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[Illustration: _Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek_]


THE CHINA OF CHIANG K'AI-SHEK:

A Political Study

by

PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

Duke University







Greenwood Press, Publishers
Westport, Connecticut

The Library of Congress has catalogued this publication as follows:
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony, 1913-1966.
The China of Chiang K'ai-shek; a political study.
Reprint of the 1943 ed. published by World Peace Foundation, Boston.
Includes bibliographical references.
1. China--Politics and government--1912-1949.
2. Chiang, Kai-shek, 1886-    .  I. Title.
DS774.L48 1973    320.9'51'042    73-725
ISBN 0-8371-6779-5

Copyright 1942 by World Peace Foundation
Originally published in 1943 by World Peace Foundation, Boston

Reprinted with the permission of World Peace Foundation
First Greenwood Reprinting 1973

Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number 73-725
ISBN 0-8371-6779-5

Printed in the United States of America




                             TO MY MOTHER

                              _With Love_




ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


Acknowledgments, for a work of this type, are always insufficient and
often ungracious. Today, political and military conditions forbid
mention of some of the persons to whom I am most indebted. Furthermore,
it is unfeasible to thank those teachers and friends who have prepared
me in years past for the present work. Nevertheless, courtesy and candor
demand that I indicate the extent of my obligation, and tender these
inadequate thanks.

For interviews, hospitality and other kindnesses shown me in Western
China I wish to thank Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek; Their
Excellencies, Sun K'ê, Yü Yu-jen, H. H. Kung, Wang Ch'ung-hui, Chang
Chia-ngau, T. F. Tsiang, Yeh Ch'u-tsang, Kan Nai-kuang, Ch'ên Kuo-fu,
Wang Shih-chieh, Ch'u Chia-hua, Hollington Tong, and Ma Chao-chun; Major
Generals J. L. Huang and Ch'u Shih-ming; Bishop Paul Yu-pin; and Messrs.
Foo Ping-shêng, Chên Ming-shu, Lo Chia-lun, Edward Bing-shuey Lee, Han
Lih-wu, P. C. Kuo, Ch'ên Chih-mai, Kinn-wei Shaw, James Y. C. Yen, Wang
Shen-tsu, Shuming T. Liu, Jen Shieh, Li Ch'in-shui, and Ma P'in-ho.
Among the foreign community, I wish to thank the American Ambassador,
Mr. Nelson Johnson, and Mr. E. F. Drumwright for their kind reception;
and to thank Mr. Tillman Durdin, Mr. Theodore White, Mr. George Fitch,
Dr. J. B. Tayler, Professor Frank Price, and Professor and Mrs. J. B.
Slocum.

I feel myself peculiarly fortunate in having three such good, loyal
friends as Drs. Chu Djang, Miao Chung-yi, and Yin Pao-yü, whose
kindnesses to me have continued ever since our student days together at
the Johns Hopkins.

Dean Shen Ch'un-lu, Mr. Tso T'ao-fên and their associates in the
National Salvation movement; Colonel Ch'in Po-k'u of the Communist
Party; Mr. Chang Peh-chuen of the Third Party; Dr. Carson Chang of the
National Socialist Party, and other spokesmen for minority and
unofficial groups were most generous with their time and information.

Messrs. You Shoo-tseng, Yang Chun, Wu Hsüeh-ping, Hawthorne Chen and
others translated Chinese materials for or with me. Save for their help,
so liberally and painstakingly rendered, this book would have been
delayed for months if not years. These gentlemen are not to be held
responsible for the selection of materials, nor for the translations in
their present form, since I have sought to check and revise this work as
far as time and my imperfect command of written Chinese have permitted.

The International Peace Campaign (China Branch), The People's Foreign
Relations Association, The Chinese-American Institute for Cultural
Relations, and other institutions in Free China were generous with their
hospitality and facilities. I owe particular thanks to the Central Bank
of China for the high courtesy shown me through the Chief Secretary and
the following gentlemen: Mr. T. T. Wang, Chief of the Engineering
Division; Mr. Ch'ên Yin-sung, Manager, Kiating Branch; and Mr. Yang
Hsia-tz'ŭ, Manager, Chengtu Branch. The officers of the Bank went to
enormous pains to ensure my timely, safe return to Chungking when I was
ill, hurried, tardy, and in danger of missing my prearranged bookings
back to America. Special acknowledgment must also be offered to Mr. C.
C. Chi, for his unfailing kindness in providing interviews and trips,
and to the China National Aviation Corporation for their unusual
courtesies.

In Hong Kong, I was assisted by Dr. Eugene Chen, Dr. Wên Yüan-ning, Dr.
Ch'en Han-seng, and Mr. Liu Yu-wan.

In Shanghai, Mr. T. Nakada of the Japanese consulate-general was most
helpful.

In Nanking, Messrs. Wên Chung-yao, Kiang Kang-hu, Tsu Min-yi, Lin
Pai-shêng, Li Shêng-wu, Hsü Liang, George Wên, P. C. Huang, T'ang
Leang-li, K. S. James Woo and L. K. Kentwell were most hospitable. Mr.
M. Kimura, of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking, was kind and courteous. I
wish to thank these gentlemen for their friendliness to an alien scholar
who had just come from the other side of the war.

In Tokyo, Messrs. Yokachiro Suma, Yoji Hirota, Kaneo Tsuchida, and Nobuo
Fujimura of the Foreign Office were hospitable and informative.

Mr. Robert Kempton, Mr. George Giffen, and Dr. Louis Wilkinson showed me
great kindness on my journey.

In the United States, I am indebted for introductions and advice to Dr.
Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador; Professor George Taylor, of the
University of Washington; and Mr. Frederick V. Field, of the American
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

My colleagues and friends at Duke University have been very helpful.
Professors Homer Dubs and Paul H. Clyde, my colleagues in the Far
Eastern field, read the manuscript and made invaluable suggestions;
Professor Dubs' command of Chinese has saved me from many predicaments.
Professor Robert R. Wilson has been unfailing in his encouragement,
sympathetic interest, and facilitation of my plans.

The Duke University Research Council has assisted me with annual grants
for the collections of documentary materials on Chinese politics. Save
for this, I have received no financial aid or subsidy from any
institution, person, or government whatever.

Mr. J. C. Yang, Mr. and Mrs. R. E. Hosack, Mrs. Freda Townsend, and Mrs.
Margaret Linebarger have assisted me with manuscripts and proof.

I wish to thank the Director, Dr. S. Shepard Jones, and the staff of the
World Peace Foundation for their patience, and helpfulness during the
preparation of this work for the press. Miss Marie J. Carroll has been
especially helpful.

All opinions and statements herein expressed are my own, unless clearly
indicated as quotation. These acknowledgments are a record of thanks. I
assume sole and complete responsibility for the contents of this book.

                                                           P. M. A. L.
  _Durham, North Carolina
  March 31, 1941_




WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

[Illustration: Logo]

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_Board of Trustees_

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The World Peace Foundation is a non-profit organization which was
founded in 1910 by Edwin Ginn, the educational publisher, for the
purpose of promoting peace, justice and good-will among nations. For
many years the Foundation has sought to increase public understanding of
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actual problems of policy.




CONTENTS


  _Frontispiece_--Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek
                                                                  PAGE
  INTRODUCTION                                                       1

      The Chinese Political Inheritance: Some Continuing Aspects     1

      China at the Outbreak of War                                   6

      The Beginning of Active Hostilities                           11

      The Hankow Period                                             15

      The Chungking Period                                          19

  I. THE CONSTITUTION                                               21

      The _Yüeh-fa_ of 1931                                         22

      The Draft Permanent or Double Five Constitution               25

      The Issue of Constitutional Change                            31

  II. THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT               41

      The Five-Power Constitution                                   42

      The Supreme National Defense Council                          46

      The President of the National Government                      52

      The Council of State                                          53

      The Executive _Yüan_                                          56

      The Military Affairs Commission                               60

      The Judicial, Legislative, Examination and Control _Yüan_     65

  III. CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS                       69

      The People's Political Council                                69

      The Administrative Pattern                                    79

      The Political Ministries                                      81

      Social and Cultural Agencies                                  83

      The Economic Ministries                                       85

  IV. PROVINCIAL, LOCAL, AND SPECIAL-AREA GOVERNMENT                98

      Chart on Provincial and Urban Government               facing 98

      The Provinces                                                 99

      Local Government                                             103

      The Communist Zone                                           111

      Guerrilla Governments                                        116

  V. THE KUOMINTANG                                                124

      The Party Constitutional System                              125

      Party Organization                                           129

      The Kuomintang Bid for Leadership                            140

      Intra-Kuomintang Politics                                    142

      The New Life Movement and Other Affiliates                   149

  VI. THE COMMUNIST AND MINOR PARTIES                              159

      The Chinese Communists: Party and Leaders                    160

      Communism: Patriotism or Betrayal?                           171

      The National Salvation Movement                              175

      The Third Party                                              178

      The Chinese National Socialist Party                         179

      Social Democrats and _La Jeunesse_                           181

  VII. GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS OF THE JAPANESE AND PRO-JAPANESE     183

      The Japanese Army as a Chinese Government                    185

      The Problem of Puppet States                                 188

      The Provisional and Reformed Governments                     192

      The Reorganized National Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei       197

  VIII. EXTRA-POLITICAL FORCES                                     211

      The Foundations of Chinese Government                        212

      Mass Education                                               214

      Rural Reconstruction                                         218

      The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives                          223

      Unorganized Pressure                                         234

  IX. SUN YAT-SEN AND CHIANG K'AI-SHEK                             239

      Sun Yat-sen                                                  240

      The _San Min Chu I_                                          250

      Chiang K'ai-shek                                             254

      Chinese Appraisals of Chiang                                 266

      The Ideology of Chiang                                       269

  CONCLUSION                                                       273

      The Chief Alternatives in China                              274

      The United States in Chinese Politics                        277

  APPENDICES
                                                                  PAGE
  APPENDIX I: GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS                                 283

      A. The Government Draft of the Proposed Constitution         283

      B. The System of Organization of the National Congress       300

      C. Act of the Legislative _Yüan_, April 31, XXVI (1937)
         Governing the Election of Representatives to the
         National Congress                                         302

      D. The Program of Resistance and Reconstruction              309

      E. An Outline of War-time Controlment                        313

      F. A Chart of the Control _Yüan_ from July 1937 to June
         1940                                                      318

      G. Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Various
         Classifications of _Hsien_                                324

      H. A Chart of Government Organization                 facing 330

  APPENDIX II: DOCUMENTS ON PARTY POLITICS                         331

      A. A Chart on Kuomintang Organization                 facing 331

      B. Constitution of the _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps, Year
         XXVII (1938)                                              331

      C. The Duties and General Activities of the _San Min Chu I_
         Youth Corps (Ch'ên Ch'êng)                                340

      D. The _Hsiao-tsu_ (Small Group) Training Program            354

      E. Party Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party         359

  APPENDIX III: MATERIALS ON POLICY                                371

      A. Reply to Questions (Chiang K'ai-shek)                     371

      B. What I Mean by Action, or A Philosophy of Action (Chiang
         K'ai-shek)                                                373

      C. Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization
         of the Various Classifications of _Hsien_ (Chiang
         K'ai-shek)                                                388

         Chart on _Hsien_ Classifications                   facing 388

      D. A Discussion of Mao Tsê-tung's Comments on the Present
         State of International Relations (Ch'ên Kuo-hsin)         403

      E. China's Long-range Diplomatic Orientation (Wang
         Ch'ung-hui)                                               418

  GLOSSARY                                                         423

  INDEX                                                            435




INTRODUCTION


The National Government of the Republic of China, located at the
auxiliary capital of Chungking, is one of the most important governments
in contemporary world affairs. It has provided fairly effective
unification for the largest nation on earth, and has fought a great
power to a standstill.

The present work is an analysis of this government. Not a biography of
Chiang K'ai-shek, it is instead a delineation of the institutions, the
parties and movements, and the armies which today determine the Chinese
destiny. Free China, mutilated as it is, is still far more populous and
complex than the Soviet Union or Germany. Its political institutions
cannot be reduced to the terms of one man's caprice, and the personality
of Chiang--while brilliantly conspicuous--is not the entire picture of
China. Generalissimo Chiang works, perhaps because he wishes to,
certainly because he must, within the framework of a triune
organization: the National Government, the central armies and the
Kuomintang. These institutions have developed to their present efficacy
only by means of thirty years of war, preceded by almost thirty years
more of conspiracy. They have become the norm of contemporary China and,
whatever their particular future, significant determinants of China's
eventual development.


THE CHINESE POLITICAL INHERITANCE: SOME CONTINUING ASPECTS

Because of cultural and historical differences between China and the
West, the application of identical terms to both is probably either
wrong or meaningless. Nevertheless, Westerners can live in China, deal
with the Chinese, scrutinize their affairs, and transpose these to such
Western descriptions as may suit the purpose. In reading of China,
however, one should keep in mind the fact that the words are English,
freighted with special meanings, and are used not by scientific choice
but for lack of others. Part of this difference can be bridged if one
recalls the salient peculiarities of China as against the Western world.

No other society comparable in size, duration and extent has ever
existed; the Chinese Empire, from the beginning of the Ch'in (221 B.C.)
to the end of the Manchus (A.D. 1911), remains the greatest social
edifice mankind has yet brought forth. As such, its modern successor is
everywhere stamped with archaic catholic traits which are today both
obsolescent and futuristic. To these must be added the characteristics
of China as a special area--a cultural zone seeking national form;
fragmented economies working their way out of backwardness in technology
and helplessness in world economics; a people in quest of government
which will give them power without enslaving them. This modern "Chinese
Republic," a Western-form state only by diplomatic courtesy in the years
succeeding 1912, has been the widest zone of anarchy in the modern
world; the Japanese attack on its emergent institutions has helped
immeasurably to re-identify the Chinese-speaking people and the officers
who presume to govern them.

To understand Chinese government in war time, one might first check the
outstanding points of old Chinese development and their modern
derivatives.

Pre-eminently, China has been _pro forma_ Confucian ever since the tenth
century after Christ. This has meant an ordering of classes in society
based on the ideal of scholarship and public administration, rather than
on ideals of valor, piety or acquisitiveness. By setting the
requirements of the examinations, and through concealed but sharp
discouragement of heterodoxy or wilful originality, the governing
mechanism made of itself a vast machine of scholars which--because its
authority rested in tradition, in language, in social usages--was able
to ride out domestic revolution and foreign invasion, and was in a
position to ensure its own perpetuation despite political or military
interruption.

The traditions of scholastic bureaucracy working in a pluralistic
society have left the Chinese people largely independent of the routine
functioning of government. The Western state becomes the articulation of
society. The government of old China was pseudomorphic as a state,
having only some of the functions of the Western state, and its
governing power was the residual capacity of an organization devoted to
the ends of ceremony, exemplarization, education and the cultivation of
personality. Administration was confined chiefly to revenue collection,
flood control and defense. In the West, the most important purposes of
society are framed in law after discussion, and are executed as policy;
in China these purposes, defined by the Confucian ideology, were known
throughout the society, with scholar-officials as their expositors.
Fulfillment was by no means a prerogative of government alone. By
contrast with the Confucian standards, the Western states, whether
democracies or not, are capricious, despotic and nonmoral; by Western
standards, Chinese society was unresponsive, sanctimonious and
amorphous.

This political excellence and stability was accompanied by economic
phenomena which are, by modern standards, less desirable. Overcrowding
and a slow rate of progress have been fairly constant features of
Chinese society since the Han. Owen Lattimore has recently appraised the
economics behind the dynastic cycle in China.[1] Each community in old
China was cell-like, largely autonomous and autarkic. Hence, the
increase of wealth was sought within the cell, and not within a larger
framework of economic advance--such as commerce or invention would
provide--and the economically predominant class (the landowners)
possessed a vested interest in overpopulation (which cheapened
agricultural labor and maintained a high, even urgent, demand for food
products). Equilibrium was reached, and a cycle of diminishing returns
initiated, when population began to outrun the land's subsistence
maximum. This drop in returns, in the face of continued population rise,
led to peasant rebellion, distributism and a reinauguration of the same
type of state--made necessary by the monopoly of managerial expertness
(essential to water conservancy, land wealth and the familiar intensive
cultivation) in the ideographically literate class. Control of the
richest water-conservancy region meant the hegemony of China.

  [Footnote 1: Lattimore, Owen, _Inner Asian Frontiers of China_, New
  York, 1940, p. 45 and _passim_. The author, a noted geographer,
  presents significant new analyses of the interconnections of Chinese
  economics and culture.]

The impact of Western imperialism has struck China in the past century,
during the critical or revolutionary phase of this immemorial cycle.
Chinese politics took the color of a back-country struggle. The centers
of modern power were beyond Chinese administrative reach. The emergent
Chinese state, deprived of its foci of power in the metropolises, was
promised control thereof only when it had become an effective and
complete state--a condition largely unobtainable without control of
Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong.

In theory, the Chinese Republic was established January 1, 1912. In
practice, the name _Republic_ has masked a _mêlée_ of governments and
power-organizations, ranging from bandit gangs with pretentious
political color to authentic regional governments administering large
areas. This culminated in the National Government which, beginning as a
conspiracy, becoming the leading regional government, is now in the
position of _de facto_ government for virtually all Free China, the
Chinese dominions, and much of the occupied area. None of these
governments has ever held an election based on wide suffrage; none has
systematically subordinated policy to law; none has possessed a
treasury, fleet or air force worthy of a second-class power, until the
present war. Out of these unpromising materials the counter-attacking
Chinese state has arisen; only by legal formula is it the same Republic
as its predecessors; only by courtesy is this the Year XXX (1941) of the
Republic.[2]

  [Footnote 2: Detailed descriptions of the political history of the
  period are to be found, _inter alia_, in Holcombe, Arthur N., _The
  Chinese Revolution_, Cambridge, 1930; MacNair, Harley F., _China in
  Revolution_, Chicago, 1931; and, most popularly, Escarra, Jean, _China
  Then and Now_, Peiping, 1940. Descriptions of the government are Wu
  Chih-fang, _Chinese Government and Politics_, Shanghai, 1934; Lum
  Kalfred Dip, _Chinese Government_, Shanghai, 1934; and Linebarger,
  Paul M. A., _Government in Republican China_, New York and London,
  1938.]

The governmental developments of the Republican era fall conveniently
into four periods: the period of establishment, 1911-1916; the period of
_tuchünism_, 1917-1926; the rule of the National Government, 1927-1936;
the period of invasion, 1937 to the present. The turning points between
these periods are, respectively, the fall of the Manchu Empire of China
(1911), the death of the dictator-President Yüan Shih-k'ai (1916), the
Great Revolution under Kuomintang-Communist leadership (culminating,
1927), and the Sian affair (December 1936) followed by full-scale
invasion (July 1937).

The present governments of China are accordingly the successors of a
wide variety of decaying imperial administration, experimental modernism
and outright confusion. Any change in China had to be made at the
expense of the _haves_--the Western powers and Japan. Japan, in seeking
the control of China, is fighting China and the Western powers; China,
in fighting back, must fight Japan, and behind Japan the whole structure
of imperialism. Most Chinese have abandoned hope of surviving as a
people without eventually triumphing as a state. In the past, they
absorbed conquerors whose bases were transferred to China; today, they
cannot accommodate invaders who come as transients from an overseas
base. The Chinese war of resistance is a revolution. It is a
continuation of the Nationalist revolution, begun against the Manchus,
continued against the imperialist powers, and now directed against the
Japanese and their Chinese associates. At the same time, this revolution
struggles to incorporate in its dynamics the drive of an endemic peasant
rebellion, Communist in its extreme phase. Nationalist in supreme
emphasis, the revolution finds its highest expression in the
articulation of an effective state--something not known in China for
twenty-two centuries.


CHINA AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Sun Yat-sen's legacy of doctrine included a program of revolution by
three stages:

(1) the military conquest of power by the Kuomintang;

(2) the tutelary dictatorship of the Kuomintang while democracy was
being instilled and adopted from the bottom up; and

(3) constitutionalism, requiring abdication of the Kuomintang in favor
of a popularly elected government.[3]

  [Footnote 3: This is given in the _Chien Kuo Ta Kang_ (Outline of
  National Reconstruction), of April 12, XIII (1924), particularly
  points 3, 5, 6, 7, and 23. Translations are to be found in Hsü,
  Leonard Shihlien, _Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals_, Los
  Angeles, 1933, and Wu Chih-fang, work cited, p. 430 _ff._]

Upon coming to power in Nanking, the National Government had begun
promising a short period of tutelage and had made various gestures in
favor of experimental popular government. A Provisional Constitution was
adopted by a _Kuo-min Hui-i_ (commonly termed, National People's
Convention) in 1931, operating under complete government supervision; a
transition instrument, self-acknowledged as such, it anticipated a
Permanent Constitution upon the accomplishment of constitutional
government in a majority of provinces (Articles 86, 87).[4] Although the
Kuomintang has ruled parts of China for more than fifteen years, and is
by profession the party of democracy, it has not yet relinquished power.
The period of tutelage is still legally in force.

  [Footnote 4: For the text of this constitution, see Wu Chih-fang,
  cited, p. 430 _ff._]

In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war, this monopoly of
governmental power by the Kuomintang was not only an important political
irritant but also an obstacle to effective Chinese unity. Discontent was
aggravated by inelasticity of the Party. Overweighted with petty
bureaucracy, it offered too few up-channel opportunities for potential
leaders. Since Nationalists were the Ins, Kuomintang membership carried
privileges rather than obligations. Many distinguished and active
citizens either refused to join, or let their purely nominal membership
ride along. The Party was saved from complete decline because it
included most of the government personnel, and new recruits to
government service gave it some freshness, vigor and inward criticism.

The leading difficulty of both state-building and democratization had
been overcome by the creation of a government which was well-designed,
functioning _de facto_ and able to meet most of the specialized problems
of modern administration. The regime was far from being a crude
hierarchy of soldiers and taxgatherers, but had accrued about its
policy-making core the essential staff and line services of modern rule.
Inadequacies lay not in absolute lack of species of personnel or
structure, but in the relative weakness of many key functions. During
the third decade of the Republic the then Nanking Government, under
Chiang's leadership, gave China its first modern national government.

Despite this beginning, which--without the invasion--stood a very good
chance of evolving into a paternalistic oligarchy in democratic form,
such as Brazil, there were enormous difficulties still facing genuine
China-wide government. First among these difficulties was the question
of regional autonomy--lingering vestiges of _tuchünism_, reinforced by a
vigorous provincialism. Whole regions of China were under the merely
nominal control of the National Government.

The second difficulty was that of personal politics. Modern China has
had ample politics of principle. It is a rare ideological cult, of any
kind, anywhere, which does not have its Chinese affiliates. No other
nation has known such a wide choice of doctrines, each represented by
armed forces and by definite political leadership. At the same time,
this ideological struggle was and is paralleled by the politics of
individuals and cliques. This made the National Government function as
an oligarchy based on three patterns of control:

(1) ideological eminence, orthodoxy, appeal and timeliness;

(2) military or economic control of power in the form of soldiers or
cash, the two being for the most part interchangeable; and

(3) governmental incumbency.

A man like Hu Han-min could owe his importance almost altogether to his
past associations with the Party and with Dr. Sun, to his authority as
an exponent of the _San Min Chu I_, and to his appeal to the sense of
prestige, dignity and stability on the part of other people who did not
possess such power, which was exercised in the name of the Kuomintang
and its ideology. T. V. Soong, in money matters, or Chang Hsüeh-liang,
in military matters, were important because they had under their
immediate influence so much cash or so many troops, the availability and
mobility of which from day to day determined their actual share of
power. Lastly, these same men possessed political authority by narrowly
lawful means, i.e., by the governmental offices which they held.

Thirdly, the government was deeply out of harmony with an overwhelming
majority of college students, much of the professional and intellectual
classes, and a broad section of the articulate farmer and labor groups.
In the pre-war years of strain, unofficial persons could follow world
fashions in ideas associated with Leftism. Although the full Western
pattern of Right, Center, and Left was not imposed upon Chinese
politics, many of the most active publicists wrote in these terms. There
was, accordingly, a traditional China and a Leftist China; the latter
faithfully imported European concepts and did much to change the
language of Chinese political struggle. The government--itself Left from
the point of view of the pre-existent order, yet committed to modes of
thought and policy formally little more radical than the American New
Deal--was constantly recalled to the most cold-blooded of
_realpolitische_ considerations.

Fourthly, the student movement--in some phases a part of the general
Leftist drive--proved a constant source of difficulty and trouble.
Chinese students (both collegiate and secondary) are self-conscious,
frequently arrogant inheritors of the Chinese tradition of rule by
_literati_. Their influence over the masses is impressive; their
patriotism, however unreflective, is ardent; and their interest in
international affairs is violent.[5]

  [Footnote 5: In particular, see Freyn, Hubert, _Prelude to War: The
  Chinese Student Rebellion of 1935-1936_, Shanghai, 1939. Reference to
  contemporary Left-liberal and Left publications in Europe and America
  will disclose numerous sympathetic eyewitness accounts of the troubles
  and the fortitude of the students. Some of these accounts now possess
  a wry, inadvertent humor in their characterization of Chiang as a
  willing accomplice of Japan.]

Fifthly, Chinese society, accustomed to acting independently of
government, urged varied foreign policies and sought wars. Almost every
kind of organization, from archaic guilds and secret societies to
business groups, sought to wage its own attack on Japan. Uncanalized,
counter-attacked, dammed up, these efforts might have undone the
government. Toward the end, the government raced frenziedly with time,
losing power through unpopularity, and increasing power through
rearmament and technical preparation. The vigorous extra-governmental
pressure of a populace accustomed to spontaneous mass action is a factor
which qualifies and will probably continue to qualify Chinese foreign
policy. It is often left out of account in Western comment on China.

Sixthly, in the winter and spring of 1936-37, the National Government
was under pressure from its own subjects to begin the negotiation of
national unity, starting with a Communist armistice and continuing with
the incorporation of as many regions as possible into the sphere of the
government; but despite such increasing pressure, the government took no
effective step in this direction until after the kidnapping of Chiang at
Sian.[6] As a result of this melodramatic affair, however, the National
Government revised policies which had become traditions ten years old
and agreed to an armistice with the Communists. The Kuomintang--bearing
full responsibility for an actual emergent state--found intra-Chinese
diplomacy as perplexing as foreign.

  [Footnote 6: For the Generalissimo's own diary of the kidnapping,
  together with a narrative by his wife, see Chiang, Mme. Mayling Soong,
  _Sian: A Coup d'Etat_, bound with Chiang K'ai-shek, _A Fortnight in
  Sian: Extracts from a Diary_, Shanghai, 1938. The Chinese edition of
  this appeared as Chiang Wei-yüan-chang [Chairman Chiang], _Hsi-an Pan
  Yüeh-chi_ [A Fortnight's Diary from Sian], Shanghai, XXVI (1937). A
  first-hand Western account is Bertram, James M., _First Act in China_,
  New York, 1938. Edgar Snow, in _Red Star over China_, New York, 1938,
  p. 395 _ff._, gives an account sympathetic to the Left; Harold Isaacs,
  in _The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution_, London, 1938, p. 445
  _ff._, presents a penetrating Trotskyist critique. An excellent
  factual summary of this crucial year, written by a well-known writer
  who visited the scene at first hand, is to be found in Bisson, T. A.,
  _Japan in China_, New York, 1938.]

Thus, at the outbreak of war, the National Government had reached a
higher level of actual political and administrative power than its
predecessors, but was faced with grave problems. In any other country
the government would presumably have been on the verge of ruin.
Controlling only major sections of its internationally recognized
territory; faced by autonomous provinces, half-legal military satrapies
and outright warlord despotism, all backed by vehement provincialism,
great distances, linguistic difficulties and mutual geographical
isolation; unpopular with its own student, intellectual and professional
elites; ridden by personal politics; just emerging from a ten years'
civil war--with these handicaps, a second-rate power undertook to
challenge the greatest power of Asia to an irreversibly fateful war. The
Chinese went further: they sought in the war not only victory, but
unity, democracy and prosperity as well! This background of purpose
makes China's internal politics richly meaningful in relation to the
world scene.


THE BEGINNING OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES

After nearly six years of military and political conflict, a full
quasi-war[7] broke out with the episode at Loukouchiao on the night of
July 7-8, 1937. It was the evident intention of the Japanese to end an
unsatisfactory state of affairs (i.e., Chinese control) in that area
once and for all, although they were perfectly willing to express
temporary amity and _ad interim_ non-aggression toward what was left of
China. The National Government, after a few days of uncertainty, began
real preparations for war. Since the government's appeasement policy had
accustomed many to think of resistance in terms of the Left, there was
an enormous inflation of Leftist sentiment, not deflated for about
eighteen months.

  [Footnote 7: "War" used to mean the reciprocal application of violence
  by public, armed bodies; private and informal homicide was termed
  "murder" or was otherwise clearly designated. Today these distinctions
  are less clear. The author must enter a _caveat lector_: no term is
  employed in other than a general (i.e., literary) meaning, except upon
  special notice. The Sino-Japanese hostilities differ greatly from war
  in several interesting but technical respects; they are a very special
  Japanese invention. Yet it would be cumbersome to refer to Chinese
  changes in Conflict-time, or to speak meticulously of armies engaged
  in an Incident.]

While new mass organizations were formed, the Chinese military command
framed a plan for a three-stage war:

(1) a period of resistance by heavy regular forces fighting
positionally;

(2) a period of stalemate wherein enemy forces, immobilized by opposing
regular armies, found lines of communication, supplies and business
harassed by guerrillas and saboteurs;

(3) a period of counter-attack in which the Chinese, having prepared
themselves technologically during the stalemate and having weakened the
enemy by a test of endurance, should drive the Japanese back into the
sea.

The strategy of this type of war was based upon the plan of retreating
in space in order to advance in time--that is, to yield area slowly and
purposefully, without too great cost to oneself, in order to outlast the
enemy and reach victory. In thus purchasing time by the mile, the
Chinese could not afford to yield intact cities, factories,
communications, mines, docks, warehouses and the other goods of
business; such cessions would only profit Japan: hence _the scorched
earth_ policy. The strategy was obviously suited to a country rich in
territory and population, but poor in _matériel_. It not only made both
regulars and guerrillas effective against Japan but made each truly
reliant upon the other. Without the Nationalist regular armies, who in
attempting to suppress the Communists had done almost everything which
the Japanese now had to do--guarding railroads, pacifying disaffected
and hostile rural areas, promoting industries and watching
agitation--the Japanese forces might disperse enough to enable Japan to
patrol and pacify enough of China to pay for the occupation. Chiang had
to hold the Japanese together, immobilize large bodies of their troops,
keep their war expenses up, and wait for the time to counter-attack.
Meanwhile the guerrillas, together with the Communist veterans, were to
prevent the Japanese from settling down, to worry them with agitation,
to sabotage their economic efforts and to wear them out for Chiang's
_révanche_.

One of the first governmental changes in wartime was the re-institution
of an effective propaganda service under the Political Department of the
Military Affairs Commission. In this Department, many of China's most
active controversialists, censored or exiled for years, found officially
sanctioned scope for their energies. Formal unity came slowly. Although
Shanghai was attacked on August 13, 1937, it was not until September 10
following that a fairly definitive arrangement was reached in regard to
the Communist-occupied zone in the Northwest.

The settlement transformed a pre-existing armistice into an
intranational alliance; technically it amounted to submission by the
Communists and their incorporation into the national government and
armies. The area of the Chinese Soviet Republic assumed the name Special
Regional Government of the Chinese Republic (_Chunghua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü
Chêng-fu_), which it had been using informally for months; the Chinese
Red Army became the Eighth Route Army (_Pa-lu-chün_); and the Chinese
Communist Party accepted the _San Min Chu I_ as the constitutional state
ideology of China, abandoning immediate measures of class war and
expropriation. The settlement was in the form of a Communist reply to
Kuomintang terms offered in February 1937 and the reply of the
Generalissimo as Chief of the Kuomintang to the Communist
declaration.[8]

  [Footnote 8: See Council of International Affairs, _The Chinese Year
  Book, 1938-39_ [Hong Kong], 1939; article by Chu Chia-hua,
  "Consolidation of Democracy in China," Chapter IV; "Reconciliation
  with the Communists," p. 339-40. This Council is an informal and
  extra-legal offshoot of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
  accordingly the annual, rich in official materials, provides
  insufficient data on Communist, guerrilla, and unofficial activities.
  See also, Epstein, I., _The People's War_ [Shanghai], 1939, p. 88
  _ff._, for an excellent, clear account of this period.]

For the first few months the war kept its quasi-European pattern. The
greater part of the fighting was done in the Shanghai area, while
Japanese forces proceeded down from North China. The Japanese still had
some expectation of localizing the North China and the Shanghai
conflicts. At most, they expected the war to be a short one, not
extending beyond the capture of Nanking. Occupation of the capital was
counted on for the ruin of the central government, the end of Chiang and
the reversion of China to a condition of malleable anarchy.

December 1937 was the blackest month of the war for the Chinese. The
Japanese advanced toward Nanking, with Chinese resistance crumbling;
part of the armies withdrew in good order, but on occasion there were
hopeless, panicky routs. To this month the Japanese looked for victory,
and were so confident that they formed the pro-Japanese Provisional
Government of the Republic of China, in Peking on December 11.[9] Four
days later the Japanese forces entered Nanking, and the ensuing
fortnight set the record for atrocity in the modern world. The Japanese
forces were preoccupied with their own disorder. The National
Government escaped up-river to Hankow, where it promptly began to
function under the three-headquarters plan: some offices at Hankow, some
at Changsha and some at Chungking. The presence of the foreign affairs,
propaganda, and military agencies at Hankow made this the practical
capital of China, although Nanking was and is the constitutional
capital.

  [Footnote 9: See below, p. 193. See also Taylor, George E., _The
  Struggle for North China_, New York, 1940, in the Inquiry Series of
  the Institute of Pacific Relations.]


THE HANKOW PERIOD

The greatest part of the year XXVII (1938) was spent in continuation of
slow retreat and heavy frontal resistance. Until October communications
with the outside world were wide open through the railroad to Canton.
Heavy supplies could arrive by the shipload. Hundreds of Japanese air
attacks on the railroad disrupted schedules but never led to serious
suspension of service. Leftist influence became overwhelming in
Hankow. That city had been the capital of the ill-fated Wu-han
Kuomintang-Communist government, which fell with the secession of Chiang
to Nanking eleven years before; its connotations still lingered. Even
conservative Kuomintang leaders, who had gone to lengths of appeasement
at which Neville Chamberlain would have blanched, tried to talk like
Negrin or Alvarez del Vayo.

In January 1938, two organizations were formed which, along with the
Communist zone in the Northwest, were to be among the most active
agencies of guerrilla leadership. The first of these was the New Fourth
Army (_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_), which emerged in the area just south of the
Japanese forces at the Yangtze mouth. It was composed of peasant and
student militia, of regular army fragments, and of some Kuomintang
volunteers, under the leadership of Communist remnants which had hidden
away, banditti-fashion, when the Red Army trekked Northwest. Its
emergence was recognized by legal order of the National Military
Affairs Commission.[10] The other organization was the Provisional
Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region
(_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_),
established by a conference at Fup'ing, January 8-15, and authorized by
central government mandate. This agency also sprang from Leftist
organizations--in this case, a bold, determined, student-peasant
guerrilla army--which had first developed despite government opposition.
It was designed to provide an emergency guerrilla government for those
portions of the three provinces which were under occupation by the
Japanese. Unoccupied portions of the provinces retained their existing
administrations.

  [Footnote 10: See Epstein, I., work cited, p. 235 _ff._ and _The
  Chinese Year Book 1938-39_, cited, article by the late P. C. Nyi,
  "Plans for Political and Economic Hegemony in China"; this includes
  a full administrative description of the Border Region, p. 254 _ff._
  The North China zone is arbitrarily translated "Border Region," to
  distinguish it from the quondam Chinese Soviet Republic in the
  Northwest, translated as "Frontier Area."]

In the next month, February 1938, there was established an agency of
supreme importance, the Supreme National Defense Council.[11] This
replaced the Central Political Council,[12] which had exercised routine
functions of the Party's sovereign control over the government; like its
predecessor, the Supreme National Defense Council tended to act as the
supreme governmental organ, although it was technically a Party organ.
The Council provided and provides a unified civilian-military control
for the duration of the war; but the Kuomintang shares its power with
other groups only in the consultative organs of state, not in the
executive.

  [Footnote 11: See below, p. 46.]

  [Footnote 12: See chart on p. 47. Descriptions of the pre-war Central
  Political Council are to be found in the texts cited on p. 5, n. 2,
  and in the first two issues of _The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36_ and
  _1936-37_, Shanghai, _passim_.]

March 1938 followed with another political step forward--the Emergency
Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress. The Party Congress had the
functions of a special constituent assembly in part, and in part those
of a restricted parliament; in this session two further actions were
taken. The first was the adoption of the momentous Program of National
Resistance and Reconstruction (_K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling_),[13]
which provides a plan for the war and commits the Kuomintang and the
National Government to a policy of victory, of industrialization, and of
economic reform as a means to war.

  [Footnote 13: See Appendix, p. 309.]

The second step taken by this important Congress was the provision for a
People's Political Council (_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_, also translatable
as People's Advisory Political Council). This was the first breach in
the Kuomintang monopoly of government since the establishment of the
Party dictatorship.[14] The government, through the constitutional
fiction of appointing members as representative individuals, provided a
rough, approximate, but fair representation of the active political
forces in China.

  [Footnote 14: See below, p. 69. This is to be distinguished from the
  various constitutional conventions, the proposed national congress
  (_kuo-min ta-hui_) which exists only in contemplation of the
  constitutional drafters, and the Kuomintang Party Congress.]

While the Emergency Session of the Party Congress took these steps for
further national defense, the Japanese were collecting a coterie of
ex-politicians, friends of Japan, and old men to serve as the Reformed
Government of the Republic of China at Nanking. They disregarded the
anomaly of having two "Chinese" national governments--the Provisional
Government in Peiping being undisturbed by these measures--and continued
to seek the division of China, even on the level of the pro-Japanese
States. The Reformed Government was established on March 27, 1938.

The autumn of 1938 brought another phase of discouragement. Relying on
the prestige of British power and the nearness of Hong Kong, the
Chinese were not watchful in the Canton area. The Japanese landed almost
unopposed. Chinese negligence, corruption, and a little treachery worked
in their favor. The landing forces performed almost superhuman feats of
endurance in forced marches overland; on several occasions Japanese
advance troops ran so far ahead of schedule that Japanese warplanes,
thinking them disguised Chinese, strafed them![15] Canton fell without a
major battle. Hankow, the great radical capital, scene of the 1926-27
Leftist upsurge and of the anti-Fascist enthusiasm of 1938, was entered
by the Imperial Japanese army, and the entire Wu-han area was lost to
China.

  [Footnote 15: An engrossing first-hand account of this is to be found
  in Hino, Ashihei, _Sea and Soldiers_, Tokyo, 1940. This, with its
  three companion volumes, _Mud and Soldiers_, _Flower and Soldiers_,
  and _Barley and Soldiers_, Tokyo, 1939 and 1940, forms an eloquent,
  humane, sensitive narrative of a young Japanese writer serving with
  the Imperial forces in China. The series ranks with the great
  narratives of the European war of 1914-18, and expresses the
  Japanolatrist devoutness, the naïveté, and bewildering courage of much
  of the Japanese infantry, but does so through the medium of a literary
  craftsmanship rare in any army.]

Not only was the Hankow period ended. By breaking the last rail
connection of the Chinese government and the outside world, and by
driving the Chinese leadership into the remote interior, Japan shut off
the ready play of international influence on domestic Chinese politics.
Foreign visitors became more rare. The government, moving to the
mountain fastnesses of Szechuan, found a home on the great
Gibraltar-like promontory of Chungking city, tiered along cliffs above
the Yangtze and Kialing rivers. The last withdrawal was a final test of
strength. Hankow, six hundred miles up-river, was commercially,
architecturally, and politically a coastal city. It was still an outpost
of world imperialism and of modern technology. With the next remove the
Chinese government found itself beyond tangible Western influence; for
the first time since 1860 the capital was out of the military reach of
Western powers, and in a city which had only slight traces of Western
influence.


THE CHUNGKING PERIOD

The Chungking period began with the transfer of further government
offices to the West, to join President Lin Shên, and marks a distinct
phase in the process of government-building in China. As the Chungking
regime, the National Government took new forms of temper and character.
Government, Kuomintang, Communists--all were in the position of an
inner-Asiatic state, without convenient access to the sea, seeking to
fight an oceanic nation whose trade reached every port in the world.
Foreign imperialism could no longer be blamed for the demoralizations of
the hour; foreign aid was too tenuous and remote to qualify the inner
play of Chinese political growth. Politically, the Chinese had to stand
on their own feet.

The second phase of the war had begun. Chinese armies stood
front-to-front against the Japanese, and kept hundreds of thousands of
invading troops immobilized. The guerrillas got to work. Most of all,
the machinery of modernization began functioning; all the programs had
been completed, and the task was clear. The international developments
of the time--the first American loan, $25,000,000 in 1938; the brief
Manchoukuo-Outer Mongol war of 1939, wherein Japan and Russia fought
each other through their respective dependencies; even the outbreak of
the European war--were remote from this far inland scene. Military
events had some effect, but nothing comparable to the Japanese victories
at Shanghai, Nanking, Canton, and Hankow recurred. The Japanese invaded
Kwangsi in the fall of 1939; they left a year later, when their drive
into French Indo-China made it unnecessary to cut those colonies off
from China. In South Hunan the Japanese suffered catastrophically when
they advanced boldly and contemptuously into non-modern areas and were
encircled by the Chinese. Even the flight and treason of Wang Ch'ing-wei
at the year's end of 1938, and his open cooperation with Japan in March
1940, did not change the general picture. The emphasis was no longer on
sudden changes, on personality, on dramatic shifts of power. It was on
construction--on the development of a modern, democratic, technically
equipped Chinese state out of the vast resources of China's hinterland.
The China which was to win had to be created before it could
counter-attack.[16]

  [Footnote 16: The literature of the war and of the struggles of Free
  China has already reached an enormous extent. The present work makes
  no attempt to present a step-by-step account of the interplay of
  personal politics, the progress of the armies, or to provide a
  first-hand personal account. Observers other than the author have
  presented these topics exceedingly well. A few of the outstanding
  works may be mentioned, however; a Shanghai press line usually
  signifies that the book was reprinted there from a British or North
  American edition. Epstein, I., _The People's War_, London, 1939, is a
  spirited, detailed account of development down to the spring of 1939,
  particularly useful for the New Fourth Army and the Border Region.
  Among accounts of the war are Bertram, J. M., _Unconquered_, New York,
  1939; Oliver, Frank, _Special Undeclared War_, London, 1939,
  containing interesting accounts, in particular, of Japanese military
  and political behavior in China. Andersson, J. G., _China Fights for
  the World_ [Shanghai], 1939; Utley, Freda, _China at War_ [Shanghai],
  1939, a significant personal account with special interest for the
  Hankow period; Mowrer, Edgar, _Mowrer in China_, Harmondsworth
  (England), 1938, published in America as _The Dragon Wakes_, New York,
  1939; Booker, Edna Lee, _News Is My Job_ [Shanghai], 1940, a
  reminiscent anecdotage; Lady Hosie, _Brave New China_, [Shanghai],
  n.d., a far more informed work than most of the autobiographical
  accounts, by the daughter and widow of two British Orientalists,
  herself a distinguished literary writer on China. On the North China
  situation, four popular works stand out: Snow, Edgar, _Red Star Over
  China_, New York, 1938, the great "scoop" on the Communists; and three
  other books based on first-hand reconnaissance: Bisson, T. A., work
  cited above; Hanson, Haldore, "_Humane Endeavour_" [Shanghai], n.d.;
  and Carlson, Evans Fordyce, _Twin Stars of China_, New York, 1940, the
  work of the U. S. Marine Corps Observer in the guerrilla area, unique
  in its value as professional military interpretation. Gunther, John,
  _Inside Asia_, New York, 1939, contains much of great interest. Very
  special viewpoints are represented in the account of a
  National-Socialist German observer, Urach, Fürst A., _Ostasien, Kampf
  um das Kommende Grossreich_, Berlin, 1940; the commentary of two
  British poets, Auden, W. H., and Isherwood, Christopher, _Journey to a
  War_, New York, 1939; and the reportage of a distinguished Soviet
  fellow-traveller, Strong, Anna Louise, _One-Fifth of Mankind_, New
  York, 1938.]




CHAPTER I

THE CONSTITUTION


The constitutional system, basic in most Western states, plays a
peculiar, subordinate role in China. Consideration of the issue of
constitutionalism high-lights the most practical aspects of the issues
of full democracy. Although the purely legal aspects of constitutional
development are still unimportant in the internal power politics of
China, further constitutional development involves a very real shift in
the domestic balance of power. The fullness of national unity, and
therefore the effectiveness of resistance against Japan, depend in part
on the successful solution or compromise of the problems of
constitutionalism.

Ever since the beginnings of political modernization in China, demands
for constitutional government have included a written constitution as an
imperative prerequisite. The formidable Empress Dowager was troubled in
her last days by the Imperial constitution, a rather unimaginative
plagiarism of the Japanese Constitution of 1889. Since the Republic
began in 1912, China has continued constitutional drafting, amendment,
replacement, and suppression; many of these constitutions have gone into
legal effect. Law being what it was, practical politics flowed on
untroubled.[1] Only with the establishment of the National Government
at Nanking did constitutional structure and actual government develop
similarities.

  [Footnote 1: On the Manchu constitutional programs, see _Columbia
  University Studies in Political Science_, Vol. XL, No. 1: Yen,
  Hawkling L., "A Survey of Constitutional Development in China";
  Vinacke, Harold Monk, _Modern Constitutional Development in China_,
  Princeton, 1920; Cameron, Meribeth, _The Reform Movement in China,
  1898-1912_, Stanford University, 1931; and Hsieh, Pao Chao, _The
  Government of China (1644-1911)_, Baltimore, 1925. The earlier
  constitutional developments under the Republic are summarized in
  Escarra, Jean, _Le Droit Chinois_, Paris and Peiping, 1936, which
  includes excellent bibliographies; Tsêng Yu-hao, _Modern Chinese Legal
  and Political Philosophy_, Shanghai, 1934, Ch. VI, "The Law of Modern
  Chinese Constitutions"; a characteristic proposal for a pre-Kuomintang
  constitution is Bau, Mingchien Joshua, _Modern Democracy in China_,
  Shanghai, 1927; and the works of Lum, Wu, and Linebarger, cited above.]


THE _Yüeh Fa_ OF 1931

In 1931, after three years' operation under an Organic Law, the National
Government adopted the _Yüeh Fa_ (Provisional Constitution),[2] designed
to cover the period between the first stage of the revolution, _military
conquest_, and the final one of _constitutional government_. This
intermediate period was formally labelled the stage of _political
tutelage_, although in fact the military unification of the country
continued. The Provisional Constitution, designed for five years' use,
has continued in force to the present (March 1941). It possesses the
merit of attempting to make actual practice and constitutional form
correspond. Grandiloquent, unenforceable provisions concerning elections
are omitted, and full exercise of the powers of sovereignty are frankly
entrusted to the tutelary Party, the Kuomintang. Such a constitution,
formally making the Kuomintang different from and higher than any other
party in China--and, for all that, in the world, since the Fascist,
National Socialist, and Communist parties are not formally the
constitutional superiors of their respective governments--and giving the
Party unrestricted authority, has provided China with government
realistic if not libertarian.

  [Footnote 2: The text of the _Yüeh Fa_ is to be found in _The China
  Year Book, 1932_, Shanghai, 1932, and in Lum, work cited, p. 161
  _ff._, and Wu Chih-fang, work cited, p. 410 _ff._ The Chinese texts
  of all outstanding Chinese constitutions, from the Imperial programs
  down to the Double Five Draft of the _Hsien Fa_ are to be found in
  Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, Shanghai, 1937, p. 699-796.]

The constitutional basis of the present Party-dictatorship in China is
well summarized by the distinguished constitutional commentator, Dr.
Wang Shih-chieh:

     According to Sun Chung-shan's[3] _Chien-kuo Ta-kang_
     [Outlines of National Reconstruction], China should pass
     through a period of political tutelage under the Chinese
     Kuomintang,[4] before the stage of constitutional government
     be reached. The National Government is merely an
     organization through which a true republic may be formed.
     Hence, in order to demonstrate the structure of the National
     Government clearly, we must first understand the meaning of
     _tang chih_ [party government].

     "Party government," so-called, signifies that the whole
     system of government is under the control or dictatorship of
     one political party only. The only difference between party
     government and dictatorship is that the former is under the
     dictatorship of an entire political party, while the latter
     is under that of a single person. Party government is of
     course different from democracy, inasmuch as with democracy,
     all policies are to be decided by the entire body of
     citizens, while with party government, policies are to be
     decided by all the members of the particular party only. In
     other words, the entire party as one man can exercise
     political dictatorship, without taking into consideration
     the opinions of those who are not the members of the party.
     Any resolution passed by that party is considered a law not
     only in fact, but sometimes even in name; moreover, the
     party may cancel or change a law by a resolution passed in a
     meeting.

     The above-mentioned points are phenomena common to countries
     under party governments.

     After the Chinese Kuomintang has come into power, the system
     of party government is not only a fact, but even prescribed
     in laws. The _Laws Governing the System of Organization of
     the National Government of the Republic of China_
     promulgated for the first time on July 1, Year XIV (1925)
     were originally formulated by the Political Council of the
     Chinese Kuomintang. Article I in this code of laws provided:
     "The National Government discharges all the political
     affairs of the entire country, under the direction and
     superintendency of the Chinese Kuomintang." The said code
     has been constantly amended since its first promulgation,
     but this article has always remained unchanged. By the
     summer of Year XVII (1928), when the successful Northern
     Expedition undertaken by the National Revolutionary Army
     unified China under one government, the period of political
     tutelage of the Chinese Kuomintang began with the
     formulation and promulgation of the _Outlines of Political
     Tutelage_ on October 3, Year XVII (1928). Article I of the
     said "Outlines" provided: "During the period of political
     tutelage of the Republic of China, the National Party
     Congress of the Chinese Kuomintang will take the place of
     the National Convention to lead the people and enforce all
     policies." By the beginning of June, in Year XX (1931), when
     the _Provisional Constitution_ for the period of political
     tutelage was promulgated, the _Outlines of Political
     Tutelage_ were again formed into a part of the _Provisional
     Constitution_, thereby giving party government a
     constitutional recognition. Besides the _Outlines of
     Political Tutelage_, Article 72 ("The National Government
     [Council of State] has a President and a certain number of
     state councillors, appointed by the Central Executive
     Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang."), and Article 58 ("The
     Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang is
     vested with the power of interpreting this Provisional
     Constitution.") of the _Provisional Constitution_, and
     Article 10 ("The National Government has a President,
     twenty-four to thirty-six state councillors, a President and
     a Vice-President of every _Yüan_, appointed by the Central
     Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang."), and
     Article 15 ("Before the promulgation of the Constitution,
     the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination and
     Control _Yüan_ will each be responsible to the Central
     Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang.") of the
     _Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National
     Government_ (December 30, Year XX [1931]) now being
     enforced, form the legal basis for party government.[5]

  [Footnote 3: I.e., Sun Yat-sen; Chung-shan was a revolutionary alias,
  which became a ceremonial posthumous name.]

  [Footnote 4: The term "Chinese Kuomintang" is not a redundancy; the
  original is _Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang_, "Central-Realm
  Realm-people-association," and could be translated as the Chinese
  Nationalist Populist Party, National Democratic Party, the Nation's
  People's Party, etc. Several Japanese organizations have had
  exceedingly similar names; hence the formal style for the Kuomintang
  is always prefaced by _China_.]

  [Footnote 5: Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, p. 649-50.]

Under Kuomintang trusteeship, demands have been heard within and without
the Party, for the promised abdication of the Party and for the
initiation of popular government. Since the Kuomintang, unlike European
one-party groups, established itself only for the formal purpose of
democratic training, and was pledged to tolerate multi-party government
as soon as possible, the continued monopoly of power was a frustration
of the Party ideology and programs. The frustration was serious;
involving much loss of popular sympathy for the government, this and
appeasement rather demoralized the Party in the years preceding the
invasion.


THE DRAFT PERMANENT OR DOUBLE FIVE CONSTITUTION

The Legislative _Yüan_ brought forth on May 5, 1936 (in Chinese
chronology, 5/5/XXV, or double-five twenty-five), the celebrated
_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_ (Draft Permanent Constitution), which was promptly
dubbed the Double Five Constitution. Ever since its first promulgation,
this document has formed the center of all Chinese constitutional
debate, and--with very minor modifications--still stands as the official
proposal for a permanent constitution, awaiting ratification by the
_Kuo-min Ta-hui_ (National [Constituent] Congress), when and if that
long-postponed body ever convenes.[6] The Draft Constitution is the
joint work of many outstanding legal scholars. A product of collective
research and study, it thereby resembles collective private
codification of municipal and international law in the West more than it
does the creation of a deliberative assembly. The celebrated Chinese
jurist, Dr. John C. H. Wu, prepared the first informal draft,[7] and the
5/5/XXV version represents the fourth draft of the Legislative _Yüan_.
The preparation of the various drafts has not, from the scholastic point
of view, been secretive or private; but broad popular participation has
neither been offered nor solicited.

  [Footnote 6: The Double Five Draft Constitution is to be found in
  Chinese in Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, and in English in Council of
  International Affairs, _Information Bulletin_, Vol. III, No. 10 (April
  11, 1937), Nanking; Hsia, C. L., "Background and Features of the Draft
  Constitution of China"; in Legislative _Yüan_, "Draft of the
  Constitution of the Republic of China," Nanking, 1937; in _The China
  Year Book_, Shanghai, and _The Chinese Year Book_, Shanghai and Hong
  Kong, _v.i._ and _v.d._ The latest version of the Draft Constitution
  is reprinted below. Appendix I (A), p. 283; the latest Chinese
  annotated version of this is the Legislative _Yüan_, _Chung-hua
  Min-kuo Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an Shuo-ming-shu_ (An Elucidation of the Draft
  Permanent Constitution of the Chinese Republic), [Chungking], XXIX
  (1940).]

  [Footnote 7: For a critique and appreciation of the final Draft
  Constitution, see Wu, John C. H., "Notes on the Final Draft
  Constitution" in _Tien Hsia Monthly_, Vol. X, No. 5 (May 1940), p.
  409-26. (Dr. Wu is one of the most extraordinary personages of the
  modern world; he has taken all knowledge--East Asiatic and
  Western--for his province. He writes a spirited, graceful English and
  is capable of discussing anything from modern politics or abstruse
  points of Anglo-American law to ancient Chinese hedonism or the
  philosophical implications of the _Autobiography_ of St. Thérèse of
  Lisieux. Dr. Wu, in a bomb-shelter, possesses much of the moral poise
  and profound personal assurance for which such Westerners as T. S.
  Eliot seek in vain.) See also Hsia, C. L., "A Comparative Study of
  China's Draft Constitution with That of Other Modern States," in _The
  China Quarterly_, Vol. 2, 1936-7, No. 1 (Summer), p. 89-101 and Hoh
  Chih-hsiang, "A History of Constitution Making in China," the same,
  Vol. 1, 1935-6, No. 4 (Summer), p. 105-117.]

The Constitution consists of eight Chapters, comprising one hundred and
forty-seven articles. Chapter I defines the Chinese state as "a San Min
Chu I Republic" (_Art._ 1), declares sovereignty to be "vested in the
whole body of its citizens" (_Art._ 2), defines the territories of the
republic, specifies racial equality for the "races of the Republic of
China," designates the national flag, and declares Nanking to be the
capital. Chapter II covers, in nineteen very specific articles, the
entire field of private rights and of the civic privileges of
individuals. Most specifications carry the qualification, "in accordance
with law" or "except in accordance with law." Since law is defined
further in the Constitution as "that which has been passed by the
Legislative _Yüan_ and promulgated by the President," the qualification
impresses many persons as sinister rather than encouraging. Except for
this point, the specific constitutional guarantees exceed in number and
specificity those of almost any other modern constitution.

The _Kuo-min Ta-hui_ (either "National Congress" or "People's Congress")
is the subject of Chapter III. This body has a function unlike that of
any Western agency; the nearest equivalent is the National Assembly of
the Third French Republic. This Congress is an electoral and constituent
body with fundamental legislative powers. It is not intended to usurp
the functions of the Legislative _Yüan_ by fulfilling the role of a
United States Congress, French Deputies and Senate, or a British
Parliament. Meeting once every three years for a one-month session, it
will be manifestly unable to act as a routine Western-type legislature.

The Central Government is the topic of the fourth Chapter. The first
section of the Chapter describes the Presidency; the remaining five, the
five _Yüan_. This applies the five-fold separation of powers. Sun
Yat-sen held that a three-fold separation of powers, as known in the
West and applied to American government, was efficacious; he also
considered that the Imperial Chinese separation of powers (an implicit
one only) was also desirable. The West had executive, legislative,
judicial; old China combined these three into the governing power, and
joined thereto the examinative power and the _chien-ch'a_[8] power. (The
_chien-ch'a_ power involved the functions of the traditional Chinese
censorate; overt and active expressions are found in auditing and in the
lodgment of impeachment charges. The term is fundamentally
untranslatable, but if the tribunician connotations of _Censor_ or the
emergency meaning of _Control_ be recalled, either of these terms will
serve.) Sun Yat-sen combined the Western and the old-Chinese
separations, developing a theory of the five powers. The Draft
Constitution, like its two working predecessors, is a five-power
constitution, with five great _Yüan_ (Boards, Presidencies, or Courts),
each headed by a _Yüan-chang_ (_Yüan_ President). The fourth Chapter, by
including the President and all five _Yüan_, almost covers the full
reach of Chinese government.

  [Footnote 8: For a more extended discussion of this point, see the
  author's _The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the
  San Min Chu I_, Baltimore, 1937, p. 218 _ff._, and also p. 96 _ff._]

This Chapter contemplates the creation of a strong President. In the
Organic Law of 1928, the five Presidents of the _Yüan_ were relatively
less strong, and the Chairman of the _Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_
(National Government Council; or, Council of State) was the key figure
in the government. Most of this time, Chiang himself was Chairman. In
the 1931 Provisional Constitution, now in force, the Chairman of the
National Government--termed President by courtesy--is an officer
comparable to the President of the Third French Republic; the President
of the Executive _Yüan_ is a more active officer: Chiang K'ai-shek is
President of the Executive _Yüan_. The new President, under the Draft
Constitution, is one of the world's most powerful officers. Holding
office for six years, eligible for re-election, commander of all armed
forces, declarer of war, negotiator of peace, treaty-maker, chief
appointing and removing officer of the state, holder of an emergency
power greater than that conveyed by Article 48 of the German Weimar
Constitution, and superior to the executive, legislative, judicial,
examinative and control branches of the government--such a President is
fully responsible to the triennial People's Congress, and to that only!
Since the proposed President may be recalled at any time by the People's
Congress, he is in that respect similar to parliamentary chiefs of
state.[9]

  [Footnote 9: See Sun Fo [President of the Legislative _Yüan_, and son
  of Sun Yat-sen], "The Spirit of the Draft Permanent Constitution," in
  _The China Quarterly_, Vol. V, No. 3 (April 1940), Shanghai, p.
  377-84.]

The President of the Executive _Yüan_, together with his subordinates,
is to be appointed and removed by the President of the Republic. The
_Yüan_ includes Cabinet Ministers--appointed to their posts from among a
special group of Executive Members of the _Yüan_, thereby providing a
simple, rational equivalent of Cabinet and Privy Council, as in Japan or
(less similarly) in Great Britain.

The Legislative _Yüan_ is an interesting semi-cameral legislative body,
which seeks to embody the better features of legislative research organs
and of representative bodies. The Judicial _Yüan_ rationalizes the
structure and administration of courts and of judicial process.

The Control [or Censor] _Yüan_ is, like the Legislative _Yüan_, a
quasi-cameral body, with indirect election of members by the People's
Congress from territorial electorates. Its functions are audit, inquiry,
and impeachment, with such ancillary powers as practice to date has
already indicated.[10]

  [Footnote 10: See Appendix I (F), p. 318-24, below.]

Chapter V of the Draft Permanent Constitution deals with local
government. The institutions of provincial government are wittingly
minimized, because of recent trouble with provincial satrapies and the
dangerously centrifugal effect of provincial autonomism. In contrast to
this, government at the district (_hsien_) level is designed in strict
accordance with the realities of twenty-odd centuries' experience. It is
probable that no other constitution in the world provides for such
careful guarantee of district, county, canton, or _Kreis_ autonomy. The
old Imperial Chinese system was a loose pseudo-centralized federation of
two thousand near-autarkic and near-autonomous commonwealths; the Draft
Constitution attempts to reinstitute (at the political level) this
vigorous cooperative independence of the _hsien_. The _hsien_ meeting,
extrapolitical, unsystematic, and occasional in the past, is made the
foundation for the new legal structure. (These proposed reforms are now
being anticipated under the Provisional Constitution and current
statutory changes.[11])

  [Footnote 11: See below, p. 106 _ff._, and Appendix I (G), p. 324.]

Chapter VI provides that the economic system shall rest on Sun Yat-sen's
principle of _min shêng_ (_q.v._, below). Willing to apply whatever
worked best, Sun himself had no theoretical objections to capitalism,
communism, state socialism, or any other economic doctrine. Hence,
proletarian ownership of the means of production is not guaranteed; yet
state ownership is not restricted, and is specifically required in the
case of "all public utilities and enterprises of a monopolistic nature"
(_Art._ 123). Henry George's influence on Sun is shown by mandatory
taxation of unearned increment (_Art._ 119). Room for free future
adaptation from corporative economic techniques successful in the
outside world is assured (_Art._ 125): "Labor and capital shall, in
accordance with the principles of mutual help and cooperation, develop
together productive enterprises." It is likely that any imaginable
economic system would be constitutional on this basis, provided that it
was initiated by due legal procedure and without hardships irresponsibly
imposed.

Chapter VII, on Education, opens: "The educational aim of the Republic
of China shall be to develop a national spirit, to cultivate a national
morality, to train the people for self-government and to increase their
ability to earn a livelihood, and thereby to build up a sound and
healthy body of citizens" (_Art._ 131), and continues, "Every citizen of
the Republic of China shall have an equal opportunity to receive
education" (_Art._ 132). State, secular control of educational policy is
assured. Articles 134 and 135 provide for tuition-free elementary
education for children and free elementary education for previously
non-privileged adults. (The constitutional guarantee concerning tuition
is indicative of the scholastic traditions of the Chinese, of the
modern educational revolution, and is reminiscent of _Art._ 12 of the
1931 Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic: "The Soviet Government
in China shall guarantee to all workers, peasants, and the toiling
masses the right to education. The Soviet Government will, as far as
possible, begin at once to introduce free universal education.")[12]

  [Footnote 12: This constitution is available in Yakhontoff, Victor A.,
  _The Chinese Soviets_, New York, 1934, p. 217-21, and in Kun, Bela
  [prefator], _Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, New
  York, 1934, p. 17-24. The writer has been unable to secure the Chinese
  text of this document.]

Chapter VIII deals with the interpretation and enforcement of the
Constitution. It was a labor of love by shrewd legal theorists, and
defines terms with great clarity. Interpretive power is vested in the
Judicial _Yüan_.


THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Nowhere in China is there outright denial of a need for constitutional
change. The need exists; the Double Five Draft is the government's
answer. Yet there are few patent demerits in the existing constitutional
system; the present political structure is more realistic, more broadly
national, more expressive of effective opinion than any other in modern
China. The question arises from commitments (dating back to the Empire)
promising to create actual constitutional government. The National
Government was established on the basis of this pledge. The democratic
ideology, whatever sects it may include, has a clean sweep of the field
of doctrine in China. No one seriously advocates monarchy, separatism,
or permanent dictatorship. The only question is: how and when?

At the close of the third session of the advisory People's Political
Council, Chiang K'ai-shek replied to demands for immediate broadening of
popular control over the government by reaffirmation of his adherence
to the democratic dogma of Sun Yat-sen, together with the following
warnings:

     The democracy which _Tsung-Li_ [The Leader, i.e., Sun
     Yat-sen] wished to establish was of the purest kind without
     the slightest vestige of make-believe or artificiality.
     Unfortunately, the Chinese people, having inherited all the
     evil practices handed down throughout the numerous dynasties
     of autocratic rule, were then at a low ebb both in
     intelligence and in vitality. The people were used to
     disorganization and selfishness....

     We have to wait until our lost territories have been
     recovered and domestic disorders liquidated before we can
     have political tutelage and prepare ourselves for
     constitutionalism....

     People at that time [the inauguration of the Republic in
     1912] made the mistake of neglecting the necessary
     procedures and instead they rivalled each other in talking
     about democracy.... As a result, democracy has remained an
     ideal....

     We must make it clear to our people that democracy is not a
     synonym for lack of law and order, or for anarchy.

     The public opinion on which democracy is based must be
     sound, collective, and representative of the majority of the
     people's wills. The freedom which democracy endows on people
     should not conflict with public welfare, nor should it go
     beyond the sphere as marked by laws of the State. With our
     nation facing the worst invasion in history, we must teach
     the people to respect the absolute authority of laws of the
     State.[13]

  [Footnote 13: China Information Committee, Chungking, _News Release_,
  No. 351 (February 25, 1939), p. 2269-71.]

The clamor for a constitution continued. The difficulties of introducing
mass suffrage to Western China were apparent to everyone, but many
leaders felt that the advantages of constitutionalism would outweigh the
inescapable loss of efficiency, and would mobilize public opinion behind
the war and further democratic progress. The Generalissimo found this
view hard to reconcile with his military, direct notions of doing first
things first, as he saw them, but he yielded in the fourth session of
the People's Political Council and accepted the demand. He stated:

     In China ... [democratization] is a tremendously heavy task
     which cannot be completed within a few days. I think that
     the Constitution and laws may as well be promulgated at an
     earlier date. But, gentlemen, please do not forget the
     _Tsung-li's_ painful consideration ... [of the necessity of
     an intermediate stage of real democratic training].
     Political tutelage does not end with the training of the
     citizens by the government. It requires training of the
     citizens by themselves.

     Today we should understand our object: to start the building
     of a constitutional government. This means laying a
     permanently sound basis for the nation. We are not concerned
     with the time of starting constitutional government. Whether
     to start it early or later does not matter much. What we are
     really concerned with is, do we have a real intention of
     forming a constitutional government? If we are truly so
     minded, we might as well promulgate the Constitution before
     the labor of political tutelage is completed.[14]

  [Footnote 14: [Chiang K'ai-shek], _Tsung-ts'ai Chien-kuo Yen-lun
  Hsüan-chi_ (The Party Chief's Utterances on Reconstruction),
  Chungking, 1940, p. 237-43. The Generalissimo concluded his speech
  with a homiletic touch which is so characteristic that it may be
  included here; it also explains his relative lack of interest in the
  Constitution: "Lastly, I have another point to tell you gentlemen. I
  have already repeated this, again and again, many times. Desiring to
  complete our revolutionary work and national reconstruction, and to
  have a constitutional government as seen in many modern states as soon
  as possible, I often study the causes of the weakness and disorder
  which exist in our country.... [He cites the traditional political
  vigor and excellence of the centuries before the time of Christ, with
  the "degeneration" and "departure from order" of the following
  centuries.] The departure is not simply due to the failures in
  politics and education and to the deprivation of the popular rights by
  a few tyrannical kings and lords since the Ch'in and Han periods. It
  is due to the fact that before the Chou, we had government by law
  [_fa chih_] as a mere supplement to government by social standards
  [_li chih_, also translatable as ideological control, or control
  through moral indoctrination]. We had social organization as the
  foundation of political organization. Everything was then
  well-organized and well-trained. Everywhere, in schools, in armies, in
  families, in society, order and the forms of propriety [i.e., social
  standards] were regarded as most important. No citizen could evade his
  duty and obligation."]

Chiang thus reconciled the beginning of constitutionalism and the
continuance of political tutelage, although implying acquiescence, not
recommendation. A theorist holding all men to be driven by "a perpetuall
and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in
Death,"[15] might consistently suppose that Chiang merely dissimulated
an inward lust for authority; more plausible is the postulation that a
man who has for years lived with and for a doctrine, giving his life and
future reputation to the fulfilment of a program, would incline to
prudence and realism in climaxing that doctrine and program. In Chiang's
case this is Sun Yat-sen's _San Min Chu I_. Chiang's reluctance to apply
democracy then and there is understandable whatever the inmost motive;
so, too, is his yielding to a widespread demand.

  [Footnote 15: Thomas Hobbes, _Leviathan_, New York and London, 1934
  (Everyman's Edition), p. 49.]

The convening of a special _Kuo-min Ta-hui_ as a national constituent
assembly was set for November 12, 1940; this day was chosen because it
was traditionally the seventy-fourth birthday of Sun Yat-sen.
Administrative machinery for preparation of a hall, secretariat,
publications, and other necessities was established and set in motion.
Following the severe fires of August 19-20, and the subsequent
large-scale demolition of above-ground downtown Chungking by raids,
indefinite postponement of the Congress was announced on September
25--on the grounds that military hazard prevented adequate assembly of
delegates, and no reasonably safe place for such a meeting could be
found.

Meanwhile, recent years have seen an uproar of constitutional debate.
This may be summarized briefly, with the case against the Constitution
stated first:

Constitutionalization would lead to the legalization of other parties,
instead of a mere condition of non-prosecution; this would disrupt the
orderliness required of a people at war. Why add discord in war time?
_Reply_: legitimization of other parties is not a struggle for power but
an act of union. It would widen the periphery of cooperation.[16]

  [Footnote 16: The writer is indebted for much of the material in this
  chapter to Dr. Djang Chu, of the New Life Movement Headquarters,
  Chungking, who supplied it to him in the form of a lecture and other
  memoranda. Dr. Djang is, of course, not responsible for any
  reinterpretations here made.]

Sun Yat-sen required three stages of the revolution: conquest, tutelage,
constitution. China is not ready for mass suffrage. The majority of the
people are not yet literate. Public opinion is just developing. The
nation is, in fact, still in the period of military recapture of
national territories. _Reply_: Sun Yat-sen must not be interpreted
mechanically. If this is done, tutelage will never end, and Sun's
cherished democracy will remain forever in the future. Furthermore, the
guerrillas, the Border Region, and other instances have shown that the
Chinese masses can and will practice democracy right now. Again, the
issue has already been decided; the government has been committed to the
immediate inauguration of the Constitution. First it was to be 1939; the
elections were held in part, until the war finally stopped them on
August 13, 1937. It is too late to raise the issue: is China ready?
Everyone--government, Kuomintang, independent groups--has decided that
China is.

Why change constitutions? The present one is satisfactory. If a war-time
amplification of the _Yüeh Fa_ is needed, it can be found in the
_Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_.[17] If a convocation of the
talents is needed, the People's Political Council is already there. What
is the use of a constitutional change in war time? _Reply_: the
constitutionalist movement is no new development. The _Program_ was a
democratic advance. "Besides, formation of the People's Political
Council was a step toward democracy. The constitutional movement was
not forced on the government, but was an outgrowth of the war; it has
not appeared overnight, but has a clear historical background. As soon
as the Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out, it was evident that more
democratic rule was necessary. As the war became prolonged, the
preliminary steps proved inadequate. A more perfect constitution,
whereby the whole people can be mobilized, is imminent. This fact was
duly recognized by the people and is the motive power of the present
constitutional movement." (This is the comment of an independent
writer.)[18]

  [Footnote 17: See Appendix I (D), p. 309.]

  [Footnote 18: Liu Shih, "Chung-kuo Hsien-chêng Yün-tung-ti Chi-ko
  Chieh-tuan" (Stages of the Chinese Constitutional Movement) in _Li-lun
  yü Hsien-shih_ (Theory and Reality), Vol. 1, No. 3, November 15, 1939,
  p. 13 _ff._]

A pointed question is raised and answered by Tso Tao-fen, one of the
Seven Gentlemen (_Ch'i Chüntzu_) who led the National Salvationists:

     Some say that as a matter of fact, the people themselves do
     not want a constitution. And--to put it more bluntly--that
     the people do not know what a constitution is. Therefore,
     the constitutional movement represents the desires of only a
     minority of the people, not the majority. You have a certain
     element of truth if you say that most of the people do not
     know what a constitution is, but it is not true that they do
     not want a constitution. In the present war period, the
     burden on the people is enormous. They should not be denied
     any privileges to which they are entitled. All the proposed
     constitutional stipulations concerning the duties, rights,
     economic status, and education of the people have an
     immediate effect on and relation to the people. Why do they
     not want a constitution? If you proceed to ask one of the
     common people, say a peasant, and you talk with him,
     professorially as though you were in a classroom, about the
     constitutional movement, he may be at a loss. But if you
     bother to ask him about his daily life--the work he is
     doing, his hopes, his bitterness, the cruelties inflicted on
     him by unscrupulous officials and landlords and gentry--and
     if he enjoys the freedom of speech, he will give you a good
     talk!... If you say that the people do not know what a
     constitution is, you should enlighten them about the close
     relationship between themselves and the constitution, not
     discontinue the constitutional movement.[19]

  [Footnote 19: From Tso Tao-fen, "A Few Questions Regarding the
  Constitution" in Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê [The United Front Club],
  _Hsien-chêng Yün-tung Lun-wên Hsüan-chi_ (A Symposium on the
  Constitutional Movement), Chungking, 1940, p. 1 _ff._]

Other questions relate to specific points in the Draft Constitution. In
the opinion of some, the phrase "according to law" which follows every
guarantee of popular rights is a dangerous phrase, particularly in view
of the neat but arbitrary definition of "law" (_Art._ 139). Others,
remembering the Weimar Article 48, mistrust the emergency power of the
President. The President's sharing of the budgetary, pardoning, and war
powers with the Legislative _Yüan_ seems illogical to some critics, who
feel that these powers should be within reach of a more popular body,
not a technically legislative organ.

Further discussion deals with the competence of the _Kuo-min Ta-hui_.
Many of the critics, particularly those of the Communist and independent
Left group, believe the long-heralded epoch of democracy would open
badly if it began with mechanical ratification of a dictated
constitution. A Communist leader said, "We want a Constitution, a
democratic Constitution--a _real_ democratic Constitution!" and pointed
out that the first Congress was too large, not truly representative of
the common people, and not given enough time to work out a constitution
by its own action; its task, as he supposed the government intended,
would be to rubber-stamp the Double Five Draft. In his opinion, this
Draft had many defects--chief of which was unresponsiveness of the
central government to popular control. The proposed Congress could not
do much with a mere triennial check; the five-power system as projected
was unsatisfactory. Democratic rights were insufficiently assured. He
added that the Communist Party of China was for a democracy, but that
the Double Five Draft was not "the constitution of a democracy."[20]

  [Footnote 20: Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u at the Chungking office
  of the 18th [Communist] Army Corps Headquarters, on July 29, 1940, to
  the author.]

Furthermore, the representativeness of the proposed
constitution-adopting _Kuo-min Ta-hui_ is called into question. The
present plan calls for 665 delegates from geographical constituencies,
380 from occupational, 155 "by special methods," 240 by government
appointment, and a large number of Kuomintang Party-officers _ex
officio_ (241 by a recent count).[21] The present administration would
obviously have a whip hand over all proceedings. The division into
groups has been criticized. A demand, for example, for 120 women members
has been made. Under the circumstances, with 1681 members already
scheduled, mere additional size could be no handicap.

  [Footnote 21: _China at War_, Vol. IV, No. 5 (June 1940), p. 79 _ff._]

The question of qualifications has also been raised. About 900 of the
representatives had been elected when war broke out. These include men
who have since died, or have changed their opinions, or are reported
missing, and even a few traitors. Are all the available elected
representatives to be gathered together, years later? or is a new
election to be held? Whatever occurs, the supreme agency on
qualifications is the Election Committee for Representatives to the
People's [Constituent] Congress, attached directly to the Council of
State.

The constitutional issue in China is no simple problem of reaction
versus progressivism. The vast majority of the population is not
literate, and is unprepared to deal with a complicated machinery of
opinion and election. Wire-pulling, corruption, adherence to form
instead of deed--these are all widespread in China. Democracy abruptly
established might frustrate further improvement, since sham-democracy
would have established itself. The opponents of sudden action also
press the telling point that the common people do not know they want
immediate democracy, although believing in the term as a symbol and
approving its trial application. The Generalissimo remains clearly
mistrustful about creating new organs of opinion, or using new political
processes; he would prefer to wait until the nation is unified, better
administered, and more literate. Hence his and the Kuomintang's
insistence on indirect elections, remoteness of policy-making
authorities from the electorate, and self-sufficient government.

China did have, it is argued, an excellent democratic constitution in
1912, many more in the warlord years. All had admirable balances of
power, guarantees to the individual, libertarian and progressive
provisions. Like Chinese social legislation, they lifted China to the
level of the rest of the modern world--_de jure_, and that only! These
elevated documents remained elevated; life went on beneath them, and the
tragic gap between law and life was so enormous that no one thought of
bridging it. The nation would have been humiliated by legislation which
limited the working day to fourteen hours, prohibited the mutilation or
slavery of children, or required that torture be administered in the
presence of a physician. Hence it had eight, ten, or twelve-hour laws,
good child legislation, and absolute prohibition of torture for any
purpose; these were unenforceable.

To counsels of caution, advocates of immediately responsive institutions
reply that the Chinese common people are better democrats than their
rulers, citing concrete cases in proof. They mention the general
strikes, strong peasant cooperation, the startling phenomena of
coordinate mass action--tens and hundreds of thousands strong--in
political protest, boycotts, or civic immobility. (In past years many a
warlord has been stopped by empty streets and closed houses: no
business, no traffic, no talking, no meetings--only the silence,
and somewhere, conspicuously inconspicuous, a committee of
plenipotentiaries!) They refer to the Frontier Area, the Border Region,
the New Fourth Zone, the guerrillas, the industrial cooperatives, and
the wealth of leadership called up from the millions by the war. They
quote to the Kuomintang its own professions of democracy, and the words
of its late Leader. Told that the masses do not understand modern
administration, modern economics, modern war, and that the peasantry and
workers would proceed to arbitrary class legislation, economic
levelling, and social revolution, they reply, "What do you
want--democracy?" It is most unlikely that the Communists would sweep
the country under free elections, but they and other dissidents, as the
political Outs, would be free to criticize the incumbents in a way sure
to bring support and involve new alignments of power. Some Kuomintang
leaders wish to shut out any group with foreign connections; the Chinese
face--despite their definite movement toward constitutionalism--the
question of the limits of democratic toleration.




CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT


By constitutional stipulation, and by dogma legally established, the
National Government of the Chinese Republic is a Kuomintang
Party-dictatorship over the Chinese nation. This rule is formally
dictatorship by a minority democracy over the absolutely governed
majority, since the Party constitution requires intra-Party democracy.
No pretense is made of further formal democracy. Actual experience of
the past ten years has shown the government to be a broad, loosely
organized oligarchy in which the Party, the Government, the Army and
regional military, and independent leaders (such as bankers, college
professors and presidents, secret society chiefs, community spokesmen)
have shared power. The center of gravity has stayed somewhere near
Chiang K'ai-shek, who as co-leader and then formal Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_,
"general ruler") of the Party and creator of the central army has
combined two of the chief sources of influence. Variety in the sources,
nature, and incidence of political power in recent Chinese affairs has,
however, not destroyed the constitutional theory: Party-dictatorship
pledged to national democracy.

The state machinery--as it has been since promulgation of the
Provisional Constitution, 1931--is among the most elaborate in the
modern world, but is nevertheless effective. One may justly regard the
present government as the most efficacious, generally powerful, and
growing Chinese government since the mid-eighteenth century. This
government is pre-eminently the creation of the Kuomintang, and of
Kuomintang leaders. A war which threatens China's national existence
accordingly threatens the leaders as government officers, as Party
members, as patriotic citizens, and as members of the Chinese race. At
the time that they fight an alien enemy, they must simultaneously
increase state power and diffuse it so that a democracy may emerge and
survive.

China's leadership is therefore posed a two-fold problem: to perpetuate
a regime, successful in one period of relative peace, through years of
invasion to a period of even deeper peace; and to permit popular access
to policy-forming agencies, allowing freer operation of pressures,
without endangering resistance and reconstruction thereby. To the
Western political scientist, it is amazing that they have carried into
the years of catastrophic war a unique, complex constitutional system,
treasuring it like an ark of the covenant. This is the five-power
system.


THE FIVE-POWER CONSTITUTION

The five-power constitution (_wu-ch'üan hsien-fa_) is a legacy of Sun
Yat-sen, and is one of the cardinal dogmas of the _San Min Chu I_.
Distinctively, two new powers are added to the familiar three: namely,
the examinative and the control powers. Westerners might question the
importance of segregating the impeaching, auditing and critical powers,
unifying them into a new agency of government, along with a glorified,
independent civil service system. Yet the five-fold division is to China
a key point of governmental development.

The five-power system is based on the notions Sun Yat-sen had of
democracy. He anticipated by a generation the need of strengthening
democratic machinery to compete with Caesarian techniques. Merely to
have qualified the suffrage, or to have narrowed the limits of
popular action, would not have sufficed, for it was authentic
democracy--government both representative and popular--which he desired,
not an empty shell of nominal republicanism. In an effort to solve this
dilemma, he employed the concepts _ch'üan_ and _nêng_,[1] which may be
translated "power" and "capacity," although the rendering would
necessarily vary in accordance with the connotations to be
encompassed.[2] He felt that it was a major discovery to apply in modern
politics a distinction between the power which the people should have
over government and the capability they had of operating the machine of
state. Abandoning the state to the vagaries of public opinion, allowing
the citizens free access to the powerful, complex controls of modern
governance, or assuming that anyone and everyone had an expert's
qualifications on all political subjects--this would, in Sun Yat-sen's
opinion, wreck the government. Nevertheless, the people had to reserve a
final power over policies and personnel of government, although they are
themselves unqualified to operate the state mechanism. Hence the people
were to exercise _the four powers_ over the government: initiative,
referendum, election, and recall. Compensatingly, the government was to
possess the _five rights_ over the people, based on the new separation
of powers. To Sun, as a Chinese, the state was not the hand of the
people; it was a separate institution above other institutions,
democratic only in allowing access to itself and in justifying its
authority by the ultimate sanction of popular vote. The new government
could not be kept clean, prompt, and high-minded by the freak, casual
operation of popular censure, nor staffed by whomever a mass fancy threw
into office. It was, instead, to be a traditionally Chinese
self-perpetuating bureaucracy, differing from the past only in being
controlled and revised by popular instead of imperial will.

  [Footnote 1: See Sun Yat-sen, _San Min Chu I_, Shanghai, 1927,
  henceforth cited as "Price translation," p. 296 _ff._; or d'Elia,
  Paschal M., S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_, Wuchang, 1931,
  p. 348 _ff._]

  [Footnote 2: An attempt to correlate Sun's democratic theory with
  Western concepts is made in the present author's _Political Doctrines
  of Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 107-9. The notion is clearly put in
  _L'Esprit des Lois_, Book 11, ch. 2.]

Accordingly, the ideal toward which the Chungking government strives may
be epitomized as _perfect bureaucracy subject to complete popular
control_. The two powers new to the West--examination and control--are
to replace public opinion at levels of obscurity, technicality, and
persistence where outside criticism could not reach; the plan of Sun
Yat-sen provides for as much use of power through voting as is found in
any Western state. This attempted solution strikes near the core
problems of any modern government, wherever it may operate and whatever
its conditions.

The five-power constitution posits a government of educated, expert men,
in which qualifying examinations will precede election for
administrative posts, and in which the examination and control _yüan_
will--professionally, officially--replace the haphazard play of
sentiment, anger, fancy, envy upon which Western peoples count to keep
their democracy healthy and intact. The United States Government is the
most complex and important institution in the United States, possessing
inquisitorial powers wider and deeper than those of any private person
or institution. Yet the Americans have no unceasing, professional,
expert investigation of their government by their government, nor does a
merit system extend to offices where it might have the drastic effect of
thwarting operation of public opinion locally or temporarily debased.

This function, specializing power to strengthen it, explains the
war-time survival of the five-power system as a fundamental theory of
state. The Chinese have suffered from weak government for decades.
Absence of dictatorship was largely owing to an inability to designate a
dictator. The five-power system was preceded by a Nationalist
government which employed the soviet form of organization--the one
instance outside the Soviet Union of such application.[3] This had been
set up for rapid, decisive action; thirteen years' preliminary
application of the five-power system has shown this to be no less swift
and effectual. Even the Communist leaders in China today are reconciled
to the retention of the five-power system, although they would certainly
like to modify its present organization.[4]

  [Footnote 3: See Holcombe, Arthur N., _The Chinese Revolution_,
  Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1930, passim, for the outstanding
  elaboration of this curious experiment, and for a lucid delineation of
  the genesis of the National Government.]

  [Footnote 4: Statement to the author by Col. Ch'in Po-k'u, interview
  cited, p. 38, n. 20, above.]

Reference to the general chart of government organization (see p. 330)
shows the intricate pre-democratic system of government now applied.
Consideration of the sources of policy in such a structure have,
therefore, to appraise not merely two agencies--executive and
legislative, with only a glance at the judiciary--as in America, but to
examine a whole hierarchy of Party, general governmental,
military-governmental, and autonomous policy-making agencies. Were it
not for the thousands of miles, the unrelatedness in cultures, the
complexities of language, and the inescapable awareness of race,
Americans might long since have looked to China as the decisive, fresh
political experiment of our times.

One further trait of the Chinese, which in Japan has been carried to the
point of a national mania, is the respect for the constitutional (or
Imperial) system as a symbol of purity and order. Western governments
are like machines in common use; they operate for the general
convenience and subject to the criticism of their members. Even
dictatorships try to seem practical. The Confucian traditions of
government by indoctrination, and particularly that of government
indoctrinating through conspicuous example, motivated heavy
ceremonialization of state functions. This often led a Chinese Emperor
to become more and more majestic and aloof, to strive for archetypal
perfection, until he became so much a model that he disappeared from
public sight altogether, swilling and carousing himself to death in the
gardens of the Forbidden City; his successors, if they came from the
people, would seem practical and workable for a few generations, until
they too succumbed to their own majesty. Some atrophy through majesty
occurs even in the relatively new Chinese National Government, arrested
but not eradicated by war-time vigor.


THE SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL

The highest political agency in China is the Supreme National Defense
Council (_Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui_).[5] This is not a part of the
government, _de jure_, since it is the war-time replacement of the
Kuomintang Central Political Council (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih
Wei-yüan-hui_), the high Party organ charged with exercise of the
Party's sovereign powers in government. The liberalization of the
policy-framing agencies in war-time cannot be better illustrated than by
the fact that this new Supreme National Defense Council reportedly
includes non-Party members, and acts in fact as a central board or
council of government, superseding not only the Kuomintang Central
Political Council but its governmental counterpart, the Council of State
(_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_) as well. Reference to the chart below
will clarify the relationship of these agencies:

          The KUOMINTANG, as a Party,
          exercises sovereign powers through

  [The CENTRAL POLITICAL COUNCIL, superseded in
                war-time by]

    The SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL,
              which transmits commands
                        to
  The COUNCIL OF STATE, highest governmental agency,
      which transforms these commands into government
                 orders applicable
                        to
          NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, or LOCAL
              GOVERNMENT AGENCIES,
                in the form of
          ORDERS, ORDINANCES, and LAWS

  [Footnote 5: The names of agencies and offices in the discussion of
  government and Kuomintang organization are taken from K'ao-shih _Yüan_
  [Examination _Yüan_], _Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao_ [Charts of
  Government and Party Development and Organization], Chungking, XXIX
  (1940), _passim_. This work has not yet been published, since it is a
  draft printing, to be revised and re-edited before formal publication.
  The author was allowed to consult a copy through the courtesy of the
  Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui, and the kind
  assistance of Mr. C. C. Chi of the Party-Ministry of Publicity. These
  charts, provisional as they are, are by far the most systematic
  presentation of modern Chinese government structure which the author
  has ever seen. For a brief commentary on the Council, see the
  one-paragraph section, _The Supreme National Defense Council_ in
  Tsiang Ting-fu, "Reorganization of the National Government," _Chinese
  Year Book 1938-39_, cited, p. 356. Dr. Tsiang, whose other writings on
  Chinese government have been models of clarity, candor, and
  concreteness, is obliged to state: "As its major functions are
  involved in the prosecution of the war, military necessity compels
  the writer to withhold the details of its organization and work for a
  later issue."]

The power of the Kuomintang is exercised by its Chief [_Tsung-ts'ai_]
and its Central Executive Committee, Central Committee, and their
respective Standing Committees (discussed below, p. 125 _ff._).

Secretiveness in a nation's highest policy-making organ is somewhat
unusual in the modern world. In most states the invisible government of
practical acquaintance and association between leaders provides a
meeting ground, and traditions require a formal, open exercise of public
authority. As a matter of fact, a few generally accepted data concerning
the Supreme National Defense Council are readily apparent to the
observer in Chungking. In the first place, it is what its title
implies--the highest agency of political control. Its meetings are the
constant source of new policy and tangible control. Secondly, one finds
a universal belief that the Generalissimo, who attends these meetings in
the multiple capacity of Chairman of the Council, Party Chief of the
Kuomintang, President of the Executive _Yüan_, Chairman of the People's
Political Council, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces,
etc., faithfully employs Council meetings for very real debate and
discussion of government and Party policy, and for the conduct of the
war. He is not believed to take any important step arbitrarily, without
consulting the Council. (In the past, he has been known to act with
dramatic and concealed swiftness, opening his mind to no one before the
crucial consummation of his plans, but at the present time this has
apparently disappeared.[6])

  [Footnote 6: For a biased but bitterly graphic portrayal of Chiang's
  tiger leaps in politics, see Isaacs, Harold, work cited, _passim_. Mr.
  Isaacs' portrayal of Chiang shows him as ambitious, able, and
  villainous in his need for power and his hostility to the proletariat.
  The Trotskyite viewpoint is a usefully different one from that
  obviously adopted by the present author.]

Third, the Council, while extending beyond the men who are primarily
Party leaders and including military and political figures who
(irrespective of nominal Party membership) are independent, has
transformed the arcanum of Party power into a body more representative
of the entire nation. Fourth, significant in connection with the
Japanese charge of Chungking Bolshevization, the Communists and other
Leftists, while fairly represented in advisory and even in military
bodies, are presumed to have no representation whatever on the Supreme
National Defense Council, nor is such representation regarded as
probable in the near future. Chiang K'ai-shek has at hand a counselling
and co-governing body whose fundamental purposes are completely one with
his own.

A nice consistency would demand that the Supreme National Defense
Council (as a Party agency) should transmit its commands to the Council
of State (its government counterpart) for transformation into law. This
is actually done, whenever possible, but the frequency of crises and of
needs for immediate action have--in the period of hostilities--led to
the occasional issuance of commands direct to the Ministry or other
governmental organ concerned.[7] To the degree that the Supreme National
Defense Council does so, it becomes a directly governing authority, and
instead of perpetuating Party authority _over_ government, it is itself
government.

  [Footnote 7: Statement to the author, August 1, 1940, in Chungking, by
  Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Secretary-General of the People's Political
  Council and Party-Minister of Publicity.]

Since a cloud of military secrecy covers the functions of the Council,
some notion of its operation and working authority may be found by
analogy with the role of the Central Political Council, which it has
displaced. According to the leading Chinese constitutional writer on the
subject, the Central Political Council (also called [Central] Political
Committee)--for which read Supreme National Defense Council today--acted
as follows:

     According to Article IV of the _Principles Governing the
     Organization of the C. E. C._ [of the Kuomintang] passed ...
     December 6, XXIV (1935), "the Central Executive Committee
     organizes a Political Committee, composed of a Chairman, a
     Vice-Chairman, and nineteen to twenty-five members,
     appointed by the Central Executive Committee, from among the
     members of the Central Executive Committee and the Control
     Committee." ... "During a session of the Political
     Committee, the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Central
     Standing Committees, the President of the National
     Government, the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Five
     _Yüan_, and the President and Vice-President of the Military
     Affairs Commission should be present, while the leading
     members of the special technical committees under the
     [control] Political Committee, and other higher officials of
     the National Government may be notified if necessary to
     attend the sessions." [The author explains that, on the
     basis of actual experience, "may be notified" signifies
     "shall attend if matters relevant to their functions
     arise."] ...

     It was originally fixed that the Political Committee should
     meet once every week, but since December XXIV (1935), it
     holds meetings either weekly or fortnightly. The number of
     members required to constitute a forum is not fixed, and
     resolutions have never been put in the form of motions
     requiring formal vote. Regarding the proposition of a
     motion, and the discussion of motions proposed _ex-tempore_,
     the Political Committee has never fixed any rigid
     regulations; moreover, even if a rule had been established
     at one time, it has not been followed closely later. Before
     being put to a decision, a motion is either studied and
     examined beforehand, or it is not. There is no definite rule
     as to whether every motion should be so studied or not, but
     the Committee possesses the power to decide this point _ad
     hoc_. The entire wording of a motion passed in a meeting is
     rarely fully read, and is then read in the following session
     as the minutes of the previous session. _Hence the Chairman
     and the Secretary-General have a certain liberty in the
     framing of the wording of resolutions. Judging from above
     circumstances, important resolutions passed in the Political
     Committee must actually represent the opinions of the
     Chairman and a small number of influential members...._
     [Italics added in translation.][8]

  [Footnote 8: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited above, p. 658
  _ff._]

Many of these features may reasonably be conjectured to have continued
in the Supreme National Defense Council, although the regular
meetings--whatever others there may be--seem to be considerably less
frequent, occurring presumably about once in five weeks.[9] In the
matter of authority, again, some continuity may be supposed between the
earlier agency and the later. Wang Shih-chieh continues:

     The authority of the Political Committee (or the Political
     Council) has undergone very few changes since its
     establishment. To speak concisely, the Political Committee
     is the highest directing organ of all governmental policies.
     Putting it in more detail, we may say that this Committee
     has the power to decide the basic principles of legislation,
     of governmental policies and their execution, and has also
     the power to appoint and dismiss governmental officials....
     [A footnote adds the following detail.] According to the
     outlines of organization now being enforced, there are still
     five kinds of affairs that should be discussed and decided
     by the Political Committee: (1) the basic principles of
     legislation, (2) the general plans of executing government
     policies, (3) important plans concerning military affairs,
     (4) financial plans, (5) the appointment of officials of the
     Especially Appointed category and of other governmental
     officials, and (6) [_sic_] cases submitted for discussion by
     the Central Executive Committee. The first four may be
     collectively classified under the two names of execution and
     legislation.[10]

  [Footnote 9: For example, the date of the law given in Appendix I (G),
  p. 324, below, is given as August 31, 1939, and it is stated to have
  passed the Council on that date at the _14th_ Regular Session; since
  the Council had been established seventeen months previously, some
  notion of the frequency or length of sessions may thus be derived.]

  [Footnote 10: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 662. The
  author adds that though the Central Political Council possesses ample
  authority to interfere in the specific work of the Judicial,
  Examination, and Control _Yüan_, such authority was rarely exercised,
  the Executive and Legislative _Yüan_ constituting the prime objects of
  its attention.]

Only from such description by analogy may the foreigner penetrate to the
inmost source of Chinese policy. This ambiguous and all-powerful agency,
a Party organ which controls government, a committee constellated about
its charismatic Chairman, is the heir both of the Grand Council of the
Manchu Empire and of the soviets established by Nationalists during the
entente with Soviet Russia. Should the fortune of war remove the
Generalissimo from the scene, this Council would become the storm center
of power; under his guidance and leadership, this agency above all
others distinguishes China from an outright dictatorship. Chiang, unlike
many other national leaders, has consistently shrunk from the regalia of
arbitrary power. In the highest matters, and at the ultimate control,
his action is veiled in the Supreme National Defense Council. The
actual play of personalities and power is hidden from us, his
contemporaries. Only the future may discover the exact degrees and
_modus operandi_ of his authority.


THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

The term National Government (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu_) is employed in two
senses. In the broad sense, it refers to the entire central government
of China. In the narrow sense, it is a synonym for National Government
Committee (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_), commonly translated as
Council of State. The highest governmental officer of China is the
_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Chu-hsi_--literally, the Chairman of the National
Government. Since this officer is the formal head of the National
Government in both senses of the term, his office may with equal
appropriateness be described as Chairmanship of the Council of State and
as Presidency of the National Government. The latter has been most
commonly accepted, although it obscured the clarity of the Chinese
governmental pattern. It is essential to note, however, that in the
National Government period there has been no _President of the Chinese
Republic_; the highest officer has been the _President of the National
Government of the Chinese Republic_, and as such the titular head of the
Chinese state for international purposes. This officer possesses
prestige rather than power, and is roughly analogous to the President of
the Third French Republic.

In his official capacity, the President acts as chairman of the meetings
of the Council of State, performs the ceremonial functions entailed by
his office, and serves as the custodian of the symbols of continuity and
legitimacy. Wang Shih-chieh writes: "... the Chairman more or less
occupies a nominal position. At most, he can give occasional advice,
only within certain limits, to the Executive or other _Yüan_, with no
power at all to decide or to reject the policies adopted by the _Yüan_.
As a matter of fact, from the end of the Year XXI (1932) down to the
present, since the man filling the office of Chairman [President] of the
National Government is very calm and law-abiding, he has never
interfered in the activities or policies of the various _Yüan_."[11]
This officer has been the veteran Kuomintang leader, Lin Shên, long a
resident of the United States, a key man in overseas affairs of the
Party, and a person of much dignity, charm, poise and prestige. With a
long beard and a humane, scholarly demeanor, President Lin has fulfilled
most admirably the requirements of his office.

  [Footnote 11: The same, p. 666.]

Generalissimo Chiang regularly reports on government activities to Lin
_Chu-hsi_, addressing him attentively and respectfully. This is no
perfunctory sham, but appears to be a very real search for advice and
guidance. The two men are close associates and have been such for many
years; the Generalissimo gives every indication of regarding his
venerable colleague with affectionate esteem. During the Chungking
bombings, the President has commonly resided in a secure place outside
the city. He is not needed for the daily prosecution of the war, but
both the office and its incumbent are strongly stabilizing factors in
the National Government. (The Japanophile Wang Ch'ing-wei, establishing
his duplicate regime in Nanking, left the Presidency open for many
months, pirating Lin Shên's name. Finally Wang gave himself the title,
although he patently would have preferred Lin.)


THE COUNCIL OF STATE

The Council of State (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_, National
Government Committee) is the formal governmental core of the Chinese
Republic. Even in peacetime, however, its importance was seriously
undermined by the vigorous activity of the Central Political Council.
The members of the State Council are commonly persons who do not hold
other important office; hence the Council does not include the most
effective leaders. Although its sphere of activity is wide, its role as
ratifier of the decisions of the Supreme National Defense Council
reduces its plenary powers to a shadow. Amnesties, general appropriation
bills, appointments and removals, solemnification of legislation adopted
by the Legislative _Yüan_, and inter-_Yüan_ problems are all within the
scope of the State Council's authority, but except for the power of
organizing and supervising the central independent agencies, subordinate
only to itself, there has been little practical power for it to
exercise.[12]

  [Footnote 12: The same, p. 667-68. The following materials on the
  independent agencies are also adapted in general from Wang
  Shih-chieh's work, although interviews, other materials, and the
  practical experience of the author have been taken into account. From
  1930 to 1937 the author's father, Judge Paul Linebarger, was Legal
  Advisor (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Fa-lü Ku-wên_), directly subordinate to the
  Council of State, and throughout this period the author served as
  Private Secretary to the Legal Advisor, being authorized by the
  Council of State to take charge of the American office of the Advisor
  during the latter's absences from the United States.]

The independent agencies under the Council of State, together with the
latter's relation to the _Yüan_ and the Military Affairs Commission, are
best shown on the chart on p. 55.[13]

  [Footnote 13: Adapted from the Examination _Yüan_, _Tang Chêng Chien
  Chih T'u-piao_, cited; various issues of _The Chinese Year Book_,
  Shanghai and Hong Kong; and [The China Information Committee] _An
  Outline of the Organization of the Kuomintang and the Chinese
  Government_, Chungking, 1940.]

Minor agencies are thus attached directly to the Council of State, which
also serves as a link and common formal superior to the five _Yüan_ and
the Military Affairs Commission. Authority of the Council is directed
primarily upon these agencies which, while minor, serve useful needs.
The Offices of Military (_Tsan-chün Ch'u_) and of Civil Affairs
(_Wên-kuan Ch'u_) are transmission and ceremonial agencies, charged with
the formal correctness of state documents and ceremonies; the military
office was originally designed to carry on more important functions,
including an independent inspectorate of troops, but now seems to be
restricted to matters of protocol. Chinese government has for centuries
operated on the basis of a two-way current of written materials:
memorials, petitions, and other communications come from the provinces
and dominions to the metropolis; orders, laws and other commands flow
outward in response.[14]

  [Footnote 14: For a description of this function in the T'ang dynasty,
  see des Rotours, Baron Robert, _La Traite des Examens_, Paris, 1932,
  _passim_; and see Fairbank, J. K., and Têng, S. Y., "Of the Types and
  Uses of Ch'ing Documents," _Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies_, Vol.
  5, No. 1 (January 1940), particularly p. 5 _ff._, for the Manchu
  empire.]

                THE SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL
                                |
                                |
                President of the National Government

                       THE COUNCIL OF STATE
                             |  |  |
  Election Committee on   }  |  |  |  { Office of the
    Representation in the }  |  |  |  {   Comptroller-General
    People's Congress     }  |  |  |  {
                          }  |  |  |--{ Office of Civil Affairs
  Academia Sinica         }  |  |     {   (Transmission)
                          }  |  |     {
  Commission for the      }--|  |     { Office of Military
    Disciplinary          }     |     {   Affairs (Transmission)
    Punishment of Public  }     |
    Officials             }     |
                          }     |
  Planning Committee for  }     |  { THE MILITARY AFFAIRS
    the Western Capital   }     |  {     COMMISSION
                                |--{   The Chairman
  THE PEOPLES POLITICAL         |  {   The Military Departments
    COUNCIL                     |
                                |  { THE EXECUTIVE _YÜAN_
                                |--{   The Executive Ministries
                                |  {     ("the cabinet")
                                |
                                |--{ THE LEGISLATIVE _YÜAN_
                                |
                                |--{ THE JUDICIAL _YÜAN_
                                |  {   The court system
                                |
                                |--{ THE EXAMINATION _YÜAN_
                                |
                                |--{ THE CONTROL _YÜAN_

The other four agencies directly dependent on the Council of State are
all of important character, but likely to be impaired by a period of
crisis. The Academia Sinica (_Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan_) serves
scientific and educational work through its own research bureaus,
through systems of extended aid, and through a program of publications;
despite war, it has continued, making heroic efforts to preserve the
national cultural vitality and continuity. The three remaining agencies
are of less importance, although the Planning Committee for the Western
Capital (_Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei Wei-yüan-hui_) found its work considerably
extended when, on October 1, 1940, Chungking was formally denominated an
auxiliary capital of the Chinese Republic, and a long-standing
anomaly--that of the city's uncertain status--was removed.

The Council of State could be regarded, therefore, as a mere excrescence
upon the design of government were it not that ceremonial and formal
functions, indispensable to any government but particularly salient in
China, can be delegated to it, and the actual policy-making agencies
thereby stripped down to maximal utility and efficacy.


THE EXECUTIVE _Yüan_

The Executive _Yüan_ is the political organ which includes the
ministries, and is therefore roughly analogous to a cabinet, just as the
Council of State is in loose parallel to a Privy Council. Together with
the Supreme National Defense Council and the Military Affairs
Commission, it exercises actual control over the National Government in
war time. Its growth involves executive giantism, and atrophy for the
remaining _Yüan_. The President (_Yüan-chang_) of the Executive _Yüan_
(_Hsing-chêng Yüan_) is the highest executive officer of the government.
This post has not always been held by Chiang K'ai-shek. At various times
Wang Ch'ing-wei (now in Nanking) and H. H. K'ung (now Minister of
Finance and Vice-President [_Fu-yüan-chang_] of the _Yüan_) have held
this office.

The Executive _Yüan_ may be compared to a parliamentary cabinet in
respect to its relations to the President of the National Government,
but it possesses no authority whatever over the Supreme National Defense
Council, nor over the Kuomintang C. E. C. and the Kuomintang Congress.
It cannot ask for its own dissolution, nor demand the dissolution of the
higher policy-making agency whose will it executes.[15] It resembles a
cabinet, therefore, in its service as a consultative and unifying agency
for the entire executive, but differs in its lack of controlling
interdependence with a broad parliament. Again, the _Yüan_ is unique
among national executive agencies in the modern world with respect to
its division of the task of policy-making and policy-supervising. Most
cabinets consist of meetings of the heads of executive ministries or
departments, with the chief executive officer presiding, but have no
elaborate secretarial or administrative machinery interposed between the
cabinet and its direct subordinates (departments or ministries). The
Executive _Yüan_ is peculiar in possessing two elaborate staff agencies
which handle as much routine work as possible, act as a clearing house
for policy and general administration, and pre-digest a maximum of
problems. The outline on p. 58 illustrates the difference.

  [Footnote 15: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 671.]

All matters short of the most critical moment are referred to one or the
other of the two staff organs (_Mi-shu Ch'u_ or Secretariat, under a
Secretary-General; and _Chêng-wu Ch'u_, or Office of Political
Affairs,[16] under a Director of Political Affairs), which are nominally
separate but actually almost fused, with the Director serving as a sort
of assistant Secretary-General. All official business (other than
crucial matters raised by the members of the Meeting) comes to these
agencies, where it is studied, assorted, and usually settled
provisionally, pending only formal ratification by the Meeting of the
Executive _Yüan_.

  [Footnote 16: Not to be confused with the Office of Civil Affairs
  (_Wên-kuan Ch'u_), adjunct to the Council of State, described above.]

                        THE PRESIDENT OR PREMIER
                                    |
                              THE CABINET
                     _______________________________
                     |          |          |       |
                 Ministry   Ministry   Ministry   etc.
                 (secretarial and administrative staff
                 usually concentrated at this level)

                   THE EXECUTIVE _YÜAN_ PRESIDENT
                                    |
                             THE _YÜAN_ MEETING
       _______________________________________________________
       |          (composed of officers of ministerial rank  |
       |             and presided over by the President)     |
       |                                                     |
  Office of Political Affairs: Sections            Secretariat: Sections
       |             |            |   |                    :       :
       |             |            |   |                    :       :
     ..|.............|............|...|.....................       :
     : |           : |          : |   |________________:__________ :
     : |           : |          : |                 |  :          |:
   Ministry      Ministry     Ministry             Ministry      etc.

The Executive _Yüan_ Meeting occurs once weekly, most commonly on
Tuesday.[17] Each Meeting is presented with a formidable agenda,
prepared by the Secretary-General, and divided into three categories:
reports, matters for discussion, and appointments. The membership of the
Meeting consists of the _Yüan_ President and Vice-President, the
Ministers heading the executive Ministries, and the Chairmen of
Commissions having the rank of Ministry.[18] The work of the Meeting is
carried on in a business-like fashion. The Generalissimo, as incumbent
_Yüan_ President, takes great interest in the work of the _Yüan_, and
makes faithfulness and punctuality in attendance a matter of high
importance. Because of the Japanese air raids over the capital, the
exact place and hour of the weekly meeting are not announced, nor are
the proceedings public.

  [Footnote 17: A brilliant and informative discussion of the practical
  work of the Executive _Yüan_ is to be found in Tsiang Ting-fu,
  "Executive _Yüan_," The Chinese Year Book 1936-37, cited, p. 241-6.]

  [Footnote 18: For these Ministries and Commissions, see the following
  chapter. These are not to be lumped with the Party-Ministries and
  Commissions which, if anything, are even more complex in structure,
  but whose titles follow the same scheme of terminology as that of the
  government.]

In giving effect to the decisions reached by the _Yüan_ Meeting, the
_Yüan_ itself issues orders in its own name for matters which are of
general interest, or which cannot be handled by any single Ministry or
Commission. If the problem is within the province of a particular
agency, the _Yüan_--through its Secretariat--addresses the appropriate
form of intragovernmental communication, and the decision is then set
forth as the order or act of the agency involved. The following subjects
are within the jurisdiction of the Executive _Yüan_:

(1) laws or legal problems submitted for promulgation by the Legislative
_Yüan_;

(2) the budget, also passed _pro forma_ by the Council of State and put
into legal form by the Legislative _Yüan_;

(3) declarations of war and peace, on the motion of the Legislative
_Yüan_;

(4) appointment and discharge of the higher ranks of officials;

(5) matters which cannot be settled by a single Ministry or Commission;

(6) other matters which the _Yüan_ President sees fit to introduce for
discussion or decision.

The Executive _Yüan_ has far outstripped all other _Yüan_ in war-time
growth. Its central position, the urgency of most government business,
and the need for speed have led to this. Executive exercise of the
ordinance-making power has led to the gradual desuetude of the
Legislative _Yüan_, which has found ample work in the preparation of the
Draft Permanent Constitution and the attempt to systematize legislation
in view of rapid territorial and administrative change. The Executive
_Yüan_, by controlling personnel, usually short-circuits the functions
of the Examination and Control _Yüan_; and the Judicial _Yüan_ has never
had practical political parity. Hence, the five-power system must be
regarded as a system with strong executive, weaker legislative,
examinative, and censoral, and dependent judicial divisions. Above the
five powers, the Supreme National Defense Council exercises its august
authority; within them, the Executive stands forth; and to them, in the
course of the war, a new agency, almost comparable to a sixth _yüan_,
has sprung forth with an elaborate bureaucracy of its own: the Military
Affairs Commission.


THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION

Some sense of the perpetual urgencies underlying Chinese government in
the past decade may be obtained by consideration of the Military Affairs
Commission.[19] A similar agency was one of the political wheels on
which the Nationalist-Communist machine rolled victoriously North in the
Great Revolution of 1925-27. After the organization of a relatively
stable government at Nanking, the separate military commission was due
for absorption into the coordinate pattern of government; instead, it
has lingered under one form or another for almost twenty years, growing
great in recurrent crises, while the Ministry of War (which was to have
absorbed it) has become its adjunct. War led to sudden distension of
the Commission, and the creation of an agency comparable to a sixth
_yüan_, if not to a duplicate, shogunal government in the Japanese
sense. The Commission had its own head, its own _Pu_ (Ministries or
Departments), its own staff and field services. Duplicating the regular
government on the one side, and the party administration on the
other, it flowered into bureaucracy so lavishly that a fourth
agency--co-ordinator for the first three--began to be needed.

  [Footnote 19: _Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui_. _The Chinese Year Book_,
  _v.d._, cited, and most of the official publicity from Chungking
  translates this term as "National Military Council," which is far from
  the original, literally "military-affairs-committee." "National
  Military Council" is also easily confused with the Supreme National
  Defense Council. Hence the present translation is employed, following
  Tsang, O. B., _A Supplement to a Complete Chinese-English Dictionary_,
  Shanghai, 1937, and the original.]

Simplicity of government structure has not been a part of the Chinese
tradition; the quasi-state of the Empire had been as elaborate as its
more potent European counterparts; and the foliation of government at
war cannot be taken as _prima facie_ proof of inefficiency. Personnel is
provided by giving each officer two, five, even ten jobs; the work is
done--delegation and counter-delegation frequently cancel out--and the
creation of new agencies does not inescapably involve confusion.

The Military Affairs Commission consists of a Chairman--the
Generalissimo (_Tsung-ssŭ-ling_), who is Chiang K'ai-shek--and seven
to nine other members, all appointed by the Council of State upon
designation by the Supreme National Defense Council.[20] The key
officers of the armed forces are _ex officio_ members, and the
Commission is charged with the military side of the prosecution of the
war. Its power has been liberally interpreted. New agencies have been
attached to it as they arose; now it deals with social work, relief,
education, agitation, propaganda, espionage, government-sponsored
"social revolution," and many economic matters in addition to its
narrowly military affairs.

  [Footnote 20: See Ho Yao-tsu, "The National Military Council," in _The
  Chinese Year Book, 1938-39_, cited, p. 361-3; Carlson, Evans Fordyce,
  _The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency_, New
  York, 1940, p. 26 _ff._; and frequent references in _China At War_ and
  the _News Release_ of the China Information Committee, both
  semiofficial, particularly the issue of the latter for July 15, 1939.
  A list of the highest military personnel and brief outline of the
  General Staff may be found in Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, _The China
  Year Book 1939_, Shanghai, n. d., p. 216-17, and p. 225.]

The work of the Commission falls into two parts. On the one hand, it is
the supreme directing agency for all the armies; on the other, the
managing agency for a variegated war effort away from the combat lines.
The Commission's work in theory covers all armies, but in practice
confines its supervisory powers to the forces in Free China and--less
clearly--to the major guerrilla units in the occupied areas.

The Commission's governmental structure coordinates military and
political functions. The Chief of the General Staff serves as assistant
to the Chairman of the Commission. The Main Office serves to smooth
interdepartmental affairs and to act as a central clearing point for
orders and other transmissions. Beneath the Commission and the main
office, there are twelve divisions with the rank of _Pu_. The Department
of Military Operations (_Chün-ling-pu_) serves as a military planning
and strategic agency. The Department of Military Training
(_Chün-hsün-pu_) supervises training facilities, military schools, and
in-service training.[21] The Directorate-General of Courts-Martial
(_Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu_) and Pensions Commission (_Fu-hsüeh
Wei-yüan-hui_) are explained by their titles; the pension program is
probably behind that of every Western power, and the personal grants
made by the Generalissimo under his own extra-governmental arrangements
are more effective than governmental pensions. The Military Advisory
Council (_Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan_) acts as a research and consultative
body, in no sense cameral. An Administration of Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü
T'ing_) applies some principles of the merit system. A Service
Department (_Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu_) is in charge of transportation,
supplies, and sanitation. The National Aviation Commission (_Hang-k'ung
Wei-yüan-hui_) has won world-wide fame for its spectacular work in
procuring a Chinese air arm, and in keeping Chinese air power alive
against tremendous odds of finance, transportation, equipment, and
personnel; Mme. Chiang's association with and interest in its success
has been of material aid. Finally, on the strictly military side, there
is the Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief (_Hai-chün
Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu_), formerly the Naval Ministry, controlling the
up-river remnants of the navy. The War Ministry (_Chün-chêng-pu_)
occupies an anomalous position in this scheme. Subordinate to the
Executive _Yüan_, it is also subordinate to the Commission, so that in
effect it is a Ministry twice over, and is even shown as two ministries
on occasion.[22] General Ho Ying-chin, as Minister of War, is
subordinate to the Generalissimo as _Wei-yüan-chang_ (Chairman) of the
Commission.

  [Footnote 21: Descriptions of the subordinate organs of all these
  agencies but the Pensions Commission and the War-Area Commission will
  be found in Ho Yao-tsu, cited immediately above. The translations of
  the titles here given, however, are those of the author.]

  [Footnote 22: As an instance, see _Outline of the Organization of the
  Kuomintang_ ..., cited above, p. 54, n.^{13}.]

The two remaining agencies of the Commission are of considerable
interest. A system of having political commissars in the army, a Soviet
device, was adopted by the Kuomintang forces when first organized under
Chiang K'ai-shek, and political training accounted for much
of that success of the Northward drive (1926-27). After the
Nationalist-Communist split, political training as such fell into
considerable disuse, and was replaced by ethical training provided by
the Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps.[23] With the renewed entente, and
war of national union for defense, a Political Department
(_Chêng-chih-pu_) was established. A graceful tribute to Communist skill
in combining war and agitation was paid when Chou En-lai, the celebrated
Red general, was designated Vice-Minister of this Department. One of the
Generalissimo's most orthodox and able subordinates was made Minister.
The Political Department extends its function in an enormous sweep
across China, and renders aid in military education within the armies,
in civilian organization, and in war propaganda. Active and omnipresent,
it is an excellent instance of functioning national unity.

  [Footnote 23: This is a semi-official agency sponsored by the
  Generalissimo. See below, p. 149. The new war-time change is well
  illustrated by the following statement: "Special commissioners were
  assigned to every group army, and political departments in the
  divisions were augmented. Enough political directors were assigned to
  every company of troops withdrawn from the front for reorganization,
  and to Chinese forces behind the enemy lines. In addition, political
  corps were formed to organize and train civilians. Because of the lack
  of personnel, so far there have been no political officers in units
  engaged in military operations.

  "Conscious and hard-working, the political officers have done much to
  remove irritations which used to occur between the commanding officers
  and the political men....

  "Political work in the army formerly consisted in a weekly or
  fortnightly talk by the officers, whereas now well-planned lessons on
  political subjects, reading classes, discussion groups, individual
  conversations and twilight meetings are conducted with clockwise
  regularity. Singing, theatricals, cartooning, sports, are promoted
  among the soldiers so long as they do not jeopardize their discipline.
  Among the civilians, the political officers have also been active. The
  organization of people's service corps, self-defense units in areas
  close to the war areas and money contributions to the war chest from
  people in the rear are a few of their accomplishments." China
  Information Committee, _News Release_, October 2, 1939.

  The comment of Generalissimo Chiang in the interview on p. 371 is,
  despite its laconicism, relevant to this topic. A further discussion
  is available in Chên Chêng, "Three Years of Political Training Work,"
  _The China Quarterly_, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn 1940), p. 581-5.]

The Party and Government War Area Commission (_Chan-ti Tang-chêng
Wei-yüan-hui_) is a coordinate agency for propaganda, relief, and
social, economic and military counter-attack within the war area (the
occupied zone), rather unusual in being a formal amalgamation of
Kuomintang and government administration. Through this agency most of
the guerrilla aid is extended, and the Nationalists seek to rival the
Communists and independents in the number of Japanese they can destroy,
or the amount of damage they can do. The more active branches of this
Commission are a part of the Party structure, but the dual function of
the Commission enables it to coordinate Party and Army work. The very
role of the Commission is indicative of the fact that the Kuomintang is
trying to meet rivalry by patriotic competition and not by suppression.
Its integration with the military makes it a perfect example of the
triune force which Nationalist China is bringing to bear on the
enemy--army, government, and Party all seek to reach into the occupied
zone, to articulate spontaneous mass resistance, to maintain the
authority of the central government pending the _révanche_, and to
uphold the existing political system, canalizing social change into
evolutionary rather than class-war lines.[24]

  [Footnote 24: The official view of this work, silent on the
  competition of the Communists and independents, is found in Li
  Chai-sum, "Chinese Government Organization behind the Enemy Lines,"
  last citation above, p. 595-600.]


THE JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, EXAMINATION AND CONTROL _Yüan_

The appearance of an actual three-power administration--army,
government, Party--has led to the sharp relative decrease in importance
of the four further _Yüan_. The Judicial _Yüan_ (_Ssŭ-fa Yüan_) was
even in peace time the least important of the five divisions of the
government, failing to display--as an American might expect--a tendency
toward effective judicial independence to counterweight the executive
and legislative. The Legislative _Yüan_ (_Li-fa Yüan_), while
exceedingly active in the years between the Mukden and Loukouchiao
incidents, has been reduced in importance by the coming of hostilities.
Its work has been confined largely to drafting the Permanent
Constitution, and continued codification of administrative
law--particularly for coordination of central government and war area
(occupied China) affairs.[25] The Examination _Yüan_ (_K'ao-shih Yüan_)
has attempted to continue in the field of civil service reform, and the
Control _Yüan_ (_Chien-ch'a Yüan_) has maintained war-time efforts.

  [Footnote 25: Statement to the author by Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), President
  of the Legislative _Yüan_, Chungking, July 17, 1940. A summary of the
  work of the _Yüan_ will be found in various issues of _The Chinese
  Year Book_; in Escarra, Jean, _Le Droit Chinois_, cited above,
  containing bibliographies; and in Tyau, M. T. Z., "The Work and
  Organization of the Legislative _Yüan_," _The China Quarterly_, Vol.
  2, No. 1 (Christmas Number, 1936), p. 73-88.]

The Legislative _Yüan_, under the _Yüeh Fa_ of 1931, consists of a
_Yüan-chang_, a _Fu-yüan-chang_, and forty-nine to ninety-nine members
(_Li-fa Wei-yüan_), appointed by the Supreme National Defense Council
for a two-year term upon nomination by the _Yüan_ President. The term's
shortness increases the dependence of members upon the President, and
transforms the _Yüan_ to a legislative study institute. Furthermore, the
newly-developed People's Political Council has assumed the function of
representation. The President of the _Yüan_ retains sole and arbitrary
power over the agenda, the final decision, and the allocation of
personnel, although the incumbent, Dr. Sun K'ê, is one of China's
leading moderates and an exponent of constitutional process, not likely
to exercise arbitrary power.

Apart from its significant constitutional powers, which remain
unimpaired, the _Yüan_ finds much of its work performed at present
through ordinances of the Supreme National Defense Council,
administrative action of the Executive _Yüan_, or commands by the
Military Affairs Commission. The jurisdiction retained includes:

     (1) general legislation;

     (2) the budget;

     (3) general amnesty;

     (4) declaration of war (never exercised);

     (5) declaration of peace;

     (6) "other important matters" (which, in practice, has
     referred to the more open and solemn aspects of
     treaty-making, and whatever topic may be assigned the _Yüan_
     by the highest Party agency).[26]

  [Footnote 26: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 676
  _ff._]

The Judicial _Yüan_ serves as an administrative and budgetary agency for
four agencies. The Ministry of Justice (_Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu_) is,
obviously, the prosecuting agency, attached to the executive in the
United States, but made a part of the general judicial system in China.
The Administrative Court (_Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan_) is an agency only
potentially important; so is the Commission for the Disciplinary
Punishment of Public Officers (_Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh
Wei-yüan-hui_). The _Yüan_ President is _ex officio_ chief magistrate of
the Supreme Court (_Tsui-kao Fa-yüan_). Wang Shih-chieh says of this
_Yüan_:

     Because of the fact that the Judicial _Yüan_ is itself not
     an organ of adjudication, and since all affairs concerning
     prosecution at law are handled by the Ministry of Justice,
     the actual work to be performed by the Judicial _Yüan_ is
     very simple and light. In addition to framing the budget for
     the _Yüan_ itself and approving the general estimates of the
     organs under it, the Judicial _Yüan_ has only three further
     duties to perform: (1) to bring before the Legislative
     _Yüan_ legislative measures connected with the Judicial
     _Yüan_ and its sub-organs; (2) to petition the President of
     the National Government with respect to such cases as
     special pardon, commutation of sentence, and the restoration
     of civil rights; and (3) to unify the interpretation of laws
     and orders, and changes in judicial procedure.[27]

  [Footnote 27: The same, p. 691.]

With peace, reconstruction and prosperity, the Judicial _Yüan_ might
acquire importance through its control of the administrative and
technical aspects of the court system. Meanwhile, courts are more
closely associated with their respective levels or areas of government
than with one another in a unified judicial system.

The Examination _Yüan_, with a President and Vice-President, is composed
of a central _Yüan_ office, which supervises two organs: the Ministry of
Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü Pu_), operating a selective promotion system, and
the Examinations Commission (_K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui_). In absolute
numbers, few examinations have been held. In practice, standard
recruitment technique continues to involve introduction, influence, or
family connections. The familiarity of such devices in China at least
gives them a high polish, and precludes utter inefficiency. Under the
circumstances, the Examination _Yüan_ finds scope for valuable, creative
work in the preparation of administrative studies and analyses of very
considerable importance.

The Control _Yüan_ is of interest to Westerners, because of the novelty
of its functions. Through the courtesy of the _Yüan_ President, a full
official memorandum on the structure and procedure was prepared,
surveying the work of the _Yüan_ during the course of the war. This is
reproduced as Appendices I (E) and I (F) below.[28] Some of the
unofficial observers, both Western and Chinese, felt that the _Yüan_
possessed further enormous possibilities of activity, and that the need
for controlment was very great indeed. In general, the _Yüan_ resembles
its legislative, judicial and examination coordinates, in that the
war-time executive growth has relegated it to a secondary position.

  [Footnote 28: See p. 313 and p. 318.]

Decrease in the importance of the _yüan_ system during hostilities
cannot be taken, by a too simple cause-and-effect argument, as proof of
the unwieldy or impractical character of this five-power system.
Measured on a scale of other world governments, success is slow; but it
is enormous in contrast to other Chinese central political institutions.
At present, it is most improbable that the form of government will be
changed, save in the event of catastrophe beyond all reckoning.




CHAPTER III

CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS


The outbreak and continuance of war has left the fulcrum of power
relatively untouched. The highest organs of state are primarily in
Kuomintang hands; the Party Chief of the Kuomintang is, even at law,
governmentally more important today than in 1937; and the constitutional
monopoly of power remains under the Kuomintang. Even changes in the
highest organs--such as establishment of the Supreme National Defense
Council and the Military Affairs Commission--have left very little
impress on the sources of power. Reforms have altered only the mode of
power, not its tenure.

Modifications have, however, been introduced at the level of government
just below the apex. These are important in two remarkable ways. The
People's Political Council (_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_) admixed an
ingredient of representation which (save for the Party) had been lacking
since the dubious, betrayed, inaugural years of the Republic.
Furthermore, sweeping administrative reorganization and reinvigoration
made possible the vitalization of the central government in the course
of the war, so that despite Japanese pressure and rising Leftist
rivalry, the National Government is, on any absolute scale, becoming
more powerful year by year.


THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL COUNCIL

The People's Political Council was established by order of the Emergency
Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress held in Hankow, March 1938. Its
creation was a compromise measure between the proposal for a
European-type United Front government, based on popular elections to a
National Convention, and a continuation of the Kuomintang monopoly of
government hitherto prevalent. Like many similar compromises in other
countries, the institution has proved its viable and useful character.
Without exaggeration, it may be stated to be the closest approximation
of representative government which China has ever known. Simple,
improvised, legally an instrument promising little independence or
_élan_ in its work, the Council demonstrates the effectiveness of the
Chinese when purpose accompanies design. Formally the least
representative of the Chinese constitutional parliaments, congresses, or
conventions, the Council is the first to get down to business
and--almost unexpectedly--to represent!

Membership, originally set at 150, was raised before the First Session
to 200, and again in the autumn of 1940 to 240.[1] The number, unlike
the 1681 tentatively projected for the People's Congress, is small
enough to allow genuine discussion and to avoid unwieldiness.
Attendance, considering war-time hazards, has been very good, with
between two-thirds and four-fifths of the members usually present.

  [Footnote 1: China Information Committee, _News Release_, Chungking,
  September 30, 1940; and the same, December 30, 1940.]

Although the Council was designed to meet quarterly by its fundamental
Statute,[2] it soon changed to semi-annual sessions and has actually met
at intervals running from six to eight months. Each session lasted for
ten days (legislative, not calendar).[3] As the Council sessions
recurred, the Council became more and more free and representative.
Despite the narrowness of its legal foundations, the Council has
provided invaluable exercise in the arts of democratic discussion.

  [Footnote 2: Wang Shih-chieh, "The People's Political Council," _The
  Chinese Year Book 1938-39_, cited, p. 346-55; the same, _The People's
  Political Council_, [Chungking], [1939?], pamphlet, reprinted from
  _The China Quarterly_, Vol. 4, No. I (Winter 1938-39). Dr. Wang's
  contributions, brief as they are, worthily supplement his pre-war
  constitutional studies, and provide the most carefully annotated data
  on the Council which the present author has found. The list of members
  given in the first article, above, is one of the most interesting
  documents of our time, giving, as it does, the residence, profession,
  and age of each Councillor. Beside "Former Prime Minister" one finds
  "Living Buddha attached to the Panchen Lama," "Reserve Member,
  Executive Committee, the Third International," "Professor, National
  Peking University" and "Head of the Mêng Clan, Descendants of
  Mencius."]

  [Footnote 3: Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, _The China Year Book, 1939_,
  Shanghai, n. d., Ch. IX, "The Kuomintang and the Government," contains
  a detailed summary of the first two sessions of the People's Political
  Council (p. 231-7). Quigley, Harold S., "Free China," _International
  Conciliation_, No. 359 (April 1940), includes a judicious appraisal of
  the work and meaning of the Council in its first two and one-half
  years (p. 137-8).]

As a technique of representation, the Council's recruitment system is
novel. The membership was, while the Council's total was at 200, divided
into the following four categories:

  _Group A_: representatives of the Provinces and Special
             Municipalities--88;
  _Group B_: four representatives for or from Mongolia and two for or
             from Tibet--6;
  _Group C_: representatives for or from the overseas Chinese--6;
  _Group D_: representatives of cultural, professional, and economic
             bodies, or persons who have been active in political
             leadership--100.

There were no elections. In the case of Group A candidates, nominations
were made by municipal or provincial governing bodies in joint session
with the Kuomintang Party organ of corresponding location and level.
Group B candidates were nominated by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs
Commission. Group C candidates were nominated by the Overseas Chinese
Affairs Commission in the Executive _Yüan_. Group D candidates, which
included the representatives of the Communists and independent Left,
were nominated by the Supreme National Defense Council. Two candidates
could be presented for each seat on the Council. Subject to a minor
detour or two on qualifications or for other reasons,[4] the final
selection or election was made by the Central Executive Committee of the
Kuomintang.

  [Footnote 4: Wang Shih-chieh, "The People's Political Council," cited,
  p. 346 _ff._ The new system, inaugurated early in 1941, provided for
  90 members to be directly elected by Provincial and Municipal People's
  Political Councils.]

Thus, an independent or Leftist, whose life had been more or less in
danger for years, because of his hostility to the Kuomintang and its
policies, might find himself nominated for the Council by the
Kuomintang's highest government-supervising agency, and elected by the
Kuomintang's highest Party agency. Leaders of the hitherto suppressed,
still technically illegal parties and factions--which meant all save the
Kuomintang--were designated representatives through the fiction of
selection for individual merits. They might take an active share in
hammering out policy, and--on the same day--find themselves legally
debarred from overt public expression of their own party work. By this
device, the Kuomintang provided a safety-valve for opposition without
touching the apparatus of its own power.

Had the Kuomintang leaders been obtuse and made the Council something
less than a genuine sounding board for public opinion, or had they
picked unrepresentative members of the other groups, the whole
experiment would have failed. In practice, the compromise worked and
gave China a focus for the national concentration of will.

The Council did not elect its own Speaker (_I-chang_) and Deputy-Speaker
(_Fu I-chang_); these were elected for it by the Central Executive
Committee of the Kuomintang. Down to 1940, the Council elected a
Resident Committee of fifteen to twenty-five members from its own
membership; under a recent reorganization, this and the Speaker and
Vice-Speaker are to be replaced by a Presidium, to be elected by but not
necessarily from among the Council, to consist of five members and to
hold the authority of designating presiding officers. This would amount
to a further step in the independence of the Council. In both cases, the
Secretariat (_Mi-shu-ch'u_) of the Council is to be under a
Secretary-General (_Mi-shu-chang_) and Deputy Secretary-General (_Fu
Mi-shu-chang_) and to include services of correspondence, general
affairs, Council affairs, and police.[5]

  [Footnote 5: _Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao_, cited, chart of the
  _Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_.]

With respect to competence, the Council is possessed of three powers:

(1) the right to deliberate on all important measures, whether of
domestic or foreign policy, before these are enacted into law by the
Central Government (but not, however, the right of making such law);

(2) the right to submit proposals to the government (but since the
Supreme National Defense Council is the highest government-directing
agency in China, its concurrence is patently necessary);

(3) the right to demand and hear reports from the _Yüan_ and the
Ministries, and to interpellate the officers of state.

The distinguished Chinese constitutional scholar, Wang Shih-chieh,
Secretary-General of the People's Political Council (Generalissimo
Chiang himself being the Speaker) writes of its functions:

     From the foregoing description, the peculiarities of the
     People's Political Council may be clearly seen. It is not an
     advisory body of the Government in the ordinary conception
     of the term, because the Government is bound, except in
     emergency cases, to submit to it for consideration all
     important measures before they are carried out. The Council
     possesses not only the power to advise, but also the right
     to be consulted. Nor is it a legislative organ, as all its
     resolutions merely embody broad principles of legislation or
     administration, i.e., lines of policy which, even after
     being assented to by the Supreme National Defense Council,
     will still have to go through the ordinary legislative or
     ordinance-making process in order to become laws or
     administrative ordinances.

     As regards the representative character of the Council, it
     rests not so much with the method by which the Councillors
     are chosen, as with the fact that, being composed of men and
     women most of whom enjoy wide popularity or respect in one
     way or another, the Council can really speak for almost all
     the articulate group-interests of the nation. In the less
     than 30 years of China's experience in republican
     government, numerous experiments had been attempted at
     representative government before the convention of the
     People's Political Council. Few of these were deficient in
     theoretic grandiloquence, but none of them was found to be
     serviceable in practical applicability.

     Theoretically, the Council is not a popular assembly; but,
     as I remarked elsewhere,[*] "it is open to question whether
     any form of election by popular suffrage can result in so
     truly representative a body." Even with reference to the
     limited scope of the Council's powers, I submit that the
     provision represents a progressive step in that any
     alternative that is less realistic would impede rather than
     facilitate the contributive work of the Council.[6]

  [Footnote *: _Chinese Year Book, 1938_, Chap. 17. [Wang Shih-chieh's
  note.]]

  [Footnote 6: Wang Shih-chieh, _The People's Political Council_, cited,
  p. 5. Obvious misprints have been corrected.]

The author adds that the resolutions have tended to be of an
extraordinarily practical character, and that bombast has remained
conspicuously absent.

The procedure of the Council has been kept very simple. A quorum
requires only a simple majority (101 members), and a simple majority of
a quorum (51) is all that is needed to pass a resolution. To ensure the
proper spacing of the calendar, all resolutions initiating new business
must come within the first four days of the ten-day session.
Introduction may not be completed by the action of a single member; a
petition of 20 members, one proposing and 19 endorsing, is necessary for
introduction. Reference may then be either to the plenary session or to
the committees. (There are five standing committees--military, foreign,
civil, financial and economic, educational and cultural affairs--which
provide further facilities through subdivision into subcommittees, or
through the addition of special committees.) Reports by the government
are introduced during the first three days of each session.[7]

  [Footnote 7: The author is indebted for some of these facts to an
  interview with Dr. Wang Shih-chieh in Chungking on August 1, 1940.]

Members cannot waste time over the pork-barrel, log-rolling, riders, or
minor fiscal questions. Since they all have the same constituency at
law, and that constituency--the C. E. C. of the Kuomintang--asks nothing
of them except representation of their moral constituencies--the groups
and areas from which they derive, Councillors are untroubled by
constituents or appropriations. The budget is submitted by the
government to the Council for approval, not enactment. Salaries of the
Councillors are nil. Each is given Ch. $350.00 (about U. S. $20.00) per
mouth for expenses, without regard to mileage, and even overseas Chinese
representatives receive no further emoluments. Since government
officials are excluded from membership, use of a Council seat for
purposes of preferment is precluded.

A liberalization of representation and of procedure occurred early in
1941. A new Council--involving the first turnover in membership since
1938--was elected. Educational and other unofficial representatives
obtained an additional twenty seats on the Council. The changes were
scarcely sufficient to compensate for the further postponement of the
promised Constitution, but they indicated a willingness of the
government to meet demands for democratization. Procedural changes
increased the effectiveness of individual members. A minor but
characteristic feature was the increase in number and importance of
women members.

Partisan organization in the Council, although elementary, has begun to
function. Each clique has informal caucuses; careful scrutiny discloses
the presence of whips from these caucuses on the floor. The groupings in
the Council are so fluid that they can be variously classified by
persons with different viewpoints. (Formally, of course, everyone is
either Kuomintang or non-Party, even though _The Chinese Year Book_,
under informal Chungking government sponsorship, proudly lists the high
rank of the Communist members of the Council--"Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming),
[age] 33, [province] Anhwei, [remarks] Member, Presidium, Central
Executive Committee, the Third International.")[8] The popular
classification of the Council cliques, commonly seen in the press, is
based on the Four Parties (_Ssŭ Tang_) and the Four Cliques (_Ssŭ
P'ai_). The four parties are the Kuomintang, National Socialist,
Communist, and _La Jeunesse_.[9] The Four Cliques, which according to
popular credence, formed soon after the first meetings of the Council,
are based on intellectual sympathy and the interplay of temperaments,
and not on dogma.

  [Footnote 8: _1938-39_ issue, p. 351.]

  [Footnote 9: Described below, p. 159 _ff._]

The most Leftist clique is believed to be the _Hua-chung P'ai_ (Central
China Clique), with the National Salvationists' Seven Gentlemen at their
core. Deeply sympathetic with the masses, and violently patriotic, this
group helped to bring about the war by opposing appeasement.
Like-thinking Council members, however affiliated, are believed to fall
under the legislative leadership of the Central China Clique. Near to
this, still far to the Left of the government, is the _Tungpei P'ai_
(Northeast Clique). The Northeastern Manchurian Chinese officers,
exiled in the Northwest, were the first bridge between the Communists
and the rest of the country. Since their native provinces and kinsfolk
have had almost ten years' Japanese domination, the Northeast group is
emphatic in demands for national unity. Communists circulate from one
group to the other, always cooperative in offering their leadership on
the basis of a United Front, which the Comintern still decrees for the
Far East after jettisoning the Popular Fronts of Europe.

The two relatively Rightist cliques are the _Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai_
(Vocational Educationists' Clique) and the _Chiao-shou P'ai_
(Professors' Clique). Composed of men still so far from attaining office
that they possess perfect freedom of criticism, they therefore stand
Left of the government in daily comment, although they may be Right of
it in theory. The former group stresses simple, direct problems: it
seeks to attack the opium problem, disease, illiteracy, and so forth,
without necessarily fighting the social revolution against the
landlords. It derives its name from two distinguished leaders of the
vocational education movement who have abstained from active political
work until finding a forum in the Council. The Professors' Clique is
reputedly led by the group of young professors who were eminent in their
fields before the outbreak of war, opposed to the government's
appeasement policy, but tactful enough not to rebel. They are considered
to stand as far Right as anyone on the Council--that is, to discuss
politics in terms of soundness of public policy, budgetary
reasonableness, immediate practicality, and other common-sense
standards, which appear conservative beside the fervid idealism of their
colleagues.

The description of the _Ssŭ P'ai_ just given is one which exists in
the popular credence. A more authoritative source placed the groups in
the Council under the following four headings:

  (1) the Kuomintang and non-Party majority;
  (2) the _La Jeunesse_ Party and the National Socialists;
  (3) the Communists;
  (4) the "Popular Front" group, including the intellectuals and the
      National Salvationists.

On this basis, the Kuomintang would retain its working control of the
Council, which appears to be the case, in terms of work performed. The
unaffiliated majority, selected by their local governments and
Kuomintang offices and elected by the Kuomintang C. E. C., would in
doubtful cases be inclined to turn to Kuomintang leadership. The _La
Jeunesse_ Party, despite the fact that it is a Western-returned student
organization, is strong in Szechuan; its influence could be expected to
run with that of the National Socialists. Both parties, while minute,
are decidedly averse to Communist fellow-travelling and not at all
disposed to alter the _status quo_, except to carve modest niches for
themselves and to advance their programs in an agreeable way. The
Communists stand alone, although they offer their cooperation to the
independents.

The Popular Front group is a category widely recognized in China--the
Left Kuomintang, the discontented idealists, the irrepressible patriots,
the minor parties, the indefatigable conspirators of Chinese hopefulness
who are always on the scene. For years they have been unforgotten
witnesses to the ferocious integrity of ideals which (in individuals
scattered at random at all levels of society) call Chinese out of the
lethargy of being very practical.

The Popular Front leaders, more than any other in China, have withstood
perennial temptation for years and have kept their activities, under
whatever name undertaken, intact. They can be distinguished from other
Party leaders, both Nationalist and Communist, by the facts that they
have never set up a government, with jobs in it for themselves; have
never controlled a government, save through lacunae in power politics;
and have never preserved a government which they did control.
Warm-hearted, philanthropic, patriotic, their shrill zeal has been
audible in China for many years. Without formal organization, they have
stood behind others who sought real power, and today--between the cold,
realistic leaders of the two opposing Parties--are assembled,
ever-hopeful, and advocating a Popular Front.

The Secretary-General stated to the author that he regarded three of the
Council's contributions as of history-making importance. First, the
Council openly expressed a Chinese national unity unprecedented in
modern history. Forms apart, never before had a crisis found all Chinese
so united; the Council gave a symbol to that unity. Second, the Council
raised the probability of successful democratic processes in China.
Failures under the Peking parliaments had reduced democratic discussion
to a sham. The Council erased this discredit, making many people believe
that democracy promises a real value to the country--not merely as an
ideal, but as a practicable means of government. This contribution was
reinforced by a third: the Council actually served to make definite,
serious, concrete improvements in government and Kuomintang structure,
through criticism and through the issues aired.


THE ADMINISTRATIVE PATTERN

Central policy-making is complicated by a trifurcation of organs--Party
Headquarters, Military Affairs Commission, and Executive _Yüan_. For
example, the nation's publicity and broadcasting services, as well as
direction of the official news agencies, are under the (Kuomintang)
Party-Ministry of Publicity, while the Foreign Office possesses its own
publicity organs for the international relations field, and the
Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission handles much
domestic propaganda and agitation. The strictly governmental, permanent
administrative agencies are simplified from their pre-war complexity, as
the following list will show:

  EXECUTIVE _Yüan_

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    Ministry of the Interior
    Ministry of Finance
    Ministry of Economic Affairs (to be reorganized)
    Ministry of Social Affairs (pending)
    Ministry of Education
    Ministry of Communications
    Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
    Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs
    Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs
    National Relief Commission
    Ministry of War (also under the Military Affairs Commission)
    Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry
      (pending; status uncertain)

  JUDICIAL _Yüan_

    Ministry of Justice

  CONTROL _Yüan_

    Ministry of Audit

  EXAMINATION _Yüan_

    Ministry of Personnel
    Examination Commission

The Ministries outside the Executive are well adapted to their
respective _Yüan_, although Americans may think the Ministry of Justice
misplaced. The Executive Ministries form the heart of the administrative
system, immediately below the cabinet (Executive _Yüan_ Meeting). The
Party scaffolding is to be torn down with constitutionalization; the
military scaffolding, with peace. The administrative organs at the
center will then bear the real burden of nourishing and protecting the
nation which now they help to create.

Despite strong Chinese imprints, the central administrative agencies are
organizationally more Westernized than the policy-making agencies. For
this reason, and because administrative emphasis is on matters economic
(outside the scope of the present work), the reader is referred to other
sources for a detailed appraisal of the work of the ministries.
Particularly fortunate is it that _China Shall Rise Again_, partly
written and partly edited by Madame Chiang K'ai-shek,[10] has been
published, including authoritative statements by the leading ministers
on the work of their respective ministries.

  [Footnote 10: May-ling Soong Chiang (Madame Chiang K'ai-shek), _China
  Shall Rise Again_, New York, 1941. Chinese economic developments are
  the subject of careful study by the Institute of Pacific Relations,
  whose _Far Eastern Survey_ follows contemporary developments closely
  and whose _Inquiry Series_ offers a monumental collection of linked
  works on Pacific affairs, with particular stress on the economic
  background to politics. The volume in this series on Chinese political
  development, by Lawrence K. Rosinger, may be expected to fill an
  important gap in the literature on China today.]

The Ministries (_pu_) may be classified into three groups, according to
the major tenor of their work: political, social and cultural, and
economic. Military defense through economic development and social
reconstruction remains their common goal, however divergent the
approaches.


THE POLITICAL MINISTRIES

Senior and most famous of all Chinese ministries is that of Foreign
Affairs (_Wai-chiao Pu_). It inherits the splendid traditions of Chinese
diplomacy, dating back to the redoubtable Pan Ch'ao, who almost
single-handed conquered Central Asia in the first century A.D. by
unsleeping guile and consistent boldness. Modern Chinese diplomacy has
made the best of a hundred years of defeat, successfully exploiting the
mutual suspicions of the imperialist powers. The morale and
professional cohesion are high. Despite incessant political changes,
the foreign office and diplomatic service have preserved their
continuity from the Empire to the present. The Chungking government
probably possesses a foreign office superior to the Gaimusho of
Tokyo.[11]

  [Footnote 11: For the latest description of the organization of the
  _Wai-chiao Pu_, see Wang Ch'ung-hui, "China's Foreign Relations during
  the Sino-Japanese Hostilities 1937-1940," Chapter XIII of Chiang,
  May-ling Soong, _China Shall Rise Again_, cited, p. 139-40.]

The effectiveness of Chinese international statesmanship has aroused an
almost superstitious dread among the Japanese, publicists, officials,
and others. Japan consistently complains that China is superior at
propaganda, and sees, behind the world-wide mistrust of Japan, occult
forces from the Comintern or vile Chinese guile. After they perpetrated
the Nanking horrors, insulted neutral men and women in Tientsin,
machine-gunned a British ambassador, sank an American gunboat, and
violated all available international law, the Japanese believed that
British and American lack of sympathy was mostly due to the machinations
of Chinese diplomacy. The recent Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang
Ch'ung-hui, a former Judge of the Permanent Court of International
Justice (World Court), is one of the modern world's greatest legal
scholars. Eminent in political leadership ever since the first
foundation of the Republic, he has always urged moderation, legality,
and intelligence in government.

The Ministry of the Interior (_Nei-chêng Pu_) forms the apex to China's
constitutional system of provincial and local governments. In accordance
with Sun Yat-sen's teaching, the National Government has consistently
sought to reduce the importance of the provinces and to foster direct
local-central intergovernmental relationships. The importance of this
ministry is reduced somewhat by the fact that other agencies possess
their own field services, and are therefore not obliged to route policy
through it, but it remains significant because of its control and
supervision of China-wide administrative development. The National
Health Administration (_Wei-shêng Shu_), formerly separate, is now a
department of this Ministry.


SOCIAL AND CULTURAL AGENCIES

The Ministry of Education (_Chiao-yü Pu_) has continued active despite
the war. The heroic marches of the Chinese universities to their new
homes in the West have become a world-famous epic. Students, faculty,
and staffs moved out of the sinister zones of enemy occupation, usually
travelling on foot, until they found new homes hundreds or even
thousands of miles from their original locations. Some colleges have
found homes in old temples or in caves where, with a minimum of
equipment and library material, they continue their work. Others, more
fortunate, have become guests of West China institutions. West China
Union University in Chengtu has four other universities on its campus,
all using the same facilities for the duration of the war. Still other
institutions have been consolidated.

The Ministry of Education has subsidized education as generously as
possible, and fosters progress despite the war and because of it. In
spite of all handicaps, institutions of higher learning have risen in
number from 91 in 1937-38 to 102 in 1939-40, with a corresponding rise
in enrollment of 31,188 to 41,494.[12] The entering class for 1940-41
was about 12,000, indicating a continued rise.[13]

  [Footnote 12: _China at War_, Vol. V, No. 2 (October 1940), p. 37.]

  [Footnote 13: The same, Vol. V, No. 4 (November 1940), p. 78. See also
  Wu Yi-fang and Price, Frank W., _China Rediscovers Her West_, New
  York, 1940; Chapter VII, "Holding the Educational Front" (p. 69-76) is
  by Y. G. Chen, President of the University of Nanking. The entire work
  edited by Messrs. Wu and Price is of value; written from the
  missionary point of view, it presents first-hand statements of affairs
  on Western China, and continues with liberal and socially conscious
  appraisals of the needs of Christian work.]

In addition to the accredited institutions, there are innumerable
volunteer agencies, some of which are patriotic but educationally
elementary schools for saboteurs, agitators, and guerrillas. Education
is propaganda, but such is its immediate appeal that Left schools obtain
capacity attendance. A few students are disappointed. One wrote, "The
most unpleasant thing to me was that, as soon as I entered the
Resist-Japan University, I was deprived of my liberty. I was not free in
speech; I was not allowed to say anything outside of Marxism-Leninism
..." and went home.[14] The total attendance remains high; if added to
that of the accredited institutions operating according to government
standards, it would swell the sum enormously.

  [Footnote 14: Wang Wên-hsiang, "K'ang-jih Ta-hsüeh yü Ch'ing-nien
  Fan-mên" ("The Sorrows of Youth and the Resist-Japan University") in
  the symposium entitled So-wei "_Pien-ch'ü_" (The So-called "Frontier
  Area"), Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 30 _ff._]

In addition to formal aid to institutions of higher learning, and
administration of the National Government colleges, the Ministry
sponsors the mass literacy movement. In this it has had the benefit of
the work of Dr. James Y. C. Yen and his associates.[15] The war, moving
vast masses of people and shifting the modernized city-dwellers from the
coast to the interior, has proved a stimulus to the rise of literacy and
the demand for popular literature.

  [Footnote 15: See the discussion of the mass education problem, below,
  p. 218.]

The Ministry is headed by Ch'ên Li-fu, whose brother, Ch'ên Kuo-fu, is
head of the (Kuomintang) Central Political Institute. Together they
stand at the Right center of the Kuomintang, exerting enormous influence
on the Party and on the country. Both have been very close to the
Generalissimo, and took a large share in revitalization of the
Kuomintang before and during the war.

The two Commissions serve important needs. The Commission on Overseas
Chinese Affairs (_Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui_) is the informal Chinese
equivalent of a colonial office. The Commission looks after the welfare
of the overseas settlements of the Chinese, fostering language schools,
hospitals and the like. It acts through Chinese community associations,
rarely through official channels. Practices of hyphenated citizenship,
so offensive to one Western nationality when undertaken by another, are
unobtrusive and necessary in the case of the Chinese. With the outside
states putting Chinese in a special economic, legal, and political
category--through immigration laws, administrative practice, and
extra-governmental pressure including lynching--the individual Chinese
who deracinates himself is indeed a lost soul. Few Chinese worry about
overseas Chinese _irredentas_. The Commission fosters no _putsches_ and
mobilizes no fifth columns, but does help to keep Chinese, whatever
their nationalities, still Chinese.

The Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (_Mêng Tsang
Wei-yüan-hui_) is the supreme agency for the dependencies. It has a
record of considerable success in fostering a good-neighbor policy
toward the half-autonomous dominions of Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang,
also called Chinese Central Asia),[16] Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. Outer
Mongolia is under indirect Soviet control, and Eastern Inner Mongolia
under the Japanese. The Chinese have utilized every device of courtesy
and diplomacy in retaining their precarious grip on these areas. The
Commission includes dominion members.

  [Footnote 16: Among the recent books on Sinkiang, one, unusual because
  it is by a Chinese author, stands out: Wu, Aitchen K., _Turkistan
  Tumult_, London, 1940. The travel books of Sven Hedin, Ella Maillart,
  Peter Fleming, and Sir Eric Teichman also contain material of
  political interest.]


THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES

The Ministries dealing in economic matters bear the ultimate burden of
resistance. Upon their success depend China's tools of war. If
artillery, aircraft, machine-guns, munitions, food, clothing and other
necessities are not available to the central armies, the opportunity for
counter-attack may come and go, and China be lost--not through the power
of her enemy, but through her own weakness. Unless economic mobilization
succeeds, the guerrilla warfare in the occupied area will be frustrated,
since its purpose is merely to prepare for a _révanche_ from Free China;
history affords few examples of guerrillas defeating mass armies,
fighting positionally, without the intervention of other mass armies.

The Ministry of Finance (_Ts'ai-chêng Pu_) is the leader of the Economic
Ministries. Headed by H. H. K'ung, successor to the celebrated T. V.
Soong, it has performed fiscal miracles in maintaining the credit of the
National Government. Chief among its accomplishments has been the
institution, within the past decade, of a managed currency on the
gold-exchange standard. Specie had been the immemorial medium of
exchange, and Chinese experience with paper money--from the earliest
times to the present--had been unfortunate. Starting with the 1860's,
China had undergone one paper-money inflation after another.
Governmental currency was frequently a receipt for silver on deposit, in
which case it amounted to no more than a commodity warehouse
certificate, thereby subject to discount for transportation charges, and
fluctuating meanwhile with the world price of silver; otherwise it was
fiat money, guaranteed by stranglers' cords and long knives. Fractional
coins passed by metallic weight; the shifts in the price of copper in
New York and London determined the number of pennies which farmers
received for their silver dollars, even on the threshold of Tibet.

By putting private bank notes, both Chinese and foreign, out of
circulation, systematizing note issuance to four government banks and a
limited number of carefully supervised provincial agencies, the
National Government made the change with far less difficulty than
anyone, even optimists, dared to hope. Until the outbreak of war
subsidiary coinage was copper and aluminum; this has been replaced by
fractional paper, circulating decimally without discount for exchange
into larger bills. Simple peasants, who used to hide a slug of silver in
their fields, now conceal a Bank of China, Bank of Communications,
Central Bank of China, or Farmers' Bank of China _fa pi_ (legal tender)
note in roofs or walls.

Other noteworthy reforms include the standardization of levies in the
provinces, now proceeding to some degree, and the imposition of direct
taxes, a revolutionary step for China. Income and inheritance taxes,
previously thought to be uncollectible in a pre-modern area such as
China's hinterland, are yielding substantial sums. War borrowing is done
almost entirely through domestic loans. These are issued in the form of
patriotic contribution bonds, and are available in denominations as low
as Ch. Nat. $5.00 (about 28 U. S. cents). Further support has come in
the form of American, British, and Soviet fiscal aid, and--until the
outbreak of the European war--additional credits, both private and
intergovernmental, from continental Europe. The Ministry has moved with
a financial prudence which promises to maintain China's domestic and
foreign credit for further years of war.

The Ministry has engaged in direct conflict with the enemy through
bank-note rivalry. Throughout the occupied area, National Government
currency is in conflict with the issuances of the Japanese army and the
pro-Japanese governments. The Chungking policy has been to hold back the
invasion currencies, on the assumption that continued circulation of the
national currency maintains a continued popular stake in the government.
Many guerrilla leaders believe that the occupied areas should use
nothing of value to the Japanese, and therefore encourage the issuance
of local emergency currency.

Under the Ministry of Finance, numerous efforts have been made to keep
foreign trade alive. With war-time pressure on transportation
facilities, foreign trade has become a virtual monopoly of the
government; few major transactions are made by wholly private interests,
since in addition to monopolizing the highways, government-owned
corporations also have access to differentials in foreign exchange
(which often mark the difference between great profits and none). In the
matter of the governmentalized Sino-American trade, correlated with the
American credits, the Foo Shing Corporation (export) and the Universal
Trading Corporation (import) control the current both ways. The
Ministries of Communications and of Economic Affairs also have a share
in this state-capitalist business.[17]

  [Footnote 17: _The Far Eastern Survey_ keeps effectively up to date
  with all new developments in this field. An authoritative but
  understandable explanation of the work of the Ministry is found in H.
  H. K'ung, "Holding China's Financial Front," Ch. XI, work by Mme.
  Chiang K'ai-shek, cited above.]

Subdivisions in the Ministry of Finance include sections for customs,
salt gabelle, internal revenue, general taxation, public loans,
currency, national treasury, accounting, and general affairs. Efforts
are now in progress to consolidate all intragovernmental fiscal
services, so that the budget shall cover the entire government, and
separate agencies will no longer be able to make half-controlled
collections and disbursements.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs (_Ching-chi Pu_) is in general
responsible for the industrialization of an area half the size of Europe
with well over two hundred million inhabitants. No non-industrial state
can defeat an industrial state unless it has access to the industrial
resources of third parties. The Chinese, realizing this, have launched a
modernization process unparalleled in modern history. The two greatest
migrations of the twentieth century have occurred, most probably, in
China: the first the settlement of Manchuria, and the second the flight
to the West. In each case more than twenty million persons have been
involved. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has transformed this rout
into a pioneering advance. Refugees have been taught to bring their
tools with them; when they had no tools their skills have been sought
out and utilized. As the national armies and government retreated up the
Yangtze and inward, they brought along the personnel of a modern
economic system, and set an industrial society down in a world
technologically backward.

West-China modernization will probably be the most durable economic
consequence of the war. Cities near the edge of Tibet have underground
electric power and automatic telephone systems. Primitive salt-drying
areas have been modernized; in one instance, steel pipe being lacking,
bamboo pipelines, plastered and cemented for reinforcement, run
cross-country. Filthy, tax-ridden, vicious little cities which had been
the haunts of opium-sotted militarists are now given the double blessing
of fair government and a business boom. (The author felt, when he
returned to America in September 1940, that he was going from a new
country to an old, leaving the hope, zest and high spirits of the
Chinese frontier for the comfortable melancholy of American
half-prosperity.)

On the government side, the stimulation to technological advance has
consisted of broad, experimental use of government personnel, subsidies,
and part-ownership, together with some outright state socialism. Four
types of encouragement appear with particular frequency: the
government-controlled movement of private industries from the endangered
areas to the West, government sponsorship of brand new industrial
enterprises, official encouragement of cooperatives, and state
ownership-management of enterprises.

Many industries were saved for China through compulsory movement.
Thousands of tons of industrial equipment were moved up to the West,
floated on barges and river-boats, or dragged by hand over macadam
highways, dirt roads, and mud footpaths. One single enterprise, the
Chung Fu Joint Mining Administration of Honan, successfully transferred
one hundred and twenty thousand tons of equipment, now applied to coal
mining in the Southwest.[18]

  [Footnote 18: Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economic Affairs,
  "Industrialization of Western China," Ch. XIV, work by Mme. Chiang
  K'ai-shek, cited above, p. 142.]

Government sponsorship of new enterprises covers the entire field of
modern industry. Investors wait in line before opportune undertakings.
Electric light bulbs, safety matches, automobile parts and tools,
clothing--everything from machine-shop tools to luxury goods is being
produced in the West. Bottlenecks do occur in new industries competing
for priorities in imported machinery.

In the field of cooperatives, the C. I. C. (China Industrial
Cooperatives) stand out as truly important social and economic
pioneering. (See below, p. 223.)

Government ownership has not been niggard or timorous. In most cases it
has followed American patterns and appeared in the form of
government-owned corporations, but there are also a considerable number
of frankly state-operated enterprises, such as municipal food stores,
ferries, and heavier industrial undertakings. The munitions and motor
fuel trades are, so far as the author could find, entirely a matter of
government ownership. In the air communications and airplane production
field, government ownership is relaxed to the point of a senior
partnership in joint companies with foreign corporations; the latter
provide the supplies and trained personnel.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs is under the control of Wong
Wen-hao,[19] whose career was first distinguished in geology and
educational administration. His scientific outlook stands him in good
stead, since the exploitation of West-China resources requires
scientific as well as business application. Subdivisions of his Ministry
include those of mining, industry, commerce, water conservancy, and
general affairs.

  [Footnote 19: He also spells it Oung Wen-hao; by the Wade
  transliteration, Wêng Wên-hao.]

A Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (_Nung Lin Pu_) was set up in
1940 as the third economic ministry. Industrialization's dependence on
farm products makes this an invaluable coordinate to the other two
Ministries. The Chinese are in many cases proceeding directly from
pre-industrial to the latest chemico-industrial techniques, and skipping
the phase of reliance upon subsoil minerals. Gasoline is being mixed
with fuel alcohol derived from grain; plastics are appearing.

Agriculture also involved China's greatest social problem--that of
encouraging freehold or cooperative farming at the expense of
sharecropping. Much of the agricultural reform is undertaken by the new
local government and provincial government plans, but the problems of
farm prices, general farm planning, and utilization of agricultural
products fall on the Ministry. It is headed, not by a farm leader or
expert, but by the General Chên Chi-tang, former governor of Kwangtung
Province.[20]

  [Footnote 20: China Information Committee, _News Release_, Chungking,
  July 1, 1940.]

A proposed Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry (or
Ministry of Economic Warfare), based approximately upon the British
Ministry of Supplies, is in process of organization.[21] The Ministry
may be kept independent of either the Executive _Yüan_ or Military
Affairs Commission, since it is to coordinate a group of industrial and
commercial agencies which are now independent. Upon its establishment,
the Ministry of Economic Affairs will become one of Industry and
Commerce, and a central agency for economic war work will be available.

  [Footnote 21: The same, December 23, 1940.]

The National Relief Commission (_Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui_) supervises the
general relief work of the government, which is performed in part by the
extragovernmental war and Party agencies and in part by local and
provincial authorities. The immensity of the relief problem in China has
always been such that organized relief can do no more than stir the
misery of the masses. Opportunely for the National Government, the
Imperial Japanese Army is securely in possession of the world's greatest
relief problem, and unable to relinquish it. Chungking is more
fortunate. (The author never dreamed that prosperity such as he saw in
West China could exist in Asia. Prices are extremely high, but wages and
farm prices tend to follow, and unemployment--always low in China
because of the work-sharing role of the family--is almost completely out
of sight. Skilled labor commands remuneration fantastic by pre-existing
scales.)

All these agencies, and much of the rest of the government, depend upon
the Ministry of Communications (_Chiao-t'ung Pu_). The invasion struck
at existing communications lines; Japanese are now in control of the
mouths of all major Chinese rivers, most of China's railway mileage, and
the coastal system of modern highways. A glance at the map of China will
show that Japanese forces have hugged modern communications lines,
whether steamship, railway, or highway. Whenever the Japanese ventured
far from these lines, they met with disaster.

The Ministry of Communications has used existing facilities to draw new
networks. The short stretches of railway in Free China are still
operated; _matériel_ from the occupied zone was brought West on them,
and they are undergoing rapid development. Roadbeds are being
constructed in anticipation of future imports of steel rails. Steamship
enterprises, under government subsidy, operate extensively, and new
reaches of river have been opened to service.

Three lines of reconstruction have proved very fruitful: motor
communications, telecommunications, and the rationalization of
pre-modern facilities already at hand.

Motor communications, both highway and aerial, have shown enormous
progress. Air service is maintained by the China National Aviation
Corporation and the Eurasia Company, both owned by the Chinese
Government, the former jointly with Pan American Airways and the latter
with German interests. Through connections from New York to Berlin are
available by the combined services of the two companies.

The highway system can be thought of as spider-like. Three enormous legs
reach to the outside: the Chungking-Kunming-Lashio route, famous as the
Burma Road; the trans-Sinkiang route, finally connecting with the Soviet
Turksib Railroad beyond thousands of miles of desert and mountains; and
the due North route, now being developed, reaching the Trans-Siberian
Railroad. The body of the system is a tight, well-metalled skein of
roads interconnecting the major cities of Free China. Most highways are
all-weather, and well-engineered, but niceties of surfacing have been
postponed.

Truck and bus service is regular, but very crowded, with inescapable
confusion as to priority. The majority of the operating firms are
government-owned, either by the central government or the provinces.
Complaint has arisen over the restrictions to private enterprise in this
field. Since gasoline costs about U. S. $1.00 per gallon and is
available only under permit, further official obstructions to highway
use seem unnecessary.

Telecommunications have been maintained and extended. Telegraph service
has reached into hitherto untapped areas, and wireless is extensively
employed. Radio services operate under the Kuomintang, not the
government; stations XGOX and XGOY reach North America and Europe with
propaganda in the world's leading languages. The telephone has come to
be a regular part of Chinese official and business life, and is to be
seen, far off the beaten track, as one of the heralds of
industrialization.

All these modern services would, however, be grossly insufficient for
the needs of the whole nation at war. They have been supplemented
through the use of every available type of pre-modern transportation.
Most of these rely on man-power, and have had their own elaborate
organization for many centuries: boatmen's guilds, unions of transport
coolies, carters, muleteers and camel-drivers. It has been possible to
ship heavy freight through country consisting of mountains traversable
only by stone-flagged footpaths or torrential streams. The Ministry has
regimented this complicated pre-modern world, with impromptu
modernizations as startling as they are efficacious. Where once couriers
trotted, they now speed by on bicycles or motorcycles; the squealing
wooden-axled wheelbarrows of the Chinese countryside are yielding to
pneumatic-tired carts which resemble American farm trailers. Three to
eight men can drag one cart, with half a ton of freight, over any
terrain, making up to forty miles a day. Provision can be made,
therefore, for moving a quarter-million tons of raw materials across
territory lacking even the most elementary roads. The roughness of the
country, which bars the Japanese army, is no obstacle to huge coolie
gangs, drafted sometimes, but more usually hired.

The Minister of Communications gave the following written answers to
questions put by the author:[22]

     1. In view of the political interruptions to commerce
     through British and French territories south of China, will
     efforts be maintained to keep communications on the same
     schedules southward that they had before?

     Yes, because commercial and export traffic is still being
     carried on southward, and there is a large accumulation of
     important materials to be moved from the frontier inward.

     2. Will the restriction of gasoline lead to the abandonment
     of certain truck and bus routes, and the maintenance of
     others, or do you expect to restrict all routes evenly?

     We expect to restrict all important routes evenly if the
     motor fuel situation becomes really acute.

     3. Is a motor road running through Inner and Outer Mongolia
     directly north to the Trans-Siberian Railroad a feasible
     project?

     Yes, it is a feasible project.

     4. For all practical purposes, is the Soviet route as it
     exists an adequate although expensive channel for the import
     of high-class American machinery, such as trucks?

     Yes, the Soviet route as it exists is adequate though
     expensive for the purpose.

     5. Is there evidence that mail between the United States and
     China has been censored or tampered with while in transit
     past Japan?

     No, there is no such evidence so far.

     6. How extensive a foreign personnel do you have in the
     varied agencies under your Ministry?

     Postal Service:                        28
     China National Aviation Corporation:   15
     Eurasia Aviation Corporation:          13
     Railways:                               8

     7. What developments of the last three years do you regard
     with most pride, as evidence of China's power to cope with
     the emergency?

     The timely completion of the Yunnan-Burma Highway may be
     considered as evidence of China's power to cope with the
     emergency and as an important development in the field of
     war-time communications. The Highway is 960 kilometers long
     from Kunming to Anting on the frontier. Construction began
     in October 1937. Eleven months later, the road was opened to
     through traffic. At one time during its construction, as
     many as 100,000 laborers were employed on the road.

     The highest point on the Highway is 2,600 meters above the
     sea level, yet the road has to pass two deep valleys, the
     Mekong and the Salween, where the Highway dips a few
     thousand feet within a distance of several miles in order to
     reach the river bed, and rises precipitously again in the
     same manner just beyond the suspension bridges over the two
     turbulent rivers. The scarcity of local labor, the
     enervating climate, and the wild and sparsely populated
     country traversed, all combine to make the construction work
     difficult. But now, anyone may take a motor car and cover
     the distance between Chungking and Rangoon in two weeks, as
     Ambassador Johnson did soon after the Highway was completed.

  [Footnote 22: Communication of August 12, 1940; in the present
  author's possession.]

The Minister Chang Kia-ngau (Chang Chia-ao) is one of the most eminent
bankers in China. His Ministry is a model of business-like organization
and systematic routines; he has a great reputation for getting things
done in the American fashion--quickly, and without ceremony.

In addition to these major ministries, there are the _Pu_ of Justice
(part of the Judicial _Yüan_, sharing its war-time somnolence), of War
(affiliated with the Military Affairs Commission), of Audit, of
Personnel, and--in process of establishment--of Social Affairs,
supplementing the Party-Ministry of Social Movements (_Shê-hui Yün-tung
Pu_) now under the Kuomintang Headquarters.

All Ministries are headed by a Minister (_Pu Chang_), seconded by a
Political Vice-Minister (_Chêng-wu Tzŭ-chang_) and Administrative
Vice-Minister (_Ch'ang-wu Tzŭ-chang_). Since almost all officers are
political appointees, and few of the new career men have touched the
higher levels of the bureaucracy, this duplication prevents a job famine
and keeps personnel levels high; the utility of a large administrative
staff depends, obviously, on the nature of the executive. Some of the
most crowded ministries seem permanently under-staffed because of the
intense activity they maintain; others, with skeleton staff, appear to
have far more civil servants than service. The over-all picture of the
Ministries, however, leads inescapably to the conclusion that they are
really functioning today. Long-transmitted vices of sloth and sinecures
are on the wane. The war, high-lighting every demerit into treason, has
created optimum conditions for administrative progress in China.




CHAPTER IV

PROVINCIAL, LOCAL, AND SPECIAL-AREA GOVERNMENT


China consists of twenty-eight provinces, varying in size about as do
the European nations. Of the twenty-eight, fourteen are wholly under
Chinese control, or are so slightly touched by invasion that normal
governmental processes continue. Ten provinces are under dual or triple
government--by the Japanese and pro-Japanese Chinese, by guerrilla and
other semi-independent groups, and by the usual constitutional
authorities. The remaining four are under firm Japanese domination,
under the name _Manchoukuo_.[1] Well over half of China's population is
under the National Government, and about one-ninth under unchallengeable
Japanese control; the residuum is the subject of sharp political
competition. The war is not merely a war between governments: it is a
struggle for the creation of government.[2]

  [Footnote 1: For an excellent definition of Free China, see Quigley,
  Harold S., "Free China," cited, p. 133-35. The most readable geography
  of China is Cressey, George B., _China's Geographic Foundations_, New
  York, 1934.]

  [Footnote 2: For further development of this problem, see below, p.
  185. The present author considered this question in relation to the
  Chinese political heritage, in _Government in Republican China_,
  cited, p. 2-12, 69-74, 188-89. Professor George Taylor, in _The
  Struggle for North China_, cited, relates this problem to the broad
  issues of world discussion, in a most acute analysis of "The Problem
  of China," p. 8-16, and gives a clear answer to the questions thus
  posed, p. 197-201.]

This problem would be immense even if there were no war. Under the
successive Imperial dynasties of the past millennium, China developed
extreme regional autonomy. Despite absolutist theory, the provinces
under their governors or viceroys were practically as independent as
states of the American union in the early nineteenth century.

  PROVINCIAL AND URBAN GOVERNMENT

      National Government -------------+                     Kuomintang
             |          |              |                          |
  Military Affairs    Executive    ..Other _Yüan_                 |
     Commission        _Yüan_      :                              |
        |                 |        :                              |
        |        The Provincial Government[B]                     |
        |              _Shêng Chêng-fu_                           |
        |                      |                                  |
        |           +-----------------------------+               |
        |           |         Chairman            |               |
        |           |         _Chu-hsi_           |               |
        |           |                             |               |
        |     +-----| The Provincial Government   |......         |
        |     |     |      Committee              |     :         |
        |     |     |  [_Shêng Chêng-fu_]         |     :         |
        |     |     |   _Wei-yüan-hui_            |     :         |
        |     |     +-----------------------------+     :         |
        |     |         | Standing   |                  :         |
   +--------------+  +--| Committee  |      +-------------+ +----------+
   | Pacification |  |  | _Ch'ang-wu |      | Provincial  | |  Party   |
   | Commissioner |  |  | Wei-yüan_  |      | People's    | | Agencies |
   | _Sui-ching   |  |  +------------+      | Political   | +----------+
   | Chu-jên_     |  |   |    |    |        | Council     |       |
   +--------------+  |   |    |    |        | _Shêng      |       |
    |                |   |    |    |        | Ts'an-chêng |       |
    |                |   |    |    |        | Hui_        |       |
    |                |   |    |    |        +-------------+       |
    |                |   |    |    |                              |
    |                |   |    |    +-------------------+          |
    |                |   |    +----------------+       |          |
    |                |   |                     |       |          |
    |                |  Reconstruction         |       |          |
    |                |    _Chien-shê    Committees:    |          |
    |                |     T'ing_        Industry      |          |
    |                |                  _Shih-yeh      |          |
    |                |                   T'ing_        |          |
    |  +------------------------+                  Secretarial    |
    |  |                 |      |                  Department     |
    | Civil Affairs      |      |                  _Mi-shu Ch'u_  |
    | _Min-chêng T'ing_  |      |                     |           |
    |                    |      |                     |           |
    |              Finance      |         +------------------+    |
    |   _Tsai-chêng T'ing_      |         | The Municipal    |    |
    |                           |         | Government[B]    |    |
    |                   Education         | _Shih Chêng-fu_  |    |
    |            _Chiao-yü T'ing_         +------------------+    |
    |                                              |              |
    |                                     +------------------+    |
    |                                     |     Mayor        |    |
    |                                     | _Shih Chang_     |    |
    |             +-------------------+   |                  |    |
    |             |Municipal Advisory |   |Municipal Council |    |
    |             |or People's Council|...|_Shih Chêng Hui-i_|    |
    |             |_Shih Ts'an-i-hui_ |   |                  |    |
    |             +-------------------+   |       Councillors|    |
    |                                     |      _Ts'an-shih_|    |
   Local      +----------------------------------------------+    |
   Military   |   |     |   |       |   |   |   |   |             |
              |   |     |   |       |   |   |   |   |             |
    Other Bureaus |     |   |       |   |   |   |   |             |
    as Needed     |     |   |       |   |   |   |   |             |
                  |     |   |       |   |   |   |   |             |
       Bureau of Public |   |       |   |   |   |   |             |
       Utilities[A]     |   |       |   |   |   |   |             |
       _Kung-yung Chü_  |   |       |   |   |   |   |             |
                        |   |       |   |   |   |   |             |
            Bureau of Local |       |   |   |   |   |       +----------+
            Government[A]   |       |   |   |   |   |       |  Party   |
            _Ti-chêng Chü_  |       |   |   |   |   |       | Agencies |
                            |       |   |   |   |   |       +----------+
                Bureau of Health[A] |   |   |   |   |             |
                _Wei-shêng Chü_     |   |   |   |   |             |
                                    |   |   |   |   |             |
                              Bureau of |   |   |   |             |
                            Engineering |   |   |   |             |
                          _Kung-wu Chü_ |   |   |   |             |
                                        |   |   |   |             |
                                  Bureau of |   |   |             |
                                   Finance  |   |   |             |
                           _Tsai-chêng Chü_ |   |   |             |
                                            |   |   |             |
                               Bureau of Public |   |             |
                                Safety          |   |             |
                               _Kung-an Chü_    |   |             |
                                                |   |             |
                           Bureau of Social Affairs |             |
                           _Shê-hui Chü_            |             |
                                                    |             |
                                              Secretariat         |
                                            _Mi-shu Ch'u_   +----------+
                                                    |       |   Party  |
                                              Urban Local   | Agencies |
                                               Government   +----------+

  [Footnote A: optional]

  [Footnote B: legal, not administrative, entity]

With the advent of war, the position of the provinces has become more
precarious, truly new political devices in the form of novel regional
governments have appeared, and the concrete problems of reform in the
village communities have become as imperative as military measures.


THE PROVINCES

The war-lord period was ushered in by the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai,
dictator-President and commander-in-chief, in 1916. He had inherited a
tradition of dual government--civil and military--no less sharp than the
Japanese distinction, and had continued it by placing his military
henchmen in power as provincial satraps. After his death, each province
had a military governor (_Tuchün_), who sometimes tolerated a civil
governor (_Shêng-chang_) and sometimes held both posts concurrently. The
various _tuchün_ rivalled one another in a vain turmoil until the rise
of the National Government suppressed or incorporated them. Even today
some of these men hold remnants of their power, but it is still
declining. The power of the National Government has increased almost
every year for over fifteen years, and its programs, bequeathed by Sun
Yat-sen, call for the constant diminution of provincial authority, until
in the end the province shall be little more than a postal link between
the central government and the districts (_hsien_).

Continued vitality of the provinces as a form of political life is shown
by the chariness with which the government approaches the problem of
re-subdividing the nation, by the continued effect of provincialism
through the influence of geography, botany, ecology, economics and
spoken language, and by the manifest utility of the provinces in the
prosecution of the war. It is impossible to discuss any aspect of
Chinese affairs for very long without entering into distinctions between
provinces.

In mild, modified, and controlled form, the pattern of civil-military
contrast in provincial government still prevails. The civil governor,
now in almost all cases the weightier official, is legally termed
Chairman of the Province (_Shêng Chu-hsi_), but he frequently possesses
a military colleague amiably designated Pacification Commissioner
(_Sui-ching Chu-jên_).[3] The war has eradicated almost the last
vestiges of provincial militarism. No Chinese army is in a position to
make peace with Japan through the negotiated treason of its commander,
although small groups occasionally change sides both ways.[4] On the
other side of the picture, it is not altogether certain how far the
National Government could go in replacing local leaders; more has been
done than ever before, but the Generalissimo has tried to work honestly
with all leaders, provincial or independent, subsuming their power under
his and the Government's without destroying it. Four provinces still
show traces of autonomy.

  [Footnote 3: Tsang, O. B., _A Supplement to a Complete Chinese-English
  Dictionary_, Shanghai, 1937, p. 267. The older, standard dictionaries
  do not include the term. Lieutenant H. S. Aldrich, in his _Hua Yu Hsü
  Chih: Practical Chinese_, Peiping, 1934, gives _Sui-ching
  Ssŭ-ling_ as Pacification Commissioner (Vol. II, p. 74).]

  [Footnote 4: An apt, grisly story is reported in the semi-official
  English-language journal of the Nanking regime. The "Peace Movement"
  is, of course, the Japanophile movement of Mr. Wang Ch'ing-wei. This
  is the way it was given in _The People's Tribune_, Vol. XXIX, Nos.
  7-10 (October-November 1940), p. 305:

  "In response to President Wang Ch'ing-Wei's peace appeal to the
  nation, Mr. Tan Shih-Chang, member of the Chungking Air Force, flew to
  Hankow by his own plane on June 10 to join the Peace Movement. Upon
  his arrival in Nanking, Mr. Tan was warmly received by the
  re-organized National Government. Later, he was sent to Macao on an
  important mission, but upon his arrival there, he was instantly killed
  by desperadoes in the employ of the Chungking regime.

  "It is learned that the plane he left in Hankow has now been repaired
  by the Japanese Air Force and brought to the Capital. Following its
  arrival, the plane was immediately handed over to the Military
  Commission by the Japanese military authorities."

  (This would need further corroboration before it could definitely be
  accepted.)]

Largest of the four is Sinkiang (Chinese Central Asia), under the
military leader Shêng Shih-ts'ai; it is subject to very strong Soviet
influence, since it is more accessible from the Soviet side of the
border, via the Turksib Railroad, than from China. Its trade naturally
flows out through the Soviet Union. The provincial authorities have been
harsh toward Christian work, and casually cruel to occasional
travellers. Since the National Government is exceedingly anxious to
maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, and obtains much of its
supplies from that country across Sinkiang province, it has made no
attempt to interfere. The province has cooperated enthusiastically in
war efforts; it is strange to see Central Asiatics with European
features marching with Chinese troops. Many of the independent Leftist
leaders have been welcomed in the area, although simon-pure Marxians are
rare, and the province, with a new university, new air bases, new
industries, and a trans-Asia highway, is undergoing rather spectacular
development. The British and the Soviets are mutually so suspicious that
the Chinese are likely to keep control, but the Chinese central
government, taking no chances, cooperates rather than commands.

Yünnan, under General Lung Yün, is the second province with special
features. Relatively isolated from the rest of China until the
completion of the Kunming-Chungking stretch of the Burma Road, it has
never been occupied by large National Government forces. The provincial
chairman submitting in form and cooperating in fact has been left
unmolested in his position. The province is becoming modernized by a
great deal of commerce and development; it is likely that this vestigial
autonomy will fade away unnoticed.

Kwangsi province possesses as leader General Pai Chung-hsi, one of the
ablest military men in China. A Kuomintang leader of long standing, he
followed, in conjunction with the leaders in Kwangtung (Canton), a
policy of _de facto_ autonomy down to the very outbreak of war. He and
his associates even had an independent air force, which was promptly
merged into the National air service. During the war, he has fought in
central China. The economic ruin of Kwangtung and the occupation of
Canton city by the Japanese has quenched Cantonese autonomy, but Kwangsi
has been relatively untouched. No whisper of suspicion has imputed
separatism to General Pai, but should he desire it, he is one of the few
men left in China still to have the means.

In Fukien province, General Ch'ên I serves as Chairman. He studied in
Japan and has a Japanese wife. He remains loyal to the National
Government, and he has fought the Japanese along the coast. No Chinese
observer has criticized him, but Westerners have observed that Fukien is
remarkably quiet; the Japanese have done little beyond blockading the
coast and seizing the major ports, and the Chinese have launched no
counter-attacks. It is possible that some unexpressed sense of
understanding between the Governor and the Japanese prevents further
conflict, while the Generalissimo--content to leave well enough
alone--lets matters stand as they are.

Provincial government, as outlined in the chart at p. 98, is very simple
in structure. The Commission plan, similar in many respects to the
Galveston plan in American municipal government, reduces the Provincial
Chairman to the status of _primus inter pares_. The departments of the
provincial government are headed by members of the province's committee.
The presence of provincial offices of the Kuomintang, military services,
and war agencies makes a provincial capital a place more important than
it seems in theory. A valuable innovation in provincial administration
has been the inauguration of the Provincial People's Political Councils
(_Shêng Ts'an-chêng Hui_). These are being taken seriously by the
administrations. Although they occasionally pass visionary,
impracticable, or bombastic resolutions, their work has for the most
part been concrete. They have aided a great deal in transforming the
atmosphere of government, and act as competent outside critical bodies
to check the administrative officers.

Provincial government has been significantly transformed by the war. Dr.
T. F. Tsiang (Chiang T'ing-fu), a distinguished historian who served on
a central inspection commission to the Southwest in 1940, stated[5] that
provincial government has improved in two outstanding ways: first, there
is a real desire to understand the common people, and to do something
for them. This was unheard-of a few years past. Second, all--or almost
all--of the officials work very hard. There is far more work than there
are men. Money is frequently available but unexpendable because there
are not enough experts to go round. Hence, the provincial governments
find their need is for men rather than funds, and the war is bringing
new levels of actual accomplishment. Although most of the governors have
military titles, many of these are like Kentucky colonelcies, courtesy
titles from time past. The over-all effect is of hard work and little
bombast.

  [Footnote 5: In an interview with the author, Chungking, July 31,
  1940; the interview was unfortunately terminated by the raid alarm. It
  might be noted at this point that proposals for the reinstitution of
  strong provincial executives have been postponed from year to year
  since 1932. See _The China Year Book 1939_, cited, p. 217 n.]

Special Municipalities, most of which are now under Japanese occupation,
are directly subject to the National Government and only incidentally a
part of the provinces in which they are located. Ordinary Municipalities
are under their respective provincial governments, but not under a
_hsien_ (district or county) administration; in some cases they include
several former hsien. The Municipality is headed by a Mayor
(_Shih-chang_), advised by a City Council (_Shih-chêng Hui-i_) composed
of the chiefs of the administrative sections, several supplementary
counsellors, and representatives from the Municipal Advisory Assembly
(_Shih Ts'an-i-hui_), if one exists. Below the _Shih_ the urban pattern
of local government differs somewhat from the rural, but otherwise city
government displays no features peculiarly Chinese.


LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Chinese local government has been the ever-fertile soil out of which
successive Empires grew. To no other level of government has the
Republic reached so poorly. Since China is constituted of about half a
million villages, several thousand market towns, and a few hundred major
cities, the bulk of the population is rural, but rural in a way foreign
to the West. Congestion imposes upon agrarian China many problems and
evils known as urban in the West. Corruption in government, extortion in
economics, demoralization in social and family life--these start with
the village and the _hsien_. Inconspicuous in any single village, each
evil summed to its China-wide aggregate becomes tremendous.

Government has not been beloved by the Chinese farmer. Governmental
benefits--for the continuance of scholastic culture, the protection of
the realm, the creation of grandiose public works--were remote, but
taxes were not; government meant the taxgatherer. Fêng Yü-hsiang, one of
the great war-lords and now a Kuomintang general, says of his own
childhood:

     The people, except for paying their taxes, had nothing to do
     with the government. The government never paid any attention
     to the conditions under which the people lived, and the
     people never bothered themselves about what the government
     was doing. One party collected the taxes; the other paid
     them. That was all there was to it. Although Paoting city
     was only about two _li_ [less than a mile] away, the
     inhabitants of Kang-k'ê village showed no interest in city
     civilization; instead, they rather looked down on that sort
     of thing. No discussions of politics were heard, and nothing
     about the encroachments of the foreign powers on China. All
     the big changes seemed to have taken place in another world,
     and very seldom affected this place.

     When the government was about to collect taxes, the _Li
     Chêng_ [a petty local officer] would ring a gong from one
     end of the village to the other, shouting:

     "Pay your taxes! Four hundred and sixty coins to the _mou_
     [about one third of an acre] for the first harvest!"

     When the people heard the gong, they did not go and pay
     their taxes immediately. They would walk listlessly to their
     doorways, only to withdraw after having taken a nonchalant
     look at the _Li Chêng_--as though they had heard nothing.
     They would wait until the very last minute, until they could
     not put it off any more, and then go, group by group, to the
     city to hand in money they had earned by sweat and blood.

     They were industrious and miserable all through the year
     ...[6]

  [Footnote 6: Fêng Yü-hsiang, _Wo-ti Shêng-huo_ (My Life), Kweilin,
  1940, p. 22.]

This basic level of Chinese society is not easily susceptible to
standardization, or the imposition of ready-made bureaucracies. Even in
the United States, it would be almost impossible to impose a uniform
plan for community organization from Bangor to San Diego and Walla Walla
to the Bronx. Sun Yat-sen once said to Judge Linebarger, "China is a
land of autonomy from the smallest village upward. Who shall dictate to
the sub-governments of China the form and manner in which they shall
express their local governmental needs? Of course, we must have a
minimum of uniformity for both economy and efficiency in government, but
the will of the people must be followed."[7] By seeking to remedy
political abuses the National Government apparently hopes that economic
inequalities will be ironed out by the people themselves.

  [Footnote 7: As reported by Paul M. W. Linebarger in his
  _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen_ [as yet unpublished; in the author's
  possession]. Book II, Chapter V.]

The Chinese land problem cannot be understood except at the
politico-economic nexus, where low political morale exposes the farmers
to the unrestrained power of the gentry, acting in the triple capacity
of officials, landlords, and money-lenders. The cycle, familiar in the
West, of freehold farmers or yeomen first mortgaging their land, then
becoming tenants, and finally ending in utter economic helplessness, has
been familiar in China. In China's past, the cycle had another phase:
agrarian insurrection sweeping the land with banditry and innumerable
rebellions, thereby increasing the fiscal burden on the remaining land,
leading to worse exploitation, until the slate was swept clean by
dynastic collapse, general civil war, and a new Imperial house, whose
administrative decline began another cycle. The peasantry never won
completely, and never lost utterly. Today, if one judges by past
experience, rebellion or reform seems long overdue.[8]

  [Footnote 8: The author has sought to trace the political and military
  aspects of this cycle in _Government in Republican China_, cited.
  There are numerous works on the subject from the economists' point of
  view. Outstanding are the books by John Lossing Buck, R. H. Tawney, J.
  B. Condliffe, Karl Wittfogel, Ch'en Han-seng, and the articles by
  Norman Hanwell (chiefly in _Asia_, _Amerasia_, and _The Far Eastern
  Survey_).]

The detailed legislation adopted by the National Government in war time
is given in Appendix I (G), and Chiang K'ai-shek's own explanation of
the new system in Appendix III (C).[9] One might explain the general
plan quite simply in terms of inter-connection between the central
government and the millions of households. The _pao-chia_ system is one
of mutual aid and mutual responsibility between households and groups of
households, under government supervision. It has appeared in China from
time to time since the Ch'in dynasty (221-203 B.C.). If used for
welfare purposes, it amounts to a recognition of the pluralistic
character of Chinese society by the government, and the happy
utilization of the family pattern. Applied for police purposes, it is
well suited to repression and terror. Thus, today the National
Government is applying the _pao-chia_ system (in relation to its whole
scheme of local government) as a measure of progress and reform, while
the Japanese encourage the same organizations in occupied China as a
device for despotism and exploitation.

  [Footnote 9: Below, p. 324, and p. 388.]

Expressed in law, now being applied in fact, the _chia_ is a group of
six to fifteen families (households), and the _pao_, a group of six to
fifteen chia. The hsiang is formally composed of six to fifteen pao;
actually it approximates what is loosely termed a community in the
United States (_e.g._, a city ward, a single suburb, part of a rural
election district). The _ch'ü_ is the rough equivalent of a township.
The _hsien_ (district; county) is the fundamental unit of the
traditional China-wide bureaucracy. Hence the missing steps are not
those between the _hsien_, near to two thousand in number, and the
central government. The gaps occur between the half-billion Chinese and
their two thousand _hsien_. The following chart shows the broad outlines
of the system:[10]

                                HSIEN
                              ("county")
                                   ^
                                   |
   Militia       Elected           |          Schools,      Kuomintang
      |             ^            CH'Ü            |              |
      |             |        ("township")        |              |
      |             |              |             |              |
  and Police  Representative       |       Secondary and      Party
      |             |           HSIANG           |              |
      |             |        ("community")       |              |
      |             |              |             |              |
      |             |             PAO            |              |
      |             |       ("neighborhood")     |              |
   Organs      Assemblies          |         Elementary    Organizations
      |             |             CHIA           |              |
      |             |  ("a group of households") |              |
      |             |              |             |              |
      |             |              \/            |              |
      |             |--------->THE PEOPLE        |              |
      |                            ^             |              |
      |____________________________|_____________|______________|

  [Footnote 10: A detailed chart will be found in Appendix III (C), at
  p. 388.]

This is the official government plan. If ever put into complete effect,
China will consist of hundreds upon hundreds of thousands of
self-governing units, arranged on seven levels (the five local levels;
provinces; nation), and the world will wonder at a massive new
democracy. In practical politics, what seems to be happening is that the
system extends to the National Government areas, involving less than
three hundred million people. Much of the application is purely formal,
and signifies no more than did the grant of an imaginary suffrage under
the first Republic. Elsewhere the new system is installed with telling
administrative effect, improving the bureaucracy, strengthening the
state, but not arousing much popular participation or enthusiasm. And in
the remainder the program is beginning to work as is intended with
genuine elections and popular participation in government.

The three chief devices which have been applied to the reform of local
government are: instruction, mandate, and other remote controls;
inspection systems; and training courses. First are the attempts to
change local government by transmission from the capital of voluminous
instructions, manuals, etc., supplemented by similar Kuomintang action
for Party reform. In the second case, central officials go to the
provinces. During the summer of 1940, a number of such groups of
officials divided China between themselves, each group taking a number
of provinces for its inspection zone. The presence of a central
delegation in the field led to some housecleaning, provided an incentive
for immediate work, and informed the National Government of the
condition of the country. Some junketing was observable, but not enough
to vitiate the work of inspection. By the third device, local officials
are called to training centers. The Generalissimo is very fond of this
method. He encourages the selection of younger men, who thereby feel
that their careers are given a boost. They are taught modern
governmental practice while living, in most cases, a disciplined but
comfortable half-military life. Some training conferences are convened
_ad hoc_ in a promising area; others continue from year to year under
the government or related organizations. Many thousand men and women
undergo some form of training. The program has clearly discernible
effects in improving local government. The selection of persons who
either hold office or are likely to hold office provides a practical
self-interest motivation. Further minor devices of local government
reform include the grants in aid to the provinces, the establishment of
model _hsien_, the military eradication of banditry, the reclamation of
farm land and forests, some resettlement, and much planned modernization
with small-scale projects. Town after town has received the stimuli of
modernization from one of these sources.

Estimates--nothing more could be found--concerning the effectiveness of
this program varied considerably. Since two equally skilled observers,
considering the same institution at first hand, can differ sharply in
their value judgments of efficacy or integrity, this is not surprising.
A few Westerners and Leftists have insisted that the program was almost
altogether sham. A few formal, optimistic officials have insisted that
it has succeeded almost everywhere. One competent foreign observer told
the author that he believed the _pao-chia_ system to be installed in 90
per cent of Free China, and to be actually working in 50 per cent.
Another agreed more or less with these figures, but suggested that there
were enormous differences between the provinces, some being genuinely
transformed and others remaining unaffected. A Chinese official, himself
a social scientist, who had been intimately connected with local reform,
stated that 50 per cent application for all Free China would be much too
high an estimate, except for the holding of token elections. Only in
Kwangsi province was the new self-government structure working over
half of the countryside; elsewhere, the ratio was about one-fifth
effective as against four-fifths nominal.

Most of all, genuine application consists in making institutions
available, and thereupon letting the people help themselves. If local
government is of practical use to the common people, they can be counted
on to discover its utility promptly. If it is of no practical use, they
will know that too. Whatever the present degree of success, obstacles
still confront the program. Local extragovernmental institutions possess
enormous vitality. If superficial or slipshod reforms are made, the new
local governments will be merely operated as screens for secret
societies, landlords' unions, or other narrow cliques.

Contrastingly, a tradition of discussion and public action makes it
equally possible that the rural masses, familiar with cooperative
action, will operate the new institutions successfully. The difference
between success and failure is not to be measured in terms of wholly new
achievement; it is determined by the choice of existing institutions
which, transmuted and fitted, fill the pattern of the rationalized local
government system. If narrow, class-bound or unprogressive groups assume
the regalia of a novel legality, using their position to obstruct
further development, the program will fail. If the town-meeting,
cooperative potentialities of the entire adult population are aroused,
and if the ordinary farmer or coolie can see that he has the opportunity
of bettering his livelihood through political action, the success of
democracy will be assured.

Potentialities in the field of local autonomy are enhanced by the fact
that the National Government has competitors. The Japanese have an
opportunity which, instead of utilizing, they have done their best to
destroy: conquest through prosperity. If they and their Chinese
associates offered low prices, easy marketing, and fair taxes, in the
place of arson, rape, thievery and bluster, their failure would become
less certain. As a third side to the triangle of competitive power, the
Communists and independent Left, while allied to the National
Government, rival it in winning the loyalty of the population. Huge
areas in Communist and guerrilla sections are sampling reform of a
drastic and immediate kind: the lowering of taxes, the democratization
of government, the abolition of usury. With the traitors on its Right
and the Communists or guerrillas on its Left, the National Government
does not abandon its chief politico-economic weapon by disregarding land
and labor reform. None of the three parties has anything to gain by
inaction. None has an interest which binds it to self-dooming reaction.


THE COMMUNIST ZONE

Three new governmental areas which are neither provinces nor local
governments have come forth out of unification and war. Their
relationship to Chungking is strange, perhaps unique. They are not
states members of a federal union, since China is a unitary republic.
They are not new regional commissions, creatures and extensions of the
central government, because--whatever the theory--they were
independently initiated. They are not allies, because they profess
national unity. They are not rebellions, because they fight a common
enemy, only occasionally coming into conflict with government troops.
Yet they possess some of the features of each of the following: federal
states, regional subgovernments, allied states, and rebellions. They cut
across the pattern of the National Government. Two are governments; one
is an army. The army and one government are largely Communist; the other
government is a genuine United Front of the parties. Two are North
Chinese; one is Central Chinese. But all three have this in common: they
are Leftist, actively revolutionary; they are objects of patronizing
suspicion to the central authorities, who are glad of the help but worry
about its post-war cost.

The first and most famous of these areas is the Communist zone in the
Northwest. Formally it includes eighteen _hsien_; the Communists claim
inclusion of twenty-three. After being termed the Special Administrative
District of the Chinese Republic (_Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü
Chêng-fu_), and then Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area (_Shan-kan-ning
Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu_), the zone assumed the much more modest style of
Administrative Area of North Shensi (_Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü_).[11]
This Frontier Area is in personnel and Party life a direct continuation
of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Leftist and Communist circles talk as
though it were a wholly autonomous state, resting on its own military
power, but cooperating with the National Government for national
resistance and reconstruction. This is largely true--at any rate, more
realistic than the opposing view, which avers that no change has taken
place in the Northern part of Shensi province, and that the Communists
are interfering with the proper processes of government. The following
is a characteristic statement of the latter position:

     At present the name "Frontier Area" seems to be very common
     because it is so called in false propaganda about the
     "independent sovereignty" [_tzŭ-li wei-wang_]. But if we
     agree that the so-called "Frontier Area" is a part of the
     territory of the Chinese Republic, the name ought to have
     been issued in conformity with the decrees of the central
     government. According to central government decree, it is
     only a "Supplementary Recruitment Area for the Eighth Route
     Army," but not an area of civil administration. [The author,
     in an extended discussion, challenges the re-division of the
     provinces as a matter not to be undertaken casually, denies
     the legal foundation of the term "Frontier Area," and then
     examines its practical justifications. He finds that the
     Communists have two: the regime is now a _de facto_ system,
     its existence is a _fait accompli_ and further discussion
     must proceed from this point; also, the regime is founded in
     popular opinion, and the government should not violate the
     wishes of the people. He disagrees with both of these and
     seeks to refute them, insisting on lawful procedure and
     constitutional government. He concludes with a peroration to
     the Communists themselves.] ... this problem is really quite
     simple, unlike the Sudeten problem. Was it the Communist
     Party of China which called the Sudeten Party of
     Czechoslovakia violators of the unity of their own country
     and running dogs of Fascism? Therefore, I think that they
     would never imitate what the reactionary Sudeten party did.
     And was it the Communists who originated the "United Front"?
     Hence they must understand very clearly what unification
     means to China, and must never utter things which they do
     not really believe. Therefore, with the rising tide of
     national unity and concentration, I suppose that the odd
     name "Frontier Area," which is contrary to the real sense of
     unification, will soon pass away and be a mere historical
     term.[12]

  [Footnote 11: See above, p. 13. The last term is literally Executive
  Area (or District) of North Shan (Shensi). In the text, Frontier Area
  is used throughout as the simplest English equivalent.]

  [Footnote 12: Chin Chi-yin, 'Pien-ch'ü' ti Ming-ch'êng' (The Name
  "Frontier Area"), in _So-wei "Pien-ch'ü_," cited above, p. 3-6.]

In practical terms this implies the informal reconciliation of two
claims constitutionally and legally incompatible. The Chinese Communist
leaders operate under the national law codes as much as they are able.
They employ the national currency. They use the nationally standard
system for local government. They profess unity. At the same time they
maintain, as a hard reality, a separate regime in which the Communist
Party is supreme, the Party Line is gospel, and dissidents are dealt
with as "pro-Japanese traitors" or otherwise. Transit between National
Government territory and Communist territory is not altogether easy.
Leftists are reported to have died on their way to the Northwest, and
Nationalists are equally well reported to have disappeared after they
got there.

The Area itself is an unpromising piece of land. "From 36° N. Lat. on
up, South of the Great Wall and West of the Yellow River, there lies a
vast, desolate tract of yellow plateau, inhabited by half a million
people. The plateau slopes from North to South; the further South it
runs, the lower the land lies, but it is still 1000 meters above
sea-level at the lowest place. This is what we have already known as
Northern Shensi. In this region, the ground is always covered with a
layer of yellow dust ... Furthermore, rainfall is scarce and no
irrigation has been introduced, so that agricultural products are
extremely scant. Under such geographical limitations, Northern Shensi
has become a region notorious for its poverty."[13] For a Chinese to
call an area notoriously poor implies a degree of destitution which the
American mind cannot grasp. In such an area, the welcome to Communism is
obvious, and the problems of Communism, once settled, are equally
obvious. The probability of mineral resources opens up opportunities for
development under Red rule, but these are distant.

  [Footnote 13: Ts'ui Yün-ch'ang, _Shan-pei Lun Kuo-hua_ (A Brief Sketch
  of Northern Shensi), Kweilin, 1939, p. 4-5. This author concludes that
  Communist rule worsened the economic status of the area. "Then there
  occurred the campaigns for 'the extermination of landlordism' and for
  'division of the lands.' The result of such proletarian disturbances
  was an astonishing decrease of population, caused by massacre and
  emigration, and the devastation of much land." (p. 6.)]

Interpretation of the achievements of the Communist regime vary with the
political standpoint of the observer, just as they do in the case of the
Soviet Union. Sympathetic observers, both Western and Chinese, report
enormous improvements in agriculture, fair land taxes, new cooperatives,
brilliant experimental democracy, bold education, and great
enthusiasm.[14] No unsympathetic Western visitors have been reported
admitted, and a few neutrals came away enthusiastic; but critical
Chinese have found as much to question as one might find in a similar
Western situation: terrorism, puppet elections, murder both judicial and
plain, sham education, and immorality are charged.

  [Footnote 14: See the works cited above, p. 20, n. 16. It is possible
  to find a contradictory interpretation in Chinese sources for almost
  every point cited by Western visitors as meritorious. Since the
  Nationalists are not interested in promoting the international
  reputation of the Frontier Area, and at the same time are unable to
  launch any counter-propaganda (for fear of alienating Leftist
  sentiment in the West, because it would give the Japanese a propaganda
  advantage, and would disturb the appearance of the United Front), very
  little criticism--sound or otherwise--of the Chinese Communist area
  has appeared in the West. Even in a case such as the issuance of paper
  money, universally regarded as a clever move by the Communists and
  guerrillas, Chinese writers have charged that the issuance is fiat
  currency imposed by Communist force (e.g., Wang Ssü-ch'êng,
  _Ju-tz'ŭ Pien-ch'ü_ [So this is the Frontier Area!] Chungking,
  1938, p. 38 _ff._) Within China, Communism is just as open to
  interpretation as the Soviets are in the Western world. Western data
  now available seems to cover only one side of the case, which is
  doubtless well-founded; but there must be another. There always is.]

The position of the Frontier Area is clear in a few respects.[15] In the
first place, it is not declining. Communist strength is believed to be
growing, by persons of almost all forms of political belief; differences
arise only over the rate and probable maxima of that growth. The
Communist strength in the Northwest is far less than it was in South
Central China seven years ago, but much of that loss of power has been
compensated for by increased relations with sympathetic guerrillas.
Secondly, the Communist area is strategically poorly located. The land
itself is poor; the adjacent large cities are completely under
Nationalist control; and the general military-political locale is
something like northern Arkansas in the United States. This explains the
willingness of the Nationalist commanders to avoid friction with the
Communists, and the positive zest with which they suggest further
consolidation of Communist forces around the one center at Yenan. It
soothes the impatience of Communists who wish unrestricted rights of
agitation, organization, and propaganda throughout the country. Although
the Communists make little visible headway against the Japanese in the
great urban slums of the coast, they are anxious to obtain freer access
to city workers. Thirdly, the Communist area displays no structural
peculiarities of government. Its profound difference from the rest of
Free China is not a difference in institutional forms, but in the forces
operating behind and through those forms. The Chinese Communists have
achieved very considerable success in working within the legal limits of
another state philosophy, and have done it with a minimum of violence;
this augurs well for the perpetual continuation of the truce. Their
practical accomplishments are extensive and novel; their leadership,
brilliant; that their government should be so orthodox in form is all
the more significant. By remaining within orthodox limits they challenge
the National Government on common ground; the gain is theirs and
China's.

  [Footnote 15: Since the author has neither extensive acquaintance with
  Chinese Communists, nor has visited Yenan, he offers these conclusions
  more tentatively than he would others, concerning the Kuomintang.]


GUERRILLA GOVERNMENTS

The special area second in importance is the Hopei-Chahar-Shansi Border
Region (_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_).
Widely publicized in the Western world as the Hermit Government, this
regime functions altogether within the Japanese lines. A number of
competent Western observers have visited this area, among them Major
Evans Fordyce Carlson, Mr. Haldore Hanson, and Professor George Taylor.
All have come away most enthusiastic about the work of the government.
The governmental picture which emerges from their and other accounts is
one of a highly flexible mechanism, working with great efficacy and
superb morale.[16] The driving power behind the regime is social
revolution as a means to national resistance, made easy by the flight of
many former local bureaucrats, and by the treason of some
ultra-conservatives, who affiliated themselves with the Provisional
Government established by the Japanese in Peiping. The personnel is as
genuinely United Front as may be found anywhere in the world; the
position is eased by the circumjacency of the Japanese, and the formal
recognition of the area by the Military Affairs Commission and the
Executive _Yüan_.

  [Footnote 16: Professor George Taylor's _The Struggle for North China_
  presents a full and clear picture of the Border Region and the Peiping
  regime in startlingly apposite juxtaposition. He concludes by pointing
  out the significant paradox that the Japanese established a
  reactionary regime designed to keep China agrarian, backward, and
  exploitable, but that they had not managed to extend their affiliate
  beyond the cities. The country, which they had hoped to capture,
  escaped them through the political resurgence of the Border Region. P.
  C. Nyi, article cited above, p. 16, n. 10, presents an outline of the
  regime which supplements the first-hand materials Professor Taylor
  appends to his work. Major E. F. Carlson's works, which describe this,
  are _Twin Stars of China_ and _The Chinese Army_, both cited above;
  the latter, a valuable contribution to the _Inquiry Series_ of the
  Institute of Pacific Relations, includes Wang Yu-chuan, "The
  Organization of a Typical Guerrilla Area in South Shantung" (p.
  84-130), a brilliant survey which reveals, sometimes unwittingly, the
  values and dangers of a Communist-Nationalist-popular union. Mr.
  Hanson's work is "_Humane Endeavour_," cited above; as a personal
  account, it is the most engrossing of the group.]

The Border Region, like smaller guerrilla areas elsewhere in occupied
China, is scarcely a domestic political problem because it is enfolded
by the Japanese armies. Even a United Front area, such as the Border
Region, would lead to far greater difficulties in political adjustment
if established in Free China. The tension and balance between the
Parties is such that this strain might not be borne. Behind the Japanese
lines, where the central armies cannot do anything even if they wish,
the Border Region finds Chungking's acquiescence to be stimulated by
Chungking's impotence. What could or will happen if the Japanese leave
the dividing area, and the Border Region has to settle the issue of
_status quo_ v. _status quo ante bellum_ with the central government,
no one knows. The Generalissimo told the present author that he did not
fear the encroachments of the guerrilla groups, because he and they were
all working for democracy.

Following from this involuntarily protective and insulating role of the
Japanese forces is the constitutional theory of the Border Region.
Unlike the Frontier Area, where it is exceedingly difficult to gloss
over the autonomy of Communist rule, the Border Region is definitely
established as a war-time agency, controlling territory beyond the reach
of the provincial governments. The provincial governments still
function, in unoccupied corners of their provinces, or in exile, and the
openly provisional (_lin-shih_) nature of the Border Region makes it
palatable even to Kuomintang conservatives.

The pattern of government is one of devolution from an Executive
Committee, which was established by a meeting of officials, volunteers,
mass organizations, and others at Fup'ing in January 1938. The area is
divided into provincial districts which are able to function with
economy of personnel. The following outline illustrates the structure of
this area:[17]

                 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

                     Secretariat
              Civil Affairs Department
            Financial Affairs Department
                Education Department
                Industry Department
                 Justice Department

   Inspectorates of the Seven Provincial Districts

  _Hsien_ Governments or Joint _Hsien_ Governments or
                Sub-_Hsien_ Governments

                     _Hsien_ Districts

                    Village Committees

  [Footnote 17: P. C. Nyi, article cited in _The Chinese Year Book
  1938-39_, p. 255. Reading between the lines will illustrate much of
  the Chungking attitude.]

A very high degree of direct popular government has been achieved. Over
wide areas, the average age of the _hsien_ magistrates is in the
twenties. Recruitment to the Region of numerous professors and students
from Peiping has helped to fill the need for trained personnel, and has
assisted in maintaining the area as a genuine multi-group affair rather
than a Communist front. Communists, although present and highly
esteemed, do not hold the highest formal offices. (For further
consideration of the United Front problem, see below, p. 123.)

The New Fourth Army (_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_), third of the special zones,
was formed by re-consolidation of the small mutually isolated Soviet
areas left behind when the main Communist forces made the celebrated
Long March. When first assembling under the truce, these Red units faced
a certain amount of difficulty from the provincial military who did not
grasp the United Front idea, but the Military Affairs Commission
recognized them. The Army did not establish a government except through
its Political Department, which coordinated political work of the
volunteer village committees.[18]

  [Footnote 18: On the New Fourth Army, see Epstein, I., _The People's
  War_, cited above, p. 260 _ff._ Agnes Smedley, the well-known
  pro-Communist writer, has lived among the New Fourth recently. Another
  foreign visitor has been Jack Belton, of the Shanghai _Evening Post_.
  Publicity for the New Fourth Army, reduced to an absolute minimum by
  Chungking, is handled by an independent agency, the New China
  Information Committee (not to be confused with the semi-official China
  Information Committee) in Hong Kong. The China Defense League, in
  which the moving spirit is Mme. Sun Yat-sen, also in Hong Kong, acts
  as an agency for receiving gifts, etc., for the Army.]

According to available reports, the Army stands far to the Left of the
Border Region. Formally United Front, its proportion of Communists is
much higher and Communist control more telling. Operating in East
Central China--the Anhwei-Kiangsu-Kiangsi-Fukien-Chekiang area--which
provided the base of ten years' Communist insurrection and was long the
home of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the New Fourth Army Zone represents
a recrudescence of Soviet activities under different names and with a
different military objective. This fact has caused intense
dissatisfaction among some Kuomintang generals, who spent half their
careers trying to root out Communism in that same area. They do not mind
the Communist zone in the Northwest, where an effective informal _cordon
sanitaire_ can be drawn, but renewed Communist activity in the Yangtze
valley impresses them as an evil not much less than pro-Japanese
treason.

The New Fourth Zone, the Border Region, and the Frontier Area--together
with a wide scattering of guerrilla areas and governments individually
of less but collectively of equal importance--are the military
step-children of the Chinese government. They all receive subsidies for
their work, varying in amount. Usually this is calculated on the number
of _hsien_ actually occupied as bases, so that the sum provides for a
far smaller number of villages than those directly affected. In the case
of troops, the salary allowances are based on the permitted size of the
units, in almost all cases below the actual numbers. The money is paid
to the commanders or other leading officials, who then set salary rates
incomparably lower than those of the central forces. The money thus
saved is applied to the general budget of the forces. Corruption, while
occasional and inescapable, seems to be more sharply punished in the
guerrilla than in the government areas.

In January 1941, the New Fourth Army was officially abolished, following
a clash with regular National Government forces. The clash arose from a
fundamental difference between the Generalissimo and the New Fourth
leaders concerning the nature of the Chinese government. The Communists
and their sympathizers held that the unity of China was a political
union between separate groups. When the Generalissimo ordered the New
Fourth Army to move North, and oppose the Japanese forces above the
Yangtze, the New Fourth countered with a demand for arms and funds.
Treating this as military insubordination in war time, the central
forces attacked the New Fourth--each side claiming that the other opened
hostilities--capturing Yeh Ting, the commander. The rest of the Army was
officially abolished, although its main forces were within the occupied
zone and outside the Generalissimo's reach. A full Communist-Nationalist
clash was avoided, however, and the Red leaders unwillingly acquiesced
in the Generalissimo's interpretation of the episode as a military and
not a political affair. The conflict brought forth the fundamental
Communist question: are the Chinese Communists loyal first to the
Chinese government, or first to the Communist Party? No answer was
forthcoming, although the Communists failed to rebel elsewhere. The
Generalissimo, by military swiftness and political acumen, had triumphed
in one more particular instance.

With the parsimonious policy of the central government keeping them in
fiscal extremity, the more Leftist guerrilla units make up their lack of
funds with direct economic measures. These include suspensions of rents
to landlords, regulation of share-cropping, lowering of taxes on the
poorer farmers, and creation of cooperatives. The Communists have
strained every point to avoid actual class war, and the economic reforms
of the guerrilla and special areas are smoothed by the usual absence of
the landlords. The political necessity of a bold economic policy remains
important, if the special areas are to continue their activity against
Japan or--in the Frontier Area case--their independence. Political
development thus is inclined to stress the use of popular machinery of
government, not for the creation of systematic, modern, responsible
bureaucracy, but for pushing vigorous mass action, direct popular
government, and socio-economic reconstruction, revolutionary by
implication if not by immediate content.

Not all the guerrilla areas fall into the Left pattern. The Kuomintang,
so long habituated to control of the state mechanism that its
revolutionary background is somewhat dimmed, is bringing Kuomintang
guerrilla work into action. The Party and Government War Area Commission
is the chief supervisory agency for this work, and an enormous amount of
planning has been done. Actual application of mass-movement work seems
as yet to lag behind that of the Left. Meanwhile, in most areas except
the Communist Northwest, Kuomintang officers, officials, teachers, and
volunteers are active. The guerrilla groups all accept the same flag,
hail Chiang as their leader, recognize the _San Min Chu I_ as the state
ideology, and maintain the cherished symbols of unity.

The Government and the Kuomintang were reportedly seeking a settlement
of the whole special-area problem, in anticipation of the close of war,
by urging the movement of all Communist or Communist-infiltrated forces
Northward, so that a more or less continuous Left corridor would run
from the Border Region to the Frontier Area. This precipitated the clash
with the New Fourth Army; in March 1941 no settlement has been reached.
Part of this is owing to the Communist desire to have unrestricted
agitational rights, and to official Kuomintang insistence that no Party
other than itself is constitutionally legitimate. The special areas
meanwhile prepare fighters in the anti-Japanese war, and are helped by a
government which is proud of them as Chinese but mistrustful of them as
Leftists. And they develop vigorous applications of democratic formulae
which challenge the reality and sincerity of everything the National
Government does behind the lines.

Despite recurrent clashes, it is likely that the areas and the
government will continue their present relations. In part this is owing
to the genuineness of the universal hatred of Japan and the devotion to
the long-cherished unification now achieved; in even greater part the
wrangling, acrimonious, but effective cooperation of the government and
the guerrilla Left depends on their equal and great desire for such
cooperation. The highest Kuomintang leaders--above all others,
Chiang--have pledged themselves to unity and cooperation, and are
determined to eschew civil war in the midst of invasion; the higher
Communist leaders are equally determined. In three years of
collaboration, the highest officers on each side have developed very
genuine respect for each other's sincerity. Quarrels are provoked by the
men in-between, overbearing Nationalists or the doctrinaire Communists,
who cannot forget 1927-37. (The author talked to one Communist leader
who had an odd, not unattractive muscular tic in his face: the
consequence of Kuomintang torture a few years past. Yet he collaborates,
and so do his Kuomintang equivalents, men whose parents lie in unknown
graves.) The common people on both sides want peace above all else,
internal peace between factions, and peace--after victory, and then
only--with Japan. The juxtaposed and competitive forces watch one
another, compete in the development of institutions, and engage in an
auction of good government: whoever wins the deepest love and esteem of
the Chinese people wins China in the end. Few institutional reforms in
the West have had such fateful stimuli.




CHAPTER V

THE KUOMINTANG


The Kuomintang, a Chinese political party, was formed by federation of
old anti-Manchu secret societies, and has become the vehicle for the
will of its Leader, Sun Yat-sen: constitutionally and legally it is the
superior of the Chinese National Government; administratively, one of
the three chief organs of policy execution for the regime; politically,
the only legal political party in Free China. It has had undisputed
primacy, but not monopoly, in domestic Chinese politics for fourteen
years. Despite revolutionary purposes, and idealistic obligations, the
Kuomintang is responsible for the welfare of the government which it
created. Its interest is therefore superior to and identical with the
government's; the party of a one-party state has no business criticizing
the government, since the party at all times possesses the means of
correction or change.

By its constitution and organization the Party is democratic. In
practice it has been a loose oligarchy, similar to the machinery whereby
American presidential candidates are nominated. In composition it is by
its own statement a cross section of China, composed of persons who
qualify as a political elite by their zeal in seeking and obtaining
entrance to the Party. Administratively, the Kuomintang possesses a
group of Ministries (_pu_), closely similar to the governmental
ministries, and executing quasi-governmental policy, plus an additional
group of separate or affiliated organizations having common purposes. In
power politics, the Kuomintang claims supremacy in all unoccupied China
and legitimate power over the occupied areas; in practice it yields
frequently to the demands of dissidents. In function, its highest
purpose--bequeathed by Sun Yat-sen--is to destroy its own monopoly of
power when the time for democracy shall come; like medicine, it is
committed to the eradication of the reason for its own existence.


THE PARTY CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

The Kuomintang adopted a Party-Constitution after thirty-odd years of
activity when, at the suggestion of Soviet advisers, it reorganized on
January 28, 1924 as a formal party, with membership books, regular dues,
etc. Up to then it had operated through techniques intermediate in
formality between American major-party looseness and Chinese
secret-society formality. In twelve chapters, the Constitution dealt
with Membership, Organization, Special Areas, the Leader (Sun Yat-sen,
_Tsung-li_), the Highest Party Organs, Provincial Party Organization,
_Hsien_ Organization, District (_ch'ü_) Organization, and Sub-district
(_ch'ü-fên_, roughly equivalent to the _pao_ in local government)
Organization, Terms of Office, Discipline, and Finance.[1] The actual
application of this Constitution is best described in the words of Wang
Shih-chieh, who wrote before the current hostilities:[2]

     The system of organization of the Chinese Kuomintang is
     based upon the _Constitution and Bye-laws of the Chinese
     Kuomintang_ [_Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Hsien-chang_] which was
     passed in the First Party Congress [_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao
     Ta-hui_] on January 28, Year XIII [1924], and amended in the
     following two Party Congresses on January 16, Year XV
     [1926] and on March 27, Year XVIII [1929]. No amendment of
     any sort was made in the Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses
     held in the Years XX [1931] and XXIV [1935] respectively.

     According to the above _Constitution and Bye-Laws_, the
     Kuomintang has five divisional organizations, _viz._: one
     for the whole country, one for each province, one for each
     _hsien_ (or governmental district), one for each district,
     and one for each district subdivision [_ch'ü-fên-pu_]. The
     organ possessing the highest authority in the Kuomintang is
     the Party Congress of the Kuomintang. When this Congress is
     not in session, the Central Executive Committee is the
     highest authority. The organization of the Congress and the
     method of electing the Delegates are fixed by the Central
     Executive Committee, while the members of the Central
     Executive Committee are elected by the Party Congress.
     Moreover the number of these members is also fixed by the
     Congress. Article I of the "Outlines of the Organization of
     the Central Executive Committee," passed in the First
     Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee Meeting, on
     December 6, Year XXIV [1935], provides: "The Central
     Executive Committee appoints nine standing members of the
     Committee, to form a Standing Committee which shall
     discharge the duties of the Central Executive Committee when
     the latter is not in Session. The Standing Committee is
     provided with a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, elected from
     among the nine standing members." Hence it can be said that
     when the Central Executive Committee is not in session, this
     Standing Committee represents the highest authority of the
     Kuomintang. The offices of the Chairman [superseded by the
     Party Chief, _Tsung-ts'ai_] and the Vice-Chairman have been
     provided for since December, Year XXIV [1935]. Whether the
     Chairman can be the representative of the highest authority
     of the Kuomintang or not, under the tacit consent of the
     Standing Committee, still depends upon the changes in
     circumstances. The said "Outlines of the Organization" does
     not state clearly the rights and duties of the Chairman and
     the Vice-Chairman. Hence, the highest authorities of the
     Kuomintang as prescribed by various written laws are (1) the
     Party Congress, (2) the Central Executive Committee, and (3)
     the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee.
     When the larger organ is not in session, the next following
     organ represents the highest authority of the Kuomintang.
     But this only applies in theory. As a matter of fact, when
     the lower organs are exercising their power, they can not
     but be limited by certain restrictions. Whenever important
     questions arise which may cause fierce disputes among
     members or among the people, the lower organs which have the
     authority to decide when the upper organ is not in session
     usually reserve the questions for discussion in the meeting
     of the upper organ. The resolutions passed by the upper
     organs--the Party Congress down to the Central Executive
     Committee Meeting--are usually elastic so that the lower
     organs--the Standing Committee up to the Central Executive
     Committee--do not experience great difficulties or
     restrictions in facing various troublesome situations.

     According to the _Constitution and Bye-Laws of the Chinese
     Kuomintang_, there is, besides the Central Executive
     Committee, a Central Control Committee for the Kuomintang.
     Its organization is similar to that of the Central Executive
     Committee, though with fewer members. It occupies the same
     rank as the Central Executive Committee, and its duty is to
     superintend and inspect the personnel of the Kuomintang.

     The names and organizations of the various organs directly
     controlled by the Central Executive Committee have
     unavoidably undergone some changes, though in principle
     their structures have remained the same. According to the
     "Outlines of the Organization of the Central Executive
     Committee," the organs under it are divided along three
     lines: organization, publicity, and popular training, with
     various committees. These organs are to discharge all
     affairs of the Kuomintang. Besides these, there is a
     Political Committee [superseded by the Supreme National
     Defense Council], to "act as the highest directing organ in
     all governmental policies and to be responsible to the
     Central Executive Committee." Although these organs are
     authorized by the Central Executive Committee and formed in
     the Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee, the
     Standing Committee can still exercise authority over them
     when the Central Executive Committee is not in session,
     because in accordance with the _Constitution and Bye-Laws_,
     the Standing Committee takes the place of the Central
     Executive Committee. As a matter of fact, since the
     activities along the lines of organization, publicity, and
     popular training are the internal activities within the
     Kuomintang, these organs are usually under the rigid
     control of the Standing Committee. As the Political
     Committee discharges various political affairs, its position
     may be said to be independent. Any resolution passed by this
     Committee is sent to the government for execution, and the
     Standing Committee has no power to restrict its activities.
     Hence under the party government of the Chinese Kuomintang,
     the Political Committee is in reality the highest directing
     and supervisory authority in matters concerning governmental
     policies.

  [Footnote 1: The text of this Constitution is given in Arthur N.
  Holcombe's invaluable study of the Great Revolution, _The Chinese
  Revolution: A Phase in the Regeneration of a World Power_, Cambridge,
  Massachusetts, 1930, p. 356-70.]

  [Footnote 2: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, Shanghai, XXVI
  (1937), p. 651-3.]

The Emergency Party Congress of the Kuomintang, Hankow, March 29-April
1, 1938, provided for two further amendments to the Party Constitution.
It abolished the system of reserve members, and, far more significantly,
it created the post of _Tsung-ts'ai_, here translated Party Chief, which
was indistinguishable except as a matter of terminology from the post of
_Tsung-li_, held in perpetuity by Sun Yat-sen. Chiang K'ai-shek was
elected Party Chief, and the powers of his office were stated to be
duplicates of those given originally to the _Tsung-li:_ a general
provision that "all members shall follow the direction of" the
_Tsung-li_, which was not implemented; chairmanship of the Party
Congress and of the Central Executive Committee (_a fortiori_, of the
Standing Committee of the C.E.C.); and a veto over the acts of the
Congress and the C.E.C. Furthermore, the Political Committee (Central
Political Council) was replaced by the Supreme National Defense Council,
of which Chiang was also elected Chairman.

Since Chiang had been Chairman of the Standing Committee, it follows
that the change of formal labels did not much alter the constitutional
organization of the Kuomintang, nor materially change Chiang's position.
Chiang does not help to create machinery of power in order to lurk
behind it, thus proclaiming it a mere façade. He, as a public servant
reared in the Confucian tradition, possesses sufficient respect for
words to let them mean what they are publicly declared to mean. The
post of _Tsung-ts'ai_ is more than ample in providing Chiang with the
power he feels necessary to accomplish national unification, mitigate
social injustice, and promote serious representative government. He
accepts the full measure of his power; doing so publicly, his subsequent
actions appear relatively modest. By Western standards, Chiang is naive
enough to be honest.

A point brought out in connection with the National Government (p. 46,
above) is worth reiteration. Neither by Party action nor by governmental
change has the Kuomintang monopoly of political power been modified by
law. There is no United Front, Popular Front, or any other kind of front
in the legal system; even in practical administration, the entrance of
non-Party men has been at Party direction; and it is only in the Special
Areas, the special war services, and the military organization that the
Kuomintang has relaxed its control of power. Other groups are sharing in
the work of the People's Political Council. The prudence of such a
policy may appear open to question; its consistency is not.


PARTY ORGANIZATION

Organizationally the Party is bipolar, with the power concentrated in
the entire membership at the base, and in the Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_) at
the apex. The highest authority of the Kuomintang is the Party Congress
(_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui_), which could also be translated as
All-Nation Convention of Party Delegates. Party Congresses have been
held as follows: I, Canton, 1924; II, Canton, 1926; III, Nanking, 1929;
IV, Nanking, 1931; V, Nanking, 1935; and the Emergency Party Congress,
Hankow, 1938. Wang Ch'ing-wei organized a rump Kuomintang on the basis
of a "Sixth Party Congress" held in 1939; the legitimate Sixth Congress
has not yet been called.

The Party Congress is the highest agency of the Kuomintang, and thereby
the highest legal authority in China--a position which it now shares
with the Party Chief, _ex officio_ its Chairman. The Kuomintang Party
Constitution provides that the Congress should ordinarily meet every
other year (_Art._ 27), but permits the C.E.C. to postpone a Congress
for not more than one year. This provision has frequently been violated.
In actual effect the Congress is neither an effective governing body,
nor, at the other extreme, a completely helpless tool. No Party Congress
has led to a drastic shift of actual political power.

The barometer of influence functions outside the Congress, and the
Congress ratifies and establishes what has actually occurred. The high
authority of the incumbent C.E.C. in matters of accrediting delegates,
plus its power to appoint delegates from areas not represented (a
feature taken from Soviet practice), gives the political Ins a
formidable weapon with which to bludgeon down opposition, but since the
value of the Party Congress is that of a legitimizing agency, overt
interference with Party functions would destroy the utility of the
Congress. Its level of freedom and efficacy may be compared with
American party conventions. Unwieldy, improvised agencies are not able
to meet the challenges of well-knit executive groups, but their very
unmanageability preserves to them a freedom of incalculable action. The
Party Congress could not in practice exercise its formal, legal power of
overthrowing the entire Party leadership and starting the Party off on a
new tack; it could, however, so humiliate the incumbents by subtle but
obvious political gestures familiar to all Chinese, that the leadership
would retire for reasons of health, or because of a yearning to
contemplate the cosmos.

The elaborate structure of the Kuomintang is shown on the chart of
organization (p. 331). Abstraction of the most essential features of
this chart reveals the following:

         -------------KUOMINTANG PARTY CONGRESS-------------
         ||              Chairman: The Chief              ||
         ||                     ||                        ||
         \/                     \/                        \/
  CENTRAL CONTROL     CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  SUPREME NATIONAL
    COMMITTEE            Chairman: The Chief ----->  DEFENSE COUNCIL
         ||                     ||                        ||
         \/                     \/                        \/
  the _control_ power     Party administration   The National Government
   over the Party     through subordinate organs     of China
         ||                     ||                        ||
         \/                     \/                        \/
  supervisory system      Party Branches,         the political system
                       agencies and affiliates

The Central Executive Committee (_Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui_)
is a relatively large body with one hundred and twenty members. The
Party Constitution requires that it meet every six months or less. These
sessions, the Plenary Sessions of the C.E.C., are by far the
best-established political processes in the Chinese state. Actual shifts
in power are here fought out, since the C.E.C. possesses authority ample
for almost any emergency. The expulsion of Wang Ch'ing-wei was effected
through C.E.C. action, and did not require the work of any higher body.

The Central Control Committee (_Chung-yang Chien-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui_) is
an agency which the Chinese adapted from two sources, the Bolshevik
pattern of an independent intra-party control system, and the native
_chien-ch'a_ power. Similar in function to the Commission of Party
Control employed by the Communist Party in the Soviet Union rather than
to the Organization Bureau, the Central Control Committee (also termed,
in another common translation, Central Supervisory Committee) is in
charge of an inspective system. Because of the relative laxness of
Kuomintang organization, the work of this Committee is far less than one
might expect. It has not been adequate to ensure rigidly strict Party
efficiency, diligence, or honesty; neither has it become a terrorist
agency inflicting an inviolable Party line. Few faults in politics fail
to be virtues as well; inefficiency has its minor compensations. In
times of secure power, rigid Party discipline might let the Kuomintang
grow into a genuine and full-fledged tyranny; nevertheless, in times of
stress, such as the present, the Party stands in need of stiffening and
control.

The third agency, the Supreme National Defense Council, is the Party's
agent in charge of government. (See above, p. 46 _ff._)

Immediately under the Central Executive Committee there are three
agencies of vitality and importance. The first of these is the _San Min
Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan_ (usually translated _San Min Chu I_ Youth
Corps, or Kuomintang Youth Corps). A war-time addition to the Party, it
became politically possible when the abandonment of appeasement
re-aligned government and youth. The Communist Youth Corps (_Kung-ch'an
Ch'ing-nien T'uan_) provided a model and rival. The Constitution of the
Corps, together with an appraisal (from the official point of view) of
its work, is given below in Appendices II (B) and II (C). In terms of
practical political effect, the Corps is significant, although far less
important than its organization scheme would indicate. It combines some
of the functions of a military training system with social and
propaganda work. Leftists have complained against it bitterly as an
agency of espionage and repression within student groups; others have
acclaimed it as a meeting of the Kuomintang and the youth, fruitful in
terms of national unity. The importance of the Corps lies in its
organization of a broad group of young men, one or more steps up from
the bottom of the economic scale, and in the fact that the government
and Kuomintang--after years of overriding youth opinion--now find it
feasible to organize their own affiliate. Few charges of corruption have
touched the Corps, which lies particularly within the purview of the
Generalissimo. A minor but active element in the political scene, it
stands for the Kuomintang's bid for permanence, and, in the event of
internal dissension, would be a valuable prop to the _status quo_. The
political indecision and laxness of China in general has kept the group
from becoming either a _Hitlerjugend_ or a frankly democratic C.C.C.
(Civilian Conservation Corps) on the American plan; the Corps is at best
a laggard bid to young men, and a belated competition with the Left and
the Communists.[3]

  [Footnote 3: See _China at War_, Vol. V, No. 3 (October 1940), p.
  77-8, for a recent official account of the Corps.]

The Party Affairs Committee (_Tang-wu Wei-yüan-hui_) supplements the
work of the Central Control Committee in investigating Party personnel
and acting as a supplementary housekeeping agency for intra-Party
organization.

The third of these agencies is the [Central] Training Committee
(_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_). To this Committee has fallen the labor of
invigorating the Kuomintang under conditions of strain, from war, from
the Wang schism, and from new domestic competition. The Generalissimo
has put the most vigorous efforts into the work of this agency, and has
organized under it a Kuomintang Training Corps (_Hsün-lien T'uan_) which
is providing extensive new resources of leadership to the Party.
Enterprising or promising young men are gathered together in training
meetings, and given intensive work in Party doctrine, propaganda and
organization methods, local administration, etc. The Corps has tended to
accept youths and some men of middle age from positions of
responsibility, and to equip them with the knowledge and the discipline
necessary to continuation of pre-democratic government. In the constant
race between government activity as a positive force and government
apathy combined with outside anti-governmental revolution as negative
forces, the training agencies are doing as much as any single enterprise
to stabilize the regime.

The Central Political Institute (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao_)
tops the entire program, as a training agency combining features of a
university, a camp, and a Party office. Under the personal control and
leadership of Dr. Ch'ên Kuo-fu, one of the Generalissimo's intimates and
the elder of the celebrated Ch'ên brothers, the Institute stands high
for its selection of students, the discipline and instruction it
imparts, and its practical political effect. The Kuomintang, pronounced
moribund by competent foreign observers ten years ago, today is in a
better position for leadership and development than it has been for many
years. (The author, who visited the Institute during the summer of 1940,
found the student body as well disciplined as any he has seen outside of
Germany, the staff highly competent [mostly American-trained], and the
physical facilities unsurpassed.) Admission to the Institute is open to
graduates of Middle Schools (secondary); students who are married may be
admitted, but single students may not marry while in attendance. The
courses of study are in general the equivalent of American undergraduate
work, although some graduate study is offered. The curriculum includes
such subjects as military training, Japanese language and politics, and
Marxian thought (in connection with _min shêng chu-i_). The general
course is supplemented by two special courses--the Civil Service
Training Corps and the Advanced Civil Service Training Corps--which are
set up in collaboration with the Examination _Yüan_. Graduates are
organized into alumni associations, to which the faculty are admitted as
supervisory members. It is a matter of success and distinction to
undergo the training of the Institute, which is the equivalent of a West
Point for political and governmental work. The Generalissimo visits the
Institute and speaks before it as much as possible, frequently as often
as bi-weekly, but with occasional gaps of months.[4] In addition to the
Central Political Institute, there is a [Kuomintang] Northwest Academy
of Youth, which has been even more active in training young men for
Party and government service. Proximity to the Red training center at
Yenan makes its work urgent; training, according to report, is briefer,
cruder, and more vigorous than in the central agency. The sub-surface
possibility of renewed class war by the Communists makes the Academy
peculiarly necessary.

  [Footnote 4: Information given the author by Dr. Ch'ên Kuo-fu and
  members of his staff, at the Central Political Institute, August 18,
  1940. Few places are more beautiful than the valley in which the cool,
  spacious buildings of the Institute are set. Landscaped for centuries,
  and celebrated as a beauty spot, the area is filled with carved
  shrines, severely simple monuments, and flagstone walks. A river runs
  through a forested gorge; waterfalls feed the stream.

  Dr. Ch'ên supplemented his hospitality in Western China by
  transmitting to the author a series of statements in reply to
  questions which were put to him in writing. Of these, the two most
  interesting refer, first, to the economic status of the Institute's
  students, and secondly, to the Kuomintang training plan in the
  Northwest: "Judged by functions and economic levels, students of the
  Central Political Institute represent all economic strata of Chinese
  society. Those of peasant origin are most numerous, forming over 40%
  of the total number."--"For the purpose of educating young men and
  women in the border provinces, the Central Political Institute has
  established a School for the Border Provinces, of which branches were
  established at Powtow (Suiyuan province), Sinin (Chinghai province),
  and Kangting (Sikong province) in October 1934. Another branch was
  established at Shuchow (Kansu province) in August 1935, this being the
  school sponsored by the Kuomintang in the Northwest. The Powtow branch
  was suspended in 1940, and those in Sinin and Kangting were handed
  over to the Provincial Governments concerned at the same time. So the
  only Kuomintang school in the Northwest at present is the one at
  Shuchow. It is subdivided into three parts: namely, a Normal School, a
  Middle School, and a Primary School. Its annual budget is one hundred
  thousand dollars Chinese national currency." (Letter to the author,
  March 10, 1941.)]

Apart from the Youth Corps, the training agencies, and the Party Affairs
Committee, but also directly underneath the Kuomintang C.E.C., come the
coordinated and uncoordinated agencies of Party administration. Their
organization is as follows:

                    C.E.C. OF THE KUOMINTANG
                       STANDING COMMITTEE

                              |||| ||||||||
  _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps-|||| ||||||||- Central Secretariat
                               ||| |||||||
  Training Committee-----------||| |||||||-- Party-Ministry of
    Training Agencies           || ||||||        Organization
                                || ||||||--- Party-Ministry of Publicity
  Party Affairs Committee-------|| |||||
                                 | |||||---- Party-Ministry of Social
  Affiliates-------------------- | ||||          Affairs
                                   ||||----- Party-Ministry of Overseas
                                   |||           Chinese Affairs
                                   |||------ Party-Ministry of Women's
                                   ||            Affairs
                                   ||------- Special Committees:
                                   |           Revolutionary Achievement
                                   |             Investigation Committee
                                   |           Pension Committee
                                   |           Party History Committee
                                   |           Revolutionary Loans
                                   |             Committee
                                   |           Overseas-Chinese
                              Party Field        Contributions Committee
                                Agencies

The Party-Ministries[5] constitute a part of the governing machinery of
China. The Organization Party-Ministry is important because of its
intra-Party work; the Minister, Dr. Ch'u Chia-hua, a German-educated
student, is one of the most active Party leaders, and deeply suspect by
the Left. His work is the field of Kuomintang Party administration. The
Party-Ministries of Social and Overseas Chinese Affairs combine the
functions of government with those of the Party; the former is a bureau
of protocol, and the latter acts as an extra-governmental colonial
office. The Secretariats provide study agencies for the governmental
system. They perform functions which are in the United States both
governmental and private (e.g., the work of the Brookings Institution,
the Public Administration Clearing House, the various Presidential
research and advisory committees, and intra-departmental housekeeping
agencies). The system of local government reform is sponsored by the
Central Kuomintang Secretariat (_Chung-yang Mi-shu-ch'u_), even more
than by the Ministry of the Interior in the government, under whose
jurisdiction it falls. The Secretary-General is a benign revolutionary
veteran, Yeh-Ch'u-tsang; the Deputy Secretary-General, Dr. K'an
Nai-kuang, is a Party official of almost twenty years' standing, who
studied in the United States and visited Europe in quest of data on
administration. Boundlessly energetic, he is typical of the younger
scholars who combine the academic and the political and impart to the
Kuomintang a large share of its present energy.

  [Footnote 5: The term _pu_ is usually translated Board, but the
  _pu-chang_ (_pu_ chief) is given as Minister. Since the identical
  terms are rendered Ministry, Minister, Vice-Minister, etc., in the
  case of the government, the term Party-Ministry is here adopted as
  both distinct and descriptive.]

Internationally, the most important Party-Ministry is that of Publicity
(_Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu_), which carries out most of the Chinese
propaganda program. Headed by Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, a very outspoken man,
its functions are distributed between Sections of General Affairs,
Motion Pictures, Newspapers, Advisory, Consultation, and International
Publicity, together with services such as China's leading semi-official
news service (the Central News Agency), the Party newspapers, the
Central Motion Picture Studios, and the official broadcasting system.
Because of the difficulties of language, travel, and passports, the
International Department supplies most of the news which reaches the
world press from Free China. The function of the Western newspapermen
consists largely in editing and supplementing this news from whatever
independent source they can find, or, occasionally and at the cost of
considerable hardship, to attempt to discover the facts for themselves.


In general, the Chinese follow the policy of giving the favorable side
of the news, simply omitting anything that could conceivably be
unfavorable. Their publicity services are no more guilty of positive
_suggestio falsi_ than the services of the British or Americans.
Nevertheless, Chinese notions of dignity and public policy differ widely
from Americans'; news would be hard to obtain or valueless when
obtained, except for the fact that the staff of the International
Section is almost entirely American-trained and well-acquainted with
American notions of news. The very able and active Hollington Tong, one
of China's most successful newspapermen, who was in press work long
before he became a Party official, has led in the supply of ample news
in the face of great difficulties. He is esteemed by Westerners to be,
along with Mme. Chiang, one of the Generalissimo's most effective
publicity advisers.

The Party-Ministry of Publicity also attends to the needs and interests
of Western newspapermen and other visitors, arranging appointments,
schedules, etc., and even boarding many of them at a Press Hostel. These
attentions, while from time to time irritatingly restrictive, are in the
end almost always appreciated as invaluable. Only the Leftists shun the
Publicity Ministry; they do so unsuccessfully, and to their loss. No
other Asiatic, and few Western, states can boast as alert and effective
a system of propaganda. In the troubled shifts and crises of world
politics, the Chinese have managed to retain the sympathy of the most
diverse audiences--from American church people to Soviet agitation
squads, and from British conservatives to Nazi clubs in Germany. The
American traditions of frankness, zest, liveliness in news are
transplanted; while they have suffered a sea-change, they still operate
with telling effect.[6]

  [Footnote 6: Visitors to Chungking owe much to the Foreign Affairs
  Section of the International Publicity Department. Its chief, the
  affable Mr. C. C. Chi, a well-known economist from Shanghai, has acted
  as host to almost every visitor to Hankow or Chungking. He has
  fulfilled endless requests--many of them irrational--with unfailing
  patience, good humor, candor, and intelligence. Few books on
  contemporary China fail to bear the imprint of his help; the present
  one is no exception.]

The Ministry of Women's Affairs, decreed in 1940, is in process of
organizing women's work for the Party. Previously, most women's
organizations had been knit together in the affiliated New Life
Movement. The minor committees of the Party--historical, pensions,
etc.--lie outside the scope of war activities. Although they continue,
their functions are subordinate to the purposes of resistance and
reconstruction.

Formal field organization follows seven patterns:

     -----------------------PARTY CONGRESS
     |                            |
  Central                    Party Chief
  Control                         |
  Committee          Central Executive Committee
                           Standing Committee
                                  |
                           Party Secretariat
                                  |
      ------------Central Party Administrative System----------------
      |         |         |           |           |       |        |
      |     Overseas-     |           |           |       |  Provincial
      |     Chinese       |           |           |       |     Party
      |     Party         |           |           |       |     Organ
      |     Organ         |           |           |       |        |
      |         |         |           |           |       |        |
      |         |         |      Special          |       |        |
      |         |         |      Party Organ      |       |        |
      |         |    Special     for Army         |       |     _Hsien_
  Direct        |     Party        Navy,          |   Special     or
  Overseas-     |     Organ      Air Forces       |  Municipal Municipal
  Chinese       |       for         and           |    Party     Party
  Party         |   Railwaymen   Military         |    Organ     Organ
  Organ         |       and      Schools          |       |        |
      |         |    Seamen           |           |       |        |
      |         |         |           |      Direct   District District
      |      Branch  District    District    District  Party    Party
      |      Party   Party Organ Party Organ Party     Organ    Organ
      |      Organ        |           |      organ        |        |
      |         |         |           |           |       |        |
  Sub-organ  Sub-organ  Sub-       Sub-       Sub-     Sub-       Sub-
  [_Pu-fên_]    |      district   district   district  district district
      |         |      Party      Party      Party     Party     Party
      |         |      Organ      Organ      Organ     Organ     Organ
      |         |         |           |           |       |        |
    Small     Small     Small       Small       Small   Small    Small
    Group     Group     Group       Group       Group   Group    Group
                                 [_Hsiao-tsu_]

Much of this exists only on paper. After the break with the Communists
in 1927, and the transformation of the Kuomintang from a
government-destroying to a governing agency, the functional and
agitational groups were allowed to slip into desuetude. Under the
pressure of war, and the encouraging political situation, which puts a
premium on action, the Kuomintang has adopted a variety of policies
designed to maintain its position.


THE KUOMINTANG BID FOR LEADERSHIP

Chief among the new devices is the reintroduction of the Small Group, or
Party Cell (_hsiao-tsu_). A comprehensive plan for small-unit
organization has been proclaimed; the text is given below, Appendix II
(D). This cell system, as explained by the Deputy Secretary-General of
the Kuomintang, Dr. K'an Nai-kuang, will provide the roots of the Party
with new vigor.[7] The small group provides for further diffusion of
Party work, and introduces novel principles of political organization to
the Party. Self-criticism, airing of opinion, mutual personal
examination--these are expected to stimulate Party work. The war
provides the Party with the opportunity to do with ease things which
seemed insurmountably slow and difficult before Japanese bombers helped
unification. Opium-suppression, bandit-eradication, and similar work of
organization and improvement challenges the Party to further effort. The
imminence of democracy requires more intensive preparation in discussion
and in self-organization for small groups. The _hsiao-tsu_ system is
designed to bolster Party morale, improve the Party work, and spread the
teaching of Sun Yat-sen.

  [Footnote 7: Statement to the author at Kuomintang Central
  Headquarters, Chungking, July 16, 1940; Dr. K'an also supplied the
  facts for the new organizational features of the Party. The following
  interpretations are the author's alone.]

The new governmental pattern of local government is to be reinforced by
the corresponding development of Kuomintang agencies. In the
government's plan, rural development operates on four levels: the
militia; the school system; the agricultural and industrial
cooperatives; and the political organization. The same person in each
village or hamlet would be responsible for all four. If he is to be a
Party man, he must be effective to be of service and a credit to the
Party.

In order to eradicate undesirable personnel, the Kuomintang has
increased its Party-purging facilities with what is known as the Party
Supervisor's Net (_Tang-jên Chien-ch'a Wang_). By action of the C.E.C.
on June 13, 1940, the sub-district Party organs are to elect one to
three members each to serve, with a six months' term, as Control
Members. With a power of report on Party discipline, and responsibility
for Party conditions, this change was expected to drive undesirables
more effectively out of the Party.

Three years from 1940 was set as the final date for the installation of
the new system. While the fractionization of a Party may seem to be of
minor importance, it actually is a major factor in the potential
development of the Kuomintang. In the period of Party government, the
more popular organs of Party members tended to slough off, leaving large
_Tangpu_ (Party Headquarters) in the _hsien_ or cities. These quite
often fell into the hands of local machines, with the consequence that
they interfered with government, and promoted the usual evils of party
machines. The diffusion of Party work, by letting individuals
participate more freely as individuals, may help to break the monopoly
of these bureaus, and restore the Party effectiveness with less reliance
on supervision from above.

The Kuomintang, in addition to these reorganization devices, is meeting
competition from the Left by increasing its membership. Membership
figures are not available in war time; the total is probably over two
million. In some instances the new members are no particular improvement
on the pre-existing group, but in the majority of cases the Party
broadens its base of popular support.


INTRA-KUOMINTANG POLITICS

The years which saw the rise of the Kuomintang to power, and its
subsequent period of authority, showed a diminution of the disparateness
of Party fractions. For a long time the adherents of Wang Ch'ing-wei
stood formally Left; those of Hu Han-min, formally Right; while various
older Party alignments preserved their outlines more or less clearly
(e.g., the Kuomintang Western Hills Group). With the consistent rise of
Chiang K'ai-shek to Party and national leadership, and the steady influx
of non-Party or merely nominal Party men into the government, Party
distinctions lost their cogency in practical affairs.

In terms of influence, patronage, and effective policy-making, the
Kuomintang is a conglomeration of innumerable personal leaderships knit
together by a common outlook, a common interest in the maintenance of
the National Government and formal Party power, and a common loyalty to
the Party Chief. The clearest groups are those which are out of the
current political stream; most notable among these is the Wang schism,
and a few scattered irreconcilables of half-forgotten Party struggles.
Within the regime, Kuomintang groups tend to coalesce as the leaders
meet, negotiate, and govern together in the councils of state.

So completely in the ascendant that they have lost their general
character as groups are the _Erh Ch'ên_ (literally "the two Ch'êns";
also termed "C.C. group" by English-speaking Chinese), led by the
brothers, Ch'ên Li-fu, Minister of Education, and Ch'ên Kuo-fu, head of
the Central Political Institute, and the _Huangpu_ (Whampoa Academy)
groups, led by the Generalissimo himself. The Ch'ên brothers have been
close adherents of Chiang throughout his career. Brilliant, vigorous,
sharp in the retention of power, they have made themselves anathema to
the Left. They are effective reorganizers of the Kuomintang, keenly
aware of its position as monopoly Party, and their protégés and trainees
are omnipresent through government and Party. Their military counterpart
is the _Huangpu_ group. It includes officers either trained by Chiang
himself or under his close supervision. With the passage of each year,
the proportion of Whampoa (or daughter-institution) graduates in the
national armies rises. The officers include a high proportion of
technically qualified men, whose capabilities and interests are chiefly
military. Builders of the new army, they look to the Generalissimo and
the Party for dicta on social, economic, and political policy; they
provide China with the unpolitical army which has been an American
ideal, although rejected by Soviet and South American practice. The
officers are not encouraged to assume decisive roles in local politics,
but to refer such things back to Headquarters. In consequence, although
the danger of a new _tuchünism_ has almost disappeared, the army staff
does not readily adapt itself to a _levée en masse_, or to the problems
of a social-revolutionary army. The very factors which make of the army
a tool and not a practice-ground of government also make it somewhat
rigid in dealing with guerrilla situations.

Both the C. C. and Whampoa groups are instilled with notions of Party
and military discipline which trace back in the first place to the
instruction given by Russians from the Soviet Union. While they follow
Sun and Chiang in accepting the promises of democracy, their notion of
democracy is as different from that of the Left as Washington's was from
the Jacobins'. They are interested in sound, disciplined, powerful
national government, representative, republican, and stable; they see
the revolution as largely complete in the power-destroying phase, and
are beginning to think in the reconstruction phase. After ten years of
strain and terror in fighting the Communists, they look with suspicion
on political changes which would open the nation to opportunist
Communist agitation, or make Chungking the helpless diplomatic
dependency of the Narkomindel. The bitterness of internecine conflict
has made them deeply suspicious of sudden or radical reform, although
they themselves profess a genuine interest in social welfare. The actual
reforms which have been accomplished are, in the scale of political
reality, already stupendous: opium eradication, tax collection,
diffusion of national authority, communications, industrialization,
military advance, etc. To the Kuomintang center, a demand for sharp or
shocking change is suspect. They desire to amplify what they have, and
to let changes wait on the ability of trained personnel--not entrusting
progress to the vagaries of mass movements with incalculable force and
direction.

While the National Government was at Nanking, there was a _Fu-hsing Shê_
(Regeneration Club), organized by a few hot-headed members of the
Kuomintang center. Its activities in support of the Generalissimo and
the government, under the further sobriquet of Bluejacket or Blue Shirt
group, earned it the reputation of a Chinese _Schutzstaffel_. The
comparison was at best fanciful, but any comparison at all was heartily
desired by the Europocentric Chinese Left and by the world press.
Magnified beyond recognition, the Club was identified with almost every
agency in the government and Party, not excluding the New Life Movement.
As applied, the name _Blue Shirt_ covered a wide scattering of unrelated
agencies which had the common features of a Kuomintang-center position,
an inclination to effective action (including violence) and some
secrecy. Effective political-police work is led by one T'ai Li, whose
name is whispered by dissidents; but counter-espionage and supervision
of suspects is also performed through Party agents, the regular
military, and governmental agencies.

Around the Kuomintang center there are other groups, some closely
related to Chiang, some remote. The Political Scientists (_Chêng-hsüeh
Hsi_) owe their name to a society which once existed in Nanking. They
include many of the administrators, men with American training who are
interested in industrial and fiscal development. The clarity of this
group has faded by its absorption into the governing center. The
Cantonese are represented by two levels of politics: those who based
their power on Canton province and those who remained within the
government. President Sun K'ê of the Legislative _Yüan_ has been
outstanding in his willingness to cooperate with the Communists and
Left, and is on cordial terms with relatively independent progressives,
such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen. Further groups within the Kuomintang are
constituted by the loyalist followers of Wang Ch'ing-wei, who now attach
themselves to other leaders, and by other personal or regional
followings (e.g., the _Tungpei_ followers of Chang Hsüeh-liang,
ex-_tuchün_ of Manchuria and ex-Vice-Commander-in-Chief, still "retired"
as a result of the Sian kidnapping). Finally, a number of elder Party
leaders remain because of their seniority or connection with Sun
Yat-sen; they do not need to attach themselves to any particular clique
in order to retain their position. These include such men as the
venerable Secretary-General of the Party, Yeh Ch'u-tsang; the President
of the National Government, Lin Shên; and the President of the Control
_Yüan_, Yü Yu-jên.

What has been said about the groups in the People's Political Council
(see p. 76 _ff._) applies to these. It is possible, as in American
congressional or administrative circles, to distinguish blocs of
leaders with differing interests or policy; but clarity fades upon
scrutiny. The orientation, even by the participants, is subjective.
Lacking continuous institutional form, clustering of leaders is
transient, shifting with political events.

It is difficult to appraise the role of the Kuomintang without at the
same time assessing the position of the government. The two are
inescapably connected. Although the Communists profess recognition of
the government, and pledge it loyalty, they offer only comradeship--on
their own terms--to the Kuomintang. This arrangement may last for a
considerable length of time, but the National Government is a Kuomintang
creation; short of violent revolution, Party control will scarcely break
in war time. Upon the Party, therefore, depends much of the efficacy of
the Government.

Many well-known Leftist writers on China--such as Edgar Snow--make the
comment that whereas the National Government is deserving as a
government, and worthy of support, the Kuomintang is hopelessly corrupt,
a creature of landlords and capitalists, or, of even worse, "feudal
elements." Such a distinction, based on strong moral urges and a desire
to achieve historical parallels, is untenable in practice. Kuomintang
power has weathered more than a decade of adversities. The Generalissimo
depends upon it. Analysis of the Kuomintang as the party of the Chinese
national bourgeoisie, and ascription of a mass character to the
Communists alone, is a fallacy, comparable to a consideration of Earl
Browder as the real leader of the American working class.

In point of fact, neither the Kuomintang nor the Communist Party in
China is a mass party. Neither ever has been, although each sought mass
character in the Great Revolution. Still largely apolitical, the Chinese
masses are organized socially, culturally, and economically into a
village and guild system which functions through most of the country.
The Kuomintang includes a very high proportion of shopkeepers, returned
overseas-Chinese, Chinese still resident overseas, Christians,
landlords, and Western-returned students. The class composition of the
Kuomintang is largely incidental to its functional character. Since the
Kuomintang was the party of Westernization, it gathered in revolutionary
days Chinese of all classes who were sufficiently modernized to be
interested. Naturally the poorest peasants and the coastal proletariat
did not constitute a large proportion of such membership. The men who
entered did so as Christians, as travellers, as temperamental rebels,
rather than as representatives of the bourgeoisie. When the Communists,
whom a recent writer[8] with unconscious humor calls the party of the
Chinese proletariat, came on the scene, the same social elements
contributed to its membership. Once the Communist Party abandoned the
Trotskyist line of urban revolt for the leadership of endemic peasant
rebellions, its composition changed somewhat, although the Communist
leaders of today are socially much like their Kuomintang equivalents.
The men who are class-conscious are, like Lenin, historically,
philosophically, and morally so; it is a matter of literary necessity,
not of fact.

  [Footnote 8: For a Marxian analysis of the Kuomintang, carefully
  stripped of frank Marxian verbiage, see "Wei-Meng-pu," "The Kuomintang
  in China: Its Fabric and Future" in _Pacific Affairs_, Vol. XIII, No.
  1 (March 1940), p. 30-44. The author _a priori_ defines the Kuomintang
  as the party of the national bourgeoisie in China, in effect exhorting
  it to fulfill its historic mission of completing the national
  democratic revolution, whereupon socialism [i.e., Stalinism] may
  historically follow. Nevertheless, its comment on personalities is
  informing in terms of practical politics.]

The Kuomintang is in power; the Communist and Left parties are not. As
the governing group, the Kuomintang naturally attracts those persons who
would seek to enter any government. Since it has not and does not
promote rural class warfare, pre-existing class relationships continue.
The Party and the Government have sought, not always efficiently or
faithfully to the _n_th degree, to carry out the programs of land
reform, democratization, etc., to which they have been committed. The
Kuomintang has tolerated widespread sharecropping, land destitution,
usury, and rural despotism--because it found these in existence, and was
preoccupied with building a national government, a modern army, adequate
finance, and with eradicating some of the worst evils, such as opium,
bandits, and Communists (who, whatever their ideals, nevertheless helped
to impoverish a poor nation by merciless civil war).

If the Kuomintang were out, it too could point to existing evils.
Whoever controls government bears the responsibility. A class element is
to a certain degree inescapable in any government; illiterate,
unqualified persons do not assume leadership even in the Soviet Union
until they have escaped their handicaps through training. But to make of
the Kuomintang the party of the Chinese landlords and merchants alone is
as fallacious as to make the Republicans or Democrats solely the
instruments of American capitalism. A comment such as this would be
unnecessary in the case of the United States; but persons who are not
Marxian with respect to the analysis of current American events often
assume a Left approach to China because of impatience with evils which
they see but cannot understand.

The final appraisal of the Kuomintang must be based on the practical
work of the government and the Party. In 1940, their effective control
was wider and deeper than ever before. The Chinese state was more nearly
in existence. The armies were undefeated. The growth of China in the
past ten years, and the stand made by China at war, has been made under
the unrelaxed control of the Kuomintang monopoly of constitutional
power, together with its clear primacy in more tangible power--schools,
finance, armies, and police.


THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT AND OTHER AFFILIATES

The important New Life Movement (_Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung_) is, strictly
speaking, not a Party organization; but Chiang is its Chairman, and in
purposes and personnel it interlocks with the Party. Convinced that
institutional and economic reform required accompanying moral and
ideological reform, the Generalissimo founded an Officers' Moral
Endeavor Corps as early as 1927. This organization was placed, soon
after its initiation, in the hands of Colonel (now Major-General) J. L.
Huang, a graduate of Vanderbilt University and an experienced Y.M.C.A.
secretary. The Corps' purposes were comparable to those of a Y.M.C.A.
with American armies, but Chinese morality in general, not Christian
sectarian teaching, was stressed. With Chiang's encouragement, the Corps
came to include a high percentage of the officers. Teaching cleanliness,
truthfulness, promptness, kindness, dignity, etc., it helped build
morale.

In 1934, after seven years of war against the Communist-led agrarian
insurrections in South Central China, the Generalissimo decided to
extend to the whole people the type of work done by the Corps. On
February 19, 1934, he made his first speech announcing the New Life
Movement and on the following March 11, a mass meeting of about one
hundred thousand people, representing five hundred organizations,
signalized the formal inauguration of the movement.[9] From then on the
Movement was continued as a regular phase of anti-Communist
reconstruction. It elicited praise for its attempt to reach the roots of
China's political demoralization, and its intent to remedy the everyday
life of the people,[10] although there was skepticism as to its
effectiveness in removing troubles deeply ingrained in the economic
system.

  [Footnote 9: The China Information Committee, _News Release_, March 4,
  1940. English translations of names such as the New Life Movement,
  Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps, National Spiritual Mobilization, etc.
  are often awkward or jejune where the original is not.]

  [Footnote 10: Young, C. W. H., _New Life for Kiangsi_, Shanghai, 1935,
  is a missionary work which praises the New Life Movement highly. The
  book includes interesting, first-hand, unfavorable accounts of the
  rule of the quondam Chinese Soviet Republic, and explains some of the
  opposition to the Communists. The interconnection between
  Communist-suppression and the New Life Movement is consciously and
  clearly demonstrated.]

The type of evil against which the New Life Movement struggles is
well-illustrated by Mme. Chiang's enumeration of the seven deadly sins:
self-seeking, "face," cliquism, defeatism (_mei-yu fa-tzŭ_, the
Chinese _nitchevo_), inaccuracy (_ch'a-pu-to_), lack of self-discipline,
and evasion of responsibility.[11] In addition to these sins of social
and political behavior, there are others such as filthiness,
carelessness of infection, indecent or sloppy dress, bad manners,
unkindness, etc. The Movement, easily understood in view of the
traditional Confucian emphasis on personal conduct, seeks to reach
individual behavior. The West European and North American peoples have
been disciplined by technology itself: timeliness, cleanliness,
regularity, have come to be a part of daily life. Any nation which seeks
to shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy discovers that
amiable defects become ruinous flaws: machinery cannot wait; a machine
society requires a discipline of its own. The New Life Movement is
attacking the points of social behavior which strike the newcomer to
China most immediately and most unfavorably.

  [Footnote 11: Chiang, May-ling Soong, _China Shall Rise Again_, New
  York, 1941, p. 38 _ff._ Mme. Chiang's work also includes a full
  account of the enterprises of the New Life Movement and of its
  affiliates.]

The positive virtues of the New Life Movement were formulated by the
Generalissimo. Four in number, they are _li_, _i_, _lien_, and _ch'ih_.
_Li_ is the fundamental Confucian virtue, and is based upon _jên_. _Jên_
being humane self-awareness, or consciousness of membership in society,
_li_ is the application of this awareness to conduct; it thereby
signifies proper behavior, not in the superficial sense of empty
formality, but in the sense of behavior which is _human_: the full
expression of man's moral and ethical stature. The traditional
translation of _li_ is _rites_, _ceremonies_, or _etiquette_--terms
which, because of their connotations of an empty ceremonialism, are
inadequate as a rendition of the original. The Generalissimo writes of
_li_: "It becomes natural law, when applied to nature; it becomes a
rule, when applied to social affairs; and signifies discipline, when
applied to national affairs. These three phases of one's life are all
regulated by reason. Therefore, 'li' can be interpreted as regulated
attitude of mind and heart."[12] Chiang thus reconciled, for his own
thought, the naturalistic ethics of Confucius, wherein man and nature
were parts of an inseparable ethical structure, and the pragmatism of
Sun Yat-sen.

  [Footnote 12: Chiang K'ai-shek, _Outline of the New Life Movement_,
  Chungking (?), n.d. p. 8. This is the translation, by Mme. Chiang, of
  _Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung Kang-yao_, Nanking, n.d., originally
  published in May 1934.]

_I_ is the element in man which makes him observe _li_: ethics or
justice. _Lien_ is "clear discrimination (honesty in personal, public,
and official life): Integrity." According to the lexicographer,[13] it
is "pure, incorrupt, not avaricious." The fourth principle is _ch'ih_,
given by the dictionary as "to feel shame,"[14] and rendered by the
Generalissimo and Madame Chiang as "real self-consciousness
(self-respect): Honor."[15] From this the Generalissimo evolved his
formulation of a theory of action.[16] That he is not unaware of
criticisms directed against him for talking about morality when people
are fighting and starving is shown by his spirited counter-attack:

     There are two kinds of skeptics:

     First, some hold the view that the four virtues are simply
     rules of good conduct. No matter how good they may be, no
     benefit to the nation can be derived from them if the
     knowledge and technique used by that nation are inferior to
     others.

     Those who hold this view do not seem to understand the
     difference between matters of primary and secondary
     importance. From the social and national point of view, only
     those who are virtuous can best use their knowledge and
     technique for the salvation of the country. Otherwise,
     ability may be abused for dishonorable purposes. "Li," "i,"
     "lien," and "ch'ih" are the principal rules alike for a
     community, a group, or the entire nation. Those who do not
     observe these rules will probably utilize their knowledge
     and ability to the disadvantage of society. Therefore, these
     virtues may be considered as matters of primary importance
     upon which the foundation of a nation can be solidly built.

     Secondly, there is another group of people who argue that
     these virtues are merely refined formalities, which have
     nothing to do with the actual necessities of daily life. For
     instance, if one is hungry, can these formalities feed him?
     This is probably due to some misunderstanding of the famous
     teachings of Kuan-Tze, who said: "When one does not have to
     worry about his food and clothing, then he cares for
     personal honor; when the granary is full, then people learn
     good manners." The sceptic fails to realize that the four
     virtues teach one how to be a man. If one does not know
     these, what is the use of having abundance of food and
     clothing? Moreover, Kuan-Tze did not intend to make a
     general statement, merely referring to a particular subject
     at a particular time. When he was making broad statements,
     he said: "'li,' 'i,' 'lien,' and 'ch'ih' are the four
     pillars of the nation." When these virtues prevail, even if
     food and clothing are temporarily insufficient, they can be
     produced by man power: or, if the granary is empty, it can
     be filled through human effort. On the other hand, when
     these virtues are not observed, there will be robbery and
     beggary in time of need: and from a social point of view
     robbery and beggary can never achieve anything. Social order
     is based on these virtues. When there is order, then
     everything can be done properly: but when everything is in
     confusion, very little can be achieved. Today robbers are
     usually most numerous in the wealthiest cities of the world.
     This is an obvious illustration of confusion caused by
     non-observance of virtues. The fact that our country has
     traitors as well as corrupt officials shows that we, too,
     have neglected the cultivation of virtues, and if we are to
     recover, these virtues must be adopted as the principles of
     a new life.[17]

  [Footnote 13: Giles, Herbert, _A Chinese-English Dictionary_, Second
  Edition, Shanghai and London, 1912; ideograph No. 7128.]

  [Footnote 14: The same; ideograph No. 1999.]

  [Footnote 15: Chiang K'ai-shek, cited, p. 7.]

  [Footnote 16: Reprinted as Appendix III (B), p. 373, below.]

  [Footnote 17: Chiang K'ai-shek, cited, p. 6-7.]

Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang both work actively in the Movement,
inspecting its branches and enterprises, speaking at its meetings, and
supervising its functions. The Movement possesses a small but very
active central staff, with Major-General Huang as Secretary-General and
Dr. Chu Djang, a Johns Hopkins political scientist, as his assistant.
Efforts are made to improve the daily life of the people. Shops are
encouraged to join the Movement, on conditions requiring cleanliness,
uniform prices, etc. Thus in addition to the work of a Y.M.C.A. for all
ages and classes, the Movement attempts the role of a municipal health
campaign agency, a better business bureau, and a civic service club.
Marriages have traditionally depleted family budgets; many a Chinese
farmer or worker has fallen into usurious debt because of the social
necessity of extravagant feasting and celebration. The Movement
accordingly organized inexpensive mass marriages, collectively
celebrated under official auspices; the purpose is not to increase the
population, but to circumvent a wasteful custom. Peep-show operators
have been given displays which are patriotic instead of mythical,
chivalric, or licentious. Story-tellers are taught new, public-spirited
stories to tell. The New Life Movement seeks to reinvigorate Chinese
society by adapting existing institutions or businesses to new needs.

In addition to attempting change in traditional life, the Movement has
introduced innovations. The only cafeteria in Chungking serving cheap
but dietetically sound meals is operated by the New Life Headquarters.
Chinese foods were hard to preserve and unpleasant to eat in the
darkness of air raid shelters; China has had no sandwiches, crackers, or
equivalent preparations; the New Life Movement concocted a cheap but
tasty and nutritious wheat and soy biscuit, and scattered the recipe
broadcast. News is distributed to the illiterates through lantern-slide
lectures in market-places. Mass singing, virtually unknown in China
until now, is making enormous strides with the war; the New Life
Movement is diffusing this, along with calisthenics.[18]

  [Footnote 18: Most of these and the following facts, but not the
  interpretations, are based on interviews which the author had with the
  hospitable Major-General J. L. Huang in Chungking, on July 14, 1940,
  and subsequently.]

A group of minor New Life agencies are clustered about the Headquarters.
These, like the Movement, are not financed by popular subscription,
membership fees, or collection drives. All administrative expenses are
borne by the Generalissimo and his closest associates, who contribute
from their private funds or from available contingent funds of their
offices, and from contributions by local governments. Since part of the
program is distribution of cash gifts to all wounded soldiers, the
budget runs into fairly high figures, but the Generalissimo realizes
that in China there is no better way to create mistrust of an enterprise
than to collect money for it. The leading agencies affiliated with the
New Life are:

(1) the War Area Service Corps, designed for propaganda, instruction,
spreading of cooperatives, relief, etc., in the occupied and combat
zones;

(2) the Rural Service Corps, designed to perform the same functions
behind the lines, and to aid in rural reconstruction;

(3) the New Life Students Rural Summer Service Corps, an organization
which organizes students from the colleges during their summer
vacations, and sends them out on the land for service work, along with
new agricultural information, hygienic teaching, literacy drives, etc.;

(4) the Wounded Soldiers' League, a self-help organization for disabled
veterans, who are assisted and encouraged to set up their own
cooperatives; they have done so with particular success in
cigarette-making, printing, and shoe-weaving;

(5) the Friends of the Wounded Society, wherein volunteers become
friends to veterans who are in hospitals, or who return to civil life as
cripples (each Friend contributing money, transmitted direct to the
veteran; Friends are also encouraged to write or visit the veterans);

(6) the New Life Secretaries' Camp, virtually a summer undergraduate
college, with an academic curriculum, strict discipline, and ample
organized recreation; and

(7) the Women's Advisory Council, which in turn tops another pyramid of
war-time activity in the hands of women's organizations.[19]

  [Footnote 19: For an excellent outline of the role of women in the
  war, see Chiang, May-ling Soong, _China Shall Rise Again_, cited, p.
  287 _ff._]

In addition to these major activities, there are innumerable further
enterprises, including another industrial cooperative system, a really
extensive chain of orphanages for war orphans, schools for girls,
training camps for young women, etc. It is no uncommon sight to stand on
a city street in West China and see three-fourths of the young people
wearing the uniforms of various war activities, most of which--outside
the army--are affiliates of the Party or the Movement.

These activities have not received much praise from Leftists or foreign
visitors. They begin at a level so far below American requirements of
social service that they seem ineffectual. The author once saw, in
China's _tuchün_ years, old people dying in the streets while
pedestrians walked by, uncomfortable but aloof; he saw children with
burnt-out eyes whining for alms, to the profit of a beggars' syndicate;
he watched soldiers rotting alive on the flagstones of temple
courtyards. The Kuomintang, the New Life, and their affiliates cannot
relieve the general poverty of China, nor alter the fundamental economic
faults and continuing maladjustments of class functions. These agencies
do, however, eliminate evils so bad that the ordinary American would not
remember them for his schedule of social reform. In the vast reaches of
Free China, these organizations--like many others--almost disappear in
the perpetual routines of ancient, enduring institutions: the
market-place, the hucksters' streets, the tea-house. But their influence
is felt. In contrast with the entire American New Deal, they are nothing
at all; in contrast with the Y.M.C.A., Komsomol, or similar
organizations, they are agents of one of the greatest practical social
reforms ever undertaken in Asia, and a step bound to have political
repercussions.

Popular non-participation still stultifies them. The leadership of the
agencies parallels government personnel. Women leaders are in many
instances the wives of officials; an exceptional person, such as Mme.
Chiang or her celebrated sisters, may be a leader in her own right, but
this is no usual rule. In many agencies, such as intended mass
organizations for reform, instruction, health, etc., the mass character
is entirely lacking. The masses are the beneficiaries of Kuomintang
action, but not often participants in that action. The Communists and
the independent Left hold an enormous leverage in popular interest;
ignoring class lines, illiteracy, or lack of preparation, they draw the
common people into a real share in government and social reconstruction.
The Kuomintang has ignored this opportunity--in part because of the
Confucian cleavage between scholars and the untutored which made the
scholar, however benevolent or philanthropic, a being apart from the
commonalty.

Two further organs--the National Spiritual Mobilization (_Kuo-min
Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan_) and the Mass Mobilization--are Kuomintang
devices for mass participation. The former, developed as an antidote to
defeatism engendered by protraction of the war, rising prices, and the
treason of Wang, actually consists in a propaganda machine, which holds
torchlight vigils, national fealty ceremonies, and similar festivals in
the larger cities; it has adapted some of the stagecraft of the German
National Socialists, but lacks a broadly popular character. The Mass
Mobilization is under the Training Department of the Military Affairs
Commission; useful as a military device, its political character is
slight in Free China. In the guerrilla and occupied zones, a genuine
_levée en masse_ has been accomplished; in the free areas, safeguards
which hedge Mobilization have robbed it of utility save that which is
strictly military. As an adjunct to the army, this is useful; otherwise
it has been ineffectual, despite the competitive success obtained by the
guerrilla zones in equivalent organizations.

The over-all picture of the Kuomintang and its activities is hard to
bring into focus. One general contrast will point some of its strength
and weakness clearly: as a governing agency, which created and
maintained the government, the Kuomintang has been more effective than
any other group in China. The Party has met and overcome obstacles in
practical politics, international relations, working administration,
internal unification, and national defense. The Party has succeeded well
enough to remain in power, which none of its predecessors or competitors
have managed to do. As a social and political force, its governing
character colors its work. More has been done by the government for the
people than in any comparable situation in East Asia. But Kuomintang
rule, however excellent when measured by the standards of authoritary or
colonial government, still falls far short of even elementary
application of democratic techniques. The flexibility of the Party, and
a continued ability to yield power in order to retain power, are the
most hopeful factors in the view of the Kuomintang future.

The Kuomintang could not be overthrown by any force--mere force--on
earth, unless the Party betrayed itself. Attacked by a major power, it
has emerged unscathed. But the Communists or other opponents may find
their most useful weapons in the weaknesses of the Kuomintang itself: in
the slowness of its change, or in its unadaptability to rapidly changing
conditions; or in an extra-Party resentment arising from severe economic
dislocation which, though consequent to war rather than to governmental
policies, was not swiftly enough controlled by a slowly-moving
Kuomintang. By contrast with 1935, however, the Kuomintang has gained
much power; the Communists have lost some. Regional and half-separatist
regimes, often corrupt, have almost altogether disappeared. Along with
the Kuomintang, the independent Leftists have also profited.

No prediction, to be plausible, can assume the early demise or collapse
of the Kuomintang. The Party has obtained power; its organization is one
of the three policy-executing branches of the new national organization.
Ruin of the Kuomintang implies ruin of the emergent Chinese state, so
laboriously constructed; though a successor might arise, too much of the
work would have to be done over again. Many Chinese, of all classes,
realize this. Kuomintang rule is the _status quo_; despite demerits, it
is the first stable government modern China has had, and China's chief
tool of defense today.




CHAPTER VI

THE COMMUNIST AND MINOR PARTIES


The party politics of Republican China fall into two periods: the early
period of competitive, pre-parliamentary parties, 1912 to the Great
Revolution; and a later period of struggling monopoly-power parties,
from the Great Revolution to the present. In the earlier period the
Kuomintang and its rivals tolerated one another's existence; each
regarded co-existing parties as natural, desirable, and useful. But the
sham democracy of the prostituted Republic disheartened the Kuomintang,
which thereupon bid for the complete conquest of power, brooking no
legitimate competitors; its rivals did likewise. The first coalition
(1922-27) of Kuomintang and Communists was therefore not the democratic
competition of two parties with different stresses upon a common
ideological foundation, but a war-time alliance of basically
incompatible forces. After the 1927 break, the Kuomintang became the
only legal party in most of the country, while the Communists--with a
rebel army, an unrecognized government, and a territory of their
own--enjoyed legality within the limits of their own swords. The
Kuomintang, embraced by all major groups save the Communists, became the
foremost vehicle for Chinese political life. Minor parties enjoyed
precarious, ineffectual existences, underground or expatriate.

With the outbreak of war in 1937, Nationalists and Communists adopted a
truce, formally a Communist surrender of armed rebellion, subversive
ideology, and separate government. In actuality it was an alliance of
deadly enemies against the Japan which threatened them both. Today,
Chinese party politics revives in the People's Political Council, and to
a slight degree in public opinion. The legal prohibition of minor
parties, including the Communists, remains in effect. Chinese party
politics, in the Western sense of a friendly subdivision of common
opinion, remains vestigial. The only guarantee of party rights is an
unstable toleration extended by the Kuomintang in the negative form of
non-prosecution. The Kuomintang is the Party for most of China. The
Communist Party is the party for a separate fraction of China. The minor
parties, holding neither territory nor armies in the game of power,
maneuver between and about the two, struggling to attain legal
existence.


THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS: PARTY AND LEADERS

Literary Marxism runs back to the Ch'ing dynasty, but the first formal
organization of a Chinese Communist Party occurred with the first
Congress of the Chinese C.P., in Shanghai, during July of 1921.[1] The
Soviet-Kuomintang entente was, strictly speaking, not a union between
the Kuomintang and the Communist parties, although it came to be such in
fact; it was collaboration between the Third International, which agreed
that Communism was unsuited to China, and the Kuomintang. The
development of a Chinese Communist Party, and open Communist debate
concerning the assumption of power, made the Kuomintang mistrustful,
repressive, and finally hostile. The suppression of the Communists by
Chiang in 1927 has become world history; Vincent Sheean and André
Malraux have preserved aspects of it in moving literature.[2]

  [Footnote 1: Miff, P., _Heroic China_, New York, 1937, p. 14. This
  valuable pamphlet is by one of the Comintern's leading expounders of
  Marxism as applied to China. Trotskyist Marxism is represented by a
  far fuller, more careful work by Harold Isaacs, cited, together with
  the following, cited on p. 20, n. 16. Edgar Snow, the distinguished
  American journalist, operates on the basis of an independent,
  unacknowledged type of Marxism, which shows itself in consistent
  prejudice against the Kuomintang, and in a soul-hungry search for a
  dialectical, inner meaning of things with which to supplement
  common-sense observation; his "Things that Could Happen," _Asia_, Vol.
  XLI, No. 1 (January 1941), employs Hegelianism at tenth-remove to
  analyze the future. It leads to a frequent implication of motives and
  to subjective interpretations which rearrange fact as it ought to be
  in terms of a rational economic dialectic (i.e., an occult pattern
  which provides a uniform key to all human experience). Thus, in his
  _Red Star Over China_, p. 306, he ascribes the massacre of Reds by
  Kuomintang officers to the fact that the officers were the sons of
  local landlords, enraged by expropriation of the land.
  Land-expropriation is a class motive; a moment's reflection would
  reveal that previous massacre of the officers' families by Communists
  would be a better common-sense motive for blood-thirstiness. This
  feature of diluted Marxism would not be worth mentioning were it not
  common to so many books about Communists written by self-proclaimed
  "non-Communists" habituated to the dialectic. It is found in the
  writings of Agnes Smedley, Victor Yakhontoff, Anna Louise Strong, and
  I. Epstein, to mention but a few.]

  [Footnote 2: Sheean, Vincent, _Personal History_, New York, 1937;
  Malraux, André, _Man's Fate_, New York, n.d.]

In the period 1927-37 the Chinese Communists operated the Chinese Soviet
Republic (_Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo_),[3] primarily in Kiangsi,
but also in the Ao-yü-wan (Hupeh, Honan, Anhui) area. In the Long March
of 1934-35 the main forces of the Communists, in the most spectacular
military move in China since the great Northern raid of the T'aip'ing,
marched a distance of some six thousand miles, and established their new
area in North Shensi (see above, p. 112 _ff._). Not only did the Chinese
Red Army remain intact; through great and successful effort, the
Communists transplanted schools, banks, and other institutions intact.
The Long March was comparable to the celebrated Flight of the Tartars,
in that it amounted to the transplanting of an entire people, their
worldly goods, and their most highly treasured institutions and
traditions.

  [Footnote 3: _Kung-ho-kuo_ is the Western-type term for Republic; the
  Kuomintang uses _Min-kuo_ or Folk-realm. _Su-wei-ai_ is a phonetic
  representation of "Soviet"; the characters, not intended to have
  meaning, are unconsciously humorous in that their lexicographical
  signification is "Revive (and) maintain dust!"]

Despite Kuomintang theory, the Frontier Area is a one-party _imperium in
imperio_, and its unchallenged party is the Communist. Under conditions
requiring great fortitude, the Chinese Communist leaders have
consolidated power, and use their base to spread Marxism through the
guerrilla movement. They are thus in the best possible political
position; their strategic excellence makes them welcome in precisely
those zones wherein their doctrines can best take effect. Their party
organization controls the Frontier Area through formal appointment of
the leading officials by the National Military Affairs Commission, and
through formulae of election for the subordinate officials.

The hierarchy of the Chinese C.P. is much like that of the Kuomintang,
which also copied Soviet models:[4]

       |---
       | CENTRAL PARTY<--COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL
       |   COMMITTEE
       |
    |--| NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS-----------------
    |  |---------------|      /\                |
    \/                 |      ||                |
  Executive Bureau     |      \/                |->Central Control
  Political Bureau     | National Party             Committee
  Special Departments: |   Convention
    Organization       |      /\
    Publicity          |      ||
                       |      \/
                       |   Provincial Council of Party Delegates
                       |     Provincial Party Committee
                       |       Standing Committee----------|
                      \/            /\                     |
    Communist Youth Corps           ||                     |
                                    \/                    \/
                           _Hsien_ Councils of      Municipal Councils
                             Party Delegates        of Party Delegates

                             _Hsien_ Party
                               Committee
                                    /\       |-------->Municipal Party
                                    ||       |             Committee
                                    \/       \/
                         Party Members' Mass Meetings
                           District (_ch'ü_) Councils of Party Delegates
                             District Party Committees
                                    /\
                                    ||
                                    \/
                             Branch Party Organs (cells)
                          Branch Party Organ Executive Committees

  [Footnote 4: Based on the Party Constitution, _Kung-ch'an-tang
  Tang-chang_ [Party Constitution of the Communist Party], [Chungking?],
  XXVII (1938), p. 1-21. The entire Constitution is reprinted below as
  Appendix II (E), p. 359.]

The shibboleth of Democratic Centralism applies to the Chinese as well
as to other Communist Parties; in practice this means the high and
unqualified concentration of power at the top of the hierarchy
following action by the democratic, or mass, element of the party
through the Party Council or Congress. In effect, nothing is decided at
such elections, since the plebiscites, according to the familiar
authoritarian pattern, concern questions to which only one answer is
reasonably possible: the answer decided by the party rulers. The free
use of meaningless elections characterizes Communist activity in
governmental as well as party matters. The voting act gives the
impression of concurrence, improves morale, and ceremonializes the
approval of the majority for the minority. The purpose which elections
serve in democracies--that is, of providing a decision to issues not
previously ascertained--appears very rarely in Communist elections,
where a near unanimity is constructed to indicate popular support, and
contested elections, disunity.

In terms of personnel, the Communist hierarchy has been consistently
compliant with world Communist policy as made in Moscow. This is a
tribute to the high international unity and uniformity of the ecumenical
Communist movement, but raises, in China, problems of intra-national
Communist policy. Revolutionary veterans of the party, who fought,
suffered, studied, and worked for their cause through ten, fifteen, or
twenty years of effort, often find themselves displaced, dictated to, or
expelled by the clique of younger men who have lived comfortably in
Moscow studying the dialectic mystagogy and acquiring an inside track in
Stalinist cliquism.[5] The Chinese Communist Party has been shaken by
violent schisms, casting off many once highly-valued leaders.

  [Footnote 5: Harold Isaacs, in the work cited, has many passing
  references to this phenomenon; his caustic indictment of Ch'en Shao-yu
  (Wang Ming), p. 438 _ff._, is a case in point. Note Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li
  Li-san, Chang Kuo-tao--in China, as in Russia, most of the founders
  and early leaders of the Communists have been set aside.]

No sooner does a man become suspect to the ultimate authorities than
his previous record, hitherto praised, is re-examined and captious
criticism proves that he was a traitor from the beginning, like Trotsky,
Bukharin, Chicherin, and Zinoviev. The profound vitality of the Chinese
Communist movement as a quasi-religious, self-sacrificial organization
is demonstrated by the fact that it has weathered these storms. The
terrible hunger for a guidance in life, an insight into the ethical
meanings of things, and an absolute which asks nothing but acceptance
and obedience--these factors call for courage, humility, abasement,
fortitude. They do not favor imagination, individual integrity of
thought, or the examination of fact. There has been no indication
whatever, despite the wishful thinking of Western liberals, that the
mentality of the Chinese Red leaders is one whit different from that of
Western Communists. They talk practical democracy, moderation,
collaboration with the Kuomintang; they do so because this is the
Comintern's China policy, just as they have fought the National
Government in the past when the Soviet authorities disliked Chiang more
than they did Japan.

Their all-China collaboration is no doubt sincere; but the sincerity is
based not on the wish to collaborate, but on what, in their special
phrasing, is termed the "objective" analysis of the situation. If the
Soviet Union, the chief "proletarian" force in the world, turned against
Chiang, the Communist _ipso facto_ would be against collaboration. The
war of China against Japan would no longer be a war of "national
liberation" but an "inter-imperialist" war in which the true interests
of the "working classes" would be against _both_ sides. This provides to
Marxians, under the name "science," an absolute, infallible guide to
ethics in practical politics, because it presumes to reveal the
inescapable long-range meaning of human affairs. The supposition that
daily affairs may in fact possess none but short-range meaning, outside
of slow, general, nearly impalpable changes in ecology, demography, and
genetics, etc., is anathema to the Marxians. A humanism trained to deal
directly, pragmatically, and simply with events is as far beyond the
Chinese Communists as it is beyond other Marxians.

This orthodoxy, so complete that it enthralls the leadership to Moscow
and paralyzes Marxian heretics in the very act of dissidence, reaches
throughout the upper levels of the party. This fact does not mean that
the Chinese Communist movement is in no wise different from other
national Communist movements. The historical basis of the Chinese
Communism, ever since Chiang smashed the urban unions in 1927, has been
that of an exotic faith imposed upon a native _jacquerie_, in which the
exoticism is unwittingly traditionalist. Peasant revolts of the Chinese
past have operated with the counter-ideocratic leverage of a
superstition, normally Taoist in derivation. The heads of the Yellow
Turbans (ca. 200 A.D.) and the Boxers (ca. 1900) were all magicians; the
T'aip'ing (ca. 1850) leader was a Christian in communication with God
Himself. These heresies against the all-pervading order of Confucian
common sense disappeared after their high-pitched dynamics died down in
social readjustment.

Marxism provides an element of faith, devotion, and irrational
submission which has operated in past Chinese history. The frugality,
honesty, and integrity of the Chinese Red leaders are celebrated by
foreign visitors and even by Nationalist officials; such revolutionary
virtues seem new in China, whereas they are the twentieth-century
manifestation of a common enough phase of Chinese political activity.
However, one cannot herefrom conclude that the Chinese Communist
movement is destined to disappear with its predecessors, for it has
three things which they did not have: an extra-Chinese application,
which not only supports it, but proves its concreteness and relative
realizability; a modern system of education, and thereby a class of
counter-ideologues to compete with the post-Confucian Nationalists; and
leaders with revolutionary experience greater than any in the world, not
excepting that of the great Soviet leaders themselves. Ancient peasant
uprisings revealed a final cleavage between dervish-type organizers and
the peasants, once infuriated, who finally sought normalcy. If the
Chinese Communist leaders can, through the example of the Soviet Union,
or by education, or by dexterous leadership, make Communism into
normalcy, they may retain their hold on such sections of the peasantry
as their leadership has captured.

Two men stand forth above all others in Chinese Communism. Both would be
remarkable individuals in any historical setting. Their partnership has
led them to be described by one hyphenated phrase: _Chu-Mao_: Chu Tê and
Mao Tse-tung. Chu Tê, the military genius of Chinese Communism, was born
of a gentry family in Szechuan, and attended the Yünnan Military Academy
at the time that Chiang was in Japan; he entered the years of his early
maturity as an aide to a provincial _tuchün_. According to Edgar Snow,
he was at this time sunk in vice, enjoying wealth, opium-smoking, a
harem, and the amenities of a war-lord existence.[6] Chu felt an urge
within himself to escape this rut. He abandoned his worthless existence,
leaving his harem provided for, and went to the coast, where he could
become acquainted with the revolutionary movement. On the way he broke
himself of the drug habit. He went to Europe, living in France and
Germany, and in the latter country joined the Chinese Communist branch
established among the students. He returned in 1926 during the Great
Revolution, and served as political officer in the Kuomintang forces.
Later he was instrumental in the creation of the Chinese Soviet
Republic, and was the prime military leader of the Communist forces in
the long civil war. He led the trek to the Northwest, and is esteemed as
a military hero of Arthurian proportions. Friendly, candid, interested
in specific tasks, he is characteristic of the superb leadership which
preserved Communism in China. He is the only Chinese military leader who
was not defeated by Chiang, although Chiang pursued him six thousand
miles. Major Evans Carlson, the American Marine officer, compares him
with Robert E. Lee, U. S. Grant, and Abraham Lincoln--drawing on the
best features of each for the purpose.[7]

  [Footnote 6: Snow, Edgar, work cited, p. 348 _ff._]

  [Footnote 7: _Twin Stars of China_, cited, p. 66. Major Carlson adds
  to this description in his _The Chinese Army_, cited, p. 35 _ff._ Most
  enthusiastically, he attributes to the Red Leaders honesty, humility,
  selflessness, truthfulness, incorruptibility, and a desire to do what
  is right. He praises their superb tactical abilities, their efficiency
  as organizers, their competence as leaders. He accepts the statements
  made by the Communist leaders as matters of good faith, and does not
  question their sincerity. Since he is the only qualified military
  visitor to put his impressions on record, these appraisals are
  valuable.]

Mao Tse-tung was born in Hunan in 1893 of a well-to-do farmer family.
His autobiography, dictated to Edgar Snow, is a classic of Western
literature on China.[8] His history was that of many other restless
young Chinese intellectuals, struggling for education amidst turmoil,
and adjusting their sense of values to the chaotic early Republic. He
was caught up by the Marxism of the literary Renaissance after 1917,
served in the Kuomintang during the Great Revolution, and worked as head
of the All-China Peasants Union. During the Soviet period, in which he
first became a colleague of Chu Tê, he stood forth as the chief
political leader. He and Chu between them formed a team to rival
Generalissimo Chiang, although Mao shared his political leadership with
various others, particularly Chang Kuo-tao. Mao is an expert
dialectician, skilled in rationalizing the policies of the Communist
International, and keenly critical within the limits of his Marxian
orthodoxy. Less genial than Chu Tê, he is nevertheless an inspiring
leader. His political skill, in following the lurches and shifts of the
Stalin party line while simultaneously leading an enormous Chinese
peasant revolt, is monumental. His earlier rivals and colleagues are in
most cases dead or forgotten. He survived both ideological and practical
ordeals.

  [Footnote 8: Snow, Edgar, _Red Star Over China_, cited, p. 111-167.]

A third Communist leader, Chou En-lai, is of importance because he acts
as liaison officer between the National Government and the Frontier
Area. The Communist quasi-legation in Chungking is maintained as a
purchasing and communications office of the Eighteenth Army Corps
(formerly Eighth Route Army). Chou, who studied abroad in Japan, France,
and Germany, served at the Whampoa academy under Chiang, and in the
period of civil war he was one of the chief political officers, twice
Chinese Communist delegate to Moscow. He is an old acquaintance of many
Kuomintang leaders from Chiang on down, and appears to be one of the
most successful diplomats in the world. Despite acrimony from secondary
leaders on both sides, Chiang and Mao seek to maintain their alliance
against Japan, and Chou is their chief intermediary. At Chungking he is
seconded by the alert, brilliant Ch'in Po-k'u, a veteran of Communist
political-bureau work.

The difficulties and conditions of Communist collaboration with the
National Government are well illustrated in the life of Chang Kuo-tao.
One of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai, in 1921,
Chang was of the upper classes, like Chu Tê; and like Mao, he was a
radical student in Peking. Just before his departure from the party in
1938, he had been chairman of the Northwestern Soviet, taking precedence
over Mao himself; but with the coming of national unity, Chang wished
to cooperate fully with China's leader, government, and legal Party, the
Kuomintang. He adopted subterfuges to get out of the Communist Area.
Arriving in Hankow, he announced his desire to form a genuine United
Front on the basis of a candid and sincere acceptance of the _San Min
Chu I_, which would mean the actual abandonment of Marxian dreams of
Communist "proletarian" dictatorship in China, even for the future. He
did not renounce Communism, but simply took his colleagues at their
words, and announced his intention of cooperating honestly, and not
through compulsion of the Moscow dialectic. He wrote:

     According to the views of the Chinese Communists, the
     present United Front is only a temporary union of many
     political groups, which are entirely different from one
     another in nature. These political groups have their own
     social bases, and they represent the interests of different
     classes. "The Kuomintang," so they believe, "represents
     landlords and capitalists, while the Communist Party
     represents the working class." No [ultimate] compromise can
     be made between the two parties.

     Now we often hear such slogans of the Chinese Communists as,
     "Let's lead the people _together_," "Let's _all_ take
     responsibilities," "Let us _both_ be progressive," and
     "Let's act under the _same_ principles." These represent the
     old ideas of striving for leadership. These show that they
     do not have the foresight to work unselfishly for the nation
     and the people. They want to retain their military forces.
     They want to maintain the Frontier Area and special,
     privileged positions in certain occupied areas. They keep
     these in order to await future developments....

     I hope they [the following suggestions] will receive the
     consideration of the Chinese Communists:

     (1) the Chinese Communists should always remember that the
     benefits of the nation and the people go before everything.
     They should support the movement of Resistance and
     Reconstruction under the leadership of Mr. Chiang K'ai-shek.
     They should carry out the _San Min Chu I_ without
     hesitation. What they do must agree with what they say;

     (2) there should be complete coordination of governmental
     and military operations, under all conditions.... I hope the
     Chinese Communists will not think that the Eighth Route Army
     is one privately owned by the Communist Party.... The
     Frontier Area [where Chang Kuo-tao had so recently been
     leader] should not be made a Communist base, nor made into
     an isolated place where Communist-made laws are executed and
     prejudice, together with political persecution, prevails....

     (3) with a view to working for the nation and the people,
     the Communists should follow the foreign policies adopted by
     the central government.[9]

  [Footnote 9: Chang Kuo-tao, _T'ou-li Kung-ch'an-tang Mien-mien-kuan_
  [An Impartial Survey of (My) Departure from the Communist Party],
  Kuangchou [Canton], 1938, p. 27 _ff._]

Chang demanded that the Communists react more sincerely, that they
accept the full implications of a united China, and abandon their
long-range dialectic for power.[10] For this he was denounced, his years
of service were reappraised, and he was dropped from the Communist
Party.[11] He was accused of hurting the United Front, because he urged
a more nearly perfect union. The chief Communist leaders challenged him
in open letters, revealing their continued adherence to an ideology
which made an eventual struggle for power inescapable.

  [Footnote 10: The same, p. 10.]

  [Footnote 11: The Resolutions of the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of
  the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of China
  comment as follows: "The danger of the 'Right' opportunists lies in
  the fact that they execute the tactics of an anti-Japanese National
  United Front at the expense of the independence of the party,
  politically and organizationally distorting the policy of the
  proletariat [_sic_] in building an Anti-Japanese National United Front
  so that _the working class and the Communist Party become tails of the
  bourgeoisie rather than the vanguard_." (Italics inserted in
  translation.) New China Information Committee, _Resolutions and
  Telegrams of the Sixth Plenum, Central Committee, Communist Party of
  China, November 6, 1938_, Hong Kong [1939?], p. 9. The demand for
  vanguard position from a minority party still technically illegal, and
  the damning of the Government and Kuomintang as "bourgeois," are
  continuous features of Communist policy. Their concept of cooperation
  is, as in Germany, Spain, and elsewhere, cooperation _under_ Communist
  leadership.]

The Communists have, therefore, cooperated as far as they are able,
without emerging from the infallibilities of their cult. They retain the
Marxian rationalization apparatus, and the linkage with Moscow. As such,
they are welcome but not completely trustworthy allies. Their presence
is undoubtedly the greatest check to the development of democracy in
China; the presence of a totalitarian party, respecting no rules but its
own, jeopardizes the entire experiment. The Communists want democracy,
but they want it quite frankly as a step toward "working-class"
(Marxist) power; they accept the _San Min Chu I_ on the condition that
it be read as elementary Marxism. They do not insist on the term
Communism, but employ the terms "working-class" interests for their
party, "scientific objectivity" for their ideology, and "a people's
movement" for radical, arbitrary reforms to rip Free China open with
social revolution. The Kuomintang leaders are fully aware of the support
in name plus subversion in fact which the Communists offer, and complain
bitterly about the principles of Sun being twisted about to Marxism as
in the form of "'independent' nationalism, 'free' democracy, and
'beneficent' livelihood," the qualifying terms sufficing for the
alignment.[12] They understand that the Communists are incapable of
sincere extra-class democracy; the Communists are hurt by the
Kuomintang's unwillingness to admit that it is not a Party of patriots,
but the Party of a transitional, historically doomed middle class.

  [Footnote 12: Ch'ao Shê [The Morning Club], _Niu-wu Yen-lun Chien-t'ao
  Kang-yao_ [A General Review of Fallacious Utterances], Chungking, XXIX
  (1940), p. 7. The work is a Kuomintang reply to Communist theses in a
  debate on the nature of national union.]


COMMUNISM: PATRIOTISM OR BETRAYAL?

If the Communists were as inflexible, disciplined, ferocious, and
intransigeant as they like to appear to themselves, China would have
had a three-sided war long ago. In practice, however, the Chinese
Communists yield amazingly. The Communist International is not goading
the Chinese Communists into the sabotage of Chiang and of national
resistance. Whether Moscow could do so is a standing question of Chinese
politics. The answer cannot be known except by practical test. One
might, however, plausibly suppose that an attempt by Stalin to
consummate a Moscow-Tokyo pact (possibly in accordance with pressure
from Berlin, which would require immediate protection of the proletarian
fatherland) would create a deep schism in Communist ranks; but it is
unthinkable that all the Chinese Communists would abjure their faith.
Moscow would not be naive enough to require the Communists to cease
fighting Japan _in form_. Such a Kuomintang-Communist break would
probably weaken the National Government; it would not destroy the
Chungking regime unless the Generalissimo ignored the chance offered by
a Leftward turn, to retain some of the peasant-radical and guerrilla
forces in his own ranks. It would, however, enormously strengthen Japan,
and be a severe blow to China. The greatest danger of a
Kuomintang-Communist break would lie in an American defeat of Japan. By
removing the necessity of Soviet support of Chiang, and increasing the
power of the National Government, American aid would lessen the
opportunities of Communism in China.

At present, however, the Chinese Communists welcome American aid, even
though the effect of such aid is to strengthen the China of Chiang as
against the China of Chu-Mao. The Communist spokesman, Ch'in Po-k'u,
told the author that American aid was not feared in China, but was
_welcome_, emphasizing the word. He even stated, in response to a
far-fetched hypothetical question, that actual American troops would be
welcome at Yenan, and stated that inter-party trouble was to be expected
only in case of defeat.[13]

  [Footnote 13: Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u to the author, Chungking,
  July 29, 1940.]

The final picture of the Communist position which emerges in China is
about as follows:

(1) the Communists are gaining ground because of their helpfulness and
vigorous leadership in organizing the guerrilla areas; wherever the
Japanese forces go, the Communists (thus shielded from Chinese National
armies) increase their influence;

(2) the Communists are benefiting politically by a genuine popular
movement in both Free and occupied China, particularly in the latter,
where spontaneous mass action is providing a base either for
Sunyatsenist democracy or for Communism in the future;

(3) in view of their belief that time is on their side, because of the
present direction of Soviet foreign policy, the Chinese Communists are
very cooperative in the alliance against Japan, patiently postponing
demands for "democracy" (i.e., unrestricted rights of organization and
agitation);

(4) they have superlative leadership, rich in practical experience,
which represents the super-orthodox residuum of years of schism and
purging; such a leadership is not likely to abandon the fundamentals of
Communism, such as the dialectic, the class-outlook on all history and
politics, and belief in the inescapable universality of future
"proletarian" rule (Communist world conquest); therefore, it is almost
unthinkable that they would fail to do Moscow's bidding, if the party
line demanded national treason in war time;

(5) the interests of the Soviet Union run parallel with those of
non-Communist China for a long time in the future, unless the European
balance of power forces the U.S.S.R. to appease Japan; under such
circumstances, the Soviet Union will be very anxious to maintain the
foothold of Communism in China, and will not be likely to ask the
Chinese Communists to commit candid treason;

(6) lastly, the Kuomintang possesses the opportunity of rivaling
Communism, of overtaking its rate of growth in political power, by a
bold policy of freeing speech, constitutionalizing the government,
reforming the land tenure system, and pushing cooperative industrialism;
the base of Communism has been widespread peasant revolt. If the
conditions of peasant revolt are eliminated, Communism will not be much
more of a threat to China than it is to the advanced countries of
Europe. (Wisely or not, the Kuomintang has not consented to meet the
Communists in open ideological competition. If it did so, and won,
Kuomintang morale would be strengthened. At present the practical aims
of Party policy toward Communists are about as follows: restriction and
isolation of the Frontier Area and of the Border Region, so far as
agitation is concerned, before ingestion by the constitutional national
system; military precautions, balancing Communist forces with
Nationalist; standardization of Red military practice by national rules,
and the elimination of peculiar political features; eventual dissolution
of fellow-travelling organizations, and their absorption into the
corresponding officially sponsored movements; supervision of Communists
and channels of Communist propaganda; courtesy toward Communist leaders,
strictness toward Communist subordinates, and harshness toward the
Communist laboring class following. A corresponding policy toward the
Kuomintang is pursued by the Communists.)

Finally, the deepest element eludes political analysis: the moderation
of the Chinese character, and the heritage of Confucian common sense.
The Chinese language and the Confucian inheritance of ideological
sophistication lead to clarity, pragmatism, and practicality. The
Chinese have long delighted in ingenious formulae with which to meet _de
jure_ impasses, while proceeding _de facto_ in quite another direction.
The Chinese are perhaps the only people in the world with enough finesse
about "face" to save the Communist face. The Generalissimo is in theory
consciously anti-Marxian; but when he was asked whether it is possible
that Communists or Leftists might exploit democratic rights for
unscrupulous power politics, he answered quietly by writing: "No,
because democracy in itself has the ability to work out the solutions
for those problems if there are any." A Communist leader said, the
Generalissimo would have nothing to fear from the Communists if he won
the war. His prestige would be unassailable. Chiang and the Communists
both know this.


THE NATIONAL SALVATION MOVEMENT

The National Salvation (_Chiu Kuo_) movement is third in point of size
and influence, and has been largely instrumental in assisting national
unification and resistance. The movement began in 1935 with the
organization of a number of professors, students, and young
intellectuals who were influenced by the student anti-appeasement
movement in North China. It had a simple, and very clear program: stop
civil war; stop appeasement.[14] Unlike the Kuomintang or the
Communists, the National Salvationists never developed formal dogma, or
a comprehensive ideology. Genuinely a movement, it had no membership
books, no formal or systematic organization, no minorities, and no
schisms. The movement spread like wildfire, across the length and
breadth of China as well as overseas; and, because of its lack of formal
hierarchy, was ignored by the National Government. Its loose
organization, consciously based on the middle class of clerks, students,
business men, professors, etc., followed functional lines familiar to
the Chinese.

  [Footnote 14: An early statement of National Salvation views is found
  in Wang Tsao-shih, "A Salvationist's View of the Sino-Japanese
  Problem," _The China Quarterly_, Vol. II, No. 4 (Special Fall Number,
  1937), p. 681-9. The author is one of the Seven Gentlemen.]

When the National Salvationists began the creation of a structure,
however rudimentary, by forming an inter-professional federation for
National Salvation, and when they followed this with the national
congress for National Salvation, the government took action, which
resulted in the celebrated trial of the Seven Gentlemen (_ch'i
chün-tzŭ_). The term (_chün-tzŭ_) is the Confucian word for
superior or upright person, without reference to gender, and was applied
in affectionate derision by the press. One of the _chün-tzŭ_ was a
lady. The seven, who included a celebrated and popular law school dean
(Shên Chun-lu), a banker, and authors (Tso Tao-fên, the spokesman among
them) were tried and imprisoned late in 1936. Demands for their release
figured in the Sian kidnapping.

The movement was financed very simply through volunteer contributions.
Most of the work was done by volunteers who asked no pay, travelling and
working at their own expense. About Ch. $5,000 (then about U. S. $1,000)
sufficed to cover the whole expenses of headquarters. Despite the
imprisonment of its leaders, the movement gathered momentum. Funds were
collected to support guerrillas opposing Japan in transmural China. Most
literate persons not already committed to formal Kuomintang or Communist
membership fell under the influence of the movement. General Shêng
Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang offered the movement a home, and many of its
workers went to the West.

In practical terms, the National Salvationists often work with the
Communist Party, although they are strictly Chinese and do not have an
elaborate dialectic. A strain of economic determinism runs through their
thought, but this is not systematized. The leaders of the movement were
released after the outbreak of war, but their organizations continued to
be suppressed, and work is largely suspended. The leaders told the
author that they had no means of estimating the actual number of their
adherents; they had no formal membership roll, and they were still
legally suppressed in Chungking areas. The quest for policy and
principle instead of power is new to Chinese politics, and the National
Salvation leaders are esteemed almost universally and hated by none.
Nevertheless the Kuomintang has not admitted the legality of the
movement, which continues to exist in non-public fashion. Some of the
leaders were recognized to the extent of being put on the People's
Political Council. In addition to standing with the Communists in
matters of practical domestic reform, the National Salvation leaders
demand two fundamental policies: continuation of the war, and unity of
the country above all party considerations.

The National Salvation leaders are able, modest, and patriotic. They
represent the older non-political sentiment of China, infused with
modern Leftist content. Dean Shên of Shanghai, the senior of the
movement, is an elderly man of almost dainty gentleness, keenly
intelligent demeanor, and serious but charming good humor. Mr. Tso
Tao-fên, an author, is a world traveller. Their colleagues are of the
student, publisher, author type: intellectual, patriotic, common-sense
in outlook.

The National Salvation movement looks forward to constitutionalism. It
has become almost universal in the guerrilla areas. The leaders have
faith that the Constitution and liberalized public life are developing,
although they expected in the summer of 1940 that the Convention would
be postponed until 1941, to allow the Communists and Nationalists
further opportunity for balancing and adjusting power relationships. The
National Salvationists are past masters in the techniques of indirect,
almost invisible pressures. Their disinterestedness, high principles,
and patriotism put them in an admirable position to act as a determined
moderating force between the two major Parties. As such they are the
third party of China, although another, smaller group bears this name.


THE THIRD PARTY

The party commonly called The Third Party (_Ti-san Tang_) was organized
by dissident Communists and Left Kuomintang members who wished to keep
on collaborating after the major parties broke apart in 1927, thus
ending the Great Revolution. Led by the indomitable Têng Yen-ta, who was
finally shot to death in Shanghai, the party began illustriously with
the participation of Mme. Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ching-ling) and the Left
ex-Foreign Minister, Eugene Chen. The formal names of the party varied.
From 1927 to 1929, and again from 1930 to 1937, it was the Revolutionary
Action Commission of the Chinese Kuomintang (_Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang
K'ê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_); in 1929-1930, the Chinese
Revolutionary Party (_Chung-kuo K'ê-ming Tang_); and after 1937, the
Acting Commission for the National Emancipation of China (_Min-ts'u
Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_).[15] The party is at present led
by Dr. Chang Pai-chün, a returned student from Germany and lieutenant to
the late Mr. Têng. It suffers from the official ban on minor parties,
but retains, by its own statement, a formal organized membership of
about 15,000. (This estimate would, in the opinion of independent
observers, need to be discounted.)

  [Footnote 15: Statement by the head of The Third Party, Dr. Chang
  Pai-chün (Chang Peh Chuen), to the author, Chungking, August 2, 1940.
  The translations were also supplied by Dr. Chang.]

The Third Party is a _San Min Chu I_ party. It accepts the legacies of
Dr. Sun, in their Left-most phase as they were at the time of his death.
The party is strongly anti-imperialist, socialist, and land-reform in
its teaching. Its socialism is of an independent kind; the party neither
seeks nor wishes collaboration with the Third International, although it
is willing to cooperate with the Communists as well as the Kuomintang.
It finds its chief political dogma in the last policies of Sun, executed
in the period just before his death: (1) a pro-Soviet orientation in
international power politics; (2) a Nationalist-Communist entente; and
(3) immediate aid for the peasants and workers. It is therefore more
like the old Left Kuomintang than the Communists.

At the present time, the party seeks to promote collaboration between
the two major parties, thus becoming the second third-party to that
friendship, and urges constitutional government. Eventually it would
prefer a representative government of the whole people (_p'ing min_),
with the executive agencies composed 60 per cent of peasants and
workers, 40 per cent of others, chiefly intellectuals. (The proportion
is believed to be Mme. Sun's contribution.) In past practical politics,
The Third Party took part in the Foochow insurrection of 1933-34, but
has on no other occasion obtained power. It is not expected to attain
major status.


THE CHINESE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY

The elder brother of Chang Kia-ngau, who is the enterprising Minister of
Economic Affairs, has organized a political party after the fashion of
the traditional pavilions of learning and patriotism. In China's past,
Confucians frequently developed an institution which admixed the
features of a perpetual resort camp, a library, a seminar, and a club.
Living together amid scenically beautiful and scholastically adequate
surroundings, they made their influence felt through their writings and
their example, whenever one of their number returned to public life. Dr.
Carson Chang (Chang Chia-shêng) has organized an Institute of National
Culture at Talifu in Yünnan, in the mountains just below Tibet. There
he associates with kindred souls to attempt a restoration of traditional
values in the traditional manner.

The confusing and unhappy similarity of the name of his party to Adolf
Hitler's party is explained in the following communication:

     To give to the world in a clear and unambiguous way the
     principles our party stands for and the platform we wish to
     adopt should we have the chance to serve our country, I have
     written a book, entitled _What A State Is Built On_. In
     formulating my political philosophy, though I have drawn
     freely upon the wisdom of the West, I have kept my eye
     steadily on the needs of my people and the circumstances of
     my country as the guiding and controlling principles in
     shaping my own thought. In view of the possibility of
     distortions you have suggested in your letter, an extract is
     now being prepared in English, with the idea to facilitate
     the understanding of our movement and to present to the
     intellectual world of the West our principles and policies
     ...

     The accidental similarity of names between our party and
     Hitler's is indeed an endless source of misunderstanding,
     but the similarity is truly "accidental." In Chinese the
     name of our party runs "Kuo Chia She Hui Tang," which may be
     literally translated into "Nation (Kuo Chia) Society (She
     Hui) Party (Tang)," a name we adopted long before Hitler's
     party became known, embodying principles widely different
     from what Hitler's party stands for. The suspicion abroad of
     our connection with Hitler's National Socialist Party may be
     traced to an incident two years ago at Hankow when
     Kuomintang first came to recognize the legal status of minor
     political parties. The foreign correspondents, in reporting
     my exchange of letters with Generalissimo Chiang with regard
     to the recognition of our party, referred without a second
     thought to our party as "Nazi," thus creating all
     distortions which might have occurred even without such
     mischief. I shall be more than grateful to you if you would
     undertake to clear the suspicion on us and pave the way for
     lasting understanding between us and your people.[16]

  [Footnote 16: Letter to the author, dated October 24, 1940.]


SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND _La Jeunesse_

These two minuscule parties are both expatriate groups organized in
Paris. The Social Democratic Party was organized in 1925. It has no
connection with the Socialist Party of the pro-Japanese Kiang Kang-hu,
but is simply the Chinese affiliate of the Second International. The
Social Democratic Party may unite with the Third Party, in view of the
close similarity of aims and ideology; its leader, Mr. Yang Kan-tao, has
been recognized by being seated in the People's Political Council.

The party called _Kuo-chia Chu-i Pai_ (_La Jeunesse_, or _Parti
Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine_) was organized in 1923 in
Paris, by a Mr. Tseng Chi, with whom is now associated Mr. Tso
Shen-sheng, the most active worker for the party. It survived for years
as an expatriate organization, joined by successive generations of
Chinese students in France. Its policies are strongly democratic and
social-minded. A functional legislature, the cooperative movement and
state capitalism have suggested a similarity to Fascism in the minds of
some observers; of Trotskyism, to others.[17] The party, through
accident and the family connections of its founder, has connections in
Szechuan, and the transfer of the National Government to Chungking was a
corresponding aid to the slight influence of the party. Long in exile,
it is known by one of its French names even in China; all it does is to
help diversify opinion. Mr. Tso occupies a seat in the People's
Political Council.[18]

  [Footnote 17: E.g., John Gunther in his _Inside Asia_, New York, 1939,
  p. 272.]

  [Footnote 18: By far the most complete summary of the minor and
  minuscule parties is to be found in two articles by a young Chinese
  newspaperman: Shen, James, "Minority Parties in China," _Asia_, Vol.
  XL, no. 2 (February 1940), p. 81-3; and a second installment, in the
  same periodical. Vol. XL, no. 3 (March 1940), p. 137-9.]

The National Salvationists are an operating force in China, and the
Communists, while a minority party, are not a minor party in the
American sense. Unhappily, the existence of minuscule parties among both
patriots and pro-Japanese elements suggests that multi-party
constitutionalism is likely to degenerate into innumerable party
fractions, splinter parties, and novel, unstable groups. The Kuomintang
and the Communists possess their respective monopolies of power; the
National Salvationists have a popular and sincere cause. The other
parties exist in part because they obtain recognition. As long as
Chinese political processes depend on leadership by personality,
individuals will be free to form their own parties, while the
geographical, cultural, and economic diversity of the country holds out
little hope for the appearance of two or three China-wide democratic
parties. Far more likely is it that, with the presumable advent of
constitutionalism, the Kuomintang-Communist alignment will continue,
while the present minor parties will gain some ground, and innumerable
new parties will appear in order to profit by democratic guarantees of
minimal representation, or to fulfill functions exercised by fraternal
societies in the United States.




CHAPTER VII

GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS OF THE JAPANESE AND PRO-JAPANESE


Facing the National Armies, and encircling the guerrillas, lie the
Imperial Japanese forces. Frank agents of Imperial policy, they--unlike
the Hitler-Mussolini contingents in Spain--make no pretense of
subordination to their Chinese allies. Publicly and legally instruments
of the Japanese state, their function is to destroy the Chinese
government, to control and bend Chinese society to the Imperial
purposes, and to protect Chinese who come forth as allies. The Japanese
Empire is accordingly itself militarily extended to China; occasional,
half-hearted attempts to deny the ensuing international complications
have been sternly rejected by other great powers. The United States is
not alone in insisting on full Japanese responsibility for everything
that happens within the zone of Japanese control.

The position of the Japanese army as a governing engine, unacknowledged
colonial machinery of a vast unassimilable colony, is not one relished
by the Japanese people or by their leaders. Even in the case of
Manchoukuo, the Japanese played a half-deception on themselves by
pretending that they were extending the area of their influence, not the
extent of their responsibilities. In part this distaste for overt
control is based on the ease, cheapness and irresponsibility of indirect
rule, employed in varying degrees by the British in Malaysia, the French
in Indo-China, and the Soviets in Outer Mongolia. The Japanese like to
think that they are aiding China, and incidentally themselves, to a New
Order in East Asia--autarkic, stable, racially independent of the
Whites, militarily secure. They do not like to contemplate the slaughter
of innocent people for sheer conquest, or to consider the hopeless
immensity of trying to overwhelm China. This complicates their
position.[1]

  [Footnote 1: An excellent bibliography, providing further references
  to the Japanese side of the war, is found in Borton, Hugh, _et al._,
  _A Selected List of Books and Articles on Japan_, Washington, D. C.,
  1940. An outstanding short discussion is Colegrove, K. W., _Militarism
  in Japan_, Boston (World Peace Foundation), 1936.]

For if the status of the Japanese army in China is clear, its purposes
are not. The war aims of the Japanese are confused. Japan's goal is
defined by overtones of the inexpressible--in economic motivation, once
valid, no longer meaningful; in rationalizations so long reiterated that
they become genuine; in the toss and push of world affairs, tempting
Japan's leaders to this opportunism or that; in sheer sentiments of
Japanolatry, Emperor-worship, racialism, archaic resentment against
China, fellow-feeling for the Chinese orientals, and plain fear. A few
Japanese know exactly what they want. The policy as a whole, the policy
of the Imperial state, encompasses ill-assorted economic, political,
strategic, racial and purely ideological objectives.

Even at the simple level of institutional control, the Japanese aim in
China has been ill-defined. The restoration of the Manchu monarchy in
Manchoukuo was an appeal to monarchist legitimism, to the Chinese past,
and to common Confucianist values. When the Japanese came further into
China, it was at first expected that they might install Mr. Chin P'u-yi
as Emperor of all China, and rehabilitate him in the Palace-museum he
left when a youth. Instead, they apparently attempted to create a chain
of linked, reactionary, agricultural Chinese states, mixed in form--a
federation of princes in Inner Mongolia, an Empire in Manchoukuo,
republics elsewhere. They began by going as far as to create a dozen or
more ephemeral pro-Japanese agencies--for a while one might legitimately
have expected that a Nanking government follow a Peking government, a
Hankow government, a Canton government, _ad infinitum_. But the trend
was reversed when the Autonomous East Hopei Anti-Communist Government of
Mr. Yin Ju-kêng was merged with the Peking regime, and--as pressure rose
in Japan for a settlement of the China affair--a China-wide Japanophile
government was first contemplated, and then established. The
establishment of these institutions has not meant the abdication of the
Imperial Japanese forces from the government of China. The pro-Japanese
governments were and are civil auxiliaries of the Japanese army; their
influence has in no case extended beyond the immediately effective reach
of the Japanese infantry. Even in planning the long-range permanent
settlement of Chinese affairs--on her own terms--Japan does not propose
to withdraw all her troops from China.


THE JAPANESE ARMY AS A CHINESE GOVERNMENT

The Japanese army is the effective military government of occupied
China. The Japanophile Chinese have a few troops, who function in close
proximity to Japanese, and are in no sense a military counterweight to
the invaders. The Japanese army is a large force, modern by somewhat
second-rate standards, which requires the use of an effective
communications system, modern economic auxiliaries such as shops, banks,
post offices, and a variety of other services including hospitals,
shrines, brothels, and crematories. These do not exist in China in forms
suited to Japanese needs, nor could Japan afford to trust Chinese with
the railways, the air services, the river commerce, the telegraphs, the
food warehouses, and other most vital services. Thus, all over occupied
China, the Japanese have installed a military government.

This government assumes direct responsibility for administering whatever
seems necessary or profitable. Thus, in the city of Nanking, the best
buildings are occupied by the Japanese, and the Wang government is
profoundly gratified to be allowed to share some of them, obtaining
second choice. The Japanese military, through protected corporations,
supervises the operation of the railroads and airlines, but it does not
even rely on the corporations to provide military transport, which is
under direct army control. If a Chinese who has gone over to the
Japanese and occupies a high position in their protected governments
wishes to ride on a Chinese train between Shanghai and Nanking, he must
buy a ticket from a Japanese clerk, show it to a Japanese conductor
under the eyes of a Japanese guard, with Japanese detectives standing
about, order a Sino-Japanese or pseudo-European meal in a Japanese
dining car with Japanese waitresses from a menu printed in Japanese, and
must pay, not in his own puppet-bank currency, but in special Japanese
currency not acceptable in Japan.

To govern China, the Japanese Army has not developed beyond the usual
devices of military rule. There are several reasons for this, primary
among them the difficulty of governing Chinese at all. In a pluralistic
society, such as China, command is largely superseded by negotiation,
and the issuer of a command must be prepared for oblique thwarting. A
Japanese who tells a Chinese to do something needs a bayonet with which
to gesture; otherwise the Chinese, accustomed to circumventing,
avoiding, or mocking authority, will disregard him. The Germans may
order the Danes to make a two-way street a one-way street, and the
Danes, accustomed to authority, will concur. When the Japanese
promulgate a regulation, nothing short of massacre could ensure its
absolute, unconditional obedience.

The language difficulty is another obstacle to direct Japanese
government. A cultivated Japanese and Chinese may write classical
Chinese to one another, and even the barely literate can scribble a few
characters, the meanings of which may coincide; but the spoken languages
differ from one another almost as much as English differs from either.
To govern China directly would involve an enormous feat of language
training, or an overnight re-shaping of the Chinese national character.
Non-violent resistance, wilful but concealed negligence, lurking
impertinence, consistent sloppiness, obsequiousness mingled with
hatred--these Chinese tools of resistance, added to the language
barrier, prevent any early Japanese hope of direct government. In years
to come, if such come, Japanese trained in the Chinese language could
supersede every Chinese above the level of foreman. A strong tendency in
that direction is observable in Manchoukuo.[2]

  [Footnote 2: Bisson, T. A., _Japan In China_, cited, _passim_, for
  many instances.]

The Japanese have abandoned direct government for the present. They
would defeat their own purposes by assuming a task for which they have
insufficient personnel, which would be very costly, and for which their
army is ill-equipped in morale or technical ability. Difficult though it
may be to employ pro-Japanese Chinese associates, it would be even more
difficult to find Chinese now ready to profess direct loyalty to Japan.
The only Chinese thus far Japanized are a number of Taiwanese
(Formosans), whose island was ceded to Japan forty-six years ago.
Chinese by blood and language, many of them have been reared in the
third generation of Japanese rule. Some are fighting with the Chinese
forces, but others, loyal to their lawful superiors, betray their
fellow-Chinese. The Formosans are insufficient in number to govern
China, or to provide Japan with even the most elementary foothold. The
Japanese have hence turned to the peculiar form of indirect rule
identified by the popular appellation, _puppet states_.


THE PROBLEM OF PUPPET STATES

Lawful, well-established indirect rule is a familiar feature of colonial
practice. Constituting an internationally recognized legal relationship
between the paramount power and the encompassed state, it has been
applied extensively by the European powers in Africa and Asia. The
Indian and Malay states, under Britain; Cambodia and Annam-Tonkin, under
France; the East Indian sultanates, under the Netherlands--these offer a
rich repository of precedent.

Unacknowledged intervention involving no legal relationship is also a
known feature of modern politics. The practices of the United States in
the Caribbean and Central America, particularly during the 1920's, are
familiar, but the leading case of intervention without responsibility
occurred in the relationship between the Soviet Union (first the
R.S.F.S.R.) and the Outer Mongol People's Republic. Four features of
what has since come to be called political puppetry are here made fully
manifest: first, the establishment of the subordinate through the
military aid of the superior; second, the continued effective control,
unacknowledged in law, of the subordinate by the superior, coupled with
economic coordination of the two; third, bilateral insistence upon the
formal independence of the subordinate state; fourth, the claim
of the superior that it _has not_ intervened, coupled with
international non-recognition of the new relationship. The four
features--establishment, coordination, fictitious independence and
international nonentity--were clearly defined by Soviet political
practice in Outer Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva long before Manchoukuo was
created.

In addition to this neighborly example, the Japanese had another source,
commonly ignored in current Western comment on the Far East, on which to
draw: the quasi-familist Confucian international system which prevailed
down to the time of men now living. Successive Chinese Empires developed
a clear, viable scheme of senior-junior relationships controlling their
intercourse with other organized governments. The other, smaller states
acknowledged China to be the senior realm, conceding that the Chinese
Emperor was lord of the world. They paid formal tribute to China; their
envoys were not ambassadors but tributary agents, while Chinese envoys
came as high commissioners, superior in rank to the courts to which they
were accredited. This relationship (awkwardly termed "dependency,"
"vassalage," "tributary" status, or subjection to "suzerainty," in
Western terms) could not be fitted into the Western state system.
Involving the assertion of Chinese power without concurrent admission of
Chinese responsibility, it was rejected by the Western states, and
lapsed following the French seizure of Indo-China, the British
occupation of Burma, and Korean independence under Japanese compulsion.
Today, Japan's moral effusions concerning the New Order in East Asia and
her digressions from Western patterns of international law in dealing
with Manchoukuo and Wang Ch'ing-wei both indicate that the Japanese move
freely, sincerely, and unconsciously in a frame of reference which,
obvious to them, is invisible to Westerners. The Japan-Manchoukuo or
Japan-Wang relationship could be aligned with the relationship which Li
Hung-chang wished, sixty years ago, to maintain in Korea, and found
significantly similar. The Japanese understood the position of
juniority in international relations: to their intense humiliation, they
confessed themselves China's junior during the Ashikaga period.[3]

  [Footnote 3: It is unfortunate that work on the nature of old Far
  Eastern international relations has no more than just begun.
  Descriptions from the viewpoint of Western international law often
  possess the unreal lucidity of dialectical materialism or of
  theosophy, since it is necessary to read into Chinese and other Far
  Eastern political institutions the characteristic features of a
  European invention--the juridical, omnicompetent, secular,
  territorially limited state. See Djang Chu, _The Chinese Suzerainty_,
  unpublished doctoral dissertation, the Johns Hopkins University, 1935;
  Nelson, Melvin Frederick, _The International Status of Korea,
  1876-1910_ unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1939,
  particularly Part I, "The International Society of Confucian
  Monarchies" and Part II, "Korea in Conflicting Societies of Nations";
  both attempt to reconstruct the working Asiatic theory in terms
  comprehensible to the West. Clyde, Paul H., _United States Policy
  Toward China_, Durham, 1940, Section XXIV, gives a succinct statement
  and relevant American public documents.]

A third meaningful context for Japanese practice is found in the basic,
factual scheme of current international relations. No nation in an
interdependent world is independent except by legal fiction; none could
maintain its present level of civilization without the existence of the
others. In these terms, legal independence fades as time passes, and
cross-national power becomes more evident. Western imperialism was
described by Sun Yat-sen as reducing China to a hypo-colony. More
recently, first the Communists and then the Japanese have accused Chiang
K'ai-shek of being the puppet of imperialism,[4] while occasional
Leftists regard Chiang as even now a puppet of Japan[5] and a few
citizens of imperialist states see him as a Communist puppet. The
Germans treat Churchill as the puppet of Roosevelt, and Roosevelt as a
puppet for international Jewry, while the present Stalinist line
attributes puppetry to the entire catalogue of world political
institutions save those made quick by its own infallibility. The
fundamental point of such appraisal depends upon the _attribution_ of
power relationships. Dependence is indisputable only if one government
functions within the military framework of another, or if the personnel
of the subordinate is drawn from the superior, or if clear and immediate
causal relationships can be proved between the continued fiscal or
military action of the sustaining government and the actual existence of
the sustained government--although even this last leads to subjective
interpretation.

  [Footnote 4: Taylor, George, _The Struggle for North China_, cited, p.
  66.]

  [Footnote 5: Statements to the author, by persons not in Chungking.]

The term _puppet_ is not clear or apt, except in its most concrete
sense--that of a person who is almost literally a marionette, whose
utterances public and private are not his own, whose actions are
supervised, and whose personal choice or opinion is not merely thwarted,
but left out of consideration. Not all the Chinese who work with Japan
are ventriloquists' dummies. The author talked freely with men who
staked their careers on the inescapable success of the Japanese
military, and who functioned in absolute conformity to general limits of
policy and publicity laid down by the Japanese; these general limits
were wide enough to permit a considerable degree of latitude of manners,
and to allow variance in power and policy between the various Chinese
under Japan. Use of the term _puppet_ in such cases is not clear. It
implies a higher degree of effective Japanese control, and a greater
pliability of Chinese cooperators, than can be shown to exist.

Since, however, the National Government is recognized, both by the
majority of the Chinese people and by _all_ powers (including Germany
and Italy) except Japan, to be the legitimate government of China,
representing the Chinese nation, action against that government may
properly and strictly be denominated treason; a person so acting may be
called, formally, a traitor and, less formally but more descriptively, a
Japanophile. Juridically the Chinese Soviet leaders were also traitors,
but they were never Japanophile. This term gains by specificity what it
loses through awkwardness.


THE PROVISIONAL AND REFORMED GOVERNMENTS

The Japanese have determined, assisted and promoted establishment of a
number of friendly Chinese governments. Huapeikuo, a North China
separatist state, went the way of the Francophile Rhineland Republic; it
never got off the drafting board. The East Hopei Autonomous
Anti-Communist Government of Mr. Yin Ju-kêng provided, within the North
China demilitarized zone, a vast gateway for smuggling; when the
National Government withdrew its forces from North China, the Japanese
sought more pretentious aids to conquest. The Provisional Government was
the first of these, following an Inner Mongol federation (_Mêng-liu
Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu_), affiliated with Manchoukuo; it was soon
rivaled by the Reformed Government; and in March 1940, both were
incorporated into the Reorganized National Government of Mr. Wang
Ch'ing-wei. Other governments, sponsored by various quarreling
departments of the Japanese military, or organized by Chinese confidence
men, have appeared transiently and then disappeared.

Three points concerning Japanophile governments contribute to assessment
of their chances; their origin and structure; their ideological
(narrowly, propagandist) position; and their personnel. These points
illustrate a significantly ambivalent trend: the Japanese have found
their degree of freedom of action less than they had expected in Chinese
politics, and to that extent have been defeated; they have also yielded
to the demands of the situation, and have won, in part, in that their
chances of success appreciate with realism.

The Provisional Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo
Lin-shih Chêng-fu_) was formed at Peking on December 14, 1937, and ended
by merger into the Wang Ch'ing-wei government on March 30, 1940,
perpetuating a high degree of separatism under the subgovernmental
style, North China Political Council. Like its predecessors and
successors, it was created by a self-proclaimed committee organized with
the consent and knowledge of the Japanese military, if not by the
Japanese directly. The members of the Provisional Government were old,
weak men, mostly adherents of the Anfu clique which had been Japanophile
during and after the War of 1914-18. A few were even brought forth from
more archaic strata, lonely adherents to the abandoned monarchy. The
youngest were in their fifties and the leading officers were extreme
conservatives--men of some intelligence and reputation, but obsolete.

The structure of the _Lin-shih_ Government was interesting in that it
formed a republic of three committees, as follows:[6]

  PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT (Committee)

                                     |
                                     |---Political Council
                                     |
                                     |--------Administrative
  Executive Division (Committee)-----|        Ministries and
                                     |        Boards
                                     |
                                     |---Secretariat
  Legislative Division (Committee)---|
                                     |
  Judicial Division (Committee)------|


  [Footnote 6: Nyi, P. C., "Plans for Economic and Political Hegemony in
  China," cited, p. 239. Compare this with the chart in George Taylor,
  work cited, p. 204. Professor Taylor's study covers the entire history
  of the Provisional Government, significantly aligned with that of its
  rival, the guerrilla Border Region.]

Structurally important features are: the absence of any method of
election, direct or indirect, or of any ultimate source of "sovereign"
personnel--the government having borne itself out of chaos,
constitutionally a remarkable feat; the elimination of even nominal
party control of government, or cameral legislation, or constituent
assembly, these being hated vestiges of the Chinese and Western, but not
Japanese, notion that popular sovereignty is to receive genuflections if
not credence; and, most startlingly, the absence of a head! There was no
President, Protector, Chief of State, Leader, or Dictator; the highest
officer was the Shanghai banker, Mr. Wang K'ê-min, Chairman of the
Executive Division (literally, _yüan_, but not in the Nationalist
sense). The scope, succession and competence of this Provisional
Government were as much in doubt as its origin.

Under the Provisional Government there flowered a new political
philosophy, the _Hsin Min Chu I_ ("Principles of the Renewed People,"
"People-Renewing Principles," or "Principles of the New People"). The
similarity of this principle to the _San Min Chu I_ is striking, but is
no more than verbal. Propaganda under this credo resembled the
Japanese-prepared state-philosophy of _Wang Tao_, the _kingly_ (as
opposed to tyrannous and unnatural) _way_ of the Confucian canon,
which--revered throughout the Far East, even by Sun Yat-sen--had been
slanted to suit Manchoukuo through a Concordia Society (_Hsieh-ho-hui_).
Each of the Sunyatsenist principles was refuted in detail, Pan-Asian
racialism was encouraged, a class-war _between_ the nations was
emphasized, and conservatism in thought, manners, and morals
recommended. The Peking propaganda machinery was well-financed; the
_Hsin-min-hui_ became the only tolerated political group. This _hui_ was
headed by Mr. Miao Ping, a Kuomintang Party veteran whose
political-bureau experience dated back to the days of Borodin. His
renegation, never publicly explained, enabled Japan to issue a careful
parody of the _San Min Chu I_. His assistant was a Japanese. Business
associations, student groups, and educational administration were fitted
into the pattern. The principles were not logically or systematically
developed, but the key terms sufficed to coordinate opportunist appeals
justifying the invasion, and opposing resistance, guerrillas,
modernizations, and democracy. The _Hsin Min Chu I_ received no credence
through conversion, faith, or loyalty. Operating on sound advertising
principles, however, they served well even if they failed to command
obedience but did unsettle allegiance to the other side, and ubiquitous
iteration muddied thought.

The personnel of the Provisional Government included no actively
important political leader. Many had been important long before; some
were conspicuous in fields other than politics, and had even served on
the semi-buffer Hopei-Chahar Political Council which was Chiang's last
compromise with Japan. Japan's failure to obtain an effective political
leader is important, for this lack eventually led to the acceptance of
Wang Ch'ing-wei. The old age, past misfortunes, the motley reputations
of the Provisional Government leaders attested a national sentiment
sufficient to enforce unity beyond the reach of national law.

The Reformed Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo
Wei-hsin Chêng-fu_) was established March 28, 1938. It lapsed
simultaneously with its rival and colleague, the Provisional Government.
There were several suggestive points of difference, although the chief
difference was the fact that the Provisional Government operated from
Peiping and the Reformed from Nanking. Both were national in form, a
difficulty which was solved by the creation of a United Council to speak
for all occupied China. This Council had only the power to issue news
releases, which it did. Despite duplication of capitals and national
form, the Nanking government revealed a slipping in the Japanese
insistence on conformity to their ideas.

In structure, the Reformed Government was a mutilated copy of the
National Government. It possessed five _yüan_, thereby continuing the
Sunyatsenist constitutional system which Japan first sought to destroy.
In doctrine, it took over the North China-Manchoukuo pattern, under the
name _Ta Min Chu I_ (Principles of the Great People), with a party under
the name _Ta-min-hui_. The walls of Nanking were covered with the emblem
of the party, a red circular shield with a yellow crescent moon
enclosing a white star. Quasi-educational work approximated that of the
North; but the Japanese found the Yangtze sympathetic to the National
Government and Kuomintang, and hence employed devices reminiscent of
Chungking.

For Reformed Government personnel, the Japanese found individuals who
were in most instances either as old as their Peiping colleagues, but
less famous, or much younger, and relatively unknown. With the city of
Shanghai only partially under its control, because local opportunists
reached the tax offices first, the Reformed Government provided an
outlet for persons who had felt themselves unjustly denied office, or
slighted by the Kuomintang, or who had wrecked careers, once promising,
by some ghastly misstep or crime and now saw a miraculous chance to
return.

These new governments could not on principle claim the allegiance of
their own clerks. The personnel, disloyal and of poor morale, was often
so corrupt that no government services--needed by Japanese civilians and
army alike--could be entrusted to them. Multiple taxes blocked Japanese
trade in the area Japan had occupied. The Japanese realized that the
United Council and the senescent politicians were not enough. Instead of
abandoning interventionist governments, they tried a leader of genuine
importance, considerable ability, and some following. His treason was
Japan's last chance to govern China without assuming the task herself,
risking a premature undertaking. To understand the moves and motives of
Wang Ch'ing-wei it is necessary to regard his character and political
history.


THE REORGANIZED NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF WANG CH'ING-WEI

In contrast to Chiang, who receives the obloquy which goes with power,
Wang Ch'ing-wei has spent the greater part of his life as a political
Out. He began brilliantly. While in his twenties, he became a
revolutionary hero by a bold attempt to assassinate the Prince Regent,
and after the establishment of the Republic followed the unhappy
meanders of the Nationalist movement. His association with Sun in the
years before Sun's death was very close, and he has as good a title as
anyone to the apostolic succession. (His title is not necessarily much
better than that of various other Kuomintang leaders; a score or so of
elder statesmen of the Party could claim a longer service of Party
leadership and equality or seniority to Wang in Party rank.)

In 1927 Chiang and Wang had different regimes for the first time, and
Wang went into exile; he tried again in 1930, and went into exile; and
he is trying now. His cooperation with the Japanese must not be regarded
as the sudden prostitution of a worthy figure, nor as the culminating
criminality of an utter rogue. As in a Greek tragedy, Wang, blinded by
self-esteem and goaded by political frustration, has chosen his unsavory
course from understandable motives. Several lines of continuity lead up
to his establishment of the Reorganized National Government at Nanking,
and condition the nature of this government.

Primarily, Wang has been an in-and-out schismatic in Kuomintang ranks.
It is quite possible that in terms of a head count, he may have had the
immediate support of a greater portion of the membership than did Chiang
in the first break in 1927, but his proportion has fairly steadily
declined ever since. There have been a large number of men who accepted
him as leader, just as in the preceding decade there were men _Wu mi_
("infatuated with Wu [Pei-fu]"). In 1930-31 his organization paralleled
the Government-supported Kuomintang in all parts of the world. Today he
has some followers who follow even to Nanking. These men are bound to
him by ties of long, habitual obedience, by blood kinship, and by
generously offered loyalty: the distinguished and vigorous Ch'en
Kung-po, now Mayor of Shanghai; by Chou Fu-hai, who--before his
proscription--was the most popular commentator on the _San Min Chu I_;
Lin Pai-sheng, who had served Wang well as spokesman; and the
entertaining T'ang Leang-li, a Javanese-Chinese writer of international
fame, who has probably written more books on China in English than any
other Chinese.

On the other hand, he has lost office-holding followers by the scores,
many of whom hold positions ranging up to Vice-Ministerships in
Chungking, and he seems to have lost almost all of his rank and file
followers. The chief defection was that of Messrs. Tao Hsi-shêng and Kao
Tsung-wu, who fled from Chungking to Shanghai and Nanking, and then fled
back again, bringing with them sensational copies of Wang's secret
preliminary agreements with the Japanese. Dr. Tao, a historian, served
Wang temporarily as Party-Minister of Publicity; Dr. Kao had been in the
foreign office while Wang still collaborated with Chiang.[7] His
following consisted almost entirely of politicians, ranging from the
rank of scholar-bureaucrat down to hooligans. The masses which he led
in 1927 have dwindled to hundreds, and the replacements are of distinct
unworthiness--persons, already cooperating with the Japanese, whom he
must lead for lack of better. He has lost followers with almost every
move he has made, whether rebelling, going into exile, accepting
government post under Chiang, or working with Japan. The Wang clique may
be represented by a consistently declining curve.

  [Footnote 7: _The Japan-Wang Ch'ing-wei Secret Agreements,
  1938-1939-1940_, Shanghai, 1910; these also appeared in the _China
  Weekly Review_, January 27, 1940, p. 318; February 3, 1940, p. 341.]

In the face of this, it is unexpected to find that Wang has been
reasonably honest and consistent, as were Trotsky and Röhm. His
consistency may be described as a perfectly regular spiral, which
maintains unchanging direction but never goes in a straight line. Wang
has always favored not-fighting, peace, civilian and constitutional
government, and making friends with any nation which professes
friendship for China. The loftiness of his motives might be impugned by
pointing out that each is the antithesis of one of Chiang's
characteristics; but the ultimate test of Wang's sincerity lies with the
psychiatrists rather than with political scientists. Assuming sincerity,
how did these consistent standards lead him to Nanking?

In 1927 Chiang broke with the Communists quite a while before Wang did.
Wang was willing to yield a doubtful point here, to credit the other
side with good motives there, and to keep the Wuhan government going as
long as he could. His difficulties were the difficulties of a
constitutionalist willing to maintain the constitution at the cost of
some appeasement. In the following years of exile, he upbraided Chiang's
machine-boss tactics within the Kuomintang; the name "Reorganized
Kuomintang" which he selected for his schismatics, is indicative of his
desire to promote regularity in party elections and free democratic
discussion in party congresses.

A striking instance of repetition may be seen in contrasting the
Nanking of 1940 with the Peking of 1930. In 1930 Chiang K'ai-shek had
been threatened by military attack and had found a great part of China
wrested from him by superior forces, those of the _tuchün_ Feng
Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan; but the National Government maintained its
position in the capital. In 1940, the capital had moved to Chungking and
the armed enemies were Japanese; Hu Han-min (the great Rightist leader)
was dead, a new Communist alliance was in effect, and the outside world
was in a turmoil more profound than China's. Despite the supervening
changes, Wang Ch'ing-wei was found in 1940 in precisely the role of
1930. Again he was the front for a military regime. In 1930 he had been
a Left-liberal front for native militarism; in 1940, he was the
appeasing, conservative front for the Imperial Japanese army. In 1930 he
had his own "Reorganized" Kuomintang; he had his "Orthodox" again in
1940. In 1930 he usurped the National Government offices, titles, and
regalia; he did this again in 1940. In 1930 his career ended with
military defeat and he went into exile, later bargaining his position
back into Chinese politics.

Wang appears to have become the victim of an _idée fixe_: he believes
that if he impersonates government devotedly enough, and with careful
enough detail, he will become government. Brilliant, sincere, adroit, he
is burdened by a pathological self-esteem and is so much the victim of
his own past rationalizations that he is no longer inventive. Obviously
such a character, in the face of recurrent failure, cannot assume the
blame for it. Wang's demon is the Generalissimo.

Another characteristic of Wang appears clearly at this point: the belief
of the appeaser that he can outsmart the appeased; he no doubt thought
that his _tuchün_ colleagues would become victims of the government
which they let him create. On his way out of China after Chiang's armies
and Chang Hsüeh-liang's intervention had settled this affair, he
stopped over in Canton to take part in an even more transitory and less
successful rebellion.

The next round of Wang-Chiang rivalry displays the consummate political
strategy of the Generalissimo and the ruin of Wang by his own virtues.
For three full years, 1932 through 1935, Wang was President of the
Executive _Yüan_ and second only to Chiang. After a little more than a
year out of office--owing in part to a gunshot wound--he returned in the
crucial months of 1937 just before the outbreak of general hostilities,
and stayed with the National Government through the first year and a
half of the war--until December 1938. In fifteen more months he reached
terms with the Japanese; eight months after he set up a government with
their consent and sponsorship, they recognized that government.
Throughout this period Wang advocated peace, non-aggression to the point
of non-defense and surrender, and universal conciliation. These
attitudes made him very useful to Chiang when Chiang needed him, and
made him dispose of himself when he was no longer helpful to Chiang.

Wang was ruined by the long, agonizing appeasement of which Chiang was
the leader, in the six years between the Japanese invasion of China's
Manchurian provinces and the outbreak of undeclared war in July 1937.
Throughout this period the forces of Leftist reform, of Communist
pressure (both military and political), of student sentiment, of
overseas-Chinese patriotism, and finally of national self-respect
itself, fed the opposition to Chiang, who knew that, whatever the cost,
China was not militarily or politically ready to fight Japan. Wang
Ch'ing-wei, who when out of office had espoused some of the most
genuinely popular and necessary reforms, found himself civilian leader
of a government following an intensely unpopular policy, and unable to
profit by the rise of opposition. The Generalissimo needed someone to
replace Hu Han-min, with whom he disagreed and whom he temporarily
incarcerated. Wang provided a counter-balance to the Hu Han-min group,
undermined his own popularity, and helped shield Chiang from
anti-appeasement criticism.

Wang Ch'ing-wei, in this period, feared war and grasped at the
conciliation which the Japanese offered between successive invasions. In
1937, Wang worked for the localization of the war at the cost of North
China, on the theory that the Japanese could take what they wished. He
reiterated his old point that the Chinese could not possibly whip the
Japanese on the fields of battle, but that they might outmaneuver them
over the tables of diplomacy. The advent of war was a disappointment and
source of worry to him.

In the course of the celebrated retreat from Nanking to Hankow, and from
Hankow to Chungking, Wang lost no opportunity to work for peace. When
the Germans offered themselves as intermediaries in the Hankow period,
Wang sought the opening of negotiations. There was a violent uproar in
the People's Political Council, not then reported in the press. When the
government moved to Chungking, Wang was even more despondent: victory
seemed remote, the Communists worried him as much as did the Japanese,
and the Generalissimo swept opposition aside with the slogans of
resistance. Like other peoples in war time, the Chinese began to confuse
peace and treason. Wang and his closest supporters felt that they were
being deprived of freedom of speech; their known inclination to
surrender and negotiate had supplied Chiang with a weapon which might
even prove personally dangerous to them. The death by firing-squad of
General Han Fu-ch'u showed that treason, or the charge of it, had become
serious. Wang and his followers rationalized their own fearfulness
concerning the war into the belief that they were expressing the will of
the peace-loving masses. In December 1938 he got out of China by a
surprise flight to Indo-China. His followers had previously been
filtering down to Hong Kong. The Konoye statement,[8] just issued, gave
him an opening to treat with the Japanese.

  [Footnote 8: Statement of the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro
  Konoye, December 22, 1938, Jones and Myers, _Documents on American
  Foreign Relations, 1939-40_, Boston (World Peace Foundation), p. 299.]

Throughout the negotiations, Wang behaved as though he were himself the
legitimate Chinese government. He did not accept the minimum Japanese
conditions, but held out for an agreement which would preserve the
fictions of Chinese independence, allow him to fly the national flag,
establish his version of the Kuomintang, and attempt every kind of
linkage with the past. One of his followers asked the author in Nanking,
"Do you think we were traitors when we spent more than a year getting a
fair peace agreement from the Japanese?" This agreement, released by
Messrs. Tao and Kao, consisted of the cession of broad military,
foreign-relations, and economic rights over China to Japan. The Chinese
were to lose no territory _pro forma_, and were to keep a minimum of 35
per cent interest in major economic enterprises.

The regime is sufficiently well known so that there is no need to detail
its history: the long dickering with the two Japanophile "governments"
already established in Peking and Nanking, since they were the third
parties to the Japan-Wang negotiations, the installation of the
government in March 1940, and its recognition the following November.
The more significant problem is--what part can this Nanking
establishment play in the actual contest for power in East Asia?

In the first place, the Reorganized National Government (_Chung-hua
Min-kuo Ts'an-chêng Kuo-min Chêng-fu_) of China is not a puppet
government in the sense that the Manchoukuoan government is. The
Japanese have a very loose surveillance of the officers of state.
Interviews with officials indicate pretty conclusively the absence of
dictaphones or of Japanese Special Service agents. The leaders in the
government at Nanking are not watched or hounded in any intimate way.
One of them said: "Why should the Japanese watch us? They know that we
cannot do anything to them, and they know that their only chance of
success lies in our becoming a real government."

Secondly, the personnel of the Nanking regime is not sufficient to cope
with the problems which face it. The Nanking regime has no diplomatic
officer who has regularly represented any other Chinese government; only
a few consuls, in Japanese territory, joined it.[9] In no single
instance can a Nanking officeholder, compared with his Chungking
counterpart, be regarded (patriotism apart) as better-qualified or more
able than his rival. In an enterprise of this sort, it would seem likely
that Nanking should have the better man in some few positions. Diligent
and disinterested inquiry fails to reveal a single one. Finally, the
personnel is a mixture of Wang cliquists, politically obsolete
conservatives, careerist Japanophiles, colorless opportunists, and
actual criminals.

  [Footnote 9: Ch'ên Lo died, and the only persons with any diplomatic
  experience had, in the past, been only casually connected with the
  Foreign Office.]

A Western newspaper man, well acquainted with the Nanking situation,
told the author that he estimated the regime as 5 per cent Japanophiles,
5 per cent upright men who worked with the enemy because of a sense of
public duty toward the Chinese people in the occupied areas, 20 per cent
opportunists, and 70 per cent low characters interested in thievery.
Nanking officials, to whom these estimates were communicated without
revelation of the source, felt the latter categories to be much too
high. Several of the more intelligent men in Nanking offered the
argument that if they did not share in the regime, unscrupulous elements
would deceive the Japanese and oppress the people; or they stated that
the Reorganized Government had brought back the flag, the constitution,
the titles, the law codes, and the political doctrines of the National
Government, so that occupied and unoccupied China had the same polity.
They disregarded the point that this abetted the enemy.

Thirdly, the government has nothing to do. The power of the Nanking
regime in no instance reaches beyond the Japanese patrols. No counties
are under Nanking control which are not also under Japanese control. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no foreign affairs. The Ministry of
Finance collects some excises and disburses many salaries, as well as
limited amounts for the upkeep of some schools, law courts, minimal
public services, and state property, insofar as the Japanese have
returned any. (It is interesting to note that the officials at Nanking,
deploring the "Communist" tendencies of Chiang, live in commandeered
houses, and use the commandeering of private property as a form of
patronage for their supporters.) The Central Political Council has so
little to do that it draws up a budget and solemnly debates items of
less than U. S. $100.[10] The officials cannot ride far from the city
limits of Nanking, because of the guerrillas who operate all about. The
railroad runs only by daylight. The Nanking police are mostly unarmed,
except for clubs--an unprecedented condition for modern China!--and many
who carry rifles or pistols seem to have no cartridges.

  [Footnote 10: See _The People's Tribune_ (Shanghai), XXIX, p. 130
  _ff._, August 1940. This is the semi-official English organ of the
  regime; each issue contains a selection of public documents. It is
  edited by the volatile T'ang Leang-li. The other English-language
  journal is _The Voice of China_, fortnightly, Nanking, edited by Mr.
  L. K. Kentwell, a graduate of Oxford and Columbia Universities,
  Hawaiian-born of British and Cantonese parentage. The journal is
  spirited, and very anti-British.]

Fourthly, the Nanking government is an encouraging indication that the
modern Chinese have finally come to the point where five-power
republicanism is the norm. It is significant that the Nanking regime
practices an extreme purism of organization and nomenclature, conforming
precisely to antebellum practice.[11] The regime has changed the
theoretical structure of the National Government very little, but added
the Party ministries to the government cabinet. One further change has
consisted in the logically desirable transference of the Ministry of
Justice to the Executive _Yüan_ from the Judicial, thus eliminating the
anomaly of having both prosecuting and adjudicatory agencies under the
same control.[12] The minister, Li Shêng-wu, is a well-known scholar in
international law and an educational editor.[13]

  [Footnote 11: Such a chart is found in _The People's Tribune_, XXIX
  (March 1940), p. 214, together with a list of incumbents on the
  following pages. The issue is headed by an editorial, "The National
  Government Returns to Its Capital" and "Peace, Struggle, and Save
  China" by Wang Ching-wei (_sic_). The official outline of the
  government is to be found in [Reorganized Government], _K'ao-shih Yüan
  Kung-pao_ (Public Gazette of the Examination _Yüan_), Nanking. Vol. I,
  No. 2 (June 1940), following p. 80.]

  [Footnote 12: [Reorganized Government], _Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng
  Kung-pao_ (Public Gazette of the Ministry of Justice), Nanking, gives
  a well-edited résumé of the work of the Ministry and its policy in
  prosecutions.]

  [Footnote 13: [_China Weekly Review_; J. B. Powell, editor], _Who's
  Who in China, Fifth Edition_, Shanghai, [1937], p. 145. For further
  information see the supplement on the pro-Japanese leaders in _Who's
  Who in China, Supplement to Fifth Edition_, Shanghai, [1940]. This
  presents a hall of notoriety for all the major Chinese leaders
  affiliated with the enemy. This _Who's Who_ is regarded by the present
  author as one of the most valuable sources on all Far Eastern
  politics. It is engrossingly good reading and entertainment, the
  pictures of the subjects being included in most instances. Behind
  these simple and short biographies, there lies more drama than
  Hollywood dare produce.]

Since the Japanese may be expected to foster the kind of Japanophile
government which would help them most, it is interesting that their
crusade against Sunyatsenism has turned to a quasi-Kuomintang structure
for aid. The attempt does not, as yet, seem to be working, but the
technique of the deception reveals the depth to which Kuomintang
principles and practices have penetrated in the past generation. The
Nanking incumbents make every effort to confuse their regime with the
National Government at Chungking, even to the extent of copying the
names of all minor offices, the forms of the stationery, and the
organization of semi-public cultural associations. Chinese fashion, they
confuse correct form and legitimacy. Given a long enough period, this
technique may succeed. Meanwhile, the failure of the earlier traitor
Governments, non-Nationalist in form, is a real indicium of the value of
the Sunyatsenist pattern.

Along with the bewildering _Doppelgänger_ effect which prevails in all
other matters, there are two Kuomintangs. The major, recognized
Kuomintang continues from Chungking. At Nanking Wang and his friends
have organized the "Orthodox Kuomintang." This can scarcely be thought
of as a Party fraction, so much has it dwindled. The overseas branches
have been lost, and the populace in its own cities is savagely
contemptuous. Wang Ch'ing-wei held a "Sixth Plenary Session of the
C.E.C. of the Kuomintang" on August 29, 1939, and the affair seems to
have been an uproarious farce, with all of Wang's friends bringing in
random acquaintances in order to make up a quorum.[14] Since then, the
vestigial party has been equipped with appropriate party organs, and is
preparing to share its hypothetical power with an equally _ad hoc_
Nanking People's Political Council. The Kuomintang leaders in Nanking,
as a part of their application to the Chungking pattern, have even
listed a considerable number of minor parties which are on their side of
the Japanese army. Persistent, specific inquiry in Nanking failed to
elicit the name of a single _bona fide_ minor party representative,
other than representatives of the _Hsin Min Hui_ (ex-Provisional), the
_Ta Min Hui_ (ex-Reformed), the Republicans (_Kung-ho Tang;_ Hankow;
merged with the Orthodox Kuomintang), and the Chinese Socialist Party,
which consists of the venerable Dr. Kiang Kang-hu. It is perhaps fair to
conclude that the Nanking regime is not a Kuomintang regime because a
sizable portion of the Kuomintang membership were weary of war, but
because some few Kuomintang leaders found no other way to power, and
because the Japanese had reluctantly decided that the simulacrum of the
Kuomintang was the minimum requirement of any Chinese government.

  [Footnote 14: For an account of this see, "Wang's Farcical C.E.C.
  Session," _China At War_ (Hong Kong), III, No. 6, p. 57; January
  1940.]

Lastly, the lack of success of Wang Ch'ing-wei and his government is
proof of the emergence of a state in China. This is not the first time
that Wang has set up his own government. It is not even the first time
that Chinese have accepted foreign aid in such enterprises. Wang
thought, and presumably thinks, that he is playing the accepted game of
Chinese politics; he is likely to find that he has committed a treason
which is disastrously real to him. The non-support of his government is
a clear proof of the rising race-national awareness among China's common
millions.

Stripped of the confusion and distortion which have surrounded the Wang
Ch'ing-wei secession, the rivalry between Wang and Chiang is not so very
different from Benedict Arnold's departure from the then dubious
American revolution. In this century we have revised our opinion of
Benedict Arnold upward--in part--and Wang Ch'ing-wei may, perhaps,
justly fit the same category. A gifted but maladroit and unhappy
political leader had brought his misfortunes to the Japanese. They,
_faute de mieux_, have accepted his aid. So far this has been
ineffectual. Most probably, only a very long lapse of time or the truly
catastrophic ruin of their opponents could place Wang and his group in
a position of autonomous importance and power. On the world scene Wang
stands halfway between Quisling and Pétain. A traitor to the emergent
Chinese state, he demonstrates the ancient Chinese capacity to
surrender, appease, and survive. Had he antagonists less formidable than
Chiang and the infuriated masses, his Reorganized Government might
secure actual power.

The Japanese finally recognized the Reorganized National Government of
Wang Ch'ing-wei on November 30, 1940, after many months of delay. _Art._
I provided for mutual recognition, but added the provision that the two
countries should "... at the same time take mutually helpful and
friendly measures, political, economic, cultural, and otherwise ..." and
in the future prohibit "... such measures and causes as are destructive
to the amity between the two countries in politics, diplomacy,
education, propaganda, trade and commerce, and other spheres." _Art._ II
was an anti-Communist agreement leaving Japanese forces in North China
indefinitely. _Art._ IV left the problem of Japanese evacuation to
separate annexes. _Art._ VI provides "Economic cooperation," with the
inescapable implications. By _Art._ VII Japan relinquishes
extraterritoriality (in the future), but obtains the opening of all
China to Japan.[15] These terms, which not only involve admission of
Chinese defeat, but preclude any possible attempt of China to restore
military, economic, or political independence, are the best that Japan
has to offer. When one considers that even these are merely legal,
whittled back to realism by protocols and annexes, and that they are
made with Japan's Chinese friends, Japan appears incapable of ending
the China incident. The Japanese do not know when to stop. Gauche in
power politics, they are undone by greediness and inexperience.

  [Footnote 15: The full text of the treaty is to be found in China
  Information Committee, _News Release_, December 2, 1940, together with
  the Generalissimo's comment. For a brief account, clearly interpreted,
  see Steiger, G. Nye, "Japan Makes Peace--with Wang," _Events_, Vol. 9,
  No. 49 (January 1941), p. 60-2. The Generalissimo's comment on the
  Nanking regime will also be found below, Appendix III (A), No. 7.]

The recognition is important only in that it assists Japan in escaping
responsibility for action taken by or through the Chinese affiliates,
while at the same time pinning Japan to the Chinese earth and committing
the Empire to indefinite continuation of hostilities. If the Japanese
achieved complete success in international power politics, there is a
possibility that the Reorganized Government might remain as the
functioning half-autonomous affiliate of Japan. Otherwise, Nanking can
be nothing more than an ornamental, occasionally useful auxiliary to the
Imperial Japanese Army, itself an uncomfortable Chinese government _pro
tem_. Having ultimate authority, the Army cannot yet escape or delegate
final responsibility.




CHAPTER VIII

EXTRA-POLITICAL FORCES


Government, wherever organized, is distinguished from other social
institutions by claims to universality of scope and competence, and
paramountcy of authority; the term _political_, on the basis of such a
distinction, refers to activities, occasionally individual but more
usually collective, involving access to the symbols of government; and
the term _governmental_ refers to the application of such symbols in
governmental sanctions and services. The process of government is
accordingly one wherein groups smaller than the totality of society seek
("politically") to obtain action in the name of the totality
("governmental"), for or against other groups according to shifting
interests. In the West this politico-governmental process has been
further characterized by ceremonial forms ("laws") and reinforced by
conceptions of amoral omnicompetence ("sovereignty").

The cellular socio-economic structure of old China, plus the Confucian
employment of ideological as opposed to governmental control, kept the
entire process of politics and government at a very low level of
intensity. Modern China, inheritor of an apolitical past, is still the
most pluralistic society in the world, and modern Chinese
government--despite recent gigantism--a frail legal superstructure above
a flood of extra-political power. Western societies depend upon their
states; the Chinese state depends upon a society which could, albeit
uncomfortably, dispense with states altogether.

This condition amounts in international politics, to both a strength and
a weakness. Chinese society suffers more political ruin with less social
disturbance than does any comparable society; the guerrillas, for
example, probably find government helpful when available, but regard it
as a luxury rather than a necessity. Chinese society is near to an
orderly anarchy; uniform conditioning from the past, or uniform present
opinion, takes the place of mass organization and totalitarian
government. The high death rate of traitors is probably not owing to
activity on the part of Chungking, but to the spontaneous action of
ordinary men; on one occasion a high pro-Japanese official was shot by
his own bodyguard while the two sat in a sedan on a busy street: the
bodyguard had experienced a revulsion of conscience. Fu Hsiao-ên, Wang
Ch'ing-wei's Mayor of Shanghai, was also killed by a member of his own
household. Spontaneous but uniform action applies not only to
sensational political matters; it appears in less dramatic but equally
important affairs, such as commercial rivalry, landlord-tenant
relationships, and the police power of the community and the family.
However, in a contest for power, while the Chinese lose little by
defeat, their counter-attacks are correspondingly more difficult. The
fluid autonomy of innumerable groups slows down the engines of formal
power. The political-governmental process is apt to be sluggish in
crises.


THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT

The society upon which the National Government of China, its Left
associates, and its Japanophile rivals rest is not a settled, stagnant
society. An extraordinary ferment has gripped China for more than a
century--arising from cadastral, agrarian, technological, economic,
fiscal, ideological, political, and governmental change. The Chinese
people have endured; they have also acted. Within a single century,
three blazing revolutions have swept China: the T'aip'ing Rebellion,
put down with Western aid after fifteen years of war; the Boxer
uprising, deflected into xenophobia by the Manchus; and the Great
Revolution, which succeeded in part. Between these, there have been
changes, bloody but of secondary magnitude: the Moslem rebellions; the
minor uprisings of Sun Yat-sen; the Republican Revolution; the 1919
movement; the _tuchün_ wars; the Communist communes, which failed
utterly in Shanghai and Canton; the Communist _jacqueries_, which
continued; and the present rip tide of resistance. None of these was
effectively mastered by organized government; each was exploited by one
government, and opposed by another. Unlike a Western state, wherein
government becomes the prime mobilizer during crises, Chinese society
shifts its incalculable forces, and governments leap forward to take
advantage of them.

This extensive, unorganized residue of opinion and power, outside the
reach of government, keeps any modern Chinese government in a peculiar
condition. Like a perpetual process of revolution, social changes demand
that a government exploit them, deflect them, or employ them--but not
launch or stop them. The Kuomintang has failed in its attempts to launch
favorable mass movements, and also failed to stop antagonistic ones. The
secret of the Chinese Communist power has lain in the skill of the Red
leaders, who utilized available movements. Hence the continued
development of Chinese government rests upon the wills, fancies,
interests, mob action, enthusiasm or dispiritedness of a people who in
their own communities do not read newspapers, listen to radios, or pay
much attention to the national state. Despite attempts to bring society
under the control of government, in order to make it possible to bring
government under the control of society (constitutionalism), the
decisive forces of modern Chinese life are outside the reach of
propaganda or control.

General opinion in China is not ascertainable, except through action. In
vital matters this action is apt to be either violent, or the equivalent
of violent: sit-down, general, or go-slow strikes; boycotts; universal
derision. The National Government possesses unprecedented amounts of
power by Chinese standards. By Western standards it is incredibly
obliging, casual, and unsystematic. The power which the Government, with
Chiang as leader, enjoys, arises from a support which it could not
compel, and which it cannot ensure by any means other than the pursuance
of support-arousing policies. The Kuomintang, the Communists, the
National Salvationists, the independent Left guerrilla leaders--these
agencies are not the organization of entire opinion groups, but the
spearheads of immeasurable forces. The modernization of government, both
administrative and constitutional, awaits the transformation of
materials around and under government. Greatest of these is popular
mentality. Ancillary are economic, organizational, educational and
cultural forces. Progress toward the omnicompetent state is slowed by
the fact that few Chinese wish to abandon the freedom of a pluralist
society for the efficient universality of legalism. They desire
modernization, but haggle at the price.

Three factors in particular are working upon and among the millions of
farmers and townsmen: mass education, rural reconstruction, and the
cooperative movement. Each not only takes immediate, beneficial effect,
but also transforms the political material of China. These forces, not
in any strict sense political, possess enormous political importance.


MASS EDUCATION

Literacy has risen very rapidly in modern China. Before the impact of
the West, becoming literate was in itself a career. By the time one
could read at all, one was a scholar, unless one learned the limited
quasi-shorthand of the merchants. Educational reforms came about as the
result of modern schools, particularly British and American Protestant
schools, and the action of the government. The fabric of Chinese society
had begun to change even before the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty. The
literary revolution led by Hu Shih after 1915, which popularized
_pai-hua_ (a written form of the Chinese spoken language) had extensive
repercussions, and made possible the rapid diffusion of ideographic
literacy. (Phonetization failed then, and later.) Almost every
government in China has attempted the diffusion of literacy. The popular
demand is intense.

The present status of literacy in China is revealed by official figures
from the Ministry of Education, which may err somewhat on the side of
optimism. These put the total population of China at 450 million
(Manchuria presumably remaining unmentioned), of which 90 million are
literate and 360 million illiterate. Such an estimate would give China
about the same absolute number of literates as the United States. The
remaining 360 million illiterates are broken down as follows: 40.05
million children below the age of six; 45 million aged six to twelve;
29.25 million aged twelve to fifteen; 79.43 million persons over
forty-five; and 1.57 million dumb, deaf, cripples, or insane. The adults
to be reached by the mass literacy movement amount therefore to 165
million; government estimates state that 46,348,469 illiterates were
educated since 1938, of whom 25.2 million were adults between fifteen
and forty-five, leaving roughly 140 million to be educated.[1]

  [Footnote 1: The China Information Committee, _News Release_, April 1,
  1940.]

The mass education program is supplementary to the education of
children, which is far from complete or even adequate. The literacy
imparted is of the most elementary kind; but in a civilized society such
as China this has immediate effect. The author never knew a Chinese who
could read and was not addicted to it; a common sight in Western China
is a knot of coolies deciphering a newspaper together. The intense
reverence for learning and scholarship makes the training welcome, and
the teachers who seek to teach the minimum of one thousand ideographs in
six weeks never lack pupils.

The program of the National Government was summarized by Ch'ên Li-fu,
the Minister of Education, speaking over the radio after the Mass
Education Conference of March 1940:

     Accordingly, our first step is to wipe out illiteracy. In
     this respect we proceed simultaneously with the
     enlightenment of the masses of adult illiterates, both men
     and women, and with the education of children in order to
     put an end to illiteracy that may otherwise arise in the
     future. At the National Conference on People's Education
     held from the twelfth day to the sixteenth day of this month
     in Chungking, the _five-year plan for the people's
     education_, adopted by the Executive _Yüan_, was further
     deliberated and promulgated. The proper enforcement of this
     plan will help to convert at least one hundred and forty
     million (140,000,000) adult illiterates into intelligent
     citizens for China within the coming five years.

     At present there are already 44 per cent of the entire
     number of children of school age (from six to twelve) in
     school; that is, nineteen million and eight hundred thousand
     (19,800,000). By the enforcement of this plan, there should
     be, during the first two years, at least one people's school
     in every three _pao_. And each village should have a nucleus
     school, according to the plan. In this way there should be
     at least more than 260,000 people's schools for the 800,000
     _pao_ of the entire nation at the end of the first two
     years. Each people's school consists of three divisions or
     classes, namely, the children's division, the men's
     division, and the women's division. During the second two
     years there should be at least one people's school in every
     two _pao_. In the fifth and last year there should be at
     least one people's school in each _pao_. That is to say, at
     the end of the fifth year there should be at least 800,000
     people's schools for the 800,000 _pao_ of the nation,
     besides the 80,000 or more nucleus schools and the 200,000
     schools of the same grades now already existent which can
     be improved, to provide education for at least 90 per cent
     of the entire number of children of school age. As a matter
     of fact, certain provinces have already succeeded in
     establishing one or even two people's schools in each _pao_.
     Kwangsi Province, for instance, has at present one people's
     school in each _pao_, while Fukien Province even has two
     people's schools in each _pao_. The fulfillment of this
     five-year plan needs at least $2,932,000,000 and 1,600,000
     properly trained teachers.

     Our vocational education aims at building a sound middle
     cadre for the various professions and industrial
     enterprises. There are training schools and short-time
     classes for mechanics, electrical communications, metal
     work, etc. Also, special classes are opened in more than ten
     colleges and universities for advanced studies along such
     lines.

     Our attempt to universalize productive education may be
     evidenced by the incorporation of productive education
     courses into the middle school curriculum, besides
     instituting organizations for the same in the various
     vocational schools in order to facilitate the practice of
     students along such lines.... In 1938, for example, only
     53.0 per cent of the entire number of students who took part
     in the examination studied science and engineering, but in
     1939 it jumped to 59.4 per cent.[2]

  [Footnote 2: The same, April 8, 1940. Minor changes in punctuation
  have been introduced.]

This statement gives the official view, which is highly optimistic. In
terms of practical politics, however, the Generalissimo has given the
movement his cordial backing, and sees in it a preliminary to democracy.
Although final results might fall far short of the hopeful estimate, the
effect would still be considerable. Diffusion of literacy creates a
momentary satisfaction with the political system which makes literacy
possible, but the after-effect of literacy is to make men of any
nationality easier to govern well and harder to govern badly. A
government which diffuses literacy without advancing reforms is
sharpening weapons against itself. The National Government's
American-inspired trust in education as a panacea implies that Chiang
and his fellow leaders expect to remain popular, and do not contemplate
appeasement, reaction, or other unpopular measures.


RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

An even more interesting aspect of the mass-education movement is its
connection with rural reconstruction. In this field much is owed to Dr.
James Y. C. Yen, a graduate of Yale and Princeton who began his work
with the Chinese labor corps in France during the 1914-18 war. The
war-time work of the correlated mass education and rural reconstruction
movement was summarized by Dr. Yen himself:

     The most hopeful factor in the whole China situation is that
     her greatest and most valuable resource, the three hundred
     and fifty million farmers, has not yet been tapped for the
     upbuilding of the nation. The Chinese farmer has had a
     measure of freedom and responsibility, of dignity and
     independence. He is thrifty and industrious, intelligent and
     an expert in intensive farming. A great number of our
     national leaders are sons and daughters of our farmers. The
     fathers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
     were farmers.

     These nearly three years of terrible war have proved beyond
     doubt that our faith in the Chinese farmer has not been
     misplaced. It has revealed his greatness. Our nation is
     rediscovering the "forgotten man," the tiller of the soil.
     Most of our soldiers come from the farm. To a remarkable
     extent he has also financed the war. He is the real hero of
     this war.

     The Chinese Mass Education Movement was organized in 1923 to
     explore the potentialities of the rural masses and find a
     way of drawing out the best in them. Since the first
     publication of the "thousand character test," it has been
     estimated that some thirty million illiterate people have
     been taught to read during the past five years.

     Beginning with 1929 the point of emphasis of the Movement
     shifted from extensive promotion of literacy to intensive
     study of the life of the farmers in the rural districts. As
     a living social laboratory in which to do our research and
     to work out principles and techniques, we selected
     Tinghsien, a district of four hundred thousand people,
     one-thousandth of the total population of China, in Hopei
     Province. This was the first time in our history that an
     organized group of Chinese intellectuals went deliberately
     to the country to live among the rural people to study their
     life and find out how to develop their latent possibilities.
     The Movement has evolved what is known as the "Tinghsien
     Four-fold Reconstruction Education" including the cultural,
     economic, health, and the political.

     Several other experimental _hsien_,--Hengshan in Hunan,
     Central China, and Hsintu in Szechwan, West China, were
     established in cooperation with the provincial governments.
     One of our special emphases in these experimental _hsien_
     has been the reform of the _hsien_ government, i.e. the
     local government.

     The Tinghsien Experiment with its "laboratory approach" to
     social and political problems and with its _correlated_
     program of rural reconstruction as demonstrated in the
     district attracted attention from all over China and
     inspired similar experiments in various parts of the
     country. As a result the movement for rural reconstruction
     gained great momentum in China.

     Since the outbreak of hostilities the Mass Education
     Movement has thrown itself unreservedly into the task of
     assisting the Central and Provincial governments in
     strengthening the nation's struggle against the enemy. It
     was most gratifying that at this hour of China's supreme
     struggle we have been able to help the government to
     revitalize the _hsien_ government, to train civil service
     personnel and to mobilize the farmers. Extensive application
     of the new system as developed in the experimental _hsien_
     was made to an entire province such as we did in Hunan--a
     rich province with a population of thirty million.

     In order to insure that the new political machinery should
     function effectively a School of Public Administration to
     train administrative and technical personnel from the
     magistrate down to the village elders was established with
     the senior members of our Movement taking full charge.
     Altogether the School trained about 4,000 higher officials
     for the local government and some 35,000 of the village
     elders. Since Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek assumed
     concurrently the governorship of Szechwan, a new system of
     _hsien_ government (chiefly modelled after the experimental
     _hsien_ of the country) with the object of releasing the
     new life of the rural masses has been promulgated. Under his
     order the same is taking place in neighboring provinces.

     Unless serious and painstaking study of rural reconstruction
     is made by scientists and scholars on the one hand, and
     administrative and technical personnel are systematically
     trained and imbued with a spirit of service to the rural
     masses on the other, the movement for rural reconstruction
     may dwindle away as so many other movements have done in the
     past.

     It is most heartening to state that Generalissimo Chiang
     Kai-shek has given his public approval and backing to the
     new National Institute of Rural Reconstruction which he
     considers to be of fundamental importance to China's
     post-war reconstruction. The inspiration of the Institute
     has already helped to mould the principal rural
     reconstruction groups in the country into one national
     force. The rural reconstruction movement has achieved a
     united front unparalleled in its history. Today it is a
     great unifying force, an outstanding national platform upon
     which all Chinese can agree. It will meet the needs of China
     today and lay the foundation for the China of tomorrow.[3]

  [Footnote 3: The same, May 6, 1940.]

This program possesses obvious merit. Lacking a foundation of dogma, it
requires no implementation through terrorism. The politically innocuous
character of the movement is attested by the frequent demands by
provincial officials for personnel from the Mass Education training
centers. Since the purpose is to improve the entire community without
revolutionizing its class structure, the enlightened landlords are as
favorable as the peasants themselves. Unfortunately, enlightened
landlords are not always prevalent. Despite the modesty of the program,
it finds stumbling blocks in actual corruption, extortion, and
illegality. Many _hsien_ are under local machines which permit wealthy
conservatives to evade tax payments, steal government funds, and repress
genuine farmer organization. The consequence has been that the movement
succeeds only when it has the immediate backing of a provincial or
central authority; its progress has been slow. Many critics, both
Chinese and Western, have become disgusted with the slowness of social
reform on the land, and despair of anything save reconstruction through
implicit class war.[4]

  [Footnote 4: Research Staff of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific
  Relations, _Agrarian China, Selected Source Materials from Chinese
  Authors_, Shanghai, 1938. A more Leftist and even gloomier view is
  taken by Chen Han-seng, _Landlord and Peasant in China_, New York,
  1936, and the same author's _Industrial Capital and Chinese Peasants,
  A Study of the Livelihood of Chinese Tobacco Cultivators_, Shanghai,
  1939. Two general surveys of the Chinese economy are Condliffe, J. B.,
  _China Today: Economic_, Boston, 1932, and Tawney, R. H., _Land and
  Labour in China_, New York, 1932. A significant hypothesis of the
  relations of economics, government, and culture in China is found in
  Lattimore, Owen, _Inner Asian Frontiers of China_, New York, 1940, Ch.
  III, esp. p. 39 _ff._; this rests in part upon Wittfogel, Karl August,
  _Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas_, Leipzig, 1931, the leading
  Marxian exposition of the subject.]

The present period of resistance and reconstruction opens a very
promising period in rural modernization. In the first place, war-time
stress puts great power in the Generalissimo's hands. Ubiquitous armies
can, on short notice, enforce orders from Chungking. The shift of troops
among provinces makes the central government an outside power now
physically present in tens of thousands of communities. Devolution of
watchfulness by the Commander-in-Chief and his staff results in slow but
irreversible accumulation of governmental authority.

Secondly, the proclamation of manifold programs has the effect,
obviously, of drawing attention to each of them. The Kuomintang, anxious
to retain its paramountcy, promotes new local government changes. These
face frustration by mass illiteracy. Mass education is impeded by local
economic injustices. The Whampoa and _Erh Ch'ên_ groups in the
Kuomintang, while they have landlord connections, are interested--even
assuming a strong economic-class interest--in the maintenance of
government. Action is appearing, slow and haphazard by Western
standards, but indisputably present. The minimum of good government in
China is a very low minimum, but it is rising in the face of the
Communist and Japanese pressure. One may be sure that the National
Government will not pass below that minimum if the state's existence is
in danger.

Thirdly, there is a very genuine boom condition in Western China. The
movement of the government to the West, and lightening of intolerable
but long-endured _tuchün_ exactions, would in itself have led to sudden
prosperity. To this are added more than twenty millions of new
population, a growing network of communications, a sharp but controlled
inflation. These further stimulate speculation and construction and
development. The most important factors in a new prosperity have been,
however, the reappearance of handicraft-type industry as a consequence
of blockade, and governmental advocacy of every conceivable development.
The author beheld, during the summer of 1940, conditions of prosperity
in Szechwan which he had not expected to find in China within the space
of one lifetime. Narcotics were eradicated. The working population was
commanding high wages, but suffering from high prices; the prices were
somewhat ahead of the wages, but not so far that social morale was
troubled. Skilled labor was in a superb bargaining position; chauffeurs,
electricians, good carpenters, etc. were in considerable demand. The
salaried classes were suffering at all levels, a factor which was
patently wholesome in stimulating working-class morale. The clerical
class, which had held itself aloof from manual labor with a persistence
which boded ill for China, was placed more nearly on a par with its
American equivalent. While poverty was still universal by Western
standards, the pathological squalor endemic to the coast was nowhere
visible.


THE CHINESE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVES

The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (_Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso
Hsieh-hui_) are an important and widely publicized outgrowth of the war,
and are perhaps the only feature of domestic Chinese affairs--outside of
the Communist area and the roads program--which is as well known beyond
China as within. The purpose of the cooperatives is to launch an
enormous program of decentralized industry throughout Free China, with
thirty thousand separate industrial cooperatives for the first major
goal. The purpose is to develop an industrial system which will keep
China autarkic for resistance and reconstruction; long-range, the
purpose is to circumvent impending evils of concentrated industrialism,
slums, megalopolitan crowding, extra-legal oppression. China might thus
proceed directly from a decentralized half-handicraft economy to the
decentralized power economy of the future. Four principles underlie the
program: sound technical design, cooperative organization, voluntary
self-discipline, and social welfare on the basis of Sun's _min
shêng_.[5]

  [Footnote 5: Publicity release of Indusco, Inc., The American
  Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, New York, January
  1940 [1941]. This agency, exceedingly active in publicizing China's
  cooperative progress, has released a great deal of up-to-date
  information on the movement. The Western literature on the C.I.C. has
  appeared mostly in popular sources, to which _The Bulletin of Far
  Eastern Bibliography_ issued by the Committees on Far Eastern Studies
  of the American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C.,
  serves as a useful guide. The writings of Edgar Snow are of special
  value and vividness in treating this topic: articles in _Asia_,
  various dates; "China's Blitzbuilder, Rewi Alley," _The Saturday
  Evening Post_, Vol. 213, no. 32 (February 8, 1941); and his recent
  _The Battle for Asia_, New York, 1941, which appeared as this work was
  completed and sent to press. A convenient handbook is the anonymous
  _The People Strike Back! or The Story of Chinese Industrial
  Cooperatives_, Shanghai, (1939?).]

Formally, the C.I.C. Headquarters is a social organization sponsored by
the Executive _Yüan_. H. H. K'ung, Minister of Finance and
Vice-President of the _Yüan_, is its Chairman. The Secretary-General
and Associate Secretary-General, Messrs. K. P. Liu and Hubert Liang, are
both American-returned students; the former once worked in the Ford
factories while studying at the University of Cincinnati and later was a
banker in Manchuria. The most inspiring force in the movement is Mr.
Rewi Alley, a New Zealander strongly interested in cooperatives and in
labor welfare, formerly factory inspector in the International
Settlement. Familiar, because of his Shanghai experiences and
famine-relief work, with the problems of economic organization in China,
he presented his plan to Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang through the
intervention of that extraordinarily popular British Ambassador, Sir
Archibald Clark-Kerr. The Chiangs were impressed with it, and the
Generalissimo gave it his support. A headquarters was established at
Hankow in August 1938, with the following five departments: _general_,
for secretarial and administrative housekeeping; _financial_,
administering funds for the headquarters and the cooperative units;
_organization_, in charge of planning and inauguration of cooperatives;
_technical_, devising simple industrial techniques; and _accounting_, an
independent agency of audit.[6] The Executive _Yüan_ has continued to
make administrative funds available; the central headquarters near
Chungking now has a staff of about seven hundred. Professor J. B. Tayler
of Yenching University, a noted economic expert, is consultant for staff
service.

  [Footnote 6: "The Movement in Action," _New Defense, A Journal of the
  30,000 Industrial Cooperatives Movement in China_ (Chungking) Vol. I,
  no. 1 (April 1939), p. 5.]

As projected by Rewi Alley and his fellow-enthusiasts, the C.I.C. had to
adjust itself to three zones of China's war-time economy. A guerrilla
zone in and around the combat area, as well as behind the Japanese
lines, concentrated on the creation of immediate war-time necessities.
Some of these were in the form of direct medical and military supplies;
others, replacements of indispensable articles which otherwise would
have been procured from the enemy. The second zone, of light industry,
was within easy reach of Japanese air raids and espionage, and
consequently given to enterprises having light capital investment,
mobile, and readily concealed. The third, or inmost Chinese zone, being
best protected, was the proper area for the development of the heavier
industries, although even here no grandiose or heavily centralized works
are planned. The ultimate aim, peace-time as well as military, of the
C.I.C. is to distribute industry across the countryside, replacing the
once flourishing handicraft industries, and allowing Chinese society to
develop naturally and continuously.

The author attended a C.I.C. exhibit in Chungking which presented a
startling array of modern goods. Ford tools and auxiliary parts,
matches, lamps (electric, kerosene, and an improved wood-oil lamp which
equals kerosene), light electric appliances, lathes, machine-shop tools,
medical kits, Western shoes, toothpaste, canned foods, paper, printing
presses, books, and fountain pens--all were produced in areas which did
not even have the spinning wheel in some instances, and which until
recently imported all Western or modern goods from the coast or from
outside.

The organization and practical accomplishments of the C.I.C. are well
summarized in a recent article by K. P. Liu, Secretary-General:

     INTRODUCTION: When it became clear that in order to continue
     economic resistance against Japan China must at all costs
     develop production in the rear of the fighting line, one of
     the steps taken was the founding of the Chinese Industrial
     Cooperatives by Dr. H. H. Kung.

     The plan was to construct throughout China chains of small
     industries which should use local materials to supply the
     manufactured goods fundamentally necessary to the life of
     the people.

     Industrial cooperative societies are organized around about
     60 depots over 16 provinces. An average depot of about 25
     cooperatives is supervised and advised by a group of men
     consisting of depotmaster, accountant, technician, and two
     or three organizers.

     For the coordination of work depots are divided among five
     regions: the Northwest (NW), the Southeast (SE), the
     Chuankang (Szechwan and Sikang) region (CK), the Southwest
     (SW), and Yunnan (Y). Each is headed by regional
     headquarters, which are responsible to the Central
     Headquarters at Chungking which represents the C.I.C. on
     general questions and negotiations, and decides, in
     consultation with regional chiefs, on broad lines of policy.
     The Central Headquarters also supplies the services of
     traveling advisers on engineering, accounting, and
     organization problems.

     The staff of 700 is financed by Government funds, since the
     C.I.C. has been named a social organization responsible to
     the Executive Yüan. Further, the C.I.C. was given $5,000,000
     by the Central Government to be used as loan capital for
     cooperatives. More recently, negotiations with various banks
     have made new large sums available, so that the amount which
     can now be used for the capitalization of cooperatives is
     near $30,000,000.

     The above two sources of income provide no money for
     education, research, evacuation of workers from occupied
     areas, technical training, refugee work relief, medical
     help, or capital loans in guerrilla regions. Necessary
     auxiliary activities as these are provided for to a certain
     extent by gifts from interested men and women in China and
     abroad.... FORMING AN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVE: When a depot
     is first set up, the depotmaster advertises the objectives
     of the C.I.C. by posters and speeches. But as soon as a few
     workmen get to know about its activities there is no more
     need to advertise. There are always plenty of workers who
     will prefer the security and freedom of a cooperative to
     unemployment or to working for a master.

     The number of men needed to form a cooperative is at least
     seven, but there is no upper limit. They first come to talk
     things over with a C.I.C. organizer, present their plan for
     setting up a factory or workshop, with proof of their
     qualifications and a tentative budget showing how much loan
     capital will be needed to start work. The organizer explains
     to them the cooperative system of self-government, Chinese
     cooperative law, and the C.I.C. Model Constitution. Then
     they take some descriptive literature home, and discuss
     among themselves whom they want as their officers.

     Meanwhile, their plans are talked over by the depotmaster,
     accountant, organizer, and engineer, and modifications
     suggested. If, as often happens, it turns out that they are
     only merchants anxious to get rich quick and not _bona fide_
     workmen ready to work hard, the plans are rejected.

     If all is satisfactory, a meeting is held for the election
     of officers, determination of share capital, voting of
     wages, and work begins as soon as the loan is put through.
     At least one quarter of the subscribed share capital must be
     paid up immediately, and the total loan--long-term and
     short--cannot exceed 20 times the subscribed share
     capital.... The actual ratio of share to loan capital
     averages about 1 to 6.

     INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION: Distribution of industry is shown
     in the following condensed table:

     Textiles         610 [cooperatives]
     Engineering       49
     Mining           118
     Chemical         206
     Pottery           69
     Foodstuffs        83
     Transport          4
     Miscellaneous    395
                    -----
                    1,534
   */

     There are no less than 114 types of cooperatives, and almost
     every daily need of the people can be met.

     Before any cooperative is organized, investigations are made
     to ensure that (I) there are raw materials near at hand,
     (II) there is skilled workmanship available, and (III) there
     is a market for the finished product. Where these three do
     not co-exist at one place, a compromise of the most
     reasonable kind is effected if possible. Some examples--by
     no means exhaustive--of the adaptation of types of industry
     to meet local conditions are described as follows:

     _Wool_ ... In the beginning of 1939 woolspinners of Chentu
     were still using either the simple old whorl or the
     handturned wheel. The volume of production was very small.
     But during 1939 the C.I.C. embarked on a huge program of
     blanket production for the army, and improved streamlined
     treadle spinners were introduced, and thousands of men and
     women taught the technique of using them. Blankets were made
     at eight centers of west and northern China; everywhere
     improved woolspinning and woolweaving machines and
     techniques brought new productive power. During the winter
     of 1939-40, 400,000 blankets were turned out, and another
     million and a half will be made during the remainder of
     1940.

     The wool used by the blanket-making cooperatives comes from
     the highlands of Chinghai, Kansu, Ningsia, and Shensi, and
     now instead of being carried raw to Tientsin or Shanghai as
     in the old days, it is being spun and woven near to the
     source of supply. Improvements are constantly being
     made--better machines, finer spinning, use of waterpower,
     better carding and finishing--so that the whole project
     works to raise the efficiency and living standard of the
     local people.

     _Cotton_. Wherever cotton is grown spinning and weaving
     cooperatives are numerous, for clothing is one of the
     fundamental needs of life....

     _Grass Cloth_. Linen, or more correctly grass cloth, was
     introduced into Szechwan from Kwangtung generations ago, and
     now fine cloth is woven. Production thereof from ramie
     thread was at its height 20 years ago, but since then the
     craft has declined until recently, when the partial blockade
     of the war made the industry profitable again....

     _Goldwashing_. Placer gold exists along every river in West
     China and in many parts of South China too. Even in
     Chungking one may see needy coolies scraping up and washing
     riverside mud for its tiny precious content.

     The gold is easily available by simple methods, though
     certain difficulties have hitherto prevented its extraction
     on a larger scale. But now every grain is an asset to China
     in economic warfare, and so many goldwashing cooperatives
     have been organized. In the whole country there are 66
     cooperatives, most of which are in the Han valley.... Now
     the cooperatives ... are self-supporting and produce 60 to
     70 oz. of gold a day.

     _Coal and Iron_. Throughout the hinterland of China new
     sources of coal and iron are being needed continually by
     newly transplanted industry. Szechwan has good coal,
     widespread, but rather thin in seam....

     At the same time plans for the construction of blast
     furnaces have been worked out by C.I.C. engineers, and only
     wait for adequate financing. It is planned first to set up
     in South Shensi at a point within easy distance of coal and
     iron supplies a coke-making and a smelting plant, the total
     capitalization being $105,000.

     _Alcohol._ A first experimental plant for the production of
     96 per cent pure alcohol has been running nearly a year with
     a maximum output of 350 gallons a day. Since the cost of
     such a plant is comparatively small, and available supplies
     of grain make the cost of alcohol much less than that of
     gasoline, other plants have been set up. There are now six
     in operation and greater production in the future is
     envisaged. The sites of alcohol plants are naturally at key
     positions on the highway, where good supplies of coarse
     grain meet with the traffic line.

     _Prime Movers._ In many cooperatives one may see a quaint
     mixture of old and new, where big flywheels are turned by
     human labor to maintain the spin of lathes, carding
     machines, and the like. This is a useful temporary
     expedient, possible where labor is cheap. Animal power is
     also used.

     But C.I.C. engineers are not satisfied with this state of
     affairs; they are always on the lookout for new sources of
     power. So charcoal-or gasoline-burning internal combustion
     engines are commonly employed.

     But most popular are waterwheels, and in every part of China
     will be found old wheels adapted for modern uses--driving
     textile machinery, turning lathes, grinding flour--undershot
     or overshot, single or in series. Gradually the wheels are
     being made of better materials and more efficient. Iron
     wheels are constructed at present weighing about one ton, at
     a cost of $3,000, and generating over 30 H.P.

     In the plains waterpower is rarely available, but in the
     foothills of Tibet, the Tsingling Shan, or in the rough
     country of southern China this cheapest of all forms of
     power will come more and more into its own as C.I.C. machine
     shops construct improved waterwheels.

     ACCOUNTING: During the past two years the C.I.C. staff has
     tackled the question of modern accounting wholeheartedly in
     every depot, and training classes in cost accounting have
     been given for cooperative accountants who only know old
     style Chinese bookkeeping. C.I.C. trained accountants have
     been allocated to cooperatives--for big cooperatives one
     accountant is employed by each society, for small, one
     accountant serves two or three. Emphasis has been placed on
     the presentation of monthly balance sheets and yearly
     closing of accounts with profit sharing.

     Profits are divided among the members once--or in rare cases
     twice--a year. The usual method of division, all claims
     including interest on loans and shares having first been
     paid, is as follows:

     Reserves                       20 per cent
     Emergency Fund                 10 per cent
     Bonus to Officers of Society   10 per cent
     Common Good Fund               10 per cent
     Divided among Members          50 per cent
   */

     The division accords with Chinese Law. The bonus to officers
     is usually made to include gifts to apprentices and hired
     workers such as cooks, and the Common Good Fund is used for
     education, medical welfare, and other social service. The
     division among members is made in strict proportion to wage
     and time worked.

     Local conditions and various industries differ so much that
     no wage-policy has at present been applied. In general it
     may be said that wages in cooperatives--fixed by the members
     themselves--are about the same as those in private factories
     of the district. The products in general sell at prevailing
     rates, though in some cases the prices have been lowered and
     profiteering prevented by the action of the cooperatives.

     COOPERATIVE FEDERATIONS: Wherever the societies have passed
     the first short period of infantile dependence on the C.I.C.
     they have been associated into federations, sometimes
     according to trade, but more often and more wholesomely,
     according to districts. The most important immediate
     function of the federation is to open a supply and marketing
     agency, which by its centralization, specialization, and
     greater supply of circulating capital is able to relieve the
     cooperatives of most of their problems of buying and
     selling....

     TRAINING: Training of organizers is of vital importance, for
     it is they who will succeed or fail in giving to the workers
     true conceptions of cooperation, industry, and business, and
     in inculcating efficient methods and habits. Classes for
     organizers have consequently been held in every region.

     Training of cooperative chairmen in their duties is also
     undertaken. They "learn by doing,"--how to conduct meetings,
     business principles, cooperative law, history of
     cooperation, scope and significance of industrial
     cooperation in China.... The most usual training is by
     weekly night classes and meetings. There is also constant
     informal training by the organizers, who devote about one
     day a week to each cooperative, and work with the members on
     the solution of immediate problems by the application of
     cooperative principles. Popular education of workers will be
     described later.

     Another important aspect of training is technical. In no
     case is a society organized until the technical ability of
     the members is adequate for making a successful business.
     So, with refugees and unskilled peasants it is usually
     necessary to give preliminary training--mainly in textiles.
     Wherever there is textile work, training classes have been
     held in spinning and weaving....

     SOCIAL WELFARE WORK: No statistics have been compiled about
     the social contribution of the C.I.C. to the communities
     around its depot. The work varies according to local needs
     and opportunities, and according to available resources in
     funds and manpower....

     OUTLOOK: After the war there will undoubtedly come a period
     of readjustment, when the renewed influx of machinery and
     machine-finished goods will demand a shift of emphasis--for
     instance handspinning cannot survive indefinitely, no matter
     how essential it is at present. It is to be expected that at
     that period the C.I.C. will continue to use in some
     industries methods now employed, but that in others there
     will be a transition to rationalization and mechanization.
     With a soundly integrated network of skilled workmen,
     experienced engineers, and bankers' confidence, the C.I.C.
     will be able to make this transition without severe
     dislocation.

     The C.I.C. is essentially a non-political organization; its
     functions are all technical, and its staff is composed of
     experts in various lines--cooperative methods, accounting,
     engineering. Success does not depend on political position
     or power, but on the simple and essential condition that
     this type of industry produces efficiently the goods that
     China needs. The C.I.C. objective is just Dr. Sun Yat-sen's
     Third Principle--People's Livelihood--practically expressed.

     The success of cooperative movements in other parts of the
     world--their ability to weather economic crises and
     depressions--has been due to the solidarity that comes when
     the motive force in industry and commerce is not the profit
     of a few but the livelihood of many. In the same way the
     C.I.C. can become a permanent force for national stability
     and strength.[7]

  [Footnote 7: The China Information Committee, _News Release_, July 15,
  1940. The article and tables have been somewhat abridged. The
  cooperatives spread so rapidly that figures are often obsolete before
  they are tabulated.]

The Model Constitution for an Industrial Cooperative[8] establishes
safeguards to keep the cooperatives from becoming profiteering
sweatshops. Bankrupts, drug addicts, persons incapable of working, and
persons already members of a unit are forbidden to join a unit being
formed (_Art._ 7). No member may subscribe more than 20 per cent of the
share capital of a single society (_Art._ 9). A general annual meeting,
with the quorum set at one-half, and action requiring the majority of a
quorum, is the highest authority in a unit (_Art._ 19). This meeting
elects a board of directors and a separate board of supervisors (_Arts._
22 and 23). Sweeping disqualifications keep members from mixing personal
or outside interests and cooperative matters (_Art._ 32). The design of
the unit constitution is such that each unit is an authentic, autonomous
cooperative, governed well or badly in accordance with the abilities and
needs of its members, and is not a mere fraction of state capitalism.

  [Footnote 8: "Model Constitution for Chinese Cooperative Societies,
  Revised July 7th, 1940," The China Information Committee, _News
  Release_, July 15, 1940.]

The C.I.C. taps a level of Chinese society hitherto largely
unused[9]--the family, guild, village, and volunteer-society devices of
the peasantry and townsmen who lived beneath the lowest limits of the
scholastic bureaucracy. The Communists act as the inheritors to
temporarily fanatical peasant rebellions; the National Government and
Kuomintang, to ascendant mandarinates; the C.I.C. brings into play the
rich experience of the Chinese with collective action. The resources of
the social power so mobilized cannot easily be estimated, but general
success would reshape much of Chinese society.

  [Footnote 9: Nevertheless, the rural cooperative movement must be
  counted in as having made some beginnings, despite the obstacles it
  has faced. More than seventy thousand credit and marketing
  cooperatives were in service last year. (The same, April 22, 1940.)]

In fitting the C.I.C. to the general Chinese scene, however, it is
important to compare the movement with some of the New Deal reforms in
the United States, such as T.V.A. (Tennessee Valley Authority). Though
these are important, neither the American nor the Chinese enterprises
proclaim social revolution or charter Utopias. The reforms of President
Roosevelt have had incalculable effect; no one knows what would have
happened without them. Nevertheless, it is excessive to suggest that the
existence of the United States as a political society depends upon these
reforms. Similarly, the continuation of the National Government of China
does not rest on the C.I.C., or on any other single institution alone.

The C.I.C. extends patterns of cooperation and farm-factory balance
already tried in Europe, and also approached by such diverse agencies as
the Soviet state and collective farms, and Mr. Henry Ford's
worker-garden plans. Hitherto the Chinese cooperative workers have had a
closer contact with Dearborn, Michigan, than with Moscow, R.S.F.S.R. The
endeavor is a serious and important one. It supplements and develops the
facilities--themselves very extensive--which are under full
state-capitalist or private control. But Free China's markets, while
they contain C.I.C.-made goods, are mostly filled with private or
government products. A private Chinese business system which has
survived thirty years of domestic war does not obsolesce
instantaneously. The cooperative movement is, largely because of the
integrity, enthusiasm, and tirelessness of Mr. Alley, the nearest thing
to a realization of _min shêng_ which China has yet seen; but the Right
still plans for a China with vast state-capitalist and state-subsidized
private industries, along with an all-pervading flow of _laissez-faire_
commerce. The Marxians look on sympathetically but contemptuously.


UNORGANIZED PRESSURE

The long one-party rule of the Kuomintang, now relaxed but not
disestablished, has habituated the Chinese to the use of completely
non-political groups--families and their connections; economic
associations of various kinds; religious agencies--for political
leverage. There are relatively few groups which possess clear public
purposes and at the same time maintain unofficial status. Indeed, the
stamp of quasi-official approval is so highly prized that many groups
which seem to have no affiliation with the government are discovered to
seek affiliation or to have acquired it roundabout.

Among the private or quasi-private groups which take most effect may be
mentioned, however, the People's Foreign Relations Association, the
League of Nations Union, and the China Branch of the International Peace
Campaign. The first of these publishes the useful quarterly, _The China
Herald_. The Campaign, which was launched as a world-wide
center-and-left drive for peace, was under respected European
leadership, and was favored by a large labor bloc in England. In the
United States it was associated in the minds of some people with the
Stalinist fellow-travellers--the elements who sat in the councils of the
temporarily-joined forces of anti-Fascism and pro-Stalinism, who
organized the American League for Peace and Democracy (a Popular Front
movement), the American Friends of the Chinese People, and who dominated
groups such as the American Youth Congress. In China, contrariwise, the
International Peace Campaign, fitting in with purposes of government and
people, seemed to offer a world-wide sympathy for China's
anti-aggression activities. The China Branch was among the most
effective organizations in the Campaign. It developed vitality in
diffusing peace propaganda--that is, for peace after the war. There was
no trace of defeatism, sabotage of national defense, or obstruction to
defensive war. With the outbreak of the European war, the I.P.C.
disappeared almost altogether from the Western scene, but continues in
China. Finally, the China League of Nations Union publishes _The China
Forum_, and carries on an educational campaign.

Christian activities have been extended and activized by war. Never
before have the missions had as many opportunities for social and
national service in China. Their schools are filled; their hospitals,
crowded; their cause, related to America, to peace, and to a sane long
view, is welcomed. The Chinese Y.M.C.A. has met the shock of war with
extensive participation in relief, particularly among students and
soldiers. Medical aid, tragically inadequate but infinitely better than
nothing at all, is coming into China. The curtailment of mission
activities in occupied China makes exploitation of the Christian field
in the West even more desirable from the viewpoint of the Western
churches. A recent work, by two Christians born in China, one American
and the other Chinese, describes this situation clearly and
significantly: _China Rediscovers Her West_.[10]

  [Footnote 10: Wu Yi-fang and Price, Frank W., editors; New York,
  1940.]

The other side of extra-political pressure comes in the form of class
and regional interests. The phenomena of lobbying and special favor are
less evident in Chungking than in previous governments of China. Special
groups representing industries, areas, or vested interests do appear,
but are apt to work through casual, untraceable patterns of personal
relationships. There is no Chinese C.I.O., nor A. F. of L., but there is
also no National Association of Manufacturers. The politics of economics
gains by diffusion and absence of protest what it loses in sensitivity
and explicitness. An economic group which feels itself outraged takes a
long time to develop group consciousness; hence, it is less apt to feel
outraged, and the generality of the people, the public, is often better
off. There are undoubtedly scurrilous, politically vile, selfish
advantages being taken in West China today; but the net outcome is
counterbalanced by concrete improvement in the condition of the people
as a whole, and the unquestionable morale of the leading and
administrative classes.

Every government, where and however it may operate, has a double set of
barriers which form its corridor of further existence: on the left it
must meet the minimal needs of the governed, satisfy their physical and
moral appetites sufficiently to keep itself from being ignored or
overthrown; on the right it must compensate the persons who govern, and
do so well enough to retain personnel adequate to government. The
Marxians stress the former element; the Paretians, the latter. Both are
visible in China. Had the exigencies of reform, social change, and
military activity proved too sharp, too violent, too profitless, the
personnel trained by experience and fitted by temperament to government
might have gone over to Japan. The low caliber of Wang Ch'ing-wei and
his clique is testimony to the _élan_ of the West Chinese leaders.
Chungking has ample reserves of administrative talent, military
intelligence, and political acumen upon which to draw.

The last part of the picture is the most important: the _lao-pai-hsing_,
the Old Hundred Names, the common people of China. They are the ultimate
arbiters of this war, and of all future wars in East Asia: to this
degree they are a superlative force in the world. Hundreds of millions
strong, adept, flexible, trained in a culture which has flowed under
(but not through) literacy for centuries, hard-working, patient, and
physiologically sound, they are perhaps the greatest unified human
group. Upon their anger against Japan depends the future of that Empire;
if the _lao-pai-hsing_ are determined to resist, Chiang could go,
Chungking fall, the government scatter, the Communists collapse, and
there would yet be war--restless, bitter, implacable, with the ferocity
of a sane man employing violence as a last defense against violence not
sane. Leaders exist aplenty in that sea of men, waiting for circumstance
to cast them forth. Intelligence, information, cunning, power, and
patience are all at hand.

The difference between a strange half-industrial modern Chinese
Republic, striding toward the twenty-first century with seven-league
boots of progress, and a Chinese chaos stinking with vice and disease
under Japanese rule--this difference lies within the decision of the
common people. The war has roused the workers, peasants, and petty
townsmen. The Japanese bombers have carried ubiquitous messages of
alarm. The Western world gasped when across the dusty plains of North
China there rolled the tidal wave of Boxerism; but the _I Ho Ch'üan_ of
yesteryear is a passing fad in contrast to the bitterness and resolution
of today's common people. There is no defeat in most of the faces in
Shanghai, no surrender in the eyes of men who live, and must keep on
living, surrounded by enemy vainglory. The traitors are marked by their
own behavior; they bear the stigmata of a surrender to vice. Yet even
they cannot be trusted by Japan. One who has visited the sources and the
mouths of the rivers, who has seen the free Yangtze pouring out of Tibet
and the captive Yangtze ripple past the grey flanks of Imperial Japanese
destroyers, can testify that the Chinese people are not beaten now. If
they are ever going to be beaten, it will take a bigger force than
Japan to do it--a morally greater, technically surer, politically wiser
force.

The Chinese people know they are unconquered. They do not know it with
their minds, despite hopeful calculations in terms of years and yen and
reserves of oil. They do not even know it with a conscious assumption of
faith, a fanatical determination to die for the new state. They know it
just as men have always known the simplest things of life--things so
simple that they may trouble the psychologist or elude the philosopher,
and never even enter the vocabulary of political science. The Chinese
sense of victory is like a reminiscent fragrance, a half-heard but
poignant sound, a flash of inexpressible but profound meaning out of
everyman's irrecoverable past. This omnipresent sense of victory and
freedom may be twisted. Weak and cunning men rationalize this sense of
victory into self-deceiving subterfuges of boring from within; they
accept Japanese salaries while promising themselves sometime, always
tomorrow, to subvert Japan; but even they lack no assurance of ultimate
Chinese victory.

The winning of that victory lies on the sweating backs of men--in
paddy-fields, on flaring highways, on flagstone pathways across a world,
or behind the adobe and lattice walls of China's workshops. The war has
conjured up an awareness of power. No one asks the _lao-pai-hsing_ what
they want; no ballots, no polls can reach them. But no people can hold
such overt power and be unconscious of their own strength. China has
awakened.




[Illustration: _Dr. Sun Yat-sen_]

CHAPTER IX

SUN YAT-SEN AND CHIANG K'AI-SHEK


The two highest offices in the Kuomintang are _Tsung-li_ (Leader) and
_Tsung-ts'ai_ (Chief). These are occupied by Sun Yat-sen as Leader and
Chiang K'ai-shek as Chief. Sun Yat-sen, though he died on March 12,
1925, holds the higher office in perpetuity. So vast is his legacy to
modern China that it exceeds full enumeration: founder of the effective
revolutionary movement and Party, first practical republican, political
organizer of the modern and overseas Chinese, first President of the
Republic, and therefore officially acknowledged State Founder, a drafter
of the national plan of modernization, author of the accepted ideology
(_San Min Chu I_), initiator of the Nationalist-Communist entente and of
the consequent Great Revolution, promulgator of the Outline of National
Reconstruction, and posthumous patron of the National Government. Keenly
and devotedly an advocate of democracy, Sun Yat-sen established by
practical example the principle of charismatic leadership. He most
certainly left a mantle. This is now, after years of struggle, draped
about the shoulders of Chiang K'ai-shek, although Wang Ch'ing-wei
retains a few threads torn from the hem.

Sun Yat-sen was a leader in the sense that the great religious and
philosophical figures have been leaders. He is not to be compared to
Alexander, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, or Hitler, but to Confucius, Gautama
Buddha, or Mohammed. Like the spiritual leaders he blended profound
humility and complete assurance. He knew that he was the savior of
China, and knew it long before anyone else did. He did not rely on
rising to power within a party, as did Lenin, or within a state, as did
Hitler. He created his own Party and his own state. Had he not
succeeded, he would have been labelled a maniac; so would most of the
other major figures of human history, had they failed. His success,
whatever its future fortune, is already so immense that it makes his
sense of leadership seem modest. And within the limits of success, he
was very modest; throughout life Sun remained more open-minded, ready to
consult, deferential to the opinions of others, and more willing to
yield power for the sake of harmony than the majority of his compeers.
This duality has troubled some of his biographers. As late as 1939 an
anonymous Englishman published an attack on Sun, which, missing the
history of six decades, failed to note that Sun had lived, had
succeeded, and had died objectively justified in his conception of
himself.

Sun's example, unconsciously at variance with his teachings, has left a
strong Caesarian strain in practical Chinese politics. Without Sun
Yat-sen in the background, it is altogether impossible to understand the
role played by Chiang, or to resolve the contradiction between a state
pledged to democracy and a leader over-loaded with power. No group in
China, except the officials of Manchoukuo, disavows Sun Yat-sen: the
Japanophiles, the Nationalists, and the Communists all claim to execute
his will.


SUN YAT-SEN

Sun Yat-sen was born in Kwangtung Province, near the Portuguese city of
Macao. Although he was uncertain of the date, the National Government
has found it to be November 12, 1866. Both his provincial and class
background had effect on his later life. The Cantonese are among the
most turbulent of Chinese, living at the southern edge of China and
speaking a dialect far different from the majority of the country.
Active, rebellious, enterprising, the Cantonese were disposed to change.
Sun's use of their tongue and knowledge of their customs gave him an
audience which both suffered and profited by its distinctness. Sun's
family was certainly not of the gentry class, and yet not so utterly
poor that it lacked all profitable connections. Otherwise his
potentialities might have been thwarted by ruinous poverty, disease, or
early death.

In adolescence, Sun felt the stings and urges of resentment driving him
to reform and revolution. He had kin who were involved in the T'aip'ing
Rebellion (1850-65), the vast peasant uprising which, under Christian
collectivist leadership by the Messianic Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, swept North
to the Yangtze and drowned in a sea of blood less than two years before
Sun's birth. He thus had direct knowledge not merely of Chinese revolt
against the alien Manchu empire, but he knew of the revolutionary
technique of a religious leader. The effect of this presumptive
knowledge has never been explored; it would explain a great deal in
Sun's career--much of the sharp enthusiasm, the use of ecstatic slogans,
the emphasis on will, his demands for faith in himself--if one could
know that he followed the instance of a Chinese Joseph Smith or Brigham
Young, not that of a Chinese Mazzini or Marx. The other important
feature about his early life was Western education.[1]

  [Footnote 1: _Sun Yat-sen_ is the Cantonese pronunciation of _Sun
  I-hsien_, just as _Chiang K'ai-shek_ is that of _Chiang Chieh-shih_.
  Both men first acquired their world reputations under this
  pronunciation, which has become standard in English. According to
  Chinese custom, one's given name is used only by one's elders;
  consequently Sun Yat-sen has been referred to, by his grateful
  followers, by his "courtesy name" Wên, which is the name by which one
  refers to one's elder. In addition, he is referred to by another
  special name which he took for conspiratorial work, Chung-shan
  (allusive to an ancient hero), or by his title--as _Tsung-li_ or _Sun
  Tsung-li_, much as we refer to President Wilson rather than to Woodrow
  Wilson. Sun was known most widely in life as Sun Wên; Chiang is most
  commonly mentioned as Chiang Chung-chêng. The question of names is
  extensively discussed in the biographies of the two leaders, cited
  below.]

Western training gave him a channel upward which the Confucian system
had denied a hundred generations of his predecessors. Patriots, rebels,
reformers--these have been sown by temperament and fortune across the
centuries of Chinese social existence, but such potential heroes have
been ploughed out or crippled by the language and the examinations. No
man could command power--save in its transient forms: banditry,
conspiracy, commerce--without mastering the Confucian canon. Once the
intricate scholarship of the past gripped him, the complex, beautiful,
archaic language of the mandarinate stopped up his mouth for plain
utterance. He was isolated from the people. Sun escaped this by the use
of the English language and the command of Western science. He was par
excellence the great counter-ideologue, whose self-confidence and
command of men rested upon foundations beyond the ken of his
adversaries. Judge Linebarger wrote, on the basis of what Sun told him:

     Like a soldier who after long study and practice has at
     length mastered the manual of arms so as to have complete
     confidence in his weapons, Sun now began to feel at last a
     confidence in his ability to show others the path of his new
     wisdom, for, while thus enjoying a steady advance under
     English tutelage in the ways of the foreigner, he was by no
     means neglecting his study of Chinese politics, even in the
     pressure of college work. He knew now that he would have to
     lead out in the Great Reform. At Hong Kong, Macao, and
     Canton he had college intimates, and these he sought out as
     often as his college course would permit.[2]

  [Footnote 2: Linebarger, Paul [M. W.], _Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese
  Republic_, New York and London, 1925, p. 176; this is the authorized
  life of Sun Yat-sen, written much as he wished it. The standard
  critical biography is Sharman, Lyon, _Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its
  Meaning_, New York, 1934. Sun Yat-sen also wrote a number of short
  autobiographies, some of which are deliberately inexact. Western
  language material on Sun is surveyed in an annotated bibliography
  appended to the present author's _The Political Doctrines of Sun
  Yat-sen_, Baltimore, 1937, p. 265 _ff._ A work which has since
  appeared is "Sagittarius," _The Strange Apotheosis of Sun Yat-sen_,
  London, 1939.]

Sun lived with his elder brother in Honolulu on two occasions, and
finally, after a period of discontent and rising turbulence at home,
went to study medicine in Hong Kong. He was the outstanding student in
the school because of his already fluent command of the English
language,[3] and was graduated as one of the very first Chinese
physicians to be trained in Western medicine. Through their very nature,
medical studies impart to the student a sense of responsibility for
others, and also incline them toward the expert's indifference to lay
opinion. Throughout his life Sun never lost confidence in the powers of
his own reason, or in the belief that, although difficult, it was both
necessary and possible to know the form and nature of social no less
than of biological processes, and to prescribe remedies for an ill
civilization as well as for a sick man.

  [Footnote 3: Statement to the author by Wên Chung-yao, President of
  the Legislative _Yüan_ of the Reorganized National Government of Wang
  Ch'ing-wei, at Nanking, September 5, 1940. Dr. Wên was a classmate of
  Dr. Sun at Queen's College.]

With traditional patriotism, a Cantonese background, the memory of
poverty, foreign training, and contact with overseas China, Sun was
already a marked man in his twenties. By 1895 he was important enough
for the Imperial Chinese Legation in London to kidnap him, preparing to
charter a ship to return him to China, where the torturers of the Board
of Punishments waited. In a _cause célèbre_, Sun was released; from then
on he had an international reputation.

His technique of revolution was little affected by the growing
proletarian parties of Europe. He adhered to traditional Chinese
methods, working through the consolidation of pre-existent secret
societies, the recruitment of terrorists, the launching of insurrection
after insurrection in the hope that one of them would catch the waiting
tinder and blaze across China. In Japan, in America, and in Europe, he
travelled, gathering funds, carrying on vigorous polemics against his
fellow-exiles, the monarchist reformers. His followers were organized
under a variety of names, of which Kuomintang is the last and
best-known. By 1911 the revolution broke out, flared sporadically across
the central and southern provinces, then lapsed into negotiations
between the Republicans and the Empire. Sun Yat-sen, in America when the
clash was precipitated, returned home to be elected Provisional
President of the Chinese Republic, on January 1, 1912. But his
revolution had begun to pass into other hands. Opportunists, no rare
breed in China, leapt aboard the bandwagon, minimizing the role of the
Nationalists and grasping for the materials of power: offices, guns and
money, slogans. The new-born Republic was taken over by the formidable
Yüan Shih-k'ai and converted into a pyramid of military dictatorships;
with Yüan's death the nation fell into _tuchünism_ and foreign meddling.

The years following were the saddest in Sun's life. He headed
miscellaneous governments in Canton, lived for a while in Shanghai, and
died at a fruitless unification conference in Peking. In his last years,
obsessed by his clear realization of the evils which beset his country,
he was even derided. He saw the vast economic maladjustments which would
follow the World War, and wrote a work, _The International Development
of China_[4] which in its grandeur anticipated the Five-Year and
Four-Year Plans; his idea was to finance a spectacular modernization of
China through public works by a scheme of international loans. Not only
would the imports of capital goods have benefited the Western powers,
but the development of a prosperous China would have provided the
expansion necessary to support an imperialist capitalism. His argument
was that international capitalism needed a market; China, one fourth of
humanity, provided a market; international guarantees and supervision
would make modernization possible; and modernization, while building
state-socialism and the material basis of prosperity in China, would
have enriched capitalism throughout the world. There is no evidence that
anyone save his followers and friends took his plan seriously.

  [Footnote 4: New York, 1922; reissue, 1929.]

The next step, in 1922, was a turning from capitalist democracies, which
had disappointed him, to a Russia which professed a new justice in the
world. Sun negotiated with emissaries of the Third International,
accepting Red help on the clear understanding that Communism was
recognized, by him and by the Communists, as unsuited to China--a
proposition which history calls into question. Only in his last stay in
Canton did he escape the ten-year pattern of frustration which had been
broken only by his happy second marriage, to Soong Ching-ling. (The
author, then a small boy, remembers Sun in Shanghai as a man of gentle
kindness and rueful gaiety; Sun was never too busy to speak to him, nor
to remember little presents; and in the midst of revolution Sun found
time to write a note of encouragement and good cheer.) With the new
allies, Sun, a dying man, went South, founded the lineal predecessors of
the Chungking government, called his comrades to him, and discovered an
effective military helper--his first after Huang Hsing, dead in the
years of Yüan. This military aide was Chiang K'ai-shek.

Just before his death Sun made sixteen lectures, out of a scheduled
program of eighteen. He did not write them, but they were transcribed
and roughly edited. In other years he had drafted monumental political
treatises; when the manuscripts were lost he did not reconstruct them.
The lectures, improvised, filled with minor inaccuracies, incomplete
arguments, and appeals to immediate opinion, rank nevertheless among
works of political genius. They are sharp, stirring, pointed, hopeful,
concrete. They define China's position in the world, and the goals of
the Chinese revolution. They adumbrate the reinforced democracy which
was to come and now fights for existence. And they prescribe an economic
philosophy humane beyond the dogma of the Russo-German dialecticians and
far more self-conscious than the obstinate torpor of Coolidge's
capitalism. Sun's lectures are today the foundation of the Chinese state
philosophy, taught in all curricula, required in all examinations. As
the _San Min Chu I_, they form an ideology with more legal adherents
than Marxism and National Socialism and Fascism combined. For democrats,
wherever they may be, this is a matter of importance, bearing directly
on the confused uncanalized struggles of our time. China possesses a
doctrine which indefeasibly associates her independence, her democracy,
and her prosperity.

It would be a mistake to consider these lectures and Sun's lesser
writings the only source of Sun Yat-sen's dogma. Since the government is
in the hands of the Kuomintang, and Kuomintang seniority depends largely
on closeness of association with Sun Yat-sen, Sun's personal, casual,
unconsidered influence on his friends forms a vital background to state
policy. Sun's American biographer wrote,

     Some criticize the _San Min Chu I_, because it seems to them
     severe and lofty. To this I reply that there are things
     other than what is written in the _San Min Chu I_. The
     English and other nations have their laws, written and
     unwritten. So too do we, the partisans of Sun Yat-sen, have
     our laws, written and unwritten. And this unwritten law is
     to us the dearer, is closer to our hearts, and is more
     moving as the goal of our activity, than even the written
     commentaries. This unwritten law is for us, who, sitting at
     his feet, received his teaching, the highest of all laws of
     truth and fidelity, the law of _bona fides_.[5]

  [Footnote 5: Linebarger, Paul Myron, _Mes Mémoires Abrégés sur les
  Révolutions de Sun Yat-sen_, Paris, 1938, p. 194. Paragraphing deleted
  in translation from the French.]

The continuing power of Sun Yat-sen is shown by the prestige and power
of his kin. Sun Yat-sen had two families. Early in life, before his
medical studies had ended, he was married to a woman of his own class
who was devoted, family-loving, characteristically Chinese, untouched by
the West, and undisposed to revolution. She bore him three children; the
son, Dr. Sun K'ê, was reared largely in the United States and has been
an important figure in Chinese politics ever since his return to China
from Columbia University. Successively Mayor of Canton, Chairman of
Kwangtung Province, Minister of Communications, of Finance, and of
Railways, President of the Executive and of the Legislative _Yüan_, he
has served with distinction. A practical and moderate man, he has always
advocated a moderate, constitutional application of his father's dogma,
has espoused full democratic government, stood for Party abdication, and
worked for national unity. One of his sisters died young and the other
married a gentleman who was later Chinese Minister to Brazil. Mrs. Sun
Yat-sen, Sun K'ê's mother, lived to a ripe old age in Macao. Charitable,
pious, humane, she was an enthusiastic Christian convert and a terror to
sluggard officials in that European outpost of vice. She took no part in
politics.

Sun Yat-sen's second family was acquired when he married Miss Soong
Ching-ling. After his defeat by Yüan Shih-k'ai and the frustration of
the first Republic, Sun Yat-sen felt very much in need of a companion to
hearten him, help his work, and share his troubles. He had been on very
close terms with C. J. Soong, a Christian business man, and had asked
Mr. Soong's eldest daughter, Ai-ling, to act as his secretary. When Miss
Ai-ling Soong left, her sister succeeded her. Sun fell genuinely and
deeply in love with the beautiful, vivacious, American-educated girl who
understood his work and desired to share his troubles. In all his life,
it is likely that Sun met no one more devoted to himself, more
understanding of what he sought from life and from his work for China,
than Ching-ling Soong. They were married on October 15, 1915, in Japan,
Sun Yat-sen having provided for separation from his first wife. The
younger wife has since become world-famous as Mme. Sun Yat-sen.

Ching-ling and Ai-ling Soong had a third sister,[6] May-ling, who
married Chiang K'ai-shek after Ai-ling had married H. H. K'ung. (Hence
Chiang K'ai-shek's closest family connection with Sun Yat-sen consists
in being brother-in-law to the second wife.) The three Soong sisters
thus married the two outstanding leaders and another who stood just
below. The Soong brothers were less successful, although one, T. V.
Soong, has been a leading fiscal reformer and financial expert.

  [Footnote 6: In the case of Chinese names which are commonly
  transliterated in an Americanized form, the Western name-order is
  preserved. According to standard Sinological practice, the three
  sisters are Sung Ai-ling, Sung Ch'ing-ling, and Sung Mei-ling; their
  famous brother (T. V. Soong) is Sung Tzŭ-wên.]

The beauty, American education, polished cosmopolitan manners, and sense
of publicity of the three sisters have made them sensational news
figures. Their eldest brother's success has added distinction to this
family. The inescapable consequence has been a great deal of speculation
about the "Soong dynasty"; but the surprising feature of the Soongs is
not their fame and power through marriage, plus ability, but their
slight cohesion as a Chinese family. They have stood together only at
times of highest crisis, and not always then. Mme. Sun Yat-sen has
continued along the Leftist tangent which her husband followed just
before he died. For years she was the only Leftist in China who did not
fear death or a more painful fate. She kept her ideals; from the homes
of her family she wrote scathing denunciations of the blood-soaked
tyranny of her brother-in-law, her sisters, her stepson, and her
brother. Mme. K'ung appears to have worked most steadfastly in the
interest of the entire family, although rivalry between her brother and
her husband has been a matter of general report. Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek,
the youngest of the three sisters, has been a loyal wife first of all,
and has contributed enormously to the Generalissimo's international
prestige. No other modern leader possesses an able publicity adviser,
capable and apt, so near to himself. The family relationships of Sun
Yat-sen thus display themselves in his son, constitutional and moderate,
who is inclined to favor Mme. Sun, with Sun's sisters-in-law and
brothers-in-law following their respective political courses with their
own families--all on cordial political terms, but scarcely a monolithic
family bloc.

In addition to his doctrine, his Party, his followers, and his family,
Sun Yat-sen has bequeathed his name. As Chung Shan, he fills the void in
Chinese polity left by the Emperor. Every Monday morning his will is
read, throughout every government office in the land. His picture is
seen everywhere. His sayings and slogans have become the shibboleths of
revolution, union, and reconstruction. The reverence paid to him is a
form of secular worship, focussed upon a magnificent mausoleum near the
cenotaphs of the Ming Emperors on Purple Mountain, Nanking. All virtues
and most knowledge are attributed to him; inescapably, some hard-headed
people react against the cult. Dead, he is to the Chinese what the King
is to the British, or the assembled forefathers to the Americans,
or--save partial eclipse by Stalin--Lenin is to the Soviet Union.
Perpetual leader of the Kuomintang, Sun has in death more power than
life vouchsafed him. In a world wild with alarm and hungry for
leadership, his sense of providential mission and of terrible political
urgency no longer seems shrill or vain. His is the greatest of
posthumous satisfactions: vindication by history.


THE SAN MIN CHU I

Out of the broad body of doctrine embodied in the public and private
utterances of Sun Yat-sen, one single integrating philosophy stands
forth, which entitles him to rank as a major political thinker. This is
the _San Min Chu I_, which may be translated "three principles of the
people," "three principles of government for the benefit of the people,"
"three principles concerning people" and so forth, or may--most
accurately--be represented by the neologism, "tridemism."[7] It consists
of an affirmation of a body of theory and a scheme of programs to be
applied generally to human experience, and particularly to the modern
problems of China.

  [Footnote 7: d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun
  Yat-sen_, Wuch'ang, 1931, p. 36-49, gives an exhaustive analysis of
  possible translations. Stylistically, the term should be given _San
  Min Chu I_ as a classical title; _san-min chu-i_ as a noun; and
  _san-min-chu-i_ when used as an adjective. The first form alone is
  followed because of its wide currency.]

The prime problem faced by Sun Yat-sen was displacement of the Confucian
ideology, long refreshed and perpetuated by the mandarinate. (The
scholastic bureaucracy rested on the difficulty and character of the
language, which removed writing from speaking and, lacking what
Westerners commonly consider grammar, depended upon exact, appropriate
choice of terms.) Confucius, anticipating semantic controversialists by
many centuries, established a doctrine of meaning which made politics
the by-product of correct speech and thought, to be performed by
conspicuous, informed, and majestic persons. When ideas and ideals were
clear, moral standards firm and visible, and demeanor correct--as
determined by archaic natural standards--the realm would prosper.
Education was stressed as a means to public service. In succeeding
centuries Confucians first monopolized education, establishing the
Confucian classics as formal Chinese canons, and then monopolized the
bureaucracy. Providing for elementary circulation of an academic elite,
although economically based on land-ownership, they gave China a
modified sort of representative government, which operated by the
all-encompassing constitutionalism of common sense itself, and rested
ultimately on the lack of an alternative to common sense. The Confucians
were intellectually indifferent to natural science and economically
unfriendly to technological change; China, unsurpassed for political
sophistication and deliberate social order, was immobilized by an
ancient success. Ideological control led to veneration of the scholar,
even veneration of writing. Emperors, officials, people--all were
captive to accomplishment, and so completely indoctrinated that they
presumably enjoyed a very high conscious freedom. Rigid social and
mental uniformity spelled political laxity; the state became atrophied
and vestigial.

Social rigidity made China only very slowly progressive in mechanical
terms. Political laxity made the country weak in the face of invasion,
exploitation, and possible partition. Intellectual traditionalism shut
off stimuli available from the outside. Confucius had said, "If terms be
not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If
language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot
be carried on to success."[8] Sun Yat-sen, Confucian in spirit though
not in form, turned to the dynamics of ideological rather than legal
control. To stir the immense lethargy of China, he substituted science
for archaism; a Party elite for the scholastic system, propaganda to
replace doctrinal education, and agitation to supersede incantation and
reverence.

  [Footnote 8: _The Analects_, Book XIII, Ch. v; Legge, James, _The
  Chinese Classics_, Oxford, 1893 [Peiping, 1939], I, p. 93; the word
  _terms_ has been substituted for _names_ in rendering _ming_.]

He struck at ideas first: "We cannot say in general that ideas, as
ideas, are either good or bad. We must judge whether, when put into
practice, they prove useful or not. If they are of practical use to us,
they are good; if they are impractical, they are bad. If they are useful
to the world, they are good; if they are not useful to the world, they
are not good."[9] This pragmatic utilitarianism was to be the
philosophical foundation of his revolution. The _San Min Chu I_
therewith remained alien to Marxism, which is dependent upon the occult
mysteries of a topsy-turvy Hegelianism; Sun's thought is kin to the
working philosophy of America, a pragmatism tinctured by idealist
vestiges.

  [Footnote 9: d'Elia translation, cited, p. 130-1.]

The first political principle he developed was _Nationalism_ (_min
ts'u_). The theoretical basis for this was a racialism which,
scientifically no more tenable than National Socialist Aryanism, is
clear in common practice. Very few Chinese have trouble in identifying
another Chinese. Sun Yat-sen pointed out that although the European
peoples were divided, China was to him both a race and a nation. He
thereby established for his followers a foundation for nationality more
credible than any mere appeal to state allegiance. Treason against one's
government is taken lightly in China: witness the Japanophiles. Treason
to the Chinese race is a far more serious matter. In order to preserve
the Chinese race-nation, Sun Yat-sen called for ideological
reconstruction from three elements: ancient Chinese morality,
traditional Chinese social knowledge (e.g., bureaucratic techniques;
arbitration instead of adjudication), and Western physical science. He
urged a return to cosmopolitanism through nationalism. By becoming
strong--instead of extinct under alien colonial rule--the Chinese state
could lead the world back to the old pacific cosmopolitanism of Eastern
Asia.

Programmatically, Sun subsumed under his _min t'su_ theory, the
necessity of a patriotic elite, formed into the party of his followers,
which was to unify China and to cultivate a genuine state-allegiance
instead of the veneration of a concretely paramount Emperor or other
leader. He also advocated that China maintain independence, make
independence a reality in which the entire race-nation should share by
fostering actual autonomy (hence, democracy), and by fighting
defensively against economic exploitation by the imperialist powers.

The second principle presented was _Democracy_ (_min ch'üan_). He
pointed out that old China was democratic in allowing considerable
social mobility, and much equality within the framework of that
mobility, and that popular government was a reality in local affairs,
while popular supremacy (corresponding to Western theories of popular
sovereignty) followed from the universally admitted Chinese right of
rebellion. He justified democracy on the grounds that it was commanded
by China's antique sages, was necessarily consequent upon nationalism,
was decreed by the _Zeitgeist_, was necessary to good administration,
and was a modernizing force. But he modified his democracy by a
distinction between _ch'üan_ (power) and _nêng_ (ability), keeping
government and people perpetually dual, and making the problem of
democratic personnel one of popular choice plus the control of popular
choice. The programs of democracy involved the revolution of three
stages, the five-_yüan_ government, and emphasis on the _hsien_.[10]

  [Footnote 10: See above, p. 42.]

The third principle is based on Sun Yat-sen's own philosophy of history.
_Min shêng_, frequently translated "the principle of the people's
livelihood," rested upon Sun Yat-sen's belief that history is not based
exclusively on materialism and that it cannot be analyzed merely in
terms of the ownership of the means of production. He insisted that
history was based on the fundamental fact that man has _jên_--humane
self-awareness; human fellow-sympathy; consciousness of being located in
society, together with orientation by values social, not individually or
materially established; benevolence. _Min shêng_ is accordingly an
ethical doctrine first, and an economic one afterward. It is the basis
of history (_min-shêng wei li-shih-ti chung-hsin_). It presupposes, for
China: (1) a national economic revolution against imperialism and for
democracy; (2) an industrial revolution for the enrichment of China; and
(3) a prophylactic against social revolution. Although showing the
influence of Karl Marx, Henry George, and the modern American, Maurice
William,[11] the doctrine remained Chinese in spirit, pragmatically
collectivist in application. Under the programs of _min shêng_ Sun
included the bold projects for which he had sought all his life,
desiring the independent, socially just prosperity of his country.

  [Footnote 11: See William, Maurice, _Sun Yat-sen vs. Communism_,
  Baltimore, 1932, for an appraisal which stresses the importance and
  degree of this influence; on the opposite side, see "The Alleged
  Influence of Maurice William on Sun Yat-sen" by P. C. Huang and W. P.
  Yuen in _T'ien Hsia Monthly_, V, 4 (November 1937), p. 349-76.]

These doctrines form the constitutional foundation of government action,
as well as being the Party credo of the Kuomintang. Whoever proposes
policy in China must first square it with the _San Min Chu I_. In this
the Generalissimo has combined adroitness with profound sincerity.


CHIANG K'AI-SHEK

Despite a small shelf of biographies, Chiang K'ai-shek remains a
personality above and behind the news, not in it. His former teacher
and present publicity adviser, Hollington Tong, has written an
authorized life, clear, detailed, and well expurgated. The celebrated
Sven Hedin published a study of Chiang; virtues, but not specific
personality stood forth. An able American newspaperman had recourse to
his files, and some Chinese admirers sketched an incredibly soft, lovely
picture: the background was clarified, but not Chiang. Two world-famous
reporters, trained to epitomize a life or a nation in a double column or
sharp review, failed to grasp Chiang. He eludes everyone.

Part of the trouble comes from the fact that he possesses virtues which,
once lauded, are now suspected of being mythical, wheresoever they
occur. Frederick the Great, George Washington, Julius Caesar in his
careerist years--authentic in history, as contemporaries these leaders
would strike the moderns as characters inflated or incredible. Sincerity
has become consistency with one's source of income; persons who fail to
fit into the accepted moral and intellectual types of Western
industrialist society are labelled fakes. One is a gentleman-liberal, an
intellectual-liberal, a capitalist, a picturesque _native_, a war-lord
sinister, obscene, cruel, and criminal--one fits such a type, and if one
doesn't, one does not exist. Yet Chiang exists, and is thereby suspect
to a host of commentators. Sun Yat-sen as First President was an
acceptable news figure; as Saint of the Great Revolution he became
vulnerable. When Chiang seems neither a general nor a reactionary, he
bewilders many Westerners.

Within China, Chiang is more readily grasped. In any other age, he would
be the founder of a new dynasty. The establishers of Imperial houses
have, as a group, combined intense vigor with a flair for the
disreputably picturesque, in turn qualified by the highly respectable
associates they sought out after success. Several have been bandits; one
was an unfrocked Buddhist priest. For vigor and a timely
libertarianism, they compare favorably with the Claudian line. Today the
Dragon Throne is irrecoverably remote; the Manchoukuoan Emperor Kang Tê
lacks elementary plausibility. Chiang is far too wise, far too modern in
his own motivations, to wish or dare dream of Empire. Upon him has
descended grace of a new kind, the charismatic halo of Sun Yat-sen. His
reputation can be carved in the most enduring of materials: indefeasible
history. With a son who is a Bolshevik, a little Eurasian grandchild,
and an adopted son of no high merit, Chiang does not face the problem of
power-bequeathal. He has power now; it matters little where power goes
after his death; the value to him lies in immediate use.

Assuming even an abnormal egocentrism, Chiang--at the apex of state--is
above ambition; he has no welfare but that of the state. In fact, Chiang
is a man of almost naively insistent morality. Even Westerners act on
the stage of today with posterity as an audience; Chinese,
state-building, moral, Chiang moves under the glare of his perpetual
reputation. As in the case of Sun, his sense of leadership would be
maniacal if not grounded on fact; but what assumption would not? A
peanut-vendor who thinks he is the King of Egypt is crazy; Farouk is not
therefore crazy because King of Egypt. If Chiang were not the leader of
China, he would be mad; but he, and he alone, is leader. His humility
begins with the assumption of his power.

Twenty-one years the junior of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang was born in 1888 in
Chekiang province.[12] His family was of a class intermediate between
the truly eminent landlord-official or merchant families, and the
farmers. They had been farmers, but also minor gentry, and had been
connected with the salt-revenue system. His grandfather attained
considerable renown as a scholar, but Chiang's own father died when
Chiang was eight years of age. The child had few special advantages. His
family background is one which is of common occurrence among political
leaders; his widowed mother, mastering and managing for the family,
inculcated a sharp morality, an unrelenting frugality, and a persistent
drive of industriousness in her children. To such a person, who rises
from poverty and hardship by his own efforts, the failure of others to
do likewise becomes a personal problem. By his own case he has proved
that opportunities are there. He is impatient with the poor, the stupid,
or the shiftless; instead of re-arranging society to give them a chance,
he expects them to improve themselves to meet existing realities. Chiang
has not explicitly stated all these points; many of them are qualified
by the fact that the _status quo_ in modern China is the _status quo_ of
perpetual revolution.

  [Footnote 12: Biographies of Chiang are: Chen Tsung-hsi _et al._,
  _General Chiang Kai-shek, the Builder of New China_, Shanghai, 1929;
  Tong, Hollington K. (Tung Hsien-kuang), _Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and
  Statesman_, 2 vols., Shanghai, 1937, the authorized biography and a
  model of its kind; Berkov, Robert, _Strong Man of China_, Boston,
  1938; and Hedin, Sven, _Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal of China_, New York,
  1940. _Who's Who in China_ is, as usual, useful for Chiang and for the
  members of his family. Almost every book on modern China, or magazine
  dealing with Asiatic materials, has discussions of Chiang. Among the
  most noteworthy writers on his career and personality are Gustav
  Amann, whose account remains the most carefully detailed; Edgar Snow
  and John Gunther, the reporters mentioned above; and Harold Isaacs.
  The Generalissimo's own diary and speeches, together with Mme.
  Chiang's writings, are unconsciously rather than deliberately
  revelatory.]

Leftist commentators, dubbing Chiang a combined product of landlordism,
compradore class, and criminal gangs, explain him through a mystagogic
economic determinism. Actually, Western impress on Chiang is of a more
special nature: Western religion, and Western warfare. The ideals which
animate him, and determine--so far as these are visible--his own sense
of values, are concepts and attitudes extraneous to the Chinese scene.
Deduct the threaded recurrency of religion, and the sense of technique
from military training, and Chiang could be paired with many other
modern Chinese leaders--soldiers of turmoil, administrators of the _ad
interim_, complacent leaders of hypothetical groups. He and Sun stand
out because each had a Western technique so thoroughly mastered that it
gave him a clear competence over other men: Sun, the physician; Chiang,
the strategist. Each also had a Western moral drive which turned
hungrily to the past and justified itself in Chinese antiquity: Sun, the
all-around Christian, who professed and denied the churches alternately
throughout life, and Chiang, the Bible-quoting Methodist, both cite the
Confucian canons; both esteem the Chinese ethics; both discern the
forcefulness of Western spirituality.

Leadership, plus technical power, plus alien moral reinforcement, spells
preeminence. The Confucians have gone; the serene mandarins are dead.
Methodist soldiers, Baptist bankers--such Chinese control China.
Marxism, which by combining jargon and act of faith, is both religion
and erudition, unites these ideocratic forces; Wang Ming can feel that
he is a scientist analyzing society with peculiar objectivity, and he
can feel morally gratified at the same time. Chiang and the Nationalist
leaders keep such sustenance dual.

The special religious background came to him through his mother. Women
have traditionally turned to Buddhism for piety in China, and Mrs.
Chiang was one of the exceptional characters who combined intense hard
work with great piety. The children grew with the infinite looming over
them; every misstep meant thousands upon thousands of years of hopeless,
damnable rebirth. Buddhism can match the Christian, "It is a fearefull
thing to fall into the hands of the living God ...,"[13] with the even
more fearful doom of life in a world which does not want to live.
Buddhism, socially, goes about in circles; the Mahayana sect provides a
qualified kind of salvation, but not the salvation which a determined
man can wring bloody-handed out of circumstance itself. The discipline,
the austerity, were ready; Christianity, when it came to him, fell on
plowed and waiting ground. The other instinct of ascendancy was
cultivated by his education: professionalism. His life falls into three
stages after childhood: education; wasted years; and the mastery and use
of power.

  [Footnote 13: John Donne, in a sermon of commemoration of the Lady
  Danvers, late wife of Sir John Danvers; 1627.]

Chiang went to the Imperial Military Academy at Paotingfu. Aloof and
ambitious, he was so successful that within a year he was sent to the
Shinbo Gokyo (Preparatory Military Academy) in Tokyo; he remained in
Japan four years. The Japanese under whom he studied retained no special
impression of him, except that he eagerly accepted discipline. As a part
of his study, he served with the 13th Field Artillery (Takada) Regiment
of the Imperial Army. Chiang therewith acquired not merely military
knowledge, but a working insight into Japanese language, mentality, and
strength.

His military studies were terminated by the outbreak of the Republican
Revolution in 1911. Chiang returned to Shanghai, and began a vigorous
military career under the local military commander, pro-Sun in politics.
Chiang himself had come into contact with the Republican-Nationalist
group while in Japan. There was already no question of where his
loyalties lay. He made rapid progress, and saw something of fighting. He
took part in the abortive Second Revolution, of 1913, which was the
military attempt by Sun Yat-sen and his first military coadjutant, Huang
Hsing, to check Yüan Shih-k'ai and to save the newborn Republic by
force. In this time, while the enthusiasm of his military studies had
not yet worn off, Chiang wrote prodigiously. No Westerner has, so far as
the present author knows, taken the trouble to go through Chiang's
writings in order to study him. Chinese commentators praise them as full
of military acumen, a sense of the novel and important forces in Chinese
society, and a vigorous moralism--modern-military in form, but archaic
in language--which animated Chiang's youthful desire to improve the
world with good, technically apt gunfire. He was at this time
twenty-three or twenty-four.

Between this early career and the later years of Chiang's life--the
years in which his star rode incessantly ascendant--there is a gap of
several years, 1913 to 1918. In this time Chiang lived a life primarily
civilian, although he remained under the patronage of his first military
leader, General Chen Ch'i-mei, murdered in 1915. Chiang went on a
military intelligence trip for the Sun Yat-sen group, travelling through
Manchuria in 1915. He opposed Yüan's moves, and stayed in close contact
with the patriotic organization. Yet, the total picture of his life in
these years lacks the connecting linkage which binds his childhood, his
school days, and his mature career. His activity, while considerable,
was diffuse.

He went down to Canton in 1918, and fought under the command of Sun
Yat-sen, with the inferior troops and hopeless expeditions which the
Leader, politically adept but strategically inexpert, kept throwing
against the confusion of the _tuchün_ wars, with the result that the
war-lords, counting him as another element in their balance of power,
did not even set up a united front against him. Chiang, a Central
Chinese, was unsympathetic to the intense provincialism of the
Cantonese, and was hopelessly tactless in criticizing old-type soldiers
upon whom Sun then relied. Disillusioned but still loyal, he went back
to Shanghai and wrote letters of advice to his friends in the South,
including Dr. Sun. Throughout this time he was simply one more among
the dozens of bright young military men who were, in the existing
crudity of warfare, unneeded in China. (Chu Tê, Chiang's present
colleague and rival who heads the Soviet Chinese military system, was at
this time besotted in Yünnan--a petty war-lord of landlord family,
trapped hopeless on his little island of power amidst ruin.)

The period in the Shanghai years was filled in with business activity.
Chiang was acquainted with some of the most influential merchants of the
city, among them the crippled Chang Ching-chiang, a Paris merchant whose
personal wealth was an informal treasury of Sun's movement. Chiang
entered brokerage, and is supposed to have made a great deal of money.
He became acquainted with the modernized, Westernized young Chinese of
the metropolis, and left many friends behind him among the Chinese
business men and industrialists.

Speculative or unfriendly writers asseverate that Chiang joined the
Green Gang, an association which combined the features of a protection
racket and a benevolent society. (Such a society, common in China during
periods of disturbance, is the archetype of the American-Chinese Tong
[_tang_] in its more violent phases.) If so, membership gave Chiang the
key to an underworld as well organized as François Villon's Paris,
wherein beggars, thieves, pickpockets, kidnappers, labor contractors,
burial societies, and legitimate associations merged under the
extra-legal government of a Masonic-like hierarchy. (The author is
acquainted with a Chinese League of Nations official who joined the Gang
as a necessary implement of social research, and was afforded genuine
courtesy in preparing a report, general but accurate as to prevailing
conditions, through the assistance of his fellow-members.)

Chiang's marriage, which had been made Chinese-fashion in his late
boyhood, had given him posterity--a son, now the pro-Communist,
Soviet-trained Major-General Chiang Ching-kuo--but little companionship.
His wife and son remained most of the time at his native home, whence he
returned to see them and his mother, at Fenghua in Chekiang. Social
contacts, acquaintance with capitalism, looseness of family connections,
spasmodic work for the Revolution, and some military work--this,
combined with the making and the losing of a fortune, fill the early
maturity of Chiang.

He appeared upon the national and the world scene by his selection in
1923 to go to Moscow under the terms of the Nationalist-Soviet
understanding, there to receive military training. He had definitely
cast in his lot with Sun Yat-sen, making soldiery his vocation, and the
selection implied that Sun began to see in him a military aide, to
replace Huang Hsing of the first revolution. Chiang spent four months in
the Soviet Union. The Communists, whom he was to fight six years later,
showed him their combination of political and military warfare applied
in Trotsky's Red Army. Chiang, already the beneficiary of Japanese
training, had found Japanese military science dependent upon the
framework of a stable constitutional system. In China his earlier
training had been superior to its environment and did not have the
practical utility of five years' banditry. Chiang, professional by
spirit, restless under the drive of conscience and ambition, now found
in Moscow the intermediate steps between modern warfare and
government-building. He found that an army, from being the tool of
pre-existing order, could become the spearhead of an accompanying order.
Returning to China via the Trans-Siberian Railroad, he met General
Galens (Vassili Bluecher), later his chief Soviet military aide at
Canton.

In Canton, the first military creation on Soviet models was the Whampoa
(_Huangpu_) Academy. Decreed by Sun Yat-sen, who made Chiang chief, the
Academy had Soviet advisers, eager to instill revolutionary and
civil-war techniques. Chiang began the development of a modern army, and
the real accretion of his own power. Even before he commanded full
armies, Chiang used his cadets to good purpose in actual combat.

From this point on, Chiang's career becomes a part of the military
history of the revolution. In his earlier years of power, Chiang emerged
to leadership by cooperating with various intra-Kuomintang groups. He
stood with the Left and utilized the Communists, although he managed to
provoke, suppress, and appease the Communists in a way which no one else
managed. He led the victorious Northern Expedition in 1925-27, carrying
his forces on the crest of the Great Revolution. He was little known,
but seen to be ambitious, zealous, incalculable, and a political
strategist of ruthless genius. He soon found himself one of the
triumvirate of Sun Yat-sen's successors: Hu Han-min, the Right
Kuomintang leader, editor of Sun's works; Chiang; and Wang Ch'ing-wei,
the Left Kuomintang leader.

At Shanghai, in 1927, Chiang's troops turned suddenly against the
Communists and Left groups, quenching the uprising which had taken the
city under his flag. This coup was undertaken because Chiang felt that
the Communists were outrunning their promises. The Soviet advisers, who
had come to help the Nationalists, had professed their concern for
China's national struggle, and for the desirability of a fight against
imperialism. They had not told Sun himself that he was a mere precursor
to the proletarian revolution, nor informed the Nationalists that they
were being given the privilege of fighting a war to advance the
historical necessity of Nationalist extinction, as the next step in
China's dialectic progression. Trotsky talked openly in Moscow about
overthrowing the Chinese revolutionaries, and hijacking the Chinese
revolution with the Chinese Communists, while Stalin believed in
appeasing the Nationalists longer before discarding them. Of this Chiang
was fully aware, and he struck at the sources of Communist power, labor
and peasant unions, using a ruthlessness comparable to theirs. He went
further, establishing the National Government (in the five-power form)
at Nanking, and leaving the Left Kuomintang uneasily in the company of
the Communists at Hankow. When the Communists proceeded to debate the
question of monopolizing the remnants, even the Left-Kuomintang had had
enough. They suppressed the Communists, and dissolved, coming down river
to Nanking and joining the new government, while Chiang stepped
technically out of the picture to ease the healing of the schism.
Chiang's legitimacy in the leadership of the Kuomintang and the Sun
Yat-sen revolution is shown by the fact that within two years he had an
overwhelming majority of the veteran Kuomintang leaders at his capital.

In the ensuing years Chiang dedicated himself to three tasks: the
development of the National Government, the stabilization of his own
power, and the modernization of the country, both moral and mechanical.
In 1927 he had married Miss May-ling Soong, and brought himself into
alliance with the influential Soong family. The success of his efforts
is attested by the continued functioning of a National Government at
Chungking, the resistance and unification of China, which Chiang has
come to symbolize, and the stalemate of Japan. These things would have
appeared in some form, even without Chiang, but they would probably not
exist with their present clarity and strength. The ten years of
armament, modernization, and Japan-appeasement built an area into a
nation, changing one more government into an elementary national state.

The Generalissimo has changed in appearance and manner considerably in
the past ten years; these changes seem to have immediate bearing on his
political role. In 1931 he was unmistakably the first soldier of
China--brusque, forthright, sharp-voiced, and dismayingly lacking in the
devious but pleasant _k'ê-ch'i_ (ceremonial politeness) which is carried
to professional heights by Chinese officials. Even then he was a
masterful and clear-willed sort of man, who upset political precedents
by a directness which would have been naive were it not so obviously
both self-conscious and sincere. He possessed a keen awareness of his
own historical importance, and a consistent responsibility before
history--which still animates him--was the result. When coupled with the
regular exercise of authority, this trait may have the consequence of
moderating arbitrariness and minimizing opportunism.

With Chiang's self-possession there went an impatience with opposing
views, a carelessness of means in the face of ends, and a fanatical
insistence on loyalty. He now seems little older in body, despite the
injury to his back during the Sian episode, but the years have left a
very clear impress on his moral character. To the sharp discipline and
authority of the soldier he has added the characteristics of a
teacher--reserved kindliness, a daily preoccupation with moral
questions, an inclination to harangue his followers on the general
meaning of their problems. Ten years ago it was very difficult to find
out what Chiang really believed and wanted; his ambition and patriotism
were both patent, but beyond them there was little detail to be filled
in. He is beginning to have the relationship of, let us say, Lenin to
Marx in his treatment of the _San Min Chu I_ of Sun Yat-sen, and is
beginning to stand forth as an interesting political theorist in his own
right. He gives every indication of maturing in office, and of rising in
stature in proportion to the responsibilities which are thrust upon him.



CHINESE APPRAISALS OF CHIANG

Among both official and unofficial circles in Chungking there is a
widespread and apparently well-founded belief that the two critical
points of China's resistance and continued national independence rest
more on Chiang's life, activity, and support than on any other single
man or institution. These points are, of course, the domestic armistice
and the promotion of resistance and reconstruction. The enormous strains
which collaboration imposes on Nationalists and Communists are borne by
Chiang. The finesse necessary to keep regions, classes, and groups in
line, would probably not be available if the Generalissimo were dead. It
is a tribute to his associates and followers of all parties that they
work with him and with each other, but at the same time it is the
supreme accomplishment of Chiang to have developed so that he can
personify unity.

A question which the writer put to almost everyone he met in Western
China was, "What do you think of Chiang? And what do you think Chiang
thinks of himself?" The answers varied in tone and detail, but showed an
interesting unanimity in major stress. One of the National Salvationist
leaders,[14] bitter about Chiang's high-handed repression of
Left-liberal movements in pre-war years, replied "Impossible!" to the
question, "From your point of view, could General Chiang become an
outright dictator?" But this leader explained that Chiang differed from
President George Washington in that the latter's own conception of his
role was in close harmony with public expectation and governmental
necessity, whereas Chiang--believing in democracy as a part of his
loyalty to his leader, Dr. Sun, and to the _San Min Chu I_--found
himself unready to trust democratic processes in really vital issues.

  [Footnote 14: One of the Seven Gentlemen (_Ch'i Chüntzŭ_), whose
  name is withheld by request, interviewed August 2, 1940, in
  Chungking.]

The critic continued by adding that the difference between Sun and
Chiang was to be found in the fact that the former, whatever his
impatience, let the Plenary Session of the C.E.C. of the Kuomintang
reach its decisions through discussion, whereas Chiang tried to help the
committee decide by lecturing at it. He concluded thus: if there were no
political group other than the Kuomintang, Chiang might become a
dictator in fact while remaining a democratic leader in name. The
presence of other parties and groups makes this difficult, if not
impossible. For example, the Kuomintang might try to apply the new
constitution in such a way as to prevent its being an additional step on
the road to democracy; but the other groups, including the Communists,
could thwart this move by refusing to take part in any of the
constitutional ceremonies, and thereupon [in the traditional Chinese
fashion] discredit the whole thing. These opinions are of special
interest when one considers that they stem from a group which is still
suffering from a very careful police supervision and a state of
non-recognition and semi-repression.

Another interesting interpretation of Generalissimo Chiang's role is
found among the Communists. One of the Chinese Communist leaders[15] had
the question put to him, "On what long-range basis of practical politics
can you people and the Generalissimo cooperate? After all, you must be
consolidating power which can be used against him and he power which can
be turned against you?" He replied that if Chiang made terms with the
Japanese, or if he failed to resist, the Communists would need to have
nothing to do with him, nor he with them, since he would be ruined in
any case. On the other hand, if the war came to a successful end, Chiang
would be the supreme hero of modern China; the Communists could not turn
against him; and Chiang knew this well enough to know that if he
defeated Japan he had won China. The commentator did not explore other
obvious possibilities, such as a long stalemate in the Japanese war, or
a shift in Soviet policies, but what he said indicates the present
reality of the common interests between the Communists and the
Generalissimo.

  [Footnote 15: Communist leader, interviewed in Chungking, whose name
  is also withheld by request.]

From these and other comments, the visitor to China soon learns that
although Chiang is the Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_) of the Kuomintang, his
power rests as much on broad national support as it does on Party power.
It is significant that although Chiang still has two groups of
semi-secret protective police, one Party and the other Army, he has far
less occasion to use them than he did five years ago. There is an
inadequacy of due process, of course, which would strike the lay
American as critically unsatisfactory, but the smoothness, evenness, and
relative frankness of government is far greater than at any other time
in modern China.

Democracy is obtaining some real beginnings, not because of a sudden
lurch in political necessity, nor because of the charm of a theory, but
because the firm ground of a common opinion is knitting the country
together and affording the limits indispensable to the functioning of
democratic techniques; this common opinion, the universal popularity of
the war, is based on the resistance-and-reconstruction policy. The same
patriotic surge which supports the war supports Chiang, as the hero and
chief technician of the war.

The political changes which translated Chiang from the status of a Party
leader and a new kind of militarist into a real national leader are
mirrored in his writings. His published political works now run to a
considerable number of volumes, representing collections of his speeches
and essays.[16] It would, perhaps, be interesting to note the main
trends of his political philosophy, since it serves as the firm ground
of his policy. It is possible that no other leader in the world, except
Stalin, has satisfied himself so thoroughly with the connection between
his own epistemological and ethical presuppositions and his working
conclusions in terms of action as has Chiang.

  [Footnote 16: Some of the recent volumes are: _Lu-shan Hsün-lien Chi
  Hsüan-chi_ (Collected Papers of the Lu Shan Training Conference),
  Chungking, 1939; _O-mei Hsün-lien Chi Hsüan-chi_ (Collected Papers of
  the Omei Training Conference), Chungking, 1939; _Li-hsing Chê-hsiao_
  (The Philosophy of Being Practical), Chungking, 1940; _Tsung-ts'ai
  Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi_ (The Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on
  Reconstruction), Chungking, 1940; _Tsung-ts'ai Wai-chiao Yen-lun
  Hsüan-chi_ (The Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on Diplomacy), Chungking,
  1940; and _Tsung-ts'ai K'ang-chan Yen-lun Hsüan-chi_ (The
  Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on Resistance), Chungking, 1940. A
  collection of the Generalissimo's leading speeches, in English, is in
  press and is to be issued soon by the China Information Publishing
  Company, Hong Kong.]


THE IDEOLOGY OF CHIANG

First and foremost, Chiang accepts the _San Min Chu I_ of Sun Yat-sen,
deviating from the letter of these doctrines by no single brush-stroke.
In his spirit of interpretation, he follows in general the Rightist
exegeses, as represented by the works of Hu Han-min and T'ai Ch'i-t'ao,
although he has developed his own conclusions in great part from his
first-hand memory of Dr. Sun, and from his own experience. (Needless to
say, he is worlds apart from the interpretations given by such Leftists
as the Communists, the Third Party, or Mme. Sun, or such ultra-Rightists
as the Japanophiles.)

Secondly, he has found the pragmatic elements of Sun's philosophy highly
palatable. Apart from his public life, he has always made a fetish of
action, and has stood for getting something done. His orthodox but
modified Sunyatsenism and his practicality can best be shown by excerpts
from a recent essay of his which states his position.[17] One notes the
stress on practicality, the Christian influence in the matter of love,
and the opinions of Communism, Fascism, and Democracy:

     In order to make a scientific study of any subject it is
     best to use the analytical, deductive and inductive methods.
     By applying this principle to the study of the _San Min Chu
     I_, I have made a chart showing its system and working
     procedure.... In order to realize his ideas, Sun invented
     the most complete and the most practical political
     principles, the _San Min Chu I_. At the present there are
     mainly three schools of political thought, namely, Democracy
     so-called, Communism, and Fascism. None of them is perfect.
     For instance, take Communism. It attaches enough importance
     to the economic side of life and resembles the Principle of
     Livelihood, but it ignores the ideas embodied in the
     Principles of Nationalism and Democracy. Furthermore, it
     considers the economic interests of only one class of
     people, and not of all. The Fascist school stresses only
     those ideas as embodied in the Principle of Nationalism and
     ignores the other two principles. Besides, it ignores the
     interests and welfare of other nationalities. So-called
     Democracy is too much involved with capitalism and can
     hardly solve the problems of _min shêng_. The Three
     Principles of Sun are different from these in that they
     originate from the idea that _the world belongs to the
     public_. His aim is to bring about the real equality of the
     people without any distinction of classes, religion, and
     occupations. After this is realized in China, it is expected
     that the equality of all nationalities in the whole world
     can be brought about by means of the spirit of mutual help
     and sincere cooperation.

     Of all the common human feelings, the sentiment of
     nationality is the most worthy one. The Principle of
     Nationalism is based on this point. Laws specifically define
     the popular responsibilities and privileges which underlie
     the Principle of Democracy. And lastly, in Livelihood, each
     man's reasoning power is used to advantage in working out
     the most rational way of distribution, whereby people will
     be put in an equitable position economically. Thus it can be
     seen that the Three Principles are very adaptable to China
     as well as to any other nation.

     As I outline above, Sun, starting with the Principle of
     _people's livelihood_ and embodying the idea that _the
     world belongs to the public_, established the _San Min Chu
     I_. But just having a Principle won't do; a motive power is
     needed to fulfill it. That power is revolution....

     Revolution is not an easy thing. It needs a very strong
     driving force to carry it out. What are the driving forces
     in the case of the Chinese revolution? They are wisdom,
     love, and courage. I wish to point out specially that the
     second factor is the most important. "Love" means, among
     other things: Save your country, even at the cost of your
     life!

     Let us define more fully the meanings of these three words.
     Wisdom means, how to understand Love. It also means: first,
     wide reading; second, care in your inquiries; third, careful
     thinking; fourth, the power of distinguishing right and
     wrong. By Love is meant loyalty, filial piety, faithfulness,
     and peace. Courage means the determination to do what is
     right. Besides, what is the most important is the need for
     persistence, without which nothing can be accomplished.

     When you have the virtues of Wisdom, Love and Courage and
     the persistence required, the next move is to start and
     work. Sun told us that it is hard to know and easy to do. If
     you study the _San Min Chu I_ carefully and yet don't do
     what is required of you, it is not because you can't do it,
     but because you won't do it. If you just won't do it, you
     are not a faithful disciple of the _San Min Chu I_.

     When you are to start the revolutionary work, you must have
     a Party, because in a Party all the revolutionary forces can
     be consolidated and all the revolutionary activities can be
     planned and directed....

  [Footnote 17: [Chiang K'ai-shek], _San-min-chu-i chih T'i-hsi nai
  ch'i-shih Hsing-ch'êng-hsü_ (The _San Min Chu I_ System and its
  Method of Application), Chungking, 1939. This booklet is part of a
  series called _Conclusions of the Party Chief_, published by the
  Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang Training Corps, Chungking,
  1939.]

The character of Chiang as a political leader which emerges from his
military training, his successful marriage and even more successful
jockeying for power, his maturity under the influence of that power, and
his somewhat crude but austere recognition of responsibility, is quite
different from the portraits drawn by the coastal diehards or by
Leftists. To the former he is just another Asiatic swashbuckler who
conceals murder and extortion behind orotund banality; to the latter he
is a sort of Franco, supinely cooperative with Anglo-American
imperialism because of his compradore-class mentality, who faces a last
chance of dialectical salvation if he yields to the Chinese Communists
in their version of democracy and promotes upper-class liquidation in
war time. It is likely that he will break the limits of either attempt
to define him, and will--if the war succeeds--play a distinctly Chinese
part in the construction of a China which, by reason of the speed of
technological progress coupled with the rising extent of governmental
economics, will break through the ruinous Right-Left pattern of Western
politics. Chiang probably has enough awareness of Chinese history to
realize that as the founder of an enduring democratic system his
prestige would exceed that obtainable by any process of dictatorship. If
he becomes a dictator, he will have successors; but as first President
of a real democracy, he would be eternally unique, and as _de facto_
founder of a great power, a world figure for this century. Against his
desire to let democracy grow beneath his military aegis, his
conservatism of habit and his anxiety to get things done right continue
to militate; but there is thirteen years' evidence to show that he has
tried very hard to work within the limits of the constitutional system
of the National Government, has avoided arbitrariness as much as he
thought possible, and has at worst behaved like a Salazar, Atatürk, or
Pilsudski.




CONCLUSION


The China of Chiang K'ai-shek has withstood the shock of foreign war,
and has demonstrated its capacity to grow and survive as a state despite
heavy domestic adversity. The constitutional structure nears a condition
of realistic operation. The political organs, while still monopolized by
the Kuomintang, are highly effective; their unrepresentative character
is mitigated by the new experiments with consultative legislation.
Administratively, both as to special functions and in developing
local government, significant new enterprises are under way.
Communist-Nationalist rivalry, while still bitter, has avoided domestic
civil war during the invasion; despite the clash of National troops with
the New Fourth Army, the postponement may be indefinitely continued.
Taken all together, Free China presents a hopeful picture; and it
therefore acquires international importance as the presumptive
predecessor of a great Asiatic democracy.

Nevertheless, the fact that a Chinese central government has emerged in
time for effective action, and has withstood invasion, does not provide
proof that Japan is doomed to fail. Japanese progress thus far in China
has depended in great part upon Japanese world commerce--on raw
materials and finance from her lucrative American trade. China's
resistance has depended, but to a lesser degree, on Western aid. In each
case, the early history of the conflict was qualified if not determined
by the character of third-party relations. If the United States, the
Soviet Union, Britain, and Germany continued for the next twenty-odd
years to do in the Far East precisely what they have been doing for the
past ten, the future might be more or less predictable on the basis of
the Far Eastern elements alone. Such a prediction is, however, wholly
unsupportable at the present time; it is indeed safe to predict the
contrary, and assume that it is impossible for the major outside powers
to continue their reciprocal power-relationships unchanged, in the Far
East or elsewhere. China's future is therefore bound up with European
and American uncertainties. The Three-Power Pact, signed at Berlin,
September 27, 1940 between Germany, Italy and Japan, and the American
Lease-Lend Bill have already begun to interlock the European and East
Asiatic wars.


THE CHIEF ALTERNATIVES IN CHINA

The Chinese domestic situation will inescapably be bound up with China's
international position. The extremes of probability can be readily
marked off: on the one hand, it is most improbable that the Chinese
resistance should collapse altogether, and leave the way open for an
almost effortless Japanese victory, through the consolidation of the
Wang regime without guerrilla, volunteer or West-China opposition; on
the other hand, an immediate and complete Chinese victory, coupled with
solution of Nationalist-Communist rivalry, is not at all in sight.
Somewhere between these two extremes there lie a number of more probable
alternatives.

Chief among these is a Kuomintang China, winning a slow victory against
Japan under the continuation of existent institutions and leadership.
Such a country--nationalist, democratic, and economically
pragmatist--would, by the fact of victory over Japan, create a nucleus
for liberal democracy in Asia.[1] A variant of this solution would be a
United Front China, wherein the independents and the Left actually
shared power with the Kuomintang under conditions of broad popular
suffrage; this would presumably lie between the United States and the
Soviet Union in the matter of ideology and foreign policy. Neither of
these would afford Japan much opportunity for continued influence on the
continent.

  [Footnote 1: This discussion includes extracts from the author's
  "China: Right, Left, or Center?", _The Quarterly Review of the
  Michigan Alumnus_, Vol. XLVI, No. 14 (Winter 1940).]

A long continuation of the present hostilities might imply the
development of a permanently divided China--permanent save in terms of
centuries--with Nationalists and Communists landbound in inner Asia, and
pro-Japanese governments along the coast. Such a violation of Chinese
cultural and economic unity would perpetuate disequilibrium, and imply
continuing wars. Differing from this in degree rather than kind would be
a reversion of China to _tuchünism_ and anarchy. Neither of these
possibilities could command acceptance from the awakened, vigorous China
of today.

Outside intervention presents a third group of alternatives: the
partition of China through a Soviet-Japanese understanding, or the
complete Sovietization of China, through the combined efforts of Soviet
and Chinese Communists. Soviet-Japanese partition, once almost
unthinkable, appears within the range of possibility because of the
apparent weakness of the Soviet Union, which calls for unconventional
remedies. If Communist dialectic insured the Soviets who shared China
with Japan an ultimate victory over Japan as well, the evil might seem
transitory to the Soviet Union. Were such a step taken to thwart rising
American influence, it might seem the lesser of two evils. Neither this
nor a Soviet China (which would swell the Communist frontier and
resources immeasurably) appeared probable in the spring of 1941.

The more practical aspects of the China-building problem still concern
the immediate, local effectiveness of the Japanese military effort to
control the growth of Chinese government.

To create a victorious condition, Japan has sought the collaboration of
phantom Japanophile governments. But in the face of the continuing
National Government, and guerrilla opposition, these governments are
incapable of functioning. When the conquerors of China entered the
cities, and took over the government, they were strangers holding mere
islands in the greatness of China.

Japan has the seven most important cities of China. She has most of the
railroads. The waters around China are closed by the Japanese fleet. But
how is Japan to occupy the hundreds of thousands of villages? How is
Japan to persuade the Chinese people, who are still overwhelmingly
country people, that they are conquered when Japan thinks that they are?

The Japanese have not yet succeeded in making much impression on the
Chinese farmers, except to anger them with cruelty and rapine. In
Manchuria, where the Japanese have had undisputed sway for ten long
years, thousands of bandits, a Chinese version of Minute Men, are still
fighting. Ten, five, even three miles from the great fortified centers
of the Japanese army in China, Chinese irregulars, peasant volunteers,
spring up in the night. In the darkness there is shooting, sudden
flames, perhaps an airplane burning or a gasoline storage tank set on
fire; when dawn comes there is nothing to be seen except the patient
quiet coolies working in their little fields.

At the present time the war has reached its quiescent stage. The
Japanese army has done what in most other cases would be called winning
a victory. The battle is accordingly a battle between the Chinese
government in the West and the Japanese in the East of China, not with
guns or ships so much as with words and with price levels--not for
strategic territory, but for the support of the Chinese masses.

The Chinese must make it possible for their own people to live
successfully and happily. But they have the world's greatest farm
problem, a problem of over-indebtedness, sharecropping, soil exhaustion,
prices and markets. Japan wanted to prevent the creation of a united
China strong enough to take Manchuria back, and to drive the Japanese
off the Asiatic continent back to Japan. Japan accordingly took the
disastrous and painful step of conquering the world's greatest relief
problem--the millions of underfed, undernourished, desperate Chinese
farmers. Now she has them.

In this light, the Far Eastern conflict takes on a different appearance
from the usual picture of China versus Japan. It is a conflict, not
merely of one nation against another but of competing governments within
the same territory. China is trying to build one way; Japan, another;
but they are both building for the same end, control of the Far East,
and on the same foundations, the Chinese people. Both Japan and the
independent Chinese government are struggling for the mastery of an area
which is in the grip of a tragic farm problem. The key to power is the
mastery of the problem, not the mastery of the men. The Chinese farmers
would welcome Communism, capitalism, or almost any kind of leadership
which could guarantee them a good livelihood in return for their long
and patient labor. The basic issues are social, technological, and
economic, as well as political and military. The Japanese failure in
China is not a failure of the economic resources; Japan could have been
a weak but adequate economic partner to China. The failure of Japan now
leads China to look elsewhere for help.


THE UNITED STATES IN CHINESE POLITICS

The American Lease-Lend Bill, designed primarily to extend effective aid
to Britain, also applied to China. The United States executive was
clearly aware of the purposes of Japan, and displayed a temper to
thwart them. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, presenting a statement in
support of the Bill to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January
15, 1941, stated:

     It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated
     from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing
     herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the
     Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their
     determination to achieve and maintain that position by force
     of arms and thus to make themselves master of an area
     containing almost one-half of the entire population of the
     world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control
     of the sea and trade routes in that region.

       *       *       *       *       *

     It should be manifest to every person that such a program
     for the subjugation and ruthless exploitation by one country
     of nearly one-half the population of the world is a matter
     of immense significance, importance and concern to every
     nation wherever located.

On March 15, the President's speech to the White House Correspondents'
Association included a ringing promise to give help to the Chinese
people, who had asked for aid through Chiang K'ai-shek. The United
States moved toward a more definite policy in Asia as well as giving
more aid to Britain in the North Atlantic area. The lease-lend program
might upset the entire balance of power in the Far East even more
readily than in Europe; but immediate evidence of such large-scale
application was not forthcoming.

In his message to President Roosevelt, March 18, 1941, Chiang K'ai-shek
said:[2]

     The people of China, whether engaged in fighting the
     aggressor or toiling in the fields and workshops in the rear
     in support of the defenders, will be immeasurably heartened
     by your impressive reaffirmation of the will of the American
     people to assist them in their struggle for freedom from
     foreign domination, and in the resumption of their march
     towards democracy and social justice for all.

  [Footnote 2: Department of State, _Bulletin_, IV, p. 335.]

Significantly, the statement of Secretary Hull may apply to future
Soviet advance in China as well as to the Japanese invasion. American
aid which would weaken Japan and strengthen the Soviet Union thereby,
would be welcome to Stalin; but American influence, carried to the point
of consolidating the National Government against the Communists, and
reducing the probabilities of rising Communist influence, would not be
welcome.

Whether the United States Government and the American people are
pro-Chinese or not, the National Government of China is pro-American.
The only influence to rival the American in modern China is that of the
Soviet Union. Soviet and American impress are found in intellectual
life, in political ideals, in standards and types of organization, and
in ethical creeds. It is no accident that the Kuomintang traces its
three principles back to Lincoln, while the Chinese Communists quote
Lenin and Stalin. The rivalry is clear, and acute. American aid to China
strengthens the pro-American party and weakens the Communists; cessation
of the Burma route traffic in the summer of 1940 stimulated discussion
of a closer Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

Generalissimo Chiang is a Christian. He is surrounded by
American-trained officials. The common secondary language of the
Nationalists is English. The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives are based
on an American background with New Zealand and British advice. The
educational system is patterned after that of the United States in great
part; the American impress on the system of higher education, in
particular, cannot be overestimated. The interests, appetites, and
orientation of the Kuomintang and the National Government are
Pacific-centered; much bitterness of an intimate, almost uncomplaining
sort, has been aroused by America's continued aid to Japan through
business channels.

Adjustments within China are bound to react to the pressures in the
outside world. If the United States abandons Free China, the Japanese
will probably not conquer China; but the Soviets will be in an excellent
position to try, for themselves or through agreement with the Japanese,
to demoralize Chinese resistance so that the Soviet forces could
intervene because of a political vacuum and protect the "racially kin
working classes," as in Poland. Whether China should go Communist
through the triumph of the Chinese Communists, or through military
occupation by the Soviet Red Army, would not matter much to the United
States. What would matter would be the loss of an incomparable ally, an
ally who today is almost embarrassingly cordial toward us, thankful to
us, and who admires our institutions and culture.

Once Japan were forced out of the picture as an aggressive power, once
the United States and China were to reach an understanding, the Soviet
Union--debarred from a warm-water naval base on the Pacific--could be
left in the _status quo_, its menace removed, to work out its own
destiny if it did not challenge renewed intervention by renewed
provocation of co-existing societies. No other challenging power could
appear on the Pacific. A group of nations from Buenos Aires to Labrador,
from Melbourne to Kashgar, from Lhasa to Boston would cover three and
one-half continents. The area thus freed from war and aggression,
encompassing the Americas and the Pacific basin, would include every
necessary article in the entire schedule of man's appetites. The
Chungking government, elementarily and crudely, has broken ground for
the culture-political American advance into Asia. Strong without us,
Free China is a great power with us, and the one place in the world
where construction, liberty, education, and hope still rise day by day.
Both cosmopolitan and national, the Chinese are ready to accept their
share of responsibility for the new world order.

The responsibility for building a democratic world, whether or not the
four authoritarian powers go down, lies in great part upon the United
States. Generalissimo Chiang, alone among leaders, has stood forth for
world government, for world freedom. He has written:[3]

"In as much as cosmopolitanism and world peace are two of the main aims
of _San Min Chu I_, China will naturally be disposed to participate in
any world federation or confederation based on the equality of nations
and for the good of mankind."

  [Footnote 3: See below, p. 371.]




APPENDIX I. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS




_A._ THE GOVERNMENT DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION[1]


  [Footnote 1: _T'ien Hsia Monthly_, v. X, No. 3 (May 1940), p.
  493-506. The transliterations have not been altered. _Yüan_ therefore
  appears as "Yuan."]

     Released April 30, 1937, this differs from the celebrated
     Double Five Draft (_q.v._ in Text) by the omission of an
     article providing that the first Kuo-min Ta-hui should
     exercise full power, and not be confined to the preparation
     of a constitution. This Draft represents the official
     viewpoint and was prepared by the Legislative _Yüan_ with
     the help and criticism of private persons; accordingly, it
     is the outstanding draft constitution.

By virtue of the mandate received from the whole body of citizens and in
accordance with the bequeathed teachings of Dr. Sun, Founder of the
Republic of China, the People's Congress of the Republic of China hereby
ordains and enacts this Constitution and causes it to be promulgated
throughout the land for faithful and perpetual observance by all.


CHAPTER I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 1. The Republic of China is a _SAN MIN CHU I_ Republic.

ARTICLE 2. The sovereignty of the Republic of China is vested in the
whole body of its citizens.

ARTICLE 3. Persons having acquired the nationality of the Republic of
China are citizens of the Republic of China.

ARTICLE 4. The territory of the Republic of China consists of areas
originally constituting Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupeh,
Hunan, Szechwan, Sikang, Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Honan, Shensi, Kansu,
Chinghai, Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, Liaoning, Kirin,
Heilungkiang, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Ningsia, Sinkiang, Mongolia and
Tibet.

The territory of the Republic of China shall not be altered except by
resolution of the People's Congress.

ARTICLE 5. All races of the Republic of China are component parts of the
Chinese Nation and shall be equal.

ARTICLE 6. The National Flag of the Republic of China shall have a red
background with a blue sky and white sun in the upper left corner.

ARTICLE 7. The National Capital of the Republic of China shall be at
Nanking.


CHAPTER II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE CITIZENS

ARTICLE 8. All citizens of the Republic of China shall be equal before
the law.

ARTICLE 9. Every citizen shall enjoy the liberty of the person. Except
in accordance with law, no one may be arrested, detained, tried or
punished.

When a citizen is arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed
a criminal act, the authority responsible for such action shall
immediately inform the citizen himself and his relatives of the cause
for his arrest or detention and shall, within a period of twenty-four
hours, send him to a competent court for trial. The citizen so arrested
or detained, or any one else, may also petition the court to demand from
the authority responsible for such action the surrender, within
twenty-four hours, of his person to the court for trial.

The court shall not reject such a petition; nor shall the responsible
authority refuse to execute such a writ as mentioned in the preceding
paragraph.

ARTICLE 10. With the exception of those in active military service, no
one may be subject to military jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 11. Every citizen shall have the freedom of domicile; no private
abode may be forcibly entered, searched or sealed except in accordance
with law.

ARTICLE 12. Every citizen shall have the freedom to change his
residence; such freedom shall not be restricted except in accordance
with law.

ARTICLE 13. Every citizen shall have the freedom of speech, writing and
publication; such freedom shall not be restricted except in accordance
with law.

ARTICLE 14. Every citizen shall have the freedom of secrecy of
correspondence; such freedom shall not be restricted except in
accordance with law.

ARTICLE 15. Every citizen shall have the freedom of religious belief;
such freedom shall not be restricted except in accordance with law.

ARTICLE 16. Every citizen shall have the freedom of assembly and of
forming associations; such freedom shall not be restricted except in
accordance with law.

ARTICLE 17. No private property shall be requisitioned, expropriated,
sealed or confiscated except in accordance with law.

ARTICLE 18. Every citizen shall have the right to present petitions,
lodge complaints and institute legal proceedings in accordance with law.

ARTICLE 19. Every citizen shall have the right to exercise, in
accordance with law, the powers of election, recall, initiative and
referendum.

ARTICLE 20. Every citizen shall have the right to compete, in accordance
with law, in state examinations.

ARTICLE 21. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, be amenable to
the duty of paying taxes.

ARTICLE 22. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, be amenable to
the duty of performing military service.

ARTICLE 23. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, be amenable to
the duty of rendering public service.

ARTICLE 24. All other liberties and rights of the citizens which are not
detrimental to public peace and order or public welfare shall be
guaranteed by the Constitution.

ARTICLE 25. Only laws imperative for safeguarding national security,
averting a national crisis, maintaining public peace and order or
promoting public interest may restrict the citizens' liberties and
rights.

ARTICLE 26. Any public functionary who illegally infringes upon any
private liberty or right, shall, besides being subject to disciplinary
punishment, be responsible under criminal and civil law. The injured
person may also, in accordance with law, claim indemnity from the State
for damages sustained.


CHAPTER III. THE PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

ARTICLE 27. The People's Congress shall be constituted of delegates
elected as follows:

     1. Each district, municipality or area of an equivalent
     status shall elect one delegate, but in case its population
     exceeds 300,000, one additional delegate shall be elected
     for every additional 500,000 people. The status of areas to
     be equivalent to a district or municipality shall be defined
     by law.

     2. The number of delegates to be elected from Mongolia and
     Tibet shall be determined by law.

     3. The number of delegates to be elected by Chinese citizens
     residing abroad shall be determined by law.

ARTICLE 28. Delegates to the People's Congress shall be elected by
universal, equal, and direct suffrage and by secret ballots.

ARTICLE 29. Citizens of the Republic of China having attained the age of
twenty years shall, in accordance with law, have the right to elect
delegates. Citizens having attained the age of twenty-five years shall,
in accordance with law, have the right to be elected delegates.

ARTICLE 30. The term of office of Delegates of the People's Congress
shall be six years.

When a Delegate is found guilty of violation of a law or neglect of his
duty, his constituency shall recall him in accordance with law.

ARTICLE 31. The People's Congress shall be convened by the President
once every three years. Its session shall last one month, but may be
extended another month when necessary.

Extraordinary sessions of the People's Congress may be convened at the
instance of two-fifths or more of its members.

The President may convene extraordinary sessions of the People's
Congress.

The People's Congress shall meet at the place where the Central
Government is.

ARTICLE 32. The powers and functions of the People's Congress shall be
as follows:

     1. To elect the President and Vice-President of the
     Republic, the President of the Legislative Yuan, the
     President of the Censor Yuan, the Members of the Legislative
     Yuan and the Members of the Censor Yuan.

     2. To recall the President and Vice-President of the
     Republic, the President of the Legislative Yuan, the
     President of the Judicial Yuan, the President of the
     Examination Yuan, the President of the Censor Yuan, the
     Members of the Legislative Yuan and the Members of the
     Censor Yuan.

     3. To initiate laws.

     4. To hold referenda on laws.

     5. To amend the Constitution.

     6. To exercise such other powers as are conferred by the
     Constitution.

ARTICLE 33. Delegates to the People's Congress shall not be held
responsible outside of Congress for opinions they may express and votes
they may cast during the session of Congress.

ARTICLE 34. Without the permission of the People's Congress, no delegate
shall be arrested or detained during the session except when apprehended
in _flagrante delicto_.

ARTICLE 35. The organization of the People's Congress and the election
as well as recall of its Delegates shall be determined by law.


CHAPTER IV. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT


Section 1. _The President_

ARTICLE 36. The President is the Head of the State and represents the
Republic of China in foreign relations.

ARTICLE 37. The President commands the land, sea and air forces of the
whole country.

ARTICLE 38. The President shall, in accordance with law, promulgate laws
and issue orders with the counter-signature of the President of the Yuan
concerned.

ARTICLE 39. The President shall, in accordance with law, exercise the
power of declaring war, negotiating peace and concluding treaties.

ARTICLE 40. The President shall, in accordance with law, declare and
terminate a state of emergency.

ARTICLE 41. The President shall, in accordance with law, exercise the
power of granting amnesties, special pardons, remission of sentences and
restoration of civil rights.

ARTICLE 42. The President shall, in accordance with law, appoint and
remove civil and military officials.

ARTICLE 43. The President shall, in accordance with law, confer honors
and award decorations.

ARTICLE 44. In case the State is confronted with an emergency, or the
economic life of the State meets with a grave danger, which calls for
immediate action, the President, following the resolution of the
Executive Meeting, may issue orders of emergency and do whatever is
necessary to cope with the situation, provided that he shall submit his
action to the ratification of the Legislative Yuan within three months
after the issuance of the orders.

ARTICLE 45. The President may call meetings of the Presidents of the
five Yuan to confer on matters relating to two or more Yuan, or on such
matters as the President may bring out for consultation.

ARTICLE 46. The President shall be responsible to the People's Congress.


ARTICLE 47. Citizens of the Republic of China, having attained the age
of forty years, may be elected President or Vice-President of the
Republic.

ARTICLE 48. The election of the President and Vice-President shall be
provided for by law.

ARTICLE 49. The President and Vice-President shall hold office for a
term of six years and may be re-elected for a second term.

ARTICLE 50. The President shall, on the day of his inauguration, take
the following oath:

"I do solemnly and sincerely swear before the people that I will observe
the Constitution, faithfully perform my duties, promote the welfare of
the People, safeguard the security of the State and be loyal to the
trust of the people. Should I break my oath, I will submit myself to the
most severe punishment the law may provide."

ARTICLE 51. When the Presidency is vacant, the Vice-President shall
succeed to the office.

When the President is for some reason unable to attend to his duties,
the Vice-President shall act for him. If both the President and the
Vice-President are incapacitated, the President of the Executive Yuan
shall discharge the duties of the President's office.

ARTICLE 52. The President shall retire from office on the day his term
expires. If by that time a new President has not been inducted into
office, the President of the Executive Yuan shall discharge the duties
of the President's office.

ARTICLE 53. The period for the President of the Executive Yuan to
discharge the duties of the President's office shall not exceed six
months.

ARTICLE 54. Except in case of an offense against the internal or
external security of the State, the President shall not be liable to
criminal prosecution until he has been recalled or has retired from
office.


Section 2. _The Executive Yuan_

ARTICLE 55. The Executive Yuan is the highest organ through which the
Central Government exercises its executive powers.

ARTICLE 56. In the Executive Yuan, there shall be a President, a
Vice-President and a number of Executive Members, to be appointed and
removed by the President.

The Executive Members mentioned in the preceding paragraph who do not
take charge of Ministries or Commissions shall not exceed half of those
who are in charge of Ministries or Commissions as provided in the first
paragraph of ARTICLE 58.

ARTICLE 57. In the Executive Yuan, there shall be various Ministries and
Commissions which shall separately exercise their respective executive
powers.

ARTICLE 58. The Ministers of the various Ministries and the Chairmen of
the various Commissions shall be appointed by the President from among
the Executive Members.

The President and the Vice-President of the Executive Yuan may act
concurrently as Minister or Chairman mentioned in the preceding
paragraph.

ARTICLE 59. The President of the Executive Yuan, the Executive Members,
the Ministers of the various Ministries and the Chairmen of the various
Commissions shall be individually responsible to the President.

ARTICLE 60. In the Executive Yuan there shall be Executive Meetings
composed of the President, the President of the Executive Yuan and the
Executive Members to be presided over by the President. In case the
President is unable to be present, the President of the Executive Yuan
shall preside.

ARTICLE 61. The following matters shall be decided at an Executive
Meeting:

     1. Statutory and budgetary bills to be submitted to the
     Legislative Yuan.

     2. Bills concerning a state of emergency and special pardons
     to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan.

     3. Bills concerning declaration of war, negotiation of
     peace, conclusion of treaties and other important
     international affairs to be submitted to the Legislative
     Yuan.

     4. Matters of common concern to the various Ministries and
     Commissions.

     5. Matters submitted by the President.

     6. Matters submitted by the President of the Executive Yuan,
     the Executive Members, the various Ministries and
     Commissions.

ARTICLE 62. The organization of the Executive Yuan shall be determined
by law.


Section 3. _The Legislative Yuan_

ARTICLE 63. The Legislative Yuan is the highest organ through which the
Central Government exercises its legislative powers. It shall be
responsible to the People's Congress.

ARTICLE 64. The Legislative Yuan shall have the power to decide on
measures concerning legislation, budgets, a state of emergency, special
pardons, declaration of war, negotiation of peace, conclusion of
treaties and other important international affairs.

ARTICLE 65. In the discharge of its duties the Legislative Yuan may
interrogate the various Yuan, Ministries and Commissions.

ARTICLE 66. In the Legislative Yuan, there shall be a President who
shall hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible for
re-election.

ARTICLE 67. In regard to the election of Members of the Legislative
Yuan, the Delegates of the various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet and of
citizens residing abroad, to the People's Congress shall separately hold
a preliminary election to nominate their respective candidates and
submit a list of their names to the Congress for election. The
candidates are not confined to the Delegates to the People's Congress.
The respective number of candidates shall be proportioned as follows:

     1. A province with a population of less than 5,000,000 shall
     nominate four candidates. A province with a population of
     more than 5,000,000 but less than 10,000,000 shall nominate
     six candidates. A province with a population of more than
     10,000,000 but less than 15,000,000 shall nominate eight
     candidates. A province with a population of more than
     15,000,000 but less than 20,000,000 shall nominate ten
     candidates. A province with a population of more than
     20,000,000 but less than 25,000,000 shall nominate twelve
     candidates. A province with a population of more than
     25,000,000 but less than 30,000,000 shall nominate fourteen
     candidates. A province with a population of more than
     30,000,000 shall nominate sixteen candidates.

     2. Mongolia and Tibet shall each nominate eight candidates.

     3. Citizens residing abroad shall nominate eight candidates.

ARTICLE 68. Members of the Legislative Yuan shall hold office for a term
of three years and may be eligible for re-election.

ARTICLE 69. The Executive Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan, and
Censor Yuan may submit to the Legislative Yuan measures concerning
matters within their respective jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 70. The President may, before the promulgation or execution of a
legislative measure, request the Legislative Yuan to reconsider it.

If the Legislative Yuan, with regard to the request for consideration,
should decide to maintain the original measure by a two-thirds vote of
the Members present, the President shall promulgate or execute it
without delay; provided that in case of a bill of law or a treaty, the
President may submit it to the People's Congress for a referendum.

ARTICLE 71. The President shall promulgate a measure presented by the
Legislative Yuan for promulgation within thirty days after its receipt.

ARTICLE 72. Members of the Legislative Yuan shall not be held
responsible outside of the said Yuan for opinions they may express and
votes they may cast during its session.

ARTICLE 73. Without the permission of the Legislative Yuan, no member
may be arrested or detained except when apprehended in _flagrante
delicto_.

ARTICLE 74. No Member of the Legislative Yuan may concurrently hold any
other public office or engage in any business or profession.

ARTICLE 75. The election of Members of the Legislative Yuan and the
organization of the Legislative Yuan shall be determined by law.


Section 4. _The Judicial Yuan_

ARTICLE 76. The Judicial Yuan is the highest organ through which the
Central Government exercises its judicial powers. It shall attend to the
adjudication of civil, criminal and administrative suits, the discipline
and punishment of public functionaries and judicial administration.

ARTICLE 77. In the Judicial Yuan, there shall be a President who shall
hold office for a term of three years. He shall be appointed by the
President.

The President of the Judicial Yuan shall be responsible to the People's
Congress.

ARTICLE 78. Matters concerning special pardons, remission of sentence
and restoration of civil rights shall be submitted to the President for
action by the President of the Judicial Yuan in accordance with law.

ARTICLE 79. The Judicial Yuan shall have the power to unify the
interpretation of statutes and ordinances.

ARTICLE 80. Judicial officials shall, in accordance with law, have
perfect independence in the conduct of trials.

ARTICLE 81. No judicial official may be removed from office unless he
has been subject to criminal or disciplinary punishment or declared an
interdicted person; nor may a judicial official be suspended or
transferred, or have his salary reduced except in accordance with law.

ARTICLE 82. The organization of the Judicial Yuan and the various Courts
of Justice shall be determined by law.


Section 5. _The Examination Yuan_

ARTICLE 83. The Examination Yuan is the highest organ through which the
Central Government exercises its examination powers. It shall attend to
the selection of civil service candidates by examination and to the
registration of persons qualified for public service.

ARTICLE 84. In the Examination Yuan there shall be a President who shall
hold office for a term of three years, to be appointed by the President.

The President of the Examination Yuan shall be responsible to the
People's Congress.

ARTICLE 85. The Examination Yuan shall, in accordance with law, by
examination and registration determine the following qualifications:

     1. For appointment as a public functionary.

     2. For candidacy to public office.

     3. For practice in specialized professions and as technical
     experts.

ARTICLE 86. The organization of the Examination Yuan shall be determined
by law.


Section 6. _The Censor Yuan_

ARTICLE 87. The Censor Yuan is the highest organ through which the
Central Government exercises its censorial powers. It shall attend to
impeachment and auditing and be responsible to the People's Congress.

ARTICLE 88. In the discharge of its censorial powers, the Censor Yuan
may, in accordance with law, interrogate the various Yuan, Ministries
and Commissions.

ARTICLE 89. In the Censor Yuan, there shall be a President who shall
hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible for
re-election.

ARTICLE 90. Members of the Censor Yuan shall be elected by the People's
Congress, from candidates separately nominated by the Delegates of the
various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet and Chinese citizens residing
abroad. Each group of Delegates shall nominate two candidates. The
candidates are not confined to Delegates to the Congress.

ARTICLE 91. Members of the Censor Yuan shall hold office for a term of
four years and may be eligible for re-election.

ARTICLE 92. When the Censor Yuan finds a public functionary in the
Central or local government guilty of violation of a law or neglect of
his duty, an impeachment may be instituted upon the proposal of one or
more Members and the indorsement, after due investigation, of five or
more Members. Impeachment against the President or Vice-President, the
President of the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan,
Examination Yuan or Censor Yuan may be instituted only upon the proposal
of ten or more Members and the indorsement, after due investigation, of
one-half or more Members of the entire Yuan.

ARTICLE 93. When an impeachment is instituted against the President or
Vice-President or the President of the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan,
Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan or Censor Yuan in accordance with the
preceding Article, it shall be brought before the People's Congress.
During the adjournment of the People's Congress, the Delegates shall be
requested to convene in accordance with law an extraordinary session to
decide whether the impeached shall be removed from office.

ARTICLE 94. Members of the Censor Yuan shall not be held responsible
outside of the said Yuan for opinions they may express and votes they
may cast while discharging their duties.

ARTICLE 95. Without the permission of the Censor Yuan, no Member of the
Censor Yuan may be arrested or detained except when apprehended in
_flagrante delicto_.

ARTICLE 96. No Member of the Censor Yuan may concurrently hold any other
public office or engage in any business or profession.

ARTICLE 97. The election of the Members of the Censor Yuan and the
organization of the Censor Yuan shall be determined by law.


CHAPTER V. THE LOCAL INSTITUTIONS


Section 1. _The Provinces_

ARTICLE 98. In the Province, there shall be a Provincial Government
which shall execute the laws and orders of the Central Government and
supervise local self-government.

ARTICLE 99. In the Provincial Government there shall be a Governor who
shall hold office for a term of three years. He shall be appointed and
removed by the Central Government.

ARTICLE 100. In the province, there shall be a Provincial Assembly which
shall be composed of one member from each district or municipality to be
elected by the district or municipal council. Members of the Provincial
Assembly shall hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible
for re-election.

ARTICLE 101. The organization of the Provincial Government and the
Provincial Assembly as well as the election and recall of the Members of
the Provincial Assembly shall be determined by law.

ARTICLE 102. The government of areas not yet established as provinces
shall be determined by law.


Section 2. _The Districts_

ARTICLE 103. The district [_hsien_] is a unit of local self-government.

ARTICLE 104. All matters that are local in nature are within the scope
of local self-government.

The scope of local self-government shall be determined by law.

ARTICLE 105. Citizens of the district shall, in accordance with law,
exercise the powers of initiative and referendum in matters concerning
district self-government as well as the powers of election and recall of
the District Magistrate and other elective officials in the service of
district self-government.

ARTICLE 106. In the district, there shall be a District Council, the
members of which shall be directly elected by the citizens in the
District General Meeting. Members of the District Council shall hold
office for a term of three years and may be eligible for re-election.

ARTICLE 107. District ordinances and regulations which are in conflict
with the laws and ordinances of the Central or Provincial Government
shall be null and void.

ARTICLE 108. In the district, there shall be a District Government with
a District Magistrate who shall be elected by the citizens in the
District General Meeting. The Magistrate shall hold office for a term
of three years and may be eligible for re-election.

Only those persons found qualified in the public examinations held by
the Central Government or adjudged qualified by the Ministry of Public
Service Registration may be candidates for the office of District
Magistrate.

ARTICLE 109. The District Magistrate shall administer the affairs of the
district in accordance with the principles of self-government and, under
the direction of the Provincial Governor, execute matters assigned by
the Central and Provincial Governments.

ARTICLE 110. The organization of the District Council and District
Government as well as the election and recall of the District Magistrate
and the Members of the District Council shall be determined by law.


Section 3. _The Municipalities_

ARTICLE 111. Unless otherwise provided by law, the provisions governing
self-government and administration of the district shall apply _mutatis
mutandis_ to the municipality [_shih_].

ARTICLE 112. In the municipality, there shall be a Municipal Council,
the Members of which shall be directly elected by the citizens in the
Municipal General Meeting. One-third of the Members shall retire and be
replaced by election annually.

ARTICLE 113. In the municipality, there shall be a Municipal Government
with a Mayor to be directly elected by the citizens in the Municipal
General Meeting. He shall hold office for a term of three years and may
be eligible for re-election.

Only those persons found qualified in the public examinations held by
the Central Government or adjudged qualified by the Ministry of Public
Service Registration may be a candidate for the office of Mayor.

ARTICLE 114. The Mayor shall administer the affairs of the municipality
in accordance with the principles of municipal self-government and,
under direction of the competent supervising authority, execute matters
assigned by the Central or Provincial Government.

ARTICLE 115. The organization of the Municipal Council and Municipal
Government as well as the election and recall of the Members of the
Municipal Council and the Mayor shall be determined by law.


CHAPTER VI. NATIONAL ECONOMIC LIFE

ARTICLE 116. The economic system of the Republic of China shall be based
upon the Min Shêng Chu I (Principle of Livelihood) and shall aim at
national economic sufficiency and equality.

ARTICLE 117. The land within the territorial limits of the Republic of
China belongs to the people as a whole. Any part thereof the ownership
of which has been lawfully acquired by an individual or individuals
shall be protected by, and subject to, the restrictions of law.

The State may, in accordance with law, tax or expropriate private land
on the basis of the value declared by the owner or assessed by the
Government.

Every landowner is amenable to the duty of utilizing his land to the
fullest extent.

ARTICLE 118. All subterranean minerals and natural forces which are
economically utilizable for public benefit, belong to the State and
shall not be affected by private ownership of the land.

ARTICLE 119. The unearned increment shall be taxed by means of a
land-value-increment tax and devoted to public benefit.

ARTICLE 120. In readjusting the distribution of land, the State shall be
guided by the principle of aiding and protecting the land-owning farmers
and the land-utilizing owners.

ARTICLE 121. The State may, in accordance with law, regulate private
wealth and enterprises when such wealth and enterprises are considered
detrimental to the balanced development of national economic life.

ARTICLE 122. The State shall encourage, guide and protect the citizens'
productive enterprises and the nation's foreign trade.

ARTICLE 123. All public utilities and enterprises of a monopolistic
nature shall be operated by the State; except in case of necessity when
the State may specially permit private operation.

The private enterprises mentioned in the preceding paragraph may, in
case of emergency for national defense, be temporarily managed by the
State. The State may also, in accordance with law, take them over for
permanent operation upon payment of due compensation.

ARTICLE 124. In order to improve the workers' living conditions,
increase their productive ability and relieve unemployment, the State
shall enforce labor protective policies.

Women and children shall be afforded special protection in accordance
with their age and physical condition.

ARTICLE 125. Labor and capital shall, in accordance with the principles
of mutual help and cooperation, develop together productive enterprises.

ARTICLE 126. In order to promote agricultural development and the
welfare of the farming population, the State shall improve rural
economic and living conditions and increase farming efficiency by
employment of scientific farming.

The State may regulate the production and distribution of agricultural
products, in kind and quantity.

ARTICLE 127. The State shall accord due relief or compensation to those
who suffer disability or loss of life in the performance of military or
public services.

ARTICLE 128. The State shall give suitable relief to the aged, feeble,
or disabled who are incapable of earning a living.

ARTICLE 129. While the following powers appertain to the Legislative
Yuan in the case of the Central Government, they may be exercised by the
legally designated organ if, in accordance with law, such matters may be
effected independently by a province, district or municipality:

     1. To impose or alter the rate of taxes and levies, fines,
     penalties, or other imposts of a compulsory nature.

     2. To raise public loans, dispose of public property or
     conclude contracts which increase the burden of the public
     treasury.

     3. To establish or cancel public enterprises, monopolies,
     franchises or any other profit-making enterprise.

     4. To grant or cancel public enterprises, monopolies,
     franchises or any other special privileges.

Unless specially authorized by law, the government of a province,
district or municipality shall not raise foreign loans or directly
utilize foreign capital.

ARTICLE 130. Within the territorial limits of the Republic of China all
goods shall be permitted to circulate freely. They shall not be seized
or detained except in accordance with law.

Customs duty is a Central Government revenue. It shall be collected only
once when the goods enter or leave the country.

The various grades of government shall not collect any dues on goods in
transit within the country, with the exception of tolls levied for the
purpose of improving the waterways and roads, on vessels and vehicles
making use of them.

The right to impose taxes and levies on goods belongs to the Central
Government and shall not be exercised except in accordance with law.


CHAPTER VII. EDUCATION

ARTICLE 131. The educational aim of the Republic of China shall be to
develop a national spirit, to cultivate a national morality, to train
the people for self-government and to increase their ability to earn a
livelihood, and thereby to build up a sound and healthy body of
citizens.

ARTICLE 132. Every citizen of the Republic of China shall have an equal
opportunity to receive education.

ARTICLE 133. All public and private educational institutions in the
country shall be subject to State supervision and amenable to the duty
of carrying out the educational policies formulated by the State.

ARTICLE 134. Children between six and twelve years of age are of school
age and shall receive elementary education free of tuition. Detailed
provisions shall be provided by law.

ARTICLE 135. All persons over school age who have not received an
elementary education shall receive supplementary education free of
tuition. Detailed provisions shall be provided by law.

ARTICLE 136. In establishing universities and technical schools, the
State shall give special consideration to the needs of the respective
localities so as to afford the people thereof an equal opportunity to
receive higher education, thereby hastening a balanced national cultural
development.

ARTICLE 137. Educational appropriations shall constitute no less than
fifteen per cent of the total amount of the budget of the Central
Government and no less than thirty per cent of the total amount of the
provincial, district and municipal budgets respectively. Educational
endowment funds independently set aside in accordance with law shall be
safeguarded.

Educational expenditures in needy provinces shall be subsidized by the
central treasury.

ARTICLE 138. The State shall encourage and subsidize the following
enterprises or citizens:

     1. Private educational institutions with a high record of
     achievement.

     2. Education for Chinese citizens residing abroad.

     3. Discoverers or inventors in academic or technical fields.

     4. Teachers or administrative officers of educational
     institutions having good records and long service.

     5. Students of high records and good character who are
     unable to pursue further studies.


CHAPTER VIII. THE ENFORCEMENT AND AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE 139. The term "law" as used in the Constitution means that which
has been passed by the Legislative Yuan and promulgated by the
President.

ARTICLE 140. Laws in conflict with the Constitution are null and void.

The question whether a law is in conflict with the Constitution shall be
settled by the Censor Yuan submitting the point to the Judicial Yuan for
interpretation within six months after its enforcement.

ARTICLE 141. Administrative orders in conflict with the Constitution or
laws are null and void.

ARTICLE 142. The interpretation of the Constitution shall be done by the
Judicial Yuan.

ARTICLE 143. Before half or more of the provinces and territories have
completed the work of local self-government, the Members of the
Legislative Yuan and of the Censor Yuan shall be elected and appointed
in accordance with the following provisions:

     1. The Members of the Legislative Yuan: The Delegates of the
     various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet, and of the citizens
     residing abroad, to the People's Congress shall separately
     hold a preliminary election to nominate half of the number
     of the candidates as determined in Article 67 and submit
     their list to the People's Congress for election. The other
     half shall be nominated by the President of the Legislative
     Yuan for appointment by the President.

     2. The Members of the Censor Yuan: The Delegates of the
     various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet, and of the citizens
     residing abroad, to the People's Congress shall separately
     hold a preliminary election to nominate half of the number
     of candidates as determined in Article 90 and submit their
     list to the People's Congress for election. The other half
     shall be nominated by the President of the Censor Yuan for
     appointment by the President.

ARTICLE 144. The Magistrates of districts where the work of
self-government is not yet completed shall be appointed and removed by
the Central Government.

The preceding paragraph is applicable _mutatis mutandis_ to those
municipalities where the work of self-government is not yet completed.

ARTICLE 145. The methods and procedure of helping the establishment of
local self-government shall be determined by law.

ARTICLE 146. No amendment to the Constitution may be made unless it
shall have been proposed by over one-fourth of the delegates to the
People's Congress and passed by at least two-thirds of the delegates
present at a meeting having a quorum of over three-fourths of the entire
Congress.

A proposed amendment to the Constitution shall be made public by the
proposer or proposers one year before the assembling of the People's
Congress.

ARTICLE 147. In regard to those provisions of the Constitution which
require further procedure for their enforcement, such necessary
procedure shall be determined by law.




_B._ THE SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS[1]


  [Footnote 1: "Kuo-min Ta-hui Tsu-chih Fa" in Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan
  Pu (Party-Ministry of Publicity), _Hsien-chêng Chien-shê Fa-kuei_,
  Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 35-8.]

     The following laws were passed by the Legislative _Yüan_
     April 31, XXVI (1937), in amended form, after the election
     had been postponed.

ARTICLE 1. The National Congress shall frame the Constitution, and shall
determine its date of execution.

ARTICLE 2. _i._ The National Congress shall be organized by the
                Representatives of the people to the Congress.
          _ii._ The manner of electing these Representatives is fixed
                in another set of laws.

ARTICLE 3. Members and reserve members of the Central Executive
Committee of the Kuomintang, and of the Central Supervisory Committee of
the Kuomintang shall be Representatives to the Congress without
election; members of the National Government and its officials may
attend the Congress.

ARTICLE 4. The date of convening the Congress is to be fixed by the
National Government.

ARTICLE 5. The Congress shall convene in the locality occupied by the
National Government.

ARTICLE 6. Representatives to the Congress shall take an oath of
allegiance during the opening ceremonies of the Congress, to wit:
"I,------, do hereby promise with absolute sincerity that as a
representative of the Chinese people, I shall receive the instructions
of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Republic, and that I shall execute
my official power only according to law, and shall obey the discipline
of the National Congress."

After taking the oath, the Representatives should thereto sign their
names.

ARTICLE 7. Thirty-one members shall be elected from among the
Representatives themselves to form the Presidium of the Congress. Their
duties shall be:

    _i._ To fix the manner of discussing motions and to regulate
         the progress of the discussion.
   _ii._ To discharge executive affairs of the Congress.
  _iii._ To perform other duties fixed in this code of laws.

ARTICLE 8. During a meeting of the Congress, the Presidium shall elect
the Chairman of the Meeting.

ARTICLE 9. The National Congress shall form special committees to
examine the qualifications of the Representatives, to examine motions
and proposals and for other matters. These committees shall be organized
upon the request of the Presidium and passed by the Meeting.

ARTICLE 10. The period of a session of the Congress is 10 to 20 days; it
may be extended whenever necessary.

ARTICLE 11. The duties of the National Congress are fully discharged
when its Meeting closes.

ARTICLE 12. A quorum shall consist of at least half of the total number
of members. Motion can be passed when more than half of the members
present vote for it.

In adopting the Constitution, at least two-thirds of the total number of
the members shall be present, and adoption shall require a majority
greater than two-thirds of the members present.

ARTICLE 13. The Congress may adopt any of the following methods to put a
motion to vote: raising the hands, standing up, or balloting. In case of
a tie, the Chairman may cast the deciding vote.

ARTICLE 14. The National Congress shall have a Secretariat and an
organization of police guards. Their organization and duties shall be
decided by the Presidium.

ARTICLE 15. The National Congress shall have a Secretary General,
appointed by the Presidium, and discharging the affairs of the entire
Congress.

ARTICLE 16. The Representatives shall not assume any responsibility
towards the general public for any opinion expressed by them during the
session of the Congress.

ARTICLE 17. Except by approval of the Congress, no Representative of the
Congress may be detained or arrested when the Congress is in session.

ARTICLE 18. During the session, a Representative who does not abide by
the rules of the Congress may be warned by the Chairman, or may forfeit
his privilege to speak. Adequate punishment shall be imposed upon any
who may commit serious offenses.

ARTICLE 19. The above mentioned punishment will be decided by the
Congress, upon the examination of the Punishment Committee (formed by
the Representatives to the Congress).

ARTICLE 20. The date of adoption of this code of laws is to be fixed in
an order from the Central Government.




_C._ ACT OF THE LEGISLATIVE _YÜAN_, APRIL 31, XXVI (1937) GOVERNING THE
ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS[1]


  [Footnote 1: "Kuo-min Ta-hui Tai-piao Hsüan-chü Fa" in Chung-yang
  Hsüan-ch'uan Pu (Party-Ministry of Publicity) _Hsien-chêng Chien-shê
  Fa-kuei_, Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 38-49.]

     [Note particularly the world-wide electoral areas.]


CHAPTER I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

ARTICLE 1. These laws are formulated in conjunction with what is
provided in Section _ii_ of Article 2 in the Law concerning the System
of Organization of the National Congress.

ARTICLE 2. Besides the Representatives to the National Congress without
election, there shall also be provided:

    _i._ 665 Representatives elected through district election.
   _ii._ 380 Representatives elected through professional election.
  _iii._ 155 Representatives elected through special election.
   _iv._ 240 Representatives appointed by the National Government.

ARTICLE 3. All citizens of China above 20 years of age have the
privilege of voting for Representatives to Congress, upon taking the
oath of citizenship.

ARTICLE 4. The following persons have no privilege of voting:

    _i._ Rebels against the National Government, proven or under arrest.
   _ii._ Corrupt officials, proven or under arrest.
  _iii._ Those whose citizenship privileges have been forfeited due to
         crimes, etc.
   _iv._ Those who are insolvent.
    _v._ Those afflicted with mental diseases.
   _vi._ Those smoking opium or substitutes therefor.

ARTICLE 5. Each voter may have not more than two choices.

Those who may both elect in the district and the professional elections
should participate in the professional election. Those who may both
elect in the professional election and the special election should elect
in the special election. In professional election, an elector eligible
in more than two professions should vote only in one of them at his
choice.

ARTICLE 6. The Representatives to the National Congress are elected by
balloting which does not require signature, and by single entry. The
names of candidates for Representative should be printed on the ballot,
and the electors are to choose one man out of them.

ARTICLE 7. Candidates for Representative who receive a majority vote are
elected as Representatives. In case of tie, the candidates shall draw
lots to decide who is the elected Representative.

ARTICLE 8. After the full number of Representatives has been obtained,
those candidates who obtain some votes [but less than a majority] will
be reserve Representatives. Their rank will be based upon the number of
votes. In number the reserve Representatives shall correspond to the
elected Representatives.


CHAPTER II. DISTRICT ELECTION

ARTICLE 9. All provinces and cities directly under the Executive Yüan
shall elect a number of Representatives corresponding to the attached
List No. 1, and according to the laws governing District Elections.

ARTICLE 10. The Representatives from various provinces are elected in
various districts. The division of districts and the number of
Representatives elected in every district are fixed in the attached List
No. 2.

ARTICLE 11. The Heads of the _hsiang_ [suburb of a city] and of the
_chên_ [a village market] of each _hsien_ in the electorate should
nominate candidates. The number should be ten times that of the number
of Representatives to be elected. If there is a _shih_ within the
electorate, the Head of the _fang_ [a group of houses in a _shih_]
should also participate in the nomination. If there is no Head of the
_hsiang_ or _chên_ in a _hsien_, then the corresponding officials of the
_hsiang_, _chên_, or _hsien_ shall nominate.

ARTICLE 12. Candidates for Representative should have the following
qualifications:

    _i._ Possess the qualifications of an elector of the Representatives
         and have taken the citizenship oath in an electorate other than
         this one.
   _ii._ Be above twenty-five years of age.
  _iii._ Be a resident of the respective electoral district.

ARTICLE 13. Representatives to the National Congress in each district
are elected in the manner prescribed in Article 6.

ARTICLE 14. The Special Municipalities directly under the Executive Yüan
should elect their Representatives according to Articles 11-13 and
Article 15.


CHAPTER III. PROFESSIONAL ELECTION

ARTICLE 15. The various professional organs in provinces or Special
Municipalities should elect a number of Representatives according to the
attached List No. 3.

ARTICLE 16. Organs of the liberal professions shall elect
Representatives not according to localities or districts. Their numbers
are fixed in attached List No. 4.

ARTICLE 17. The professional organs participating in the election are
limited to those who were legally recognized before the adoption of this
code of laws.

ARTICLE 18. The officers of the various professional organs shall
nominate Representatives for those particular professions. Their number
should be three times the number of Representatives to be elected. The
officers mentioned above are limited to those who have executive power
in that particular professional organ.

ARTICLE 19. Nominated Representatives for professional election should
have the following qualifications:

    _i._ Possess the privileges of an elector.
   _ii._ Be above twenty-five years of age.
  _iii._ Have been practicing in that profession for three years or
         more.
   _iv._ Be a member of that professional organization.

The period of practicing that profession may be the sum of intermittent
periods of practice.

ARTICLE 20. The Representatives of professional organs should be elected
by legally recognized electors according to Article 6.

ARTICLE 21. If there are several sub-organs to a professional
organization, the nomination of Representatives should be made by the
officials of the lowest sub-organ, and elected by the members of the
lowest sub-organ.

If the members of the professional organization form groups, then the
election of Representatives should be done by the individual members of
those groups.

ARTICLE 22. In Special Municipalities directly under the Executive Yüan,
the nomination and election of Representatives from professional
organizations should be in accordance with Article 24.

ARTICLE 23. For organs of the liberal professions, their manner of
nominating and electing is the same as for professional organizations.


CHAPTER IV. SPECIAL ELECTIONS


Section 1. _Elections in the Provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang
and Jehol_

ARTICLE 24. No distinction concerning district or profession is made in
the election of Representatives in these four provinces. Their numbers
are:

    _i._ For Liaoning      14
   _ii._ For Kirin         13
  _iii._ For Heilungkiang   9
   _iv._ For Jehol          9

Two of the Representatives from Kirin are elected in the Special Eastern
District of that Province.

[Provision is made for the use of polls in exile and for absentee
ballots.]


Section 2. _Elections in Mongolia and Tibet_

[This follows the provisions of Section 1.]


Section 3. _Representatives from Overseas_

ARTICLE 32. The numbers of Representatives from overseas are as follows:

  1 from Hawaii                 1 from Chile
  1 from Peru                   1 from Cuba
  1 from Mexico                 1 from Central America
  3 from the United States      2 from the Philippines
  2 from Canada                 4 from Malaya
  3 from Annam                  2 from Thailand (Siam)
  1 from India                  2 from Burma
  1 from Europe                 1 from Japan
  1 from Korea                  1 from Australia
  1 from Tahiti                 1 from Africa
  4 from The Netherlands        1 from Hong Kong
    East Indies                 1 from Formosa
  1 from Macao

ARTICLE 33. The nomination of overseas Representatives is modelled after
that of Professional Elections. But the groups nominating the
Representatives are to be approved by the Central Committee of Overseas
Affairs.

The National Government shall fix twice the number of Representatives
electable as nominated Representatives.

ARTICLE 34. The election of Overseas Representatives is modelled after
that governing provincial districts.


Section 4. _Elections in the Army, Navy, and Air Forces_

ARTICLE 35. Thirty Representatives shall be elected from the Nation's
army, navy, air force, and other military organs.

ARTICLE 36. Nominations of Representatives from the military are as
follows:

    _i._ The Army: Two nominations from every division. One from every
         independent lü [brigade] or from special brigades holding more
         than two tuan [regiments]. For the rest of the smaller forces,
         nomination of Representatives shall be made by combination of
         the forces.
   _ii._ The Navy: Each fleet may nominate one Representative. All the
         Marines combined may nominate one Representative. The
         Department of the Navy will combine the remainder to nominate
         Representatives.
  _iii._ The Air Force shall nominate one Representative.
   _iv._ Three Representatives shall be nominated by other military
         organs.

The National Government will appoint ninety Representatives thus
nominated as the nominated Representatives.

ARTICLE 37. The nominated Representatives will be elected by the
officers and soldiers of the military who have the qualifications of
electors. Representatives are elected in the manner prescribed in
Article 6.

ARTICLE 38. Representatives nominated should have the following
qualifications:

    _i._ Possess the qualifications of an elector.
   _ii._ Be more than twenty-five years of age.
  _iii._ Have served for more than five years in the troops with good
         record, or be a graduate of good standing from a military
         school.


CHAPTER V. ELECTION OF THE CHIEF ELECTION OFFICE AND OF THE ELECTION
INSPECTORS

ARTICLE 39. The National Government forms the Chief Election Office of
the Representatives of the National Congress. The Office is headed by a
Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner. Election Inspectors are also
specially appointed to direct and watch all affairs of the election. The
appointment of the Chief Election Office is determined by order.

ARTICLE 40. The Election Inspector of every province is the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Civil Affairs of the province.

The Provincial Election Inspector is the highest executive official of
the province. In case there is no highest official, the Chief Election
Office will appoint one of the executive officials to fill the post.

ARTICLE 41. In Special Municipalities directly under the Executive Yüan,
the Inspector is the City Mayor.

ARTICLE 42. In elections in Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang, and Jehol,
and of liberal professional organizations, the Minister of the Ministry
of the Interior will be the Inspector-General. In elections in Mongolia
and Tibet, the Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission
will be the Inspector-General. In overseas elections, the Chairman of
the Overseas Affairs Committee will be the Inspector-General.

ARTICLE 43. Elections in Mongolia, Tibet, and overseas and military
elections shall be under the Inspectors appointed by the Chief Election
Office.

ARTICLE 44. The qualifications of the electors, the nominated and
elected Representatives shall be examined by the Inspectors.

ARTICLE 45. The date and locality of the election are fixed by the
Election Inspectors.

ARTICLE 46. The rest of the officials for the election, _e.g._, ballot
administrators and inspectors, etc., are also appointed by the
Inspectors-General.

ARTICLE 47. Inspectors and officials for electoral affairs cannot be the
Congress Representatives of that district or professional organization.

[ARTICLE 48 OMITTED IN THE TEXT.]


CHAPTER VI. ELECTION AND FORFEITED ELECTION

ARTICLE 49. The election is considered null and void if:

   _i._ It is legally proved that more than one-third of the electorate
        are cheating in or manipulating the election; or,
  _ii._ It is legally proved that the election is not conducted
        according to the laws prescribed.

ARTICLE 50. In case of an election being forfeited, it should be
performed again according to law, unless it be too late to repeat under
the existing circumstances.

ARTICLE 51. Elected Representatives lose their privilege when:

    _i._ They die; or,
   _ii._ It is legally proved that their submitted qualifications are
         false; or,
  _iii._ It is legally proved that the number of ballots is incorrect.

ARTICLE 52. When an elected Representative loses his privilege or when
he refuses to take his privilege, the reserve Representative will take
his place as prescribed in Article 8.


CHAPTER VII. LAW SUITS CONCERNING ELECTION AFFAIRS

ARTICLE 53. Electors or nominated Representatives who are not elected
may file suit within ten days of the date of the election against any
administrative officer of the election if they hold that he abuses his
duty.

ARTICLE 54. If electors or nominated Representatives who are not elected
see that the number of ballots cast for the elected Representatives are
untrue, or that the qualifications of the elected Representatives are
untrue, they may file suit within five days of the date for announcement
of successful candidates.

ARTICLE 55. All law suits connected with election affairs will be heard
by the Supreme Court. They shall take precedence over all other cases,
and sentence will be given after one single hearing. Law suits connected
with military elections will be heard before a military tribunal.

ARTICLE 56. Offenses committed during an election are governed by the
criminal code.


CHAPTER VIII. SUPPLEMENT

ARTICLE 57. When it is impossible to elect in Special Elections as
prescribed in Chapter IV, the National Government may appoint
Representatives.

ARTICLE 58. The Chief Election Office for the Election of
Representatives to the National Congress is the sole organ empowered to
interpret the meaning of this set of laws.

ARTICLE 59. The detailed procedure for enforcing these laws will be
fixed by order.

ARTICLE 60. The date of enforcing these laws will be fixed by order.

[The attached lists are omitted.]




_D._ THE PROGRAM OF RESISTANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION[1]


  [Footnote 1: Official English text from Ch'u Chia-hua (Party-Minister
  of Organization of the Kuomintang), "Consolidation of Democracy in
  China," in Council of International Affairs, _The Chinese Yearbook
  1938-39_, [Hong Kong], 1939, p. 337-8.]

     This quasi-constitutional proclamation of war policy for the
     nation was adopted by the Kuomintang Party Congress,
     Emergency Session, at Hankow, March 29, 1938.


A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

1. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary principles and his other teachings
are hereby declared to be the supreme authority, regulating all war-time
activities and the work of national reconstruction.

2. All war-time powers and forces are hereby placed under the control
of the Kuomintang and of General Chiang K'ai-shek.


B. DIPLOMACY:

3. China is prepared to ally herself with all states and nations that
sympathize with her cause, and to wage a common struggle for peace and
justice.

4. China is prepared to safeguard and strengthen the machinery of peace
as well as all treaties and conventions that have the maintenance of
peace as their ultimate object.

5. China is prepared to ally herself with all forces that are opposed to
Japanese imperialism in order to check Japanese aggression and to
safeguard peace in the Far East.

6. China is prepared to improve still further the existing friendly
relations with other Powers in order to gain more sympathy for the
cause.

7. All bogus political organizations which Japan has created in
consequence of her military occupation of Chinese territory, and all
their actions, are hereby repudiated and declared null and void.


C. MILITARY AFFAIRS:

8. The army shall receive more political training, so that both officers
and men may appreciate the importance of war-time national
reconstruction and be ready to lay down their lives for the nation.

9. All able-bodied men shall be trained; the people shall have their
military strength increased; the troops at the various fronts shall be
supplied with new recruits. Overseas Chinese who have returned home to
offer their services at the front shall be given a proper course of
training to fit them for their work.

10. All people who have arms of their own shall receive the support and
encouragement of the Government and, under the direction of local
military authorities, shall cooperate with the regular army to defend
the country against foreign invasion. Guerrilla warfare shall be waged
in the enemy's rear with the object of smashing and dividing his
military forces.

11. Both the wounded and the killed shall be pensioned; the disabled
shall be cared for; and the families of soldiers fighting at the front
shall be treated with the utmost consideration, so that people will
rejoice to fight for their country and the work of national mobilization
may proceed with the highest degree of efficiency.


D. POLITICS:

12. A People's Political Council shall be created in order to unify the
national strength, to utilize the best minds of the nation, and to
facilitate the formulation and execution of national policies.

13. The district [_hsien_] shall be taken as the fundamental unit from
which the work of increasing the self-defensive power of the people
shall be started. The conditions of local self-government shall be
fulfilled as soon as possible, so that the political and social basis of
the present war shall have been firmly established and a preparation
shall have been made for the eventual promulgation of a constitution.

14. A thorough reform in the central and local governmental machinery
shall be instituted with the object of simplifying and making it
rational. Only thus can administrative efficiency be obtained to meet
the urgent needs of war.

15. The conduct of all officials, both high and low, shall conform to
rules of propriety. They shall be faithful to their work, ready to
sacrifice themselves for the cause of the nation, observe discipline,
and obey orders, so that they may serve as a model for the people. If
they prove to be disloyal and obstruct the prosecution of the war, they
shall be tried by court martial.

16. Corrupt officials shall be severely punished, and their property
shall be confiscated.


E. ECONOMICS:

17. Economic reconstruction shall concern itself mainly with matters of
military importance, and incidentally with matters that contribute to
the improvement of the livelihood of the people. With these objects in
view, a planned economy shall be put into operation, investments by
people both at home and abroad shall be encouraged, and large-scale
war-time production shall be undertaken.

18. The greatest measure of energy shall be devoted to the development
of village economy, the encouragement of cooperative enterprises, the
unhampered transportation of foodstuffs, the cultivation of waste land,
and the work of irrigation.

19. Mining shall be undertaken; the foundations of heavy industries
shall be laid; light industries shall be encouraged; and handicraft
industries in the various provinces shall be developed.

20. War-time taxes shall be levied, and thoroughgoing reforms in
financial administration shall be instituted.

21. The banking business shall be strictly controlled, so that
commercial and industrial activities may be properly adjusted.

22. The legal tender shall be made unassailable; foreign exchange shall
be controlled; and imports and exports shall be regulated in order to
secure financial stability.

23. Facilities of communication shall be improved; transportation by
steamers, automobiles, and aeroplanes shall be undertaken; railroads and
highways shall be built; and air lines shall be increased.

24. No profiteering or cornering shall be allowed; and a system of
price-fixing shall be instituted.


F. MASS MOVEMENT:

25. The people throughout the country shall be organized into
occupational groups such as farmers, laborers, merchants, and students.
The principle shall be: From each according to his ability. The rich
shall contribute in money, and the able-bodied shall sweat. All classes
of people shall be mobilized for war.

26. In the course of the war, the freedom of speech, the freedom of the
press, and the freedom of assembly shall be fully guaranteed to the
people, provided they do not contravene Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary
principles or the provisions of the law.

27. Refugees from the war areas as well as unemployed people shall
receive relief, and shall be given proper training to fit them for
war-time work.

28. National consciousness shall be instilled into the people, so that
they may assist the Government in detecting and eradicating treasonable
acts. Traitors shall be severely punished, and their property shall be
confiscated.


G. EDUCATION:

29. The whole educational system shall be reorganized. A course of
war-time education shall be instituted and emphasis shall be placed on
the cultivation of morals, scientific research, and the expansion of
research facilities.

30. Various technical experts shall be trained and assigned to proper
posts in order to meet the requirements of war.

31. The youths of the nation shall be properly trained, so that they may
offer their services to society and contribute to the cause of the war.





_E._ AN OUTLINE OF WAR-TIME CONTROLMENT[1]


  [Footnote 1: An unpublished memorandum presented in manuscript by
  President Yü Yu-jên of the Control _Yüan_ to the author in Chungking,
  September 1940. It consists of nine folios, not numbered, with a
  chart. It is entitled _Chan Shih Chien-ch'a K'ai-lüeh_ (An Outline of
  War-time Controlment), and is dated August, XXVIII (1939). The present
  extract is folios 1-A to 4-B.]

     An official but unpublished statement, this document was
     presented by the President of the Control _Yüan_ to the
     author for inclusion in the present work.

According to Article 46, Chapter VIII of the Organic Law of the National
Government, the Control _Yüan_ is "the highest supervisory organ of the
government, obliged to exercise the power of impeachment and auditing in
accordance with law." Since the beginning of our resistance against the
Japanese invasion, the powers of control have been gradually
strengthened so as to meet the demands of this critical time. A static
control has developed into a dynamic one; that is, more emphasis is laid
upon prevention than upon correction. Therefore the duties of the office
become heavier and more complicated, as its work becomes more
intensified. But the influence which the _Yüan_ has exercised over
Chinese politics as a whole becomes also wider and wider. In this
report, we are going to describe the activities of the _Yüan_ under the
two headings of the Control _Yüan_ and the Ministry of Audit.


THE CONTROL YÜAN:

The function of auditing is performed by the Ministry of Audit,
subsidiary to the _Yüan_. What is directly performed by the _Yüan_ is
impeachment. On the authority of the Impeachment Act, any motion of
impeachment, after being proposed by some control Committee or control
Commissioner, is to be reviewed by three other control Committees. If
the bill is passed by the three, the accused must be punished. Whenever
a bill is rejected and its proponent does not agree to the rejection,
the bill shall be reviewed once more by five other committees whose
determination shall be final. Furthermore, emergency relief measures may
be requested, according to the urgency of the occasion; and in order to
facilitate the performance of its functions, the _Yüan_ is permitted to
investigate the documents of other offices as well as to demand
explanations from them. The initiation of a motion of impeachment must
be based upon one of the three following conditions:

_a._ Article 2, Impeachment Act: "If any illegal action or negligence of
duty of an official be discovered, the Control _Yüan_ itself is
permitted to bring an impeachment against him."

_b._ Article 4, Regulations for the Execution of Government Rights; and
Article 11, Act for the Punishment of Officials: "Specified officials
may be impeached on demand of the superior who has submitted the case of
his guilty subordinate to the Control _Yüan_."

_c._ "If an official be accused by the people, the case must be
investigated. If the accusation prove to be true, the accused shall be
impeached."

Although it is very prudent that the legislators have obliged the
impeaching officers to take such steps as investigation, motion, and
review, yet in this critical time these complicated measures must be
considered too slow to keep pace with the development of affairs.

After the outbreak of war, the Central Government published the
"Temporary Regulations for the Execution of War-time Controlment," in
which the Control _Yüan_ was charged with the duties of _censure_ and
_proposition_, besides what have already been mentioned. By censure it
is meant that when emergency measures must be taken against an official
whose illegal action or negligence of duty has been discovered, a
written notice of censure may be submitted to the officer who directly
controls, or is immediately superior to, the official in question. The
officer receiving the notice must decide in as short a time as possible
to deal with the censured with the administrative power in his hands. If
he holds the censured innocent, he must reply, giving sufficient
reasons. If he takes no measures, or fails to reply, or replies
groundlessly, the control Committee making the censure is obliged to
change the motion of censure into one of impeachment, and the impeached
is liable to a penalty. Hence the principal significance of censure is
that it takes emergency measures against the undesirable conduct of
officials, so as to meet the demands of the war-time. This also implies
further extension of the controlment to the administrative system, in
order to quicken efficiency.

As for _proposition_, this means that when some legally specified
obligations of office are administered feebly or inadequately, the
Control _Yüan_ may make a proposal or express its views to the office
involved or to the office immediately superior. The office which
receives the proposal must in as short a time as possible take adequate
measures to remedy the situation. The duties of _proposition_,
therefore, can not only correct administrators, but can also improve
agencies. They are preventive, capable of requiring strict improvement
of governmental activities. Effective anticipatory control may now be
exercised over Chinese government agencies. Since being charged with the
two new duties of censure and proposition, the Control _Yüan_ has
carried them into action with prudence. And the effects are rather
remarkable.

When, in 1937, the government was moved to Chungking, a part of the
_Yüan_ employees were ordered dismissed. But the _Yüan_ authorities
still prepared copies of "Directions for the Work of Control _Yüan_
Employees in Their Native (or Other) Cities (or Provinces)," and
"Directions for the Work of Dismissed Control _Yüan_ Employees," which
were distributed to the dismissed. The former employees have been
obliged to make monthly reports upon the local phenomena according to
the "Directions." These reports are sent to the _Yüan_, thus helping its
understanding of the truth in all corners of China.

In view of the fact that the "Temporary Regulations for the Execution of
War-time Controlment" came into force, the Control _Yüan_ accordingly
prepared "Directions for Inspection and Investigation." From time to
time, the control commissioners have been ordered to tour their
respective districts. Moreover, control committees have been selected
and sent out to different places to perform inspection of
administration, national spiritual mobilization, conscription, military
confiscation and requisition, the organization and training of the
people, hoarding and reserves of supplies, communication and
transportation, public support of the war, public security, the utter
erasure of traitors, anti-air-raid preparations, ambulance equipment,
the management of wounded soldiers and of refugees, taxation and other
imposts on the people, production, construction, education, and all
other things related to the war. Thus the work of the _Yüan_ has become
all the more intensified. In order to adapt itself to the circumstances,
its organization was readjusted. A "Board of Legislative Study,"
subordinate to the _Yüan_, was established, with a view to studying Dr.
Sun Yat-sen's "Constitution based upon the Principle of the Separation
of Five Powers," the Control system, and anything related to war-time
legislation about controlment. Besides, a "Committee on Procedural
Technique" was added under the Secretariat, so that it will prepare
plans for the improvement of _Yüan_ activities, and will help to carry
them into action.

In the spring of 1939, a "Plan of War-time Procedure for the Second
Stage of War" was passed in the Fifth Plenary Session of the C.E.C. and
C.S.C. of the Kuomintang. Both the decision concerning Article VI of
Political Report and the lecture delivered by Generalissimo Chiang
K'ai-shek in this meeting showed that much was expected from the Control
_Yüan_. Abiding by the government's policy and taking into consideration
its present needs, the _Yüan_, in addition to the performance of
impeachment, censure, proposition and other functions established by
law, prepared "An Outline of the Execution of War-time Controlment for
the Second Stage" and its "Preliminary Procedure," with the extension of
inspection as the chief means to set the machinery in motion.

According to the aforementioned "Outline" and "Procedure," the work of
inspection is classified into two kinds. The inspection of the conduct
of political officers and administrative officials is termed the
_general inspection_. When special agents are sent out to inspect
specified cases, this is called the _special inspection_. For the
general inspection of the Central Government, the units are the offices,
while for that of the local governments, the units are the districts
[_hsien_]. In the case of a special inspection, when the agents are sent
out solely by the Control _Yüan_, the term used is _exclusive
inspection_; the inspection performed cooperatively by agents both of
the _Yüan_ and of other offices is called _joint inspection_.

The general inspection has, since January 1940, been vigorously put into
effect. For instance, the anti-air-raid preparations on the outskirts of
Chungking, the relief and management of wounded soldiers, refugees, and
suffering children, and the spiritual mobilization of central and local
government offices (including problems of efficiency and diligence) have
all been carefully examined. Moreover, Control Committees have been sent
out to different districts within certain periods, the frequency of
which is based upon the importance of the place. Some went to Kweichow
and Szechwan to inspect local administration in different districts.
Recently, committees have been sent out to Shantung to make a variety
of inspections. As for the special inspections, delegates have been
incessantly sent out to make exclusive inspections; and joint
inspections have also been made, by the joining of many control
committees into the Itinerant Inspection Corps for Military Discipline
and Morale, and the War-time Economic Inspection Corps. Committees which
have thus been delegated to joint work are not only obliged to fulfil
duties required by the Corps, but are also permitted independently to
impeach or censure illegal or incompetent officials, whether civil or
military. The primary functions of the committees remain unaffected.

Since military operations must be in harmony with political
administration, wherever the military power reaches, the power of
controlment must follow in its wake. The Control _Yüan_ recently
prepared the "Regulations for the Organization of Control _Yüan_
War-time Inspection Corps of War Districts," which were later sanctioned
and then promulgated. The number of the corps and of the areas to be
inspected are fixed according to the War Districts marked off by the
Military Affairs Commission. Each corps consists of three committees,
and is organized by the control committees themselves; if there is a
control commissioner in the area, he of course joins the committee, and
performs all the functions established for him by law. Under each
committee there are one secretary, one inspecting agent, three
assistants, and one clerk--to assist the committees in routine
administration.

Since the work of the control commissioners is stationary, behind the
battle lines, the Inspection Corps of War Districts are itinerant, so
that their emphasis can be laid upon the front. They are mutually
dependent and intimately correlated. The network of national controlment
is completed by the mobilization of the control committees to be sent
out to make inspections, so that corruption may be eliminated and law
and order enforced. And undoubtedly our resistance against the Japanese
invasion has been benefited. This work is indeed a great help to the
construction of a new China.




_F._ A CHART OF THE CONTROL _YÜAN_ FROM JULY 1937 TO JUNE 1940[1]


  [Footnote 1: Continuation of Appendix I (E), p. 313; this comprises
  folios 5-A to 9-A with chart.]


THE READJUSTMENT:

Since the outbreak of war, the _Yüan_, together with other offices of
the Government, was moved from Nanking to Chungking. In order to adapt
itself to the circumstances, its organization was readjusted. A "Board
of Legislative Study" was established, while the six sections of General
Affairs, Editing, Book-Collection, Printing, Receipt and
Transmission,[2] and Archive, all subordinate to the Secretariat, were
merged into four departments. Moreover, a "Committee on Administrative
Procedure" and two new sections, called the first and the second, were
added to the main body of the _Yüan_.

  [Footnote 2: A formal agency for the receipt and registry of incoming
  communications, and of verification and transmission of outgoing
  ones.]


THE FUNCTIONS:

                 | Impeachment------     | Acceptance of Popular
                 |                  |    |   Petitions
  Functions      | Censure          |    |
    Established--|                  -----| Inquiry and
    by Law       | Proposition           |   Examination
                 |                       |
                 | Supervision of        | Emergency Relief
                 |   Examinations        |   Measures
                 |                       |
                 | Audit                 | Interpellation


THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION:

  The Control _Yüan_
     |                           |Committee on Administrative Procedure
     |                           |First Department [of the _Yüan_]
     |        |Secretariat-------|Second Department
  The _Yüan_--|Advisers' Office  |--------------------Office for Review
    Meeting   |Board of          |Third Department
              | Legislative      |--------------------Special Delegates'
              | Study            |Fourth Department     Office
              |Office of         |First
              | Regional Control | Section  |Accounting--|Office of
              | Commissioners    |----------| Room       | Accounting
              |Ministry of Audit |Second                 | and
                   |             | Section  |Statistics--| Statistics
                   |             |----------| Room
      -------------------        |President's Office
      |                 |        |Office for the Receipt of Petitions
  Auditing Offices    Auditing
    of Provinces     Sub-Office

THE WORK:

  1. Acceptance of people's petitions and investigations:
     Number of petitions received in this period....
       [Number is omitted from original report.]
     Number of cases in which delegates were sent out to investigate....
       [Number omitted.]
     Number of cases in which other offices were charged to
     investigate....
       [Number omitted.]

(Those petitions which were either outside the function of control or
false in the description of facts were remarked upon and preserved by
the committees.)

  2. Motions:
     Number of impeachments moved                          121
     Number of censures moved                              149
     Number of propositions moved                          234
  3. Supervisions of Civil Service Examinations:
     Number of Higher Examinations supervised                2
     Number of Common Examinations supervised                5
     Number of Special Examinations supervised              34
  4. Supervisions of the relief of sufferers from natural
     calamities:
     Total number                                            5
  5. Inspections:
       [A detailed enumeration of inspections performed and
        results accomplished is here omitted.]
  6. Cooperation with other offices:
       [The detailed summary is omitted.]


THE MINISTRY OF AUDIT:

The functions of audit, as performed by the Ministry of Audit, are
founded upon the Auditing Act. The old Auditing Act, however, is too
tradition-bound and therefore inconvenient. The necessity of revision is
especially pressing in war-time. In the spring of 1938, the Ministry
prepared a draft Act and submitted it to the Legislative _Yüan_. The
latter adopted this and published a New Auditing Act. According to the
New Auditing Act, the Ministry is charged with three functions of
internal checking (interior auditing), auditing (post-auditing) and
supervision. These functions include:

    _i._ Supervision of the execution of the budgets;
   _ii._ Scrutiny of orders of receipt and payment;
  _iii._ Scrutiny of computations and balance sheets;
   _iv._ Control of illegal or unfaithful conduct in financial affairs.

Two merits of the New Auditing Act should be mentioned. In the first
place, emphasis has been laid upon visiting auditing. For instance, the
work of internal checking is not limited to the supervision of the
receipts and disbursements of the State Treasury by the scrutiny and
indorsement of the receiving and paying orders; but even receiving and
paying vouchers of Government offices have been made ineffective, unless
scrutinized and indorsed by auditors stationed in the offices by the
Ministry. Owing to the vastness of the area of China, and owing also to
the limited number of workers available in this line, this system is
not universally applicable. Only offices in which the work of receiving
and paying is especially heavy find such auditors present. As for
auditing, the Government offices were formerly obliged only to submit to
the Ministry accounting reports which they themselves had prepared. It
is different now. The New Act ordains that auditors should be sent out
periodically by the Ministry to visit the Government offices and
scrutinize their books and vouchers. Or in each year, some offices
should be selected to be thus scrutinized. The duties of supervision
were not clearly defined, but they now include the following items:
(_a_) the supervision of the revenue and expenditures of the offices;
(_b_) the scrutiny of cash, bills, and bonds in the offices; (_c_) the
supervision of the construction of buildings and of the purchase or sale
of the property attached to the offices; (_d_) the supervision of the
drawing and repayment of bonds and the destruction of bonds returned;
(_e_) joint-administration with the financial departments of other
offices; and (_f_) the scrutiny of other administrative affairs related
to finance.

Secondly, the New Auditing Act ordains that the Ministry of Audit is
directly responsible for the auditing of financial affairs of the
offices of different ranks of the Central Government, while that of the
local governments is under the charge of local auditing offices,
subordinate to the Ministry.

[A detailed narrative of the war-time work of the ministry is omitted.]

Before the outbreak of war, the Ministry had established auditing
offices in the Provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Hupeh, Shensi and Honan
and in the city of Shanghai, and one sub-office for the Tientsin-Pukow
Railway. The office of Shanghai concurrently took charge of the auditing
affairs of the Nanking-Shanghai Railway; and that of Hupeh, the affairs
of the Peiping-Hankow Railway. In 1938 the offices of Hunan, Kweichow
and Szechwan were established. In July 1939, a conference of auditors
was held in Chungking. All auditors sent out now returned to attend it.
They reported on their work, assisted the auditors in the Ministry, and
discussed with them the directions of war-time auditing. In October, Mr.
Lin Yün-kai, the Minister of Audit, visited Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu, and
Chinghai to inspect the audit work going on in Shensi and Szechwan and
at the same time to examine the local financial conditions as a step
toward the extension of the auditing system.

In the spring of 1939, the Ministry prepared "An Outline for the
Execution of War-time Audits" which was passed and enacted by the
Supreme National Defense Council. There are eleven items, to be carried
out in several periods, in this outline. A part of them are required by
the New Auditing Act, while the rest are the new work arising from the
war. They are as follows:

_a._ Auditing prefectural [_hsien_] finance: A prefecture, on the
authority of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Constitution, is the unit of
self-government; and whenever the self-government is accomplished, China
becomes constitutional. This being the case, the prefectural finance
actually concerns the future of the country and the people. Therefore,
beginning from 1939, the Ministry introduced the auditing of prefectural
finance. It ordered the provincial offices to have the prefectures make
monthly reports on their revenue and expenditure. The reports should be
submitted to the provincial auditing offices which will also send out
delegates to scrutinize the accounting records of some selected
prefectures as well as to investigate the prefectural financial
organizations, the taxation system, and the sorts of taxes. Up to June
1940, there have been 84 prefectures selected for such investigation.

_b._ The auditing of the Central Government Offices in the provinces and
cities where no auditing offices have been established: In such cases,
the Ministry has appointed the auditing offices of neighboring
localities to take charge. But the Ministry has taken over the auditing
affairs of Chungking for the moment. Meantime, plans have been made to
establish auditing offices in Kwangsi, Fukien, etc.

_c._ The auditing of the receipts and disbursements of public
treasuries: Since October 1939, when the Public Treasury Act came into
force, the Ministry has sent delegates to the State Treasury Bureau to
scrutinize and indorse the accounting vouchers, and the provincial
offices have sent delegates to Provincial Treasuries as well.

_d._ The auditing of special funds: As a rule, the institutes in charge
of special funds have from time to time submitted their reports on their
receipts and disbursements to the Ministry. Since 1939, the Ministry has
also sent delegates to examine strictly these funds.

_e._ Itinerant auditing: The present economic conditions do not permit
the Ministry to establish auditing offices in all the government-owned
concerns. But itinerant auditing, after the model of circuit courts,
has been introduced since 1939. The Suchow-Kunming and Yünnan-Burma
Railways have been thus examined. The provincial offices have also
applied this system to the business offices.

_f._ The visiting auditing: The system of visiting auditing has been
developed gradually. Delegates have been stationed in Sufferers' Relief
Committee, City Government of Chungking, Ministry of Finance, Ministry
of Economics, and Ministry of Communications. Other delegates have been
sent out to visit some selected offices who have submitted their
accounting reports.

_g._ The supervision of the revenue of government offices: Salt Tax and
Commodities Tax have been scrutinized.

_h._ The supervision of clothing, provisions, and other military
supplies: Since the outbreak of war, the amount of clothing, provisions,
etc. purchased by the military authorities has greatly increased. The
delegates from the Ministry are always present on the occasions of
signing contracts, announcing the bids, deciding the winning bidder, and
delivering the goods. If the supplies are purchased in the provinces,
the provincial offices are in charge of the supervision.

_i._ The supervision of mass purchase and constructions: The delegates
from the Ministry or its provincial offices are always present on the
occasions of signing contracts, announcing the bids, deciding the
winning bidder, and delivering the goods or completing constructions
when there are any mass purchases or sales of government-owned property
or any construction work.

_j._ The financial scrutiny of the war-time provisional organizations:
There are huge sums of receipts and disbursements in such organizations
as the "Joint Emergency Air Raid Relief Office of Chungking" and the
general office of the "National Committee for Soldiers' Comfort," so
that their auditing affairs are made the charge of the delegates from
the Ministry.

_k._ The supervision of the payment, preservation, and usage of
contributions of all sorts: National Salvation Bonds, Aviation
Contribution, and all other contributions donated by the Chinese at home
and abroad have been scrutinized by the Ministry delegates.

Many considerable results have been achieved since the execution of the
above items from January 1939, to date. The "Auditing Plan for 1941" has
already been prepared by the Ministry. When it is passed by the Supreme
National Defense Council, it will come into force from January of next
year.




_G._ REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE VARIOUS
CLASSIFICATIONS OF _HSIEN_[1]


  [Footnote 1: Chung-yang Hsün-lien T'uan [Central (Kuomintang) Training
  Corps], _Hsien Ko-chi Tzŭ-chih Kang-yao_ [Regulations Concerning
  the Organization of the Various Classifications of _Hsien_],
  Chungking, XXVIII (1939); these regulations are also found in
  Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu [Central Publicity Board], _Hsien-cheng yü
  Ti-fang Tzŭ-chih_ [Constitutional Government in Relation to Local
  Self-Government], Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 37-44.]

     These laws, a fundamental charter for local self-government,
     were approved and promulgated by the 14th Regular Meeting of
     the Supreme National Defense Council, August 31, 1939. For
     the Generalissimo's lecture on the same subject, see
     Appendix III (C), p. 388.


A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. Each _hsien_ is a self-administrative unit. Its size and area are
determined by customs and history but subject to the demarcation of the
National Government.

2. There are three to six classes of _hsien_, classified according to
area, population, and conditions of economy, culture, and
communications. The classifications are to be worked out by the
Provincial Government and subject to the approval of the Ministry of
Interior.

3. Regulations governing _hsien_ administration are to be promulgated by
the National Government.

4. Each _hsien_ is divided into _hsiang_, and each _hsiang_ is further
divided into _pao_ and _chia_. If a _hsien_ is too large, it may be
first divided into _ch'ü_ to be under the charge of several bureaus.
Education institutions, police, public health and tariff offices should
be distributed in accordance with above-mentioned divisions.

5. Each _hsien_ and each _hsiang_ is a legal person.

6. At the age of twenty, a man or woman of Chinese nationality, after
living in the _hsien_ for six months or more, or having possessed a
residence for more than one year, is qualified as a citizen of that
_hsien_. He or she has the right of suffrage, recall, initiative, and
referendum in this _hsien_. The following persons are disqualified:

_a._ Those who are deprived of citizenship by the National Government.

_b._ Those who owe governmental money.

_c._ Those who have been imprisoned for [political] corruption[2] or
forgery.

_d._ Those who are not allowed to possess personal property.

_e._ Those who are opium or other poisonous smokers.

  [Footnote 2: The practice termed _squeeze_ on the coast.]


B. THE _Hsien_ GOVERNMENT (_hsien chêng-fu_)

7. There shall be one magistrate (_hsien-chang_) for each _hsien_. His
duties are:

_a._ To supervise the local administration of the whole _hsien_ under
the control of the Provincial Government.

_b._ To carry out Provincial or Central Government orders under the
supervision of the Provincial Government.

8. The _Hsien_ Government consists of the following departments:

_a._ Civil Affairs Department.

_b._ Financial Department.

_c._ Educational Department.

_d._ Reconstruction Department.

_e._ Land Affairs Department.

_f._ Social Affairs Department.

The number of departments and the distribution of functions are
determined by the Provincial Government in accordance with the class and
necessities [of the _hsien_], and registered with the Ministry of the
Interior.

9. In the _Hsien_ Government there are to be secretaries, department
heads, advisors, police officers, clerks and technicians. The number of
such staff and their salaries are to be determined by the Provincial
Government and subject to the approval of the Ministry of the Interior.

10. The examination, training, appointing, and discharging of a
magistrate or of general staffs are to be done according to the
promulgated National law.

11. There shall be a _Hsien_ Council (_hsien chêng hui_) which is to be
convened every two weeks. The following matters should be settled in
this Council:

_a._ Cases brought out by the _Hsien_ People's Council.

_b._ Other important matters concerning _hsien_ policies.

(The regulations governing the _Hsien_ Council are promulgated by the
Ministry of the Interior.)

12. The _Hsien_ Council meeting can be held before the establishment of
the _Hsien_ People's Council.

13. Regulations concerning a _hsien_ shall be drafted by the Provincial
Government and submitted to the Executive _Yüan_ for its approval
through the Ministry of the Interior.

Any organizations which are not mentioned in the regulations should not
be established.

14. Regulations governing the _hsien_ administration shall be drafted by
the Provincial Government and registered in the Ministry of the
Interior.


C. THE _Hsien_ PEOPLE'S COUNCIL (_hsien ts'ang-chêng hui_)

15. The _Hsien_ People's Council is organized by the members of the
Council who are elected from People's Representative Committee. Each
_hsiang_ elects one member. Representatives of public organizations may
be recognized as members, but the number of such members should not
comprise more than one-third of the whole Council.

16. The chairman of the Council should be elected from its members.

17. The bylaws and the duties of the Council shall be dealt with
separately.


D. FINANCES OF A _Hsien_

18. _Hsien_ revenue consists of the following items:

  _a._ Part of the land tax.
  _b._ Surtax on the land tax.
  _c._ Thirty per cent of the stamp tax.
  _d._ Taxes on land after improvement.
  _e._ Part of the business taxes.
  _f._ Income from public properties.
  _g._ Income from public enterprises.
  _h._ Other legal taxes.

19. Funds required for the execution of Provincial Government orders
shall be provided from the National Treasury or the Provincial Treasury.
Local collection of such funds is prohibited. _Hsien_ which are
financially self-sufficient may resort to their own treasuries to meet
educational and administrative expenses. _Hsien_ with scanty population
and most of their area uncultivated may be subsidized by both the
Provincial and National Treasuries.

20. Extra expenses for reconstruction shall be collected by a means of
floating loans with the approval of the _Hsien_ People's Council and the
Provincial Government.

21. The incomes and expenses of the _hsien_ proper shall be the
independent responsibility of the _Hsien_ Government.

22. If the _Hsien_ People's Council has not been established, the
budgets and financial statements shall be examined by the _Hsien_
Council and then submitted to the Provincial Government by the
Magistrate.

23. After the establishment of the _Hsien_ People's Council, the budgets
and the financial statements shall be examined by this Council first and
then be submitted to the Provincial Government. In case of emergency the
Magistrate may submit such documents to the Provincial Government
directly.


E. _Ch'ü_

24. Each _ch'ü_ is constituted by fifteen to thirty _hsiang_.

25. The _Ch'ü_ Bureau, a subsidiary office of _hsien_, represents the
_Hsien_ Government to perform the educational and administrative work.
If the _hsien_ is not divided into _ch'ü_ then this work is done by the
special officers sent by the _Hsien_ Government.

26. There shall be one _Ch'ü_ Chief (_ch'ü-chang_) and two to five
advisers in each _ch'ü_. Their duties are to take charge of civil,
reconstruction, educational and military affairs. They shall be trained
and examined before appointment.

27. There shall be police stations in each _ch'ü_ under the supervision
of the _Ch'ü_ Chief.

28. A Rural Reconstruction Committee is to be formed in a _ch'ü_. The
members of this committee shall be elected from among the popular
persons in that _ch'ü_. The _Ch'ü_ Chief shall concurrently be Chairman
of the Committee.


F. _Hsiang_[3]

  [Footnote 3: In some areas termed the _chên_.]

29. Each _hsiang_ is constituted by six to fifteen _pao_. [See Art. 45
_ff._]

30. Systems of _hsiang_ and _pao chia_ are to be worked out by the
_Hsien_ Government and submitted to the Provincial Government. They must
be registered with the Ministry of the Interior.

31. There shall be one _Hsiang_ Chief (_hsiang-chang_) and one to two
Assistant Chiefs (_fu-hsiang-chang_) in each _hsiang_ office. They shall
be persons possessing the following qualifications:

_a._ Those who have passed the ordinary examinations.

_b._ Those who have served in the Delegated Appointment[4] capacity.

_c._ Those who have graduated from Middle and Normal schools.

_d._ Those who have contributed service for the public good.

  [Footnote 4: A level in the National civil service.]

32. There shall be four sections in each _hsiang_ to take charge of the
civil, economic, educational affairs and police service. Each section
has one chief and several secretaries. One of the secretaries shall take
charge of controlment. The _hsiang_ staff shall be selected from among
the primary school teachers. If the _hsiang's_ financial resources are
insufficient these sections may be amalgamated into one office.

33. The tenure of _Hsiang_ Chiefs shall be two years, with permissible
re-election.

34. The offices _Hsiang_ Chief, the headmaster of the primary school,
and officer of militia[5] may be delegated to one person. If the
_hsiang_ possesses sufficient financial resources, the headmaster of the
primary school shall not be allowed to hold other office.

  [Footnote 5: _The chuang-ting-tui tui-chang_, heading a local force of
  able-bodied citizens; the regular rank is not specified.]

35. Plans initiated by the _hsiang_ itself must be passed by the
_Hsiang_ Council meeting before they are adopted.

36. The _Hsiang_ Chief shall act as the chairman of the Hsiang Council
Meeting. Every section chief is required to attend the Meeting. The
_pao_ chiefs must also attend this Meeting.

37. The procedure of training of _Hsiang_ Chiefs and other _hsiang_
staff shall be dealt with separately.


G. THE _Hsiang_ PEOPLE'S COUNCIL

38. The members of the _Hsiang_ People's Council shall be elected from
the _Pao_ People's Council. Each _pao_ shall elect two members.

39. The _Hsiang_ Chief may act as the chairman of the _Hsiang_ People's
Council provided that he has been elected by the Council as the Chief.

40. The bylaws and the duties of the _Hsiang_ People's Council shall be
dealt with separately.


H. FINANCE OF THE _Hsiang_

41. The _hsiang's_ revenue consists of the following items:

_a._ All legal taxes.

_b._ Income from public properties.

_c._ Income from public enterprises.

_d._ Subsidiary funds.

_e._ Special incomes to be collected with the approval of the _Hsien_
Government.

42. The procedure of purchasing properties shall be dealt with
separately.

43. The bylaws of the _Hsiang Treasury_ Committee shall be dealt with
separately.

44. The financial report prepared by the _hsiang_ office shall be
submitted to the _Hsien_ Government. The expenses of the _hsiang_ shall
be included in the _hsien's_ financial report after audit.


I. _Pao_ AND _Chia_

45. Each _pao_ is constituted of six to fifteen _chia_.

46. Public primary schools, cooperatives, and warehouses[6] shall be
established within two or three _pao_ where the population is dense. The
_Pao_ Chief shall be in charge of these institutions. Reserves of each
_pao_ shall be trained separately.

  [Footnote 6: In Far Eastern English parlance, _godown_.]

47. There shall be one _Pao_ Chief (_pao-chang_) and one assistant _Pao_
Chief (_fu-pao-chang_) in each _pao_. They are elected by the _Pao_
People's Council. And they must be chosen from among persons with the
following qualifications:

_a._ Those who have graduated from middle schools.

_b._ Persons who have worked more than one year in Government.

_c._ Those who have been specially trained.

_d._ Those who are active in social work.

Before the time of election, the _Pao_ Chief may be recommended by the
_hsiang_ office to the _Hsien_ Government for appointment.

48. The tenure of the _Pao_ Chief shall be two years; he may be
re-elected.

49. The offices of _Pao_ Chief, headmaster of the _pao_ primary school,
and militia officer may be delegated to one person. When the _pao's_
financial resources are sufficient the headmaster is not allowed to hold
other office.

50. There shall be two to four secretaries in each _pao_ to take charge
of the political, educational, cultural affairs, and police service. The
_pao_ staff shall be elected from among the primary school teachers. If
the _pao's_ financial resources are not sufficient, there shall be only
one person to take care of all these activities.

51. The procedure of training of the _pao_ office staff shall be dealt
with separately.

52. One representative of each family is required to be present at the
_Pao_ People's Council (_pao-min ta-hui_) meeting. The bylaws and the
duties of this council shall be dealt with separately.

53. Each _chia_ consists of six to fifteen families.

54. There shall be one _Chia_ Chief (_chia-chang_) in each _chia_. He is
elected by the Family Chiefs Council and is registered with the _hsiang_
office through the _pao_.

55. There shall be established a Family Chiefs Council and _Chia_
People's Council in each _chia_.

56. The old names of the streets may be used as the names of _pao_.

57. The bylaws of _pao_ and _chia_ shall be dealt with separately.

58. The controlment procedure for _pao_ and _chia_ shall be dealt with
separately.

59. The present bylaws shall become effective after the date of
promulgation.

60. If any item in these regulations conflicts with the National laws,
it shall be null.




_H._ A CHART OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION


     The chart facing this page is a composite of various
     official charts to which the author was allowed access in
     Chungking. Revisions cover changes down to the opening of
     1941.


                                  [KUOMINTANG:
                        SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL]

                   NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA: STATE COUNCIL
                     |                             |
  Election Committee on Representation        Office of the
     in the People's Congress                     Comptroller-General
  Academia Sinica                             Office of Civil Affairs
  Commission for the Disciplinary             Office of Military Affairs
     Punishment of Public Officials
  Planning Committee for the Western Capital

                     THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
                                          |
  -----------------------------------------
  |
  |-|Military---Generalissimo---| Department of Military Operations
  | |Affairs     Commission     | Department of Military Training
  | |Commission   Meeting       | Directorate-General of Courts
  |                   |         |     Martial
  |                   |         | Pensions Commission
  |             General Staff   | Military Advisory Council
  |                   |         | Administration of Personnel
  |                   |         | Service Department
  |             Armed Forces    | The National Aviation Commission
  |                             | Office of the Naval
  |                             |     Commander-in-Chief
  |                           |-| Party and Government War Area
  |                           | |     Commission--Occupied and
  |                           | |     Guerrilla Areas
  |                           | |-Political Department
  |                           |
  |                       Ministry of War
  |-People's Political        |
  |   Council                 |                       |-Provincial
  |                           |-| Ministry of         |  Governments
  |                             |     Foreign Affairs | Local
  |                             | Ministry of the     |  Governments
  |                             |     Interior--------|
  |-Executive---_Yüan_ Meeting--| Ministry of Finance |-Special
  |   _Yüan_        [Cabinet]   | Ministry of Economic   Municipalities
  |                             |     Affairs [to be
  |                             |     reorganized]
  |                             | Ministry of Social Affairs [pending]
  |                             | Ministry of Education
  |                             | Ministry of Communications
  |                             | Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
  |                             | Commission on Mongolian and
  |                             |     Tibetan Affairs----------Mongolia
  |                             |                              and Tibet
  |                             | Commission on Overseas
  |                             |     Chinese Affairs
  |                             | National Relief Commission
  |                             | Material and Resources Control and
  |                                   Supervisory Ministry [in process
  |                                   of organization]
  |-Legislative---_Yüan_ Meeting
  |    _Yüan_
  |
  |-Judicial---_Yüan_ Meeting---| Ministry of Justice
  |  _Yüan_                     | Supreme Court
  |                             | Administrative Court
  |                             | Commission for the Disciplinary
  |                                        Punishment of Public Officers
  |
  |-Examination--_Yüan_ Meeting--| Examination Commission
  |   _Yüan_                     | Ministry of Personnel
  |
  |-Control----_Yüan_ Meeting---| Ministry of Audit
     _Yüan_                     | Office of Regional Control
                                      Commissioners




APPENDIX II. DOCUMENTS ON PARTY POLITICS




_A._ A CHART OF KUOMINTANG ORGANIZATION


     The chart facing this page is a composite of various
     official charts to which the author was allowed access in
     July and August 1940.

                   KUOMINTANG PARTY CONGRESS
                   |      PARTY CHIEF      |
        |----------|           |           |----------------------|
        |                      |                                  |
  Central Control     Central Executive----[Central-----Supreme National
     Committee            Committee         Political    Defense Council
    Standing Committee  Standing Committee  Council]           |
                               |                               |
     ---------------------------------------------------    Government
     |             |             |                     |
  Training   Party Affairs  _San Min Chu I_            |
  Committee   Committee       Youth Corps              |
     |                                                 |
  General Affairs Section                              |
  Advisory Section                                     |
  Planning Section                                     |
  Training Section                                     |
                                                       |
      ---------------------------------------------------------
      |      |       |           |     |       |  |  |        |
  OTHER      | PARTY-MINISTRY OF | Provincial  |  |  |     CENTRAL
  AFFILIATES | OVERSEAS CHINESE  | Party Organ |  |  |   SECRETARIAT
             |   AFFAIRS         |     |       |  |  |        |
             |       |           |     |       |  |  | Statistics Bureau
        SPECIAL  First Section   | _Hsien_ (or |  |  | Confidential
     COMMITTEES  Second Section  | Municipal)  |  |  |   Affairs Section
             |   Third Section   | Party Organ |  |  | Finance Section
             |                   |     |       |  |  | Business Section
  Revolutionary Achievements     |     |       |  |  |
    Investigation Committee      | District    |  |  |
  Pension Committee              |  (_ch'ü_)   |  | PARTY-MINISTRY OF
  Party History Committee        | Party Organ |  |    ORGANIZATION
  Revolutionary Loans Committee  |     |       |  |          |
  Overseas Chinese Contributions |     |       |  | Regular Party
    Committee                    | Sub-district|  |    Affairs Section
              |------------------| (_ch'ü-fên_)|  | Special-Area Party
              |                    Party Organ |  |    Affairs Section
         PARTY-MINISTRY                |       |  | Army Party Affairs
           OF SOCIAL                   |       |  |    Section
            AFFAIRS                Small Group |  | Party-Members Regi-
              |                        |       |  |    stration Section
  Section for People's Organizations   |       |  | General Affairs
  Social Movements Section           PARTY     |  |     Section
  Editing Section                  MEMBERSHIP  |  | Inspection Office
  General Affairs Section                      |  |
                                               |  |
                      |------------------------|  |-------|
                      |                                   |
       PARTY-MINISTRY OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS           PARTY-MINISTRY
          [in process of organization]             OF PUBLICITY
                                                          |
                           |------------------------------|
                           |                              |
            Publicity Advisers                  Publicity Advisory
            The Central News Agency               Section
            Party Press                         International Publicity
            The Central Motion Picture Studios    Section
            The Central Broadcasting            Newspaper Section
               Administration Section           Motion Picture Section
                                                General Affairs Section



_B._ CONSTITUTION OF THE SAN MIN CHU I YOUTH CORPS, YEAR XXVII (1938)[1]


  [Footnote 1: San-min-chu-i Ch'ing-nien T'uan Chung-yang T'uan-pu [_San
  Min Chu I_ Youth Corps Central Corps Headquarters], _San-min-chu-i
  Ch'ing-nien T'uan T'uan-chang_ [Corps Constitution of the _San Min Chu
  I_ Youth Corps], Chungking, n.d.]

     Proclaimed June 16, 1938, amended by the Fourth Meeting of
     the Corps' Provisional Central Managing Board, July 17,
     1939, this is the fundamental charter of the most
     significant Kuomintang auxiliary to appear in many years.


CHAPTER I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. The name of the organization is the San Min Chu I Youth Corps.

2. The object of the Corps is to unite and train young people, to
enforce the San Min Chu I, to defend the nation, and to bring national
rebirth.


CHAPTER II. MEMBERSHIP

3. All Chinese youths, male or female, aged between 16 to 25, vowing to
abide by the Corps constitution, can become members of the Corps upon
the payment of the membership fee.

Members of the Managing Boards of various subordinate Corps agencies and
other Headquarters officials specially admitted are not restricted by
the above rule. Members who pass 25 years of age can still retain their
membership in the Corps.

4. Two members of the Corps must propose and second a member before the
latter can become eligible. The new member must also be approved by the
Sectional Corps and Troop and his name registered in the Central Corps
Headquarters.

5. New members must take an oath before admittance, as follows:

"I hereby swear that I promise to abide by the principles of San Min Chu
I, to obey the order of the Corps Leader, to abide by the constitution
of the corps, to act according to the principles of the New Life
Movement, to be ever loyal to the Principles, to work for all other
people, to stand firm against all hardships, and to be prepared to
sacrifice my all. I promise that if I fail to perform the above duties,
I will be willing to receive the severest punishments."

6. The private life of the members should be in conformity with the
regulations fixed by the Corps.

7. Members of the Corps who die in service or who lose their profession
because of service in the Corps will receive pensions or other relief.
The detailed procedure will be fixed later.

8. Members, upon a change of profession or job, or upon removal to other
localities, must register with their identification cards at the local
Corps Headquarters.


CHAPTER III. SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION

9. The system of organization of the Corps is as follows: the Central
Corps Headquarters, the Branch Corps, the Divisional Corps, the
Sectional Corps, the Divisional Troop, the Sectional Troop.

10. Besides the above, the Corps may organize other sub-organizations
according to the nature of the locality, the profession of the members,
etc. The details will be further fixed.


CHAPTER IV. THE CORPS LEADER

11. The Corps Leader is the highest executive of the Corps, and is
concurrently the Party Chief of the Kuomintang [Chiang K'ai-shek].

12. The Corps Leader is the chairman in the All-Corps Representative
Assembly, and has the power to veto a resolution already passed by the
Assembly; he also has the power to finally sanction all resolutions
passed by the Central Managing Board and the Central Controlment Board.



CHAPTER V. THE ALL-CORPS REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHER MEETINGS OF
REPRESENTATIVES

13. The All-Corps Representative Assembly may be held every two years.
At the discretion of the Corps Leader or the Central Managing Board,
however, it may be postponed or a temporary meeting be held instead.

14. The works of the All-Corps Representative Assembly are:

_a._ to discuss and examine the report submitted by the Central Managing
Board and the Central Controlment Board.

_b._ to fix plans for the Corps activities.

_c._ to discuss motions proposed by the Corps Leader.

15. The Meeting of Representatives of the Branch Corps may be held once
a year. At the discretion of the Central Managing Board, however, the
Meeting may be postponed or a temporary Meeting be held instead.

16. The duties of the Meeting of Representatives of the Branch Corps
are:

_a._ to examine and discuss the reports submitted by the Managing Board
and the Controlment Board of the Branch Corps.

_b._ to fix plans for the Branch Corps activities.

17. The Meeting of Members of the Sectional Corps is held every six
months. At the discretion of the Managing Board of the Branch Corps, it
may be postponed or a temporary meeting be held instead. If the number
of members of the Section is too big or if the communication system is
unfavorable, a Meeting of the Representatives of the Sectional Corps may
be held.

18. The duties of the Meeting of the Members of the Sectional Corps are:

_a._ to examine and discuss the reports submitted by the Managing Board
and the Controlment Board of the Sectional Corps.

_b._ to fix plans for the Sectional Corps Activities.

19. The Meeting of Members of the Divisional Troop is to take place
every three months. At the discretion of its Managing Board, it may be
postponed, or a temporary meeting be called.

20. The duties of the Meeting of Members of the Divisional Troop are:

_a._ to examine the reports submitted by the Leader of the Divisional
Troop.

_b._ to fix the plans for the Divisional Troop activities.

21. Meetings for the Members of the Sectional Troop will be held every
week, to be presided over by the Leaders of the Sectional Troop. Unless
specially permitted, these meetings must not be postponed. During these
meetings, reports concerning politics, the Troop activities,
discussions, etc., will be read. New members are admitted through these
meetings too, and plans for the Sectional Troop activities will be
fixed.

22. The system of organization for the various Meetings of Members or
Meetings of Representatives will be fixed later.


CHAPTER VI. THE CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS

23. The Central Managing Board of the Central Corps Headquarters is
formed by twenty-five to thirty-five managing directors, in addition to
the nine to fifteen reserve members of the Managing Board.

24. The Central Managing Board has the following powers:

_a._ to execute the orders of the Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek] and to
execute the resolutions passed in the All-Corps Representative Assembly.

_b._ to fix the plans for activities.

_c._ to form various corps of lower rank, and to command or inspect
their activities.

_d._ to execute all resolutions submitted by the Central Controlment
Board.

_e._ to form a budget to regulate various financial questions of the
Corps.

25. The Central Managing Board forms a Standing Managing Board
consisting of nine Standing Managing Directors, appointed by the Corps
Leader from among the twenty-five to thirty-five Managing Directors.
This Standing Managing Board fulfills the duties of the Central Managing
Board Meeting when the latter is not in session.

26. The Corps Leader appoints a Secretary-General to the Central
Managing Board from among the Standing Managing Directors, to direct all
the affairs of the Board.

27. The various sub-organs of the Central Managing Board will be
formulated later, together with their system of organization.

28. There are a Manager and a Vice-Manager in the Office of the
Secretary-General. They are nominated by the Secretary and appointed by
the Corps Leader.

29. In every Department of the Central Managing Board there is a
Commissioner and one or two Deputy Commissioners. They are appointed by
the Corps Leader upon the nomination of the Secretary-General.

30. The Central Corps Headquarters has a Central Controlment Board of
twenty-five to thirty-five members and nine to fifteen reserve members.

31. The duties of the Central Controlment Board are:

_a._ to inspect the progress of the Corps activities.

_b._ to raise and examine all statements concerning any member who does
not fulfill his duties.

_c._ to audit all incomes and expenditures of the Corps.

_d._ to direct Controlment Boards of lower rank in their work of
inspection.

32. The Central Controlment Board forms a Standing Controlment Board
consisting of five members of the Controlment Board, appointed by the
Corps Leader. This Standing Controlment Board shall function when the
Controlment Board is not in session.

33. The Central Controlment Board has also a Secretary-General,
appointed by the Corps Leader from among the Standing Controlment Board
members. He shall direct the affairs of the Central Controlment Board.

34. The Central Controlment Board has various sub-organs, of which the
system of organization will be fixed later.

35. Both the Central Managing Board and the Central Controlment Board
will hold meetings every three months, to be presided over by the Corps
Leader. Under special circumstances there may be temporary meetings or
combined meetings for the two Boards.


CHAPTER VII. THE BRANCH CORPS

36. The Branch Corps has a Managing Board consisting of seven to eleven
members, besides the three to five reserve members.

37. The duties of the Branch Corps Managing Board are:

_a._ to execute the orders from the Central Corps Headquarters and the
resolutions passed in the Meeting of the Representatives of the Branch
Corps.

_b._ to fix the plans for the activities of the Branch Corps.

_c._ to command and inspect the works of the lower organs.

_d._ to execute all resolutions submitted by the Branch Corps
Controlment Board.

_e._ to form a budget regulating the financial state of the Branch
Corps.

38. The Managing Board has a Secretary, appointed by the Corps Leader,
from among the members of the Managing Board. He is to direct all
affairs of the Managing Board.

39. The Managing Board has various sub-organs, the system of
organization of which will be fixed later.

40. The Branch Corps has a Controlment Board consisting of three to five
members with three reserve members.

41. The Controlment Board has a Secretary, appointed by the Corps Leader
from among the Controlment Board members, to discharge all affairs of
the Board.

42. The system of organization of the various sub-organs of the
Controlment Board will be fixed later.

43. The duties of the Controlment Board are:

_a._ to inspect the progress of the activities done by the lower organs.

_b._ to raise and examine statements concerning any member who rebels
against the discipline of the Corps.

_c._ to audit the budget and all financial statements of the Branch
Corps.

_d._ to direct the Controlment Boards of lower rank in their work of
inspection.

44. The Managing Board of the Branch Corps should hold meetings every
half-month. The Controlment Board should meet once every month. The
meetings are to be presided over by the Secretaries. Under special
circumstances, temporary sessions or combined meetings may be held.

45. The Branch Corps has also one to five Directors, appointed by the
Corps Leader, to direct the affairs of the Branch Corps.


CHAPTER VIII. THE DIVISIONAL CORPS

46. The Divisional Corps has three to five Managing Directors, who have
power to command, direct, inspect, and examine the work done by the
Divisional Corps, in accordance to the will of the higher Corps
Headquarters.

47. There is a Secretary of the Divisional Corps, appointed by the Corps
Leader from among the Managing Directors, whose duty it is to discharge
all the affairs of the Divisional Corps.

48. The Managing Directors should perform their duties in various
localities at various periods.

49. Whenever necessary, the Secretary of the Divisional Corps can call a
Managing Directors' meeting.

50. A Divisional Corps will be formed when there are more than five
Sectional Corps under it. But this may not take place if the Managing
Board of the Branch Corps sees no necessity for such action.


CHAPTER IX. THE SECTIONAL CORPS

51. The Sectional Corps has a Managing Board formed by three to five
members and one to three reserve members, elected in the General Meeting
of the Members of the Sectional Corps or in the Meeting of the
Representatives of the Sectional Corps.

52. The duties of the Managing Board are:

_a._ to execute the orders of the higher Corps Headquarters and the
resolutions passed in the Meeting of the Members of the Sectional Corps
or the Meeting of the Representatives of the Sectional Corps.

_b._ to fix the plans for activities.

_c._ to direct and watch the activities of the lower organs.

_d._ to form a budget and other financial statements.

_e._ to execute the resolutions passed in the Meeting of the Controlment
Board.

_f._ to examine the work done by the Divisional Troops and Sectional
Troops.

53. The Managing Board has a Secretary, appointed by the Corps Leader
from among the members of the Managing Board, to discharge all the
affairs of the Managing Board.

54. The system of organization of the various sub-organs of the Managing
Board will be formulated later.

55. The Sectional Corps has a Controlment Board formed by three members
and one reserve member. Under special circumstances, there is sometimes
only one Controller without any Controlment Board.

56. The Controlment Board has one Secretary, appointed by the Corps
Leader from among the members of the Controlment Board, who is to
discharge all affairs of the Board.

57. The duties of the Controlment Board are:

_a._ to inspect the works done by the Sectional Corps, and by the
Divisional and Sectional Troops under the Sectional Corps.

_b._ to raise and examine statements concerning members who rebel
against the Corps discipline.

_c._ to audit financial statements of the Sectional Corps and those of
the Divisional and Sectional Troops under it.

58. The Managing Board and the Controlment Board of the Sectional Corps
will hold separate meetings once every half-month. The respective
Secretaries shall preside. Under special conditions they can call for
temporary sessions.


CHAPTER X. THE DIVISIONAL TROOP

59. The Divisional Troop has a Leader and an Assistant Leader, elected
from among the Leaders and Assistant Leaders of the Sectional Troop and
by themselves.

60. The Divisional Troop executes the orders of the superior organs and
the resolutions passed in the All-Corps Representative Assembly. The
Divisional Troop also directs and examines the work of the members.


CHAPTER XI. THE SECTIONAL TROOP

61. The Sectional Troop is the basic organization of the San Min Chu I
Youth Corps. It is formed by eight to fifteen members, with a Leader and
an Assistant Leader elected by the members themselves.

62. The chief duties of the Sectional Troop are:

_a._ to execute the orders of all superior organs and all resolutions
passed in the Sectional Troop Meeting.

_b._ to call for new members and to collect the fees.

_c._ to train and examine every member.

_d._ to read books, to propagate San Min Chu I and its policies, to
distribute publicity literature.

_e._ to participate in all social activities.

_f._ to investigate political and social conditions.

63. All extra-Corps organs holding more than three members may form
special Groups, upon the sanction of the Sectional Troop. Their duty is
to execute the principles of the Corps and to watch the work of the
members. Whenever necessary, the chief of the Group may attend the
Sectional Corps Meetings.


CHAPTER XII. THE ELECTION OF OFFICERS AND THEIR TERM OF SERVICE

64. Unless already specified, the members of the Managing Boards of the
various Corps and Troops are elected in the General Meeting or the
Meeting of Representatives of the respective Corps and Troops. Before
the General Meeting or the Meeting of Representatives, the members of
the Managing Boards are appointed by the Corps Leader.

65. The duration of service of members of the Managing and Controlment
Boards of the Central Corps Headquarters is two years. That of members
of the corresponding Boards of the other Corps is one year. That of the
Leaders and Assistant Leaders of the two Corps is six months. All of
them can be re-elected.


CHAPTER XIII. DISCIPLINE

66. All members should obey the following commandments:

_a._ All questions may be freely discussed. But no dispute is allowed,
once the final resolution is passed.

_b._ It is not allowed to rebel against the principles of the New Life
Movement.

_c._ It is prohibited to reveal the secrets of the Corps.

_d._ It is prohibited for members to join other organizations.

_e._ It is prohibited to criticize unfavorably the Kuomintang and the
Corps, or to plot against other members.

_f._ It is prohibited to express one's ideas too freely upon current
events, especially those that are against the resolved plans or policies
of the Kuomintang or the Corps.

_g._. It is prohibited to form other organizations within the Corps.

67. Those who are proved to act against the above rules will e punished
in the following ways:

  _a._ warning
  _b._ demerit
  _c._ cross-questioning
  _d._ expulsion
  _e._ other appropriate punishments.


CHAPTER XIV. FEES

68. Every member must pay a membership fee of ten cents on entering the
Corps.

69. A monthly contribution of ten cents is required of every member.
Under special circumstances other contributions may be called for.


CHAPTER XV. AMENDMENTS, ETC.

70. This Constitution may be amended, with the approval of the Corps
Leader, in the All-Corps Representative Assembly or in the Meeting of
the Central Managing Board.

71. The Constitution is enforced upon the day of announcement, having
been approved by the Corps Leader.




_C_. THE DUTIES AND GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE SAN MIN CHU I YOUTH CORPS
(CH'ÊN CH'ÊNG)[1]


  [Footnote 1: Ch'ên Ch'êng, _K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Yü Ch'ing-nien
  Tsê-jen_ [Resistance and Reconstruction in Relation to the Duties of
  Youth], Chungking XXIX (1940), p. 43-68. The book was published by the
  Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission (_Chün-shih
  Wei-yüan-hui Chêng-chih-pu_) of the National Government.]

     A lecture delivered May 9, 1940, before a Kuomintang
     training class: note the somewhat pedagogical outline.
     General Ch'ên Ch'êng, until recently Secretary-General of
     the Corps, is one of the closest military associates of the
     Generalissimo.


OUTLINE


A. THE DUTIES AND NATURE OF THE CORPS:

1. _Duties_: to organize and train the nation's youth with a view to
enforcing the San Min Chu I; to lead and unify the ideals, opinions and
activities of the nation's youth; to centralize and cultivate special
talents, forming a nucleus to serve as a model.

2. _Activities_: to urge youths to join the practical work connected
with the war of national defense; to enforce military and political
training; to encourage civil progress, labor and skill in production.

3. _Nature_: the Corps is an organization composed of young people and
included within the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang and the Corps are one and
indivisible.


B. THE GROWTH AND THE PLAN CONCERNING THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORK OF
THE CORPS:

1. _Growth_: Period of formation, July 9, 1938 to September 1939; full
establishment since September 1939, when the Central Managing Board and
the Central Controlment Board were formed.

2. _Plan concerning the intensification of activities_: Amendment of the
Corps Constitution; issuing of general procedures for the carrying out
of the activities to various sections; general principles governing the
future activities of the Corps.


C. GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS:

1. _Organization_: general development of the organization in various
localities; calling for new members; regulating the inner structures of
the organization; the formation of a selected central nucleus.

2. _Training_: entrance training and normal training; young men's summer
camp; training of talented gliders.

3. _Publicity_: periodicals at fixed intervals; the compilation of
various collective works; the formation of a committee for publicity.

4. _Social works_: the establishment of a Young Men's Labor Service
Camp; the distribution of Young Men's Entertaining Offices in various
localities; the work of Youths' Service Associations and Corps in
various localities.

5. _Financial assistance_: compilation of Dr. Sun's works on economics;
aid given to young men's work for material productivity; planning of
business organizations under group management.


D. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE TWO YEARS' ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS AND THE
PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE NATION'S YOUTH:

1. _General discussion of the two years' activities_: its good as well
as its bad points.

2. _Principles guiding the nation's youth_: conclusion.


A. THE DUTIES AND NATURE OF THE CORPS


1. The Duties

It is two years since the establishment of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps
was declared at Hankow on July 7, 1938. From the name, we know that the
purpose of its creation is to employ the unified efforts of the
nation's youth in the work of carrying out the San Min Chu I. As youth
is the vital element in a nation's life and the foundation for all
future social and political progress, the Kuomintang has, in the second
and present stage of national salvation, especially organized a Youth
Corps to reinforce the powers of the Kuomintang by shouldering the
following epochal duties:

First, to unite and train the nation's youth for the promulgation of San
Min Chu I, the defense of the nation and the salvation of its people.

Secondly, to lead the nation's youth to a unity of thought and
activities so that they can justly perform the great task of national
salvation, thus completing the second phase of the achievements of the
People's Revolution.[2]

  [Footnote 2: _Kuo-min kê-ming_, i.e., the revolution (_kê-ming_) as
  planned by Sun Yat-sen.]

Thirdly, to collect youth of especial talents for the central nucleus as
a model for all, thereby giving new and ever-confirming life to the
Kuomintang, and enabling it to carry out its future work.


2. The Activities

The Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek] has clearly stated in his open
letter to the nation's youth that the chief activities of the Corps are
six in number:

1. To mobilize the activities of youth according to the National General
Mobilization Act.

2. To give thorough military training to develop the skill in defending
the nation.

3. To heighten political training, giving every youth the required
political knowledge for a citizen of a republic.

4. To encourage civil progress, thus raising the general intellectual
standard of the nation.

5. To encourage labor and service, according to the motto: Life is to
serve.

6. To develop the skill in material productivity according to scientific
principles, thus hastening the work of national construction.

The first two of the above are collectively the fundamental works of
military reconstruction, the third and fourth are those of education,
and the last two those of economic reconstruction. The Corps has
classified the various aspects of the above works of national
construction as the works of the youth. Besides, we should clearly
understand that they are the fundamental requisites of a complete system
of national defense, and form the first stage towards the completion of
a republic based upon the San Min Chu I.


3. The Nature

The Corps is a Youth association included within the organization of the
Kuomintang, under one principle, one leader, one command, and is willing
to struggle for the sake of the People's Revolution. The Kuomintang and
the Corps are one and indivisible. It is "The Kuomintang's [own] Corps."
If a distinction is necessary, then we may say that the members of the
Corps have a special duty to organize and train the nation's youth so
that it may be able to shoulder the responsibilities and work concerning
social welfare and national salvation. Thus the Corps may be said to be
the younger and newer life of the Kuomintang. Besides, it may also serve
the Kuomintang in various aspects; for example, if, as in case of
overseas localities, Kuomintang work is difficult to execute, the Corps
may be established instead, or also, if people are not willing to join
the Kuomintang, they may join the Corps. With the formation of the
Corps, therefore, the Kuomintang may be enlarged and strengthened.

The relation between the Kuomintang members and the Corps members is
clearly stated. According to the amended Constitution of the Corps, the
age of members has been changed from eighteen to thirty-eight years, to
sixteen to twenty-five years. Also according to the resolution of the
Central Regular Meeting of the Kuomintang, the relation between the two
is as follows:

1. Members joining the Kuomintang should be above twenty-five years of
age.

2. Corps members reaching the age of 25 will become Kuomintang members.

3. Students staying in schools, irrespective of their age, are
considered Corps members. Those who previously joined the Kuomintang
should also become members of the Corps, reserving their membership in
the Kuomintang.

We can see that Kuomintang members and Corps members differ chiefly in
their ages. Except for this, the two are in fact one.

With a view to the system of organization, the Kuomintang and the Corps
each has its own structure. The Kuomintang leads the Corps, but this
does not mean that the Corps is under the Kuomintang in authority. In
the speech, "The Relation between the Kuomintang and the Corps," made by
the Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek], we are told that under the same
general system of organization, the aim of the Kuomintang's leadership
of the Corps is to unite all our efforts under the same banner. Leading
does not mean in the least commanding or ordering. To lead is to help.
Hence a Corps member may also lead a Kuomintang member. The idea is to
make both members combine their energy towards helping our leader. The
strength of the Corps depends upon the well-being of the Kuomintang,
while the future of the Kuomintang depends upon the growth of the Corps.
There should be mutual help between the two in order to reach the same
final goal. Hence the activities of the two organizations should be
everywhere combined into one, employing division of labor and
cooperation wherever and whenever possible.


B. THE GROWTH AND THE PLAN CONCERNING THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORKS
OF THE CORPS


1. The Growth

In April 1938, the Representatives of the Kuomintang gathered together
for a Meeting (Congress) to amend the Constitution of the Kuomintang and
to form the San Min Chu I Youth Corps in order to gather the nation's
youth for the great task of national reconstruction. It was also
resolved that the Party Chief (Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek) is at the
same time the Corps Leader. On June 16, the Corps Leader issued his
Letter to the Nation's Youth, and announced the constitution of the
Corps. On July 9, a Central Managing Board was temporarily formed as the
Corps' central organization. The growth of the Corps activities can be
divided into two periods:

1. _Period of formation_: July 1938 to September 1939. During this
period, the Central Managing Board was formed. While the other work of
organizing was done according to a principle of simplicity, as advised
by the Corps Leader, all other internal organs were formed according to
their necessity. The various subsections in different provinces and
districts were also formed during this period.

2. _Period of full establishment_: September 1939 to the present. In
accordance with general opinions, the Central Managing Board temporarily
formed was dissolved after its fourth general meeting, and on September
1, 1939 a permanent Central Managing Board and a Central Controlment
Board were formed. The Corps Leader has on various occasions appointed
thirty-five members for the Central Managing Board with fifteen more as
reserve members, and thirty-five members for the Central Controlment
Board with fifteen reserve members also. Besides, there are five
standing members of the Central Managing Board and five standing members
of the Central Controlment Board. The rest of the officials are also
appointed. The system of organization is as follows:

                                             Office of the Sec.-Gen.
                                              |
            |Sessions of       | |          |-| |Department of General
  The Corps |the Central       | |Secretary-|   |  Administration
    Chief   |Managing Board    |-|General   |---|Organization
      |     |                  | |          |   |  Department
      |-----|Sessions of the   |                |Training
            |Standing Committee|                |  Department
            |of the Central    |                |Publicity
            |Managing Board    |                |  Department
                                                |Department of
                                                |  Social Work
                                                |Finance
                                                |  Department
                                                |Young Women's
                                                |  Department


2. Plan concerning the Intensification of Activities

The aim of having a permanent Central Managing Board is to conclude the
work of the formative period and start the work of calling for the
nation's youth in the task of national reconstruction. The plans
concerning the intensification of activities are all based upon the
orders of the Corps Leader, the past experiences of the Corps members,
and the present situation; the chief plans are:

1. _Amendment of the Constitution_--to increase the training of the
Corps members and to fix the system of organization for the All-Corps
Representative Assembly in accordance with the idea of democracy. The
chief points are (_a_) the change in age limit from eighteen to
thirty-eight years to sixteen to twenty-five years, and (_b_) to fix the
system of organization for the General Meetings of the Corps members and
their Representatives; the fixing of rules concerning the election into
office of the members and their period of service.

2. _Issuing of general procedures for the carrying out of the activities
of various sections_: (_a_) to make all members and all youth understand
that the Corps is a youth organization to train and unite all youth in
the principles of San Min Chu I, with the aim of strengthening the
nation's defense; (_b_) to lead the nation's youth in the cultivation of
good national characteristics, to exemplify their deeds and actions, and
to correct all fallacious beliefs, and childish actions. These are the
ways of training good useful youth for the national service; (_c_) the
subsections of the Corps should work for all the members of the Corps,
while the members should work for all the youth of the country. They
should encourage all youth to serve all the citizens of the nation,
thereby fulfilling the duties of youth toward the country; (_d_) in
calling for members, special attention is paid to discover youth of
higher abilities. At the same time it is necessary that the Corps work
should be good enough so as to be able to influence all the youth of the
nation so that they will join the Corps of their own accord; (_e_) the
subsections in schools should work in conjunction with the educational
authorities. The assistance of the teachers is necessary in order to
develop the political ideas, the mind work, the physical constitution of
the youth, besides the cultivation of the power to organize and
cooperate; (_f_) to organize society's youth, especially those having a
profession or those who are capable of material productivity, so that
they may be joined to the youth in schools in forming a combined
strength necessary to the establishment of a revolutionary nation; (_g_)
to point out to the youth the activities done in the war of national
defense, the international relations, and the intrigues of the traitors
and enemies, thus making every youth able to distinguish the right from
the wrong. At the same time, they should be encouraged under favorable
conditions to work for national defense; (_h_) to help every youth solve
the problem of his livelihood. For example, the choice of a profession,
the question of education, etc. The members should therefore look upon
their Corps as their family, not as a mere institution for work.

3. _General principles governing the future activities of the Corps_:
(_a_) in obedience to the ideas expressed by the Corps Leader, and based
upon the experience obtained during the period of two years, it has been
resolved that the chief aim of the activities of the Corps is to
solidify the union of the members, so that it may become the central
motivating force for all the youth of the nation; (_b_) the activities
of the Corps will also be directed to benefit youths, especially those
in school, to help them solve all questions and troubles that usually
confront young men. Besides, the Corps also aims at mobilizing the youth
in war districts, and behind the enemy front, to increase the force of
national defense; (_c_) the principles regarding the admittance of new
members will be: 1, that quality as well as quantity will be considered;
2, that youths in schools will be especially fitted for membership,
although youths having professions will not be neglected; 3, that women
members will be especially welcome; (_d_) in establishing the various
subdivisions of the Corps in various localities, importance will be
especially given to provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, Shensi, and Kansu.
Except these, attention is also given to overseas districts (the Malay
Archipelago) and behind the enemy lines. All subdivisions formerly
established will be unified under one status, and be turned into regular
subdivisions; (_e_) a date for the All-Corps Representative Assembly
will be fixed, as well as the dates for the General Meetings of Members;
(_f_) the training of the members will be chiefly military and
political, emphasizing the skill to produce, with plenty of practice in
various actual fields, so that the works of the Corps and those of
society will be interrelated; (_g_) the training of the members is
divided into primary, middle, and senior parts, with special attention
upon the lower two. Different training courses are given according to
the abilities, talents, and inclinations of the members; (_h_) the
training of the central nucleus is based upon the general training for
groups, laying special emphasis upon mental and physical training so
that the central nucleus may be the model for other members.

(_i_) The central aim of publicity is to lead the nation's youth to
recognize the history and national character of the Chinese nation, to
fight for national unity and salvation, to find the way of becoming a
"Chinese," and to abolish all fallacious beliefs that are detrimental to
the growth of the nation; (_j_) to intensify the movement to all classes
of people, attention is drawn to the fact that: 1, every member is a
publicity member; 2, actions and not words should be the basis of
publicity; 3, care should be given to the difference in locality, time,
or people, when the members are helping to do social work; 4, members'
actions and thoughts should be earnest, devoted, intelligent,
ingenuous, and truthful; (_k_) to increase the cooperation between
youths, the amount of publicity literature should be increased.
Encouragement should also be given to the study of science and to
development of the physical constitution; (_l_) social service is
especially aimed at relieving the poor and the sick, paying attention to
the wounded soldiers, their families, refugees, and other helpless
people; (_m_) the calling in and training of students who have no chance
to study should be emphasized. Help should be given them to find work or
continue studies. Attention should also be given to those behind the
enemy's lines so that they may not turn out to be traitors.

(_n_) The work of the Young Men's Labor Service Camp, the Young Men's
Service Association and Corps should be intensified, aiming at the
increase of necessary public services during wartime, and the hastening
of social advancement; (_o_) concerning the financial help given to the
members, attention is given to group works like cooperative stores, etc.
Encouragement is given for thrift, saving, etc.; (_p_) members should be
encouraged to produce more, to heighten the skill in production; (_q_)
members should spread the new economic thought expressed in the San Min
Chu I. They should also study the various books on economics; (_r_)
encouragement is given to young women, especially those in war districts
and students who want to join the Corps. Training will be given to them.
Their work is chiefly to spread the spirit of the Corps among women, to
render war-time assistance and educational help; (_s_) rigid inspection
of the Corps personnel is to be enforced: 1, not only may a lower
officer be reprimanded by a senior officer, but vice versa; 2, in every
subdivision of the Corps an organization to inspect the personnel is
formed; 3, attention is given to the reserve list of the Corps
personnel; 4, rigid censure of careless and corrupt officials, and also
of those who recommended them.

(_t_) A system of inspecting the various activities of the Corps is to
be formed; 1, the inspectors are given the authority to watch and to
lead; 2, the various subdivisions should elect officials who shall
constantly make inspection tours; 3, close cooperation with the Central
Controlment Board should be established; (_u_) a competition of
activities among various subdivisions should be encouraged, whether it
be interdivisional, personal, etc. Competitions are based upon research
statistics, exchange of views, grading of work, etc.


C. THE GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS


1. Organization

With the formation of the Central Managing Board of the Corps,
organizing work has been pushed ahead to hasten the mutual movements of
the nation's youth, especially those in the provinces of Szechwan,
Shensi, Kansu, and Kweichow. The chief points concerning the organizing
movement are as follows:

1. _General development of the organization in various localities._ The
subdivisions originally planned have all been formed. In Szechwan,
subdivisions are formed in every city (_hsien_). In the rest of the
provinces, subdivisions are formed in different districts. Subdivisions
have also been formed in the chief universities and middle schools in
the country. Owing to special circumstances, overseas and war districts
are under the investigation of special officials sent there to inspect
the local surroundings before the subdivisions be formed.

2. _Membership enrollment_: Members are chiefly youthful students and
youths with some ability. According to the report made in April 1940,
there are 126,111 members in the Corps. Members will be called according
to the basic plan in the future, and especially women members and other
young men will be encouraged to join.

3. _Regulation of the inner structures of the organization and the
formation of a central nucleus_: to insure perfect harmony in carrying
out various activities, those temporary subdivisions which have been
doing good work and which have an efficient central nucleus are to be
made into regular subdivisions. The selection of the central executive
nucleus will be based upon the talent of the members. The method of
selection is by means of questioning, recommendation, or other ways.


2. The Training

Training of the Corps members is to organize an efficient executive
organization for the sake of practical national reconstruction according
to the principles of San Min Chu I. Besides military and political
training, attention is given to the development of skill in production.
At present, the chief training work of the Corps is as follows: (_a_)
Entrance training and normal training: there are usually three stages of
training, viz.: entrance training, normal training, and special
training for nucleus members. Except the last mentioned, all members of
the Corps must undergo the first two trainings. The period of entrance
training is two weeks, during which the training of the mind is
emphasized. Normal training is divided into reading, discussion, and
recommended readings. Weekly gatherings are held for all members of a
division to attend. The recommended readings are based upon the Corps
Leader's "Recommended Readings and Methods of Discussion." Every member
must read a number of required books, according to the systematic plan
given. (_b_) Young Men's Summer Camp--this is aimed at collectively
training all members who are attending schools. During July and August
1938, a tentative camp has been formed at Chungking and Chengtu, with
mostly university and middle school students as attending members. It is
planned to start similar camps at Chengtu, Chungking, Sian, and Changsha
this year. (_c_) Training of gliders: this is aimed at heightening the
interest in aviation shown by youths. The Corps has arranged with the
Aviation Committee to form a class of amateur gliders, who will become
pilots in the future.


3. Publicity

Besides the normal work concerning publicity, special attention is given
to:

1. Fixed periodicals, such as the "Chinese Youth Monthly," the "News of
the Corps Activities," the "Civil News," the "Materials for Publicity,"
etc. They aim at teaching the various subdivisions the work of publicity
and at supplying materials for publicity. Besides these, there are many
local publications of the Corps.

2. The compilation of collected works, such as the "Young Men's Books
concerning National Defense," the "Young Men's Books of History and
Geography," the "San Min Chu I Series for Youth," etc. Among pamphlets
for publicity are "Dr. Sun's teachings for the Young Men," "The Way of
Leading Youth's Career," "The May 4 Movement and Modern Young Men's
Movements," etc. Besides these, the Corps has other publicity organs,
such as the Central Publicity Corps, the Youth's Dramatic Associations
of various subdivisions, etc. Publicity literature is distributed in
various localities by the China Civil Supply Association, or its
branches, or sometimes by specially chartered book companies.


4. Social Work

At present the Social Work of the Corps is aimed at cultivating youths'
ability to serve, especially in the present stage of warfare: (_a_) the
formation of Young Men's Labor Service Camps--this is to develop the
skill of production so as to help the country materially. This camp was
tentatively formed at Chengtu and Chungking where young men were
gathered to receive the required training; (_b_) various local Young
Men's Entertaining Offices--these are established in eleven places among
which are Chungking, Sian, Changsha, Kweilin, Kinhwa. There is a monthly
accommodation capacity of about three thousand men. Many of them are to
be sent later to the Young Men's Labor Service Camp for training; (_c_)
various local Young Men's Service Associations and Corps--their aim is
to serve in the war zone, and to help the productivity of society. The
Service Associations under the various subdivisions of the Corps are
formed at Chengtu, Sian, Lanchow, Changsha, Kweilin, Ch'ü-chiang, etc.,
numbering forty-two in all. The Service Corps are formed in twenty-three
places, such as Hungyang, Neichuan, Wanling, Kingshan, etc.


5. Financial Assistance

The aim of this branch of work is to spread Dr. Sun's economic thoughts
as shown in the San Min Chu I, besides helping the members financially
by means of cooperative movements. At present, the works emphasized are:

1. Compilation of Dr. Sun's economic works--they are based upon the San
Min Chu I, the various manifestos issued, and a study of comparative
economy of other countries. There are twelve series of books thus
published, _e.g._, "The Economic Theories and System of the San Min Chu
I," "The Population Policy of China," "The Labor Policy of China," "The
Policy of Land Tenure in China," etc.

2. Aid given to youth along material productivity--the Corps pays
special attention to the theory and practice of material productivity.
It has arranged with the Board of Economy a plan to establish
cooperative organizations with the Board, and the Central Office for
Agricultural Research, so that the Corps members can have practical work
in economic reconstruction.

3. Planning of business organizations under group
management--temporarily, the activities along this line will be the
establishment of cooperative stores. These are now the "Young Men's
Dressing Stores," the "Haosen Cooperative Store," and other local Young
Men's Cooperative Stores.


D. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE TWO YEARS' ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS AND THE
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE NATION'S YOUTH


1. Discussion of the Corps' Past Work

Due to lack of experience, there were some unavoidable points which
await reformation. According to the reports submitted by the touring
inspectors, the work for 1939 and that of the first three months of 1940
can be described in a list:

1. _Bad Points_: 1, Due to the short period of time, activities of the
Corps have failed to cope with the original plan and schedule; 2, The
development of the Corps activities has not yet been made known to the
mass of youth. Thus the foundation of the Corps is not yet strong
enough; 3, Publicity and service have not yet been adequately mixed. The
ideal "service is publicity" has not yet been reached. At the same time,
owing to traffic interruption, publicity literature has not been widely
distributed; 4, Members are deficient in their conception of the central
activities of the Corps. The subdivisions in schools are especially
lacking in this conception. They require further training; 5, The
officers lack adequate force. Many of them occupy other positions so
that their whole attention cannot be concentrated upon the Corps
activities.

2. _Good Points_: 1, On the whole, officers and members of the central
nucleus are persevering, and possess the will to sacrifice. The
remuneration of the Corps officers is very low. Those working in the
front receive a monthly maintenance fee of only fifteen to twenty
dollars. They are living a soldier's life; 2, Due to the care of the
Corps bestowed upon social services, many social activities were first
started by the Corps to be followed later by the people; 3, As a rule,
the youths trained by the Corps have good discipline; example may be
taken from the fact that all the university students of Chungking
behaved very well in their schools after the training; 4, As a rule,
members are influenced by the spiritual loftiness of the Corps Leader
[Generalissimo Chiang]. They have the will to sacrifice, as shown by the
fact that many have willingly taken up work behind the enemy's lines.


2. Principles Guiding the Nation's Youth

Since the Corps has for its mission the training of youth, the officers
must shoulder the responsibility of leading youth to be good, to avoid
all past errors, corruption, etc., that harms the mind of youth instead
of benefiting it.

We must lead the youth according to the following principles:

1. As ones who have joined the People's Revolution, we should lead the
youth in accordance with the principles of San Min Chu I, in order that
we may conclude the work of the People's Revolution. We must use every
possible method to love and train all youth so as to make them strong
figures in the work of national defense and reconstruction.

2. In order to lead youth, we must know the youthful mind. The few young
men who went the wrong way are not bad in themselves, but merely
influenced by untrue and selfish ideas. To correct this we must first
correct ourselves, and be their example. We must love them as we do our
own children. In this way they shall certainly be happy to come to us.

3. It is necessary to know that the only real danger against our
People's Revolution is Japanese imperialism. The rest of the political
factions will be easily dealt with by political action in the future. We
must not be irritated at their existence.

4. In leading the youths to fight against imperialism and other
reactionary ideas, we must first of all conquer our own worst selves
before we can expect to be their leaders.

5. In leading the youths, we must induce them to shoulder all future
responsibilities. Let them understand that what they suffered in youth
should not be suffered by posterity. Do unto others what you expect
others to do unto you. The generations must progress, not go backward.

       *       *       *       *       *

The future activities of the Corps will be chiefly to unite and train
youth in productive work. On the one hand, we should call for all good
youths to be members of the Corps. On the other, we should select
specially qualified ones to form a central nucleus to shoulder jointly
the activities of the Corps. In this respect, the Corps shall and must
be able to accomplish the task that has been ever hoped for by the Corps
Leader.




_D._ THE _HSIAO-TSU_ (SMALL GROUP) TRAINING PROGRAM[1]


  [Footnote 1: Mimeographed memoranda from the Central Party
  Headquarters of the Kuomintang; presented to the author on July 17,
  1940, by Dr. K'an Nei-kuang, Deputy Secretary-General of the
  Kuomintang. The original title is _Hsiao-tsu Hsün-lien Kang-ling_;
  undated, unpublished.]

     A formal statement of Party policy, this was passed by the
     117th session of the Fifth Central Standing Committee of the
     Kuomintang on March 23, 1939 and amended by its 123rd
     session on June 15, 1939. This typifies the Kuomintang drive
     to establish closer contact with broad reaches of the
     population.


INTRODUCTION

The Sub-District Party Organ (_ch'ü-fen-pu_) is the fundamental unit of
the Kuomintang. Due to its large membership, it has been found extremely
difficult to give the members proper training. As a measure of remedy,
the Central Party Headquarters has promulgated a set of regulations
governing the small-group conference. However, due to the fact that the
position and nature of such an institution as well as its relations with
the Kuomintang have not been adequately defined, this plan has not been
successfully carried out. Recently, the Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Kuomintang [The Party Chief, Chiang
K'ai-shek] has repeatedly instructed that the small-group conference be
put into practice in order to improve the Party affairs. Hence, the
regulations were promulgated to be enforced by the various Party organs.

The Kuomintang aims to have a Party organ established in every
organization.[2] In order to realize this aim, the following points must
be observed:

  [Footnote 2: I.e., factory, cooperative, school, etc.]

1. The small-group conference is just for training the Party members. It
is different from the Sub-District Party Organ which is the lowest
administrative authority. Consequently, only matters concerning the
Party principles are to be discussed in the small-group conference while
other important issues are left to the Sub-District Party Organ.

2. The Sub-District Party Organ may have unlimited membership. Its
members may be organized into more than two small-group conferences. If
the members are not more than ten in number, one small-group conference
may be formed.

3. As the small-group conference is to be organized from the
Sub-District Party Organs, a distinction between the District Party and
the Sub-District Party Organ must be made. The fundamental principle is
that there will be one Party organ for one single [extra-Party]
organization. If a Sub-District Party has too many members, several
Sub-District Party Organs may be formed under the charge of a District
Party Organ. It is not permissible for several parallel Party Organs to
exist in one single organization nor may the members of several
organizations go into one Party organ. However, if the number of Party
members of one organization is too small to form a Sub-District Party
Organ, they may join the neighbor Sub-District Party Organ. It is to be
remembered that the best policy is to have enough Party members in each
organization to form its own Sub-District Party Organ.

4. Small-group conferences may be named in numerical order such as,
First and Second Small-Group Conference, or the First and Second
Small-Group Conference of a certain _hsien_ or Sub-District Party Organ.
If there is only one small-group conference, it will not necessarily be
named as such.

5. When such small-group conference is organized in every institution
down to the _pao-chia_, then the people will be better enlightened
concerning the Government and Party policies. Thus it will help the
Government in having its orders fully enforced.

6. The small-group conference and the Sub-District Party meeting should
take place every two weeks alternately.

All the Party organs upon receipt of this memorandum should make a
careful study of the local conditions and submit to the Provincial
Kuomintang in ten days' time their working plan. Approval should be
given not later than ten days, and within a month all such small-group
conferences should be organized. However, if there should be any
difficulty encountered or any comments to be made they may be submitted
to the proper Party authority for their consideration.


A. ORGANIZATION

1. A small-group conference is established for training the Party
members of the Sub-District Kuomintang Organ.

2. A small-group conference may have three to ten members. If a
Sub-District Party Organ has more than ten members, two or more
small-group conferences may be organized and members distributed
according to their intellectual standing, interests and occupations. It
is the best policy that the members of higher education should be evenly
distributed among the small-group conferences.

3. In the border districts, if the number of Party members is less than
five, and consequently a Sub-District Party Organ cannot be formed, a
small-group conference may be organized first to be under the direct
charge of some other higher Party authorities.

4. A small-group conference may be reorganized every six months. If
there are too many shiftings of members and any other difficulties, it
may be reorganized before that time.

5. Every small-group conference has one Chief who is responsible for
calling conferences, reading reports and giving guidance regarding the
thoughts and activities of his members. He is to be elected by the
members and may be re-elected after six-months' service.

6. If the intellectual standing of the members of a small-group
conference is equivalent to that of a primary school student, the Chief
may be appointed by the Executive Committee of the Sub-District Party.


B. CONFERENCES

7. Small-group conferences are to be held every two weeks. The
conference is to last not more than two hours. Members are to be
notified by the Chief of the time and place of the conference. It is
important that conferences should be planned so as not to interfere with
the work of the members.

8. In the conferences each member may be the Chairman by turn. Minutes
are to be recorded by any member appointed at the conference. The
minutes are to be read by the Chief in the Sub-District Party meetings.

9. Agenda of the small-group conference includes:

_a._ The Chief announces the opening of the conference.

_b._ The Chief reads Dr. Sun's will.

_c._ The Chief reports communications from the Sub-District Party Organ,
important current problems, publications of the Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the Central Kuomintang Headquarters, and any
other topics.

_d._ Discussions.

_e._ Comments.

_f._ The Chief reads regulations governing Party members.

_g._ The Chief announces the adjournment of the conference.

10. The discussions include:

_a._ Party principles,

_b._ current issues,

_c._ working abilities,

_d._ book reviews.

11. Materials for discussion may be given by the Central Party
Headquarters or prepared by the _Hsien_ Party Organ, if necessary.

12. Members are required to read certain books. In the case of those who
cannot read by themselves, assistance may be given by the fellow members
or by an instructor especially appointed for this purpose. Encouragement
should be given to those who can do good written work.

13. Small-group conferences are responsible for the education of the
illiterate members.

14. Every member should take part in the discussion.

15. If the members of the small-group conference cannot reach an
agreement regarding any one of the four topics enumerated in the Item
No. 10, they may refer to Central Party Headquarters or the _Hsien_
Party Headquarters through the Sub-District Party Organ.

16. If it is found that all the small-group conferences cannot reach an
agreement regarding certain topics discussed or if the Secretary of the
Sub-District Party Organ considers it necessary, a Sub-District mass
meeting may be called to discuss these topics. The agenda for the
small-group conference can also be used for the Sub-District Party
meetings.

17. When the small-group Chief considers it necessary, he may decide
whether to have the Item "Comment" only on the agenda.

18. In commenting, the members may do:

_a._ Self-comment: Members may tell in the conference their own
thoughts, activities and past experiences, as well as plans for the
future.

_b._ Mutual comment: Members may make comments upon each other's
thoughts, activities, etc., in the most sincere and friendly manner.

19. All the comments should be recorded in the minutes for future
reference. After the conference members should not broadcast each
other's secrets.

20. At every fourth meeting, the conference may be held in the form of a
tea party or a picnic. In such meetings, members may express their ideas
freely regarding Party, politics, economics, and any other social
problems. It is not necessary to reach a conclusion, but the
discussions should be recorded.

21. Regulations governing leave of absence for the Sub-District Party
Organ are applicable to the small-group conference.


C. GUIDANCE AND EXAMINATION

22. Small-group conference is the major work of all the Party organs.
The Sub-District Party Organ may appoint a person to attend and
supervise the small-group conferences.

23. The Sub-District Party Organ will see to it that the small-group
conferences are held according to schedule. It will submit monthly to
its superior organ the results of such small-group conferences and in
every three months to the Central Party Headquarters.

24. The small-group conference Chiefs may attend the Sub-District Party
meeting to discuss matters concerning small-group training.

25. The District Party Organ may send out inspectors at any time to
supervise the small-group conferences. Every six months it may call a
meeting which all the Secretaries of the Sub-District Party Organs,
small-group conference Chiefs, will attend to discuss matters concerning
small-group conferences. The Secretary of the Sub-District Party Organ
will take the chair in the meeting and the minutes will be submitted to
the _Hsien_ Party.

26. The _Hsien_ Party Organ may also send out inspectors to supervise
the small-group conferences. Every six months, after the meeting as
stated in Item 25 has taken place, a _Hsien_ Party meeting is to be
called to discuss the small-group conferences in the whole _hsien_. The
Secretary of the _Hsien_ Party Organ will preside in such meetings.
Minutes are to be submitted to the Provincial Party Headquarters.

27. If necessary, the _Hsien_ Party Organ may hold different
competitions in such fields as sports, speeches, Party principles, etc.,
in order to make the small-group conferences more interesting.

28. The Provincial Party Organ, besides sending out inspectors to make
inspections of the small-group conferences, may obtain at any time the
minutes of a certain small-group conference of a certain _hsien_ for
examination.

29. The Provincial Party Organ may have a general examination of the
small-group conferences that have taken place, taking the _hsien_ as a
unit. Encouragement and punishment should be given according to merit.

30. The Central Party Headquarters, besides sending out inspectors, may
obtain any number of minutes of the small-group conferences for
examination.

31. Those Party organs below the _Hsien_ Party Organ should pay especial
attention to the character, morals and intellectual ability of the
members. The names of those members who have made special contributions
to the Party work should be filed with the Central Party Headquarters
for appointment.


D. APPENDIX

32. All the _Hsien_ Parties upon receipt of this Program should make a
study of local conditions and make out a plan for carrying them out.

33. For the border districts and war areas strict observance of these
items may be dispensed with, upon the request of the local Party organ
to the Central Party Headquarters.

34. The items contained in this memorandum are applicable to Special
Municipal Party Organs, Seamen's Party Organs, Overseas Party Organs,
and agencies under the charge of the Central Party Headquarters.

35. The above is effective after the approval of the Central Executive
Committee of the Kuomintang.




_E._ PARTY CONSTITUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY[1]


  [Footnote 1: _Kung-ch'an-tang Tang-chang_ [Party Constitution of the
  Communist Party], [Chungking?], XXVII (1938), p. 1-21.]

     Despite the many changes in the governmental form of the
     Communist-controlled areas, the Chinese Communist Party has
     retained the same Party Constitution for many years. The
     following constitution was adopted in 1928 by the Sixth
     Party Congress.


CHAPTER I. TITLE

ARTICLE 1. _The Title_: The Communist Party of China is a branch of the
Communist International. Therefore the title is "The Chinese Communist
Party."


CHAPTER II. THE MEMBERS

ARTICLE 2. _Qualifications of Party Members_: The Party members should
accept the regulations and constitution of the Communist International
and of the Chinese Communist Party. They should join one of the Party
Organs and abide by the resolutions which have been passed by the
Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party. They are
required to pay the Party dues regularly.

ARTICLE 3. _Procedure to Join the Party_: The candidates of the
following qualifications can be recognized as Party members with the
approval of the _hsien_ Party Councillor and the sanction of the Branch
Organs:

_a._ Factory Laborers: recommended by one Party member and approved by
one Branch of Production Party Organ.

_b._ Farmers, handicraft men, intellectuals and public functionaries of
the lower grades: recommended by two Party members.

_c._ High public functionaries: recommended by three Party members.

     Note:

     1. The sponsor must take full responsibility for the
     candidate. In case qualifications are false, the sponsor
     shall receive punishment according to the regulations. He
     may be expelled in a serious case.

     2. The candidate shall be asked to do some Party work for
     trial before he can be recognized as a member, in order that
     his qualifications and understanding of party principles can
     be examined.

_d._ A candidate who is an ex-member of other Parties shall become a
Communist Party member by the recommendation of three Party members of
more than three years' standing. If he was an ordinary Party member of
the other Party, his membership in the Communist Party shall be
sanctioned by the Provincial Party Committee; if he was a special member
of another Party, then his membership shall be sanctioned by the Central
Party Organ.

ARTICLE 4. _The Adherence of Organized Groups_: In case other political
groups or branches of other parties want to join the Communist Party,
their organization systems must be studied and amended according to the
ideas of the Communist Central Party Organ.

ARTICLE 5. _The Transfer of Members_: The Party members may be
transferred from one Organ to another if they move from one place to
another. The transfer, however, must be approved by the Central Party
Organ.

ARTICLE 6. _The Expulsion of Members_: The expulsion of members must be
first passed by the general meeting of that particular Branch Organ and
then be approved by the higher Organ. Until the approval is obtained, it
is necessary to stop the work of the member involved. In case the member
is not satisfied with the discharge, he is allowed to send a petition to
the highest Party Organ for final judgment. Every Party committee has
the power to expel a member who is discovered as an anti-Communist. The
resolution must be communicated to the Organ to which that member
belonged.


CHAPTER III. THE ORGANIZATION

ARTICLE 7. _The Principle of Organization_: Like other Communist
International Branch Parties, the essential of organization of the
Chinese Communist Party is Democratic Centralism. By Democratic
Centralism is meant:

_a._ Both superior and subordinate Party Organs shall be formed
according to resolutions which have been passed in the Councils of Party
Delegates and the National Communist Party Congress.

_b._ Each Party Organ is required to make a report of its newly elected
members.

_c._ Subordinate Party Organs must accept orders issued by the higher
Organs. They shall strictly obey the regulations of the Party. They
shall effectively carry out the resolutions and plans which have been
determined by the Communist International Central Committee and its
supervisory Party Organs. The Party members may discuss and argue on
certain points which are not yet passed by the Party Organ. In other
words, they must obey unconditionally the resolutions which have been
already determined by the Communist International or their superior
Organs, whether they agree with these resolutions or not.

ARTICLE 8. _The Supervisory Party Organs_: Under certain circumstances,
subordinate Party Organs are allowed to appoint new supervisory
Committees to join the Party with the sanction of its superior Organs.

ARTICLE 9. _The Distribution of Party Organs_: The distribution of Party
Organs is according to geographic units. The Administrative Party Organ
in a certain place is the supervisory Organ of that place. People of
different nationalities may all join the Communist Party. However, they
must first join a Chinese District Party Organ before they can become
members of the Chinese Communist Party.

ARTICLE 10. _Duties of the District Organs_: The District Organs have
the power to settle their local affairs within the scope of resolutions
passed by the Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party.

ARTICLE 11. _The Supreme Party Organs_: The supreme Party Organs are the
Party Members' Mass Meeting and the Councils of Party Delegates.

ARTICLE 12. _The Party Committee_: Different classes of Party committees
shall be elected from among the Party Members' Mass Meeting and the
Councils of Party Delegates[2] and the National Communist Party
Congress.[3] The committees shall supervise the routine procedures of
their subordinate Organs.

  [Footnote 2: The term _Tai-piao Ta-hui_ rendered "Council of Party
  Delegates," may also be put as "Party Conference." Cf. "The Rules of
  the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" in Rappard, William E., _et
  al._, _Source Book on European Governments_, New York, 1937, p.
  v34-v52.]

  [Footnote 3: _Ch'üan-kuo Ta-hui_ is given as "National Party
  Congress"; the term _Ch'üan-kuo_ has been translated as "All-China"
  elsewhere.]

ARTICLE 13. _Problems of Criticism_: In the case of _hsien_ Branch Party
Delegates, it is necessary for them to undergo criticism by the
(subordinate) officers of higher Party Organs.

ARTICLE 14. _The Organization System of the Communist Party Organs_:

_a._ Different Branch Party Organs shall be established in every
factory, workshop, shop, street, village, and army unit.

_b._ There shall be a District Party Council and District Council of
Party Delegates in every city or country district, under the supervision
of a District Party Committee.

_c._ There shall be a Hsien or Municipal Council of Party Delegates in
each _hsien_ or municipality, under the supervision of a Municipal Party
Committee.

_d._ A special Council of Party Delegates which is constituted by
several _hsien_ or parts of a province shall be established when
necessary. The establishment must be approved by the Provincial
Committee.

_e._ There shall be a Provincial Council of Party Delegates in every
province, to be supervised by a Provincial Party Committee.

_f._ There shall be a National Communist Congress in the nation,
supervised by the Central Committee.

_g._ For the convenience in training Party members, a special Central
Executive Bureau shall be established and special central officers shall
be sent to different places. This Bureau and the officers shall be
appointed and supervised by the Central Committee.

ARTICLE 15. Further departments and subordinate committees shall be
established to deal with special Party functions, such as the
Organization Department, Publicity Department, Labor Movement Committee
and Women's Movement Committee. These departments and committees shall
be under the supervision of their respective Party Committees.

     Note: To improve understanding of differences in custom and
     language among Party members of different nationalities,
     several Nationality Movement Departments shall be formed.


CHAPTER IV. BRANCH PARTY ORGANS

ARTICLE 16. _Fundamental Organizations_: Branch Party Organs of the
factories, mines, workshops, shops, streets, villages, and armies are
the fundamental organization of the Communist Party. Members working in
the above-mentioned places shall join the Branch Party Organs. New
Branch Party Organs can be organized when there are at least three or
more members. But they must be under the control of the _Hsien_
Committee.

ARTICLE 17. _Special Organizations of the Branch Party Organs_: Members
of certain businesses can join the Production Branch Organ of the same
occupation in their neighboring city. Special Branch Organs shall be
organized according to the localities and the nature of their work, such
as handicraft laborers, free laborers, family laborers, or
intellectuals.

ARTICLE 18. _Duties of the Branch Party Organs_: The Branch Party Organ
unites the strength of the farmers and laborers. Its duties are:

_a._ To use its systematic and effective agitation and slogans to absorb
farmers and laborers into the Communist party.

_b._ To use its power of organization to join the political and economic
struggles of the farmers and laborers. To encourage the people's
revolutionary spirit. To teach the meaning of class-struggles. To
supervise the farmers' and laborers' revolutions. To lead proletarians
to the Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party.

_c._ To enlist and train new members. To distribute Party periodicals
among members and non-members in order to encourage political and
educational work.

ARTICLE 19. _Branch Organ Executive Committee_: Each Branch shall have
three to five executive committeemen to manage the routine Party work.
They shall take charge of the division of labor, such as the publicity
work, distribution of printed materials, organization of farmer and
labor parties, women's movements, and youth movements. There shall be
one secretary; he shall carry out resolutions and orders.


CHAPTER V. CITY AND COUNTRY DISTRICT PARTY ORGANS

ARTICLE 20. _The District Council of Party Delegates_: In the sphere of
the city or country districts the supreme Party Organs are the Party
Members' Mass Meeting and the District Councils of Party Delegates. The
Party Members' Mass Meeting and the Councils of Party Delegates shall
receive and approve the reports of the District Party Committee; shall
elect the Delegates to District, _Hsien_, Municipal, or Provincial
Councils of the Party Delegates Meeting.

ARTICLE 21. _District Party Committee_: The District Party Committee
shall take charge of the supervision of affairs within that district
before and after the Party Members' Mass Meeting or the District Council
of Party Delegates' Meeting. Regular meetings of the city or rural
District Party Committee shall be directed by the Standing Committee,
elected by the Party Committee itself.


CHAPTER VI. _Hsien_ AND MUNICIPAL PARTY ORGANS

ARTICLE 22. _The Hsien Council of Party Delegates_: The supreme Party
Organ in the _hsien_ is the _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates. The
special meeting of the Council shall be called once in three months. It
shall be called by the demand of a majority of other organizations in
the _hsien_; by determination of the Provincial Party Committee or
Special District Party Committee. The _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates
which is called by the _Hsien_ Party Committee shall read reports issued
by the _Hsien_ Party Committee or the _Hsien_ Control Committee. It
shall elect Delegates of the _Hsien_ Party Committee, _Hsien_ Control
Committee, Provincial Party Committee, and Special District Party
Committee.

ARTICLE 23. _Hsien Party Committee_: The _Hsien_ Party Committee is
elected by the _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates. Before and after the
meetings of _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates this Committee is the
supreme Party Organ in the _hsien_. The Committee shall be constituted
by _Hsien_ Delegates and delegates from important villages. The meeting
of the Committee shall be called at least once a month, and its date
shall be determined by the _Hsien_ Committee itself. A Standing
Committee shall be elected to take care of routine Party affairs. There
shall be one secretary of the Standing Committee, to be elected from
among the Committee members.

ARTICLE 24. A _Hsien_ Party Committee shall put into effect previously
passed resolutions of the _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates, the
Provincial Party Committee, and the Central Party Committee. Whenever
possible, different committees, such as the Organization Committee,
Publicity Committee, Women's Movement Committee, and Farmers' Movement
Committee, shall be established. The _Hsien_ Party Committee shall also
appoint the editors of _Hsien_ Party newspapers. It shall take dual
responsibilities to obey the orders of its superior Organ and to report
its own merits to its superior Organs.

ARTICLE 25. No Municipal Party Committee shall be formed in a city where
a _Hsien_ Party Committee has already been established. In such a case
the Party affairs of the city shall be in charge of the _Hsien_ Party
Committee. A City District Party Committee under it may be formed to
take an active part in the City Party affairs.

ARTICLE 26. _The Municipal Party Committee_: The organization of the
Municipal Party Committee is the same as that of the _Hsien_ Party
Committee. A City District Party Committee is subordinate to it. This
Committee shall administer its Branch Party Organs and Branch Organs of
its neighbors. No Municipal Party Committee shall be established in a
place where the Provincial Party Committee or Special District Party
Committee has already been established.

ARTICLE 27. The organization and functions of the Special District Party
Committee shall be the same as the _Hsien_ Party Committee. In the place
where there is no Provincial Party Committee provided then the Special
District Party Committee shall be directed by the Central Party
Committee. In such a case the functions and organization of the Special
Party Committee shall be the same as the Provincial Party Committee.


CHAPTER VII. PROVINCIAL PARTY ORGANS

ARTICLE 28. _The Provincial Council of Party Delegates_: The Provincial
Council of Party Delegates is the supreme Party Organ in the province.
The regular meeting of the Council shall be called to meet once
semi-annually. Special meetings shall be called according to the demand
of a majority of other organizations of the province, or by the
determination of the Central Party Committee. The regular meeting of the
Provincial Council of Party Delegates, which is called by the Provincial
Party Committee, shall have the responsibility of hearing reports issued
by the Provincial Party Committee, and by the Provincial Control
Committee. It shall discuss the social work and Party affairs problems
of the province; and elect delegates to Provincial Party Committee,
Provincial Control Committee, and National Party Congress.

ARTICLE 29. _Provincial Party Committee_: Before and after the meeting
of the Provincial Council of Party delegates, the Provincial Party
Committee is the supreme Party Organ in each province. Delegates of the
central Provincial organizations or other district Party Organs are
required to join the Provincial Party Committee. The meeting of the
Provincial Party Committee shall be called at least once in two months;
the date of the meeting shall be determined by the Committee itself. A
Standing Committee under it shall be authorized to take charge of Party
affairs before and after the meeting of the Provincial Party Committee.
Secretaries are to be appointed accordingly.

ARTICLE 30. _The Duties and Organization of Provincial Party
Committees_: The duties of the Provincial Party Committee are: to put
into effect the passed resolutions of the Provincial Council of Party
Delegates or Central Party Committee; to organize the subsidiary Party
Organs; to appoint editors for the Party newspapers; to distribute the
Party funds; to control the accounting department; to supervise the
Party work among non-Communists; to draft regular reports to the Central
Party Committee; to announce the Party Movement to its subordinate
Organs. For the furtherance of important work different departments and
committees shall be provided, such as the Provincial Organization
Department, Publicity Department, Labor Movement Department, etc. The
department heads who act concurrently in the Provincial Party Committee
shall supervise Party affairs under the control of the Provincial
Standing Committee.

ARTICLE 31. The Provincial Party Committee shall help the District Party
Committee to carry out the Party activities. Therefore the _Hsien_ Party
Committee in that particular city should only take care of the Party
work within its own sphere.


CHAPTER VIII. THE NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTION[4]

  [Footnote 4: _Ch'üan-kuo Hui-i_.]

ARTICLE 32. The National Party Convention shall be called to meet twice
annually. The numbers of candidates and Delegates to be elected by
different organs are to be determined by the Central Party Committee.

ARTICLE 33. The previously passed resolutions of the Convention shall be
put into effect after the approval of the Central Party Committee.

ARTICLE 34. In case the Convention meeting is held before the meeting of
the Communist International then several Delegates can be elected to
attend the meeting of the latter. However, they must get the consent of
the International Communist Committee.


CHAPTER IX. THE NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS

ARTICLE 35. The National Party Congress is the supreme Party Organ in
the country. The meeting shall be called once annually by the Central
Party Committee and the Communist International. Special meetings can be
called by the Central Party Committee or initiated by the Communist
International. It may also be called by request of a majority of the
Delegates who attended the last meeting. The call of the special
meeting, however, must be approved by the Central Party Committee first.
Resolutions which have been passed by the majority of the Delegates
shall become effective. The number of Delegates and percentage in each
Party Organ shall be determined by the Communist International, the
Central Party Committee, or the preliminary session of the Party
Convention.

ARTICLE 36. The duties of the National Party Congress are:

_a._ To receive and examine reports issued by the Central Party
Committee.

_b._ To determine Party regulations.

_c._ To determine the important political or organization plans.

_d._ To elect the Central Party Committee.

ARTICLE 37. Delegates to the Party Congress are to be elected by the
Provincial Councils of Party Delegates. In special cases requiring
secret action, they may be appointed by the Provincial Party Committee
with the approval of the Communist International Committee. A
provisional Congress can be substituted for the regular Congress with
only the consent of the International Communist Committee.


CHAPTER X. THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE[5]

  [Footnote 5: _Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui_.]

ARTICLE 38. The number of the Central Party Committee members shall be
determined by the National Party Congress.

ARTICLE 39. While the National Party Congress is in session, the Central
Party Committee is the supreme Party Organ. It represents the Party in
contacts with the other political parties. Besides this its duties are:
to establish various subordinate Party Organs; to supervise and control
subordinate Party Organs; to edit the Party newspapers; to send special
Party officers to different provinces; to form the Central Executive
Bureau in order to encourage Party principles; to distribute the Party
funds; to control the Central Accounting Department. The Central Party
Committee shall be called at least three times a month.

ARTICLE 40. A Political Bureau shall be established in the Central Party
Committee. It shall supervise the political affairs before and after the
meeting of the Central Party Committee. A Standing Committee is to be
elected to take charge of routine work.

ARTICLE 41. When necessary the Central Party Committee shall establish
different subordinate departments or committees such as the Organization
Department, Publicity Department, Laborers' Movement Committees, Women's
Movement Committees and Farmers' Movement Committees. The functions of
these Departments and Committees shall be guided by the Central Party
Committee, which shall also appoint Department heads and Chairmen.

ARTICLE 42. The Central Party Committee shall determine the work and the
scope of work of the District Party Organs with reference to their
political and economic background. The distribution of Party Organs
shall also be settled by the Central Party Committee.


CHAPTER XI. THE CENTRAL CONTROL COMMITTEE[6]

  [Footnote 6: The term here is _shên-ch'a wei-yüan-hui_, not
  _chien-ch'a_, which is the term used for "Control" as one of the five
  powers of Sun Yat-sen's plan.]

ARTICLE 43. For the control of the financial and accounting work of the
subordinate Party Organs, Central or District Control Committees shall
be elected by the National Party Congress, Central or District Party
Committee.


CHAPTER XII. THE PARTY DISCIPLINE

ARTICLE 44. Strict obedience to Party discipline is the highest duty of
every Communist. Resolutions passed by the Communist International,
Central Party Committee, or other superior Party Organs shall be carried
out effectively and exactly by the Party members. Until resolutions have
been passed, members are allowed to discuss them freely.

ARTICLE 45. Those who have failed to put into effect the orders or
resolutions, or those who violate the Party discipline shall be punished
by the Party Organs with reference to the Party regulations. The
punishments for Organs are: reprimand, dissolution, and reregistration
of its members. The punishments for the members are: reprimand, warning,
deprivation of Party activities, expulsion from membership, or
suspension from duties for stated periods. Cases involving punishment
shall be studied and examined by the Party Members' Mass Meeting or by
respective Party Organs. Special Committees may be formed with the
approval of Party Organs to settle difficult cases. Expulsion from
membership shall be carried out according to particulars stated in Item
6 of this Constitution.


CHAPTER XIII. PARTY FINANCE

ARTICLE 46. The sources of the Party revenue are: Party fees, special
levies, income from printed materials, and the compensations from its
superior Organs.

ARTICLE 47. The amount of the Party fee shall be determined by the
Central Committee. Members without employment or those in poverty are
allowed exemption from payment. Those who do not pay their fees for
three months, without stating reasons, shall be recognized as released
from membership, and their names shall be announced to the Mass
Meeting.


CHAPTER XIV. SPECIAL PARTY GROUPS [CORPS][7]

  [Footnote 7: _Tang-t'uan_.]

ARTICLE 48. Special Party Groups are to be constituted by three or more
Party members. The main function of these Party Groups is the
encouragement of the Party principles among the non-Communist groups.
The routine affairs of the Group shall be in charge of a Managing Board
elected from the Party Group. Whenever a Party Committee and a Special
Party Group conflict and then come to an agreement on certain points,
these points shall be reconsidered and concurrently passed by the two
Organs. Quick action must be taken. If agreement is not reached, a
petition is required for submission to a superior Party Organ for final
determination.

ARTICLE 49. Delegates of Party Groups shall attend the Party Committee
Meeting whenever there is matter dealing with the Party Group.

ARTICLE 50. A Managing Board shall be formed in each Group with the
approval of the Party Committee. The Committee can appoint its members
to the Board and may also recall or remove those members when necessary.
In such cases, however, the reasons for recall or removal require
announcement to the Party Group.

ARTICLE 51. A list of names of the staff members of the Party Group
shall be submitted to a Party Organ for approval. Removal of staff
members from a group shall also require approval by the Party Organ.

ARTICLE 52. Resolutions to be carried out by the Party Group shall first
be passed by the Group Meeting or Meeting of the Managing Board. In a
Party Members' Mass Meeting all the Group members must support a
resolution which is already passed by its own Group. If one fails to do
so he may be punished according to the regulations.


CHAPTER XV. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMMUNIST YOUTH CORPS[8]

  [Footnote 8: _Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan_.]

ARTICLE 53. The District or Central Party Organs shall send Delegates to
the Communist Youth Corps for exchanging ideas. At the same time the
Communist Youth Corps can also send their members to attend the various
meetings of the different Councils of the Party Delegates.




APPENDIX III. MATERIALS ON POLICY




_A._ REPLY TO QUESTIONS (CHIANG K'AI-SHEK)[1]


  [Footnote 1: Private communication by and to the present author, and
  in his possession.]

     Replies to the following questionnaire were very kindly
     supplied by Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek. The questions by
     the present author were submitted to him on July 23, 1940;
     the replies were transmitted through the Vice-Minister of
     Publicity, Mr. Hollington Tong, on November 26, 1940.

(1) Do you believe that the _San Min Chu I_ are suited to China alone,
or do you think it possible that they represent a golden mean between
totalitarianism and democracy?

_San Min Chu I is a type of democracy particularly suited to China. In
its general features, I think, it is similar to Western democracies._

(2) Do you feel that a _San Min Chu I_ China will have any positive
proposals to make concerning the subject of world federation or
confederation, if that subject is raised at the end of the current
European war?

_In as much as cosmopolitanism and world peace are two of the main aims
of San Min Chu I, China will naturally be disposed to participate in any
world federation or confederation based on the principle of equality of
nations and for the good of mankind._

(3) Do you believe that the inauguration of the constitution and of a
constitutional period will lead to the uncontrolled freedom of minor
parties, including the Communist? Is there not a danger that the minor
parties, because they do not share the responsibility for government,
will be able to exploit formal democratic rights more unscrupulously
than the Kuomintang?

_No, because democracy in itself has the ability to work out the
solutions for those problems if there are any._

(4) What do you regard as the clearest factual indication of the growth
of democracy in Free China?

_The following are the clearest indications of the growth of democracy
in China: 1, the convocation of the People's Political Council; 2, the
convocation of the Provincial Political Councils; 3, the growth of
popular interest in both public and national affairs; 4, the growth of
the sentiment of national solidarity; 5, the spontaneous response to the
call for public services._

(5) Within the army, what democratic tendencies have you fostered or
observed?

_Since the army is now recruited from the different walks of life, it
naturally shares the growing democratic sentiment. Within the army,
however, the soldiers and officers are of course trained and disciplined
in strict accordance with military regulations._

(6) When the war against Japan is successfully concluded, do you believe
that the National Government will have any difficulty in re-establishing
its full authority over the guerrilla-governed areas, which will have
tasted autonomy?

_No, because all these forces are fighting for the liberty and
independence of China._

(7) Do you believe that the bogus Government at Nanking is intended by
the enemy to deceive the Chinese, to fool the Japanese home public, or
actually to govern China? Why do you think that a man as ambitious as
Wang Ch'ing-wei put himself in such a humiliating and ridiculous
position--before the world, and before history?

_Whatever may be the intention of the Japanese in putting up Wang
Ch'ing-wei as the head of the bogus government, they certainly have no
idea of letting him or any other puppet govern China in reality. As to
the latter part of the question, I prefer that you would ask Wang
directly._




_B._ WHAT I MEAN BY ACTION, OR A PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION (CHIANG
K'AI-SHEK)[1]


  [Footnote 1: Chiang K'ai-shek, _A Philosophy of Action, or What I Mean
  by Action_, Chungking, 1940; p. 7-20. The accompanying foreword and
  notes are here omitted. The translation is the work of Mr. Ma P'in-ho,
  a naturalized Chinese scholar but of European race and nativity.]

     The following essay, delivered as a speech, represents the
     clearest formulation by Generalissimo Chiang of his own
     philosophy. To this must be joined his exegesis on the San
     Min Chu I, quoted in part above, p. 270.

THE TRUTHS WE MUST ENDEAVOR TO GRASP ANEW

In 1932 I delivered a lecture on the subject "Stages in the Development
of Revolutionary Philosophy." In it I dealt with two points of especial
importance. Firstly, I tried to explain how the actual grasp of what we
know comes only with positive action. I said: "The universe contains
spirit in addition to matter. Spirit implies mind, and mind implies
conscience. Conscience must find its expression in action, in the
practice of what it urges. Otherwise the conscience would be a barren
thing, and there would be no way of avoiding a futile idealism on the
one hand or determinist materialism on the other." Secondly, I explained
the importance of the philosophy of action in regard to the Revolution.
I said: "Only the word 'action' covers the meaning of what has brought
into being all things in space and time. Our philosophy therefore takes
as the one central principle of human life and thought the maxim: 'From
true knowledge action naturally proceeds.' In short, any philosophy of
ours must be a philosophy of action. The consummation of the Republican
revolution and the overthrow of Japanese Imperialist aggression depend
upon our putting into practice Dr. Sun's principle of action as the
natural product of knowledge."

Since I suggested this term _philosophy of action_ and became the
advocate of _positive action_ as the course the revolutionary must
follow, a considerable effect has been visible in our ranks. The spirit
of positive action has been intensified among us. In the army and in
schools, and in political and social life generally, a gradual
transformation has taken place in the state of inert frustration,
vagueness and depression formerly prevalent. There has been a general
tendency to take the initiative, to express ourselves in positive
action. Such indeed was my aim in promoting this _philosophy of
action_. When I take note of the results achieved by our _action_,
however, I remain unsatisfied on a number of points. For instance, there
is sometimes mere action without clear realization of its why and
wherefore, resulting in what the ancients called "unreal action." With
others there is initial vigor and great positive effort, followed by
impatience of checks and failure to persevere in the face of
difficulties, leading some to throw the blame on circumstances and
others upon their fellow-men. The irritable then proceed to arguing and
quarrels; while the sweeter-tempered lose heart. In this way the real
issue is lost to sight and obstacles unnecessarily multiplied; or the
individual may be overcome with outright disgust and take on a
completely negative attitude, the initial speed of his progress being in
the end equalled by the speed of his subsequent retrogression. Another
kind of failure comes with a man who impulsively imitates others; who
when he sees others on the go feels any move on their part calls for
some move on his; who spends all his time in acting on the spur of some
transitory stimulus or exigency, forgetful of our broad revolutionary
conceptions and far-reaching aims.

In seeking the reasons for such faulty conduct, I have been forced to
the conclusion that it is due to imperfect knowledge of the essential
meaning of _positive action_, and to imperfect realization of the
significance and nature of _action_, that there is lack of
determination, faith and perseverance among us.


ACTION IS LIFE ITSELF: THE TIRELESS PERTINACITY OF NATURE OUR EXAMPLE

According to my own individual experience, our first step must be to
draw a clear distinction between _action_ and _motion_. The monosyllabic
structure of the Chinese language has occasioned the use of substantival
phrases consisting of two words. One of these phrases is _hsing-tung_
(action-motion), which in common parlance often has the meaning properly
covered only by the word _hsing_ alone, a word of far deeper and wider
meaning than the word _tung_. In fact, we may say that action is _human
life_ itself. An antithesis is commonly implied between the words
_action_ and _thought_, and between _word_ and _act_. In reality,
however, thought and word are processes of action, and are properly to
be considered as included within the scope of _action_, rather than as
foreign to it. From birth to death, while he is subject to space and
time, a man cannot withdraw himself from the sphere of action; he grows
up in action and his character is formed and elevated by action. All
saintly and heroic men, like the devoted revolutionary, attain their
ends and achieve their nobility of character only through their planned
and determined actions.

If we wish to realize the true nature of _action_ we can do no better
than take as the _point-de-départ_ for our thinking the words of the
_I-ching_ or _Book of Changes_: "Let the superior man exert himself with
the unfailing pertinacity of Nature." For the most obvious thing in the
universe, the very principle animating all its phenomena, is the
activity of the forces of Nature. The gloss reads: "Day by day the
heavens revolve, with a constancy that only a supreme pertinacity could
maintain. The superior man models himself upon it in the unceasing
exertion of his energies." This _pertinacity_ is something perennially
unimpaired and ever changeless, greatest strength united to greatest
durability, and moreover an absolute thoroughness and completeness. And
we must model ourselves on the activity of nature, on its spontaneous
and unremitting flow of energy. If there is this realization of the
value and place of human life in the universe, action will appear to us
something inevitable, and there will follow as a matter of course
single-minded devotion to purpose, a completely natural attitude, and
resolute advance with firm strides towards our ends--we shall have
achieved, in the words of the _Chung-yung_, "the highest integrity,
unfailing and enduring." Man's existence and progress depend entirely
upon his perception of these truths.

_Action_, therefore, differs from _motion_. _Motion_ is by no means
necessarily _action_, though _action_ may on occasion include some form
of _motion_. Action is continuous, whereas motion is intermittent;
action is essential, whereas motion is accidental; action is
spontaneous, whereas motion is usually due to the application of
external force. Action is in response to the supreme order of things and
in harmony with the nature of man. Motion is impulsive response to some
fortuitous external stimulus. Action we may describe as more natural and
smoother intrinsically than motion; and extrinsically it is wholly good
in its outcome, whereas motion may be good or may be evil. Action
unfolds in uninterrupted continuity; motion proceeds by fits and starts.
As an illustration, action may be compared to a ceaseless flow of water,
in the words of Confucius, "racing on, unpausing day and night." The
unremitting and insistent character of _positive action_ may thus be
figured forth. Motion on the other hand may be compared to the impact of
a stone upon water into which it is thrown. The water is violently
agitated and leaps high into the air; its movement is tumultuous while
it lasts, but subsides when after a moment or so the extraneous force
that caused it is expended. Such motion is, therefore, transitory,
simply because its motive force comes from without.


ACTION IS NOT MERE MOTION

We cannot of course say that all _motion_ is bad, but we can at least
say that the value of _motion_ is never comparable with that of
_action_. What we commonly call _impulse_ is a manifestation of the
reflex action of some sense or faculty. When we speak of a man's motions
as "blind," "wild," or "furious," it is always a case of response to
external stimulus or of the application of external force. Such motions
are not spontaneous and they therefore pursue no definite course; they
have no basis in the consciousness of the individual and no precise
direction or aim; the individual's concern with them is limited to the
passing moment of their duration; he envisages nothing as to what may be
their result. There may be great initial activity and force, but because
there is no basis in reason, consciousness and spontaneity, momentary
agitation is succeeded by relapse into quiescence. A man who lives by
passion and impulse, who _moves_ rather than _acts_ is like a bell,
which when struck vibrates and emits sound but unless struck is silent.
All passive and transient activity, arising from mere impulse and
sense-stimulation, is in opposition to the positive action required of
us by our revolutionary philosophy, for such _motion_ has no lasting
effect and is powerless to transform the lives of men.

It is imperative therefore that there should be no confusion of what we
mean by _action_ with what is better termed _motion_. The action of
which I have been speaking is the operation of man's innate faculties
according to the true natural laws of his being; it is what I have
called the expression of conscience in practice, the exercise of
conscience. Although we colloquially speak of "violent actions" and
"wrong-minded action" in describing men's conduct, such conduct, being
that of men acting under the influence of impulse or illusion, should
properly be classed as a form of _motion_. It is not what we mean by
action.


ACTION IS NATURE AT WORK IN MAN: THE WHOLE UNIVERSE IS THE SCENE OF
ACTION

Genuine action is necessarily ordered, rhythmical, systematic and
directed towards some aim. It arises from that fullness of consciousness
described as the "calm of mature reflection." It is inevitably
straightforward and continuous, undeviating and unhesitating. Such
motion as that of the revolving globe we ought not to call mere motion;
that ceaseless axial and orbital rotation is a phenomenon called in
ancient times the _activity_ of nature; and it may serve us as the best
possible illustration of the qualities of action. We may proceed to a
fuller description of the nature of action by saying it is always marked
by a certain regularity and order in the course of its fulfilment. Human
life in all its aspects of growth and development, in each transition
from stage to stage, in the preparatory and supplementary acquisitions
of substance and experience between phase and phase,--all this is
action. The normal routine of daily life,--sleeping, resting, eating and
working,--is all to be considered within the scope of action. For the
meaning of action may apply equally well to what occurs both in states
of repose and in states of movement. While work throughout the process
of carrying out a given task may clearly be action, recreation may also
be action. States of motion and repose are of course to a superficial
view opposites. Moreover in the modern world _motion_ is especially set
up in opposition to _repose_, and emphasized almost to the exclusion of
the latter. This has caused the importance of _stability_ to be lost to
view.

For the truth of the matter is: "stability allows of repose; repose
allows of calm; calm allows of reflection, and reflection gives grasp."
It should be realized that repose can have a positive function. And what
I call the philosophy of action permits of no distinction between motion
and repose, a distinction which is superficial. A course of action may
involve intervals of both motion and of repose, just as the invisible
working of living matter contributes to the visible growth of the body.
We need only concern ourselves as to whether what is done is in harmony
with the laws of man's innate character.

The natural processes of the universe and of human life go on
unceasingly, and in trying to ameliorate human life by positive action
we must realize that such action to be effectual must be similar to
those processes in its continuity and tenacity. Positive action in its
every phase, whether outwardly visible or impalpable, never ceases to be
action, never really for a moment comes to a halt. The whole universe is
the scene of such action, and man in so far as he truly acts
participates in its immense activity. Let us therefore distinguish
clearly between mere _motion_ and the true _action_ that works by a
steady advance in an undeviating course, with the timeless
inexhaustibility of flowing water towards its appointed aim.

And now I have something more to add in definition of the essential
meaning of action and its relation to life. The ancients said "Man's
innate character is given him at birth together with life itself." I
consider _action_ to be the expression of that innate character, and so
as inseparable from life as it. Man in his earliest infancy can laugh
and cry, eat and drink; as he grows up he learns to gaze and listen,
speak and walk; and once grown up, no matter whether he be intelligent
or stupid, he strives for existence, progress, and development. Or, in
other words, he seeks to conform to the elementary needs of human life.
All these phenomena are phenomena of _action_, the action of the
faculties for discerning moral and material good, with which man is
naturally endowed.

It is apparent to me that love of ease and dislike of exertion are no
part of fundamental human nature, but that on the contrary mankind is
naturally disposed to labor and work. If you compel a lively man
accustomed to be always on his feet and busy with his hands to be idle
and sedentary, depriving him of anything to do, he is certain to feel
exceedingly unhappy. In the same way, the least intelligent or
experienced of men has felt the satisfaction and content that come with
work, the joy of contributing to the accomplishment of some undertaking.
There is a colloquialism current in certain coastal districts of China
which substitutes the word "life" for the word "work"; thus, you may be
asked whether you have "lived your life" for the day, in the sense of
"have you done your day's work?" Work is indeed life; unless a man be
totally incapable he will inevitably require the means of expression for
his abilities, and particularly such expression as will accrue to the
benefit of somebody beyond himself. Even a little child is conscious of
the intense satisfaction to be derived from doing one's best in the
service of others. Though no praise be awarded the child it is aware of
an extraordinary complaisance within itself.


THE BROADEST SENSE OF LIFE

All these little illustrations bear witness to the fact that action is
the object of man's life; and we should, vice versa, make life the
object of our action. We are born with faculties for the discernment of
moral and material good; life, from childhood to old age, is the
energetic, ceaseless, use of them, at first chiefly for the satisfaction
of the needs of one's own existence, to secure one's own footing in
life, but next, as one's mental perspective broadens, the family, the
village, the community, the nation, and mankind become objects of the
desire to express oneself and give of oneself. When we speak of _life_
it should mean for us the life of mankind, the life and existence of
people and nation, the livelihood of masses and citizenry. And when we
speak of _action_, we should mean action performed in the service of
life in such a broad sense.

The difference between man and the beasts of the field and the birds of
the air consists just in this. We read in the classics of "a virtue of
surpassing excellence, which is given to the people as a law of their
being," and the virtue alluded to is this propensity to look after one's
own welfare and at the same time the welfare of one's fellow-men. We are
naturally endowed with the disposition to will the good of others and to
act in their service. "Action," with the qualities I have sketched, is
something primordially bound up with life.


THE REVOLUTION DEMANDS ACTION OF ALL MEN AT ALL TIMES

The essential meaning of action being once understood we may proceed to
inquire into its spirit and wherein it finds its highest expression. How
is it that men for all the apparent unity of their existence sometimes
live lives of such devotion to the good of mankind and the world that
they earn the admiration of posterity, while others live degenerate
lives governed by the lowest desires, to the detriment of themselves and
their neighbors? Education and environment are factors that play their
part in this, but more important is what the ancient called "material
desire"--the tendency to seek possession rather than creation, to enjoy
rather than contribute. In the words of Dr. Sun, "making one's aim
acquisition and not service" leads to degraded and uncontrolled conduct
which is an obstacle to human progress and what we as comrades in
Revolution must strive our utmost to avoid and eradicate.

Revolutionary motives are motives of service, of self-sacrifice for the
good of others. The task the Revolution sets itself is the "practice of
goodwill" in the broadest sense of those words,--action inspired by love
for men to the exclusion of all that tends to their harm. In our
revolutionary zeal to promote _positive action_ throughout our world we
aim to create an all-pervading moral attitude to life such as is
rationally conformable to man's true nature; and we moreover seek to
bring into full play the deep funds of humanity and benevolence in our
own people. We push aside considerations of individual ability, of past
education and environment, and of how far bad habits acquired may have
become ingrained. We appeal to all as they are to take fresh stock of
their lives and realize how from the very fact of their being alive they
possess the ability to act,--to act in no less a sense than the great
deliverers of mankind in their saintly and heroic deeds. The difference
between such deeds and the actions of normal daily life is one of
degree, not of kind. We are everyone men born of woman and passing our
days between heaven and earth; not for us to vex ourselves with fear of
failure; the only failure is in failing to act.


THE MEANING OF EASE

Let use take the three key-virtues of judgment, goodwill, and courage as
our guides in the task of "playing the man." For the rest, let us follow
the dictum of Sun Wên to the effect that "the very clever and able
should strive to serve ten million fellow-men; a man of lesser ability
may aspire to serve ten hundred men; while a man devoid of talent may
content himself with doing the best he can for a single fellow-man." The
highly talented may perform their duties with ease; the moderately
gifted may make smooth progress with theirs; while the poorly gifted may
do so with only a narrow margin of competence; but all that matters is
our full use of our faculties in positive action for the good of others.
If we advance without ever falling away from a pure and concentrated
resolve to do our best, we shall certainly be able to realize the ideal
of _action_. In a sense it will prove _easy_, though this does not of
course mean that anything can be got without pains or anything managed
in a facile and quiescent fashion. Nor does it mean that all will
necessarily be plain sailing, fraught with no obstacles. Our path
through life is strewn with dangers, hindrances and obstructions.
Revolutionary action is attended by many risks; it requires the will to
make great sacrifices. Nevertheless, man's capacity for positive action
has achieved many a colossal feat in the course of his history, the
prodigious hydraulic engineering of the ancients, ascent into the air
and penetration of the earth, and revolutionary deeds that have
transformed the face of human affairs. The ultimate consideration is
always whether we possess thorough determination and a spirit of
unflinching zeal, for with these we may overcome towering obstacles as
it were "in our stride," and "face dangers with imperturbable calm." A
man worthy of his place in the ranks of the Revolution will regard as
nothing extraordinary difficulties and dangers that would daunt others.
His revolutionary spirit, which is the very spirit of action, gives him
a sublime indifference to whatever may be the magnitude of the demands
his duty makes upon him; whatever his principles, faith and
responsibility involve is "all in the day's work" for him, though it be
ordeal by fire and water or the abnegation of everything dearest to him.
He takes no account of difficulty, and fear is a thing still stranger to
him. It is in the sense that to a man with such an attitude action is
_easy_ that I use the word.

Action born of that innate character given us with life, conceived in
absolute sincerity, and aimed at the good of others treats things as
"all of a piece." From beginning to end of an appointed task it
maintains a uniform consistency and integrity of purpose. The seeds of
its final success are inherent in its first beginnings. Difficulty and
failure as I understand them can have no part in such action.

Positive action with a complete integrity of purpose produces that
honesty and trustworthiness which are distinctive marks of all true
action. It penetrates to the core of matters, and deals only in
realities. It is free from superficial trappings and fuss; permits of no
slack approximation and evasion of the point, all of which comes from
that shrinking from effort and hardship that is so incompatible with the
spirit of positive action. Whereas I have called all true action _easy_,
those who go about things without its spirit find themselves confronted
with seemingly insurmountable difficulties everywhere. When the ancients
said: "There is nothing either difficult or easy in the world," they had
in mind this way of thinking, as I had too when I said that wartime and
peacetime were one and the same.


SINCERITY THE ROOT OF ACTION AND GOODWILL

The next thing to consider is what is to be the central aim of our
action. I would answer if asked this with a single word: "Goodwill."
Action is the _practice of goodwill_ in its deepest sense.

Goodwill is grounded in the sense of justice and issues from complete
sincerity. The sincere man is necessarily conscious of goodwill and he
is necessarily possessed of the moral courage required to practice it.
The ancients said "there is completeness in sincerity," and again,
"where there is not sincerity there is a void." The place of sincerity
in human life is indeed like that of energy in the atom, the structure
of which would collapse without it. If a man's life lacks "ardent
sincerity," he will likewise be powerless to form and manifest the three
key-virtues of judgment, goodwill, and courage. And without the strength
to be derived from those virtues, the Three Principles of the People can
make no headway. Only by action inspired with perfect sincerity can the
splendid truths of those Principles be asserted and translated into
fact.

Sincerity is dependent upon the sense of justice. The keynote of our
Republican Revolution has been the smashing of selfish individualism and
the rescue of our people from their sufferings and of our nation from
its peril. To achieve what yet remains to be done, to acquit ourselves
well as a section of humanity, and to explore the full scope of possible
human well-being, all we do and enact must be grounded in perfect
sincerity. Then the pains we take and the plans we devise will prove
creative, progressive, and constructive; we shall put flesh on the bones
of the egalitarian philosophy of social justice; we shall be clear as to
what we think and are aiming at; we shall be able to give full
expression to our true nature and faculties, proceeding in all we do
resolutely, frankly, and boldly.

Action attains its highest point of intensity in the giving of one's
life in the cause of justice, when death in that cause is accepted as
sweet and shorn of all its terrors. "One may die in the course of
willing men good, but life is not to be purchased at the price of
willing them ill" is a classical teaching we may take as a supreme ideal
of positive action. Action that lives up to that ideal will inevitably
be _revolutionary_, while, vice versa, it is only genuinely
revolutionary conduct that possesses the true qualities of positive
action. Sincerity is the primal motive force of action. With it, a man
is aware only of the interests he has in common with his fellow-men, and
of none that conflicts with those of his fellow-men. With sincerity, a
man acts his will to good in perfect self-possession, pushing steadily
onwards through difficulty and danger to success. This is the bearing of
Dr. Sun's teaching on the revolutionary movement.


THE LAWS OF ACTION

In what I have said so far I have sketched the outlines of our
conception of action. Men differ in profession, rank and work; but there
is not a single one of us but must be a _man of action_ if our
revolutionary aims are to be completely realized. Action, however, is
subject to certain laws, which I now wish to go into. It must, firstly,
have its _point-de-départ_, secondly its regular order of procedure
(that is, a methodical and scientific plan), thirdly, its definite goal,
and lastly it must possess the qualities of constancy and continuity.


One: The Starting Point

Firstly, by _point-de-départ_ we mean the careful selection of whatever
way of approach may be most appropriate, direct, and efficacious for the
carrying out of our projects. The same is true of study, affairs, and
revolutionary action. The ancients said: "Ascent must start from places
low; remote objectives are attained from near beginnings." This was
their way of expressing the nature of the _point-de-départ_. If any
mistake is made about it we are bound to miss our objective and
destination however sure we may be of the direction in which we want to
go. Again, if we try to run before we can walk, or skip preliminaries,
or gain the heights by some ill-considered short-cut, our work will
inevitably prove abortive.


Two: Ordered Unfolding of Plans

Secondly, the necessity for what I have called "a regular order of
procedure" means the uselessness of reliance upon mere verve and
enthusiasm, and the futility of action taken on the spur of some
transitory turn of thought, action which is bound to encounter
unforeseen obstacles in its course, be disconcerted by them, and lose
its character as action by becoming some irrational form of _motion_.
Action must be preceded by the laying down of plans and choice of a mode
of procedure whereby all possible contingencies may be allowed for and
prepared for. The plans, moreover, must be precise in matters of time
and space, and in quantitative and numerical considerations. They must,
when decided upon, be carried out with due attention to detail, and with
periodical stock-taking of the ground covered. A steady rate of advance
will thus be maintained. When it is possible to make plans it is
obviously also possible to foresee to a great extent the circumstances
of time and place under which the plans will be carried out and the
quantitative and numerical requirements that will have to be met. In
scientific accordance with these foreseen circumstances and requirements
the execution of the whole project should be apportioned among the
persons involved so that each has work in all respects congenial to his
qualities, while provision is also made for cooperation between all
concerned. With order and method in procedure there will be no putting
of the cart before the horse, no abrupt intrusion of irrelevancies, no
slackening at moments of urgency, or precipitate speed where none is
needed; day by day and step by step substantial progress will be made.
In this way we shall have no abortive enterprises, nor the
disappointment they engender.


Three: Unswerving Aim at the Target

Coming, thirdly, to the matter of _goal_, it should be like a
conspicuous target at which one takes steady, unfaltering, aim. No
matter whether the work we are engaged in be of vast or slight
dimensions, its aim should be seen, as it were, through sights trained
on the main target of an ideal goal. To every piece of work there must
be a beginning and an end, a clearly-defined destination. Before the
destination be reached there can be no pause in our concentrated effort.


Four: The Even Texture of a Life of Action

Lastly, with regard to the fourth and especially important point:
perseverance and continuity, the very qualities that, as I said at the
beginning, distinguish _action_ from _motion_. I spoke of action as
essentially regular, orderly, and purposeful, and said that such action
would necessarily be revolutionary action and its influence
revolutionary influence. In other words, revolutionary action unfolds in
an unbroken uniformity of effort; it draws on the funds of moral vigor
in our national genius, and provides a new channel for the expression
of the great moral qualities of which that genius is composed, whereby
it may rehabilitate the status to which it is properly entitled. It must
be realized that our Revolutionary and the reconstructive activities
pursue a broad and enlightened policy free from all manner of trickery
and opportunism. We are actuated by a spirit of extraordinary power, but
what we are doing is nothing abnormal as the word should be understood,
and our methods are wholly realistic.

All unnatural and inhuman conduct, and illogical and unscientific
methods, result in frustration and can have no place in revolutionary
activity. The ancients spoke of "acts of routine virtue" in their
emphasis upon the almost _humdrum_, stolid, qualities of true virtue.
Our Revolution is likewise dependent upon the capacity to maintain a
course of persevering and continuous effort; the behavior required is in
no way peculiar or foreign to everyday life. For out of continuity comes
perseverance and what we may call _ease_. Tsêng Kuo-fan said: "things
should be done soundlessly and as it were 'odorlessly,' with both
precision and economy of effort." By this he meant not wooden
impassivity or dry-as-dust pedantry but directness, simplicity, and an
absence of fuss, a straightforward and unassuming way of going about
things. In working for the success of the Revolution we should cultivate
the attitude of the nameless hero who braves dangers and endures
hardships as matters of course. We shall thus keep in touch with the
people and render the influence of what we do in the service of mankind
broad and lasting.


FORMATION AND CONSTANCY OF PURPOSE

Unremitting perseverance to the very end of our task, every day we live
a day of positive action, and full employment of our powers in harmony
with the laws of Nature and Man, are the conditions for our successful
accomplishment of our revolutionary mission. Among Tsêng Kuo-fan's
self-admonitory words on "Formation of Purpose" there are the following
phrases: "To cast away the gifts of Heaven and live in sloth will bring
upon me some evil catastrophe.... This I swear never to forget as long
as I can still draw breath." That is to say, the formation of our
purpose in life requires of us diligent and courageous devotion and the
full exercise of our talents. The great writer and statesman also
admonished himself on the subject of steadfastness of purpose,
reproaching himself: "Again and again have you been delinquent in your
duties and endeavors, and been swayed by material temptations; but no
one has ever heard of your being unpunctual at mealtimes!" How is it, he
meant, that if we can be regular in attending to our material wants we
cannot be equally unfailing in the performance of our duties? The full
accomplishment of any aim requires strong-minded formation and
steadfastness of purpose. The true meaning of the words "let the
superior man exert himself with the unfailing pertinacity of Nature"
embraces this.

I have now completed my explanation of the fundamental principles
involved in positive action. I wish to conclude by once again exhorting
you all to firm faith in the Tsung-li's teaching: "From true knowledge
action naturally proceeds." The meaning of the Revolution is as bright
and spacious as the skies; and the clearer our comprehension of it the
more vigor we shall put into the practice of it. Moreover, the methods
we are to adopt and the mode of procedure we are to follow have been
laid down for us in detail by Dr. Sun Wên. We have only to obey his
directions, each of us playing a part for which his temperament, calling
and knowledge fits him, relying upon his faculties for the discernment
of moral and material good at every step in his bold and resolute
execution of his duty to nation and people.


ACTION ENGENDERS KNOWLEDGE

I wish to say another word on the subject of the _knowledge_ from which
as we have seen action proceeds; and what I have to say is: that just as
action proceeds from knowledge, action in its turn engenders knowledge.
Dr. Sun said: "The ability to know implies the ability to act." I would
add the words: "without action one cannot attain to knowledge." For
knowledge comes with experience, and apart from the broad and
fundamental truths of revolutionary thought our knowledge need not
necessarily be in the first place very rich. Though, therefore, we must
of course do all we can to acquire knowledge for its own sake, we must
at the same time seek it as one of the fruits of positive action. Any
knowledge acquired in the course of study, research, or experience which
we do not proceed to put to the test of practice in the field of
actuality is not to be considered with certainty as worthy of being
called true knowledge. So it is that in all our undertakings practice
will yield us true knowledge, and action alone will give us the ability
to extend and enrich our knowledge. Chu Hsi in his commentary on the
_Great Learning_ wrote: "By long application of our powers we one day
reach a point whence we see the whole scheme of things spread out before
us, we perceive the realities underlying phenomena, the relation of
accident to essence, and the structure and workings of the human mind."
This attainment can come only as the fruit of positive action. If in the
course of practice and experience knowledge we have acquired and methods
we have based on it prove inefficacious we may take it that what we
valued as knowledge was not true knowledge. In this way we shall be
constantly broadening the scope and sifting the quality of our
knowledge, which is the genuine process of gaining knowledge. "To be
aware of ignorance brings knowledge" and "the open mind invites the
entrance of information," are maxims than which none are better as
guides in the search for knowledge.


COMRADES IN REVOLUTION! RESOLVE ANEW!

I am well aware of the magnitude of our revolutionary task of Resistance
and Reconstruction, and I have been no less impressed with recent
manifestations of my comrades' will to action. I have felt impelled by
the one and encouraged by the other to present you today this exposition
of positive action and of what is requisite for its success, in the hope
that you will all keep in mind these indispensable principles, gathering
fresh knowledge with experience, acting with deliberation, perspicacity,
and conscientiousness, spurning all things that tend to distract you
from your fixed purpose and involve you in the wild and motiveless
conduct of those who possess no such fixed purpose. In the _Chung-Yung_,
or _Doctrine of the Mean_, there is a passage emphasizing the importance
of "conscientiousness" in action, by which it means the refusal to be
satisfied with half-measures, the pursuit of ends to their logical
conclusion. If you give earnest thought to what I have said you will
realize that very much of what has long passed with us for action has
not been true action, that is, not positive action, and that therefore
we have failed in much that we have undertaken. It is only because our
action has not been really positive that we have allowed our minds to
enlarge on the difficulties and dangers of the Revolution. In fact,
these difficulties exist only for those whose minds lack resolution,
enthusiasm and faith. The ancient adage says: "There's nothing difficult
in the world if there's a man of spirit to be found" (where there's a
will there's a way). This is a piece of the age-old proverbial wisdom of
the people, and it may well serve us as a salutary warning against the
slack thinking and evil habits concealed beneath the airy phrase: "It's
easy enough to know what should be done; it's acting accordingly that's
hard."

We need, therefore, in the revolutionary nation-building we have before
us only to assert our wills, inflame our hearts with a fresh sincerity
and faith, and give ourselves up to positive action. If everyone of us
does so, I have no hesitation in pronouncing it will mean the certainty
of our success.




_C._ DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF _HSIEN_ (CHIANG K'AI-SHEK)[1]


  [Footnote 1: [Chiang K'ai-shek], _Ch'üeh-ting Hsien Ko-chi Tsu-chih
  Wên-t'i_ (Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of
  the Various Classifications of _Hsien_), [Chungking], 1939, p. 43 and
  chart.]

     One of a series of lectures, each issued separately,
     entitled _The Conclusions of the Party Chief_, and
     originally delivered before the Party and Government
     Training Class of the Central Training Corps. Compare with
     Appendix I (G), p. 324.

     The chart, opposite, is a translation of the chart appended
     to the original Chinese of the Generalissimo's booklet on
     _Hsien_. P.M.A.L.


ORGANIZATION OF THE VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF _HSIEN_

                                  +------------------+                               _Hsien_
  _Hsien_                         |_Hsien_ Government|                      _Hsien_   Party
  People'.........................|------------------|.......................Party  Supervisory
  Council                         |  _Hsien_ Chief   |                       Organ   Committee
   |                              |   (Magistrate)   |                          |          |
   |       +---------------------------------------------------------------+    |          +--+
   |       |       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    +---------|   |
   |People's       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |People's          |   |
   |Organizations  |Library|Middle-|Land   |Mili-  |Edu-   |Civic  |   |Organizations:    |   |
   |(_cont'd_):    |       |School |Section|tary   |cation |Affairs|   | Ex-Servicemen's  |   |
   | Laborers Assn.|       |       |       |Section|Section|Section|   |   Assn.          |   |
   | Farmers' Assn.|   Cooperative |       |       |       |       |   | Elders' Assn.    |   |
   | Merchants'    |   Union       |       | Reconstruction|    Police | Women's Assn.    |   |
   |   Assn.       |               |       | Section       |    Bureau | Able-bodied      |   |
   | Education     |             Social    |               |           |   Citizens' Corps|   |
   |   Assn.       |             Affairs   |             Finance       | Young Men's Corps|   |
   | Others     Experimental     Section   |             Section       |                  |   |
   |            Farm                       |                        Public                |   |
   |                            +------------------+                Health                |   |
   |         Reconstruction-----|   _Ch'ü_ Bureau  |                Bureau            District|
   |         Committee          |------------------|                                  Party   |
   |                            |   _Ch'ü_ Chief   |                                  Organ   |
   |                     +---------------------------------------------------------+      |   |
   |                     |        |        |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |      |   |
   |                     |      Ch'ü       |Military |Education|Director | Health  |      |   |
   |                     |      Vocational |Director |Director |of Civic | Bureau  |      |   |
   |                     |      Training   |         |         |Affairs  |         |      |   |
   |                     |      Class      |   Reconstruction  |         |     Able-bodied|   |
   |                     |                 |   Director        |      Police   Citizens'  |   |
   |                 Cooperative           |                Finance   Bureau   Union      |   |
   |                 Union                 |                Director                      |   |
  _Hsiang_                      +------------------+                                      |   |
  People's <==================> |  _Hsiang_ [or    |                                  Sub-    |
  Council                       | _Ch'ên_] Office  |                                  district|
   |                            |------------------|                                  Party   |
   |                            |  _Hsiang_ Chief  |                                  Organ   |
   |                      +-----------------------------------------+                     |   |
   |                      |        |   |   |    |    |    |    |    |                     |   |
   |               People's        | School| Division| Division|People's                  |   |
   |               Organizations   | System| of      | of      |Organizations:            |   |
   |               (_cont'd_):     |       | Police  | Economic| Ex-Servicemen's          |   |
   |                Laborers' Assn.|       | Affairs | Affairs |   Assn.                  |   |
   |                Farmers' Assn. |       |         |         | Elder's Assn.            |   |
   |                Education Assn.|       |   Division of     | Women's Assn.            |   |
   |                Others         |       |   Cultural        | Able-bodied              |   |
   |                          Cooperatives |   Affairs         |   Citizens' Corps        |   |
   |                                       |                   | Young Men's Corps        |   |
  _Pao_                         +------------------+           |                      Small-  |
  People's <==================> |   _Pao_ Office   |        Division                  Group   |
  Council                       |------------------|        of Civic                  (cell)  |
   |                            |   _Pao_ Chief    |        Affairs                     |     |
   |                            +-----------------------------------+                   |     |
   |                             |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |                   | Party
   |                             |Citizen's| Economic| Police  | _Pao_ Able-bodied      | Super-
   |                             |School   | Affairs | Section | Citizens' Troop        | visors'
   |                             |         | Section |         |                        | Net
   |                          _Pao_        |         |      Civic                       |
   |                          Cooperatives |     Cultural   Affairs                     |
   |                                       |     Affairs    Section                     |
   |                                       |     Section                                |
   |                                       |                                            |
   |                            +------------------+             _Chia_ Able-bodied     |
   |                            |   _Chia_ Chief   |-------------Citizens' Troop        |
   |                            +------------------+                                    |
   |                                       |                                            |
   |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
   |                                   The People                                       |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

At the fifth meeting of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central
Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang on April 8, 1938,
I made a speech on "The Reform of Party Affairs and Readjustments for
Party and Political Organizations." Attached to that speech was a draft
chart showing the interrelations among the Party and political
organizations under the _hsien_, with illustrations and explanations. I
pointed out then that the chart was only intended as an initial draft.
As to promulgating the detailed formulae and laws for execution, I
pointed out that the draft was only to serve as a basis and that the
wording in which the draft was written should not prove too binding.
There should be plenty of room for further study and discussion so that
perfection might be obtained. Furthermore, the draft chart was intended
mainly as an exposition of the relations between Party and political
organizations (hence it was also called "Party and Political Affairs
Chart"). The various administrative organizations were attached as an
appendix to it.

Since the publication of this draft chart, the serious attention of many
of our comrades, scholars and specialists has been aroused. In many
districts experiments have been carried on--a fact which is indeed very
gratifying and which evidences the earnest desire on the part of various
local administrations for reform.

The Party and Political Personnel Training Class was recently
inaugurated by the Central Training Corps. In order to lecture on the
problems covered in the draft chart and lay out the necessary formulae,
I had instructed several of my associates to collect views and data from
all possible sources and to make a thorough study of the question. Under
my personal supervision, the original draft has been revised and
supplemented. The main points contained therein may be summarized as
follows:

1. In connection with Party organizations, the _ch'ü_[2] (township)
office should be linked up with the _hsiang_ (_chên_), while small units
should be established under the _pao chia_ system. Thus the Party
organizations are brought to conformity with the political. The network
of Party members' supervisory organizations should be placed directly
under the Supervisory Committee of the _hsien_ Party headquarters.

  [Footnote 2: For explanation of such local government terms as
  _hsiang_, _pao_, _ch'ü_, see the text, p. 107.]

2. The _hsien_ is the unit of local government autonomy. The _hsien_
should be classified into three to six groups according to their area,
population, economic resources, cultural and communication development.
Below the _hsien_, the _hsiang_ (_chên_) constitutes the basic lower
unit, with _pao_ or village and streets as their constituents.
Elasticity may be allowed between the _hsien_ and _hsiang_ according to
local requirements. When and where necessary, a _ch'ü_ (township) office
may be established to serve as the connecting link, but if this is not
needed, the _hsiang_ (_chên_) should be placed under the direct
jurisdiction of the _hsien_. The same elasticity may exist between the
_hsiang_ (_chên_) and _pao_. In densely populated areas, a village and
a street may form one natural unit, inseparable from each other. In such
cases, one unit may consist of two or three _pao_ with one _pao chang_
(chief of the _pao_) at the helm of affairs, so that unnecessary
breaking-up of the village from the street may be avoided. To eliminate
difficulties arising from finances and personnel, all the posts of
secretaries (_kan shih_) of the _hsiang_ (_chên_) and _pao_ (or village
and street) may be concurrently served by the teachers of primary
schools, while the school principals of the _hsiang_ (_chên_) and _pao_
should concurrently serve as leader of the able-bodied citizens' corps
(_Chuang ting tui_) in accordance with the principle of unity of
administration, instruction, support and protection. In areas with
better economic and educational development where affairs concerning
local autonomy are multifarious, the principals of _hsiang_ (_chên_)
primary schools and pao citizens' [mass education] schools should
preferably concentrate on their school jobs with a view to efficiency.
The masses should be organized into different groups to undertake
different works in order to meet the actual requirements.

3. In connection with organs for expressing the views and opinions of
the people, there should be organized the _pao_ people's assembly, the
_hsiang_ (_chên_) people's representative assembly, the _hsien_ council,
each vested with proper authority, with a view to increasing the
people's interest in participating in government affairs. Thus the
influence of the masses may be properly magnified and the goal of true
democracy attained. With a view to greater alacrity, I wish to explain
in further detail as follows:


A. READJUSTMENTS IN THE RELATIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE PARTY
AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE _Hsien_

(_This item, consisting of eleven articles, is not intended for
publication._)

     A routine announcement of Party duties, of Party supervision
     of local morale, of seniorities as between Party and
     Government officers, etc. follows. It has been omitted in
     accordance with the statement in parentheses.


B. POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. The _hsien_ is the unit of local autonomy. These units can be
classified into from three to six groups according to the population,
economic status, culture and communication. On the one hand, the _hsien_
governments should handle affairs concerning local autonomy of their
respective district under the supervision of the provincial government
and on the other hand should carry out the orders of the Central and
provincial governments.

_a._ The area of the _hsien_ under the present system should remain the
same as before. The cancellation of the _hsien_ and the change in its
area are to be decided upon only with the authorization and approval of
the Central Government. In the _hsien_ there should be a magistrate,
under whom there should be secretaries, section chiefs, directors,
police officers, senior and junior staff members in the different
sections, technicians and assistants and police patrol officers handling
civic, financial, educational, construction, military, land, and social
affairs. The number of sections to be provided under the _hsien_
governments and their duties is to be decided by the provincial
government which in making decisions is to take into consideration the
local requirements of the _hsien_ concerned. The number of staff
members, and their ranks and salaries, is likewise to be decided upon by
the provincial government.

_b._ In each _hsien_ there should be held _hsien_ political affairs
meetings at which decisions concerning the _hsien_ administration are to
be reached and proposals made for submission to the _hsien_ People's
Council. The _hsien_ political affairs meetings should be held
irrespective of whether the _hsien_ Council has been established or not.

_c._ The rules and regulations governing the organization of the _hsien_
governments should be promulgated by the provincial governments and then
submitted to the Central Government for approval.

2. The _ch'ü_ (township) office is a subsidiary organization to the
_hsien_ government. Its duty is to supervise the affairs of the various
_hsiang_ (_chên_) on behalf of the _hsien_ government in connection with
the enforcement of local autonomy.

_a._ The scope of the _ch'ü_ should consist of from six to fifteen
_hsiang_. In those _hsien_ in which the total number of _hsiang_ is
below fifteen, no _ch'ü_ office should be established. The _hsiang_ in
such cases are to be placed under the direct jurisdiction of the _hsien_
government. In frontier regions where special conditions obtain,
specifications for the number of _hsiang_ for the _ch'ü_ office may be
modified.

In _hsien_ where no _ch'ü_ office is established, the _hsien_ government
should appoint representatives to supervise the affairs of the different
_hsiang_.

_b._ The _ch'ü_ office is headed by a district chief under whom there
should be two to five directors handling civic, financial, construction,
education, and military affairs. All such personnel are by special
appointment with pay, and they should be chosen by the superior
organizations from those who have received appropriate training. The
district chiefs should preferably be those who come from the districts
to which they are designated, their qualifications and treatment to be
fixed by law.

_c._ In the place where the _ch'ü_ office is seated, there should be
established a police bureau which is to be under the direction of the
district chief dealing with the police administration of the place.

_d._ In the _ch'ü_ there should be established the _hsiang_
reconstruction committee comprising local leaders as members. This
committee is to conduct research and map out the plans concerning rural
reconstruction, the district chief acting concurrently as its chairman.

_e._ In order to increase the vocational ability of the people and
develop local industries, there should be established in the _ch'ü_
vocational training classes.

_f._ In addition to the number of policemen as specified, there should
be organized in the _ch'ü_ the joint able-bodied citizens' corps
(_Chuang-ting lien tui-pu_) office which is to control and supervise the
_Chuang-ting_ of the various _hsiang_ (_chên_). Whenever necessary, the
_chuang-ting_ may be summoned together for special training and
organization.

_g._ The _ch'ü_ office should unite together all the _hsiang_ (_chên_)
cooperative societies and organize them into cooperative unions. Each
union is to consist of several departments dealing with different
cooperative enterprises. The _ch'ü_ office should appoint a supervisor
to be stationed in the union.

3. The _hsiang_ (_chên_) is to be defined as the basic administrative
unit under the _hsien_, and its organization should be substantiated
accordingly.

a. Each _hsiang_ in principle comprises six to fifteen _pao_. In drawing
such limits, however, consideration should be given to the historical
background and natural conditions of the locality. The demarcation and
the organization of the _pao chia_ system are to be decided upon by the
_hsien_ government, subject to the approval of the provincial
government. Reports must also be submitted to the Central Government.

_b._ The chief personnel of the _hsiang_ guild (_kung so_) should
include a director (_hsiang chang_) and one or two vice-directors. They
are to be elected from qualified citizens at the _hsiang_ people's
representative meetings. In the guild there should be provided four
departments, handling civic, police, economic and cultural affairs
respectively, each to be headed by one man with several staff members.
These posts should be held by the vice-directors and teachers of the
_hsiang_ primary schools. The date for the election of the director and
vice-directors of the _hsiang_ is to be fixed and announced in orders to
be issued by the _hsien_ government. The term of their office will be
two years.

_c._ There should be established in each _hsiang_ a central school
composed of three divisions for children, women especially, and adults.
There should be primary and higher primary classes. The posts of the
school principal, leader of the able-bodied citizens' corps, and
director of the _hsiang_ are to be concurrently held by one man. The
teachers are to undertake the extracurricular duties of training and
supervising. They are also to help the _hsiang director_ to handle
affairs of the _hsiang_. In the higher primary class of the school
stress should be laid on training the masses to enable them to undertake
the work of census-taking, promotion of health and sanitation and
cooperative affairs.

In places with better economic and educational development, the
principals of the _hsiang_ central schools should preferably concentrate
on their own duties at school.

_d._ The cooperative societies also have the _hsiang_ as the unit (with
branch societies in the _pao_). There should also be established in the
_hsiang_ public safe-deposit agencies for the storage of articles.
Separate granaries should be set up whenever necessary.

_e._ The leader of the _hsiang_ able-bodied citizens' corps should from
time to time summon chosen groups of the _chuang ting_ of the _pao_ to
the _hsiang_ to undergo advanced training. During the training period,
they are to perform police duties and when the period expires they are
to be sent back to take up the work as junior officers of the
able-bodied citizens' corps of the _pao_, charged also with the duties
of promoting local autonomy in the _pao_. Thus not only will the police
force be strengthened, but various activities properly developed. The
outposts established in the _hsiang_ by the _hsien_ police bureaus
should also be placed under the direction of the _hsiang_ director.

_f._ The _hsiang_ should convene _hsiang_ affairs meetings with the
director as chairman and all the department heads and senior members of
the staff in attendance. The chiefs of the _pao_ concerning whom
proposals are submitted to the meeting should also be present.

_g._ A hospital or clinic should be established for each _hsiang_ or a
number of _hsiang_. These hospitals or clinics should be staffed with
Western-trained doctors. In case of lack of personnel and finance,
[old-style] Chinese physicians may do on a temporary basis.

4. The _pao_ should be defined as a constituent of the _hsiang_ and its
organization be substantiated accordingly.

_a._ Each _pao_ is to consist of from six to fifteen _chia_, headed by a
_pao chang_ (chief of the _pao_) and an assistant _pao chang_. They are
to be elected from qualified citizens at the _pao_ people's meeting, and
their names are to be submitted by the _hsiang_ guild to the _hsien_
government. Before the election, the _pao chang_ and assistant _pao
chang_ may be nominated by the _hsiang_ guild subject to official
appointment by the _hsien_ government. In the office of the _pao_ there
should be two to four secretaries (_kan shih_) handling civic, police,
economic and cultural affairs. These posts may be concurrently held by
the assistant _pao chang_ and teachers of citizens' (mass education)
schools. In _pao_ with limited finances, one secretary may suffice.

The term of office for the _pao chang_ and assistant _pao chang_ will be
two years. They may be re-elected at the expiration of their term of
office.

_b._ All affairs of the _pao_ should be discussed and transacted at
_pao_ affairs meeting in which as many capable citizens of the _pao_ as
possible are to be asked to participate, in order to hasten progress of
the reconstruction of the _pao_.

_c._ All the activities undertaken by the _pao_ are to be under the
supervision and direction of the hsiang guild, the _ch'ü_ office and the
_hsien_ government. The latter superior organs should give constant help
and advice so that the program of work may be carried out step by step
as desired.

_d._ Every _pao_ is to have a mass education school, with the principal
of the school concurrently serving as the _pao chang_ and as the leader
of the _pao_ able-bodied citizens' corps. The school is to comprise
three divisions for children, for women especially, and for adults, and
its aim is to raise the level of education and vocational ability of the
masses. Teachers are also to help the _pao chang_ in dealing with
various affairs of the _pao_.

In _pao_ better-developed in economic resources and education, the
principles of the mass education schools should preferably concentrate
on their school duties.

_e._ Membership of the _pao_ branches of the cooperative societies is
composed of the families in the _pao_. The directors of the branch
societies are to be elected by members. The _pao chang_ can be elected
and concurrently hold this office.

_f._ The _pao_ office, the _pao_ able-bodied citizens' corps and the
_pao_ mass education schools should be simultaneously established. They
should have a joint office so that affairs of common interest may be
pushed from the same center.

_g._ In densely populated areas where a village and a street seem each
to be an integral part of the other, two or three _pao_ may be
amalgamated, the amalgamation not exceeding three _pao_. The mass
education schools, branch cooperative societies and treasuries,
likewise, may be amalgamated, with only the _pao_ able-bodied citizens'
corps remaining separate. One presiding _pao chang_ is to be elected to
take the helm of affairs, and a joint office is to be established.

_h._ The _pao_ should be equipped with a medicine box, with one of the
mass education school teachers trained in rudiments of the medical
science, in charge. He is to give simple treatment for diseases and to
give small-pox vaccination. If this should prove beyond the finances of
one _pao_, several _pao_ may join together.

_i._ The organization of the _chia_ is to consist of from six to fifteen
families, headed by a _chia chang_. There should be meetings of the
heads of families, and general _chia_ conferences, held from time to
time.

The _chia chang_ is to be elected at the meeting of heads of families.
His name is to be submitted by the _pao_ office to the _hsiang_ guild.

_j._ The _pao_ may retain its old name, such as _ts'un_ (village),
_chieh_ (street) or _ch'ang_ (market), but it is desired that they
should gradually adopt the official name of _pao_ with a view to
uniformity.


C. PEOPLE'S ORGANS THROUGH WHICH POPULAR POLITICAL OPINIONS MAY BE
EXPRESSED

1. To increase the people's interest in participation in government
affairs and to train their political insight and ability in accordance
with the principle of the inherent unity of teaching, learning and
practicing, people's organs for discussion of government affairs for the
various administrative units under the _hsien_ should be established
within specified time limits, and these organs should be vested with the
appropriate authority.

2. In the _pao_ should be established the _pao_ people's meeting to
elect the _pao chang_; the _hsiang_, the _hsiang_ people's
representative meeting to elect the _hsiang chang_.[3] (The
qualifications and standards of both the _pao chang_ and the _hsiang
chang_ are to be specified by law.) Thus it is hoped to attain the ideal
standards of local government and to establish the system of the
people's supervision of the government. No people's organ is needed for
the _ch'ü_ (district), while the _hsien_ people's council will serve as
the general organ for people of the entire _hsien_.

  [Footnote 3: Heretofore translated as "director of the _hsiang_."]

3. With a view to flexibility in the exercise of the people's
privileges, members of the _hsien_ people's council are to be brought
forth at the _hsiang_ people's representative meetings. Each _hsiang_ is
entitled to elect one representative as member of the council. The
number of representatives of legitimate professional bodies may be
increased in order to put representation of the districts and that of
the professions on equal footing. Representatives to the _hsiang_
people's meeting are to be produced at the _pao_ people's meeting. Each
_pao_ is entitled to two representatives. The _pao_ people's meeting
should be attended by one person from each family whose qualifications
and position in the family conforms to specifications in the law.

4. The _hsiang chang_ and _pao chang_ who are elected may both act as
chairmen of their respective people's organs, namely the _hsiang_
people's representative meeting and the _pao_ people's meeting. The
_hsien_ people's council for the time being is not to elect the
magistrate. It is to elect its own chairman.

5. Before the _hsien_ people's council is organized, the budget and
accounts of the _hsien_ government should be studied and passed by the
_hsien_ Administrative Meeting and then submitted by the magistrate to
the provincial government for approval.

After the _hsien_ people's council is inaugurated, the budget and
accounts of the _hsien_ should be presented to the council for
examination and then submitted to the provincial government for
approval. When necessary, the budget and accounts may first be sent to
the provincial government for approval and then the council may be
approached for confirmation and verification.


EXPLANATION

1. The basic spirit of this draft is to arouse and mobilize the masses,
to strengthen local organization and hasten district autonomy
enterprises so that the cornerstone of the revolution and national
reconstruction may be laid. Some may be of the opinion that as education
has not been popularized, it would be difficult to allow the masses
participation in government affairs. But the political system stressing
on people's privileges must be founded on the will of the masses. If
participation in government affairs is allowed only after education has
been developed on a nation-wide scale, the slogan "revolutionized
people's privileges" will be of no meaning. The people need only be
trained practically in the exercise of their political privileges, and
the main task of the government during the political tutelage period
lies in teaching the people how to exercise their four rights
[election; recall; initiative; referendum]. Tutelary government
[Party-dictatorship] and constitutional government are different only in
degree but not in fundamentals. During the period of tutelage,
therefore, the interest of the people in participation in government
affairs must be gradually aroused and increased. Thus measures enforced
with this purpose in view during the political tutelage period may not
contravene the aims of constitutional government, and the progress from
tutelage to constitutionalism may be attained smoothly. This explains
the transitional process from the beginning to the complete realization
of autonomous government and it was for such an explanation that this
draft was prepared.

2. With a view to the solution of the personnel and financial problems
confronting the various basic administrative units, the _hsiang_ chief,
_hsiang_ central school principal, and the _hsiang_ leader of the
able-bodied citizens' corps, excepting in those areas more highly
developed in education and economic resources, should be the same man.
The same thing applies to the _pao_. All those charged with
administrative duties should pay attention to education which should
serve as the means to attain the objectives of the revolution and
national reconstruction. Those with educational responsibilities should
give their time and energy also to the organization and training of the
masses. They should consider the masses as their students, the society
as a school and all existing circumstances and conditions as references
of instruction. Emphasis should also be laid on instructing the people
how to live properly, how to accomplish their duties. The basic
principles governing the revolutionary movement and national
reconstruction as laid down by our late Leader [Sun Yat-sen], measures
on the control of rice and the control of land as stipulated in the
ordinances and regulations governing district autonomy, together with
the seven measures previously announced by the Central Government,
should all be included in the scope of instruction. It was with these
considerations in mind that this draft provides that teachers of the
_hsiang_ middle [secondary] and _pao_ mass-education schools should
concurrently act as secretaries of the _hsiang_ guild and _pao_ office.
It would not do to maintain the old system when school teachers only
taught in the classroom, with the result that in many places where
schools have been conducted for many years people still refuse to be
conscripted, to pay taxes, to observe the New Life principles. This
could be attributed to the fact that teachers and others in charge of
the schools failed to do their duties.

It is also provided in the ordinances and regulations governing the
initial enforcement of district autonomy that "aside from enabling
people to read and write, schools should also emphasize what has been
known as the 'omnipotency of both hands' campaign." We should try to
make all the tools or machines that can increase the productive ability
of both hands, instead of relying on others. From now on, therefore,
local schools should emphasize vocational training by which the students
may be taught how to manufacture simple machines. This is not merely
scientific education but also an important way of carrying out the
doctrine of the people's livelihood. It is therefore provided in this
draft that in the _ch'ü_ (township) there should be established the
district vocational training class so that education and living may be
closely wedded.

In the past, educational organization has been too complicated. Besides
primary schools, there have been mass education schools, short-term
primary schools, rural schools. Now, since it is stipulated that the
_pao_ has _pao_ mass education schools and the _hsiang_ has _hsiang_
middle schools, the children and adults should be taught in separate
classes but at the same school so that all the former units of
education may be absorbed. The tutor (_tao shêng_) system should be used
as much as possible in the hope that the entire people of the nation may
be given at least the minimum education for citizenship within a limited
period of time. Thus all the personnel and finances may be concentrated;
the teachers may conveniently do their duty in directing the masses into
proper participation in various local enterprises. In this way,
education and autonomy may be closely affiliated with each other.

3. The organization of the various local administrative units is roughly
in accordance with the decimal system. In such provisions of this draft,
allowances have been made whereby the difficulties in the way of
enforcement of the system may be solved. Once the scope of the various
local administrative units is fixed, all plans and programs such as
establishing schools, training personnel, appropriation of funds and
statistics may be mapped out according to definite standards. The
conduct of a big nation with its variegated enterprises depends on
strict organization in war-time as well as in peace-time. In the army,
for instance, the number of units composing each army corps is
definitely fixed. Scientific administration must be governed by rules
and regulations.

For the convenience of execution, certain elasticity has been allowed in
provisions concerning organization in this draft. The _hsiang_, for
instance, is composed of from six to fifteen _pao_, and so on with other
lower administrative units. In cases where the village and the street
cannot be separated, joint organizations for the handling of affairs of
common interest is allowed. All these provisions are arrived at in order
to allow some flexibility whenever and wherever necessary. Within the
bounds of these regulations, the various local district governments may
exercise their discretion in disposing their respective affairs without
consulting their superior governments. But they will not be permitted to
trespass beyond the limits because disorderly organizations will make
control and supervision hard.

After the scope of the various local administrative units is fixed,
their respective spheres of education, health, cooperative movements and
police must also be uniformly determined so that control, instruction,
support, and protection may have an equal and well-balanced development.

4. Concerning the organization and training of the masses, it is indeed
regrettable that no wholesome accomplishments have been achieved during
the past many years. According to this new draft, the following
explanations have to be made:

_a._ Demarcation among people's groups and organizations: the former is
determined by professions and the latter according to age and sex. From
the standpoint of the requirements of the country, the latter should be
organized first. Especially urgent is the demand for such organizations
as the able-bodied citizens' corps and women's associations. From the
standpoint of the needs of the people, the organization of the
professional groups should be put on a sound basis as soon as possible,
particularly the farmers, laborers, and merchants groups which are
vitally concerned with the economic reconstruction movement of the
country. Steps, therefore, should immediately be taken in the order of
urgency. Next, for people's organizations, emphasis is to be laid on
organization and training; for the groups, direction and supervision are
to be stressed.

_b._ The work of organizing the various people's groups should proceed
from the bottom upwards because wholesome organizations can only be had
when the foundation is soundly laid. In peace-time, this will help
forward self-rule. In war-time, it will help meet military needs. In the
past, the various people's groups (such as farmers' associations and
women's associations) had only nominal existence, hanging their shingles
in the _hsien_ city, but few really worked. The reasons might be many,
but the main one has been the failure on the part of those responsible
to penetrate into the lower strata of activities and help develop them.
It must be realized that the various people's groups are necessary to
the various administrative units in the district autonomous government
system just as parts to the main body of a machine. Without the parts,
the machine would not be able to operate. From now on, therefore,
efforts must be made to substantiate the people's bodies so that they
may be enabled to function efficiently.

_c._ The able-bodied citizens' corps are necessary in peace as well as
in war-time. Attention should be paid both to training and to the
supervision so that their usefulness may be fully developed. The
constituents of the able-bodied citizens' corps are the pillars of
society, and on them depends the successful realization of most
enterprises concerning district autonomy. In this lies the importance of
our late Leader's [Sun Yat-sen] teaching about "omnipotency of both
hands." During the training, emphasis should not be on military alone
but also on general and vocational ability, in order to turn corps
members into useful members of society.

5. The people's organs for various local administrative units serve best
the purpose of training the people in the exercise of their rights in
government affairs. They constitute the prerequisites for democracy. In
the past, it has proved difficult to secure _hsiang_, _pao_ and _chia_
chiefs; or, after they were elected to their respective offices, they
failed to do their duties and some of them even committed acts harmful
to the people which slipped the notice of the superior government
offices. All these shortcomings must be overcome by virtue of democratic
measures. The higher supervisory organizations, limited in personnel,
can hardly keep an eye on every small detail. The _hsiang_ and _pao_
chiefs and other staff members under them are most closely associated
with the people. In order to prevent them from undermining the people's
interest for their selfish gains, the democratic (_Min-chu_) control and
supervision system should be enforced as the most efficient and
effective method. That the _pao_ people's meeting should be attended by
the families as representative units is a preliminary step. This is so
because China is an agricultural country, different from other
industrialized nations where the individual citizens constitute the
representative units. Representatives to the _hsiang_ people's
representative meetings are to be produced at the _pao_ people's
meeting. Councilors from the _hsiang_ and higher administrative units
for the _hsien_ people's council are to be produced by indirect instead
of direct election. Next comes the question of increasing the people's
economic stability and developing local enterprises. It is specially
provided that adequate representation to the various professional groups
should be given in the _hsien_ people's council. (This is limited to the
professional groups and their representation is not to exceed thirty per
cent.) In this way the district conception and the interests of
professions are given equal consideration.

6. To prepare the personnel for the various local administrative
government units, the various grades of schools should be adapted to the
needs of the local organizations and enterprises. With such adaptation,
the school training may not be in vain and young students upon
graduation may find appropriate employment. A separate set of rules and
regulations should be promulgated whereby these youths may be encouraged
and their future welfare safeguarded. At present, the training of such
personnel and their future disposal have not been systematically enough
planned. Proper remedy must be provided so that definite standards may
be fixed. Most important of all, persons properly trained should be
assigned to places where are located their native home villages or
towns. All such jobs concerning the development of district enterprises
like insurance of treasuries or storehouses, transportation of rice and
foodstuffs, farmland irrigation, fishing, grazing, and land reclamation,
should all be filled by persons with special technical training. As the
development of such district enterprises continues, the demand for
appropriate personnel will grow as a foregone conclusion.

7. With regard to financial problems, the late Leader instructed that
the district self-rule organizations should be founded on the basis of
"political and economic cooperation." The sources of finance, therefore,
should be derived from the people's public productive enterprises,
instead of depending on new taxes. There are many public properties in
various localities that should be utilized. Instead, these have mainly
been exploited and monopolized by individuals who cared for nothing but
their own selfish interests. Henceforth, these properties should be
placed under public control. With efficient management, the proceeds
from these enterprises should serve as finances for the entire _hsiang_
or _pao_. In case such properties consist of land, they could be turned
into experimental farms and be placed under the management of the
schools for the improvement of agricultural products and for training
the people in reformed farming methods. The joint property of a clan
should be dealt with in a similar way so that their income may be
increased and the results of agricultural improvement programs may be
extended from one locality to another easily. In places where there are
no such lands, steps should be taken to reclaim the mountainous or hilly
regions or the streams and ponds. Free labor may be utilized with a view
to increasing the income. Besides, surplus rice may be stored in the
_hsiang_ and the _pao_, under the management of the people of the
respective districts. The various cooperative societies transporting
agricultural products should also provide granaries and issue mortgage
loans. Part of the profits thus derived should be devoted as funds for
the development of local enterprises. Thus not only will the financial
problem be solved but district autonomy development will follow local
needs. Before the local public enterprises (as described above) are so
developed that income is sufficient to meet financial requirements,
attention should be paid to the following measures:

_a._ Taxes which the _hsiang_ guild may collect independent of the
superior government offices.

_b._ The finances of the _hsien_ should be demarcated from those of the
province, and the quota of the former should be gradually increased if
possible.

_c._ In lean _hsien_, the _hsien_ government should be subsidized by the
provincial government.

8. Last of all, it should be pointed out that this draft was drawn up
after repeated discussions and studies. Henceforth, all the _hsien_ and
lower district government units in the autonomy system should observe
this draft as the basis. This is a time of national crisis when the
destiny of our entire nation and race is hanging between life and death.
It is hoped that all comrades of our Party and our fellow-countrymen
should strive with strong determination for nation-wide enforcement of
these district autonomy measures. Bold initiative should solve any
unforeseen difficulties that may arise. Fear and hesitation should never
be allowed to gain the upper hand. Only in this way, may we hope that
the cornerstone for various political levels of true democracy is laid
on a sound basis, and only in this way may we hope that the stupendous
task of national reconstruction can be accomplished.




_D._ A DISCUSSION OF MAO TSÊ-TUNG'S COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (CH'ÊN KUO-HSIN)[1]


  [Footnote 1: Min-i Ts'ung-k'an (Popular Opinion Series), _Mao Tsê-tung
  Ch'ên Shao-yü Tsui-chin Yen-lun-ti Tsung Chien-t'ao_ (A General Review
  of the Most Recent Utterances of Mao Tsê-tung and Ch'ên Shao-yü),
  Chungking, 1940; p. 1-17.]

     The following article, expressing the general Kuomintang
     view, but written and published unofficially, illustrates
     debate on foreign policy, and the type of discussion between
     Nationalists and Communists. Written in the autumn of 1939,
     it was reprinted in 1940 as a part of a symposium, forming a
     critique of Chinese Communist views. Mao Tsê-tung (see
     above, p. 166) is the outstanding Chinese Communist leader.


I. THE QUESTION OF UNEXPECTED POLITICAL "COUPS"

As the Central Government has already formulated correct principles of
action, the recent German-Soviet Pact has no influence upon our
National policies. If we follow these policies, that Pact does not
compel our attention. But it is not so with the Chinese Communists and
their external organs. They are confounded and struck dumb by this
unexpected blow so much that they can only keep their grief to
themselves.

In all propaganda literature of the Communist Party, we can easily
discern the great confusion resulting from this coup. For example,
Hitler was the "Fascist Robber" or the "mad dog," but within these days,
he becomes the Führer, with all due respects. The word "Fascist" is
still being used, but whether they are planning to discard it
altogether, we do not know. For instance, on the day previous to the
announcement of the Pact, the Communists were saying, dreamily, that a
clause prohibiting Germany's seizure of other countries was included in
the Pact. Again, when Germany attacked Poland, the Communists cleverly
said that this was caused by Great Britain's playing Judas against
Poland, and they decisively said that Great Britain and France would not
aid her, and some even said that the two antagonistic fronts were still
there, though without giving any reason. When reports of these momentous
international changes arrived in quick succession, they tried every
means to make them appear unimportant. They did this perhaps to avoid
the too much "heating up" of their followers on one side, and to avoid
committing blunders before they could receive orders concerning their
future policy. They were afraid of punishment, to be sure. Hence many
ridiculed these poor people, saying that they were like a herd of sheep
without a shepherd, for they showed their ignorance, their childishness,
hesitation, and paradoxical thoughts and actions during this period.

Public opinion as a whole praises the policies we now adopt since they
are independent of any outside element. On the other side, these praises
show that while the principles of National Defense are still as sound as
ever, the ten principles of the Communist Party are now just like ten
big stones falling on Communist toes. The Communists are about to be
killed by their own weapons. Had the Government of China been formed by
the Communists, it would, in that event, have collapsed as easily as any
Japanese cabinet since the War. What would become of the country, if
under the present crisis foreign policy were to be the speculation of
foreigners? These are exactly the ideas expressed by public gossip and
in discussions in schools. It is true that the Chinese Communists
cannot hold power because they lack political training and profound
learning. This is their inner, incurable trouble. In fact, many young
Communists have also spoken with me, and they show their sorrow when
they feel the lack of a really efficient central organ.

But speaking with consideration, we can see their good qualities shown
by censoring a great part of the news concerning Moscow's abolition of
the Anti-Fascist movement, and on the other hand advertising in a
special manner the news concerning the will of the French Communists to
fight on the first line of defense, and to help the French Government to
destroy Fascism. Perhaps this is a true revelation of the editor's faith
in the principle "Country and Nation above all," so that unconsciously
he showed it in his actions. This point is worthy of our praise and
sympathy.

After about ten days of hesitation and aimless probing, Mr. Mao
Tsê-tung, as the head of the Party, issued a lengthy talk entitled "On
the Present International Situation and the War of National Resistance,"
in the form of a catechism in which the questions are asked by a news
reporter. In the first section, he explained the German-Soviet Pact; in
the second, he predicted the future development of international
affairs, in the third he discussed the future of China. His aim in
publishing this article is to pacify the agitated hearts of his fellow
Communists. But since it is made public, we have the liberty of
discussing it, especially so since the Communists themselves have the
same habit and they also emphasize free speech. I hope they will not be
irritated.


II. IS THE GERMAN-SOVIET PACT CASUAL?

Mr. Mao seems to take it for a treaty that has been signed "all of a
sudden." Now this is quite untrue if we consider the facts.

Many periodicals and newspapers have published articles proving that the
Pact was long-planned. We shall not consider them. We shall not even
consider the original friendship between Germany and monarchic Russia.
But we must remember how Germany brought Lenin back to Russia in a
sealed train, how the formation of the Red Army was based upon German
plans, and the fact that Germany established an aviation school in
Russia. We see how Germany helped the Russian Soviet Revolution to
succeed. I often think that if we trust the words of a country's
foreign minister and the slogans the people shout to provide us an
outline of the country's foreign policy, we end in the position of
buying goods upon reading an advertisement. In the end we will find
ourselves cheated. In fact shops which are "liquidating" their goods may
sell their goods at an even higher price than in an ordinary sale. A
more reliable way of observation is to judge the policy by studying the
secret tendencies in the actions of high military and economic organs
which are essential in national defense. If we believe in slogans alone,
we might as well ask a salesman about the curative power of his patent
medicine. In reality, the salesman is a mere hireling. What pharmacist
discloses his real formula and method of combinations? Hence, to probe
into the real relation between the two countries, we must ask the
smaller nations between them; these make the closest observations.

For two years, these small states have been expecting this treaty. The
question of "which to side with" gives them sharp suffering which has
made them all the more sensitive. They know what the two countries have
been planning when they see so many secret delegates coming and going
very busily. Within the last two years, observers in Europe and America
have also predicted cooperation between Germany and Soviet Russia. Even
in China, did not Mr. Chiang Po-li write an essay to this effect,
warning the Chinese people? According to them, the slogans shouted in
both countries are strange diplomatic weapons; like the masques worn in
a Greek play, they do not show the faces of the actors. When the Jewish
Litvinoff went off the stage, it was the sign: "First Act Completed."
Now the spectators who wear red glasses are still enchanted by the first
act. Anyway, Mr. Mao's explanation that the Pact is a sudden one is
unreasonable.

In China, many were doubting the National policy of independent
struggle. Not until their "Soviet Help," "Single Alliance with Russia"
essays had been erased by the recent coup, did the policy of independent
struggle begin to shine in its brilliancy. At first our policy of
independent foreign relations lost influence to the better-sounding
slogan of "A united foreign front." After this lesson, we can perhaps
see more clearly. Such a lesson to a political party not in power is a
very wholesome admonition; had the party been in power, we know the
damage which could have befallen the nation. Speaking with
consideration, I also earnestly hoped for the success in the
British-French-Soviet parleys because it would ensure safety in Europe
by safeguarding all lesser states. Furthermore, it would help us also by
checking Germany and Japan. But this was only a hope, and I seriously
doubted its realization. The "united foreign policy front" advocated by
the Communists is not too unreasonable; its error lies in stating with
certainty the necessity of two international fronts. Some even
acknowledged the existence of such a situation two years ago, and they
forbade any doubt expressed to fellow-members concerning this point.
Even a week prior to the signing of the Pact, they said with certainty
that the rumor of such a Pact was a mere invention of Trotskyites and
German spies. Such a ban on free speech is not only detrimental to the
progress of a nation, but even to the Communists' own welfare. Their
members will not only be made to look foolish, but they will even lose
their faith by being called upon to change about. For the sake of our
national intelligence, for the sake of the Communists themselves, I hope
that in the future, such bans will be lifted, thus encouraging freer and
more reasonable ideas. I hope this appeal will do some good, even to the
editors of their newspapers.


III. WHY THE GERMAN-SOVIET PACT?

Concerning this Pact, Mao Tsê-tung used words like "reactionary,"
"Capitalistic," "intrigue," etc., about Great Britain and France. On the
other hand, he employed words like "great" (to be added "talented" if
Ch'ên Shao-yü were to write it), "increasing the power," "more
progressive," etc., about Soviet Russia. In the end, he even used the
phrase "have laid the foundation for the world's oppressed people to
seek for liberty and emancipation." All right! The term does not sound
ugly, and to ensure better Sino-Soviet relations, we may leave it at
that. But under the present state of affairs, too many attacks directed
against Chamberlain and Daladier are certainly not good. As a matter of
fact, all this is like sending congratulations to Soviet Russia, and a
letter of condolence to those with whom Soviet Russia is dissatisfied.
All these are but social affairs, the only point is that in both the
ideas are not too logically expressed. That's all!

Now if you look at the Pact in the same way that you look into a
kaleidoscope, you can see as many meanings as you want, while turning
the thing around. Basically, Germany's only reason for wanting this
Pact is, as she has stated, to avoid the British encircling policy. The
economic cooperation talked of by politicians can also give further
meaning to the Pact. Recently, in the occupation of Danzig and Warsaw,
the sound of guns is the wordless explanation. As to the plan of
partitioning Poland and absorbing the Eastern European States (enclosed
in a secret clause), we do not know yet. Let us for the time being not
discuss it.

As to Soviet Russia, her effort at bettering her friendly relationship
with China can be no better revealed than in Molotov's own speech. He
said: "We have always been trying to increase the amity between the
peoples of Germany and Russia. This Pact is important because it means
that the two big Powers in Europe have decided to be friends and to live
peacefully." Thus we can see that the Pact is not a casual happening.
Molotov again says: "There are some who want to take advantage of the
strained relationship between Great Britain and Germany.... Such people
aim at involving Soviet Russia in a war against Germany by taking sides
with Great Britain. How foolish these political speculators for war
are!" Hence we know that the Pact was signed according to Soviet
Russia's own will, and, unlike what Mao said, it was planned long ago,
and not at all after the failure of the British-French-Soviet parleys.
Now we only want those who advocate "united foreign policy front" to
think of the meaning of words like "foolish" and "war speculators."
These words are new compared with "retrograde," "stubborn,"
"Trotskyites," etc.

Perhaps the greatest part of all in Molotov's speech is: "The Soviet
Union will still continue to proceed in her own independent policy which
is based upon the welfare of all Soviet Russian citizens." This
corresponds exactly with our "Nation and country above all!" Sun Yat-sen
also said that the success of the Soviet Russian October Revolution was
based upon its ability to apply the laws concerning Nationalism.
Leninism corrects Marxism by adding the idea of Nationalism. And
Stalinism intensifies Leninism by an even greater emphasis laid on
Nationalism. Hence we can say what the Soviet Revolution adopted was
Leninism, and that what the Soviet Union is now adopting is Stalinism.
The success of Lenin and Stalin is largely due to this reason. This Pact
between Germany and Soviet Russia is but the fruit borne out of the
principle "national welfare above all." The Soviets believe "The Soviet
Government above all." Now what should we in China have?

As for Mr. Mao's reasons concerning the failure of the Three-Power
Parley, the explanation he gives is just a reduced and "Chinafied" copy
of the Soviet explanation concerning this problem. We can also say it is
abridged. Mr. Mao always "Chinafies" things. I am sorry that this
article has not been "Chinafied" (much to his distaste, I suppose) so
its power must be weaker.


IV. A DISCUSSION ON THE "NEW FRONT" AS MADE IN A CHINESE STORY-TELLER'S
WAY

The manner in which Mr. Mao discussed the question resembles that of a
Chinese story-teller, though his speech is less vivid. When he spoke of
the "future development of the present international situation," it was
like talking to a class of naive schoolboys who are always credulous.

He said that the present state of affairs in Europe was caused by the
policy of non-intervention. The Second Imperialistic War has already
entered the second stage. This is a war of plunder, not a rightful one.
Concerning the East, he also made a vain distinction. He said the
present state of affairs in China is also a new stage. No other
explanation was given. We suppose he is always careful in expressing his
ideas, so that if necessary he will have plenty of chances to make a
shift. He divided the imperialistic nations into several camps: Germany
and Italy belong to the Fascist[2] camp; Great Britain and France belong
to the Fascistic[3] camp; the Americas under the U. S. are a
capitalistic camp. As to Soviet Russia, she is presumably in another
world. Mr. Mao said that she would cooperate with the U. S. to start the
world's peace movement. Besides these, there were numerous tales as
enchanting as the Arabian Nights. The most important ones: in Europe, a
war on the entire front, and the movement planned by English and French
Communists and Social Democrats to overthrow the Fascist regime; in the
East, British policy was to partition China between herself and Japan.
According to him, these are "present" situations, and if we take into
consideration his manner of speaking, we can almost say that they meant
the "actual" position at present.

  [Footnote 2: _Fa-hsi-ssŭ_.]

  [Footnote 3: _Fa-hsi-ssŭ-hua-ti_, i.e., changing to Fascism.]

His chess-board analysis of international situations resembles his
former "front" theory--perhaps it is his new front theory. His aim, we
believe, is to cheat his spectators. Being ignorant of the real
situation, he was at first dumbfounded. Now he tries to move our
attention to other things, just like a magician at work, who needs a
band to create enough noise to shift the audience's attention. We should
be considerate, knowing his difficulties. But I suppose such a manner of
doing things does not increase the reputation of the Chinese Communists,
does it?

In fact, if any one of the following events occurs, his new front will
immediately be shattered: 1. Soviet Russia also adopts a
non-intervention policy; 2. Italy keeps herself aloof or joins the side
of the Allies; 3. A sufficiently large number of European states remain
neutral; 4. America cooperates with Great Britain; America or any
country in America declares war against Germany; 5. Great Britain does
not help Japan in dividing up China; 6. Soviet inclination to sign
treaty with Japan is revealed; etc., etc. I believe anyone who has
sufficient knowledge of international relations will know that the error
in the old "front" theory lies in its presumption that countries of the
same systems of government will tend to unite against those of another
system. The new front theory is based upon the presumption that the
central motivating ideas of different countries will form the basis of
separating them between two hostile fronts. This is an even more
mistaken conception than the first. It is built on sand. It is easy to
teach such a rigidly formulated doctrine of "hostile fronts" but in case
they meet with a really intelligent and well-informed member, they will
be certainly at a loss. Hence as a matter of fact, such authoritative
articles do more harm than good. Mr. Mao has written a great deal since
the war for publication; if we now connect all these articles together
for a thorough study, we can find numerous places where he is dropping a
stone upon his own toe. In fact such a chess-board analysis of the
international situation is based upon materials gotten from the G. P. U.
plus some "judgment" derived accidentally. As a matter of fact, such G.
P. U. reports are unreliable down to the last word. The work of the G.
P. U. is to pay special attention in getting the past record of a man or
organ important in a given country.

When required, some high-sounding or bad names are added to the
personality so as to strengthen the mood of speech in propaganda
literature. So somebody even said: "If you wish to follow the propaganda
methods of the Communist Party, observe two dogs barking in the street.
After due observation you should analyze their points of difference.
You should be able to speak like this: This is a dog infused with
British, French, American, German or Japanese imperialistic ideas. He is
stubborn, retrograde, reactionary, capitalistic, Fascist, and in danger
of being a Trotskyite traitor or a person like Wang Ch'ing-wei. Now the
other is a Soviet Socialistic dog, talented, progressive, belonging to
the world of light, a supporter of world peace, a dog who sides with the
poor and oppressed."

In fact how can confused international situations be so simply analyzed
by a mere figure drawn on a chess-board? Unless all their members are
mechanical men deprived of the power of thinking, they will have their
own doubts, especially when Mr. Mao has repeatedly dropped stones on his
own toe. The more he shouts the correctness of his views, or the success
of his work, the more he will be a laughing-stock to the people. He will
be the Don Quixote of China, or Ah-Q,[4] to be ridiculed by all. Yet in
fact, there is no necessity for him to make these comments, and such
methods of talking without material basis are usually avoided by
politicians, especially when they are in service or partly in service.
For example, Molotov spoke very cleverly on the Pact: after giving a
historical explanation of the necessities for signing the Pact, he
concluded, almost carelessly, by saying: "When Germany showed her
willingness to improve the friendship between the two countries, Soviet
Russia certainly had no reason to refuse. Hence the Pact is made."
Besides, he talked of the welfare of the nation, as if to give a further
proof of the necessity in signing the Pact. How clever his manipulations
are! But the same thing under Mr. Mao's pen becomes a series of
hot-faced scoldings, now praising A, then cursing B. And concerning his
doctrine that the German-Soviet Pact is caused by the failure of the
British-French-Soviet parleys, he expounded and expounded his reasons
and proof, only to lead himself into greater confusion, so that fewer
will believe him. Now comparing these two events, this will be very
detrimental to the Communists, who find it difficult to give a
satisfactory explanation. Even from a rhetorical point of view, no
matter how Mao curses the British non-intervention policy, no matter how
he curses this policy as the reason for Japanese invasion of China, for
German occupation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, no matter how he condemns
the Munich Meeting, any reader will correspondingly ask: Is Soviet
Russia also adopting the policy of non-intervention? How about Poland?
What is the difference between the Munich Meeting and the German-Soviet
Pact? All these questions will produce the exactly opposite effect in
the minds of the readers as that which was wished for by Mao. This is
but one point. If we go on to have a closer analysis, we see that Mr.
Mao's art of speaking needs more practice. As to his material proof in
his article, up to date [September 15, 1939], the Soviet attitude is
still the sit-and-look attitude condemned by him, as being the result of
non-intervention policy; the countries proclaiming their neutrality are
quite numerous; Italian attitude is yet uncertain; the British Communist
Party is declaring that full confidence is placed in Chamberlain; the
French Communists are on the front to fight for their motherland and the
Third International has now no power over them. On the other hand, there
are rumors concerning a _rapprochement_ between Japan and Soviet Russia.
All these only tend to disprove the sayings of Mr. Mao.

  [Footnote 4: The hero of a novella by Lu Hsün, China's outstanding
  modern writer, Ah-Q is a figure of profound pathos.]


V. A SINGLE ENEMY? OR A SINGLE ALLY?

Everybody knows that our foreign policy during the period of the war is
to spot one enemy only. We attack only Japan. We try to be friends with
every country other than Japan. This spirit can be seen in the
manifestoes and other proclamations of the Government. Hence although
Germany and Italy are the allies of our enemy, we still have every wish
to bind their friendship, and hope that they will help our enemy the
less in her war of aggression, and contribute more materially to our
success by selling us armaments. Such a "one-enemy" foreign policy is
the basis of our future success. Otherwise, the Nation will easily be
led into a path of thorns, if we adopt the policy of allying with one
today and cutting another tomorrow. In Molotov's report, there are
several sharp sentences: "In foreign policy, the aim is always not to
make more enemies, but rather to lessen the number of enemies." This can
be jotted down as a note to the "one-enemy" policy.

But what about Mao Tsê-tung's idea? In fact he preaches "one-ally"
policy. He has condemned them all, except for the Soviet Union. Now he
again places Soviet Russia in another almost intangible world. What does
he mean, then? Does he mean that we can satisfy our hunger by looking at
a cake? In fact, this was the same old question long before disputed.
We can all remember that the Communists were the advocates of a military
alliance with Soviet Russia. Now it was Soviet Russia, not we, who
declined. Those who were boasting of the alliance were Communists; and
so were those who stopped it. Soviet Russia said that she alone was too
weak and that she hoped China could find more allies. Because of this,
the "one-ally" policy did not gain as much support as the
British-American-French-Soviet union. When the British-French-Soviet
parleys broke off, Mr. Mao found it difficult to give a good
explanation, so that he could not but take up the old theory of
"one-ally" to ward off attack.

The chief countries helping China in the war are Great Britain, the U.
S. A., and Soviet Russia. In the past, at present, and in the future,
their central powers of aiding China are economic power from Great
Britain, political power from the U. S. A., and military power from
Soviet Russia. It is a fact that even if Soviet Russia remains at peace,
she can check Japan (unless Soviet Russia proclaims amity with Japan,
and makes adequate assurances, in which case it will greatly influence
our condition). But the economic power of Great Britain and the
political power of the U. S. A. are also absolutely necessary. At
present, we are still enjoying these advantages, and the breaking-up of
the British-French-Soviet parleys does not influence this situation. We
don't know why Mr. Mao is bent upon rejecting the friendly assistance of
Great Britain and the U. S. Should we act like this if we believe that
"the country and the nation are above all?" Now suppose we follow the
Communists and throw ourselves into the bosom of Soviet Russia, are we
sure that she will do everything for us? If she signs a treaty with our
enemy, what then?

The most unreasonable point in Mao's discussion is his attitude toward
Great Britain. He probably wants to please his superiors by guessing
their ideas. Perhaps he thinks that the Third International is going
back on the policy adopted years ago--the policy of "Anti-Britain" so
much sung by Trotsky and his followers. Hence Mao starts this movement
in China, and gathers false proofs that Japan and Great Britain will
sooner or later be allies so that they can divide up China. Up to now,
Mr. Mao's words have not yet become fact. Furthermore, Great Britain has
reassured us that her policy towards China will not be changed. To us
this is good news--but perhaps unhappy news for Mr. Mao.

Mr. Mao's opinion that we "may approach Germany" does not sound very
safe or very natural. Mr. Mao does not adopt the foreign policy of
"befriend those who help us and hate those who help our enemy," but
rather of "befriend Soviet Russia's friend, attack Soviet Russia's
enemies." This is flatly against the principles of independent foreign
policy. The old German-Italian line advocated by Wang Ch'ing-wei is
wrong because it makes us bend our knees. But we must also know what the
new German line amounts to. Japan's _rapprochement_ with Soviet Russia
and Great Britain are rumors scattered out simultaneously, but are
things that cannot be possible. According to foreign telegraphic
reports, the German foreign minister is now trying to pull together
Japan and Soviet Russia, with the hope of forming a future grand
alliance among Germany. Italy, Japan, and Soviet Russia. As to the
Japan-Soviet line, it is based upon the "double-south policy" of
attacking Great Britain. Japan will move south from the Pacific and
[Soviet] Russia will move south from Central Asia, so that British
interest in all districts lying between the Near and the Far East will
be equally divided up by [Soviet] Russia and Japan. Their method of
procedure is like this: 1, A treaty will be signed by Soviet Russia, as
the protector of Outer Mongolia, and Japan; Soviet Russia will stop
enmity against "Manchukuo" and Japan, so that Japan may concentrate her
attention on China. 2, A commercial treaty will be signed between them.
3, A final alliance promising mutual non-interference with appended
clauses. Of course this is Germany's dream, or may be a flat rumor,
since it is unbelievable that Soviet Russia should join Japan. Even from
the point of material benefit, why should Soviet Russia act so as to
hurt others but remain doubtful that she can derive real benefit? But to
insure absolute safety, we must be careful of any German intrigue. We
must warn her often. In the past we used to buy munitions from her, so
we must have her goodwill. Now with the War, it is unlikely that Germany
will still sell us munitions. Hence why must we still follow Germany and
"approach her"? After all, what is the difference between this and the
German-Italian line advocated by Wang Ch'ing-wei? Now, just a "warning":
if [Soviet] Russia and Japan do join up to form an alliance, I must ask
the Chinese Communist Party a question: Concerning the name, the Chinese
Communist Party, are they going to throw away the word "Chinese" and
adopt a Soviet Russian nationality, or, as said in the _Hsin Min Pao_,
to be so base as to join Wang Ch'ing-wei's regime, or shall they stick
to the word "Chinese" and cancel the word "Communist"? I hope they will
reply to my question.

Concerning the theory of a Second Imperialistic War, Mao himself has for
two years forbidden his followers to comment, on the charge of being a
Rightist, a closed-door Rightest, a childish Rightest, or a Trotskyite
who is plotting with Germany. Now we see that he himself has fully
adopted a Trotskyite view. In that article he used the words
"progressive" and "retrogressive" to suppress any upheaval within his
party; but now what he means by "progressive" is exactly "retardation";
what he formerly advocated as "progress" is now a discarded fig. He is
just making a circle, like a donkey fastened to turn a grind-stone,
pressed onward by whipping and kicking, and when he has turned half a
circle, he may be said to have retarded half a circle.

Now Mr. Mao condemns every country as imperialistic. But we must ask, in
his opinion, does he think that Poland is imperialistic? Why is the war
of national defense on the part of Poland not a rightful war? Under the
exactly similar conditions, why did the Communists formerly show
sympathy for Abyssinia and Spain, and are now cold toward Poland? He
says that Communists always hate wars; then why did he advocate the
Help-Abyssinia Movement? This is a paradox. Perhaps the saying that
Communists hate war is invented by Mr. Mao himself. So far as we know,
the Communists in Poland, Great Britain, and France are absolutely
sympathizing with the Poles in their defensive war.

There is another ridiculous point: Mr. Mao also labelled Chamberlain and
Daladier as Fascist Reactionaries. Before the German-Soviet Pact, they
were hailed as saints, but now they are convicts, as it were. If Mr. Mao
is not satisfied with them, then condemn them as he wishes. But why must
he put such a "Fascist" hat upon the oldest democratic countries? This
spring, one American political commentator predicted jokingly that in
the near future Hitler will say that the headquarters of the Communists
are located in London and Paris, hence anti-Communist will mean
anti-French. Now the direction of this pseudo-prophecy is already
established, though Hitler did not give the above reason. But we did not
expect that the Chinese Communists would adopt such a belief by calling
democratic countries Fascist and by advocating "that we may approach
Germany." This is perhaps a conclusion by their special logic.


VI. A REASONLESS CONCLUSION

Concerning the future of China, Mr. Mao made many surface talks, though
in general there is no serious fault. But his theories and his
conclusions are disjointed. For example, if he makes light of the Polish
war, what will be the value of this Oriental war? Besides, is the policy
of "single alliance with Soviet Russia" in unison with the principle:
"We will befriend those who aid us, and attack those who aid our enemy"?
If Soviet Russia aids Japan, what shall then be done? If he opposes the
splitting movement, then why not advocate unity? These are but a few of
the numerous contradictions that may be found in his article.

Especially strange is his idea that to ally with countries other than
Soviet Russia, we should ally with their peoples and not with their
governments. But the word "people" is not used in foreign affairs and
its meaning is also most indistinct. According to him (I presume) he
desires that China fan up revolutions in all countries while carrying on
the War of National Resistance. True, the method may apply to Japan, but
not to other countries. Otherwise, all world Powers will begin to hate
China who is still fighting the War of National Resistance. What will we
think of this? Now to speak frankly, the Communists in various countries
have not succeeded in fanning up revolutions in their countries, and on
the contrary, with their force weakening year after year, what shall we
help them for? When we ourselves have not yet stood up firmly, we are
already thinking of shouldering a weight of a thousand pounds. Is there
a reason in such an attempt? In reality, we know the force of the
Chinese proletarian classes. They amount to about two million people,
mostly in Shanghai and Tientsin. Now the puppet regimes of Yin Ju-keng
and Wang Ch'ing-wei are all formed in these districts. Ch'ên Shao-yü is
the chief representative of the Shanghai section of the Communist Party.
Has he gone there for an investigation? To whom do those who are
performing Anti-Japanese and Anti-Traitor work belong--to the Communist
Party, or what? It is better for Communists to moderate their tune and
not boast of any more world revolution.

Concerning the present European war, Mr. Mao's attitude is that of a man
expressing his joy on seeing others' loss and misfortune. This is not
the way of the Chinese people. We always express our sorrow in a war.
What General Chiang has said concerning his hope for peace in Europe is
the natural revelation of the Chinese moral character based upon love
and compassion. What Mr. Mao expresses is something like the spirit of
"kill-kill-kill" advocated by the notorious robber Chang Shen-chou. This
is because Mr. Mao has not yet thoroughly imbibed the idea of
"Chinafying" things. I express my sympathy for him in his policy of
"Chinafication." This of course does not mean that I believe in the
preachings of old-fashioned Chinese that the eight planets were first
discovered by the Chinese because a line can be found in the _Book of
Poetry_:[5] "Three and Five stars in the East." What I mean by sympathy
is that I like the way he appreciates the Chinese national culture, and
wants to be a one hundred per cent Chinese.[6] In this respect he is
more worthy than Ch'ên Shao-yü, and hence deserving of greater
achievement.

  [Footnote 5: _Shih Ching_, one of the Confucian classics.]

  [Footnote 6: The Americanism, _i-pai-fên chih pai-ti Chung-kuo-jen_,
  occurs in the original.]

Lastly, I sincerely hope that Mr. Mao can find a better secretary,
without considering the question of class. He must not follow the
example of Mr. Lu, the Vice-President of the Anti-Japanese University,
who never employs a secretary unless she is beautiful. Though he does
not consider the question of class, such actions do not befit Mr. Mao.
But speaking about this, we can have a comparison. The second wife of
Mr. Mao, Miss Ho, is the heroine who marched with the Red Army for a
distance of twenty-five thousand _li_ to North Shensi. But why is it
that Mr. Mao sends her to Soviet Russia, and lives together with film
actress Miss Lan Pin? The reason is quite simple: considering the
question of class, Miss Ho stands higher than Miss Lan; considering the
question of sexual love, Miss Lan is much more beautiful than Miss Ho.
Hence with similar reasoning, I should say that the standard set by Mr.
Mao concerning the employment of a secretary will be whether she can
write beautifully, and the question of class must not be considered. If
so, I can predict that Mr. Mao's articles will be better written, not
like his past ones which arouse a great deal of unnecessary
argumentation. I hereby humbly present before him my personal ideas.[7]

  [Footnote 7: The conclusion, couched in billingsgate, is less a
  violation of the unmentionable in China than it would be in America;
  but it does strike a note sharply discordant to the gently sardonic
  tone of the main line of debate. A secretary is germane to the point
  of literary style, however; ghost-writing is a rarely disturbed
  tradition of Chinese public life. Mao Tsê-tung, according to Western
  observers, is, with Chiang K'ai-shek, one of the few leaders to write
  his own speeches, so that the present charge, while familiar, is
  certainly unjust.]




E. CHINA'S LONG-RANGE DIPLOMATIC ORIENTATION (WANG CH'UNG-HUI)[1]


  [Footnote 1: Private communication transmitted from Chungking,
  September 10, 1940; in possession of the present author.]

     This memorandum was graciously supplied by Dr. Wang
     Ch'ung-hui.


1. OUTLINE OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Since the establishment of the National Government, China's foreign
policy has been elucidated from time to time. Following the outbreak of
the war, the Extraordinary Session of the Kuomintang National Congress
convened in 1938 laid down five principles:

"1. China is prepared to ally herself with all states and nations that
sympathize with her and to wage a common struggle for peace and justice.

"2. China is prepared to safeguard and strengthen the machinery of peace
as well as all treaties and conventions that have the maintenance of
peace as their ultimate object.

"3. China is prepared to ally herself with all forces that are opposed
to Japanese aggression and to safeguard peace in the Far East.

"4. China will endeavor not only to preserve but also to enhance the
existing friendly relations with other countries.

"5. China repudiates all bogus organizations which Japan has created and
declares all their actions null and void."


2. CHINA'S STAND VIS-À-VIS JAPAN

From the above outline it can be clearly seen that China's foreign
policy aims at achieving independence internally and co-existence
externally.

Shortly before the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident I told a group of
Japanese newspapermen in Nanking that "China's diplomatic policy has
always been consistent. It aims at self-existence and co-existence....
It is important to harmonize the friendship between the two peoples; but
such a task should not rest only upon the shoulders of one party.... If
any foreign country has any designs on China, the Chinese people are
determined to resist.... I hope Japan will respect China's territorial
integrity and political sovereignty and will seek to readjust
Sino-Japanese relations through diplomatic channels and in accordance
with the spirit of reciprocity and equality."

Japan was bent on disturbing peace and order and launched her attack on
North China on July 7, 1937. Not only had every effort at conciliation
failed, but the hostilities were extended to Shanghai on August 13th. On
the following day the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made China's position
clear in an official statement, an extract of which follows:

"The Chinese Government now solemnly declares that China's territorial
integrity and sovereign rights have been wantonly violated by Japan in
glaring violation of such peace instruments as the Covenant of the
League of Nations, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Paris Peace Pact. China
is in duty bound to defend her territory and her national existence, as
well as the sanctity of the above-mentioned treaties. We will never
surrender any part of our territory. When confronted with aggression, we
cannot but exercise our natural right of self-defense. If Japan did not
entertain territorial designs on China, she should use her efforts to
seek a rational solution of Sino-Japanese problems and at the same time
cease all her aggressions and military movements in China. In the event
of such a happy change of heart, China would, in conformity with her
traditional policy of peace, continue her efforts to avert a situation
pregnant with dangerous possibilities both for East Asia and for the
world at large.

"In this our supreme fight not only for a national but for a world
cause, not only for the preservation of our own territory and
sovereignty, but for the maintenance of international justice, we are
confident that all friendly nations, while showing sympathy with us,
will be conscious of their obligations under the international treaties
to which they have solemnly subscribed."


3. NON-RECOGNITION OF PUPPET REGIMES

With regard to Japanese-sponsored puppet regimes in China, the Chinese
Government has consistently denounced them as illegal. On December 20,
1937, following the appearance of the so-called "Provisional Government"
in Peiping, the National Government solemnly declared that "the
establishment of any bogus regime in Peiping or other localities under
Japanese military occupation constitutes a violation by Japan of China's
sovereignty and administrative integrity. Any action taken by such
puppet regimes, whether of an internal or external nature, shall _ipso
facto_ be null and void."

Following the installation by the Japanese of Wang Ch'ing-wei as the
chief puppet of the bogus "National Government" in Nanking, the Foreign
Minister reiterated this stand in his identic notes of March 30, 1940 to
the various embassies and legations in China to the following effect:

"The Chinese Government desires to take this opportunity to repeat most
emphatically the declaration already made on several occasions that any
act done by such an unlawful organization as has just been set up in
Nanking or any other puppet body that may exist elsewhere in China, is
_ipso facto_ null and void and shall never be recognized by the Chinese
Government and people. The Chinese Government is convinced that all
self-respecting States will uphold law and justice in the conduct of
international relations and will never accord _de jure_ or _de facto_
recognition to Japan's puppet organization in China. Any manifestation
of such recognition, in whatever form or manner, would be a violation of
international law and treaties and would be considered as an act most
unfriendly to the Chinese nation, for the consequences of which the
recognizing party would have to bear full responsibility."


4. CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS BASED ON NINE-POWER TREATY

China's foreign policy relating to the Sino-Japanese hostilities is
based upon the Nine-Power Treaty, which provides that the contracting
Powers, other than China, agreed to the following:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and
administrative integrity of China;

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to
develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing
and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and
industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to
seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of
subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action
inimical to the security of such States.

Under present conditions, the aggressor is still reluctant to attend any
international conference for seeking a just settlement. Therefore, the
only alternative is for China to continue her war of resistance until
Japan comes to her senses or reaches the point of exhaustion, which can
be accomplished through the extension of greater assistance to China and
the application of an embargo on military supplies to Japan.

There is no need to elaborate on the well-known fact that the role of
the United States in the maintenance of peace in the Pacific area is an
important one. We have great confidence in the sense of justice of
America, our traditional friend, who realizes the full significance of
the so-called "New Order in Greater East Asia," which Japanese spokesmen
admit applies to the South Seas region.

World peace and peace between China and Japan are indivisible. An era of
prosperity in this part of the world, which cannot but be of benefit to
the world in general, can only be ushered in after a just and lasting
solution to the Sino-Japanese conflict has been found.




GLOSSARY


[Chinese ideographs have been attached to the names of all the more
important political terms, as given in the following list. Proper names
may be found with their correct ideographs in _Who's Who in China_ and
the _Supplement_ thereto, cited above. Place-names have been given in
the Chinese Postal transliteration; all other names and terms are given
in the Wade-Giles spelling, but with the tones omitted. In a few cases,
the spelling of a name has been well established by long newspaper
usage, by the caprice or decision of a man in re-spelling his own name,
or by common practice which has become standard English. Examples are
_tuchün_, Kuomintang (instead of _Kuo-min Tang_ or _Kuo-min-tang_) and
T. V. Soong. Capitalization and hyphenation follow, as closely as
possible, the practices established by the _Quarterly Bulletin of
Chinese Bibliography_, Peking and Kunming.]

_Chan-ti Tang-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_ 戰地黨政委員會 the (Kuomintang) Party
and (National) Government War Area Commission; the Chungking agency for
the government of those parts of China technically occupied by the
Japanese; under the Military Affairs Commission

_chang_ 長 a chief, or head

_Ch'ang-wu Wei-yüan_ 常務委員 a Standing Committee, or administrative
committee

_Ch'ang-wu Tz'ŭ-chang_ 常務次長 an Administrative Vice-Minister (of a
_pu_)

_chên_ 鎮 a unit of local government; "community"; the equivalent of a
_hsiang_

_Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui_ 振濟委員會 the (National) Relief Commission

_Chêng-chih-pu_ 政治部 the Political Department (of the Military Affairs
Commission); the important and powerful agency which coordinates
civilian aid to the war from Chungking, in propaganda, civilian
mobilization, etc.; competitive with the Chinese Communists

_Chêng-wu Ch'u_ 政務處 a Political Affairs Department; the political
secretariat of a _Yüan_

_Chêng-wu Tz'ŭ-chang_ 政務次長 a Political Vice-Minister (of a _pu_)

_Ch'i Chün-tzŭ_ 七君子 the "Seven Gentlemen"; the leaders of the National
Salvation movement

_chia_ 甲 a group of households; a unit in the _pao-chia_ system of
local government

_Chiao-t'ung Pu_ 交通部 Ministry of Communications

_Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui_ 僑務委員會 Commission on Overseas Chinese
Affairs (under the Executive _Yüan_)

_Chiao-yü Pu_ 教育部 Ministry of Education (under the Executive _Yüan_)

_chien-ch'a_ 監察 one of the five powers of government in the plans of
Sun Yat-sen; a combination of impeachment, audit, supervisory
investigation and other functions

_Chien-ch'a Yüan_ 監察院 the Control (or Censoral) _Yüan_; one of the
five major divisions of the government

_Chien Kuo Ta Kang_ 建國大綱 the _Outline of National Reconstruction_, a
manifesto by Sun Yat-sen which charted the subsequent formal policies of
the Kuomintang

_ch'ih_ 恥 self-respect; honor

_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_ 晉察冀邊區臨時
行政委員會 "Provisional Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei
Border Region"; formal style of the Border Region, _q.v._

_Ching-chi Pu_ 經濟部 Ministry of Economic Affairs (under the Executive
_Yüan_)

_Chiu Kuo_ 救國 National Salvation; an anti-aggression movement
organized outside the Kuomintang

_Chu-hsi_ 主席 chairman; refers particularly to the _Kuo-min Chêng-fu
Chu-hsi_ (President of the National Government)

_ch'ü_ 區 a unit of local government above the _pao_, _chia_, and
_hsiang_, but below the _hsien_ ("county"); a township; with reference
to the Party organization of the Kuomintang, a district

_ch'ü-fên_ 區分 sub-district; the lowest territorial unit in Kuomintang
organization

_ch'üan_ 權 "power," _i.e._, of the people, as contrasted with the nêng
(capacity) of the government; the distinction is Sun Yat-sen's, and
applies to the political process

_Ch'üan-hsü Pu_ 銓敘部 the Ministry of Personnel; under the Examination
_Yüan_

_Ch'üan-hsü T'ing_ 銓敘廳 Administration of Personnel (for the military);
under the Military Affairs Commission

_Ch'üan-kuo Hui-i_ 全國會議 the (Chinese Communist) National Party
Convention

_Ch'üan-kuo Ta-hui_ 全國大會 the (Chinese Communist) National Party
Congress

_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui_ 全國代表大會 the (Kuomintang) Party Congress

_Chün-chêng-pu_ 軍政部 the Ministry of War; under the joint jurisdiction
of the Executive _Yüan_ and the Military Affairs Commission

_Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu_ 軍法執行總監部 the Directorate-General
of Courts Martial; under the Military Affairs Commission

_Chün-hsün-pu_ 軍訓部 Department of Military Training; under the Military
Affairs Commission

_Chün-ling-pu_ 軍令部 Department of Military Operation; office of the
Chinese high command; under the Military Affairs Commission

_Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan_ 軍事參議院 Military Advisory Council; under the
Military Affairs Commission

_Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui_ 軍事委員會 the Military Affairs Commission; the
chief politico-military organ of the National Government

_Chung-hua Min-kuo Kuo-min Chêng-fu_ 中華民國國民政府 literally: the
Republic of China, National Government; the style of the National
Government under the Kuomintang

_Chung-hua Min-kuo Lin-shih Chêng-fu_ 中華民國臨時政府 the "Provisional
Government of the Republic of China," Peking, 1937-1940; pro-Japanese

_Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü Chêng-fu_ 中華民國特區政府 "Special District
Government of the Chinese Republic"; the first formal style of the
Chinese Soviet area in the Northwest after the intra-national armistice

_Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsiu-chêng Kuo-min Chêng-fu_ 中華民國修正國民政府 the
"Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China"; the National
Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei at Nanking; pro-Japanese

_Chung-hua Min-kuo Wei-hsin Chêng-fu_ 中華民國維新政府 the "Reformed
Government of the Republic of China," Nanking, 1938-1940; pro-Japanese

_Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo_ 中華蘇維埃共和國 the Chinese Soviet
Republic

_Chung-kuo Kê-ming Tang_ 中國革命黨 the Chinese Revolutionary Party;
style of the Kuomintang, 1914-1920; style of the Third Party, 1929-1930

_Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Kê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_ 中國國民黨革命
行政委員會 the Revolutionary Action Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang;
first style of the Third Party

_Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso Hsieh-hui_ 中國工業合作協會 the Chinese
Industrial Cooperatives

_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao_ 中央政治學校 the Central Political
Institute; under the Kuomintang

_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui_ 中央政治委員會 the Central Political
Council; the agency whereby the Kuomintang exercised its power over the
National Government until the Supreme National Defense Council was
created

_Chung-yang Chien-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui_ 中央監察委員會 the (Kuomintang)
Central Control Committee

_Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui_ 中央執行委員會 the (Kuomintang)
Central Executive Committee

_Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu_ 中央宣傳部 the (Kuomintang) Party-Ministry
of Publicity [or Central Publicity Board]

_Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui_ 中央委員會 the (Chinese Communist Party)
Central Committee

_fa pi_ 法幣 (National Government) legal tender notes

_fang_ 坊 a territorial unit of municipal government; roughly, a
precinct

_Fu-hsing Shê_ 復興社 the Regeneration Club; former center of the
so-called Blue Shirts

_Fu-hsüeh Wei-yüan-hui_ 撫郋委員會 the Pensions Commission; under the
Military Affairs Commission

_Fu I-chang_ 副議長 Deputy Speaker (of the People's Political Council)

_Fu Mi-shu-chang_ 副秘書長 a Deputy Secretary-General

_Fu-yüan-chang_ 副院長 the Vice-President of a _Yüan_ (one of the five
divisions of the government)

_Hai-chün Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu_ 海軍總司令部 Office of the Naval
Commander-in-Chief, successor to the Ministry of the Navy which manages
the up-river remnants of the Chinese fleet; under the Military Affairs
Commission

_Hang-k'ung Wei-yüan-hui_ 航空委員會 the (National) Aviation Commission;
under the Military Affairs Commission

_Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu_ 後方勤務部 the [Rear-Area] Service Department
under the Military Affairs Commission

_hsiang_ 鄉 a unit of local government, also termed _chên_; a village or
community

_hsiao-tsu_ 小粗 the "small-group"; the lowest fraction of Kuomintang
organization

_Hsieh-ho-hui_ 協和會 the Concordia Society; the propaganda agency of
Manchoukuo

_hsien_ 縣 district; roughly comparable to the American county

_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_ 憲法草案 the Draft Permanent Constitution; the
official sponsored project for the new constitution, known most widely
in the version of the Double Five Draft of May 5, 1936

_Hsin-min-hui_ 新民會 a political "party" organized by pro-Japanese
elements in North China

_Hsin Min Chu I_ 新民主義 a pro-Japanese doctrine taught in occupied
North China

_Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung_ 新生活運動 the New Life Movement

_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_ 新四軍 New Fourth Army; a guerrilla force under
Communist influence; operating in the Yangtze lowlands, it clashed with
Chinese National forces early in 1941, and was formally disbanded

_Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan_ 行政法院 the Administrative Court; under the
Judicial Yüan

_Hsing-chêng Yüan_ 行政院 the Executive _Yüan_, greatest of the five
divisions of the government

_Hsün-lien T'uan_ 訓練團 the Training Corps (of the Kuomintang)

_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_ 訓練委員會 the (Central) Training Committee (of
the Kuomintang)

_Huangpu_ 黃埔 the name of a military academy (in Cantonese, Whampoa),
now applied to the Generalissimo's protégés as a political faction

_hui_ 會 a meeting, guild, league, or society

_Hui-i_ 會議 a deliberative body; particularly, a City Council
(Shih-chêng Hui-i)

_i_ 議 propriety; ethics; justice

_I-chang_ 議長 Speaker (of the People's Political Council)

_I Ho Ch'üan_ 義和拳 the "Boxers" of 1900

_Kan Shih_ 幹事 the police executive in a _hsiang_ or _chên_

_K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling_ 抗戰建馘綱領 the Program of Resistance
and Reconstruction; the formal declaration of government policy during
the invasion; adopted at Hankow in March, 1938

_K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui_ 考選委員會 the Examinations Commission; under
the Examination _Yüan_

_K'ao-shih Yüan_ 考試會 the Examination _Yüan_; one of the five major
divisions of the government

_Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan_ 共產青年團 the Communist Youth Corps

_Kung-ch'an Tang_ 共產黨 the (Chinese) Communist Party

_Kung-wu-yüan Ch'eng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui_ 公務員懲戒委員會 the Commission
for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Officers (under the Judicial
_Yüan_), a lower agency than the Commission for the Disciplinary
Punishment of Public Officials (attached to the Council of State)

_Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai_ 國家主義派 the "Nationalist Party"; Parti
Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine

_Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang_ 國家社會黨 the (Chinese) National Social(ist)
Party

_Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui_ 國防最高委員會 the Supreme National
Defense Council; the quasi-governmental agency whereby the Kuomintang
controls the National Government; established in 1938 as a war measure,
it supersedes the _Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui_ (Central
Political Council)

_Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan_ 國立中央研究院 the Academia Sinica; the
national scientific and scholastic body, attached to the Council of
State

_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_ 國民政府委員會 "National Government
Council"; commonly termed Council of State, this is the highest strictly
governmental agency in China

_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Chu-hsi_ 國民政府主席 "chairman of the National
Government"; more formally, President of the National Government of
China; _ex-officio_ chairman of the Council of State, and ceremonial
chief of the government

_Kuo-min Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan_ 國民精神總動員 the National Spiritual
Mobilization

_Kuo-min Hui-i_ 國民會議 the National People's Convention of XX (1931),
which adopted the Provisional Constitution

_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_ 國民參政會 the People's Political Council;
advisory legislature inaugurated in Hankow

_Kuo-min Ta-hui_ 國民大會 the National Congress or People's Congress;
this term designates both the constituent body which shall adopt the
projected Constitution, and a subsequent constitutional legislature
meeting triennially

_lao-pai-hsing_ 老百姓 old inhabitants; common people; archaically or
etymologically, the Old Hundred Names

_li_ 禮 rites; ceremonies; ideological conformity

_Li-fa Wei-yüan_ 立法委會 members of the quasi-cameral plenary session of
the Legislative _Yüan_; experts in legal matters, they combine the
function of legislators with that of consultants in codification

_Li-ja Yüan_ 立法會 the Legislative _Yüan_; one of the five divisions of
the government

_lien_ 廉 integrity

_lü_ 旅 a brigade

_Mêng-ku Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu_ 蒙古聯合自治政府 the "Federated
Autonomous Government of Mongolia"; pro-Japanese

_Mêng Tsang Wei-yüan-hui_ 蒙藏委員會 Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan
Affairs (under the Executive _Yüan_)

_Mi-shu-chang_ 秘書長 a Secretary-General

_Mi-shu Ch'u_ 秘書處 a Secretariat; particularly important in the case of
the Executive _Yüan_

_min ch'üan chu-i_ 民權主義 the "principle of democracy," by Sun Yat-sen;
second of the _San Min Chu I_

_min-shêng chu-i_ 民生主義 the "principle of the people's livelihood," by
Sun Yat-sen; third of the _San Min Chu I_

_Min-ts'u Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_ 民族解放行政委員會 the
Acting Commission for the National Emancipation of China; third, final,
formal style of the Third Party

_min ts'u chu-i_ 民族主義 the "principle of nationalism," by Sun Yat-sen;
first of the _San Min Chu I_

_Nei-chêng Pu_ 內政部 the Ministry of the Interior (or of home affairs);
under the Executive _Yüan_

_nêng_ 能 "capacity" (see _ch'üan_)

_Nung Lin Pu_ 農林部 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (under the
Executive _Yüan_)

_Pa-lu-chün_ 八路軍 "Eighth Route Army"; the chief Chinese Communist
force, formerly the Chinese Red Army and now the Eighteenth Army Corps

_pao_ 保 a unit of local government; roughly, a neighborhood

_pao-chia_ 保甲 a system of local government embodying principles of
collective responsibility and mutual aid within interlocking groups of
households and neighborhoods

_Pien-ch'ü_ 邊區 Frontier Area or Border Region; the former translation
is used for the Communist zone in the Northwest, and the latter for the
guerrilla government in North China

_Pu_ 部 a Ministry (under the _Yüan_), Department (under the Military
Affairs Commission), or equivalent organ of government; the term is one
of long standing in Chinese government

_Pu Chang_ 部長 Minister; head of a _pu_

_San Min Chu I_ 三民主義 the three principles of the people; Sun
Yat-sen's political philosophy, now the official state dogma of China

_San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan_ 三民主義青年團 the _San Min Chu I_
Youth Corps

_Shan-kan-ning Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu_ 陝甘寧邊區政府 the "Government of the
Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area"; second formal style of the
Communist zone in the Northwest

_Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü_ 陝北行政區 the "Administrative Area of North
Shensi"; third formal style of the Communist zone in the Northwest
(Frontier Area)

_Shê-hui Yün-tung Pu_ 社會運動部 the (Kuomintang) Party-Ministry of
Social Movements

_Shên-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui_ 審查委員會 the (Chinese Communist Party) Control
Committee

_Shêng_ 省 a province

_Shêng-chang_ 省長 Governor; the civilian head of a province; now
superseded by a Provincial Chairman

_Shêng Chêng-fu_ 省政府 a Provincial Government

_Shih_ 市 a Municipality

_Shih-chang_ 市長 a Mayor

_Sui-ching Chu-jên_ 綏靖主任 a Pacification Commissioner; the chief
military officer of a province

_Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu_ 司法行政部 the Ministry of Justice, literally the
"executive ministry of the judiciary"; under the Judicial _Yüan_ in the
National Government, but under the executive in the Reorganized
Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei

_Ssŭ-fa Yüan_ 司法院 the Judicial _Yüan_, one of the five divisions of
the government

_ssŭ p'ai_ 四派 the "four cliques" (in the People's Political Council)

_ssŭ tang_ 四黨 the "four parties" (in the People's Political Council)

_Ta-min-hui_ 大民會 a political "party" organized by pro-Japanese
elements in Central China

_tang chih_ 黨治 "party government"; the single-party tutelary
dictatorship of the Kuomintang

_Tai-piao Ta-hui_ 代表大會 the (Chinese Communist) "Council of Party
Delegates"

_Tangpu_ 黨部 (local) Party Headquarters of the Kuomintang

_Ti-san Tang_ 第三黨 the Third Party; a popular name

_Ts'ai-chêng Pu_ 財政部 Ministry of Finance

_Ts'an-chêng-hui_ 參政會 a People's Political Council; preceded by a term
indicating the level at which established, _e.g._, _Shêng
Ts'an-chêng-hui_, Provincial People's Political Council

_Ts'an-chün Ch'u_ 參軍處 Office of Military Affairs; a military
secretariat attached to the Council of State

_Ts'an-i-hui_ 參議會 an Advisory Council, as in the Municipality

_Tsui-kao Fa-yüan_ 最高法院 the Supreme Court; under the Judicial _Yüan_

_Tsung-li_ 總理 the [Party] Leader; the formal office held by Sun
Yat-sen in the Kuomintang; his in perpetuity, the title is used as a
respectful form of reference to Sun

_Tsung-ts'ai_ 總裁 the [Party] Chief, or leader; title vested in Chiang
K'ai-shek as formal head of the Kuomintang by the Emergency Party
Congress, Hankow, March, 1938

_t'uan_ 團 a regiment

_tuchün_ 督軍 the military chief of a province, a war-lord

_Wai-chiao Pu_ [also written _Waichiaopu_] 外交部 the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; under the Executive _Yüan_

_Wang Tao_ 王道 "the kingly way," a cardinal concept of traditional
Chinese political thought; now, reinterpreted, the state philosophy of
Manchoukuo

_Wei-shêng Shu_ 衛生暑 National Health Administration (in the Ministry of
the Interior)

_Wei-yüan-chang_ 委會長 chairman (of a committee, commission, etc.); this
title often refers to Generalissimo Chiang in his capacity of Chairman
of the Military Affairs Commission

_Wên-kuan Ch'u_ 文官處 Office of Civil Affairs; a civilian secretariat
attached to the Council of State

_wu-ch'üan hsien-fa_ 五權憲法 the "five power constitution"; the
five-fold separation of powers taught by Sun Yat-sen and applied by the
National Government

_Yüan_ 院 literally "board"; one of the five divisions of the National
Government of China

_Yüan-chang_ 院長 the President of a _Yüan_

_Yüeh Fa_ 約法 the Provisional Constitution, adopted in 1931




INDEX


  Ability (_nêng_), 253

  Academia Sinica (_Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan_), 56

  _Act Governing the Elections of Representatives to the National
    Congress_, 302

  _Acting Commission for the National Emancipation of China_ (_Min-ts'u
    Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_), 178

  Administration of Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü T'ing_), 62

  Administrative agencies, chart, 80

  Administrative Area of North Shensi (_Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü_), 112

  Administrative Court (_Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan_), 67

  Administrative:
    development, 96
    law, 65
    organs, 69
    pattern, 79

  Administrative Vice-Minister (_Ch'ang-wu Tz'ŭ-chang_), 96

  Adult education, 30

  Agitation, 61

  Agrarian problems, 104

  Agriculture, 91

  Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of (_Nung Lin Pu_), 91

  Air communications, 90

  Alexander the Great, 239

  Alley, Rewi, 224

  Amendments to the Constitution (proposed constitutional provisions), 300

  American Friends of the Chinese People, 234

  American Lease-lend Bill, 217, 274

  American loans, 19

  Ao-yü-wan, 161

  Appointment and discharge of officials, 59

  Armistice, intra-national, 10

  Army participation in rural reform, 221

  Atatürk, Kemal, 272

  Audit, Ministry of, 96, 320

  Autonomous East Hopei Anti-Communist Government, 185


  Bank of China, 87

  Bank of Communications, 87

  Basic patterns of modern Chinese politics, 8

  Bibliographical notes, 20, 21, 160, 190, 221, 223, 242, 256

  "Blue Shirts," 144

  Border Region, 16, 35, 116
    chart of government, 118

  Boxers (_I Ho Ch'üan_), 213, 237

  Buddhism, 258

  Budget, 59, 75

  Bureaucracy:
    traditional ideal, 44
    at Chungking, 68

  Burma, 189

  Burma road, 93, 95, 279

  Bukharin, 164

  Bus services, 93


  Cabinet, 56

  Canton, 18

  Cantonese clique, 145

  Capacity (_nêng_), 43

  Capitalism, 30

  Caribbean, 188

  Carlson, Major Evans Fordyce, 116, 167

  "C.C." clique, 142

  Censor _Yüan_ (_see_ Control _Yüan_)

  Censoral power, 27

  Censorship of news, 138

  Censure, motion of, 314

  Central America, 188

  Central Bank of China, 87

  Central China clique (_Hua-chung P'ai_), 76

  Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, 72

  Central government (proposed constitutional provisions), 287

  Central Secretariat of the Kuomintang (_Chung-yang Mi-shu-ch'u_), 137

  Central News Agency, 137

  Central Political Council (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui_), 16, 46

  Central Political Institute (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao_), 134

  Central Publicity Board (_see_ Party-Ministry of Publicity)

  Chamberlain, Neville, 15

  Chang, Carson (_Chang Chia-shêng_), 179

  Chang Ching-chiang, 261

  Chang Hsüeh-liang, 9, 200

  Chang Kuo-tao, 163, 167, 168

  Chang Peh Chuen (Chang Pai-chün), 178

  Charts (_see also_ type of government)
    Control _Yüan_, 318
    _Hsien_ classifications, 388
    Kuomintang organization, 331
    national governmental structure, 330
    provincial and urban government, 98

  _Chên_ (_see_ Community)

  Chen Ch'i-mei, 260

  Chen Chi-tang, 91

  Chen, Eugene, 178

  Ch'ên brothers, 134

  Ch'ên Ch'êng, 340

  Ch'ên I, 102

  Ch'ên Kung-po, 198

  Ch'ên Kuo-fu, 84, 134, 142

  Ch'ên Kuo-hsin, essay on Mao Tsê-tung, 403

  Ch'ên Li-fu, 84, 142

  Ch'ên Lo, 204

  Ch'ên Shao-yu (Wang Ming), 163

  Ch'ên Tu-hsiu, 163

  _Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai_ (_see_ Vocational Educationists' Clique)

  _Chia_, 107, 324, 395

  Chiang Chieh-shih (_see_ Chiang K'ai-shek)

  Chiang Ching-kuo, 262

  Chiang K'ai-shek:
    biography, 254
    in Canton, 260
    character, 255
    childhood, 257
    Chinese appraisals, 266
    and Christianity, 257
    on constitutionalism, 32
    _Definition of the Problems of Various Classifications of Hsien_, 388
    ethical theory, 150
    governmental role, 48
    historical role, 255
    ideals, 257
    kidnapped at Sian, 10
    in the Kuomintang, 128
    life, 256
    marriage, 261
    military rise, 263
    military writings, 260
    nature of his power, 268
    and the New Life Movement, 149
    political theory, 265, 269
    present personality, 265
    and President Lin, 53
    relations with Wang Ch'ing-wei, 201
    rise in the Kuomintang, 263
    and Roosevelt, 278
    secret police, 268
    in Shanghai, 261
    and the Shanghai Communists, 263
    statement to the author, 371
    Soviet training, 262
    and Sun Yat-sen, 245
    training in Japan, 259
    _What I Mean by Action (Li-hsing Chê-hsiao)_, 373
    writings, 268

  _Chiao-shou P'ai_ (_see_ Professors' Clique)

  Chicherin, 164

  Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_), 239

  _Chien-ch'a_ power, 27

  _Chien Kuo Ta Kang_, 6

  _Ch'ih_, 150

  China Branch of the International Peace Campaign, 234

  China Defense League, 119

  _China Forum, The_, 235

  _China Herald, The_, 234

  "China's Long-range Diplomatic Orientation," 418

  China National Aviation Corporation, 93

  Chinese Central Asia (_see_ Sinkiang)

  Chinese Communist Party (_see_ Communist Party)

  Chinese ideals, 2

  Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (_see_ C.I.C.)

  Chinese Mass Education Movement, 218

  Chinese National Socialist Party (_Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang_), 179

  Chinese Red Army, 13, 161

  Chinese Republic, 2

  Chinese Revolutionary Party (_Chung-kuo K'ê-ming Tang_), 178

  Chinese Soviet Republic (_Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo_), 13, 112, 161

  Chinese Turkestan (_see also_ Sinkiang), 85

  Chi, C.C., 139

  Chin P'u-yi, 184, 256

  Ch'in state and dynasty, 2, 107

  Ch'in Po-k'u, 168

  Chou En-lai, 64, 168

  Chou Fu-hai, 198

  Christian activities, 235

  Chu Djang, 153

  _Chu-Mao_, 166

  Chung Fu Joint Mining Administration, 90

  Chungking, 1, 15, 18, 56

  Chung Shan (_see also_ Sun Yat-sen), 249

  Chu Tê, 166, 261

  _Ch'ü_, 107, 327, 391

  _Ch'üan_ (power), 253

  Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê (United Front Club), cited, 37

  Ch'u Chia-hua, 136

  C.I.C. (Chinese Industrial Cooperatives; _Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso
      Hsieh-hui_):
    appraisal, 233
    distribution of profits, 230
    establishment, 224
    formation of cooperatives, 226
    the Model Constitution, 232
    regions, 226
    relation to government, 223
    social welfare work, 231
    the three zones, 224

  Citizenship (proposed constitutional provisions), 284

  City Council (_Shih-chêng Hui-i_), 104

  Civil governor of a province (_Shêng-chang_), 99

  Civil service reform, 66

  Civil Service Training Corps, 134

  Clark-Kerr, Sir Archibald, 224

  Class politics in China, 146

  Class war, 13

  Coal and iron, 228

  Coal mining, 90

  Collection of revenue, 86

  College students, 9

  Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Officers
    (_Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui_), 67

  Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (_Mêng Tsang
    Wei-yüan-hui_), 8

  Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs (_Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui_), 84

  Committee Chairman (_Wei-yüan-chang_; _see_ name of Committee)

  Communications, Ministry of (_Chiao-t'ung Pu_), 92

  Communications Southward, 95

  Communications system, foreign personnel in, 95

  Communism, 30, 270

  Communist communes, 213

  Communist Party (_Kung-ch'an Tang_), 13, 159, 263, 275
    and American aid to China, 172
    appraisal of, 173
    Branch Party Organs, 363
    Central Party Committee, 368
    chart of structure, 162
    and Chiang K'ai-shek, 175
    _Constitution_, 359
    Council of Party Delegates, 162, 364
    foundation, 160
    _Hsien_ Organs, 364
    international policy, 403
    leaders, 166
    and Moscow, 163
    motives, 164
    National Party Congress, 367
    National Party Convention, 367
    organization, 361
    and peasants, 165, 213
    in perpetual revolution, 213
    policy toward the Kuomintang, 174
    potential treason, 172
    Provincial Party Organs, 366
    purges and schisms, 169
    Sun Yat-sen's alliance, 245
    Supreme Party Organs, 362
    views on Chiang K'ai-shek, 267

  Communist Youth Corps (_Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan_), 132, 370

  Communist zone (_see_ Frontier Area)

  Communists:
    compared with Kuomintang, 146
    and the five-power system, 45
    and the guerrillas, 162
    in the People's Political Council, 76
    policy of collaboration, 121
    and the proposed Constitution, 37
    rivalry with Kuomintang, 159

  "Community" (_hsiang_), 107

  Community life in China, 4

  Complexity of government structure, 61

  Concordia Society (_Hsieh-ho-hui_), 194

  Conflict: the term, 11

  Confucianism, 2, 3, 45, 189, 250

  Confucius, 239

  Constitution, Chiang's comment on, 32

  _Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, 31

  _Constitution of the_ San Min Chu I _Youth Corps_, 331

  Constitutional change, issues of, 31

  Constitutionalism, 6, 177, 213, 371

  Constitutions (_see also_ Draft Constitution), 21

  Constitutions, ineffectual, 39

  Consultative organs, 39

  _Control_ (_chien-ch'a)_ power, 27

  Control _Yüan_ (_Chien-ch'a Yüan_):
    appraisal, 66
    chart of functions, 318
    diagram of organization, 319
    proposed constitutional provisions, 292
    reorganization under the proposed Constitution, 29
    war work, 313, 318

  Cooperatives (_see also_ C.I.C.), 89, 393

  Corruption, 38, 120

  Cotton, 228

  Council of State (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_):
    administrative and constitutional status, 52
    agencies directly attached, 54
    functions, 47
    proposed constitutional role, 28

  County (_see hsien_)

  Courts of justice (proposed constitutional position), 292

  Credit, national, 86

  Currency, Japanese, 186

  Currency rivalry, 87

  Currents of documents in Chinese government, 55

  Customs, 88


  Declarations of war and peace, 59

  _Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of the
    Various Classifications of Hsien_, 388

  Delegates to the constituent People's Congress, 38

  Democracy (_min chu_; Sun Yat-sen's term, _min ch'üan_), 270

  Democracy in free China, 371

  Democracy, inauguration of, 38

  Democracy, prospects, 273

  Democracy (_min ch'üan_), the theory of, 253

  Democratic Centralism, 162

  Democratic tendencies in the armies, 372

  Democratic toleration, limits of, 40

  Department of Military Operations (_Chün-ling-pu_), 62

  Department of Military Training (_Chün-hsün-pu_), 62

  Deputy Secretary-General (_Fu Mi-shu-chang_) of the People's
    Political Council, 73

  Deputy Speaker (_Fu I-chang_) of the People's Political Council, 72

  Dialectical materialism (_see_ Communism, Communists)

  Diplomacy, 310

  Diplomatic Orientation, China's Long-range, 418

  Direct taxes, 87

  Director of Political Affairs, 57

  Directorate-General of Courts-Martial (_Chün-fa Chih-hsing
    Tsung-chien-pu_), 62

  _Discussion of Mao Tsê-tung's Comments on the Present State of
    International Relations_ (Ch'ên Kuo-hsin), 403

  District (_see hsien_ for government; _ch'ü_ for parties)

  Double Five Constitution (_see_ Draft Permanent Constitution)

  Draft Permanent Constitution (_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_), 25, 283

  _Duties and General Activities of the_ San Min Chu I _Youth
    Corps_, 340


  East Hopei Autonomous Anti-Communist Government, 192

  Eastern Inner Mongolia, 85

  Economic affairs:
    advance in the West, 89
    industrial development, 90
    in _Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_, 311
    policy and administration, 85
    proposed constitutional provisions, 296
    war finance, 87

  Economic Affairs, Ministry of (_Ching-chi Pu_), 88

  Economic cycle in China, 106

  Economic groups in politics, 236

  Economic theory in the _San Min Chu I Youth Corps_, 351

  Economics of old China, 3

  Education, 30, 61, 83, 214, 312, 393

  Education, Ministry of (_Chiao-yü Pu_), 83

  Education: proposed constitutional provisions, 298

  Eighteenth Army Corps, 168

  Eighth Route Army, 13, 168

  Election Committee for Representatives to the People's [Constituent]
    Congress, 38

  Elections, Communist, 163

  Elections of representatives to the National [People's]
    Congress, 302

  Emergency Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress, 16

  Empire, Chinese, 2

  _Erh Ch'ên_ group, 142

  Espionage, 61

  Establishment, period of, 5

  Eurasia airlines, 93

  Examination _Yüan_, 56, 66, 68, 134
    proposed constitutional provisions, 292

  Examinations Commission (_K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui_), 68

  _Exclusive inspection_, 316

  Executive _Yüan_ (_Hsing-chêng Yüan_):
    executive responsibility, 57
    functions, 59
    Meeting, 58
    proposed constitutional provisions, 29, 288
    structure, 58


  _Fa chih_ (government of laws), 33

  Farmers, 218

  Farmers' Bank of China, 87

  Fêng Yü-hsiang, 104

  Fenghua, Chekiang, 262

  Farouk, 255

  Fascism, 270

  Finance, Ministry of (_Ts'ai-chêng Pu_), 86

  Five-fold separation of powers, 27, 206, 264

  Five-power constitution (_wu-ch'üan hsien-fa_), 42, 68

  _Five rights_, 43

  Five _yüan_, 253

  Foo Shing Corporation, 88

  Foochow insurrection, 179

  Ford, Henry, 233

  Foreign Affairs, Ministry of (_Waichiaopu_), 81

  Foreign financial aid, 87

  Foreign policy, 403, 418

  Foreign trade, 88

  Formosans, 187

  Four Cliques (_Ssŭ P'ai_), 76

  Four Parties (_Ssŭ Tang_), 76

  _Four powers_, 43

  France, 181

  Frederick the Great, 255

  Free China, extent of, 98

  Free China, prosperity, 89, 222

  Freedoms under the proposed constitution:
    assembly and forming associations, 285
    domicile, 284
    religious belief, 284
    speech, writing, and publication, 284

  French Indo-China, 19

  Friends of the Wounded Society, 155

  Frontier Area (for Chinese, _see_ Administrative District of North
    Shensi), 13, 16, 111, 115, 162

  Fu Hsiao-ên, 212

  Fukien province, 102, 217

  Function of auditing, 313

  Fup'ing, 118

  Future development of Chinese politics, 274


  _Gaimusho_, 82

  Galens, General (Vassili Blücher), 142

  Gasoline, 91, 95

  Gautama Buddha, 239

  _General inspection_, 316

  General Staff, 62

  General strikes, 39

  Generalissimo (_Tsung-ssŭ-ling_), 61

  Genghis Khan, 239

  Gentry in politics, 106

  George, Henry, 30, 254

  Germany, 273, 274

  Glossary, 423-433

  Gold-washing, 228

  Government-owned corporations, 90

  Government, nature of, 211

  Government organization: chart, 330

  Grants in aid to the provinces, 109

  Grass cloth, 228

  Great Revolution, 5, 60, 213

  Green Gang, 261

  Groups of households (_chia_), 107

  Guerrillas:
    areas, 372
    governments, 116
    and the Military Affairs Commission, 62
    and the National Salvationists, 177
    schools, 84
    strategy, 12
    warfare, 310
    zones under Chungking, 64

  Guilds, 10


  Han dynasty, 3

  Han Fu-ch'u, 202

  Hankow, 4, 15

  Hanson, Haldore, 116

  Hedin, Sven, 255

  Highway system, 93

  Hitler, Adolf, 239

  Hong Kong, 4

  Honolulu, Sun Yat-sen in, 243

  Hopei-Chahar Political Council, 195

  Hopei-Chahar-Shansi Border Region (_Chin-ch'a-ch'i Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih
    Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_), Provisional, Administrative Committee
    of, 116

  Ho Ying-chin, 63

  _Hsiang_ (or _chên_; "community"), 107, 324, 391

  _Hsiang_ guild, 393

  _Hsiao-tsu_ ("small group") training program, 354

  _Hsien_ ("county" or district), 29, 107, 253, 311
    area, 391
    definition of problems by Chiang K'ai-shek, 388
    experimental, 219
    governments, 391
    organizations of the Communists, 364
    proposed constitutional provisions, 294
    regulations (text), 324

  _Hsin Min Chu I_, 194

  _Hsin Min Hui_, 208

  Huang, J. L., 149

  Huang Hsing, 245, 259, 262

  _Huangpu_ (Whampoa) Academy and political group, 142, 262

  Huapeikuo, 194

  Hu Han-min, 8, 142, 202, 262

  _Hui-i_ (a legislative "council"; _see_ level of government concerned)

  Hull, Cordell, 278

  Hunan, 19

  Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, 241

  Hu Shih, 215

  Hypo-colony, 190


  _I_ (ethics), 150

  Ideological control, 251

  _I Ho Ch'üan_ (Boxers), 237

  Impeachment, 313

  Impeachment, proposed constitutional provisions, 293

  "In accordance with law," 26

  Incident, 11

  Income taxes, 87

  Indirect rule, 183

  Indo-China, 183

  Indusco (_see_ C.I.C.)

  Industrial cooperatives (_see_ C.I.C.)

  Inheritance, the Chinese political, 1

  Inheritance taxes, 87

  Inner Mongolia, Federated Autonomous Government of (_Mêng-ku Lien-ho
    Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu_), 192

  Inner Mongolia and Chungking, 85

  Inspection systems, 108

  Institute of National Culture, 179

  Intellectual traditionalism, 251

  Interior, Ministry of (_Nei-chêng Pu_), 82

  Internal revenue, 88

  _International Development of China, The_, 244

  International relations (_see_ diplomacy, foreign policy, etc.)

  Interpretation of statutes and ordinances: proposed constitutional
    provisions, 291

  Invasion, period of, 5

  Italy, 274


  Japanese:
    aims in China, 184
    army, 18, 276
    army as a Chinese government, 185
    attitudes to Chinese foreign policy, 82
    Imperial Government in China, 183
    prospects in China, 274
    recognition of Wang Ch'ing-wei, 209
    role of the army, 183
    subsidiary Chinese governments (_see_ Pro-Japanese Groups)
    training of Chiang K'ai-shek, 259

  Japan's puppets or Japanophiles (_see_ Pro-Japanese Groups)

  _Joint inspection_, 316

  Judicial _Yüan_ (_Ssŭ-fa Yüan_), 65, 291

  Justice, Ministry of (_Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng Pu_), 67, 96


  K'an Nai-kuang, 137, 140

  Kang Tê, Emperor of Manchoukuo, the (_see_ Chin P'u-yi)

  Kao Tsung-wu, 198

  Kentwell, L. K., 205

  Kialing river, 18

  Kiang Kang-hu, 181

  Kiangsi, 161

  Korea, 189

  Kung, H. H., 57, 86, 223

  Kung, Mme. H. H. (Ai-ling Soong), 248

  Kung so, 393

  _Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai_ (_La Jeunesse_ party), 181

  Kuomintang:
    appraisal of, 146
    army connections, 143
    attitude toward Communists, 144
    Bolshevik pattern of organization, 131
    bureaucracy, 7
    central administrative structure, 72, 131, 137
    Central Control Committee (_Chung-yang Chien-ch'a
      Wei-yüan-hui_), 127, 131
    Central Executive Committee (_Chung-yang Chih-hsing
      Wei-yüan-hui_), 57, 126, 127, 131
    Central Political Institute (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih
      Hsüeh-hsiao_), 134
    Central Publicity Board (_see_ Publicity, Party-Ministry of)
    Central Training Committee (_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_), 133
    chart of field organization, 139
    chart of central organization, 131
    chart of general structure, 331
    and the Ch'ên brothers, 84
    and the Communists, 159
    Congress (_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui_), 57
    constitutional status, 124
    democratic outlook, 143
    and economic classes, 135
    Emergency Session of the Party Congress, 69, 128
    _hsiao-tsu_ ("small-group"), 140, 354
    intra-Party politics, 142
    membership, 141
    monopoly of government, 41
    organization, 125, 129, 331
    "Orthodox" fraction, 200
    Party cell, 140
    Party Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_), 126, 128
    Party Congress (_see_ Congress)
    Party Constitution, 125
    Party democracy, 124
    Party-Ministries, 136
    Party purges, 141
    in the People's Political Council, 76
    policy toward Communist Party, 174
    purposes, 125
    "Reorganized" fraction, 200
    rivalry with Communists in the Northwest, 135
    "small-group" (_see hsiao-tsu_)
    Supreme National Defense Council (_Kuo-fang Tsui-kao
      Wei-yüan-hui_), 132
    Training Corps (_Hsün-lien T'uan_), 133
    Wang Ch'ing-wei, 197
    Youth Corps (_see San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps)

  Kwangsi province, 19, 102, 109, 217

  Kwangtung province, 102


  Labor:
    law, 39
    proposed constitutional provisions, 297

  _La Jeunesse_ (Parti ... de la jeune Chine; _Kuo-chia Chu-i
    P'ai_), 76, 181

  Land problem:
    proposed constitutional provisions, 296
    reform, 106, 110, 218

  Landlords, 4, 148, 221

  _Lao-pai-hsing_ (the common people), 236

  Lattimore, Owen, 3

  Law: the term, 299

  _Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National
    Government of the Republic of China_ (1925), 23

  _Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National
    Government_ (1931), 24

  Leader (_Tsung-li_), 239

  League of Nations Union, 234

  Left Kuomintang, 264

  Leftists and Leftism, 9, 101, 111, 248

  Legal Adviser to the National Government (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Fa-lü
    Ku-wên_), 54

  Legal tender notes (_fa pi_), 87, 312

  Legislative _Yüan_ (_Li-fa Yüan_): function, 65

  Members (_Li-fa Wei-yüan_), 66
    proposed constitutional provisions, 29, 289

  _Li_ (ideological conformity), 150

  _Li chih_ (government by _li_), 33

  Liang, Hubert, 224

  _Lien_ (integrity), 150

  Li Hung-chang, 189

  Li Li-san, 163

  Linebarger, Paul M. W., 54, 105, 242, 246

  Lin Pai-shêng, 198

  Lin Shên (Lin Sen; Lim Sun), 53, 145

  Li Shêng-wu, 206

  Literacy, 214, 215

  Liu, K. P., 224

  Local finance, 402

  Local government (_see also hsien_):
    appraisals, 109
    chart, 107
    Chiang K'ai-shek's comment, 397
    general role, 98
    under the _Hsien Fa_, 29
    proposed constitutional reforms, 294
    in the recent past, 104
    reform of, 311
    reform under the Kuomintang, 137
    reform methods, 108

  Long March of the Chinese Reds, 119, 161

  Long-Range Diplomatic Orientation, China's, 418

  Lung Yün, 101


  Mahayana Buddhism, 259

  Mail censorship, 95

  Main Office of the Military Affairs Commission, 62

  Malaysia, 183

  Malraux, André, 161

  Manchoukuo, 98, 183, 189, 256

  Manchoukuo-Outer Mongol war, 19

  Manchu Empire of China (Ch'ing dynasty), 5

  Manchuria, 89

  Manchus, 2, 241

  Mao Tsê-tung, 166, 403-417

  Marx, Karl, 241, 254

  Marxism, 160, 234, 258, 263

  Marxism and Chinese history, 165

  Marxism-Leninism, 84

  Marxist effect on the _San Min Chu I_, 252

  Mass:
    action, 10
    education, 215
    literacy movement, 84
    marriages, 153
    mobilization, 157
    movements, 312
    singing, 154

  Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry, 91

  Mayor (_Shih-chang_), 104

  Mayors under the proposed constitution, 295

  Mazzini, 241

  Miao Ping, 194

  Migration of schools, 83

  Migrations, 88

  Militarism in the provinces, 100

  Military Advisory Council (_Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan_), 62

  Military affairs, 310

  Military Affairs Commission (_Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui_), 13, 60, 162

  Military governor (_tuchün_), 99

  Military jurisdiction under the _Hsien Fa_, 284

  Military policy, 61

  Military service under the _Hsien Fa_, 285

  Military unification, 6

  Militia, 393

  _Min-ch'üan chu-i_ (_see_ Democracy, Sun Yat-sen, and _San Min Chu I_)

  _Min shêng chu-i_, 30, 223, 253

  _Min ts'u chu-i_ (_see_ Nationalism, Sun Yat-sen, and _San Min Chu I_)

  Ming Emperors, 249

  Minister (_Pu Chang_), 96

  Ministry of ---- (_see_ name of Ministry)

  Ministries, 81

  Minor parties:
    and constitutionalism, 34
    at Nanking, 208
    in occupied China, 235
    representation, 72
    status, 160

  Minority democracy, 41

  Mobilization, economic, 86

  Model _hsien_, 109

  Modernization of West China, 89

  Mohammed, 239

  Monarchist legitimism, 184

  Morale, governmental, 236

  Moscow (_see_ Communism)

  Moslem rebellions, 213

  Motor communications, 93

  Motor fuel trade, 90

  Municipal Advisory Assembly (_Shih Ts'an-i-hui_), 72, 104

  Municipal food stores, 90

  Municipal government, 103

  Municipal People's Political Council (_see_ Municipal Advisory
    Assembly)

  Municipalities under the _Hsien Fa_, 295

  Munitions, 90


  Nanking, capture of, 14

  Nanking regimes (_see_ Reorganized Government; Reformed Government)

  Napoleon, 239

  "National" (_see also_ "People's," "Chinese")

  National Aviation Commission, 63

  National capital in the _Hsien Fa_, 284

  National [Constituent] Congress (_Kuo-min Ta-hui_), 25, 27, 300

  National Congress: election of representatives, 302

  National Congress: system of organization, 300

  National Government (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu_): the term, 52

  National Government Committee (_see_ Council of State)

  National Health Administration (_Wei-shêng Shu_), 83

  National Institute of Rural Reconstruction, 220

  National Military Council (_see_ Military Affairs Commission)

  National People's Convention (_Kuo-min Hui-i_), 7

  National Relief Commission (_Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui_), 92

  National Salvation (_Chiu Kuo_) movement, 175

  National Socialism (German), 252

  National Socialist Party (_Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang_), 75, 179

  National Spiritual Mobilization (_Kuo-min Ching-shên
    Tsung-tung-yüan_), 157

  National treasury, 88

  Nationalism (_min ts'u_), theory of, 252

  Negrin, 15

  Neighborhood (_pao_), 107

  Nêng (ability), 253

  New Fourth Army (_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_), 119

  New Life Movement (_Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung_), 149

  New Life Secretaries' Camp, 155

  New Life Students Rural Summer Service Corps, 154

  New Order in East Asia, 184, 189

  News services, 137

  North China, 14

  North Shensi (_see also_ Frontier Area), 161

  Northeastern Clique (_Tungpei P'ai_), 76


  Occupied China:
    Chungking control over, 64
    missions, 235
    poverty, 92

  Office of Civil Affairs (_Wên-kuan Ch'u_), 54

  Office of Military Affairs (_Tsan-chün Ch'u_), 54

  Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief (_Hai-chün
    Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu_), 63

  Office of Political Affairs (_Chêng-wu Ch'u_), 57

  Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps, 63, 149

  Old China:
    economics, 3
    government, 5
    socio-economic structure, 211
    in Sun Yat-sen's theory, 251

  Old Hundred Names (_lao-pai-hsing_), 236

  Opinion, public, 39

  Organic Law of XVII (1928), 28

  Organization of the Kuomintang, etc. (_see_ relevant group or agency)

  "Orthodox" Kuomintang, 200, 207

  Outer Mongol People's Republic, 183, 188

  _Outline of National Reconstruction_, 6

  _Outline of War-Time Controlment_, 313

  _Outlines of Political Tutelage_, 24

  Overseas Chinese, 84


  Pacification Commissioner (_Sui-ching Chu-jên_), 100

  Pai Chung-hsi, 102

  _pai-hua_ (written vernacular), 215

  Pan American airlines, 93

  Panchen Lama, 71

  Pan Ch'ao, 81

  _Pao_ ("neighborhood"), 107, 324, 394

  _Pao_ schools, 216

  _Pao-chia_ system, 106

  Paper money, 86

  _Parti Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine_ (_see Kuo-chia
    Chu-i P'ai_)

  Party Affairs Committee of the Kuomintang (_Tang-wu
    Wei-yüan-hui_), 133

  Party Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_), 41

  Party Constitution (_Tang-chang_):
    Communist, 359
    Kuomintang, 125

  Party dictatorship (_tang chih_), 6, 23

  Party-government relations, 49

  Party and Government War Area Commission (_Chan-ti Tang-chêng
    Wei-yüan-hui_), 64, 112

  Party headquarters, 141

  Party-politics, 158

  Party-politics in the People's Political Council, 76

  Party Supervisor's Net (_Tang-jên Chien-ch'a Wang_), 141

  Party-Ministries of the Kuomintang, 136

  Party's role in the constitutional system, 23

  Peasant rebellions, 4

  Pensions Commission (_Fu-hsüeh Wei-yüan-hui_), 62

  People's Advisory Political Council (_see_ People's Political Council)

  People's Congress (_see_ National Congress)

  People's Foreign Relations Association, 234

  People's Political Council (_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_):
    competence, 73
    election, 72
    function of representation, 66
    membership, 70
    nominations, 71
    practicality, 74
    procedure, 74
    in _Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_, 311
    reorganization, 75
    sessions, 70

  Permanent Constitution, Draft (_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_), 5, 25, 283

  Personnel, Ministry of (_Ch'üan-hsü Pu_), 68, 96

  _Philosophy of Action, A_, 373

  _Pi Chiao Hsien Fa_ (_Comparative Constitutions_, by Wang Shihchieh),
    translated and quoted, 23, 49, 50, 52, 67, 125

  Pilsudski, 272

  Planning Committee for the Western Capital (_Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei
    Wei-yüan-hui_), 56

  Pluralism, 3, 211

  Policy-making, 47, 74, 79

  Political Affairs Department or Office (_Chêng-wu Ch'u_), 57

  Political commissars in the army, 63

  Political Department (_Chêng-chih-pu_) of the Military Affairs
    Commission, 64

  Political laxity, 251

  Political rights: proposed constitutional provisions, 285

  Political Scientists' group (_Chêng-hsüeh Hsi_), 145

  Political Vice-Minister (_Chêng-wu Tz'u-chang_), 96

  Politics of ideology, 8

  Popular democracy, 39

  Popular Front group, 78, 129

  Popular government in the Border Region, 119

  Population, 3

  Poverty in occupied China, 222

  Power (_ch'üan_), 43, 253

  Pragmatic utilitarianism of Sun Yat-sen, 252

  Presidency proposed under the _Hsien Fa_, 28, 287

  President (_Yüan-chang_) of the Executive Yüan, 56

  President (_Chu-hsi_) of the National Government, 52

  Presidium of the People's Political Council, 73

  Pressure politics, 234

  Prime movers, 229

  Principles of the Great People (_Ta Min Chu I_), 196

  Private rights: proposed constitutional provisions, 284

  Private property: proposed constitutional provisions, 285

  Privy Council, 56

  Problems of the _hsien_: comment of Chiang K'ai-shek, 388

  Professors' Clique (_Chiao-shou P'ai_), 77

  _Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_ (_K'ang-chan Chien-kuo
    Kang-ling_), 17, 35, 309

  Pro-Japanese elements, 186, 192, 212, 276, 310

  Propaganda, 61, 137

  _Proposition_, 314

  Prosperity, 222

  Protestant schools, 215

  Provincial Governments (_Shêng Chêng-fu_):
    Chairman (_Shêng Chêng-fu Chu-hsi_), 100, 294
    connection with central government, 82
    councils, 72
    current role, 98
    proposed constitutional provisions, 293
    Provincial People's Political Councils (_Shêng
      Ts'an-chêng-hui_), 103
    structure, 102

  Provincialism, 8, 99

  Provisional Constitution (_Yüeh Fa_), 22, 24

  Provisional Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border
    Region (_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng
    Wei-yüan-hui_; _see also_ Border Region), 16

  Provisional Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo
    Lin-shih Chêng-fu_), 14, 192, 207

  _Pu_ (ministries or departments), 61

  Public Administration, School of, 219

  Public opinion, 214

  Public service: proposed constitutional provisions, 285

  Public utilities: proposed constitutional provisions, 296

  Publicity, 79

  Publicity, Party-Ministry of (_Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu_), 137

  Publicity of the _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps, 350

  "Puppet states," 188

  Purple Mountain, 249

  P'u Yi (_see_ Chin P'u-yi)


  Races: proposed constitutional provisions, 284

  Radio, 94

  Railways in Free China, 92

  _Resistance and Reconstruction, Program of_, 309

  Reformed Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo
    Wei-hsin Chêng-fu_), 17, 192, 195

  Regeneration Club (_Fu-hsing Shê_), 144

  Regional autonomy, 8

  Regular troops, 8

  _Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Various
    Classifications of Hsien_, 324

  Relief, 61, 297

  "Reorganized Kuomintang," 200

  Reorganized National Government of China (_Hsiu-chêng Kuo-min
      Chêng-fu_):
    affiliation with Japan, 183
    creation and function, 197
    personnel, 204
    practical work, 205
    significance to Chiang K'ai-shek, 372
    status, 203

  Representation, function of, 66

  Republic: the term, 161

  Republican revolution, 213

  Republicans (_Kung-ho Tang_), 208

  Resident Committee of the People's Political Council, 73

  Resist-Japan University, 84

  Resistance, 12, 213

  Revolution by three stages, 6, 22, 35, 253

  Revolutionary Action Commission of the Chinese Kuomintang (_Chung-hua
    Kuo-min-tang K'ê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_), 178

  Rights, constitutional, 28

  Roosevelt, Franklin D., 233, 278

  Rosinger, Lawrence K., 81

  Rural education, 218

  Rural reconstruction, 218, 397

  Rural Service Corps, 154

  Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, (R.S.F.S.R.), 188


  Salazar, Antonio de O., 272

  _San Min Chu I_:
    and Chiang K'ai-shek, 270
    explanation and comment, 8, 13, 34, 178, 245, 250, 371
    and _Hsin Min Chu I_, 194
    proposed constitutional provisons, 287

  _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps (_San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan_):
    appraisal, 352
    chart of organization, 345
    Constitution, 331
    description by General Ch'ên Ch'êng, 340
    history, 341
    and the Kuomintang, 132
    Leader, 342

  Salt gabelle, 88

  Scholars of old China, 3

  Scholastic bureaucracy, 3, 250

  School for the Border Provinces, 135

  Schools (_see_ education), 216

  _Scorched earth_ policy, 12

  Second Revolution, 259

  Secret societies, 10

  Secretariat (_Mi-shu-ch'u_), 57, 73

  Secretary-General (_Mi-shu-chang_), 57, 73

  Service Department, military (_Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu_), 63

  Seven Gentlemen (_Ch'i Chün-tzu_), 36, 76, 176

  Shanghai, 13

  Sharecropping, 91

  Sheean, Vincent, 161

  Shên Chun-lu, 176

  Shêng Shih-ts'ai, 176

  Shensi (_see_ Frontier Area)

  Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area (_Shan-kan-ning Pien-ch'ü
    Chêng-fu_), 112

  _Shih_ (_see_ municipality, _q.v._)

  Sian affair, 5, 10, 176

  Sinkiang (Chinese Central Asia; Chinese Turkestan), 85, 101

  Sino-American trade, 88

  Sino-Siberian highway, 93, 95

  Small-Group Training Program, 354

  Smith, Joseph, 241

  Snow, Edgar, 146, 160

  Social Affairs, Ministry of, 96

  Social Movements, Party-Ministry of (_Shê-hui Yün-tung Pu_; also
    translated Party-Ministry of Social Affairs, Board of Social
    Affairs), 96, 136

  Social Democratic Party, 181

  Social rigidity, 251

  Social work, 61

  Social work of the _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps, 351

  Socialist Party, 181, 208

  Soong, C. J., 247

  Soong, T. V., 9, 86, 248

  Soong Ching-ling, 245

  Soong sisters, 248

  Sovereignty: proposed constitutional provisions, 283

  Soviet China, 275

  Soviet form of government in China, 45

  Soviet influence in Sinkiang, 101

  Soviet-Japanese understanding, 275

  Soviet policy in China, 171

  Soviet training of Chiang K'ai-shek, 262

  Soviet Union (_see also_ Communists; Marxism), 188, 273, 275

  Speaker (_I-chang_) of the People's Political Council, 72

  Special Administrative District of the Chinese Republic (_Chung-hua
    Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü Chêng-fu_), 112

  Special-area governments, 98, 111, 120

  _Special inspection_, 316

  Special Regional Government ... (_see_ Special Administrative
    District ...)

  Specie, 86

  Stalemate, 12

  Stalin, Joseph, 263

  Stalinism (_see also_ Communist Party), 234

  State Council (_see_ Council of State)

  State examinations: proposed constitutional provisions, 285

  State socialism, 30, 89

  Steamships, 93

  Strategy of the Chinese, 12

  Sub-district (_ch'ü-fên_) of the Kuomintang, 126, 139

  Subterranean minerals: proposed constitutional provisions, 296

  Sung Ai-ling (_see_ Kung, Mme. H. H.)

  Sung Ch'ing-ling (_see_ Sun Yat-sen, Mme.)

  Sung Mei-ling, 248, 261

  Sung Tzu-wên (_see_ Soong, T. V.)

  Sun I-hsien (_see_ Sun Yat-sen)

  Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), 66, 145, 247

  Sun Yat-sen:
    biography, 240
    doctrines (_see also San Min Chu I_), 6
    family, 247
    historical role, 239
    on imperialism, 190
    on local government, 105
    Provisional President, 244
    revolutionary technique, 244
    sense of mission, 240
    state planning, 245
    Western training, 242

  Sun Yat-sen, Mme., 145, 178, 247

  Supreme Court (_Tsui-kao Fa-yüan_), 67

  Supreme National Defense Council (_Tsui-kao Kuo-fang
    Wei-yüan-hui_), 16, 46

  Symbolism of government, 45

  System of organization of the National Congress, 300

  Szechwan, 181


  T'ai Li, 145

  T'aip'ing Rebellion, 161, 213, 241

  Taiwanese, 187

  _Ta Min Chu I_, 196

  _Ta-min-hui_, 196, 208

  _Tang Cheng Chien Chih T'u-piao_, cited, 46, 54

  T'ang Leang-li, 198

  Tannu-Tuva, 189

  Tao Hsi-shêng, 198

  Tayler, J. B., 224

  Taylor, George, 116

  Taxation: proposed constitutional provisions, 285

  Telecommunications, 93

  Telegraph, 94

  Telephone, 94

  Têng Yen-ta, 178

  Territory: proposed constitutional provisions, 283

  Third International (_see also_ Communist Party), 71, 161, 245

  Third Party (_Ti-san Tang_), 178

  Three-Power Pact, 274

  Three-stage war, 12

  Three stages of revolution (_see_ Revolution by three stages)

  "Three principles of the people" (_see San Min Chu I_)

  Tibet, 85

  Tientsin, 4

  Tinghsien, 219

  Tong, Hollington, 138, 255

  Tongs (_tang_), 261

  Township (ch'ü), 107

  Training Committee (_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_) of the Kuomintang, 133

  Training conferences, 109

  Trans-Sinkiang highway, 93

  Tridemism (_see San Min Chu I_)

  Trotsky, Leon, 164, 263

  Truck service, 93

  Tseng Chi, 181

  Tso Shen-sheng, 181

  Tso Tao-fên, 36, 176

  _Tsung-ts'ai_, 41

  _Tuchünism_, 5, 244

  _Tungpei P'ai_ (_see_ Northeastern Clique)

  Turksib railroad, 101

  Tutelage, period of, 7

  Tutelary dictatorship (_tang chih_), 23

  Types of government sponsorship, 89


  Unearned increment, 30, 296

  United Council of the pro-Japanese, 195

  United Front, 70, 111, 113, 119, 129

  United States of America, 273, 275, 277, 279

  Universal Trading Corporation, 88

  Urban pattern of local government, 104

  _Utterances on Reconstruction, The Party Chief's (Tsung-ts'ai
    Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi)_, quoted, 33


  Vayo, Julio Alvarez del, 15

  Vice-President of a _Yüan (Fu-yüan-chang)_, 57

  Vocational education, 217

  Vocational Educationists' Clique (_Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai_), 77


  Wang Ch'ing-wei, 20, 53, 56, 129, 142, 145, 192, 197, 239, 263, 372
    agreements with the Japanese, 203
    flight from Chungking, 203
    following, 197
    record of schism, 199
    significance, 208

  Wang Ch'ung-hui, 82, 418

  Wang K'ê-min, 194

  Wang Ming, 257

  Wang Shih-chieh, 23, 73, 137

  _Wang Tao_, 194

  War Area Service Corps, 154

  War finance, 87

  War, Ministry of (_Chün-chêng-pu_), 60, 63, 96

  War: the term, 11

  War-time Controlment, Outline of, 313

  Washington, George, 255

  Water-conservancy regions, 4

  Western imperialism, 4, 190

  Western states, 3

  Whampoa (_see Huangpu_)

  _What I Mean By Action_, 373

  William, Maurice, 254

  Wireless, 94

  Women's Advisory Council of the New Life Movement, 155

  Wong Wen-hao, 91

  Wool, 227

  Workers' living conditions: proposed constitutional provisions, 296

  World federation, 371

  World government: comment of Chiang, 281

  Wounded Soldiers' League, 155

  Wu, Dr. John C. H., 26

  Wu-han government, 15

  Wu Pei-fu, 198


  Yang Kan-tao, 181

  Yangtze, 18

  Yeh Ch'u-tsang, 137

  Yen, Dr. James Y. C, 84, 218

  Yenan, 115

  Yin Ju-kêng, 185, 192

  Y. M. C. A., 149, 235

  Young, Brigham, 241

  _Yüan_, 24, 28

  _Yüan-chang_, 28

  Yüan Shih-k'ai, 244, 259

  Yü Yu-jên, 145

  Yünnan, 101


  Zinoviev, G., 164




      *      *      *      *      *      *




Transcriber's note:

Obvious printer's errors have been corrected.

Inconsistent spellings have been kept, as well as inconsistent use of
hyphens (e.g., "war-time," "wartime," and "war time"), inconsistent
use of space in contractions (e.g., "C. E. C." and "C.E.C.") and
inconsistent Chinese transcription (e.g., "Chün-tzŭ" and "Chüntzu").