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    THE INTRODUCTION TO

    HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF FINE ART




    THE INTRODUCTION TO

    HEGEL'S

    PHILOSOPHY OF FINE ART


    TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

    _WITH NOTES AND PREFATORY ESSAY_


    BY

    BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A.

    LATE FELLOW AND TUTOR OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD


    LONDON

    KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO., 1 PATERNOSTER SQUARE

    1886


(_The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved._)




TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.


Hegel's "_Æsthetik_," or "Philosophy of Fine Art," is a work which
should no longer be inaccessible to the English reading public, but the
reproduction of which, in its complete form of 1600 pages, is a task
not to be lightly undertaken. I know of three partial reproductions
of the "_Æsthetik_" in English, viz. Mr. Bryant's translation of
Part II.,[1] Mr. Kedney's short analysis of the entire work,[2] and
Mr. Hastie's translation of Michelet's short "Philosophy of Art,"[3]
prefaced by Hegel's Introduction, partly translated and partly analysed.

I wholly disapprove of analyses (among which may be reckoned Michelet's
summary above mentioned) as representations of Hegel's writing, which
is attractive chiefly by the force and freshness of its detail. I
am convinced that Hegel should be allowed to speak for himself, and
that failing the translation of the whole "_Æsthetik_," or of very
copious selections, the best course is that which I have adopted in the
present volume, viz. to translate the entire Introduction, including
the chapter entitled, "Division of the Subject." This Introduction
is in Hegel's best manner--so far as he can be said to have literary
manner at all, especially in a work which has been produced by editors
from lecture-notes,--and is tolerably complete in itself. It is not
contained as a whole in any of the above-mentioned works. I ought to
say, however, that Mr. Hastie's translation is excellent in style;
but after the first thirty-four pages it also becomes an analysis.
Nor is it wholly free from serious mistakes. I have hoped that the
present volume may be of interest to many who, without being students
of philosophy, are intelligent lovers of art. I have therefore done
my best to _interpret_ philosophical expressions, instead of merely
furnishing their technical equivalents. I have also added a few short
notes, either to explain literary allusions, or to complete the
interpretation of technical terms. The prefatory essay was written with
a similar intention, not as original speculation, but as an assistance
to general readers in apprehending the point of view from which Fine
Art is regarded by Hegel and kindred writers.

I have broken up the "_Einleitung_," or Introduction proper, which is
continuous in the original, into four chapters,[4] hoping that the
arrangement of the discussion may be thus rendered easier to follow.
The "_Eintheilung_," which forms my Chapter V., is a separate chapter
in the original. The table of contents is translated from the original,
excepting those portions of it which are enclosed in square brackets,
[ ].

My literary notes are entirely borrowed from the late Mrs. F. C.
Conybeare's translation of Scherer's "History of German Literature;" a
work invaluable to the English student, whose gratitude must for long
be saddened by the untimely death of the translator.




CONTENTS.


                                                               PAGE

  TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE                                           vii
  PREFATORY ESSAY BY THE TRANSLATOR                             xiii

  CHAPTER I.

  THE RANGE OF ÆSTHETIC DEFINED, AND SOME OBJECTIONS
  AGAINST THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART REFUTED (1-25).

  [[Greek: a.] Æsthetic confined to Beauty of _Art_               2
  [Greek: b.] Does Art _merit_ Scientific Treatment?              5
  [Greek: g.] Is Scientific Treatment _appropriate_ to Art?       8
  [Greek: d.] Answer to [Greek: b.]                              13
  [Greek: e.] Answer to [Greek: g.]]                             20

  CHAPTER II.

  METHODS OF SCIENCE APPLICABLE TO BEAUTY AND ART (26-42).

  [1. Empirical Method--Art-scholarship                          27

  (_a_) Its Range                                                27
  (_b_) It generates Rules and Theories                          28
  (_c_) The Rights of Genius                                     38
  2. Abstract Reflection                                         40
  3. The Philosophical Conception of Artistic Beauty, general
  notion of]                                                     41

  CHAPTER III.

  THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY,
  BEGINNING WITH CURRENT IDEAS OF ART (43-105).

  PART I.--The Work of Art as Made and as Sensuous            43-78

  1. Work of Art as Product of Human Activity                    48
  [(_a_) Conscious Production by Rule                            48
  (_b_) Artistic Inspiration                                     50
  (_c_) Dignity of Production by Man                             54
  (_d_) Man's Need to produce Works of Art]                      57

  2. Work of Art as addressed to Man's Sense                  60-78
  [(_a_) Object of Art--Pleasant Feeling?                        60
  (_b_) Feeling of Beauty--Taste                                 63
  (_c_) Art-scholarship                                          65
  (_d_) Profounder Consequences of Sensuous Nature of Art        66
  ([Greek: a]) Relations of the Sensuous to the Mind             67
  ([Greek: aa]) Desire                                           68
  ([Greek: bb]) Theory                                           70
  ([Greek: gg]) Sensuous as Symbol of Spiritual                  72
  ([Greek: b]) The Sensuous Element, how Present in the
  Artist                                                         74
  ([Greek: g]) The _Content_ of Art Sensuous]                    78

  PART II.--The End of Art.

  3. [The Interest or End of Art                            (79-106)
  (_a_) Imitation of Nature?                                     79
  ([Greek: a]) Mere Repetition of Nature is--                    79
  ([Greek: aa]) Superfluous                                      80
  ([Greek: bb]) Imperfect                                        80
  ([Greek: gg]) Amusing merely as Sleight of Hand                82
  ([Greek: b]) _What_ is Good to Imitate?                        83
  ([Greek: g]) Some Arts cannot be called Imitative              85
  (_b_) _Humani nihii_--?                                        87
  (_c_) Mitigation of the Passions?                              90
  ([Greek: a]) _How_ Art mitigates the Passions                  91
  ([Greek: b]) _How_ Art purifies the Passions                   94
  ([Greek: aa]) It must have a Worthy Content                    95
  ([Greek: bb]) But ought not to be Didactic                     95
  ([Greek: gg]) Nor explicitly addressed to a _Moral_
  Purpose                                                        98
  (_d_) Art has its own Purpose as Revelation of Truth]          105

  CHAPTER IV.

  HISTORICAL DEDUCTION OF THE TRUE IDEA OF ART IN
  MODERN PHILOSOPHY (107-132).

  1. Kant                                                       107
  [(_a_) Pleasure in Beauty not Appetitive                      110
  (_b_) Pleasure in Beauty Universal                            111
  (_c_) The Beautiful in its Teleological Aspect                112
  (_d_) Delight in the Beautiful _necessary_
   though _felt_]                                               113
  2. Schiller, Winckelmann, Schelling                           116
  3. The Irony                                                  120

  CHAPTER V.

  DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT (133-175).

  [1. The Condition of Artistic Presentation is the Correspondence
  of Matter and Plastic Form                                    133
  2. Part I.--The Ideal                                         141
  3. Part II.--The Types of Art                                 144
  ([Greek: a]) Symbolic Art                                     145
  ([Greek: b]) Classical Art                                    148
  ([Greek: g]) Romantic Art                                     151
  4. Part III.--The Several Arts                                157
  ([Greek: a]) Architecture                                     160
  ([Greek: b]) Sculpture                                        162
  ([Greek: g]) Romantic Art, comprising                         164
  (i.) Painting                                                 167
  (ii.) Music                                                   169
  (iii.) Poetry                                                 171
  5. Conclusion]                                                173




PREFATORY ESSAY BY THE TRANSLATOR.

ON THE TRUE CONCEPTION OF ANOTHER WORLD.

"With such barren forms of thought, that are always in a world beyond,
Philosophy has nothing to do. Its object always something concrete,
and in the highest sense present."--HEGEL'S _Logic_, Wallace's
translation, p. 150.


It will surprise many readers to be told that the words which I have
quoted above embody the very essence of Hegelian thought. The Infinite,
the supra-sensuous, the divine, are so connected in our minds with
futile rackings of the imagination about remote matters which only
distract us from our duties, that a philosophy which designates its
problems by such terms as these seems self-condemned as cloudy and
inane. But, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, Hegel
is faithful to the present and the concrete. In the study of his
philosophy we are always dealing with human experience. "My stress
lay," says Mr. Browning,[5] "on the incidents in the development of a
soul; little else is worth study." For "a soul" read "the mind," and
you have the subject-matter to which Hegel's eighteen close-printed
volumes are devoted. The present introductory remarks are meant to
insist on this neglected point of view. I wish to point out, in two or
three salient instances, the transformation undergone by speculative
notions when sedulously applied to life, and restrained from generating
an empty "beyond." By so doing I hope to pave the way for a due
appreciation of Hegel's philosophy of fine art. That the world of mind,
or the world above sense, exists as an actual and organized whole, is a
truth most easily realized in the study of the beautiful. And to grasp
this principle as Hegel applies it is nothing less than to acquire a
new contact with spiritual life. The spiritual world, which is present,
actual, and concrete, contains much besides beauty. But to apprehend
one element of such a whole constitutes and presupposes a long step
towards apprehending the rest. It is for this reason that I propose, in
the first place, to explain, by prominent examples, the conception of
a spiritual world which is present and actual, and then to let Hegel
speak for himself on the particular sphere of art. So closely connected
indeed are all the embodiments of mind, that the Introduction to the
"Philosophy of Fine Art" is almost a microcosm of his entire system.

We know, to our cost, the popular conception of the supra-sensuous
world. Whatever that world is, it is, as commonly thought of, not here
and not now. That is to say, if here and now, it is so by a sort of
miracle, at which we are called upon to wonder, as when angels are
said to be near us, or the dead to know what we do. Again, it is a
counterpart of our present world, and rather imperceptible to _our_
senses, than in its nature beyond contact with sense as such. It is
peopled by persons, who live eternally, which means through endless
ages, and to whose actual communion with us, as also to our own
with God, we look forward in the future. It even perhaps contains a
supra-sensuous original corresponding to every thing and movement in
this world of ours. And it does _not_ necessarily deepen our conception
of life, but only reduplicates it.

Such a world, whatever we may think about its actual existence, is
_not_ the "other world" of philosophy. The "things not seen" of Plato
or of Hegel are not a double or a projection of the existing world.
Plato, indeed, wavered between the two conceptions in a way that should
have warned his interpreters of the divergence in his track of thought.
But in Hegel, at least, there is no ambiguity. The world of spirits
with him is no world of ghosts. When we study the embodiments of mind
or spirit in his pages, and read of law, property, and national unity;
of fine art, the religious community, and the intellect that has
attained scientific self-consciousness, we may miss our other world
with its obscure "beyond," but we at any rate feel ourselves to be
dealing with something real, and with the deepest concerns of life.
We may deny to such matters the titles which philosophy bestows upon
them; we may say that this is no "other world," no realm of spirits,
nothing infinite or divine: but this matters little so long as we know
what we are talking about, and are talking about the best we know. And
what we discuss when Hegel is our guide, will _always_ be some great
achievement or essential attribute of the human mind. He never asks,
"Is it?" but always "What is it?" and therefore has instruction, drawn
from experience, even for those to whom the titles of his inquiries
seem fraudulent or bombastic.

These few remarks are not directed to maintaining any thesis about
the reality of nature and of sense. Their object is to enforce a
distinction which falls _within_ the world which we know, and not
_between_ the world we know and another which we do not know. This
distinction is real, and governs life. I am not denying any other
distinction, but I am insisting on this. No really great philosopher,
nor religious teacher,--neither Plato, nor Kant, nor St. Paul--can
be understood unless we grasp this antithesis in the right way. All
of these teachers have pointed men to another world. All of them,
perhaps, were led at times by the very force and reality of their own
thought into the fatal separation that cancels its meaning. So strong
was their sense of the gulf between the trifles and the realities
of life, that they gave occasion to the indolent imagination--in
themselves and in others--to transmute this gulf from a measure of
moral effort into an inaccessibility that defies apprehension. But
their purpose was to overcome this inaccessibility, not to heighten it.

The hardest of all lessons in interpretation is to believe that great
men mean what they say. We are below their level, and what they
actually say seems impossible to us, till we have adulterated it to
suit our own imbecility. Especially when they speak of the highest
realities, we attach _our_ notion of reality to what _they_ pronounce
to be real. And thus we baffle every attempt to deepen our ideas of the
world in which we live. The work of intelligence is hard; that of the
sensuous fancy is easy; and so we substitute the latter for the former.
We are told, for instance, by Plato, that goodness, beauty, and truth
are realities, but not visible or tangible. Instead of responding to
the call so made on our intelligence by scrutinizing the nature and
conditions of these intellectual facts--though we know well how tardily
they are produced by the culture of ages--we apply forthwith our idea
of reality as something separate in space and time, and so "refute"
Plato with ease, and remain as wise as we were before. And it is true
that Plato, handling ideas of vast import with the mind and language
of his day, sometimes by a similar error refutes himself.[6] He makes,
for instance, the disembodied soul see the invisible ideas. Thus he
travesties his things of the mind as though they were things of sense,
only not of _our_ sense--thereby destroying the deeper difference
of kind that alone enables them to find a place in our world. That
his doctrine of ideas was really rooted, not in mysticism, but in
scientific enthusiasm, is a truth that is veiled from us partly by his
inconsistencies, but far more by our own erroneous preconceptions.[7]

There is, however, a genuine distinction between "this" world and
the "other" world, which is merely parodied by the vulgar antitheses
between natural and supernatural, finite and infinite, phenomenal and
noumenal. We sometimes hear it said, "The world is quite changed to
me since I knew such a person," or "studied such a subject," or "had
suggested to me such an idea." The expression may be literally true;
and we do not commonly exaggerate, but vastly underrate its import. We
read, for instance, in a good authority, "These twenty kinds of birds
(which Virgil mentions) do not correspond so much to our species as to
our genera; for the Greeks and Romans, I need hardly say, had only very
rough-and-ready methods of classification, just as is the case with
uneducated people at the present day."[8] Any one may verify the same
fact as regards the observation of flowers. Every yellow ranunculus
is called a "butter-cup," every large white umbellifer a "hemlock."
These, with hundreds of other differences of perception, affect the
surroundings in which men consciously live, at least as much as a
considerable degree of deafness or blindness. It is no metaphor, but
literal fact, to say that man's whole environment is transformed by the
training even of his mere apprehension of natural objects. But there
is more in the matter than this. Without going into metaphysics, which
I wish to avoid, I cannot, indeed, maintain that mind "makes" natural
objects, although by enabling us to perceive them it unquestionably
makes our immediate conscious world. My individual consciousness does
not make or create the differences between the species of ranunculus,
although it does create my knowledge of them. But when we come to speak
of the world of morals or art or politics, we may venture much further
in our assertions. The actual facts of this world do directly arise
out of and are causally sustained by conscious intelligence; and these
facts form the world above sense. The unity of a Christian church or
congregation is a governing fact of life; so is that of a family or a
nation; so, we may hope, will that of humanity come to be. What is this
unity? Is it visible and tangible, like the unity of a human body? No,
the unity is "ideal;" that is, it exists in the medium of thought only;
it is made up of certain sentiments, purposes, and ideas. What even of
an army? Here, too, an ideal unity is the mainspring of action. Without
mutual intelligence and reciprocal reliance you may have a mob, but
you cannot have an army. But all these conditions exist and can exist
in the mind only. An army, _qua_ army, is not a mere fact of sense;
for not only does it need mind to perceive it--a heap of sand does
that--but it also needs mind to _make_ it.

The world of these governing facts of life is the world of the things
not seen, the object of reason, the world of the truly infinite and
divine. It is, of course, a false antithesis to contrast seeing with
the bodily eye and seeing with the mind's eye. The seeing eye is always
the mind's eye. The distinction between sense and spirit or intellect
is a distinction _within the mind_ just as is St. Paul's opposition
between the spirit and the flesh. Nevertheless, the mind that only sees
colour--sense or sense-perception--is different from the mind that sees
beauty, the self-conscious spirit. The latter includes the former, but
the former does not include the latter. To the one the colour is the
ultimate fact; to the other it is an element in a thing of beauty. This
relation prevails throughout between the world of sense and the world
above sense. The "things not seen," philosophically speaking, are no
world of existences or of intelligences co-ordinate with and severed
from this present world. They are a value, an import, a significance,
superadded to the phenomenal world, which may thus be said, though with
some risk of misunderstanding, to be degraded into a symbol. The house,
the cathedral, the judge's robe, the general's uniform, are ultimate
facts for the child or the savage; but for the civilized man they are
symbols of domestic life, of the Church, and of the State. Even where
the supra-sensuous world has its purest expression, in the knowledge
and will of intelligent beings, it presupposes a sensuous world as
the material of ideas and of actions. "This" world and the "other"
world are continuous and inseparable, and all men must live in some
degree for both. But the completion of the Noumenal world, and the
apprehension of its reality and completeness, is the task by fulfilling
which humanity advances.

I pass to the interpretation, neither technical nor controversial, of
one or two of Hegel's most alarming phrases.

The "infinite" seems to practical minds the very opposite of anything
real, present, or valuable. As the description of life, it is the
mere negation of the life we know; as the description of a purpose,
it is the very antithesis of any purpose that we can conceive to be
attainable; as the description of a being, it appears to be formed
by denying every predicate which we attach to personality. And I
could wish that Hegel had not selected this much-abused term as the
distinctive predicate of what is most real and most precious in life.
He adhered to it, no doubt, because his infinity, though different in
nature to that of common logic, yet rightly fills the place and meets
the problem of that conception. I will attempt to explain how this
can be, and what we are discussing when we read about infinity in the
Hegelian philosophy.

It is an obvious remark, that infinity was a symbol of evil in
Hellenic speculation, whereas to Christian and modern thought it is
identified with good. Much idle talk has arisen on this account, as to
the limitation of the Hellenic mind. For in fact, the Finite ascribed
to Pythagoras, and the idea of limit and proportion in Plato or in
Aristotle, are far more nearly akin to true infinity than is the
Infinite of modern popular philosophy. Infinite means the negation of
limit. Now, common infinity, which may be identified in general with
enumeration _ad infinitum_,--the _false_ infinity of Hegel--is the
attempt to negate or transcend a limit which inevitably recurs. It
arises from attempting a task or problem in the wrong way, so that we
may go on for ever without making any advance towards its achievement.
All quantitative infinity--which of course has its definite uses,
subject to proper reservations--is of this nature. A process does
not change its character by mere continuance, and the aggregate of a
million units is no more free from limitation than the aggregate of
ten. A defect in kind cannot be compensated by mere quantity. We see
the fallacious attempt in savage, barbaric, or vulgar art. Meaningless
iteration, objectless labour, enormous size, extravagant costliness,
indicate the effort to satisfy man's need of expression by the mere
accumulation of work without adequate idea or purpose. But such
efforts, however stupendous, never attain their goal. They constitute a
recurrent failure to transcend a recurrent limit, precisely analogous
to enumeration _ad infinitum_. A hundred thousand pounds' worth of
bricks and mortar comes no nearer to the embodiment of mind than
a thousand pounds' worth. To attempt adequate expression by mere
aggregation of cost or size is therefore to fall into the infinite
process or the false infinity.

Another well-known instance is the pursuit of happiness in the form
of "pleasure for pleasure's sake." The recurrence of unchanging units
leaves us where we were. A process which does not change remains the
same, and if it did not bring satisfaction at first, will not do so at
last.[9] We might as well go on producing parallels to infinity, in the
hope that somehow or somewhere they may meet. An infinite straight line
may serve as a type of the kind of infinity we are considering.

Infinity in the Hegelian sense does not partake in any way of this
endlessness, or of the unreality which attaches to it. Its root-idea is
self-completeness or satisfaction. That which is "infinite" is without
boundary, because it does not refer beyond itself for explanation, or
for justification; and therefore, in all human existence or production
infinity can only be an aspect or element. A picture, for instance,
regarded as a work of fine art, justifies itself, gives satisfaction
directly and without raising questions of cause or of comparison,
and is in this sense--_i.e._ in respect of its beauty--regarded as
"infinite." When, on the other hand, we consider this same work of art
as an historical phenomenon, as a link in a chain of causation--_e.g._
as elucidating the development of a school, or proving the existence
of a certain technical process at a certain date--then we go beyond
itself for its interest and explanation, and depress it at once
into a finite object. The finite is that which presents itself as
incomplete; the infinite that which presents itself as complete, and
which, therefore, does not force upon us the fact of its limitation.
This character belongs in the highest degree to self-conscious mind,
as realized in the world above sense; and in some degree to all
elements of that world--for instance, to the State--in as far as they
represent man's realized self-consciousness. It is the nature of
self-consciousness to be infinite, because it is its nature to take
into itself what was opposed to it, and thus to make itself into an
organized sphere that has value and reality within, and not beyond
itself. If false infinity was represented by an infinite straight line,
true infinity may be compared to a circle or a sphere.

The distinction between true and false infinity is of the profoundest
moral import. The sickly yearning that longs only to escape from the
real, rooted in the antithesis between the infinite and the actual or
concrete, or in the idea of the monotonous "_infini_" which is one with
the "_abîme_" or the "_gouffre_," is appraised by this test at its true
value. It is seen to rest on a mere pathetic fallacy of thought and
sentiment. So far from the infinite being remote, abstract, unreal,
nothing but the infinite can be truly present, concrete, and real.
The finite always refers us away and away through an endless series of
causes, of effects, or of relations. The infinite is individual, and
bears the character of knowledge, achievement, attainment. In short,
the actual realities which we have in mind when, in philosophy, we
speak of the infinite, are such as a nation that is conscious of its
unity and general will, or the realm of fine art as the recognition of
man's higher nature, or the religious community with its conviction of
an indwelling Deity.

Now, whether we like the term Infinite or not, whether or no we think
that man's life can be explained and justified within the limits of
these aims and these phenomena, there is no doubt that these matters
are real, and are the most momentous of realities. In acquainting
ourselves with their structure, evolution, and relation to individual
life, we are at least not wasting time, nor treating of matters beyond
human intelligence.

There is a very similar contrast in the conception of human Freedom.
"Free will" is so old a vexed question, that though the conflict still
rages fitfully round it, the world hardly conceives that much can
turn upon its decision. But when in place of the abstract, "Is man
free?" we are confronted with the concrete inquiry, "When, in what,
and as what, does man carry out his will with least hindrance and with
fullest satisfaction?" then we have before us the actual phenomena of
civilization, instead of an idle and abstract Yes or No.

Man's Freedom, in the sense thus contemplated, lies in the spiritual or
supra-sensuous world by which his humanity is realized, and in which
his will finds fulfilment. The family, for example, property, and law
are the first steps of man's freedom. In them the individual's will
obtains and bestows recognition as an agent in a society whose bond
of union is ideal--_i.e._ existing only in consciousness; and this
recognition develops into duties and rights. It is in these that man
finds something to live for, something in which and for the sake of
which to assert himself. As society develops he lives on the whole
more in the civilized or spiritual world, and less in the savage
or purely natural world. His will, which is himself, expands with
the institutions and ideas that form its purpose, and the history
of this expansion is the history of human freedom. Nothing is more
shallow, more barbarously irrational, than to regard the progress of
civilization as the accumulation of restrictions. Laws and rules are a
necessary aspect of extended capacities. Every power that we gain has a
positive nature, and therefore involves positive conditions, and every
positive condition has negative relations. To accomplish a particular
purpose you must go to work in a particular way, and in no other way.
To complain of this is like complaining of a house because it has a
definite shape. If freedom means absence of attributes, empty space
is "freer" than any edifice. Of course a house may be so ugly that we
may say we would rather have none at all. Civilization may bring such
horrors that we may say "rather savagery than this;" but in neither
case are we serious. Great as are the vices of civilization, it is only
in civilization that man becomes human, spiritual, and free.

The effort to grasp and apply such an idea as this can hardly be
barren. It brings us face to face with concrete facts of history,
and of man's actual motives and purposes. True philosophy here, as
everywhere, plunges into the concrete and the real; it is the indolent
abstract fancy that thrusts problems away into the remote "beyond"
or into futile abstraction. Plato, the philosopher, knows well that
the mind is free when it achieves what as a whole it truly wills. But
Plato, the allegorist and imaginative preacher, refers the soul's
freedom to a fleeting moment of ante-natal choice, which he vainly
strives to exempt from causal influence. Pictorial imagination, with
its ready reference to occurrences in past and future, is the great foe
to philosophic intelligence.

Finally, it is impossible to omit all reference to the notion of an
immanent Deity, which forms the very centre of Hegel's thought. When
an unspeculative English reader first meets with Hegel's passionate
insistence that God is not unknowable, that He necessarily reveals
himself as a Trinity of persons, and that to deny this is to represent
men as "the heathen who know not God," he feels as if he had taken
sand into his mouth. He is inclined to ask what these Neo-Platonic or
mediæval doctrines are doing in the nineteenth century, and why we
should resuscitate dead logomachies that can have no possible value for
life or conduct. Now, I must not attempt here to discuss the difficult
question of Hegel's ultimate conception of the being of God, and I am
bound to warn any one who may read these pages that I only profess
to reproduce one--though by far the most prominent--side of that
conception. But, subject to this reservation, I have no hesitation in
saying, that our own prejudices form the only hindrance to our seeing
that Hegel's subject-matter is here, as elsewhere, human life. He
gives us what he takes to be the literal truth, and we will have it
to be metaphor. Verbally contradicting Kant, he accepts, completes,
and enforces Kant's thought. "Revelation can never be the true ground
of religion," said Kant; "for revelation is an historical accident,
and religion is a rational necessity of man's intelligent nature."
"Revelation is the only true knowledge of God and ground of religion,"
says Hegel, "because _revelation consists in the realization of God in
man's intelligent nature_." We are, however, not unaccustomed to such
phrases, and our imagination is equal to its habitual task of evading
their meaning. We take them to be a strong metaphor, meaning that God,
who is a sort of ghostly being a long way off, is, notwithstanding,
more or less within the knowledge of our minds, and so is "in" them,
as a book which is actually in London may be in my memory when I am
in Scotland. Now, right or wrong, this is not what Hegel means. He
means what he says; that God is spirit or mind,[10] and exists in the
medium of mind, _which is actual as intelligence, for us at any rate,
only in the human self-consciousness_. The thought is hard from its
very simplicity, and we struggle, as always, to avoid grasping it. We
imagine spirits as made of a sort of thin matter, and so as existing
just like bodies, although we call them disembodied. And then we think
of this disembodied form as an alternative to human form, and suppose
spirit to have somehow a purer existence apart from human body. This
error really springs from imagining the two as existences of the same
kind, and so conflicting, and from not realizing the notion of spirit
as mind or self-consciousness, which is the only way of conceiving its
actual presence in our world.

Mind uses sensuous existence as its symbol; perhaps even needs it. The
poet who has hit Hegel's thought so nearly,[11] fails here:--

                      "This weight of body and limb,
    Are they not sign and symbol of thy division from Him?"

Here we leave the track of the higher Pantheism for that of vulgar
mysticism. Spiritual being is conceived as somehow incompatible with
bodily shape, either because incapable of any concrete embodiment, or
because it has a quasi-material shape of its own. Now, this is just the
reverse of the Hegelian idea. According to Hegel, it is only in the
human form that intelligence can for us find its full expression. The
notion of a spiritual body other than and incompatible with the natural
body does not arise. Spirit exists in the medium of consciousness, not
in a peculiar kind of matter. The spiritualization of the natural body
is not to be looked for in an astral or angel body, but in the gait
and gesture, the significance and dignity, that make the body of the
civilized man the outward image of his soul, and distinguish him from
the savage as from the animal. The human soul becomes actual itself,
and visible to others, only by moulding the body into its symbol
and instrument. It ought to have been an axiom of physiology, Hegel
says, that the series of animated forms must necessarily lead up to
that of man. For this is the only sensuous form in which mind could
attain adequate manifestation. Thus anthropomorphism in fine art is
no accident, nor an unworthy portrayal of divinity. If the Deity is
to be symbolized to sense, it must be in the image of man. The symbol
is not indeed the reality, as the sensuous image is not conscious
thought; but this is a defect inherent in artistic presentation, and
not attributable to anthropomorphism in particular.

It is obvious that in the light of such a conception, a speculative
import can be attached to the doctrine of the Incarnation, and Hegel's
reading of Christian ideas is, in fact, to be interpreted entirely in
this sense. This is not the place to go deeper into such views, which,
however profound, may perhaps continue to seem non-natural expositions
of Christian dogma. I am only concerned to show how here, also, the
speculative idea, operating upon the concrete and actual, generates
a fresh and inspiring insight into life and conduct. Few chapters of
anthropology are more thorough, profound, and suggestive than Hegel's
account of the "actual soul;" _i.e._ of the habits and attributes which
make the body distinctively human by stamping it with the impress of
mind. Nor has philosophic insight ever done better service to the
history of religion than in grasping the essence of Christianity as the
_unity_, (not merely the _union_) of the divine and human nature.

Among the things which are spiritually discerned, an important place
belongs to beauty. As a boundary and transition between sense and
thought, it is peculiarly fitted to illustrate the reality which we
claim, in contradistinction to mere sensuous appearance, for what
is best in life. Many who distrust Hegelian formulæ are convinced
that beauty at least is real. They will admit that fine art and the
recognition of beauty are not trifles, not amusements, but rank high
among the interests that give life its value. All such will find
themselves in sympathy with the purpose of a great philosopher who has
bent all the power of his genius and his industry to vindicating a
place for art as an embodiment of the divine nature. The Introduction
to Hegel's "Æsthetic," which is all that it was possible to reproduce
in the present volume, lacks, of course, the solidity and detailed
elaboration of the treatise. Yet to all who care for thorough and noble
thought on a great subject, and for a defence of their faith in the
true spiritual realities, I have hope that the ensuing pages, however
marred by imperfect translation, will be welcome.




HEGEL'S ÆSTHETIC.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE RANGE OF ÆSTHETIC DEFINED, AND SOME OBJECTIONS REFUTED.


The present course of lectures deals with "Æsthetic." Their subject
is the wide _realm of the beautiful_, and, more particularly, their
province is _Art_--we may restrict it, indeed, to _Fine Art_.

The name "Æsthetic" in its natural sense is not quite appropriate to
this subject. "Æsthetic" means more precisely the science of sensation
or feeling. Thus understood, it arose as a new science, or rather as
something that was to become a branch of philosophy for the first
time,[12] in the school of Wolff, at the epoch when works of art
were being considered in Germany in the light of the feelings which
they were supposed to evoke--feelings of pleasure, admiration, fear,
pity, etc. The name was so inappropriate, or, strictly speaking, so
superficial, that for this reason it was attempted to form other
names, _e.g._ "Kallistic." But this name, again, is unsatisfactory,
for the science to be designated does not treat of beauty in general,
but merely of _artistic_ beauty. We shall, therefore, permit the
name Æsthetic to stand, because it is nothing but a name, and so is
indifferent to us, and, moreover, has up to a certain point passed into
common language. As a name, therefore, it may be retained. The proper
expression, however, for our science is the "Philosophy of Art," or,
more definitely, the "Philosophy of Fine Art."

[Greek: a.] By the above expression we at once exclude the _beauty
of Nature_. Such a limitation of our subject may appear to be an
arbitrary demarcation, resting on the principle that every science has
the prerogative of marking out its boundaries at pleasure. But this is
not the sense in which we are to understand the limitation of Æsthetic
to _the beauty of art_. It is true that in common life we are in the
habit of speaking of beautiful colour, a beautiful sky, a beautiful
river, and, moreover, of beautiful flowers, beautiful animals, and,
above all, of beautiful human beings. We will not just now enter into
the controversy how far such objects can justly have the attribute
of beauty ascribed to them, or how far, speaking generally, natural
beauty ought to be recognized as existing besides artistic beauty. We
may, however, begin at once by asserting that artistic beauty stands
_higher_ than nature. For the beauty of art is the beauty that is
born--born again, that is--of the mind;[13] and by as much as the mind
and its products are higher than nature and its appearances, by so
much the beauty of art is higher than the beauty of nature. Indeed,
if we look at it _formally_--i.e. only considering in what way it
exists, not what there is in it,--even a silly fancy such as may pass
through a man's head is _higher_ than any product of nature; for such
a fancy must at least be characterized by intellectual being and by
freedom.[14] In respect of its content, on the other hand, the sun,
for instance, appears to us to be an absolutely necessary factor in
the universe, while a blundering notion passes away as accidental and
transient; but yet, in its own being, a natural existence such as the
sun is indifferent,[15] is not free or self-conscious, while if we
consider it in its necessary connection with other things we are not
regarding it by itself or for its own sake, and, therefore, not as
beautiful.

To say, as we have said, in general terms, that mind and its artistic
beauty stand _higher_ than natural beauty, is no doubt to determine
almost nothing. For "higher" is an utterly indefinite expression, which
designates the beauty of nature and that of art as if merely standing
side by side in the space of the imagination, and states the difference
between them as purely quantitative, and, therefore, purely external.
But the mind and its artistic beauty, in being "_higher_" as compared
with nature, have a distinction which is not simply relative. Mind, and
mind only, is capable of truth, and comprehends in itself all that is,
so that whatever is beautiful can only be really and truly beautiful as
partaking in this higher element and as created thereby. In this sense
the beauty of nature reveals itself as but a reflection of the beauty
which belongs to the mind, as an imperfect, incomplete mode of being,
as a mode whose really substantial element is contained in the mind
itself.

Moreover, we shall find the restriction to fine art very natural, for
however much has been and is said--though less by the ancients than by
ourselves--of the beauties of nature, yet no one has taken it into his
head to emphasize the point of view of the _beauty_ of natural objects,
and to attempt to make a science, a systematic account of these
beauties. The aspect of _Utility_, indeed, has been accentuated, and a
science, _e.g._ of natural things useful against diseases a _materia
medica_, has been compiled, consisting in a description of minerals,
chemical products, plants, and animals that are of use for curative
purposes. But the realm of nature has not been arrayed and estimated
under the aspect of beauty. In dealing with natural beauty we find
ourselves too open to _vagueness_, and too destitute of a _criterion_;
for which reason such a review would have little interest.

The above prefatory remarks upon beauty in nature and in art, upon the
relation between the two, and the exclusion of the former from the
region of the subject proper, are meant to remove any idea that the
limitation of our science is owing merely to choice and to caprice.
But this is not the place to _demonstrate_ the above relation, for the
consideration of it falls within our science itself, and therefore it
cannot be discussed and demonstrated till later.

Supposing that for the present we have limited ourselves to the beauty
of art, this first step brings us at once into contact with fresh
difficulties.

[Greek: b.] The first thing that may suggest itself to us is the
difficulty whether fine art shows itself to _deserve_ a scientific
treatment. Beauty and art, no doubt, pervade all the business of
life like a kindly genius, and form the bright adornment of all our
surroundings, both mental and material, soothing the sadness of
our condition and the embarrassments of real life, killing time in
entertaining fashion, and where there is nothing good to be achieved,
occupying the place of what is vicious, better, at any rate, than vice.
Yet although art presses in with its pleasing shapes on every possible
occasion, from the rude adornments of the savage to the splendour of
the temple with its untold wealth of decoration, still these shapes
themselves appear to fall outside the real purposes of life. And
even if the creations of art do not prove detrimental to our graver
purposes, if they appear at times actually to further them by keeping
evil at a distance, still it is so far true that art belongs rather to
the relaxation and leisure of the mind, while the substantive interests
of life demand its exertion. Hence it may seem unsuitable and pedantic
to treat with scientific seriousness what is not in itself of a serious
nature. In any case, upon such a view art appears as a superfluity,
even if the softening of the mental temper which preoccupation with
beauty has power to produce, does not turn out a detrimental, because
effeminating influence. In this aspect of the matter, the fine
arts being granted to be a _luxury_, it has been thought necessary
in various ways to take up their defence with reference to their
relation towards _practical_ necessities, and more especially towards
morality and piety; and, as it is impossible to demonstrate their
harmlessness, at least to make it credible that the mental luxury in
question afforded a larger sum of _advantages_ than of _disadvantages_.
With this view very serious aims have been ascribed to art, and it
has been recommended in various ways as a mediator between reason
and sensuousness, between inclination and duty, as the reconciler of
these elements in the obstinate conflict and repulsion which their
collision generates. But the opinion may be maintained that, assuming
such aims of art, more serious though they are, nothing is gained for
reason and duty by the attempt at mediation, because these principles,
as essentially incapable of intermixture, can be parties to no such
compromise, but demand in their manifestation the same purity which
they have in themselves. And it might be said that art itself is not
made any more worthy of scientific discussion by such treatment, seeing
that it is still doubly a servant--to higher aims, no doubt, on the
one hand, but none the less to vacuity and frivolity on the other; and
in such service can at best only display itself as a means, instead of
being an end pursued for its own sake. Finally, art, considered as a
means, seems to labour under this defect of form, that, supposing it to
be subordinated to serious ends, and to produce results of importance,
still the means employed by art for such purposes is _deception_.
For beauty has its being in appearance.[16] Now, it will readily be
admitted that an aim which is real and true in itself ought not to
be attained by deception, and if it does here and there achieve some
success in this way, that can only be the case to a limited extent, and
even then deception cannot approve itself as the right means. For the
means should correspond to the dignity of the end, and only what is
real and true, not semblance or deception, has power to create what is
real and true; just as science, for instance, has to consider the true
interests of the mind in accordance with the truth of reality and the
true way of conceiving it.

In all these respects it may appear as if fine art were _unworthy_
of scientific consideration; because, as is alleged, it is at best a
pleasing amusement, and even if it pursues more serious aims is in
contradiction with their nature, but is at best the mere servant alike
of amusement and of serious aims, and yet has at command, whether as
the element of its being or as the vehicle of its action, nothing
beyond deception and semblance.

[Greek: g]. But, in the second place, it is a still more probable
aspect of the question that, even if fine art were to form a subject
of philosophical reflections in a general way, it would be no
_appropriate_ matter for strictly scientific treatment. The beauty
of art presents itself to sense, to feeling, to perception, to
imagination; its sphere is not that of thought, and the apprehension
of its activity and its productions demand another organ than that of
the scientific intelligence. Moreover, what we enjoy in the beauty of
art is precisely the _freedom_ of its productive and plastic energy. In
the origination, as in the contemplation, of its creations we appear
to escape wholly from the fetters of rule and regularity. In the forms
of art we seek for repose and animation in place of the austerity
of the reign of law and the sombre self-concentration of thought;
we would exchange the shadowland of the idea for cheerful vigorous
reality. And lastly, the source of artistic creations is the free
activity of fancy, which in her imagination is more free than nature's
self. Not only has art at command the whole wealth of natural forms
in the brilliant variety of their appearance, but also the creative
imagination has power to expatiate inexhaustibly beyond their limit in
products of _its own_. It may be supposed that, in presence of this
immeasurable abundance of inspiration and its free creations, thought
will necessarily lose the courage to bring them _completely_ before it,
to criticize them, and to array them under its universal formulæ.

Science, on the contrary, every one admits, is compelled by its form to
busy itself with thought which abstracts from the mass of particulars.
For this reason, on the one hand, imagination with its contingency and
caprice--that is, the organ of artistic activity and enjoyment--is of
necessity excluded from science. And on the other hand, seeing that art
is what cheers and animates the dull and withered dryness of the idea,
reconciles with reality its abstraction and its dissociation therefrom,
and supplies out of the real world what is lacking to the notion,
it follows, we may think, that a _purely_ intellectual treatment of
art destroys this very means of supplementation, annihilates it, and
reduces the idea once more to its simplicity devoid of reality, and to
its shadowy abstractness. And further, it is objected that science,
as a matter of _content_, occupies itself with what is _necessary_.
Now, if Æsthetic puts aside the beauty of nature, we not only gain
nothing in respect of necessity, but to all appearance have got further
away from it. For the expression _Nature_ at once gives us the idea
of Necessity and Uniformity,[17] that is to say, of a behaviour which
may be hoped to be akin to science, and capable of submitting thereto.
But in the mind, generally, and more particularly in the imagination,
compared with nature, caprice and lawlessness are supposed to be
peculiarly at home; and these withdraw themselves as a matter of course
from all scientific explanation.

Thus in all these aspects--in origin, in effect, and in range--fine
art, instead of showing itself fitted for scientific study, seems
rather in its own right to resist the regulating activity of thought,
and to be unsuitable for strict scientific discussion.

These and similar objections against a genuinely scientific treatment
of fine art are drawn from common ideas, points of view, and
considerations, which may be read _ad nauseam_ in full elaboration in
the older writers upon beauty and the fine arts, especially in the
works of French authors. And in part they contain facts which have a
certain truth; in part, too, the argumentation[18] based upon these
facts appears plausible at first sight. Thus, _e.g._, there is the
fact that the forms of beauty are as manifold as the phenomenon of
beauty is omnipresent; and from this, if we choose, we may proceed
to conclude to a universal _impulse of Beauty_ in human nature, and
then go on to the further inference: that because ideas of beauty are
so endlessly various, and therefore, as seems obvious, are something
_particular_,[19] it follows that there can be no universal laws of
beauty and of taste.

Before it is possible for us to turn from such considerations to our
subject proper, it is our business to devote a brief introductory
discussion to the objections and doubts which have been raised. In the
first place, as regards the _worthiness_ of art to be scientifically
considered, it is no doubt the case that art can be employed as a
fleeting pastime, to serve the ends of pleasure and entertainment,
to decorate our surroundings, to impart pleasantness to the external
conditions of our life, and to emphasize other objects by means of
ornament. In this mode of employment art is indeed not independent, not
free, but servile. But what _we_ mean to consider, is the art which is
_free_ in its end as in its means.

That art is in the abstract capable of serving other aims, and
of being a mere pastime, is moreover a relation which it shares
with thought. For, on the one hand, science, in the shape of the
subservient understanding, submits to be used for finite purposes,
and as an accidental means, and in that case is not self-determined,
but determined by alien objects and relations; but, on the other
hand, science liberates itself from this service to rise in free
independence to the attainment of truth, in which medium, free from all
interference, it fulfils itself in conformity with its proper aims.

Fine art is not real art till it is in this sense free, and only
achieves its highest task when it has taken its place in the same
sphere with religion and philosophy, and has become simply a mode
of revealing to consciousness and bringing to utterance the Divine
Nature,[20] the deepest interests of humanity, and the most
comprehensive truths of the mind. It is in works of art that nations
have deposited the profoundest intuitions and ideas of their hearts;
and fine art is frequently the key--with many nations there is no
other--to the understanding of their wisdom and of their religion.

This is an attribute which art shares with religion and philosophy,
only in this peculiar mode, that it represents even the highest ideas
_in sensuous forms_, thereby bringing them nearer to the character
of natural phenomena, to the senses, and to feeling. The world, into
whose depths _thought_ penetrates, is a supra-sensuous world, which
is thus, to begin with, erected as a _beyond_ over against immediate
consciousness and present sensation; the power which thus rescues
itself from the _here_, that consists in the actuality and finiteness
of sense, is the freedom of thought in cognition. But the mind is able
to heal this schism which its advance creates; it generates out of
itself the works of fine art as the first middle term of reconciliation
between pure thought and what is external, sensuous, and transitory,
between nature with its finite actuality and the infinite freedom of
the reason that comprehends.

[Greek: d]. The _element_ of art was said to be in its general nature
an _unworthy_ element, as consisting in appearance and deception. The
censure would be not devoid of justice, if it were possible to class
appearance as something that ought not to exist. An appearance or
show, however, is essential to existence. Truth could not be, did it
not appear and reveal itself,[21] were it not truth _for_ some one or
something, _for_ itself as also _for_ Mind. Therefore there can be no
objection against appearance in general, but, if at all, against the
particular mode of appearance in which art gives actuality to what is
in itself real and true. If, in this aspect, the _appearance_ with
which art gives its conceptions life as determinate existences is to
be termed a _deception_, this is a criticism which primarily receives
its meaning by comparison with the external world of phenomena and
its immediate contact with us as _matter_, and in like manner by
the standard of our own world of feeling, that is, the inner world
of _sense_. These are the two worlds to which, in the life of daily
experience, in our own phenomenal[22] life, we are accustomed to
attribute the value and the title of actuality, reality, and truth, in
contrast to art, which we set down as lacking such reality and truth.
Now, this whole sphere of the empirical inner and outer world is just
what is not the world of genuine reality, but is to be entitled a mere
appearance more strictly than is true of art, and a crueller deception.
Genuine reality is only to be found beyond the immediacy of feeling
and of external objects. Nothing is genuinely real but that which is
actual in its own right,[23] that which is the substance of nature
and of mind, fixing itself indeed in present and definite existence,
but in this existence still retaining its essential and self-centred
being, and thus and no otherwise attaining genuine reality. The
dominion of these universal powers is exactly what art accentuates and
reveals. The common outer and inner world also no doubt present to us
this essence of reality, but in the shape of a chaos of accidental
matters, encumbered by the immediateness of sensuous presentation, and
by arbitrary states, events, characters, etc. Art liberates the real
import of appearances from the semblance and deception of this bad and
fleeting world, and imparts to phenomenal semblances a higher reality,
born of mind. The appearances of art, therefore, far from being mere
semblances, have the higher reality and the more genuine existence in
comparison with the realities of common life.

Just as little can the representations of art be called a deceptive
semblance in comparison with the representations of historical
narrative, as if that had the more genuine truth. For history has not
even immediate existence, but only the intellectual presentation of it,
for the element of its portrayals, and its content remains burdened
with the whole mass of contingent matter formed by common reality
with its occurrences, complications, and individualities. But the
work of art brings before us the eternal powers that hold dominion in
history, without any such superfluity in the way of immediate sensuous
presentation and its unstable semblances.

Again, the mode of appearance of the shapes produced by art may be
called a deception in comparison with philosophic thought, with
religious or moral principles. Beyond a doubt the mode of revelation
which a content attains in the realm of thought is the truest reality;
but in comparison with the show or semblance of immediate sensuous
existence or of historical narrative, the artistic semblance has the
advantage that in itself it points beyond itself, and refers us away
from itself to something spiritual which it is meant to bring before
the mind's eye. Whereas immediate appearance does not give itself
out to be deceptive, but rather to be real and true, though all the
time its truth is contaminated and infected by the immediate sensuous
element. The hard rind of nature and the common world give the mind
more trouble in breaking through to the idea than do the products of
art.

But if, on the one side, we assign this high position to art, we must
no less bear in mind, on the other hand, that art is not, either in
content or in form, the supreme and absolute mode of bringing the
mind's genuine interests into consciousness. The form of art is enough
to limit it to a restricted content. Only a certain circle and grade of
truth is capable of being represented in the medium of art. Such truth
must have in its own nature the capacity to go forth into sensuous form
and be adequate to itself therein, if it is to be a genuinely artistic
content, as is the case with the gods of Greece. There is, however, a
deeper form of truth, in which it is no longer so closely akin and so
friendly to sense as to be adequately embraced and expressed by that
medium. Of such a kind is the Christian conception of truth; and more
especially the spirit of our modern world, or, to come closer, of our
religion and our intellectual culture, reveals itself as beyond the
stage at which art is the highest mode assumed by man's consciousness
of the absolute. The peculiar mode to which artistic production and
works of art belong no longer satisfies our supreme need. We are
above the level at which works of art can be venerated as divine,
and actually worshipped; the impression which they make is of a more
considerate kind, and the feelings which they stir within us require
a higher test and a further confirmation. Thought and reflection have
taken their flight above fine art. Those who delight in grumbling and
censure may set down this phenomenon for a corruption, and ascribe it
to the predominance of passion and selfish interests, which scare away
at once the seriousness and the cheerfulness of art. Or we may accuse
the troubles of the present time and the complicated condition of civil
and political life as hindering the feelings, entangled in minute
preoccupations, from freeing themselves, and rising to the higher
aims of art, the intelligence itself being subordinate to petty needs
and interests, in sciences which only subserve such purposes and are
seduced into making this barren region their home.

However all this may be, it certainly is the case, that art no longer
affords that satisfaction of spiritual wants which earlier epochs
and peoples have sought therein, and have found therein only; a
satisfaction which, at all events on the religious side, was most
intimately and profoundly connected with art. The beautiful days of
Greek art, and the golden time of the later middle ages are gone by.
The reflective culture of our life of to-day, makes it a necessity for
us, in respect of our will no less than of our judgment, to adhere to
general points of view, and to regulate particular matters according
to them, so that general forms, laws, duties, rights, maxims are what
have validity as grounds of determination and are the chief regulative
force. But what is required for artistic interest as for artistic
production is, speaking generally, a living creation, in which the
universal is not present as law and maxim, but acts as if one with
the mood and the feelings, just as, in the imagination, the universal
and rational is contained only as brought into unity with a concrete
sensuous phenomenon. Therefore, our present in its universal condition
is not favourable to art. As regards the artist himself, it is not
merely that the reflection which finds utterance all round him, and the
universal habit of having an opinion and passing judgment about art
infect him, and mislead him into putting more abstract thought into his
works themselves; but also the whole spiritual culture of the age is of
such a kind that he himself stands within this reflective world and its
conditions, and it is impossible for him to abstract from it by will
and resolve, or to contrive for himself and bring to pass, by means of
peculiar education or removal from the relations of life, a peculiar
solitude that would replace all that is lost.

In all these respects art is, and remains for us, on the side of its
highest destiny, a thing of the past. Herein it has further lost for
us its genuine truth and life, and rather is transferred into our
_ideas_ than asserts its former necessity, or assumes its former
place, in reality. What is now aroused in us by works of art is over
and above our immediate enjoyment, and together with it, our judgment;
inasmuch as we subject the content and the means of representation
of the work of art and the suitability or unsuitability of the two to
our intellectual consideration. Therefore, the _science_ of art is a
much more pressing need in our day, than in times in which art, simply
as art, was enough to furnish a full satisfaction. Art invites us to
consideration of it by means of thought, not to the end of stimulating
art production, but in order to ascertain scientifically what art is.

[Greek: e]. As soon as we propose to accept this invitation we are
met by the difficulty which has already been touched upon in the
suggestion that, though art is a suitable subject for philosophical
reflection in the general sense, yet it is not so for systematic and
scientific discussion. In this objection there lies the false idea
that a philosophical consideration may, nevertheless, be unscientific.
On this point it can only be remarked here with brevity, that,
whatever ideas others may have of philosophy and philosophizing, I
regard the pursuit of philosophy as utterly incapable of existing
apart from a scientific procedure. Philosophy has to consider its
object in its necessity, not, indeed, in its subjective necessity or
external arrangement, classification, etc., but it has to unfold and
demonstrate the object out of the necessity of its own inner nature.
Until this evolution[24] is brought to pass the scientific element
is lacking to the treatment. In as far, however, as the objective
necessity of an object lies essentially in its logical and metaphysical
nature, the isolated treatment of art must be conducted with a certain
relaxation of scientific stringency. For art involves the most complex
pre-suppositions, partly in reference to its content, partly in respect
of its medium[25] and element,[26] in which art is constantly on the
borders of the arbitrary or accidental. Thus it is only as regards
the essential innermost progress of its content and of its media of
expression that we must call to mind the outline prescribed by its
necessity.

The objection that works of fine art elude the treatment of scientific
thought because they originate out of the unregulated fancy and out
of the feelings, are of a number and variety that defy the attempt
to gain a conspectus, and therefore take effect only on feeling and
imagination, raises a problem which appears still to have importance.
For the beauty of art does in fact appear in a form which is expressly
contrasted with abstract thought, and which the latter is forced
to destroy in exerting the activity which is its nature. This idea
coheres with the opinion that reality as such, the life of nature and
of mind, is disfigured and slain by comprehension; that, so far from
being brought close to us by the thought which comprehends, it is by
it that such life is absolutely dissociated from us, so that, by the
use of thought as the _means_ of grasping what has life, man rather
cuts himself off from this his purpose. We cannot speak fully on this
subject in the present passage, but only indicate the point of view
from which the removal of this difficulty, or impossibility depending
on maladaptation, might be effected.

It will be admitted, to begin with, that the mind is capable of
contemplating itself, and of possessing a consciousness, and that
a _thinking_ consciousness, of itself and all that is generated by
itself. Thought--to think--is precisely that in which the mind has its
innermost and essential nature. In gaining this thinking consciousness
concerning itself and its products, the mind is behaving according
to its essential nature, however much freedom and caprice those
products may display, supposing only that in real truth they have
mind in them. Now art and its works as generated and created by the
mind (spirit), are themselves of a spiritual nature, even if their
mode of representation admits into itself the semblance of sensuous
being, and pervades what is sensuous with mind. In this respect art
is, to begin with, nearer to mind and its thinking activity than is
mere external unintelligent nature; in works of art, mind has to do
but with its own. And even if artistic works are not abstract thought
and notion, but are an evolution of the notion _out of_ itself, an
alienation from itself towards the sensuous, still the power of the
thinking spirit (mind) lies herein, _not merely_ to grasp _itself only_
in its peculiar form of the self-conscious spirit (mind), but just as
much to recognize itself in its alienation in the shape of feeling
and the sensuous, in its other form, by transmuting the metamorphosed
thought back into definite thoughts, and so restoring it to itself.
And in this preoccupation with the other of itself the thinking spirit
is not to be held untrue to itself as if forgetting or surrendering
itself therein, nor is it so weak as to lack strength to comprehend
what is different from itself, but it comprehends both itself and its
opposite. For the notion is the universal, which preserves itself
in its particularizations, dominates alike itself and its "other,"
and so becomes the power and activity that consists in undoing the
alienation which it had evolved. And thus the work of art in which
thought alienates itself belongs, like thought itself, to the realm of
comprehending thought, and the mind, in subjecting it to scientific
consideration, is thereby but satisfying the want of its own inmost
nature. For because thought is its essence and notion, it can in the
last resort only be satisfied when it has succeeded in imbuing all the
products of its activity with thought, and has thus for the first time
made them genuinely its own. But, as we shall see more definitely
below, art is far from being the highest form of mind, and receives its
true ratification only from science.[27]

Just as little does art elude philosophical consideration by unbridled
caprice. As has already been indicated, it is its true task to bring
to consciousness the highest interests of the mind. Hence it follows
at once with respect to the _content_ that fine art cannot rove in the
wildness of unfettered fancy, for these spiritual interests determine
definite bases[28] for its content, how manifold and inexhaustible
soever its forms and shapes may be. The same holds true for the forms
themselves. They, again, are not at the mercy of mere chance. Not every
plastic shape[29] is capable of being the expression and representation
of those spiritual interests, of absorbing and of reproducing them;
every definite content determines a form suitable to it.

In this aspect too, then, we are in a position to find our bearings
according to the needs of thought in the apparently unmanageable mass
of works and types of art.

Thus, I hope, we have begun by defining the content of our science,
to which we propose to confine ourselves, and have seen that neither
is fine art unworthy of a philosophical consideration, nor is a
philosophical consideration incompetent to arrive at a knowledge of the
essence of fine art.




CHAPTER II.

METHODS OF SCIENCE APPLICABLE TO BEAUTY AND ART.


If we now investigate _the required mode of scientific consideration_,
we here again meet with two opposite ways of treating the subject,
each of which appears to exclude the other, and so to hinder us from
arriving at _any true result_.

On one side we see the science of art merely, so to speak, busying
itself about the actual productions of art from the outside, arranging
them in series as a history of art, initiating discussions about extant
works, or sketching out theories intended to provide the general points
of view that are to govern both criticism and artistic production.

On the other side we see science abandoning itself independently to
reflection upon the beautiful, and producing mere generalities which do
not touch the work of art in its peculiarity, creating, in short, an
abstract philosophy of the beautiful.

1. As regards the former mode of treatment, which starts from the
empirical side, it is the indispensable road for any one who means
to become a student of art. And just as in the present day every
one, even though he is not busied with natural science, yet pretends
to be equipped with the essentials of physical knowledge, so it has
become more or less obligatory for a cultivated man to possess some
acquaintance with art,[30] and the pretension to display one's-self as
a dilettante and connoisseur is pretty universal.

(_a_) If such information is really to be recognized as
art-scholarship,[31] it must be of various kinds and of wide range. The
first necessity is an exact acquaintance with the immeasurable region
of individual works of art of ancient and modern times, works which
in part have actually perished, in part belong to distant countries
or portions of the world, or which adverse fortune has withdrawn from
one's own observation. Moreover, every work belongs to its _age_, to
its _nation_, and to its environment, and depends upon particular
historical and other ideas and aims. For this reason art-scholarship
further requires a vast wealth of historical information of a very
special kind, seeing that the individualized nature of the work of
art is related to individual detail and demands special matter to
aid in its comprehension and elucidation. And lastly, this kind of
scholarship not only needs, like every other, a memory for information,
but a vivid imagination in order to retain distinctly the images of
artistic forms in all their different features, and especially in order
to have them present to the mind for purposes of comparison with other
works.

(_b_) Within this kind of consideration, which is primarily historical,
there soon emerge various points of view which cannot be lost sight
of in contemplating a work of art, inasmuch as our judgments must be
derived from them. Now these points of view, as in other sciences
which have an empirical starting-point, when extracted and put
together form universal criteria and rules, and, in a still further
stage of formal generalization, _Theories of the arts_. This is not
the place to go into detail about literature of this kind, and it
may, therefore, suffice to mention a few writings in the most general
way. For instance, there is Aristotle's "Poetics," the theory of
tragedy contained in which is still of interest; and to speak more
particularly, among the ancients, Horace's "Ars Poetica" and Longinus's
"Treatise on the Sublime" suffice to give a general idea of the way
in which this kind of theorizing has been carried on. The general
formulæ which were abstracted by such writers were meant to stand
especially as precepts and rules, according to which, particularly in
times of degeneration of poetry and art, works of art were meant to be
produced. The prescriptions, however, compiled by these physicians of
art had even less assured success than those of physicians whose aim
was the restoration of health.

Respecting theories of this kind, I propose merely to mention that,
though _in detail_ they contain much that is instructive, yet their
remarks were abstracted from a very limited circle of artistic
productions, which passed for _the_ genuinely beautiful ones, but yet
always belonged to a but narrow range of art. And again, such formulæ
are in part very trivial reflections which in their generality proceed
to no establishment of particulars, although this is the matter of
chief concern.

The above-mentioned Horatian epistle is full of these reflections, and,
therefore, is a book for all men, but one which for this very reason
contains much that amounts to nothing, _e.g._--

    "Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci
    Lectorem delectando pariterque monendo"--

"He carries all votes, who has mingled the pleasant and the useful,
by at once charming and instructing his reader." This is just like so
many copybook headings,[32] _e.g._ "Stay at home and earn an honest
livelihood," which are right enough as generalities, but lack the
concrete determinations on which action depends.

Another kind of interest was found, not in the express aim of directly
causing the production of genuine works of art, but in the purpose
which emerged of influencing men's judgment upon works of art by such
theories, in short of _forming taste_. In this aspect, Home's "Elements
of Criticism," the writings of Batteux, and Ramler's "Introduction
to the Fine Arts," were works much read in their day. Taste in this
sense has to do with arrangement and treatment, the harmony and finish
of what belongs to the external aspect of a work of art. Besides,
they brought in among the principles of taste views that belonged to
the psychology that was then in vogue, and that had been drawn from
empirical observation of capacities and activities of the soul, of
the passions and their probable heightening, succession, etc. But it
remains invariably the case that every man judges works of art, or
characters, actions, and incidents according to the measure of his
insight and his feelings; and as that formation of taste only touched
what was meagre and external, and moreover drew its precepts only from
a narrow range of works of art and from a _borné_ culture of intellect
and feelings, its whole sphere was inadequate, and incapable of seizing
the inmost and the true, and of sharpening the eye for the apprehension
thereof.

Such theories proceed in general outline, as do the remaining
non-philosophic sciences. The content which they subject to
consideration is borrowed from our idea of it, as something found
there; then further questions are asked about the nature of this idea,
inasmuch as a need reveals itself for closer determinations, which
are also found in our idea of the matter, and drawn from it to be
fixed in definitions. But in so doing, we find ourselves at once on
uncertain and debatable ground. It might indeed appear at first as if
the beautiful were a perfectly simple idea. But it soon becomes evident
that manifold sides may be found in it, one of which is emphasized by
one writer and another by another, or, even if the same points of view
are adopted, a dispute arises on the question which side after all is
to be regarded as the essential one.

With a view to such questions it is held a point of scientific
completeness to adduce and to criticize the various definitions of the
beautiful. We will do this neither with historical _exhaustiveness_,
so as to learn all the subtleties which have emerged in the defining
process, nor for the sake of the _historical_ interest; but we will
simply produce by way of illustration, some of the more interesting
modern views which come pretty close in their purport to what in fact
the idea of the beautiful does involve. For such purpose we have
chiefly to mention Goethe's account of the beautiful, which Meyer
embodied in his "History of the Formative Arts[33] in Greece," on which
occasion he also brings forward Hirt's view, though without mentioning
him.

Hirt, one of the greatest of genuine connoisseurs in the present day,
in his brochure about artistic beauty (_Horen_,[34] 1797, seventh
number), after speaking of the beautiful in the several arts, sums
up his ideas in the result that the basis of a just criticism of
beauty in art and of the formation of taste is the conception of the
_Characteristic_. That is to say, he defines the beautiful as the
"perfect, which is or can be an object of eye, ear, or imagination."
Then he goes on to define the perfect as "that which is adequate to its
aim, that which nature or art aimed at producing within the given genus
and species[35] in the formation of the object." For which reason,
in order to form our judgment on a question of beauty, we ought to
direct our observation as far as possible to the individual marks which
constitute a definite essence. For it is just these marks that form
its characteristics. And so by _character_ as the law of art he means
"that determinate individual modification[36] whereby forms, movement
and gesture, bearing and expression, local colour, light and shade,
chiaroscuro[37] and attitude distinguish themselves, in conformity, of
course, with the requirements of an object previously selected." This
formula gives us at once something more significant than the other
definitions. If we go on to ask what "the characteristic" is, we see
that it involves in the first place _a content_, as, for instance,
a particular feeling, situation, incident, action, individual; and
secondly, the _mode_ and _fashion_ in which this content is embodied
in a representation. It is to this, the mode of representation, that
the artistic law of the "characteristic" refers, inasmuch as it
requires that every particular element in the mode of expression shall
subserve the definite indication of its content and be a member in the
expression of that content. The abstract formula of the characteristic
thus has reference to the degree of appropriateness with which the
particular detail of the artistic form sets in relief the content
which it is intended to represent. If we desire to illustrate this
conception in a quite popular way, we may explain the limitation which
it involves as follows. In a dramatic work, for instance, an action
forms the content; the drama[38] is to represent how this action takes
place. Now, men and women do all sorts of things; they speak to each
other from time to time, at intervals they eat, sleep, put on their
clothes, say one thing and another, and so forth. But in all this,
whatever does not stand in immediate connection with that particular
action considered as the content proper, is to be excluded, so that in
reference to it nothing may be without import. So, too, a picture, that
only represented a single phase of that action, might yet include in
it--so wide are the ramifications of the external world--a multitude
of circumstances, persons, positions, and other matters which at
that moment have no reference to the action in question, and are not
subservient to its distinctive character.

But, according to the rule of the characteristic, only so much ought
to enter into the work of art as belongs to the display[39] and,
essentially, to the expression of that content and no other; for
nothing must announce itself as otiose and superfluous.

This is a very important rule, which may be justified in a certain
aspect. Meyer, however, in his above-mentioned work, gives it as his
opinion that this view has vanished and left no trace, and, in his
judgment, to the benefit of art. For he thinks that the conception in
question would probably have _led_ to caricature. This judgment at
once contains the perversity of implying that such a determination
of the beautiful had to do with _leading_. The Philosophy of art
does not trouble itself about precepts for artists, but it has to
ascertain what beauty in general is, and how it has displayed itself
in actual productions, in works of art, without meaning to give rules
for guidance. Apart from this, if we examine the criticism, we find
it to be true, no doubt, that Hirt's definition includes caricature,
for even a caricature may be characteristic; but, on the other hand,
it must be answered at once that in caricature the definite character
is intensified to exaggeration, and is, so to speak, a superfluity of
the characteristic. But a superfluity ceases to be what is properly
required in order to be characteristic, and becomes an offensive
iteration, whereby the characteristic itself may be made unnatural.
Moreover, what is of the nature of caricature shows itself in the light
of the characteristic representation of what is ugly, which ugliness
is, of course, a distortion. Ugliness, for its part, is closely
connected with the content, so that it may be said that the principle
of the characteristic involves as a fundamental property both ugliness
and the representation of what is ugly. Hirt's definition, of course,
gives no more precise information as to what is to be characterized and
what is not, in the artistically beautiful, or about the content of the
beautiful, but it furnishes in this respect a mere formal rule, which
nevertheless contains some truth, although stated in abstract shape.

Then follows the further question--what Meyer opposes to Hirt's
artistic principle, _i.e._ what he himself prefers. He is treating, in
the first place, exclusively of the principle shown in the artistic
works of the ancients, which principle, however, must include the
essential attribute[40] of beauty. In dealing with this subject he is
led to speak of Mengs and Winckelmann's principle[40] of the Ideal, and
pronounces himself to the effect that he desires neither to reject nor
wholly to accept this law of beauty, but, on the other hand, has no
hesitation in attaching himself to the opinion of an enlightened judge
of art (Goethe), as it is definite,[41] and seems to solve the enigma
more precisely.

Goethe says: "The highest principle of the ancients was the
_significant_, but the highest result of successful _treatment_, the
_beautiful_."

If we look closer at what this opinion implies, we find in it again two
elements; the content or matter in hand, and the mode and fashion of
representation. In looking at a work of art we begin with what presents
itself immediately to us, and after that go on to consider what is its
significance or content.

The former, the external element, has no value for us simply as it
stands; we assume something further behind it, something inward, a
significance, by which the external semblance has a soul breathed into
it.[42] It is this, its soul, that the external appearance indicates.
For an appearance which means something, does not present to the mind's
eye itself and that which it is _qua_ external, but something else; as
does the _symbol_ for instance, and still more obviously the _fable_,
whose moral and precept constitutes its meaning. Indeed every _word_
points to a meaning and has no value in itself. Just so the human
eye, a man's face, flesh, skin, his whole figure, are a revelation of
mind and soul, and in this case the meaning is always something other
than what shows itself within the immediate appearance. This is the
way in which a work of art should have its meaning, and not appear as
exhausted in these mere particular lines, curves, surfaces, borings,
reliefs in the stone, in these colours, tones, sounds, of words, or
whatever other medium is employed; but it should reveal life, feeling,
soul, import and mind, which is just what we mean by the significance
of a work of art.

Thus this requirement of _significance_ in a work of art amounts to
hardly anything beyond or different from Hirt's principle of the
_characteristic_.

According to this notion, then, we find distinguished as the elements
of the beautiful something inward, a content, and something outer which
has that content as its significance; the inner shows itself in the
outer and gives itself to be known by its means, inasmuch as the outer
points away from itself to the inner.

We cannot go into detail on this head.

(_c_) But the earlier fashion alike of rules and of theories has
already been violently thrown aside in Germany--especially owing to
the appearance of genuine living poetry,--and the rights of genius,
its works and their effects, have had their value asserted against the
encroachment of such legalities and against the wide watery streams of
theory. From this foundation both of an art which is itself genuinely
spiritual, and of a general sympathy and communion with it, have
arisen the receptivity and freedom which enabled us to enjoy and to
recognize the great works of art which have long been in existence,
whether those of the modern world,[43] of the middle ages, or even of
peoples of antiquity quite alien to us (_e.g._ the Indian productions);
works which by reason of their antiquity or of their alien nationality
have, no doubt, a foreign element in them, yet in view of their
content--common to all humanity and dominating their foreign
character--could not have been branded as products of bad and barbarous
taste, except by the prejudices of theory. This recognition, to speak
generally, of works of art which depart from the sphere and form of
those upon which more especially the abstractions of theory were based,
led, in the first instance, to the recognition of a peculiar kind of
art--that is, of _romantic_ art,--and it therefore became necessary to
apprehend the idea and the nature of the beautiful in a deeper way than
was possible for those theories. With this influence there co-operated
another, viz. that the idea in its self-conscious form, the thinking
mind, attained at this time, on its side, a deeper self-knowledge in
philosophy, and was thereby directly impelled to understand the essence
of art, too, in a profounder fashion.

Thus, then, even judging by the phases of this more general evolution
of ideas, the theoretical mode of reflection upon art which we were
considering has become antiquated alike in its principles and in
its particulars. Only the _scholarship_ of the history of art has
retained its permanent value, and cannot but retain it, all the more
that the advance of intellectual receptivity, of which we spoke, has
extended its range of vision on every side. Its business and vocation
consists in the æsthetic appreciation of individual works of art, and
in acquaintance with the historical circumstances that externally
condition such works; an appreciation which, if made with sense and
mind, supported by the requisite historical information, is the
only power that can penetrate the entire individuality of a work of
art. Thus Goethe, for instance, wrote much about art and particular
works of art. Theorizing proper is not the purpose of this mode of
consideration, although no doubt it frequently busies itself with
abstract principles and categories, and may give way to this tendency
without being aware of it. But for a reader who does not let this
hinder him, but keeps before him the concrete accounts of works of art,
which we spoke of just now, it at all events furnishes the philosophy
of art with the perceptible illustrations and instances, into the
particular historical details of which philosophy cannot enter.

This, then, may be taken to be the first mode of the study of art,
starting from particular and extant works.

2. There is an essential distinction between this and the opposite
aspect, the wholly theoretical reflection, which made an effort to
understand beauty as such out of itself alone, and to get to the bottom
of its idea.

It is well known that Plato was the first to require of philosophical
study, in a really profound sense, that its objects should be
apprehended, not in their _particularity_, but in their _universality_,
in their genius, in their own nature and its realization: inasmuch as
he affirmed that the truth of things[44] did not consist in individual
good actions, true opinions, beautiful human beings or works of art,
but in _goodness_, _beauty_, _truth_ themselves. Now, if the beautiful
is in fact to be known according to its essence and conception, this
is only possible by help of the thinking idea, by means of which
the logico-metaphysical nature of the _Idea as such_, as also that
of the _particular Idea of the beautiful_ enters into the thinking
consciousness. But the study of the beautiful in its separate nature
and in its own idea may itself turn into an abstract Metaphysic, and
even though Plato is accepted in such an inquiry as foundation and
as guide, still the Platonic abstraction must not satisfy us, even
for the logical idea of beauty. We must understand this idea more
profoundly and more in the concrete, for the emptiness of content
which characterizes the Platonic idea is no longer satisfactory to the
fuller philosophical wants of the mind of to-day. Thus it is, no doubt,
the case that we, too, in modern times, must in our philosophy of art
start from the idea of the beautiful, but we ought not to abide by the
fashion of Platonic ideas, which was purely abstract, and was the mere
beginning of the philosophic study of beauty.

3. The philosophic conception of the beautiful, to indicate its true
nature at least by anticipation, must contain, reconciled within it,
the two extremes which have been mentioned, by combining metaphysical
universality with the determinateness of real particularity. Only thus
is it apprehended in its truth, in its real and explicit nature. It is
then fertile out of its own resources, in contrast to the barrenness of
one-sided reflection. For it has in accordance with its own conception
to develop into a totality of attributes, while the conception itself
as well as its detailed exposition contains the necessity of its
particulars, as also of their progress and transition one into another.
On the other hand, again, these particulars, to which the transition
is made, carry in themselves the universality and essentiality of
the conception as the particulars of which they appear. The modes of
consideration of which we have so far been treating, lack both these
qualities,[45] and for this reason it is only the complete conception
of which we have just spoken that can lead to substantive, necessary,
and self-complete determinations.




CHAPTER III.

THE CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

PART I.--THE WORK OF ART AS MADE AND AS SENSUOUS.


After the above prefatory remarks, we approach closer to our subject,
the philosophy of artistic beauty. Inasmuch as we are undertaking to
treat it scientifically we must begin with its _Conception_. Not till
we have established this conception can we map out the division, and
with it the plan of the entirety of the science; for a division, if it
is not, as is the case with unphilosophical inquiries, taken in hand in
a purely external manner, must find its principle in the conception of
the object itself.

In presence of such a demand we are at once met by the question,
"Whence do we get this conception?" If we begin with the given
conception of artistic beauty itself, that is enough to make it a
_pre-supposition_ and mere assumption; now, mere assumptions are not
admitted by the philosophical method, but whatever it allows to pass
must have its truth demonstrated, _i.e._ displayed as necessary.

We will devote a few words to coming to an understanding upon this
difficulty, which concerns the introduction to every philosophical
branch of study when taken in hand by itself.

The object of every science presents _prima facie_ two aspects: in the
first place, that such an object _is_; in the second place, _what_ it
is.

In ordinary science little difficulty attaches to the first of these
points. It might even, at first sight, look ridiculous, if the
requirement were presented that in astronomy and physics it should
be demonstrated that there was a sun, heavenly bodies, magnetic
phenomena, etc. In these sciences, which have to do with what is given
to sense, the objects are taken from external experience, and instead
of demonstrating them ("beweisen") it is thought sufficient to show
them ("weisen"). Yet even within the non-philosophical sciences,
doubts may arise about the existence of their objects, as _e.g._ in
psychology, the science of mind, it may be doubted if there _is_ a
soul, a mind, _i.e._ something subjective, separate, and independent,
distinct from what is material; or in theology, whether a God _is_. If,
moreover, the objects are of subjective kind, _i.e._ are given only
in the mind, and not as external sensuous objects, we are confronted
by our conviction that there is nothing in the mind but what its own
activity has produced. This brings up the accidental question whether
men have produced this inner idea or perception in their minds or not,
and even if the former is actually the case, whether they have not made
the idea in question vanish again, or at any rate degraded it to a
merely _subjective idea_, whose content has no natural and independent
being. So, for instance, the beautiful has often been regarded as not
naturally and independently necessary in our ideas, but as a mere
subjective pleasure or accidental sense. Our external intuitions,
observations, and perceptions are often deceptive and erroneous, but
still more is this the case with the inner ideas, even if they have in
themselves the greatest vividness, and are forcible enough to transport
us irresistibly into passion.

This doubt whether an object of inward ideas and inward perception
as such is or is not, as also the accidental question whether the
subjective consciousness has produced it in itself, and whether the act
or mode in which it brought it before itself was in its turn adequate
to the object in its essential and independent nature--all this is just
what aroused in men the higher scientific need, which demands that,
even if we have an idea that an object is, or that there is such an
object, the object must yet be displayed or demonstrated in terms of
its necessity.

This proof, if it is developed in a really scientific way, must also
satisfy the further question _What_ an object is. But to expound this
relation would carry us too far in this place, and we can only make the
following remarks on the point.

If we are to display the necessity of our object, the beautiful in art,
we should have to prove that art or beauty was a result of antecedents
such as, when considered in their true conception, to lead us on with
scientific necessity to the idea of fine art. But in as far as we begin
with _art_, and propose to treat of the essence of _its_ idea and of
the realization of that idea, not of antecedents which go before it _as
demanded by_ its idea, so far art, as a peculiar scientific object,
has, for us, a pre-supposition which lies beyond our consideration,
and which, being a different content, belongs in scientific treatment
to a different branch of philosophical study. For it is nothing short
of the whole of philosophy that is the knowledge of the universe as in
itself _one single_ organic totality which develops itself out of its
own conception, and which, returning into itself so as to form a whole
in virtue of the necessity in which it is placed towards itself, binds
itself together with itself into _one single_ world of truth. In the
coronal of this scientific necessity, each individual part is just as
much a circle that returns into itself, as it has, at the same time, a
necessary connection with other parts. This connection is a backward
out of which it derives itself, as well as a forward, to which in its
own nature it impels itself on and on, in as far as it is fertile by
creating fresh matter out of itself, and issuing it into the further
range of scientific knowledge. Therefore, it is not our present aim
to demonstrate the idea of beauty from which we set out, that is, to
derive it according to its necessity from the pre-suppositions which
are its antecedents in science. This task belongs to an encyclopædic
development of philosophy as a whole and of its particular branches.
For us, the idea of beauty and of art is a pre-supposition given in
the system of philosophy. But as we cannot in this place discuss this
system, and the connection of art with it, we have not yet the idea
of the beautiful before us _in a scientific form_; what we have at
command are merely the elements and aspects of it, as they are or have
at former periods been presented, in the diverse ideas of the beautiful
and of art in the mere common consciousness. Having started from this
point, we shall subsequently pass to the more profound consideration of
the views in question, in order thereby to gain the advantage of, in
the first place, obtaining a general idea of our object, and further,
by a brief criticism effecting a preliminary acquaintance with its
higher principles, with which we shall have to do in the sequel. By
this mode of treatment our final introduction will act, so to speak, as
the overture to the account of the subject itself, and will serve the
purpose of a general collection and direction of our thoughts towards
the proper object-matter of our discussion.

What we know, to begin with, as a current idea of the work of art,
comes under the three following general predicates:--

(1) We suppose the work of art to be no natural product, but brought to
pass by means of human activity.

(2) To be essentially made _for_ man, and, indeed, to be more or less
borrowed from the sensuous and addressed to man's sense.

(3) To contain an _end_.

1. As regards the first point, that a work of art is taken to be a
product of human activity, this view has given rise (_a_) to the view
that this activity, being the _conscious_ production of an external
object, can also be _known_, and _expounded_ and learnt, and prosecuted
by others. For, what one can do, it might seem, another can do,[46] or
imitate,[47] as soon as he is acquainted with the mode of procedure;
so that, supposing universal familiarity with the rules of artistic
production, it would only be a matter of any one's will and pleasure
to carry out the process in a uniform way, and so to produce works of
art. It is thus that the above-mentioned rule-providing theories and
their precepts, calculated for practical observance, have arisen. But
that which can be executed according to such instruction, can only be
something formally regular and mechanical. For only what is mechanical
is of such an external kind that no more than a purely empty exercise
of will and dexterity is required to receive it among our ideas and
put it in act; such an exercise not needing to be supplemented by
anything concrete, or anything that goes beyond the precepts conveyed
in general rules. This is most vividly displayed when precepts of the
kind in question do not limit themselves to what is purely external
and mechanical, but extend to the meaning-laden spiritual activity
of true art. In this region the rules contain nothing but indefinite
generalities; _e.g._ "The theme ought to be interesting, and each
individual ought to be made to speak according to his rank, age, sex,
and position." But if rules are meant to be adequate on this subject,
their precepts ought to have been drawn up with such determinateness
that they could be carried out just as they are expressed, without
further and original activity of mind. Being abstract, however, in
their content, such rules reveal themselves, in respect of their
pretension of being adequate to fill the consciousness of the artist,
as wholly inadequate, inasmuch as artistic production is not formal
activity in accordance with given determinations. For it is bound as
spiritual activity to work by drawing on its own resources, and to
bring before the mind's eye a quite other and richer content and ampler
individual creations than any abstract formulæ can dictate. Such rules
may furnish guidance in case of need, if they contain anything really
definite, and therefore of practical utility; but their directions can
only apply to purely external circumstances.

(_b_) The tendency which we have just indicated has therefore been
abandoned, and, in place of it, the opposite principle has been pursued
to no less lengths. For the work of art came to be regarded no longer
as the product of an _activity general_ in mankind, but as the work of
a mind endowed with wholly peculiar gifts. This mind, it is thought,
has then nothing to do but _simply_ to give free play to its particular
gift, as though it were a specific force of nature, and is to be
entirely released from attention to laws of universal validity, as
also from the interference of reflection in its instinctively creative
operation. And, indeed, it is to be guarded therefrom, inasmuch as its
productions could only be infected and tainted by such a consciousness.
In this aspect the work of art was pronounced to be the product of
_talent_ and _genius_, and stress was laid on the natural element
which talent and genius contain. The view was partly right. Talent is
specific, and genius universal capability, with which a man has not the
power to endow himself simply by his own self-conscious activity. We
shall treat this point more fully in the sequel.

In this place we have only to mention the aspect of falsity in the
view before us, in that all consciousness respecting the man's own
activity was held, in the case of artistic production, not merely
superfluous, but even injurious. Production on the part of talent
and genius then appears, in general terms, as a _state_, and, in
particular, as a state of _inspiration_. To such a state, it is said,
genius is in part excited by a given object, and in part it has the
power of its own free will to place itself therein, in which process,
moreover, the good service of the champagne bottle is not forgotten.
This notion became prominent in Germany in the so-called _epoch of
genius_, which was introduced by the early poetical productions of
Goethe, and subsequently sustained by those of Schiller.[48] In their
earliest works these poets began everything anew, in scorn of all the
rules which had then been fabricated, transgressed these rules of set
purpose, and, while doing so, distanced all rivals by a long interval.
I will not enter more closely into the confusions which have prevailed
respecting the conception of inspiration and genius, and which prevail
even at the present day respecting the omnipotence of inspiration
as such. We need only lay down as essential the view that, though
the artist's talent and genius contains a natural element, yet it is
essentially in need of cultivation by thought, and of reflection on
the mode in which it produces, as well as of practice and skill in
producing. A main feature of such production is unquestionably external
workmanship, inasmuch as the work of art has a purely technical side,
which extends into the region of handicraft; most especially in
architecture and sculpture, less so in painting and music, least of
all in poetry. Skill in this comes not by inspiration, but solely by
reflection, industry, and practice; and such skill is indispensable to
the artist, in order that he may master his external material, and not
be thwarted by its stubbornness.

Moreover, the higher an artist ranks, the more profoundly ought he to
represent the depths of heart and mind; and these are not known without
learning them, but are only to be fathomed by the direction of a man's
own mind to the inner and outer world. So here, too, _study_ is the
means whereby the artist brings this content into his consciousness,
and wins the matter and burden of his conceptions.

In this respect one art may need the consciousness and cognition of
such matter more than others. Music, for instance, which concerns
itself only with the undefined movement of the inward spiritual
nature, and deals with musical sounds as, so to speak, feeling
without thought, needs little or no spiritual content to be present
in consciousness. It is for this reason that musical talent generally
announces itself in very early youth, while the head is still empty
and the heart has been but little moved, and is capable of attaining
to a very considerable height in early years, before mind and life
have experience of themselves. And again, as a matter of fact we
often enough see very great expertness in musical composition, as
also in execution, subsist along with remarkable barrenness of mind
and character. The reverse is the case with poetry. In poetry all
depends on the representation,--which must be full of matter and
thought--of man, of his profounder interests, and of the powers that
move him; and therefore mind and heart themselves must be richly and
profoundly educated by life, experience, and reflection, before genius
can bring to pass anything mature, substantial, and self-complete.
Goethe's and Schiller's first productions are of an immaturity, and
even of a rudeness and barbarism, that are absolutely terrifying.
This phenomenon, that the greater part of those attempts display a
predominant mass of thoroughly prosaic and in part of frigid and
commonplace elements, furnishes the chief objection to the common
opinion, that inspiration is inseparable from youth and youthful
fire. Those two men of genius, it may be said, were the first to give
our nation works of true poetry, and yet it was only their mature
manhood[49] that presented us with creations profound, substantial, and
the outcome of genuine inspiration, while no less thoroughly perfect
in form. Thus, too, it was not till his old age that Homer devised and
uttered his immortal songs.

(_c_) A third view, which concerns the idea of the work of art as
a product of human activity, refers to the position of such a work
towards the external appearances of nature. It was an obvious opinion
for the common consciousness to adopt on this head, that the work of
art made by man ranked _below_ the product of nature. The work of art
has no feeling in itself, and is not through and through a living
thing, but, regarded as an external object, is dead. But we are wont
to prize the living more than the dead. We must admit, of course,
that the work of art has not in itself movement and life. An animated
being in nature is within and without an organization appropriately
elaborated down to all its minutest parts, while the work of art
attains the semblance of animation on its surface only, but within is
common stone, or wood and canvas, or, as in the case of poetry, is
idea, uttering itself in speech and letters. But this aspect, viz.
its external existence, is not what makes a work into a production of
fine art; it is a work of art only in as far as, being the offspring
of mind, it continues to belong to the realm of mind, has received
the baptism of the spiritual, and only represents that which has been
moulded in harmony with mind. A human interest, the spiritual value
which attaches to an incident, to an individual character, to an action
in its plot and in its _dénoûment_, is apprehended in the work of art,
and exhibited more purely[50] and transparently than is possible on
the soil of common unartistic reality. This gives the work of art a
higher rank than anything produced by nature, which has not sustained
this passage through the mind. So, for instance, by reason of the
feeling and insight of which a landscape as depicted by an artist is a
manifestation, such a work of mind assumes a higher rank than the mere
natural landscape. For everything spiritual is better than anything
natural. At any rate, no existence in nature is able, like art, to
represent divine ideals.

Upon that which, in works of art, the mind borrows from its own
inner life it is able, even on the side of external existence, to
confer _permanence_; whereas the individual living thing of nature
is transient, vanishing, and mutable in its aspect, while the work
of art persists. Though, indeed, it is not mere permanence, but the
accentuation of the character which animation by mind confers, that
constitutes its genuine pre-eminence as compared with natural reality.

Nevertheless, this higher rank assigned to the work of art is in turn
disputed by another idea of the common consciousness. It is said that
nature and its products are a work of God, created by his goodness and
wisdom, whereas the work of art is _merely_ a human production, made
after man's devising by man's hands. In this antithesis between natural
production as a divine creation and human activity as a merely finite
creation, we at once come upon the misconception, that God does _not_
work in man and through man, but limits the range of his activity to
nature alone. This false opinion is to be entirely abandoned if we
mean to penetrate the true conception of art. Indeed, in opposition to
such an idea, we must adhere to the very reverse, believing that God
is more honoured by what mind does or makes than by the productions or
formations of nature. For not only is there a divinity in man, but in
him it is operative under a form that is appropriate to the essence of
God, in a mode quite other and higher than in nature. God is a Spirit,
and it is only in man that the medium through which the divine element
passes has the form of conscious spirit, that actively realizes itself.
In nature the corresponding medium is the unconscious, sensible, and
external, which is far below consciousness in value. In the products
of art God is operative neither more nor less than in the phenomena of
nature; but the divine element, as it makes itself known in the work
of art, has attained, as being generated out of the mind, an adequate
thoroughfare for its existence; while existence in the unconscious
sensuousness of nature is not a mode of appearance adequate to the
Divine Being.

(_d_) Granting, then, that the work of art is made by man as a creation
of mind, we come to the last question, which will enable us to draw a
deeper result from what has been said. What is man's need to produce
works of art? On the one hand the production may be regarded as a
mere toy of chance and of man's fancies, that might just as well be
let alone as pursued. For, it may be said, there are other and better
means for effecting that which is the aim of art, and man bears in him
interests that are yet higher and of more import than art has power
to satisfy. But, on the other hand, art appears to arise from the
higher impulse and to satisfy the higher needs, at times, indeed, even
the highest, the absolute need of man, being wedded to the religious
interests of whole epochs and peoples, and to their most universal
intuitions respecting the world. This inquiry concerning the not
contingent but absolute need of art we cannot as yet answer completely,
seeing that it is more concrete than any shape which could here be
given to the answer.[51] We must, therefore, content ourselves for the
present with merely establishing the following points.

The universal and absolute need out of which art, on its formal
side,[52] arises has its source in the fact that man is a _thinking_
consciousness, _i.e._ that he draws out of himself, and makes explicit
_for himself_, that which he is, and, generally, whatever is. The
things of nature are only _immediate and single_, but man as mind
_reduplicates_ himself, inasmuch as _prima facie_ he _is_ like the
things of nature, but in the second place just as really is _for_
himself, perceives himself, has ideas of himself, thinks himself,
and only thus is active self-realizedness.[53] This consciousness
of himself man obtains in a twofold way: _in the first place
theoretically_, in as far as he has inwardly to bring himself into
his own consciousness, with all that moves in the human breast, all
that stirs and works therein, and, generally, to observe and form an
idea of himself, to fix before himself what thought ascertains to be
his real being, and, in what is summoned out of his inner self as in
what is received from without, to recognize only himself. Secondly,
man is realized for himself by _practical_ activity, inasmuch as he
has the impulse, in the medium which is directly given to him, and
externally presented before him, to produce himself, and therein at
the same time to recognize himself. This purpose he achieves by the
modification of external things upon which he impresses the seal of his
inner being, and then finds repeated in them his own characteristics.
Man does this in order as a free subject to strip the outer world of
its stubborn foreignness, and to enjoy in the shape and fashion of
things a mere external reality of himself.[54] Even the child's first
impulse involves this practical modification of external things. A boy
throws stones into the river, and then stands admiring the circles that
trace themselves on the water, as an effect in which he attains the
sight of something that is his own doing. This need traverses the most
manifold phenomena, up to the mode of self-production in the medium
of external things as it is known to us in the work of art. And it is
not only external things that man treats in this way, but himself no
less, _i.e._ his own natural form, which he does not leave as he finds
it, but alters of set purpose. This is the cause of all ornament and
decoration, though it may be as barbarous, as tasteless, as utterly
disfiguring or even destructive as crushing Chinese ladies' feet, or
as slitting the ears and lips. It is only among cultivated men that
change of the figure,[55] of behaviour, and of every kind and mode of
self-utterance emanates from spiritual education.[56]

The universal need for expression in art[57] lies, therefore, in man's
rational impulse to exalt the inner and outer world into a spiritual
consciousness for himself, as an object in which he recognizes his own
self. He satisfies the need of this spiritual freedom when he makes
all that exists explicit for himself _within_, and in a corresponding
way realizes this his explicit self _without_, evoking thereby, in
this reduplication of himself, what is in him into vision and into
knowledge for his own mind and for that of others. This is the free
rationality of man, in which, as all action and knowledge, so also art
has its ground and necessary origin. The specific need of art, however,
in contradistinction to other action, political or moral, to religious
imagination and to scientific cognition, we shall consider later.

2. We have so far been considering that aspect of the work of art
in which it is made by man. We have now to pass on to its second
characteristic, that it is made for man's _sense_, and for this reason
is more or less borrowed from the sensuous.

(_a_) This reflection has furnished occasion for the consideration
to be advanced that fine art is intended to arouse feeling, and
indeed more particularly the feeling which we find suits us--that, is
pleasant feeling. Looking at the question thus, men have treated the
investigation of fine art as an investigation of the feelings, and
asked what feelings it must be held that art ought to evoke,--fear, for
example, and compassion; and then, how these could be pleasant--how,
for example, the contemplation of misfortune could produce
satisfaction. This tendency of reflection is traceable particularly to
Moses Mendelssohn's times, and many such discussions are to be found
in his writings. Yet such an investigation did not lead men far, for
feeling is the indefinite dull region of the mind; what is felt remains
wrapped in the form of the most abstract individual subjectivity,[58]
and therefore the distinctions of feeling are also quite abstract, and
are not distinctions of the actual object-matter itself. For instance,
fear, anxiety, alarm, terror, are no doubt of one and the same sort
of feeling variously modified, but in part are mere quantitative
heightenings, in part are forms which in themselves have nothing to do
with their content itself, but are indifferent to it. In the case of
fear, for instance, an existence is given in which the subject (_i.e._
a person) has an interest, but at the same time sees approaching
the negative that threatens to annihilate this existence, and so
finds immediately in himself, as a contradictory affection of his
subjectivity, the two at once, this interest and that negative. Now,
such fear considered in itself is not enough to condition any content,
but is capable of receiving into itself the most diverse and opposite
matters.[59] Feeling, as such, is a thoroughly empty form of subjective
affection. No doubt this form may in some cases be manifold in itself,
as is hope, grief, joy, or pleasure; and, again, may in such diversity
comprehend varied contents, as there is a feeling of justice, moral
feeling, sublime religious feeling, and so forth. But the fact that
such content is forthcoming in different forms of feeling is not enough
to bring to light its essential and definite nature; they remain purely
subjective affections of myself, in which the concrete matter vanishes,
as though narrowed into a circle of the utmost abstraction.[60]
Therefore, the inquiry into the feelings which art arouses, or ought to
arouse, comes utterly to a standstill in the indefinite, and is a mode
of study which precisely abstracts from the content proper and from
its concrete essence and notion. For reflection upon feeling contents
itself with the observation of the subjective affection in its
isolation, instead of diving into and fathoming the matter in question
itself, the work of art, and, while engaged with it, simply letting
go the mere subjectivity and its states. In feeling it is just this
vacant subjectivity that is--not merely retained, but--given the first
place, and that is why men are so fond of having emotions. And for the
same reason such a study becomes tedious from its indefiniteness and
vacancy, and repulsive from its attentiveness to little subjective
peculiarities.

(_b_) Now, as a work of art is not merely to do in general something of
the nature of arousing emotion--for this is a purpose which it would
have in common, without specific difference, with eloquence, historical
composition, religious edification, and so forth--but is to do so only
in as far as it is beautiful, reflection hit upon the idea, seeing that
beauty was the object, of searching out a _peculiar feeling of beauty_
to correspond to it, and of discovering a particular _sense of beauty_.
In this search it soon appeared that such a sense is no blind instinct
made rigidly definite by nature, and capable from the beginning in
its own independent essence of discerning beauty. Hence it followed
that education came to be demanded for this sense, and the educated
sense of beauty came to be called _taste_, which, although an educated
appreciation and apprehension of the beautiful, was yet supposed to
retain the nature of immediate feeling. We have already mentioned
how abstract theories undertook to educate such a sense of taste, and
how external and one-sided that sense remained. The criticism of the
time when those views prevailed, was not only defective in _universal_
principles, but also, in its particular references to individual works
of art, was less directed to justifying a _definite_ judgment--the
power to make one not having at that time been acquired--than to
advancing the general education of taste. For this reason such
education in its turn came to a standstill in the indefinite, and
merely endeavoured so to equip feeling as sense of beauty by help
of reflection, that there might thenceforth be capacity to find out
beauty whenever and wherever it should exist. Yet the depths of the
matter remained a sealed book to mere taste, for these depths demand
not only sensibility and abstract reflection, but the undivided reason
and the mind in its solid vigour; while taste was only directed to the
external surface about which the feelings play, and on which one-sided
maxims may pass for valid. But, for this very reason, what is called
good taste takes fright at all more profound effects of art, and is
silent where the reality comes in question, and where externalities
and trivialities vanish. For when great passions and the movements
of a profound soul are unveiled, we are no longer concerned with the
finer distinctions of taste and its pettifogging particularities. It
feels that genius strides contemptuously over such ground as this, and,
shrinking before its power, becomes uneasy, and knows not which way to
turn.

(_c_) And thus, as we should expect, men have abandoned the tendency
to consider works of art solely with an eye to the education of taste,
and with the purpose of merely displaying taste. The _connoisseur_,
or scholar of art, has replaced the art-judge, or man of taste. The
positive side of art-scholarship, so far as it concerns a thorough
acquaintance with the entire circumference[61] of the individual
character in a given work of art, we have already pronounced to
be essential to the study of art. For a work of art, owing to its
nature as at once material and individual, is essentially originated
by particular conditions of the most various kinds, to which belong
especially the time and place of its production, then the peculiar
individuality of the artist, and in particular the grade of technical
development attained by his art. Attention to all these aspects
is indispensable to distinct and thorough insight and cognition,
and even to the enjoyment of a work of art; it is with them that
connoisseurship, or art-scholarship, is chiefly occupied; and all that
it can do for us in its own way is to be accepted with gratitude. Yet,
though such scholarship is entitled to rank as something essential,
still it ought not to be taken for the sole or supreme element in the
relation which the mind adopts towards a work of art, and towards art
in general. For art-scholarship (and this is its defective side) is
capable of resting in an acquaintance with purely external aspects,
such as technical or historical details, etc., and of guessing but
little, or even knowing absolutely nothing, of the true and real nature
of a work of art. It may even form a disparaging estimate of the value
of more profound considerations in comparison with purely positive,
technical, and historical information. Still, even so, art-scholarship,
if only it is of a genuine kind, at least strives after definite
grounds and information, and an intelligent judgment, with which is
closely conjoined the more precise distinction of the different, even
if partly external, aspects in a work of art, and the estimation of
their importance.

(_d_) After these remarks upon the modes of study which have arisen
out of that aspect of a work of art in which, being a sensuous object,
it is invested with a relation to man as a sensuous being, we will
now consider this aspect in its more essential relation to art as
such, and so ([Greek: a]) partly as regards the work of art as object,
([Greek: b]) partly with respect to the subjectivity of the artist, his
genius, talent, and so on; but without entering into matter relative to
these points that can only proceed from the knowledge of art in its
universal idea. For we are not yet on genuinely scientific ground, but
have only reached the province of external reflection.

([Greek: a]) The work of art then, of course, presents itself to
sensuous apprehension. It is addressed to sensuous feeling, outer or
inner, to sensuous perception and imagination, just as is the nature
that surrounds us without, or our own sensitive nature within. Even
a speech, for instance, may be addressed to sensuous imagination
and feeling. Notwithstanding, the work of art is not only for the
_sensuous_ apprehension as sensuous object, but its position is of such
a kind that as sensuous it is at the same time essentially addressed to
the _mind_, that the mind is meant to be affected by it, and to find
some sort of satisfaction in it.

This intention of the work of art explains how it is in no way meant
to be a natural product and to possess natural life, whether a natural
product is to be ranked higher or lower than a _mere_ work of art, as
it is often called in a depreciatory sense.

For the sensuous aspect of the work of art has a right to existence
only in as far as it exists for man's mind, but not in as far as _qua_
sensuous thing it has separate existence by itself.[62] If we examine
more closely in what way the sensuous is presented to man, we find
that what is sensuous may bear various relations to the mind.

(_aa_) The lowest mode of apprehension, and that least appropriate to
the mind, is purely sensuous apprehension. It consists naturally in
mere looking, listening, feeling, just as in seasons of mental fatigue
it may often be entertaining to go about without thought, and just to
hear and look around us. The mind, however, does not rest in the mere
apprehension of external things by sight and hearing, it makes them
objects for its own inner nature, which then is itself impelled in a
correspondingly sensuous form to realize itself in the things, and
relates itself to them as _desire_. In this appetitive relation to
the outer world, the man stands as a sensuous particular over against
the things as likewise particulars; he does not open his mind to them
with general ideas as a thinking being, but has relations dictated
by particular impulses and interests to the objects as themselves
particulars, and preserves himself in them, inasmuch as he uses them,
consumes them, and puts in act his self-satisfaction by sacrificing
them to it. In this negative relation desire requires for itself not
merely the superficial appearance of external things, but themselves in
their concrete sensuous existence. Mere pictures of the wood that it
wants to use, or of the animals that it wants to eat, would be of no
service to desire. Just as little is it possible for desire to let the
object subsist in its freedom. For its impulse urges it just precisely
to destroy this independence and freedom of external things, and to
show that they are only there to be destroyed and consumed. But, at the
same time, the subject himself, as entangled in the particular limited
and valueless interests of his desires, is neither free in himself,
for he does not determine himself out of the essential universality
and rationality of his will, nor free in relation to the outer world,
for his desire remains essentially determined by things, and related
to them. This relation of desire is not that in which man stands
to the work of art. He allows it to subsist as an object, free and
independent, and enters into relation with it apart from desire, as
with an object which only appeals to the theoretic side of the mind.
For this reason the work of art, although it has sensuous existence,
yet, in this point of view, does not require concrete sensuous
existence and natural life; indeed, it even _ought_ not to remain on
such a level, seeing that it has to satisfy only the interests of mind,
and is bound to exclude from itself all desire. Hence it is, indeed,
that practical desire rates individual things in nature, organic and
inorganic, which are serviceable to it, higher than works of art, which
reveal themselves to be useless for its purpose, and enjoyable only for
other modes of mind.

([Greek: bb]) A second mode in which the externally present may be
related to the mind is, in contrast with singular sensuous perception
and desire, the purely theoretical relation to the _Intelligence_. The
theoretic contemplation of things has no interest in consuming them as
particulars, in satisfying itself sensuously, and in preserving itself
by their means, but rather in becoming acquainted with them in their
universality, in finding their inner being and law, and in conceiving
them in terms of their notion. Therefore the theoretical interest
lets the single things be, and holds aloof from them as sensuous
particulars, because this sensuous particularity is not what the
contemplation exercised by the intelligence looks for. For the rational
intelligence does not belong, as do the desires, to the individual
subject[63] as such, but only to the individual as at the same time
in his nature universal. In as far as man has relation to things in
respect of this universality, it is his universal reason which attempts
to find himself in nature, and thereby to reproduce the inner essence
of things, which sensuous existence, though having its ground therein,
cannot immediately display. But again, this theoretic interest, the
satisfaction of which is the work of science, is in the scientific
form no more shared by art, than the latter makes common cause with
the impulse of the purely practical desires. Science may, no doubt,
start from the sensuous thing in its individuality, and may possess a
sensuous idea of the way in which such an individual presents itself in
its individual colour, shape, size, etc. Still, this isolated sensuous
thing, as such, has no further relation to the mind, inasmuch as the
intelligence aims at the universal, the law, the thought and notion of
the object. Not only, therefore, does it abandon all intercourse with
the thing as a given individual, but transforms it within the mind,
making a concrete object of sense into an abstract matter of thought,
and so into something quite other than the same object _qua_ sensuous
phenomenon. The artistic interest, as distinguished from science, does
not act thus. Artistic contemplation accepts the work of art just as
it displays itself _qua_ external object, in immediate determinateness
and sensuous individuality clothed in colour, figure, and sound, or as
a single isolated perception, etc., and does not go so far beyond the
immediate appearance of objectivity which is presented before it, as
to aim, like science, at apprehending the notion of such an objective
appearance as a universal notion.

Thus, the interest of art distinguishes itself from the practical
interest of _desire_ by the fact that it permits its object to subsist
freely and in independence, while desire utilizes it in its own service
by its destruction. On the other hand, artistic contemplation differs
from theoretical consideration by the scientific intelligence, in
cherishing interest for the object as an individual existence, and not
setting to work to transmute it into its universal thought and notion.

[Greek: gg] It follows, then, from the above, that though the sensuous
must be present in a work of art, yet it must only appear as surface
and _semblance_ of the sensuous. For, in the sensuous aspect of a work
of art, the mind seeks neither the concrete framework of matter, that
empirically thorough completeness and development of the organism
which desire demands, nor the universal and merely ideal thought.
What it requires is sensuous presence, which, while not ceasing to be
sensuous, is to be liberated from the apparatus of its merely material
nature. And thus the sensuous in works of art is exalted to the rank
of a mere _semblance_ in comparison with the immediate existence of
things in nature, and the work of art occupies the mean between what is
immediately sensuous and ideal thought. This semblance of the sensuous
presents itself to the mind externally as the shape, the visible look,
and the sonorous vibration of things--supposing that the mind leaves
the objects uninterfered with (physically), but yet does not descend
into their inner essence (by abstract thought), for if it did so, it
would entirely destroy their external existence as separate individuals
_for it_. For this reason the sensuous aspect of art only refers to the
two _theoretical_ senses of _sight_ and _hearing_, while smell, taste,
and feeling remain excluded from being sources of artistic enjoyment.
For smell, taste, and feeling have to do with matter as such, and with
its immediate sensuous qualities; smell with material volatilization
in air, taste with the material dissolution of substance,[64] and
feeling with warmth, coldness, smoothness, etc. On this account these
senses cannot have to do with the objects of art, which are destined to
maintain themselves in their actual independent existence, and admit
of no purely sensuous relation. The pleasant for these latter senses
is not the beautiful in art. Thus art on its sensuous side purposely
produces no more than a shadow-world of shapes, sounds, and imaginable
ideas;[65] and it is absolutely out of the question to maintain that it
is owing to simple powerlessness and to the limitations on his actions
that man, when evoking worlds of art into existence, fails to present
more than the mere surface of the sensuous, than mere _schemata_.[66]
In art, these sensuous shapes and sounds present themselves, not simply
for their own sake and for that of their immediate structure,[67] but
with the purpose of affording in that shape satisfaction to higher
spiritual interests, seeing that they are powerful to call forth a
response and echo in the mind from all the depths of consciousness.
It is thus that, in art, the sensuous is _spiritualized_, _i.e._ the
_spiritual_ appears in sensuous shape.

([Greek: _b_]) But for this very reason we have a product of art only
in so far as it has found a passage through the mind, and has been
generated by spiritually productive activity. This leads us to the
other question which we have to answer--how, that is, the sensuous
side, which is indispensable to art, is operative in the artist as a
productive state of the subject or person. This, the method and fashion
of production, contains in itself as a subjective activity just the
same properties which we found objectively present in the work of art;
it must be a spiritual activity which, nevertheless, at the same time
has in itself the element of sensuousness and immediateness. It is
neither, on the one hand, purely mechanical work, as mere unconscious
skill in sensuous sleight of hand,[68] or a formal activity according
to fixed rules learnt by rote; nor is it, on the other hand, a
scientific productive process, which passes from sense to abstract
ideas and thoughts, or exercises itself exclusively in the element
of pure thinking; rather the spiritual and the sensuous side must in
artistic production be as one. For instance, it would be possible in
poetical creation to try and proceed by first apprehending the theme to
be treated as a prosaic thought, and by then putting it into pictorial
ideas, and into rhyme, and so forth; so that the pictorial element
would simply be hung upon the abstract reflections as an ornament or
decoration. Such a process could only produce bad poetry, for in it
there would be operative as two _separate activities_ that which in
artistic production has its right place only as undivided unity.

This genuine mode of production constitutes the activity of artistic
_fancy_. It is the rational element which, _qua_ spirit, only exists
in as far as it actively extrudes itself into consciousness, but yet
does not array before it what it bears within itself till it does so in
sensuous form. This activity has, therefore, a spiritual import, which,
however, it embodies in sensuous shape. Such a process may be compared
with the habit even of a man with great experience of the world, or,
again, with that of a man of _esprit_[69] or wit, who, although he
has complete knowledge of the main stakes of life, of the substantive
interests that hold men together, of what moves them, and of what is
the power that they recognize, yet neither has himself apprehended
this content in the form of general rules, nor is able to explain it
to others in general reflections, but makes plain to himself and to
others what occupies his consciousness always in particular cases,
whether real or invented, in adequate instances, and the like. For in
his ideas, everything shapes itself into concrete images, determinate
in time and place, to which, therefore, names and other external
circumstances of all kinds must not be wanting. Yet such a kind of
imagination rather rests on the recollection of states that he has gone
through, and of experiences that have befallen him, than is creative
in its own strength. His recollection preserves and reproduces the
individuality and external fashion of occurrences that had such and
such results with all their external circumstances, and prevents the
universal from emerging in its own shape. But the productive fancy of
the _artist_ is the fancy of a great mind and heart, the apprehension
and creation of ideas and of shapes, and, indeed, the exhibition of
the profoundest and most universal human interests in the definite
sensuous mould of pictorial representation. From this it follows
at once, that in one aspect Fancy unquestionably rests on natural
gifts--speaking generally, on talent--because its mode of production
requires a sensuous medium. It is true that we speak in the same way
of scientific "talent," but the sciences only presuppose the universal
capacity of thought, which has not, like Fancy, a natural mode (as
well as an intellectual one), but abstracts just precisely from all
that is natural (or native) in an activity; and thus it would be more
correct to say that there is no specifically scientific talent in the
sense of a _mere_ natural endowment. Now, Fancy _has_ in it a mode of
instinct-like productiveness, inasmuch as the essential plasticity and
sensuousness of the work of art must be subjectively present in the
artist as natural disposition and natural impulse, and, considering
that it is unconscious operation, must belong to the natural element
in man, as well as to the rational. Of course, natural capacity leaves
room for other elements in talent and genius, for artistic production
is just as much of a spiritual and self-conscious nature; we can but
say that its spirituality must, somehow, have an element of natural,
plastic, and formative tendency. For this reason, though nearly every
one can reach a certain point in an art, yet, in order to go beyond
this point, with which the art in the strict sense begins, it is
impossible to dispense with native artistic talent of the highest order.

Considered as a natural endowment, moreover, such talent reveals itself
for the most part in early youth, and is manifested in the impelling
restlessness that busies itself, with vivacity and industry, in
creating shapes in some particular sensuous medium, and in seizing on
this species of utterance and communication as the only one, or as the
chief and the most suitable one. And thus, too, a precocious technical
facility, that up to a certain grade of attainment is without effort,
is a sign of natural talent. A sculptor finds everything transmute
itself into shapes, and he soon begins to take up the clay and model
it. And, speaking generally, whatever men of such talents have in their
imagination, whatever rouses and moves their inner nature, turns at
once into shape, drawing, melody, or poem.

([Greek: g]) Thirdly, and to conclude: the _content_ of art is also in
some respects borrowed from the sensuous, from nature; or, in any case,
even if the content is of a spiritual kind, it can only be seized and
fixed by representing the spiritual fact, such as human relations, in
the shape of phenomena with external reality.




CHAPTER III. (_Continued_).

THE CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

PART II.--THE END OF ART.


3. The question then arises, what the interest or the _End_ is which
man proposes to himself when he reproduces such a content in the
form of works of art. This was the third point of view which we set
before us with reference to the work of art, and the closer discussion
of which will finally make the transition to the actual and true
conception of art.

If in this aspect we glance at the common consciousness, a current idea
which may occur to us is--

([Greek: a]) The principle of the _imitation of nature_. According
to this view the essential purpose of art consists in imitation, in
the sense of a facility in copying natural forms as they exist in a
way that corresponds precisely to them; and the success of such a
representation, exactly corresponding to nature, is supposed to be what
affords complete satisfaction.

([Greek: a]) This definition contains, _prima facie_, nothing beyond
the purely formal[70] aim that whatever already exists in the external
world, just _as_ it is therein, is now to be made a second time by man
as a copy of the former, as well as he can do it with the means at his
command. But we may at once regard this repetition as--

([Greek: aa]) A _superfluous_ labour, seeing that the things
which pictures, theatrical representations, etc., imitate and
represent--animals, natural scenes, incidents in human life--are before
us in other cases already, in our own gardens or our own houses, or
in cases within our closer or more remote circle of acquaintance.
And, looking more closely, we may regard this superfluous labour as a
presumptuous sport which--

([Greek: bb]) Comes far short of nature. For art is restricted in its
means of representation; and can produce only _one-sided_ deceptions,
_i.e._ for instance, a semblance of reality addressed to one sense
only; and, in fact, it invariably gives rise, if it rests in the formal
purpose of _mere imitation_, to a mere parody[71] of life, instead of
a genuine vitality. Just so the Turks, being Mohammedans, tolerate,
as is well known, no pictures copied from men or the like; and when
James Bruce, on his journey to Abyssinia, showed paintings of fish
to a Turk, the man was amazed at first, but soon enough made answer:
"If this fish shall rise up against you on the last day, and say, 'You
have created for me a body, but no living soul,' how will you defend
yourself against such an accusation?" The prophet, moreover, it is
recorded in the Sunna, said to the two women, Ommi Habiba and Ommi
Selma, who told him of pictures in Æthiopian churches--"These pictures
will accuse their authors on the day of judgment!"

There are, no doubt, as well, examples of completely deceptive
imitation. Zeuxis' painted grapes have from antiquity downward been
taken to be the triumph of this principle of the imitation of nature,
because the story is that living doves pecked at them. We might add
to this ancient example the modern one of Büttner's monkey, which bit
in pieces a painted cockchafer in Rösel's "Diversions of the Insect
World," and was pardoned by his master, in spite of his having thereby
spoilt a beautiful copy of this valuable work, because of this proof
of the excellence of the pictures. But when we reflect on these and
similar instances, it must at once occur to us that, in place of
commending works of art because they have _actually_ deceived _even_
pigeons and monkeys, we ought simply to censure the people who mean
to exalt a work of art by predicating, as its highest and ultimate
quality, so poor an effect as this. In general, we may sum up by saying
that, as a matter of mere imitation, art cannot maintain a rivalry with
nature, and, if it tries, must look like a worm trying to crawl after
an elephant.

([Greek: gg]) Considering the unvarying failure--comparative failure,
at least--of imitation when contrasted with the original in nature,
there remains as end nothing beyond our pleasure in the sleight
of hand[72] which can produce something so like nature. And it is
doubtless open to man to be pleased at producing over again what is
already present in its own right, by his labour, skill, and industry.
But enjoyment and admiration, even of this kind, naturally grow frigid
or chilled precisely in proportion to the resemblance of the copy to
the natural type, or are even converted into tedium and repugnance.
There are portraits which, as has been wittily said, are sickeningly
like; and Kant adduces another instance relative to this pleasure in
imitation as such, viz. that we soon grow tired of a man--and there
are such men--who is able to mimic the nightingale's strain quite
perfectly; and as soon as it is discovered that a man is producing
the notes, we are at once weary of the song. We then recognize in it
nothing but a conjuring trick, neither the free production of nature,
nor a work of art; for we expect from the free productive capacity
of human beings something quite other than such music as this, which
only interests us when, as is the case with the nightingale's note, it
gushes forth from the creature's own vitality without special purpose,
and yet recalls the utterance of human feeling. In general, such
delight at our skill in mimicking can be but limited, and it becomes
man better to take delight in what he produces out of himself. In this
sense the invention of any unimportant and technical product has the
higher value, and man may be prouder of having invented the hammer,
the nail, and so forth, than of achieving feats of mimicry. For this
fervour of abstract[73] copying is to be evened with the feat of the
man who had taught himself to throw lentils through a small opening
without missing. He displayed this skill of his before Alexander, and
Alexander presented him with a bushel of lentils as a reward for his
frivolous and meaningless art.

([Greek: b]) Moreover, seeing that the principle of imitation is
purely formal, to make it the end has the result that _objective
beauty_ itself disappears. For the question is in that case no longer
_of what nature_ that is which is to be copied, but only whether it
is _correctly_ copied. The object and content of the beautiful comes
then to be regarded as matter of entire indifference. That is to
say, if we go outside the principle and speak of a difference of
beauty and ugliness in considering beasts, men, landscapes, actions,
or characters, this must nevertheless, in presence of the maxim in
question,[74] be set down as a distinction that does not belong
particularly to art, for which nothing is left but abstract imitation.
In this case the above-mentioned lack of a criterion in dealing with
the endless forms of nature reduces us, as regards the selection of
objects and their distinction in beauty and ugliness, to subjective
_taste_ as an ultimate fact, which accepts no rule and admits of no
discussion. And, in fact, if in selecting objects for representation we
start from what _men_ think beautiful or ugly, and therefore deserving
artistic imitation--that is, from their taste,--then all circles of
natural objects open to us, and not one of them will be likely to
fail of a patron. Among men, for instance, it is the case that at
any rate every bridegroom thinks his bride beautiful, and indeed,
perhaps, he alone; though not, it may be, every husband his wife; and
that subjective taste for such beauty has no fixed rule one may hold
to be the good fortune of both parties. If we, moreover, look quite
beyond individuals and their accidental taste, to the taste of nations,
this again is full of extreme diversity and contrast. How often we
hear it said that a European beauty would not please a Chinese or
even a Hottentot, in as far as the Chinaman has quite a different
conception of beauty from the negro, and the negro in turn from the
European, and so forth. Indeed, if we look at the works of art of those
extra-European peoples--their images of the gods, for instance--which
their fancy has originated as venerable and sublime, they may appear to
us as the most gruesome idols, and their music may sound to our ears
as the most horrible noise; while they, on their side, will regard our
sculptures, paintings, and musical productions as trivial or ugly.

([Greek: g]) But even if we abstract from an objective principle of
art, and if beauty is to be based on subjective and individual taste,
we shall still soon find on the side of art itself that the imitation
of nature, which certainly appeared to be a universal principle and
one guaranteed by high authority, is at any rate not to be accepted
in this universal and merely abstract form. For if we look at the
different arts it will at once be admitted that even if painting and
sculpture represent objects which appear like those of nature, or
the type of which is essentially borrowed from nature, yet works of
architecture on the other hand--and architecture belongs to the fine
arts--and the productions of poetry, in as far as they do not confine
themselves to mere description, are by no means to be called imitations
of nature. At least, if we desired to maintain the principle as
valid in the case of these latter arts, we should have to make a long
circuit by conditioning the proposition in various ways, and reducing
the so-called truth[75] at any rate to probability. But if we admitted
probability we should again be met by a great difficulty in determining
what is probable and what is not; and still, moreover, one would
neither consent nor find it possible to exclude from poetry all wholly
arbitrary and completely original[76] imaginations.

The end of art must, therefore, lie in something different from the
purely formal[77] imitation of what we find given, which in any case
can bring to the birth only _tricks_ and not _works_ of art. It is,
indeed, an element essential to the work of art to have natural shapes
for its foundation; seeing that its representation is in the medium of
external and therefore of natural phenomena. In painting, for instance,
it is an important study to know how to copy with precision the colours
in their relations to one another, the effects of light, reflections,
etc., and, no less, the forms and figures of objects down to their
subtlest characteristics.[78] It is in this respect chiefly that the
principle of naturalism in general and of copying nature has recovered
its influence in modern times. Its aim is to recall an art which has
grown feeble and indistinct to the vigour and crispness of nature;
or, again, to invoke against the purely arbitrary and artificial
conventionalism, as unnatural as it was inartistic, into which art
had strayed, the uniform, direct, and solidly coherent sequences of
nature. But however true it is that there is something right in this
endeavour from one point of view, yet still the naturalism at which it
aims is not as such the substantive and primary concern that underlies
fine art. And, therefore, although external appearance in the shape
of natural reality constitutes an essential condition of art, yet,
nevertheless, neither is the given natural world its _rule_, nor is the
mere imitation of external appearance _as_ external its _end_.

(_b_) The further question then arises--What _is_ the true content
of art, and with what aim is this content to be presented. On this
subject our consciousness supplies us with the common opinion that it
is the task and aim of art to bring in contact with our sense, our
feeling, our inspiration, _all_ that finds a place in the mind of man.
Art, it is thought, should realize in us that familiar saying, "Homo
sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto." Its aim is therefore placed in
arousing and animating the slumbering emotions, inclinations, and
passions; in filling the _heart_, in forcing the human being, whether
cultured or uncultured, to feel the whole range of what man's soul in
its inmost and secret corners has power to experience and to create,
and all that is able to move and to stir the human breast in its
depths and in its manifold aspects and possibilities; to present as a
delight to emotion and to perception all that the mind possesses of
real and lofty in its thought and in the Idea--all the splendour of
the noble, the eternal, and the true; and no less to make intelligible
misfortune and misery, wickedness and crime; to make men realize the
inmost nature of all that is shocking and horrible, as also of all
pleasure and delight; and, finally, to set imagination roving in
idle toyings of fancy, and luxuriating in the seductive spells of
sense-stimulating visions. This endlessly varied content, it is held,
art is bound to embrace, partly in order to complete the natural
experience in which our external existence consists, and partly with
the general aim of provoking the passions of our nature, both in order
that the experiences of life may not leave us unmoved, and because
we desire to attain to a receptivity that welcomes all phenomena.
Now, such a stimulus is not given in this sphere by actual experience
itself, but can only come by the semblance thereof, by art, that is,
deceptively substituting its creations for reality. The possibility
of this deception by means of artistic semblance rests on the fact
that all reality must, for man, traverse the medium of perception and
ideas, and cannot otherwise penetrate the feelings and the will. In
this process it is quite indifferent whether his attention is claimed
by immediate external reality, or whether this effect is produced by
another means--that is, by images, symbols, and ideas, containing
or representing _the content_ of reality. Man can frame to himself
ideas of things that are not actual as though they were actual. Hence
it is all the same to our feelings whether external reality or only
the semblance of it is the means of bringing in contact with us a
situation, a relation, or the import of a life. Either mode suffices to
awaken our response to its burden, in grief and in rejoicing, in pathos
and in horror,[79] and in traversing the emotions and the passions
of wrath, hatred, compassion, of anxiety, fear, love, reverence, and
admiration, or of the desire of honour and of fame.

This awakening of all feelings in us, the dragging of the heart
through the whole significance of life, the realization of all such
inner movements by means of a presented exterior consisting merely in
deception--all this was what, from the point of view which we have been
considering, constituted the peculiar and pre-eminent power of art.

Now, as this mode of treatment credits art with the vocation of
impressing on the heart and on the imagination good and bad alike,
and of strengthening man to the noblest, as of enervating him to the
most sensuous and selfish emotions, it follows that the task set before
art is still purely formal, and so it would have no certain purpose,
but would merely furnish the empty form for every possible kind of
significance and content.

(_c_) It is a fact that art does include this formal side, in that it
has power to present every possible subject-matter in artistic dress,
before perception and feeling, just exactly as argumentative[80]
reflection has the power of manipulating all possible objects and modes
of action, and of furnishing them with reasons and justifications.
But when we admit so great a variety of content we are at once met
by the remark that the manifold feelings and ideas, which art aims
at provoking or reinforcing, intersect and contradict, and by mutual
interference cancel one another. Indeed, in this aspect, in so far
as art inspires men to directly opposite emotions, it only magnifies
the contradiction of our feelings and passions, and either sets them
staggering like Bacchantes, or passes into sophistry and scepticism,
in the same way as argumentation.[81] This diversity of the material
of art itself compels us, therefore, not to be content with so
formal[82] an aim for it, seeing that rationality forces its way into
this wild diversity, and demands to see the emergence of a higher
and more universal purpose from these elements in spite of their
self-contradiction, and to be assured of its being attained. Just in
the same way the State and the social life of men are, of course,
credited with the purpose that in them _all_ human capacities and _all_
individual powers are to be developed and to find utterance in _all_
directions and with _all_ tendencies. But in opposition to so formal a
view there at once arises the question in what _unity_ these manifold
formations must be comprehended, and what _single end_ they must have
for their fundamental idea and ultimate purpose.

As such an end, reflection soon suggests the notion that art has the
capacity and the function of mitigating the fierceness of the desires.

([Greek: a]) In respect to this first idea, we have only to ascertain
in what feature peculiar to art it is that the capacity lies of
eliminating brutality and taming and educating the impulses,
desires, and passions. Brutality in general has its reason in a
direct selfishness of the impulses, which go to work right away,
and exclusively for the satisfaction of their concupiscence. Now,
desire is most savage and imperious in proportion as, being isolated
and narrow, it occupies the _whole man_, so that he does not retain
the power of separating himself as a universal being from this
determinateness, and becoming aware of himself as universal. Even if
the man in such a case says, "The passion is stronger than I," it is
true that the abstract I is then separated for consciousness from
the particular passion; but still only in a formal way, inasmuch as
this separation is only made in order to pronounce that, against the
power of the passion, the I as such is of no account whatever. The
savageness of passion consists, therefore, in the oneness of the I
as universal with the limited content of its desires, so that the
man has no will outside this particular passion. Now, such brutality
and untamed violence of passion is softened through art, to begin
with, by the mere fact that it brings before the man as an idea what
in such a state he feels and does. And even if art restricts itself
to merely setting up pictures of the passions before the mind's eye,
or even if it were actually to flatter them, still this is by itself
enough to have a softening power, inasmuch as the man is thereby at
least _made aware_, of what, apart from such presentation, he simply
_is_. For then the man observes his impulses and inclinations, and
whereas before they bore him on without power of reflection, he now
sees them outside himself, and begins already to be free from them, in
so far as they form an object which he contrasts with himself. Hence
it may frequently be the case with the artist that when attacked by
grief he softens and weakens the intensity of his own feelings in its
effect on his own mind by representing it in art. Tears, even, are
enough to bring comfort; the man, who to begin with is utterly sunk
and concentrated in grief, is able thus, at any rate, to utter in a
direct fashion this his inner state. Still more of a relief however,
is the utterance of what is within in words, images, pictures, sounds,
and shapes. For this reason it was a good old custom at deaths and
funerals to appoint wailing women, in order to bring the grief before
the mind in its utterance. Manifestations of sympathy, too, hold up
the content of a man's misfortune to his view; when it is much talked
about he is forced to reflect upon it, and is thereby relieved. And
so it has always been held that to weep or to speak one's fill is a
means to obtain freedom from the oppressive weight of care, or at least
to find momentary relief for the heart. Hence the mitigation of the
violence of passion has for its universal reason that man is released
from his immediate sunkenness[83] in a feeling, and becomes conscious
of it as of something external to him, towards which he must now enter
into an _ideal_ relation. Art, by means of its representations, while
remaining within the sensuous sphere, delivers man at the same time
from the power of sensuousness. Of course we may often hear those
favourite phrases about man's duty being to remain in immediate oneness
with nature, but such oneness in its abstraction is simply and solely
coarseness and savagery; and art, in the very process of dissolving
this oneness for man, is raising him with gentle hand above and away
from mere sunkenness in nature. Man's mode of occupying himself with
works of art is always purely contemplative,[84] and educates thereby,
in the first place, no doubt, merely attention to the representations
themselves, but then, going beyond this, it cultivates attention to
their significance, the power of comparison with other contents, and
receptivity for the general consideration of them, and for the points
of view which it involves.

([Greek: b]) To the above there attaches itself in natural connection
the second characteristic which has been ascribed to art as its
essential purpose, viz. the _purification_ of the passions, instruction
and _moral_ perfecting. For the characteristic that art was to bridle
savageness and educate the passions remained quite abstract and
general, so that a question must again arise about a _determinate_ kind
and an essential _end_ of this education.

([Greek: aa]) The doctrine of the purification of passion suffers
indeed under the same defect as the above doctrine of the mitigation of
the desires; yet, when more closely looked at, it at any rate arrives
at the point of accentuating the fact that the representations of art
may be held to lack a standard by which their worth or unworthiness
could be measured. This standard simply means their effectiveness in
separating pure from impure in the passions. It therefore requires
a content that has capacity to exercise this purifying power, and,
in as far as the production of such an effect is taken to constitute
the substantive end of art, it must follow that the purifying content
must be brought before consciousness in its _universality_ and
_essentiality_.

([Greek: bb]) In this latter aspect the end of art has been pronounced
to be that it should _teach_. Thus, on the one side, the peculiar
character of art would consist in the movement of the emotions and in
the satisfaction which lies in this movement, even in fear, compassion,
in painful pathos and shock--that is to say, in the satisfying
engagement of the emotions and passions, and to that extent in a
complacency, entertainment, and delight in the objects of art, in their
representation and effect; but, on the other side, this purpose (of
art) is held to find its higher standard only in its instructiveness,
in the _fabula docet_,[85] and thus in the useful influence which the
work of art succeeds in exerting on the subject.[86] In this respect
the Horatian saw,[87] "Et prodesse volunt et delectare poetæ," ("Poets
aim at utility and entertainment alike") contains, concentrated in
a few words, all that has subsequently been elaborated in infinite
degrees, and diluted into the uttermost extreme of insipidity as a
doctrine of art. As regards such instruction we have, then, to ask,
whether it is meant to be directly or indirectly, explicitly or
implicitly contained in the work of art.

If, speaking generally, we are concerned about a purpose which is
universal and not contingent, it follows that this purpose, considering
the essentially spiritual nature of art, cannot but be itself
spiritual, and indeed, moreover, one which is not contingent,[88] but
actual in its nature and for its own sake. Such a purpose in relation
to teaching could only consist in bringing before consciousness,
by help of the work of art, a really and explicitly significant
spiritual content. From this point of view it is to be asserted that
the higher art ranks itself, the more it is bound to admit into
itself such a content as this, and that only in the essence of such
a content can it find the standard which determines whether what is
expressed is appropriate or inappropriate. Art was, in fact, the first
_instructress_ of peoples.

But the purpose of instruction may be treated as _purpose_, to such a
degree that the universal nature of the represented content is doomed
to be exhibited and expounded directly and obviously as abstract
proposition, prosaic reflection, or general theorem, and not merely
in an indirect way in the concrete form of a work of art. By such a
severance the sensuous plastic form, which is just what makes the
work of art a work of _art_, becomes a mere otiose accessory, a husk
which is expressly pronounced to be mere husk, a semblance expressly
pronounced to be mere semblance. But thereby the very nature of the
work of art is distorted. For the work of art ought to bring a content
before the mind's eye, not in its generality as such, but with this
generality made absolutely individual, and sensuously particularized.
If the work of art does not proceed from this principle, but sets in
relief its generalized aspect with the purpose of abstract instruction,
then the imaginative and sensuous aspect is only an external and
superfluous adornment, and the work of art is a thing divided against
itself,[89] in which form and content no longer appear as grown into
one. In that case the sensuously individual and the spiritually
general are become external to one another.

And further, if the purpose of art is limited to this _didactic_
utility, then its other aspect, that of pleasure, entertainment, and
delight, is pronounced to be in itself _unessential_, and ought to have
its substance merely in the utility of the teaching on which it is
attendant. But this amounts to pronouncing that art does not bear its
vocation and purpose in itself, but that its conception is rooted in
something else, to which it is a _means_. Art is, in this case, only
one among the several means which prove useful and are applied for
the purpose of instruction. This brings us to the boundary at which
art is made no longer to be an end on its own merits, seeing that
it is degraded into a mere toy of entertainment or a mere means of
instruction.

([Greek: gg]) This boundary becomes most sharply marked when a question
is raised, in its turn, about a supreme end and aim for the sake of
which the passions are to be purified and men are to be instructed.
This aim has often, in modern times, been declared to be _moral_
improvement, and the aim of art has been placed in the function of
preparing the inclinations and impulses for moral perfection, and
of leading them to this goal. This idea combines purification with
instruction, inasmuch as art is, by communicating an insight into
genuine moral goodness--that is, by instruction,--at the same time
to incite to purification, and in this way alone to bring about the
improvement of mankind as its useful purpose and supreme goal.

Regarding art in reference to moral improvement, the same has _prima
facie_ to be said as about the didactic purpose. We may readily grant
that art must not as a principle take for its aim the immoral and its
furtherance. But it is one thing to take immorality for the express
aim of representation, and another to abstain from taking morality.
Every genuine work of art may have a good moral drawn from it, but, of
course, in doing so much depends on interpretation and on him who draws
the moral. Thus one may hear the most immoral representations defended
by saying that we must know evil, or sin, in order to act morally; and,
conversely, it has been said that the portrayal of Mary Magdalene,
the beautiful sinner who afterwards repented, has seduced many into
sin, because art makes it look so beautiful to repent, and you must
sin before you can repent. But the doctrine of moral improvement, if
consistently carried out, goes in general yet further. It would not be
satisfied with the possibility of extracting a moral from a work of art
by interpretation, but it would, on the contrary, display the moral
instruction as the substantive purpose of the work of art, and, indeed,
would actually admit to portrayal none but moral subjects, moral
characters, actions, and incidents. For art has the choice among its
subjects, in contradistinction to history or the sciences which have
their matter fixed for them.

In order that we may be able to form a thoroughly adequate estimate of
the idea that the aim of art is moral from this point of view, we must
inquire first of all for the definite standpoint of the morality on
which this doctrine is based. If we look closely at the standpoint of
morality as we have to understand it in the best sense at the present
day, we soon find that its conception does not immediately coincide
with what apart from it we are in the habit of calling in a general
way virtue, respectability,[90] uprightness, etc. To be respectable
and virtuous is not enough to make a man moral.[91] Morality involves
_reflection_ and the definite consciousness of that which duty
prescribes, and acting out of such a prior consciousness. Duty itself
is the law of the will, which man nevertheless lays down freely out of
his own self, and then is supposed to determine himself to this duty
for duty's and its fulfilment's sake, by doing good solely from the
conviction which he has attained that it is the good. Now this law, the
duty which is chosen for duty's sake to be the guide of action, out
of free conviction and the inner conscience, and is then acted upon,
is, taken by itself,[92] the abstract universal of the will, and is the
direct antithesis of nature, the sensuous impulses, the self-seeking
interests, the passions, and of all that is comprehensively entitled
the feelings[93] and the heart. In this antagonism the one side is
regarded as _negativing_ the other; and, seeing that both are present
as antagonists within the subject (person), he has, as determining
himself out of himself, the choice of following the one or the other.
But, according to the view under discussion, a _moral_ aspect is
acquired by such a decision, and by the act performed in accordance
with it, only through the free conviction of duty on the one hand, and,
on the other hand, through the conquest, not only of the particular or
separate will, of the natural motives, inclinations, passions, etc.,
but also through that of the nobler emotions and the higher impulses.
For the modern moralistic view starts from the fixed antithesis
of the will in its spiritual universality to its sensuous natural
particularity,[94] and consists not in the completed reconciliation of
these contrasted sides, but in their conflict with one another, which
involves the requirement that the impulses which conflict with duty
ought to yield to it.

This antithesis does not merely display itself for our consciousness,
in the limited region of moral action; but also emerges as a
fundamental distinction and antagonism between that which is real
essentially and in its own right,[95] and that which is external
reality and existence. Formulated in the abstract, it is the contrast
of the universal and particular, when the former is explicitly fixed
over against the latter, just as the latter is over against the former;
more concretely, it appears in nature as the opposition of the abstract
law against the abundance of individual phenomena, each having its
own character; in the mind, as the sensuous and spiritual in man, as
the battle of the spirit against the flesh, of duty for duty's sake,
the cold command, with the individual interest, the warm feelings,
the sensuous inclinations and impulses, the individual disposition
as such; as the hard conflict of inward freedom and of natural
necessity; further, as the contradiction of the dead conception--empty
in itself--compared with full concrete vitality, or of theory and
subjective thought contrasted with objective existence and experience.

These are antitheses which have not been invented, either by the
subtlety of reflection or by the pedantry of philosophy, but which
have from all time and in manifold forms preoccupied and disquieted
the human consciousness, although it was modern culture that
elaborated them most distinctly, and forced them up to the point of
most unbending contradiction. Intellectual culture and the modern
play of understanding create in man this contrast, which makes him an
amphibious animal, inasmuch as it sets him to live in two contradictory
worlds at once; so that even consciousness wanders back and forward
in this contradiction, and, shuttle-cocked from side to side, is
unable to satisfy itself _as_ itself on the one side as on the other.
For, on the one side, we see man a prisoner in common reality and
earthly temporality, oppressed by want and poverty, hard driven by
nature, entangled in matter, in sensuous aims and their enjoyments;
on the other side, he exalts himself to eternal ideas, to a realm of
thought and freedom, imposes on himself as a _will_ universal laws and
attributions, strips the world of its living and flourishing reality
and dissolves it into abstractions, inasmuch as the mind is put upon
vindicating its rights and its dignity simply by denying the rights
of nature and maltreating it, thereby retaliating the oppression and
violence which itself has experienced from nature. Such a discrepancy
in life and consciousness involves for modern culture and its
understanding the demand that the contradiction should be resolved.
Yet the understanding cannot release itself from the fixity of these
antitheses. The solution, therefore, remains for consciousness a mere
_ought_, and the present and reality only stir themselves in the
unrest of a perpetual to and fro, which seeks a reconciliation without
finding it. Then the question arises, whether such a many-sided and
fundamental opposition which never gets beyond a mere ought and a
postulated solution, can be the genuine and complete[96] truth, and,
in general, the supreme purpose. If the culture of the world[97] has
fallen into such a contradiction, it becomes the task of philosophy to
undo or cancel it, _i.e._ to show that neither the one alternative in
its abstraction nor the other in similar one-sidedness possesses truth,
but that they are essentially self-dissolving; that truth only lies in
the conciliation and mediation of the two, and that this mediation is
no mere postulate, but is in its nature and in reality accomplished
and always self-accomplishing. This intuition agrees directly with the
natural faith and will, which always has present to the mind's eye
precisely this resolved antithesis, and in action makes it its purpose
and achieves it. All that philosophy does is to furnish a reflective
insight into the essence of the antithesis in as far as it shows that
what constitutes truth is merely the resolution of this antithesis, and
that not in the sense that the conflict and its aspects in any way
_are not_, but in the sense that they _are_, _in reconciliation_.

(_d_) Now, as an ultimate aim implied a higher standpoint in the case
of moral improvement, we shall have to vindicate this higher standpoint
for art no less than for morals. Thereby we at once lay aside the
false position, which has already been remarked upon, that art has to
serve as a means for moral ends, and to conduce to the moral end of
the world, as such, by instruction and moral improvement, and thereby
has its substantive aim, not in itself, but in something else. If,
therefore, we now continue to speak of an aim or purpose, we must, in
the first instance, get rid of the perverse idea, which, in asking
"What is the aim?" retains the accessory meaning of the question,
"What is the _use_?". The perverseness of this lies in the point that
the work of art would then be regarded as aspiring to something else
which is set before consciousness as the essential and as what ought
to be; so that then the work of art would only have value as a useful
instrument in the realization of an end having substantive importance
_outside_ the sphere of art. Against this it is necessary to maintain
that art has the vocation of revealing _the truth_ in the form of
sensuous artistic shape, of representing the reconciled antithesis
just described, and, therefore, has its purpose in itself, in this
representation and revelation. For other objects, such as instruction,
purification, improvement, pecuniary gain, endeavour after fame and
honour, have nothing to do with the work of art as such, and do not
determine its conception.

It is from this point of view, into which _reflective_ consideration
of the matter resolves itself, that we have to apprehend the idea of
art in its inner necessity, as indeed it was from this point of view,
historically speaking, that the true appreciation and understanding
of art took its origin. For that antithesis, of which we spoke, made
itself felt, not only within general reflective culture, but no less in
philosophy as such, and it was not till philosophy discovered how to
overcome this antithesis absolutely, that it grasped its own conception
and, just in as far as it did so, the conception of nature and of art.

Hence this point of view, as it is the re-awakening of philosophy
in general, so also is the re-awakening of the science of art; and,
indeed, it is this re-awakening to which alone æsthetic as a science
owes its true origin, and art its higher estimation.




CHAPTER IV.

HISTORICAL DEDUCTION OF THE TRUE IDEA OF ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.


I Shall touch briefly upon the historical side of the transition above
alluded to, partly for its historical interest, partly because, in
doing so, we shall more closely indicate the critical points which
are important, and on the foundation of which we mean to continue
our structure. In its most general formulation, this basis consists
in recognizing artistic beauty as one of the means which resolve and
reduce to unity the above antithesis and contradiction between the
abstract self-concentrated mind and actual nature, whether that of
external phenomena, or the inner subjective feelings and emotions.

1. The Kantian philosophy led the way by not merely feeling the lack
of this point of union, but attaining definite knowledge of it, and
bringing it within the range of our ideas.[98] In general, Kant
treated as his foundation for the intelligence as for the will, the
self-related rationality or freedom, the self-consciousness that
finds and knows itself in itself as infinite.[99] This knowledge of
the absoluteness of reason in itself which has brought philosophy to
its turning-point in modern times, this absolute beginning, deserves
recognition even if we pronounce Kant's philosophy inadequate, and
is an element in it which cannot be refuted. But, in as far as Kant
fell back again into the fixed antithesis of subjective thought and
objective things, of the abstract universality and the sensuous
individuality of the will, it was he more especially who strained to
the highest possible pitch the above-mentioned contradiction called
morality,[100] seeing that he moreover exalted the practical side of
the mind above the theoretical. In presence of this fixed antithesis,
with its fixity acknowledged by the understanding, he had no course
open but to propound the unity merely in the form of subjective
ideas of the reason to which no adequate reality could be shown to
correspond, or again, to treat it as consisting in postulates which
might indeed be deduced from the practical reason, but whose essential
nature[101] was not for him knowable by thought, and whose practical
accomplishment remained a mere ought deferred to infinity. Thus, then,
Kant no doubt brought the reconciled contradiction within the range
of our ideas, but he succeeded neither in scientifically unfolding its
genuine essence nor in presenting it as the true and sole reality. Kant
indeed pressed on still further, inasmuch as he recognized the required
unity in what he called the _intuitive understanding_; but here,
again, he comes to a standstill in the contradiction of subjectivity
and objectivity, so that although he suggests in the abstract a
solution of the contradiction of concept and reality, universality
and particularity, understanding and sense, and thereby points to the
Idea, yet, on the other hand, he makes this solution and reconciliation
itself a purely _subjective_ one, not one which is true and actual in
its nature and on its own merits.[102] In this respect the Critique
of the power of judgment, in which he treats of the æsthetic and
teleological powers of judgment, is instructive and remarkable. The
beautiful objects of nature and art, the rightly adapted products
of nature, by connecting which Kant is led to a closer treatment of
organic and animated beings, are regarded by him only from the point of
view of the reflection which subjectively judges of them. Indeed Kant
defines the power of judgment generally as "the power of thinking the
particular as contained under the universal;" and he calls the power
of judgment _reflective_ "when it has only the particular given to it,
and has to find the universal under which it comes." To this end it
requires a law, a principle, which it has to impose upon itself; and
Kant suggests as this law that of _Teleology_. In the idea of freedom
that belongs to the practical reason, the accomplishment of the end
is left as a mere "ought," but in the teleological judgment dealing
with animated beings, Kant hits on the notion of regarding the living
organism in the light that in it the idea, the universal, contains
the particulars as well. Thus in its capacity as end, it determines
the particular and external, the structure of the limbs, not from
without, but from within, and in the sense that the particular conforms
to the end _spontaneously_. Yet even in such a judgment, again, we
are supposed not to know the objective nature of the thing, but only
to be enunciating a subjective mode of reflection. Similarly, Kant
understands the _æsthetic_ judgment as neither proceeding from the
understanding as such _qua_ the faculty of ideas, nor from sensuous
perception as such with its manifold variety, but from the free play of
the understanding and of the imagination. It is in this free agreement
of the faculties of knowledge, that the thing is related to the subject
or person, and to his feeling of pleasure and complacency.

(_a_) Now this complacency is, in the first place, to be devoid of any
interest, i.e., _devoid of relation to our appetitive faculty_. If
we have an interest, by way of curiosity for instance, or a sensuous
interest on behalf of our sensuous want, a desire of possession and
use, then the objects are not important to us for their own sake, but
for the sake of our want. In that case, what exists has a value only
with reference to such a want, and the relation is of such a kind that
the object is on the one side, and on the other stands an attribution
which is distinct from the object, but to which we relate it. If, for
instance, I consume the object in order to nourish myself by it, this
interest lies only in me, and remains foreign to the object itself.
Now, what Kant asserts is, that the relation to the beautiful is not
of this kind. The æsthetic judgment allows the external existence
to subsist free and independent, giving licence to the object to
have its end in itself. This is, as we saw above, an important
consideration.[103]

(_b_) The beautiful, in _the second place_, says Kant, is definable
as that which, without a conception, _i.e._ without a category of the
understanding, is perceived as the object of a _universal_ delight.
To estimate the beautiful requires a cultivated mind; the natural
man[104] has no judgment about the beautiful, seeing that this judgment
claims universal validity. The universal is, indeed to begin with,
_as such_ an abstraction; but that which in itself and on its own
merits[105] is true, bears in itself the attribution and the claim
to be valid even universally. In this sense the beautiful, too, ought
to be _universally_ recognized, although the mere conceptions of the
understanding are competent to no judgment thereupon. The good, that,
for instance, which is right in particular actions, is subsumed under
universal conceptions, and the act passes for good when it succeeds
in corresponding to these conceptions. Beauty, on the other hand,
according to the theory, should awaken a universal delight directly,
without any such relation. This amounts to nothing else than that, in
contemplating beauty, we are not conscious of the conception and of the
subsumption under it, and do not permit to take place the severance
of the individual object and of the universal conception which in all
other cases is present in the judgment.

(_c_) In the _third_ place, the beautiful (Kant says) has the form of
teleology,[106] in as far as a teleological character is perceived in
the object without the idea of an end. At bottom this only repeats the
view which we have just discussed. Any natural production, _i.e._ a
plant or an animal, is organized teleologically, and is so immediately
a datum to us in this its teleology that we have no separate abstract
idea of the end, distinct from its given reality. It is in this way
that even _the beautiful_ is to be displayed to us as teleological.
In finite teleology[107] end and means remain external to one another,
inasmuch as the end stands in no essential inner relation to the
material medium of its accomplishment. In this case, the idea of the
end in its abstraction[108] distinguishes itself from the object in
which the end appears as realized. The beautiful, on the other hand,
exists as teleological in itself, without means and end revealing
themselves in it as distinct aspects. For instance, the purpose of
the limbs of an organism is the vitality which exists as actual in
the limbs themselves; separately they cease to be limbs. For in the
living thing the end and the material medium of the end are so directly
united, that the existing being only exists so long as its purpose
dwells in it. The beautiful, Kant maintains, when considered from this
point of view, does not wear its teleology as an external form attached
to it; but the teleological correspondence of the inner and outer is
the immanent nature of the beautiful object.

(_d_) Lastly, Kant's treatment determines the beautiful, in the
_fourth_ place, as being recognized, without a conception, as object
of a _necessary_ delight. Necessity is an abstract category, and
indicates an inner essential relation of two aspects; _if_ the one is,
and _because_ the one is, _then_ (_and therefore_) the other is. The
one in its nature involves the other as well as itself, just as cause,
_e.g._, has no meaning without effect. The delight which the beautiful
involves is such a necessary consequence, wholly without relation to
conceptions, _i.e._ to categories of the understanding. Thus, for
instance, we are pleased no doubt by what is symmetrical, and this
is constructed in accordance with a conception of the understanding.
But Kant requires, to give us pleasure, even more than the unity and
equality that belong to such a conception of the understanding.

Now, what we find in all these Kantian laws is a non-severance of
that which in all other cases is presupposed in our consciousness to
be distinct. In the beautiful this severance finds itself cancelled,
inasmuch as universal and particular, end and means, conception
and object thoroughly interpenetrate one another. And thus, again,
Kant regards the beautiful in _art_ as an agreement in which the
particular itself _is_ in accordance with the conception. Particulars,
as such, are _prima facie_ contingent, both as regards one another
and as regards the universal, and this very contingent element,
sense, feeling, temper, inclination, is now in the beauty of art not
merely _subsumed_ under universal categories of the understanding
and _controlled_ by the conception of feeling in its abstract
universality, but so united with the universal that it reveals itself
as inwardly and in its nature and realization[109] adequate thereto.
By this means the beauty of art becomes embodiment of a thought, and
the material is not externally determined by this thought, but exists
itself in its freedom. For in this case the natural, sensuous, the
feelings and so forth have _in themselves_ proportion, purpose, and
agreement; while perception and feeling are exalted into spiritual
universality, and thought itself, not content with renouncing its
hostility to nature, finds cheerfulness therein. Thus feeling,
pleasure, and enjoyment are justified and sanctified, so that nature
and freedom, sensuousness and the idea, find their warrant and
their satisfaction all in _one_. Yet even this apparently complete
reconciliation is ultimately inferred[110] to be, nevertheless,
merely subjective in respect of our appreciation as in respect of our
production, and not to be the naturally and completely true and real.

These we may take as the main results of the Kantian Criticism, so far
as they have interest for us in our present inquiry. This criticism
forms the starting-point for the true conception of artistic beauty.
Yet this conception had to overcome the Kantian defects before it could
assert itself as the higher grasp of the true unity of necessity and
freedom, of the particular and the universal, of the sensuous and the
rational.

2. And so it must be admitted that the artistic sense of a profound,
and, at the same time, philosophic mind was beforehand with philosophy
as such, in demanding and enunciating the principle of totality and
reconciliation as against that abstract endlessness of reflective
thought, that duty for duty's sake, that intelligence devoid of plastic
shape, which apprehend nature and reality, sensation and feeling as
a mere _limit_, and as an absolutely hostile element. For _Schiller_
must be credited with the great merit of having broken through the
Kantian subjectivity and abstractness of thought, and having dared
the attempt to transcend these limits by intellectually grasping the
principles of unity and reconciliation as the truth, and realizing
them in art. Schiller, in his æsthetic discussions, did not simply
adhere to art and its interest without concerning himself about its
relation to philosophy proper, but compared his interest in artistic
beauty with the principles of philosophy; and it was only by starting
from the latter, and by their help that he penetrated the profounder
nature and notion of the beautiful. Thus we feel it to be a feature in
one period of his works that he has busied himself with thought--more
perhaps than was conducive to their unsophisticated beauty as works of
art. The intentional character of abstract reflection and even the
interest of the philosophical idea are noticeable in many of his poems.
This has been made a ground of censure against him, especially by way
of blaming and depreciating him in comparison with Goethe's agreeable
straightforwardness[111] and objectivity. But in this respect Schiller,
as poet, did but pay the debt of his time; and the reason lay in a
perplexity which turned out only to the honour of that sublime soul and
profound character, and to the profit of science and cognition.

At the same epoch the same scientific stimulus withdrew Goethe,
too, from poetry, his proper sphere. Yet just as Schiller immersed
himself in the study of the inner depths of the _mind_, so Goethe's
idiosyncrasy led him to the _physical_ side of art, to external nature,
to animal and vegetable organisms, to crystals, to cloud formation,
and to colour. To such scientific research Goethe brought the power of
his great mind, which in these regions put to rout[112] the science
of mere understanding with its errors, just as Schiller, on the other
side, succeeded in asserting the idea of the free totality of beauty
against the understanding's science of volition and thought. A whole
set of Schiller's productions is devoted to this insight of his into
the nature of art, especially the "Letters upon Æsthetic Education."
In these letters the central point from which Schiller starts is that
every individual human being has within him the capacity of an ideal
humanity. This genuine human being, he says, is represented by the
State,[113] which he takes to be the objective, universal, or, so to
speak, normal form in which the diversity of particular subjects or
persons aims at aggregating and combining itself into a unity. There
were, then, he considered, two imaginable ways in which the human
being in time (in the actual course of events) might coincide with the
human being in the Idea: on the one hand, by the State, _qua_ genus
or class-idea of morality,[114] law, and intelligence, destroying
individuality; on the other hand, by the individual raising himself
to the level of his genus, _i.e._ by the human being that lives in
time ennobling himself into the human being of the Idea. Now reason,
he thinks, demands unity as such, the generic character, but nature
demands diversity and individuality; and both these legislative
authorities have simultaneous claims on man. In presence of the
conflict between these antagonistic elements, æsthetic education simply
consists in realizing the requirement of mediation and reconciliation
between them. For the aim of this education is, according to Schiller,
to give such form to inclination, sensuousness, impulse, and heart,
that they may become rational in themselves, and by the same process
reason, freedom, and spirituality may come forward out of their
abstraction, and uniting with the natural element, now rationalized
throughout, may in it be invested with flesh and blood. Beauty is thus
pronounced to be the unification of the rational and the sensuous, and
this unification to be the genuinely real.

This notion of Schiller's may be readily recognized in the general
views of "Anmuth und Würde,"[115] and in his poems more particularly
from the fact that he makes the praise of women his subject matter;
because it was in their character that he recognized and held up to
notice the spontaneously present combination of the spiritual and
natural.

Now this _Unity_ of the universal and particular, of freedom and
necessity, of the spiritual and the natural, which Schiller grasped
from a scientific point of view as the principle and essence of art,
and laboured indefatigably to evoke into actual existence by help of
art and æsthetic culture, was considered, by a further advance, _as
the Idea itself_, and was thus constituted the principle of knowledge
and of existence, while the Idea in this sense was recognized as the
sole truth and reality. By means of this recognition, science, in
Schelling's philosophy, attained its absolute standpoint, and although
art had previously begun to assert its peculiar nature and dignity in
relation to the highest interests of humanity, yet it was now that
the actual _notion_ of art and its place in scientific theory were
discovered. Art was now accepted, even if erroneously in one respect,
which this is not the place to discuss, yet in its higher and genuine
vocation. No doubt before this time so early a writer as Winckelmann
had been inspired by his observation of the ideals of the ancients in a
way that led him to develop a new sense for the contemplation of art,
to rescue it from the notions of commonplace aims and of mere mimicry
of nature, and to exert an immense influence in favour of searching out
the idea of art in the works of art and in its history. For Winckelmann
should be regarded as one of the men who have succeeded in furnishing
the mind with a new organ and new methods of study in the field of art.
On the theory, however, and the scientific knowledge of art his view
has had less influence.

3. To touch briefly on the further course of the subject, A. W. and
Friedrich von Schlegel, in proximity to the renaissance of philosophy,
being covetous of novelty and with a thirst for what was striking and
extraordinary, appropriated as much of the philosophical idea as
their natures, which were anything but philosophical, and essentially
of the critical stamp, were capable of absorbing. Neither of them can
claim the reputation of a speculative thinker. But it was they who,
armed with their critical understanding, set themselves somewhere near
the standpoint of the Idea, and with great plainness of speech and
audacity of innovation, though with but a poor admixture of philosophy,
directed a clever polemic against the traditional views. And thus they
undoubtedly introduced in several branches of art a new standard of
judgment in conformity with notions which were higher than those that
they attacked. As, however, their criticism was not accompanied by the
thorough philosophical comprehension of their standard, this standard
retained a character of indefiniteness and vacillation, with the result
that they sometimes did too much and sometimes too little. No doubt
they are to be credited with the merit of bringing afresh to light
and extolling in a loving spirit much that was held obsolete and was
inadequately esteemed by their age, e.g. the work of the older painters
of Italy and the Netherlands, the "Nibelungen Lied," etc.; and, again,
they endeavoured with zeal to learn and to teach subjects that were
little known, such as the Indian poetry and mythology. Nevertheless,
they attributed too high a value to the productions of such epochs,
and sometimes themselves fell into the blunder of admiring what was
but mediocre, _e.g._ Holberg's comedies, and attaching a universal
importance to what had only relative value, or even boldly showing
themselves enthusiasts for a perverse tendency and subordinate
standpoint as if it were something supreme.

Out of this tendency, and especially out of the sentiments[116] and
doctrines of Fried. von Schlegel, there further grew in all its
manifold shapes the so-called _Irony_. This idea had its deeper root,
if we take it in one of its aspects, in Fichte's philosophy, in so
far as the principles of his philosophy were applied to art. Fried.
von Schlegel, as also Schelling, started from Fichte's point of view;
Schelling, to pass wholly beyond it, Fried. von Schlegel to develop it
in a peculiar fashion, and to tear himself loose from it. As regards
the intimate connection of Fichte's principles with one tendency
(among others) of the irony, we need only lay stress on the following
point, that Fichte establishes the =I= as the absolute principle of
all knowledge, of all reason and cognition; and that in the sense of
the =I= which is, and is no more than, utterly abstract and formal.
For this reason, in the second place, this =I= is in itself absolutely
simple, and, on the one hand, every characteristic, every attribute,
every content is negated therein--for every positive matter is
annihilated by absorption into this abstract freedom and unity; on the
other side, every content which is to be of value for the =I=, is given
position and recognition only by favour of the =I=. Whatever is, is
only by favour of the =I=,[117] and what is by my favour =I= am in turn
able to annihilate.

Now, if we abide by these utterly empty forms which have their origin
in the absoluteness of the abstract =I=, then nothing has value in
its real and actual nature, and regarded[118] in itself, but only as
produced by the subjectivity of the =I=. But if so, it follows that
the =I= is able to remain lord and master of everything, and in no
sphere of morality or legality, of things human or divine, profane or
sacred, is there anything that would not have to begin by being given
position by the =I=, and that might not, therefore, just as well be in
turn annihilated thereby. This amounts to making all that is actual in
its own right[119] a mere _semblance_, not true and real for its own
sake and by its own means, but a mere appearance due to the =I=, within
whose power and caprice it remains, and at its free disposal. To admit
it or to annihilate it stands purely in the pleasure of the =I= which
has attained absoluteness in itself and simply as =I=.

In the third place,[120] then, the =I= is a _living_, active
individual, and its life consists in bringing its individuality to its
own consciousness as to that of others, in uttering itself and taking
shape in phenomena. For every human being while he lives, seeks to
realize himself, and does realize himself. With respect to beauty and
art this receives the meaning of living as artist and forming one's
life _artistically_. But, according to the principle before us, =I=
live as artist when all my action and utterance in general, whenever it
has to do with any content, is for me on the level of mere _semblance_,
and assumes a shape which is wholly in my power. So =I= am not really
in _earnest_, either about this content, or generally, about its
utterance and realization. For genuine earnest comes into being only
by means of a substantial interest, a matter that has something in
it, truth, morality, and so forth; by means of a content which, as
such (without my help) is enough to have value for me as something
essential, so that =I= myself only become essential in my own eyes
in as far as =I= have immersed myself in such a matter and have come
to be in conformity with it in my whole knowledge and action. At the
standpoint according to which the artist is the =I= that binds and
looses[121] of its own power, for whom no content of consciousness
counts as absolute and as essentially real, but only as itself an
artificial and dissoluble semblance, such earnest can never come into
being, as nothing has validity ascribed to it but the formalism of the
=I=. By others, indeed, my self-display in which =I= present myself to
them may be taken seriously, inasmuch as they interpret me as though I
were really concerned about the matter in hand; but therein they are
simply deceived, poor _borné_ creatures, without talent and capacity to
apprehend and to attain my standpoint. And this shows me that not every
one is so free (_formally_[122] free, that is) as to see in all that
usually has value, dignity, and sanctity for mankind, simply a product
of his own power of caprice, whereby he is able to set his seal on the
value of such matters, and to determine himself and obtain a content by
their means, or not. And then this skill in living an ironical artist
life apprehends itself as a _God-like geniality_,[123] for which every
possible thing is a mere dead creature, to which the free creator,
knowing himself to be wholly unattached, feels in no way bound, seeing
that he can annihilate as well as create it. He who has attained such
a standpoint of God-like geniality looks down in superiority on all
mankind besides, for they are pronounced _borné_ and dull in as far as
law, morality, and so forth retain for them their fixed, obligatory,
and essential validity. And the individual who thus lives his artist
life assigns himself indeed relation to others, lives with friends,
mistresses, etc., but as genius he sets no value on this relation to
his determinate reality and particular actions, or to what is universal
in its own right; that is, he assumes an ironical attitude towards it.

This is the universal import of the genial God-like irony, as that
concentration of the =I= into itself for which all bonds are broken,
and which will only endure to live in the bliss of self-enjoyment.[124]
This irony was the invention of Herr Fried. von Schlegel, and many
followed him in prating about it then, or are prating of it afresh just
now.

The proximate form of this negativity which displays itself as irony
is, then, on the one hand the futility[125] of all that is matter of
fact, or moral and of substantive import in itself; the nothingness of
all that is objective, and that has essential and actual value. If the
=I= remains at this point of view, all appears to it as nothing worth
and as futile, excepting its own subjectivity, which thereby becomes
hollow and empty, and itself mere conceit.[126] But on the other hand,
the reverse may happen, and the I may also find itself unsatisfied
in its enjoyment of itself, and may prove insufficient to itself, so
as in consequence to feel a craving for the solid and substantial,
for determinate and essential interests. Out of this there arises
misfortune and antinomy, in that the subject desires to penetrate into
truth and has a craving for objectivity, but yet is unable to abandon
its isolation and retirement into itself, and to strip itself free of
this unsatisfied abstract inwardness (of mind), and so has a seizure
of sickly yearning[127] which we have also seen emanate from Fichte's
school. The discontent of this quiescence and feebleness,--which does
not like to act or to touch anything for fear of surrendering its
inward harmony, and, for all its craving after the absolute, remains
none the less unreal and empty, even though pure in itself,--is the
source of morbid saintliness[128] and yearning. For a true saintly soul
acts and is a reality. But all that craving is the feeling of the
nullity of the empty futile[129] subject or person, which lacks the
strength to escape this its futility,[129] and to fill[130] itself with
something of substantial value.

In so far, however, as the Irony was treated as a form of art, it did
not content itself with conferring artistic shape upon the life and
particular individuality of the artist. In addition to the works of art
presented by his own actions, etc., the artist was bound to produce
external works of art as creations of his fancy. The principle of these
productions, which for the most part can only come to the birth in
poetical form, is, in due course, the representation of the Divine as
the Ironical. The ironical, as "genial" individuality, consists in the
self-annihilation of what is noble, great, and excellent; and thus even
the objective shapes of art will have to represent the mere principle
of absolute subjectivity, by displaying what has value and nobleness
for man as null in its self-annihilation. This implies, not merely that
we are not to be serious about the right, the moral, and the true, but
that the highest and best of all has nothing in it, inasmuch as in its
exhibition through individuals, characters, and actions, it refutes
and annihilates itself, and so is irony at its own expense. This mode,
taken in the abstract, borders closely on the principle of comedy; but
yet within this affinity the comic must be essentially distinguished
from the ironical. For the comic must be limited to bringing to nothing
what is in itself null, a false and self-contradictory phenomenon;
for instance, a whim, a perversity, or particular caprice, set over
against a mighty passion; or even a _supposed_ reliable principle or
rigid maxim may be shown to be null. But it is quite another thing
when what is in reality moral and true, any substantial content as
such, exhibits itself as null in an individual and by his means. Such
an individual is then null and despicable in character, and weakness
and want of character are thus introduced into the representation. In
this distinction between the ironical and the comic it is therefore
an essential question what import that has which is brought to
nothing. In the case supposed they are wretched worthless subjects,
persons destitute of the power to abide by their fixed and essential
purpose, but ready to surrender it and let it be destroyed in them.
The "Irony" loves this irony of the characterless. For true character
involves on the one hand an essential import in its purpose; on the
other hand, adherence to that purpose, such that the individuality
would be robbed of its whole existence if forced to desist from and
to abandon it. This stability and substance constitute the keynote of
character. _Cato_ can live only as Roman and as republican. Now, if
Irony is taken as the keynote of the representation, this means that
the supremely inartistic is taken as the true principle of the work of
art. For the result is in part insipid figures; in part shapes void
of import and of conduct,[131] seeing that their substantive nature
turns out to be a nullity; and in part, finally, those yearning moods
and unresolved contradictions of the heart that attach themselves to
such conceptions. Representations of this kind can awake no genuine
interest. And for this reason it is from the Irony that we have eternal
lamentations over the lack of profound feeling, artistic insight, and
genius in the public, inasmuch as it does not understand these heights
of Irony. That is to say, the public does not like all this mediocrity,
half grotesque and half characterless. And it is well that these
unsubstantial languishing natures afford no pleasure; it is a comfort
that such insincerity and hypocrisy are not approved, and that, on the
contrary, man has a desire no less for full and genuine interests than
for characters which remain true to the weighty purposes of their lives.

It may be added as an historical remark that those who more
particularly adopted irony as the supreme principle of art were Solger
and Ludwig Tieck.

This is not the place to speak of Solger at the length which is due to
him, and I must content myself with a few observations. Solger was
not like the others, satisfied with superficial philosophical culture,
but the genuine speculative need of his innermost nature impelled him
to descend into the depths of the philosophic idea. And therein he hit
upon the dialectical element of the Idea, the point to which I give the
name of "infinite absolute negativity," the activity of the idea in
that it negates itself as the infinite and universal, so as to become
finiteness and particularity, and just as really cancels this negation
in turn, establishing thereby the universal and infinite in the finite
and particular. Solger got no further than this negativity, and it is
no doubt an element in the speculative idea, but yet when conceived
as this mere dialectic unrest and dissolution both of infinite and of
finite _no more than_ an element; not, as Solger maintains, _the entire
Idea_. Unhappily Solger's life was too soon interrupted for him to
have achieved the concrete development of the philosophical Idea. And
so he never got beyond this aspect of negativity, which has affinity
with the dissolution that Irony effects of what is determinate and of
what has substantive value in itself, a negativity in which he saw the
principle of artistic activity. Yet in his actual life, considering the
solidity, seriousness, and strength of his character, he neither was
himself, in the sense above depicted, an ironical artist, nor was his
profound feeling for genuine works of art, developed in protracted art
studies, in this respect of an ironical nature. So much in vindication
of Solger, whose life, philosophy, and art merit to be distinguished
from the previously mentioned apostles of irony.

As regards Ludwig Tieck, his culture, too, dates from that period
in which for some time Jena was the literary centre.[132] Tieck and
others of these distinguished people display great familiarity with the
phrases in question, but without telling us what they mean by them.
Thus, Tieck no doubt always says there ought to be Irony; but when he
himself approaches the criticism of great works of art, though his
recognition and portrayal of their greatness is excellent, yet, if we
fancy that now is the best opportunity to explain where the Irony is,
_e.g._ in such a work as "Romeo and Juliet," we are taken in--for we
hear no more about the Irony.




CHAPTER V

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.


1. After the above introductory remarks, it is now time to pass to
the study of our object-matter. But we are still in the introduction,
and an introduction cannot do more than lay down, for the sake of
explanation, the general sketch of the entire course which will be
followed by our subsequent scientific considerations. As, however, we
have spoken of art as proceeding from the absolute Idea, and have even
assigned as its end the sensuous representation of the absolute itself,
we shall have to conduct this review in a way to show, at least in
general, how the particular divisions of the subject spring from the
conception of artistic beauty as the representation of the absolute.
Therefore we must attempt to awaken a very general idea of this
conception itself.

It has already been said that the content of art is the Idea, and that
its form lies in the plastic use of images accessible to sense. These
two sides art has to reconcile into a full and united totality. The
_first_ attribution which this involves is the requirement that the
content, which is to be offered to artistic representation, shall show
itself to be in its nature worthy of such representation. Otherwise
we only obtain a bad combination, whereby a content that will not
submit to plasticity and to external presentation, is forced into that
form, and a matter which is in its nature prosaic is expected to find
an appropriate mode of manifestation in the form antagonistic to its
nature.

The _second_ requirement, which is derivable from this first, demands
of the content of art that it should not be anything abstract in
itself. This does not mean that it must be concrete as the sensuous
is concrete in contrast to everything spiritual and intellectual,
these being taken as in themselves simple and abstract. For everything
that has genuine truth in the mind as well as in nature is concrete
in itself, and has, in spite of its universality, nevertheless, both
subjectivity and particularity within it. If we say, _e.g._, of God
that he is simply _One_, the supreme Being as such, we have only
enunciated a lifeless abstraction of the irrational understanding. Such
a God, as he himself is not apprehended in his concrete truth, can
afford no material for art, least of all for plastic art. Hence the
Jews and the Turks have not been able to represent their God, who does
not even amount to such an abstraction of the understanding, in the
positive way in which Christians have done so. For God in Christianity
is conceived in His truth, and therefore, as in Himself thoroughly
concrete, as a person, as a subject,[133] and more closely determined,
as mind or spirit. What He is as spirit unfolds itself to the religious
apprehension as the Trinity of Persons, which at the same time in
relation with itself is _One_. Here is essentiality, universality, and
particularity, together with their reconciled unity; and it is only
such unity that constitutes the concrete. Now, as a content in order to
possess truth at all must be of this concrete nature, art demands the
same concreteness, because a mere abstract universal has not in itself
the vocation to advance to particularity and phenomenal manifestation
and to unity with itself therein.

If a true and therefore concrete content is to have corresponding to it
a sensuous form and modelling, this sensuous form must, in the third
place, be no less emphatically something individual, wholly concrete
in itself, and one. The character of concreteness as belonging to both
elements of art, to the content as to the representation, is precisely
the point in which both may coincide and correspond to one another; as,
for instance, the natural shape of the human body is such a sensuous
concrete as is capable of representing spirit, which is concrete in
itself, and of displaying itself in conformity therewith. Therefore we
ought to abandon the idea that it is a mere matter of accident that an
actual phenomenon of the external world is chosen to furnish a shape
thus conformable to truth. Art does not appropriate this form either
because it simply finds it existing or because there is no other. The
concrete content itself involves the element of external and actual,
we may say indeed of sensible manifestation. But in compensation this
sensuous concrete, in which a content essentially belonging to mind
expresses itself, is in its own nature addressed to the inward being;
its external element of shape, whereby the content is made perceptible
and imaginable, has the aim of existing purely for the heart and mind.
This is the only reason for which content and artistic shape are
fashioned in conformity with each other. The _mere_ sensuous concrete,
external nature as such, has not this purpose for its exclusive ground
of origin. The birds' variegated plumage shines unseen, and their
song dies away unheard, the _Cereus_[134] which blossoms only for a
night withers without having been admired in the wilds of southern
forests, and these forests, jungles of the most beautiful and luxuriant
vegetation, with the most odorous and aromatic perfumes, perish
and decay no less unenjoyed. The work of art has not such a naïve
self-centred being, but is essentially a question, an address to the
responsive heart, an appeal to affections and to minds.

Although the artistic bestowal of sensuous form is in this respect
not accidental, yet on the other hand it is not the highest mode
of apprehending the spiritually concrete. Thought is a higher mode
than representation by means of the sensuous concrete. Although in a
relative sense abstract, yet it must not be one-sided but concrete
thinking, in order to be true and rational. Whether a given content
has sensuous artistic representation for its adequate form, or in
virtue of its nature essentially demands a higher and more spiritual
embodiment, is a distinction that displays itself at once, if, for
instance, we compare the Greek gods with God as conceived according to
Christian ideas. The Greek god is not abstract but individual, and is
closely akin to the natural human shape; the Christian God is equally a
concrete personality, but in the mode of pure spiritual existence, and
is to be known as _mind_[135] and in mind. His medium of existence is
therefore essentially inward knowledge and not external natural form,
by means of which He can only be represented imperfectly, and not in
the whole depth of His idea.

But inasmuch as the task of art is to represent the idea to direct
perception in sensuous shape, and not in the form of thought or of pure
spirituality as such, and seeing that this work of representation has
its value and dignity in the correspondence and the unity of the two
sides, _i.e._ of the Idea and its plastic embodiment, it follows that
the level and excellency of art in attaining a realization adequate to
its idea,[136] must depend upon the grade of inwardness and unity with
which Idea and Shape display themselves as fused into one.

Thus the higher truth is spiritual being that has attained a shape
adequate to the conception of spirit. This is what furnishes the
principle of division for the science of art. For before the mind can
attain the true notion of its absolute essence, it has to traverse
a course of stages whose ground is in this idea itself; and to
this evolution of the content with which it supplies itself, there
corresponds an evolution, immediately connected therewith, of the
plastic forms of art, under the shape of which the mind as artist
presents to itself the consciousness of itself.

This evolution within the art-spirit has again in its own nature two
sides. In the _first_ place the development itself is a spiritual[137]
and universal one, in so far as the graduated series of definite
_conceptions of the world_ as the definite but comprehensive
consciousness of nature, man and God, gives itself artistic shape;
and, in the _second_ place, this _universal_ development of art is
obliged to provide itself with external existence and sensuous form,
and the definite modes of the sensuous art-existence are themselves a
totality of necessary distinctions in the realm of art--which are _the
several arts_. It is true, indeed, that the necessary kinds of artistic
representation are on the one hand _qua_ spiritual of a very general
nature, and not restricted to any one material;[138] while sensuous
existence contains manifold varieties of matter. But as this latter,
like the mind, has the Idea potentially for its inner soul, it follows
from this that particular sensuous materials have a close affinity
and secret accord with the spiritual distinctions and types of art
presentation.

In its completeness, however, our science divides itself into three
principal portions.

_First_, we obtain a _general part_. It has for its content and object
the universal Idea of artistic beauty--this beauty being conceived as
the Ideal--together with the nearer relation of the latter both to
nature and to subjective artistic production.

_Secondly_, there develops itself out of the idea of artistic beauty a
_particular_ part, in as far as the essential differences which this
idea contains in itself evolve themselves into a scale _particular_
plastic[139] forms.

In the _third_ place there results a _final_ part, which has for its
subject the individualization of artistic beauty, that consists in
the advance of art to the sensuous realization of its shapes and its
self-completion as a system of the several arts[140] and their genera
and species.

2. With respect to the first part, we must begin by recalling to
mind, in order to make the sequel intelligible, that the Idea _qua_
the beautiful in art is not the Idea as such, in the mode in which
a metaphysical logic apprehends it as the absolute, but the Idea as
developed into concrete form fit for reality, and as having entered
into immediate and adequate unity with this reality. For the _Idea
as such_, although it is the essentially and actually true, is yet
the truth only in its generality which has not yet taken objective
shape; but the _Idea_ as the _beautiful in art_ is at once the Idea
when specially determined as in its essence individual reality, and
also an individual shape of reality essentially destined to embody
and reveal the Idea. This amounts to enunciating the requirement that
the Idea, and its plastic mould as concrete reality, are to be made
completely adequate to one another. When reduced to such form the Idea,
as a reality moulded in conformity with the conception of the Idea,
is the _Ideal_. The problem of this conformity might, to begin with,
be understood in the sense that any Idea would serve, so long as the
actual shape, it did not matter what shape, represented this particular
Idea and no other. But if so, the required truth of the Ideal is
confounded with mere correctness, which consists in the expression of
any meaning whatever in appropriate fashion so that its import may be
readily recognized in the shape created. The Ideal is not to be thus
understood. Any content whatever may attain to being represented quite
adequately, judged by the standard of its own nature, but it does not
therefore gain the right to claim the artistic beauty of the Ideal.
Compared indeed with ideal beauty, even the presentation will in such
a case appear defective. From this point of view we must remark to
begin with, what cannot be proved till later, that the defects of a
work of art are not to be regarded simply as always due, for instance,
to individual unskillfulness. _Defectiveness of form_ arises from
_defectiveness of content_. So, for example, the Chinese, Indians,
and Egyptians in their artistic shapes, their forms of deities, and
their idols, never got beyond a formless phase, or one of a vicious
and false definiteness of form, and were unable to attain genuine
beauty; because their mythological ideas, the content and thought of
their works of art, were as yet indeterminate in themselves, or of a
vicious determinateness, and did not consist in the content that is
absolute in itself. The more that works of art excel in true beauty of
presentation, the more profound is the inner truth of their content and
thought. And in dealing with this point, we have not to think merely
perhaps of the greater or lesser skill with which the natural forms as
given in external reality are apprehended and imitated. For in certain
stages of art-consciousness and of representation, the distortion and
disfigurement of natural structures is not unintentional technical
inexpertness and want of skill, but intentional alteration, which
emanates from the content that is in consciousness, and is required
thereby. Thus, from this point of view, there is such a thing as
imperfect art, which may be quite perfect, both technically and in
other respects, _in its determinate_ sphere, yet reveals itself to be
defective when compared with the conception of art as such, and with
the Ideal. Only in the highest art are the Idea and the representation
genuinely adequate to one another, in the sense that the outward shape
given to the Idea is in itself essentially and actually the true
shape, because the content of the Idea, which that shape expresses,
is itself the true and real content. It is a corollary from this,
as we indicated above,[141] that the Idea must be defined in and
through itself as concrete totality, and thereby possess in itself the
principle and standard of its particularization and determination in
external appearance. For example, the Christian imagination will be
able to represent God only in human form and with man's intellectual
expression, because it is herein that God Himself is completely known
in Himself as mind. Determinateness is, as it were, the bridge to
phenomenal existence. Where this determinateness is not totality
derived from the Idea itself, where the Idea is not conceived as
self-determining and self-particularizing, the Idea remains abstract
and has its determinateness, and therefore the principle that dictates
its particular and exclusively appropriate mode of presentation, not
in itself but external to it. Therefore, the Idea when still abstract
has even its shape external, and not dictated by itself. The Idea,
however, which is concrete in itself bears the principle of its mode of
manifestation within itself, and is by that means the free process of
giving shape to itself. Thus it is only the truly concrete Idea that
can generate the true shape, and this correspondence of the two is the
Ideal.

3. Now because the Idea is in this fashion concrete unity, it follows
that this unity can enter into the art-consciousness only by the
expansion and reconciliation of the particularities of the Idea, and
it is through this evolution that artistic beauty comes to possess a
_totality of particular stages and forms_. Therefore, after we have
studied the beauty of art in itself and on its own merits, we must see
how beauty as a whole breaks up into its particular determinations.
This gives, as our _second part_, _the doctrine of the types of art_.
These forms find their genesis in the different modes of grasping the
Idea as artistic content, whereby is conditioned a difference of the
form in which it manifests itself. Hence the types of art are nothing
but the different relations of content and shape, relations which
emanate from the Idea itself, and furnish thereby the true basis of
division for this sphere. For the principle of division must always be
contained in _that_ conception whose particularization and division is
in question.

We have here to consider _three_ relations of the Idea to its outward
shaping.[142]

[Greek: a]. First, the Idea gives rise to the beginning of Art when,
being itself still in its indistinctness and obscurity, or in vicious
untrue determinateness, it is made the import of artistic creations.
As indeterminate it does not yet possess in itself that individuality
which the Ideal demands; its abstractness and one-sidedness leave its
shape to be outwardly bizarre and defective. The first form of art is
therefore rather a mere search after plastic portrayal than a capacity
of genuine representation. The Idea has not yet found the true form
even within itself, and therefore continues to be merely the struggle
and aspiration thereafter. In general terms we may call this form the
_Symbolic_ form of art. In it the abstract Idea has its outward shape
external to itself[143] in natural sensuous matter, with which the
process of shaping begins, and from which, _qua_ outward expression,
it is inseparable.

Natural objects are thus primarily left unaltered, and yet at the same
time invested with the substantial Idea as their significance, so that
they receive the vocation of expressing it, and claim to be interpreted
as though the Idea itself were present in them. At the root of this
is the fact that natural objects have in them an aspect in which they
are capable of representing a universal meaning. But as an adequate
correspondence is not yet possible, this reference can only concern _an
abstract attribute_, as when a lion is used to mean strength.

On the other hand, this abstractness of the relation brings to
consciousness no less strongly the foreignness of the Idea to
natural phenomena; and the Idea, having no other reality to express
it, expatiates in all these shapes, seeks itself in them in all
their unrest and disproportion, but nevertheless does not find them
adequate to itself. Then it proceeds to exaggerate the natural shapes
and the phenomena of reality into indefiniteness and disproportion,
to intoxicate itself in them, to seethe and ferment in them, to do
violence to them, to distort and explode them into unnatural shapes,
and strives by the variety, hugeness, and splendour of the forms
employed[144] to exalt the phenomenon to the level of the Idea. For
the Idea is here still more or less indeterminate and non-plastic, but
the natural objects are in their shape thoroughly determinate.

Hence, in view of the unsuitability of the two elements to each other,
the relation of the Idea to objective reality becomes a _negative_
one, for the former, as in its nature inward,[145] is unsatisfied with
such an externality, and as being its inner universal substance[146]
persists in exaltation or _Sublimity_ beyond and above all this
inadequate abundance of shapes. In virtue of this sublimity the natural
phenomena and the human shapes and incidents are accepted, and left as
they were, though at the same time understood to be inadequate to their
significance, which is exalted far above every earthly content.

These aspects may be pronounced in general terms to constitute the
character of the primitive artistic pantheism of the East, which
either charges even the meanest objects with the absolute import, or
again coerces nature with violence into the expression of its view.
By this means it becomes bizarre, grotesque, and tasteless, or turns
the infinite but abstract freedom of the substantive Idea disdainfully
against all phenomenal being as null and evanescent. By such means the
import cannot be completely embodied in the expression, and in spite
of all aspiration and endeavour the reciprocal inadequacy of shape
and Idea remains insuperable. This may be taken as the first form of
art,--Symbolic art with its aspiration, its disquiet,[147] its mystery
and its sublimity.

([Greek: b]) In the second form of art, which we propose to call
"_Classical_," the double defect of symbolic art is cancelled. The
plastic shape of symbolic art is imperfect, because, in the first
place, the Idea in it only enters into consciousness in _abstract_
determinateness or indeterminateness, and, in the second place, this
must always make the conformity of shape to import defective, and in
its turn merely abstract. The classical form of art is the solution
of this double difficulty; it is the free and adequate embodiment of
the Idea in the shape that, according to its conception, is peculiarly
appropriate to the Idea itself. With it, therefore, the Idea is capable
of entering into free and complete accord. Hence, the classical type
of art is the first to afford the production and intuition of the
completed Ideal, and to establish it as a realized fact.

The conformity, however, of notion and reality in classical art must
not be taken in the purely _formal_ sense of the agreement of a
content with the external shape given to it, any more than this could
be the case with the Ideal itself. Otherwise every copy from nature,
and every type of countenance, every landscape, flower, or scene, etc.,
which forms the purport of any representation, would be at once made
classical by the agreement which it displays between form and content.
On the contrary, in classical art the peculiarity of the content
consists in being itself concrete idea, and, as such, the concrete
spiritual; for only the spiritual is the truly inner self. To suit such
a content, then, we must search out that in Nature which on its own
merits belongs to the essence and actuality of the mind. It must be the
absolute[148] notion that _invented_ the shape appropriate to concrete
mind, so that the _subjective_ notion--in this case the spirit of
art--has merely _found_ it, and brought it, as an existence possessing
natural shape, into accord with free individual spirituality.[149] This
shape, with which the Idea as spiritual--as individually determinate
spirituality--invests itself when manifested as a temporal phenomenon,
is _the human form_. Personification and anthropomorphism have often
been decried as a degradation of the spiritual; but art, in as far as
its end is to bring before perception the spiritual in sensuous form,
must advance to such anthropomorphism, as it is only in its proper body
that mind is adequately revealed to sense. The migration of souls is
in this respect a false abstraction,[150] and physiology ought to have
made it one of its axioms that life had necessarily in its evolution
to attain to the human shape, as the sole sensuous phenomenon that
is appropriate to mind. The human form is employed in the classical
type of art not as mere sensuous existence, but exclusively as the
existence and physical form corresponding to mind, and is therefore
exempt from all the deficiencies of what is merely sensuous, and from
the contingent finiteness of phenomenal existence. The outer shape
must be thus purified in order to express in itself a content adequate
to itself; and again, if the conformity of import and content is to
be complete, the spiritual meaning which is the content must be of
a particular kind. It must, that is to say, be qualified to express
itself completely in the physical form of man, without projecting
into another world beyond the scope of such an expression in sensuous
and bodily terms. This condition has the effect that Mind is by it at
once specified as a particular case of mind, as human mind, and not
as simply absolute and eternal, inasmuch as mind in this latter sense
is incapable of proclaiming and expressing itself otherwise than as
intellectual being.[151]

Out of this latter point arises, in its turn, the defect which brings
about the dissolution of classical art, and demands a transition into a
third and higher form, viz. into the _romantic_ form of art.

([Greek: g]) The romantic form of art destroys the completed union
of the Idea and its reality, and recurs, though in a higher phase,
to that difference and antagonism of two aspects which was left
unvanquished by symbolic art. The classical type attained the highest
excellence, of which the sensuous embodiment of art is capable; and
if it is in any way defective, the defect is in art as a whole,
_i.e._ in the limitation of its sphere. This limitation consists in
the fact that art as such takes for its object Mind--the conception
of which is _infinite_ concrete universality--in the shape of
_sensuous_ concreteness, and in the classical phase sets up the perfect
amalgamation of spiritual and sensuous existence as a Conformity of
the two. Now, as a matter of fact, in such an amalgamation Mind cannot
be represented according to its true notion. For mind is the infinite
subjectivity of the Idea, which, as absolute inwardness,[152] is not
capable of finding free expansion in its true nature on condition of
remaining transposed into a bodily medium as the existence appropriate
to it.

As _an escape from such a condition_ the romantic form of art in its
turn dissolves the inseparable unity of the classical phase, because
it has won a significance which goes beyond the classical form of art
and its mode of expression.[153] This significance--if we may recall
familiar ideas--coincides with what Christianity declares to be true of
God as Spirit, in contradistinction to the Greek faith in gods which
forms the essential and appropriate content for classical art. In
Greek art the concrete import is potentially, but not explicitly, the
unity of the human and divine nature; a unity which, just because it
is purely _immediate_[154] and _not explicit_, is capable of adequate
manifestation in an immediate and sensuous mode. The Greek god is the
object of naive intuition and sensuous imagination. His shape is,
therefore, the bodily shape of man. The circle of his power and of his
being is individual and individually limited. In relation with the
subject,[155] he is, therefore, an essence and a power with which the
subject's inner being is merely in latent unity, not itself possessing
this unity as inward subjective knowledge. Now the higher stage is
the _knowledge_ of this _latent_ unity, which as latent is the import
of the classical form of art, and capable of perfect representation
in bodily shape. The elevation of the latent or potential into
self-conscious knowledge produces an enormous difference. It is the
infinite difference which, _e.g._, separates man as such from the
animals. Man is animal, but even in his animal functions he is not
confined within the latent and potential as the animal is, but becomes
conscious of them, learns to know them, and raises them--as, for
instance, the process of digestion--into self-conscious science. By
this means Man breaks the boundary of merely potential and immediate
consciousness, so that just for the reason that he knows himself
to be animal, he ceases to be animal, and, as _mind_, attains to
self-knowledge.

If in the above fashion the unity of the human and divine nature,
which in the former phase was potential, is raised from an _immediate_
to a _conscious_ unity, it follows that the true medium for the
reality of this content is no longer the sensuous immediate existence
of the spiritual, the human bodily shape, but _self-conscious
inward intelligence_.[156] Now, Christianity brings God before our
intelligence _as spirit_, or mind--not as particularized individual
spirit, but as absolute, in _spirit_ and in truth. And for this
reason Christianity retires from the sensuousness of imagination into
intellectual inwardness, and makes this, not bodily shape, the medium
and actual existence of its significance. So, too, the unity of the
human and divine nature is a conscious unity, only to be realized by
_spiritual_ knowledge and in _spirit_. Thus the new content, won by
this unity, is not inseparable from sensuous representation, as if that
were adequate to it, but is freed from this immediate existence, which
has to be posited[157] as negative, absorbed, and reflected into the
spiritual unity. In this way, romantic art must be considered as art
transcending itself, while remaining within the artistic sphere and in
artistic form.

Therefore, in short, we may abide by the statement that in this third
stage the object (of art) is _free_, concrete intellectual being, which
has the function of revealing itself as spiritual existence for the
inward[158] world of spirit. In conformity with such an object-matter,
art cannot work for sensuous perception. It must address itself to the
inward mind, which coalesces with its object simply and as though
this were itself,[159] to the subjective inwardness, to the heart, the
feeling, which, being spiritual, aspires to freedom within itself,
and seeks and finds its reconciliation only in the spirit within. It
is this _inner_ world that forms the content of the romantic, and
must therefore find its representation as such inward feeling, and
in the show or presentation of such feeling. The world of inwardness
celebrates its triumph over the outer world, and actually in the sphere
of the outer and in its medium manifests this its victory, owing to
which the sensuous appearance sinks into worthlessness.

But, on the other hand, this type of Art,[160] like every other, needs
an external vehicle of expression. Now the spiritual has withdrawn
into itself out of the external and its immediate oneness therewith.
For this reason, the sensuous externality of concrete form is accepted
and represented, as in Symbolic art, as something transient and
fugitive. And the same measure is dealt to the subjective finite mind
and will, even including the peculiarity or caprice of the individual,
of character, action, etc., or of incident and plot. The aspect of
external existence is committed to contingency, and left at the mercy
of freaks of imagination, whose caprice is no more likely to mirror
what is given _as_ it is given, than to throw the shapes of the outer
world into chance medley, or distort them into grotesqueness. For this
external element no longer has its notion and significance, as in
classical art, in its own sphere, and in its own medium. It has come
to find them in the feelings, the display of which is _in themselves_
instead of being in the external and _its_ form of reality, and which
have the power to preserve or to regain their state of reconciliation
with themselves, in every accident, in every unessential circumstance
that takes independent shape, in all misfortune and grief, and even in
crime.

Owing to this, the characteristics of symbolic art, in difference,
discrepancy, and severance of Idea and plastic shape, are here
reproduced, but with an essential difference. In the sphere of the
romantic, the Idea, whose defectiveness in the case of the symbol
produced the defect of external shape, has to reveal itself in the
medium of spirit and feelings as perfected in itself. And it is because
of this higher perfection that it withdraws itself from any adequate
union with the external element, inasmuch as it can seek and achieve
its true reality and revelation nowhere but in itself.

This we may take as in the abstract the character of the symbolic,
classical, and romantic forms of art, which represent the three
relations of the Idea to its embodiment in the sphere of art. They
consist in the aspiration after, and the attainment and transcendence
of the Ideal as the true Idea of beauty.

4. The third part of our subject, in contradistinction to the two just
described, presupposes the conception of the Ideal, and the general
types of art, inasmuch as it simply consists of their realization in
particular sensuous media. Hence we have no longer to do with the
inner development of artistic beauty in conformity with its general
fundamental principles. What we have to study is how these principles
pass into actual existence, how they distinguish themselves in their
external aspect, and how they give actuality to every element contained
in the idea of beauty, separately and by itself _as a work of art_, and
not merely as a general type. Now, what art transfers into external
existence are the differences[161] proper to the idea of beauty and
immanent therein. Therefore, the general types of art must reveal
themselves in this third part, as before, in the character of the
fundamental principle that determines the arrangement and definition
of the _several arts_; in other words, the species of art contain in
themselves the same essential modifications as those with which we
become acquainted as the general types of art. External objectivity,
however, to which these forms are introduced through the medium of a
sensuous and therefore _particular_ material, affects these types in
the way of making them _separate_ into independent and so particular
forms embodying their realization. For each type finds its definite
character in some one definite external material, and its adequate
actuality in the mode of portrayal which that prescribes. But,
moreover, these types of art, being for all their determinateness, its
_universal_ forms, break the bounds of _particular_ realization by a
determinate form of art, and achieve existence in other arts as well,
although in subordinate fashion. Therefore, the particular arts belong
each of them specifically to _one_ of the general types of art, and
constitute _its adequate_ external actuality; and also they represent,
each of them after its own mode of external plasticity, the totality of
the types of art.[162]

Then, speaking generally, we are dealing in this third principal
division with the beautiful of art, as it unfolds itself in the several
arts and in their creations into a _world_ of actualized beauty. The
content of this world is the beautiful, and the true beautiful, as
we saw, is spiritual being in concrete shape, the Ideal; or, more
closely looked at, the absolute mind, and the truth itself. This
region, that of divine truth artistically represented to perception
and to feeling, forms the centre of the whole world of art. It is the
independent, free, and divine plasticity, which has thoroughly mastered
the external elements of form and of medium, and wears them simply as
a means to manifestation of itself. Still, as the beautiful unfolds
itself in this region in the character of _objective_ reality, and
in so doing distinguishes within itself its individual aspects and
elements, permitting them independent particularity, it follows that
this centre erects its extremes, realized in their peculiar actuality,
into its own antitheses. Thus one of these extremes comes to consist
in an objectivity as yet devoid of mind, in the merely natural vesture
of God. At this point the external element takes plastic shape as
something that has its spiritual aim and content, not in itself, but in
another.[163]

The other extreme is the divine as inward, as something known, as
the variously particularized _subjective_ existence of the Deity;
it is the truth as operative and vital in sense, heart, and mind of
individual subjects, not persisting in the mould of its external
shapes, but as having returned into subjective, individual inwardness.
In such a mode, the Divine is at the same time distinguished from its
first manifestation as Deity, and passes thereby into the diversity
of particulars which belongs to all subjective knowledge--emotion,
perception, and feeling. In the analogous province of religion,
with which art at its highest stage is immediately connected, we
conceive this same difference as follows. _First_, we think of the
earthly natural life in its finiteness as standing on one side; but,
then, _secondly_, consciousness makes God its object, in which the
distinction of objectivity and subjectivity is done away. And at
last, _thirdly_, we advance from God as such to the devotion of the
community, that is, to God as living and present in the subjective
consciousness. Just so these three chief modifications present
themselves in the world of art in independent development.

([Greek: a]) The _first_ of the particular arts with which, according
to their fundamental principle, we have to begin, is architecture
considered as a fine art.[164] Its task lies in so manipulating
external inorganic nature that it becomes cognate to mind, as an
artistic outer world. The material of architecture is matter itself in
its immediate externality as a heavy mass subject to mechanical laws,
and its forms do not depart from the forms of inorganic nature, but
are merely set in order in conformity with relations of the abstract
understanding, _i.e._ with relations of symmetry. In this material and
in such forms, the ideal as concrete spirituality does not admit of
being realized. Hence the reality which is represented in them remains
contrasted with the Idea, as something external which it has not
penetrated, or has penetrated only to establish an abstract relation.
For these reasons, the fundamental type of the fine art of building
is the _symbolical_ form of art. It is architecture that pioneers the
way for the adequate realization of the God, and in this its service
bestows hard toil upon existing nature, in order to disentangle it from
the jungle of finitude and the abortiveness of chance. By this means it
levels a space for the God, gives form to his external surroundings,
and builds him his temple as a fit place for concentration of spirit,
and for its direction to the mind's absolute objects. It raises an
enclosure round the assembly of those gathered together, as a defence
against the threatening of the storm, against rain, the hurricane, and
wild beasts, and reveals the will to assemble, although externally, yet
in conformity with principles of art. With such import as this it has
power to inspire its material and its forms more or less effectively,
as the determinate character of the content on behalf of which it sets
to work is more or less significant, more concrete or more abstract,
more profound in sounding its own depths, or more dim and more
superficial. So much, indeed, may architecture attempt in this respect
as even to create an adequate artistic existence for such an import
in its shapes and in its material. But in such a case it has already
overstepped its own boundary, and is leaning to sculpture, the phase
above it. For the limit of architecture lies precisely in this point,
that it retains the spiritual as an inward existence over against the
external forms of the art, and consequently must refer to what has soul
only as to something other than its own creations.

[Greek: b] Architecture, however, as we have seen, has purified the
external world, and endowed it with symmetrical order and with affinity
to mind; and the temple of the God, the house of his community, stands
ready. Into this temple, then, in the _second_ place, the God enters in
the lightning-flash of individuality, which strikes and permeates the
inert mass, while the infinite[165] and no longer merely symmetrical
form belonging to mind itself concentrates and gives shape to the
corresponding bodily existence. This is the task of _Sculpture_. In
as far as in this art the spiritual inward being which architecture
can but indicate makes itself at home in the sensuous shape and its
external matter, and in as far as these two sides are so adapted to
one another that neither is predominant, sculpture must be assigned
the _classical form of art_ as its fundamental type. For this reason
the sensuous element itself has here no expression which could not
be that of the spiritual element, just as, conversely, sculpture can
represent no spiritual content which does not admit throughout of being
adequately presented to perception in bodily form. Sculpture should
place the spirit before us in its bodily form and in immediate unity
therewith at rest and in peace; and the form should be animated by the
content of spiritual individuality. And so the external sensuous matter
is here no longer manipulated, either in conformity with its mechanical
quality alone, as a mass possessing weight, nor in shapes belonging
to the inorganic world, nor as indifferent to colour, etc.; but it is
wrought in ideal forms of the human figure, and, it must be remarked,
in all three spatial dimensions.

In this last respect we must claim for sculpture, that it is in it that
the inward and spiritual are first revealed in their eternal repose
and essential self-completeness. To such repose and unity with itself
there can correspond only that external shape which itself maintains
its unity and repose. And this is fulfilled by shape in its abstract
spatiality.[166] The spirit which sculpture represents is that which
is solid in itself, not broken up in the play of trivialities and of
passions; and hence its external form too is not abandoned to any
manifold phases of appearance, but appears under this one aspect only,
as the abstraction of space in the whole of its dimensions.

([Greek: g]) Now, after architecture has erected the temple, and
the hand of sculpture has supplied it with the statue of the God,
then, in the third place, this god present to sense is confronted in
the spacious halls of his house by the _community_. The community
is the spiritual reflection into itself of such sensuous existence,
and is the animating subjectivity and inner life which brings about
the result that the determining principle for the content of art, as
well as for the medium which represents it in outward form, comes to
be particularization [dispersion into various shapes, attributes,
incidents, etc.], individualization, and the subjectivity which they
require.[167] The solid unity which the God has in sculpture breaks up
into the multitudinous inner lives of individuals, whose unity is not
sensuous, but purely ideal.[168]

It is only in this stage that God Himself comes to be really and
truly spirit--the spirit in His (God's) community; for He here
begins to be a to-and-fro, an alternation between His unity within
himself and his realization in the individual's knowledge and in
its separate being, as also in the common nature and union of the
multitude. In the community, God is released from the abstractness
of unexpanded self-identity, as well as from the simple absorption
in a bodily medium, by which sculpture represents Him. And He is
thus exalted into spiritual existence and into knowledge, into the
reflected[169] appearance which essentially displays itself as inward
and as subjectivity. Therefore the higher content is now the spiritual
nature, and that in its absolute shape. But the dispersion of which
we have spoken reveals this at the same time as particular spiritual
being, and as individual character. Now, what manifests itself in
this phase as the main thing is not the serene quiescence of the God
in Himself, but appearance as such, being which is _for_ another,
self-manifestation. And hence, in the phase we have reached, all the
most manifold subjectivity in its living movement and operation--as
human passion, action, and incident, and, in general, the wide realm
of human feeling, will, and its negation,--is for its own sake the
object of artistic representation. In conformity with this content, the
sensuous element of art has at once to show itself as made particular
in itself and as adapted to subjective inwardness. Media that fulfil
this requirement we have in colour, in musical sound, and finally in
sound as the mere indication of inward perceptions and ideas; and as
modes of realizing the import in question by help of these media we
obtain painting, music, and poetry. In this region the sensuous medium
displays itself as subdivided in its own being and universally set down
as ideal.[170] Thus it has the highest degree of conformity with the
content of art, which, as such, is spiritual, and the connection of
intelligible import and sensuous medium develops into closer intimacy
than was possible in the case of architecture and sculpture. The unity
attained, however, is a more inward unity, the weight of which is
thrown wholly on the subjective side, and which, in as far as form and
content are compelled to particularize themselves and give themselves
merely ideal existence, can only come to pass at the expense of the
objective universality of the content and also of its amalgamation with
the immediately sensuous element.[171]

The arts, then, of which form and content exalt themselves to ideality,
abandon the character of symbolic architecture and the classical ideal
of sculpture, and therefore borrow their type from the romantic form
of art, whose mode of plasticity they are most adequately adapted to
express. And they constitute a _totality_ of arts, because the romantic
type is the most concrete in itself.[172]

i. The articulation of this _third sphere_ of the individual arts may
be determined as follows. The _first_ art in it, which comes next to
sculpture, is painting. It employs as a medium for its content and for
the plastic embodiment of that content visibility as such in as far as
it is specialized in its own nature, _i.e._ as developed into colour.
It is true that the material employed in architecture and sculpture is
also visible and coloured; but it is not, as in painting, visibility
as such, not the simple light which, differentiating itself in virtue
of its contrast with darkness, and in combination with the latter,
gives rise to colour.[173] This quality of visibility, made subjective
in itself and treated as ideal, needs neither, like architecture,
the abstractly mechanical attribute of mass as operative in the
properties of heavy matter, nor, like sculpture, the complete sensuous
attributes of space, even though concentrated into organic shapes.
The visibility and the rendering visible which belong to painting
have their differences in a more ideal form, in the several kinds of
colour, and they liberate art from the sensuous completeness in space
which attaches to material things, by restricting themselves to a plane
surface.

On the other hand, the content also attains the most comprehensive
specification. Whatever can find room in the human heart, as feeling,
idea, and purpose; whatever it is capable of shaping into act--all this
diversity of material is capable of entering into the varied content of
painting. The whole realm of particular existence, from the highest
embodiment of mind down to the most isolated object of nature, finds
a place here. For it is possible even for finite nature,[174] in its
particular scenes and phenomena, to make its appearance in the realm
of art, if only some allusion to an element of mind endows it with
affinity to thought and feeling.

ii. The _second_ art in which the romantic type realizes itself is
contrasted with painting, and is music. Its medium, though still
sensuous, yet develops into still more thorough subjectivity and
particularization. Music, too, treats the sensuous as ideal, and does
so by negating,[175] and idealizing into the individual isolation of a
single point, the indifferent externality[176] of space, whose complete
semblance is accepted and imitated by painting. The single point, _qua_
such a negativity (excluding space) is in itself a concrete and active
process of positive negation[177] within the attributes of matter, in
the shape of a motion and tremor of the material body within itself and
in its relation to itself. Such an inchoate ideality of matter,[178]
which appears no longer as under the form of space, but as temporal
ideality,[179] is sound, the sensuous set down as negated, with its
abstract visibility converted into audibility, inasmuch as sound, so to
speak, liberates the ideal content from its immersion in matter. This
earliest inwardness of matter and inspiration of soul into it furnishes
the medium for the mental inwardness--itself as yet indefinite,--and
for the soul[180] into which mind concentrates itself; and finds
utterance in its tones for the heart with its whole gamut of feelings
and passions. Thus music forms the centre of the romantic arts, just
as sculpture represents the central point between architecture and
the arts of romantic subjectivity. Thus, too, it forms the point of
transition between abstract spatial sensuousness, such as painting
employs, and the abstract spirituality of poetry. Music has within
itself, like architecture, a relation of quantity conformable to the
understanding, as the antithesis to emotion and inwardness; and has
also as its basis a solid conformity to law on the part of the tones,
of their conjunction, and of their succession.

iii. most spiritual mode of representation of the romantic art-type,
we must look for it in _poetry_. Its characteristic peculiarity lies
in the power with which it subjects to the mind and to its ideas the
sensuous element from which music and painting in their degree began
to liberate art. For sound, the only external matter which poetry
retains, is in it no longer the feeling of the sonorous itself, but is
a _sign_, which by itself is void of import. And it is a sign of the
idea which has become concrete in itself and not merely of indefinite
feeling and of its _nuances_ and grades. This is how sound develops
into the _Word_, as voice articulate in itself, whose import it is
to indicate ideas and notions. The merely negative point up to which
music had developed now makes its appearance as the completely concrete
point, the point which is mind, the self-conscious individual, which,
producing out of itself the infinite space of its ideas, unites it
with the temporal character of sound. Yet this sensuous element,
which in music was still immediately one with inward feeling, is in
poetry separated from the content of consciousness. In poetry the
mind determines this content for its own sake, and apart from all
else, into the shape of ideas, and though it employs sound to express
them, yet treats it solely as a symbol without value or import. Thus
considered, sound may just as well be reduced to a mere letter, for the
audible, like the visible, is thus depressed into a mere indication of
mind.[181] For this reason the proper medium of poetical representation
is the poetical imagination and intellectual portrayal itself. And as
this element is common to all types of art, it follows that poetry runs
through them all and develops itself independently in each. Poetry is
the universal art of the mind which has become free in its own nature,
and which is not tied to find its realization in external sensuous
matter, but expatiates exclusively in the inner space and inner time
of the ideas and feelings. Yet just in this its highest phase art
ends by transcending itself, inasmuch as it abandons the medium of a
harmonious embodiment of mind in sensuous form, and passes from the
poetry of imagination into the prose of thought.

5. Such we may take to be the articulated totality of the particular
arts, viz. the external art of architecture, the objective art of
sculpture, and the subjective art of painting music and poetry.
Many other classifications have been attempted, for a work of art
presents so many aspects, that, as has often been the case, first one
and then another is made the basis of classification. For instance,
one might take the sensuous medium. Thus architecture is treated as
crystallization; sculpture, as the organic modelling of the material in
its sensuous and spatial totality; painting, as the coloured surface
and line; while in music, space, as such, passes into the point of
time possessed of content within itself, until finally the external
medium is in poetry depressed into complete insignificance. Or, again,
these differences have been considered with reference to their purely
abstract attributes of space and time. Such abstract peculiarities of
works of art may, like their material medium, be consistently explored
in their characteristic traits; but they cannot be worked out as the
ultimate and fundamental law, because any such aspect itself derives
its origin from a higher principle, and must therefore be subordinate
thereto.

This higher principle we have found in the types of art--symbolic,
classical, and romantic--which are the universal stages or
elements[182] of the Idea of beauty itself. For _symbolic art_
attains its most adequate reality and most complete application in
_architecture_, in which it holds sway in the full import of its
notion, and is not yet degraded to be, as it were, the inorganic
nature dealt with by another art. The _classical_ type of art, on the
other hand, finds adequate realization in sculpture, while it treats
architecture only as furnishing an enclosure in which it is to operate,
and has not acquired the power of developing painting and music as
absolute[183] forms for its content. The _romantic_ type of art,
finally, takes possession of painting and music, and in like manner
of poetic representation, as substantive and unconditionally adequate
modes of utterance. Poetry, however, is conformable to all types of the
beautiful, and extends over them all, because the artistic imagination
is its proper medium, and imagination is essential to every product
that belongs to the beautiful, whatever its type may be.

And, therefore, what the particular arts realize in individual works
of art, are according to their abstract conception simply the universal
types which constitute the self-unfolding Idea of beauty. It is as the
external realization of this Idea that the wide Pantheon of art is
being erected, whose architect and builder is the spirit of beauty as
it awakens to self-knowledge, and to complete which the history of the
world will need its evolution of ages.




FOOTNOTES:

[1] New York, Appleton and Co.

[2] Chicago, Griggs and Co., 1885.

[3] Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1886.

[4] Of these, Chapter III. is subdivided into two Parts, because of the
disproportionate length of the division in the original to which it
corresponds.

[5] Preface to "Sordello."

[6] "Endless duration makes good no better, nor white any whiter," is
one of Aristotle's comments on Plato's "eternal" ideas, and is just,
unless "eternal" conveys a difference of kind.

[7] Whewell, I think, misinterprets Plato's language about astronomy
in this sense. Plato is not decrying observation, but demanding a
theoretical treatment of the laws of motion,--a remarkable anticipation
of modern ideas.

[8] "A Year with the Birds," by an Oxford Tutor.

[9] See note above, p. xii.

[10] The fusion of these meanings in the German "Geist" gives a force
to his pleading which English cannot render. He appeals, _e.g._,
triumphantly to "God is a Spirit," _i.e._ not "a ghost" but "mind."

[11] See Tennyson's "Higher Pantheism," especially the fine lines--

    "Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet,
      Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."


[12] In Baumgarten's "Æsthetica," 1750. See Lotze's "Æsthetik in
Deutschland," p. 4, and Scherer's "Hist. of German Literature," Engl.
Transl., ii. 25.

[13] _Aus dem Geiste_--allusion to "born of water and of the Spirit."

[14] Not in the sense of fancying what you please, but in the technical
sense of having separate existence; detached, so to speak, from the
general background of things, not a mere concurrence of other elements.

[15] Has no power of distinguishing itself from other things.

[16] "_Das Schöne--in dem Scheine._"

[17] "_Gesetzmässigkeit._"

[18] "_Raisonnement_"--a disparaging term in Hegel.

[19] "Particular"--different unconnected matters, considered as merely
thrown together in an aggregate, or occurring in a series; opposed to
parts or cases united by an essential principle.

[20] "_Das Göttliche._"

[21] "_Schiene und erschiene._"

[22] The life in which we treat common circumstances and sensations as,
in their degree, realities.

[23] "_Das An--und Fürsichseyende._"

[24] "_Explication._"

[25] "_Material_," _e.g._ colour, sound, heavy matter, etc.

[26] "_Element_:" perhaps more especially any mental function entering
into art--sense, imagination, understanding, etc.

[27] "Philosophy," "_Wissenschaft_."

[28] "_Haltpunkte_:" ultimate points that the matter of art must not
leave hold of, leading ideas that must somehow dominate it.

[29] "_Gestaltung_:" shaping, as if arrangement of shapes.

[30] "_Kunstkenntniss._"

[31] "_Gelehrsamkeit._"

[32] "_Paränetischen Lehren._"

[33] "_Bildenden Künste._" I am not sure if I have given the best
rendering. It is wider than _Plastik_, because it includes painting and
architecture.

[34] _Die Horen_--the monthly magazine whose establishment by Schiller,
in 1795, first brought Schiller and Goethe into contact. It only
existed for three years. See Scherer, Eng. Trans., ii. 173.

[35] That is, not a caprice of nature or art, but the perfection of the
object _after its kind_.

[36] "_Individualität._"

[37] "_Helldunkel._"

[38] "_Drama_," Gr. [Greek: drama] = _Handlung_, "action."

[39] "_Erscheinung._"

[40] "_Bestimmung._"

[41] "_Bestimmend._"

[42] "_Begeistet wird_"--"Is spiritualized."

[43] I have no doubt he means Shakespeare, who was unpopular in Germany
before Goethe's time. _Vide_ "Wilhelm Meister."

[44] "_Das Wahre sehen nicht die einzelnen_," etc.

[45] The exhibition of particulars as contained in the principle, and
of the principle as contained in particulars.

[46] "_Machen._"

[47] "_Nach-machen._"

[48] See Appendix to Eng. Trans. of Scherer, ii. 347. Goethe's "Götz
von Berlichingen" appeared in 1773; Schiller's "Raüber" in 1781.

[49] The "Iphigenie" was completed in Goethe's thirty-eighth year,
fourteen years later than "Götz." The bulk of his great works are of
the same date as the "Iphigenie," or later. See Scherer, ii. 152,
and Appendix, 1. c. Schiller's "Wallenstein" was completed after his
thirty-fifth year.

[50] Free from irrelevancies.

[51] _i.e._ it requires a definite or determinate answer, depending on
a number of ideas which cannot be explained in an introduction.

[52] _i.e._ considered generally, apart from the wishes and, perhaps,
selfish aims of individual artists.

[53] "_Fursichsein._"

[54] Reality derivative from his own reality.

[55] He means as in attitude, bearing, gentle movement, etc.

[56] "_Bildung._"

[57] "_Bedurfniss zur Kunst._"

[58] _i.e._ you cannot describe it or picture it definitely, like a
thing with attributes, although you feel it in yourself.

[59] _i.e._ you may be afraid of anything; the fact that you are afraid
does not in itself indicate what you are afraid of.

[60] My private feeling is compared to a small circle, in which
morality, justice, etc., may _be_, but have not room to show their
nature. Feeling allows of no definition.

[61] _All_ its positive aspects or relations, age, phase, artist's
history, etc.

[62] Its sensuous aspect has no independent warrant or justification,
as that, for example, of an animal has in its own separate life. So it
must simply be such as is enough to appeal to man's mind, _e.g._ mere
surface painting.

[63] _i.e._ person.

[64] Nothing can be tasted which is not dissolved in a liquid.

[65] "_Anschauungen._"

[66] Abstract forms, which are to reality as a diagram to a picture.

[67] Lit. "figure," _Gestalt_.

[68] "_Handgriffen._"

[69] "_Eines geistreichen._"

[70] General, abstract, as much applicable to one thing as to another.

[71] "_Heuchelei_," lit. "hypocrisy."

[72] "_Kunststück._"

[73] _i.e._ _mere_ copying, devoting one's-self to the one-sided
purpose of making a thing over again, without putting any life or
meaning into it.

[74] Which says that the business of art is to imitate.

[75] Of imitation.

[76] "_Phantastischen._" "Fantastic" means "odd or wild." Hegel only
means "original," "creative."

[77] Mechanical, without origination.

[78] "_Nüancen._" Context seems to forbid referring it to colour. I
suspect it of meaning character of outline.

[79] "_Erschüttern._"

[80] "_Raisonnirende_;" a term of disparagement in Hegel, applied to
proofs, _pro_ and _con_, which do not rest on a thorough conception of
the fundamental nature of what is being discussed.

[81] "_Raisonnement._"

[82] "Formal" means here as usual, empty, or general; _i.e._ not taking
account of varieties in the matter to which it is applied.

[83] "_Befangensein._"

[84] "_Theoretisch._" I have no doubt that it has here the meaning
of [Greek: Theôrein] without a trace of allusion to "theory." It is
opposed to "destructive," or "appetitive."

[85] The moral.

[86] Person, _i.e._, here, audience or spectator.

[87] "_Kernspruch._"

[88] "Contingent" means, not so much "what may or may not exist," as
the trivial, which makes no difference whether it exists or not.

[89] "_In ihm selbst gebrochenes._" I do not suppose there is an
allusion to the words I use.

[90] "_Sittlichkeit_" almost = morality in the English sense. It means
the habit of virtue, without the reflective aspiration after goodness
as an ideal.

[91] "_Moralität_" almost = conscientiousness or scrupulosity. The
above sentence is hardly true with the English word "moral."

[92] "_Für sich_," is often used where there is no notion of
development, and seems very like "an sich."

[93] "_Gemüth._"

[94] As _e.g._ if we suppose that an act done at the bidding of natural
affection cannot also be a fulfilment of the command of duty. The
"reconciliation" would be in supposing the natural affection, _e.g._
for parents, to operate as a moral motive, being transformed by a
recognition of its sacred or spiritual character.

[95] "_An und für sich._"

[96] "_An und für sich Wahre._"

[97] "_Allgemeine Bildung._"

[98] "_Vorstellung._"

[99] See Pref. Essay, p. xix.

[100] Or conscientiousness--what was above described as the moralistic
view.

[101] "_An sich._"

[102] "_An und für sich wahrem und wirklichem._"

[103] See p. 68, _supra_.

[104] "_Der mensch wie er geht und steht._"

[105] "_An und für sich._"

[106] "_Zweck-mässigkeit._"

[107] _i.e._ in any means which we adopt in order to effect an end
which we have distinctly before us as an idea. A knife does not include
cutting, nor a spade digging, although their construction is relative
to these ends. But a man does include living, _i.e._ he is not a man if
he ceases to live.

[108] "_Für sich._"

[109] "_An und für sich._"

[110] By Kant.

[111] "_Unbefangenheit._"

[112] On Goethe's discoveries in morphology and errors in optics, see
Helmholtz's "Popular Lectures," series i., lecture ii.; but compare
Schopenhauer, "Werke," vol. i., "_Ueber das Sehn und die Farben_."

[113] Compare Browning's "Luria:"--

    "A people is but the attempt of many
    To rise to the completer life of one."

[114] Or "Of the moral, etc., man."

[115] "_Ueber Anmuth und Würde_," "Of Grace and Dignity," a work of
Schiller that appeared in 1793.

[116] "_Gesinnungen._"

[117] The Baccalaureus' speech in Faust (Part 2) "Die Welt, sie war
nicht, eh' ich sie erschuf," etc., appears to be a parody of Fichte's
ideas in this aspect.

[118] I think the order of the German must be a misprint. "_So ist
nichts an und für sich und in sich selbst werthvoll betrachtet._"

[119] "_An und für sich seyende._"

[120] The three points are, (i.) The I is abstract. (ii.) Everything is
a semblance for it. (iii.) Its own acts, even, are a semblance.

[121] Not literal. "_Das alles an sich setzende und auflösende Ich._"

[122] _Formal_ freedom is detachment from everything, or the (apparent)
capacity of alternatives; it is opposed to _real_ freedom, which
is identification of one's-self with something that is capable of
satisfying one.

[123] "_Genialität_:" the character or state of mind in which genius is
dominant--here, the mere self-enjoyment of genius.

[124] "_Selbstgenuss._" I do not think it means self-indulgence, but
the above-described enjoyment of reposing in the superiority of the ego.

[125] "_Eitelkeit_," also = "conceit;" which is the other side of this
attitude. Hegel uses it on purpose.

[126] "_Eitle._"

[127] "_Sehnsuchtigkeit._"

[128] "_Krankhafte Schönseligkeit._" _Schönseligkeit_ seems to be
really a word formed like _Redselig_, etc., but to be given an
equivocating reference to "_Schöne Seele_," which I have rendered in
the next sentence by "saintly soul."

[129] "_Eitlen_," "_Eitelkeit._"

[130] This recurring phrase may be used etymologically, as a
reminiscence of the Platonic [Greek: plêrousthai].

[131] _Haltung_: "bearing" in general, and more especially _the_
bearing of one who bears himself nobly by reason of a principle.

[132] See Scherer, Eng. Transl., ii. 248.

[133] It is natural for a reader to ask in _what_ person or subject God
is conceived to have reality. On this see below, p. 165. It appears
certain to me that Hegel, when he writes thus, is referring to the
self-consciousness of individual human beings as constituting, and
reflecting on, an ideal unity between them. This may seem to put a
non-natural meaning on the term "person" or "subject," as if the common
element of a number of intelligences could be a single person. It is
obvious that the question hinges on the degree in which a unity that
is not sensuous but ideal can be effective and actual. I can only say
here, that the more we consider the nature of ideal unity the higher we
shall rate its capabilities. See Prefatory Essay, p. xiv.

[134] _Fackeldistel_ = "Torch thistle," a plant of the genus _Cereus_,
Nat. Order _Cactaceæ_.

[135] Or "as spirit and in spirit."

[136] The idea of art.

[137] The two evolutions are, speaking roughly, (i.) that of the
subject-matter; (ii.) that of the particular mode of art: (i.)
_e.g._ you have Egyptian, Greek, Christian religion, etc., with the
corresponding views and sentiments, each in its own relation to
art; (ii.) you have, as a cross division to the former, the several
arts--sculpture, music, poetry, etc., each having its special ground
and warrant.

[138] He is asking himself why sound or paint, etc., should correspond
to one type of art as theoretically defined--this being intellectual,
not sensuous, at root--and answers that these media _qua_ natural
objects have, though more latent than in works of art, an import and
purpose of their own, which reveals itself in their suitability to
particular forms of art.

[139] "_Gestaltungsformen._" I use "plastic" all through in a
pregnant sense, as one speaks of plastic fancy, etc.; meaning ideally
determinate, and fit for translating into pictures, poetry, etc. These
"plastic forms" are the various modifications of the subject-matter of
art. See note, p. 139, above.

[140] See note, p. 139, above.

[141] See p. 134, above.

[142] "_Gestaltung._" I do not think this means the process of shaping,
but the shapes taken collectively.

[143] _i.e._ not in a separate ideal shape devoted to it. He means that
man takes a stock or stone as representation or symbol of the divine,
and as there is no real connection between divinity and the stone, it
may either be left untouched and unshaped, or be hewn into any bizarre
or arbitrary shape that comes to hand: see next paragraph.

[144] This description is probably directed, in the first place, to
the Indian representation of deities, and would apply to those of
many barbaric religions. But its truth may be very simply verified in
daily observation of the first attempts of the uneducated at plastic
presentation of their ideas, where costliness, ingenuity, labour, or
size take the place of beauty.

[145] "_Sie als Inneres._"

[146] _i.e._ an idea or purpose which gives these partial and defective
representations all the meaning they have, although they are incapable
of really expressing it.

[147] "_Gährung_," lit. "fermentation."

[148] "_Der ursprüngliche Begriff_," lit. "the original notion."

[149] _i.e._ God or the Universe _invented_ man to be the expression of
mind; art _finds_ him, and adapts his shape to the artistic embodiment
of mind as concentrated in individual instances.

[150] Because it represents the soul as independent of an appropriate
body--the human soul as capable of existing in a beast's body.

[151] "_Geistigkeit._" "The nature of thought, mind, or spirit." It
cannot be here rendered by mind or spirit, because these words make us
think of an isolated individual, a mind or soul, and neglect the common
spiritual or intellectual nature, which is referred to by the author.

[152] It is the essence of mind or thought not to have its parts
outside one another. The so-called terms of a judgment are a good
instance of parts in thought which are inward to each other.

[153] Compare Browning's "Old Pictures in Florence."

[154] _i.e._ in the form of feeling and imagination--not reflected upon.

[155] Subject, _i.e._ conscious individual person.

[156] "_Innerlichkeit_," lit. "inwardness."

[157] Taken, considered as or determined to be negative.

[158] "Inward," again, does not mean merely inside our heads, but
having the character of spirit in that its parts are not external to
one another. A judgment is thus "inward."

[159] _i.e._ does not keep up a distinction between percipient and
object, as between things in space. Goodness, nobleness, etc., are not
felt to be other than or outside the mind.

[160] The romantic.

[161] _i.e._ species, modifications naturally arising out of a
principle.

[162] Thus _e.g._ Sculpture is _the_ art which corresponds _par
excellence_ to the general type called Classical Art; but there is _a_
Symbolic kind of sculpture, and I suppose _a_ Romantic or modern kind
of sculpture, although neither of these types are exactly fitted to the
capabilities of Sculpture.

[163] Architecture as relative to the purposes of life and of religion.
See below, p. 162.

[164] "_Die schöne Architectur._"

[165] In the sense "self-complete," "not primarily regarded as
explained by anything outside," like a machine or an animal contrasted
with a wheel or a limb, which latter are finite, because they demand
explanation and supplementation from without, _i.e._ necessarily draw
attention to their own limit.

[166] _i.e._ shape taken simply as an object filling space.

[167] The terms used in the text explain themselves if we compare,
_e.g._, a Teniers with a Greek statue, or again, say, a Turner with the
same. "Subjectivity" means that the work of art appeals to our ordinary
feelings, experiences, etc. Music and poetry are still stronger cases
than painting, according to the theory. Poetry especially can deal with
_everything_.

[168] The unity of the individuals forming a church or nation is not
visible, but exists in common sentiments, purposes, etc., and in the
recognition of their community.

[169] An expression constantly applied to consciousness, because it can
look at itself. _Cf._:--

    "'Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?'
    'No, Cassius; for the eye sees not itself
    But by reflection, by some other things.'"

    _Julius Cæsar._

[170] Posited or laid down to be ideal; almost = pronounced or made
_to be_ in the sense of _not being_; e.g. musical sound is "ideal" as
existing, _qua_ work of art, in memory only, the moment in which it
is actually heard being fugitive; a picture, in respect of the third
dimension, which has to be read into it; and poetry is almost wholly
ideal, _i.e._ uses hardly any sensuous element, but appeals almost
entirely to what exists _in the mind_. "Subdivided," "_besondert_,"
like "_particularisirt_" above; because of the variety and diversity
present in the mere material of colours, musical sounds, and ideas.

[171] Again, the subject of a Turner or Teniers is not objectively
universal, in the simplest sense; not something that is actually and
literally the same everywhere and for every one. And both painting and
music (immediately sensuous elements) are less completely amalgamated
with the ideal, represent it less solidly and thoroughly than the
statue, so far as the ideal is itself external or plastic.

[172] The greater affinity of Romantic art with the movement and
variety of the modern spirit displays itself not only in the
greater flexibility of painting, music, or poetry, as compared with
architecture and sculpture, but in the fact that the Romantic type
contains these three arts at least, while the Symbolic and Classical
types had only one art each.

[173] This is drawn from Goethe's doctrine of colour, which Hegel
unfortunately adopted in opposition to Newton's theory.

[174] He means landscape, principally.

[175] "_Aufheben_," used pregnantly by Hegel to mean _both_ "cancel,"
"annul," _and_, "preserve," "fix in mind," "idealize." The use of this
word is a cardinal point of his dialectic. See "Wiss. der Logik.,"
i. 104. I know of no equivalent but "put by," provincial Scotch "put
past." The negation of space is an attribute of music. The parts of
a chord are no more in space than are the parts of a judgment. Hegel
expresses this by saying that music idealizes space and concentrates it
into a point.

[176] The parts of space, though external to each other, are not
distinguished by qualitative peculiarities.

[177] "_Aufheben._"

[178] "Ideality of matter:" the distinctively material attribute of a
sonorous body, its extension, only appears in its sound indirectly, or
inferentially, by modifying the nature of the sound. It is, therefore,
"idealized."

[179] Succession in time is a degree more "ideal" than co-existence in
space, because it exists solely in the medium of memory.

[180] "_Seele_:" mind on its individual side, as a particular feeling
subject. "_Geist_" is rather mind as the common nature of intelligence.
Thus in feeling and self-feeling, mind is said to concentrate itself
into a soul.

[181] Hegel seems to accept this view. Was he insensible to sound in
poetry? Some very grotesque verses of his, preserved in his biography,
go to show that his ear was not sensitive. Yet his critical estimate
of poetry is usually just. Shakespeare and Sophocles were probably his
favourites. And, as a matter of proportion, what he here says is true.
It must be remembered that the beauty of sound in poetry is to a great
extent indirect, being supplied by the passion or emotion which the
ideas symbolized by the sounds arouse. The beauty of poetical sound
in itself _is_ very likely less than often supposed. It must have the
capacity for receiving passionate expression; but that is not the same
as the sensuous beauty of a note or a colour. If the words used in a
noble poem were divested of all meaning, they would lose much, though
not all, of the beauty of their sound.

[182] "Stages or elements." "_Momente_," Hegel's technical phrase for
the stages which form the essential parts or factors of any idea. They
make their appearance successively, but the earlier are implied and
retained in the later.

[183] Adequate, and so of permanent value.

THE END.

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_II. RELIGION._

THEOLOGY, EXEGESIS, DEVOTIONAL WORKS, ETC.

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=PULPIT COMMENTARY, The (Old Testament Series).= Edited by the Very
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=SCHLEIERMACHER, F., On Religion.= Speeches to its Cultured Despisers.
Translated, with Introduction, by J. OMAN. 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=TAYLER, J. J., Retrospect of the Religious Life of England=; or,
Church, Puritanism, and Free Inquiry. Second Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._
6_d._

=TIELE, Prof. C. P., Outlines of the History of Religion to the Spread
of the Universal Religions.= From the Dutch, by J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.
Fifth Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ (_Philosophical Library, and
Trübner's Oriental Series._)


 =History of the Egyptian and Mesopotamian Religions.= Translated by J.
 BALLINGAL. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=TRENCH, Archbishop, Notes on the Parables of our Lord.= 8vo, 12_s._
Cheap Edition. Sixty-first Thousand. 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Notes on the Miracles of our Lord.= 8vo, 12_s._ Cheap Edition.
 Forty-eighth Thousand. 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Brief Thoughts and Meditations on some Passages in Holy Scripture.=
 Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =Apocalypse: Commentary on the Epistles to the Seven Churches of
 Asia.= Fourth Edition, revised. 8vo, 8_s._ 6_d._

 =On the Authorised Version of the New Testament.= Second Edition. 8vo,
 7_s._

 =Proverbs and their Lessons.= Eighth Edition, enlarged. Foolscap 8vo,
 4_s._

 =Studies in the Gospels.= Fifth Edition, revised. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Synonyms of the New Testament.= Tenth Edition, enlarged. 8vo, 12_s._

 =Sermons, New and Old.= Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =Lectures on Mediæval Church History.= Being the substance of Lectures
 delivered at Queen's College, London. Second Edition. 8vo, 12_s._

 =Shipwrecks of Faith.= Three Sermons preached before the University of
 Cambridge. Foolscap 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

 =Westminster and other Sermons.= Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=TRUMBULL, H. CLAY, The Blood-Covenant.= A Primitive Rite, and its
bearing on Scripture. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=TURTON, Major W. H., The Truth of Christianity.= Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=WILSON, Archdeacon, Rochdale Sermons, 1891-4.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=WYLD, Dr. GEORGE, Christo-Theosophy;= or, Spiritual Dynamics. Crown
8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._ net.


RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY AND SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY.

(_See also_ PHILOSOPHY.)

 =ARNOLD, Sir EDWIN, Death--and Afterwards.= Reprinted from the
 _Fortnightly Review_ of August, 1885, with a Supplement. Eleventh
 Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth, 1_s._ 6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._

 =FEUERBACH, L., Essence of Christianity.= From the German, by MARIAN
 EVANS. Second Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ (_Philosophical Library._)

 =FITZARTHUR, T., The Worth of Human Testimony.= Foolscap 8vo, 2_s._

 =GRAHAM, WILLIAM, Creed of Science, Religious, Moral, and Social.=
 Second Edition, revised. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =GREG, W. R., The Creed of Christendom.= Eighth Edition. 2 vols. post
 8vo, 15_s._ (_Philosophical Library._)

 =Enigmas of Life.= Seventeenth Edition. Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._
 New Edition, with Prefatory Memoir, Edited by his Wife. 6_s._
 (_Philosophical Library._)

 =Miscellaneous Essays.= Two Series. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ each.

=HEGEL, G. W. F., Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.= Translated
by the Rev. E. B. SPIERS and J. BURDON SANDERSON. 3 vols. 8vo, 12_s._
each.

  (_See also_ PHILOSOPHY.)

=HEINE, H., Religion and Philosophy in Germany.= Translated by J.
SNODGRASS. Post 8vo, 6_s._ (_Philosophical Library._)

=MORISON, J. COTTER, The Service of Man.= An Essay towards the Religion
of the Future. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=NEWMAN, F. W., Miscellanies.= Essays, Tracts, and Addresses, Moral and
Religious. 8vo. Vol. I. 10s. 6d.

=PHYSICUS, Candid Examination of Theism.= Second Edition. Post 8vo,
7_s._ 6_d._ (_Philosophical Library._)

=READE, WINWOOD, The Martyrdom of Man.= Fourteenth Edition. Crown 8vo.
7_s._ 6_d._

=WARD, W. G., Essays on the Philosophy of Theism.= Edited, with an
Introduction, by WILFRID WARD. 2 vols. 8vo, 21_s._


MYTHOLOGY, ETC.

 =BRINTON, D. G., Rig Veda Americanus.= 8vo, 12_s._

 =COX, Sir G. W., Bart., Mythology of the Aryan Nations.= New Edition.
 8vo, 16_s._

 =Tales of Ancient Greece.= New Edition. Small crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =Tales of the Gods and Heroes.= Small Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =Manual of Mythology in the Form of Question and Answer.= New Edition.
 Foolscap 8vo, 3_s._

 =Introduction to the Science of Comparative Mythology and Folk-Lore.=
 Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=DOWSON, JOHN, Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology and History,
Geography and Literature.= Post 8vo, 16_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental
Series._)

=GUBERNATIS, ANGELO DE, Zoological Mythology=; or, The Legends of
Animals. 2 vols. 8vo, £1 8_s._

=MUIR, JOHN, Cosmogony, Mythology, etc., of the Indians in the Vedic
Age.= Third Edition. £1 1_s._

=VIGNOLI, TITO, Myth and Science.= An Essay. Third Edition. With
Supplementary Note. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I.S.S._)

=WAKE, C. S., Serpent Worship=, and other Essays, with a Chapter on
Totemism. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=WESTROPP, H. M., Primitive Symbolism as Illustrated in Phallic
Worship=; or, The Reproductive Principle. With Introduction by
Major-Gen. FORLONG. 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=WILSON, H. H., Vishnu Puráná.= A System of Hindu Mythology and
Tradition. From the original Sanskrit. Illustrated by Notes derived
chiefly from other Puránás. Translated by H. H. WILSON. Edited by FITZ
EDWARD HALL. 5 vols, £3 4_s._ 6_d._


FOLK-LORE.

 =BLEEK, W. H. I., Hottentot Folk-Lore.--Reynard the Fox in South
 Africa=; or, Hottentot Fables and Tales. Post 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =CATLIN, GEORGE, Mandan Customs.--O-Kee-Pa=, a Religious Ceremony; and
 other customs of the Mandans. With 13 Coloured Illustrations. Small
 4to, 14_s._

 =COX, Sir G. W., and JONES, E. H., Popular Romances of the Middle
 Ages.= Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =GASTER, M., Greeko-Slavonic Literature and its Relation to the
 Folk-Lore of Europe during the Middle Ages.= Large post 8vo, 7_s._
 6_d._

 =GOMME, G. LAURENCE, Ethnology in Folk-Lore.= Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
 (_Modern Science Series._)

 =Indian Folk-Lore.= _See class_ ORIENTAL.

 =LONG, J., Eastern Proverbs and Emblems Illustrating Old Truths.= Post
 8vo, 6_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

 =MACRITCHIE, DAVID, Fians, Fairies, and Picts.= With Illustrations.
 Large post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =NORTHALL, G. F., English Folk Rhymes.= A Collection of Traditional
 Verses relating to Places and Persons, Customs, Superstitions, etc.
 Crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Turkish Tales.--The History of the Forty Vezirs;= or, The Story of
 the Forty Morns and Eves. Translated from the Turkish by E. J. W.
 GIBB. Crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._


_III. OCCULT SCIENCES._

 =BAUGHAN, ROSA, The Influence of the Stars.= A Treatise on Astrology,
 Chiromancy, and Physiognomy. 8vo, 5_s._

 =BINET, A., and FÉRÉ, C., Animal Magnetism.= Second Edition. Crown
 8vo, 5_s._ (_I.S.S._)

 =COLLINS, MABEL, Through the Gates of Gold.= Mysticism. Small 8vo,
 4_s._ 6_d._

 =COOK, LOUISA S., Geometrical Psychology;= or, The Science of
 Representation. An Abstract of the Theories and Diagrams of B. W.
 BETTS. Sixteen Plates. 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =COTTON, LOUISE, Palmistry and its Practical Uses.= Twelve Plates.
 Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

 =D'ASSIER, ADOLPHE, Posthumous Humanity.= A Study of Phantoms, from
 the French. By COLONEL OLCOTT. With Appendix and Notes. Crown 8vo,
 7_s._ 6_d._

 =DEWEY, J. H., The Way, the Truth, and the Life.= A Handbook of
 Christian Theosophy, Healing, and Psychic Culture. 10_s._ 6_d._

 =HARTMANN, FRANZ, White and Black Magic=; or, The Science of Finite
 and Infinite Life. Fourth Edition, revised. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =Life of Paracelsus, and the Substance of his Teachings.= New and
 Revised Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Life and Doctrines of Jacob Boehme.= An Introduction to the Study of
 his Works. Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=HEIDENHAIN, RUDOLPH, Hypnotism, or Animal Magnetism.= With Preface by
G. J. ROMANES. Second Edition. Small 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=HERMES, TRISMEGISTUS, Christian Neoplatonist=, Theological and
Philosophical Works of. Translated from the Greek by J. D. CHAMBERS.
8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =The Virgin of the World.= Translated and Edited by the Authors of
 'The Perfect Way.' Illustrations. 4to, imitation parchment, 10_s._
 6_d._

=JENNINGS, HARGRAVE, The Indian Religions=; or, Results of the
Mysterious Buddhism. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=KINGSFORD, ANNA, and MAITLAND, EDWARD, The Perfect Way=; or, The
Finding of Christ. Third Edition, revised. Square 16mo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=KINGSFORD, ANNA, Spiritual Hermeneutics of Astrology and Holy Writ.=
With Illustrations. 4to, parchment, 10_s._ 6_d._

=MATHERS, S. L. M., The Key of Solomon the King.= Translated from
ancient MSS. in the British Museum. With Plates. Crown 4to, 25_s._

 =The Kaballah Unveiled.= Containing the Three Books of the Zohar,
 translated from the Chaldee and Hebrew Text. Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =The Tarot.= Its Occult Signification, use in Fortune-telling, and
 method of Play. With Pack of 78 Tarot Cards, 5_s._; without the Cards,
 1_s._ 6_d._

=OLCOTT, Colonel, Theosophy, Religion, and Occult Science.= With
Glossary of Eastern Words. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=OWEN, ROBERT DALE, Footfalls on the Boundary of another World.= With
Narrative Illustrations. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Debatable Land between this World and the Next.= With Illustrative
 Narrations. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Threading My Way.= Twenty-seven Years of Autobiography. Crown 8vo,
 7_s._ 6_d._

=PREL, CARL DU, Philosophy of Mysticism.= Translated from the German by
C. C. MASSEY. 2 vols 8vo, cloth, 25_s._

 =Psychical Research Society, Proceedings.= Irregular.

=SERJEANT, W. C. ELDON, The Astrologer's Guide= (=Anima Astrologiæ=).
8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=STREET, J. C., The Hidden Way across the Threshold=; or, The Mystery
which hath been hidden for Ages and from Generations. With Plates.
Large 8vo, 15_s._

=VAUGHAN, THOMAS, Magical Writings.= Edited, with Introduction and
Notes, by A. E. WAITE. Small 4to, 10_s._ 6_d._

=VINCENT, R. HARRY, The Elements of Hypnotism.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=WAITE, A. E., Lives of Alchemystical Philosophers.= 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Magical Writings of Thomas Vaughan.= Small 4to, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Real History of the Rosicrucians.= With Illustrations. Crown 8vo,
 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Mysteries of Magic.= A Digest of the Writings of Eliphas Lévi. New
 and revised Edition. With Illustrations. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =The Occult Sciences.= Crown 8vo, 6_s._ #/


_IV. PHILOSOPHY._

(_See also_ RELIGION.)

 =ACLAND, Sir THOMAS DYKE, Knowledge, Duty, and Faith.= A Study of
 Principles Ancient and Modern. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =ALEXANDER, S., Moral Order and Progress=: An Analysis of Ethical
 Conceptions. Second Edition. Post 8vo, 14_s._ (_Philosophical
 Library._)

 =ALLEN, GRANT, Colour Sense=: Its Origin and Development. An Essay
 in Comparative Psychology. Second Edition. Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._
 (_Philosophical Library._)

 =ARISTOTLE, The Nicomachean Ethics.= Translated by F. H. PETERS. Third
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =BAIN, ALEXANDER, Mind and Body=: The Theories of their Relations.
 With Four Illustrations. Eighth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =BASTIAN, H. CHARLTON, Brain as an Organ of Mind.= With numerous
 Illustrations. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =COMTE, AUGUSTE, Positive Philosophy.= Translated and Condensed by
 HARRIET MARTINEAU. 2 vols. Third Edition. Large post 8vo, 15_s._

 =Catechism of Positive Religion.= From the French by R. CONGREVE.
 Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=FICHTE, J. GOTTLIEB, Characteristics of the Present Age.= Translated
by W. SMITH. Post 8vo, 6_s._

 =New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge.= Translated by A. E.
 KROEGER. 8vo, 12_s._

 =Science of Knowledge.= Translated by A. E. KROEGER. With an
 Introduction by Prof. W. T. HARRIS. 10_s._ 6_d._ (_Philosophical
 Library._)

 =Science of Rights.= Translated by A. E. KROEGER. With an Introduction
 by Prof. W. T. HARRIS. 12_s._ 6_d._ (_Philosophical Library._)

 =Science of Ethics.= Translated by W. T. HARRIS. 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Popular Works=: The Nature of the Scholar, The Vocation of
 the Scholar, The Vocation of Man, The Doctrine of Religion,
 Characteristics of the Present Age, Outlines of the Doctrine of
 Knowledge. With a Memoir by W. SMITH. 2 vols. 21_s._ (_Philosophical
 Library._)

=GUICCIARDINI, F., Counsels and Reflections.= Translated by N. H.
THOMSON. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=HARTMANN, E. von, Philosophy of the Unconscious.= Translated by W. C.
COUPLAND. 3 vols. post 8vo, 31_s._ 6_d._ (_Philosophical Library._)

=HEGEL, G. W. F., Lectures on the History of Philosophy.= Translated by
E. S. HALDANE. 3 vols. post 8vo, each 12_s._

=HINTON, JAMES, The Law-Breaker=, and =The Coming of the Law=. Edited
by MARGARET HINTON. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =Mystery of Pain.= New Edition. Foolscap 8vo, 1_s._

 =Philosophy and Religion.= Selections from the MSS. of the late James
 Hinton. Edited by CAROLINE HADDON. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =The Larger Life. Studies in Hinton's Ethics.= By CAROLINE HADDON.
 Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=HUGHES, H., Principles of Natural and Supernatural Morals. Vol. I.
Natural Morals=. 8vo, 12_s._

 =The Theory of Inference.= 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=JORDAN, F., Character as seen in Body and Parentage.= With
Illustrations. Third Edition. Small crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._ net.

=LEWES, GEORGE HENRY, Problems of Life and Mind.= 8vo.

  Series I. =Foundations of a Creed.= 2 vols. 28_s._
        II. =Physical Basis of Mind.= With Illustrations. 16_s._
       III. 2 vols. 22_s._ 6_d._

 =The Physical Basis of Mind.= With Illustrations. New Edition. With
 Prefatory Note by Prof. J. SULLY. Large post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=LANGE, Prof. F. A., History of Materialism, and Criticism of its
Present Importance.= Authorised Translation by ERNEST C. THOMAS. 3
vols. post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ each. (_Philosophical Library._)

=LESLEY, J. P., Man's Origin and Destiny.= Sketched from the Platform
of the Physical Sciences. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=LUBBOCK, Sir John, Senses, Instincts, and Intelligence of Animals.=
With special reference to Insects. With 100 Illustrations. Third
Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=LUYS, J., Brain and its Functions.= With Illustrations. Third Edition.
Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=MAUDSLEY, H., Body and Will.= An Essay concerning Will, in its
Metaphysical, Physiological, and Pathological Aspects. 8vo, 12_s._

 =Responsibility in Mental Disease.= Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._
 (_I. S. S._)

 =Supernaturalism.--Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings.= Second
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=MILL, JOHN STUART, Auguste Comte and Positivism.= Third Edition. Post
8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._ (_Philosophical Library._)

=MIVART, ST. GEORGE, On Truth.= 8vo, 16_s._

 =Origin of Human Reason.= 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=MOORE, AUBREY L., Essays, Scientific and Philosophical.= With Memoir
of the Author. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=MORSELLI, Prof. H., Suicide.= An Essay on Comparative Moral
Statistics. Second Edition. With Diagrams. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=RIBOT, Prof. T., English Psychology.= Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Diseases of Memory.= An Essay in the Positive Psychology. Third
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=RIEHL, Dr. A., Introduction to the Theory of Science and Metaphysics.=
Translated by Dr. ARTHUR FAIRBANKS. Post 8vo, 9_s._ (_Philosophical
Library._)

=ROMANES, G. J., Mental Evolution in Man.= Origin of the Human Faculty.
8vo, 14_s._

 =Mental Evolution in Animals.= With Posthumous Essay on Instinct by
 CHARLES DARWIN. 8vo, 12_s._

 =Animal Intelligence.= Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR, The World as Will and Idea.= From the German. By
R. R. HALDANE and J. KEMP. Third Edition. 3 vols. post 8vo, 12_s._ each
vol.

=SIMCOX, EDITH, Natural Law.= An Essay in Ethics. Second Edition. Post
8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ (_Philosophical Library._)

=SULLY, JAMES, Illusions.= A Psychological Study. Third Edition. Crown
8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=WEDGWOOD, JULIA, The Moral Ideal.= An Historic Study. Second Edition.
8vo, 9_s._


_V. HISTORY._

BIOGRAPHY.

 =Alchemystical Philosophers=, Lives of. With a Bibliography of
 Alchemy. By A. E. WAITE. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =ANSELM, St., Archbishop of Canterbury, and Primate of the Britons=,
 Life and Times of. By MARTIN RULE. 2 vols. 8vo, 32_s._

 =APPLETON, Dr.=, His Life and Literary Relics. By J. H. APPLETON and
 A. H. SAYCE. Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ (_Philosophical Library._)

 =BACON, FRANCIS=, Life and Times of. By JAMES SPEDDING. 2 vols. post
 8vo, 21_s._

 =BETTERTON, THOMAS.= By R. W. LOWE. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._ (_Eminent
 Actors._)

 =BLAVATSKY, Madame=, Incidents in the Life of. By A. P. SINNETT. With
 Portrait. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =BOEHME, JACOB=, Life and Doctrines of. An Introduction to the Study
 of his Works. By FRANZ HARTMANN. Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =BRADSHAW, HENRY.= A Memoir. By G. W. PROTHERO. With Portrait and
 _Fac-simile_. 8vo, 16_s._

 =Brave Men's Footsteps.= A Book of Example and Anecdote for Young
 People. By the Editor of 'Men who have Risen.' Illustrations by C.
 DOYLE. Ninth Edition. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

 =BRUNO, GIORDANO, the Nolan=, Life of. By I. FRITH. Revised by
 Professor MORIZ CARRIERE. With Portrait. Post 8vo, 14_s._

 =BURKE, the Very Rev. T. N.=, Life of. By W. J. FITZPATRICK. With
 Portrait. 2 vols. 8vo, 30_s_. New and cheaper Edition, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =BURROWS, HENRY WILLIAM.= Memorials. By E. WORDSWORTH. With Portrait.
 Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =CAXTON, WILLIAM, England's First Printer=, Biography and Typography
 of. By W. BLADES. 8vo, hand-made paper, imitation old bevelled
 binding, £1 1_s._ Cheap Edition, Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =DAWSON, GEORGE=, Biographical Lectures. Edited by GEORGE ST. CLAIR.
 Third Edition. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =DICKENS, CHARLES, and the Stage=; or, A Record of his Connection with
 the Drama. By T. EDGAR PEMBERTON. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =DIGBY, Sir EVERARD=, The Life of a Conspirator, a Biography of. By
 one of his Descendants. With Portrait. Demy 8vo, 9_s._

 =DORA, Sister.= A Biography. By MARGARET LONSDALE. With Portrait.
 Thirtieth Edition. Small 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

 =DRUMMOND, THOMAS=, Life and Letters of, Under-Secretary in Ireland,
 1835-40. By R. BARRY O'BRIEN. 8vo, 14_s._

 =DUNCAN, FRANCIS, C.B., R.A., M.P.=, Life of. By Rev. HENRY BIRDWOOD
 BLOGG. With Introduction by the BISHOP OF CHESTER. Crown 8vo, 3_s._
 6_d._

 =EDMUND, St., of Canterbury=, Life. From Original Sources. By WILFRID
 WALLACE. With 5 Illustrations and Map. 8vo, 15_s._

 =EMERSON, RALPH WALDO=, Talks with. By C. J. WOODBURY. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =Emerson at Home and Abroad.= By M. D. CONWAY. With Portrait. Post
 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ (_Philosophical Library._)

 =Episodes in the Lives of Men, Women, and Lovers.= By EDITH SIMCOX,
 Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB=, Memoir of. By W. SMITH. Second Edition.
 Post 8vo, 4_s._

 =FORBES, Bishop.= A Memoir. By DONALD J. MACKAY. With Portrait and
 Map. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =FRANCIS, S., of Assisi=, History of. By Abbé LÉON LE MONNIER. With a
 Preface by Cardinal VAUGHAN. 8vo, 16_s._

 =FRANCIS XAVIER, the Apostle of the Indies.= By MARY HALL MCLEAN.
 Crown 8vo, 6_s._ net.

 =From World to Cloister=; or, My Noviciate. By 'BERNARD.' Crown 8vo,
 5_s._

 =GARRICK, DAVID=. By JOSEPH KNIGHT. With Portrait. Demy 8vo, 10_s._
 6_d._ net.

 =GILBERT, Mrs.= Autobiography, and other Memorials. Edited by JOSIAH
 GILBERT. Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =GLADSTONE, WILLIAM EWART=, Life of. Told by Himself in Speeches and
 Public Letters. By H. J. LEECH. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =GOOCH, Sir DANIEL, Bart.=, Diaries of. With an Introductory Notice
 by Sir THEODORE MARTIN, K.C.B. With 2 Portraits and an Illustration.
 Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =GORDON, Major-General C. G.=, His journals at Khartoum. Printed from
 the Original MSS., with Introduction and Notes by A. EGMONT HAKE.
 Portrait, 2 Maps, and 30 Illustrations. 2 vols. 8vo, 21_s._ Cheap
 Edition, 6_s._

 =Gordon's Last Journal=: A _Fac-simile_ of the Last Journal received
 in England from GENERAL GORDON. Reproduced by photo-lithography.
 Imperial 4to, £3 3_s._

=GOWER, Lord RONALD, My Reminiscences.= New Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._
6_d._

=HAMILTON, ARTHUR, B.A.=, of Trinity College, Cambridge. Memoirs of.
Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=HINTON, JAMES=, Life and Letters of. With an Introduction by Sir W.
W. GULL, and Portrait engraved on steel by C. H. JEENS. Sixth Edition.
Crown 8vo, 8_s._ 6_d._

=JOHNSON, SAMUEL, Lives of the Most Eminent English Poets.= Edited,
with Notes and Introduction, by ARTHUR WAUGH, and with 30 Portraits. 6
vols. foolscap 8vo, £1 16_s._

=KEMPIS, THOMAS À.= Notes of a Visit to the Scenes in which the
Life of Thomas à Kempis was spent. By F. R. CRUISE. With numerous
Illustrations. 8vo, 12_s._

=KHAMA.= The Story of an African Chief. By Mrs. WYNDHAM KNIGHT-BRUCE.
Fourth Edition. 16mo, 2_s._

=KÖRÖS, ALEXANDER COSMA DE=, Life and Works of, between 1819 and
1842. With a short notice of all his Works and Essays, from original
documents. By THEODORE DUKA. Post 8vo, 9_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental
Series._)

=LAUD, WILLIAM=, sometime Archbishop of Canterbury. By A. C. BENSON.
Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =Life of Archbishop Laud.= By a Romish Recusant. 8vo, 15_s._

=LESLIE, FRED.=, Recollections of. By W. L. VINCENT. With
Illustrations. 2 vols. 8vo, 30_s._

=LESSING=: His Life and Writings. By JAMES SIME. New and cheaper
Edition. 2 vols. With portraits. Post 8vo, 12_s._ (_Philosophical
Library._)

=LONGFELLOW, HENRY WADSWORTH=, Life of. By his Brother SAMUEL
LONGFELLOW. With Portraits and Illustrations. 3 vols. 8vo, 42_s._

=LOWDER, CHARLES.= A Biography. By the Author of 'St. Teresa' Twelfth
Edition. With Portrait. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

=LYTTON, Lord=, Life, Letters, and Literary Remains of Edward Bulwer,
Lord Lytton. By the Earl of LYTTON. With Portraits, Illustrations, and
_Fac-similes_. 8vo. Vols. I. and II., 32_s._

=MACKLIN, CHARLES.= By EDWARD ABBOTT PARRY. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
(_Eminent Actors._)

=MACKONOCHIE, ALEXANDER HERIOT.= A Memoir. By E. A. T. Edited, with
Preface, by E. F. RUSSELL. With Portrait and Views. Large crown 8vo,
7_s._ 6_d._ Cheap Edition, crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

=MACREADY, WILLIAM CHARLES.= By WILLIAM ARCHER. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
(_Eminent Actors._)

=MARIE ANTOINETTE=, Last Days of. An Historical Sketch. By Lord RONALD
GOWER. With Portrait and _Fac-similes_. Foolscap 4to, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Marie Antoinette and Her Children, the Dauphin and the Duchesse
 D'Angoulême=, The Prison Life of. By M. C. BISHOP. New and revised
 Edition. With Portrait. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=MITCHEL, JOHN=, Life of. By W. DILLON. With Portrait. 2 vols. 8vo,
21_s._

=MOHL, JULIUS and MARY=, Letters and Recollections of. By M. C. M.
SIMPSON. With Portraits and 2 Illustrations. 8vo, 15_s._

=MOLTKE (General von).= Letters to His Wife and other Relatives. The
only complete Edition in any language. With an Introduction by SIDNEY
WHITMAN. Portraits, etc. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth, £1 10_s._ 1896.

  "Of the most surpassing interest."

=MORRIS, GOUVERNEUR, Minister of the United States to France=, Diary
and Letters of. By ANNE C. MORRIS. With Portraits. 2 vols. 8vo, 30_s._

=MOTLEY, JOHN LOTHROP.= A Memoir. By OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES. Crown 8vo,
6_s._

=MUNRO, Major-General Sir THOMAS.= A Memoir. By Sir A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

=NEWMAN, JOHN HENRY=, the Founder of Modern Anglicanism, and a Cardinal
of the Roman Church. By WILFRID MEYNELL. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=NUN, A=: Her Friends and Her Order. Being a Sketch of the Life of
Mother Mary Xaveria Fallon. By KATHERINE TYNAN. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=O'CONNELL, Count=, The Last Colonel of the Irish Brigade, and Old
Irish Life at Home and Abroad, 1745-1833. By Mrs. MORGAN J. O'CONNELL.
2 vols. 8vo, 25_s._

=OWEN, ROBERT DALE=, Threading my Way. Twenty-seven Years of
Autobiography. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=PARACELSUS=, Life of, and the Substance of His Teachings. By FRANZ
HARTMANN. New and Revised Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=PLUTARCH.= His Life, His Lives, and His Morals. By Archbishop TRENCH.
Second Edition enlarged. Foolscap 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

=RAWLE, Bishop.= A Memoir. By G. MATHER and C. J. BLAGG. Large crown
8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=ROBERTSON, F. W.=, Life and Letters of. Edited by STOPFORD BROOKE.

    I. Library Edition, with Portrait. 8vo, 12_s._
   II. With Portrait. 2 vols. crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._
  III. Popular Edition. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=RUPERT of the Rhine.= A Biographical Sketch of the Life of Prince
Rupert. By Lord RONALD GOWER. With 3 Portraits. Crown 8vo, buckram,
6_s._

=SELWYN, Bishop, of New Zealand and of Lichfield.= A Sketch of his
Life and Work, with further Gleanings from his Letters, Sermons, and
Speeches. By Canon CURTEIS. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=SHELLEY, PERCY BYSSHE=, Life of. By EDWARD DOWDEN, LL.D. With
Portrait. 12_s._ net.

=SKINNER, JAMES.= A Memoir. By the Author of 'Charles Lowder.' With
Preface by the Rev. Canon CARTER, and Portrait. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._
6_d._ Cheap Edition, crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

=SPINOZA, BENEDICT DE=, Life, Correspondence, and Ethics of. By R.
WILLIS. 8vo, 21_s._

=TAYLOR, REYNELL, C.B., C.S.I.= A Biography. By E. GAMBIER PARRY. With
Portrait and Map. 8vo, 14_s._

=TENNYSON, Poet, Philosopher, and Idealist.= By J. C. WALTERS. With
Portrait. 8vo, 12_s._

=TRENCH, Archbishop=, Letters and Memorials of. By the Author of
'Charles Lowder.' With 2 Portraits. 2 vols. 8vo, 21_s._

=TRENCH, Mrs. RICHARD=, Remains of the late. Being Selections from her
Journals, Letters, and other Papers. Edited by her Son, Archbishop
TRENCH. New and cheaper Edition. With Portraits. 8vo, 6_s._

=Wells Wills=, arranged in Parishes and Annotated. By F. W. WEAVER.
8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=WILBERFORCE, Bishop, of Oxford and Winchester=, Life of. By his Son.
Crown 8vo, 9_s._

=WOLSELEY, WILLIAM, Admiral of the Red Squadron=, Memoir of. By MARY C.
INNES. 8vo, 9_s._ net.


HERALDRY.

 =Heraldry=, English and Foreign. By R. C. JENKINS. With a Dictionary
 of Heraldic Terms and 156 Illustrations. Small 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._


HISTORY.

 =BAIN, R. NISBET, Gustavus III. and His Contemporaries, 1746-1792.=
 From original documents. 2 vols. post 8vo, 21_s._ net.

 =BAIRD, HENRY M., The Huguenots and the Revocation of the Edict of
 Nantes.= With Maps. 2 vols, 8vo, 30_s._

 =BANCROFT, K. H., Popular History of the Mexican People.= 8vo, 15_s._

 =BARING-GOULD, S., Germany, Present and Past.= New and cheaper
 Edition. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =BRIDGETT, T. E., Blunders and Forgeries.= Historical Essays. Crown
 8vo, 6_s._

 =BRYANT, SOPHIE, Celtic Ireland.= With 3 Maps. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =BRYCE, JAMES, Two Centuries of Irish History.= With Introduction by
 JAS. BRYCE, M.P. 8vo, 16_s._

 =GREVILLE, The Hon. E., The Year-Book of Australia.= Published
 Annually. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ net.

 =DENVIR, JOHN, The Irish in Britain from the Earliest Times to the
 Fall and Death of Parnell.= By JOHN DENVIR. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

 =DJEMALEDDIN, BEY, Sultan Murad V.= The Turkish Dynastic Mystery,
 1876-95. With 6 Portraits. Crown 8vo, 9_s._ net.

 =DURUY, VICTOR, The History of Greece.= With Introduction by Prof. J.
 P. MAHAFFY. Maps and many Illustrations, some coloured. 8 vols. super
 royal 8vo, £8 8_s._

 =Egypt.= _See_ ORIENTAL.

 =FREEMAN, E. A., Lectures to American Audiences.= I. The English
 People in its Three Homes. II. Practical Bearings of General European
 History. Post 8vo, 9_s._

 =GARDINER, SAMUEL R.=, and =MULLINGER, J. BASS, Introduction to the
 Study of English History.= Third and enlarged Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._
 6_d._ net.

 =HILLEBRAND, KARL, France and the French in the Second Half of the
 Nineteenth Century.= Translated from the Third German Edition. Post
 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =HOLST, H. von, The French Revolution.= 2 vols. crown 8vo, cloth,
 18_s._

 =HOPE, Mrs., The First Divorce of Henry VIII.= As told in the State
 Papers. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =India.= _See_ ORIENTAL.

 =JANSSEN, JOHANNES, History of the German People at the Close of the
 Middle Ages.= Translated by M. A. MITCHELL and A. M. CHRISTIE. 2 vols.
 8vo, 25_s._

 =KINGSFORD, W., The History of Canada.= By W. KINGSFORD. Vol.
 i. 1608-1682; vol. ii. 1679-1725; vol. iii. 1726-1756; vol. iv.
 1756-1763; vol. v. 1763-1775; vol. vi. 1776-1779; vol. vii. 1779-1807;
 vol. viii. 1808-1815. With Maps. 8vo, 15_s._ each volume.

 =LELAND, C. G., The Gypsies.= Crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =LEONARD, Major ARTHUR G., How We Made Rhodesia.= Second Edition.
 Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =LIVY.= Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius. From the
 Italian of NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI. By N. HILL THOMPSON. Large crown 8vo,
 12_s._

 =MOORE, AUBREY L., Lectures and Papers on the History of the
 Reformation in England and on the Continent.= 8vo, 16_s._

 =O'CLERY, THE, The Making of Italy, 1856-1870.= 8vo, 16_s._

 =O'HAGAN, JOHN, Joan of Arc.= An Historical Essay. Crown 8vo, 3_s._
 6_d._

 =PARAVICINI, FRANCES DE, The Early History of Balliol College.= 8vo,
 12_s._

 =PASTOR, Dr. LUDWIG, The History of the Popes.= Translated from the
 German by FREDERICK J. ANTROBUS. Vols. III. and IV. 8vo, 24_s._ net.

 =PEET, Rev. STEPHEN D., Prehistoric America.= Vol. I., The Mound
 Builders. Illustrated. Crown 8vo, 21_s._ net.

 =REINDORF, Rev. CARL CHRISTIAN, History of the Gold Coast and Asante.=
 Demy 8vo, 9_s._ net.

 =SARJENT, Lt. HERBERT H., Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign.= Crown
 8vo, 6_s._

 =TRENCH, Archbishop, Gustavus Adolphus in Germany, and other Lectures
 on the Thirty Years' War.= Third Edition, enlarged. Foolscap 8vo, 4_s._

 =WALPOLE, C. G., Short History of Ireland.= With 5 Maps and
 Appendices. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =WRIGHT, THOMAS, Early Britain--The Celt, the Roman, and the Saxon.= A
 History of the Early Inhabitants of Britain down to the Conversion of
 the Anglo-Saxons to Christianity. Corrected and Enlarged Edition. With
 nearly 300 Engravings. Crown 8vo, 9_s._


TRAVELS, VOYAGES, GUIDE-BOOKS, ETC.

 =AUBERTIN, J. J., Wanderings and Wonderings.= With Portrait, Map, and
 7 Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 8_s._ 6_d._

 =By Order of the Sun to Chili.= With Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=BEVAN, THEODORE F., Toil, Travel, and Discovery in British New
Guinea.= With 5 Maps. Large crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=BRADSHAW'S Guide.= Dictionary of Mineral Waters, Climatic Health
Resorts, Sea Baths, and Hydropathic Establishments. With a Map, 3_s._
6_d._; without Map, 2_s._ 6_d._

=BROWN, HORATIO F., Venetian Studies.= Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=BURGESS, W. W., Bits of Old Chelsea.= 40 splendid Etchings. With
Letterpress Descriptions by LIONEL JOHNSON and RICHARD LE GALLIENNE.
Only 100 copies printed. Folio, £10 10_s._ net.

=CORNEY, P., Early Northern Pacific Voyages (1813-1818).= With Preface
by Prof. W. D. ALEXANDER. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=CROKER T. CROFTON, A Walk from London to Fulham.= Enlarged and
Re-written by BEATRICE E. HORNE. With Illustrations. 7_s._ 6_d._ net.

=GRIMBLE, AUGUSTUS, The Deer Forests of Scotland.= Illustrated by A.
THORBURN. 4to, £2 10_s._ net.

=HAECKEL, Prof. ERNST, A Visit to Ceylon.= Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=HEILPRIN, A., Bermuda Islands.= 8vo, 18_s._

=HENDRIKS, DOM LAURENCE, The London Charterhouse: Its Monks and its
Martyrs.= Illustrated. 8vo, 15_s._

=HORNADAY, W. T., Two Years in a Jungle.= With Illustrations. 8vo,
21_s._

=IM THURN, EVERARD F., Among the Indians of Guiana.= Sketches,
chiefly Anthropologic, from the Interior of British Guiana. With 53
Illustrations and a Map. 8vo, 18_s._

=JOHNSTON, H. H., The Kilima-Njaro Expedition.= A Record of Scientific
Exploration in Eastern Equatorial Africa. With 6 Maps and 80
Illustrations. 8vo, 21_s._

 =History of a Slave.= With 47 Illustrations. Square 8vo, 6_s._

=KRAUS, J., Carlsbad and its Natural Healing Agents.= With Notes by
JOHN T. WALLERS. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 6_s._ 6_d._

=LELAND, C. G., Fu-Sang=; or, The Discovery of America by Chinese
Buddhist Priests in the Fifth Century. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=MARKHAM, Captain ALBERT HASTINGS, The Great Frozen Sea.= A Personal
Narrative of the Voyage of the _Alert_ during the Arctic Expedition of
1875-76. With Illustrations and Map. Sixth and cheaper Edition. Crown
8vo, 6_s._

=MITCHELL, E. H., Forty Days in the Holy Land.= With 6 Illustrations.
Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=MULHALL, M. G. and E. T., Handbook of the River Plate=, comprising
the Argentine Republic, Uruguay, and Paraguay. With Railway Map. Sixth
Edition. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=OATES, FRANK, Matabele Land and the Victoria Falls=: A Naturalist's
wanderings in the interior of South Africa. Edited by C. G. OATES. With
numerous Illustrations and 4 Maps. 8vo, 21_s._

=PIDGEON, DAVID, Venice.= With Frontispiece after TURNER. Small crown
8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._ net.

=RENDELL, J. M., Handbook of the Island of Madeira.= With Plan and Map.
Second Edition. Foolscap 8vo, 1_s._ 6_d._

=REYNOLDS-BALL, E. A., Mediterranean Winter Resorts.= With Maps and
Diagrams. Third Edition. Foolscap 8vo, 5_s._

=ROLFE, E. N., and INGLEBY, H., Naples in 1888.= With Illustrations.
Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=ROUTLEDGE, Canon C. F., History of St. Martin's Church, Canterbury.=
Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=ST. CLAIR, GEORGE, Buried Cities and Bible Countries.= Large crown
8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=SAMUELSON, JAMES, Bulgaria, Past and Present=: Historical, Political,
and Descriptive. With Map and numerous Illustrations. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=STODDARD, CHARLES AUGUSTUS, Cruising among the Caribbees.= Summer Days
in Winter Months. With Illustrations. 8vo, 9_s._

=STRACHEY, Sir JOHN, India.= With Map. New Edition. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=TAYLOR, Canon ISAAC, Egypt.= Leaves from an Egyptian Note-Book. Crown
8vo, 5_s._

=VINCENT, FRANK, Around and About South America=: Twenty Months of
Quest and Query. With Maps, Plans, and 54 Illustrations. Medium 8vo,
21_s._

=Wales.--Through North Wales with a Knapsack.= By Four
Schoolmistresses. With a Sketch Map. Small 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=WARD, BERNARD, History of St. Edmund's College, Old Hall (Ware).= With
Illustrations. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=WRIGHT, G. F., and APHAM, W., Greenland Icefields, and Life in the
North Atlantic.= With Maps and Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=YOUNG, ROSALIND AMELIA, Mutiny of the 'Bounty,' and Story of Pitcairn
Island: 1790-1894.= By a NATIVE DAUGHTER. Third Edition, Illustrated.
Crown 8vo, 5_s._


_VI.--SOCIOLOGY._

EDUCATION.

 =BAIN, ALEXANDER, Education as a Science.= Seventh Edition. Crown 8vo,
 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =BROWNING, OSCAR, Introduction to the History of Educational
 Theories.= Second Edition. 3_s._ 6_d._ (_Education Library._)

 =GALLOWAY, R., Scientific and Technical Education=; or, How the
 Inductive Sciences are taught, and how they ought to be taught. 8vo,
 10_s._ 6_d._

 =HAECKEL, Prof. E., Freedom in Science and Teaching.= With a Prefatory
 Note by Prof. T. H. HUXLEY. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =HAWTREY, MABEL, The Co-Education of the Sexes.= Crown 8vo, 2_s._
 6_d._ net.

 =LESSING, G. E., Education of the Human Race.= From the German. By F.
 W. ROBERTSON. Fourth Edition, revised. Foolscap 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

 =LANDON, JOSEPH, School Management.= Including a General View of the
 Work of Education, Organisation, and Discipline. Eighth Edition. Crown
 8vo, 6_s._ (_Education Library._)

 =MAGNUS, Sir PHILIP, Industrial Education.= 6_s._ (_Education
 Library._)

 =MAHAFFY, Prof., Old Greek Education.= Second Edition. 3_s._ 6_d._
 (_Education Library._)

 =MASON, CHARLOTTE M., Home Education.= A course of Lectures to Ladies.
 New Edition. 8vo, 6_s._

 =Parents and Children.= 8vo. 6_s._

=Our Public Schools=: Eton, Harrow, Winchester, Rugby, Westminster,
Marlborough, and the Charterhouse. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=Parents' Review.= Monthly. 6_d._

=PLUMPTRE, C. J., Lectures on Elocution.= Delivered at King's College.
Fifth Edition. Illustrated. Post 8vo, 15_s._


LAW.

 =AMOS, Prof. SHELDON, History and Principles of the Civil Law
 of Rome.= An Aid to the Study of Scientific and Comparative
 Jurisprudence. 8vo, 16_s._

 =Science of Law.= Seventh Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=BENTHAM, JEREMY, Theory of Legislation as Enunciated by Bentham.=
Translated from the French of Etienne Dumont by R. HILDRETH. Seventh
Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ New and cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo,
3_s._ 6_d._ (_Paternoster Library._)

=BERTILLON, ALPHONSE, Signaletic Instructions, including the Theory
and Practice of Anthropometrical Identification.= Translated under the
Supervision of Major R. W. MCCLAUGHTY. Illustrated. Large 8vo, half
morocco, £1 10_s._

=FIELD, D. D., Outlines of an International Code.= Second Edition.
Royal 8vo, £2 2_s._

=FOSTER, ROGER, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
Historical, and Juridical.= Vol. 1, royal 8vo, £1 4_s._ net.

=HALLECK'S International Law=; or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse
of States in Peace and War. Third Edition, thoroughly revised by Sir
SHERSTON BAKER, Bart. 2 vols. 8vo, 38_s._

=HOLST, H. von, The Constitutional Law of the United States of
America.= Translated by ALFRED BISHOP MASON. Royal 8vo, cloth, 10_s._
6_d._

 =The Constitutional History of the United States.= Translated by
 LALOR. 8 vols., 8vo, cloth. Vols. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, 18_s._ each;
 vols. 6 and 8, 12_s._ 6_d._ each.

=JENKINS, E., and RAYMOND, J., Architect's Legal Handbook.= Fourth
Edition, revised. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=LEVI, Prof. LEONE, International Law, with Materials for a Code of
International Law.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=SALAMAN, J. S., Trade Marks: their Registration and Protection.= Crown
8vo, 5_s._


POLITICS, LABOUR, SOCIALISM, FINANCE, ETC.

 =AMOS, Prof. SHELDON, Science of Politics.= Third Edition. Crown 8vo,
 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =BAGEHOT, WALTER, Physics and Politics=; or, The Application of the
 Principles of 'Natural Selection' and 'Inheritance' to Political
 Society. New Edition. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._ (Paternoster_ Library._)

 =The English Constitution. New Edition.= Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._
 (_Paternoster Library._)

 =Lombard Street.= A Description of the Money Market. New Edition. With
 Notes, bringing the work up to the present time, by E. JOHNSTONE.
 Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._ (_Paternoster Library._)

 =Essays on Parliamentary Reform.= New Edition. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._
 (_Paternoster Library._)

=BESANT, Sir WALTER, and Others, The Poor in Great Cities.= With
Illustrations by HUGH THOMPSON, etc. 8vo, 12_s._

=BRENTANO, LUJO, History and Development of Guilds, and the Origin of
Trade Unions.= 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

=BRYCE, J., Handbook of Home Rule.= Being Articles on the Irish
Question. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 1_s._ 6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._

=CLAPPERTON, JANE H., Scientific Meliorism, and the Evolution of
Happiness.= Large crown 8vo, 8_s._ 6_d._

=DAVITT, MICHAEL, Speech before the Special Commission.= Crown 8vo,
5_s._

=FAIRBANKS, ARTHUR, Introduction to Sociology.= Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._
(_Philosophical Library._)

=GEORGE, HENRY, Progress and Poverty.= An Inquiry into the Causes
of Industrial Depressions, and of Increase of Want with Increase of
Wealth; the Remedy. Fifth Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ Cabinet
Edition, crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d_. Cheap Edition, limp cloth, 1_s._ 6_d._;
paper covers, 1_s._

 =Protection or Free Trade.= An Examination of the Tariff Question,
 with especial regard to the interests of Labour. Second Edition. Crown
 8vo, 5_s._ Cheap Edition, limp cloth, 1_s._ 6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._

 =Social Problems.= Fourth Thousand. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ Cheap Edition,
 limp cloth, 1_s._ 6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._

 =A Perplexed Philosopher.= Being an Examination of Mr. Herbert
 Spencer's various utterances on the Land Question, etc. Crown 8vo,
 5_s._ Cheap Edition, limp cloth, 1_s._ 6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._

=GRAHAM, WILLIAM, Socialism New and Old.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =The Social Problem, in its Economic, Moral and Political Aspects.=
 8vo, 14_s._

=GREG, W. R., Political Problems for our Age and Country.= 8vo, 10_s._
6_d._

=HAGGARD, H. RIDER, Cetewayo and His White Neighbours.= Crown 8vo,
3_s._ 6_d._ (_Paternoster Library._)

=HOPKINS, ELLICE, Work amongst Working Men.= Sixth Edition. Crown 8vo,
3_s._ 6_d._

=HUMBOLDT, Baron W. von, The Sphere and Duties of Government.= From the
German, by J. COULTHARD. Post 8vo, 5_s._

=JEVONS, W. STANLEY, Money and the Mechanism of Exchange.= Ninth
Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=KAUFMANN, M., Christian Socialism.= Crown 8vo, 4_s._ 6_d._

 =Utopias=; or, Schemes of Social Improvement, from Sir Thomas More to
 Karl Marx. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=LEFEVRE, Right Hon. G. SHAW, Peel and O'Connell.= 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Incidents of Coercion.= A Journal of Visits to Ireland. Third
 Edition. Crown 8vo, limp cloth, 1_s._ 6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._

 =Irish Members and English Gaolers.= Crown 8vo, limp cloth, 1_s._
 6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._

 =Combination and Coercion in Ireland.= Sequel to 'Incidents of
 Coercion.' Crown 8vo, cloth, 1_s._ 6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._

=LYNCH, E. M., Killboylan Bank=; or, Every Man His Own Banker. Foolscap
8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._ (_Village Library._)

=MINTON, FRANCIS, Welfare of the Millions.= Crown 8vo, limp cloth,
1_s._ 6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._

=O'BRIEN, R. BARRY, Home Ruler's Manual.= Crown 8vo, cloth, 1_s._
6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._

=Irish Wrongs and English Remedies=, with other Essays. Crown 8vo,
5_s._

=PERRY, ARTHUR LATHAM, Principles of Political Economy.= Large post
8vo, 9_s._

=PLIMSOLL, SAMUEL, Cattle Ships.= Being the Fifth Chapter of 'An Appeal
for our Seamen.' With 46 Illustrations. Cheap Edition, 1_s._

=SPENCER, HERBERT, Study of Sociology.= Fifteenth Edition. Crown 8vo,
5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=SUMNER, W. G., What Social Classes Owe to each Other.= 18mo, 3_s._
6_d._

=TAYLOR, Sir H., The Statesman.= Foolscap 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

=TAYLOR, R. WHATELEY COOKE, The Modern Factory System.= 8vo, 14_s._

=THOMPSON, Sir H., Modern Cremation.= Second Edition, revised and
enlarged. Crown 8vo, 1_s._; cloth, 2_s._


_VII.--NATURAL SCIENCE._

ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY.

 =Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Journal of.=
 Quarterly. 5_s._

 =BALKWILL, F. H., The Testimony of the Teeth to Man's Place in
 Nature.= With Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =CARPENTER, W. B., Nature and Man.= With a Memorial Sketch by J.
 ESTLIN CARPENTER. Portrait. Large crown 8vo, 8_s._ 6_d._

 =CLODD, EDWARD, Childhood of the World=: A Simple Account of Man in
 Early Times. Eighth Edition. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ Special Edition for
 Schools, 1_s._

 =CURR, EDWARD M., The Australian Race.= Its Origin, Languages,
 Customs, etc. With Map and Illustrations. 3 vols. 8vo, 1 vol. 4to, £2
 2_s._

 =FORNANDER, A., Account of the Polynesian Race.= Its Origin and
 Migrations, and the Ancient History of the Hawaiian people. Post
 8vo. Vol. I. 7_s._ 6_d._; Vol. II. 10_s._ 6_d._; Vol. III. 9_s._
 (_Philosophical Library._)

 =GEIGER, LAZARUS, Development of the Human Race.= Translated from the
 German by D. ASHER. Post 8vo, 6_s._ (_Philosophical Library._)

 =HAECKEL, Prof. ERNST, History of the Evolution of Man.= With numerous
 Illustrations. 2 vols. post 8vo, 32_s._

 =JOLY, N., Man before Metals.= With 148 Illustrations. Fourth Edition.
 Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =QUATREFAGES, Prof. A. DE, The Human Species.= Fifth Edition. Crown
 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =SMITH, R. BROUGH, The Aborigines of Victoria.= Compiled for the
 Government. With Maps, Plates, and Woodcuts. 2 vols. royal 8vo, £3
 3_s._

 =STARCKE, C. N., The Primitive Family in its Origin and Development.=
 Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =WRIGHT, G. FREDERICK, The Ice Age in North America, and its Bearing
 upon the Antiquity of Man.= With Maps and Illustrations. 8vo, 21_s._

 =Man and the Glacial Period.= With 111 Illustrations and Map. Crown
 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)


ASTRONOMY.

 =DRAYSON, Major-General, Untrodden Ground in Astronomy and Geology.=
 With Numerous Figures. 8vo, 14_s._

 =LOOMIS, E., A Treatise on Astronomy.= 8vo, sheep, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Introduction to Practical Astronomy.= 8vo, sheep, 7_s._ 6_d._

=STANLEY, W. F., Notes on the Nebular Theory.= 8vo, 9_s._

=YOUNG, Professor, The Sun, with Illustrations.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I.
S. S._)


BOTANY.

 =CANDOLLE, ALPHONSE DE, Origin of Cultivated Plants.= Second Edition.
 Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =COOKE, M. C., British Edible Fungi: How to Distinguish and how to
 Cook them.= With Coloured Figures of upwards of Forty Species. Crown
 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Fungi: their Nature, Influences, Uses, &c.= Edited by Rev. M. J.
 BERKELEY. With numerous Illustrations. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo,
 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =Introduction to Fresh-Water Algæ.= With an Enumeration of all the
 British Species. With 13 plates. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=DAVIES, G. CHRISTOPHER, Rambles and Adventures of Our School Field
Club.= With 4 Illustrations. New and cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo, 3_s._
6_d._

=HENSLOW, Prof. G., Origin of Floral Structures through Insect and
other Agencies.= With 88 Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =The Origin of Plant Structures.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=HICKSON, S. J., The Fauna of the Deep Sea.= Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
(_Modern Science Series._)

=LENDENFELD, R. von, Monograph of the Horny Sponges.= With 50 Plates.
Issued by direction of the Royal Society. 4to, £3.

=LUBBOCK, Sir JOHN, Contribution to Our Knowledge of Seedlings.= With
nearly 700 figures in text. 2 vols., 8vo, 36_s._ net. Also Popular
Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=PHILLIPS, W., Manual of British Discomycetes.= With Descriptions of
all the Species of Fungi hitherto found in Britain, included in the
Family, and Illustrations of the Genera. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=SEDDING, JOHN D., Gardencraft, Old and New.= With Memorial Notice by
the Rev. E. F. RUSSELL. 16 Illustrations. Second Edition. 8vo, 12_s._

=Tropical Agriculturist.= Monthly. Annual Subscription, £1 6_s._

=TROUESSART, E. L., Microbes, Ferments, and Moulds.= With 107
Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=WARD, H. MARSHALL, The Oak: a Popular Introduction to Forest Botany.=
Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._ (_Modern Science Series._)

=WEED, C. M., Fungi and Fungicides.= A Practical Manual. Crown 8vo,
5_s._

=YOUMANS, ELIZA A., First Book of Botany.= Designed to Cultivate the
Observing Powers of Children. With 300 Engravings. New and Cheaper
Edition. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._


CHEMISTRY.

 =COOKE, Prof. J. P., Laboratory Practice.= A Series of Experiments on
 the Fundamental Principles of Chemistry. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =New Chemistry.= With 31 Illustrations. Ninth Edition. Crown 8vo,
 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=RICHTER, Prof. V. von, Chemistry of the Carbon Compounds: or Organic
Chemistry.= Authorised Translation by EDGAR F. SMITH. Second American
Edition from Sixth German Edition. Crown 8vo, 20_s._

 =Text-Book of Inorganic Chemistry.= Authorised Translation by EDGAR F.
 SMITH. Third American Edition from Fifth German Edition. Crown 8vo,
 8_s._ 6_d._

=SMITH, EDGAR F., Electro-Chemical Analysis.= With 25 Illustrations.
Square 16mo, 5_s._

=STRECKER, ADOLPH, Text-Book of Organic Chemistry.= Edited by Professor
WISLICENUS. Translated and Edited, with extensive Additions, by W. R.
HODGKINSON and A. J. GREENAWAY. Second and cheaper Edition. 8vo, 12_s._
6_d._

=VOGEL, Dr. HERMANN, Chemistry of Light and Photography.= With 100
Illustrations. Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)


GEOLOGY, MINERALOGY, ETC.

 =ABERCROMBY, Hon. RALPH, Weather.= A popular Exposition of the Nature
 of Weather Changes from day to day. With 96 Figures. Second Edition.
 Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =BALL, Sir ROBERT, The Cause of an Ice Age.= Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
 (_Modern Science Series._)

 =BONNEY, Prof. T. G., Ice Work, Present and Past.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._
 (_I. S. S._)

 =CATLIN, GEORGE, The Lifted and Subsided Rocks of America.= With their
 Influence on the Oceanic, Atmospheric, and Land Currents, and the
 Distribution of Races. With 2 Maps, Crown 8vo, 6_s._ 6_d._

 =DANA, E. S., Text-Book of Mineralogy.= With Treatise on
 Crystallography and Physical Mineralogy. Third Edition. With 800
 Woodcuts and Plates. 8vo, 15_s._

 =DANA, J. D., Text-Book of Geology=, for Schools. Illustrated. Crown
 8vo, 10_s._

 =Manual of Geology.= Illustrated by a Chart of the World, and 1000
 Figures. Fourth Edition. 8vo, 28_s._

 =The Geological Story Briefly Told.= Illustrated. 12mo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=DANA, J. D., and BRUSH, J. G., System of Mineralogy.= Sixth Edition,
entirely re-written and enlarged. Royal 8vo, £2 12_s._ 6_d._

 =Manual of Mineralogy and Petrography.= Fourth Edition. Numerous
 Woodcuts. Crown 8vo, 6_s._ net.

=DAWSON, Sir J. W., Geological History of Plants.= With 80
Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA IN CALCUTTA:=

 =Palæontologia Indica.= Folio. 1863-95. Published at various prices.

 [asterism] Index to the Genera and species described in the
 Palæontologia Indica up to the year 1891. By W. THEOBALD. 186 pp.
 folio. 1892. 4_s._

 =Memoirs of the Geological Survey.= Vols. I.--XXIV. Royal 8vo.
 1859-91. 10_s._ each.

 [asterism] Contents and Index to the first 20 volumes. By W.
 THEOBALD. Royal 8vo. 1892. 4_s._

 =Records of the Geological Survey.= Vols. I.-XXVIII. Royal 8vo.
 1868-95. 4_s._ each.

 [asterism] Contents and Index to the first 20 volumes (1868-87).
 Royal 8vo. 1891. 4_s._

=HAECKEL, Prof. ERNST, The History of Creation.= New Edition.
Translation revised by Prof. E. RAY LANKESTER. With 20 Plates and
numerous Figures. Fourth Edition. 2 vols. large post 8vo, 32_s._

=JUDD, Prof. J. W., Volcanoes=: What they Are, and What they Teach.
With 96 Illustrations on wood. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S.
S._)

=KINAHAN, G. H., Valleys, and their Relations to Fissures, Fractures,
and Faults.= Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=LOOMIS, E., A Treatise on Meteorology.= 8vo. sheep, 7_s._ 6_d._

=MALLET, F. R., Manual of the Geology of India.= Part 4.--Mineralogy
(mainly non-economic). 175 pp. royal 8vo. 1887. 4_s._

=MILNE, J., Earthquakes and other Earth Movements.= With 38 Figures.
Third and revised Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=MOSES, A. J., and PARSONS, C. L., Elements of Mineralogy,
Crystallography, and Blow-pipe Analysis.= 8vo, 10_s._

=OLDHAM, R. D., Manual of the Geology of India.= Second Edition,
revised and largely re-written. Royal 8vo, half calf. 1893. 16_s._

=SCOTT, ROBERT H., Elementary Meteorology.= Fifth Edition. With
numerous Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=SYMONS, G. J., The Eruption of Krakatoa, and Subsequent Phenomena.=
Report of the Krakatoa Committee of the Royal Society. With 6
Chromo-lithographs, and 40 Maps and Diagrams. 4to, £1 10_s._

=TYNDALL, J., Forms of Water in Clouds and Rivers, Ice and Glaciers.=
With 25 Illustrations. Tenth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=WRIGHT, G. F., The Ice Age in North America, and its Bearing upon the
Antiquity of Man.= With Maps and Illustrations. 8vo, 21_s._


MATHEMATICS.

 =CLIFFORD, W. KINGDON, Common Sense of the Exact Sciences.= Second
 Edition. With 100 Figures. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =KLEIN, FELIX, Lectures on the Ikosahedron, and the Solution of
 Equations of the Fifth Degree.= Translated by G. G. MORRICE. 8vo,
 10_s._ 6_d._


PHYSICS.

 =BABBITT, E. D., The Principles of Light and Colour.= With over 200
 Engravings and 4 Coloured Plates. Royal 8vo, 21_s._ net.

 =Electricity in Daily Life.= A Popular Account of its Application to
 Everyday Uses. With 125 Illustrations. Square 8vo, 9_s._

=GLAZEBROOK, R. T., Laws and Properties of Matter.= Crown 8vo, 2_s._
6_d._ (_Modern Science Series._)

=HOSPITALIER, E., The Modern Applications of Electricity.= Translated
and Enlarged by JULIUS MAIER. Second Edition, revised, with many
Additions and Numerous Illustrations. 2 vols. 8vo, 25_s._

=LE CONTE, JOSEPH, Sight.= An Exposition of the Principles of Monocular
and Binocular Vision. Second Edition. With 132 Illustrations. Crown
8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=LOMMEL, Dr. EUGENE, Nature of Light.= With a General Account of
Physical Optics. With 188 Illustrations and a Table of Spectra in
Chromo-lithography. Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=ROOD, OGDEN N., Colour.= A Text-Book of Modern Chromatics. With
Applications to Art and Industry. With 130 Original Illustrations.
Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=STALLO, J. B., Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics.= Third
Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=STEWART, BALFOUR, Conservation of Energy.= With 14 Illustrations.
Seventh Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=WURTZ, Prof., The Atomic Theory.= Translated by E. CLEMINSHAW. Fifth
Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)


ZOOLOGY.

 =BENEDEN, J. P., van, Animal Parasites and Messmates.= With 83
 Illustrations. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =BERNSTEIN, Prof., The Five Senses of Man.= With 91 Illustrations.
 Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =COMSTOCK, JOHN HENRY and ANNA B., A Manual for the Study of Insects.=
 Royal 8vo, 25_s._ net.

 =FLOWER, W. H., The Horse: A Study in Natural History.= Crown 8vo,
 2_s._ 6_d._ (_Modern Science Series._)

 =HARTMANN, R., Anthropoid Apes.= With 63 Illustrations. Second
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =HEILPRIN, Prof. A., Geographical and Geological Distribution of
 Animals.= With Frontispiece. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =HORNADAY, W. T., Taxidermy and Zoological Collecting.= With Chapters
 on Collecting and Preserving Insects, by W. J. HOLLAND, D.D. With 24
 Plates and 85 Illustrations. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =HUXLEY, Prof. T. H., The Crayfish: An Introduction to the Study of
 Zoology.= With 82 Illustrations. Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I.
 S. S._)

 =KEW, H. W., Dispersal of Shells.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =LUBBOCK, Sir JOHN, Ants, Bees, and Wasps.= A Record of Observations
 on the Habits of the Social Hymenoptera. With 5 Chromo-lithographic
 Plates. Tenth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =On the Senses, Instincts, and Intelligence of Animals.= With Special
 Reference to Insects. With 118 Illustrations. Third Edition. Crown
 8vo. (_I. S. S._)

=MAREY, Prof. E. J., Animal Mechanism=, A Treatise on Terrestrial and
Aërial Locomotion. With 117 Illustrations. Third Edition. Crown 8vo,
5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=MEYER, G. HERMANN von, Organs of Speech and their Application in the
Formation of Articulate Sounds.= With 47 Illustrations. Crown 8vo,
5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=PETTIGREW, J. B., Animal Locomotion=; or, Walking, Swimming, and
Flying. With 130 Illustrations. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S.
S._)

=POULTON, E. B., Colours of Animals: their Meaning and Use, especially
considered in the case of Insects.= With Coloured Frontispiece and 66
Illustrations in text. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=RODD, E. H., Birds of Cornwall and the Scilly Islands.= Edited by J.
E. HARTING. With Portrait and Map. 8vo, 14_s._

=ROMANES, G. J., Jelly-Fish, Star-Fish, and Sea-Urchins.= Being a
Research on Primitive Nervous Systems. With Illustrations. Second
Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

  (_See also_ PHILOSOPHY.)

=SCHMIDT, Prof. O., Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism.= With 26
Illustrations. Seventh Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =Mammalia in their Relation to Primeval Times.= With 51 Woodcuts.
 Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=SEMPER, KARL, Natural Conditions of Existence as they affect Animal
Life.= With 2 Maps and 106 Woodcuts. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._
(_I. S. S._)

=STEBBING, T. R. R., A History of Crustacea.= Recent Malacostraca. With
numerous Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=TRIMEN, ROLAND, South African Butterflies.= A Monograph of the
Extra-tropical Species. With 12 Coloured Plates. 3 vols., 8vo, £2
12_s._ 6_d._

=WARNER, Prof. F., Physical Expression: Its Modes and Principles.= With
50 Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=WEED, C. M., Insects and Insecticides.= Illustrated. Crown 8vo, 7_s._
6_d._

=WITHERBY, HARRY, Forest Birds, their Haunts and Habits.= With
Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._


_VIII.--USEFUL ARTS AND SCIENCES AND FINE ARTS._

CHESS.

 =British Chess Magazine.= Monthly, _d._

 =EUCLID'S Analysis of the Chess Ending=, King and Queen against King
 and Rook. Edited by E. FREEBOROUGH. 8vo, 6_s._ net.

 =FREEBOROUGH, E., Chess Endings.= A Companion to Chess Openings,
 Ancient and Modern. Edited and arranged by E. FREEBOROUGH. Large post
 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Select Chess End Games.= Edited and arranged. Crown 8vo, 1_s._ 6_d._
 net.

=FREEBOROUGH, E.=, and =RANKEN, C. E., Chess Openings, Ancient and
Modern.= Revised and Corrected up to the Present Time from the best
Authorities. Large post 8vo, 8_s._

=GOSSIP, G. H. D., The Chess Player's Text-Book.= An Elementary
Treatise on the Game of Chess. Numerous Diagrams. 16mo, 2_s._

=GREENWELL, W. J., Chess Exemplified in One Hundred and Thirty-two
Games of the Most Celebrated Players.= By W. J. GREENWELL, 8vo, 5_s._

=WALKER'S Chess Studies.= New Edition. With Preface by E. FREEBOROUGH.
Large post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._


GASTRONOMY AND DIET.

 =ALLEN, MARY L., Luncheon Dishes.= Comprising Menus in French and
 English, as well as Suggestions for Arrangement and Decoration of
 Table. Foolscap 8vo, cloth 1_s._ 6_d._; paper, 1_s._

 =Five O'clock Tea.= Containing Receipts for Cakes, Savoury Sandwiches,
 etc. Eighth Thousand. Foolscap 8vo, 1_s._ 6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._

=CAMERON, Miss, Soups and Stews, and Choice Ragouts.= 1_s._ 6_d._;
paper covers, 1_s._

=DE JONCOURT, MARIE, Wholesome Cookery.= Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo,
1_s._ 6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._

=HOOPER, MARY, Cookery for Invalids, Persons of Delicate Digestion, and
Children.= Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

 =Every-Day Meals.= Being Economical and Wholesome Recipes for
 Breakfast, Luncheon, and Supper. Seventh Edition. Crown 8vo, 2_s._
 6_d._

 =Little Dinners.= How to Serve them with Elegance and Economy.
 Twenty-first Edition. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=KINGSFORD, ANNA, The Perfect Way in Diet.= A Treatise advocating a
return to the Natural and Ancient Food of our race. Third Edition.
Small 8vo, 2_s._

=NEWMAN, FRANCIS WILLIAM, Essays on Diet.= Small 8vo, cloth limp, 2_s._

=SANTIAGO, D., Curry Cook's Assistant.= Foolscap 8vo, 1_s._ 6_d._;
paper covers, 1_s._

=SMITH, E., Foods.= With numerous Illustrations. Ninth Edition. Crown
8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=THOMPSON, Sir H., Diet in Relation to Age and Activity.= Foolscap 8vo,
1_s._ 6_d._; paper covers, 1_s._


MEDICINE AND PHYSIOLOGY.

 =BROTHERS, A., Infantile Mortality during Child-Birth, and Its
 Prevention.= 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ net.

 =BROWNE, EDGAR A., How to use the Ophthalmoscope.= Third Edition.
 Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =BUNGE, Prof. G., Text-Book of Physiological and Pathological
 Chemistry=, for Physicians and Students. Translated from the German by
 L. C. WOOLDRIDGE. 8vo, 16_s._

 =BYFORD, H. J., Manual of Gynecology.= With 234 Illustrations. Crown
 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ net.

 =CARPENTER, W. B., Principles of Mental Physiology.= With their
 Applications to the Training and Discipline of the Mind and the Study
 of its Morbid Conditions. Illustrated. Sixth Edition, 8vo, 12_s._

 =CATLIN, GEORGE, Shut Your Mouth and Save Your Life.= With 29
 Illustrations. Eighth Edition. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

 =DUNN, H. P., Infant Health.= The Physiology and Hygiene of Early
 Life. Small crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =DYMOCK, W., WARDEN, C. J. H.=, and =HOOPER, D., Pharmacographia
 Indica.= The principal Drugs of Vegetable Origin met with in British
 India. Six Parts and an Index. 8vo. 1889-93 £3 10_s._

 =GREEN, F. W. EDRIDGE, Colour Blindness and Colour Perception.= With 3
 Coloured Plates. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =HAMMERSTON, OLOF, A Text-Book of Physiological Chemistry.= 8vo, £1.

 =HARLINGEN, A. van, Handbook on the Diagnosis and Treatment of Skin
 Disease.= With 60 Illustrations. 8vo, 12_s._ net.

 =Index Medicus.= A Monthly Classified Record of the Current Medical
 Literature of the World. Annual Subscription, £5 5_s._

 =JACKSON, EDWARD, Skiascopy and Its Practical Application to the Study
 of Refraction.= 5_s._

 =KRAUS, Dr. J., The Etiology, Symptoms and Treatment of Gall-Stones.=
 With Remarks on Operative Treatment by H. MORRIS. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =KRAUS, Dr. J.. Senr., Pathology and Therapy of Gall-Stones.= Crown
 8vo. 5_s._

 =Carlsbad: Its Thermal Springs and Baths, and How to Use them.= Fourth
 Edition, revised and enlarged. Crown 8vo, 6_s._ 6_d._

=LAGRANGE, F., Physiology of Bodily Exercise.= Second Edition. Crown
8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=LEHMANN, K. B., Methods of Practical Hygiene.= Translated by W.
CROOKES. 2 vols., 8vo, £1 11_s._ 6_d._

=LÜCKES, EVA C. E., Lectures on General Nursing.= Delivered to the
Probationers of the London Hospital Training School for Nurses. Fourth
Edition. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=METCHNIKOFF, ELIAS, Lectures on the Comparative Pathology of
Inflammation.= Translated from the French by F. A. and E. H. STARLING.
8vo, 12_s._

=NUNN, T. W., Growing Children and Awkward Walking.= Crown 8vo, 2_s._

=PILCHER, J. E., First Aid in Illness and Injury.= With 174
Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=PURITZ, LUDWIG, Code-Book of Gymnastic Exercises.= 32mo, 1_s._ 6_d._
net.

=PYE, W., Surgical Handicraft.= A Manual of Surgical Manipulations, &c.
With 235 Illustrations. Third Edition. Revised and Edited by T. H. R.
CROWLE. Crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Elementary Bandaging and Surgical Dressing, for the use of Dressers
 and Nurses.= Twelfth Thousand. 18mo, 2_s._

=RIBOT, Prof. T., Heredity: A Psychological Study of its Phenomena,
Laws, Causes, and Consequences.= Second Edition. Large crown 8vo, 9_s._

=ROSENTHAL, Prof. J., General Physiology of Muscles and Nerves.= Third
Edition. With 75 Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

 =Sanitarian.= Devoted to the Preservation of Health, Mental and
 Physical Culture. Monthly. Annual Subscription, 18_s._

=SCOVILLE, W. L., The Art of Compounding Drugs.= For Students and
Pharmacists at the Prescription Counter. 8vo, 12_s._

=STRAHAN, S. A. K., Marriage and Disease.= A Study of Heredity and the
more important Family Degenerations. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=TAYLOR, CHARLES BELL, Lectures on Diseases of the Eye.= Third Edition.
8vo, 10_s._

=TYRRELL, WALTER, Nervous Exhaustion: its Causes, Outcomes, and
Treatment.= Crown 8vo, 3_s._

=WAKE, C. STANILAND, Development of Marriage and Kinship.= 8vo, 18_s._

=WALLIS, J. WHITE, Manual of Hygiene.= Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=WOOLDRIDGE, L. C., On the Chemistry of the Blood, and other Scientific
Papers.= Arranged by VICTOR HORSLEY and ERNEST STARLING. With
Introduction by VICTOR HORSLEY. With Illustrations. 8vo, 16_s._


MILITARY SCIENCE.

 =BAKER, Lt-Col. EDEN, R.A., Preliminary Tactics.= An Introduction to
 the Study of War. For the use of Junior Officers. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =BRACKENBURY, Major-General, Field Works.= Their Technical
 Construction and Tactical Application. 2 vols. small crown 8vo, 12_s._

 =BUXTON, Major, Elements of Military Administration.= First Part:
 Permanent System of Administration. Small crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Cavalry Tactics, Organisation, etc., Notes on.= By a CAVALRY OFFICER.
 With Diagrams. 8vo, 12_s._

 =CLERY, Gen. C. FRANCIS, Minor Tactics.= 13th Edition Revised, with 26
 Maps and Plans. Crown 8vo, 9_s._

 =FOSTER, C. W., Modern War.= Translated by C. W. FOSTER. Part I.:
 Strategy, and Atlas of 64 Plates. 8vo, £1 16_s._ Part II.: Grand
 Tactics, 15_s._

 =GALL, Captain H. R., Solutions of the Tactical Problems Examinations
 for Captains, May, 1896.= Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

 =HARRISON, Col. R., Officer's Memorandum Book for Peace and War.=
 Fourth Edition, revised. Oblong 32mo, red basil, with pencil, 3_s._
 6_d._

 =HUTCHINSON, Col., and MACGREGOR, Major, Military Sketching and
 Reconnaissance.= Fifth Edition. With 16 Plates. Small crown 8vo, 4_s._

 =PRATT, Lieut.-Col. S. C., Field Artillery.= Its Equipment,
 Organisation, and Tactics. Sixth Edition. Revised by Lieut.-Col. EDEN
 BAKER. Small crown 8vo, 6_s._ (_Military Handbooks._)

 =Military Law.= Its Procedure and Practice. Eleventh revised Edition.
 Small crown 8vo, 4_s._ 6_d._ net. (_Military Handbooks._)

=SCHAW, Col. H., Defence and Attack of Positions and Localities.=
Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

=SHAW, Lieut.-Col. WILKINSON, Elements of Modern Tactics practically
applied to English Formations.= Eighth Edition. With 31 Plates and
Maps. Small crown 8vo, 9_s._ net. (_Military Handbooks._)

=TRENCH, Major-General, Cavalry in Modern War.= Small crown 8vo, 6_s._
(_Military Handbooks._)

=WINDHAM, Sir C. A., The Crimean Diary of the late General Sir Charles
A. Windham, K.C.B.= With an Introduction by Sir W. H. RUSSELL. Edited
by Major HUGH PEARCE. With an added Chapter on The Defence of Cawnpore,
by Lieut.-Col. JOHN ADYE, C.B. 8vo.


MUSIC.

 =BLASERNA, Prof. P., Theory of Sound in its Relation to Music.= With
 Numerous Illustrations. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I.S.S._)

 =LOCHER, CARL, Explanation of Organ Stops.= With Hints for Effective
 Combinations. 8vo, 5_s._

 =PARRY, C. HUBERT H., The Evolution of the Art of Music.= Crown 8vo,
 5_s._ Also cloth, gilt top, 6_s._ (_I.S.S._)

 =POLE, W., Philosophy of Music.= Lectures delivered at the Royal
 Institution. Fourth Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ (_Philosophical
 Library._)

 =WAGNER, RICHARD, Prose Works.= Translated by W. ASHTON ELLIS.

  Vol.   I. =The Art Work of the Future, &c.= 8vo, 12_s._ 6_d._ net.
  Vol.  II. =The Drama.= 8vo, 12_s._ 6_d._ net.
  Vol. III. =The Theatre.= 8vo, 12_s._ 6_d._ net.
  Vol.  IV. =Art and Politics.= 8vo, 12_s._ 6_d._ net.


NUMISMATICS.

 =Numismata Orientalia.= Royal 4to, in paper wrapper. Part I.--Ancient
 Indian Weights. By E. THOMAS. With a plate and Map, 9_s._ 6_d._ Part
 II.--Coins of the Urtuki Turkumáns. By S. LANE POOLE. With 6 Plates,
 9_s._ Part III.--Coinage of Lydia and Persia. By BARCLAY V. HEAD. With
 3 Plates, 10_s._ 6_d._ Part IV.--Coins of the Tuluni Dynasty. By E.
 T. ROGERS. With 1 Plate, 5_s._ Part V.--Parthian Coinage. By PERCY
 GARDNER. With 8 Plates, 18_s._ Part VI.--Ancient Coins and Measures of
 Ceylon. By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. With 1 Plate, 10_s._

 Vol. I. Containing the first six parts as specified above. Royal 4to,
 half bound, £3 13_s._ 6_d._

 Vol. II. =Coins of the Jews.= Being a History of the Jewish Coinage
 in the Old and New Testaments. By F. W. MADDEN. With 279 Woodcuts and
 Plate. Royal 4to, £2.

 Vol. III. Part I.--=The Coins of Arakan, of Pegu, and of Burma.= By
 Lieut.-General Sir ARTHUR PHAYRE. Also contains the Indian Balhara
 and the Arabian Intercourse with India in the ninth and following
 centuries. By EDWARD THOMAS. With 5 Illustrations. Royal 4to, 8_s._
 6_d._

 Vol. III. Part II.--=The Coins of Southern India.= By Sir W. Elliott.
 With Map and Plates. Royal 4to, 25_s._

=Numismata Orientalia.= Illustrated. Fifty-seven Plates of Oriental
Coins, Ancient and Modern, from the collection of the late WILLIAM
MARSDEN, F.R.S. Engraved from drawings made under his directions. 4to,
31_s._ 6_d._


PAINTING, SCULPTURE, ETC.

 =BLAKE, WILLIAM, Selections from the Writings of.= Edited, with
 Introduction, by LAURENCE HOUSMAN. With Frontispiece. Elzevir 8vo,
 Parchment or cloth, 6_s._; vellum, 7_s._ 6_d._ (_Parchment Library._)

 =CLEMENT C. E., and HUTTON, L., Artists of the Nineteenth Century and
 their Works.= 2050 Biographical Sketches. Third Edition, revised.
 Crown 8vo, 15_s._

 =GOWER, Lord RONALD, Bric-à-Brac.= Being some Photo-prints
 illustrating Art Objects at Gower Lodge, Windsor. With Letterpress
 Descriptions. Super-royal 8vo, 15_s._; extra binding, 21_s._

 =HOLMES, FORBES A. W., The Science of Beauty.= An Analytical Inquiry
 into the Laws of Aesthetics. Second Edition. Post 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =HOUSMAN, LAURENCE, Arthur Boyd Houghton.= Selections from his Work in
 Black and White. With Introductory Essay. 4to, 15_s._ net.

 =HOWELLS, W. D., A Little Girl among the Old Masters.= With 54 Plates.
 Oblong crown 8vo, 10_s._

 =LEIGHTON, Lord, P.R.A., Addresses to the Students of the Royal
 Academy.= With Portrait. 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =MITCHELL, LUCY M., History of Ancient Sculpture.= With numerous
 Illustrations. Super-royal 8vo, 42_s._

 =REYNOLDS, Sir JOSHUA, Discourses.= Edited by E. GOSSE. Elzevir 8vo
 (_Parchment Library._) Vellum, 7_s._ 6_d._; parchment or cloth, 6_s._

 =THACKERAY, W. M., Essay on the Genius of George Cruikshank.=
 Reprinted verbatim from the _Westminster Review_. With 40
 Illustrations. Royal 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =THOMPSON, Sir E. MAUNDE.= English Illuminated Manuscripts. With 21
 Plates in chromo-lithography. Imp. 8vo, 18_s._

 =WOLTMANN, ALFRED, and WOERMANN, KARL, History of Painting.= With
 numerous Illustrations. Med. 8vo, Vol. I.: Painting in Antiquity and
 the Middle Ages, 28_s._ Vol. II.: The Painting of the Renasence,
 42_s._ The two volumes may be had bound in cloth with bevelled boards
 and gilt leaves, price 30_s._ and 45_s._ respectively.


TECHNOLOGY, ETC.

 =Amateur Mechanic's Workshop.= Plain and Concise Directions for the
 Manipulation of Wood and Metals. By the Author of 'The Lathe and its
 Uses.' Sixth Edition. Illustrated. 8vo, 6_s._

 =ANDERSON, WILLIAM, Practical Mercantile Correspondence.= A Collection
 of Modern Letters of Business. With Notes. Thirtieth Edition, Revised.
 Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =AXON, W. E. A., The Mechanic's Friend.= A Collection of Receipts and
 Practical Suggestions relating to Aquaria, Bronzing, Cements, Drawing,
 Dyes, Electricity, Gilding, Glass-working, &c. Second Edition.
 Numerous Woodcuts. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =BELLOWS, W., The Ocean Liners of the World Illustrated.= Second
 Edition. Small oblong 4to, 1_s._

 =DU MONCEL, Count, The Telephone, the Microphone, and the Phonograph.=
 With 74 Illustrations. Third Edition. Small 8vo, 5_s._

 =EGER, GUSTAV, Technological Dictionary.= In the English and German
 Languages. 2 vols. royal 8vo, £1 7_s._

 =FULTON, J., A Treatise on the Manufacture of Coke, and the Saving of
 By-Products.= 8vo, 21_s._

 =GALLOWAY, ROBERT, Treatise on Fuel.= Scientific and Practical. With
 Illustrations. Post 8vo, 6_s._

 =HULME, F. EDWARD, Mathematical Drawing Instruments, and How to Use
 them.= With Illustrations. Third Edition. Imperial 16mo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =HUSMANN, G., American Grape Growing and Wine Making.= New and
 entirely Revised Edition. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =INMAN, JAMES, Nautical Tables.= Designed for the use of British
 Seamen. New Edition, Revised and Enlarged. 8vo, 16_s._

 =JAPP, A. H., Days with Industrials.= Adventures and Experiences among
 Curious Industries. With Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =KAMARSCH, KARL, Technological Dictionary of the Terms Employed in the
 Arts and Sciences= (Architecture, Engineering, Mechanics, Shipbuilding
 and Navigation, Metallurgy, Mathematics, &c.). Fourth Revised Edition.
 3 vols. imperial 8vo.

  Vol.   I. German--English--French. 12_s._
  Vol.  II. English--German--French. 12_s._
  Vol. III. French--German--English. 15_s._

 =KROHNKE, G. H. A., Handbook for Laying out Curves on Railways and
 Tramways.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =Lathe, The, and its Uses=; or, Instruction in the Art of Turning Wood
 and Metal. Sixth Edition. Illustrated. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =LAWLOR, J. J., Practical Hot Water Heating, Steam and Gas Fitting.=
 Crown 8vo, 8_s._ 6_d._

 =LEFFMANN, HENRY=, and =BEAM, W., Examination of Water for Sanitary
 and Technical Purposes.= Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. With
 Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =Analysis of Milk and Milk Products.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=LUKIN, J., Amongst Machines.= A Description of Various Mechanical
Appliances used in the Manufacture of Wood, Metal, etc. A book for
boys. Third Edition. With 64 Engravings. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =The Boy Engineers.= What They Did, and How They Did It. A book for
 boys. With 30 Engravings. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =The Young Mechanic.= A Book for Boys, containing Directions for the
 Use of all kinds of Tools, and for the Construction of Steam Engines
 and Mechanical Models. Seventh Edition. With 70 Engravings. Crown 8vo,
 3_s._ 6_d._

=MAGUIRE, W. R., Domestic Sanitary Drainage and Plumbing. Second
Edition.= Revised. 8vo, 12_s._

=MALDEN, W. J., Pig Keeping for Profit.= Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._
(_Village Library._)

=MOORE, CUNNINGHAM WILSON, A Practical Guide for Prospectors,
Explorers, and Miners.= 8vo, 12_s._ net.

=MORFIT, CAMPBELL, Pure Fertilisers, and the Chemical Conversion of
Rock Guanos, etc., into various valuable products.= 8vo, £4 4_s._

 =Manufacture of Soaps.= With Illustrations. 8vo, £2 12_s._ 6_d._

=OSTERBERG, MAX, Synopsis of Current Electrical Literature.= 8vo, 5_s._
net.

=RICHARDSON, M. T., Practical Blacksmithing.= With 400 Illustrations. 4
vols. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ each.

 =Practical Carriage Building.= 2 vols. 10_s._

 =Practical Horse-shoer.= With 170 Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=ROSS, Lieut.-Col. W. A., Pyrology=; or, Fire Chemistry. Small 4to,
36_s._

=SCHEIDEL, Dr. A., The Cyanide Process=; its Practical Applications and
Economical Results. 8vo, 6_s._

=SCHOOLING, J. HOLT, Handwriting and Expression.= A Study of Written
Gesture, with 150 _Fac-simile_ Reproductions of the Handwritings of Men
and Women of various Nationalities. Translated. 8vo, 6_s._

=SCHÜTZENBERGER, Prof., Fermentation.= With 28 Illustrations. Fourth
Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S. S._)

=Science.= Weekly. £1 2_s._

=Scientific American.= Weekly. 18_s._

=Scientific American.= Export Edition. Monthly. £1 5_s._

=Scientific American.= Building Edition. Monthly. 14_s._

 =Do. Supplement.= Weekly. £1 5_s._

=SEDDING, J. D., Art and Handicraft.= Six Essays. 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=SMITH, HAMILTON, Hydraulics.= The Flow of Water through Orifices, over
Weirs, and through Open Conduits and Pipes. With 17 Plates. Royal 4to,
30_s._

=THURSTON, Prof. R. H., History of the Growth of the Steam Engine.=
With Numerous Illustrations. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S.
S._)

 =Manual of the Steam Engine.= For Engineers and Technical Schools.
 Parts I. and II. Royal 8vo. 31_s._ 6_d._ each Part.

=WANKLYN, J. A., Milk Analysis.= A Practical Treatise on the
Examination of Milk and its Derivatives, Cream, Butter and Cheese.
Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=WANKLYN, J. A., and CHAPMAN, E. T., Water Analysis.= A Treatise on the
Examination of Potable Water. Tenth Edition. thoroughly Revised. Crown
8vo, 5_s._

=WANKLYN, J. A., and COOPER, W. J., Bread Analysis.= A Practical
Treatise on the Examination of Flour and Bread. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =Air Analysis.= A Practical Treatise. With Appendix on Illuminating
 Gas. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=WATERHOUSE, Col. J., Preparation of Drawings for Photographic
Reproduction.= With Plates. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=WEISBACH, JULIUS, Theoretical Mechanics.= A Manual of the Mechanics of
Engineering. Designed as a Text Book for Technical Schools, and for the
use of Engineers. From the German, by E. B. COXE. With 902 Woodcuts.
Second Edition. 8vo, 31_s._ 6_d._

=WIECHMANN, G. F., Sugar Analysis.= For Refineries, Sugar-Houses,
Experimental Stations, &c. 8vo, 12_s._ 6_d._

=WILCOX, LUTE, Irrigation Farming.= Crown 8vo, 10_s._

=WYLDE, W., Inspection of Meat.= A Guide and Instruction Book to
Officers supervising Contract Meat, and to all Sanitary Inspectors.
With 32 Coloured Plates. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._


SPORTS.

 =GOULD, A. C., Modern American Pistols and Revolvers.= 8vo, cloth,
 7_s._ 6_d._

 =Modern American Rifles.= 8vo, cloth, 10_s._ 6_d._

=HILLIER, G. LACY, All About Bicycling.= 12mo, 1_s._

=MONEY, Captain ALBERT ("Blue Rock,") Pigeon Shooting.= Foolscap 8vo,
5_s._ net.

=NEWHOUSE. The Trapper's Guide.= A Manual of Instruction. Crown 8vo,
5_s._

=Practical Hints on Shooting.= By "20-BORE." 8vo, 12_s._

=WHEELDON, J. P., Angling Resorts near London.= The Thames and the Lea.
Crown 8vo, paper, 1_s._ 6_d._


_IX.--PHILOLOGY._

COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY.

 =ABEL, CARL, Linguistic Essays.= Post 8vo, 9_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental
 Series._)

 =Slavic and Latin.= Lectures on Comparative Lexicography. Post 8vo,
 5_s._

=BRUGMANN, K., Elements of the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-Germanic
Languages.= A Concise Exposition of the History of Sanscrit, Old
Iranian, Old Armenian, Old Greek, Latin, Umbrian, Samnitic, Old Irish,
Gothic, Old High German, Lithuanian, and Old Bulgarian. In 5 vols. 8vo,
cloth.

 Vol. I. =Introduction and Phonology.= By J. WRIGHT. 582 pp. 1888.
 18_s._

 Vol. II. Part I.--=Morphology.= Stem Formation and Inflection. By S.
 CONWAY and W. D. ROUSE. 500 pp. 1891. 16_s._

 Vol. III. Part II.--=Morphology.= Numerals, Nouns, and Pronouns. By S.
 CONWAY and W. D. ROUSE. 412 pp. 1892. 12_s._ 6_d._

 Vol. IV. Part III.--=Morphology.= Verbs: Formation of the Stem, and
 Inflection or Conjugation. By S. CONWAY and W. D. ROUSE. 630 pp. 1895.
 £1.

 Vol. V. Index of Words, Matters, and Authors mentioned in Vols. I.-IV.
 250 pp. 1895. 9_s._

=BYRNE, Dean JAMES, General Principles of the Structure of Language.= 2
vols. Second and Revised Edition. 8vo, 36_s._

 =Origin of Greek, Latin, and Gothic Roots.= Second and Revised
 Edition. 8vo, 18_s._

=CUST, R., Linguistic and Oriental Essays.= Post 8vo. First Series,
10_s._ 6_d._ Second Series, with 6 Maps, 21_s._ Third Series, 21_s._
(_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=DELBRUCK, B., Introduction to the Study of Language.= The History and
Methods of Comparative Philology of the Indo-European Languages. 8vo,
5_s._

=GARLANDA, FEDERICO, The Fortunes of Words.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =The Philosophy of Words.= A Popular Introduction to the Science of
 Language. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=GREG, R. P., Comparative Philology of the Old and New Worlds in
Relation to Archaic Speech.= With Copious Vocabularies. Super royal
8vo. £1 11_s._ 6_d._

=LEFEVRE, ANDRÉ, Race and Language.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I.S.S._)

 =Philological Society, Transactions and Proceedings of.= Irregular.

=SAYCE, A. H., Introduction to the Science of Language.= New and
Cheaper Edition. 2 vols. Crown 8vo, 9_s._

 =The Principles of Comparative Philology.= Fourth Edition, revised and
 enlarged. Crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=SCHLEICHER, AUGUST, Comparative Grammar of the Indo-European,
Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin Languages.= Translated from the Third German
Edition by H. BENDALL. 8vo, 13_s._ 6_d._

=TAYLOR, Canon ISAAC, The Alphabet.= An Account of the Origin and
Development of Letters. With numerous Tables and _Fac-similes_. 2 vols.
8vo, 36_s._

=WHITNEY, Prof. W. D., Life and Growth of Language.= Sixth Edition.
Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I.S.S._)

 =Language and the Study of Language.= Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo,
 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Language and its Study.= With especial Reference to the Indo-European
 Family of Languages. Edited by R. MORRIS. Second Edition. Crown 8vo,
 5_s._ #/


AFRICAN.

 =CUST, R. N.= A Sketch of the Modern Languages of Africa. 2 vols. With
 31 autotype portraits, 1883. Post 8vo, 18_s._ (_T.O.S._)


ALBANIAN.

 =Grammaire Albanaise=, à l'usage de ceux qui désirent apprendre cette
 langue sans l'aide d'un maître. Par P. W. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._


ANGLO-SAXON.

 =RASK, ERASMUS, Grammar of the Anglo-Saxon Tongue.= From the Danish,
 by B. THORPE. Third Edition. Post 8vo, 5_s._ 6_d._


ARABIC.

 =COTTON, General Sir A., Arabic Primer.= Consisting of 180 short
 sentences, containing 30 primary words prepared according to the vocal
 system of studying language. 38 pp., crown 8vo, cloth. 1876. 2_s._

 =Diwans, The, of the six ancient Arabic Poets=--Enn[=a]biga, 'Antara,
 Tharafa, Zuhair, 'Alqama, and Imruulqais, and a collection of their
 fragments, with a list of the various readings of the text edited by
 W. AHLWARDT. 8vo, wrapper. 1870. 12_s._

 =HIRSCHFELD, H., Arabic Chrestomathy in Hebrew characters, with a
 Glossary.= viii. and 174 pp., 8vo, cloth. 1892. 7_s._. 6_d._

 =MEAKIN, J. E. BUDGETT, Introduction to the Arabic of Morocco.=
 English-Arabic Vocabulary, Grammar, Notes, etc. Foolscap 8vo, 6_s._
 net.

 =NEWMAN, F. W., Dictionary of Modern Arabic.= (Anglo-Arabic and
 Arabo-English.) 2 vols. Crown 8vo, £1 1_s._

 =Handbook of Modern Arabic.= Post 8vo, 6_s._

=PENRICE, J., Dictionary and Glossary of the Korân, with copious
Grammatical References and Explanations.= 1873. Small 4to, £1 1_s._

=SALMONÉ, H. A., Arabic-English Dictionary.= Comprising about 120,000
Arabic words with English Index of about 50,000 words. 2 vols. Post
8vo, 36_s._


BANTU.

 =KOLBE, F. W., A Language Study based on Bantu.= An Inquiry into the
 Laws of Root Formation. 8vo, 6_s._

 =TORREND, J., Comparative Grammar of the South African Bantu
 Languages.= Comprising those of Zanzibar, Mozambique, the Zambezi,
 Kafirland, Benguela, Angola, the Congo, the Ogowe, the Cameroons, the
 Lake Region, &c. Super-royal 8vo, 25_s._


BASQUE.

 =VAN EYS, W., Outlines of Basque Grammar.= Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._.


BENGALI.

 =YATES and WENGER, Bengali Grammar.= New and Revised Edition. 136 pp.
 small 8vo, cloth. 1885. 4_s._


CHINESE.

 =BALL, J. D., How to Write Chinese.= Part I. Royal 8vo, boards. 1888.
 10_s._ 6_d._

 =EITEL, E. J., Chinese Dictionary in the Cantonese Dialect.= With
 Supplement. Royal 8vo, half calf. £2 12_s._ 6_d._

 =HIRTH, F., Text Book of Documentary Chinese.= With a Vocabulary. 2
 vols, demy 4to, £1 1_s._

 =Notes on the Chinese Documentary Style.= 1888. 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

=LOBSCHEID, Rev. W., Chinese and English Dictionary.= Arranged
according to the Radicals. 1871. Royal 4to, cloth, £2 8_s._

 =English-Chinese Dictionary.= With the Punti and Mandarin
 Pronunciation. 1866-69. 4 vols., folio, £4 4_s._

=WILLIAMS, S. WELLS, Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language.=
Arranged according to the Wu-Fang Yuen Yin, with the Pronunciation
of the Characters as heard in Pekin, Canton, Amoy, and Shanghai.
Third Edition. 4to, half calf, £3 15_s._ Also Index to same, arranged
according to Sir Thomas Wade's system of orthography, by ACHESON. 8vo,
cloth, 12_s._ 6_d._


CUNEIFORM.

 =BERTIN, GEORGE, Abridged Grammar of the Languages of the Cuneiform
 Inscriptions.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._


DANISH.

 =BOJESEN, MARIA, Guide to the Danish Language.= 12mo, 5_s._

 =OTTÉ, E. C., Dano-Norwegian Grammar.= A Manual for Students of
 Danish, based on the Ollendorffian System. Third Edition. Crown 8vo,
 7_s._ 6_d._ Key, 3_s._

 =Simplified Grammar of the Danish Language.= Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=ROSING, S., Danish Dictionary.= Crown 8vo, 8_s._ 6_d._


DUTCH.

 =AHN, F., Grammar of the Dutch Language.= 12mo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =HALDEMAN, S. S., Pennsylvania Dutch.= A Dialect of South Germany,
 with an Infusion of English. 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._


EAST INDIAN.

 =BEAMES, J., Outlines of Indian Philology.= With language Map. Second
 Edition, enlarged and revised. 1868. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =Comparative Grammar of the Modern Aryan Languages of India.= Hindi,
 Panjabi, Sindi, Gujarati, Marathi, Oriya, and Bengali. In 3 vols. 8vo,
 16_s._ each vol.

  Vol.   I.--On Sounds, xvi. and 360 pp. 1872.
  Vol.  II.--The Noun and Pronoun, xii. and 348 pp. 1875.
  Vol. III.--The Verb, viii. and 316 pp. 1879.

=CAMPBELL, G., Specimens of Languages of India.= Including those of the
aboriginal tribes of Bengal, the Central Provinces, and the Eastern
Frontier. Royal 4to, boards. 1874. £1 11_s._ 6_d._

=WHITWORTH, G. E., Anglo-Indian Dictionary.= A Glossary of Indian terms
used in English, and of such English or other non-Indian terms as have
obtained special meanings in India. 8vo, 12_s._


EGYPTIAN.

 =BUDGE, E. A. WALLIS, First Steps in Egyptian.= Large post 8vo, 9_s._
 net.

 =An Egyptian Reading Book for Beginners, with a Vocabulary.= 8vo,
 15_s._ net.


ENGLISH.

 =BARTLETT, J. R., Dictionary of Americanisms.= A Glossary of Words and
 Phrases colloquially used in the United States. Fourth Edition. 8vo,
 21_s._

 =BOWEN, H. C., Studies in English.= For the use of Modern Schools.
 Tenth Thousand. Small crown 8vo, 1_s._ 6_d._

 =English Grammar for Beginners.= Foolscap 8vo, 1_s._

=CARREÑO, Metodo para aprender a Leer, escribir y hablar el Ingles
segun el sistema de Ollendorff.= 8vo, 4_s._ 6_d._ Key, 3_s._

=JENKINS, JABEZ, Vest-Pocket Lexicon.= An English Dictionary of all
except Familiar Words, including the principal Scientific and Technical
Terms. 64mo, roan, 1_s._ 6_d._; cloth, 1_s._

=SMITH, H. PERCY, Glossary of Terms and Phrases.= Cheap Edition. Medium
8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

=TRENCH, Archbishop, English Past and Present.= Fourteenth Edition,
Revised and Improved. Foolscap 8vo, 5_s._

 =On the Study of Words.= Twenty-third Edition, Revised. Foolscap 8vo,
 5_s._

 =Select Glossary of English Words used formerly in Senses Different
 from the Present.= Seventh Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Foolscap
 8vo, 5_s._

=WEDGWOOD, H., Dictionary of English Etymology.= Fourth Edition,
Revised and Enlarged. 8vo, £1 1_s._

 =Contested Etymology in the Dictionary of the Rev. W. W. Skeat.= Crown
 8vo, 5_s._

=WHITNEY, Prof. W. D., Essentials of English Grammar.= Second Edition.
Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._


FRENCH.

 =AHN, F., Method of Learning French.= First and Second Courses. 12mo,
 3_s._ Separately, 1_s._ 6_d._ each.

 =Method of Learning French.= Third Course. 12mo, 1_s._ 6_d._

=BELLOWS, JOHN, French and English Dictionary for the Pocket.=
Containing the French-English and English-French Divisions on the
same page, Conjugating all the Verbs, Distinguishing the Genders by
Different Types, giving Numerous Aids to Pronunciation, &c. Fifty-third
Thousand of the Second Edition. 32mo, morocco tuck, 12_s._ 6_d._; roan,
10_s._ 6_d._

=BRETTE, P. H.=, and =THOMAS, F., French Examination Papers set at
the University of London.= Part I.--Matriculation and the General
Examination for Women. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._ Key, 5_s._ Part
II.--First B.A. Examinations for Honours and D. Litt. Examinations.
Crown 8vo, 7_s._

=CASSAL, CHARLES, Glossary of Idioms, Gallicisms, and other
Difficulties contained in the Senior Course of the 'Modern French
Reader.'= Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=CASSAL, CHARLES=, and =KARCHER, THEODORE, Modern French Reader.=
Junior Course. Nineteenth Edition. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._ Senior
Course. Crown 8vo, 4_s._ Senior Course and Glossary in 1 vol. Crown
8vo, 6_s._

 =Little French Reader.= Extracted from the 'Modern French Reader.'
 Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 2_s._

=KARCHER, THEODORE, Questionnaire Français.= Questions on French
Grammar, Idiomatic Difficulties, and Military Expressions. Fourth
Edition. Crown 8vo, 4_s._ 6_d._; interleaved with writing paper, 5_s._
6_d._

=LARMOYER, M. DE, Practical French Grammar.= Crown 8vo. New Edition, in
one vol., 3_s._ 6_d._ Two Parts, 2_s._ 6_d._ each.

=LE-BRUN, L., Materials for Translating English into French.= Seventh
Edition. Post 8vo, 4_s._ 6_d._

=NUGENT, French-English and English-French Pocket Dictionary.= 24mo,
3_s._

=ROCHE, A., French Grammar.= Adopted by the Imperial Council of Public
Instruction. Crown 8vo, 3_s._

 =French Translation.= Prose and Poetry, from English Authors, for
 reading, composition, and translation. Second Edition. Foolscap 8vo,
 2_s._ 6_d._

=SIMONNÉ, Metodo para aprender a Leer Escribir y hablar el Frances,
segun el verdadero sistema de Ollendorff.= Crown 8vo, 6_s._ Key, 3_s._
6_d._

=VAN LAUN, H., Grammar of the French Language.= Crown 8vo. Accidence
and Syntax, 4_s._; Exercises, 3_s._ 6_d._

=WELLER, E., Improved Dictionary.= English-French and French-English.
Royal 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._


GERMAN.

 =AHN, F., Grammar of the German Language.= New Edition. Crown 8vo,
 3_s._ 6_d._

 =Method of Learning German.= 12mo, 3_s._ Key, 8_d._

 =Manual of German Conversation=; or, Vade Mecum for English
 Travellers. Second Edition. 12mo, 1_s._ 6_d._

=FROEMBLING, F. OTTO, Graduated German Reader.= A Selection from the
most popular writers. With a Vocabulary. Twelfth Edition. 12mo, 3_s._
6_d._

=Graduated Exercises for Translation into German.= Extracts from the
best English Authors, with Idiomatic Notes. Crown 8vo, 4_s._ 6_d._;
without Notes, 4_s._


GREEK.

 =CONTOPOULOS, N., Lexicon of Modern Greek-English and English-Modern
 Greek.= 2 vols., 8vo, 27_s._

 =Modern-Greek and English Dialogues and Correspondence.= Foolscap 8vo,
 2_s._ 6_d._

=GELDART, E. M., Guide to Modern Greek.= Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._ Key,
2_s._ 6_d._

 =Simplified Grammar of Modern Greek.= Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=PAUL, C. KEGAN=, and =STONE, E. D., Philological Introduction to Greek
and Latin for Students.= Translated and adapted from the German. Third
Edition. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

=THOMPSON, E. MAUNDE, Handbook of Greek and Latin Palæography.= Second
Edition. Revised. With numerous _fac-similes_. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ (_I. S.
S._)


GUJARATI.

 =TISDALL, Rev. W. ST. CLAIR, A Simplified Grammar of the Gujarati
 Language.= Together with a short Reading Book and Vocabulary. Crown
 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._


HEBREW.

 =BALLIN, ADA S.= and =F. L., Hebrew Grammar.= With Exercises selected
 from the Bible. Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =BICKELL, G., Outlines of Hebrew Grammar.= 8vo, cloth, 4_s._


HINDI.

 =BALLANTYNE, J. R., Elements of Hindi and Braj Bhakha Grammar.=
 Compiled for the East India College at Haileybury. Second Edition.
 Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =BATE, J. D., Hindi-English Dictionary.= Royal 8vo, cloth. 1875. £1
 11_s._ 6_d._

 =KELLOGG, S. H., Grammar of the Hindi Language.= With copious
 Philological Notes and Tables. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged.
 1893. 8vo, cloth, 18_s._


HINDUSTANI.

 =CRAVEN, T., English-Hindustani and Hindustani-English Dictionary.=
 New Edition. 18mo, 4_s._ 6_d._

 =DOWSON, J., Grammar of the Urd[=u] or Hind[=u]st[=a]n[=i] Language.=
 Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Hind[=u]st[=a]n[=i] Exercise Book.= Passages and Extracts for
 Translation into Hind[=u]st[=a]n[=i]. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=FALLON, S. W., A New English-Hindustani Dictionary.= With
Illustrations from English Literature and Colloquial English. iv. and
674 pp. royal 8vo, cloth. 1883. (Published at Rs. 22.) Reduced to £1.

  [asterism] Printed in Roman characters only.

=A New Hindustani-English Dictionary.= With Illustrations from
Hindustani Literature and Folk-lore. xxiv. ix. and 1216 pp. royal 8vo,
cloth. 1879. (Published at Rs. 52.) Reduced to £2.

  [asterism] All Hindustani words are printed in the Persian and Roman
  character; those of Hindi origin also in the Devanagari.

=PALMER, E. H., Simplified Grammar of Hindustani, Persian, and Arabic.=
Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=PHILLIPS, Col. A. N., Hindustani Idioms.= With Vocabulary and
Explanatory Notes. Crown 8vo, 5_s._


HUNGARIAN.

 =SINGER, J., Simplified Grammar of the Hungarian Language.= Crown 8vo,
 4_s._ 6_d._


IRISH.

 =STOKES, WHITLEY, Goidelica.= Old and Early-Middle Irish Glosses,
 Prose and Verse. Second Edition. Medium 8vo, 18_s._


ITALIAN.

 =AHN, F., Method of Learning Italian.= 12mo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =CAMERINI, E., L'Eco Italiano.= A Guide to Italian Conversation. With
 Vocabulary. 12mo, 4_s._ 6_d._

 =MILLHOUSE, J., English and Italian Dictionary.= 2 vols. 8vo, 12_s._

 =Manual of Italian Conversation.= 18mo, 2_s._ #/


JAPANESE.

 =BABA, TATUI, Elementary Grammar of the Japanese Language.= With easy
 Progressive Exercises. Second Edition. 5_s._

 =CHAMBERLAIN, Prof. B. H., Simplified Japanese Grammar.= Crown 8vo,
 5_s._

 =Romanised Japanese Reader.= Consisting of Japanese Anecdotes and
 Maxims, with English Translations and Notes. 12mo, 6_s._

 =Handbook of Colloquial Japanese.= Second Edition. 8vo, 12_s._ 6_d._

 =Handbook of the Japanese Language.= For Tourists and Residents. In
 the Colloquial style. 24mo, 4_s._

=HEPBURN, J. C., Japanese and English Dictionary.= Second Edition. Imp.
8vo, half roan, 18_s._

 =Japanese-English and English-Japanese Dictionary.= Third Edition.
 Royal 8vo, half morocco, 30_s._ Pocket Edition, square 16mo, 14_s._
 Index of Chinese characters in the royal 8vo. Edition, arranged
 according to their radicals by W. H. WHITNEY. 1888. Cloth, 4_s._ 6_d._

=IMBRIE, W., Handbook of English-Japanese Etymology.= Second Edition,
1889. 8vo, 6_s._

=MUTSU, H., Japanese Conversation Course.= 1894. Small 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._


KHASSI.

 =ROBERTS, H., Grammar of the Khassi Language.= Crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._


LATIN.

 =AHN, F., Latin Grammar for Beginners.= Thirteenth Edition. 12mo, 3_s._

 =IHNE, W., Latin Grammar for Beginners, on Ahn's System.= 12mo, 3_s._


MALAGASY.

 =PARKER, G. W., Concise Grammar of the Malagasy Language.= Crown 8vo,
 5_s._


NORWEGIAN.

 =SMITH, M.=, and =HORNEMAN, H., Norwegian Grammar.= With a Glossary
 for Tourists. Post 8vo, 2_s._


PALI.

 =CHILDERS, R. C., Pali-English Dictionary.= With Sanskrit Equivalents.
 Imperial 8vo, £3 3_s._

 =MÜLLER, E., Simplified Grammar of the Pali Language.= Crown 8vo,
 7_s._ 6_d._


PANJABI.

 =TISDALL, W. ST. CLAIR, Simplified Grammar and Reading Book of the
 Panjabi Language.= Crown 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._


PERSIAN.

 =FINN, A., Persian for Travellers.= Oblong 32mo, 5_s._

 =PALMER, E. H., English-Persian Dictionary.= With Simplified Grammar
 of the Persian Language. Royal 16mo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Persian-English Dictionary.= Second Edition. Royal 16mo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Simplified Grammar of Hindustani, Persian, and Arabic.= Second
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._ #/


POLISH.

 =MORFILL, W. R., Simplified Grammar of the Polish Language.= Crown
 8vo. 3_s._ 6_d._


PORTUGUESE.

 =D'ORSEY, A. J. D., Colloquial Portuguese=; or, The Words and Phrases
 of Every-day Life. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =Grammar of Portuguese and English.= Adapted to Ollendorff's System.
 Fourth Edition. 12mo, 7_s._

=VIEYRA'S Pocket Dictionary of the Portuguese and English Languages.= 2
vols. Post 8vo, 10_s._


PUSHTO (or Afghan).

 =TRUMPP, E., Grammar of the Pas't[=o]=; or, Language of the
 Afgh[=a]ns, compared with the Tr[=a]nian and North Indian Idioms.
 Cloth, 1873. 21_s._


ROMANY.

 =LELAND, C. G., English Gipsies and their Language.= New and Cheaper
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._


ROUMANIAN.

 =TORCEANU, R., Simplified Grammar of the Roumanian Language.= Crown
 8vo, 5_s._


RUSSIAN.

 =RIOLA, HENRY, How to Learn Russian.= A Manual for Students. Based
 upon the Ollendorffian System. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 12_s._ Key,
 5_s._

 =Russian Reader.= With Vocabulary. Crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ #/


SANSKRIT.

 =BALLANTYNE, J. R., First Lessons in Sanscrit Grammar.= Fifth Edition.
 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =BENFEY, THEODOR, Grammar of the Sanskrit Language.= For the use of
 Early Students. Second Edition. Royal 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =COWELL, E. B., Short Introduction to the Ordinary Prakrit of the
 Sanskrit Dramas.= Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

 =Prakrita-Prakasa, or the Prakrit Grammar of Vararuchi.= With the
 Commentary (Manorama) of Bhamaha. 8vo, 14_s._

=WHITNEY, Prof. W. D., Sanskrit Grammar.= Including both the Classical
Language and the Older Dialects of Veda and Brahmana. Second Edition.
8vo, 12_s._


SERBIAN.

 =MORFILL, W. R., Simplified Serbian Grammar.= Crown 8vo, 4_s._ 6_d._


SOMALI.

 =Somali-English Dictionary.= Post 8vo. In the Press. Orders booked.


SINHALESE.

 =MENDIS, GUNASEKARA A., A Comprehensive Grammar of the Sinhalese
 Language.= 8vo, 12_s._ 6_d._

 =Sinhalese Made Easy; or, Phrase-Book of Colloquial Sinhalese.=
 Revised and enlarged Edition. 12mo, 3_s._ 6_d._


SPANISH.

 =BEALE, ALFRED A., Excelsior English-Spanish and Spanish-English
 Dictionary.= Commercial and Technical. Foolscap 8vo, roan, 10_s._
 6_d._

 =BUTLER, F., Spanish Teacher, and Colloquial Phrase-Book.= 18mo, half
 roan, 2_s._ 6_d._

 =VELASQUEZ, M. de la CADENA, Dictionary of the Spanish and English
 Languages.= For the use of Young Learners and Travellers. Crown 8vo,
 6_s._

 =Pronouncing Dictionary of the Spanish and English Languages.= Royal
 8vo, £1 4_s._

 =New Spanish Reader.= Passages from the most approved Authors, with
 Vocabulary. Post 8vo, 6_s._

 =Introduction to Spanish Conversation.= 12mo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=VELASQUEZ and SIMONNÉ, New Method of Learning the Spanish Language.=
Adapted to Ollendorff's system. Revised and corrected by Senor VIVAR.
Post 8vo, 6_s._; Key, 4_s._


SUAHILI.

 =KRAPF, L., Dictionary of the Suahili Language.= 8vo, £1 10_s._


SWEDISH.

 =OTTE, E. C., Simplified Grammar of the Swedish Language.= Crown 8vo,
 2_s._ 6_d._


TAMIL.

 =ARDEN, A. H., A Progressive Grammar of Common Tamil.= 8vo, 5_s._

 =A Companion Reader to Arden's Progressive Tamil Grammar.= 2 vols.
 8vo, 5_s._ each. Vol. I.: Companion Exercises and Easy Stories. Vol.
 II.: The Panchatranta in Tamil. #/


TIBETAN.

 =JÄSCHKE, H. A., Tibetan Grammar.= Prepared by Dr. H. WENZELL. Second
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =Tibetan-English Dictionary.= With special reference to the prevailing
 dialects, to which is added an English-Tibetan Vocabulary. Royal 8vo,
 cloth. (Published £1 10_s._) £1 1_s._ #/


TURKISH.

 =ARNOLD, Sir EDWIN, Grammar of the Turkish Language.= With Dialogues
 and Vocabulary. Post 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

 =REDHOUSE, J. W., Simplified Grammar of the Ottoman-Turkish Language.=
 Crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Turkish Vade-Mecum of Ottoman Colloquial Language.= English-Turkish
 and Turkish-English, the whole in English Characters, the
 Pronunciation being fully indicated. Third Edition. 32mo, 6_s._ #/


VOLAPUK.

 =SPRAGUE, C. E., Handbook of Volapuk.= The International Language.
 Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 5_s._


ZULU.

 =ROBERTS, C., An English-Zulu Dictionary.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._ net.

 =The Zulu-Kafir Language.= Crown 8vo, 6_s._ net. #/


_X.--ORIENTAL._

BRITISH INDIA.

 =ALBÊRUNI'S India: The Religion, Philosophy, Literature, &c., of India
 about A.D. 1030.= Arabic Text, edited by Prof. E. SACHAU, 1887. 4to,
 £3 3_s._

 =ARNOLD, Sir EDWIN, India Revisited.= With 32 full-page Illustrations.
 Crown 8vo, 6_s._

  (_See also class_ BELLES-LETTRES.)

 _BALDWIN, Capt. J. H., Large and Small Game of Bengal and the
 North-Western Provinces of India._ With Illustrations. Second Edition.
 Small 4to, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =BALL, V., Diamonds, Coal, and Gold of India.= Foolscap 8vo. 1881.
 5_s._

 =BALLANTYNE, J. R., Sankhya Aphorisms of Kapila.= Translated and
 Edited. Third Edition. Post 8vo, 16_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

 =BARTH, A., Religions of India.= Translated by the Rev. J. WOOD. Third
 Edition. Post 8vo, 16_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

 =Bhagavad-Gita; or, The Song Celestial.= From the Sanskrit by Sir E.
 ARNOLD. Fifth Edition. 1894. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =Bhagavadgita.= With Commentary and Notes, as well as References
 to the Christian Scriptures. Translated from the Sanskrit by M.
 CHATTERJI. Second Edition. 1892. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =Bhagavad-Gita.= English translation, with a Commentary and a few
 introductory papers by HURRYCHUND CHINTAMON. 1874. x. and 83 pp. 8vo,
 6_s._

 =Bhagavad Gita; or, the Sacred Lay.= Translated, with notes, from
 the Sanskrit by J. DAVIES. Third Edition. 1893. Post 8vo, 6_s._
 (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

 =BOSE, P. NATH., A History of Hindu Civilization during British Rule.=
 Vols. I. and II. together, 15_s._ net. Vol. III., 7_s._ 6_d._ net.
 Crown 8vo. To be completed in 4 volumes.

 =BOYD, P., Nagananda=; or, the Joy of the Snake World. From the
 Sanskrit of Sri-Harsha-Deva. 1872. Crown 8vo, 4_s._ 6_d._

  _BRITISH MUSEUM CATALOGUES OF INDIAN LITERATURE._

  _Special List Sent on Application._

 =BURNELL, A. C., South Indian Palæography, from the 4th to the 17th
 Century.= Enlarged Edition, with Map and Plates. 4to, £2 12_s._ 6_d._

 =Ordinances of Manu.= Translated from the Sanskrit, with introduction.
 Completed and edited by E. W. Hopkins. 1884. Post 8vo, 12_s._
 (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=CHRISTIAN, J., Behar Proverbs.= Classified and arranged according to
subject-matter, with notes. 1890. Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ (_Trübner's
Oriental Series._)

=COTTON, H. J. S., New India=; or, India in Transition. Third Edition.
Crown 8vo, 4_s._ 6_d._

=COWELL, Prof. E. B., Short Introduction to the Ordinary Prakrit of
the Sanskrit Dramas=. 1875. Crown 8vo, 3_s._
6_d._

 =Prakrita-Prakasa; or, The Prakrit Grammar of Vararuchi.= With the
 Commentary (Manorama) of Bhamaha. 1868. 8vo, 14_s._

=COWELL= and =GOUGH, A. E., The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha=; or, Review of
the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy. 1882. Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._
(_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=CUNNINGHAM, Major-Genl. ALEX., Ancient Geography of= India. Vol. I.:
The Buddhist Period. With 13 Maps. 1870. 8vo, £1 8_s._

=DAVIES, J., S[=a]nkhya K[=a]rik[=a] of Iswara Krishna.= An Exposition
of the System of Kapila. 1881. Post 8vo, 6_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental
Series._)

=DOWSON, J., Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology and History,
Geography and Literature.= 1879. Post 8vo, 16_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental
Series._)

=DUTT, ROMESH CHUNDER, History of Civilisation in Ancient India, based
on Sanskrit Literature.= Revised Edition in 2 vols. 1894. 8vo, 21_s._

 =Lays of Ancient India.= Selections from Indian Poetry rendered into
 English verse. 1894. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

=DUTT, TORU, Ancient Ballads and Legends of Hindustan.= With an
Introductory Memoir by EDMUND GOSSE. 18mo, cloth extra, gilt top, 5_s._

=EDGREN, H., Compendious Sanskrit Grammar.= With a brief sketch of
scenic Prakrit. Crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ (Forms a volume of _Trübner's
Collection of Simplified Grammars_.)

=ELLIOT, Sir H. M., History of India, as told by its own Historians.=
The Muhammadan Period. Revised and continued by Professor JOHN DOWSON.
8vols. 1871-77. 8vo, £8 8_s._

 =History, Folk-lore, and Distribution of the Races of the
 North-Western Provinces of India.= Edited by J. BEAMES. With three
 coloured Maps. 2 vols. 1869. 8vo, £1 16_s._

=FERGUSSON, J., Archæology in India.= vii. and 115 pp. text, with
numerous Cuts. 1884. 8vo, 5_s._

=FERGUSSON, J.=, and =BURGESS, J., The Cave Temples of India.= 536 pp.
text, with one hundred Plates. 1880. 4to, half calf (Pub. at £2 2_s._)
£1 11_s._ 6_d._

=GOUGH, A. E., Philosophy of the Upanishads.= 1882. Post 8vo, 9_s._
(_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=GOVER, C. E., Folk Songs of Southern India.= Containing Canarese,
Badaga, Coorg, Tamil, Malayalam, and Telugu Songs. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=GRAY, J., Ancient Proverbs and Maxims from Burmese Sources=; or,
The Niti Literature of Burmah. Post 8vo, 6_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental
Series._)

=GRIFFIN, Sir LEPEL, The Rajas of the Punjab.= History of the principal
States in the Punjab, and their political relations with the British
Government. 1870. Royal 8vo, 21_s._

=HAIG, Maj.-Gen., The Indus Delta Country.= With 3 Maps. 1895. Royal
8vo, 5_s._ net.

=HAUG, M., Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the
Parsis.= Third Edition. Edited and enlarged by E. W. WEST. 1884. Post
8vo, 16_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=HODGSON, B. H., Essays on the Languages, Literature, and Religion of
Nepal and Tibet.= 1874. 8vo, 14_s._

 =Miscellaneous Essays relating to Indian Subjects.= 2 vols. 1880. Post
 8vo, 28_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=HUNTER, Sir W. W., Imperial Gazetteer of India.= Second Edition,
enlarged and revised. 14 vols. 1885-87. 8vo, half calf. (Pub. at £3
3_s._) £2 2_s._

=Imperial Series of the Reports of the Archæological Survey of India.=
_List Sent on Application._

=JACOB, G. A., Manual of Hindu Pantheism.= The Vedântasâra. Translated,
with Annotations, &c. Third Edition. 1891. Post 8vo, 6_s._ (_Trübner's
Oriental Series._)

=JOHNSON, S., Oriental Religions, and their Relation to Universal
Religion: India.= 2 vols. 1879. 402 and 408 pp. 8vo, £1 1_s._
(_Trübner's Philosophical Library._)

=KNOWLES, J. H., Folk Tales of Kashmir.= 1888. Post 8vo, 16_s._
(_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=Koran.= Selections from it, with a commentary. Translated by E. W.
LANE. New Revised Edition, with Introduction by S. LANE-POOLE. 1879.
Post 8vo, 9_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=Mahabharata.= Translated literally from the original Sanskrit text
into English prose by M. N. DUTT, M.A. To be complete in 30 parts, of
which the first three are out. Subscription price to the whole work, £1
5_s._

=Mahabharata.= Translated into English prose by the late PROTAP CHUNDRA
R[=O]Y. Price of the whole work, bound in 10 vols. 8vo, £10 10_s._

=MAISEY, Gen. F. C., Sanchi and its Remains.= With Introductory Note by
the late Maj.-Gen. Sir ALEX. CUNNINGHAM. With 40 plates. 1892. Royal
4to, £2 10_s._

=Manava-Dharma-Castra, the Code of Manu.= Original Sanskrit text.
Edited, with critical Notes, by JULIUS JOLLY. 1887. Post 8vo, 10_s_.
6_d_. (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=MASON, F., Burma, its People, and Productions.= Being Notes on the
Fauna, Flora, and Minerals of Tenasserim, Pegu, and Burma. New Edition,
re-written and enlarged by W. THEOBALD. 2 vols. 1884. 4to. (Pub. at £3
3_s._) £1 11_s._ 6_d._

=MUIR, J., Original Sanskrit Texts, on the Origin and History of
the People of India, their Religion and Institutions.= Collected,
Translated, and Illustrated by JOHN MUIR. 5 vols. 8vo. Price of a
complete set, £5 5_s._ Sold only in sets.

=MÜLLER, MAX, Sacred Hymns of the Bramins=, as preserved in the
Rig-Veda-Sanhita. Translated from the Sanskrit. Vol. I.: Hymns to the
Maruts, or the Storm-Gods. 1869. 8vo, 12_s._ 6_d._

 =Hymns of the Rig-Veda.= In the Sanhita and Pada texts. Reprinted from
 the Edition Princeps. 2 vols. Second Edition. 1877. 8vo. (Pub. at £1
 12_s._) 16_s._

=Naradiya Dharma-Sastra=; or, The Institutes of Narada. Translated from
the Sanskrit by JULIUS JOLLY. 1876. Crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=PICKFORD, J., Maha-vira-Charita=; or, The Adventures of the Great Hero
Rama. From the Sanskrit of Bhavabhüti. 1871. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=ROUTLEDGE, J., English Rule and Native Opinion in India.= From notes
taken in 1870-74. 1878. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=SCOTT, J. G., Burma as it Was, as it Is, and as it Will Be.= Cheap
Edition. 1886. Crown 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=STRACHEY, Sir J., India., with map.= New Edition. 1894. Crown 8vo,
6_s._

=WATT, G., A Dictionary of the Economic Products of India.= 6 volumes,
bound in 9. 1889-1893. Royal 8vo, half calf, £3 3_s._

=WEBER, A., History of Indian Literature.= Translated from the German.
Third Edition. 1890. Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ (_Trübner's Oriental
Series._)

=WHEELER, J. TALBOYS, History of India.= From the Earliest Ages down to
the time of the Mughul Empire. 5 vols. 1867-1881. 8vo, £6 6_s._ net. Or
separate, except vol. I.

 =Early Records of British India.= A History of the English Settlements
 in India. 1878. Royal 8vo, 15_s._

=WILLIAMS, Sir M. MONIER, Modern India and the Indians.= Fifth Edition.
Post 8vo, 14_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=WILSON, H. H., Complete Works.= 12 vols., bound in 13. 1862-77. 8vo,
£10 10_s._ net.

 =Rig-Veda-Sanhita.= A Collection of Ancient Hindu Hymns. From the
 Sanskrit. Edited by E. B. COWELL and W. F. WEBSTER, 6 vols. 1854-1888.
 8vo, £6 6_s._ net.

 =The Megha-Duta (Cloud Messenger).= Translated into English verse with
 the Sanskrit text of Kalidasa. Third Edition. 1867. 4to, 10_s._ 6_d._


CENTRAL AND WESTERN ASIA.

 =BRETSCHNEIDER, E., Mediæval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources.=
 Fragments towards the Knowledge of the Geography and History of
 Central and Western Asia, from the 13th to the 17th Century. 2 vols.
 With two Maps. 1888. Post 8vo, 21_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

 =Papers Relating to Indo-China.= Reprinted from Dalrymple's "Oriental
 Repertory," "Asiatic Researches," and the "Journal" of the Asiatic
 Society of Bengal. 2 vols. 1886. Post 8vo, 21_s._

 =----Second Series.= Edited by the late R. ROST. With Plates, and a
 Map. 2 vols. 1887. 25_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

 =RALSTON, W. R. S., Tibetan Tales.= Derived from Indian sources. Done
 into English from the German of F. ANTON VON SCHIEFNER. 1882. Post
 8vo, 14_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)


CHINA.

 =ALEXANDER, Maj.-Gen. G. G., Confucius, the Great Teacher.= Crown 8vo,
 6_s._

 =Lao-tsze, the Great Thinker.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=ALLEN, C. F. ROMILLY, Book of Chinese Poetry.= Being the Collection
of Ballads, Sagas, Hymns, and other Pieces known as the Shih Ching,
metrically translated. 8vo, 16_s._

=BALFOUR, F. H., Leaves from my Chinese Scrap-Book.= Post 8vo, 7_s._
6_d._

=DENNYS, N. B., Folk-Lore of China, and its Affinities with that of the
Aryan and Semitic Races.= 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=DOUGLAS, Prof. R. K., Catalogue of Chinese Printed Books, Manuscripts,
and Drawings in the Library of the British Museum.= 4to, 20_s._

 =Chinese Language and Literature.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =Life of Jenghiz Khan.= Translated from the Chinese. Crown 8vo, 5_s._

=EDKINS, J., D.D., Religion in China.= Containing a Brief Account of
the Three Religions of the Chinese. Third Edition. Post 8vo, 7_s._
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=FABER, E., The Mind of Mencius=; or, Political Economy Founded upon
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Philosopher Mencius. Translated from the German, with Additional Notes,
by A. B. HUTCHINSON. Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ (_Trübner's Oriental
Series._)

=FERGUSSON, T., Chinese Researches, Chinese Chronology and Cycles.=
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=HAHN, T., Tsuni-Goam, the Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi.= Post 8vo,
7_s._ 6_d._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

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  Vol.   I.--=Life and Teachings of Confucius.= Sixth Edition.
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EGYPT AND ASSYRIA.

=BRITISH MUSEUM PUBLICATIONS:=

 =TYLOR, J. J., Wall Drawings and Monuments of El Kab.= Part I.:
 Paheri. 18 Plates. With Notes by SOMERS CLARKE. £2 2_s._ [Other Parts
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 =BUDGE, E. A. WALLIS, Book of the Dead.= The Papyrus of Ani, in the
 British Museum. With Translation and Transliteration. 4to, half
 morocco, £1 10_s._

 =Archaic Classics, Assyrian Texts.= Being Extracts from the Annals of
 Shalmaneser II., Sennacherib, and Assur-Bani-Pal, with Philological
 Notes. Small 4to, 7_s._ 6_d._

 =History of Esarhaddon= (Son of Sennacherib), King of Assyria, B.C.
 681-668. Translated from the Cuneiform Inscriptions in the British
 Museum. Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=Inscriptions in the Hieratic and Demotic Character.= Folio, £1 7_s._
6_d._

=Egyptian Texts of the Earliest Period.= From the coffin of Amamu. 32
Coloured Plates. Folio, £2 2_s._

=Fac-simile of an Egyptian Hieratic Papyrus of the Reign of Rameses
III.=, now in the British Museum. Folio, £3.

=Photographs of the Papyrus of Nebseni=, in the British Museum.
Unmounted, £2 2_s._ Or, Mounted and in portfolio, on special terms.

=EGYPT EXPLORATION FUND:=

  =MEMOIRS.=

  Vol.   I.--=The Store City of Pithom, and the Route of the Exodus.=
  By E. NAVILLE. Third Edition. 1887. Out of print.

   "    II.--=Tanis.= Part I., by W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE. Second
  Edition. 1888. £1 5_s._

   "   III.--=Naukratis.= Part I. By W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE. Third
  Edition. 1888. £1 5_s._

   "    IV.--=Goshen, and the Shrine of Saft-el-Henneh.= By E.
  NAVILLE. Second Edition. 1888. £1 5_s._

   "     V.--=Tanis.= Part II. Including Tell Defenneh, and Tell
  Nebesheh. By W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE, etc. 1888.
  £1 5_s._

   "    VI.--=Naukratis.= Part II. By E. A. GARDNER and F. L.
  GRIFFITH. 1889. £1 5_s._

   "   VII.--=The City of Divas, and the Mound of the Jew.= By E.
  NAVILLE and F. L. GRIFFITH. 1890. £1 5_s._

   "  VIII.--=Bubastis.= By E. NAVILLE. 1891. £1 5_s._

   "    IX.--=Two Hieroglyphic Papyri from Tanis.= 1891. 5_s._
              I. The Sign Papyrus. By F. L. GRIFFITH.
             II. The Geographical Papyrus. By W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.

   "     X.--=The Festival Hall of Osorkon II.= (Bubastis). By E.
  NAVILLE. 1892. £1 5_s._

   "   XI.--=Ahnas el Medineh.= By E. Naville. And =The Tomb
  of Paheri at El Kab.= By J. J. TYLOR and F. L.
  GRIFFITH. 1894. £1 5_s._

   "  XII.--=Deir el Bahari.= Introductory Volume. By E. NAVILLE.
  1894. £1 5_s._

   " XIII.--=Temple of Deir el Bahari.= By E. NAVILLE. Part I.
  1896. £1 10_s._

 =Atlas of Ancient Egypt.= Second Edition. Revised. Small 4to, 3_s._
 6_d._

=LE PLONGEON, AUGUSTUS, Queen Moo and the Sphinx.= Royal 8vo, £1 10_s._
net.

=MARIETTE, ALPHONSE, The Monuments of Upper Egypt.= Crown 8vo, 7_s._
6_d._

=PATON, A. A., History of the Egyptian Revolution.= From the Period of
the Mamelukes to the death of Mohammed Ali. Second Edition. 2 vols.
8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._

  =PUBLICATIONS OF THE ARCHÆOLOGICAL SURVEY
  OF EGYPT:=

 FIRST MEMOIR.--=Beni Hasan.= Part I. By P. E. NEWBERRY. 1890-91. £1
 5_s._

 SECOND MEMOIR.--=Beni Hasan.= Part II. By P. E. NEWBERRY and G. W.
 FRASER. 1891-92. £1 5_s._

 THIRD MEMOIR.--=El Bersheh.= Part I. By P. E. NEWBERRY. 1892-93. £1
 5_s._

 FOURTH MEMOIR.--=El Bersheh.= Part II. By F. L. GRIFFITH and P. E.
 NEWBERRY. 1893-94. £1 5_s._

 FIFTH MEMOIR.--=Beni Hasan.= Part III. By F. L. GRIFFITH. £1 5_s._

=SANDWITH, F. M., Egypt as a Winter Resort.= Crown 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._


ISLAM.

 =BLUNT, W. S., The Future of Islam.= Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =BROWN, J. P., The Dervishes.= With Illustrations. 1868. Crown 8vo,
 14_s._

 =BUNSEN, ERNEST DE, Islam, or True Christianity.= Crown 8vo, 5_s._

 =HUNTER, Sir W. W., The Indian Musalmans.= Third Edition. 1876. 8vo,
 10_s._ 6_d._

 =LANE, E. W., Selections from the Koran.= New Edition. With
 Introduction by STANLEY LANE-POOLE. Post 8vo, 9_s._ (_Trübner's
 Oriental Series._)

 =REDHOUSE, J. W., History, System, and Varieties of Turkish Poetry.=
 Illustrated by Specimens in the Original English Paraphrase. 8vo,
 2_s._ 6_d._

 =The Mesnevi.= Usually known as the Mesnev[=i]yi Sher[=i]f, or Holy
 Mesnev[=i] of Mevl[=a]n[=a] (Our Lord), Jel[=a]lu'd-Din Muhammed
 Er-R[=u]m[=i]. Illustrated by a Selection of Characteristic Anecdotes.
 Translated by J. W. REDHOUSE. Post 8vo, £1 1_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental
 Series._)

 =Tentative Chronological Synopsis of the History of Arabia and its
 Neighbours, from B.C. 500,000 (?) to A.D. 679.= 8vo, paper, 1_s._

=SELL, Rev. EDWARD, The Faith of Islam.= Second Edition, Revised. Post
8vo, 12_s._ 6_d._ (_Trübner's Oriental Library._)

=WHERRY, A Comprehensive Commentary to the Quran.= To which is Prefixed
Sale's Preliminary Discourse, with additional Notes and Emendations.
Together with a Complete Index to the Text, Preliminary Discourse, and
Notes. Vols. I., II., and III., 12_s._ 6_d._ each. Vol. IV., 10_s._
6_d._

=WRIGHT, W., Book of Kalilah and Dimnah.= Translated from Arabic into
Syriac, with Preface and Glossary in English. 8vo, 21_s._


JAPAN.

 =CHAMBERLAIN, BASIL, Classical Poetry of the Japanese.= Post 8vo,
 7_s._ 6_d._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

 =Things Japanese.= Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 8_s._ 6_d._

=Chushingura, or the Loyal Retainers of Akao.= Translated by JUKICHI
INOUYE, with numerous Illustrations by EISEN TOMIOKA. 8vo, 3_s._ 6_d._

=GOWER, Lord RONALD, Notes of a Tour from Brindisi to Yokohama,
1883-84.= Foolscap 8vo, 2_s._ 6_d._

=GRIFFIS, W. E., The Mikado's Empire.= Book I.--History of Japan from
B.C. 660 to A.D. 1872. Book II.--Personal Experiences, Observations,
and Studies in Japan, 1870-74. Second Edition. Illustrated. 8vo, 20_s._

=History of the Empire of Japan.= Compiled and Translated under
the direction of the Department of Education, Tokyo. With numerous
Illustrations, of which some are in Colours and Collotype, and a Map.
vi. and 428 pp. of text. 1893. 8vo, boards, 12_s._ 6_d._

  [asterism] The Illustrations are printed on Japanese paper.

=Nihongi; or, Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to A.D. 697.=
Translated from the original Chinese and Japanese, by W. G. ASTON. Vol.
I. 1896. 8vo. Price, complete in 2 vols., 21_s._

=SALWAY, CHARLOTTE M., Fans of Japan.= With 10 full-page Coloured
Plates, and 39 Blocks in Text. Royal 4to, 31_s._ 6_d._ net.

=TAYUI, R., The Commercial Guide and Trade Directory of Japan.= Royal
8vo, cloth, £1 1_s._

=WENCKSTERN, F. von, Bibliography of the Japanese Empire.= Being a
Classified List of all Books, Essays, and Maps in European Languages,
relating to Dai Nihon, published in Europe, America, and the East,
from 1859-93, to which is added a _fac-simile_ reprint of Léon Pagès'
_Bibliographie japonaise depuis le XV^e. siècle jusqu'à 1859_. 1895.
Large 8vo, £1 5_s._ net.


ORIENTAL BUDDHISM.

 =BEAL, S., The Romantic Legend of Sakya Buddha.= From the Chinese
 Sanskrit. 1875. Crown 8vo, 12_s._

 =Life of Hiuen-Tsiang.= By the Shamans HWUI LI and YEN-TSUNG, with an
 Account of the Works of I-TSING. Post 8vo, 10_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental
 Series._)

 =Dhammapada.=--Texts from the Buddhist Canon, commonly known as
 Dhammapada. Translated from the Chinese. Post 8vo, 7_s._ 6_d._
 (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

 =Catena of Buddhist Scriptures.= From the Chinese. 8vo, 15_s._

 =Si-Yu-Ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World.= Translated from
 the Chinese of HIUEN TSIANG (A.D. 629). With Maps. 2 vols. Post 8vo,
 24_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=BIKSHU, SUBHADRA, Buddhist Catechism.= 12mo, 2_s._

=EDKINS, J., D.D., Chinese Buddhism.= Sketches Historical and Critical.
Post 8vo, 18_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=EITEL, E. J., Chinese Buddhism.= Handbook for the Student of. Second
Edition. Crown 8vo, 18_s._

=FAUSBOLL, V., The Jataka.= Together with its Commentary, being tales
of the anterior birth of Gotama Buddha. Now first published in Pali.
Vols. I.-VI. 8vo, 28_s._ each.

=JENNINGS, H., The Indian Religions=; or, Results of the Mysterious
Buddhism. 1890. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

=KISTNER, O., Buddha and his Doctrines.= A Bibliographical Essay. 4to,
2_s._ 6_d._

=LILLIE, A., Popular Life of Buddha.= Containing an answer to the
Hibbert Lectures of 1881. With Illustrations. 1883. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =Buddhism in Christendom=; or, Jesus the Essene. With Illustrations.
 1887. 8vo, 15_s._

=RHYS-DAVIDS, T. W., Buddhist Birth-Stories=; or, Jataka
Tales. The Oldest Collection of Folk-Lore extant. Being the
J[=a]takatthavannan[=a], translated from the Pali Text of V. FAUSBOLL.
Vol. I. Post 8vo, 18_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=ROCKHILL, W. W., Life of the Buddha and the Early History of
his Order.= Derived from Tibetan works in the Bkah-Hgyur and the
Bstan-Hgyur. 1884. Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

 =Udanavarga.= A collection of Verses from the Buddhist Canon. Compiled
 by DHARMATRÂTA, and translated from the Tibetan. 1883. Post 8vo, 9_s._
 (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=SWAMY, Sir M. C., Sutta Nipata=; or, Dialogues and Discourses of
Gotama Buddha. Translated from the Original Pali. Crown 8vo, 6_s._

 =The Dathavansa=; or, the History of the Tooth Relic of Gotama
 Buddha., Pali Text with Translation. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ English
 Translation only, 6_s._

  (_See also under_ CHINA.)


PERSIAN.

 =HAFIZ, The Divan.= By KHWAJA SHAMSU-D-DIN MUHAMMAD-I-HAFIZ-I-SHIRAZI.
 Translated into English Prose, with Remarks, etc., by Lieut.-Col. H.
 WILBERFORCE CLARKE. Vols. I. and II. 1891. 4to, cloth, £2 12_s._ 6_d._
 Vol. III., 4to, cloth, £1 11_s._

 =HAFIZ, of Shiraz, Selections from His Poems.= Translated from the
 Persian by H. BICKNELL. 1875. 4to, cloth, £2 2_s._

 =JOHNSON, S., Oriental Religions and their Relation to Universal
 Religion.= Persia. 8vo, 18_s._

 =OMAR KHAYYAM, The Quatrains.= Persian Text with an English Verse
 Translation by E. H. WHINFIELD. 1883. Post 8vo, cloth, 10_s._ 6_d._
 (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

 =The Quatrains.= New Translation into English Verse by E. H.
 WHINFIELD. 1881. Post 8vo, cloth, 5_s._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=RIEU, C., Catalogue of Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum.= 3
vols. 1879-83. 4to, cloth, 25_s._ each volume.

=SA'D UD DIN MAHMUD SHABISTARI. Gulshan i Raz (the Mystic Rose
Garden).= Persian Text with an English Translation, Notes, and a
Commentary, by E. H. WHINFIELD. 1880. 4to, cloth, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =The Gulistan, or Rose Garden of Shekh Mushliu'd-Din Sadi of Shiraz.=
 Translated from the Atish Kadah, by E. B. EASTWICK. Second Edition.
 Post 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._ (_Trübner's Oriental Series._)

=Vazir of Lankuran.= A Persian Play, with a Grammatical Introduction,
Translation, Notes, and Vocabulary, by W. H. HAGGARD and G. LE STRANGE.
Crown 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._


_XI.--BIBLIOGRAPHY, PERIODICALS, AND PUBLICATIONS OF SOCIETIES._


BIBLIOGRAPHY.

 =ALLIBONE, S. A., Dictionary of English Literature and British and
 American Authors.= From the Earliest Accounts to the Latter Half of
 the 19th Century. 3 vols. Royal 8vo, £5 8_s._ SUPPLEMENT, 1891, 2
 vols. royal 8vo, £3 3_s._

 =Bibliographica--3 Volumes.= Containing the 12 parts. Bound in half
 morocco (Roxburgh style). Large Imperial 8vo, £2 2_s._ net. each.

 =British Museum Publications.= List on application.

 =DUFF, E. GORDON, Early Printed Books.= With Frontispiece and Ten
 Plates. Post 8vo, 6_s._ net. (_Books about Books._)

 =ELTON, CHARLES and MARY, The Great Book Collectors.= With 10
 Illustrations. Post 8vo, 6_s._ net. (_Books about Books._)

 =FLETCHER, W. YOUNGER, English Bookbindings in the British Museum.=
 With 66 plates. Printed in _fac-simile_ by W. GRIGGS. Folio, limited
 to 500 copies, £3 3_s._ net.

 =HARDY, W. J., Book Plates.= With Frontispiece and 36 Illustrations of
 Book Plates. Post 8vo, 6_s._ net. (_Books about Books._)

 =HORNE, H. P., The Binding of Books.= With 12 Plates. Post 8vo, 6_s._
 net. (_Books about Books._)

 =IBRAHIM, HIMLY, Prince, The Literature of Egypt and the Soudan.=
 A Bibliography, comprising Printed Books, Periodical Writings,
 and Papers of Learned Societies, Maps and Charts, Ancient Papyri
 Manuscripts, Drawings, etc. 2 vols. Demy 4to, £3 3_s._

 =Japan, Bibliography of.= (_See_ ORIENTAL.)

 =MADAN, FALCONER, Books in Manuscript.= With 8 Plates. Post 8vo, 6_s._
 net. (_Books about Books._)

 =POLLARD, A. W., Early Illustrated Books.= With Plates. Post 8vo,
 6_s._ net. (_Books about Books._)

 =POOLE, W. F., Index to Periodical Literature.= Revised Edition. Royal
 8vo, £3 13_s._ 6_d._ net. FIRST SUPPLEMENT, 1882 to 1887. Royal 8vo,
 £2 net. SECOND SUPPLEMENT, 1887 to 1892. Royal 8vo, £2 net.

 =SLATER, J. H., Early Editions.= A Bibliographical Survey of the Works
 of some Popular Authors. 8vo, 21_s._ net. Interleaved with Writing
 Paper, 26_s._ net.

 =SWINBURNE, Bibliography of Algernon Charles Swinburne from 1857 to
 1887.= Crown 8vo, vellum, gilt, 6_s._

 =THACKERAY, Bibliography of.= Sultan Stork, and other Stories and
 Sketches, 1829-44, now first collected. To which is added the
 Bibliography of Thackeray. Large 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._

 =THOMPSON, Sir E. MAUNDE, English Illuminated Manuscripts.= With 21
 Plates in Chromo-Lithography. Imperial 8vo, 18_s._ net.

 =TRÜBNER'S Bibliographical Guide to American Literature from 1817 to
 1887.= 8vo, half bound, 18_s._

 =Catalogue of Dictionaries and Grammars of the Principal Languages and
 Dialects of the World.= Second Edition. 8vo, 5_s._ #/


PERIODICALS AND SOCIETIES.

 =Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Journal of.=
 Quarterly. 5_s._

 =Antiquarian Magazine and Bibliographer, The.= Edited by EDWARD
 WALFORD and G. W. REDWAY. Complete in 12 vols. 8vo, £3 net.

 =Asiatic Society of Bengal, Journal.= 8vo, 3_s._ per number.
 Proceedings, 1_s._ per number.

 =Asiatic Society, Royal.= Bombay Branch. Journal. Irregular.

 =Asiatic Society, Royal.= Ceylon Branch. Journal. Irregular.

 =Asiatic Society, Royal.= China Branch. Journal. Irregular.

 =Asiatic Society, Royal.= Straits Branch. Journal. Irregular.

 =Asiatic Society.= Japan Branch. Transactions. Irregular.

 =Bibliotheca Sacra.= Quarterly, 3_s._ 6_d._ Annual Subscription, 14_s._

 =British Chess Magazine.= Monthly, 9_d._

 =Calcutta Review.= Quarterly, 6_s._

 =Imperial Institute Year Book.= 10_s._ net.

 =Index Medicus.= A Monthly Classified Record of the Current Medical
 Literature of the World. Annual Subscription, 50_s._

 =Indian Antiquary.= A Journal of Oriental Research in Archæology,
 History, Literature, Languages, Philosophy, Religion, Folk-lore, etc.
 Annual Subscription, £1 16_s._

 =Indian Evangelical Review.= Annual Subscription, 10_s._

 =Psychical Research Society, Proceedings.= Irregular.

 =Sanitarian.= Devoted to the Preservation of Health, Mental and
 Physical Culture. Monthly. Annual Subscription, 18_s._

 =Science.= Weekly. Annual Subscription, £1 2_s._

 =Scientific American.= Weekly. Annual Subscription, 18_s._

 =Scientific American, Export Edition.= Monthly. Annual Subscription,
 £1 5_s._

 =Scientific American, Building Edition.= Monthly. Annual Subscription,
 14_s._.

 --------=Supplement.= Weekly. Annual Subscription, £1 5_s._

 =Tropical Agriculturist.= Monthly. Annual Subscription, £1 6_s._

 =Parents' Review.= Monthly, 6_d._

       *       *       *       *       *

 =Messrs. KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER & CO., Ltd, are also Publishers
 to the following Societies, etc., lists of publications of which may
 be had on application:=

  =The Chaucer Society.=
  =The Early English Text Society.=
  =The New Shakspere Society.=
  =The Wagner Society.=
  =The British Museum.=
  =The Geological Survey of India.=
  =The India Office.=
  =The Egypt Exploration Fund.=

Plymouth: W. BRENDON and SON, Printers

       *       *       *       *       *

  Transcriber's Note

  Obvious typographical errors have been corrected, but inconsistencies
  of spelling, hyphenation and accent have been retained.

  The table of contents confuses Translator's Preface and Prefatory
  Essay by the Translator, omitting the second of these. This has been
  corrected.

  Italics are represented thus, _italics_ and bold thus, =bold=.

  The list of publications contains a number of asterisms shown as
  [asterism] and several macron accented vowels shown as, for example
  [=a].

  The page reference in the book catalogue index to Theosophy has been
  corrected.