremendous. Further
to the left, however, success had been met with, and Reutel Village,
Abraham Heights and Gravenstafel were now in our hands.

It may be complained that this chapter has dealt too fully with the
infantry operations, and has not sufficiently recorded the daily life of
the batteries and their experiences during the attacks. The answer to
this complaint is, briefly, that the batteries had no daily life but
rather a daily death, while their experiences—day in, day out—were
invariably the same. Morning, noon and night the men were splashing
about in mud, trying to keep their ammunition clean and their guns
serviceable; daily they were shelled, sometimes with long deliberate
bombardments, sometimes in hurricane shell-storms which descended upon
them for forty minutes or so two or three times a day. They were always
wet, always cold; they continually saw the guns and ammunition, which
they had spent hours in cleaning and preparing, blown to bits in the
passing of a second; they helped to bring up more guns, more ammunition,
and saw, in the serving of these new guns, their mates blown to pieces,
shattered, torn. They grew to believe that relief would never come, that
for all time they must exist in the grim shadows of Maple Copse, of
Fosse Wood and of Armagh Wood. They felt, as they saw the shells
crashing down all around them, that they were forgotten by God and man.
There _is_ no daily history of the batteries to record save the success
or failure of the operations in which they took part, and for the
supporting of which they paid this heavy price. There lies the true
history of the batteries, and that it is which in these pages must be
recorded.

From October 5th there ensued a pause during which the batteries
strained every nerve to get up more ammunition from the dumps, to clear
up their shell-wrecked positions and to sort out the gun line personnel
into some sort of workable detachments. B/162 came up into action again
from the wagon-lines on the 7th and took over its old position from
B/242, and for a few days such registration and reconstruction of
positions was carried out as was possible, having regard for the heavy
enemy fire which continually swept the entire area in which the
batteries were located. Only for a short time was there a lull, however,
for a fresh attack had been ordered to be carried out on October 9th.

On Tuesday, the 9th, the 5th Division attempted to complete the capture
of the Polderhoek ridge and, by extending its left to Polygon Beek, to
form connection with the 17th Division. For this purpose the weight of
artillery, the pace of the creeping barrage and the formation of the
standing barrage were to be identical with those of the 4th, but the
objective in this case was to include the whole of Polderhoek Château
and Wood together with Cameron Covert, and was to bend back to the then
front line at Joist Farm on the north. The 15th Infantry Brigade was
responsible for the attack on the right, while on the left the 95th
Infantry Brigade was ordered to pivot on a stationary left flank and,
clearing all the ground east of Cameron Covert to as far south as the
Reutelbeek and as far eastwards as the line of the objective, was to
form the connection between the left of the 15th Brigade and the right
of the 17th Division.

Zero hour was shortly after 6.0 A.M., and three minutes after the
beginning of the barrage the infantry advanced to the assault. The
ground, already a sea of mud, was churned up yet more by the intensity
of the barrage, and the troops forming the extreme right of the 5th
Division, by their efforts to avoid portions of ground which were
utterly impassable, lost direction and moved towards the south-east. The
mistake was presently discovered, but too late to catch up the barrage,
and a line was taken up a little in advance of the previous front line
immediately north of the Scherriabeek. Simultaneously the left and
centre companies of the right battalion advanced on their proper course,
but came under intense fire from Gheluvelt and Polderhoek Château, and
only one platoon—themselves all wounded—reached the Château; ultimately,
owing to heavy casualties, they withdrew to their original front line.
Loss of direction was responsible also for the failure of the left
battalion of this brigade to reach its objective. Moving too much
towards the right it came under heavy fire from some houses north of the
Château and, suffering many casualties, was held up. By ten o'clock in
the morning, despite the fiercest efforts by the batteries to beat down
the opposition, the whole brigade was back in its old line. The left
brigade, having no forward movement on the right to which to conform,
did not advance at all.

The state of the ground was now becoming appalling, and, with two
successive attacks rendered failures by the mud, a lull set in on this
part of the front—a lull during which each of the batteries in turn
managed to seize a few days' rest at the wagon-lines. The news that
these short rests were to be granted was received with mixed feelings;
clearly, if it was thought necessary to send each battery in turn for a
short spell at the wagon-lines, the brigades were not destined to move
right out of the line yet awhile, but on the other hand this new plan
did assure a short interruption of the nerve-racking conditions of the
gun line, and for this reason at any rate it was welcome. On October
13th Lieut.-Colonel Butler and Lieut.-Colonel Skinner handed over the
control of their groups to the commanding officers of the 27th and 103rd
Brigades respectively and, accompanied by the personnel of one battery
from each brigade (A/156 and D/162), moved out to the wagon-lines. On
the 17th these two batteries moved back into action again after a
four-day rest, and on the 18th three more batteries moved out. Each
battery in turn had four days at the wagon-lines of comparative rest and
quiet, and then moved up into action again, and by the 24th all the
batteries except C/162 were back in the line once more, slightly
refreshed, slightly reorganised, but still suffering greatly from an
almost complete lack of trained men. C/162 (Major Hill) had been left at
the wagon-lines owing to the fact that the severe casualties sustained
by the battery just prior to moving out had rendered it unfit to go back
into action again.

On October 24th 162nd Brigade Headquarters moved back into the line
also, and took over command of "C" Group at Bedford House under the 7th
Divisional Artillery. This group consisted of "A" and D/162, "B" and
C/156, and also of the 46th, 47th and 112th Australian batteries. The
front covered by the group and held by the infantry of the 7th Division
was, at the same time, changed from north of Gheluvelt to just south of
it, as the batteries could reach this new zone at a slightly shorter
range; with the new front allotted and registered, orders were received
for this group and also for the 156th Brigade to cover an attack by the
7th Division to be launched on the 21st. It seemed madness for any such
attack to be contemplated, for the weather had been wet and stormy since
October 9th and the ground was even more impassable, even more
treacherous than it had been earlier in the month. The only hope of
salvation for the infantry lay in the putting down by the batteries of
such a curtain of fire as would completely cover the assaulting troops
while they waded through the mud, and this the batteries now prepared to
do. D/162 (Major Lee), its position at Maple Copse being almost
completely untenable owing to the searching fire which the enemy
continually directed upon it, moved eight hundred yards northwards on
the 24th to a position just west of Zouave Wood. D/156 (Major Barstow)
moved forward to the middle of what had been Sanctuary Wood, dropping
the trails just off the road under the shelter of the slopes in the
western half of the wood, and at dawn on Friday, the 26th, all batteries
manned their guns to support this, as it seemed to them, desperate
venture.

The actual front of the attack by the 7th Division, which the guns of
the 33rd Divisional Artillery were to cover, included Gheluvelt and the
ground for six hundred yards north and south of it, and the assault was
supported by one hundred and forty-four 18-pdrs., forty-eight 4·5 in.
howitzers, thirty-two six-inch and twenty heavier howitzers. Two
objectives were fixed, the first including the whole of Gheluvelt except
the extreme eastern outskirts and running down south-west to Berry
Cottages, while the final objective reached from the lake north-west of
Gheluvelt down to Reigate farm, running one hundred yards east of
Gheluvelt Village, the object of the operation being to capture
Gheluvelt and some ground along the Zandvoorde Spur, and so to secure
the hold on Tower Hamlets. "C" Group covered the 20th Infantry Brigade
on the left, while "A" and D/156 with B/162 were acting under the orders
of Lieut.-Colonel Marriott, commanding "B" Group, and covered the 91st
Infantry Brigade on the right.

At 5.40 A.M. the barrage began, the nearest fringe of it dropping one
hundred and fifty yards in front of the infantry as they formed up for
the attack. There it remained for six minutes, and then started
gradually to creep forward at the rate of twelve yards per minute; after
traversing two hundred yards at this pace the speed of advance was
slackened down to ten yards per minute for another two hundred yards,
and then, at a uniform pace of seven yards per minute, it moved on to
the protective line beyond the first objective. Here it remained from
7.4 A.M. until 7.50 A.M. to give the infantry time to reorganise and
prepare for the next attack; at 7.50 A.M. it moved forward again, after
four minutes' intense fire to warn the assaulting troops that the time
to advance had come, and so forward at the same slow rate to the
protective line beyond the final objective; this it reached at 8.46 A.M.
and there remained as a protective barrage to allow the infantry to
consolidate the ground won.

Thus moved the barrage, but what of the infantry who should have been
close behind it? Already attention has been called to the bog-like
nature of the ground across which they were to attack, and, even had it
not, the extraordinarily slow rate of the barrage—twelve yards per
minute—should be sufficient evidence of the opinion formed by the Higher
Command of the sort of conditions with which the infantry would have to
contend. As events turned out it was this very mud which denied success
to our troops. Enemy artillery fire on the forward system had been light
up till zero, and not for seven minutes after our barrage dropped did
the enemy put down any sort of reply with his guns. The cause of the
infantry's undoing was the machine-guns which played upon them and swept
them while they struggled helplessly in the mud—machine-guns safely
ensconced in concrete pill-boxes while our men were in the mud up to
their waists. By twenty minutes to eight the 91st Brigade was held up at
Lewis House and forced back to its original line; at half-past eight
elements of the 20th Brigade had reached Gheluvelt, but were stopped by
the enemy pill-boxes and ultimately had to come back. Throughout the
morning the gunners maintained a protective barrage beyond the infantry
to try and assist them in their now almost hopeless task, but at 2.35
P.M. the barrage was called off and the battle ceased.

All along the line of the 7th Division, and further to the right, the
assaulting troops had been beaten back to their original positions and
in some cases even west thereof. Machine-gun fire from Lewis House and
Berry Cottages had stopped the 91st Infantry Brigade, while the men of
the 20th Brigade had been beaten by the mud itself. They had fought
their way right through to Gheluvelt but, on reaching it, had been
unable to ward off counter-attacks as they were up to their waists in
mud and every rifle was clogged and smothered with the same substance. A
message sent that afternoon to headquarters urged that the advanced
battalions should instantly be relieved "owing to heavy officer
casualties, disorganisation and the condition of the rifles," and that
sentence in itself very aptly summed up the conditions. Disorganisation
there had been, and very considerable at that, but such was the
condition of the ground that nothing else could have been expected. Thus
the day ended in failure on this particular portion of the front; under
normal circumstances, and with anything like firm ground over which to
attack, success might well have been achieved, but the weather
conditions stepped in and tilted the balance in favour of the enemy with
overwhelming effect.

This was the last infantry operation in which the 33rd Divisional
Artillery took part. On October 28th "A" and C/156 moved out to the
wagon-lines; three days later they were followed by D/156, which had
been very heavily gas shelled on the night of the 29th/30th. B/156 was
relieved on November 2nd, and next day the whole of the 162nd Brigade
withdrew from the line and marched back to Dickebusch, this time with
the promise before them of a real period of rest in the back areas.

The losses of the batteries in this autumn fighting had been appalling.
For fifty-one days they had been in continuous action under the worst of
conditions, covering attack after attack and undergoing interminable
shell fire from enemy guns of every calibre. The smallest possible
personnel was kept at each position, and seldom did the total strength
at the gun line of any one battery exceed thirty-six officers and men.
Yet the battle casualties of the 162nd Brigade numbered three hundred
and fifteen for this period, while those of the 156th Brigade were
almost as great. A/156, a six-gun battery, had twenty-six guns disabled
during the time it was in the line, while D/162, which had suffered the
loss of one hundred and six casualties including six officers, had had
nineteen guns put out of action by the enemy. The batteries had, in
fact, been practically wiped out, and it was a mere remnant of their
former selves which reached the wagon-lines. They had marched up to the
Salient a fine fighting weapon, the outcome of many months' training and
experience, hardened and versed in all the methods of war. They came
away from that murderous spot smashed, depleted, worn out, their work
accomplished but at a tremendous cost. Ypres was no longer to them a
legendary spot, but a plain, ghastly reality, a grim and deadly place
where the batteries learnt, as they had never learnt before, the full
horror of war. In trench fighting it is the infantry who look more
closely into the depths of Hell than do any other branches of the
Service; but at Ypres the field guns share this deadly privilege, and
the price of it is high, higher than can be bought with anything save
human life itself. The 33rd Divisional Artillery had shared that
privilege, had paid that price, and the account thereof may be seen
to-day in the cemeteries which cluster round Reninghelst, Dickebusch and
La Clytte, in the nameless graves lying amid the shell holes of Maple
Copse, Sanctuary Wood and Armagh Wood.




                              CHAPTER IX.
                         WINTER IN THE SALIENT.
                      (DECEMBER 1917—MARCH 1918.)


After the tremendous fighting of the autumn offensive at Ypres and the
smashing casualties which were suffered therein by the batteries, a full
month in the rest area was required to bring the 33rd Divisional
Artillery back to anything like its normal pitch of efficiency once
more. Every detachment in every battery had to be reorganised and built
up on the foundation of the few remaining gunners who had survived the
two months' battle; raw recruits from England needed instruction and
drilling, gaps in the non-commissioned ranks awaited filling,
newly-joined officers were watched and tested. From highest to lowest
the personnel of the two brigades were busily engaged in the tremendous
work of smartening up and training, of teaching and of learning, of
overhauling equipment and of filling up stores, of removing all traces
of the scorching fires through which the batteries had recently passed.
By November 3rd both brigades had completed the withdrawal to the
wagon-lines at Dickebusch; on the 4th the 156th Brigade marched to the
training area around La Nieppe, to be followed the next day by the 162nd
Brigade which moved into billets in Bavinchove, Zuytpanne and Trois
Rois, all in the neighbourhood of Cassel. Here for a week they remained,
at first resting and refitting, then beginning the more elementary forms
of training and gradually bringing the batteries back to something
approaching a state of efficiency once more.

On November 12th a move was made to the Bouvelinghem area, still further
from the line. The 156th Brigade found billets in Bas Loquin and Warlez,
the 162nd in Alquines, Le Buisson and Haute Planque. Billets were none
too good and horse lines had to be set up in the open, but the
surrounding country was more suitable for the advanced training which
now became possible, and in real earnest did the instruction and
drilling of the batteries set in. Gun drill and driving drill became a
daily affair, while battery staff work and manœuvring in the open were
added to the curriculum. Training of every description, combined with
sports, races and concerts, kept the men busy and contented, with the
result that efficiency and smartness appeared once more and the havoc of
the autumn became almost completely effaced. As the month wore on and
time for a return into action drew near the condition of the batteries
grew daily better, and by the end of November it could fairly be said
that both brigades had very nearly reached their old high standard once
more.

It had been generally understood that a bare four weeks of rest could be
hoped for, and that the end of the month would see a return into action.
On November 22nd Brigadier-General Stewart and his staff had moved up to
the Menin Gate at Ypres to take over command of the artillery covering
the infantry of the 33rd Division, then holding the line at
Passchendaele, and daily the order was expected for the batteries to
follow. Semi-officially it had been stated that the brigades would be in
action by December 3rd, but night set in on November 30th without any
warning order having been received, and the line was distant a full
three days' march. It was difficult to believe that, with so much time
to spare for the issuing of warning orders, any sudden move could be
contemplated, yet that was actually what took place. At five o'clock on
the evening of Saturday, December 1st, orders were received for the
batteries to march at 8.0 A.M. on the following morning and, moreover,
to be in action by the evening of December 3rd.

Such haste, such rushing and such short notice seemed strange, in view
of the fact that for over a week the batteries might have had the
preliminary notice; yet fourteen hours, and fourteen hours of darkness
at that, was all the warning that was received, and far into the night
the detachments laboured by the light of lanterns, packing the vehicles
and getting ready to move at daybreak. To reach the line in two days
meant a very considerable march table for each day, and Zermezeele had
accordingly been fixed as the billeting area of the batteries for the
night of December 2nd/3rd. Late in that evening and in darkness the
brigades, after a long day of trekking, laboured in to the lines
allotted to them and hastily settled for the night, as an early start
was ordered to be made on the following day.

                            ORDER OF BATTLE.

                       DECEMBER 1917—MARCH 1918.

                                H.Q.R.A.

               C.R.A.                 Brigade Major.    Staff Captain.

  Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G.,     Major T. E.       Capt. W. E.
               D.S.O.                 Durie, D.S.O.,     Bownass, M.C.
                                           M.C.

                             156th Brigade.

                 Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler, D.S.O.

                    Adjutant: Capt. H. W. Smail, M.C.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Major F. B.       Major M. A.      Major Barker,    Major D. Jones,
     Carrell.         Studd, M.C.      D.S.O., M.C.          M.C.

                      Capt. S. G.
                        Taylor.

                             162nd Brigade.

                  Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner, D.S.O.

                      Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Major W. G.    Major H. C. Cory,  Major M. M. I.   Major F. L. Lee,
   Pringle, M.C.         M.C.           Body, M.C.           M.C.

     Major G.
 Fetherston, M.C.

At daybreak on December 3rd the march was resumed, and now further rush
tactics were adopted. The personnel of one section per battery was
conveyed to Ypres by motor lorry while the remainder of the batteries
continued the march by road, for it was intended to take over a portion
of the battery positions that very night in the line, so that on the
following morning the 33rd Divisional Artillery would be able to assume
responsibility for the artillery support of the zone without further
delay. By midday these advance parties had "debussed" at Potijze
Château, where guides were waiting for them, and by three o'clock in the
afternoon control of one section per battery had been taken over, while
every battery commander was busying himself in learning from his
"opposite number" the zone to be covered and the general characteristics
of the battery position itself. Thus the programme had been adhered to,
and by the evening of the 3rd a portion of the relief was carried out;
just forty-eight hours after the receipt of the warning order, and
thirty-six hours since the beginning of the march from a training area
so far distant as to be within ten miles of Boulogne, two guns per
battery of both brigades were in action once more.

While all this had been going on at the gun line, the remainder of the
brigades had marched to the wagon-lines which they were to occupy during
such time as the batteries were in action—the 156th Brigade taking over
an area 1,200 yards south-east of Vlamertinghe, where permanent huts and
stables were being built on either side of the road, while to the 162nd
Brigade had been allotted an open area half a mile west of Ypres,
between Goldfish Château and Belgian Battery Corner. These lines were
reached late on the evening of the 3rd and were extremely difficult to
get into, in the case of the 162nd Brigade, owing to the fact that the
approaches from the road were rendered quite impassable by mud. A most
uncomfortable night was spent on the side of the road, and not until
daylight came was there any chance of getting horses and men into their
permanent "billets"—mud lines and tents in the month of December! Longer
notice, less rushing and a spreading of the march over three days would
have meant much to both horses and men, yet the programme had been
organised and ordered by some Higher Command which was for ever
impressing upon Divisional Artilleries the importance of the care of
horses and the need of avoiding any unnecessary overwork or strain!

On Tuesday, December 4th, the remaining two sections per battery marched
up to the gun line, led by guides from the advance parties, and
completed the relief of the outgoing units, the 26th and 311th Army
Field Artillery Brigades. The 156th Brigade together with D/162 formed
No. 1 Group of the artillery covering the divisional front and was
placed under the command of 158th Brigade Headquarters, while
Lieut.-Colonel Skinner (162nd Brigade) commanded No. 2 Group which
comprised the 18-pdr. batteries of his own brigade. This was, however,
only a temporary arrangement, for on December 17th Lieut.-Colonel Butler
(156th Brigade) took over command of No. 1 Group which was enlarged to
contain the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, while Colonel
Skinner and his headquarters moved out to the wagon-line, leaving the
186th Brigade to form No. 2 Group.

[Illustration:

  Scale 1:20,000.
]

As matters now stood, the whole of the 33rd Division was concentrated
together, the artillery covering for once its own infantry on the
Passchendaele Ridge-Crest Farm-Meetcheele Line. The batteries of the
156th Brigade all lay along the Langemarck-Zonnebeke road north-west of
Zonnebeke, between Windmill Cabaret and Kansas Cross, and covered the
right of the zone, while the 162nd Brigade supported the left zone from
positions around Gravenstafel. "A" and B/156, however, moved their guns
to the vicinity of Otto Farm on the 12th and 14th respectively.

Infantry action was at a standstill, for the mud and general condition
of the ground precluded movement of any sort; in few places, indeed, was
there any fire-trench at all, fortified shell-holes linked together in
groups and half-full of water offering the only possible cover to the
front-line troops. The forward system was almost completely cut off by a
vast sea of mud which extended back to and beyond the battery positions
and was traversed at intervals by narrow duckboard tracks, the sole
means of communication from front to rear. Any smashing of those tracks,
any detour from them to avoid shell-fire meant hours of struggling
through the slime, while the wretched men who got wounded while crossing
the morass were, as likely as not, engulfed in the mud and never seen
again.

Infantry operations, it has been said, were at a standstill, but the
same could by no means be recorded of the artillery. From dawn till dusk
the enemy was for ever pounding away at our lines, raking battery
positions from end to end and destroying the wooden roads which offered
the only possible route for the supply of ammunition and rations.
Gravenstafel, Kansas Cross and the road right back to Wieltje were in a
continual state of eruption, while devastating shell-storms daily
descended upon the battery area between Gravenstafel and Zonnebeke. It
was a grievous time for the gunners; dug-outs were impossible, as water
was met only eighteen inches below the surface, and pill-boxes were few
and far between. Even the latter, with their doors facing towards the
east, were by no means sure refuges, and it was while actually standing
inside such an one that Captain Gallie, who had distinguished himself so
wonderfully in the autumn fighting, was killed on December 14th. The
only way to minimise casualties was to scatter a number of little
shelters all around the battery positions and, by keeping the men thus
separated, to reduce the damage which one direct hit alone could do. Yet
even so the strain of being eternally wet and cold, of being for ever
soaked with mud and under continuous shell-fire was tremendous, and, as
far as was possible, detachments at the guns were relieved every four
days.

There was, indeed, little for the men to do except to keep the gun-pits
and ammunition serviceable, and to try to keep themselves alive. Firing
was reduced to the minimum of registration, calibration and response to
infantry calls, for it needed a full day's work by every man to keep the
guns clean, to rebuild the gun-pits after their daily destruction by
hostile shell-fire and to keep dry the ammunition which, even when it
was not blown up by enemy bombardment, used to sink of its own accord in
that bottomless mud which rendered almost any form of foundation
useless. Moreover, every round fired necessitated the bringing up of
fresh supplies from the wagon-lines, and this was work not lightly to be
undertaken. As late as September 1920 the road from Wieltje to
Gravenstafel was still but a faint track of ploughed-up earth winding
across the shell holes and literally paved with the skeletons of horses
and, in some cases, of men; it was one of the main arteries—and there
were but few in that wilderness of mud—from the wagon-lines to the
batteries, and, to the terrible cost of the drivers and teams, well the
enemy knew it.

Thus, from December 4th, the batteries just barely existed; they had had
a month's rest in the back area and knew that, for gunners, this would
be considered sufficient to keep them going for a long time to
come—hopes of relief, therefore, were not even entertained. At intervals
the guns were registered on the Gasometers east of Passchendaele; at
intervals they bombarded enemy positions around Moorslede, but mostly
the detachments contented themselves with preparing for emergencies by
keeping the guns as serviceable as was possible. It was a nightmare
existence from which all ranks hoped that they might one day awaken, but
the awakening was not yet expected.

It seemed, therefore, scarcely credible to the 162nd Brigade when, on
December 19th, orders were received to march out next day to the
wagon-lines. Foul as were the conditions in the line, a mere seventeen
days of continuous action was never regarded by Higher Authority as
sufficient to entitle a battery to a rest, and neither officers nor men
had in their wildest dreams hoped to spend Christmas out of the line;
yet such was now to be the case. On Thursday, December 20th, all
batteries of the brigade had reached their wagon-lines in safety, and on
December 23rd they marched back to Divisional reserve in a camp on the
Poperinghe-Busseboom road, leaving their less fortunate comrades of the
156th Brigade to carry on the war in their absence. Less fortunate the
latter certainly were, for they were destined to spend Christmas in
action, but on the other hand the positions they were occupying were not
so bad as those of the 162nd Brigade, nor had they been subjected to
such violent shell-storms.

December 23rd to the 26th were spent by the 162nd Brigade in overhauling
kit and equipment, in helping to build permanent standings in the camp
they were occupying, and in celebrating the unexpected luxury of a
Christmas in rest. On Christmas night a dinner for the officers was
given at "Skindles" in Poperinghe, while on Boxing Night the batteries
organised dinners for their men. On this day, also, the 156th Brigade
was relieved by the 48th Army Field Artillery Brigade and came down to
the wagon-lines, with the result that the whole of the 33rd Divisional
Artillery was able to see out in peace the old year which held for it
such mighty, such proud and such undying memories.

In peace the old year went out, but by no means in idleness. On Boxing
Day orders had come for the preparation of ten reserve battery positions
to cover the Army defence zone and to be occupied in the event of a
German offensive on the Ypres sector, and every day before dawn working
parties from each battery set out in motor lorries to Potijze Château,
between which spot and Oxford Road the proposed positions lay. From
December 26th to January 7th the work was carried out during every hour
of daylight, for orders, inspired possibly by the fears of a German
Spring offensive, were imperative that the work should be pushed on as
hard as possible.

On January 7th the work ceased temporarily and one section per battery
of each brigade went into the line again, relieving the 250th and 251st
Brigades of the 50th Divisional Artillery. January 8th saw the relief
complete, and once more the brigades were back in action, the 162nd
occupying the same positions around Gravenstafel, the 156th remaining as
before round Windmill Cabaret, Otto Farm (the pill-box where Captain
Gallie of A/156 was killed) and Van Issacker's Farm, but with two guns
of B/156 (Major Studd) and two 4·5 in. howitzers of D/156 (Major Jones)
in forward positions for use as anti-tank guns. The front to be covered
remained unchanged, while the "grouping" of the batteries showed but
little alteration—Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler commanding No. 1 Group
which consisted of the whole of the 156th Brigade and B/119, while No. 2
group (162nd Brigade) was controlled by Major N. G. Jervis from a
pill-box east of Frezenburg. Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner commanded the
whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery group which was made up of the
156th, 162nd and 119th Brigades.

The organisation and allocation of the brigades were therefore but
little changed since the previous tour of duty in the line before
Christmas, but a great difference showed itself in the attitude of the
enemy. Hostile artillery activity had died down in an extraordinary way,
and comparative quiet reigned in the battery area after the shell-storms
of the earlier period. Roads were only occasionally searched, battery
positions were subjected merely to a few sniping rounds or at most to
short neutralising bursts of fire, and the long concentrated
bombardments which previously had been the order of the day were now
exceptional events. "Quiet day," "light shelling of tracks,"
"intermittent bursts of fire on Zonnebeke Road and Windmill Cabaret"
appear frequently in the official diaries of that period, and only on
two days—January 13th and 20th—did the hostile artillery show any marked
activity. On those two days the Zonnebeke-Windmill Cabaret area and the
Crest Farm-Meetcheele line were bombarded respectively, the latter very
heavily indeed, but these two outbursts marked isolated exceptions to
the quietness which had now set in and were not of long duration.

On January 29th, after a most uneventful period in the line, one section
per battery of each brigade was relieved by the 50th Divisional
Artillery and marched again to the wagon-lines. Next day the relief was
completed and the batteries marched to the Oudezeele area, the gun line
parties handing over their guns in action and moving by lorry to the
first night's halting place, there to join up with the wagon-line
personnel who had marched by road in the ordinary way. The next day saw
a continuation of the move to Zudrove and Le Bas, and on February 1st
the ultimate rest billets were reached in Thiembronne, Merck St. Lievin
and Bout de la Ville. Here the batteries carried out the usual
overhauling and training, rejoicing at the quite phenomenal number of
"rests" which they had of late been enjoying.

It was, indeed, most unusual for artillery to reach the rest area so
often as had the 156th and 162nd Brigades of late. Gunners were usually
kept in the line almost continuously, staying on after the infantry of
their division had been relieved and covering the incoming troops. A
scheme was now in practice by which the whole of the 33rd
Division—infantry and gunners alike—held the line together and went into
rest together, the 50th Division acting as their "opposite number," and
by this scheme the two brigades were benefiting. It could not last for
long—it was too good for that; but while it lasted it was wondrously
pleasant!

There came an interruption in the ordinary routine of training on
February 12th; the 18-pdr. batteries of the 156th Brigade were ordered
to march to Tilques, there to have their guns calibrated by the
Sound-ranging Section, after which they were attached to the 98th
Infantry Brigade for tactical exercises. On the 14th the 18-pdrs. of
162nd Brigade were also calibrated, so that, by the 15th, all guns were
ready for the return into action which had been ordered for February
22nd. Before this march took place, however, C/162 (Major Hill) was
detached from the Divisional Artillery for special duties. On February
18th it marched to Tilques to join the 2nd Army Artillery School as a
training battery, and there it was left when once more the move to the
line was made.

On February 19th the 156th Brigade moved to the Elnes area and on the
20th to La Nieppe, the 162nd Brigade reaching Renescure on the same day.
On the 21st advance parties from each brigade moved by rail to
Vlamertinghe to take over the wagon-lines of the 50th Divisional
Artillery, while the batteries continued their march to Zermezeele and
Rietveld—D/162, which had gone round by Tilques to calibrate its guns,
rejoining the rest of the brigade on this day. February 22nd saw the
arrival of the batteries at their wagon-lines east and south-east of
Vlamertinghe, the same which they had occupied on the return to action
in early January; A/162, however, remained near Goldfish Château, and
B/156 went to Ypres Asylum. On the 22nd also lorries took one section
per battery direct to the forward area, the 156th Brigade this time
relieving No. 2 Group (251st Brigade), the 162nd Brigade No. 1 Group
(250th Brigade).

The relief was complete by Saturday, February 23rd, and on the next day
33rd Divisional Artillery Headquarters took over the control, at Menin
Gate, of the artillery covering the infantry of the 33rd Division on a
two thousand yard front opposite Passchendaele and due west of
Moorslede. On this occasion the 162nd Brigade took over the positions
previously held by the 156th along the Langemarck-Zonnebeke road, "A"
and D/162 (Major Fetherston and Major Lee) at Windmill Cabaret, some six
hundred yards north-west of Zonnebeke, B/162 (Major Cory) about two
thousand yards also to the north-west of the village, while Brigade
headquarters were situate in a pill-box one thousand yards north-east of
Frezenburg. The 156th Brigade positions, with the exception of Major
Carrell's battery (A/156) which remained at Otto Farm, were those which
had previously been held by the 162nd Brigade at Gravenstafel.

The policy adopted by the batteries on their return into action now was
to remain quiet, only registration and calibration being carried out.
The enemy on the whole were also inactive until the end of the month;
one or two attempts were made to rush our advanced posts, and a large
raid was executed—unsuccessfully, however—upon the division on the
right. Apart from this, and from a certain amount of activity with
high-velocity guns upon our back areas, the enemy attitude was very
similar to ours.

March saw a change in the general policy of the Germans holding this
part of the line. An ever-increasing volume of artillery fire began to
be directed upon our battery positions, while high-velocity guns were
continually searching the roads and back areas. On the 2nd nearly all
our batteries were heavily shelled, while severe bombardments were
carried out upon both flanks of the division; on the 3rd enemy
aeroplanes were very active and continued so for several days,
especially on the 7th when low-flying machines appeared everywhere. On
the 6th a big shoot was carried out on the Windmill Cabaret area N.W. of
Zonnebeke, and on the 9th the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery
were bombarded with gas shell. The front was indeed gradually boiling up
to a state of high enemy activity, and, with the fine weather which
supervened and the knowledge that an enemy offensive was almost
inevitably coming on some part of the front, the plan of action to deal
with such an emergency was continually tested. On March 10th in the
early morning all batteries fired "counter-preparation," a slow barrage
which was to be used in the event of an enemy attack being expected. On
this and the succeeding days fire was also directed upon special
targets, upon machine guns, dug-outs and likely places for the
concentration of hostile troops, while all batteries constantly
practised the drill of pulling their guns out of the pits at short
notice and of engaging targets on the flanks and at short ranges.

On the 14th a heavy German raid was repulsed, a prisoner who had been
taken beforehand having given information concerning it, and on the 17th
all batteries again fired in response to an S.O.S. call at 4.40 A.M.,
but in this case no infantry action took place. All this time the enemy
long-range guns were for ever bombarding Ypres, Wieltje, St. Jean,
Potijze and every road leading up from the back area, as many as one
thousand high-velocity shells being poured into the neighbourhood of
Ypres each day. At the same time battery positions, and especially the
area between "Seine" and Abraham Heights, were continually shelled, gas
at night being the usual practice.

Thursday, March 21st, 1918, was a comparatively quiet day in the Ypres
sector. The batteries had not been worried much, and for their own
part had not done more than to direct bursts of fire upon enemy
dug-outs and machine guns which were annoying the infantry. About 1.0
P.M., just as the detachments were sitting down to their midday meal,
came the first message, telephoned up from Divisional Headquarters, of
the beginning of the great German offensive in the south. Little news
was given beyond the fact that the attack had been launched and that
our troops, after giving up the advanced system, "were holding the
enemy on the main Army Defence Line." Every few hours further messages
came in, admitting certain losses of ground but stating that the enemy
was being held in the main, and that the day was going in our favour.
Such reports were certainly encouraging to the men, and in no way gave
any suggestion of defeat; bit by bit, however, names of villages which
had been captured by the enemy began to appear, and reference to a map
disclosed the disquieting fact that a deep penetration into our lines
had been made, a penetration which must necessarily become deeper
still owing to the loss of certain tactical points. Information was
very sparse and rumours immediately became rife everywhere, so that a
fair idea of the situation could hardly be obtained. It was, indeed,
of little use to worry; the batteries had their own share of the front
to look after and knew that, sooner or later, they would be plunged
into the battle themselves—"sufficient unto the day ..." then, for in
France it was not good to worry about troubles before they came.

On March 25th the front covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery was
extended some five hundred yards further to the south, S.O.S. lines
being rearranged accordingly, and on March 28th/29th one section each of
"B," "C" and D/156 moved out to alternate positions S.E. of Kansas
Cross, S.E. of Bostin Farm and east of Kansas Cross respectively. During
the preceding weeks the enemy had been constantly shelling the Abraham
Heights area with gas and had rendered it quite untenable, B/156 having
as many as forty gas casualties in one week; the change of position
described above had therefore become an urgent necessity. Although the
enemy artillery activity had died down since the 21st it was still
fairly vigorous, especially upon roads, back areas and wagon-lines—the
latter suffering considerably.

A further extension of the brigade zones to the south was made on March
29th, and on the same day another section of "B," "C" and D/156 moved
back to the alternative positions described above. Next day Major Hill's
battery (C/162), which had left Tilques on the 27th and had marched up
via Godewaersvelde to wagon-lines at Goldfish Château, sent one section
into action at Bostin Farm, one thousand yards west of Zonnebeke Church,
to be joined by the rest of the battery on the night of March 31st/April
1st; by the end of March, therefore, the 33rd Division had its guns well
distributed in depth, and could be certain of giving adequate protection
to the infantry even should the latter be forced back behind the line of
forward guns.

Thus the batteries remained for the first week of April. March had made
its exit with a heavy enemy bombardment on the evening of the 31st upon
the forward, battery and back areas, with a heavy gas concentration upon
the Frezenburg line, to all of which the batteries had at infantry
request responded. April came in, bringing with it little news save an
ever-increasing expectation of attack on the Divisional sector, and so
the first week passed while everybody held his breath, as it were, in
anticipation.

On Sunday, April 7th, portions of the 156th and 162nd Brigades were
relieved by the 28th Army Field Artillery Brigade (Colonel Paynter) and
marched out to their wagon-lines near Vlamertinghe. On the 8th the
relief was completed and the batteries were all resting in the
wagon-lines, hourly expecting orders to move down south to the aid of
the hard-pressed 5th Army, for thither they all believed they were to
go, nor is it too much to say that considerable despondency was felt in
both Brigades at not being engaged in the battle then in progress.
Before any such orders were issued, however, an enemy offensive was
suddenly launched upon them from much nearer at hand, and, although the
162nd Brigade marched to the Peselhoek-Poperinghe area on April 9th,
there was to be neither for them nor for the 156th Brigade any rest. The
Germans were about to start their great attack in the north which grew
into a drive for the coast, and every man, every gun, every available
round of ammunition was needed in the great struggle shortly to begin.




                               CHAPTER X.
                                PART I.
                   THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN FLANDERS.
                           (APRIL-MAY 1918.)


Early on the morning of Tuesday, April 9th, there came to the batteries,
as they lay resting in their wagon-lines, the sound of tremendous
shelling to the south, a continuous thunder which was maintained
throughout the whole of that and the succeeding day (April 10th), giving
rise to considerable speculation and rumour. Clearly a great weight of
artillery was at work and almost certainly an attack was, if not already
begun, at least imminent, but what was happening and why did not the
batteries move up to take part in the battle? Of news or orders there
were none, and not for many hours did the men learn of the mighty German
thrust which even then was in progress, the thrust which, starting
between Givenchy and Bois Grenier on the 9th, spread northwards to
Messines on the 10th and marked the beginning of the greatest battle yet
seen on the Flanders front.

At last, on the afternoon of April 10th, news came to the 156th Brigade
that the Germans had attacked and advanced on a long front between
Ploegsteert Wood and Givenchy; that they had taken Armentières and had
advanced well in the direction of Bailleul, though Neuve Église was
still ours, and that the batteries were to move up into action
immediately to stop this onslaught. At 5.0 P.M. the march began, and the
brigade set out for its rendezvous, a point about one mile
west-north-west of Neuve Église, which it reached in pitch darkness
after many weary hours on roads greatly congested by traffic and by
refugees who, in the last stage of exhaustion, had scarcely strength to
get out of the way of our troops. Here the situation was found to be
very obscure; nobody knew where the infantry were, but warnings were
received that parties of Germans were believed to be little more than a
mile to the south, and at any moment the guns might be called upon to
open fire. Consequently the horses remained fully harnessed up all night
and practically alongside the guns, the latter having their trails
dropped in a position ready to fire, Lewis guns and guards were posted
in every battery position, and so the brigade stood awaiting information
which would clear up a little the prevailing chaos.

At three o'clock on the morning of Thursday, the 11th, the expected
orders arrived, and at half-past four began the march to Vierstraat,
where positions had been allotted to the brigade. By ten o'clock
Lieut.-Colonel Butler had completed his reconnaissance of Vierstraat
cross-roads, by half-past ten the four battery commanders were engaged
upon the same work, and midday saw the batteries in action bombarding
the enemy who had by then reached a line running just east of Wytschaete
and curving away thence towards the north-east. The battery positions
lay around Vierstraat and between that village and Kemmel, and from
observation stations north-east of Wytschaete the S.O.S. lines of the
guns were quickly registered.

Meanwhile the 162nd Brigade, farther back in the Poperinghe rest area,
had also received urgent orders to move into action. On the morning of
April 10th the batteries had paraded for a drill order of the whole
brigade and had moved off to some open country near by to begin the
exercise. While this was actually in progress a dispatch rider arrived
and brought the parade to an abrupt conclusion, for he carried with him
orders for the brigade to join the 19th Division at Dranoutre
immediately and to move into action without a moment's delay. Leaving
Captain Pavitt (the Adjutant) to collect the batteries and lead them to
the rendezvous, Lieut.-Colonel Skinner (O.C. 162nd Brigade) set off by
motor with his orderly officer to report for orders to the C.R.A. 19th
Division near Neuve Église. Owing to various difficulties on the way
these orders were not received until 2.0 P.M., but their effect was that
Colonel Skinner should bring his batteries into action immediately near
Spanbroekmolen. As no horses were available, the reconnaissance of these
positions had to be carried out on foot and took a long time, but when
the positions were finally chosen the orderly officer (Lieut.
Bartholomew) was sent back to Dranoutre to await the arrival of the
batteries and to guide them to their positions.

                            ORDER OF BATTLE.

                           APRIL—AUGUST 1918.

                                H.Q.R.A.

               C.R.A.                 Brigade Major.    Staff Captain.

  Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G.,     Major T. E.       Capt. W. E.
               D.S.O.                 Durie, D.S.O.,     Bownass, M.C.
                                           M.C.

   Brig.-Gen. G. H. W. Nicholson,     Major W. A. T.
               C.M.G.                Barstow, D.S.O.,
                                           M.C.

                             156th Brigade.

                 Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler, D.S.O.

                    Adjutant: Capt. H. W. Smail, M.C.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Major F. B.       Major M. A.      Major Barker,    Major D. Jones,
     Carrell.       Studd, D.S.O.,     D.S.O., M.C.          M.C.
                         M.C.

                      Capt. S. G.
                     Taylor, M.C.

                      Major W. G.
                     Sheeres, M.C.

                             162nd Brigade.

            Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner, D.S.O. (_wounded_).

                         Lieut.-Colonel Ramsden.

                   Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Warren, D.S.O.

                   Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt, M.C.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

     Major G.      Major H. C. Cory,  Major M. M. I.   Major F. L. Lee,
    Fetherston,          M.C.           Body, M.C.           M.C.
   D.S.O., M.C.

                                                          Major R. D.
                                                         Russell, M.C.

Meantime Colonel Skinner set out to find the infantry Brigadier in that
part of the line, so that he might inform him of his plans. This was a
long and tedious business in an unknown place in a now dark and rainy
night, and, on finding the Brigadier, Colonel Skinner to his disgust, if
not surprise, was told that the positions he had chosen had, since he
had left them, practically fallen into the hands of the enemy. There was
only one thing to do, and that quickly. Setting out as fast as possible,
he covered the four miles to Dranoutre in pitch darkness and, arriving
there at the same time as the batteries, he stopped them and held a
consultation with the C.R.A. of the 19th Division, who had just been
shelled out of his headquarters. After a short discussion regarding the
general situation which, as can be judged by the foregoing narrative,
was very obscure, the batteries marched at once into action between
Rossignol Wood and Parrot Camp (North of Kemmel Village), and by 3.0
A.M. on Thursday, April 11th, were in action, Brigade Headquarters being
at Parrot Camp. Thus they found themselves after a seventeen-mile march
along roads congested with troops, transport, refugees and cattle, a
march which had been preceded by over an hour's work on drill order the
previous morning; unfavourable conditions, those, to usher in one of the
greatest battles yet fought.

From April 11th onwards the batteries were under the administration of
the 19th Division. Brig.-Gen. Stewart and his staff had, on April 9th,
handed over control of the artillery in the Passchendaele sector to
Colonel Paterson (119th Brigade R.F.A.), but had marched straight to
Dranoutre, and on the 11th remained with headquarters of the 33rd
Division. On that fateful day General Stewart commanded a composite
infantry brigade until the early morning of the 12th, when he took over
command of the artillery covering the infantry of the 33rd Division on
the Meteren front, south of the 156th and 162nd Brigades. The latter
were therefore left with the C.R.A. 19th Division.

During this period from the 11th onwards both brigades underwent the
severest trials. Great demands were made upon them; the batteries were
required to shoot on a big area whenever an enemy attack showed signs of
developing, yet never did the guns fail to carry out their work.
Attempts were daily made to man O.P.'s on Kemmel Hill, but although the
gallantry of observing officers and signallers always enabled
communication to be established, the heavy and continuous fire which the
enemy brought to bear upon the hill rendered it impossible for that
communication to be maintained. In the case of the 156th Brigade
observation was usually carried out from a point north-east of
Wytschaete, while the batteries of the 162nd Brigade were able to obtain
a very good view of the enemy from the ridge just in front of the guns.

From the moment that the batteries dropped into action they were shelled
almost continuously, but no infantry actions developed. This was in a
large part due probably to the efforts of the batteries, by which every
sign of concentration was smashed at the outset. Especially was this the
case on the 12th, when small bodies of the enemy were continually
advancing in the open, but were as continually broken up by the fire of
the guns. Every suspicion of movement was shelled and, whether movement
was visible or not, harassing fire was maintained night and day. On the
15th information was received that our line was to be withdrawn to
Vierstraat-Lindenhoek, but in the evening this retirement was cancelled,
and the fatal morning of April 16th dawned to find the batteries still
occupying the same positions.

[Illustration:

  Scale. 1:20,000.
]

A dense fog hung over the ground on Wednesday, 16th April, blotting out
all vision and deadening sound. There was no suggestion of an enemy
attack on the front covered by the batteries, no preliminary
bombardment—other than the continuous shelling which had characterised
every day since the offensive began—no S.O.S. signals, yet early in the
morning of that day the enemy made a heavy attack from the south and,
advancing his line in a north-westerly direction, captured Wytschaete
Ridge, Wytschaete Village and Wood, together with the Hospice and
Peckham. Apparently the Germans, making use of the thick fog, advanced
without an artillery barrage, and the same fog hid the infantry S.O.S.
signals. The first intimation of an attack was obtained by the Forward
Observing officer of the 156th Brigade, who from his O.P. three hundred
yards north-east of Wytschaete suddenly saw Germans twenty-five yards
away. He opened rifle fire upon these at point-blank range, but needless
to say was unable to stop them. He then tried to get away in order to
warn the neighbouring batteries, but was shot in the stomach and later
died of his wounds. The batteries, however, were by now fully roused and
were pouring gun fire into the advancing troops to try and check their
onslaught. Those of the 156th Brigade were just able to remain in their
positions, and, as soon as dawn broke, set up O.P.'s on the ridge of the
Kemmel-Vierstraat road, the original O.P.'s being by then in enemy
hands. From this ridge observed fire was directed all day upon
Wytschaete Village and Ridge, and great havoc was wrought amongst the
Germans as they advanced in the open.

Meanwhile the 162nd Brigade was also enduring a deluge of shell similar
to that which was descending upon the 156th but, being further to the
right, was in more imminent danger of being captured, since the enemy
advance was, as already described, taking the form of a north-westerly
sweep from the south. Shorter and shorter grew the ranges of the guns,
until at last the necessity of a retirement became imperative;
reluctantly the withdrawal began, one section per battery at a time. In
this operation conspicuous gallantry was shown by all ranks, for the gun
positions were being torn and swept by a veritable tornado of shell
which rendered the approach of the teams well-nigh impossible. As an
instance of this, the retirement of a section of A/162 under Lieut. J.
R. B. Turner may well be quoted; such heavy fire was directed upon his
guns that the teams could not get near them, and guns and wagons had to
be manhandled out of action. Under a hail of shell each gun in turn was
saved, every temporary lull being taken advantage of for a team to dash
in, limber up and get clear, and ultimately the section was successfully
withdrawn. Similar deeds were enacted in every battery, and ultimately
the whole brigade was withdrawn, the leading sections coming into action
in fresh positions and covering the withdrawal of the remainder by their
fire. By this means every gun was saved, while the continuity of the
barrage covering our own infantry was never broken—a most gallant
performance by the personnel of the batteries, and a fine example of the
tactical handling of a brigade of artillery.

After the first rush the enemy advance slowed down and ultimately
stopped, there being no further attack on the evening of the 16th nor on
the night of the 16th/17th. Lieut. Bruce and Lieut. McDonald of the
156th Brigade went forward to Byron Farm and got good information
regarding the position of the infantry, and during the whole of the
night the batteries kept up a slow harassing fire upon all likely places
where the enemy might concentrate for a further assault. 162nd Brigade
Headquarters, which had been set up in the ruins of a small cottage a
short distance in front of the new positions occupied by the batteries,
was heavily shelled, although hitherto the spot had been more or less
immune; after losing the wireless operator and several men, together
with a great deal of stores destroyed, it moved out and was established
at dawn with D/162.

Thursday, April 17th, brought with it a heavy enemy bombardment of all
the battery positions. The 162nd Brigade, as a result of its retirement
on the previous day, lay east of the Millekruisse-Hallebast road,
between the road and Kemmel-Beek; Major Cory's battery (B/162) was on
the left, nearest Hallebast Corner, with C/162 (Major Body) next on the
right. A/162 (Major Fetherston) lay further to the right still, and then
came Major Lee's guns (D/162) on the Millekruisse-Kemmel road. The 156th
Brigade was still hanging on to the original positions held prior to the
enemy attack on the previous day, but the flashes of the more forward
batteries must have been clearly visible to the enemy on Wytschaete
Ridge, and the guns came in for a heavy gruelling. This did not prevent
them, however, from giving the utmost support to a counter-attack
launched by our infantry upon Wytschaete at 7.30 P.M., in which the guns
of the 162nd Brigade also took a large share. The counter-attack was
unsuccessful, and, with the enemy still on Wytschaete Ridge, the
necessity of a withdrawal of a portion of the 156th Brigade to a more
covered position became apparent. Next day (April 18th) a reconnaissance
was carried out and positions were chosen some one thousand yards
further west, behind the road known as Cheapside which ran parallel with
and about eleven hundred yards west of the Kemmel-Vierstraat road. On
the 19th these positions were occupied by two batteries and the guns
were registered from just in front, the whole Brigade except for Major
Carrell's battery (A/156) being now clustered around Lieut.-Colonel
Butler's headquarters in a line five hundred yards in length. A/156 lay
further to the north-east, little more than a quarter of a mile from
Ridge Wood.

From April 17th until the 25th the enemy did not make any considerable
advance, and, although the batteries were daily shelled, a fair amount
of opportunity offered itself for strengthening the gun line. A certain
readjusting of positions also took place about this time. D/162 sent
forward a section under Lieut. Bennet and Lieut. Garrod to a position
two hundred yards south of Siege Farm, near the old position which had
been held prior to the loss of the Wytschaete Ridge, and from which some
excellent harassing fire was carried out. On the 22nd Major Studd
(B/156), with only four serviceable guns left, moved two of them some
three hundred yards further south on the Kemmel-Ridge Wood road, and to
this latter position was added on the 23rd a third gun, received that
morning from the I.O.M. On April 24th A/156, who had been very heavily
shelled on the previous day, moved two guns to a position three hundred
yards north of Siege Farm; the remainder were to have moved thither on
the morning of the 25th, but the events of that day, as will presently
be shown, put an end to any such ideas. About the 23rd also Major Jones
(D/156) put one 4·5 in. howitzer two hundred yards to the north of the
A/156 "Siege Farm" section. Thus the batteries were more split up, each
brigade having a main line of guns with detached sections thrown out
slightly in front, from which latter the majority of the firing was
done.

Before the further operations on this front are described a word must
here be spoken of the battery wagon-lines. As a rule the wagon-lines
were looked upon as comparatively safe—a "cushy" job for those whose lot
it was to live there—but the wagon-lines during the German advance were
far from restful. True, they did not suffer the dense barrages which the
gun line had to face; but they were constantly shelled by high-velocity
guns at long range, a most disconcerting performance which meant that
day and night, at odd intervals, a shell would crash into the crowded
horse-lines or work havoc amongst the men's bivouacs, and even
occasional shells are terribly upsetting when they burst amongst a mass
of horses. In addition, enemy aeroplanes came nightly and scattered
bombs along the length and breadth of the lines, while daily the weary
drivers and teams had to make their way up to the batteries with
ammunition, usually being shelled all along the road. The consequent
strain upon horses and men may well be imagined.

Throughout this period the wagon-lines were kept in two portions—a
forward wagon-line, in which were kept the gun teams and such wagons as
were necessary to the batteries in a move of any emergency, and rear
wagon-lines where lived the main body of drivers and teams. From April
12th until the loss of Kemmel on April 25th the forward wagon-lines of
both brigades were situated between Hallebast Corner and Vierstraat, the
rear wagon-lines of the 156th Brigade being in the Reninghelst-Ouderdom
area, while those of the 162nd Brigade lay at first at Canada Corner,
north of Locre, moving on the 17th to the area between Reninghelst and
Busseboom. There they were all kept continually moving, sometimes in
Reninghelst, sometimes nearer Busseboom, every spot they inhabited being
shelled by the enemy and, after a very short period, rendered
uninhabitable. In both rear and advanced wagon-lines the casualties
amongst horses and men mounted rapidly, but it is safe to say that the
"emergency" teams at Hallebast Corner had far the worst time.

To return to the tactical situation, however. On April 19th both
brigades had been put under the command of the C.R.A. 9th Division, but
on the 22nd the French 28th Division came up into the line and the
French Artillery Commander took over control of the 162nd Brigade.
Headquarters of the latter moved over to Scherpenberg to be near the
French commander, but the distance from there to the batteries was too
great for any efficient control to be carried on, and permission was
obtained by Lieut.-Colonel Skinner to move his headquarters back to
Millekruisse so as to be near the batteries, and also near the commander
of a "groupe" of French artillery which had just come up and lay in
action to the east of and near the village. Lieut. Norton (C/162), who
could speak French fluently, was left as liaison officer with the
"C.R.A." of the French division.

The disposition of the two brigades on April 24th, therefore, was as
follows. The batteries of the 156th were grouped together about 1,800
yards due north of Kemmel, with an advanced section of 18-pdrs. (A/156)
and one advanced 4·5 in. howitzer (D/156) near Siege Farm and about 600
yards in front of the main line of guns. Lieut.-Colonel Butler's
headquarters were right amongst his guns, between "C" and B/156, but the
remaining two sections of A/156 were some 1,200 yards to the north-east
and were so far away that, when the battle began on April 25th, it was
found impossible to exercise command over them.

The 162nd Brigade also lay together between the Millekruisse-Hallebast
road and the Kemmel-Beek, and therefore slightly in rear of the 156th
Brigade. Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's headquarters were in Millekruisse, and
in this case one advanced section of 4·5 in. howitzers (D/162) was
thrown forward in a position just west of Rossignol Wood.

As far as communications were concerned, a party of scouts was kept on
the top of Mount Kemmel in visual signalling with the guns, while O.P.'s
were manned at Desinet Farm, at Vierstraat Cross-roads and elsewhere,
whence good observation of Wytschaete Valley and Wood and all the
country to Spanbroekmolen was obtainable; these O.P.'s were also in
visual communication with the guns, but the fog and smoke during the
battle of the 25th rendered all their work impossible. Each brigade had,
in addition, a liaison officer with the infantry battalion in the line,
and therefore the system of communication between infantry and
artillery, and the observation kept upon the enemy by the guns, was as
good as could be hoped for. Buried cables, however, were scarce, and it
needed but a few well-placed shells to cut off all connection of this
kind.

April 24th was an unusually quiet day, though prior to this date the
enemy counter-batteries had been very active, each of our batteries
being carefully and accurately registered. This may have been done by
sound-rangers, but stringent precautions to avoid being located by them
were taken, and the universal opinion, which was reported by Colonel
Butler to Corps Headquarters, was that the location of the batteries was
being carried out by expert observers in the German balloons. These had
come very close to the line and numbers of them were constantly in the
air, entirely unmolested either by the Flying Corps or by the R.G.A.
April 24th, therefore, gave little hint of what was coming, unless the
exceptional activity of the German anti-aircraft guns were taken as a
sign. The quietness, however, was soon to be broken; at 1.0 A.M. on
Friday the 25th a few of the batteries were warned that an enemy attack
might be expected at dawn, but the remainder were completely unaware
that any untoward events were impending until suddenly, at 2.0 A.M.,
there descended upon them with a roar and a crash the most appalling
barrage that they had ever yet undergone.

With a fairly extensive experience of shelling, it was acknowledged by
all ranks that never before had such a bombardment been endured. In the
battery positions it was hell, the gunners working their pieces in a
perfect hailstorm of shell fire, while, to add to this tremendous test
of endurance, a large proportion of the barrage consisted of gas shell
which necessitated the wearing of gas helmets by all ranks. How any of
the guns or gunners survived that terrible morning remains to this day a
mystery, yet survive it they did and to most excellent effect. The
barrage which enveloped the guns was also beating down upon the front
line system, and the batteries, in order to show the infantry that they
were not forgotten, opened fire on their S.O.S. lines. It was soon very
clear, however, that an attack was imminent, and accordingly
"counter-preparation" was begun and continued for several hours.

From 2.0 A.M. until 5.30 A.M. the barrage did not relax, but from 4.30
A.M. onwards high explosive gradually superseded gas shell until the
bombardment became one almost entirely of high explosive. Although this
change did even more to wreck the battery positions than had the
chemical shell, it at least dispersed the gas and enabled the men
ultimately to remove their respirators; they were by now almost dropping
with the physical exhaustion of firing their guns at top speed in gas
helmets, combined with the nervous strain of this terrific bombardment,
and a breath of fresh air came to them as a blessed relief.

At 5.30 A.M. a considerable bombardment was maintained on the battery
positions, but the full fury of the barrage dropped back on to the
infantry and, after resting on the trenches for about forty-five
minutes, began to creep forward towards the batteries once more. Under
cover of this creeping barrage the enemy infantry advanced to the
assault, and as it rolled up inexorably towards the guns again—who all
this time were being pounded and smashed by the enemy artillery—the
Germans advanced swiftly over the front line and began to approach the
battery area. Thick fog enveloped their movements, practically every
telephone wire was cut and, as the same fog prevented any visual
signalling at all, the situation became extremely obscure. With a
visibility of only fifty yards it was impossible for battery commanders
to know when the enemy might not be right up to and amongst the guns.

At 6.10 A.M. the infantry got through their last message to the guns; on
a buried cable to 156th Brigade Headquarters the company commander of a
front-line company stated that he was still being shelled, but that the
Germans had so far made no movement. Shortly afterwards the cable was
destroyed and a terrible silence, as far as information was concerned,
set in. It would appear that, very shortly after the despatch of that
last message, the enemy assault was delivered.

At about 7.0 A.M. Lieut.-Colonel MacCullock of the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. rode
up to the battery positions. His battalion had been lying in support in
the valley of the Kemmel-Beek, where it had been heavily gas shelled,
and he now decided to move up to a line of disused trenches on the
forward slopes of Hill 44, just in front of the guns. While his men were
settling down into position, Colonel MacCullock rode up along the main
road to find out what was happening towards Wytschaete, and, penetrating
as far as the Grand Bois, he discovered that this was still in our
hands, whereupon he returned to complete his dispositions for the
defence of Hill 44. While this was still in progress, Lieut. Phipps
(156th Brigade) returned from Desinet Farm at about 7.50 A.M. and
reported that the enemy's rifle fire had got very near. Owing to the fog
he had been unable to see any Germans, but there was no doubt but that
they were rapidly approaching; he further added that there were
practically no French troops to be seen in that area. Even while he was
making his report some French infantry retired through the line of guns,
shouting that the enemy were in Kemmel village and were coming on fast.
It was therefore clear that there now remained no infantry between the
guns and the enemy except for the K.O.Y.L.I. whose right flank
terminated in front of B/156, there being from there southwards an
ominous gap.

At 8.45 A.M. patrols sent out reported that there were no British troops
to be seen on the other side of the Kemmel-Vierstraat road, and
following almost immediately upon this news small parties of Germans
were seen coming across the road. These were immediately engaged by such
of the guns as were still serviceable, but by 10 A.M. the enemy had
pushed across the road and, although he did not appear to have made much
progress in the visible ground near Godizonne Farm, had got beyond Siege
Farm further to the south and was within five hundred yards of the
batteries.

Shortly before this last period a decision had had to be come to as to
the withdrawal of the guns. The only infantry in the neighbourhood were
the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. and some stragglers of the late front-line battalion
whom Major Barker (C/156) had collected to form an escort to his guns;
the line held by these troops ran about one hundred yards in front of
the batteries, but stopped on the right at Hill 44, and south of this
point no troops were to be seen at all. Northwards the left of the
K.O.Y.L.I. was continued by some other infantry, but the whole line was
terribly thin and could not hope to stop a determined rush by the enemy.
Lieut.-Colonel Butler and Lieut.-Colonel Skinner were therefore faced
with this problem:—Hill 44, a slight rise in the ground on the
Ridge-Wood—Kemmel road, had a surprisingly good command over the country
from Dickebusch Lake round by the west to the northern slopes of Mount
Kemmel; it was, therefore, very important to hold it. For this purpose
the only infantry available were the 9th K.O.Y.L.I., but they were in
the best of spirits. On the other hand, reconnaissance showed that,
whereas the Germans were only using volatile gas on Hill 44, they were
using mustard gas some 700 yards to the rear, and the natural deduction
was that Hill 44 was part of the enemy objective. If, therefore, the
enemy gained the hill he would capture the guns _en bloc_, and there
would be no further obstacle to impede his progress. It was accordingly
decided to withdraw, one by one, a proportion of those guns which were
still undamaged, but to keep the remainder in action in their present
positions until the retired guns, from a line further back, could open a
full volume of covering fire upon the enemy opposite Hill 44.

Hitherto the tactical continuity of the narrative has been maintained in
order to relate, as clearly as possible, the true story of the attack by
which the Germans captured Kemmel Hill, but now a digression must be
made so as to follow closely the action of the batteries in their
withdrawal. To do this, the story of each Brigade will be taken
separately, beginning with the 156th.

At 9.0 A.M., shortly after the first crossing of the Kemmel-Vierstraat
road by the Germans, the order to prepare for a withdrawal was issued
from Lieut.-Colonel Butler's headquarters. Since as early as 6.0 A.M.
A/156 had in its main position only one gun capable of firing, and by
8.45 A.M. this gun also had been silenced; therefore, on receipt of
Colonel Butler's message, the battery withdrew from its main position
and moved to a fresh line in the direction of Ouderdom. Shortly
afterwards a section of Major Barker's battery (C/156) was also
withdrawn.

By 11 A.M. practically all the ammunition in B/156 southern position had
been expended, and moreover the guns were unable, owing to trees, to
fire at ranges of less than 1,200 yards. Major Studd therefore removed
the breech-blocks and dial sights from these guns and, sending back a
portion of his detachments to the wagon-lines to hurry up the teams
which had already been sent for, concentrated his efforts on the two
guns which he had kept in a position 300 yards further north. Of these
two guns, one was taken away by a team belonging to C/156 to a
previously reconnoitred spot north of La Clytte; the other was run
forward by hand, with the assistance of nine men of the K.O.Y.L.I., for
a distance of some one hundred yards to the crest of the hill, whence
Major Studd and his four remaining gunners engaged the enemy over open
sights at a range of 300 yards.

By 11.15 A.M. the remaining two sections of C/156 were in full view of
the enemy, some five hundred yards away, and, as their ammunition was
running out, a withdrawal to a line north of La Clytte was decided upon.
From a position of assembly two hundred yards to the rear the limbers
were brought up, one at a time; the first gun got away without being
fired upon; the second and third escaped under heavy rifle fire, but the
lead driver of the fourth gun took it through a patch of soft ground
which made the pace so slow that all the horses and one of the drivers
were shot, and the gun had to be abandoned for the time. The withdrawal
of this battery was rendered very difficult by the fact that there were
only one sergeant and six men still unwounded; all the officers and the
remaining other ranks had been either killed or disabled, though Major
Barker continued to command his battery despite his wound. They had put
up a most brilliant fight, and the gallantry of all ranks was
unsurpassable, typical of every battery on this grim morning.

There remained now only the advanced section of A/156, D/156, and the
single gun of B/156. The advanced section of A/156 (Lieut. Blackwell in
charge) for a long time had been firing upon the enemy at point-blank
range; early in the morning teams were sent up to try and save these two
guns, but the rapid advance of the enemy had not been realised and,
fight to the last though they did with the enemy all around them, the
guns together with their teams were captured. The advanced gun of D/156
near by had been knocked out earlier in the day and had to be abandoned,
after the withdrawal of dial sights and breech-blocks. D/156 main
position had also to be abandoned temporarily.

Thus, by 11.0 A.M. the only gun in action in the forward positions was
the solitary 18-pdr. manned by Major Studd and his four men. This little
party was now joined by Colonel Butler who, by his quiet bearing and
confidence, greatly inspired both gunners and infantry. He collected and
controlled a party of machine gunners whose officer had just been
killed, and for some time remained with Major Studd's gun, the capture
of which was only prevented by the thin line of K.O.Y.L.I. in front.
Machine guns and a 5·9 in. howitzer worried this party considerably, but
steady harassing fire was kept upon the enemy and prevented them from
making any further advance.

At about 11.30 A.M. this single gun was switched round through 180° to
fire on some Germans who were making for La Clytte, almost directly in
rear. At first about twenty of the enemy were visible who, on being
fired at, ran back one hundred yards into some scrub. This movement,
however, caused some three hundred of the enemy to get up and bunch
round their officers. Major Studd turned his gun on these and obtained a
number of bursts right amongst them, with the result that they ran back
five hundred yards into a patch of dead ground.

So the morning wore on, the enemy making no considerable advance since
he had established himself well across the Kemmel-Vierstraat road. By
1.0 P.M. the ammunition of B/156 solitary gun had all been expended; as
its presence was drawing fire upon the K.O.Y.L.I., it was run back
behind the slope, and Major Studd, removing breech-block and dial sight,
set out with his four men to find out what had happened to the remainder
of his battery.

Thus, at 1.0 P.M., the last gun of the 156th Brigade ceased to operate
in the forward positions; all the remainder had either got away or been
silenced by 11.0 A.M., and it only remained to remove those which had
had to be abandoned. At 5.0 P.M. in the evening Captain S. G. Taylor
took up teams and attempted to save the guns of B/156, but was only able
to reach the single gun in the northern position as it was impossible in
the darkness to tell where the enemy was. During the night of 25th/26th
and the morning of the 26th the howitzers of D/156 (less the advanced
one, which had been hit) were removed from under the enemy's nose, as
was also the one gun of C/156 which had been abandoned, and on the
morning of the 26th also Captain Taylor brought up his teams and saved
the three guns of B/156 in broad daylight with the enemy only four
hundred yards away—a very fine performance.

So ended the doings of the 156th Brigade on April 25th; three guns had
fallen into the hands of the enemy, but all the remainder, although a
few had temporarily to be abandoned, were saved; in every case the guns
had been fought to the last, tremendous casualties being inflicted upon
the enemy. Let us now turn to the 162nd Brigade and follow their doings
also on this memorable day.

The four batteries of the 162nd Brigade had, in common with all the
other guns, been enveloped in the tremendous barrage which the enemy put
down at two o'clock in the morning. In spite of this terrific storm of
shell—the intensity of which may be judged from the fact that Lieut.
Squire of B/162 was killed by the concussion of the bursting shell all
around him, his body being otherwise unwounded—the detachments under
their battery officers' control maintained a steady rate of fire upon
the enemy. All communication between "A," "B" and C/162 and Brigade
headquarters completely broke down, and runners were either killed or
prevented by wounds from reaching their destination; to quote the words
of one who was a witness of the batteries' deeds:—"Standing on the
fringe of that barrage was hell enough for me; to think of Fetherston,
Body, Lee and Cory (the four battery commanders) and all the others
walking about in their batteries in the thick of it—I don't know how
they ever got out." Casualties came thick and fast amongst the
detachments, guns were disabled or completely knocked out, yet the fire
of the guns never faltered, and all through the morning they offered a
determined opposition to the enemy advance.

The first guns to move back were, of course, the forward section of
D/162 at Rossignol Wood. By great good fortune the wire between this
forward section and the main battery position remained intact, as did
also the wire from there on to Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's headquarters,
and the most useful information was thereby transmitted to the
Divisional Commander. At about 8.0 A.M., the enemy being then almost on
top of the two forward guns, orders were sent to Major Lee to withdraw
this section, and teams were immediately sent forward under Lieut.
Escott to carry this into effect. Making their way through the barrage,
the little party reached the forward section just as the latter, who had
been firing at intense rate the whole morning, had expended practically
all the ammunition. In front the enemy were only three hundred yards
away; on either flank they had worked right round until they had almost
closed in on the guns, yet the withdrawal was carried out successfully
under heavy rifle, machine-gun and shell fire, the gunners with their
officers walking beside the guns. It is impossible to say too much for
such a fine feat; the section, under two young officers (Lieut. Bennet
and Lieut. Garrod, and later Lieut. Escott who was in charge of the
teams), had been in a very exposed and advanced position; it came under
the most intense fire both prior to and during the retirement, every
horse in both teams—there were no wagons—was hit, yet the guns were
saved without the loss of a single small store, and all the wounded were
brought safely away. In recognition of this performance every driver of
both teams was awarded the Military Medal.

Shortly after the return of this advanced section to the main line of
guns, the withdrawal of the latter to previously reconnoitred positions
began. The batteries had now been firing for many hours in the face of a
perfect hail of shell, and, great as had been the tenacity and
determination shown by officers and men in keeping up a vigorous rate of
fire upon the enemy in spite of terrific retaliation, still greater
tenacity and courage was shown in the carrying out of the retirement.
For some time past not a single runner had succeeded in making the
double journey from Brigade Headquarters to the batteries and back, each
man in turn falling a victim to the intensity of the enemy barrage, but
finally Lieut. Stanley-Clarke of B/162, with much good fortune and
considerable gallantry, succeeded in conveying to the guns the order to
withdraw.

Gun by gun the retirement began, each battery retaining a proportion of
its guns in the forward position until the remainder had got safely
away. It was a performance on the part of the officers, gunners and
drivers which has never been surpassed; while other brigades were being
forced to abandon their guns, the 162nd Brigade retained practically its
full tactical powers. Only three guns, two of C/162 and one of A/162,
could not be removed until nightfall and were then got away with the
enemy only a few hundred yards distant, but not one single gun was lost
to the Germans by the 162nd Brigade on April 25th, and in this
achievement they stood practically alone. Many of the neighbouring
batteries of other Divisions had earlier been silenced or had been
forced to abandon their guns, and too much praise cannot be given to the
officers and men of this Brigade who, in the face of overwhelming
short-range fire, continued to serve their guns long after they might
reasonably have been expected to retire, and even then withdrew them in
an orderly manner.

On the withdrawal of the batteries being completed, Brigade Headquarters
moved back to a prearranged rendezvous on the Reninghelst-Ouderdom road.
No horses or transport could come up to assist in this, and the entire
equipment had to be carried by the Headquarters' staff under the
direction of Captain Pavitt (the Adjutant). A number of casualties were
suffered during the march from shell-fire and from low-flying
aeroplanes, but ultimately the new control-post was reached and command
of the batteries was carried out from there.

Thus has been described in detail the story of the two brigades and the
part they played in one of the great battles which threatened the
Channel ports. Before we return to the main narrative again and describe
the doings of the rest of that day, a word must be said of the officers
and men who put up such a wonderful fight. Names have already been
mentioned in connection with deeds of especial gallantry, and yet with
hesitation has this been done, for how can one name in one battery be
singled out from amongst the others when all behaved in such a
magnificent way? Every officer, every man on that day showed such
gallantry as can never be surpassed, and proud should be he who can say,
"I served with the 33rd Divisional Artillery on April 25th, 1918!"

Yet two names must be mentioned, for without them this narrative would
be incomplete. Through all the trials and horrors of the day, through
all the great strain of the whole of this period every battery was
inspired and encouraged by the presence of the two Brigade Commanders,
Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler and Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner. When
times were grim and depressing, when the enemy seemed to be pushing
remorselessly on, when the brigades, with their backs to the wall,
appeared to be forgotten by God and man, there was ever the presence of
those two to cheer up and hearten the weary spirits of their officers
and men. With the control of the artillery continually passing from one
Division to another, even from one nation to another, but little was
done for the gunners who were left to look after themselves. Orders from
above were few and far between, and in many cases came too late to be of
any use; communications from Division and Corps were seldom received,
and it remained with the two Brigade Commanders to discuss between
themselves the situation as it appeared to them, and to issue orders to
the batteries accordingly. The battery commanders and their officers and
men—wonderfully gallant fellows all—had behind them the moral support of
their Brigade Commanders, but Lieut.-Colonel Butler and Lieut.-Colonel
Skinner had no such comforting support from above. Yet they were for
ever calm, confident and cheerful, and bore the tremendous strain of
acting on their own initiative in a way which the batteries strove hard
to repay. Colonel Skinner was wounded on May 10th and taken away in an
ambulance; Colonel Butler met a soldier's death in the final British
advance in the autumn, but the names of both will ever bring to the
minds of those who served under them a sense of deep gratitude and a
happy memory of a very highly valued friendship.

The main narrative of the battle was broken off at the point where, at
10.0 A.M., the Germans had established themselves firmly across the
Kemmel-Vierstraat road and had pushed on past Siege Farm towards the
battery positions. It was about this time—shortly before it, to be
exact—that the withdrawal of the 156th Brigade had begun, and it was
about now that the culminating point of the battle was reached. Having
got past Siege Farm, the enemy advance seemed to slow down as though
requiring a breathing space, and for this the fire of the guns and of
the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. who were still on Hill 44 was largely responsible. At
11.30 A.M., as already recounted, a strong attempt was made by some five
hundred of the enemy to work round by the south to La Clytte so as to
cut off the retreat of our troops, but this manœuvre was defeated, and
Colonel MacCullock, taking the initiative, decided to counter-attack
without delay. As many guns as could be collected were warned of the
plan but, just as the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. prepared to launch their assault, a
counter-attack was delivered by fresh British troops from the direction
of La Clytte, with the result that Colonel MacCullock considered that
any movement on his part was unnecessary.

A condition of stalemate now ensued. Whenever the enemy showed himself
he was fired on, while he on his part began sniping very actively.
Artillery fire was slow, taking the form of occasional rounds thrown
about promiscuously and varied by five-minute barrages. The roads,
however, were kept under constant fire by enemy high-velocity guns,
while counter-battery work on both sides was maintained. About 3.30 P.M.
one section of A/162, still in action near Millekruisse, fired at the
request of the infantry on some Germans who were collected in huts on
the far side of Cheapside, and shortly afterwards our infantry
reinforcements arrived.

The situation now seemed well in hand, and during that night and the
following day no further enemy advance took place. The 162nd Brigade,
having succeeded in withdrawing all its guns except three, was able to
come into action again immediately, and indeed some of its guns were in
their fresh positions before the withdrawal of the remainder had begun.
Therefore in a very short time they were all bombarding the enemy from a
line east of the Zevecoten-Ouderdom road and, under the orders of the
9th Division, were covering an infantry brigade of the 49th Division
along the La Clytte-Millekruisse road. The 156th Brigade had fewer
serviceable guns and did not come into action again as a unit until next
day, when positions were taken up one mile north of La Clytte and were
occupied until the 28th. On the night of the 28th/29th the 156th Brigade
pulled out and began to march to the Winnezeele rest area; the German
attack on the 29th, about to be described, delayed this march for a few
hours, but ultimately Winnezeele was reached. Next morning (30th) this
brigade was again called up into action, but only for a few hours, and
ultimately returned to Winnezeele with the prospect of a few days of
rest ahead.

From April 26th to 28th the whole of the battery area was heavily
shelled by the enemy, while the roads and wagon-lines were searched by
high-velocity guns. The wagon-lines, indeed, came in for a very bad time
and, after being shelled out of different camps, came ultimately to rest
about one mile west-south-west of Poperinghe, with forward wagon-lines
between Ouderdom and Reninghelst. On the 26th Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's
headquarters were shelled out and forced to move to Reninghelst, and on
the 27th the whole of the 162nd Brigade changed positions; "A," "B" and
"C" batteries occupied an area near Goed Moet Mill, east-north-east of
Ouderdom, "D" battery moved 600 yards north of Ouderdom, while Brigade
headquarters went to De Drie Goen Farm.

On Tuesday, April 29th, even while the relief of the 156th Brigade was
still in progress, the combined effort of both brigades was called upon
to resist yet another German attack, for at 5.0 A.M. the enemy assaulted
with eleven divisions in mass formation, the density being from six to
eight bayonets to the yard. It was again the same story, from the
batteries' point of view, of terrific shelling resolutely borne, but
this time there was the satisfaction of knowing that the work of the
guns had been successful. The attack, after getting up to within one
hundred yards of the line held by the 49th Division, was repulsed, as
was also a second assault at 6.0 A.M.; the German effort to turn the
Ridge Wood flank proved a costly failure, and the enemy dead lay in rows
in front of our line.

The fight of April 29th was the last big episode of the German offensive
in Flanders. From that date onwards there were a number of local actions
but no large-scale attacks, nor was any serious penetration made by the
enemy. From May 1st until the 7th the 162nd Brigade continued to bombard
the enemy and to be heavily shelled in return. On the 6th
Brigadier-General Stewart and his Staff took over from the C.R.A. 9th
Division the control of the artillery covering the front, which extended
from Kruisstraathoek cross-roads on the north to just south of
Vierstraat. This artillery consisted of the 50th, 51st and 122nd
Brigades (9th Division), the 149th Brigade (30th Division) and the 162nd
Brigade. On the 7th/8th, however, one section of the 162nd Brigade was
relieved by the 121st and marched into rest at Winnezeele, while at the
same time the 156th Brigade came up from the back area and took over the
positions of the 149th Brigade, in the very area where the wagon-lines
had been when the batteries were in action at Passchendaele five short
weeks earlier.

April 29th had been the last large-scale operation which the enemy
undertook on the Lys front, but Thursday, May 8th, saw a most determined
local action, in which the 156th Brigade and the two sections per
battery of the 162nd Brigade still in the line took an active part. At
3.0 A.M. on the morning of the 8th the enemy put down a very heavy
barrage on the battery and back areas, to which was added, at 5.0. A.M.,
a severe bombardment on the front system. All the morning until 11.0
A.M. this barrage continued, and under cover of it the Germans attacked.
The right brigade front was penetrated, but the left brigade formed a
defensive flank from Hallebast Corner to the southern end of Dickebusch
Lake. All day long the batteries fired on their S.O.S. lines, a steady
rate being maintained until 6.15 P.M., when a quarter of an hour's
intense bombardment was followed by a counter-attack on the part of the
19th Infantry Brigade. By this counter-attack all objectives were
regained except on the extreme left where the situation remained
obscure, and, after a night of intermittent harassing fire with
counter-preparation fired at 3.30 A.M. in the morning (9th), the
remainder of the 162nd Brigade withdrew from the line and marched to
Winnezeele for a short period of rest.

                        SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY

                                   BY

   FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, K.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E.,
             COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, BRITISH ARMIES IN FRANCE.

  I wish to convey to all ranks of the Royal Regiment of Artillery my
  deep appreciation of the splendid service rendered by them in all
  stages of the Somme and Lys battles since the opening of the enemy's
  attack.

  The difficult conditions imposed by a defensive fight against
  greatly superior numbers have been faced with the same skill,
  courage and devotion to duty which characterised the work of all
  branches of the Artillery throughout the offensive battles of 1917.
  With less constant and loyal co-operation on the part of both field,
  heavy and siege batteries, the great bravery and determination of
  the infantry could scarcely have availed to hold up the enemy's
  advance. The infantry are the first to admit the inestimable value
  of the artillery support so readily given to them on all occasions.

  The knowledge possessed by each arm, doubly confirmed by the severe
  tests already passed through successfully, that it can rely with
  absolute confidence upon the most whole-hearted and self-sacrificing
  co-operation of the other is the greatest possible assurance that
  all further assaults of the enemy will be met and defeated. I thank
  the Artillery for what it has already done, and count without fear
  of disappointment upon the maintenance of the same gallant spirit
  and high standard of achievement in the future.

                                 (Signed) D. HAIG, F.-M.,
                                             British Armies in France.

  General Headquarters.
      _May 9th, 1918._




                               CHAPTER X.
                                PART II.
                    HOLDING THE ENEMY IN THE NORTH.
                           (MAY-AUGUST 1918.)


Following on the two checks which had been administered to the Germans
on April 29th and May 8th, there now set in a period of holding the line
and of taking every possible step to prevent the enemy from renewing the
offensive. From May 9th until the 12th counter-preparation was fired
morning and evening, and to the weight of artillery employed in this was
added, on the 10th, three groups of the French 47th Regiment of
Artillery together with the 107th French heavy battery. On the same day
also the 44th French Regiment relieved the 19th Infantry Brigade.

On May 12th the 162nd Brigade, after a very short three days' rest,
moved into action in the II. Corps area and relieved the 17th Brigade
R.F.A. in the vicinity of Salvation Corner, Ypres. A/162 relieved the
13th Battery, "B" the 26th, "C" the 92nd and "D" relieved D/17, and here
they remained under the command of the C.R.A. 29th Division until the
17th. On Friday, the 17th, after an uneventful period they were
themselves relieved by the 187th Brigade (41st Divisional Artillery) and
moved to their wagon-lines one and three-quarter miles E.N.E. of
Poperinghe, continuing the march next day to wagon-lines in fields one
mile north-east of Houtkerque. Previous to this the 156th Brigade had
come out of action on the 12th and had marched on the 15th to Clifford
Rest Camp, near Proven; the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery,
therefore, was now concentrated in II. Corps Reserve.

From May 18th to the 31st a period of rest and training—very badly
needed by all ranks—was enjoyed. The two brigades were attached to the
49th Division, and were detailed to support with the latter the right
flank of the Belgian Army in case of enemy attack. This involved a
certain amount of reconnaissance of various battery positions to cover
the different lines of defence, but apart from this there was little to
do, and the blessed absence of shell-fire and of constant expectation of
attack came as a tremendous relief.

On the 20th General Sir Herbert Plumer inspected the 33rd Division, in
the following week all guns were recalibrated at Tilques, and on the
29th, as a final distraction, the 162nd Brigade held mounted and
dismounted sports at D/162 wagon-lines. A final distraction it was, for
on May 31st orders were received for the two brigades to relieve the
245th and 246th Brigades (49th Divisional Artillery) in the Ypres
sector, and on June 1st the march began.

The relief was spread over two days, but the morning of Tuesday, June
3rd, found the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery in action just
south of Ypres—an area which the men were beginning to regard with an
air of regular proprietorship. Both brigades occupied positions midway
between Vlamertinghe and Ypres; with main wagon-lines just east and
north-east of Poperinghe, and forward wagon-lines in the vicinity and
north-west of Vlamertinghe, the batteries settled down to cover the
right brigade of the 6th Division opposite Voormezeele.

From June 3rd to the 7th the time was passed in harassing the enemy,
while he in return kept up a heavy shelling of the battery positions and
roads. On Saturday the 8th, at 4.57 A.M., the French 46th Regiment on
the right attacked Ridge and Scottish Woods under cover of a barrage, in
which the 33rd Divisional Artillery took part, and captured both places,
but counter-attacks at noon left Ridge Wood in enemy hands again. On the
8th also the 33rd Division relieved the 6th Division, and the two
brigades found themselves covering their own infantry once more.

During the rest of June little of any importance took place. On the 10th
Major Lee's battery (D/162) moved its position some 500 yards further
south to some old horse standings, and during the whole of this period
considerable counter-battery work was carried on by both brigades with
excellent effect. On June 13th the French attacked and captured Ridge
Wood for the second time, but again lost it in a counter-attack during
the afternoon. On the 20th two raids were carried out, one by the 1st
Middlesex on Lankhof Château, just north of Voormezeele, at 12.15 A.M.,
the other by the 2nd Worcesters at the same hour on Manor Farm, south of
Zillebeke. The latter was completely successful, but in the Middlesex
raid the British covering party met a German covering party in No Man's
Land at three minutes before "zero." Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued
and the British covering party, reinforced by the raiders who were
forming up at the time, drove the enemy back to his trenches. No
identifications were, however, obtained.

Following this raid there was but little hostile retaliation. The enemy
activity had died down considerably of late, although from the 17th to
the 19th heavy area shell-storms occurred once more upon the guns, and
indeed it seemed that the enemy was devoting all his attention to the
battery and back areas. This, in fact, was hardly surprising. The chief
work of the 156th and 162nd Brigades at the time was the bombardment of
enemy roads and battery positions, and in the latter considerable
success had attended their efforts. Many explosions were caused amongst
the enemy batteries which were the targets, and it was only natural—a
compliment, in fact, to the accuracy of the British guns—that the
Germans should turn the chief blast of their hatred upon the originators
of this trouble.

Thus the month passed out uneventfully but uncomfortably, and July came
in to continue the conditions which had been prevailing. On June 30th a
slight change in the disposition of the brigades had been made, for on
that day the 11th Army Field Artillery Brigade withdrew from the line
and the 156th Brigade was left to cover the entire front of the left
infantry brigade, the 162nd looking after the right. To simplify this
"A," "B" and D/156 took over the positions of the 83rd, 85th and D/11
batteries respectively, and July found them in action in the Canal
sector. The policy of the batteries remained the same—harassing fire on
roads and tracks, constant counter-battery work and occasional responses
to infantry calls, while the enemy continued the practice of frequent
shell-storms on the batteries, with high-velocity guns looking after the
roads and back areas. In particular the forward gun positions at Groenen
Jager and the area around Vlamertinghe and Goldfish Château received
exceptionally heavy bombardment.

At the end of the first week certain alterations of the front covered by
the batteries were made; the infantry of the 33rd Division handed over
to the division on their left the front from Zillebeke Lake to the
Ypres-Comines Canal and, sideslipping to the right, took over from the
6th Division on the right (who had relieved the French 46th Division on
June 26th) the front to as far south as the Vijverhoek-Eizenwalle
railway. No infantry operations took place, however, until the 14th.

On Monday, July 14th, at 6.0 A.M. the right battalion, right brigade of
the 33rd Division (1st Middlesex), together with the 18th Infantry
Brigade of the 6th Division on the right, attacked under cover of the
guns to recapture the original front line east of Ridge Wood and from
there to Voormezeele, and succeeded in every detail. The enemy barrage
was not really strong, and only for short periods was it heavy. At first
it was confined to the forward area but later in the day spread to the
batteries, and during the afternoon the latter came in for a fairly
severe gruelling. All gains were held, and the Forward Observing
Officers dealt very effectively with small parties of the enemy who kept
dribbling up as though concentrating for a counter-attack. No such
concentration, however, was permitted by the guns to be carried out.
Counter-preparation was fired daily, morning and evening, and so the
British troops were able to boast of a successful advance on their part
on the scene of the late German offensive; the strategic initiative was
once more in our hands.

Following on this attack, hostile artillery activity greatly increased.
All battery positions were heavily shelled, Goldfish Château and
Vlamertinghe being bombarded with great severity, and C/162 forward
section had both its guns knocked out by direct hits. It was a typical
period of trench warfare, when the artilleries of both sides sought each
other out and pounded away at the opposing positions, keeping the while
a watchful and active eye on the doings of the infantry.

It was therefore a most suitable time for "new hands" to come and learn
the ropes, and fortunately come they did. On July 14th five American
artillery officers were posted to each brigade, to see what active
service was like and to learn British methods. They were the advance
party of a division shortly to come into the line, and for several days
they remained with the batteries before they returned to their own
units, there to expound to the latter the information and experience
they had gained. On July 25th a battalion of the 30th American Division
took over part of the front of the right infantry brigade, 33rd
Division, and thus the United States of America began to take a part in
the war in the north.

The only striking feature which presented itself during the month of
July on this sector was the constant fear of a renewed enemy offensive.
The German reserves, even as late as July 20th, numbered some
thirty-five divisions opposite this part of the front alone, and, with
the presence of such an enemy concentration, it was only natural that
there should be continued warnings and alarms of impending attacks. On
July 21st the wagon-lines of all batteries were ordered to "stand by"
throughout the night, with teams fully harnessed up; on July 24th a
message was received at 1 A.M. that the enemy would attack at dawn.
Again on the 26th the battery wagon-lines were rudely disturbed by a
warning that an enemy assault was hourly awaited, and once again the
drivers stood by their teams expecting at each moment to hear the
distant crash of the opening barrage. As a result of these rumours every
battery was called upon to reconnoitre tiers of positions to be occupied
in case of a successful enemy attack, but such an event never took
place, and the month drew to a close with no untoward affair to mark its
going.

Thus July passed out as its predecessor had gone—uneventfully, but with
considerable liveliness. With its going, however, the Division lost
Brigadier-General Stewart, who on July 29th handed over the command of
the Divisional Artillery to Brigadier-General G. H. W. Nicholson.
General Stewart had been with the Divisional Artillery for many months,
first as Colonel, later as Brigadier, and, although the exigencies of
war often took him away from the brigades to other sections of the front
where the infantry of the Division was being covered by artillery not of
its own, his presence was familiar and welcome to all ranks. His
departure was a cause of great regret to his many friends, but he left
behind him a unit of which any Commander might justly be proud.

August 1918, a month of great deeds amongst the troops farther south,
brought little change of conditions in Flanders, and the holding of the
line continued as before. On the 2nd the 156th and 162nd Brigades
assisted in a raid which gained identification of the 8th German
Division in this sector; the 8th Division, however, seemed to be
following a policy exactly similar to its predecessors, and life in the
batteries continued as before, with rather an unusual interlude on the
6th, when His Majesty the King inspected selected officers from the 33rd
Divisional Artillery at Lovie Château.

On August 7th the rear position of A/162 (Major Fetherston) was moved to
a point 500 yards north-east of Goldfish Château, midway between
Vlamertinghe and Ypres, and on the 10th C/162 took a similar step. At
this time two more American officers, Captain Westfeldt and Captain
Fields, were attached to the 156th and 162nd Brigades respectively,
while forty-eight hour visits of infantry officers to the batteries also
began—a most welcome interruption to the monotony of these days, and a
very interesting diversion for all concerned.

On Saturday, August 17th, the 119th and 120th Infantry Regiments of the
30th American Division relieved the infantry of the 33rd Division in the
line, and the 156th and 162nd Brigades found themselves under the
control of an American C.R.A. for the first time. It was a novel
experience; the 33rd Divisional Artillery had at different times covered
nearly half the British divisions in France; it had worked alongside the
Belgians, and had supported and been controlled by the French on various
occasions. Now the guns found themselves co-operating with the United
States Army whose troops they covered for the remainder of the month.

On August 28th came a sudden change. After a period of artillery duels,
of enemy bombardments on certain areas and of vigorous counter-battery
work by both sides, there appeared the advance parties of the 330th and
331st Brigades (66th Divisional Artillery) who came to relieve sections
of the 33rd Divisional Artillery. One section per battery moved out to
the wagon-lines on Wednesday the 28th, and on the 29th/30th the relief
was completed, the 156th Brigade marching back to wagon-lines in the
Haandehote area, the 162nd to a camp near Houtkerque. By August 30th the
concentration of the 33rd Divisional Artillery in the back area was
complete, and on the evening of that day there came the warning order to
prepare to entrain for the 3rd Army.

On August 31st-September 1st the brigades entrained—the 156th at Proven,
the 162nd at Heidebeke and Waayenburg—and left for ever the dismal
surroundings of the Ypres sector, where they had been for twelve long
months. Down in the south, whither they were now going, the British
offensive was in full swing; finished for ever was the stagnation of
trench warfare. The batteries, after manfully holding the gate of the
north, were about to be thrown into the great advance in the south which
thrust the enemy back on to his own frontier, and were to take part in
that wonderful pursuit which ended in victory for the Allied arms,
bringing to a close the world-wide struggle of over four weary years.




                              CHAPTER XI.
            THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER 1918.
            FINAL ADVANCE TO VICTORY ON THE 3RD ARMY FRONT.


Before the doings of the 33rd Divisional Artillery in the 3rd Army
advance are followed, it will be wise to review the tactical situation
on this part of the front from the opening of the British offensive on
August 8th up to the point where the 156th and 162nd Brigades joined in
the battle. Accordingly, the movements of the batteries in question must
be left for a moment while the broad aspect of these operations is
considered.

On August 8th Rawlinson's (4th) Army had opened the offensive with a
brilliant victory between the Ancre and the Avre, and on the 21st Byng
(3rd Army) extended the zone of attack northwards to beyond Albert. A
succession of attacks from August 23rd onwards pushed the enemy back
over the old Somme battlefields until, on the 31st, our troops had
forced the crossing of the Somme at Clery and entered Péronne next day.

By September 6th, after constant attacks, Rawlinson's Army had
penetrated seven miles to the east of Péronne, while Byng had reached
the western edge of Havrincourt Wood. On the 7th the greater part of the
wood was in our hands, and three days later the 3rd Army was beyond our
original front line of March 21st. The result of these operations was
that the Germans were forced back to the Siegfried line—a great
defensive zone seven miles in depth and many times stronger than the
Hindenburg line—with a few strong positions still held in front thereof,
and, before the grand assault on the Siegfried line could take place, it
was necessary that these few strong positions should be captured. To
achieve this, Byng struck on September 12th with the IV. and V. Corps
between Trescault and Havrincourt, capturing both villages and clearing
the ground for the coming battle. On the 13th he made a further advance
on the 3rd Army front between Havrincourt and Gouzeaucourt, and there
now only remained the capture of certain strategical features, marked
down for assault on the 18th, before the 3rd Army front would be ready
to take part in Foch's supreme effort against the Siegfried line.

                            ORDER OF BATTLE.

                        SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER 1918.

                                H.Q.R.A.

               C.R.A.                 Brigade Major.    Staff Captain.

   Brig.-Gen. G. H. W. Nicholson,     Major W. A. T.      Capt. W. E.
               C.M.G.                Barstow, D.S.O.,    Bownass, M.C.
                                           M.C.

                                        Capt. S. D.
                                          Graham.

                                        Major C. E.
                                       Boyce, D.S.O.

                             156th Brigade.

           Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler, D.S.O. (_killed_).

                        Major W. G. Sheeres, M.C.

                    Adjutant: Capt. H. W. Smail, M.C.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

    Major F. B.       Major W. G.      Major Barker,    Major D. Jones,
     Carrell.        Sheeres, M.C.     D.S.O., M.C.          M.C.
                                       (_till end of
                                       September_).

    Major K. W.                      Capt. L. Vestey.
    Milne, M.C.

                             162nd Brigade.

                   Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Warren, D.S.O.

                      Adjutant: Capt. D. Strachan.

   "A" Battery.      "B" Battery.      "C" Battery.      "D" Battery.

     Major G.      Major H. C. Cory,    Major J. R.       Major R. D.
    Fetherston,          M.C.          Barnes, M.C.      Russell, M.C.
    D.S.O, M.C.

    Major S. G.          Major
   Taylor, M.C.     Vaughan-Hughes,
                         M.C.

Thus matters stood when, on September 16th/17th, the 156th and 162nd
Brigades moved into action. They had not gone into the line directly on
arrival in the Army area but, on detraining at Petit Houvain, Frevent
and Bouquemaison, had marched to billets around Rebreuviette and Roziere
on the main Frevent-Avesnes-le-Comte road, where they remained for
thirteen days. This period was spent in training, in the carrying out of
tactical schemes and in general practising of open warfare, and on
September 14th/15th the march into action began. Great secrecy was being
maintained regarding the concentration of troops on any part of the
front, for the element of surprise was proving a tremendous factor in
the success of every attack; the march of the batteries up to the Line
was therefore conducted by night, the brigades leaving their billets at
evening on the 14th and, after an all-night march through Bouquemaison
and Doullens, arriving at Acheux (156th) and Louvencourt (162nd) at 5
A.M. on the 15th. Next night the performance was repeated and, passing
through Albert and Le Sars, the batteries reached Le Transloy in the
early morning of the 16th. From here positions were reconnoitred in the
V. Corps area around Heudecourt to support the 17th Division in an
attack on the Gouzeaucourt-Peizière line, and wagon-lines were
established on the afternoon of the same day in the neighbourhood of
Bus.

On the night of the 16th/17th the batteries advanced into action north
of Heudecourt in a tremendous thunderstorm; officers and men, after the
long marches of the preceding nights, were completely exhausted and, as
soon as the guns were unlimbered, literally dropped where they stood
while awaiting daylight. They were all worn out with bodily fatigue and
ached for rest, and a few hours they now obtained before, on the 17th, a
rapid but accurate registration was carried out. There was little time
for this latter to be achieved as the attack had been fixed for the next
day, but twelve hours of daylight sufficed for the essential
preparations to be made, and by nightfall on the 17th the batteries were
ready to fulfil their part of the programme in the coming battle,
despite the fact that the barrage table was not received until 11.0 P.M.

On September 18th at 5.20 A.M. the assault was delivered in heavy rain
along the whole Corps front, the 156th and 162nd Brigades covering the
infantry of the 17th Division, with the 38th Division on the left and
the 21st on the right. The division on the left was held up, but the
17th, after fierce fighting, gained their objectives and consolidated a
line north and east of Gauche Wood. Many prisoners and guns were
captured, and during the whole afternoon the batteries of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery were busy engaging numerous moving targets and
silencing hostile machine-guns and trench mortars. Two counter-attacks
were broken up by the fire of the guns, and at nine o'clock at night a
further creeping barrage was put down under cover of which the 17th
Division pushed north and consolidated a line just north of St. Quentin
Redoubt.

[Illustration:

  Scale 1:40,000.
]

After three days of active artillery fire, during which the infantry of
the 33rd Division (which had relieved the 21st on the 20th) slightly
advanced its line, the batteries of the 156th and 162nd Brigades began
to move up. On the night of the 21st the wagon-lines had been brought to
the Equancourt area, and on the 23rd the guns themselves advanced, 156th
Brigade to an area about 1,700 yards north of Peizière, 162nd Brigade to
new positions about 2,000 yards S.S.E. This move was not carried out
without loss, for the advanced guns moving up in the afternoon were
subjected to the most intense shell-fire, but ultimately all guns
reached the new line and from there the harassing of the enemy was
continued.

It was on this day (23rd), or rather on the night of 23rd/24th, that a
serious calamity befell the 162nd Brigade. An intense enemy gas
bombardment put the whole of the Headquarters staff and "B" battery out
of action, reducing the personnel of the Brigade by nearly a quarter; it
was a very severe loss in view of the active operations which were being
conducted, but Major Fetherston (A/162) from his own battery position
commanded from midnight onwards the rest of the brigade in addition to
his own guns, despite the fact that since the 18th he had been suffering
from a severe wound in the back which had to be dressed twice a day. It
was, indeed, a great feat of endurance and devotion to duty on Major
Fetherston's part, for he carried on for a number of days in command of
the 162nd Brigade, and took no notice of a wound which, of itself
intensely painful, took a long time to heal when ultimately he was
forced to go into hospital.

The period 25th/28th was one of much front trench and outpost fighting,
bringing many calls for support to the batteries and keeping all guns
actively engaged day and night. Pigeon Trench, Targelle Ravine and
Honnecourt Wood were frequently bombarded at request of the infantry,
while concentrations were continuously fired upon all hostile
communications and approaches. On the 25th "A" and C/162 were
strengthened by the attaching to them of one gun each from B/162 which
owing to casualties on the 23rd was unable to man all its guns, while on
the 26th yet another addition, and a strange one at that, was made to
the same two batteries. Four captured German 77 mm. guns with a large
supply of German "Yellow Cross" gas shells were allotted to them; with
grim delight the detachments bombarded the enemy that very evening and
far into the night with his own gas, and a particularly deadly form of
it at that.

On the 29th the attack broke out afresh in conjunction with the whole of
the 3rd, 4th and Debeney's French Armies. On the previous day battery
commanders had reconnoitred the forward areas with a view to a possible
advance should the forthcoming operations prove successful, and at 3.30
A.M. the assault was delivered. Covered by the guns of the 156th and
162nd Brigades, the 98th Infantry Brigade moved forward to capture
Villers Guislain, one company working round on the north-west, one from
the south-east and one making a frontal attack up the centre. With each
company there went a Tank which latter, however, were all knocked out
very early in the day or were blown up in our own minefield, and in
front of the whole body an artillery barrage rolled through the village.

Villers Guislain was captured together with two hundred prisoners, but
unfortunately the various enemy machine-gun posts, strong points and
dug-outs were not mopped up, and the attacking troops found themselves
with parties of Germans behind them. From here onwards the situation
became very obscure; a second attack—a continuation of the first—was
launched at 5.50 A.M. when the 100th Infantry Brigade assaulted the
trenches east of Villers Guislain, the objective being the line Evett
Copse-Crawford Crater, an attack which was accompanied by the advance of
the 21st and 12th Divisions on the left and right respectively, but
progress by the infantry was very irregular. Owing to the presence of
Germans who had not been mopped up in the rear of the attacking
infantry, and as a result of stiff resistance put up by the enemy all
along the line, the day developed into one long hard fight, every
battery being heavily engaged. A company of the 1st Middlesex was
completely cut off by Germans whose dug-outs had been overlooked in the
first assault, and, when our troops ultimately succeeded in capturing
this ground next day, the whole of the company which had been surrounded
was found lying dead all around. Whether the Middlesex had been captured
and slaughtered in cold blood it was impossible to say, but their
general appearance gave grounds for such an idea, and little mercy was
shown to the enemy in the succeeding days' operations. By 2.30 P.M. the
right infantry brigade was back on its original front line and the enemy
had practically regained Villers Guislain, and by evening the whole of
the attacking troops had retired once more to their starting point.

Meanwhile, with the success of the earlier part of the day, orders had
come for the 162nd Brigade to advance to positions south and south-east
of Villers Guislain, and at 2.0 P.M. "A" and C/162 had begun to move
forward in accordance with these orders. Hardly had they started,
however, than they came under intense fire which continued all along
their line of advance, while later, in the intermediate positions which
they were compelled to take up owing to the retirement of the infantry,
they were heavily bombarded by 4·2 in. and 77 mm. B/156, another battery
to move up according to prearranged orders—which had been drafted on the
assumption that the attack would be a success—went right on to its
forward position and stayed there within four hundred yards of the
enemy, but it suffered heavily for its temerity.

The night of the 29th/30th passed quietly, and at 10.30 A.M. on the 30th
the enemy was reported to be evacuating the ground west of the Canal de
l'Escaut. Sunday's attack, although not a success on the batteries'
immediate front, had elsewhere pierced the mighty Siegfried line, the
effect of which was so great that the enemy was forced to carry out a
retirement along the whole front. As soon as information of this
withdrawal was received a general advance began, the batteries
reconnoitring the ground which covered the crossings of the canal and
the zone east thereof, while the infantry reached the line which had
been the objective of the 5.50 A.M. attack on the previous day and threw
out patrols to the western bank of the canal. Between 11.0 A.M. and 2.0
P.M. the 156th Brigade advanced to positions 2,000 yards east of
Peizière, while A/162 came into action just west of Villers Guislain.

During the night 31st/1st the 162nd Brigade brought forward its guns,
and by dawn on October 1st was in action 1,000 yards east of Villers
Guislain, while the 156th Brigade also advanced its guns to the vicinity
of Pigeon and Targelle ravines, 2,000 yards south of the village. From
3.30 A.M. to 7.0 A.M. such guns as had reached the forward position
fired a barrage in support of an infantry advance on the right, and for
the rest of the day were kept hard at work in engaging the many targets
and movement which presented themselves on the far side of the canal. At
the same time the batteries were subjected to intense area shoots by the
enemy who was trying desperately to cover his retreat.

These area shoots were undoubtedly extremely unpleasant, but just at
this time the batteries were given visible proof that counter-battery
work was not entirely confined to the German side. During the advance to
the Canal, four 5·9 in. enemy howitzers were found deserted, but still
in the firing position, along a road. On this road just behind them a
German field battery of four 77 mm. guns had apparently been
marching—_had_, it should be noticed, for it would never march again.
Whether it had been caught in a shell-storm directed upon the 5·9 in.
howitzer battery, or whether an aeroplane had seen it and had switched
some of our batteries round to catch it will never be known, but
whatever had occurred the work was most effectual. The entire battery,
personnel and guns, lay dead and smashed upon the ground; the battery
commander at the head of the column, behind him his trumpeter and the
whole of the battery staff, all lay dead beneath their horses. Every
team of every gun was still in its harness, all three drivers of each
team were still in their places, but all were dead, torn and riven by
our shells. It was a most uncanny sight, this battery complete in every
detail laid out along the road, and swift must have been the storm from
our guns which transformed it and its surroundings into a shambles.

October 1st/5th was a period of probing the enemy line and of trying to
force the pace of his retreat. Day and night his communications were
shelled, his front system bombarded and every sign of movement engaged.
Patrols pushed out to the edge of the canal on the 3rd found it still
held by machine-gun parties, and as a result certain batteries sent
forward sections so as better to engage Honnecourt and the numerous
targets which presented themselves in the neighbourhood. On one occasion
an aeroplane reported enemy transport to be on the move near Basket
Wood, and a storm of shell was immediately directed upon the area
involved. During the advance a couple of days later the batteries passed
the locality where this transport had been, and the sight of the smashed
and broken wagons and the dead drivers and horses who had been killed by
the batteries' own fire was most uplifting to the detachments who had
done the work. All this time gas concentrations were fired into La
Terrière and Basket Wood, and everything was done to render as difficult
as possible the retirement which the enemy was clearly carrying out.

At last, on the 5th, the line gave. Further to the right our troops had
captured Montbrehain and Beaurevoir, and their loss necessitated a
withdrawal by the enemy from the La Terrière Plateau. At dawn the 5th
Scottish Rifles, accompanied by forward observing officers from each
brigade, pushed patrols across the river and, meeting only slight
resistance, advanced to Franque Wood and on through La Terrière,
establishing themselves in Aubencheul by 3.0 P.M. As soon as it was
known that the enemy had retired to the east of the canal, the 156th and
162nd Brigades began to make rapid preparations for the crossing, the
repairing of bridges at Les Tranchées and elsewhere being taken in hand
without delay. By 4.0 P.M. the 156th Brigade had completed a rough
bridge in the southern end of Honnecourt, and an hour later both
brigades were ordered to move across the Canal in support of the
infantry. A/156 and a section of C/156 immediately effected a crossing
and dropped into action midway between Vendhuille and La Terrière. At
dusk D/156 went into action 1,000 yards south of La Terrière, and the
remainder of C/156 crossed the canal and took up a position of readiness
one thousand yards to the east thereof.

Thus the batteries pushed their way over one of the great barriers which
lay across the line of advance, and before night had fallen a proportion
of guns was firmly established on the eastern side. Darkness prevented
any further work from being done, but with the arrival of dawn on the
6th, B/156 and the remainder of the 156th Brigade crossed over and took
up positions covering Aubencheul from south of La Pannerie Wood. The
162nd Brigade, in the meantime, had been seriously held up at the lock
south of Honnecourt, as the bridge, although repaired once, had again
been broken, but at 4.0 P.M. on the 5th after several hours' delay the
crossing was successfully carried out by portions of the batteries; at
dawn on the 6th the remainder came into action in the vicinity of
Franque Wood and La Terrière after a perilous march along the east bank
of the canal, between the latter and a marsh, with only two inches of
clearance on either side of the wheels.

On October 7th the 162nd Brigade again advanced to Basket Wood, while
wagon-lines were brought forward to the vicinity of the Canal, and at
1.0 A.M. on October 8th all batteries put down a barrage in support of
an attack by the 115th Infantry Brigade of the 38th Division. This
Division had relieved the 33rd at 10.0 P.M. on the 5th, and now advanced
to the assault of the Beaurevoir Line and Villers Outreaux in
conjunction with a general attack on the last of the Siegfried zone by
Byng, Rawlinson and Debeney. After much opposition and very severe
fighting the final objectives were gained at 10.0 A.M., and
three-quarters of an hour later the 162nd Brigade again moved
forward—the third advance in three days—to the west of Mortho Wood,
while the 156th Brigade guns advanced to the southern edge of
Aubencheul. From here another barrage was fired at 11.30 A.M., almost in
fact before the guns had dropped their trails—"limber supply" being
adopted by certain batteries until the ammunition wagons, arriving at
the gallop, came up just in time to prevent a stoppage—and under cover
of it the 114th Infantry Brigade assaulted Malincourt and the
Malincourt-Serain road beyond.

At about noon it was clear that the enemy was in full retreat, and
accordingly the barrage was stopped, the infantry pushing on with little
opposition through Malincourt and reaching the final objective at three
o'clock in the afternoon. At two o'clock one section of B/156, and
shortly afterwards three howitzers of D/156, advanced until they were
almost up with the attacking infantry, and by shooting in close support
and co-operation with the latter did excellent work in the engaging of
hostile movement, machine-guns and strong points. At the same time the
whole of 156th Brigade advanced so as to keep touch with the infantry,
reaching by 4.0 P.M. the area just south of Malincourt.

At dawn on October 9th the advance was resumed. Tuesday's battle had
wiped out the whole of the Siegfried Line, the enemy was now well on the
run and the 19th Infantry Brigade (33rd Division) pushed on through the
114th, the C.R.A. 33rd Division taking over control of the guns, which
consisted of the 121st and 122nd Brigades in addition to the 156th and
162nd. Little resistance was met with until Clary was reached, but here
the infantry were held up by snipers and machine-gun fire. Two guns of
A/156 and three of B/156 together with some advanced sections of the
162nd Brigade, which had followed close on the heels of the infantry,
came into action immediately on the western outskirts of the village and
successfully engaged the enemy machine-guns over open sights. Shortly
afterwards the infantry established themselves on the eastern outskirts
of Clary, whereupon two of the advanced guns of B/156 were pushed
through the village and again came into action, shooting over open
sights with extremely good effect at a range of 800 yards. In the
meantime the rest of the 156th and 162nd Brigades had been advancing
rapidly and, after passing through Villers Outreaux and Malincourt, had
dropped into action just west of Clary to help the infantry in the
assault on the eastern outskirts. With the fall of Clary the advance
quickened and the infantry went right through Bertry unchecked and on to
La Fayte and Troisvilles, closely followed by the forward guns of the
156th and 162nd Brigades, which were shooting at very close ranges over
open sights all the afternoon and were successfully dealing with every
sign of enemy resistance. Keeping pace with the advance came on also the
main body of guns of the two brigades, which searched out and broke up
every sign of enemy movement and opposition. So rapid was the move
forward that the batteries took up three successive positions during the
day, night finding them in the vicinity of Bertry with forward guns on
the western edge of Troisvilles.

[Illustration:

  Scale 1:40,000.
]

The speed of the advance, indeed, was now beginning to make itself felt;
ammunition and food supply became a most serious problem, and on this
day (October 9th) tremendous difficulty was met with by the wagon-lines
in keeping touch with their firing batteries without either crowding
upon or losing all sight of them. The day, with its eight mile advance
and the occupation of three successive positions, laid a heavy strain
upon all the wagon-lines which, unable to move in a direct line across
country, had to complete a long march before they joined up with their
guns at Bertry in the evening; yet throughout this period the guns and
detachments were never without ammunition and food, a fact which
compares very favourably with the batteries of the United States army
which in some cases, being without food, were completely unable to keep
up with the advance. There was another and most novel proof of the pace
at which the line was pushing forward; on entering Clary and Bertry the
infantry and guns were met by cheering French civilians who, in their
exultation at the departure of the enemy after so many weary years,
rushed to greet our troops with an outburst of joy—quite embarrassing!
Unable to cope with the rapidity of the attack the Germans had allowed
these people to stay behind, and in their excitement at this unexpected
relief they vented their delight upon the British troops in the most
amazing and whole-hearted manner.

Seven o'clock on the morning of the 10th saw all batteries on the move
again, supporting an advance by the 98th Infantry Brigade, assisted by
cavalry, upon the bridgeheads east of the River Selle between Neuvilly
and Montay. This was a great day for the guns and, indeed, for all the
troops concerned, for the advance was carried out according to the true
style laid down in the drill book for open fighting. Cavalry patrols in
front, infantry following on, batteries first in "battery column" and
then manœuvring into line, the whole countryside around Troisvilles
presented the amazing spectacle of vast masses of troops moving steadily
forward exactly as though on an Aldershot field day. The 156th Brigade
lay on the right of the 162nd, and together the two brigades manœuvred
up to the crest of the hill which commanded the crossing of the Selle.
By 8.0 A.M. the infantry were within 800 yards of the river, where they
halted until such time as the Divisions on the right and left had come
up into line, and by the same hour the batteries had pushed through
Troisvilles to a point midway between that village and Le Cateau, from
which positions they vigorously shelled hostile batteries and machine
guns.

In addition to the delay on the flanks, the enemy on the immediate front
was showing clear signs of increased resistance. Several field batteries
had come up and were firing over open sights at the infantry, while our
own batteries, as they neared the crest of the hill, came under very
heavy shell fire. With ammunition wagons detached, however, the guns
pressed on under severe fire and reached the crest whence, over open
sights, they were able to assist the infantry in no small measure, and
throughout the day continued to engage hostile troops and movement of
every description. At the same time the German batteries rendered our
positions very uncomfortable with 77 mm. and long-range fire, while the
teams which went back to Troisvilles to water found the village
congested with cavalry, artillery and infantry pack horses, all of whom
suffered severe casualties through being spotted by an enemy aeroplane
which called down a shell-storm upon the entire village.

The whole of the 10th was spent in registration, harassing fire and
counter-battery work, D/156 and D/162 engaging with great success four
hostile batteries in action on the forward slopes of the high ground
east of the River Selle. Many enemy machine-guns and snipers also
demanded the attention of the guns, and so, despite fairly active
artillery fire on the part of the enemy, the batteries were kept busy
until 5 P.M.; at that hour a barrage was fired to cover the 98th
Infantry Brigade in an attempt to cross the river and to form
bridgeheads on the crest of the hill to the north-east, in conjunction
with the 17th Division on the left.

This attack met with considerable opposition as the River Selle formed a
most important part of the enemy defensive line, and nowhere was an
advance made beyond the railway. Night fell with the enemy still holding
the high ground, and brought with it a most unpleasant time for the
batteries. Without cover of any sort or description, lying out in the
open and being consistently shelled with 77 mm. and 4·2 in., the
detachments awaited the dawn, when it was hoped that this stand on the
part of the enemy might be broken down.

Dawn, however, brought no further success, but on the contrary a
temporary reverse. The 98th Infantry Brigade at 10.15 A.M. reported that
it had been counter-attacked and now only had two posts on the eastern
side of the Selle; the 162nd Brigade was accordingly detailed to look
after the troops across the river, while the remainder of the artillery
covering the infantry were left to fire on observed targets and to
engage all movement and all possible hostile batteries. The latter
during the morning were quiet, but from 2.0 P.M. until 4.0 P.M. a very
considerable bombardment of 5·9 in., 4·2 in. and 77 mm., mainly from the
Ovillers direction, descended upon the whole area occupied by the
batteries.

No further move was now made until 5.0 A.M. on the 12th when the 100th
Infantry Brigade assaulted the high ground east of the river, the
objective being the line of the road running from Amerval to the
outskirts of Montay. No creeping barrage was utilised in this attack,
the batteries firing on selected and observed targets throughout the
day. By 8.0 A.M. the left battalion was reported to have gained its
objective in spite of strong enemy opposition, but the right battalion
was held up by machine-gun fire from the river. An early morning mist
rendered observed artillery fire—the only kind of any use at the
moment—impossible, and not till the middle of the day could anything be
done. Excellent work was then carried out by the batteries but came too
late, for by then the left battalion had been forced back to the railway
by strong enemy counter-attacks; evening found our troops, in spite of
stubborn fighting and most gallant resistance, back to the west of the
river whither they had been driven by superior numbers of the enemy,
only a few posts remaining on the eastern bank.

With S.O.S. lines along the railway, both brigades now began a period of
continuous harassing fire on all enemy strong points and communications,
with synchronised bombardments on areas of especial importance. A lull
in the infantry action had set in, but it was essential that the enemy
should have no chance of organising his front or improving his defences,
and to prevent this the full powers of the batteries were called upon.
From October 13th to the 20th under the control of the C.R.A. 38th
Division (which had relieved the 33rd on the 13th) the guns bombarded
the railway, the hostile trenches and batteries, the ravines east of the
Selle and every possible point which might be utilised by the enemy. Gas
was fired nightly into the ravines, every hostile effort to put out wire
was nullified, and two 6 in. trench mortars were brought into position
to help in the bombardment. The result of this firing, although not
apparent at the time, was clearly shown later when the batteries, on
advancing, found the railway embankment covered with the bodies of dead
Germans, all of whom had obviously, from their mangled state, been
killed by shell fire. Daily the enemy replied to this activity by
shelling the forward and battery areas, but the initiative had passed
for ever into the hands of the British Army, and the lull, although of a
week's duration, was but a temporary measure. On October 20th Byng
struck with seven divisions in an attempt to capture the Selle line
north of Le Cateau to Denain, five miles from Valenciennes, and the 38th
Division, covered by a barrage from the guns, assaulted and captured by
10.0 A.M. the high ground between Forest and the Selle as its share of
the operation; this, together with victories on other parts of the 3rd
Army front, left the way clear for a further general advance.

Next day (21st) the expected orders to resume the advance were received.
A general assault by the 3rd and 4th Armies was planned, the objectives
of the 33rd Division being Wagnonville and Poix-du-Nord; the attack was
to be on a grandiose scale, tanks assisting the infantry, while in
addition to the 156th and 162nd Brigades the whole of the 38th
Divisional Artillery and the 223rd Brigade R.F.A. (Naval Division) were
to form the creeping barrage behind which the infantry would move
forward. Two 6 in. trench mortars were allotted to each infantry
brigade, the 6 in. howitzers of the V. Corps Heavy Artillery were
detailed to bombard selected targets and engage in counter-battery work,
and one 18-pdr. battery of the 162nd Brigade was placed at the disposal
of the G.O.C. 19th Infantry Brigade.

In order to cover the Ovillers Slaughter House road for this attack the
156th Brigade moved to within 1,000 yards of the Selle, north-west of
Montay. From here all necessary points were registered during the
21st/22nd, and on the 22nd every battery sent forward a reconnoitring
party to examine the approaches to and crossings of the River Selle.
This was to be no local attack but an operation on the very largest
scale with tremendous issues hanging in the balance, for it marked the
beginning of the destruction of the new water front, the Scheldt and the
Sambre Canal, which the enemy was seeking to hold, and the start of the
last of the great conflicts in the west. No precaution was to be
overlooked, no step left untaken which in any way might assist in
bringing success to this great combined effort further to hurl the enemy
back towards his frontiers.

During the night of the 22nd/23rd the infantry of the 33rd Division
relieved the 38th, the C.R.A. 33rd Division taking over control of the
guns, and at 2.0 A.M. on the 23rd the attack was launched behind a
creeping barrage with the 98th Infantry Brigade on the right, the 19th
on the left. By 4.30 A.M. the 1st Middlesex were in Forest, and the 4th
King's had passed through their lines and were pushing on towards the
next objective; an hour later B/156 with one section of D/156 crossed
the Selle and followed up the leading battalion of the 98th Infantry
Brigade with whom they kept in close touch throughout the day, and by
6.45 A.M. both artillery brigades had crossed the Selle, the 156th
shortly afterwards taking up positions 1,000 yards west of Croix, the
162nd dropping into action west of Forest.

Meantime the infantry, in face of strong opposition, were pushing slowly
on, and by 10.30 A.M. were lining the Croix-Vendegies road ready for the
next advance. Before this took place the guns of the 162nd Brigade again
moved up, this time to Richemont, while C/156 pressed on nearly to
Croix. So successful was the attack, however, that the batteries found
themselves being left too far behind, and accordingly at 12.30 P.M. the
162nd Brigade again advanced its guns in close support of the infantry
and came into action 1,000 yards north of Croix. Here it remained
throughout the rest of the day, neutralizing machine-gun fire and
generally assisting in every possible way the infantry who were slowly
making their way through Vendegies Wood.

[Illustration:

  Scale 1:40,000.
]

By 5.0 P.M. the British line ran approximately along the northern edge
of the wood, and here the advance was stayed for the night, the 156th
Brigade, who had occupied the same positions since before midday,
pushing up to an area 1,000 yards north of Croix where it remained
throughout the hours of darkness. The day had been a complete and
overwhelming success all along the line, and the batteries, after
sixteen hours of continuous fighting and advancing, were thankful to
snatch a short rest. The strain had been great, nor had the victory been
won without loss; all batteries had suffered to a more or less marked
extent, but in particular must be mentioned the tragic and yet glorious
death of Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler. While riding up from his
headquarters at Richemont to visit the batteries he was severely wounded
and died the same evening, a loss which the 156th Brigade could ill
afford. Elsewhere has been related the story of his gallantry during the
enemy offensive, and in the advance of the British line his courage and
example were no less marked. His death robbed the Brigade of a friend
and a leader than whom a better could not be found, and with victory
almost in sight it seemed doubly hard that he should not have survived
to share in it.

On the 24th at 4.0 A.M. the advance on Englefontaine was resumed, Major
W. G. Sheeres, M.C., taking over command of the 156th Brigade. Heavy
bursts of fire were put down in front of the infantry under cover of
which they moved forward towards Paul Jacques Farm and Wagnonville, and
at dawn, although all ranks were now very exhausted, the batteries began
to advance. At 6.0 A.M. the 162nd Brigade had reached the southern
outskirts of Vendegies and was directing fire upon the eastern outskirts
of Poix-du-Nord, where the enemy was reported to be retreating. By 8.0
A.M. the same brigade had again advanced to a position in observation
1,000 yards further on, the 156th Brigade reaching the edge of the Bois
de Vendegies one hour later. From here harassing fire was kept up on the
approaches to Englefontaine, while A/156 kept in close touch with the
leading battalion of infantry. News was then received that, after the
overcoming of strong opposition, Wagnonville had been captured and
Englefontaine itself was being rapidly threatened. Upon receipt of this
information further battery positions were hastily reconnoitred and all
the guns were moved up, the 156th Brigade coming into action between
Poix-du-Nord and Wagnonville, the 162nd Brigade in Poix-du-Nord itself.

As events turned out, the infantry were held up between Poix-du-Nord and
Englefontaine, and the latter was accordingly kept under the fire of the
guns. All through the night of the 24th/25th and during the day of the
25th the exits from the village were continually bombarded, and at 1.0
A.M. on the 26th an attack was carried out by both infantry brigades of
the 33rd Division under cover of a thick barrage in which ten per cent.
of gas shells were used. The programme for this barrage was worked out
almost entirely by Brig.-General G. H. W. Nicholson who, depleted of his
staff by "Spanish influenza" and other causes, tackled the work
single-handed and with such skill that the operation was a complete
success. Five hundred prisoners and many machine-guns were taken, and
with the fall of the village one battery of the 162nd Brigade pushed
forward to a previously reconnoitred position from which close support
of the infantry was possible.

From the 26th until the end of the month the batteries remained in the
same positions, and it was well that this was so, for the so-called
Spanish influenza was now raging in both brigades. It was believed that
this epidemic had been contracted through sleeping in dug-outs and barns
recently occupied by the enemy who was known to be suffering from it
very badly, but whatever the cause it handicapped the guns to a marked
extent. At one time the brigade commander and all four battery
commanders of the 162nd Brigade were down with the disease, but despite
this counter-preparations were fired morning and evening to break up any
would-be counter-attacks by the enemy, while frequent gas concentrations
were fired into the hostile lines. On the 29th a successful "mopping-up"
of houses on the Englefontaine-Bavai road was carried out by the 17th
R.W.F. (the 38th Division had relieved the 33rd on the evening of the
26th), and on the 29th/30th there came to the weary batteries a short
relief. On that night the 122nd Brigade R.F.A. "took over" from the
162nd who marched back to Bertry for a 72-hour rest, to be followed two
nights later by the 156th Brigade.

For over six long weeks the batteries had been fighting, advancing and
fighting again, covering in all a depth of 30 miles and never once
enjoying rest of any kind. Upon Brigade and Battery commanders there had
been the constant strain of dealing with the ever-arising fresh
situations, and of keeping in close touch with the infantry in every
stage of the advance; amongst all the battery personnel there had been
no rest, no respite from unending firing, marching and enemy shelling,
while the wagon-lines had been hard put to it each day to keep touch
with the gun lines in every move and to keep them fully supplied with
ammunition. It is scarcely surprising, then, that officers and men were
dropping with fatigue when the orders for a 72-hour rest were received,
yet so high was the morale of the troops at the time and so inflamed
were all with the sense of victory, that grudgingly did they give up
their share in the battle and move back to the quieter surroundings of
Bertry.

They need not have feared, however, that they would be long left out of
the line. The so-called 72-hour rest, although achieved by the 162nd
Brigade, was reduced in the case of the 156th to one of twenty-four
hours, and November 2nd saw both brigades back into action once more. A
great combined attack by the 1st, 3rd and 4th Armies, together with the
1st French Army, was about to be launched upon the formidable defences
of the Sambre, the great Mormal Forest and the fortifications of the
town of Le Quesnoy, and to take part in this the two brigades were
ordered to cover the line due east of Englefontaine from positions in
the western outskirts of Poix-du-Nord (156th Brigade) and from
Wagnonville (162nd Brigade). These positions they occupied in the
afternoon of November 2nd, Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Boyce temporarily
commanding the 156th Brigade, and Colonel Pim (who was wounded next day
and succeeded by Major Vaughan-Hughes) the 162nd in place of
Lieut.-Colonel Warren.

Before any further details of the fighting are entered upon, a word of
explanation is called for with regard to this chapter. Hitherto a
careful chronicle of the events of each day has been given, the
movements of the batteries being followed in detail. As a result,
perhaps, of this strict attention to tactics the personal element has
found itself excluded, the interest of the chapter being in the main
historical. Yet this is unavoidable; in one short chapter must be
described the whole of that brilliant advance from September 16th until
November 11th, with all its attacks, its changes of position and forward
marches. To digress from this and enter upon personal narratives must
inevitably destroy the continuity of the story, and moreover, another
difficulty has to be faced. In those days no battery had time to think
of the doings of any other guns save of its own; no battery had really
sufficient time to think and record what it was doing itself, and
therefore, were stories of individual exploits narrated in these pages,
only a particle could be put down and many as deserving of mention would
have to be left untold. On frequent occasions every battery of both
brigades performed brilliant exploits in galloping forward guns to a
level with the most advanced infantry and in shooting upon the enemy
over open sights at almost point-blank range; on frequent occasions
batteries had to pass through shell-storms to drop into the positions
chosen for them, and had to maintain effective covering fire under the
full weight of an enemy bombardment, but each and all did it in turn and
the singling out of any one in particular would be invidious. All eight
batteries took an equal share in this wonderful advance, and the valour
of their work can best be appreciated by an account of the battles in
which they were engaged.

On November 2nd the brigades had come back into action; November 3rd was
spent in reconnoitring advance positions and in maintaining close
co-operation between the infantry and the guns, and on November 4th
began the great attack on the Forêt de Mormal. At 6.15 A.M. under a
creeping barrage the 38th Division moved forward to the assault, and for
two hours the guns continued to maintain a curtain of fire in front of
the infantry as they pushed their way on towards the objective. At 8.15
A.M. both the 156th and 162nd Brigades began to advance, one battery at
a time, to positions already chosen east of Englefontaine, and by
adopting this procedure the continuity of the barrage was in no way
interrupted, the rear positions maintaining a brisk rate of fire until a
proportion of guns had reached the forward positions and had begun to
carry on the work from there. The 162nd Brigade successfully reached the
new positions, although heavily shelled on the way, but the 156th was
prevented from doing so by intense machine-gun fire, which mere fact
alone goes to show how closely the batteries were following up the
infantry. Only A/156 was able to get through, the remainder having to
drop into action temporarily to the west of the village, but after a
time the machine-gun fire slackened and the move was completed, the
whole of the 156th Brigade lying 1,000 yards south-east of Englefontaine
in the outskirts of the Forêt de Mormal and close alongside the 162nd
Brigade.

From here the barrage was continued until 3.0 P.M., when the final
objectives were reached. Positions were then reconnoitred 3,000 yards
further forward, and at dusk all batteries advanced again. Great
difficulty was now experienced as numerous trees had been felled across
the roads which had, in addition, been blown up, but by 8.0 P.M. all
batteries were in action again in the reconnoitred positions around a
_carrefour_ or meeting of roads in the forest. The state of the roads,
in point of fact, prevented the moving up of any heavy guns except the
60-pounders, the six-inch howitzers being compelled to remain halted far
behind until some sort of track had been repaired for them.

During the night of the 4th/5th the batteries again moved forward and
were deployed along the Sassegnies-Ribaumet-Sarbaras line, covering the
River Sambre, while the infantry of the 33rd Division relieved that of
the 38th. At 4.30 A.M. the advance began again, and each battery
immediately sent one section forward to keep in touch with the battalion
commanders. These sections pushed on through La Grande Pature and took
up positions east of Sarbaras which gave easy command of the crossings
of and ground beyond the River Sambre, and from which very successful
observed fire was carried out, much enemy movement being engaged. In the
meantime the remainder of the batteries hurried forward as fast as
possible, but great delay was caused by congestion on the roads and by
mine craters and felled trees. Not until noon had all the batteries, in
extremely wet weather, made their way through the Forêt de Mormal, but
by that time they were in action east of Sarbaras and bombarding the
ground beyond the Sambre with the utmost vigour.

This day, Tuesday, November 5th, marked the final breaking of the
enemy's resistance. With the two wings of his army separated, with the
Siegfried and Brynhild zones overrun, he was no longer in retreat but in
full flight, and during the afternoon of the 5th a careful
reconnaissance of the routes forward and of the crossings over the
Sambre was carried out, for the rout of the enemy might enable a
crossing to be effected at any moment. During the night of the 5th/6th
the enemy retired to the east of the river and the 162nd Brigade was
ordered to follow him, the 156th being told to remain in their present
positions to the west. Night and day the enemy kept the bridgeheads
under the most intense shell and machine-gun fire, and entirely
prevented the Sappers and the battery working parties from repairing the
bridges sufficiently for the guns to get across. Ultimately, at dawn on
the 7th, a rough structure had been thrown up, and the batteries began
to move over the river. On the previous evening a reconnaissance of the
approach to the bridge had been made by Major Taylor and Captain Heads,
and it was found that the proper approach had been hopelessly blocked.
The batteries, when they did advance, had to move down a steep, winding
and very narrow track, while the only route on the eastern side of the
river was a tortuous towing path and necessitated the cutting of gaps in
hedges and the manhandling of guns across rivulets and swamps—a very
difficult task.

D/162 was the first battery actually to cross the Sambre, but it was so
closely followed by A/162 that the latter got into action first,
dropping its gun trails just west of Pot de Vin at the moment when the
infantry were assembling along a sunken road for the attack on the
village. The gratitude of the infantry for this close support by the
artillery was very marked, and several of their officers came up to the
batteries to express their thanks, for they knew with what difficulty
and at what a cost this advance of the guns close under the enemy's nose
had been effected. "B" and C/162 were prevented for some time from
crossing the river, for an infantry wagon broke down right in the middle
of the bridge shortly after "A" battery had got over, but after a delay
of about two hours the whole brigade was across the last barrier and,
despite severe casualties suffered in the operation, was supporting the
infantry to the full extent of its power. November 7th was the last real
fighting day of the war on this part of the front, but it was none the
less a very nasty day, and in every battery a certain number of
casualties were suffered. The enemy was putting up a stiff resistance
for he was trying to bar to us the road to Namur, but his was only a
forlorn hope and did little more than to slow down slightly our rate of
advance.

From this date onwards the only batteries of the 33rd Divisional
Artillery to the east of the Sambre were those of the 162nd Brigade, as
the 156th Brigade had not been called upon to advance. In fact, the
162nd Brigade shared with the 169th Army Field Artillery Brigade the
distinction of being the only guns across the river on this section from
the 6th until the conclusion of hostilities.

On the 8th, even while a little group of men were sitting round a table
in the Forest of Compiègne discussing the terms of Armistice, the
infantry of the 38th Division advanced to the Maubeuge-Avesnes road and
later to the Bois de Beugnies, supported as far as possible by the 162nd
Brigade which pushed on beyond the cross-roads north-west of Dourlers.
On the 9th the enemy retreat became general; the infantry followed up as
far as Wattignies, and "B" and C/162 moved into action 1,000 yards west
of the village, "A" and "D" batteries remaining at Dourlers. Saturday,
the 9th, was in fact the last day of the war for the 33rd Divisional
Artillery. In the early morning of that day the 162nd Brigade fired upon
the enemy rearguards—the 156th were already out of the battle—and
reconnoitred forward as far as Wattignies where the infantry had halted.
Small patrols of cavalry pushed further on to try and establish contact
with the rearguard of the German army, and desultory machine-gun fire
could be heard every now and then away in the distance, but to all
intents and purposes the enemy had completely vanished and nowhere could
our troops get into contact with them.

On November 10th came orders for the wagon-lines to join up with the
guns and for all four batteries of the 162nd Brigade to remain in a
position of readiness between Dourlers and Ecuelin. To the east all the
bridges had been blown up by the retreating enemy, and pursuit by the
batteries was utterly impossible. Moreover, it was known by all ranks
that German plenipotentiaries had passed through our lines some days
before to sue for terms, and the knowledge of that fact, combined with
the utter rout of the enemy on the batteries' own front, prepared the
men for the news which was shortly to come.

At 9.0 A.M. on Monday, November 11th, 1918, came the news that the war
was over. In the Wattignies sector the order to break off hostilities
did not come, as many accounts strove to describe it, in the midst of
the battle, with raging gun-fire at one moment and our troops all
shouting and waving their helmets at the next. The orders merely
confirmed what already was known and anticipated, and although, when the
message from G.H.Q. was read out to the assembled batteries, there was
such cheering as comes from deep down in the heart, the occasion was far
too great to be grasped in a single moment, and the gunners, as soon as
the parade was over, set off to play a football match against the
infantry! Such an attitude of mind must have seemed inexplicable to
onlookers of other nationalities who could not understand the
temperament of the British soldier, yet in a way the action was only
natural. The Great Pursuit was over; nay, more, the war, the terrible
nightmare of four years, was finished. How could the realisation of such
a mighty event be grasped in a moment by men who for months and years
had been hourly awaiting death, and now saw death pass from them?




                              CHAPTER XII.
                                FINALE.


And so the work is done, the record finished. In all humbleness the pen
was taken up to chronicle the deeds of these men; in all humbleness it
is laid down again with the closing of the story. In mere bald words it
has been impossible to describe the wonderful gallantry, the grand
determination and the final success over insuperable difficulties which
typified the men of the 33rd Divisional Artillery. The true tale of
their heroism, of their suffering and sacrifice can never really be
understood by any save those whose privilege it was to be a witness
thereof, but the story of the battles in which they took part may
perhaps convey a small idea of the glory of their war record.

In December, 1915, they had their first experience of active service; in
November, 1918, the last "Cease Firing" sounded and their work was
accomplished. In all those ten hundred and fifty days of war the
batteries were in the line for over eight hundred days, and these
figures offer perhaps the most striking testimonial that can be given of
their work. They had been at one time the extreme right-hand unit of the
British line, on another occasion at Nieuport they guarded the extreme
left. On April 9th, 1917, the guns of one of the brigades were the first
of the whole line to follow up the enemy in every successive advance; in
November, 1918, they were the first guns to cross the River Sambre. All
along the British front they fought, at Nieuport, amid the grim horrors
of Passchendaele and Ypres, at Kemmel, Givenchy, Cambrin and Arras; in
the ruins of Hebuterne and the wilderness of Gommecourt, High Wood and
Delville Wood; in the sea of mud round Bouchavesnes and in the Somme
marshes. In the dark days of early 1918 they held with glorious
obstinacy and determination the gate of the north; in that wonderful
autumn of the same year it was the 33rd Divisional Artillery who took
part in that mighty onslaught which flung the enemy back upon his
frontiers and ultimately forced him to ask for peace. At this point it
would have been gratifying to have been able to record in fuller detail
the individual services of various officers and men who were especially
connected with the doings of the brigades and batteries during the war,
yet to attempt to do such a thing is well-nigh impossible. Each and all
contributed their share, each and all played a noble part, and who is to
judge as between man and man in the scorching fires of battle? Elsewhere
has been described the great work done by Colonel Frederick Hall, whose
sheer determination and personal endeavour got all the batteries out to
France within eleven months of the date of their first recruitment—a
record probably unequalled by any other New Army unit. Already mention
has been made of Brig.-General C. F. Blane who took the brigades out to
France and initiated them in the rigours of active service; of
Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd who led the 156th Brigade in the earlier
days, and of Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris who commanded so gallantly the
162nd; of Colonel A. H. S. Goff and Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff, and of
Brig.-General C. G. Stewart who succeeded General Blane as C.R.A. of the
Division. Already we have spoken of Lieut.-Colonel Butler and
Lieut.-Colonel Skinner, the two Brigade Commanders of the latter period
of the war, and of Brig.-General G. H. W. Nicholson who controlled the
batteries in the final victorious advance in 1918. Yet memory still
teems with the names of many others, for who is there from out of all
the batteries who is not also worthy of mention? Major Johnston and
Major Bennett, both killed on the Somme; Captain Heap and Lieut. Tucker
who died at Arras; Majors Studd, Barstow and Fetherston who were never
away from the Divisional Artillery for long; Taylor, Sheeres and Heads
of the 156th Brigade, Warr the "Mayor of King's Clere"; Benett-Stanford
and van Straubenzee of the 162nd Brigade; Cory and Pavitt, Lutyens and
Hill, Talbot and Bruce, Turner and Barnes; Gallie who died at
Passchendaele, Colonel Johnson and Captain Rhodes of the D.A.C., both
killed at Zillebeke. There is no end to the names of those who should be
spoken of, since for every name mentioned at least three more
immediately present themselves to the mind. One and all did their best,
and better than that no man can do.

To follow the movements of the 33rd Divisional Artillery after the
Armistice would indeed seem an anti-climax, and yet, just as the story
has been told of its first formation, the gradual evolving of a unit of
artillery from the original raw mass, so must the final days be recorded
until the date when the men cast from them the apparel of war and
returned to civilian life once more, men who had for ever deserved from
their country the full rights of Citizenship. From November 11th until
the 14th the batteries remained in the areas they had been occupying
when hostilities ceased, and on the 14th they turned their faces towards
the west and began to retrace their steps over the scenes of the late
fighting. It was not decreed that they should take part in the
occupation of Germany, and accordingly they marched back through Forest,
Bertry and Clary to billets in Villers Outreaux (156th) and Lesdain
(162nd). Here they remained until December 6th and here, or rather at
Crevecoeur near by, was held on November 22nd a thanksgiving service at
which officers and men were decorated for gallantry in the fighting now
past and done with; here also the men were visited by His Majesty the
King who had come over to France to thank in person his victorious
troops, and on December 6th began the six-day march to the last rest
billets which the men were to occupy in France.

Two routes were followed, one by each brigade, and, as mile after mile
rolled by, the batteries turned their backs once and for all upon ground
which for them held memories that can never be effaced. Through Tincourt
and Manancourt, past Riencourt and Méaulte where they had assembled
before moving into the Somme battle of 1916, through Blangy-Tronville
and Pont Noyelles, Le Mesge and Picquigny, on beyond Selincourt and St.
Maulvis they marched until at last they reached their permanent billets
around Brocourt-Liomer, Inval Boiron and Hornoy. Here they stopped and
here, for many weeks, they passed the time in educational schemes, in
physical training and recreation until such time as authority should
permit of their return to civil life once more.

All through the war demobilisation, a return to England, to Peace with
no threat of war hanging over their heads, had seemed to these men a
wonderful dream which could never come true by any possibility, which
was so far removed from the order of things as to be something quite
intangible and incredible. It seemed that the war must still be in
progress beyond the eastern horizon, that soon they must be flung into
the scorching fires of battle again, that this talk of a return to
England for ever was fantastic, imaginary—a trick of their brains. Yet
even this most wonderful of events did actually occur; in March, 1919,
all units were reduced to "Cadre A," the surplus men being sent to the
Base for demobilisation, in May a further 25 per cent. of these cadres
was dispatched home, and in the second week of June only an equipment
guard remained with each battery.

In July these last remnants of the 33rd Divisional Artillery departed
from the land of France which owed to them so much. All through the
first week of the month the skeletons of the batteries entrained and
moved to Havre, and the 9th found them in that port waiting for a ship
to carry them home. On Thursday, the 10th, the 156th Brigade embarked
for Southampton, on the 12th and 17th the D.A.C. followed, and on Sunday
July 27th, 1919, the 162nd Brigade, last remaining unit of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery, watched the quays and houses of Havre glide slowly
by as the ship gathered way and headed for the coast of England.

Thus the Brigades left France and set foot in England again, their work
accomplished, the battle won. Camberwell turned out and gave right royal
welcome to its Gunners when, a few days later, they marched as victors
through the crowded streets; and well might it be so, for they had
returned with such glory as can hardly be believed of mortal man.
Several days did the people spend in rejoicing and in welcoming their
citizen-soldiers home once more, days in which the pangs and miseries of
those dark times of watching and waiting were put aside and forgotten.
Yet in all those festivities, beneath all the laughter and song of that
week there was for ever present the divine and sacred memory of those
whose good fortune it had not been to return from the battle, of those
many hundreds who had died in the service of the guns of the 33rd
Division and who lay in soldiers' graves along the length and breadth of
the far-flung battle line. Their example, their sacrifice must stand for
all time as a memorial and a constant reminder to those who come after
of the price which has been paid that they may live, and there will ever
remain to those who mourn the loss of many whose places can never be
filled, the proud memory of their heroism and endurance, the glad
knowledge of a man's part nobly played.

  "Their seed shall remain for ever and their glory shall not be
  blotted out. Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth
  for evermore."

                                THE END.




                              APPENDIX I.


                              CASUALTIES.

                       33rd Divisional Artillery.

                                  1916.

 _Officers:_                         _Other Ranks:_
   Killed                          9   Killed                        117
   Wounded                        43   Wounded                       419
   Missing                         1   Missing                         5
                                 ———                                 ———
        Total                     53        Total                    541

                          Officer Casualties.

                               _Killed:_

 Baldwin, 2/Lt. H. D.
 Bennett, Major W. P.
 Briggs, 2/Lt. H. K.
 Fell, 2/Lt. D. M.
 Gardner, 2/Lt. F. G. B.
 Haylett, 2/Lt. N.
 Johnston, Major R. G. M.
 Peerless, 2/Lt. C. S.
 Prior, 2/Lt. M. S.

                               _Wounded:_

 Barlow, 2/Lt. C. G.
 Barstow, Capt. W. A. T.
 Beresford, Lt. F. R.
 Body, 2/Lt. M. M. I.
 Collins, 2/Lt. G. R.
 Cooper, 2/Lt. F. D'A.
 Fisher, 2/Lt. L. E.
 Forbes, 2/Lt. W. F.
 Goff, Col. A. H. S.
 Goff, Lt.-Col. L. T.
 Greenwood, 2/Lt. T. A.
 Hailey, 2/Lt. V.
 Hancock, 2/Lt. G. E. L.
 Harvey, 2/Lt. W. E.
 Henley, 2/Lt. A. W.
 Hewitt, 2/Lt. H. H.
 Hill, Capt. L. R.
 Huddart, 2/Lt. G. H.
 Jacobs, 2/Lt. P. A.
 Keable, 2/Lt. A. M.
 Kernan, Capt. G. E.
 Kerr, 2/Lt. J. C.
 Macartney-Filgate, 2/Lt. J.
 Maxwell, Capt. A.
 Milne, 2/Lt. K. W.
 Mocatta, 2/Lt. H.
 Moore, Lt. C.
 Murray, Major A. D.
 Ormond, 2/Lt. E. C.
 Osborne, 2/Lt. M.
 Russell, Capt. R. D.
 Shepherd, Lt. T. D.
 Swinton, 2/Lt. R. A.
 Tait, 2/Lt. J. A.
 Thompson, Major R. H.
 Turner, 2/Lt. K. F. S.
 Vick, Lt. D. M.
 Watson, Lt. W. D.
 Watson, 2/Lt. J. Irvine
 White, 2/Lt. L. H.
 Woodroffe, 2/Lt. F. G.
 Wreford, 2/Lt. W. J.

                               _Missing:_

 Elliott, 2/Lt. F. W.


                            CASUALTIES 1917.

                          156th Brigade, R.F.A.

 _Officers:_                         _Other Ranks:_
   Killed                          6   Killed                      65[2]
   Wounded                        16   Wounded                    281[2]
   Missing                         —   Missing                         —
                                 ———                                 ———
        Total                     22                                 346

                          162nd Brigade, R.F.A.

 _Officers:_                         _Other Ranks:_
   Killed..                        7   Killed..                       62
   Wounded                        22   Wounded                       313
   Missing..                       —   Missing..                       2
                                 ———                                 ———
        Total                     29                                 377

             GRAND TOTAL             Officer Casualties               51

                                     Other Ranks do.                 723

Footnote 2:

  Not quite complete.

                          Officer Casualties.

                               _Killed:_

 Barlow, 2/Lt. C. G. (156th).
 Barton, 2/Lt. V. A. (162nd).
 Beerbohm, Capt. C. (156th).
 Bostock, 2/Lt. N. S. (162nd).
 Dean, 2/Lt. G. F. (162nd).
 Fitch, 2/Lt. D. (162nd).
 Grant, 2/Lt. N. (156th).
 Heape, Capt. B. R. (162nd).
 Johnson, Lt.-Col. A. G. (D.A.C.).
 Lutyens, 2/Lt. C. J. (156th).
 Neate, 2/Lt. A. B. (162nd).
 Rhodes, Capt. H. (D.A.C.).
 Tucker, 2/Lt. A. R. (162nd).
 Vickers, 2/Lt. R. (162nd).
 Wheatley, 2/Lt. E. R. (156th).
 Wimbush, 2/Lt. E. T. (D.A.C.).

                               _Wounded:_

 Barstow, Major W. A. T. (156th).
 Beadle, 2/Lt. F. W. (156th).
 Beal, 2/Lt. S. N. (162nd).
 Benett-Stanford, Major V. (162nd).
 Body, Capt. M. M. I. (162nd).
 Bloor, 2/Lt. C. A. (156th).
 Bunbury, Capt. T. St. P. (162nd).
 Chapman, 2/Lt. J. G. J. (162nd).
 Colfox, Major W. P. (162nd).
 Cunis, Lt. V. W. (162nd).
 Donovan, 2/Lt. E. T. G. (162nd).
 Edwards, 2/Lt. H. R. (162nd).
 Escott, 2/Lt. H. J. (162nd).
 Hanna, 2/Lt. P. R. (156th).
 Hannaford, 2/Lt. W. (162nd).
 Harrison, 2/Lt. W. E. (162nd).
 Howard, 2/Lt. L. M. (162nd).
 Kitchin, 2/Lt. E. J. H. (162nd).
 Lee, Major F. L. (162nd).
 Leigh, 2/Lt. R. (156th).
 MacDonald, 2/Lt. A. (156th).
 McEwan, 2/Lt. A. (156th).
 McLeod, 2/Lt. D. (156th).
 Molyneux, 2/Lt. H. P. (156th).
 Mousley, 2/Lt. (156th).
 Odhams, 2/Lt. R. C. (162nd).
 Oxley, Lt. B. L. (156th).
 Phipps, 2/Lt. H. E. (156th).
 Revels, 2/Lt. D. (156th).
 Sall, 2/Lt. B. (156th).
 Thompson, 2/Lt. H. A. (162nd).
 van Straubenzee, Capt. A. (162nd).
 Walker, Major C. H. (162nd).
 Whiting, 2/Lt. A. H. (D.A.C.)
 Willett, 2/Lt. S. W. (156th).
 Wingfield, 2/Lt. R. M. (156th).
 Two others—unknown.


                            CASUALTIES 1918.

                          156th Brigade, R.F.A.

 _Officers:_                         _Other Ranks:_
   Killed                       3[3] Killed               }  Lists
   Wounded                      7[3] Wounded              } unobtainable
   Missing                         2 Missing              }

                          162nd Brigade, R.F.A.

 _Officers:_                         _Other Ranks:_
   Killed                          2 Killed                           49
   Wounded                        21 Wounded..                       266
                                 ———                                 ———
        Total                     23 Total                           315

Footnote 3:

  Lists incomplete.

                          Officer Casualties.

                               _Killed:_

 Bruce, Lt. W. G. (156th).
 Bruce, 2/Lt. A. P. (156th).
 Butler, Lt.-Col. B. A. B. (156th).
 Essex, Lt. E. C. (162nd).
 Squire, 2/Lt. C. A. (162nd).

                               _Missing:_

 Blackwell, 2/Lt. K. R. (156th).
 Clow, 2/Lt. O. W. (156th).

                               _Wounded:_

 Barker, Major A. (156th).
 Bedford-Pim, Lt.-Col. G. (162nd).
 Coleman, Capt. G. (162nd).
 Cory, Major H. C. (162nd).
 Escott, 2/Lt. H. J. (162nd).
 Evans, 2/Lt. A. J. (162nd).
 Fetherston, Major G. (162nd).
 Garrod, Lt. R. G. (162nd).
 Gough, Lt. H. L. R. (162nd).
 Greig, 2/Lt. J. G. (156th).
 Groves, 2/Lt. F. E. S. (156th).
 Hadley, 2/Lt. P. A. S. (162nd).
 Herlihy, 2/Lt. W. (162nd).
 Lawson, 2/Lt. E. B. (156th).
 McNabb, 2/Lt. I. B. (162nd).
 Mitcheson, 2/Lt. J. C. (162nd).
 Paterson, Lt. B. S. McC. (162nd).
 Pavitt, Capt. and Adjt. R. H. (162nd).
 Phipps, 2/Lt. H. E. (156th).
 Rollason, 2/Lt. M. H. (162nd).
 Saunders, 2/Lt. G. (162nd).
 Skinner, Lt.-Col. E. J. (162nd).
 Tetlow, 2/Lt. (156th).
 Warren, Lt. F. D. (162nd).
 Williamson, Lt. G. W. (156th).
 Wimshurst, 2/Lt. T. E. (162nd).
 Two others—unknown.




                              APPENDIX II.


   A LIST OF THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS THE INFANTRY OF WHICH WERE COVERED
  BY THE GUNS OF THE 33RD DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS.

 _La Bassée._

 February—July, 1916                                      33rd Division.
                                                          39th Division.

 _Battle of the Somme._

 July—September, 1916                                      1st Division.
                                                           5th Division.
                                                           7th Division.
                                                          14th Division.
                                                          24th Division.
                                                          33rd Division.
                                                          51st Division.

 _Dainville, Hebuterne and the Battle of the Ancre._

 September—November, 1916                                 12th Division.
                                                          31st Division.
                                                          33rd Division.
                                                          35th Division.
                                                          49th Division.

 _The Somme._

 November, 1916—March, 1917                                4th Division.
                                                           8th Division.
                                                          33rd Division.
                                                          40th Division.

 _Battle of Arras._

 April—June, 1917                                      Cavalry Division.
                                                           3rd Division.
                                                           4th Division.
                                                           9th Division.
                                                          12th Division.
                                                          15th Division.
                                                          17th Division.
                                                          29th Division.
                                                          37th Division.

 _Hindenburg Line and the Coast._

 June—August, 1917                                        49th Division.
                                                          50th Division.
                                                          66th Division.

 _Battles of Ypres and Passchendaele._

 September—November, 1917                                  5th Division.
                                                           7th Division.
                                                          17th Division.
                                                          23rd Division.
                                                          24th Division.
                                                          33rd Division.

 _Passchendaele._

 December, 1917—April, 1918                               33rd Division.
                                                          50th Division.

 _German Flanders Offensive, Kemmel._

 April—August, 1918                                        6th Division.
                                                           9th Division.
                                                          19th Division.
                                                          33rd Division.
                                                          49th Division.
                                                   28th French Division.
                                                   44th French Regiment.
                                                   46th French Regiment.
                                                 30th American Division.

 _British Final Offensive, 3rd Army._

 September—November, 1918                                 17th Division.
                                                          21st Division.
                                                          33rd Division.
                                                          38th Division.




                             APPENDIX III.


            THE VARIOUS SECTORS OF THE BATTLE-LINE IN FRANCE
                             AND FLANDERS.

      Together with the Official Names of the Battles in which the
                  33rd Divisional Artillery took part.

     Period.             Sector.                    Battles.

 Dec. 1915—July   La Bassée.             (Holding the line.)
   1916,

                  Givenchy-Cuinchy.

 July—Sept. 1916. The Somme.             The Battles of the Somme 1916:

                  High Wood-Delville       (i.) Battle of Bazentin
                    Wood.                  Ridge.

                                           (ii.) Battle of Delville
                                           Wood.

                                           (iii.) Attacks on High Wood.

                                           (iv.) Battle of Guillemont.

 Sept.—Nov. 1916. Dainville.             (Holding the line.)

                  Hebuterne-Gommecourt.  The Battle of the Ancre 1916.

 Dec. 1916—Mar.   Bouchavesnes-Clery-    (Holding the line.)
   1917.            sur-Somme.

 April—June 1917. Arras.                 The Battles of Arras 1917:

                  Feuchy-Monchy.           (i.) First Battle of the
                                           Scarpe 1917.

                                           (ii.) Second Battle of the
                                           Scarpe 1917.

                                           (iii.) Battle of Arleux.

                                           (iv.) Third Battle of the
                                           Scarpe 1917.

                                           (_a_) Capture of Roeux.

 June—July 1917.  Cherisy-Bullecourt.    (Holding the line.)


 July—August      Nieuport.              (Preparation for an offensive.)
   1917.

 Sept.—Nov. 1917. Ypres Salient.           (i.) Battle of the Menin Road
                                           Ridge.

                  Reutel-Gheluvelt.        (ii.) Battle of Polygon Wood.

                                           (iii.) Battle of Broodseinde.

                                           (iv.) Battle of Poelcappelle.

                                           (v.) First Battle of
                                           Passchendaele.

                                           (vi.) Second Battle of
                                           Passchendaele.

 Dec. 1917—April  Ypres Salient.
   1918.

                  Passchendaele.         (Holding the line.)

 April—August     Ypres Salient.         The Battles of the Lys:
   1918.

                  Mt. Kemmel.              (i.) Battle of Messines 1918.

                                           (ii.) Battle of Bailleul.

                                           (iii.) First Battle of Kemmel
                                           Ridge.

                                           (iv.) Second Battle of Kemmel
                                           Ridge.

                                           (v.) Battle of the
                                           Scherpenberg.


 Sept.—Nov. 1918. Third Army.            The Battles of the Hindenburg
                                           Line:

                  Peizière—Bertry—         (i.) Battle of Epehy.

                    Englefontaine—         (ii.) Battle of the St.
                                           Quentin Canal.

                    Forêt de Mormal—       (iii.) Battle of the
                                           Beaurevoir Line.

                    Wattignies.            (iv.) Battle of Cambrai 1918.

                                         The Battle of the Selle.

                                         The Battle of Valenciennes.

                                         The Battle of the Sambre.




                                 INDEX.


 Abraham Heights, 129, 144, 145.

 Adinfer Wood, 105.

 Adinkerke, 106, 109.

 Aiguille Ravine, 68.

 Ailly-sur-Somme, 24, 62.

 Airaines, 61, 62, 65, 68.

 Aire, 6, 7.

 Air Service, German, 16.

 Albert, 174, 176.

 Aldershot, 183.

 Allaines, 71.

 Alquines, 135.

 Amerval, 184.

 Amesbury, 4, 6.

 Amiens, 24.

 Ammunition supply, 15.

 Amplier, 106.

 Ancre, The, 56, 57, 60, 61, 174.

 Anderlu Wood, 65.

 Annequin, 8, 10, 15.

 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (2nd), 75.

 Arleux-en-Gohelle, 91.

 Armagh Wood, 129, 134.

 Armentières, 147.

 Arouves, 24.

 Arras, 37, 53-56, 77, 78, 80-82, 85-87, 89, 98-100, 194, 195.

 Asylum (Ypres), 143.

 Athies, 82.

 Aubencheul, 180, 181.

 Auchy, 10-13, 18.

 Authieule, 106.

 Avesnes, 192.

 Avesnes-le-Comte, 176.

 Avre, River, 174.


 Bailleul, 147.

 Baird, Brig.-General, 72.

 Bapaume, 99, 100.

 Barker, Major, 157-159.

 Barkworth, Major, 11.

 Barnes, Major, 195.

 Barstow, Captain, 11;
   Major, 69, 70, 131, 195.

 Bartholomew, Lieut., 148.

 Basket Wood, 180, 181.

 Bas Loquin, 135.

 Bass Wood, 119.

 Bathurst, Lady, 3.

 Battery Valley, 89, 98.

 Baudimont Gate, 81.

 Bavai, 188.

 Bavinchove, 135.

 Bayonet Trench, 90, 91.

 Bazentin, 26, 28, 30-32, 35, 40, 43.

 Beaumont-Hamel, 61.

 Beaurains, 99-100, 103.

 Beaurevoir, 180, 181.

 Becordel, 25.

 Bedford House, 125, 131.

 Belgian Battery Corner, 138.

 Belgrave, Major, 57, 70, 74.

 Belloy-sur-Somme, 69.

 Benett-Stanford, Lieut. V., 43;
   Major, 70, 90, 195.

 Bennet, Lieut. C. H., 153, 161.

 Bennett, Major W. P., 10, 26, 195.

 Bergues, 106.

 Berguette, 7.

 Bertry, 182, 183, 188, 196.

 Béthune, 10, 13.

 Beugnies, Bois de, 192.

 Beuvry, 10, 16.

 Black Watch Corner, 119.

 Blackwell, Lieut., 159.

 Blane, Brig.-General C. F., 11, 62, 65, 68, 70, 77, 195.

 Blangy, 80, 81, 83, 85, 86.

 Blangy-Tronville, 196.

 Bluff, The, 13.

 Body, Lieut. M. M. I., 46;
   Captain, 90;
   Major, 152, 160.

 Boeschepe, 125.

 Boiry St. Martin, 105.

 Boiry St. Rictrude, 100.

 Bois du Sars, 89.

 Bois Grenier, 147.

 Bonnay, 50, 52.

 Bostin Farm, 145.

 Bostock, Lieut., 90.

 Bouchavesnes, 62, 65, 68-70, 194.

 Boulogne, 55, 138.

 Bouquemaison, 176.

 Bout de la Ville, 142.

 Bouvelinghem, 135.

 Boyce, Lieut.-Colonel, C. E., 189.

 Boyelles, 100.

 Braddell Castle, 12.

 Bray-sur-Somme, 64.

 Brickstacks, The, 13, 14.

 Bridges, Major, 61.

 Brocourt-Liomer, 196.

 Bruce, Lieut., 152, 195.

 Brynhild Line, 191.

 Bulford, 3, 7, 26.

 Bullecourt, 88, 91, 93, 102, 103.

 Bunbury, Captain, 37.

 Burgomaster Farm, 121.

 Bury Cottages, 132, 133.

 Bus, 176.

 Buscourt, 70.

 Busseboom, 140, 154.

 Butler, Lieut.-Colonel, 81, 114, 127, 130, 138, 141, 148, 153-155, 157-
    159, 163, 187, 195.

 Byng, General, 174, 181, 185.

 Byron Farm, 152.


 Camberwell, 11, 197.

 Camberwell, Mayor of, 3.

 Cambrai, 61, 80, 84, 87.

 Cambrin, 8, 10, 12, 51, 194.

 Cameron Covert, 128, 130.

 Cameron Highlanders, 48.

 Cameron House, 119.

 Camp 14, 62, 64.

 Camp 21, 64, 65, 69.

 Canada Corner, 154.

 Canal de l'Escaut, 179.

 Canteleux, 12.

 Cardonette, 24.

 Carlisle Farm, 119.

 Carrell, Major, 143, 153.

 Cassel, 111, 135.

 Caterpillar Valley, 26, 33, 39, 41.

 Caterpillar Wood, 26, 28, 31, 33, 35, 38, 40, 41.

 Chapter Wood, 72.

 Cheapside, 153, 164.

 Chemical Works, 89, 93, 95.

 Cherisy, 93, 104.

 Chocques, 23.

 Clapham Junction, 115.

 Clary, 182, 183, 196.

 Clery-sur-Somme, 65, 70, 72, 74, 174.

 Clifford Rest Camp, 168.

 Coast, The, 104, 106, 146.

 Coffin, Captain, 10, 17.

 Colfox, Major, 96, 105.

 Comines, 170.

 Compiègne, Forest of, 192.

 Contalmaison, 28.

 Corbie, 24, 62.

 Corons de Maron, 12.

 Cory, Major, 125, 143, 152, 161, 195.

 Couin, 58, 61.

 Coxyde Bains, 106, 107, 109, 110.

 Crawford Crater, 178.

 Crest Farm, 139, 142.

 Crevecoeur, 196.

 Croix, 186, 187.

 Cuinchy, 11, 18, 21, 51.


 Dainville, 54-56.

 Daours, 24.

 Dead Man's House, 12.

 Debeney, General, 178, 181.

 De Drie Goen Farm, 164.

 Delville Wood, 28-30, 36-40, 44, 46, 48, 49, 194.

 Denain, 185.

 Dernancourt, 40.

 De St. Paule, Commandant, 70.

 Desinet Farm, 155, 157.

 Deverell, Major-General, 98.

 Devil's Trench, 93, 94, 96, 97.

 Dickebusch, 111, 120, 121, 133-135, 158, 165.

 Divisional Ammunition Column, 8, 46, 62, 111, 114, 125, 195.

 Dormy House, 125.

 Doullens, 54, 106, 176.

 Dourlers, 192.

 Douvrin, 13.

 Drake, General, 3.

 Dranoutre, 148, 150.

 Duck's Bill, 20, 21.

 Duisans, 81, 82.

 Dumbarton Lakes, 115.

 Dumbarton Wood, 119.

 Dump, The, 12.

 Duncan, Major, 1, 11.

 Dunkirk, 106, 109.

 Durie, Major, 106.

 Dust, Captain, 69.


 East Yorks. Regiment (15th), 103.

 Eclusier, 69.

 Ecuelin, 192.

 Elliott, Lieut., 31.

 Elnes, 143.

 Englefontaine, 187-190.

 Equancourt, 177.

 Escott, Lieut., 161.

 Estrée-Blanche, 10.

 Evett Copse, 178.


 Falfemont Farm, 47.

 Fampoux, 82.

 Fetherston, Captain, 38, 40;
   Major, 70, 81, 143, 152, 160, 172, 177, 195.

 Feuchy, 82, 84, 87, 88, 95.

 Feuchy Chapel, 87.

 Feuillaucourt, 71, 74.

 Feuillières, 70, 72.

 Fitzclarence Farm, 119.

 Flatiron Copse, 30, 31.

 Flers, 32, 44.

 Foch, Maréchal, 174.

 Fonquevillers, 56, 57.

 Fontaine-lez-Croisilles, 102-104.

 Forest, 185, 186, 196.

 Fosse 8, 8, 12.

 Fosse Wood, 112, 115, 129.

 Fouquereuil, 23.

 Four Hundred, The, 12.

 Franque Wood, 180, 181.

 Freckles Wood, 71.

 Fred's Wood, 83.

 French, Field-Marshal Lord, 8.

 Fresnoy, 93.

 Frevent, 176.

 Frezenburg, 141, 143, 146.

 Fricourt, 26, 28.

 Frise, 69.


 Gallie, Captain, 139, 141, 195.

 Gallipoli, 111.

 Garrod, Lieut., 153, 161.

 Gauche Wood, 176.

 Gaudiempré, 55, 56.

 Geleide Post, 110.

 Gheluvelt, 115, 119, 122, 123, 125-128, 130-133.

 G.H.Q. Reserve, 68.

 Ghyvelde, 106, 111.

 Ginchy, 28, 44-48.

 Givenchy, 8, 10-12, 18, 20, 147, 194.

 Godewaersvelde, 145.

 Godizonne Farm, 157.

 Goed Moet Mill, 164.

 Goff, Colonel A. H. S., 11, 31, 195.

 Goff, Lieut.-Colonel L. T., 40, 195.

 Goldfish Château, 138, 143, 145, 170-172.

 Gommecourt, 55-57, 194.

 Gordon's Brewery, 3.

 Gorre, 8.

 Gough, Lieut.-General Sir Hubert, 8.

 Gouzeaucourt, 174, 176.

 Grand Dune, 107.

 Gravenstafel, 129, 139-141, 143.

 Greenland Hill, 89, 93, 97.

 Groenendyk, 108.

 Groenen Jager, 170.

 Groves, Lieut.-Colonel, 114, 125.

 Guarbecque, 7, 23.

 Guards Grenadier Regiment, German, 75.

 Guillemont, 28, 44, 47.


 Haandehote, 173.

 Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas, 98, 167.

 Haisnes, 13, 17.

 Hall, Major Frederick, 1;
   Lieut.-Colonel, 11, 195.

 Halle, 71.

 Hallebast Corner, 125, 152, 154, 155, 165.

 Hamblain, 94.

 Hamelincourt, 100, 102.

 Harfleur, 7.

 Harley Street, 16, 17.

 Harpur, Lieut.-Colonel, 11.

 Harris, Lieut.-Colonel, 11, 41, 43, 44, 48, 54, 70, 74, 77, 81, 98,
    195.

 Hatchet Wood, 89.

 Haute Planque, 135.

 Havrincourt Wood, 174.

 Hazebrouck, 6, 106.

 Heads, Captain, 191, 195.

 Heape, Captain, 95, 195.

 Hebuterne, 56-59, 194.

 Heidebeke, 173.

 Heninel, 102, 104.

 Henin-sur-Cojeul, 102, 104.

 Herenthage Château, 119.

 Herold's Institute, 3.

 Hersfeld Trench, 74.

 Heudecourt, 176.

 Highland Light Infantry (9th), 20, 72.

 High Wood, 26, 28-32, 34, 36-38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 49, 194.

 Hill 44 (Ypres), 157, 158, 163.

 Hill, Major, 121, 131, 143, 145, 195.

 Hindenburg Line, 61, 74, 75, 99, 100, 102, 103, 174.

 Hohenzollern Redoubt, 15.

 Honnecourt, 177, 180, 181.

 Hornoy, 196.

 Horse Show, 105.

 Hospital Wood, 65, 66.

 Houtkerque, 168, 173.

 Howitzer Wood, 70.

 Hulluch, 15.


 Indian Well House, 13.

 Infantry Hill, 97.

 Inval Boiron, 196.


 Jean, P. C., 70.

 Jervis, Major, 141.

 Jigsaw Wood, 89.

 Joffre, General, 8.

 John Copse, 57, 60.

 Johnson, Colonel, 195.

 Johnston, Major, 37, 41, 45, 195.

 Joist Farm, 123, 130.

 Jones, Major, 141, 153.

 Juniper Cottages, 126.

 Jut Farm, 123.


 Kansas Cross, 139, 145.

 Keeling Copse, 92.

 Kemmel, 148, 150-155, 157, 158, 160, 163, 194.

 Kemmel Beek, 152, 155, 157.

 King's Clere, 10, 12, 195.

 King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (9th), 157-160, 163.

 Kruisstraathoek, 165.


 La Bassée, 8, 13, 18, 21, 22, 30, 98.

 La Bassée Canal, 10, 11.

 La Bassée Road, 12.

 La Clytte, 134, 158, 159, 163, 164.

 La Fayte, 182.

 La Grande Pature, 191.

 La Louverie Farm, 60.

 La Lovie, 172.

 Langemarck, 139, 143.

 La Nieppe, 135, 143.

 Lankhof Château, 169.

 La Panne, 109.

 La Pannerie Wood, 181.

 Larkhill, 3.

 La Terrière, 180, 181.

 Le Bas, 142.

 Le Buisson, 135.

 Le Cateau, 183, 185.

 Lee, Major, 131, 143, 152, 160, 161, 169.

 Le Forest, 65.

 Le Gros, Commandant, 70.

 Le Havre, 6, 7, 196, 197.

 Le Mesge, 24, 196.

 Le Quesnoy, 189.

 Les Briques, 12.

 Lesdain, 196.

 Les Tranchées, 180.

 Le Transloy, 176.

 Lewis House, 128, 132, 133.

 Lille, 71.

 Lille Gate, 112.

 Lillers, 6, 23.

 Limberlost Wood, 71, 76.

 Lindenhoek, 151.

 Littlejohn, Captain, 69.

 Lloyd, Major-General Sir Francis, 3.

 Locre, 154.

 Lombardzyde, 109, 110.

 Lomer, Captain, 30, 70.

 Lone Farm, 12, 13.

 Longueau, 24.

 Longueval, 28-30, 33, 35-38, 44, 45.

 Loos, 8, 13.

 Lutyens, Captain, 30;
   Major, 81, 195.

 Lys, 165.


 MacCullock, Lieut.-Colonel, 157, 163, 164.

 Mad Point, 11, 20.

 Maison Rouge, 12.

 Malincourt, 181, 182.

 Mametz, 26, 33, 35, 39.

 Manancourt, 196.

 Manchester Regiment, 96.

 Maple Copse, 112, 115, 129, 131, 134.

 Maricourt, 64, 65, 69.

 Marrières, 65, 72.

 Marriott, Lieut.-Colonel, 132.

 Martinpuich, 29, 30, 36.

 Maubeuge, 192.

 Maurepas, 44, 62, 65.

 Mazinghem, 7.

 McDonald, Lieut., 152.

 Méaulte, 25, 196.

 Meetcheele, 139, 142.

 Menin Gate, 112, 136, 143.

 Menin Road, 121-123, 125.

 Merck St. Lievin, 142.

 Messines, 147.

 Meteren, 150.

 Middlesex (1st), 169, 170, 178, 186.

 Millekruisse, 152, 154, 155, 164.

 Moislains, 68.

 Monchy-le-Preux, 87-90, 102.

 Montauban, 26, 29, 33, 35, 39, 41, 43.

 Montay, 183, 184, 186.

 Mont Bernanchon, 7, 23.

 Montbrehain, 180.

 Montenescourt, 53.

 Mont St. Quentin, 70, 71.

 Moorslede, 140, 143.

 Mormal Forest, 189-191.

 Mortho Wood, 181.

 Mountain House, 10, 12.

 Murray, Lieut.-Colonel, 47.


 Namur, 192.

 Naval Division, 186.

 Neate, Lieut., 90.

 Neuve Église, 147, 148.

 Neuville, 50, 52.

 Neuvilly, 183.

 Nevinson, Colonel, 70.

 New Zealand Field Artillery, 50.

 Nicholson, Brig.-General G. H. W., 172, 188, 195.

 Nieuport, 70, 106, 108-110, 194.

 Norton, Lieut., 154.

 Nurlu, 71.


 Observatory Ridge, 84.

 Oppy, 93.

 Orange Hill, 85, 87, 89, 90.

 Order of Battle, 9, 19, 27, 54, 63, 73, 79, 101, 113, 137, 149, 175.

 Ostend, 107, 108, 110.

 Otto Farm, 139, 141, 143.

 Ouderdom, 154, 158, 162, 164.

 Oudezeele, 142.

 Ovillers, 184, 186.


 Packham, Captain, 10.

 Paris, 71.

 Parrot Camp, 150.

 Passchendaele, 37, 111, 115, 136, 139, 140, 143, 150, 165, 194, 195.

 Paterson, Lieut.-Colonel, 150.

 Paul Jacques Farm, 187.

 Pavitt, Captain, 148, 162, 195.

 Paynter, Lieut.-Colonel, 146.

 Peake, Colonel, 3.

 Peckham Tramway Depôt, 3.

 Peizière, 176, 177, 179.

 Pekly Bulge, 74, 75.

 Pelican Ridge, 110.

 Pelves, 89, 91, 92, 94.

 Péronne, 71, 77, 174.

 Perrott, Major-General Sir T., 3.

 Peselhoek, 146.

 Petit Houvain, 176.

 Phipps, Lieut., 157.

 Picquigny, 24, 62, 196.

 Pigeon Trench, 177, 179.

 Pim, Lieut.-Colonel, 189.

 Plateau Siding, 68.

 Ploegsteert Wood, 147.

 Plumer, General Sir Herbert, 169.

 Poezelhoek, 128.

 Point, The, 57, 59.

 Poix-du-Nord, 185, 187-189.

 Polderhoek Château, 115, 123, 124, 126, 128-130.

 Polygon Beek, 126, 129.

 Polygon de Zonnebeke, 122.

 Pont Fixe, 10.

 Pont Noyelles, 196.

 Poperinghe, 140, 141, 146, 148, 164, 168, 169.

 Pot de Vin, 191.

 Potijze Château, 138, 141, 144.

 Pozières, 28.

 Pringle, Major, 104.

 Proven, 168, 173.

 Puisieux, 57, 58, 60.


 Railway Triangle, 12, 17, 83-89.

 Rancourt, 72, 74.

 Rawlinson, General Sir H., 174, 181.

 Rebreuviette, 176.

 Reigate Farm, 132.

 Renescure, 143.

 Reninghelst, 111, 121, 134, 154, 162, 164.

 Reorganisation of Divisional Artillery, 17, 53, 69.

 Reutel, 120, 126, 128, 129.

 Reutelbeek, 120, 122, 128, 130.

 Rhodes, Captain, 195.

 Ribaumet, 190.

 Richards, Major, 104.

 Richemont, 186, 187.

 Ridge View, 12.

 Ridge Wood, 153, 157, 165, 169, 170.

 Riencourt, 88, 196.

 Rietveld, 143.

 Rifle Trench, 90, 91.

 Rochfort-Boyd, Lieut.-Colonel, 11, 43, 61, 195.

 Roeux, 89, 90, 93, 95-97.

 Rossignol Wood (Arras), 56.

 Rossignol Wood (Kemmel), 150, 155, 161.

 Rouziers, Commandant, 70.

 Royal Sussex Regiment (17th), 92.

 Royal Welsh Fusiliers (2nd), 20, 21.

 Royal Welsh Fusiliers (17th), 188.

 Roziere, 176.

 Ruin, The, 12.

 Running-out Springs, 35.

 Russell, Captain, 30.

 Ryan's Keep, 17.


 Sailly-au-Bois, 55-59.

 Sailly-le-Sec, 72, 76.

 Sailly-Saillisel, 62.

 Sallieux, 24.

 Salvation Corner, 168.

 Sambre, River, 186, 189, 191, 194.

 Sanctuary Wood, 131, 134.

 Sarbaras, 190, 191.

 Sassegnies, 190.

 Scabbard Trench, 92.

 Scarpe, River, 80, 81, 83, 85, 87-91, 93, 95.

 Scheldt, River, 186.

 Scherpenberg, 154.

 Scherriabeek, 128, 130.

 Scottish Rifles (5th), 180.

 Scottish Wood, 169.

 Seine, River, 144.

 Selincourt, 196.

 Selle, River, 183-186.

 Serain, 181.

 Serre, 57, 60.

 Sheeres, Major, 187, 195.

 Shoeburyness, 3.

 Shrapnel Corner, 111, 125.

 Siege Farm, 153, 154, 157, 163.

 Siegfried Line, 174, 179, 181, 182, 191.

 Skindles, 141.

 Skinner, Lieut.-Colonel, 125, 128, 130, 138, 141, 148, 154, 155, 157,
    161, 163, 164, 195.

 Slaughter House, 186.

 Somme, River, 18, 20, 22, 23, 28, 38, 44, 47, 61, 66, 69-72, 76, 78,
    174, 194-196.

 Soues, 24.

 Southampton, 6, 197.

 Spanbroekmolen, 148, 155.

 Spanish Influenza, 188.

 Spotted Dog, 17.

 Squire, Lieut., 160.

 Stanley-Clarke, Lieut., 161.

 Steenvoorde, 121.

 Stewart, Lieut.-Colonel C. G., 43, 47, 53, 54, 69, 70;
   Brig.-General, 77, 98, 102, 106, 121, 125, 136, 150, 165, 172, 195.

 Stewart, Major D., 33, 40.

 Stewart, Brig.-Gen. D. B., 108.

 St. Hubertshoek, 125.

 St. Idesbalde, 109.

 St. Jean, 144.

 St. John's Wood, 3.

 St. Leger, 58, 61.

 St. Martin-sur-Cojeul, 104.

 St. Maulvis, 196.

 St. Nicholas, 81, 83.

 St. Pierre Vaast Wood, 68.

 Stuart, Brig.-General, 3.

 Studd, Captain, 11, 16, 30, 40;
   Major, 70, 81, 106, 141, 153, 158-160, 195.

 Suffolk Regiment (4th), 74.

 Suzanne, 64, 65.

 Switch Trench, 26, 29-31, 34, 35, 38, 48, 49.


 Talbot, Captain, 40;
   Major, 70, 195.

 Targelle Ravine, 177, 179.

 Taylor, Captain, 160;
   Major, 191, 195.

 Therouane, 10.

 Thiembronne, 142.

 Thiennes, 7.

 Thiepval, 47.

 Tilloy, 82, 83.

 Tilques, 142, 143, 145, 169.

 Tincourt, 196.

 Tor Top, 114.

 Tourbière Loop, 16.

 Touvert Farm, 60.

 Tower Hamlets, 119, 132.

 Trench Mortars, 71, 114, 125.

 Trescault, 174.

 Treux, 25.

 Trois Rois, 135.

 Troisvilles, 182-184.

 Tucker, Lieut., 95, 195.

 Tunnelling Company, 21.

 Turner, Lieut. J. R. B., 151, 195.


 United States Army, 171, 172, 183.


 Valenciennes, 185.

 Valley Cottages, 120.

 Van Issacker's Farm, 141.

 van Straubenzee, Captain, 41, 46;
   Major, 70, 195.

 Vaughan-Hughes, Major, 189.

 Vauxhall Bridge, 10.

 Vaux-sur-Somme, 62, 72, 76.

 Vaux Wood, 69.

 Vecquemont, 24, 62.

 Veldhoek, 119.

 Vendegies, 186, 187.

 Vendhuille, 181.

 Verbrandenmolen, 120.

 Verdun, 13.

 Vermelles 8, 11.

 Vierstraat, 148, 151, 153-155, 157, 158, 160, 163, 165.

 Villers Guislain, 178, 179.

 Villers Outreaux, 181, 182, 196.

 Vimy Ridge, 77, 80, 88.

 Violaines, 10, 12.

 Vlamertinghe, 138, 143, 146, 169-172.

 Voormezeele, 169, 170.


 Waayenburg, 173.

 Wagnonville, 185, 187-189.

 Wanquetin, 53, 55, 56.

 Warr, Captain, 195.

 Warren, Lieut.-Colonel, 189.

 Watery Wood, 83.

 Wattignies, 192, 193.

 Westende, 108.

 Wieltje, 139, 140, 144.

 Wilmot, Army Schoolmaster, 3.

 Wilson's House, 12.

 Windmill Cabaret, 139, 141-144.

 Wingfield, Lieut., 94.

 Winnezeele, 164-166.

 Wood Lane, 41-44, 47, 49.

 Woolwich, 3.

 Worcestershire Regiment (2nd), 21, 75, 169.

 Wytschaete, 148, 150-153, 155, 157.


 Ypres, 13, 18, 110-112, 115, 125, 134-136, 138, 141, 144, 169, 170,
    172, 173, 194.

 Yser, River, 108.


 Zandvoorde, 132.

 Zermezeele, 136, 143.

 Zevecoten, 164.

 Zillebeke, 111, 114, 115, 169, 170, 195.

 Zonnebeke, 139, 142-144.

 Zouave Wood, 131.

 Z, The, 57.

 Zuytpanne, 135.


 1st Army, 10, 93, 189.

 1st Corps, 7, 8, 10.

 1st Division, 41, 47, 48, 106, 111.

 1st French Army, 189.

 1st Indian Cavalry Division, 61.

 2nd Army Artillery School, 143.

 2nd Australian Division, 117.

 2nd Corps, 168.

 2nd Division, 8, 37.

 3rd Army, 54, 174, 178, 185, 189.

 3rd Corps, 34, 42, 44, 47.

 3rd Division, 28, 60, 83, 90, 93, 98.

 4th Army, 54, 174, 178, 185, 189.

 4th Corps, 174.

 4th Division, 70, 93.

 5th Army, 93.

 5th Australian Division, 123, 124.

 5th Corps, 174, 176, 186.

 5th Division, 34, 37, 126, 127, 129, 130.

 6th Corps, 83, 91.

 6th Division, 169, 170.

 7th Corps, 55-57, 83, 100.

 7th Division, 28, 44, 46, 131, 133.

 8th Division, 72, 74, 75.

 8th German Division, 172.

 9th Division, 28, 83, 88, 97, 154, 164, 165.

 11th German Division, 83.

 12th Division, 8, 10, 15, 54, 55, 83, 90, 91, 93, 178.

 13th Corps, 34, 38, 42, 57.

 14th Corps, 44, 47.

 14th Division, 41-46.

 15th Corps, 32, 34, 36, 38, 41, 42, 44, 47, 54, 106.

 15th Division, 78, 80, 83, 84, 90.

 16th Division, 15.

 17th Corps, 54, 56, 83.

 17th Division, 39, 55, 89, 90, 129, 130, 176, 177, 184.

 17th French Division, 70.

 19th Division, 34, 148, 150.

 20th French Corps, 62.

 21st Division, 32, 102, 106, 126-128, 176-178.

 23rd Division, 28, 114, 117, 119-121, 125, 126.

 24th Division, 46-48, 114.

 28th French Division, 154.

 29th Division, 88, 90, 168.

 29th French Regiment of Artillery, 70.

 30th Division, 165.

 30th French Regiment of Artillery, 70.

 30th U.S.A. Division, 171, 172.

 31st Division, 57, 60.

 33rd Division, 11, 15, 18, 23, 28, 29, 32, 33, 41, 42, 44-46, 62, 67,
    68, 75, 76, 102, 121-123, 125, 136, 139, 142, 143, 150, 169-172,
    177, 181, 185, 186, 188, 191, 197.

 34th Division, 90.

 35th Division, 54.

 37th Division, 54, 87, 88, 102, 127.

 38th Division, 176, 181, 185, 186, 188, 190-192.

 39th Division, 18, 122.

 40th Division, 62, 65, 68, 76.

 41st Division, 117, 119, 168.

 44th French Regiment, 168.

 46th Division, 55.

 46th French Regiment, 169, 170.

 47th French Regiment of Artillery, 168.

 48th Division, 57.

 49th Division, 57, 109, 164, 165, 168, 169.

 49th French Regiment of Artillery, 70.

 50th Division, 102, 103, 141-143.

 51st Division, 33, 34, 36, 40, 90.

 66th Division, 108, 109, 173.

 127th French Regiment of Artillery, 62, 64.




                          TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES


 1. Silently corrected simple spelling, grammar, and typographical
    errors.
 2. Retained anachronistic and non-standard spellings as printed.
 3. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.